Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 6 [1 ed.] 9789004324602, 9789004324596

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Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 6

Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment International Series Advisors Guobin Yang (University of Pennsylvania) David Sonnenfeld (State University of New York)

VOLUME 6

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/cren

Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 6 Editor

LIU Jianqiang

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is the result of a co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were selected and translated into English from the original 《中国环境发展报告(2014)   》(Zhongguo huanjing fazhan baogao 2014) with the financial support of the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Liu Jianqiang (Journalist), editor. Title: Chinese research perspectives on the environment, Volume 6 / editor LIU Jianqiang. Other titles: Zhongguo huan jing fa zhan bao gao. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2016. | Includes indexes. | This volume of the Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment series is a translation of selections from the 2014 or the 9th edition of the Annual Report on Environment Development of China. Identifiers: LCCN 2016032365 (print) | LCCN 2016038419 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004324596 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004324602 (E-book) Subjects: LCSH: Environmental policy—China. | China—Environmental conditions. Classification: LCC GE190.C6 C455 2016 (print) | LCC GE190.C6 (ebook) | DDC 333.70951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016032365

issn 2212-7496 isbn 978-90-04-32459-6 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-32460-2 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgements vii List of Figures and Tables viiI List of Contributors xi Introduction: On Environmental and Ecosystem Protection: What Have We Done? 1 LI Dun 1 Competition for Water Resources and Its Economic and Political Implications 35 GUO Weiqing and ZHOU Yu 2 Initial Exploration of Environmental NGOs’ Involvement in Environmental Mass Incidents 56 LI Bo 3 Correlation between Water Pollution and Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors in the Huai River Basin 74 YANG Gonghuan 4 The Urgent Need for an Environment and Health Law: A Study of 63 Health Hazard Incidents 88 LV Zhongmei and HUANG Kai 5 Environmental and Health Risks: Unusual Expansion of Waste Incineration in China Needs Attention 107 YANG Changjiang 6 War on Smog 119 LIU Xiaoxing 7 Smog Brings Widespread and Far-Reaching Impact to Human Health 133 LIN Na 8 Environmental PILs Returned to the Starting Point in 2013 139 LIN Yanmei and WANG Xiaoxi

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CONTENTS

The Revision of China’s Environmental Protection Law from a Minor Change to a Critical Improvement 163 QIE Jianrong

10 Ecological Red Lines: Concept, Features and Supervision 172 ZOU Changxin 11

How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population at Changbai Mountain 180 PIAO Zhengji

12 The Siege of Cities by Chemical Plants: How to Make a Breakthrough? 194 PENG Liguo 13 The 2012 Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) Fourth Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 113 Chinese Cities: Bottlenecks & Breakthroughs 202 Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) 14 The “Last” Report on China’s Rivers 225 LI Bo, YAO Songqiao, YU Yin and GUO Qiaoyu 15 Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information on 122 Municipal Solid Waste Incineration Plants across China 236 Wuhu Ecology Center 16 Annual Indexes of the Environment Green Papers 2013—Changing Trends of the Environment in China 256 17 Major Environmental Incidents and Events in 2013 272 Index 285

Acknowledgements The current edition of The China Environment Yearbook is a collection of articles selected from The China Environment Yearbook published in Chinese in 2014. The translation of the edition could not have been accomplished without the efforts of a team of devoted volunteers. Some of them have participated in the translation project since the first of the series was published in 2005. We are indebted to Zhou Yong who translated the long and informative General Report and several other chapters and Cai Jindong who translated the Annual Indexes with numerous tables and figures with good technical skills and excellent English. We are grateful to all the other volunteers who translated the remaining chapters. While most of them have participated in the translation project for the previous China Environment Yearbooks, some new volunteers have joined the group this year. They are engaged in different professions, but their working language is English. They completed the translation with excellence. Their deep dedication to Friends of Nature and environmental protection is truly admirable. They are Chen Juebin, Cheng Minghui, Cui Lingling, Deng Xiaowen, Gao Xiuping, Guan Hui, Huo Siliang, Li Zhaohui, Wan Feng, Wang Qiang and Zhao Fang. Wang Lili and Douglas Red did proofreading. Friends of Nature

List of Figures and Tables Figures 3.1 Diagram of correlation between environmental pollution and prevalence of tumors 77 3.2 Water quality of different regions: 1997–2009 80 3.3 Frequency of water pollution: 1997–2009 83 3.4 Standardized death rate from liver cancer among men: 1973–1975 84 3.5 Standardized death rate from liver cancer among men: 2004–2006 85 3.6 Standardized variation rate of death from liver cancer: 1973–2006 86 4.1 Lead and cadmium pollution incidents: 2004–2013 90 4.2 Spatial distribution of lead and cadmium pollution incidents 91 4.3 Distribution of lead and cadmium pollution incidents 92 4.4 Sources of lead and cadmium pollution 93 5.1 The trend of the proportion of garbage incinerated in China 115 11.1 Changes on the number of ungulates in the CNR 185 11.2 Population changes in Erdaobai River town next to the CNR 187 11.3 Changbai Mountain biotic region map 188 11.4 Number of Changbai Mountain tourists 1980–2010 189 11.5 The CNR and surrounding area population distribution and land usage 190 13.1 PITI annual average score comparison 207 13.2 Four-year average score comparison among the eastern, central, and western regions 208 13.3 Annual comparison of daily supervision information average scores 209 13.4 Chinese internet users 217 13.5 Platform for automatic monitoring of key pollution sources 219 13.6 Key pollution source map for 2011 221 16.1 Comparison of China’s 10 largest river basins in 2012 by categories of water quality 257 16.2 Water quality of state-level monitored lakes and reservoirs, 2004–2012 259 16.3 Offshore seawater qualities in 2012 262 16.4 Generation and discharge of industrial solid waste nationwide during 2004–2012 265 16.5 Urban air quality, 2004–2012 267

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

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16.6 Acid rain frequencies nationwide, 2006–2012 268 16.7 Urban acoustic environments nationwide, 2007–2012 271 Tables 2.1 Major stakeholders in the Anning refinery project and their action strategies 66 2.2 Action outputs and outcomes of Anning refinery project 67 4.1 Lead and cadmium pollution incidents by province 90 4.2 Causes of lead and cadmium pollution 93 4.3 Types of pollution for lead and cadmium pollution incidents 94 4.4 Lead and cadmium pollution incidents: accumulative or acute 94 8.1 The number of environmental PILs accepted by courts in different areas of China from 2007 to 2013 141 8.2 Environmental PILs filed by relevant organizations and not accepted by the court 150 11.1 Result of the Siberian tigers survey in CNR and its surrounding area 182 11.2 Location, number, time, and cause of death for Siberian tigers killed by hunting 183 13.1 2012 PITI final results and rankings for 113 cities 204 13.2 Scores of the top 10 cities in 2012 PITI 206 13.3 Scores of the last 10 cities in 2012 PITI 206 13.4 Breakdown of recommendations for comprehensive pollution source information disclosure 212 15.1 Monitoring data concerning 42 MSW incineration plants 238 15.2 China and EU’s standards for pollution control on MSW incineration 244 15.3 Dioxin monitor data of 10 MSW incineration plants 245 15.4 Smoke monitoring data of 40 MSW incineration plants 247 15.5 Hg monitor data of 8 MSW incineration plants 253 16.1 Emission of major pollutants in exhaust gas nationwide in 2012 256 16.2 Comparison of China’s 10 largest river basins in 2012 by categories of water quality 257 16.3 Water quality of major lakes and reservoirs in 2012 258 16.4 Water quality of state-level monitored lakes and reservoirs, 2004–2012 259 16.5 Discharge of major pollutants in wastewater nationwide in 2012 261

x 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 16.10 16.11 16.12 16.13 16.14 16.15

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Offshore seawater quality in 2012 262 Total discharge of pollutants from seagoing rivers into the four largest seas in 2012 (in tons) 263 Discharge of pollutants directly into the seas in 2012 264 Pollutants discharged directly into the four largest sea areas in 2012 264 Generation and utilization of industrial solid waste nationwide in 2012 (in million t) 264 Generation and discharge of industrial solid waste nationwide during 2004–2012 (in million t) 265 Urban air quality, 2004–2012 266 Acid rain frequency nationwide, 2006–2012 268 Monitoring points reaching the standards in urban functional zones nationwide in 2012 270 Urban acoustic environment nationwide during 2007–2012 270

List of Contributors Throughout this volume, Chinese names are ordered according to standard practice in China, with surnames preceding given names. To clarify this ordering, surnames are in capital letters. GUO Qiaoyu (郭乔羽) is consultant to the Great Rivers Partnership of The Nature Conservancy (TNC). GUO Weiqing (郭巍青) is a professor at the School of Government and Public Affairs, Sun Yatsen University, and a research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Public Administration. His major research fields cover public policy analysis, government and local governance, and civil society development. HUANG Kai (黄凯) is a PhD candidate at Zhongnan University of Economics and Law in environmental resource law and a key member of the project team for “Research on the legal supervision of the environmental impact of lead and cadmium pollution on human health.” LI Bo (李波) is a member of the Board Directors of Friends of Nature, and was also a visiting scholar at the India China Institute, The New School in New York, and an executive member of IUCN-CEESP committee. LI Dun (李楯) is a professor and the head of the Experts Network at Tsinghua University Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC) and executive director of the Social Policy Research Institute, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. Professor Li is also the chairman of the board of directors of the Friends of Nature Foundation. LIN Na (林娜) is a Beijing-based reporter for www.chinadialogue.net. LIN Yanmei (林燕梅) is a PhD candidate in environmental resource law at China University of Political Science and Law and associate professor and deputy director of the US-Asia Partnership for Environment Law Project at Vermont Law School.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

LIU Xiaoxing (刘晓星) is a reporter with China Environment News, mostly covering issues on economy, energy, hydroelectricity development, and biodiversity. LV Zhongmei (吕忠梅) is professor and Dean at Hubei Institute of Economics, chief legal advisor for the project titled “Research on the legal supervision of the environmental impact of lead and cadmium pollution on human health.” PENG Liguo (彭利国) is a senior reporter with Southern Weekly. PIAO Zhengji (朴正吉) is a senior engineer at Changbaishan Institute of Science, his areas of specialty include the ecology of and the impact of human activity on wildlife. QIE Jianrong (郄建荣) is a member of Friends of Nature, and a senior reporter with Legal Daily. WANG Xiaoxi (王晓曦) has an MA in environmental resource law from China University of Political Science and Law and works as a student advisor at the China University of Political Science and law. Wuhu Ecology Center (芜湖生态中心) was founded in October 2008 and began operation in April 2009. Based in the southern Anhui Province, this NGO is committed to environmental health, nature conservation, and environmental education. YANG Changjiang (杨长江) is a reporter with China Inspection and Quarantine Times, focusing on the issue of urban waste. YANG Gonghuan (杨功焕) is senior scientist at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and distinguished professor at Peking Union Medical College. YAO Songqiao (姚松乔) is an independent scholar working on river protection.

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YU Yin (于音) is an independent scholar working on river protection. ZHOU Yu (周雨) received a PhD from the School of Government and Public Affairs, Sun Yat-sen University, and does research in environmental politics, nature conservation, and NGOs. ZOU Changxin (邹长新) is the deputy director of the Ecological Center of Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science, which is under the Ministry of Environmental Protection, director of the Research Center for Regional Ecological Safety and a key member of the technical team working on ecological red line.

Introduction

On Environmental and Ecosystem Protection: What Have We Done?* LI Dun** Abstract Socioeconomic development can become sustainable only when it is aimed at serving human beings while at the same time respecting, instead of trying to conquer or defeat nature. Hope for the human race depends on our ability to reflect on what the country has done towards and for the environment, and how cooperation in environmental protection among citizens, enterprises, and governments can be achieved.

Keywords knowledge of environmental issues – environment vs. health – public policy making – public engagement

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Current Situation1

There have been a growing number of environmental, meteorological, and geological disasters in recent years. There is no avoiding the question of whether environmental problems such as pollution and deteriorating ecosystems are being alleviated or worsening in China. *  Li Yifang gave suggestions for the analytic framework of this Report. Liang Xiaoyan, Li Bo, Li Xiang, Wang Jingjing and Ge Feng also were very helpful in writing this Report. Wang Huan, Liu Gaojun and others made great efforts in gathering and sorting out data and information. My gratitude goes to all of them. ** Li Dun, head of the Experts Network at Tsinghua University Center for the Study of Contemporary China and director of the Friends of Nature Foundation. 1  The data here all come from the Report on the State of the Environment in China 2012 released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) of the People’s Republic of China, unless otherwise specified.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_002

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1.1 Water Pollution vs. a Shortage of Water Resources Surface water across China was “slightly polluted,” according to the 2010, 2011, and 2012 editions of the Report on the State of the Environment in China (hereinafter Chinese Environmental Report), which were published in 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. Before that, surface water across China was rated as being “moderately polluted” from 2004 to 2009. “Sources of rural drinking water and surface water are polluted to varying degrees,” according to the 2012 edition of the Chinese Environmental Report. In a pilot program, substandard water was detected at 22.8% of the 1,370 water source points being monitored. In the same villages where the pilot program took place, surface water at 35.3% of the 984 points monitored registered Grades of IV, V, or worse. The same report also notes that “[e]xcessive amounts of heavy metals are found in the surface water in a small number of villages involved in the pilot program.” With regard to groundwater, the quality is poor for 40.5% of the 198 monitored Chinese cities and very poor for 16.8% of them. A total of 162 million residents of key cities with an environmental protection program in China are served by sources of drinking water that can support the water needs of a minimum of 1,000 people. Of these sources, 9.4% was rated inferior according to the Chinese Environmental Report 2011, and the percentage was 4.7% for the following year, according to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012. Groundwater-related problems such as pollution, excess withdrawal, and land subsidence caused by drops in water table have become increasingly severe since the 1990s. Cones of depression of different sizes had formed across China by the end of the 1990s. At that time, there were over 50 cones of depression larger than 100 km2 in area throughout the country. By the end of 2006, the cones of depression in the Hengshui and Cangzhou, both of Hebei Province, and Dezhou in Shandong Province reached 8,815 km2, 7,553 km2, and 5,333 km2 in size, respectively. On the side of seawater quality in offshore areas, seawater at Grades III, IV, and Lower than Grade IV account for a total of 30.6%, according to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012. Before that, the percentages were about 50% in 2002–2004, 32.8% in 2005, and over 37% in 2007, 2010, and 2011. Spawning and feeding grounds and spawning migration routes of sea fishes, shrimps, shellfishes, and algae were all polluted to different degrees, with pollutants including inorganic nitrogen, labile phosphates, and oil products. Sediments in fishing areas were mainly polluted by cadmium, mercury, copper, and oil.

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Of the nearly 100,000 enterprises that have been punished and registered by environmental authorities since 2004, only a little over 160 have been confirmed to have taken corrective actions and thus have been removed from relevant database query results, according to the China Water Pollution Map (this map was later renamed the Pollution Map and information on air, solid-waste, and heavy-metal issues have since been added to it) made by the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), an environmental NGO. In 2013, severe water pollution was revealed by Greenpeace reports on excessive groundwater exploitation and illegal pollutant discharge in the Shenhua Ordos Coal to Oil Project, on coal-fueled power plant development and water resources, on water pollution by international clothing brands in China, and on toxic and harmful residues from branded clothing worldwide. In addition, some of the results from the “Assessment on the Correlation between Water Pollution in the Huai River basin and the Local Incidence of Tumors”,2 a research project that had been receiving attention for years, were finally disclosed thanks to the publication of The Atlas Showing How the Water Environment in the Huai River Basin Relates to Local Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors.3 Conventional monitoring data about the water environment from the competent environmental authority and survey data about causes of death from the public health authority were separately gathered and did not cross each other, according to public information. Combined analysis of the two sets of data shows that changes in the water environment in the Huai River basin and the ones in the causes of local deaths over the past three decades have two main characteristics. Firstly, areas with the most severe and persistent pollution happen to be the ones with the highest growth rates of deaths caused by digestive tract tumors, which are several times higher than the corresponding nationwide averages. Secondly, the spatial analysis results show that the distribution of heavily polluted areas is highly consistent with that of areas with high incidences of several new digestive tract tumors. “These results are unable to explain how pollution in the water environment causes tumors, which instead should be answered by pathologists, but this

2  Yang Gonghuan and Zhuang Dafang, Assessment on the Correlation between Water Pollution in the Huai River Basin and the Local Incidence of Tumors, a research project funded by the 11th Five-Year National Scientific and Technological Support Program. 3  Yang Gonghuan and Zhuang Dafang, The Atlas Showing How the Water Environment in the Huai River Basin Relates to Local Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors, SinoMaps Press, 2013.

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phenomenon makes us believe there must be inherent ties between them,” explained a researcher. Additionally, the official Xinhua News Agency quoted a media report in Hong Kong as saying that “the central government is funding research on how pollution affects human reproduction.” This report said that the infertility rate of Chinese couples had risen to 12.5% from 3% more than twenty years before. It is believed by some that this phenomenon is partly due to unhealthy lifestyles, although it is believed by others that environmental conditions may also have certain effects.4 1.2 Air Pollution and Acid Rain Of the 325 Chinese cities at the prefecture or higher levels, the ones that met the ambient air quality standard accounted for 91.4%, according to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012. Comparatively, of the 113 major Chinese cities in which environmental protection is key, 88.5% have ambient air quality standards. However, starting in 2011, several initiatives with urbanite involvement, like “Measure the air quality in China,” have drawn more public attention to air pollution, especially the large amounts of toxic and harmful substances contained in PM 2.5. These initiatives have greatly intensified the long time debate on this hot topic, and drawn the attention of China and even the world: pollutants with real severe damages to human health are outside of the monitored items. This debate contributed to the official release of the new Ambient Air Quality Standard in February 2012. Under this new standard, the percentage of compliant cities at the prefecture or higher levels in major regions such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas would be 40.9%; and 23.9% in major Chinese cities in which environmental protection is key. These regions would be 50.5 and 64.6 percentage points lower than the percentages under the old standard, respectively. In 2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) released data about the air quality in major regions and 74 Chinese cities. The overall percentage of the number of compliant days in these cities from January through March was 44.4%. In May, the average percentage of the number of compliant days in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was 27.4%, before dropping to 24.2% in June. Beijing suffered four consecutive instances of heavy smog in January, when there were only four sunny days in this city.5 In December, unusually 4  “China researches how pollution affects human reproduction, with a focus on sperm, according to a Hong Kong-based newspaper,” Xinhuanet, http://www.zj.xinhuanet.com/news center/rb/2013-12/12/c_118528270.htm (accessed December 12, 2013). 5  China Central Television (CCTV) News Channel, News Weekly, February 2, 2013.

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heavy smog shrouded half of the Chinese Mainland including Northern China and the coastal southeastern region. On the sixth day of December, 104 cities in 20 Chinese provinces suffered heavily polluted air, as the heavy smog covered areas ranging from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region down to the Yangtze River Delta, according to some MEP data.6 The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas combine to represent only about 8% of China’s land area, but emit over five times more pollutants per square kilometer than the other regions, said Wu Xiaoqing, the deputy head of the MEP. Large amounts of pollutants emitted into the air add to the concentration of PM 2.5 and contribute to the formation of smog. There are over 100, and in particular cities, even over 200 smoggy days in the aforementioned regions per year, according to monitoring statistics.7 On October 17, 2013, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a part of the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report to classify outdoor air pollution as carcinogenic, saying that PM 2.5 definitely relates to the rising incidence of cancers.8 This view is shared in similar reports written by worldwide experts. There are about 350,000–500,000 premature deaths caused by outdoor air pollution in China per year, according to a report published by Chen Zhu, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the former head of the Ministry of Health (MOH), and contributor to The Lancet.9 Smog causes acid rain and photochemical smog, higher mortality rates, the worsening of chronic diseases such as respiratory and heart diseases, changes in pulmonary structure and function, lower fertility, and structural changes in the human immune system, according to the Green Book of Climate Change: Annual Report on Actions to Address Climate Change (2013), co-published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the China Meteorological Administration (CMA).10 The Chinese government took specific actions including: setting out to implement the 12th Five-Year Program for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Major Regions, the Action Plan for Air Pollution and Control, the Implementation 6  Chen Bin, “Learn to endure smog from now on,” Southern Weekly, December 12, 2013. 7  CCTV News Channel, News Weekly, March 16, 2013. 8  “Cancer experts say smog doubtlessly affects the incidence of lung cancer,” People’s Daily Online, http://cppcc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1120/c34948-23594454.html (accessed November 20, 2013). 9  Wang Erde, “Chen Zhu: there are 350,000–500,000 premature deaths caused by air pollution in China per year,” 21st Century Business Herald, January 7, 2014. 10  “The CASS and the CMA report that smog affects fertility,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhua net.com/politics/2013-11/05/c_125649970.htm (accessed November 4, 2013).

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Rules for the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in the BeijingTianjin-Hebei Region and Surrounding Regions, the Weather Monitoring and Warning Plan for Heavy Pollution in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and Surrounding Regions (Trial), and the Ambient Air Quality Standard (GB 3095-2012). In the private sector, there have long been reports disclosing research and information on the pollution caused by coal from mining, storage, and transport to consumption, as well as the urban smog that threatens human life and the “brown clouds” that damage human health. 1.3 Soil Pollution vs. Farmland Decrease; Soil Erosion vs. Desertification According to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012, the area of soil erosion across China was 2,949,100 km2 (or 31.12% of the surveyed land area), including a water-eroded area of 1,293,200 km2, and a wind-eroded area of 1,655,900 km2. Compared to this, the area of soil erosion was reported to be 3,569,200 km2 (or 37.2% of China’s total land area) in the 2008 edition of the Chinese Environmental Report. The 2012 edition of the Chinese Environmental Report does not provide data about farmland, garden land, woodland, grassland, and other land for agricultural purposes, nor does it disclose data about farmland lost because of construction, disasters, conversion of farmland for ecosystem rehabilitation, adjustments to the agricultural structure, farmland added because of reclamation, or land used for residential, industrial, mining, transport, and water utilization purposes. The report on a nationwide soil pollution survey, which has been finished long before, has yet to be released. In May 2013, over 100 batches of rice containing unacceptably high amounts of cadmium were found in Guangdong Province. On December 30, 2013, the State Council Information Office held a news conference on the second nationwide soil survey, saying that the average farmland area per capita in China decreased to 0.1013 ha from the 0.1060 ha reported in the first land survey, and that about 3.33 million ha of farmland were moderately or even heavily polluted; and therefore, generally were no longer suitable for farming. 1.4 Solid Waste Pollution According to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012, 3,290,460,000 t of industrial solid wastes were generated across China, up 477% from 1989 and 73% from 2008, and 60.9% of them were re-utilized. Unlike the editions published until 2010, the 2012 edition of the Chinese Environmental Report did not

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disclose the amounts of industrial solid wastes discharged, stored, and disposed of in the year. There were about 6,700,000 t of chromium slag across China, and most of them had been stored for one, two, or even over five decades, according to the Chinese Environmental Report 2012. The disposal of chromium slag started in late 2005. By the end of 2012, nearly all the chromium slag had been disposed of. In addition, according to the aforementioned report, enterprises that generated chromium slag were regulated as major polluters in order to ensure that all the chromium slag generated in the year would be disposed of by the end of the year. Nonetheless, some environmentalists said that the process for the disposal of chromium slag was neither open to the public, nor were they allowed to participate in the monitoring of this process. The Chinese government took the following actions: releasing the 12th FiveYear Program for Hazardous Waste Pollution Prevention and Control, which set the goal of determining the amounts of hazardous wastes by the end of 2015; finishing the construction for 36 of the 57 centralized hazardous wastes treatment facilities specified in the National Program for Building Hazardous and Medical Wastes Treatment Facilities, with the construction of the remaining 21 having yet to begin or be completed. 2

Policy Choices

Regarding environmental and ecosystem issues, political parties, the central and local governments, enterprises, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and communities will have their respective policy choices. Individuals also will have their policy preferences. At the state level, the first national meeting on environmental protection was held in 1973, when the State Council set up an environmental protection committee. In 1974, the Chinese government announced the goal of getting pollution under control within five years (1974–1979) and fundamentally solving the pollution issue within 10 years (1974–1984). In 1983, environmental protection was established as a basic national policy in China. In 1996, the Chinese government accepted the concept of “sustainable development” and announced its own sustainable development strategy. Later on, the Chinese government made it clear that the primary solution to the pollution issue lied in improving the structure of industry, the growth and consumption patterns, taking action against pollution, and rehabilitating the ecosystem.

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In 2013, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) issued the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, with a section specific to accelerating institutional development toward an ecological civilization. It is proposed in this document that: the ownership and use management systems for natural resources assets are improved; a red line be set for ecosystem protection; the use of resources on a paid basis and payments for ecological services (PES) be carried out; and the ecosystem protection and management system be reformed. A review of the past four decades indicates that pollution has become a growing problem in China, which has failed to alleviate ecosystem deterioration, on the one hand, and keeps developing in an unsustainable manner as a result of path dependence, on the other. For the past two decades, the Chinese government has been busy with shutting down or transforming polluting enterprises, punishing individuals and organizations for non-compliant use of land, and keeping tight control over the launch of projects in industries with an overcapacity. It also reiterates why it is necessary to make adjustments. Unfortunately, however, unsustainable development seems unstoppable in China. The Chinese government has taken measures to ban or restrict activities that pollute the environment and/or damage ecosystems such as: making legal provisions on crimes against the environment, natural resources, and public health; establishing systems to approve standards for “state-allowed” pollutant discharge and emission and for making “state-allowed” changes in the original conditions of land (including farmland), forests, grasslands, wetlands, rivers, and lakes; and setting a mechanism for buying the “rights” to polluting and damaging the environment, as exemplified by paying pollutant discharge/ emission charges, paying noise compensation to affected individuals, paying for the use of land, and trading in the “right to pollute the environment.” But none of these measures are able to effectively control pollution or rehabilitate the ecosystem. It is assumed that all production activities by human beings have effects on the environment and ecosystems. In China, the central and local governments have made policies, whether proper or not, that are intended to reduce the environmental impact of animal husbandry and agriculture, such as banning or restricting pasturing in certain areas or periods, converting farmland for ecosystem rehabilitation, and merging smaller villages into a single larger one. In contrast, the governments are not only unable to control the industrial sector, especially the mining industry, which has the greatest environmental impact, but also acquiesce in its further expansion despite already obvious overcapacity and an emerging crisis.

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In the past, both overemphasis on GDP growth and for-profit activities that some individuals and organizations carry out in the name of national interests or socioeconomic development were unduly blamed for the aforementioned phenomenon. By comparison, less attention was paid to an impulse inherent and fundamental in the system of government to achieve continuous economic growth, which is a unique, internal tension that differs from the one in capitalist market economies. Policy analysis is required to determine what the primary cause for the aforementioned internal tension is and how it differs from the one in market economies. A review of the Chinese history over the past six or more decades indicates that, during most of that time, this country was faced with external and internal tensions. Externally, China was isolated due to confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union, followed by the worsening of bilateral ties after it began the process of reform and opening up, in addition to export setback amid the Financial Crisis, global economic slowdown, and trade barriers. Internally, a series of destructive political movements were followed by widening income gaps and conflicts of interest as a result of other issues. It is the security need from within the system of government and core interests that have led to the basic goal of, and an internal impulse to succeed in, catching up with, overtaking, and defeating the global powers. As a result, there is always a need within the system of government for achieving continuous economic growth. Unlike the pressing need to achieve continuous economic growth in China because of its system of government, desire to become a global power, and constant vigilance against potential threats, the internal tension in market economies is derived from corporate systems rather than demand. Its economic growth is triggered by the desire to make profits, rather than the other way around. Nonetheless, with the rule of law and the interest balancing mechanism in market economies, the market itself is not omnipotent, as both criticism of consumerism and environmentalism counterbalance the market to certain extents. Given that it has retained the original basic system, core interests, and was introduced to a market economy system, a structure characterized by strong administrative powers, a weak market, and the absence of civil society11—the legacy of the planned economy in which the government system in urban areas

11   The social development research team, Department of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, Toward Social Reconstruction, 2010.

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differed from its rural counterpart—make it difficult to create mechanism of checks and balances and change the unsustainable economic growth pattern. In more recent years, Chinese leaders have held a “people-oriented” position.12 They believe that “peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times,” that “[t]he law of the jungle will not lead to the coexistence of human society,” that “[t]he arbitrary use of force cannot make the world a better place,”13 and that relevant countries should “build a new model of major-country relationship featuring non-confrontation, non-conflict, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.”14 These ideas make it possible to change the old economic growth pattern, to overcome institutional flaws in creating systems in favor of an ecological civilization, to expand global cooperation at multiple levels and on all fronts,15 and to change the unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable development in China.16 Policies that enable effective responses to environmental pollution and ecosystem deterioration can never be merely about the environment and ecosystems themselves. Instead, they must relate to the overall goal, strategy, program and project system regarding socioeconomic development, to the production, survival and consumption patterns of the people, and to the social structure and regulations. Under the aforementioned understanding, a new and basic concept of environmental and ecosystem-relevant policies should include: 1. Given the “people-oriented” position, pay sufficient attention to the impact of pollution and ecosystem deterioration on human health, confirm and protect, at the highest level of national law, citizen rights to health and environment Environmental pollution and ecosystem deterioration both have a direct impact on human health and survival. The rights to health and environment should be among its citizens’ basic rights and, relatively speaking, the state should be actively responsible for both rights.

12  “Hu Jintao’s Report to the 18th CPC National Congress,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet .com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/m_113711665_6.htm (accessed November 17, 2012). 13  Ibid. 14  “A congratulatory message by Xi Jinping to the fourth annual China-US Consultation on People-to-People Exchange,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/201311/22/c_118259460.htm (accessed November 22, 2013). 15  “Hu Jintao’s Report to the 18th CPC National Congress,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet .com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/m_113711665_6.htm (accessed November 17, 2012). 16  Ibid.

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The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the Constitution) already has provisions very close to recognizing and protecting citizens’ right to health. The first paragraph of Article 21 of the Constitution specifies what the state does in developing medical and health services, and says that all these efforts aim to protect the people’s health. The first paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution provides that “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to material assistance from the State and society when they are old, ill, or disabled. The State develops social insurance, social relief, and medical and health services that are required for citizens to enjoy this right.” China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1997. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) ratified the ICESCR in 2001. Article 12 of the ICESCR makes it clear that states should be actively responsible for protecting citizens’ right to health. Under the current definition, health means that a person is physically and mentally healthy and is able to get along and work with others and calmly respond to changes, not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. China should amend the Constitution to clarify citizens’ right to health and the state’s corresponding responsibility. Also, the Constitution of China has provisions very close to recognizing and protecting citizens’ right to environment. The first paragraph of Article 26 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he State protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.” Like the aforementioned provisions regarding the right to health, Article 26 only specifies what the state does in preventing and controlling pollution and in protecting the environment and ecosystems, and mentions nothing from a citizen-rights perspective. Up to this day, there remain no binding provisions regarding the right to environment in international law. Moreover, there are only a small number of countries where the right to environment is covered by the constitution. This being said, China has long identified itself as a socialist country, and has specified in the Constitution, as is mentioned above, that “[t]he State protects and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological environment. It prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.” In addition, China has agreed upon a series of UN conventions and important instruments regarding environmental and ecosystem protection. Accordingly, China should take the lead in the world by establishing in the Constitution the right to environment as a basic right of citizens: everybody has the right to live in a safe environment that is able to satisfy their reasonable needs and requirements and is obligated to not pollute the environment or damage ecosystems; the state shall be actively responsible for protecting citizens’ right to environment.

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Under the basic concept of the rule of law, protecting the environment, first of all, should not be a choice among national interests, but rather, it should be the state’s responsibility to citizens. When a state emphasizes being “people-oriented” and gives the highest priority to the people’s well being, we should change our understanding to reflect this. In the past, people were regarded as no more than a kind of “input,” whether from a wartime or economic perspective, ranging from the most general war-force or workforce up to the most valuable human resources. It is now time to regard people—who can freely make choices and lead a highquality life, that is, people who can rely on their own will, make full use of their wisdom and capabilities, and make choices on their own to fully participate in economic, social, cultural, and political activities, who are good at going along and working with other persons, who lead a full life and generally are optimistic, and who are kind and respectful and think ethically—as the final “output” of all our efforts. The greatest possible achievement that can ever be made by all politicians, entrepreneurs, and other successful persons is to let as many people have access to sufficient necessities, live in peace, and work with contentment, together with continuous improvements in their quality of life and behavior. The primary preconditions for human beings to survive include having access to clean water, fresh air, and safe food, and enjoying a certain quality of life, safety assurance, and freedom from harm. We should therefore follow the concept of overall public health by regarding public health, environmental protection, and food safety as a single whole. At the level of policy, it is necessary to stay highly alert of environmental and ecosystem risks that may threaten human health and survival, and to provide citizens with safety assurance with respect to the environment and ecosystems. The extent to which human rights to health and environments are realized mirrors some qualities of a county or a society—whether it is in harmony and whether it is able to achieve sustainable development. 2. Pay attention to and ensure environmental equity Environmental pollution and ecosystem damages by some people (or one generation) may cause infringement upon the rights of others (or the next generation). Ecosystems, in their broad sense, also include resources, especially non-renewable ones. The over-consumption of non-renewable resources by one generation will necessarily cause a shortage of resources needed for the survival of the offspring. As with other issues, the presence or absence of equity and justice is especially important in determining the value of a choice with respect to the issue of the environment and ecosystems.

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The impact of pollution and ecosystem damages generally is not confined to the places where they occur, to the boundaries of land or bodies of water, or to underground, underwater, on-the-ground, or aerial spaces. As a result, such impact may span communities, administrative areas, national boundaries, and even the atmosphere. In a particular period of time, pollution and ecosystem damages not only generally relate to both the wrongdoers and the victims, but also infringe upon the rights of the victims to extents that vary with their social status, wealth, and accessible social resources. The issue of infringement relevant to the environment and ecosystems will become extremely complex if equity is factored in. Moreover, there are many occasions when it is difficult to identify who caused pollution and/or ecosystem damages, or when the wrongdoers can be identified but are unable to assume responsibility for the consequences fully or at all. It is on the aforementioned occasions when equity needs to be realized by social or state relief. If pollution and ecosystem damages were caused by people who are already dead, then it is impossible to hold them legally responsible. But who should instead be held responsible for the consequences or provide relief and compensation in order to realize equity? It is of course impossible for the unborn to claim their rights. Who then is to claim and protect the rights of the unborn so as to protect them from the impact of environmental and ecosystem damages and to ensure intergenerational equity? The issue of equity is of a socialist nature, as it recognizes participation by individuals, on the one hand, and requires both the state and the society to actively assume corresponding responsibility, on the other. Relative to the traditional legal definitions of rights, there is a theory of the environment and ecosystems as public assets. These assets are of course not owned by individuals, although in no way are they owned by the state. Likewise, relative to the traditional liabilities, from a legal perspective, which occur due to the infringement upon certain rights, holding polluters responsible for rehabilitating the polluted environment and the ones who caused ecosystem damages responsible for providing corresponding compensation is a difficult task. Not to mention, it is even more difficult in cases where the wrongdoers are already dead. Should we therefore define “liabilities shared by all human beings?” Neither poverty nor being a developing country or region can justify environmental pollution or ecosystem damages. It is necessary to develop a single set of rules for prohibiting environmental pollution and ecosystem damages. One’s being unable to determine that certain environmental pollution and/ or ecosystem damages were caused by his/her activities cannot justify his/her

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being free from the responsibility of doing everything possible to rehabilitate the ecosystem. The responsibility for paying the “liabilities shared by all human beings” should be shared depending on capabilities. To realize equity with respect to the environment and ecosystems, individuals and organizations must not overemphasize their respective interests. It is instead necessary to coordinate all relevant interests; political parties, governments, enterprises, NGOs, nonprofit organizations (NPOs), neighborhoods, the international community, and global civil societies need to work together. 3. Respect the right to life of all beings in nature People have different attitudes toward nature. Some think that human beings are superior to all other beings, should rule over his territory and even all of nature, and can take advantage of everything in nature they think are useful to them, and change, conquer, or defeat everything they deem undesirable or useless. Others think that nature may avenge itself for the damages arising from humanity’s overexploitation of natural resources. This attitude makes environmental and ecosystem protection somewhat utilitarian, that is, it justifies the need for protection, on the basis that this would avoid vengeance. Others think that man is able to make proper use of resources for a higher quality of life and that man should cherish and respect nature. The third attitude derives from a value choice and is based upon thinking from the perspective of ecological ethics. The proposal that “man should be in harmony with nature” can be classified into expressions of the third attitude, although legal interpretations are required in this context. Traditional law only recognizes the status of persons and their organizations (i.e., juridical persons) as the holders of rights, whereas nature as an “object” can only be dominated and protected. Recognizing the right to life or the survival of all things in nature, that is, granting them rights, is nothing short of a revolution in the development of laws. In reality, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, international legal provisions on the protection of endangered species, and, in China, the legal provisions to set up nature reserves and the protection of animals and plants are all self-evidently in line with the third attitude. Nonetheless, the point is that granting all things in nature the legal status of the holders of rights differs from protecting some things in nature, such as the cultural and natural heritage and endangered species, as the objects of rights. If all things in nature are regarded as objects of protection, then it is necessary to answer the question of who owns them. Are they owned by states, individuals, groups, or human beings as a whole? If all things in nature are granted the legal status of the holders of rights, then who is entitled to act as their agent?

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Do all things in nature have a limited right to life or survival? This is now not only a religious and philosophical question, but also an unavoidable real-world question regarding policy choice. 3

What Have Citizens Done?

If we say that, in China, governments, enterprises, and the public constitute three determinants of issues regarding the environment and ecosystems, then governments are the primary one that plays a critical role in tackling pollution, rehabilitating ecosystems, and recognizing and protecting citizens’ rights to health and environment. That is because the system of government in China entails government control of resources, as well as unusually great power and organizational and operational capabilities. Under a system of government in which the state plays a dominant role, governments control environmental protection in all respects and often claim themselves as the protectors of the public and the suppliers of a clean environment in which the public live. The term “public engagement” was not mentioned until a few years ago.17 It is true, during the transformation of China, that the possibilities of public engagement increase too slowly and may even be deliberately reduced, but it is still significant to see what we have done and whether we can do a ­better job in terms of citizens’ willingness to engage and citizen actions. Under the Constitution, citizens are the owners of this state and therefore should be responsible for the well being of themselves and the human race. We need to cherish and respect nature without which we cannot exist. Checking what we have done lets us do a better job in the future. 3.1 Citizen Actions—Interactions between Citizens and Governments In a good society, interactions between citizens and governments, as a type of citizen (including NGOs) actions, may include: policy advocacy; institutionalized exchange of information and opinions; the making of, and response to, 17  It was proposed in the work report by the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that the government must “expand the citizens’ orderly participation in political affairs at each level and in every field,” “expand people’s democracy,” and “guarantee the people’s rights to be informed, to participate, to be heard, and to oversee.” And it was proposed in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee that the government should “establish a social participation mechanism” and “fully give rein to the people’s enthusiasm, initiative and creativity.”

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claims and requests; applying for the disclosure of information, hearings, and administrative review, and the filing of administrative lawsuits; negotiations and mediation; and cooperation. 3.1.1 Policy Advocacy Regarding policy advocacy, citizens actively propose policy and legislation recommendations to government authorities before engaging in the making of public policies and laws. In China, policy advocacy also includes citizens’ active response to government requests for their opinions on policies and laws to be made. Publishing research and survey reports is also a method of policy advocacy utilized by citizens and NGOs. In 2012, Xie Yan, an associate researcher at the Institute of Zoology, CAS, and over 100 other experts in nature protection submitted six motions and two recommendations at the 1st session of the 12th National People’s Congress, plus three proposals at the 1st session of the 12th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, for the making of the Nature Reserves Law. Shen You, together with the Chengdu Bird Watching Society of which he is a member, drafted the Recommendations on Issuing the Chengdu Municipal Regulations on Wetland Protection in early 2013. Moreover, they submitted to the CPPCC National Committee, through one of its members, a written speech titled “Let communities around nature reserves play a leading role in environmental protection and development.” All these actions belong to active policy advocacy. In addition, some experts, environmentalists and environmental NGOs jointly gave their opinions, recommendations, and proposals to the NPC and the CPPCC in order to prevent the Natural Heritage Protection Law (Draft), which they think have severe flaws, from being reviewed by the Standing Committee of the NPC. They also proposed their own recommendations on legislation, through such actions as submitting the Recommendations on Amending the Wildlife Protection Law and the Recommendations on Amending the Environmental Impact Assessment Law as well as suggested amendments to the Beijing Municipal Regulations on Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Draft) to the NPC through some delegates. Giving recommendations, when government authorities are asking for opinions on how to amend the Environmental Protection Law, also can be regarded as part of policy advocacy in its broad sense. Nonetheless, making response only when the lawmaker is asking for opinions on legislation or amendments differs from active advocacy. Moreover, the current practice of asking for opinions on legislation or amendments is one-way and without specific feedback— the asker will give no reason for refusing to accept a particular opinion. Giving

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one’s opinion, criticism, and recommendations when the government is asking for opinions on the draft of a law has become a way of public engagement. NGOs have increasingly employed the practice of publishing reports to show its position and thus hopefully influence policies related to the environment and the ecosystem that put out by governments or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In 2009, thirty-eight NGOs such as the FON, OXFAM, Greenpeace, ActionAid, GVBChina, Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), and IPE published the Chinese Civil Society on Climate Change. In 2012, the Greenovation: Hub (GHUB), SHAN SHUI Conservation Center (SHAN SHUI), Institute for Environment and Development (IED), FON, China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and IPE, together with many other NGOs and individuals, spent one year writing A Civil Society Review of 20 Years of Sustainable Development, before releasing this report at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). In 2013, the GHUB partnered with the Institute of Environmental Public Interest in the School of Philanthropy at San Yat-sen University, to publish the Report on the Urban Environment and Livability Indices in Guangdong Province 2013. Six organizations including FON published The “Last Report” On China’s Rivers. In 2012–2013, IPE partnered with thirteen other organizations including FON18 to publish reports such as Green Choice Alliance: Report on China’s Textile Industry 3, Cleaning up the Fashion Industry Report, Sustainable Apparel’s Critical Blind Spot, Green Choice Alliance: the Survey on Pollution in the IT Industry, Research Report on the Supply Chain in the IT Industry (Phase VI), Phase I Report on Green Securities—the Cement Industry Has a Long Way to Go in Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), Understanding the Water Footprint of a Business—Case Study of a Corporate Water Footprint, 2012 Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI): Fourth Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 113 Chinese Cities, the Assessment of Air Quality Transparency Index (AQTI) in Chinese Cities 2012, and Review of Environmental Information Transparency in the Past Three Years: Assessment of Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) 2011. Greenpeace published reports on such topics as: excessive groundwater exploitation and illegal pollutant discharge in the Shenhua Ordos Coal to Oil Project, coal-fueled power plant development and 18  These thirteen organizations included: FON, EnviroFriends, Nature University (the Green Beagle Institute), Green Stone, 环友科技, Public Environmental Concern Center (PECC), Morning Dew Environmental Public Interest Service Center, Green Home of Fujian, Green Hunan, SynTao-Sustainability Solutions, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Unilever China, and 美国自然资源保护委员会 (American Committee on National Resource Protection).

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water resources, water pollution by international clothing brands in China, and toxic and harmful residues from branded clothing worldwide. By revealing the severity of pollution and ecosystem deterioration in China, these reports aim to enable improvements in relevant policies of the Chinese government, international organizations, and multinational companies (MNCs). Of all the published reports, Thirty Years of Environmental Law in China: Have We Succeeded—Bluebook on Environmental Rule of Law in China (1997– 2010) still deserves attention. 3.1.2 Institutionalized Communication The public had the chance to express their opinions on the amendment to the Environmental Protection Law, but this was a one-way, not two-way, process—the public acted as the speaker and the government the listener. In China, there has long been a lack of an institutionalized communication mechanism among citizens, NGOs, and government. Back in 2006, the Central Committee of the CPC said in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Building a Socialist Harmonious Society that a mechanism for the public to express their needs and requirements should be created. In 2013, the Central Committee of the CPC said in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform that “We will build a consultative democracy featuring appropriate procedures and complete segments . . . and conduct consultations before and during the implementation of policy decisions.” All these promises have yet to be kept and must be institutionally guaranteed. 3.1.3 Making and Responding to Claims and Requests According to Chinese law, claims and requests made to governments include questions, petitions, appeals, opinions, recommendations, complaints, accusations, and reports, which can be expressed in ways specified in Article 35 of the Constitution. Nonetheless, how governments respond to claims and requests and whether there are institutional constraints and guarantees rely on how governments relate to the civil society. This is because in countries under the rule of law, claims and requests actually are made as acts that oppose and pressure governments such that they will know and pay attention to certain issues, before it is possible to coordinate relevant interests, improve policies, and solve issues. In 2013, the Nanxi River Ecosystem Protection Organization, a volunteer organization in Zhejiang Province, submitted a petition to the local government and talked with the head of the early management team of the Nan An

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Reservoir project. In doing so, they made the local government agree to cancel the power generation function of this project in order to reduce damages to the Nanxi River ecosystem. In 2013, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) wanted to build a nuclear fuel plant in the city of Heshan, Guangdong Province. The Jiangmen Development and Reform Bureau released the results of an assessment on social stability risks before the local public questioned project safety and decision-making procedures. About 1,000 local citizens gathered before the municipal government building to express their opinions. Some members of the Municipal Standing Committee of the CPC and an executive deputy mayor talked with these citizens at the site. On another day, the head of the municipal committee of the CPC and the mayor also talked with citizens before the government building. At last, the Jiangmen Municipal Government issued a document coded JFG (2013) No. 1 to confirm the cancellation of this nuclear fuel plant project. Later on, a number of relevant government officials admitted mistakes that the government had made in information transparency. This incident may lead to the inclusion of provisions regarding public engagement and information transparency into the Nuclear Safety Law currently under discussion.19 In 2013, residents of Kunming, Yunnan Province acted against a ten-millionton oil refinery project by the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and a p-Xylene (PX) project of Sinopec in the city of Anning, a county-level city administered by Kunming. Both projects were therefore suspended. Li Wenrong, the mayor of Kunming, promised at a subsequent news conference that the government would only green-light projects agreed upon by all stakeholders. In 2013, there were also citizen actions that demanded governments to disclose the latest information on groundwater and soil pollution. A lot of environmental NGOs strongly called on the MEP to release a schedule of comprehensively disclosing regulatory information on major sources of pollution.20 19  Jia Kehua, “Public engagement and information transparency may be included into the Nuclear Safety Law,” China Energy News, July 29, 2013. 20  It has been reported that, most recently, the MEP has “quietly” released the Measures for Major State-monitored Enterprises to Monitor Themselves and Disclose Information (Trial) (the draft for comments) and the Measures for Monitoring and Disclosing Information on Sources of Pollution from Major State-monitored Enterprises (Trial) (the draft for comments), http://wenku.baidu.com/view/b3187dc3ad51f01dc281f19c.html. In addition, there were 15,797 major state-monitored enterprises across China in 2013, including 4,944 wastewater treatment plants, 4,189 waste gas treatment plants, 3,581 sewage treatment plants, 2,834 heavy metal makers, and 249 large-scale livestock/poultry farms.

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Unfortunately, however, applications for information transparency were still often rejected for various reasons. In 2012, Lv Zhi (a professor at Peking University), Xie Yan (an associate researcher at the CAS), Zheng Yisheng (a researcher at the CASS), and Yang Yong (a geologist), together with environmental NGOs such as the FON, SHAN SHUI, Green Beagle Institute, and IPE, called on the State Council to immediately stop the Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station (early stage) project that would bring more damages than benefits. In 2012, FON wrote to the NPC—in opposition of the provision in the draft amendment to the Environmental Protection Law that the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF) under the MEP shall be the only plaintiff in environmental public interest litigation—to recommend that there be no limitations, in the legislation, on plaintiffs in environmental public interest litigation. Fourteen environmental law experts also jointly wrote to the head of the Standing Committee of the NPC, making this legislature suspend the review and passing of the aforementioned amendment. Some people have argued that 2012 saw the widest and most active public engagement in environmental protection in recent years, leading to certain effects and positive response from governments. It was in this year that locals made claims and requests to the governments of the following cities: Shifang, Sichuan Province (due to public concerns about potential environmental pollution caused by a molybdenum and copper smelting project), Qidong, Jiangsu Province (due to public concerns about the potential effects of a papermaking and wastewater discharge project of the Japan-based Oji Holdings Corporation on the local ecosystem and offshore fish farming), and Zhenhai District, Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province (due to objection to the expansion of a PX plant). All these projects have since been terminated or relocated. On the one hand, some critics have said that active public engagement in air and drinking-water quality discussion and measurement indicates that the public can no longer tolerate environmental pollution and are forced, because of environmental crises, to engage in relevant actions.21 On the other hand, these public actions and their results show the NIMBY (“Not In My Back Yard”) effect regarding environmental pollution from large projects—the involved citizens only demand that the potential pollution not occur near them. Also in 2012, a municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration plant project in the western part of Qinghuangdao City, Hebei Province was suspended due to 21  An address by Liu Jianqiang, the editor-in-chief of Chinadialogue and the Annual Report on Environment Development of China, at a conference to release the 2013 edition of the Green Book of Environment.

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rights-protection actions of local peasants led by Pan Zhizhong. During these actions, the hired lawyer discovered evidence that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report on this project had provided false information on public engagement. A number of environmental NGOs, including the Nature University jointly wrote to the MEP asking for the disqualification of the organization that provided this EIA report. In 2013, the MEP released a list of 88 punished EIA organizations. 3.1.4

Applying for the Disclosure of Information, Hearings, and Administrative Reviews, and Filing Administrative Lawsuits Of all the ways of making claims and requests, applying for the disclosure of information, hearings, and administrative reviews, and the filing of administrative lawsuits, in countries under the rule of law, are supposed to be institutionally guaranteed approaches with which citizens demand that governments work and change policy decisions under law. In 2013, lawyer Dong Zhengwei demanded the MEP to disclose the methodology for surveying soil pollution across China, the resulting data, causes for such pollution, and countermeasures. The MEP refused to disclose the demanded soil pollution data by claiming it as “a state secret.” In 2013, Zhao Liang, a volunteer of the Tianjin-based Future Green Youth Leadership Council (FGYLC), applied for the release of an EIA report on a Sinopec oil refinery project in Yunnan Province, 34 measurements on the Yuqiao Reservoir, and the result of supervision on the handling of river pollution arising from the Water Diversion Project from the Luanhe River to Tianjin City. Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Department replied to his applications, with exception to the one regarding the Water Diversion Project from the Luanhe River to Tianjin City. In 2012, the Wuhu Ecology Center (WEC) submitted applications to 76 municipal and district environmental protection bureaus for the disclosure of emission monitoring data of 122 MSW incineration plants across China. Only 45 bureaus replied to its requests, and 42 MSW incineration plants disclosed incomplete emission monitoring data.22 In 2013, eleven environmental NGOs such as the GEV and the Chengdu Urban Rivers Association (CURA) submitted an application to the MEP for conducting a hearing on the approval of an EIA report on the water/electricity supply, road construction, and ground leveling project for the Jinsha 22  “The report on applying for disclosing information on 122 MSW incineration plants across China,” WEC, http://www.waste-cwin.org/sites/default/files/zhong_guo_122zuo_zai_yun_ xing_fen_shao_han_xin_xi_shen_qing_gong_kai_bao_gao_.pdf, 2012.

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Hydropower Station on the Yangtze River. The MEP replied that it would not accept this application, because these NGOs were not the stakeholders of this administrative approval. In 2013, three environmental NGOs such as FON requested for an administrative review specific to the lack of a legally required section about public engagement in an EIA report on a ten-million-ton oil refinery project of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in Yunnan Province. They requested that: the approval be cancelled; the project be terminated; the refining & chemicals project department and the Yunnan Petrochemical Co., Ltd. of the CNPC as the project implementers be ordered to organize public engagement under law, modify the EIA report, and resubmit it to the MEP for approval. The Policy and Law Department of the MEP rejected this application for the reason that the applicants were not stakeholders in the issue subject to administrative review. Also in 2013, Li Bo, Zhong Yu and Yang Yunfeng, who were all residents in Kunming City, Yunnan Province, submitted an application to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) for the administrative review of the location of the aforementioned CNPC ten-million-ton oil refinery project in Yunnan Province. MOHURD rejected this application for the reason that the involved Project Location Proposal met relevant legal requirements. A resident of Anning City, Yunnan Province, Luo Tingyan requested for the administrative review of the MEP approval of the EIA report on the CNPC tenmillion-ton oil refinery project in Yunnan Province, asking the MEP to cancel the approval. After being rejected by the MEP, Luo filed an administrative lawsuit with the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. This case is still being heard. In addition, the China Mangrove Conservation Network (CMCN), Green Kunming, Green Anhui, and citizen Chen Liwen separately applied for administrative review to demand that government authorities disclose certain environmental information, and received favorable court rulings. Administrative lawsuits filed by the Nature University against certain local environmental authorities for the disclosure of environmental information were also heard by the courts. The 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China provides in Article 121 that “If a State organ or its personnel, while executing its duties, encroaches upon the lawful rights and interests of a citizen or legal person and causes damages, it shall bear civil liability.” This being said, there have been no cases where the rights and interests of any citizen are

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harmed due to the execution of duties (including inaction) by any state organ or its personnel with respect to the environment or ecosystems. 3.1.5 Negotiations and Mediation Regarding coordinating interests and addressing conflicts under the legal framework, it is important that negotiations or third-party mediation can be carried out between two parties with different interests and opinions. Negotiations and mediation require that both parties believe that it is possible to settle the dispute with the other party and to make certain compromises for settlement. More importantly, it is necessary to prepare alternative solutions and to have sufficient negotiation and mediation skills. Unfortunately, however, efficient and effective negotiations or mediation has yet to occur. 3.1.6 Cooperation In 2013, FON and the Qujing Environmental Protection Bureau (QJEPB) jointly filed environmental public interest litigation against Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (Luliang Chemical) and Luliang Heping Technology Co., Ltd. (Luliang Heping). This is a case of cooperation between environmental NGOs and governments. Hangzhou Eco-culture Association (HZECA)—an environmental NGO which was registered at Hangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Department in 2010 and became China’s first ever environmental NGO with a CPC committee and a trade union in 2012—received 500,000 yuan from the central government for the procurement of its participation in public service projects in 2013. It conducted activities including: organizing the protection of the main and tributary streams of the Qiantang River by means of patrols; partnering with relevant environmental authorities to build an interactive environmental monitoring model involving collaboration from the public; accepting an invitation from Zhejiang Environmental Protection Bureau to assist in the enforcement of administrative laws; and participating in the coordination of massive protests caused by pollution in Pingyang County, Wenzhou City. Registered as an NGO in 2005, Shaanxi Volunteer Mothers Association for Environmental Protection partnered with Shaanxi Women’s Federation and Shaanxi Provincial Environmental Protection Department in an initiative intended to turn tens of thousands of households into demonstrative “green homes.” This also is a way of cooperation between environmental NGOs and governments. Some foreign or international NGOs have long been working with the Chinese government. They have invested much in relevant projects in which they partner with the Chinese government.

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3.2 Citizen Actions—Interactions between Citizens and Enterprises In fields relevant to the environment and ecosystems, interactions that citizens can carry out with enterprises, or other organizations that differ from citizens in terms of interests and opinions, in order to protect their rights to health and environment include: revelation and criticism; boycott; struggling, pressuring and claiming; exchange of opinions, dialogs and negotiations; cooperation; civil action, reporting, accusation, giving tip-offs and private prosecution; and mediation. 3.2.1 Revelation and Criticism Although the MEP already made a policy in 2013 to require that state-controlled enterprises (SCEs) disclose environmental information on their own initiative, environmental authorities should also disclose regulatory information on such enterprises.23 Nonetheless, there is no reason to be optimistic about public access to information on pollution by enterprises in the foreseeable future. As a result, the Pollution Map database created by the IPE remains significant. The Pollution Map database contains information on the results of pollution investigations by environmental authorities and punishment imposed by them on relevant enterprises as the polluters. By the end of December 2013, this database contained over 130,000 non-compliance records for about 100,000 enterprises released by local environmental regulators since 2004.24 Greenpeace has published five consecutive reports that reveal how heavy metals and toxic chemicals, which have yet to enter the list of substances that should be measured as published by the Chinese government, relate to the occurrence of cancers and the interference with the endocrine systems of human beings and animals, which may affect their fertility. Heavy metals and toxic chemicals in wastewater from enterprises related to clothing 23  The Measures for Major State-Monitored Enterprises to Monitor Themselves and Disclose Information (Trial) (the draft for comments) and the Measures for Monitoring and Disclosing Information on Sources of Pollution from Major State-Monitored Enterprises (Trial) (the draft for comments) issued by the MEP. There were 15,797 major state-monitored enterprises across China in 2013, including 4,944 wastewater treatment plants, 4,189 waste gas treatment plants, 3,581 sewage treatment plants, 2,834 heavy metal makers, and 249 large-scale livestock/poultry farms, according to the List of Major State-monitored Enterprises 2013. 24  They include 91,356 records about water pollution, 32,384 records about air pollution, 2,965 records about solid wastes, 319 records about heavy metal pollution, 667 records about exhaust gas from motor vehicles, and 18,266 record about procedural noncompliance. The sum of these figures exceeds the actual amount (i.e., 137,890) of records in this database, because some enterprises have violated environmental laws/regulations in more than one aspect.

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production can hardly degrade naturally and, instead, may accumulate in living things through the food chain or move through ocean and air currents and the food chain to distant places or even to the polar regions, posing great threats to the health or even survival of human beings and other living things. Thanks to efforts by Greenpeace, these reports have led to over 6,000 media reports worldwide and 8,000,000 views within 10 hours after being released on t.qq.com. The aforementioned reports co-published by 14 environmental organizations such as IPE and FON about pollution by the textile, IT, and cement industries reveal severe pollution illegally caused by enterprises in these industries. Media reporters have never stopped revealing pollution and damages to ecosystems and the resulting impact on public health. As an early example, Tao Haijun reported on excessively high blood lead levels (BLL) of over 800 persons in Huixian County, Gansu Province. More recently, media reporters such as Liu Yiman reported on Chinese cities being surrounded by petrochemical facilities, CNPC or Sinopec launching projects without government approval, local governments illegally approving particular projects, failure to satisfy health requirements regarding safe distances, and failure to remove residents from within such distances.25 In addition, individual citizens have also produced certain effects by revealing pollution via online platforms in China such as Sina Weibo (microblogging), WeChat (messaging and calling app) and Fetion (instant messaging client). As for public figures, for example, Pan Shiyi forwarded, via Sina Weibo, screenshots of Microsoft PowerPoint slides relevant to PM 2.5 and the mortality rate of lung cancer; Ren Zhiqiang posted, also via Sina Weibo, evidence of the seemingly unstoppable pollution by enterprises. 3.2.2 Boycott Boycotting products from certain companies is a kind of consumer campaign used outside China. Consumers may opt to boycott products from companies that cause pollution, damage ecosystems, and/or pay little attention to or infringe upon labor rights. There have been only a few such actions in China. As an example, fifty NGOs formed the Green Choice Alliance (GCA) to identify sources of pollution and to force large companies to not use enterprises with the aforementioned bad behavior as their suppliers. This is one of those actions in which large companies are pressured to not deal with enterprises with bad behaviors, such as polluting the environment. As a type of boycott that has yet to gain momentum in China, there are Chinese individuals who boycott cadmium-polluted rice or release or forward 25  Liu Yiman, Wang Zhiliang, and Huang Kejie, “Chinese cities are being surrounded by petrochemical projects,” Oriental Outlook, 2013, Issue 35.

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information, via Internet platforms such as Sina Weibo, on identifying and boycotting genetically-modified and unhealthy foods (including dairy products) or clothing. 3.2.3 Protesting, Pressuring, and Claiming Compensations Citizen actions against enterprises can be taken by directly protesting, or pressuring enterprises that have caused, or may cause, pollution and damages to ecosystems, or by claiming, as victims, compensations for damages from such enterprises. Such actions are exemplified by the aforementioned protests: in the city of Shifang, Sichuan Province caused by public concerns about potential environmental pollution caused by a molybdenum and copper smelting project; in the city of Qidong, Jiangsu Province due to public concerns about the potential effects of a papermaking and wastewater discharge project of the Japan-based Oji Holdings Corporation on the local ecosystem and offshore fish farming; and in the Zhenhai District, Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province due to objection to the expansion of a PX plant in 2012. These three projects have since been terminated or relocated as a result of objection from the local public. In addition, the Ta Foundation, a Beijing-based animal protection organization, partook in such a citizen action in 2012, when it partnered with 72 famous persons to write a letter to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) against the IPO of Guizhentang Pharmaceutical Company that specializes in raising black bears and extracting bile out of living bears. 3.2.4 Negotiations and Dialogues Citizen actions against enterprises can also exchange opinions or holding dialogues and negotiations, rather than confrontations, to stop pollution and damages to ecosystems, coordinate interests, or even have relevant enterprises compensate the victims and nature, take action to reduce pollution and participate in the rehabilitation of ecosystems. By publishing reports on pollution caused by the textile and garment industries, Greenpeace has managed to force 17 well-known Chinese and international clothing makers to talk with it before promising that they would not discharge toxic pollutants in the future. By publishing similar reports and forming the GCA, environmental NGOs such as IPE have successfully made over 1,000 enterprises disclose pollution information and over 160 enterprises receive audits monitored by NGOs while urging large companies to identify polluters across their respective supply chains and to pressure suppliers that have caused severe pollution, thereby contributing to environmental improvement.

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In reality, there are quite a few cases where citizens, environmental organ­ izations, and enterprises address pollution and other issues by exchanging opinions or holding dialogues and negotiations. Nonetheless, enterprises in a transitional China, especially the ones backed by local governments, typically disdain talking with the public, not to mention handling disputes through negotiations with them. 3.2.5 Cooperation To help some polluters seek solutions, Greenpeace held workshops on safe chemical alternatives in the cities of Shenzhen, Beijing, and Hangzhou in 2011 through 2013, presenting EU experience and the status of relevant Chinese policies while discussing with the attending companies on how to reduce pollution. Environmental NGOs such as Green Watershed and FON work with financial institutions to promote green credit. This process has been recorded by Green Credit Footprint of Chinese Banks, which was co-authored by Yu Xiaogang et al. and published by the China Environmental Science Press (CESP) in 2013, and the 2009, 2010 and 2011 editions of the Environmental Record of Chinese Banks. Cooperation between environmentalists and enterprises is exemplified by Huo Daishan, the head of the Huaihe River Guardian as an environmental NGO, and Henan Lianhua Gourmet Powder Co., Ltd., with which Huo finally worked to handle pollution instead of struggling with it as he did in the early period. 3.2.6

Civil Action, Reporting, Accusation, Giving Tip-offs, and Private Prosecution Lawsuits against enterprises for pollution and damages to ecosystems include: civil action, where the one who filed the complainant, whose rights has been infringed upon, requires the stopping of infringement, the elimination of dangers, restoration and/or compensation; criminal cases, where reporting or accusation is made, or tip-offs are given to the police or the public prosecutor’s office; and private prosecution. Public interest litigation is a new type of litigation intended to protect citizen rights to health, the environment, and ecosystems. It is also a major development beyond the traditional judicial system and legal theories. In 2013, the Center for the Protection of the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens (CPRDC), backed by the Asian Legal Resource Center (ALRC), had a lawyer file a suit against Luliang Heping on behalf of Wu Shuliang, a peasant in

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Qujing City, Yunnan Province, for the death of his son Wu Wenyong as a result of chromium slag pollution by the defendant, requesting the company to pay compensation. The court rejected this lawsuit, saying that “it is impossible to prove the cause-and-effect relationship between the death of Wu Wenyong and chromium slag pollution.” Wu Shuliang appealed to the Qujing Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, which upheld the original ruling. In 2013, a two-year lawsuit filed jointly by FON, the Green Volunteer League of Chongqing (GVLCQ) and QJEPB against Luliang Chemical and Luliang Heping for chromium slag pollution, became stagnant once again after the defendants refused to sign a settlement agreement already reached under the authority of the court. The year 2013 saw nine environmental lawsuits on behalf of public interest rejected by the courts, including two lawsuits filed separately by FON and the Headstream Lovers’ Environmental Institute (Headstream Lovers)—a Fengtai District, Beijing City-based environmental NGO—against China Shenhua Coal to Liquid and Chemical Co., Ltd. (CSCLC) and its branch in Ordos City, Inner Mongolia for excessive groundwater exploitation and wastewater discharge, and seven lawsuits filed by ACEF. Altogether, Chinese courts heard twelve such lawsuits filed by environmental NGOs between 2009 and 2013. Nowadays, there are cases, from time to time, where victims of pollution are charged with “gathering people to disturb public order” in their struggle with the polluters or are charged with “extortion” in claiming compensation from the latter. Accordingly, growing attention has been paid to Wei Kaizu and Yu Dinghai from Zhongxiang City, Hubei Province, Chen Fengying from Xinhua County, Hunan Province, Liu Futang from Hainan Province, and Wu Lihong known as the Guardian of Taihu Lake. In 2013, Chinese lawyers such as Zeng Xiangbin, Yang, Xia Jun, Zhao Jingwei, Zhao Li, Zhang Danjie, Wan Jue, and Zhou Hua formed the Group of Lawyers for Environmental Public Interest, announcing that they would provide legal services for victims of environmental pollution, environmental organizations, and environmentalists across China. In July, Wuhan University Public Interest and Development Law Institute (PILDI) and Green Anhui co-held the Workshop on Environmental Legal Empowerment in Huangshan City, Anhui Province. In December, Green Han River set up an environmental law department. Both FON and ACEF have long had departments specializing in environmental litigation. The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) is an organization specializing in environmental litigation. Nonetheless, since China has yet to launch comprehensive, in-depth reforms including the reform of its judicial system, the right of action still faces various constraints. There are many occasions when lawsuits regarding environmental

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and ecosystem damages are rejected by the courts. China’s judiciary still plays a limited role in incidents where citizen rights to health and environment are infringed upon or public interest regarding the environment and ecosystems is harmed. 3.2.7 Mediation Unlike in interactions between citizens and governments, there are more possibilities of third-party mediation in interactions between citizens and enterprises. Mediation will hopefully become a low-cost way of solving issues in assisting victims of pollution and realizing environmental equity, if China evolves toward an equitable market economy and a society under the rule of law. Mediation can be more flexible than litigation. 3.3 Citizen Actions—Changing Oneself While Influencing Others Changing oneself is important, especially when everybody may become a victim of pollution and ecosystem deterioration while being a participant in polluting the environment and damaging ecosystems. First of all, it is necessary to change the old ways of survival, production, and living. Secondly, it is necessary to improve the micro-environment through self- and mutual-assistance. 3.3.1 Changing the Old Ways of Survival, Production, and Living For the purpose of sustainability, people should change the old ways of survival, production, and living, whether they are urban or rural residents, or whether they live on grasslands, in forest-covered or mountainous areas, or near rivers, lakes, or seas. A man in his forties, Li Peng, left the farm and began doing business in 1986, before returning to his hometown and becoming a woodland development contractor in 2001. He partnered with other contractors and forest farmers to set up a voluntary forest patrol team for forest patrol, management, and ­protection. As both the team and the patrol area expanded, they established the Tongbai County Forest Protection Association in 2009. This organization now has about 100 members. Li Weihong, a Tibetan, studied how to grow grapes without the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers in her own grape vineyard. She has made videos as materials to teach other villagers how to grow grapes in an eco-friendly manner. A resident in Guodong Village, Jiahe Township, Minqin County, Gansu Province, Ma Junhe founded a website called “Save Minqin” (www.minqin.cn) in 2005. He founded the Volunteers Association for Saving Minqin County in 2006 and has since acted as the director of this NGO. From 2007 onward, they

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have been carrying out a local program intended to reduce the area of deserts mainly by planting saxaul and burying wheat straws to obstruct sand movement. Up until now, they have finished the rehabilitation of 166.67 hectares of desertified land, bringing local peasants over 200,000 yuan worth of labor service income in cash. In addition, they have got “Lehuo Shabao” (it literally means “a happy life with treasures from the desert”) registered as a trademark and are trying to conduct commercial promotion for their products in order to help local villagers increase income through the rehabilitation of desertified land. FON invited nearly 60 volunteer families in Beijing to participate in an initiative named the Low-Carbon Home. These families were required to use energy-saving products and technologies at home, including solar power and heating, low-cost thermal insulation, green plants to improve the air, and toxicity-free remodeling; this reduced energy consumption and improved their indoor environment, assuring the quality of life. In addition, we should be able to maintain survival with dignity and high quality if we start categorizing waste, using wastes such has leftovers and food scraps to make enzymes, minimizing the use of plastic bags and cars, travelling by bike or on foot as often as possible, and rejecting consumerism by means of moderate consumption in place of over-consumption. 3.3.2 Self- and Mutual-Assistance The GHUB, for example, promoted the My Water Measurement Kit in an initiative named the Missing Water Action. Citizen actions intend to seek protection from pollution are exemplified by: self-measurement of the air; indoor methanol measurement by a paid professional organization; the purchase of drinking-water dispensers, bottled water, water cleaning equipment and/or air purifiers; the growing of green plants including vegetables at home; the ordering of eco-friendly farm produce, and the contracting of farmland in suburbs to grow vegetables by oneself; and the emergence of communitysupported agriculture (CSA) such as the Country Fair, the Tianfuyuan Organic Farm Club, and the Little Donkey Farm in Beijing. Other actions also include people helping each other. It is noteworthy, however, that it is difficult for the aforementioned selfassistance to solve relevant problems for most people and, at least, does not fit the lifestyle of rural-urban migrants and low-income urban residents. 3.4 Citizen Actions—Facing Society and Nature Alike Actions that relate to environmental and ecosystem protection rather than target particular individuals, groups, or organizations may include donation and

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voluntary action, measurement and monitoring, protection and rehabilitation, education and training, and examination and research. 3.4.1 Donation and Voluntary Action Good deeds include donation for environmental and ecosystem protection, tree planting, garbage removal, and the protection of plants, animals, and the landscape. 3.4.2 Measurement and Monitoring There are occasions when some people or organizations carry out measurement and continuous monitoring of certain pollution or conditions in certain areas in order to identify where the pollution is from and who has caused it. Greenpeace, for example, has carried out initiatives to secure samples from hidden pipelines through which the targeted enterprises discharge wastewater, before making measurement and toxicity analysis. Such actions require professional skills and lead to high risks. Greenpeace is therefore under heavy pressure in facing enterprises including MNCs that are in pursuit of profits and local governments obsessed with GDP growth. On the other hand, however, Greenpeace has set a good example, as a doer, for environmental NGOs by planning these initiatives, publishing and promoting the resulting reports, and choosing the right strategies for drawing attention and increasing influence. Among actions similar to the ones by Greenpeace, Green Hunan has launched the Guard the Mother River program. It has set up 10 volunteer monitoring stations and 63 daily monitoring points along six Level 1 tributaries and two heavily-polluted areas in the Xiangjiang River basin outside the government’s environmental monitoring system. Sixty-one volunteers, who form the core of Green Hunan, regularly monitor the ecosystem in this river basin. This environmental NGO has published Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI): Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 14 Cities and Autonomous Prefectures across Hunan Province 2010–2011, Report on the Ecosystem in the Xiangjiang River Basin, and Assessment on the Environmental Performance of Listed Hunan-based Companies. In addition, Green Hunan has urged local governments to enforce environmental laws and regulations in the field more than 20 times. The monitoring team in Lianshui County alone managed to force dozens of local enterprises to shut down, stop production, or take corrective action in just a year. In 2012, the Wuhan-based branch of FON launched a program named Measure Air in Wuhan by raising money to buy measurement equipment before measuring air quality and releasing the results on social networking sites. It released information on a rapid decrease in air quality at the earliest

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possible time after severe brown smog covered large portions of central China (the concentration of PM 2.5 exceeded 613 μg/m3 for some time), calling on the local government to release similar information as soon as possible. Xiran Jiangcuo, the head of the CPC committee of the Haxiu Township, Yushu County, Gansu Province worked with the Beijing-based SHAN SHUI to set up the Villagers’ Resources Center (VRC)—an environmental organization that respects local community traditions and allows local herdsmen to may join voluntarily—in Yunta Village with abundant wildlife resources. VRC also monitors bharal, providing their data to Peking University for use in a research program called Snow Leopard vs. Bharal—Relationship between the Predator and the Prey. In 2013, the Haxiu Township was recognized as Yushu County’s first ever “Demonstrative Township toward Eco-civilization.” Environmental NGO Green Quzhou has set up three waters patrol teams to carry out weekly patrols on the Changshan, Jiangshan, and Wuxi Rivers. By so doing, they aim to protect the local aquatic environment, monitor the quality of water including runoffs, identify sources of industrial wastewater, and visit residents along these rivers. These teams have identified several hundred environmental pollution incidents and reported dozens of them to the local environmental authority in addition to addressing these incidents by acting to stop them or communicating with relevant organizations. 3.4.3 Protection and Rehabilitation Citizen actions through direct participation in ecosystem protection and environmental rehabilitation appear to be quiet with limited recognition across society, but such participation is valuable. Nan Jia, a Tibetan herdsman living near the Qinghai Lake, has saved 12 Przewalski’s gazelles and five Tibetan gazelles. He raised 50,000 yuan to rent a grassland over 67 hectares in area for keeping nearly 200 Przewalski’s gazelles. He works with his family and friends to rehabilitate desertified grasslands, about 133 hectares of which had been revitalized by the end of 2012. He also works with other volunteers to protect the Xiaobo Lake wetland, enabling 24 black-necked cranes to inhabit there. In addition, he often removes garbage from around the Qinghai Lake and stops illegal fishing of naked carp. The Yueyang Finless Porpoise Protection Association has spent over 1.20 million yuan setting up a river patrol team and www.fpchina.net. This organization aims to stop illegal fishing; it has managed to prevent 54 fishing boats from fishing by electric shock in 2012 alone. In addition, it has helped over 100 fishermen get employed outside the fishing industry. Wang Sanyi, a peasant in Anqing City, Anhui Province, founded the Caizi Lake Wetland Ecosystem Protection Association with members comprising of fishermen, peasants, and journalists from three counties and districts around the

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Caizi Lake, including Tongcheng, Zongyang, and Yixiu. He spent 15,450 yuan disseminating relevant environmental information and 15,000 yuan building a watchtower for the purposes of protecting the wetland ecosystem. In addition, he bought over 1,500 kilograms of wheat as food for migratory birds in the winter. In 2012, dozens of oriental storks were found to have been poisoned in the Beidagang Wetland Reserve in Tianjin City, before receiving much attention from Internet users. As a result, journalist Deng Fei co-founded a national alliance of bird protectors, set up a fund named the Let Migratory Birds Fly Foundation, and enabled joint actions by environmental NGOs and China’s forestry authority against the massive hunting of migratory birds. Zheng Yuanying, the founder and head of the Hangzhou-based Ai Lv Environmental Culture Center, has been promoting a program called Improve Water Through Young Fish. 14 events have been carried out throughout Zhejiang province in the cities of Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Quzhou, Huzhou, Taizhou, and Wenzhou, with over 50,000 participants in all. A total of six million fish fries that eat algae have been put into local rivers. 13 environmental organizations and over 80 government authorities, media outlets, and enterprises across Zhejiang Province have been involved in these events. In 2013, the Zhejiang Non-Governmental Aquatic Environment Protection Work Committee was founded as a collaboration mechanism among regional environmental NGOs. Park Sang-ho, a South Korean and head of the EcoPeaceAsia China office, has been working with the Jilin Provincial Department of Forestry, Hongri Grass Industry, and South Korea-based organizations. Having worked on the ­rehabilitation of desertified land in China for a decade, Park Sang-ho offers seeds and equipment, with labor and tractors from local herdsmen. They finished the bio-rehabilitation of about 50,000 hectares of desertified land between 2008 and 2012. Since 2008, Park Sang-ho also started organizing South Korean university students to come to China as volunteers. Here they participated in the rehabilitation of areas that were the sources of sandstorms while understanding the nomadic culture unique to the grasslands from a new perspective. 4

Reflection on the Future of Humankind

There are a few questions that need to be answered: First of all, the Club of Rome proposed the idea that there are limits to economic growth back in 1972. Today, what do we think of resources exhaustion, environmental pollution, ecological imbalance, and above all, human development?

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Secondly, are the existing environment- and ecosystem-friendly measures no more than an end-of-pipe treatment? Nowadays, China differs from other countries in that pollution and damages to ecosystems are made with the knowledge of their consequences. To address environment- and ecosystemrelevant issues, therefore, should we thoroughly change our minds so as to stop correcting “big wrongs” with “small rights”? Thirdly, some people argue that environmental problems can be solved only after economic growth is achieved. Nonetheless, given that almost all members of Chinese society have agreed, in all respects, that “A big pie brings only benefits and no harms,” some researchers have pointed out that this idea is absolutely a major misconception. The point lies in not the size of the pie, but the presence of justice.26 Is human society really faced with a dilemma—economic growth necessitates damages to ecosystems, and environmental protection always means economic stagnation or even recession such that many people find it difficult to rid themselves of poverty or have to come to terms with a lower quality of life? Fourth, if it is necessary to solve environment- and ecosystem-relevant issues, then how should we do it? Should the state authorities do it for the public or organize them in doing it, or are both public engagement and cooperation among the public, governments, and enterprises required? If public engagement is required for the resolution of environment- and ecosystem-relevant issues, then does it presuppose the availability of the right to access environmental information? To address these issues, there must be sufficient, issue-specific debates among groups with different interests, claims, and ways of survival so as to reach a basic agreement required for coexistence. Only by so doing can human beings possibly avoid ruining themselves and achieve sustainability. 26  Zheng Yefu, How to Address Problems with Education in China, CITIC Press, 2013.

CHAPTER 1

Competition for Water Resources and Its Economic and Political Implications GUO Weiqing and ZHOU Yu Abstract This paper differentiates the causes of competition for water into a lack of water resources and relevant government policies. It explains how such competition has evolved under the influence of factors, such as the need to achieve economic development in a system under which local governments compete with each other, water resources strategies that fall within the context of political economy and that are characterized by a close combination of water resources projects, political interests, and economic development. In addition, this paper raises basic questions that need to be addressed in water governance under new political thinking.

Keywords competition for water due to a lack of water resources and government policies – a system under which local governments compete with each other – lack of river basin management – water politics

The shortage of water resources has become one of the toughest challenges that must be addressed in the development of China. A piece of news about Dongting Lake became noteworthy in 2013. According to a report, the water level of Dongting Lake was dropping rapidly since the volume of water flowing into the Dongting Lake from the Yangtze River was on a continuous decline due to a water storage test at the Three Gorges Dam. Water flowed into the Dongting Lake from the Yangtze River at three locations (i.e., Songzi, Taiping and Ouchi) at a combined rate of 130,000 m3/s in early September 2013, before it dropped sharply to only 119 m3/s on the September 24. The combined rate at which water flowed into Dongting Lake from the abovementioned three locations and four rivers (i.e., the Xiang, Zi, Yuan, and Li Rivers) was 1,664 m3/

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_003

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second, as opposed to 2,310 m3/second, the rate at which water flew out of this lake.1 The water crisis facing Dongting Lake is not only a problem in Hunan Province, but is the epitome of the ecological mess throughout the Yangtze River basin in terms of water resources. The same thing is true with all river basins across China. This situation has led to fierce interregional competition for water resources. Given the pressure to achieve economic development and the current system under which local governments compete with each other, competition for water resources has brought about a series of complex implications in the economic, political, societal, and ecological aspects, which all require careful analysis. 1 Introduction China ranks fifth in the world in terms of total freshwater resources, although it sees an average volume of water resources per capita of less than 2,000 m3/ year, which is much lower than the global average per capita at nearly 6,200 m3/year.2 Water resources are unevenly distributed among Chinese regions as a result of climate change, precipitation, farming methods, population, and economic activities. Some regions, such as North and Northwest China, suffer from a severe lack of water, whereas other regions, such as the Pearl River Delta and the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River, have ample water resources. Nowadays, a shortage of water resources, flood prevention and control, and water pollution prevention and control are three major aspects of the water issue in China.3 Among them, a shortage of water resources has led to competition, whether obvious or not, between areas, bargaining among the local and central governments and the water resources authorities, and widespread ecological, political, and societal effects. There is even competition for 1  Liu Dexin and Chang Shiming, “The amount of water flowing out of Dongting Lake has become much greater than the water flowing into it due to a water storage test for 2013 at the Three Gorges Dam,” Hunan Daily, 8, October 25, 2013. 2  Scott Moore, “Issue Brief: Water Resource Issues, Policy and Politics in China,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/water-politics-china-moore (accessed February 12, 2013). 3  Ma Jun, “Water resource issues in China,” Universities Service Centre for China Studies, www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=2600.

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water resources, to varying extents, in areas covered by any of China’s seven largest river systems, not to mention in areas suffering from a severe lack of water resources and/or heavy water pollution, such as the Huai River basin and North and Northwest China, where both local governments at all levels and the masses compete for water resources more fiercely. Competition for water resources is carried out mainly by building dams, water gates, and other water control works. Local governments compete for water resources with direct objectives that have much to do with the general need for local economic and welfare development, although they have broader and deeper considerations. With an increasing shortage of water resources, competition for water has escalated into a strategic need. The water strategy has become critical whether for maintaining developmental advantages or for getting rid of developmental disadvantages. It is obvious in every river basin that all local governments are planning their respective strategic deployment centered on the competition for water resources. Retaining local water resources while securing more flowing water resources relates to leadership in development, having a louder voice regarding developmental issues and reshaping the competitive landscape. Competition for water resources has become very fierce due to the current system under which local governments compete with each other. Unfortunately, the resulting consequences may be detrimental to national policies intended to address the issue of uneven spatial distribution of available water in China. In addition, competition for water will bring about project and ecological risks in areas where water control works have been, or are being, built. Stakeholders in competition for local water resources mainly include: local governments around particular river basins, including townships, counties, and provinces; the central government, its water resources authorities, and river basin commissions under the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR); and private individuals and organizations, including the media, participants in decision-making, scientists, Internet users, and inhabitants. Among them, local governments play a leading role whether in inter- or intraprovincial water resource disputes. On the one hand, the governments of townships, counties, and provinces all aim to increase local revenues and promote local economic development by making and enforcing decisions and lobbying. On the other hand, there are perennial conflicts between national policies and the localness of water resources. Rounds of bargaining among the abovementioned stakeholders for water resources have now become the epitome of water politics in China. In other words, local governments always do their utmost, under the existing legal and administrative systems, to use all

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possible resources in repeatedly negotiating and bargaining with other local governments as rivals and the central government as the coordinator for the rights to water. Regarding recent incidents in competition for the rights to water, in particular river basins, the most reported and debated ones mainly include: the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan competing for water resources; provinces along the Yellow River competing for water resources; the Jiangxi provincial government’s plan of building a large dam on Poyang Lake and its implications on the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River;4 competition for water resources between water diversion, and power generation projects in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. These incidents occur in different geographical surroundings and reflect the different behavioral strategies of local governments, but they are all essentially intended to offset the negative effects of deficiencies in geographical surroundings, unbalanced water management systems, and local incentives with the dynamic balance of bargaining among the stakeholders. This thereby achieves temporary local stability (e.g., the success of preventing certain parts of the Yellow River from drying up5 and the management of Taihu Lake across administrative areas). Given the outstanding endogenous nature of water politics, every instance of competition has its own characteristics with respect to geographic areas and local policies; the resulting experience is not helpful enough to be generalized. Maintaining the abovementioned stability cannot guarantee local governments’ proper use of water resources. Securing the rights to water also cannot guarantee that local governments will make great efforts in maintaining the ecosystems around water resources (e.g., by growing forests for ecological restoration and controlling the generation of domestic and industrial wastes). This paper will analyze typical cases of two types of competition for water resources—competition in the traditional type of local protectionism and 4  Chinese provinces in the Yangtze River Basin have been suffering from lower water levels of this river over the past few years, with severe negative effects on production activities and people’s lives during the dry season. These provinces generally blame the building of the Three Gorges Dam for the depletion of local water resources, although some researchers argue that this problem results from various factors such as climate change, population growth, and the ineffectiveness of upstream ecosystem protection programs. 5  Hu Angang and Wang Yahua, “Transformation of water resource utilization to sustainability from the traditional mindset: initial assessment on efforts to prevent parts of the Yellow River from drying up (2000–2004),” 2005 (Part 1); Scott Moore, “Issue Brief: Water Resource Issues, Policy and Politics in China,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ papers/2013/02/water-politics-china-moore (accessed February 12, 2013).

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in the context of political economy. We hope that, through these typical cases, we can identify the structural and strategic factors of competition for water resources in China in order to explain water politics in China and envision its future. 2

Competition Among the Provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan for the Zhang River: Local Protectionism for Water Resources

Water disputes have existed since in ancient times, when government officials, squires, and the masses of the two localities involved in such a dispute confronted each other. There are no essential differences between the current competition among the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan for the Zhang River and water disputes in ancient times—to prevent floods and access water, the local governments and masses compete, or competed, for the rights to water with local interests at the core. 2.1 Local Backgrounds The provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan are all water-scarce areas, each with an average volume of water resources per capita at about 50% of the nationwide average. Under the Plan of Distributing Water Available from the Yellow River approved by the State Council, China’s cabinet, in 1987, the allowable maximum volume of water available to provinces in the Yellow River basin is 37.0 billion m3, including 4.31, 2.0 and 5.54 billion m3 to Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan, respectively. This plan has since remained unchanged. Each of these provinces is faced with distinctive problems with the use of water resources. The water-scarce Hebei Province, for example, has to supply water to Beijing to guarantee water availability for this city. In Shanxi Province, the South-toNorth Water Diversion Project (S2NWDP) has failed to alleviate the local water crisis. Corn, which is one of the main crops in these three provinces, happens to be highly water consuming; additional strain is placed by the increase of water consumption in the local industrial sector for activities such as coal mining. Since water from the Yellow River is not enough for use, local rivers and groundwater have both become important sources of water for economic development and domestic use in the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan. Exploiting local rivers has become a necessary evil for each province under the current system. Shanxi has taken a dominant position in the exploitation of interprovincial rivers since both Hebei and Henan are downstream areas; as a result, both Hebei and Henan play a passive role in the competition for water resources.

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Competition for Water Resources Characterized by Local Protectionism The Zhang River’s water resources are geographically and historically meaningful for both Shanxi and Hebei, especially in the areas that it runs through. The only source of water for the urban and rural areas of Shanxi and Hebei are in its basin. The Zhang River is known as the “Mother River” in cities in Shanxi Province, such as Changzhi City, and rural areas, such as Cixian County, and supports industrial and agricultural production activities and people’s lives. In the downstream provinces of Hebei and Henan, the Zhang River is also the primary source of water for the cities of Handan and Anyang as well as other surrounding areas in its basin, which has a combined urban population of nearly three million. There have been water disputes regarding the Zhang River between the upstream Shanxi and the downstream Hebei and Henan for 50 years. The walls of the main channel of the Red Flag Canal, an irrigation canal built in the 1960s to divert water from the Zhang River, were simultaneously demolished at two locations in 1992 due to a water dispute between the Baishan Village in Hebei and the Panyang Village in Henan.6 Given frequent water disputes in this region, the Haihe Water Resources Commission (HHWRC) of the MWR, which is responsible for managing the Zhang River basin, set up the Zhanghe Upper Reaches Administration (ZHURA) to manage water distribution and the watercourse, monitor and control water quality, and address water disputes along the 108-km-long stretch of the Zhang River. This being said, there has been no clearly defined water distribution scheme for the other parts of the Zhang River basin. There remain frequent water disputes in the form of massive fights along the Zhang River. With an active role in water disputes involving the abovementioned three provinces that have lasted for nearly five decades, Shanxi Province has been exploiting the upper reaches of the Zhang River for 10 years. A province in the Yellow River basin, Shanxi is one of the most water-scarce provinces in China. The shortage of water resources, including water for industrial and domestic use, is always one of the biggest problems facing Shanxi. As an example, the coal mining industry in Shanxi known for being water-hungry and well developed satisfies its water consumption needs mainly by exploiting groundwater. The resulting overexploitation of groundwater has led to land subsidence and poor water quality across Shanxi. Before 2006, in terms of surface water resources, Shanxi had been waiting for its share of water from the S2NWDP, on the one hand, and hoping to 2.2

6  Yao Haiying, “The walls of the Red Flag Canal were demolished amid competition for water,” New Weekly, October 26, 2004.

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alleviate the shortage of water resources through the Yellow River Water Diversion Project, on the other. Unfortunately, however, the Yellow River Water Diversion Project has been performing below expectations since it was put into operation at the beginning of the 21st century. In addition to poor water quality and high water prices, it fails to reach the designed annual water flow of 1.2 billion m3 due to the Yellow River itself and climate. After Yu Youjun became the governor of Shanxi Province in 2006, he took decisive measures to exploit surface water and retain water resources in this province. A large number of dam building projects have since been launched throughout Shanxi. “We plan to finish a number of medium- and large-scale reservoirs and important water diversion projects within three to five years, build a lot of small reservoirs, dams and ponds, repair and reinforce reservoirs wherever necessary, and to store and make good use of rainwater,” wrote Yu Youjun in an article.7 Hebei Province is also faced with the same problems. All the rivers in Hebei have dried up or been heavily polluted as a result of industrial development, population expansion, and inefficient water use. Even the S2NWDP is also unable to alleviate the water crisis in Hebei. A water-scarce province that buys water from the Yellow River, Hebei has to supply 1.9 billion m3 of water to the cities of Tianjin and Beijing each year.8 With regards to the distribution of water resources of the Zhang River among Shanxi, Hebei and, Henan, there have long been detailed provisions in government documents. To deal with water disputes among the three provinces, ZHURA has launched water control works and market-oriented approaches, before seeing the alleviation of massive fights for water resources. Nonetheless, ZHURA manages only a limited amount of water resources and is not entitled to manage the part of the Zhang River basin in Shanxi Province. In addition to water disputes, competition for water resources in the Zhang River basin has been going on in a new manner in recent years—both Hebei and Henan object, by various means, to Shanxi’s building water control works in the upper reaches of the Zhang River. There are three important cases in this regard. In Case 1, Shanxi attempts to build the Wujiazhuang Reservoir on the Zhuozhang River, a tributary of the Zhang River in Shangyao Town, Licheng County, Changzhi City, but is unable to implement this plan due to objection from both Hebei and Henan. Some Shanxi-based delegates to the National 7  Yu Youjun, “Implement the water strategy under market economy thinking,” People’s Daily, August 29, 2007. 8  Jia Haifeng, “A survey on water disputes among the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan,” 21st Century Business Herald, Issue 10, 2008.

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People’s Congress (NPC) and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) submitted motions to NPC sessions or proposals to CPPCC sessions twice in 2009, calling for the central government to approve the Wujiazhuang Reservoir plan as early as possible. In the meantime, delegates of Hebei and Henan jointly submitted a motion in strong objection to this plan to an NPC session. From the city of Handan, Song Furu, the leading delegate in submitting this motion, believed that the Wujiazhuang Reservoir, if built, would cause a 52.6% decrease in the annual average volume of water flowing into Hebei, including a 23.6% decrease in the annual average volume of water flowing into the Yuecheng Reservoir in the city of Handan, producing severe effects on the supply of drinking water in the plains of southern Hebei Province. In addition, neither Hebei nor Henan would reach any agreement with Shanxi at a meeting held by the MWR to coordinate the building of the Wujiazhuang Reservoir.9 Some Handan- and Anyang-based NPC delegates jointly carried out research in October 2013 on the potential negative effects of the planned Wujiazhuang Reservoir on the downstream part of the Zhang River. To sum up, both Hebei and Henan strongly object to the building of the Wujiazhuang Reservoir.10 In Case 2, a water dispute occurred due to the launch of the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir project on the Qingzhang River, another tributary of the Zhang River, in Zuoquan County, Shanxi Province, in 2009. The phase 2 project of the Zecheng Xi’an Hydropower Station, also known as the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir, was kicked off as part of the General Hai River Basin Program formulated by the MWR in 1993. This project was designed to not only generate power but also store water. Down the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir, Shexian County, Hebei Province, which borders Shanxi Province, suffers from drought almost every year. Shexian County relies on the Qingzhang River and groundwater recharge as the sources of water for domestic use by as many as 400,000 people. A large number of water control works and hydropower stations have been built in this county, and they all rely on water flowing from Zuoquan County into the Qingzhang River. The competent authority of Hebei announced that it knew nothing about the plan to build a reservoir in Shanxi Province. Under China’s water law, the exploitation of water resources should simultaneously take into account the interests of the upstream and downstream areas, localities on both 9  Liu Bin, Kou Guoying and Yuan Weihua, “The plan to build the Wujiazhuang Reservoir in Shanxi must be canceled,” Yanzhao Metropolis Daily, March 14, 2010. 10  Wang Xiang, “NPC delegates research water resources of the Zhanghe River,” Handan Daily, October 24, 2013.

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banks, and other relevant areas. Moreover, the organization that plans a water resources development project involving other areas and/or sectors should first ask the competent authorities of these areas and/or sectors for opinion. This being said, Zuoquan County began building the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir without the knowledge of Shexian County. Given its size, the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir is more than a hydropower station, as it has an obvious function of water storage. In addition, “this reservoir was designed to supply water not to the downstream areas, but to the urban areas of Jinzhong City and other localities, according to Li Yonghong, the head of the Jinzhong Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).”11 Last but not least, the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir, if built, would produce a huge impact on Shexian County in terms of public welfare and economic development. As many as 160,000 people living along the Qingzhang River jointly sent a letter to the government of Shexian County in late 2009. The governments of Shexian and Zuoquan Counties submitted this dispute to the MWR and the HHWRC, both of which then ordered ZHURA to handle this issue and the government of Zuoquan County to suspend this project. Instead of suspending the Xiajiaozhang Reservoir project, however, the government of Zuoquan County went so far as to deny access to the site by setting checkpoints on the road to it.12 Facing the challenge from Hebei Province, the water resources authority of Shanxi Province replied that they were building a hydropower station, not a reservoir, which would produce few effects on the availability of water downstream. Xue Fenghai, Deputy Chief Engineer at the Shanxi Provincial Department of Water Resources, denied in an interview in late 2009 that 81.4% of all water resources of the Qingzhang River had been exploited in Shanxi Province.13 In Case 3, competition for water resources among the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan has become a delicate issue since the aniline leakage incident in Shanxi Province. On December 31, 2012, a certain amount of aniline was spilled into the Zhuozhang River as a result of a production accident by 11  Zuo Zhiying, “Shanxi Province is allegedly building a reservoir in the Zhanghe River Basin that would reduce water flowing to Shexian County, Hebei Province,” Southern Metropolis Daily, January 13, 2012. 12   Chen Yong, “Zuoquan County has not suspended the building of Zecheng Xi’an Hydropower Station, but denies access to the site by setting up checkpoints,” eeo.com.cn, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2010/0106/159924.shtml (accessed January 6, 2010). 13  Li Fan, “Shanxi Province says the building of a reservoir will not affect water use downstream,” cnr.cn, http://news.cnr.cn/gnxw/200912/t20091231_505835371.html (accessed December 31, 2009).

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Tianji Coal Chemical Industrial Group Co., Ltd., based in Lucheng City, Shanxi Province. The downstream cities of Handan and Anyang suspended water supply from the Zhang River on January 5, 2013. The government of Changzhi City in the upper reaches of the Zhang River had identified Lucheng City, where the aniline leakage occurred, as the industrial center of its administered areas, where Tianji Coal Chemical had become one of the pillars of the industrial economy. When developing this plan, the local government did not consider environmental risks against cities downstream of the Zhang River, according to an editorial.14 This case also suggests that the traditional competition for water resources will expand into the field of water pollution. 2.3 Local Protectionism vs. Water Resources Competition for water resources among Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan generally is caused by a shortage of water arising from natural resource endowment, and we refer to it as competition for water due to a lack of water resources. On the other hand, human activities such as the S2NWDP will also cause a shortage of, and competition for, water, and we refer to them as a shortage of, and competition for, water due to relevant government policies. Actions similar to the ones taken by the local governments in Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan are also being carried out in the basin of the Han River, the largest tributary of the Yangtze River. Like in the aftermath of competition for water due to a lack of water resources, a shortage of water due to relevant government policies, such as the S2NWDP, also will trigger a race to build dams throughout the Han River basin since this river is in the middle section of the main water source for the S2NWDP. There will be a series of nine reservoirs in the lower and middle reaches of the Han River. Under the water diversion plan for the middle section of the S2NWDP, the Danjiangkou Reservoir, a major water source in the upper reaches of the Han River, will supply over 9.0 billion m3 northward each year in the early stage and 13.0–14.0 billion m3 each year afterward. The Hubei provincial government submitted the Assessment Report on the Environmental Impact of the Middle Section of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project on the Lower and Middle Reaches of the Han River to the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Office of the State Council in 2006, arguing that water diversion will produce huge negative effects on the Han River itself and the Han River Plain.15 14  Song Fuli, “Water policies of three provinces in the Zhanghe River Basin,” The Economic Observer, January 14, 2013. 15  Zhou Chengsi, “Competition for water in the Hanjiang River Basin,” 21st Century Business Herald, May 26, 2011.

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In addition, the upstream province of Shaanxi has announced and initiated the Han River to Wei River Water Diversion Project due to a lack of water resources. To alleviate the impact of the S2NWDP on the availability of water for agricultural, domestic, and industrial purposes throughout the Han River basin, the Hubei provincial government proposed to the MWR the Yangtze River to Han River Water Diversion Project in 2008. Nonetheless, this is only the tip of the iceberg, as municipalities and provinces in the Han River basin have all joined in the competition for this river’s water resources. They are in a race to exploit the already overburdened Han River through local water diversion projects.16 It is generally believed by people, including researchers, that the primary cause of such exploitation lies in the impact of the Three Gorges Dam on the water flow downstream. We can see from the abovementioned cases that local protectionism constitutes an important reason for the fierce competition for water resources whether due to a lack of such resources or to relevant government policies. In addition to the need for economic benefits and the consumption of water in the river basin, a shortage of knowledge regarding water governance is an important cause of this competition for water resources. Has local protectionism aimed at certain benefits caused a permanent bottleneck in water governance? This is an issue that needs to be addressed by the competent administrations with broader thinking and better techniques. Also, participation by the masses in relevant river basins is needed to confirm the democratic nature and legality of every relevant policy and procedure. 3

A Water Control Work in Poyang Lake: Political Economy of Water Resources

The traditional competition for water resources arising from local protection has evolved—under the influence of factors such as the need to achieve economic development and the system under which local governments compete with each other—into a political economy of water resources characterized by a close combination of water resources projects, political interests, and economic development. The Jiangxi provincial government has dreamed, for decades, of building a large dam between Poyang Lake and the Yangtze River, but why was it not until 2013 that it began building such a dam? The primary 16  Wang Kunzuo, “Hubei has proposed the Yangtze River to Hanjiang River Water Diversion Project to the Ministry of Water Resources due to the overexploitation of the Hanjiang River by the South-to-North Water Diversion Project,” New Weekly, November 2, 2010.

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cause lies in that, under the current system in which local governments compete with each other, water resources are among the basic resources facilitating local GDP growth, the promotion of local government officials, and a new economic development pattern. The aspiration for a clean lake has become a determinant for Jiangxi Province to achieve a rise. 3.1 The Multidimensional Significance of Poyang Lake and Beneficiaries Poyang Lake, China’s largest freshwater lake, is situated in the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River. The ecosystem of Poyang Lake is significant, in multiple dimensions, for a less economically-developed, agriculturedominated central province like Jiangxi. This ecosystem also has significant effects on the inhabitants surrounding Poyang Lake. In the dimension of water resources, Poyang Lake not only belongs to Jiangxi Province, but also to the entirety of the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River. As a large lake that connects with the Yangtze River, Poyang Lake received floodwaters from the Yangtze River annually during the rainy summer until the Three Gorges Dam began functioning against floods in 2000. “If Poyang Lake did not receive any floodwater, the water level downstream of Hukou County would increase by 0.7m, adding to the pressure to prevent flooding in large cities such as Wuhan, Nanjing, and Shanghai.”17 Water flowing into Poyang Lake from the Yangtze River has become a rare phenomenon since the Three Gorges Dam was built. Instead, water typically flows into the Yangtze River from Poyang Lake since the water level of the former tends to be lower than that of the latter due to factors such as the Three Gorges Dam, climate, and ecological problems with the upper reaches of the Yangtze. Consequently, since the beginning of the 21st century, Poyang Lake has been faced with the danger of drying up. Under China’s water resources management system, the power of administering water resources and relevant projects is held by the MWR and its river basin commissions. In the case of Poyang Lake, for example, the MWR and the Changjiang Water Resources Commission (CJWRC) are among the stakeholders. In the dimension of ecosystem protection, Poyang Lake faced threats mainly from the floodwaters from July through September every year before the Three Gorges Dam was built. “The large number of shallows in Poyang Lake, plus different periods of flooding, adds to the difficulty of eliminating Oncomelania hupensis and, hence, leads to very high likelihood of inhabitants

17  Liu Yong, “The Poyang Lake control project: the dream of a peaceful lake has yet to come true,” Jiangxi Daily, August 26, 2009.

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around this lake being infected with schistosomiasis.”18 Also, due to the industrial development around the lake, “the eutrophication index of Poyang Lake has stayed around 48 over the past few years and is very close to the critical value of 50.”19 The extremely low water level in recent years has caused ecological damages to the national wetlands park that is the Poyang Lake wetland. In the winter of 2012, for example, over 500,000 migratory birds stayed around Poyang Lake. To feed these birds, the provincial government and the Poyang Lake reserve had no choice but to put 150 million and 720,000 young fish into Poyang Lake and the core lake of this reserve, respectively. China’s environmental and forestry authorities and local governments at all levels in Jiangxi Province are among the stakeholders in this dimension. In the third, and most important, dimension of economic development, the building of an eco-friendly economic zone around Poyang Lake has been the focus of developmental efforts in Jiangxi Province since Meng Jianzhu became the head of the Jiangxi Provincial CPC Committee. Jiangxi is the least economically developed among the six central Chinese provinces. By comparison, Hubei and Hunan as two other central provinces received the approval of the State Council to build the Wuhan City Circle and the Changsha-ZhuzhouXiangtan City Cluster, two resources-saving and environmentally friendly comprehensive reform pilot areas in China’s strategic program. Early in 2006, Jiangxi cities were also not on the list of the four city clusters backed by the Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Boosting the Rise of the Central Region. The city cluster around Poyang Lake was also not among the main areas listed in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan for the rise of China’s central region. The Jiangxi provincial government developed the concept of the “Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Belt” after Su Rong was appointed as the head of the Jiangxi Provincial CPC Committee in 2007. This local government submitted an application to the State Council in 2008, before receiving approval from the latter on December 12, 2009 for the Jiangxi Program for the Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Zone as a national strategy. Under this program, the Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Zone covers 30% of Jiangxi’s land area, 50% of its population, and at least 60% of its economy, with priorities given to environmental protection, water resources support systems, clean and safe energy supply systems, and integrated transport systems. This program’s objectives include b­ uilding agriculture, t­ ourism, 18  Jin Luyao et al., “Adhere to the principle of ‘be eco-friendly’ for a clean lake,” Jiangnan City Daily, January 8, 2011. 19  Deng Hai and Yu Dawei, “The Yangtze River: the severe drought in southern China in the aftermath of the Three Gorges Dam,” Caixin Century, June 2011.

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radio/TV, new energy, biotechnology, and aviation industry centers and reforming the centers of traditional industries such as copper, iron and steel, chemical, and automotive. The announcement of these strategic objectives has made the areas around Poyang Lake into the core of Jiangxi Province.20 This program can be implemented smoothly only if Jiangxi Province holds a firm grip on Poyang Lake’s resources and let it be free from disturbance caused by the CJWRC and neighboring provinces. Government planning reflects only one aspect of the economic significance of Poyang Lake. Inhabitants, counties, and cities around Poyang Lake rely on it to make a living or increase local revenues by exploiting its resources through such actions as illegally setting courses, extracting sand, randomly farming fish, and growing commercial trees. The degradation of the Poyang Lake ecosystem, which is caused by the Three Gorges Dam, climate change, and other factors, has had a huge economical impact on surrounding areas.21 As an example, severe drought in most recent years has caused heavy losses in the local fishing industry. The open water area of Poyang Lake shrank to only 600 km2, or less than 15% of this area in a typical rainy year, in late May 2011, a month that would otherwise have been the peak of fish reproduction. The severe drought has affected the production activities and lives of fishermen around the Poyang Lake. Poyang Lake’s water resources are in decline each year due to faster water outflow caused by illegal sand extraction and course setting as well as random fish farming and commercial tree growing in the surrounding counties and cities. Given the economic significance of Poyang Lake, local governments at all levels and the masses in Jiangxi Province have become stakeholders tied with each other. These stakeholders, with water resources and environmental authorities at the local and central levels, constitute a multi-party policy ecosystem, which has made Poyang Lake the central node in a fragmented water governance system. 3.2 Multi-Party Bargaining in Building Water Control Works Endowed with unique natural resources, Poyang Lake is economically and ecologically valuable for Jiangxi Province and even the entirety of the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River. The areas around Poyang Lake have long been the focus of developmental efforts by the provincial CPC committee and government of the less economically-developed province of Jiangxi. This 20  Yi Peng, “Su Rong wants to achieve balance between environmental protection and economic development in Jiangxi,” China Business Journal, June 10, 2011. 21  Wang Peng and Wang Chen, “Inquiry into Poyang Lake,” This Week, Issue 10, 2011.

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being said, the CJWRC always votes against local plans for developing the areas around Poyang Lake since it is among the major lakes in the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River that buffer floods. Starting in 2008, however, the CJWRC has a weakening voice against dam building on Poyang Lake since it suffers from an increasingly long low-water season. It is under such circumstances that all stakeholders have begun acting. The first actors are of course the Jiangxi Provincial Government, NPC delegates and CPPCC members close to it. After decades of research, the water resources authority of Jiangxi Province worked out a plan called the Poyang Lake Control Project in order to address the flow of floodwaters into Poyang Lake from the Yangtze River and prevent the occurrence of schistosomiasis. “Forty members of the Jiangxi delegation to the 5th session of the 9th National People’s Congress held in Beijing in 2002 submitted Jiangxi Province’s ‘No. 1 Motion,’ calling for the building of a water control work on Poyang Lake, China’s largest freshwater lake.”22 Such a water control program stresses overall benefits regarding flood prevention, shipping, fishing, and power generation. If continuous research since the founding of the People’s Republic of China on the possibility of building a dam on Poyang Lake is an important precondition for water resources authorities in actualizing the goals of flood and disease prevention, then for Jiangxi Province as a whole, building a dam on Poyang Lake is viewing China’s highest quality freshwater lake as an important source of economic benefits. This thinking remains unchanged in the subsequent versions of Jiangxi Province’s development program for Poyang Lake. Jiangxi Province did not give up the idea of damming and exploiting Poyang Lake even after its proposal of damming this lake was denied by the Central Water Resources Authority and relevant authorities of other municipalities and provinces. In early 2009, relevant experts and government authorities changed the Poyang Lake Control Project into an ecosystem protection and water resources development project just as the provincial CPC committee and Jiangxi government announced the creation of the Poyang Lake Ecofriendly Economic Zone. The Jiangxi Provincial Department of Water Resources (JXPDWR) proposed a plan to build an eco-friendly water control work on Poyang Lake. Instead of storing water before the low-water period began and preventing floodwaters from flowing into the Poyang Lake as proposed in the previous Poyang Lake Control Project, the new plan allowed interconnectivity between Poyang Lake and the Yangtze River during the flood season,

22  Mao Jiangfan and Hong Huaifeng, “The Poyang Lake water control project is expected to be initiated in June,” Information Daily, May 22, 2009.

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essentially letting floodwaters flow into the lake at the end of the flood season for use in the following year. This plan as part of the aforementioned strategy announced by the provincial CPC committee and Jiangxi government was submitted to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the MWR for approval. Under this plan, the pursuit of economic benefits remains the focus for the exploitation of Poyang Lake. As an example, according to the Poyang Lake Water Control Work Plan drafted in September 2008, the planned hydropower station, with a capacity of 920MW would bring remarkable benefits with respect to fishing, shipping, irrigation, and domestic water use, in addition to economic benefits from power generation.23 Nonetheless, this plan received strong objections, including ones raised by some international organizations, the central water resources and environmental authorities, as well as downstream areas such as Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanghai. Jiangxi Province responded to these objections by communicating with its opponents one by one. In April 2010, relevant Jiangxi-based organizations invited representatives from the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, also known as the Ramsar Convention, and the International Crane Foundation (ICF)—which believed that the planned Poyang Lake water control work would threaten the natural balance of the Poyang Lake wetland and the integrity of the migratory birds’ habitat—to conduct field research on Poyang Lake. To respond to the six questions raised by 15 members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in a jointly signed letter to the central government in 2009 for the suspension of damming the Poyang Lake, the provincial CPC committee and Jiangxi government invited six members of CAS, including some of the 15 opponents, to take the lead in six research projects regarding the planned water control work on Poyang Lake.24 During the same time, JXPDWR visited the water resources authorities of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Anhui in order to remove their concerns about the planned water control work. At this time, Jiangxi Province made a major revision to the Poyang Lake Water Control Work Plan to tackle Poyang Lake’s increasingly low water level. This revision mainly includes replacing the dam with a water gate and the permanent disconnection of the Yangtze River and Poyang Lake with six-month disconnection. As the head of JXPDWR puts it, “Building a water gate, not a dam, across Poyang Lake is indeed an eco-friendly compensation project for 23  The provincial CPC committee and government of Jiangxi, the Poyang Lake Water Control Work Plan (old version), http://www.jxsl.gov.cn/article.jsp?articleid=9872. 24  Liang Wei, “Instead of damming Poyang Lake, Jiangxi plans to build a water gate,” The Time Weekly, September 26, 2012.

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the lake in the low-water season, during which time it is nearly dried up. Storing water in flood season will ensure the availability of water to the ecosystem during the low-water period.”25 While giving up the traditional functions of preventing floods and generating power through a dam, this revision includes an adjustment to the width of the water gate so as to provide finless porpoise and fishes with a migration channel. Most notably, the revised water control work plan has handed over the power to open the gate to the MWR. Under the new plan, the water control work has changed from something that focused on the exploitation of water resources and economic benefits into an ecofriendly work. The new plan aims to stabilize the water level of Poyang Lake and to eliminate the increasing impact of the low-water period on its ecosystem and the production activities and lives of its surrounding inhabitants. As a result, none of the three major functions of traditional water control works— irrigation, shipping, and power generation—is included in the revised plan, which has smoothly gone through various review and approval procedures since 2011. The Poyang Lake water control project entered the implementation stage in 2012. 3.3 New Ways of Competition Like in Jiangxi Province, an initiative for building a dam across Dongting Lake is under way in Hunan Province. An integrated Dongting Lake water control project in the city of Yueyang was reportedly included into the River Transport Development Program of Hunan Province at a provincial work meeting on river transport held in late 2011. With a planned total investment of 18.0 billion yuan, this project aims to thoroughly improve the environment around Dongting Lake and to retain water in the lake when the water volume becomes increasingly low in the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River; this, thereby facilitates the development of Dongting Lake in terms of transport, hydropower generation, ecosystem, and agriculture.26 As with the old version of the Poyang Lake Water Control Work Plan, experts from some environmental organizations have questioned this program because it ignores the ecological implications. In the meantime, there will necessarily be a growing amount of water resource exploitation projects in the Yangtze River basin. Will

25  He Lidan and Sun Xiaoshan, “Damming the Poyang Lake benefits more than Jiangxi,” Xinmin Weekly, Issue 24, 2011. 26  Liu Shuangshuang, “Hunan invests 18.0 billion yuan to improve the ecosystem of Dongting Lake,” China News, http://www.chinanews.com/df/2011/12-02/3505078.shtml (accessed December 2, 2011).

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a relatively reasonable water resources development program within a certain province bring about catastrophic consequences throughout the river basin? 3.4 Summary Development activities around Poyang Lake are intended to compete not only for water resources, but, in a broader sense, for resources of strategic importance for economic development. Such competition comes with complex political and economic implications. We can see from the abovementioned strategic adjustment by Jiangxi Province in the damming of Poyang Lake that building a water control work on this lake has been a long-term dream of this province, and that there have been changes in the motive for building a water control work on this lake, but with no changes in the primary motive, that is, securing the rights to the water. Before revising the Poyang Lake Water Control Work Plan in 2011, Jiangxi Province wanted to maximize economic benefits after the dam was built and have a louder voice among municipalities and provinces in the Yangtze River basin by retaining Poyang Lake’s water resources. The 2011 revision includes significant concessions made to the MWR as well as experts and international organizations who were opponents of the original plan, mainly including: giving the highest priority in maintaining the ecosystem of Poyang Lake, through such measures as keeping the connection between Poyang Lake and the Yangtze River and protecting fishes and the wetland; removing the basic functions of traditional water control works; handing over to the MWR the power to open the water gate. As a result, Jiangxi Province seems to have given up benefits from the water control work itself, but, for the Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Zone planned by the State, such concessions will not only let this province realize an ecofriendly economy, but will also enable Jiangxi, a less developed, agriculturedominated province, to be included into China’s development strategy and thereby become eligible for a series of incentives. In brief, the approval of the Poyang Lake water control work became a major contributor to the subsequent approval of the Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Zone. Under such circumstances, water as a resource not only performs basic functions regarding human consumption, irrigation, and industrial consumption, but has also become an important resource in the local government’s development of a low-carbon, eco-friendly economy, and improvement of relevant industry chains. For Jiangxi Province, new technologies and sufficient money were important factors in securing a loud voice regarding water resources in the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River. From a water politics perspective, however, Jiangxi Province has grasped early opportunities in competition for water resources in the lower and middle

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reaches of the Yangtze River by reducing the direct economic and ecological costs of dam building and making full use of China’s strategic program. This being said, Jiangxi Province’s grasp of early opportunities may be good news for it for the time being, but it spells bad news for the entire Yangtze River basin. Given the local political and economic situations and development strategies, there is a growing trend of competition for water resources. The more severe the shortage of water the fiercer the competition for water (even resulting in the panicked plundering of water). Likewise, the more the dams are built to retain water, the more severe the shortage of water. From a long-term perspective, such a vicious circle will bring about severe ecological crises in the affected river basin. An even greater concern is that the existing methods, mechanism and forces against the occurrence of such crises are too weak to work. In contrast, the logic inherent in water politics is accelerating the occurrence of ecological crises. 4

New Water Politics?

“While the underlying reasons for water-related controversy can be numerous . . ., all water disputes can be attributed to one or more of three issues: quantity, quality, and timing,” according to research on water resource-related conflicts in countries.27 The reasons for water-related cases in China, including the ones mentioned in this paper, can all be summarized with these three keywords. This being said, we have identified, from the cases in China, characteristics unique to their competition for water. Instead of observing water politics in China only from perspectives such as water utilization techniques and economic accounting, we should include political and knowledge factors into the observation of water-relevant conflicts. We have identified the following characteristics in the cases mentioned in this paper: Firstly, there are flaws in China’s water resources management system. Article 12.1 of China’s water law provides that the State has a water resources management system that combines river basin management with administrative area management. In the implementation of this system, however, the eight river basin commissions have no sufficient administrative power or capacity since they are only institutions under the MWR. As a result, the existing system still focuses on administrative area management, whereas 27  Aaron T. Wolf et al., “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation,” World Environment, Issue 5, 2005.

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river basin management has yet to become effective. Under such circumstances, local governments will necessarily maximize the use of the power of exploiting rivers and lakes within their respective administrative areas. In the case of the Zhang River, for example, ZHURA is entitled to coordinate waterrelevant issues only within a 108 km-long part of the Zhang River. In contrast, administrative areas in the lower through upper reaches of the Zhang River need growing amounts of water for domestic use, irrigation, economic development, and especially industrial development, leading to continual conflicts throughout this river basin between local governments at all levels, all the way up to the provincial level. Secondly, water resources have become important bargaining chips for local governments in competition and development given the current relationships between the central and local governments, and between local governments themselves. Instead of the traditional competition for water resources that focuses on quality and quantity, the current competition for water has become part of the development strategies of local governments. Water resources have slowly transformed from its traditional role for domestic use and agricultural irrigation to an important resource for industrial use and the new energy industry. For less developed, agriculture-dominated provinces with a strong need for fast economic development, abundant water resources have become strategic resources for securing the State’s tax and fiscal incentives. In the case of Poyang Lake, for example, prior to and in the early stages of China’s reform, the damming of this lake was primarily aimed at preventing floods and diseases. Given the rapid development of neighboring provinces over the past years and decreased pressure to prevent floods since the Three Gorges Dam was built, Jiangxi Province has set up the Poyang Lake Eco-friendly Economic Zone and wants to center this state-level economic development zone on the resources of Poyang Lake and to replace the original Poyang Lake dam design intended to retain water via an integrated water control work with ecological and water-collecting functions. Thirdly, consumers have no access to the right to manage water resources. We can see, from the cases of Poyang Lake and the Zhang River and the analysis of both cases, those governments at all levels have their respective problems as water suppliers, which can hardly be solved under the pressure to maximize local interests. On the other side of the coin, as water consumers, inhabitants, and businesses in the communities around the lake or along the river are not granted the right to manage water resources in particular the right to cross-administrative-area negotiations and management, and thus there is no so-called constitutional consensus on the disputed areas. This has made it impossible to reach any agreement on the management of

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controversial water resources. While local governments can affect the efficiency of water supply through relevant systems, consumers’ rights to association and consultation are not embodied in the management of water resources. The entire public goods management system, which consists of the supplier and consumer management subsystems, fails to play a desirable role. Such an ineffective system may cause more severe societal consequences. The lack of a local public goods management system that involves public engagement in the distribution of water resources was among the major reasons for incidents such as the explosion and massive fights in the Zhang River basin in previous years. These violent incidents, which intended to compete for water, caused casualties; although nobody was punished accordingly, opportunities were not available for institutional reforming.28 These incidents became one of the means for local governments to acquiesce the discontent of the masses and put pressure on the opposing party. With regards to water governance, both environmental NGOs and spontaneous organizations of ordinary people as stakeholders, in addition to scientific management and proper distribution of local interests, play important roles in maintaining balanced water governance and policy effectiveness. According to Elizabeth Economy, environmental degradation and other political issues have strengthened public awareness and propelled political movements, whereas environmental NGOs serve as a lightning rod for social and political discontents. The result may not necessarily be environmental improvements, but, in some cases, will be readjustments to the entire system of government.29 We need organizations, which represent the interests of the masses and businesses in relevant river basins, to participate in making policies regarding the distribution of water resources. They are supposed to be able to participate in public debates with first-hand data. Fortunately, in addition to government policies regarding the distribution of water resources as well as aquatic ecosystem and environmental protection, we can already see, from actions against damming the Nu River, that Chinese environmental NGOs have begun acting, and the stakeholders in the river basin have started organizing for themselves, to give the highest priority to water and environmental governance on their respective agendas. Given the imminent crises involving water resources and aquatic environments, we are calling for new water politics. 28  Shi Ping and Bai Hongyi, “The Red Flag Canal sees an end to the ‘war for water’,” Insight China, Issue 7, 2004. 29  Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Jiangsu People’s Publishing Ltd., 2010, 222–223.

CHAPTER 2

Initial Exploration of Environmental NGOs’ Involvement in Environmental Mass Incidents LI Bo Abstract The mass protest led by white-collar communities against the Xiamen Paraxylene (PX) chemical factory project in 2007 marks a new watershed of environmental civil protest movement in China. However, a sharp rising curve of such crisis events nationwide after seven years is still crying out for sustainable solutions. The governmental predominate abatement measures vividly captured by medias as “the more aggressive the protests by the to-be-affected communities, the larger the compromises by the local government and business owner.” In other words, local government and investors typically would follow the same strategy to either cancel or postpone indefinitely the concerned project. But this reactive strategy hardly has resolved the issues of confidence and collaboration from the pubic and there are few lessons learned in the new decision making of similar projects. Conflicts management studies categorize the nature of environment conflicts as non-constitutional or distributional in financial gains and losses. This is somewhat comparable to the Chinese think tanks’ characterization of environmental mass protests as internal conflicts of the people. Therefore it implies that the mass protests of environmental conflicts are typically not motivated by anti-government political ideologies, rather it should be only be approached by laws of economic arrangement. This article documents and analyses NGOs’ first experience intervening the environmental mass protests against petro-chemical projects in China. In the second half of 2013 for the first time, the coalition of the four Chinese NGOs and core volunteer ­citizens—through research, reviews, and retrospective interventions in the decision making and public hearing of the environmental impact assessment of the Anning tenmillion-ton petrochemical refinery project in the suburban county, west of Kunming Municipality—aimed at making valuable contribution to the sustainable solutions to the environmental mass protests and crises while, making an action-based assertion about the indispensible roles and function of civil society organizations in addressing and preventing environmental conflicts and crises in China.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_004

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Keywords management of environmental conflicts – environmental mass protests, environmental NGO’s role and participation, Anning Oil Refinery Project of the CNPC

1

Environmental Mass Incidents: An Inevitable Result of the Lack of Public Involvement and Supervision in Environmental Decision-making and Management

The Xiamen PX incident marks the transition of Chinese economic policy from a period of recklessly fast development resulting in the cost of the environment to a period in which the public expresses their environmental interests and concerns in varied ways. The value game has likewise shifted from the official consensus that economic investment precedes environmental protection to concerns health and livability by the urban middle-class, such as environmental safety and issues concerning food and drinking water. Public unrest has grown as various health hazards resulting from environmental pollution have begun to show after more than a decade of accumulation—such as “cancer villages” and blood lead poisoning in children—while their opinion and the cost to their health and the environment have been largely ignored in decision-making procedures, which prioritize the speed and economic returns of investment projects. The government only values GDP growth, and some local governments are even ready to help eliminate all elements standing in the way of their projects. Public involvement is made more difficult by the lack of transparency and availability of decision-making information, which adds to their distrust and sometimes even gives rise to panic. PX, accidentally but inevitably, has become a “code,” a symbol for environmental mass incidents that has continually been “coded” in decision-making procedures across the country and keeps attracting the public’s attention. The year 2012 was marked as the year of environmental mass incidents. On July 3, 2012, the public demonstrated against Hongda Molybdenum Copper Project in Shifang, Sichuan Province. On July 28, 2012, the Nantong Municipal Government was forced to permanently withdraw its “Infrastructure Project for Waste Water Discharge to the Sea” due to intense oppositions and demonstrations from the public. On July 27, 2012, hundreds of citizens from Ningbo gathered in the city square to demonstrate against the PX project; the next evening the municipal government decided to suspend the project and begin further feasibility studies. In May 2013, two demonstrations occurred on the

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streets of Kunming as the citizens felt disconcerted and dissatisfied with the decision and site choice of CNPC’s Anning Project, while another one followed on July 12 in Jiangmen, Guangdong Province where the public was concerned with a nuclear material processing plant. On July 30, an explosion occurred in Gulei Petro (a PX Project) located in the Gulei Economic Development Zone in Zhangshou, Fujian Province, before it started production. On November 12, a massive explosion followed in Huangdao, Qingdao, Shandong Province, due to a leakage of Sinopec pipelines. The public concern is not groundless, considering that the decision-making procedures for so many sensitive projects were never transparent and open and that major accidents happened every year against all the promises about safety management and risk control from both the government and the investors. As is pointed out in the “Report on Environmental Mass Incidents in 2012”1 conducted by the public opinion monitoring center in Legal Daily, the mass incidents occur more frequently in cities with these common features: large populations, complex population make-up, and leading position in economic development in the area. This may suggest that currently social conflicts are shifting from the countryside to the city, where conflicts and problems are becoming more complicated and posing a greater challenge to the management of society. Government responses to such incidents include official announcements, further investigations, punishment of the party responsible, pacifying the parties concerned, and issuing policies and regulations. In 64.3% of similar incidents the local governments have taken more negative measures which serve to worsen the situation, such as blocking the news, dispersing the protesting crowds, or detaining concerned parties. Government responses to mass incidents are very limited and largely passive, while more effective measures should be prevention rather than resolution. President Xi Jinping pointed out, at the Sixth Session of the CPC Politburo on the Promotion of Ecological Civilization Development on May 24, 2013, that “an accountability system must be established so that those who disregard the ecological environment in decision-making and cause serious consequences will be held liable for their lifetime.”2 He also made it clear at the 18th National 1  Chen Rui and Fu Meng, “Report on Environmental Mass Incidents in 2012”, Public Opinion Monitoring Center, Legal Daily, January 6, 2013, http://www.21ccom.net/articles/agyp/ gqmq/arigcle_2013010674416.html. 2  Xinhua New Agency, “Xi Jinping: Adhere to Fundamental National Policies of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection and Work Towards a New Age of Socialist Ecological Civilization,” Xinhua Website, May 24, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2013-05/24/c_115901657.html.

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Congress that public involvement must be ensured in the development of ecological civilization, and that public opinion must be considered fully in the decisions concerned with public interest while all actions against it be prevented and corrected.3 It is evident that the Central Government has become fully aware of the hazards of environmental mass incidents, but as to the question of how to effectively prevent and solve such incidents and conflicts, neither the government nor the industry has come up with any proactive, preventive, and sustainable measures, at least not by the end of 2013. 2

Theory and Practice of Environmental Conflict Management

In countries with increasingly rapid urbanization and industrialization, conflicts between land use planning and public health become more intense as urban population density grows and people’s income and quality of life improves. The public concerns over the measures of resource exploitation, processing, use, waste, and recycling, especially of poisonous and hazardous products, lead to frequent occurrences of various environmental conflicts. As “the world’s factory,” China will inevitably experience a period when conflicts between environmental pollution, resource damage, and public health escalates, and such conflicts are further intensified by the outsourcing of environmental pollution from countries and regions with effective environmental regulations and social supervision to those with less due to globalized trade and logistics. The most important strategy in environmental conflict management is prevention and prepared resolutions, while effective mechanisms for intervention and solution come next. In either case, it is essential to understand the mechan­ ism where environmental conflicts arise, which usually result from the risks of unjust and non-transparent decision-making systems for economic development projects. Economic projects have both positive and negative effects; the former refers to the distribution of economic benefits and right of first refusal for land far away from pollution sources, while the latter includes sites for pollution projects, storage of pollutants, transportation routes for poisonous and hazardous substances, and noise, air, and water pollution in production. The public are exposed to these negative effects, which i­nconvenience 3  Cai Min, Hai Mingwei, Ren Qinqin, and Xu Xiaoqing, “Environmental Mass Incidents Warn the CCP to Ensure Public Participation in the Decision-making of Ecological Civilization Construction,” Xinhua Website, November 12, 2012, http://cpc.people.com.cn/18/n/2012/1112/ c350825-19551413.html.

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their lives and work, and harm their health and economic activities. Moreover, these negative effects happen and affect the public without any of the following: their knowledge, opportunities for negotiation, a more reasonable and safer back-up plan, or any economic or other supplementary arrangements. Chinese researchers have defined such eruptive mass incidents as a mass action to express their appeals and needs caused by conflicts among the people and organized by some citizens or organizations in an effort to fight for and protect their interest or to vent their discontent. In relevant research studies abroad on environmental conflict manage­ ment,4 economic development projects, which are the primary contributor to environmental conflicts as they cause pollution and violations of environmental rights, are excluded from the domain of national interest and basic constitutional rights. The decision-making of any economic development or pollution control project cannot be elevated to the level of national or constitutional interest. In other words, whether to support or oppose a project is not a conflict of national positions or basic human rights; instead, its decisionmaking process is merely an evaluation of positive and negative effects and of profits and losses between interest groups, hence conflict in the distribution of interest. It is vital to understand environmental conflicts as conflicts in the distribution of interest, because in the intervention and resolution of such conflicts, the necessity and feasibility studies of the projects can only be done within the framework of civil and commercial law, and should not be granted supreme legitimacy by public power and constitutional interpretation. Only in doing so can the investor and other interest groups negotiate on an equal footing for the feasibility of the project, so as to ensure that optimum strategies are adopted for the prevention of negative effects and for fair distribution and liability when inevitable effects do arise. This leaves legal and professional room for NGOs dedicated to environmental conflicts to participate in their resolution. North America and Europe have had 60 to 70 years of research on the practices and theories of NGOs’ involvement in environmental conflict management, whereas China still waits to see its first page. As a branch of resource management, environmental and resource conflict management stresses fairness, efficiency, rational game, and sustainability, with a special emphasis on the construction of an open platform based on consensus by a neutral third-party NGO before conflicts evolve into lawsuits. This platform allows representatives of interest groups and right groups to

4  Susskind, Lawrence and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes, The MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, 1987.

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express their positions and appeals through transparent, objective, rational, and legal negotiations, interpret the information to eliminate blind spots and prejudices, and at the same time releases extreme emotions, so that new consensus can be found and conflicts resolved in a mitigated context. Usually a win-win situation can be reached between the government, the judiciary body, and the industry after the NGO mediates their perspectives on the conflict and its liability, right, and solution and helps them reach a consensus. The concerned parties will only resort to lawsuits when the NGO’s intervention fails, which are much more costly and time-consuming. 3

Faults of CNPC’s Ten-Million-Ton Oil Refinery Project in Anning

CNPC’s Yunnan Oil Refinery Project is located in Caopu Town, Anning County of Kunming City in Yunan Province, 30 km away from Kunming; it includes crude oil processing facilities with a capacity to produce ten-million-ton per year, storage and transport facilities for oil products, and public and auxiliary engineering facilities. The PX project, as a downstream component of the refinery, was included in its project approval process. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report5 of the refinery project started in 2009,6 and its technical feasibility study even earlier; but its approval process had evaded the public of Kunming, who only came to be aware of it through unofficial channels in 2013, while its EIA report had already been approved by the Ministry of Environmental Protection7 in July 2012. The public’s distrust of the project and their dissatisfaction with the secrecy of the EIA report led to two demonstrations within two weeks in May 2013, questioning the multiple environmental risks of the project location in Kunming and the uncertainty brought by the lack of matching water resources. The mayor of Kunming responded through media on June 2, 2013.8 He said that, firstly, the municipal government would listen to the suggestions of 5  E IA Report on a Ten-million-ton Oil Refinery Project of the China National Petroleum Corporation in Yunnan Province, 782 pages, compiled by Environmental Protection and Security Company Limited, CNPC Qingdao Eastern China Institute. 6  E IA Report on a Ten-million-ton Oil Refinery Project of the China National Petroleum Corporation in Yunnan Province (annex), 243 pages. 7  Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, “Reply to the EIA Report on a Ten-million-ton Oil Refinery Project of the China National Petroleum Corporation in Yunnan Province,” Huanshen [2012] 199, July 24, 2012. 8  Hu Yuanhang, “Mayor of Kunming Says the Public Has the Veto in Anning Refinery PX Project,” China News Website, May 10 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-05-10/125427084325 .shtml.

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the community and fully respects the public opinion and that a democratic decision-making process would be adopted regarding the PX project, which was still under investigation. To quote him, “the municipal government will go through with the PX project only if the majority of the citizens agree, and will not hesitate to give it up if otherwise.” Secondly, he said, the government would unveil the EIA report of CNPC Yunnan Oil Refinery Project in due course. On June 25, a condensed 27-page version of the EIA report was published on CNPC’s website, together with an announcement on Weibo, while the full report with the reply from the Ministry of Environmental Protection began a one-month display in Ninghu Park, Anning County. On June 28, the Ministry of Environmental Protection mailed the full report to eight citizens who had applied for the publicity of the information from Beijing, Tianjin, and Kunming, which was then, through the cooperation of volunteers and NGOs, uploaded to the websites of Friends of Nature, Nature University, Green Watershed, and Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs for the public to download.9 Six months have passed, but the future of the Kunming Refinery Project remains up in the air. It is still unclear whether a win-win solution can be reached by avoiding past mistakes in the decision-making process. Although the mayor of Kunming promised “a veto vote for environment and full participation of the public,” the EIA report of the ten-million-ton project was only revealed due to public pressure after it was approved by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in July 2012, and in current EIA regulations, there are no existing channels for the public to participate and air their opinion. Four environmental NGOs therefore decided to cooperate and explore a different solution, which is, demanding that the Ministry of Environmental Protection hold public hearings through the pressure of public involvement and participatory decision-making so that all views can be heard, mistakes in decision-making reflected, problems analyzed, and solutions provided. This is also an exploration of the creative role of NGOs in environmental conflict management and decision-making.

9  The EIA Report (two versions) and the official reply from the Ministry of Environmental Protection can be downloaded from any of the websites of the four NGOs: Friends of Nature http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php/index/post/id/1457; Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs http://www.ipe.org.cn/about/notice_de.aspx?id=11236; Green Watershed http://www .cgbw.org/news_detail/newsID=afbb1500-f64a-4a8c-afe4-a2262a1e207a&comp_stas=compFrontNews_list01-1286940135271.html; Nature University http://www.hero.ngo.cn/lbsj/182 .html.

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After gaining access to the EIA report, the four NGOs wasted no time in summarizing the problems in EIA by seeking advice from experts and professionals. There are altogether eight faults in the EIA report. First, there is no chapter whatsoever on public involvement. Second, the auction and bidding of industrial land is against urban-rural planning regulation. Third, the EIA report of the CNPC Refinery Project was approved in the overall planning of Anning Industrial Park without any assessment on environmental impact. This is like putting the cart before the horse, and similar problems in the layout and planning of the oil and petrol industry have been criticized in the 2012 work summary of the EIA Center in the Ministry of Environmental Protection.10 Fourth, the Project has started illegally without any written land use approval permit or construction permit. Fifth, the city of Kunming was taken into the same boat and lowered its waste water discharge standards so that waste discharge of the Project could meet the standards. Sixth, to meet the requirement for approval and construction of the Project, other projects were shut down, suspended, or rectified so that the Project could be located in Anning where the environment was already overloaded. Seventh, the high-risk Project was approved in a geologically active period, while no strict geological risk assessment was carried out, the seismic risks were not evaluated, and no contingency measures were available. Such problems have also been noted by the EIA Center of the Ministry of Environmental Protection after the May 12 Sichuan earthquake.11 Eighth, the Report’s risk probabilities of explosion and leakage do not match the actual probabilities, and necessary response measures are absent. Immediately following the NGOs’ analysis, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued on August 29, 2013 the Assessment Results of the Reduction of Major Pollutants Discharge by Provinces, Autonomous Regions, Municipalities, and Eight Central Enterprises in 2012. As both CNPC and Sinopec failed the assessment, the Ministry decided to suspend the EIA approval of their new, modified, or extended r­efinery 10  Ren Jinming, Liu Lei, Zhang Hui, and Duan Feizhou, “Suggestions on Carrying Out the Environmental Impact Assessment of Strategic Planning of the 12th Five-Year Plan,” Theory and Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (2007–2012), China Environmental Science Press, 2012; Dong Li, Liu Wei, Jiang Hua and Su Yi, “Reflection on the Assessments of Oil and Petrol Industry during the 11th Five-Year Plan,” Theory and Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (2007–2012), China Environmental Science Press, 2012. 11  Ren Jinming, “Planning of Major Projects Should Avoid Seismic Areas: Reflections on May 12 Wenchuan Earthquake,” Theory and Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (2007–2012), China Environmental Science Press, 2012.

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­ rojects other than oil upgrading and energy conserving projects.12 CNPC’s p Anning Refinery Project happened to fall into the suspension category, as it was approved in 2012. While the four NGOs were busy evaluating the EIA report, shocking cases of corruption among the top management of CNPC began popping up in August 2013 until the end of the year.13 It is reported that the crude oil needed for the several refineries around Chongqing had to be imported from other places and even abroad at a huge cost, and it is very probable that the crude oil for the Anning Project would come from the same source. It remains unknown whether the decision-making process of the Anning Project has violated market and resource pricing rules, but CNPC’s corruption cases remind us that the lack of proper supervision for state-owned enterprises will certainly hurt national interest. The approval and construction of projects from state-owned enterprises, likewise, cannot be protected under the banner of “national interest” and evade vigorous assessment and analysis of their negative impacts on the ecological environment and society. 4

Actions and Strategies of Environmental NGOs

The involvement of NGOs in environmental mass incidents or environmental conflicts and resolutions is still a new field to be explored in China. On the one hand, Chinese NGOs are very much marginalized politically and likely to be misunderstood or discredited with accusations of being irrational masterminds behind mass incidents or influenced by overseas powers, which threaten the existence of NGOs and prove very difficult to refute. On the other hand, NGOs do not yet have the ability to effectively intervene in and mediate the public’s aggressive irrational expressions in the sudden outbreak of mass incidents, while such expressions of environmental rights, as an inevitable social development, cannot be represented by any organizations or institutes. Consequently, environmental NGOs in China have only been watching, learning, and thinking since the 2007 Xiamen incident.

12  Lv Minghe, Yuan Duanduan, Feng Jie, Li Yifan, and Gong Junnan, “CNPC and SINOPEC Against Green,” Southern Weekend, September 12, 2013. 13   Netease, “Anti-Corruption Action Escalate at CNPC,” Netease Financial Section, http://money.163.com/speical/cnpc_beidiaocha/; http://renwu.people.com.cn/GB/357675/ 369141/index.html#lm05.

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After the two demonstrations against the CNPC Anning Refinery Project in May 2013, however, four environmental NGOs finally found the opportune moment to intervene. First, a group of environmental protection professionals from Yunnan were active in the NGOs in Beijing; second, as to how to respond to and solve the environmental conflicts and the greater potential crisis caused by the Anning Project, the official opinion and voice offered more support and help for the NGOs; last and most importantly, all parties concerned with the Anning Project reached a consensus that innovative solutions for environmental mass incidents in China should be found in practice and the policy study of environmental conflict management instead of through the same old tortuous path taken in the past. This has proved a challenging issue in the studies of environmental crisis and social harmony. Four NGOs, taking this opportunity, began intervening in the social conflict management of the CNPC Anning Refinery Project, namely, Friends of Nature, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, Nature University, and Green Watershed from Kunming, with the help of a consulting team composed of academics, independent researchers, environmental organizations, and peripheral government think tanks. The four NGOs set as their joint long-term goal to launch a space and channel for social discussion and social organizations to participate in the exploration for solutions to mass incidents. They look to find a new mechanism for solving China’s environmental mass incidents in place of the old zero-sum game. Their short-term goal is to urge the Ministry of Environmental Protection to hold public hearings to make more transparent the site choice and environment management of the Anning Project so that public policies on site choice and environment management can be modified. Moreover they seek to relocate the Anning Project to a site with sufficient environmental capacity, less population density, and fewer risks of accidents while at the same time strengthen public involvement and supervision in oil and petrol projects. First, the four NGOs analyzed the main stakeholders in the Anning Refinery Project and defined preliminarily their action strategies. Under the guidance of the strategies and goals mentioned above, the NGOs got down to work. In Beijing and Kunming, seminars and lectures on the EIA report and its social impact were organized; the NGOs also visited many departments in both the Kunming municipal and Yunnan provincial government and tried to verify the specific procedures for approving the report with relevant officials, only to get evasive and vague answers to most questions. The NGOs therefore turned to analyzing the key problems of the EIA report and filed requests for administrative reconsideration and litigation regarding the following issues:

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Table 2.1

Major stakeholders in the Anning refinery project and their action strategies

Stakeholder

Basic strategies

Steps

Kunming public

Understand the intention and approach of NGO involvement; protect their rights rationally

CNPC

Analyze the tension between corporate profit and national interest

Conduct survey and interview the public on their demands for service and facilities and for involvement in decision-making according to relevance of interest, including: 1. Citizens of Kunming; 2. Citizens of Anning; 3. Farmers in Anning; 4. Immigrated business owners in Anning; 5. Kunming citizens living elsewhere; 6. Residents down the Yangtze River. 1. Draw a pollution map of CNPC and do a public credibility analysis; 2. Collect and analyze the causes, impacts, and remedies for CNPC’s environmental pollution incidents in the past three to five years; 3. Collect information on its competitors; 4. Analyze the relationship between corporate profit and energy security in the Southwest. Unite as many NGOs as they can; Reach an action consensus; Divide the labor and cooperate.

Environmental Reach a final consensus NGOs and win-win solution between all parties; have a clear position and bottom line Make a right decision Kunming that allows sustainable Municipal Government development for the city

Yunnan Provincial Government and relevant ministries

Carry out policies on the development of ecological civilization proposed in the 18th National Congress

Analyze the conflict between the Project and Kunming’s city planning; Promote the intention and approach of NGO involvement; Accept suggestions and arrange for public hearings to be held Question the reasonableness and regulatory compliance of project approval on the higher level of government through analyzing the relationship between EIA report approval and project planning, and support the public hearings on the CNPC Anning Refinery Project

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Table 2.2 Action outputs and outcomes of Anning refinery project Action outputs

Outcomes

Information is to be publicized and shared to encourage and unite the public and professionals to have online discussions so that problems can be found and studied The experts will give comprehensive 2. Form a reliable team of experts from relevant professional fields and professional assessment of the EIA report and find apparent faults and deficiencies. A common ground for consensus 3. Sort environmental mass incidents is to be found so that cooperation since the Xiamen one from both practical and theoretical perspectives, becomes possible, and theoretical focusing on the policy relevance to and evidence and policy legitimacy is provided for the involvement of strategic support for the Kunming social organizations in solving incident environmental mass incidents. 4. Share expert analysis of the EIA report A common ground for consensus is to be found so that questions with the Kunming public and from the public can be answered community, interact with them, and their actual concerns can be and seek their opinion and feedback understood by the experts, which makes their cooperation possible Ensure that all steps and procedures 5. Carry out continuous legal and for approval of the EIA report comply administrative actions against the with legal and regulatory requirements, problems found in the EIA report, for and point out its major administrative example, the holding back of project information that should be revealed per and legal problems and faults. the request of the NGOs, no response for administrative reconsiderations, and illegal production. Find issues in the credibility of the 6. Investigate the pollution of the oil industry in economy, society, and and petrol industry and its impacts environmental protection (While on the environment and society. this project proposal was being prepared, two pieces of news came out on August 27 and 29, 2013: 1. Acquire the full EIA report with reply from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, its complete annex, and most relevant documents

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Table 2.2 Action outputs and outcomes of Anning refinery project (cont.) Action outputs

7. Investigate on the feasibility and implementation of measures concerning the maneuvering of environmental capacity and water resources in the EIA report of the Anning Project

8. Prepare, rehearse, and hold public hearings

Outcomes

1. Four top management executives from CNPC were under investigation; 2. The Ministry of Environmental Protection suspended approval of CNPC’s and Sinopec’s new projects, as they failed their goal in waste discharge reduction in 2012.) A series of measures were put forward in the EIA report of the Anning Project regarding the fact that the current environmental capacity and water resources cannot fulfill project requirements; for example, closing down polluting enterprises and improving measures for cleaner production. We need to find out the implementation and possible problems of these measures through fieldwork, evaluate whether they serve the purpose of making more environmental capacity, and whether the proposed goal of waste water discharge management could be reached before the Tanglangchuan River joins the Jinsha River. Hold a public hearing successfully so that opinions from all parties can be presented and debated on in an open and fair way.

* This goal has already been achieved, and relevant documents can be downloaded from the websites of the four NGOs. ** Wu Weizheng and Sun Xiuyan, “Suspension of Approval for CNPC and Sinopec Projects Because They Failed Their Waste Discharge Reduction Goal in 2012,” People’s Daily, August 29, 2013.

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On July 2, 2013, four environmental NGOs in China—Friends of Nature Environmental Research Institute in Chaoyang, Beijing (Friends of Nature), Environmental Research Institute by Source Enthusiasts in Fengtai, Beijing (Nature University), Institute of Public Environmental Affairs in Chaoyang, Beijing (IPE), Yunnan Center for Public Watershed Management and Promotion (Green Watershed), and the citizens of Anning, dissatisfied with “Reply to the EIA Report on a Ten-million-ton Oil Refinery Project of the China National Petroleum Corporation in Yunnan Province” by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, filed three appeals for administrative reconsideration in an effort to protect public environmental rights. They requested that: (1) “Reply to the EIA Report on a Ten-million-ton Oil Refinery Project of the China National Petroleum Corporation in Yunnan Province” by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Huanshen [2012] 199) be revoked; (2) the Refinery Project Department of PetroChina Company Limited and CNPC Yunnan Petro Company Limited terminate the construction of the Project concerned immediately; and (3) the companies concerned involve the public in EIA, gather extensive public opinion to further discuss the Project’s impact on the environment and social sustainability, edit their EIA report, and refile it to the Ministry for approval. Regrettably, on August 22, 2013, the Department of Polices, Laws, and Regulations of the Ministry of Environmental Protection replied in writing that “since the environmental NGOs do not have any stake of interest in the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s reply to China National Petroleum Corporation, your appeal for administrative reconsideration does not meet the legal requirements for administrative reconsideration.”14 On August 27, 2013, the NGOs held “Press Conference on the Participation of Social Organizations in Solving Environmental Mass Incidents,” issuing to PetroChina Company Limited “Appeal to Terminate Illegal Construction of the Anning Refinery Project in Yunnan.” On August 25, 2013, a number of Kunming citizens mailed appeals for administrative reconsideration to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Housing and Urban-rural Development, National

14  Reply letter from the Department of Polices, Laws, and Regulations of the Ministry of Environmental Protection to Friends of Nature Environmental Research Institute in Chaoyang, Beijing, Environmental Research Institute by Source Enthusiasts in Fengtai, Beijing, Institute of Public Environmental Affairs in Chaoyang, Beijing, and Yunnan Center for Public Watershed Management and Promotion.

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Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Legislative Affairs Office of Yunnan Provincial Government (addressing the Commission of Industry and Information Technology, the Commission of Development and Reform, and the Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development). The appeals requested to revoke “Suggestions on the Location of the Tenmillion-ton Refinery Project” by the Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and filings on the planning adjustment of Anning Industrial Park by the Commission of Industry and Information Technology, confirm that the petro industry planning of Yunnan and relevant adjustment and decision-making procedures in the overall urban planning of Anning are illegal, and carried out administrative reconsideration. On September 23, 2013, the citizens of Kunming filed an appeal for administrative litigation to the First Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing, suing the Ministry of Environmental Protection for its decision to retain its approval of the EIA report of the Anning Refinery Project after administrative reconsideration. The case was placed on file on October 16 with relevant fees paid. On October 18, 2013, five Yunan citizens filed to the Bureau of Planning of Anning a signed “Report on the Illegal Construction of Anning Refinery Project without Planning Permit,” making four requests for the termination of construction and further investigation. On October 25, 2013, Kunming citizens filed two appeals for administrative litigation against the Yunnan Municipal Government to the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming, while mailing to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council an appeal asking for its involvement. The case was put on file in November together with evidence materials and appeal for litigation evidence preservation. On December 2, 2013, a number of Kunming citizens filed two appeals for administrative litigation to Xishan District People’s Court, suing the Yunnan Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development for its violation of regulations in the Project’s approval process. Summary and Prospect

Faced with a variety of environmental challenges, social mass incidents— resulting from development projects that damage natural resources, pollute the environment, and cause public health hazards—have become a universal

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and typical issue for the maintenance of social stability. However, in solving such conflicts among the people, there has not been a more creative approach to the administrative and the judicial systems, which, upholding principles of efficiency, justice, and fairness, work to stop the polluting damages, heal and manage the environment, and compensate and console the victims. We hope the involvement of third-party environmental NGOs can be a new approach to resolving conflicts and reaching consensus, while at the same time avoiding harm from irrational expressions of environmental rights. The involvement of the four NGOs in the solution of the Anning incident is but a beginning, with more work to follow in 2014. This paper serves as a mid-term summary that records and analyzes the strategies and action plans for the intervention, which can provide reference for the government and society for further practice and exploration in other mass incidents, especially in preventative strategies. Public hearings, such as hearings for legislation, price adjustment, and urban planning, have grown increasingly frequent in recent years and are regarded as a significant innovation that makes public decision-making more democratic and scientific, allowing for voices from the government, experts, as well as the public instead of having the government act alone. The introduction and development of public hearings as an important measure of reform in China’s public administrative decision-making system, marks the transition of the system from a “managing” model with concentrated power to a “public governance” model that encourages participation of multiple stakeholders. Despite all this, there has only been one public environmental hearing with environmental NGO participation, i.e. the Yuanmingyuan lake leakage prevention project. We have to ask why, against the reality of increasing environmental conflicts, public hearings on environmental issues, which could make for more information transparency as well as full expression and open debate of opinions, remain so rare. We hope that the Anning Refinery Project can prompt the Ministry of Environmental Protection to systemize public hearings as a proactive response to the NGO’s appeals. Stakeholders in polluting projects must be defined by breaking out of the old mindset of planned economy and residential registration. In the Anning Project, there are multiple stakeholders, including residents living downwind of the refinery as well as citizens and businesses in Kunming, as their residence, housing and, commercial activities can no longer be confined by r­ esidential registration in a market economy. If such facts are to be disregarded and stakeholders defined by following the registration rigidly, leaving out many Kunming residents and their appeals, dissatisfaction will certainly continue to grow and causes for social instability increase, which in no way serves the search for a more constructive and inclusive resolution of conflicts that encourage participation.

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It is expected yet surprising that the NGOs’ appeal for administrative reconsideration was rejected by the Ministry of Environmental Protection for “having no stake of interest,” which actually does not comply with the “Decision on Implementing Scientific Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection”15 issued by the State Council. It is pointed out in Article 27 of the “Decision” that the mechanism of social supervision should be improved and the role of social organizations fully played to encourage the report of environmental violations and promote public environmental litigation, and that public opinions must be heard through hearings, discussions of feasibility, and public displays for development and construction projects concerning public environmental rights. The “five-in-one” overall layout proposed at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress includes ecological civilization construction as equal to economic, political, cultural, and social construction, and stipulates that a life-long accountability system for damage to the ecological environment will be established and management mechanism for ecological environment protection reformed. It requires that a rigorous, scientific, and democratic decision-making system be established accompanied by extensive social supervision so that the decision-makers learn to prioritize conservation and green development, and that social supervision be strengthened by publicizing environmental information and improving the reporting system. These national policies, however, are clearly not understood or carried out to their fullest. The NGOs have encountered a lot of hindrance in the past few months. Some are to be expected, for example, prevarication of government departments when asked to disclose information or respond to a question, and sometimes even a slammed door. Some are blatant violations of national policies, for example, pressurizing the owner of venues for holding perfectly legal public lectures so that they had to be relocated at the last minute or cancelled, or influencing departments, organizations, and real estate management companies under the excuse of maintaining social harmony and public security so that they remain silent on the refinery project. Though these measures can be effective in the short term to help the project through the sensitive period and speed it up, they did not eradicate the differences and concerns of the public to resolve conflicts and achieve consensus and cooperation. Instead, they can 15  Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, “Notice on Learning and Carrying out the State Council’s Decision on Implementing Scientific Outlook on the Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection,” Huanfa [2005] 161, December 26, 2005, http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkm./zj/wj/200910/t20091022 .htm?COLLCC=1721944220&.

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give rise to more serious consequences on business, public health, and social order when the suppressed public emotions find a new outlet. Situated in southwest China and facing southeastern Asia, Kunming, as a window for international communication and cooperation, must take into serious consideration the environmental capacity in and around the city while defining its role and making relevant plans. The risks of serious leakage and explosion for heavy chemical industrial parks should be considered seriously by learning from the major accidents in the oil and petrol industry in the past decade,16 and the precautionary principle should be given priority in the planning and location of these parks.17 However, violations of regulations and laws are found in the approval process of the CNPC Anning Refinery Project, where overall higher-level planning was “kidnapped” by and adjusted for a single project. These violations contradict the national policy of constructing ecological civilization and building a beautiful China, and must be corrected in time to avoid greater social, economic, and environmental costs in the future. 16  Ren Jinming and Liu Xiaoli, “Ecological Risks and Preventative Measures in China’s Oil and Petrol Industry,” Theory and Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (2007– 2012), China Environmental Science Press, 2012; Ren Jinming and Liu Xiaoli, “Thoughts on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Reconstruction Planning of Earthquakestricken Areas,” Theory and Practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (2007–2012), China Environmental Science Press, 2012. 17  European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle, 1896–2000, translated by Center for Environmental History Studies, Beijing Normal University, China Environmental Science Press. The English version can be downloaded at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22.

CHAPTER 3

Correlation between Water Pollution and Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors in the Huai River Basin YANG Gonghuan Abstract A comparative study of the thirty-year trend of death patterns among groups of people in the Huai River basin shows that the most severely and persistently polluted regions, i.e., the tributaries of the Honghe, Shaying, Wohe and Kui Rivers, happen to be the ones with the fastest growing numbers of deaths caused by digestive tract tumors, according to the results of analytical research on changes in such deaths in the Huai River basin published in 2013. Those numbers have each risen at a rate of three to ten times greater than the national average in China. Furthermore, spatial analysis results show that severely polluted regions coincide with regions that have a high prevalence of several emerging types of digestive tract tumors.

Keywords water pollution in the Huai River basin – digestive tract tumors – trends – correlation

1 Introduction The Huai River has been haunted by frequent pollution accidents since 1975. Since 2004, several media reports have covered the so-called “Cancer Village” in the Huai River basin. For example, “We Are Used to Cancer and Death: A Visit to Cancer Villages in the Huaihe Basin”1 reads, “In late September 2004, the reporters visited some of the villages with high prevalence of cancer in the Huai River basin. With death hanging over these villages, the reporters saw 1  Ou Zhengtao and Cai Yugao, “We Are Used to Cancer and Death: A Visit to Cancer Villages in the Huaihe Basin,” Xinhuanet at Jiangsu, http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/jiao_dian/2004-11/16/ content_3225893.htm (accessed Nov. 16, 2004).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_005

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despair on people’s faces everywhere. Some are already dead while others are waiting for their doom. A case of cancer will throw the household into a lifetime of debt. Those who are cancer-free at the moment are eternally troubled by the fear that one day they will be diagnosed with the deadly disease . . . The local people seem to be used to cancer and death already. In each of these villages, people would unfailingly accuse water pollution of causing them all pain.” “In the Dongsunlou Village of the Beijiao Township, Shenqiu County, Henan Province, Wang Ziqing’s brothers, aunts, and uncles all died from esophageal cancer.” His story is really too heart-wrenching to be told. Talking to the reporter, “Wang Ziqing said, wiping away tears, “We are a big family of over 100 people. Up to now, 30 of us have died from digestive tract cancer.” “In front of Meng Xianwu in the Mengzhai Village of Zhouying Township, Shenqiu Country, the reporters saw a row of 6 tombs, including a new one. Meng Xianwu told the reporter that the tombs buried two families, including all four members of one family. They all died from digestive tract cancer. The youngest was in the thirties while the oldest only in the fifties.” With the publication of these reports, then Premier Wen Jiabao issued a long memorandum: “These problems must be dealt with seriously. The Ministries of Health and Water Resources, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the National Development and Reform Commission, and local governments in the Huai River basin must conduct in-depth studies so as to figure out the details, identify the real problem, develop scientific plans, adopt comprehensive measures, and strengthen water pollution treatment in the Huai River basin so as to curb the high prevalence of cancer in the region.”2 As instructed, the relevant ministries and administrations sent their respective expert teams to the region. To curb the impact of water pollution on people’s health, the first step is to ascertain the impact. Since 2005, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) has done extensive research in the Huai River basin to study the correlation between tumor prevalence and water pollution. Their research aims to: 1) study the history and status quo of water pollution, describe the atlas and features of water pollution and specify the spatiotemporal distribution of carcinogens and tumor promoter pollutants; 2) study the spatiotemporal distribution of the prevalence of and death from tumors, particularly digestive tract tumors, in key regions of the basin; and 3) clarify the correlation between esophageal cancer, liver cancer, and gastric cancer and specific pollution factors in key regions. 2  Ou Zhengtao, Secret Investigations of the Huaihe River, Xinhua Publishing House, 2005.

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After eight years of hard work, the research team published its report in June 2013. The report, at the macro- and micro-levels, provides a primary explanation of the correlation between water pollution and digestive tract tumors in the Huai River basin. Moreover, the report manages to describe the history and status quo of water pollution in the Huai River basin, map the atlas and features of water pollution, identify the distribution features of digestive tract tumors, specify the 30-year trend of the prevalence of digestive tract tumors in different regions of the basin by re-analyzing historical data and studying the correlation between water pollution and digestive tract tumors in the Huai River basin. The Atlas Showing How the Water Environment in the Huai River Basin Relates to Local Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors (hereafter as The Atlas) focuses on the river basin level. This paper, owing to space limitations, will not analyze the issue at the national and individual levels. 2

An Overview of the Huai River Basin

The Huai River runs 1000 km with a total drop of 200 m. It runs up to the mouth of the Hong River, which is the 360 km upstream with a drop of 178 m and a gradient of 1/2000. The midstream runs 490 km from the mouth of the Hong River to the exit of Lake Hongze, dropping by 16 m with a gradient of 1/33000. The downstream, flowing from the exit to Sanjiangying and leading to the Yangtze River, is 150 km long with a drop of 6 m and a gradient of 1/25000. In addition to the canal leading to the Yangtze River, Lake Hongze has two other drainage ways, namely the Subei General Irrigation Canal and the Huaimo New River which diverts water into the Xinyi River. The Huai River basin covers a total area of 270,000 km2, spreading across 189 counties in 40 cities in the provinces of Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Shandong, and Jiangsu. Since the 1990s, the population in the basin has grown rapidly, reaching 165 million in 2000. The population density was 610 persons/km2, 4.6 times the national average (134 persons/km2) in the same year,3 making the Huai River basin the most densely populated river basin in China. Since the 1980s, the basin has seen rapid development of township and village enterprises following China’s economic reform. Domestic sewage, industrial waste water, garbage, off-scum, medical waste, pesticides, and fertilizers have been flooding into the Huai River. For example, the 30 cities along the Shaying River discharges on average 1,662,000 t of waste water per day into 3  The Spatial Socio-Economic Database, Resource and Environment Data Center, Chinese Academy of Science.

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the river. The five counties in Fuyang City of Anhui Province pollute the Kui River, the Xinbian River, and the Wei River—all tributaries of the Huai River— with 138,000 t of waste water on a daily basis. All these have been continuously polluting the Huai River. Environmental pollution in the Huai River basin has become a serious issue of great concern. 3

Research Approach

The impact of pollution on health, particularly on the development of cancer, is an accumulative effect of long-term exposure to small doses of pollutants. The long time span, the variety of pollutants, and the complexity of cancer pathogenesis make it difficult to ascertain environmental pollution as the cause of tumors. Figure 3.1 shows how environmental pollutants may cause tumors. Therefore, to prove a causal relationship between water pollution and tumor growth, it must be proven that: 1) there is a time correlation between pollution and prevalence of tumors; for example, 10–15 years after pollution, the region sees a soar in the prevalence of tumors. There must also be a dose-response relationship; the prevalence and mortality rates of new tumor cases are higher in seriously polluted regions. 2) Pollutants, which are internationally recognized as carcinogens, from different sources pollute the local bodies of water and eventually find their way into human bodies as proven by these pollutants and their metabolins found in human blood and tissue. As mentioned earlier, this paper aims to assess the correlation between water pollution and the prevalence of tumors at the river basin level.

Figure 3.1 Diagram of correlation between environmental pollution and prevalence of tumors.

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Methodology and Findings

4.1 Spatiotemporal Distribution of Water Pollution: Past and Present 4.1.1 Analytical Approach and Indicators for Surface Water Quality The annual China Environmental Quality Report4 from 1982 to 2010 is referred to as source of data to analyze the surface water quality of the Huai River basin. The state-controlled profile data of water quality monitoring of the Huai River, including water quality class and other relevant monitoring indicators, are analyzed in this paper. Relevant Chinese water quality specifications (GB 3838–1998 and GB 33838–2002) serve as the standards to establish water quality classes and divide drainage basin. Chemical oxygen demand (COD) and Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) figures are used to decide water quality, develop the frequency of water pollution (FWP) indicator and establish the standards to decide changes in water quality. On this basis, the team managed to draw the profile water quality tendency diagram, water quality tendency diagrams, and other relevant diagrams for the 1982–2009 time period in accordance with the abovementioned water quality indicators, and 80 maps to jointly reflect the changes in the water environment of the Huai River basin. To give a visual description of the general water quality at each section, The Atlas also calculates and analyzes the percentage of the times (years) of changes in water quality class and concentration of relevant indicators (COD, BOD, and ammonia nitrogen) as against the total observation years (with data). In order to be more specific with water quality changes at each section, the water quality tendency diagram 1982–2009 is drafted for each section to show water quality change and changes in relevant water quality indicators. On this basis, other diagrams include 1986–1995, 1995–2005, 2005–2009 mainstream water quality (as measured by water quality class, BOD concentration, COD concentration, and ammonia nitrogen concentration) tendency diagrams, and 1997–2005, 2005–2009 water quality (as measured by water quality class, BOD concentration, COD concentration, and ammonia nitrogen concentration) tendency diagrams and comparison diagrams. Moreover, frequency of water pollution (FWP), that is the percentage (frequency) of Class V-Below Class V (Polluted) water occurrence against the total number of measurements. FWP shows the water quality condition of a particular section. Either comprehensive assessment or the concentration of a single indicator is used to determine whether the water is Class V or Below Class V. 4  China Environment Monitoring Station, ed., China Nationwide Environmental Quality Report, State Environmental Protection Administration, 1982–2008; Ministry of Environmental Protection, ed., China Environmental Quality Report, China Environmental Science Press, 2009–2010.

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FWP is also used to calculate spatial interpolation to show the frequency of Class V and Below Class V in a particular geographic space, so as to demonstrate the distribution of seriously polluted water in the river basin and represent the risk of water body in regions with no surface water being seriously polluted. In addition, variation in FWP figures can also reflect the changes in pollution over time. 4.1.2 Spatiotemporal Distribution GIS spatial interpolation spatializes FWP to show the spatial distribution and variation pattern of water pollution in the Huai River basin.5 For details, please refer to The Atlas. This way, the team identifies the spectra and the spatiotemporal distribution of water pollution. More than 80 maps are drafted to systematically show the variation in water quality in the mainstream and primary and secondary tributaries of the Huai River, lakes, and the Yi-Shu-Si river system in 30 years from the 1980s to 2009, demonstrate the features of water environment change and locate the regions of water pollution in the Huai River basin.6 Water pollution in the Huai River basin demonstrates the following features: In terms of time—pollution fluctuates across time; In terms of space—pollution in the mainstream fluctuates while tributaries and lakes are continuously troubled by serious pollution; In terms of pollution indicators—shared key pollution indicators include ammonia nitrogen/non-ionic ammonia, BOD5 and COD. In accordance with landform and watershed characteristics, the Huai River basin is divided into 7 regions. A calculation of the frequencies of Classes II– III, Class IV, Class V-Below Class V water from 1997 to 2009 of different regions shows that the midwest plain, the mideast plain and the Yi-Shu-Si river system region are seriously polluted on a long-term basis. Encouragingly, since 2005, the frequency of Class V-Below Class V water has been falling in each of the 7 districts (See Figure 3.2).

5  Ji Wei, Zhuang Dafang, and Ren Hongyan, et al., “Spatiotemporal Variation of Surface Water Quality for Decades: A Case Study of Huai River System, China,” Water Science & Technology, Vol. 68, No. 6, 1233–1241, 2013. 6  Yang Gonghuan and Zhuang Dafang, The Atlas Showing How the Water Environment in the Huai River Basin Relates to Local Deaths Caused by Digestive Tract Tumors, SinoMaps Press, 2013.

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Figure 3.2 Water quality of different regions: 1997–2009. 淮河流域水环境与消化道肿瘤死亡图集：Hydraulic environment of the Huaihe River Basin and incidence of tumor of the digestive system 水环境污染频度时空变化：Change over time in frequency of water pollution incidents 1997–2009年分区水质：Water quality in different districts, 1997–2009 山东省：Shandong Province 河南省：Henan Province 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 菏泽：Heze 济宁：Jining 枣庄：Zaozhuang 临沂：Linyi 日照：Rizhao 连云港：Lianyungang 宿迁：Suqian

淮安：Huaian 盐城：Yancheng 泰州：Taizhou 扬州：Yangzhou 蚌埠：Bengbu 淮南：Huainan 淮北：Huaibei 徐州：Xuzhou 商丘：Shangqiu 亳州：Bozhou 驻马店：Zhumadian 信阳：Xinyang

周口：Zhoukou 许昌：Xuchang 平顶山：Pingdingshan Mountain 漯河：Luohe 六安：Luan 郑州：Zhengzhou 洪泽湖：Hongze Lake 高邮湖：Gaoyou Lake 骆马湖：Luoma Lake 女山湖：Nüshan Lake 淮河：Huaihe River

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In terms of the FWP spatiotemporal distribution measured by water quality grades, BOD, COD, and ammonia nitrogen/non-ionic ammonia, the north bank of the Huai River shows a higher FWP. FWP is particularly high for the Honghe, Fenhe, Quan, Ying, Wo rivers in the midwest plain, the Zhuzhaoxin and Si rivers in the Nansi Lake basin, and the Kui River in the mideast plain (See Figure 3.3). However, the regions with high FWP have shrunk in recent years. In spite of this, the pollution frequency of BOD and ammonia nitrogen remains high and coincides, to a great degree, with FWP in terms of space, while the COD pollution frequency remains constant, making BOD and ammonia nitrogen the main pollution indicators for the period. 4.2 Spatiotemporal Analysis of Mortality From Digestive Tract Tumors 4.2.1 Analytical Approach and Indicators In the last 30 years, cause of death and other basic health information were not recorded in most regions in the Huai River basin. This makes it difficult to understand the health conditions of local people so as to verify the validity of media reports on “Cancer Villages” and the seriousness of the issue. Fortunately, the 1973–1975 national census of cause of death7 can be used to analyze the causes of death in this period in the Huai River basin, which will serve as the baseline to describe changes in cancer death in the following three decades. A comparison with the national average in rural areas will show the features in the change. In order to control for the variable of the influence of aging on the calculation of cancer-related deaths in 1973–1975 and 2004–2005, the original mortality figures of different age groups were standardized in line with the rate of death via digestive tract tumors in 2000 to make the rates of death by digestive tract tumors in the abovementioned two periods comparable. The 2004–2006 population of sample counties is obtained from the 2004– 2006 official household records of these countries. County population equals the sum of the population of all villages.8 In 2005, China CDC conducted a 3-year retrospective survey on cause of death in 14 counties and collected the data for 2004–2006.9 These 14 counties have a total population of 12.64 million, accounting for 8% of the total of the 7  Tumor Prevention and Treatment Office, Ministry of Health, China, Cancer in China, People’s Medical Publishing House, 1979. 8  China CDC, Cancer Prevention and Treatment in the Huaihe River Basin: A Report on Retrospective Death Cause Study, Peking Union Medical College Press, 2009. 9  Chen Zhu, Report on the Third National Cause of Death Respective Sampling and Study, Peking Union Medical College Press, 2008.

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Huai River basin and spread across six regions, namely the east downstream region, the mideast plain, the west hilly and mountainous region, the midwest plain, the south plain, and the south four-lake basin. Although samples did not cover all residential areas, samples were taken from different regions. To satisfy the technical requirements in identifying cause of death, this research developed a verbal autopsy table,10 the validity of which is verified by crosschecking the consistency between the distribution of cancerrelated death and incidences.11 The International Classification of Disease is adopted to classify causes of death. To describe the change in digestive tract tumors in the Huai River basin, in addition to the rate of cancer-related deaths and standardized the rate of death, cancer variation rate is adopted as a third indicator: cancer variation rate = (standardized rate of cancer-related deaths in 2004–2006— standardized rate of cancer-related deaths in 1973–1975) / standardized rate of cancer-related deaths in 1973–1975 × 100%. In comparison with the national variation rate, if the cancer variation rate of a particular region is 20% higher, then this region has seen a rise in cancer-related death; if the figure is –20%– +20%, cancer-related deaths have remained the same; if it is 20% lower, then the region has had a fall in variation rate. The measurements are marked on the causes of death map. 4.2.2 Spatiotemporal Distribution Research shows many areas in the downstream basin of the Huai River have already shown a high prevalence of digestive tract tumors, particularly in the form of liver cancer and stomach cancer in 1973–1975. Tumor development and water pollution were not correlated then. Figure 3.4 shows the features of liver tumor distribution in 1973–1975. An analysis of the distribution of mortality rates from different digestive tract tumors in 2004–2006 shows some regions have been historically troubled with high prevalence of tumors while some others have changed from low prevalence regions into high prevalence regions. Taking liver cancer as an example, Figure 3.5 shows this characteristic. By comparing the data on causes of death in 1973–1975 and 2004–2006, the rate of cancer variation shows: digestive tract tumor, particularly liver 10  Yang Gonghuan et al., “Validation of Verbal Autopsy Procedures for Adult Deaths in China,” International Journal of Epidemiology, September 6, 2005. 11  Wan X., Zhou M. G., and Yang G. H., “Epidemiologic Application of Verbal Autopsy to Investigate the High Occurrence of Cancer Along Huai River Basin, China,” Population Health Metrics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2011, 37–45.

Correlation between Water Pollution and Deaths

Figure 3.3 Frequency of water pollution: 1997–2009. 淮河流域水环境与消化道肿瘤死亡图集：Hydraulic environment of the Huaihe River Basin and incidence of tumor of the digestive system 水环境污染频度时空变化：Change over time in frequency of water pollution incidents 1997–2009年分区水质：Water quality in different zones, 1997–2009 水质污染频度：Frequency of water pollution incidents 山东省：Shandong Province 河南省：Henan Province 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 郑州：Zhengzhou 开封：Kaifeng 菏泽：Heze 济宁：Jining 日照：Rizhao 临沂：Linyi 连云港：Lianyungang 枣庄：Zaozhuang 淮安：Huaian

盐城：Yancheng 宿迁：Suqian 泰州：Taizhou 扬州：Yangzhou 蚌埠：Bengbu 淮南：Huainan 阜阳：Fuyang 六安：Liuan 信阳：Xinyang 驻马店：Zhumadian 漯河：Luohe 周口：Zhoukou 亳州：Bozhou

宿迁：Suqian 淮北：Huaibei 徐州：Xuzhou 商丘：Shangqiu 平顶山：Pingdingshan Mountain 许昌：Xuchang 洪泽湖：Hongze Lake 高邮湖：Gaoyou Lake 骆马湖：Luoma Lake 南阳湖：Nanyang Lake 女山湖：Nüshan Lake 淮河：Huaihe River

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Figure 3.4 Standardized death rate from liver cancer among men: 1973–1975. 河南省：Henan Province 山东省：Shandong Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 沈丘县：Shenqiu County 西平县：Xiping County 扶沟县：Fugou County 罗山县：Luoshan County 灵璧县：Lingbi County 宿县：Su County 蒙城县：Mengcheng County 寿县：Shou County 巨野县：Juye County 坟上县：Fenshang County 盱眙县：Xuyi County 射阳县：Sheyang County 连云港：Lianyungang 枣庄：Zaozhuang 济宁：Jining 郑州：Zhengzhou

开封：Kaifeng 阜阳：Fuyang 信阳：Xinyang 商丘：Shangqiu 驻马店：Zhumadian 菏泽：Heze 许昌：Xuchang 蚌埠：Bengbu 淮南：Huainan 漯河：Luohe 洪泽湖：Hongze Lake 高邮湖：Gaoyou Lake 骆马湖：Luoma Lake 微山湖：Weishan Lake 女山湖：Nüshan Lake 淮河：Huaihe River 肝癌标准化死亡率（男）1/10万： Age-standardized mortality rate from liver cancer (male) 1/100,000

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Correlation between Water Pollution and Deaths

Figure 3.5 Standardized death rate from liver cancer among men: 2004–2006. 河南省：Henan Province 山东省：Shandong Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 沈丘县：Shenqiu Province 西平县：Xiping County 扶沟县：Fugou County 罗山县：Luoshan County 灵璧县：Lingbi County 蒙城县：Mengcheng County 寿县：Shou County 巨野县：Juye County 坟上县：Fenshang County 盱眙县：Xuyi County 射阳县：Sheyang County 连云港：Lianyungang 枣庄：Zaozhuang 济宁：Jining

郑州：Zhengzhou 开封：Kaifeng 阜阳：Fuyang 信阳：Xinyang 商丘：Shangqiu 驻马店：Zhumadian 菏泽：Heze 许昌：Xuchang 蚌埠：Bengbu 淮南：Huainan 漯河：Luohe 临沂：linyi 日照：Rizhao 宿迁：Suqian 淮安：Huaian 盐城：Yancheng 泰州：Taizhou 扬州：Yangzhou

六安：Liuan 周口：Zhoukou 亳州：Bozhou 淮北：Huaibei 徐州：Xuzhou 平顶山：Pingdingshan Mountain 金湖县：Jinhu County 埇桥区：Yongqiaoqu District 颖东区：Yingdongqu District 洪泽湖：Hongze Lake 高邮湖：Gaoyou Lake 骆马湖：Luoma Lake 微山湖：Weishan Lake 女山湖：Nüshan Lake 淮河：Huaihe River

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Figure 3.6 Standardized variation rate of death from liver cancer: 1973–2006. 河南省：Henan Province 山东省：Shandong Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 沈丘县：Shenqiu Province 西平县：Xiping County 扶沟县：Fugou County 罗山县：Luoshan County 灵璧县：Lingbi County 蒙城县：Mengcheng County 寿县：Shou County 巨野县：Juye County 坟上县：Fenshang County 盱眙县：Xuyi County 射阳县：Sheyang County 连云港：Lianyungang 枣庄：Zaozhuang

济宁：Jining 郑州：Zhengzhou 开封：Kaifeng 阜阳：Fuyang 信阳：Xinyang 商丘：Shangqiu 驻马店：Zhumadian 菏泽：Heze 许昌：Xuchang 蚌埠：Bengbu 淮南：Huainan 漯河：Luohe 临沂：Linyi 日照：Rizhao 宿迁：Suqian 淮安：Huaian 盐城：Yancheng 泰州：Taizhou 扬州：Yangzhou

六安：Liuan 周口：Zhoukou 亳州：Bozhou 淮北：Hua ibei 徐州：Xuzhou 平顶山：Pingdingshan Mountain 金湖县：Jinhu County 埇桥区：Yongqiaoqu District 颖东区：Yingdongqu District 洪泽湖：Hongze Lake 高邮湖：Gaoyou Lake 骆马湖：Luoma Lake 微山湖：Weishan Lake 女山湖：Nüshan Lake 淮河：Huaihe River

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cancer and stomach cancer incidences have been rapidly increasing in Shenqiu County and Yingdong District along the Shaying River, Fugou County and Mengcheng County in the Wo River basin, Yongqiao District and Lingbi County in the Kui River basin, and Wenshang County and Juye County in the Yi-Shu-Si river system basin, at a speed several times faster than that of the national average. Figure 3.6 shows the liver cancer variation rate. As is shown, Shenqiu County and Yongqiao District saw an increase in the rate, which is three to five times higher than the national average. 5 Conclusion An analysis of the trend in deaths by digestive tract tumors in the Huai River basin shows: the 30-year pattern in deaths prove that regions seriously polluted on a long term basis—the Hong River, the Shaying River, the Wo River and the Kui River basins—show the biggest rise in death from digestive tract tumors at an increased rate that is three to 10 times higher than the national average. In terms of space, seriously polluted regions to a large extent coincide with regions with a high prevalence of new digestive tract tumors. Although water pollution in the Huai River basin has been generally under control since 2005, water pollution remains a serious problem in some areas, exposing the local residents to a higher risk of developing tumors. Taking into account the lagging effect of the impact of environmental pollution on health, it is predicted that in 10 years, in the midwest plain, the mideast plain, and the Nansi Lake basin in the north—which show a high FWP as measured by the amount of ammonia nitrogen/non-ionic ammonia, BOD, and COD—the task of tumor prevention and control remains extremely challenging.

CHAPTER 4

The Urgent Need for an Environment and Health Law: A Study of 63 Health Hazard Incidents LV Zhongmei and HUANG Kai Abstract This paper analyzes 63 environmental incidents that occurred from 2004 through 2013 and that harmed human health via lead and cadmium pollution. These incidents occurred across China, especially in the south-central and eastern regions, and harmed mainly rural people. Most of the pollutants were emitted into the air and soil through metal smelting and processing before entering the human body, typically causing cumulative harm to human health. Behind these incidents are the current lack of a collaborative mechanism between environmental and health management organizations, of sufficient environmental standards, and of applicable laws and regulations in China. It is therefore necessary to pay much attention to making legal arrangements, especially the Environmental and Health Law, so as to put China’s environmental and health-­relevant work under law.

Keywords lead and cadmium pollution incidents – environmental and health management system – environmental and health standards – environmental and health law

During the Eleventh Five-Year period, China was hit by 232 major (Class III and above) environmental pollution incidents. The management of these accidents generally followed the pattern of public petition, media exposure, and government response, showing a vicious circle of “illegal discharge—environmental pollution—victimized public—government paying the bill.” In recent years, with the appearance of “cancer village” and “manganese delta,” group incidents of heavy metal health hazards were frequently reported. The WHO’s initial assessment says that environmental problems are blamed for 21% of

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_006

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China’s burden of disease.1 It has become evident that environmental and health problems have become a major challenge to China’s construction of an ecologically-oriented civilized society. These problems are important not only to economic development and people’s livelihood, but also to political stability.2 1

Warnings of Lead and Chromium Health Hazard Incidents

To better understand the status quo of heavy metal pollution health hazards, the authors collected all the information on group health hazard incidents caused by lead and cadmium pollution from January 1, 2004 to December 2013, from environment reports by environmental protection administrations, in legal cases, and on the China National Knowledge Internet database and other authoritative websites, and conducted field work for some of these incidents. By doing this, the authors aim to identify the developmental trend and features of heavy metal pollution in China. 1.1 Overview 1.1.1 The Number of Incidents is Falling After a Stage of High Prevalence From 2004 to 2013, there were altogether 63 lead and cadmium pollution incidents, that is, 44 for lead pollution and 19 for cadmium pollution. From 2004 to 2008, five pollution incidents were recorded on average each year. 2009–2011 saw the surge in pollution incidents with 12 cases a year on average. Since 2012, the prevalence has fallen to 2.5 cases per year (see Figure 4.1). Among the 63 incidents, 24 were classified as Class IV, 22 as Class III, 8 as Class II, and 9 as Class I.3 Class II and I incidents were reported every year.

1  According to the WHO’s “Disability Adjusted of Life Years” (DALYs) analysis in 2009, it is estimated that for every 1000 Chinese people, environmental pollution causes the loss of 32 health life years, accounting for 21% of DALYs. http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/ national/countryprofile/china.pdf. 2  “How Much Can Environment and Health Problems Cost?,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2007-05/31/content_6179493 (assessed on Oct. 1, 2008). 3  Ministry of Environmental Protection, “Emergent Environmental Incident Information Report Methods,” May 1, 2011.

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Figure 4.1 Lead and cadmium pollution incidents: 2004–2013.

1.1.2

South-Central China and East China are Regions that are Hit the Worst Lead and cadmium pollution incidents have hit 17 provinces. Hunan Province has been worst hit with 11 incidents, accounting for 17.5% of the national total. Hunan, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces have a relatively higher prevalence of lead pollution while Guangdong and Hunan have seen more cadmium pollution incidents than other provinces (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1

Lead and cadmium pollution incidents by province

Number Province

Hunan Guangdong Jiangsu Zhejiang Henan Fujian Hubei Jiangxi Gansu Shaanxi Yunnan

Lead pollution

7 4 6 5 4 4 2 1 2 2 2

Cadmium pollution

4 6 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0

Total

11 10 7 6 5 4 3 3 2 2 2

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Lead and cadmium pollution incidents by province (cont.)

Number Province

Lead pollution

Cadmium pollution

Total

Anhui Shandong Shanghai Guizhou Liaoning Guangxi Total

2 2 1 0 0 0 44

0 0 0 1 1 1 19

2 2 1 1 1 1 63

Moreover, in terms of spatial distribution, south-central China and east China are hit the worst with 87% of all lead and cadmium pollution incidents, followed by the northwest and the southwest which saw four and three incidents, respectively, while northeast China and north China are hardly affected. The reason for this pattern is that China’s lead and zinc metallurgy industry and enterprises are concentrated in south-central and east China (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Spatial distribution of lead and cadmium pollution incidents.

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Figure 4.3 Distribution of lead and cadmium pollution incidents.

1.1.3 Most Health Hazard Incidents Happened in Rural Areas Most heavy metal pollution incidents happened in less-developed rural areas with poor environmental regulation capacity (see Figure 4.3). Moreover, it is worthwhile to point out that the few incidents in urban areas are mostly found in industrial parks; for example, blood lead incidents in the Beiyakou Industrial Park of Heqing County, Yunan Province, the Lin­ jiang Industrial Park of Zijin County, Guangdong Province, the Qingshan Township I­ndustrial Park of Chongyang County, Hubei Province, and the Changqing Industrial Park of Fengxiang County, Shaanxi Province. While local governments spare no efforts to build industrial parks, preferential policies have created a vacuum for environmental surveillance. As a result, the local environment is sacrificed for industrial development. 1.2 Features 1.2.1 Metallurgical Plants are the Main Sources The production of batteries is the main cause of lead and cadmium pollution, accounting for 36.4% of all incidents. Polluters are mostly large- or medium-sized battery producers including Chinese industry leaders such as GP Batteries, Chilwee Group, and Tianneng Group, and transnational corporations like Panasonic. Moreover, lead melting accounts for 22% while heavy metal mining associated cadmium pollution accounts for 9%. The processing of lead and cadmium products is responsible for 19% of pollution incidents (Figure 4.4).

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Figure 4.4 Sources of lead and cadmium pollution.

1.2.2 Enterprises’ Illegal Discharge Behaviors are the Main Reason Of all the pollution incidents, enterprises’ illegal discharge is responsible for 45 incidents, accounting for 71.4%. Quite a number of these enterprises are the investment promotional projects of local governments and some of them are enterprises below the designated size, which have adopted prohibited or obsolete technologies. Inadequate protection has also led to the lead and cadmium poisoning of workers. In addition, there are 6 incidents of unknown causes. Of all the incidents, only two are categorized as accidents (see Table 4.2). Table 4.2 Causes of lead and cadmium pollution Causes

Lead pollution incidents

Cadmium pollution incidents

Total

Percentage

Illegal discharge Lack of protection Accidents Of unknown cause Total

34 7 0 3 44

11 3 2 3 19

45 10 2 6 63

71.4 15.9 3.2 9.5 100.0

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1.2.3 Pollutants Affect Human Health through Different Channels Lead pollutants in the atmosphere and dust enter the body system through breathing and touching. Cadmium pollutants in water and soil are accumulated in food and finally find their way into human body through the food chain. The emission of gas with lead into the atmosphere is responsible for most lead pollution incidents, while the pollution of soil by cadmium-rich gas settlement and sewage discharge is the cause of most cadmium pollution incidents, although there are also cases of compound and therefore more complex causes (see Table 4.3). Table 4.3 Types of pollution for lead and cadmium pollution incidents Types of Pollution

Lead pollution incidents

Cadmium pollution incidents

Total

Percentage

Air pollution Water pollution Soil pollution Compound pollution Others Total

30 8 0 3 3 44

0 2 12 2 3 19

30 10 12 5 6 63

47.6 15.9 19.0 7.9 9.5 100.0

1.2.4 Most Pollution Incidents are Accumulative Most lead and cadmium pollution incidents are caused by accumulative pollution. It takes about 30 years for lead and cadmium pollutants to show their impacts on humans. The outbreak of heavy metal pollution in 2008 demonstrates the periodic toxic reaction of lead and cadmium pollutants (see Table 4.4). Table 4.4 Lead and cadmium pollution incidents: accumulative or acute

Accumulative Acute Total

Lead pollution incidents

Cadmium pollution incidents

Total

Percentage

41 3 44

16 3 19

57 6 63

90.5 9.5 100.0

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Behind Environmental and Health Incidents

Of the 63 lead and cadmium pollution incidents under study in this paper, none are disclosed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection but made known to the public by leadership instruction, media report, or group actions. Most victims find out their health problems unexpectedly in physical exams before the media report the relevant problems. The problem here is: Why is the Ministry of Environmental Protection at different levels blind to such serious incidents? What does this situation mean? 2.1 The Absence of an Intergovernmental Coordination Mechanism Environmental factors that affect people’s health show the following characteristics: multi-medium (air, water, soil), multi-channel (breath, food, skin exposure), multi-pollutant (heavy metal, toxic chemicals), and complex health risk. These characteristics dictate an intergovernmental coordination mechan­ ism for environment and health. In November 2007, the State Council issued the National Environment and Health Action Plan (hereafter as NEHAP), proposing an environment and health action plan under the leadership of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Health, which involves the participation of 18 ministries. Unfortunately, as a result of the lack of a support system, the coordination mechanism has never been actually established. 2.1.1

Lack of Coordination between the Environmental Protection and Health Administrations According to NEHAP, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Health are supposed to play a leading role, with the former in charge of environment quality and pollutant treatment and the latter responsible for epidemic and public health intervention. However, the two ministries have been acting on their own without collaborative efforts to establish the monitoring network, the indicator system, and monitoring agencies. Their coordination has been limited to academic research and baseline investigation. As a result, they have proven incapable of discovering and solving environment and health incidents. Before the outbreak of several lead and cadmium pollution incidents, the local health administration had actually found serious health damage to workers in polluting enterprises. For example, before blood lead was found in the children living near the Dongling Metallurgic Company in Fengxiang County, Shaanxi Province in August 2009, health records in the previous two years had already shown the blood lead level in those employees at Dongling Metallurgic Company whose work involved exposure to lead exceeded the standard by

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33.3%. This should have been regarded as an indicator of a health hazard. However, the local health administration did not report the situation to the local government or the Ministry of Environmental Protection. As a result, the best time to take action was missed, which eventually led to a major pollution incident. Likewise, the Ministry of Environmental Protection was unable to coordinate with the Ministry of Health to strengthen health monitoring and health education. The national Lead and Zinc Industry Access Standards has specified residents in health protection zones as people at high risk of lead pollution-related health problems, but few enterprises have actually taken measures to protect these people. The Ministry of Environmental Protection only monitors the discharge and emission behavior of enterprises, but makes no effort to evaluate and manage relevant health risks or involve the Ministry of Health to provide health monitoring and health education services to the local people. Some local environment officials have said, “When it comes to law enforcement, the Ministry of Environment Protection applies the relevant environmental standards accordingly while the Ministry of Health provides technical support and relevant data . . . Health law enforcement, in essence, means monitoring and managing institutions of health.” 2.1.2

Lack of Communication between the Urban Planning Administration and the Ministry of Environment Protection Our research has found many occasions where urban planning has failed to observe the general functional area zoning plan and where environment planning and urban planning do not match. It is rather common to find the absence of a environmental feasibility study and EIA in planning and locating industrial parks. For example, the ISP plant of the Dongling Metallurgic Company is located in the Changqing Industrial Park in Fengxiang County. It was not until 50% of the land area of the industrial park had started production and the health incident broke out that an EIA was conducted. In fact, at the planning stage of the industrial park, the local branch of the Ministry of Environmental Protection was not involved. The fieldwork of the research team shows that the company sits in a low-lying area with a low wind speed, making it difficult for pollutants to disperse. Moreover, although the neighboring area is rather densely populated, no protection measures of any kind have been taken. 2.1.3

Lack of Coordination between the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Other Relevant Departments During the fieldwork at the Agricultural Bureau of Guixi City, Jiangxi Province, the researchers learned that agricultural management and monitoring has focused on pollution-free cultivation. Although it is put in charge of soil safety,

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the Soil and Fertilizer Division at present only monitors soil nutrients but lacks in the necessary technologies to monitor hazardous substances in soil. The management of wastewater and gas falls in the jurisdiction of the environmental protection and health administrations while the agricultural bureau manages agricultural non-point source pollution. In theory, the Law Enforcement Squad of the Agricultural Bureau is in charge of monitoring fertilizer and pesticide residues, but because of technological incapability at the county level, the Provincial Agricultural Resource and Environment Management Station has been doing the actual work. Moreover, the relevant environmental standards applied by the Provincial Environment Monitoring Center affiliated to the Provincial Environmental Protection Department in its work are not directly linked to the relevant standards of the health administration. 2.2 Short Supply of Environmental and Health Standards The environment and health standards system serves as the basis of ­environment and health risk assessment and an important measurement of people’s health. However, the system is severely underdeveloped in China with too many conflicts and blanks in environmental protection standards and environmental health standards. The absence of a clearly defined environment and health standard system has greatly undermined the scientificity and ­effectiveness of an environment and health survey, assessment, and management. 2.2.1 Lack of Health Targets in Environmental Standards For a long time, health targets have not been a leading factor in the development and enforcement of health standards, resulting in low relevance between standard structure and implementation tools and poor coordination, which ultimately prevented relevant standards from joining forces. For example, in China, environment and health risk assessments generally apply the national Soil Environment Quality Standard (GB 15618–1995). However, the standard can be applied to a wide range of land types including the soil of general farmlands, vegetable gardens, tea gardens, orchards, pastures, woodlands, and natural reserve, and defines soil as the outer tectorium that can grow plants. However, in the several blood lead incidents, children are exposed to pollution through contact with dust on playgrounds or tables. Since this dust does not qualify as soil, no standard is applicable here. 2.2.2 Deficiency of an Environmental Standards System By the end of 2010, China had put in place 1,494 environmental protection standards. However, holes can still found in China’s environmental standards system.

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First, there is a lack of total quantity control targets. In China, a pollutant discharge standard generally sets the limit to discharge concentration at a single discharge outlet of a single pollution source. Therefore, these are concentration standards, but not standards that limit the total quantity of pollutants discharged into the environment. Moreover, environmental standards are categorized in accordance with environmental factors and industry. As a result, a standard only applies to a single industry or environmental factor. These make it difficult to control the total quantity of pollutants, making it difficult to protect the environment in general, because even when every single source of pollution discharges within the limit of the standard, serious environmental pollution can still happen when there are too many sources of pollution. Second, there are flaws in the development of environmental standards. EIAs calculate the quantity of pollutants discharged on the basis of the designed operation efficiency of environmental protection facilities. As a result, the actual discharge may be greater than the prediction. In this study, enterprises insisted that the dust collection efficiency of their dust collection facilities had reached the designated level, but refused to disclose the actual operation efficiency. In addition, while the dust collection efficiency targets particles, the lead dust collection efficiency might be much lower because lead particles are generally very small. Third, there is a lack of local environmental standards. Health risks are mostly local, varying from place to place and from industry to industry. According to the Chinese Environment Standard Management Method, local governments can, in accordance with local environmental conditions and level of economic development, enforce environmental standards stricter than national ones or develop their own local standards in the case of the absence of applicable national standards. However, the development of local environmental standards has been very disappointing in China. Aside from air ­quality standards in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shandong, Guangdong, and Zhejiang and comprehensive wastewater drainage standards in Liaoning and Shandong, local pollutant discharge standards are absent in heavy metal pollution incidentpacked provinces such as Hunan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi. 2.2.3 Conflicts between Different Environmental Standards First, conflicts exist between environmental quality standards and environmental health standards. China’s environmental health standards had been developed to deal with the messy conditions in the early years of the People’s Republic and therefore are unfit for the modern environmental condition and health problems. Take the hygienic buffer zone as an example. Since the first standard—Refinery Hygienic Buffer Zone (GB 8195–1987) in 1987, China has

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issued over 30 hygienic buffer zone standards. However, these standards apply mostly to plain and hilly terrains, not regions with complicated landforms (e.g., mountainous regions). For those storage battery factories involved in blood lead incidents in recent years, they apply the “1,000 m standard” for hygienic buffer zones. However, a blood lead test shows exceedingly high levels of blood lead is still very common among residents living beyond the 1,000 m mark. As a result, local residents are questioning the validity of the “1000 m standard.” Second, conflicts are also found between environmental quality standards and agricultural production standards. For human beings, food is the biggest source of lead intake (77.0%). Therefore, food-related agricultural production standards play an important role in affecting blood lead levels. However, the delink age between environmental standards and agricultural production standards leads to a rise in the risk of environmental pollution and makes it difficult to initiate preventive health actions and ensure food security. In recent years, this kind of delink has lead to the difficulty in enforcing laws and ultimately the repetition of high blood lead incidents. 2.3 Absence of Legislations and Regulations 2.3.1 Defects in the Legal System Of all the 30 environmental protection-related laws in China, only six laws (Environmental Protection Law, Cleaner Production Promotion Law, Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Law, Environmental Pollution Prevention and Control Law of Solid Wastes, Environmental Noise Pollution Prevention Law, and Radioactive Pollution Control Law) claim explicitly to “protect people’s health.” All these clauses are declaratory provisions without institutional arrangement for implementation. Provisions on “protecting people’s health or public health” in other regulations, rules and standards are too general to put into practice. Moreover, these clauses are scattered in laws and regulations of very different natures such as public health, food hygiene, drug control, and labor environment protection. These laws, regulations, and rules are obviously insufficient to tackle the serious environmental and health situations facing China today. As a result of these defects, public right cannot be protected and victims cannot receive help in time, which has led to more group incidents and intensified social conflicts. 2.3.2

Absence of Institutional Arrangement for Environmental Protection In the last 30 years of reform and opening up, GDP-orientation has dominated local development. The evaluation of local government leaders on the basis of GDP has lead to the pursuit of economic development and scale at the

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sacrifice of the environment. Environmental pollution and eco-damage have become the “by-products” of economic development. At the same time, when the government is concerned with “maintaining stability,” environmental and health incidents have been handled as “group riot incidents.” In recent years, there have been some pilot programs where environmental indicators have been incorporated into government performance assessments. But these pilot programs are not immune to problems. First, the weight of environmental indicators is rather low. For example, in the 1,000-point government performance assessment system in Qingdao City, environmental performance weighs only 80 points, accounting for 8%. Second, the indictor system needs improvement. In some local assessment systems, environment indicators focus on overall pollution control and energy efficiency with no reference to human health protection. For example, in Zhejiang Province, the environmental indicators in the official performance assessment system are: “main pollutant discharge control rate,” “land use per 10,000 yuan GDP,” “energy consumption per 10,000 yuan industrial added value,” “environmental protection investment,” and “drinking water quality achieved rate.” Third, there is no explanation of how to use the results of the government environmental performance assessment. It is still unclear whether environmental performance assessment results will affect the promotion of officials. The results are not disclosed to the public, still leaving the public in the dark. 3

Proposal for the Environment and Health Law

Objectively speaking, environmental and health problems are caused by multiple factors. From the natural science perspective, these problems are the results of a complex chain: “pollutant—transformation of pollutants in the environment—entry into the human body—health damage,” involving physics, chemistry, biology, ecology, medicine, and many other scientific fields. From the social science perspective, environment and health group incidents involve “enterprise discharge—government monitoring—public health intervention—public interests appeal.” The relationship between the multiple actors and their interests is a complicated one that is closely related to the socio-economic development model, corporate social responsibility, environmental management, health management, and public interests protection. To solve such a complex scientific and social problem, it is important for science to clarify the correlation between environment and health and propose technical solutions to environmental and health problems; it is also necessary

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for social scientists to study the social causes of environmental and health problems and propose institutional arrangements and policies to solve the problem. As the institutional arrangement of the highest level, legislation is of paramount significance to solving these problems. On the one hand, a human health oriented system of standards will institutionalize scientific findings and provide the scientific foundation and technological support to the system of environmental protection. On the other hand, with appropriate institutional arrangement, the rights and duties of different players can be clarified and the environment and health monitoring system and operation mechanism will be established so as to protect the people’s rights to life and health. 3.1 Precautionary Principles Because of the complexity and seriousness of environmental and health problems, the Environment and Health Law is related but not equal to the existing Environmental Protection Law. The former takes the protection of life and health as its priority and is alert to all actions that might threaten life and health. In this sense, the Environment and Health Law is “risk management” legislation. Therefore it must not be constrained by legislative ideas of “relief afterwards” and “total quantity control” of traditional environmental protection legislation, but apply risk prevention principles to establish a legal system of risk prevention, risk management, and risk communication. 3.1.1 From “Relief Afterwards” to “Risk Prevention” In terms of the basic value of law, the priority is to protect human health from harm, which is also the cardinal principle for environmental protection legislation. For this purpose, a German environment law expert has developed the “risk prevention” theory, which was put into practice in German environmental legislation. This principle has also been acknowledged in international documents such as the Rio Declaration, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Convention on Biodiversity. Different from the pollution control and relief afterwards ideal of traditional environmental protection legislation, the risk prevention theory believes that before proven safe, an activity or substance is “dangerous.” When such activity or substance poses a serious or irreversible threat, preventive measures must be taken even in the absence of scientific proof. However, most environmental protection laws in China are developed on the basis of “relief afterwards.” The absence of “risk prevention” is one of the reasons for environmental and health problems. Therefore, to develop the Environment and Health Law, the first step is to change ideas and adopt risk prevention as a basic principle. Then, for law enforcement purposes, efforts must be made to establish the environmental

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and health comprehensive planning system, improve the environmental and health standards system, and practice health risk assessment. 3.1.2 From “Total Quantity Control” to “Risk Management” “Total quantity control,” a key idea in China’s environmental protection legislation, has played an important role in controlling environment pollution. However, in practice, “total quantity control” means a “discharge reduction” target as compared with the level of pollutant discharge in the past, rather than a total quantity target set in accordance with environmental capacity. Because of the accumulative, mobile, and transformative characteristics of many environmental pollutants, toxic and hazardous substances will enter and accumulate in human body through the food chain and cause damages to human health. Without the management of long-term and potential harm of pollutants, or in particular the systematic evaluation of the correlation between environmental pollutants and human health, “total quantity control” alone will not be able to achieve the goal of controlling health hazards. Therefore, it is important to establish the risk management system on top of “total quantity control.” In 1983, the US National Academy of Sciences developed the “risk management” strategy and the two-stage environmental and health risk management, namely risk evaluation and risk management, and specified the health risk evaluation process. This risk management framework has been recognized and put into practice by many countries such as Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands with satisfactory outcomes. China’s Environment and Health Law can also reference the “risk management” strategy by conducting health risk evaluations and making risk management decisions on the basis of evaluation results and consideration of relevant social, economic, and legal factors. 3.1.3 From “Risk Blockade” to “Risk Communication” From the social psychology perspective, risk can be amplified because of its uncertainty and diffusivity of harm. Therefore, a risk signal of low occurrence probability can be amplified in the social communication process and eventually cause panic. To deal with the amplification effect of risk, different countries have generally adopted two different methods, namely “risk blockade” and “risk communication.” “Risk communication” is widely adopted in developed countries; that is, to allow effective and prompt flow of risk information among stakeholders so as to create a sense of security among the public. For example, as a result of the 1984 Bhopal Disaster in India, the American public became worried about dangerous chemicals and chemical plants. To control stress among the people, the US Congress issued the Crisis Contingency Plan and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. By upholding the principle of the

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community’s right to information and establishing the government environmental information disclosure system, the American government managed to relieve stress by protecting the public’s right to information. However, in China, “risk blockade” is more common. In order to maintain stability, local governments tend to block information about environmental and health incidents and therefore block risk. Even when information is disclosed upon the request of the public, several aspects of the incidents are still always kept outside public sight. This kind of practice cannot alleviate panic, but on the contrary, amplify the public’s distrust in the government and even lead to confrontational sentiments. Therefore, the Chinese Environment and Health Law must establish a “risk communication” mechanism to specify information disclosure, public participation, corporate social responsibility, and punishment systems and to promote effective communication between governmental departments, between government and enterprises, and between government, enterprises, and the public so as to increase public trust in the government and enhance the acceptability of environmental policies. 3.2 System Building On the topic of these management frameworks, the Environment and Health Law should also learn from the environment and health management experience of UNEP, WHO, the US, EU, and South Korea so as to establish a legal system which is fit for Chinese circumstances. The following steps may be taken: 3.2.1 Establish an Environmental and Health Risk Management System Environmental and health risk management is a complex task that involves multiple government departments. Therefore, it is a pertinent to establish an effective functional management system and a cooperative law enforcement mechanism. According to the National Environment and Health Action Plan (2007–2015) issued by the State Council, the Environment and Health Work Leadership Group has been jointly established by 18 departments of the State Council. However, this establishment is temporary in nature, with major problems with its structure, membership, and operation mechanism. In South Korea’s 2008 Environment and Health Law (Trial), Articles 9 and 10 mandate the establishment of the Environment and Health Committee. Affiliated with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Committee can establish its own expert panels. The Deputy Minister serves as the director of the Committee and members include public servants, experts, NGO representatives, and corporate delegates. Taking reference from South Korea’s experience, the Chinese Environment and Health Law should also establish

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an environment and health committee under the direct leadership of the State Council with a vice premier or a state councilor serving as the director. The administrative body will be established in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Committee members should be officials from relevant ministries, experts, NGO representatives, and corporate delegates. The Committee will be in charge of monitoring and making decisions on major environmental and health issues. 3.2.2

Clarify Government Responsibilities in Environment and Health Protection Environmental and health protection is a public service the government should and must provide. The Environment and Health Law must clarify the environmental protection responsibilities of the governments at different levels in the process of social and economic development, and implement an environmental protection target-oriented responsibility system and a relevant performance assessment system. The State Council and local governments should consider environmental targets in evaluating relevant environmental protection departments and persons in charge, and governments of a lower level and relevant government leaders. These evaluation results must carry reasonable weight in the overall performance assessment and be made available to the public. 3.2.3 Establish the Environmental Health Risk Evaluation System Health risk evaluation is a key element in environmental and health management. The World Bank has listed health impact as one of the indicators when evaluating the environmental impact of its investment projects. Countries in the EU have also, one after another, passed the mandatory requirement of conducting health impact evaluations for projects under development or construction. With years of trial, the US has established its health impact evaluation-oriented decision-making system. Health risk evaluation now runs through all environmental protection undertakings in the US. South Korea’s Environment and Health Law delegates a whole chapter to the health risk evaluation system and rules, stating that conducting health risk evaluation is a legal duty of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. At present, China’s environment management is still pollution control-oriented, without adequate research and effective management of environmental health risks. Health risk evaluations assess the health impact of construction projects and development plans so as to reduce or eliminate the negative impact on the environment and human health. Therefore, the Environment and Health Law must incorporate health risk evaluation into planning and project EIAs.

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3.2.4 Define the Priority Protection Zone and its Scope Environmental and health risks are unevenly distributed geographically and different groups are sensitive to environmental risks to various degrees. Therefore, in environmental and health risk management, it is mandatory to define the priority protection zone and the priority targets of prevention and control. For example, the US’s Superfund Act establishes the National Priorities Location List, which specifies regions that are troubled with the most serious pollution and therefore must be prioritized in pollution alleviation. These regions are priority targets for cleaning and control for the EPA and local environmental protection agencies. South Korea’s Environment and Health Law carries strict regulations on the risk management of children’s activity areas and control of risk materials in children’s products and require the Ministry of Environmental Protection to establish a data system on the toxicity level of environmental risk factors that pose a threat to children’s health. In China, the 12th Five-Year Plan for Integrated Control of Heavy Metal Pollution lists 14 provinces including Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Henan as priority zones and mining, metallurgic industry, storage battery production, leather industry and products, and chemical materials and products as the five priority industries. The Environment and Health Law should not only take reference of the risk zoning method of priority areas, but also make necessary legal arrangements to prioritize the protection of children, senior citizens, and pregnant women. 3.2.5

Improving the Public Participation and Mechanism for the Areas of Environment and Health Since environmental and health issues involve multiple interest groups, the government alone is unable to solve all problems. Therefore, in addition to the environment and health cooperative management systems, the public participation mechanism must be improved so as to establish an integral governance system of multiple players. As for public participation, the first step is to clarify people’s equal rights to the environment. The Environment and Health Law must proclaim people’s environmental rights, including the right to use the environment, the right to know information regarding the environment, the right to monitor the environment, and the right to ask for compensation for environmental damage. It is also important to recognize the public’s role in environmental protection and specify the scope and procedure of public participation. In addition, relevant provisions must specify the status and role of environmental protection NGOs so as to encourage communities and NGOs to play a more active role in environmental protection. Last but not least, in order to expand the scope and increase the channels of information

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disclosure for information on the environment, the system must be further improved by specifying the subjects of environmental information disclosure (including enterprises and government). 3.2.6

Perfect the Environmental and Health Damage Compensation System While the prevalence of environmental health hazard incidents is consistently high in China, a large number of victims are faced with problems in terms of compensation claim, scope definition, compensation calculation, and judicial testimony. As a result of the absence of environmental and health damage compensation regulations in the existing environmental legislation in China, victims cannot protect their rights because they have no channels to press charges and make claims. The Environment and Health Law must have specific regulations on health damage compensation by specifying the jurisdiction of compensation claims, health damage authentication methods, compensation scope, cost sharing principle and collection method, and state compensation duty. While ensuring comprehensive and fair assistance and compensation to the victims, relevant mechanisms must be installed to force damage-causing enterprises to abide by the law so as to ultimately reduce environmental health hazard incidents.

CHAPTER 5

Environmental and Health Risks: Unusual Expansion of Waste Incineration in China Needs Attention YANG Changjiang Abstract Waste incineration plants continued to spread across China in 2013. Numerous environmental pollution and health hazards were revealed, resulting in disputes among different parties. The revision process of the standard for pollution regulations, though delayed, finally started. However, the new regulations only cover a narrow scope of projects, require a very low standard, and are far away from the public opinion in order to establish the most stringent regulations for environmental protection. The amount of fly ash in the city of Wuhan generated by waste incineration is astonishing, but that was only the tip of the iceberg. The combustion of garbage has led to an accumulating number of unusual ecological and health hazards, casting an enormous shadow on the environment, the society, and the waste incineration industry itself.

Keywords waste incineration – unusual expansion – ecological hazards

In 2013, a garbage crisis continued to escalate in China. The government has been promoting incineration as a waste treatment process, triggering an expansion of projects by waste management companies. On the one side, stakeholders are advocating the potential financial returns of waste incineration, even hailing it as one of the emerging “blue ocean” industries of China. On the other side, among people who live near the incinerators, the number of cancer cases is surging. The massive amount of fly ash disposed by those incinerators is damaging both the environment and human health. Different parties have distinct demands and interests in this dispute. As a result, there has been little agreement on setting out a timeline to resolve the issue. In fact, there are no easy solutions to this embarrassing garbage dilemma. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_007

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Hype or Hazard?

The industry of waste incineration promoted by the government and the relevant companies is definitely a hype with a promising future. However, reported pollution incidents are emerging, revealing the severe pollution caused by the operation of the industry behind the seemingly bright picture. On May 6, 2013, media reported that an incineration plant in Hangzhou had caused several “cancer villages.” In the Shan’er Village of Binjiang District, villagers had been inhaling dusty air and eating vegetables they grew near the factory. Over a dozen of new cancer cases were found every year in the past few years, now totaling more than 100 cases. The Qiaotouwang Village, which is the nearest residential area away from the incineration plant, has more than 30 cancer patients out of its 720 villagers, exceeding 4% of the whole population. In Dafang Village, located 400 meters southwest of the plant, 2 out of 9 households have cancer patients.1 Most male villagers reported having colorectal cancer, gastric cancer, or lung cancer; most female villagers reported breast cancer or uterine cancer. These cancer cases in the neighborhoods terrified the local people. Some 500,000 residents living in nearby areas demanded the incineration plant to relocate. However, they have not heard any official response from either the Hangzhou municipal government or Binjiang district government. The cancer-causing waste incinerator belongs to a power plant of Hangzhou Energy Green Power Company which was launched in 2004. Within the past decade, over 50 resident neighborhoods, many high-tech companies, and a higher-education park accommodating 50,000 students have been built. ZTE Group’s staff dormitory, factory, and office buildings are only 530 m away from the plant. Moreover, the power plant is 2.2 km away from the Baimahu animation industrial park, 3.5 km away from the Eastern Communications Group, and 4.5 km away from Alibaba. In the Tangjiali neighborhood on Puyan Street, 700 m north to the incinerator, a residential building with floor space of 1,000,000 m2 is under construction, which is expected to attract 1,753 households of personnel with special expertise and their families in Binjiang Hightech zone.2 As time passes, the pollution around the incinerator may affect a greater area. On May 9, Huang Kunming, Secretary of the CPC Hangzhou Committee conducted a special investigation into the air and water pollution 1  “Half Million Residents in Binjiang Protest against Cancer-Causing Waste Incinerator,” May 6th, 2013, http://www.mcshe.com/toutiao/2875.html. 2  “Hangzhou May Fight the Pollution with an Iron Fist, Unknown Future for the Waste Incinerator,” May 11th, 2013, http://www.mcshe.com/dldc/4524.html.

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issues in this area. However, regarding whether the current project of Energy Green Power Company will relocate, and whether the future project of the company will choose another location or delay construction, no answer has been provided. On December 4, 2013, a Weibo post by the ID “Liu Jiting” from Wenzhou city Zhejiang Province, triggered a firestorm online. The post said, “In the seemingly beautiful Daluoshan Mountain area, a deep breath may cause the inhalation of colorless and odorless carcinogens.” This reveals a hidden problem of Yongqiang garbage power plant, a factory located in the Dushan Village in Wenzhou. The plant was put into operation in 2006. Shortly after, Wenzhou Municipal Detention Center and Criminal Investigation Unit was relocated in the vicinity. In 2013, police officers who were over 35 years old had a physical examination. Twenty-three of them were diagnosed with lung disease and “100% of them have pharyngitis,” said the Weibo post. Police dogs also went through strange changes: female dogs were unable to breed, and all the dogs’ senses of smell were quickly depreciating. Normally police dogs can work up to six or seven years, but the dogs working there had to retire within two to three years.3 Zhejiang Provincial Environmental Monitoring Center did a sampling test from October 15 to 17, with regards to the dioxin in the emissions of the incinerator, in nearby soil and in the air. The Wenzhou Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau released the monitoring data through its official Weibo webpage on December 6, saying that all three monitoring sites around the garbage power plant reported dioxin far exceeding the international standard. The location with the highest reading was in front of the Police Dogs Unit, with dioxin reading 6.6 times more than the standard. Some other waste incineration plants proclaim to have mature technologies, but accidents occurring there are no less worrisome and disturbing. At around 3 p.m. on December 5, 2013, an explosion took place in the Jiangqiao Incineration Plant in Shanghai, causing one death, five injuries, and one missing. A piece of sewage treatment equipment and an ancillary building collapsed in the plant. This is the first instance in which an incineration plant explosion has resulted in death. On the west side of Jiangqiao incineration plant, some staff dormitory rooms of Putuo sanitation workstations were only 150 m away from the plant. The massive explosion shook the dorm building, and the staff members and their families ran out of their rooms.4 At 9 p.m. on the same day, 3  Lingfeng Gan, “Police Dogs’ Senses of Smell Depreciated After Moving Beside a Waste Incinerator,” Metro Express, December 3, 2013. 4  Yun Xiao, “Shanghai Waste Incinerator Explosion Leaves 7 Injuries and Death,” Shanghai Morning Post, December 6, 2013.

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Putuo District Central Hospital treated a total of six victims from the accident. One victim died, three were severely injured, and two slightly injured. In Honghualing of Shenzhen, three incineration plants, namely Longgang District Domestic Waste Incineration Plant, Shenzhen Medical Waste Incineration Plant, Shenzhen Industrial Hazardous Waste Incineration Plant, were flocking in the vicinity. These incineration plants are emitting pollution that could influence 15 residential buildings, 13 elementary of middle schools, and 18 kindergartens. Hundreds of thousands of people in the three neighborhoods of Longgang, Longcheng, and Pingdi were affected. The local residents complained about being forced to inhale the poisonous air. “The incinerators start burning garbage at night, usually from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. The smell of the burnt garbage causes nausea and dizziness. Nobody can fall asleep. Even if you shut the doors and windows tight, the smell is still there,” said a local resident. Many people suffer from respiratory diseases. Some senior residents were diagnosed with lung cancer or throat cancer. In the landfill sites of these plants, garbage piled up to over 30 m high. Raindrops flow down along the garbage, leaving a stinky black thread-like mark. The water flows all the way down to the small rivers and then into the Longgang River, which surrounds the nearby residential buildings. All nearby estate owners are suffering and complaining. 2

Loose Regulations Even After Amendments

In recent years, the proportion of waste processed by incineration is soaring, but pollution regulation is way behind such development. Without the constraints of standards, waste incineration plants are expanding at an incredible speed. The “Pollution Control Standards for Garbage Incineration” (GB 18485– 2001) led by the Ministry of Environmental Protection was originally planned to be introduced in 2011, but was temporarily aborted. In 2013, establishing the most stringent environmental protection system has gradually become the consensus of the society. On December 27, perhaps under pressure, the ministry finally issued “Pollution Control Standards for Garbage Incineration” (second draft for comments, GB 18485–20). The amendments require the government to follow a checklist for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the garbage incinerators: comprehensively evaluating the impact that the proposed plant may cause to the surrounding environment, the health of nearby residents, and their daily life, and production activities; prohibiting burning garbage at the initial launching phase of the garbage incineration; and prohibiting processing hazardous

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waste, electronics and their residues in garbage incinerators. The new version of the standards also sets down specific regulations about the monitoring frequency of heavy metals and dioxins. All of them are worthy of recognition. However, in contrast to a public consensus on the necessity of establishing the most stringent environmental protection regulations, the new standard still avoids many sensitive issues. Some of the pollution control indexes are too loose and the coverage of these indexes is far from satisfactory. The amendments also require waste incineration facilities be a reasonable distance from residential areas, farmlands, and surface water systems. The new standard, however, does not include a specific length of that distance. It only generally states that the location of waste incinerators should comply with the local planning of urban and rural areas, environmental protection, and public hygiene programs. The distance shall be determined according to the EIA results of the proposed plant. This is actually acknowledging the distance set by the Notice on Strengthening the Environmental Impact Assement of Biomass Power Projects jointly issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the National Energy Administration in September 2008. The Notice requires a minimum distance of 300 m between the incinerators and the residential areas. Zhao Youcai, a researcher at the State Key Laboratory of Pollution Control and Resource Reuse of Tongji University, believes that the safe distance between a waste incineration plant and residential areas should be at least 3,000 m. He explained that the pollution level within 300 m is actually very little, while the level reaches its maximum value at 1,000 m away from the pollution site. After 1,000 m, the pollution level will quickly decline.5 Moreover, the direction of the wind has a strong impact over the distance that the particles of flue gas can reach. If the residential buildings are located in the downwind area of the pollution source, the safety distance should expand accordingly. However, the amendment also fails to address this issue. The new standard also deliberately shuns the notion of public participation and approval as a premise for launching the incineration project, leaving risks for conflicts between local residents and the project. The new standard not only includes very few concrete goals for pollution control, but also sets an extremely low threshold for the approved pollution level. First, the regulation offers a standard for particles in the air, without mentioning PM 2.5. Usually, burning 1 t of garbage will emit 4,000 to 7,000 m3 of flue gas, while 60% of the particles generated are PM 2.5. The larger the total amount of garbage there is, the more PM 2.5 particles it ­generates 5  Yu Dawei, “The Great Leap of Waste Incineration Starts Its Golden Age in the 12th Year Plan,” Caixin Century, Januray 10, 2012.

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through incineration. Second, the proposed standards for nitrogen oxide in the flue gas are way too low. The limit for nitrogen oxide in the emission of coalfired power plants in China is 100 mg/m3, but the cap for that in the emission of waste incinerators is an unbelievable 300 mg to 400 mg/m3. Third, the midterm evaluation of the “12th Five-Year Plan” in China shows that the amount of carbon dioxide emission was one of the two indicators that China did not meet as planned. Burning 1 t of garbage can emit 2.8 t of carbon dioxide. The absence of goals to control carbon dioxide in the emission of waste incineration is disappointing. Fourth, the standards only list dioxin as an indicator for dioxins, while indicators for furans, PCBs, and hexachlorobenzene (HCB), also known as persistent organic pollutants of waste incineration are missing. Fifth, Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) are one of the major carcinogens produced by waste incineration, while an indicator of PAHs and the standard for it are absent. Sixth, meeting the emission standards does not guarantee meeting the environmental standards automatically. The regulation does not include a requirement for the maximum environmental capacity around the plant, which is also considered to be one of the major fallacies. Moreover, the guidelines for screening the garbage that suits incineration are too lenient. The new standards consider all household garbage collected by environmental health agencies or the garbage generators, as well as the food waste collected by environmental health agencies legitimate to be used directly for incineration. However, the midterm evaluation of China’s “12th Five-Year Plan” shows that nitrogen oxides are another indicator that did not meet the standard. The mixture of kitchen garbage and food waste has a very high nitrogen component. These ingredients generate nitrogen oxides after burning and therefore should be banned for garbage incineration. In Japan, it is prohibited to burn kitchen waste in garbage incinerators. The Stockholm Convention’s “BAT/BEP Guidelines” lists alternative measures for waste incineration in urban areas; such “mixed garbage” should not be considered as suitable for incineration. The new standards require only a self-evaluation system of the companies themselves and some routine supervision of environmental protection administration departments. The current monitoring system does not have a third-party regulatory body. Given the conflict of interests, it is difficult for the citizens to believe in the official agencies, let alone the company’s own test results. On the one hand, by these standards, garbage incineration companies as well as the government institutions can take specimens of the air, and send the specimens to the inspection agencies by themselves. This leads to a problem of credibility. The sampling date is also a subtle issue. On the days when the production is steady, the specimens can always meet the standards; but on

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the other days they can never do that. On the other hand, the time of sampling in the day is also fishy. Samples taken at a few points of time in the day can easily meet the standards, while samples taken continuously from a period of time cannot. To get a realistic result, the latter method should be forcefully implemented, but the regulation does not include such specifics. It is far away from establishing a stringent monitoring system, let alone a stringent environmental protection system against waste incineration. 3

A “Blue Ocean” Industry in China?

In 2013, the policies regarding waste incineration became more specific in China. On August 1, the State Council issued “Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Energy-saving and Environmental Protection Industries (State Council [2013] No. 30),” explicating requirements to “speed up the construction of environmental infrastructure in urban areas, explore a new method for disposing urban garbage, and equip all cities and towns with the capability to treat garbage without harm by 2015. Such capabilities should reach over 870,000 t per day and harmless garbage incineration capacity shall exceed 35% of the total capacity of harmless treatment.” While these policies reassure the waste incineration companies of their legitimacy, the most attractive prospects of the business is its model for profit. These companies do not have to pay for its raw materials, but can get a good deal of subsidies instead. For burning 1 t of garbage, the local government will offer 60 RMB to 200 RMB to the companies. Moreover, the electricity generated by garbage incineration is priced at 0.65 RMB/kw by a national standard, instead of the regular 0.25 RMB. After a project launches its operation, the maintenance of the equipment as well as staff salaries are relatively low. The companies enjoy a tax exemption of corporate income tax for three years and a halved tax from year four to year six. Projects that meet the government’s standard can also apply as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to gain income from certified emission reductions (CERs). They can also sign a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract with the government for 20 to 30 years that can guarantee long-term protection from the government and a sustainable profitability. Thus, waste incineration has become an emerging strategic “blue ocean” industry for profit-driven companies and local governments. Securities investment consulting companies highly recommend the opportunities for waste incineration companies. Xiangcai Securities, Industrial Securities, GF Securities, National Securities, and other agencies have generously given a

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positive evaluation for waste incineration stocks, commenting that the industry is maturing to a turning point in its development, which creates “historical opportunities.”6 On January 7, the Guangzhou municipal government approved the “Action Plan for Promoting the Industrialization of Garbage Incineration Environmental Equipment for Guangri Group.” The plan announced that the Guangri Group is going to build an industry chain for a waste incineration plant within five years, increasing the total output of the industry in Guangdong to over 100 billion RMB. By doing so, the Group claimed that it will establish the largest advanced environmental equipment manufacturing base in China.7 At the same time, Guangdong Province plans to build 36 garbage incineration power plants from 2011 to 2015, and 19 plants from 2016 to 2020. In this trend, the proportion of incineration in garbage disposal is rapidly expanding. From 2011 to 2015, Tianjin is going to speed up the construction of three garbage incineration power plant projects, namely Hangu, Guanzhuang, and Dagang. The total design capacity of garbage processing is 1.42 million t/year, contributing to the soaring proportion of garbage incineration. The recently launched Lujiashan Garbage Incineration Plant in Beijing is as the largest processing plant of its kind in the world, burning 6,000 t of garbage a day. The second phase of the construction of Beijing Gaoantun Garbage Incineration Plant was also launched. It is expected to process 4,000 t of garbage daily after its completion, which is the daily production of garbage in Chaoyang District. Beijing has proposed that by 2015, the proportion of waste incineration will reach 70% of all garbage. By 2015, Hangzhou will be able to process 10,000 t of garbage daily, among them 8,500 t or 85% will be incinerated. A few other cities including Chongqing, Kunming, and Dongguan has an even higher goal of 100% incineration. 4

Where Does the Fly Ash Go?

The industry believes that waste incineration is the most effective method to process garbage in China. Today, however, because of its inherent shortcomings, this “mature” technology is back in the spotlight. Fly ash caused by garbage incineration sparked doubts on this technology.

6  Xinhua Net Energy Channel, “Policy Support: the New Blue Ocean Industry in China,” November 6, 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com/energy/zt/nygc/zt5.htm. 7  Feng Yunqing, “Guangzhou To Set Up Industry Chain for Waste Incineration Power Plant In 5 Years,” January 8, 2013, http://energy.people.com.cn/n/2013/0108/c71890-20129535.html.

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Figure 5.1 The trend of the proportion of garbage incinerated in China. Data source: Urban Construction Statistics, etc. (2000–2011).

On October 12, 2013, the Environmental Protection Ministry revealed 72 companies that violated the environmental protection law. Wuhan Borui Environmental Energy Development Co., Ltd. was the first in the announcement. Its subsidiary Hanyang Guodingshan Garbage Incineration Power Project was launched without an approval from the government, and transferred its fly ash to a company with no operating license for handling hazardous waste. On October 22, Wuhan Environmental Protection Bureau convened an emergency meeting of all executives of the five garbage incineration power plants and asked for corrective measures as soon as possible. It was required that in two months the factories must not let the fly ash leave the factory before the completion of the emergency safety disposal site. After the Guodingshan Waste Incineration Plant was launched at the end of 2012, it has been emitting odor very day and night. The smell seriously affected people’s normal lives. From the beginning of 2013 until November 2013, eight residents in Fangcaoyuan neighborhood died from lung cancer, liver cancer, lymphoma, or other diseases. The other residents are terrified.8 Fly ash contains toxic substances like heavy metal and carcinogenic dioxins, and has been listed in the national list of hazardous waste since 2008. The state regulates that fly ash must not be stored in its production area for a long-term period and must not be carelessly disposed. It can only be transferred and disposed after a necessary solidifying and stabilizing process.

8  China Central Television, “Waste Incineration Should Not leave Poison Behind,” 30 Minutes Economics, December 17, 2013.

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In order to reduce costs, many Chinese companies have opted for the relatively cheap technology of solidifying to deal with fly ash. The disposal of the fly ash can cost at least 1,000 RMB/t, or about 2,000 RMB using a more advanced solidifying and stabilizing technology, plus throwing it in a landfill. The Wuhan Borui Company produces over 40,000 t of fly ash every year, which means about 40 million RMB uses basic methods or 80 million RMB using more advanced technology. If the company uses the most advanced molten glass technology, the risk of toxic seepage will be greatly reduced, but the cost will be three to four times more expensive. In fact, Wuhan Borui transferred this procedure to the Wuhan Yangjian Company who has no operating license for handling hazardous waste. The latter thereafter outsourced the task to another non-licensed company Wuhan Haoxintian Energy Engineering and Technology Services Company. On June 8, 2013, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate jointly issued “Explanations for Several Issues of the Laws Applicable to Handling Criminal Cases of Environmental Pollution.” According to the explanations, anyone who “illegally discharges, dumps, or disposes over 3 t of hazardous waste shall be charged as seriously polluting the environment” and can be held criminally responsible. The explanations also clearly state that “perpetrators who knowingly provides or entrusts others who do not have a business license or whose license does not include a relevant scope of business to collect, store, utilize and dispose the hazardous waste and seriously pollute the environment, shall be convicted with a environmental pollution crime.” In Wuhan, Borui Company incinerates 1,500 t of garbage every day, Xingou Incineration Plant burns 1,000 t; Hankoubei 2,000 t; Xinghuo, 1,000 t; and Changshankou, 1,000 t. These incinerators produce about 560 t of fly ash every day, which totals 200,000 t/year.9 When the Wuhan Environmental Protection Bureau briefed the explanations, all executives from the five plants were worried about being held criminally liable. On October 23, Wuhan Environmental Protection Bureau submitted the Report on Safe Disposal Issues of Fly Ash for Wuhan’s Garbage Incineration Power Plants to the municipal government. The report says, “The city’s infrastructure planning did not consider the problem of fly ash disposal. There is no special fly ash disposal area in the city or landfills. We do not have the conditions to process the fly ash.” However, it is shocking that in Wuhan, the over 200,000 t of fly ash simply disappeared every year. In 2011, the nationwide amount of garbage incineration totaled 10.87 million t, producing 326,000 t 9  Lv Zongshu, “Wuhan Abducted by Fly Ash: Plants Knowingly Breaking the Rules Are Still Operating,” Southern Weekly, November 7, 2013.

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to 540,000 t of fly ash. Fluidized bed incinerators have a capacity of 8.31 million t of waste, producing 831,000 t to 1.24 million t of fly ash. Other furnaces incinerate 510,000 t of waste every year. If burning 1 t of waste generates 50 kg of fly ash, it would add up to 25,000 t of fly ash every year. In 2011, the nation produced about 1.18 million t to 1.8 million t of fly ash.10 We should be alerted about where the enormous amount of the fly ash generated by incinerators across the country goes. According to the requirements of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the government should publish timely environmental information, improve the whistle-blowing system, strengthen societal supervision, implement a compensation system for ecological damage, and hold the perpetrators criminally responsible. China’s extraordinary expansion of waste incinerators, their secretive information of environmental pollution, and the truth of the pollution data from the incineration companies are always hidden from the public. Chen Liwen from the Nature University applied to the Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau for information disclosure of four items but only received ambiguous answers. Wuhu Ecology Center, Friends of Nature, and other environmental organizations applied for the disclosure of information on the 122 incineration plants across China, but only 42 of them replied. Societal monitoring is extremely difficult. Five waste incineration plants have disposed fly ash illegally for a long time. Of all these organizations—the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Environmental Protection Office of Hubei Province, Wuhan Environmental Protection Bureau, Wuhan Huangpi District Environmental Protection Bureau—none have really investigated and punished those who have violated the law. Administrative regulation is basically a failure. As early as May 2005, the World Bank published a work report of “Issues and Suggestions for China’s Solid Waste Management,” saying the Chinese Ministry of Construction’s target to increase the waste incineration rate to 30% may lead the dioxin in the air on earth to at least double. Who would pay attention to the implications of “double”? Who would really face the consequences of “double”? Xu Wenlong, president of China Academy of Urban Construction, believes that by the time China almost completes its waste disposal infrastructure in 2020, the proportion of household garbage incinerated will continue to grow. If China burns 60% of its garbage in 2020, will the dioxins in global air quadruple?

10  Shao Jianrong, “Environmental Organizations Demand Waste Incinerators to Disclose Information to Public, Only 30% Replied,” Legal Daily, April 24, 2013.

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The extraordinary development of waste incineration goes along with extraordinary ecological and health risks. All the incidents that happened in Wenzhou, Hangzhou, and Wuhan are only a small fraction of the disasters exposed by the media. The Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Hubei Provincial Supervision Department have begun investigating the five waste incinerating companies in Wuhan for its serious pollution of the environment. Investigation for criminal responsibility has been put on the agenda. As the 30 Minutes Economics program of CCTV says, “We hope that the words from the Chinese president, the judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate, and the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, will really be implemented in our specific environmental work. The environment needs an account of the truth. Our people need an account of the truth.” We also hope that in spite of the concealment of information, the marginalization of the supervision, and the failure of the administration, the judicial force in 2014 is able to paint a realistic picture of the waste incinerators in China. Our future needs a truthful account, too.

CHAPTER 6

War on Smog LIU Xiaoxing Abstract A ten-point Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control (hereafter referred to as Action Plan) was issued by the State Council on September 10, 2013. Since the release of this Action Plan, in order to implement the decisions and arrangements of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, all local governments have announced implementation measures and specified the schedule as well as routes for smog treatment. The background and significance of issuing the Action Plan are introduced in the paper. The challenges and problems of air pollution treatment and industrial transformation faced by the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region are then analyzed. Possible solutions are also offered.

Keywords Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control – Beijing–Tianjin-Hebei Region – industrial transformation – structural adjustment

1

Smog “Engulfed” Many Cities

Since the end of 2012, lingering smog started to spread over 25 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities of China, ranging from the northeast to the northwest, from the north to the central and even to regions around the Yellow River, the Huai River, as well as those south of the Yangtze River. Over 100 large and medium cities, with around a population of 800 million, were affected to varying degrees. According to monitoring data, the PM 2.5 reading in a vast range of regions, including the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Yangtze River Delta, and even the Pearl River Delta, had far exceeded the standard. And in some regions, the reading of PM 2.5 was even as high as 1000 μg/m3.1 1  Liu Xiaoxing, “City Lost in Smog, All Are Alarmed,” China Environment News, Sec. 8, January 25, 2013. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_008

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In fact, in the past couple of years, smog has already started to affect the east central parts of China from time to time during autumn and winter seasons. But the smog that started in the winter of 2012 was unprecedented, as it covered such a vast area, lasted so long, and reached such a high a level of concentration. Chai Fahe, vice-president of the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, said that the widespread smog in 2013 had such notable features as having a wide range of influence, long duration, and high concentration. What stood out was the high concentration level of PM 2.5. According to monitoring data of environmental protection departments, the highest daily PM 2.5 reading in some major cities for monitoring reached 1,000 μg/m3, and the daily average was up to 600 μg/m3.2 In the past 10 years, many large cities of China such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen have struggled with smog for more than a third of the year, and some cities even for over half a year. WHO stated in the 2005 edition of Air Quality Standards that, when the concentration level of PM 2.5 reaches 35 μg/m3, the risk of death will increase by about 15% compared with the concentration level of 10 μg/m3.3 How is smog formed? Its formation involves both meteorological conditions and hazardous waste pollution. So far, these two causes have been identified. First are adverse meteorological conditions such as horizontal static wind and vertical temperature inversion. Second is pollution characterized by the increasing density of fine particles. Meteorological factors are external and uncontrollable, but pollution factors, which are closely associated with human activities, are internal and controllable. Prevention of smog should be based on a scientific understanding of its different causes in different areas of China. When there is relatively high humidity of near-ground air and there are no obvious cold air activity, tiny particles will gather and float in the air. The height of the cloud that can be observed is only 300 m. Below this level, a large amount of pollutants, in the absence of air convection, will not be able to diffuse. Instead, pollutants will accumulate. The Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences studied the prolonged smog in 2013 and identified a high concentration of secondary particles and secondary organic pollutants. The concentration of sulphate reached 200 μg/m3, and that of nitrate grew to 100 μg/m3. The monitoring results showed that the smog, which affected such a vast area and reached such a high level of concentration, was caused by an accumulation of pollutants. 2  Liu Xiaoxing, “City Lost in Smog, All Are Alarmed,” China Environment News, Sec. 8, January 25, 2013. 3  Air Quality Guidelines, Global Update, 2005.

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At the same time, monitoring data analysis showed that regional background pollution level was very high. In the regions affected by smog, the daily average concentration level of PM 2.5 amounted to an even distribution of 300 μg/m3 to 400 μg/m3. The data reflected the even regional distribution of PM 2.5, and also indicated the possibility of cross-regional influence and transmission. At least, it showed that the accumulation of pollutants in all concerning cities contributed to the severity of regional pollution. Hu Min, a professor with the College of Environmental Science and Engineering at Peking University, analyzed the sources of smoggy weather.4 She explained that such sources as coal burning, motor vehicle exhaust, and biomass combustion may all lead to the formation of PM 2.5. Some research institutions in China have carried out an analysis of the fine particles in different regions. However, there has been scarce long-term and systematic monitoring concerning the fine particles’ size, composition, as well as temporal and spatial concentration distribution, and therefore the general distribution trajectory of polluting particles on smoggy days has not yet been identified. Atmospheric particulate pollution, especially PM 2.5, will be the main and lasting cause of China’s air pollution. The government and all concerning parties have reached a consensus that, to root out environmental problems, China must transform the mode of development, seek a breakthrough in the adjustment of economic structure, promote reform on the consumption mode, and accomplish hard tasks with tough measures. On the basis of the above understandings, President Xi Jinping has made important instructions, demanding a high degree of attention, strengthened leadership, resolute determination, and strong measures to realize the goal of building a beautiful China. Premier Li Keqiang has requested stronger determinations and harsher measures to fight against air pollution. Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli has also called for steady, firm and ruthless measures against air pollution control, and has discussed specific implementation measures with the Environmental Protection Department many times. After more than half a year of hard work, in September, 2013, the State Council issued a ten-point Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control (referred to as the Action Plan), which targeted at PM 1.5 control and was known as the toughest air pollution treatment plan ever issued in Chinese history. Following the 12th Five-Year Program for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Major Regions, which was jointly released by three ministries,

4  Liu Xiaoxing, “City Lost in Smog, All Are Alarmed,” China Environment News, Sec. 8, January 25, 2013.

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including the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Action Plan is the second air pollution treatment plan ever issued in China and has been well received by the general public as the State Ten Points. As early as the end of 2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance already issued the 12th Five-Year Program for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Major Regions (hereafter referred to as The Program). It is clear that the Chinese government, after experiencing severe smog pollution at the beginning of 2013, realized that the seriousness of air pollution had been underestimated and that the goals of air pollution prevention and control had been relatively conservative. Therefore, the government initiated the new Action Plan, which had the following objectives: Firstly, by 2017, the concentration level of inhalable particles will be reduced by 10% from the level in 2012, and the number of days with excellent and good air quality will increase annually; Secondly, the concentration level of fine particulate matter in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta will decrease by about 25%, 20% and 15%, respectively, and that in Beijing will slash to 60 μg/m3. “The above goals, which are government responses to public outcries, will accelerate the process of smog treatment,” commented Wang Yi, vice director of the Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Wang also said, “Official planning should consider whether the goals are ­scientific and feasible or not. We need to look into the implementation of these goals.”5 Chai Fahe stated that “the Action Plan and the Program were issued at different times and will end in different periods, but the comparison of different goals in these two documents clearly indicate that the treatment of PM 2.5 will be accelerated.” For instance, according to the Action Plan, in Beijing-TianjinHebei Region, the worst-hit area by smog, the target is to reduce the concentration level of PM 2.5 by 25%. This is three times the targeted level in the Program, which was only 6%. The goals set in the Action Plan are ambitious. From the elimination of obsolete production capacity to the control of motor vehicle exhaust, from the setting of monitoring and early warning system to the establishment of the cadre evaluation system, what characterizes the Action Plan is “strictness.” Chai Fahe commented that “apart from the harsh treatment measures of industrial pollution, the efforts of adjusting energy structure will be greater.” 5  Wang Erde, “Ten Measures for Air Pollution Control Issued, Smog Control, and Prevention Promoted,” 21st Century Business Herald, September 13, 2013.

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According to the Action Plan, by 2017, the proportion of coal used in overall energy consumption will be lowered to below 65%. Coal consumption in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta will witness negative growth. And in order to replace the using of coal, the consumption of other sources of energy, including electricity, natural gas, and non-fossil energy, will gradually be increased. Wang Yi pointed out that the most stringent constraint index in the field of environmental protection is the amount of emission reduction, and therefore those organizations that fail to meet the standards of emission reduction should be severely punished. However, in the past, no person in charge of such organizations had been punished. No such cases can be identified in officially publicized documents. Therefore, to implement the Action Plan, a strict and feasible evaluation system needs to be established. 2 GDP is Mostly Based on Energy-Guzzling and Highly Polluting Industry Globally speaking, China is the nation with the worst PM 2.5 pollution, as well as the fastest growing area of ozone levels and VOC emission. Chai Fahe, who took part in the formulation of the Action Plan, said that while analyzing the challenges of tackling air pollution, we must be clear that the Action Plan was formulated in accordance with the annual 7.5% growth rate of our GDP. With the simultaneous implementation of various measures, the Action Plan aims not only to reduce, but also to root out pollution by targeting at the core problems that occur in the process of economic development. From 1998 to the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese economy was mainly driven by the heavy chemical industry, whose proportion grew from 57.07% in 1998 to 69.01% in 2005. The six energy-guzzling industries in China—electric power, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, building materials, petrochemicals, and chemicals— accounted for 50% of China’s total energy consumption; but they only contributed to less than 30% of GDP growth. In the past 30 or more years, China has relied on the development of secondary industries. In the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan, it was proposed that the industrial structure should be adjusted. However, so far the industrial structure dominated by heavy industries has not been drastically changed. Such sectors as heavy chemicals, thermal power, metallurgy, and cement are still the major sources of pollution, as they are notorious for low technical

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level, low production of high-grade products, and low degree of industrial concentration. Some small-scale industries such as iron, cement, and thermal power, which are internationally “prohibited and restricted,” are still prevailing in some regions of China despite repeated prohibitions. Industries burdened with excess production capacity and industries discarded in the eastern regions due to heavy pollution just make superficial changes and then move to western and backward regions. Power industries make production expansions in the guise of cogeneration. Alumina projects and coal chemical projects are also witnessing fast development. For a long time, energy consumption dominated by coal use is the main cause of air pollution in China, and is also the main source of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and soot. Air pollution in China is still characterized by soot pollution. China’s Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region only take up 6.3% of China’s land area, but they consume 40% of the nation’s coal and produce 50% of the nation’s iron and steel. Consequently, these regions suffer from a serious discharge of atmospheric pollutants and severely polluted weather on a large scale, displaying similar regional characteristics in terms of environmental pollution. The iron and steel, cement, and flat glass industries, which are burdened with excess production capacity, are the pillar industries in some regions, as they boost economic development and create job opportunities. Data shows that the six energy-guzzling sectors in Hebei Province, including iron and steel, contributed to 38.2% of the industrial growth of all provincial industrial enterprises above a designated size.6 3

How to Reduce Coal Consumption?

A ten-point Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control and Ten Implementation Regulations for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region has been officially launched. Among the air pollution treatment goals just released by the Tianjin government, there are two notable indicators: by 2017, the proportion of coal consumption in overall energy consumption will drop to below 65%; the annual concentration level of PM 2.5 will decrease by 25% from the level in 2012. 6  Zhao Jian, “Heibei: Put Down the GDP ‘Burden’, Go All Out for Four Tough Fights,” Hebei Daily, November 2, 2013.

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Economic development needs to increase, but the consumption of coal needs to decrease. What should be done then to resolve this “conflict”? Tianjin’s solution is to gradually increase the ratio of electricity transmission, the supply of natural gas, and the use of non-fossil energy, so as to replace the consumption of coal. Zhou Shengxi, director of the General Office at Tianjin Economy and Information Commission, said that many residential areas in Tianjin have started to use gas boilers, but due to the shortage of gas, coal boilers are still kept on standby. Some heating stations have removed coal boilers due to the constraint of space, and therefore can only use gas. Wang Jiahui said “in the case of extreme weather, gas use for industrial purpose is reduced so as to guarantee civilian use. If so, Tianjin will suffer from great economic loss.” It is reported that by 2013, Tianjin has modified 32 coal boilers, six of which, however, have no gas supply. Some gas boilers are even short of gas for testing and debugging. To the enterprises, the shortage of gas is a problem. The shortage of funds for modification and operation is an even bigger problem. At present, “the gas price is 3.25 yuan/m3, the gas power generation cost is 0.5 yuan/kWh, and the official price of electricity is only less than 0.4 yuan/ kWh.” Generally speaking, the annual normal operation of a power plant, coupled with the depreciation of equipment, equipment maintenance, staff salaries, and other expenses, may cause a loss of several billion yuan. Pressured by the demand for air pollution prevention and control, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and even the whole area of North China are competing for more gas supply. Heibei Province is facing the same difficult situation. In the Ten Implementation Regulations for Air Pollution Prevention and Control issued by the provincial Party committee and provincial government, coal cutting is viewed as the most essential solution for air pollution treatment. It is clearly stated that by 2017, coal consumption will reduce its numbers by 4,000 t from that of 2012. This means that in the next five years, Hebei Province cannot increase coal consumption at all. Instead, it needs to cut coal using by one-seventh of its existing level. Trains carrying coal line up into the factories of Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. via the long Hanchang (Handan-Changzhi) railway. It is said that on average over 1 t of coal is consumed daily by Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., which is indeed a “coal guzzler.” There are many such “coal guzzlers” in Hebei Province. According to figures released, four high energy consumption industries, including iron and steel,

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petrochemicals, building materials, and electric power, produced an industrial added value of 627.96 billion yuan in 2012, accounting for 56.7% of the total revenue made by industrial enterprises above the designated size. Data shows that in 2012, Hebei Province’s total energy consumption was up to 302 million t, ranking the second in the nation. The consumption of standard coal reached 271 million t, accounting for 89.6% of overall energy consumption, which is nearly 20% over the national average.7 The annual consumption of 271 million t of standard coal in Hebei Province means a daily average consumption of 740,000 t. In 2012, nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide emissions in Hebei Province were up to 1.761 million tons and 1.341 million tons, respectively, ranking first and third in China. Air pollution characterized by soot pollution was thus formed. For Handan, a city reliant on heavy industry and high coal consumption, the reduction of coal use is quite challenging. What is the scientific and feasible solution of coal consumption reduction? A professional in this field did a calculation and summarized that by 2017, Handan will reduce its overall coal using by 16.7 million t, which means a standard coal consumption gap of over 30 million t. What should be done to close this gap? Using natural gas to replace coal is a solution. But does this work in Handan? A professional in the field, who has been doing research on alternative energy resources in Handan, said that if natural gas is used to replace over 30 million t of coal, the consumption of natural gas in Handan will reach 40 billion m3. That means an annual supply of eight billion m3 of natural gas should be guaranteed. However, data shows that in 2012, the supply of natural gas in Handan was only 380 million m3. If natural gas is used as the only alternative energy in Handan, the supply of natural gas will be a big problem. Some local officials said that, in the current period when the supply of natural gas in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region is in huge shortage, we need to guarantee the use of natural gas in key cities like Beijing, Tianjin, and Shijiazhuang. And as for third tier cities, the supply of natural gas continues to remain highly uncertain. To successfully reduce coal consumption, we need to look into the essence of the problem, which is industrial transformation.

7  Xu Weibing, “Attention to the Second Tough Goal for Air Pollution Control: How to Reduce the Consumption of 40 Million Tons of Coal,” Hebei Daily, September 23, 2013.

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How to Implement Industrial Transformation?

Hebei Province aims to reduce the production capacity of iron and steel by 6,000t within five years, which means a 20% reduction of excess capacity. Crude steel production in Hebei Province, with an output of 180 million t, has ranked first in China for 12 consecutive years. Its production capacity and amount of production is more than one-fourth of the national total. In Hebei Province, ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industries, with an asset of over 700 billion yuan, consumed nearly one-third of the provincial energy and a tremendous amount of other resources, but only contributed to 9.1% of the GDP and 5.36% of revenue.8 In the ranking of air quality in the key regions and 74 cities monitored by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Tangshan City was listed in the bottom 10. As a city of large steel production around Beijing, Tangshan produces over 80 million t of iron and steel annually, and is an obstacle for the air pollution control and prevention in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.9 On October 18, 2013, the Tangshan Municipal Party Committee and municipal government issued the Implementation Plan for Tough Action against Air Pollution Treatment (hereinafter referred to as the Implementation Plan) and stated that before the end of 2017, the city will reduce the concentration of PM 10 by more than 10% of the 2012 level, and will reduce PM 2.5 concentration by more than 33% from that of 2012. In terms of discarding obsolete production capacity, Hebei Province required Tangshan city to reduce crude steel production by 40 million t. This means that more than half of the responsibility for reducing iron and steel production capacity in Hebei Province falls on Tangshan city. In 2012, the emission of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide in Tangshan City reached 318,000 t and 392,000 t, respectively, ranking the first in Hebei Province, accounting for 23.7% and 22.3% of total discharge in the province respectively, and accounting for 1.5% and 1.7% of the total national discharge respectively. Tangshan City currently has 53 iron and steel smelting enterprises, and has an annual production capacity of over 100 million t. Although due to marketing and other reasons, these enterprises have not reached their full production 8  Wei Shuanglin and Li Wei, “Reducing 60 Million Tons of Production Capacity, Hebei Iron and Steel Enterprises Facing ‘Slim Down’,” Hebei Daily, October 9, 2013. 9  Tong Kenan and Zhou Yingjiu, “Hebei Demands Tangshan for a Reduction of 40 Million tons of Crude Steel: ‘Phoenix City’ is to Go Through Revival,” China Environment News, December 2, 2013.

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capacities, the reduction of 40 million t of crude steel production capacity is enough to leave a great impact on the GDP and fiscal revenue. Wang Fujiang, director of the Economic Construction Department of the Tangshan City Finance Bureau, said that the reduction of 40 million t of crude steel production capacity itself will lead to three billion yuan loss in fiscal revenue. To obtain state subsidies, in September 2013, Tangshan City declared for the exemplary city of energy-saving and emission reduction, and received the official approval from the Ministry of Finance as well as the National Development and Reform Commission. According to preliminary estimates of Tangshan City, more than 2,000 air control and pollution projects will be implemented in three years, and the total investment will amount to 38.2 billion yuan. The investment of over 30 billion yuan will mainly come from the enterprises, and will also come from the government, which “provides bonuses instead of giving subsidies.” Thus, the enterprises are encouraged to upgrade equipment for environmental protection and to discard obsolete production capacity on self-raised funds. In the next three years, Tangshan city will raise a fund of 2.5 billion yuan to treat air pollution. To realize this goal, starting from 2013, all departments have reduced 30% of their fiscal budgets. The economic output of Tangshan city is 586.16 billion yuan and keeps a growth rate of 10%. However, as said by Wang Fujiang, there are not enough funds that can be used by the government for public projects. As for the elimination of backward production capacity of 40 million t of crude steel, the subsequent liquidation of assets is also a thorny issue. According to Wang Fujiang, although it is hard to calculate the equivalent of 40 million t of crude steel production capacity, it is estimated that, on the basis of the present condition, every 10 million t of steel production capacity needs an investment of 30 billion to 50 billion yuan. Due to a variety of issues related to lending and financing, the government can completely destroy its production equipment to ensure the reduction of production capacity, but it is not able to complete the disposal of assets. As for asset liquidation and compensation, there is still no specific plan because Tangshan’s structural adjustment plan for the industry of iron and steel has not been officially approved by Hebei Province. The government is also facing the difficulty of rearranging laid-off staff members. By 2017, 40 million t of crude steel will be reduced, which will directly affect 60,000 employees. It will also indirectly affect 300,000 employees because typically for every one position in the iron and steel industry, there are usually five people indirectly working in that capacity.

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In the past, only small and private iron and steel enterprises were eliminated, which only affected a limited number of employees. But once labor-intensive and large-scale enterprises are required to reduce production capacity, the government must add other industries to take in the laid-off employees. Handan, another city known for its iron and steel industry, is facing the same situation. According to the requirements of the Hebei provincial government and provincial Party committee, by 2017, Handan should reduce to 16.14 million t in iron production capacity and 12.04 million t in crude steel production capacity. The author recently arrived at the demolition site of Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. at Shexian County, Hebei Province, and witnessed the dismantling of production lines by excavators and other machinery under the command of on-site professionals. Meng Dayong, vice-president of Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd., said that the dismantling of the two production lines, which has an annual production capacity of 1.5 million t of pig iron, is demanded by both environmental protection needs and sales pressures. All the staff members working for the dismantling are employers of the Tiantie Group. With the dismantling of the production lines, many workers have to be laid off. To solve this problem, Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. has adopted the principle of internal digestion. The previously outsourced business, such as cleaning, canteen work, and commercial services, which Tiantie Group could not handle or were not willing to do, will be taken over by the employers of Tiantie Group. Meng Dayong, vice president of Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. said that the income of the iron and steel industry now only accounts for 40% of the total income of Tiantie Group. At present, Tiantie Group is doing diversified businesses, including trade, logistics, and the construction of education industrial parks. Hebei’s overcapacity of iron and steel is reflected more clearly in the structural surplus. The largest proportion of steel produced in Hebei Province is crude steel, and only a tiny proportion is fine steel. How to seize the opportunity of environmental protection rectification, how to adjust the structure of iron and steel industry, and how to improve the constitution of iron and steel products will be a challenge as well as opportunities for the iron and steel enterprises in Handan. Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. of Hebei Iron and Steel Group, which was famous for its management style, has recently focused on air pollution treatment in order to promote its own restructuring and upgrading. In recent years, with the construction of new factories and renovation of old ones, Handan

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Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. has eliminated all their backwards equipment and formed a domestic first-class equipment cluster with a 2,250-mm hot strip production line and a 2,180-mm cold rolling production line. In the past five years, Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. has developed 221 new products, 97 of which are regarded as the most innovative ones in Hebei Province. The increased benefits reached more than 600 million yuan, the costs saved due to the increase of efficiency which altogether amounted to 11.79 billion yuan, and the energy reserved accumulated to 700,000 t of standard coal. A few days prior to the writing of this article, the author went to Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., Hebei Iron and Steel Group. Standing in the entrance of No. 2 Stock Shed of No. 1 Raw Material Stock Yard and looking up, the author saw the high-up arched ceiling and great piles of stones far ahead. Jia Guangru, vice president of Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., said that the material stock shed span 107 m from north to south, and 536 m from east to west. What lined with the No. 1 Stock Shed was the No. 2 Stock Shed, which was put to use in the beginning of 2013. No. 2 Stock Shed shared the same length as No. 1 Stock Shed from east to west, but spanned 146 m from the north to the south. The investment of these two stock sheds in No. 1 Raw Material Stock Yard reaches nearly 700 million yuan, and the area taken up by them is up to​​ nearly 140,000 m2. This is the first large-scale and fully enclosed mechanized raw material stock yard. What motivated them to invest on such a large-scale raw material stock yard? Jia Guangru said: The primary motivation came from the benefits of protecting the environment. The two sheds in this raw material stock yard can store up to 1.15 million t of raw materials safely. Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. used to suffer 3% of storage loss due to transportation spill, rain erosion, as well as wind and dust generation. Once the weather cleared up, the raw materials that were washed by the rain easily produced dust and caused air pollution. But now all the raw materials are stored in an enclosed space, which can prevent storage loss and air pollution. As the largest industrial enterprise in Handan, Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.’s annual emission of dust, sulfur dioxide, and other air pollutants accounted for about one-third of the total amount emitted in downtown areas. Consequently, the areas around Fuxing Road, where Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. is located, are buried in smoke and dust, and suffer from much worse air quality than areas elsewhere.

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Even though there is no accurate statistics, the comparison can still indicate the important function of shed storage of raw materials. Wang Zhongxia, a deputy research member of Handan Environmental Protection Bureau, added that the housing prices around Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. used to be lower than those of other areas because of the pollution problem. But now the gap between the housing prices around Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and those in other areas have narrowed, and are nearly equal. The construction of such large-scale material stockyards means huge investment from the iron and steel enterprises because they are experiencing economic recession. Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. has invested 1 billion yuan on environmental protection since the 11th Five-Year Plan. It is said that by December 2014, Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. will invest 184 million yuan on the rectification of raw material stockyards as well as on the modification of the sintering and iron making process. The current steel industry can be described as in the winter period. In terms of carrying out air pollution control and prevention, whether it is for local governments or enterprises, the biggest problem is shortage of funds. To implement the Ten-point Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control issued by the State Council, the central government has set up special funds for atmospheric pollution treatment, and has allocated 5 billion yuan to the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and surrounding areas. From the perspective of the local governments, however, this amount of money can only play a “primer” role, and the vast majority of expenses for air pollution control and prevention will have to be shared by local governments and enterprises. The adjustment of industrial structure involves local taxation and fiscal issues as well as employment problems. As for Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd., the biggest challenge is obtaining funding. At present, due to the excess of production capacity, the entire iron and steel industry is making little to no profit, so they need financial and technical support from both the central government and local governments. In addition, half of the iron ore raw materials used by Tianjin Metallurgy Group Co., Ltd. are imported. However, the price of iron ore raw materials have continued increasing, and consequently the cost of the company’s primary steel product also keeps going up, which leads to the business difficulties of concerned downstream enterprises, the reduction of profits, and the price increase within the entire industry. What will be the consequence of reducing excess production capacity? If we take the iron and steel industry as an example, the consequence will be the closing of many uncompetitive enterprises. And the resultant unemployment and reemployment will be the most challenging problems.

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A large number of staff members will have to be laid-off from the discarded enterprises, particularly from those large-scale state-owned enterprises. If they can only obtain a small amount of “retirement money,” then many social problems will occur. Some people say that cultivating alternative industries can solve the potential problems of unemployment and reemployment, but is that not easier said than done? It is impossible to employ as many people in the industries of wind power and solar energy as it is in the iron and steel industry. The development of the service industry, especially the production service industry is a way out; but without the development of secondary industries, the service industry is nothing but rootless. Air pollution control and prevention involves many industries, and concerns benefit trade-offs on a deeper level. Different interest orientations of different administrative regions will inevitably affect the implementation of atmos­ pheric pollution control. For instance, within the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta, different provinces and cities have different interests, and therefore it is difficult to resolve the conflicts of interests and to maintain the stability as well as the depth of cooperation. A regional consensus cannot be reached until the regional demands for environmental protection and economic development remain relatively the same.

CHAPTER 7

Smog Brings Widespread and Far-Reaching Impact to Human Health LIN Na Abstract At the beginning of 2013, heavy smog hit nearly one quarter of China’s territory and almost half of the overall population was exposed to the ongoing large-scale smoggy weather.1 While people were concerned about the deterioration of the environment, they gradually turned their focus to smog’s effect on people’s health. Recently, scientists from home and abroad issued a couple of research reports concerning this topic. These statistics and conclusions are shocking. This essay intends to summarize the main ideas of these reports.

Keywords smog – morbidity of lung cancer – effect on human health – average life expectancy

For artists from other countries, China with its population of 1.4 billion has always been a lucrative gold mine. Nevertheless, Stefano Lodola, a tenor from Italy, felt no regret for leaving this land. He explained, “I’ve been staying in Shanghai for four months, and then my respiratory tract became inflamed. As a bel-canto singer, my career would be ruined if anything should happen to my throat.” Surely he had every reason to be concerned. In October 2013, Grammy-Award-winning jazz singer Patti Austin had to cancel her show in Beijing because she kept coughing after arriving in this smoggy city and was later diagnosed as having asthma caused by severe respiratory infections. During the winter of 2013, what was dubbed as the “airpocalypse” returned after hovering over northern China at the beginning of the year. This time, its 1  Zhou Yue, “One-Fourth of the Country’s Territory and Almost Half of the Overall Population Was Exposed to the Ongoing Large-scale Smoggy Weather,” China News, http://www .chinanews.com/gn/2013/07-11/5032645shtml, July 11, 2013.

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influence was expanded to eastern coastal regions where there used to have better air quality.2 In late October, the PM 2.5 reading reached 1000 mg/m3 in the northeastern city of Harbin.3 In early December, more than a hundred cities nationwide experienced smoggy weather. In Shanghai, the citywide average concentration rate of PM 2.5 per hour uncommonly exceeded 600 mg/m3.4 “China has already become unsuitable for living anymore,” remarked Lodola. This is a consensus shared by many expatriates living in China. According to a report by Financial Times, smog not only drives expatiates away but also increases companies’ difficulty in recruiting international employees. Lars Rasmusssen, senior marketing officer for Nokia, decided to leave China with his two children after staying for three years. Pollution is one of the most important factors.5 Meanwhile, because of smog, some foreign companies would provide a hazard subsidy as high as 150,000 RMB per year to its employees based in Beijing, disclosed by a head of international headhunting company during an interview with Global Times.6 While expatriates are reevaluating their career opportunities in China, Chinese people are also becoming increasingly concerned about air pollution. According to a survey conducted by Outlook Weekly and Public Opinion Research Center of Jiangxi Province, three-fourths of the interviewees in Beijing think that the smog in China’s capital is severe.7 On the other hand, the statistics issued by taobao.com, China’s largest online shopping website, indicate that in 2013 Chinese people spent 8.7 billion RMB purchasing online products used to prevent smog.8

2  Liu Yaochen, “Heavy Wind’s Coming; Hundreds of Cities in China Will Say Good- bye to ‘Smoggy Week’,” China News, http//www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/12-09/5596801.shtml, December 9, 2013. 3  Wang Chen, “Harbin’s Covered by Smog, PM 2.5 Jumps to 1000,” Reuters, http://cn.reuters .com//article/CNTopGenNews/idCNE99Ko8Q2013102, October 21, 2013. 4  Xu Weiwei, “Shanghai Smog Forecaster: PM 2.5 Exceeds 600; I’ve Never Seen Before,” 21st Century Business Herald, http://news/sohu/com/20131213/n391747581.shtml, December 13, 2013. 5  Ji Miou, “Beijing Pollution Drives Expatriates Away,” Financial Times, April 2, 2013. 6  Zhang Chuan, Ji Shuangcheng, et al., “Some Expatriates Leave China Because of Smog; Foreign companies Pays 150,000 Hazard Subsidy,” Global Times, May 2, 2013. 7  Li Song, “To Control Smog, the Public Expects Government to Be More Committed,” Outlook Weekly, April 7, 2013. 8  Han Yuanjia, “Netizens Pay 870 Million RMB for Smog,” Beijing Morning Post, December 13, 2013.

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Ma Yun, founder of taobao.com, also expressed similar concerns in his keynote speech given at the 13th Annual Meeting of China Entrepreneurs Forum in early 2013. He said, “In 10 years, every family in China will be bothered by three types of cancer: liver cancer, lung cancer, and gastric cancer. Liver cancer probably originates from the water we drink; lung cancer is because of the air we breathe; gastric cancer stems from the food we eat.”9 Ma Yun’s concern is not ungrounded. China’s morbidity rate from lung cancer saw a sharp leap in the past decades. In November 2013, Professor Liu Jiasui, head of the experts’ panel for comprehensive cancer prevention and control in ethnic minority areas of the China National Health Association mentioned that China’s morbidity rate of lung cancer increased 465% from 30 years ago.10 At present, the morbidity rate of lung cancer grew at a rate of almost 27% each year. As experts predict, China might become the country with greatest lung cancer incidence in the world in 12 years time.11 Although most Chinese experts agree that smoking is the primary factor that leads to lung cancer, more and more scholars are beginning to focus on air pollution’s effect on the morbidity rate of lung cancer.12 In October 2013, the International Agency for Research on Cancer of the World Trade Organization (IARC) issued a research report that listed outdoor air pollution as one of carcinogenic factor for human beings.13 The IARC reports, “After reviewing all the latest scientific studies, leading world experts called upon by the IARC Monographs Programme reached the conclusion that sufficient evidence shows that exposure to air pollution will lead to lung cancer.”14 IARC Monographs Programme once confirmed that the components of outdoor air pollution and their mixture (such as diesel exhaust and soot) might cause cancer. However, latest research reviews indicate that outdoor air 9  Ma Yun, “Pollution Makes Me Sleepless,” Speech made at the 13th Annual Meeting of China Entrepreneurs Forum, Yabuli, February 22, 2013. 10  Xia Lijuan, “China’s Morbidity Rate of Lung Cancer Increased 465% in 30 Years. Experts Say Early Detection Is a Preventative Measure,” Iyaxin.com. http://news.sina.com .cn/c/2013-11--4/033528610633.shtml, November 4, 2013. 11  Wang Kala, “China Will Become the Country with the Greatest Number of Lung Cancer Incidence in the World in 12 Years Time,” Beijing News, November 17, 2013. 12  Li Qiumeng, “Lung Cancer Morbidity Rate Increased 70% in the Past Five Years. Smog and Health Surveillance Begin This Week,” Beijing Times, November 26, 2013. 13  Huang Han, “WHO Lists Air Pollution as Carcinogenic Factor,” Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2013-10-24/c-125594534.htm, October 23, 2013. 14   I ARC, “Outdoor air pollution is the leading environmental cause of cancer-related deaths,” http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/pr221_E.pdf.

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pollution as a whole (including PM 2.5, PM 10 and other articles in the air which are under surveillance of air pollution and epidemiological research) will lead to cancer.15 Moreover, IARC also warned that the carcinogenic risk of air pollution could be even greater than that of second-hand smoking under certain circumstances, “In areas where outdoor air pollution is of medium level, the carcinogenic risk of air pollution is the same with that of second-hand smoking. Nevertheless, air pollution will bring more devastating risk than secondhand smoke because the number of people who are exposed to air pollution is larger than that of second-hand smoke and some densely-populated areas in the process of rapid industrialization.”16 However, smog’s effect on health is far beyond causing cancer. According to the 2010 Assessment on the Global Burden of Disease Study published by the authoritative medical magazine The Lancet in 2012, outdoor air pollution has become the fourth lethal element in China.17 It took nearly 500 scientists from 50 countries five years to finish the study. Through analyzing many health risk factors such as smoking, food, drinking, and indoor and outdoor air pollutions, the study indicates that in 2010 there were 1.2 million people who died prematurely of outdoor air particulate matter pollution (mainly referring to PM 2.5) in China.18 Among them, 604,519 people died of cerebrovascular disease caused by outdoor air particulate matter pollution; 196,202 people died of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; 283,331 people died of ischemic heart disease; 10,469 people died of lower respiratory tract infection; and 139,369 died of vertebrate trachea cancer, bronchus cancer or lung cancer.19 “Stroke, heart disease, lung cancer, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease have a high morbidity rate in China. All of these lethal diseases are influenced by air pollution,” commented Aaron Cohen, co-chair of the environmental air pollution experts’ panel, to a journalist from Southern Weekend.20

15  “Q&A on outdoor air pollution and cancer,” http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/ 2013/pdfs//pr221_Q&A.pdf. 16  Ibid. 17  Wang Erde, “Latest Report: 2010 PM 2.5 Causes 1.2 Million People to Die Prematurely,” 21st Century Business Herald, April 1, 2013. 18   G DB profile, China, http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/sites/defaulth/files/ country-profiles/GBD%20Country%20Report%20-%20China.pdf. 19  Wang Erde, “Latest Report: 2010 PM 2.5 Causes 1.2 Million People to Die Prematurely,” 21st Century Business Herald, April 1, 2013. 20  Wang Tao, “Air Pollution Causes Diseases; China Bears the Highest Pressure—An Interview with Aaron Cohen, Chief Scientist of Health Effects Institute (HEI),” Southern Weekly, April 4, 2013.

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What corresponds to the study is the continuously soaring morbidity rate along with the ever-worse air pollution. According to reports from Beijing Times, the abnormal rate of respiratory and cardiovascular activity during health examination for citizens from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou witnessed a substantial increase from three years ago. Over 40% citizens said they had experienced symptoms caused by abnormal cardiovascular activity, like palpitation, fatigue, dizziness, and dyspnea. What should be held accountable is PM 2.5 pollution.21 After tracking smog’s effect on human health in northern China in 2013, Kan Haidong, a professor from the Public Health Department of Fudan University found that the outpatient numbers in hospitals of Beijing, Shijiazhuang, and Tangshan had increased by 20% to 30% compared to normal winters.22 Not coincidentally, the first Smog Outpatient Department in Sichuan Province, which was set up in Chengdu’s People’s No. 7 Hospital, received more than a hundred patients who felt sick due to the smoggy weather during the first week of the opening of the department.23 Moreover, in July 2013, a research report published jointly by scholars from China, the United States, and Israel made the Chinese people become more concerned about smog. The research, entitled Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to Air Pollution on Life Expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy, was published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). It discovers that life expectancies of residents living north of the Huai River are 5.52 years lower than those in the south because of the air pollution caused by central heating. The four scholars from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem collected information on the annual daily average concentration of total suspended particulates (TSP) for 90 cities north and south of the Huai River from 1981 to 2000, as well as the mortality rate, life expectancies, and the cardiorespiratory causes of death of different from 1991 to 2000. Their findings show that the air pollution level changes smoothly from south to north. However, due to the heating policy, there is a sharp increase of pollution around the Huai River. Therefore, in the conclusion of this paper, they point out, “The analysis 21  Li Qiumeng, “The Increase of Cardiovascular System Abnormal Rate of People in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou Might Be Linked to Smog”, Beijing Times, December 14, 2013. 22  Jin Yu, “Beijing Is Hit by Heavy Smog again; Visibility Is Less than 1 Mile”, Beijing News, April 1, 2013. 23  Wang Jingyi, Hu Yao, “First Smog Outpatient Department in Chengdu Receives a Hundred Patients within a Week,” WCC Daily, December 18, 2013.

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suggests that the Huai River policy, which had the laudable goal of providing indoor heating, had disastrous consequences for health, presumably due to the failure to require the installation of sufficient pollution abatement equipment. Specifically, it led to TSP concentrations that were 184 μg/m3 higher or 55% higher in the North and reductions in life expectancies of 5.52 years in the North due to elevated rates of cardiorespiratory mortality.” Although this paper was questioned and criticized by officials from the Ministry of Environmental Protection as “biased” and “untrustworthy”24 right after it was published, the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control issued by the State Council afterwards seems to indicate that policy makers have already realized the harmful consequences coal heating imposes on people’s health and are seeking to change the coal-burning situation. In the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control issued in September 2013, Article 1 states explicitly, “Comprehensively regulate the small coal-fired boilers; accelerate the speed of construction projects of central heating, of ‘replacing coal by gas,’ and ‘replacing coal by electricity.’ ”25 For Lin Qifen, an engineer who has worked and lived in Beijing for many years, the government’s determination to control air pollution arrived too late. He quit his job and decided to leave Beijing in the middle of 2013. “In the past, we heard many people talk about how to control air pollution. In my opinion, this task can’t be possibly realized in a short period of time. Perhaps when the air quality in the capital city gets better, your lung is too sick to function. Everyone has only one life. To be able to breathe fresh air, to eat healthy food, and to drink clean water is the bottom line of mine.”

24  “Life expectancy of northerner is 5.5 years lower? Ministry of Environmental Protection replies the result is untrustworthy,” Southern Weekly, July 10, 2013. 25  “Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control issued by the State Council,” http:// www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-9/12/content_2486773.htm.

CHAPTER 8

Environmental PILs Returned to the Starting Point in 2013 LIN Yanmei and WANG Xiaoxi Abstract The new Civil Procedure Law, which formally established the public interest litigation (PIL) system, took effect on January 1, 2013. Nonetheless, no breakthroughs have been made in environmental PILs, which instead suffered a “cold spell.” This paper offers a brief review of environmental PIL cases handled by local courts from 2007 through 2013, with a focus on analyzing the obstacles to their handling such cases and the debate on changes made in the Environmental Protection Law to the qualification of parties in environmental PILs. To explore the direction of PILs, it then analyzes environmental PILs that the courts rejected in 2013 as well as the progress of environmental PILs and other environmental lawsuits involving the disclosure of environmental information or environmental crimes that they are hearing.

Keywords new Civil Procedure Law – environmental PIL – amendment to the environmental protection law

1

New Civil Procedure Law Failed to Make Breakthroughs

The National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s Decision on the Revision of Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (the revised law is hereinafter referred to as the new Civil Procedure Law) was approved at the 28th meeting of the 11th session of the NPC Standing Committee on August 31, 2012 and took effect on January 1, 2013. Article 55 of the new Civil Procedure Law stipulates that “in the event of environmental pollution, ­violation of consumer’s legal rights, and other harm to public interests, relevant government departments and organizations may bring a lawsuit to the people’s court.” This provision is considered to be a new system to protect © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_010

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the public interest, namely “the system of civil public interest litigation,” which provides the legal basis of civil public interest litigation to be put on trial in a number of areas. Since November 2007, seizing the opportunity to set up environmental courts for relevant lawsuits, cities like Guiyang, Wuxi, and Kunming put forward a public interest litigation system for environmental lawsuits, under which relevant departments such as procuratorial authorities and Environmental Protection Bureaus at all levels and other organizations like environmental protection NGOs can serve as the plaintiff in environmental PILs. Five years later, the legislature passed legislation which basically supported the practice by providing a legal basis for environmental PILs. Moreover, with concerted efforts, relevant provisions in the new Civil Procedure Law defined the subject of PILs as “the legal authority and relevant organizations” rather than “the legal authority and relevant social groups” in the original draft, suggesting the intent of the legislature to enable environmental NGOs1 to file environmental PILs. However, it was unexpected that the special provisions in the new Civil Procedure Law, which was supposed to facilitate environmental PILs, turned out to hinder them: since the law came into effect, the court has not accepted any environmental PILs filed by the environmental protection organizations, including the seven charges by All-China Environment Federation.2 The court either rejected the charge as a disqualified subject or did not put it on file, or simply did not with no reply. According to media reports, environmental PIL practice in 2013 remained stagnant, which did not become easier in spite of legal breakthroughs. 2

The Tortuous Road of Legislation

2.1 Guidelines of the Supreme People’s Court As for “disqualified subjects,” the local court attributed it to the lack of specific provisions in the law.3 It is true that the provisions of the new Civil Procedure 1  According to the provisions of Regulations on the Registration of Social Groups in 1998, new social groups are not allowed to register where there are already organizations of the same business. Therefore, many environmental protection organizations take the form of NGOs, including the Friends of Nature, Huai River Guider, Green Kunming, and Nature University. 2  Zhuang Qinghong, et al., “Environmental PILs Still Face Difficulty in Reality,” China Youth Daily, October 31, 2013. 3  In the verdict by Haikou Intermediate People’s Court which rejected the charge of All-China Environment Federation against Hainan Luoniushan Pig Breeding Co. Ltd. and Hainan

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The number of environmental PILs accepted by courts in different areas of China from 2007 to 2013*

Litigation subject

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Environmental protection organizations Procuratorial authorities Government departments Others** Total

0 0 1 0 1

0 5 0 5 10

2 4 2 8 16

1 4 2 7 14

4 3 1 8 16

3 6 5 1 15

2 (9) 1 0 1 4

Note: * The statistics here include the number of civil environmental PILs and administrative environmental PILs. Since the information comes from media reports and the environmental protection and ecology court of Qingzhen, Guiyang, the data may not be complete. See also: “Publicly reported environmental PILs 2007–2013,” Environmental Justice Bulletin, no. 3. ** “Others” refers to individual citizens or other social organizations; ( ) refers to cases filed but not accepted. See Part 3 for details.

Law are more theoretical than feasible, which excluded “organizations outside legal regulations,” while it remains controversial whether “legal” modifies “relevant organizations” or not. According to the current law, the authorities that can file PILs now are only those that “exercise the power of supervision and management of the marine environment in accordance with this law” stated in the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Marine Environmental Protection Law. In the absence of new laws, procuratorial authorities, Environmental Protection Bureaus at all levels, or other relevant government departments cannot become the subject of civil environmental PILs, so the PILs filed by such subjects in 2013 mostly ended in failure.4 Tiangong Biological Engineering Company, the court made the ruling on the grounds that: “As the present law has not made stipulations on the qualification of All-China Environment Federation as a subject of civil litigation prosecution, All-China Environment Federation is disqualified as the plaintiff in civil public interest litigation, thus the proposed lawsuit should be rejected.” 4  In 2013, Qingzhen Environmental Court accepted the public interest litigation on air pollution liability disputes filed by Guizhou Qingzhen People’s Procuratorate against Guizhou Xidianlongteng Ferroalloy Co., Ltd. Qingzhen Branch. In Article 23 of The Regulations on the Promotion of Ecological Development of Guiyang issued in 2010, it is stipulated that for public interest, the procuratorial authorities, environmental protection administrations

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On the range of “relevant organizations,” the Supreme People’s Court published “On the Understanding and Application of Civil PILs”5 under the name Gao Minzhi, as part of the guidelines to implement the new Civil Procedure Law. In the article, it is noted that the new Civil Procedure Law does not emphasize the legal definition of “relevant organizations,” but illustrates the types of organization suited for PILs, which can be further stipulated in future legislations and gradually explored in judicial practice, but should be associated with the prosecution.6 According to this article, the Supreme People’s Court basically encourages local courts to experiment and develop in legal practice. It is further suggested that the people’s court accept environmental civil PILs filed by organizations with the following conditions: 1) nonprofit environmental protection organizations registered and established according to law; 2) the organization is dedicated to long-term environmental protection in accordance with its constitution; 3) the organization has more than 10 fulltime technical personnel and legal staff members dedicated to environmental protection; and 4) the lawsuit is in accordance with the purpose, scope of business, and service area stated in the constitution of the organization.7 The Second and Third Review Draft of the Amendment to Environmental Protection Law As the new Civil Procedure Law cannot offer environmental protection organ­ izations access to PILs, people had to seek opportunity in the revision of Environmental Protection Law. In the draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 2.2

and NGOs may bring lawsuits on the pollution of the environment and destruction of resources, demanding the responsible parties to stop the infringement, remove the obstruction, eliminate the danger, and restore the original state. See http://www.ghb.gov.cn/ doc/201029/52054307.shtml. 5  After the promulgation of the new Civil Procedure Law, the Supreme People’s Court sought to put forward a guideline to implement the law. It also asked for expert advice on the draft of the guidelines on the implementation of environmental civil PILs, and put forward judicial interpretation taking shape in judicial practice. Although the Supreme People’s Court failed to put forward the guidelines before the new Civil Procedure Law took effect, it has published a series of guidelines under the name Gao Minzhi on People’s Court Daily since early December 2012, for the implementation of the new Civil Procedure Law. Among them is “On the Understanding and Application of Civil PILs,” which discusses some “tentative views” of the Supreme People’s Court on the understanding and application of the civil PILs. 6  Gao Minzhi, “On the Understanding and Application of Civil PILs,” People’s Court Daily, December 7, 2012. 7  Ibid.

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“first review draft”), published by the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress on August 31, 2012, there were no provisions on environmental PILs.8 Major revision was made to the first review draft by the new 12th session of the NPC Standing Committee, which published the second review draft on July 19, 2013. The second review draft added provisions on environmental PILs (Article 48): “In the event of the pollution of the environment, destruction of ecology, and damage of public interests, All-China Environment Federation as well as the local environment federations in all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government may bring a lawsuit to the court.”9 This stipulation has caused great controversy, for All-China Environment Federation is a semi-official social group supervised by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, many of whose members are heavy polluters. The system of environmental public interest litigation is intended to mobilize all social forces to supervise enterprises on pollution by legal means and to play a part in the environmental protection, while the second review draft excluded all organizations but All-China Environment Federation. Such provisions not only went against the new Civil Procedure Law and did not accord with the spirit of the legislation, but also did harm to the development of the system of environmental public interest litigation, so much so that the media remarked that “the highlight in the second review draft was instantly covered by the discontent about the subject of PILs.”10 Fortunately, the second review draft was not submitted to the Standing Committee for voting. On October 21, 2013, the National People’s Congress again reviewed the draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law. The full text of the new draft (hereinafter referred to as “the third review draft”) was not available to the public. The Legal Daily reported that the third review draft “modified the provisions on the subject to file environmental PILs. In the event of the pollution of the environment, destruction of ecology, and damage of public interests, a lawsuit may be brought to the court by any national social organization that was registered in the Civil Affairs Department of the State Council according to law, dedicated to public welfare activities in environmental protection 8  For the content of the draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (first review draft), see http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/ lfgz/flca/2012-08/31/content_1735713.htm. 9   For the content of the draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law (second review draft), see http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2013-07/17/ content_1801189.htm. 10   Wang Tao, “Environmental Public Interest Litigation: Worries and Uncertainties,” Southern Weekend, July 5, 2013.

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for over five consecutive years, and enjoys a good reputation. Where there are other stipulations, those stipulations shall apply.”11 Through this modification, has the range of subject for environmental PILs been expanded or reduced? The second review draft stipulated that All-China Environment Federation and the local environment federations in all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government, which are not subordinate to All-China Environment Federation,12 may bring a lawsuit to the court, making 32 legal subjects for the litigation in total. But so far provincial environment federations have been established in only Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Hunan, Jilin provinces, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, which reduced the number to eight. In addition, a reporter for China Youth Daily visited websites of major ministries, searching for commonwealth organizations meeting the conditions in the third review draft, and found 11 of them, including: China Environmental Culture Promotion Association, China Environmental Protection Foundation, China Association of Environmental Protection Industry, and Chinese Society of Environmental Science under the Ministry of Environmental Protection; China Education Association of Forestry and China Forestry Industry Association under the State Forestry Administration; Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Society under the Ministry of Water Resources; Chinese Association of Agricultural Science Societies under the Ministry of Agriculture; China Mining Association and China Land Science Society under the Ministry of Land and Resources; Chinese Society for Oceanography under the State Oceanic Administration.13 They add up to 12 subjects together with All-China Environment Federation. Economy & Nation Weekly reported that “in the deliberation of the second review draft, it was the idea of the legislative branch that since the way to environmental litigation must be cleared, the second review draft would ‘have a try’ by collecting different views before making the final decision.”14 In terms of the number of subjects, the third review draft did broaden the scope of subject for 11  Chen Liping, “Draft of the Amendment to Environmental Protection Law Submitted for Review the Third Time on the Expansion of Subject to File Environmental Public Interest Litigation,” Legal Daily, October 21, 2013. 12  Tian Jianchuan, “All-China Environment Federation Responded to Dispute over Subject in Environmental Public Interest Litigation: No Monopoly, No ‘Rent-Seeking,’ ” Xinhua, June 30, 2013, http://www.xinhuatone.com/interfaceDetail.jsp?con_id=17886. 13  Zhuang Qinghong et al., “Environmental PILs Still Face Difficulty in Reality,” China Youth Daily, October 31, 2013. 14  Economy & Nation Weekly, “Small Steps in Environmental Protection Law Lead to Big Changes,” Economy & Nation Weekly, July 9, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ fortune/2013-07/09/c_124976359.htm.

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environmental PILs; aside from All-China Environment Federation, the others are mainly societies and industry associations, which so far have not filed any environmental PILs. In view of this, neither the second nor the third review draft complied with the legislative intent of the new Civil Procedure Law. According to the Supreme People’s Court (under the name Gao Mingzhi), the lawmakers of the new Civil Procedure Law expected relevant laws to clear the authorities to file civil PILs, which both the second and the third review drafts of Environmental Protection Law failed to do.15 On the other hand, both drafts gave strict definitions to “relevant organizations” about which the lawmakers did not require legal stipulation. The NPC Law Committee gave its reason for such a restriction. “As environmental public interest litigation is a new system, development should be made steadily, with factors such as the professional ability and reputation taken into account in determination of the scope of subjects, so as to prevent lawsuit abuse.”16 But such apprehension did not agree with the truth. As is shown in Table 8.1, even with the support of local environmental courts, environmental groups did not file as many environmental PILs, with only nine cases accepted by the court in five years, of which All-China Environment Federation filed seven, an unfortunate mismatch with the situation of environmental pollution in China. “To prevent lawsuit abuse” is probably an excuse given by lawmakers for the restriction of subjects for environmental PILs. On the one hand, in the face of severe environmental problems in China, the court and decision-makers in the National People’s Congress have to submit to public opinion by expressing their support for system innovation, so as to show their competence in response to the ecological crisis. On the other hand, the authorities had no precise prediction about to what extent the public interest litigation system would shift the conflict between economic development and environmental protection to the court, or whether it would upset the local governments’ plan for economic growth, maintaining stability, social management, and other aspects. This is shown in the resistance of local courts to the environmental public interest litigation system in 2013 by refusing to put the cases on file or accept the materials. All in all, though the decision-makers theoretically 15  Apart from the draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law, the newly revised Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consumers made no stipulation on the subject to file PILs against the infringement of consumer’s interests. 16  Gu Ruizhen and Yu Xiaojie, “Draft of the Amendment to Environmental Protection Law to Expand the Scope of Subjects for Environmental PILs,” Xinhuanet.com, October 21, 2013, http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/hjbhfxzaca/2013-10/21/content_1810474.htm.

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support the mobilization of the public for environment protection, they are not yet determined to empower environmental protection NGOs by offering them public interest litigation to hold the polluters accountable, which may lead to the government itself. However, a real public interest litigation system is preferable to a fake one, which will open up a new path for environmental protection in China. The Possible Turning Point: The Fourth Review Draft of the Amendment to Environmental Protection Law and the Revision of the Administrative Procedure Law The legislators faced with two opportunities: the amendment to the Environmental Protection Law and Administrative Procedure Law. With respect to the intent of Civil Procedure Law and to encourage public participation in environmental protection supervision, experts and environmental protection organizations suggested necessary restriction by law or judicial interpretation on the scope of relevant organizations entitled to file PILs, which should not go beyond the necessary limit. According to their explanation, only two conditions are required for “relevant organizations,” established in accordance with the law (for “organization”), and with lawsuit in accordance with the purpose or scope of business stated in the constitution of the organization (for “relevant”). The subject’s ability in litigation is irrelevant to its qualification, thus should not be stipulated by law or judicial interpretation. “Relevant organizations” will decide for themselves whether to file a lawsuit based on their own situation, and those with no or inadequate ability may choose not to file the case or to entrust it to a lawyer.17 There has been controversy with regard to what authorities should enjoy as the plaintiff in PILs. Administrative and procuratorial departments responsible for environmental protection have both filed environmental PILs and won public support, but according to opponents, the legal administration for environmental protection, with sufficient administrative power, has no need for the power to file environmental PILs; while procuratorial authorities, with the power to supervise administrative departments, can urge the administrative departments and the relevant organizations with support and supervision to file PILs, and therefore has no need for the power to file environmental PILs, either. However, the supporters argue that empowering the administrative and procuratorial departments to file PILs as law enforcement organizations is a new way of law enforcement led by judicial organizations, which may achieve 2.3

17  Hu Jing, “Ideas about the Development of Environmental Public Interest Litigation,” Speech on the chromium slag pollution, Conference of Environmental Public Interest Litigation, Qujing, May 17, 2013.

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some purposes unattainable with the present ability, such as long-term clean-up of pollution, compensation for natural resource damages, suspension of production for rectification, and closure. Therefore, empowering the administrative and procuratorial departments to file PILs should bring about new solutions. As an important aspect of the innovation of social management, the creation of the civil public interest litigation system in the new Civil Procedure Law implemented the decision-maker’s governing strategy,18 which will suffer a setback if the amendment to Environmental Protection Law imposes constraint on the further development of the system. It was put forward at the Third Plenary Session of the CPC’s 18th Central Committee that “the development of ecological civilization depends on a complete system, which ensures the protection of environment in a systematic way.” Civil public interest litigation system is an important part of this system. In 2014, the NPC Standing Committee will carry out the fourth review of the revised draft of Environmental Protection Law, when people concerned about environmental protection ought to suggest the committee further expand the scope of subjects for environmental PILs to ensure a sound development of the newly created system.19 In addition to the revision of Environmental Protection Law, another opportunity for environmental PILs is the revision of Administrative Procedure Law, which has been incorporated into the NPC Standing Committee’s legislative agenda, and is likely to be submitted for deliberation and approval in five years.20 A document crucial for the revision of Administrative Procedure Law is one that advocates “the door to administrative litigation be opened to ensure that the administrative disputes are resolved by court rulings,” adopting measures including expanding the scope of litigation accepted by the court and the qualification of the plaintiff, and increasing the number of administrative PILs.21 The existing Administrative Procedure Law mainly applies to the infringement of the personal rights and property rights of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations, with strict restrictions on the qualifications of the 18  Gao Minzhi, “On the Understanding and Application of Civil PILs,” People’s Court Daily, December 7, 2012. 19  According to insiders, the fourth review of the revised version of Environmental Protection Law may take place in 2014 instead of at the end of December 2013, for the draft will be revised after the NPC conference in December. 20  Jian Hong, “Revision of Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates Included into NPC Legislation Planning,” Procuratorial Daily, November 4, 2013. 21  Ying Songnian, “Improving the System of Administrative Litigation: Discussion on the Key Issues in the Revision of Administrative Procedure Law,” Social Sciences in Guangdong, No. 1, 2013.

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plaintiff.22 Unless otherwise stipulated in the law, any citizen, legal person or other organization cannot file a lawsuit by the existing Administrative Procedure Law on the infringement of other legitimate rights and interests, such as labor right, environmental right, the right to rest, the right to education, religious right, the right to equal participation, the right of expression, and other political rights. Regarding the distinction between types of rights as inappropriate, most experts suggest that the new Administrative Procedure Law provide that “a lawsuit can be filed by any citizen, legal person, or other organization that is affected by and discontent with the administrative behavior.”23 At present, citizens, legal persons, and other organizations often suffer from the lack or abuse of administrative action in promoting the administration to enforce environmental laws, collecting environmental information, participating in environmental impact assessment and planning, who can seldom seek judicial remedy as they are not yet subject to the infringement of personal rights and property rights. If the new Administrative Procedure Law expands the plaintiff’s qualification and cover other legal rights, it will effectively promote the use of legal means to protect environment.24 In addition, experts also suggested the revised Administrative Procedure Law establish a system of administrative public interest litigation. Drawing on the provisions of the new Civil Procedure Law, the system will advance environmental PILs step by step, offering access to PILs in fields of major public interest, including natural resources, ecological environment, food safety, and administrative monopoly, while imposing certain limit to the subject of PILs.25 Also drawing on the practice of the new Civil Procedure Law in 2013, the 22  According to Article 2 of Administrative Procedure Law, citizens, legal persons, or other organizations are entitled to sue if a specific administrative act is believed to have violated their “legitimate rights and interests,” while the cases in the eleventh article are only about the infringement of personal rights and property rights. This brings about some questions: the provisions of Articles 11 and 2 do not exactly match; the cases on personal rights and property rights in Article 11 limit the extensive connotation of “legitimate rights and interests” in Article 2. In fact, many lawsuits filed by citizens in recent years according to Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information against the violation of the right to know have been accepted by the court. 23  Ying Songnian, “Improving the System of Administrative Litigation: Discussion on the Key Issues in the Revision of Administrative Procedure Law,” Social Sciences in Guangdong, No. 1, 2013. 24  Jian Anjie, “Revision of Administrative Procedure Law Focuses on Improvement of Administrative Litigation System,” Legal Daily, March 21, 2012. 25  Ying Songnian, “Improving the System of Administrative Litigation: Discussion on the Key Issues in the Revision of Administrative Procedure Law,” Social Sciences in Guangdong,

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revised Administrative Procedure Law should set definite conditions on the subject of PILs after deliberation and soliciting opinions, rather than “leaving blanks” for other laws to fill. 3

The Difficult Environmental Public Interest Litigation

Environmental Public Interest Litigation to be Accepted by the Court in 2013 By November 2012, All-China Environment Federation had filed six environmental PILs. Two environmental NGOs, namely Friends of Nature Environment Institute in Chaoyang, Beijing (hereinafter referred to as Friends of Nature), and Source Lover Environment Institute in Fengtai, Beijing (hereinafter referred to as Nature University) filed lawsuits respectively to Beijing Dongcheng District People’s Court and Inner Mongolia Erdos Intermediate People’s Court in July and September in 2013, against China Shenhua Coal to Liquid and Chemical Co., Ltd. and its Erdos branch over exploitation of groundwater and sewage pollution. However, none of the environmental PILs filed by environmental groups in 2013 has been accepted. Please refer to Table 8.2 for details. Why these cases were not accepted is worth pondering. Before the implementation of the new Civil Procedure Law, environmental protection organ­ izations filed environmental PILs according to government policies and local regulations, such as the State Council’s Decision on Strengthening Environmental Protection in the Implementation of Scientific Outlook on Development (No. 39 [2005]), 12 of which were accepted by courts. Except for the one still being heard, all the rest ended with the environmental organizations winning or dropping the charge and both sides reaching an agreement, receiving positive responses of the public. After the implementation of the new Civil Procedure Law, in spite of the controversy over the qualification of the subject, the law still provided legal basis for environmental PILs. However, it is perplexing that except the environment court in Qingzhen, Guiyang, which permits environmental PILs, no other court has accepted PILs filed by environmental groups. It is believed that the qualification of the subject is just the court’s excuse for rejecting the charges, while the real reason is the conflict between the local courts’ engagement in environmental law enforcement and safeguarding public interest, and handling their relationship with the local environmental protection bureaus and governments. 3.1

No. 1, 2013. Professor Ying suggested making procuratorial departments and approved social organizations subjects of administrative PILs.

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Table 8.2 Environmental PILs filed by relevant organizations and not accepted by the court* Time of prosecution (in 2013)

The court

The parties Plaintiff

Defendant

March

Shandong Weifang Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

Weifang Legang Food Co., Ltd. Third Hoggery

March

Shanxi Xinzhou Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

Shanxi Yuanping Bureau of Construction and Housing

May

Chongqing No. 4 Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

Chongqing Shuangqing Barium Sulfate Co., Ltd.

May

Chongqing Maritime Court

Chongqing Liangjiang Voluntary Service Center, Friends of Nature

Chongqing Red Butterfly Strontium Industry Co., Ltd.

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Details of the case and plaintiff’s request

The reason for rejecting the charge

The plaintiff accused the defendant of pollution discharge exceeding the standard without operating sewage treatment facilities, causing serious pollution of groundwater. The plaintiff demanded the defendant stop pollution immediately, and claimed over 700 million RMB for pollution control and remediation.a The plaintiff accused the defendant of the mismanagement of the local sewerage network when building a road, which led to the discharge of the domestic sewage from the upper reaches and the wastewater from some enterprises into Liu Village, Xinyuan Town, damaging the environment of the village. The plaintiff demanded the defendant stop the infringement immediately and take effective measures to eliminate the damage.b The plaintiff accused the defendant of polluting the Yu River, the drinking water source of Pengshui County, with its industrial wastewater, in which many pollutants far exceeded the standard. The plaintiff requested the court to immediately stop the defendant’s illegal discharge, and demand the defendant take effective measures to improve the environment surrounding the factory, including removing the waste in soil and the road, eliminating the pollution to the Yu River and damage to the health of local residents.c From 1994 to 2008, the residue discharged by the defendant piled up by the Fu River, which up to now has covered an area of about 3.3 ha. Tests show that the waste contains large amounts of sulfide, arsenic, heavy metals, and other toxic substances. Whenever the residue pile is immersed in the Fu River in the event of rainfall or rising water level, the toxic substances enter the river, and end up in the Yangtze River. The court was requested to demand the defendant take effective measures to

The court neither dismissed the request nor filed the case.

The court did not file the case on the grounds that the Supreme Court gave no judicial interpretation on the qualification of the plaintiff in environmental PILs.

The court neither dismissed the request nor accepted the case.

The court held that whether land-based pollution is under the jurisdiction of the maritime court is in dispute at present both in theory and in practice, with obscure judicial interpretation, and thus did not to file the case.

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Table 8.2 Environmental PILs filed by relevant organizations (cont.) Time of prosecution (in 2013)

The court

The parties Plaintiff

Defendant

June

Hainan Haikou Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

Hainan Luoniushan Pig Breeding Co. Ltd.

June

Hainan Haikou Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

Hainan Tiangong Biological Engineering Company

July

Beijing Dongcheng District People’s Court

Friends of Nature, Nature University

China Shenhua Coal to Liquid and Chemical Co., Ltd. and its Erdos branch

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Details of the case and plaintiff’s request

eliminate the pollution and damage of its residue pile, located by the Fu River in Xiangshan Village, Anju Town, Chongqing Tongliang, to the Fujiang River and the Yangtze River. The plaintiff accused the defendant of the long-term discharge of wastewater, threatening the lives and health of the local people and environmental public interest. The discharged wastewater, exceeding the standard, polluted the soil and groundwater without any preventive measures, and threatened the Luoniu River and the national mangrove protection zone. The court was requested to demand that the defendant eliminate the danger to areas along the river and the wastewater reservoir as well as the national mangrove protection zone, take measures to reduce the accumulated pollution, and pay 13.99 million RMB as compensation.d The plaintiff accused the defendant of discharging waste water, which polluted the soil and groundwater and threatened the Luoniu River and the national mangrove protection zone. The court was requested to demand that the defendant pay 2.33 million RMB as compensation.e The plaintiff accused the defendant of pumping groundwater since 2006, with a daily volume of tens of thousands of cubic meters, resulting in the continuous decline of underground water level in grassland over the years. Moreover, the defendant discharged wastewater into the nearby river and sands, creating a large area of wastewater pits in the sands about 500 m away, which tested for large amounts of toxic and harmful substances. The plaintiff demanded the defendant stop discharging wastewater into the sands, take effective measures for the wastewater pits, stop pumping groundwater from the water source in Haolebaoji, Erdos, and bear all the legal costs and lawyer’s fees of this case.f

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The reason for rejecting the charge

The court dismissed the charge on the grounds that “All-China Environment Federation is disqualified as the subject in civil PILs.”

The court dismissed the charge on the grounds that “All-China Environment Federation is disqualified as the subject in civil PILs.” On August 30, 2013, the court informed the plaintiff’s lawyer on the telephone the case would not be filed, on the ground that in spite of Article 55 in Civil Procedure Law, the qualification of the plaintiff in environmental PILs remained vague. The court did not issue a written verdict.

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Table 8.2 Environmental PILs filed by relevant organizations (cont.) Time of prosecution (in 2013)

The court

The parties Plaintiff

Defendant

August

Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court

All-China Environment Federation

State Oceanic Administration

September

Erdos Intermediate People’s Court

As in the case in July

As in the case in July

* The data came from media reports, and may not be complete. a Qie Jianrong, “Three Environmental PILs by All-China Environment Federation Yielded No Result,” b Ibid. c Qie Jianrong, “Villagers Complained in Vain about Polluting Enterprises Introduced by the Government,” d Qie Jianrong, “No Public Interest Litigation Has Been Accepted by the Court after the Implementation e Ibid. f Hu Shaobo, “Seminar Report on the Public Interest Litigation of Friends of Nature and Nature g Zhang Mianmian, “All-China Environment Federation Sued the State Oceanic Administration, 2013, http://www. chinanews.com/gn/2013/08-04/5119787.shtml.

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Details of the case and plaintiff’s request

The reason for rejecting the charge

On February 16, 2013, the State Oceanic Administration announced that the oil field of ConocoPhillips in an oil spill accident had restored its production ability and may gradually resume production. All-China Environment Federation believed that the State Oceanic Administration had not consulted experts or held public hearings before giving approval. Therefore, it filed an administrative review, which was not accepted by the State Oceanic Administration. In August, 2013, All-China Environment Federation filed for administrative proceedings, requesting the court to rule the defendant’s approval illegal, and demanding the defendant reexamine ConocoPhillips before resuming production in accordance with the law.g As in the case in July

On August 13, 2013, the court dismissed the case on the grounds that All-China Environment Federation was disqualified as the subject in administrative litigation, as its legitimate rights and interests were not violated by the State Oceanic Administration’s No. 716 approval.

On September 13, 2013, the court returned the filing materials.

Legal Daily, June 20, 2013. Legal Daily, September 18, 2013. of the New Civil Procedure Law,” Legal Daily, August 8, 2013. University against China Shenhua Coal to Liquid and Chemical Co. Ltd. and Its Erdos Branch.” Questioning Irregularities in Production Resumption of ConocoPhillips,” China National Radio, August 4,

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3.2 Environmental PILs Heard or Concluded in 2013 In October 2011, Friends of Nature and the Green Volunteer League of Chongqing filed environmental public interest litigation in Yunnan Qujing on chromium slag pollution against Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industrial Co., Ltd. and Yunnan Luliang Peace Technology Co., Ltd.,26 which is so far the only environmental public interest litigation filed by environmental NGOs and accepted by the court.27 After two years of obtaining evidence and negotiation, the plaintiff and defendant reached a tentative agreement in January 2013. The agreement provided a variety of solutions, including defining the responsibility, scope, and procedures of the chromium slag pollution remediation, introducing a mechanism in which the plaintiff may supervise through both direct participation and entrusting a third party, and establishing a bank account for chromium slag pollution treatment. If the agreement had been finally concluded and implemented, it would set an example for environmental PILs,28 but unfortunately, the defendant officially refused to sign the agreement on April 18, 2013, which marked the failure of the court-led mediation and the beginning of the trial procedure.29 To provide sufficient evidence in the court, members of Friends of Nature went to assess the pollution in Qujing, Yunnan in June 2013, along with experts from the Environment Pollution Damage Assessment Center of the Chinese Society of Environmental Science, and the Environmental Risk and Damage Assessment Center of the Environmental Planning Institute under the Ministry of Environmental Protection, to come up with a plan to assess the environmental damage for the environmental 26  For details of this case, please see “Friends of Nature Filed Public Interest Litigation to Yunnan Qujing Intermediate People’s Court on Chromium Slag Pollution,” September 22, 2011, http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=14622; “Public Interest Litigation by Friends of Nature on Chromium Slag Pollution Accepted by the Court,” October 20, 2011, http:// www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=14652. 27  With the coordination of the Higher Court of Yunnan, Qujing Environmental Protection Bureau joined in the lawsuit as the third plaintiff. In addition, in the 2010 lawsuit of All-China Environment Federation and Guiyang Public Environment Education Center against Wudang Dingba Papermaking Factory on water pollution; the center is an environmental NGO. 28  Yang Yang, “The Past and Present of Public Interest Litigation on Yunnan Chromium Slag Pollution,” “Speech on the Chromium Slag Pollution in Qujing at the Conference of Environmental Public Interest Litigation,” Conference Minutes, May 17, 2013. 29  Liu Hongqiao and Ren Zhongyuan, “Yunnan Chromium Slag Case to Enter Trial Procedure after Mediation Failure,” Caixin.com, http://china.caixin.com/2013-04-19/100516302 .html, (accessed April 18, 2013).

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public interest litigation.30 The time for hearing the case had not yet been determined as of November 2013, and the case would probably not continue until 2014. However, the situation is pressing for the local villagers and environment threatened by chromium slag pollution. Hancheng Environmental Protection Bureau of Shaanxi province is luckier than the environmental protection organizations above. On March 22, 2013, Hancheng People’s Court issued its verdict of the lawsuit filed in 2012 by Hancheng Environmental Protection Bureau against Hancheng Baifan Mining Co., Ltd. on its slag pollution, ordering the defendant to pay 1.005 million RMB as compensation for environmental damage, which the defendant accepted without appeal.31 Song Donggang, director of Policy and Regulation Division under the Shaanxi Environmental Protection Department, explained the reasoning for filing the environmental public interest litigation to the reporter of Legal Daily. “The environmental protection department had demanded the defendant repair the damage within a given time, suspend production for rectification, and pay a penalty, but still could not stop the defendant from destroying the ecological environment, and could only resort to the law to stop the violation of environmental laws.”32 In addition, the administrative penalty cannot restore the environment, while environmental public interest litigation may make the defendant “repair the damage to public environment.”33 The trial was carried out on December 4, 2012, before the new Civil Procedure Law came into force. Although the defendant questioned the qualification of the Hancheng Environmental Protection Bureau for filing an environmental public interest litigation, the bureau argued that “according to Article 6 of the existing Environmental Protection Law, all organizations and individuals are responsible for protecting the environment, and have the right to report and accuse any organization or individual of pollution and damage to the environment. Therefore, any organization or individual may become the legal subject of civil environmental PILs. Besides, from a practical perspective,

30  Friends of Nature, “Friends of Nature Assessed Chromium Slag Pollution in Qujing, Yunnan with Experts,” Friends of Nature, July 18, 2013, http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php/ index/post/id/1485. 31  Tai Jianlin, “A Complete Account of the First Environmental Public Interest Litigation in Shaanxi,” Legal Daily, April 10, 2013. 32  Ibid. 33  Ibid.

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the relaxation of the qualification of the subject in civil PILs is required in the public management and legal development of the country.”34 In addition to the above two cases, Fujian Daily reported a lawsuit that Quanzhou Yongchun People’s Court accepted of Dongping Economic and Social Affairs Service Center against an unregistered animal farmer on water pollution, which was allegedly the first environmental public interest litigation in Fujian Province. The plaintiff and the defendant finally reached an agreement, demanding the defendant shut down the farm.35 Besides, according to Guizhou Morning Post, on the repeated destruction of the ecological environment by Dapo Sandstone Factory in Lianhua Village, Zhanjie Town, Guizhou Qingzhen Environmental Court issued its first pretrial injunction, stopping the pollution and damage to environment before proceedings.36 3.3 Progress in Other Environmental Litigation Apart from the practice of environmental PILs, progress has also been made in the use of law in other aspects of environmental protection in 2013, with the administrative litigation filed by many environmental NGOs on the disclosure of environmental information accepted or concluded by the court.37 After eight months of administrative litigation, China Mangrove Conservation

34  Ibid. 35  Xu Zhansheng, Shi Yousen, Wu Zhiwen, “ Sewage from Animal Farm Discharged into River, Town Government Won Environmental Public Interest Litigation,” Fujian Daily, May 22, 2013, http://fjrb.fjsen.com/fjrb/html/2013-05/22/content_627458.htm?div=-1. 36  Long Xiang and Shao Peijia, “Qingzhen Environmental Court Issued Its First Pretrial Injunction,” Guizhou Morning Post, March 2, 2013. 37  Although the litigation cases on environmental information publication are filed by environmental organizations for public access, which is open to the public once obtained, this paper does not take such litigation as environmental public interest litigation. The main reason is that according to Paragraph 2, Article 33 of Regulations on Government Information Publication, “In the event that any citizen, legal person, or other organization believes that a specific administrative act of an administrative organ(?) in government information disclosure has infringed upon their legitimate rights and interests, the former party can apply for administrative review or bring an administrative lawsuit according to law.” As long as the application for government information is rejected, or the reply is overdue or does not meet the requirements, the applicant becomes a qualified plaintiff whose right to know has been violated by the administrative organ. Therefore, the litigation does no belong to the public interest litigation system to be established by the new Civil Procedure Law and the revised Administrative Procedure Law. See Li Guangyu, “Government Information Disclosure Litigation—the Idea, Method and Case,” Law Press, 2009, 33–35.

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Network (CMCN) obtained the complete copy of the environmental impact assessment report (not including parts concerning business secrets and the state secrets)38 of the Guangxi East Bay Road Project on July 7, 2013, which was offered by Guangxi Fangchenggang Environmental Protection Bureau. Environmentalist Chen Liwen sued Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau in March 2013, demanding the defendant disclose information such as the environmental impact assessment report of Likeng Waste Incineration Plant (Stage 1), with both the first trial by Guangzhou Yuexiu Court and the second trial by Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court ruling the overdue reply of Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau illegal. After that, the defendant performed its duty, and the Guangdong Environmental Protection Department disclosed the environmental impact assessment report of Likeng Waste Incineration Plant (Stage 2).39 Furthermore, Nature University sued government departments such as the Beijing Miyun Environmental Protection Bureau, Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau, and Sichuan Environmental Protection Department on the publication of environmental information, all of which have been accepted, and are under trial. In other cases, by filing administrative reviews or expressing the intent to file litigation on government information disclosure to administrative departments, environmental NGOs such as Green Kunming and Green Anhui have mostly obtained the required information, including the environmental impact report of the Beihai wetland tourism construction project in Tengchong County, and the list of all dioxin-emitting enterprises in China. With the efforts of both the citizens and environmental organizations in demanding environmental information disclosure and the influence of the successful cases, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued Guidelines on Government Information Disclosure on Environmental Impact Assessment of Construction Projects (Trial) on November 14, 2013, demanding that the environmental protection departments should publicize the complete reports of environmental impact assessment (except parts involving state secrets and business secrets) and other relevant information.40 38  China Mangrove Conservation Network, “Litigation Concluded on Information Disclosure on Fangchenggang Mangrove,” China Mangrove Conservation Network, July 20, 2013, http://www.china-mangrove.org/page/3971. 39  Chen Wanru, “Second Trial of Chen Liwen V. Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau Affirmed Original Judgment,” Southern Metropolis Daily, September 12, 2013. 40   General Office of Ministry of Environmental Protection, “Notice on the Release of Guidelines on Government Information Disclosure on Environmental Impact Assessment of Construction Projects (Trial),” Document of General Office of Ministry of Environmental Protection (2013: No. 103), November 14, 2013, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/ gkml/hbb/bgt/201311/t20131118_263486.htm.

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On June 18, 2013, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued the Explanation on the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Concerning Environmental Pollution,41 which set 14 criteria for “serious pollution of the environment.” The judicial interpretation also identified five kinds of pollution behavior,42 which, once committed even without causing property losses, casualties, or other serious consequences, are “serious pollution of the environment.” Such a provision not only turned the environmental pollution crime from a consequential offense to an offensive act, but also defined “serious pollution of the environment.” This definition is helpful for the explanation and application of “damage caused by environmental pollution” in Article 65 of the Tort Liability Law and “environmental pollution” in Article 55 of the new Civil Procedure Law, and is also beneficial for the development of Environmental Public Interest Litigation Law. In addition, Article 11 of the interpretation identified the appraisal organization and procedure in environmental pollution cases. “In cases where the technical issues concerning environmental pollution are difficult to determine, the appraisal report shall be given by judicial appraisal organizations or organizations designated by the environmental protection department under the State Council. The monitoring data given by monitoring agencies at or above the county level, if 41  The eighth amendment to the Criminal Law, which came into force on May 1, 2011, made significant changes to “the crime of major environmental pollution accident” stipulated in the 1997 Criminal Law. The range of contaminants was expanded from “other hazardous waste” to “other harmful substances”; the threshold for conviction was lowered from “causing major environment pollution accidents, with serious losses to public or private property or human casualties” to “serious pollution of the environment.” The title of the crime was also changed from “the crime of major environmental pollution accident” to “the crime of environmental pollution” after the revision. 42  These five kinds of pollution behavior are as follows: the emission, dumping, or disposal of radioactive waste, waste containing pathogen of infectious diseases and poisonous substance in drinking water source protection zones and the core region of nature protection areas; illegally emitting, dumping, or disposing of over 3 t of hazardous waste; the illegal discharge of waste containing heavy metal, persistent organic pollutants, and other pollutants with serious harm to the environment and human health, the amount of which is over three times more than the standards for the discharge of pollutants stipulated by the state or governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government with legal authorization; the emission, dumping, disposal of radioactive waste, waste containing pathogen of infectious diseases and poisonous substance through underground pipes, seepage wells, seepage pits, and cracks or caves without permission; emitting, dumping, or disposing of radioactive waste, waste containing pathogen of infectious diseases and poisonous substance after receiving administrative penalty more than two times in the past two years for the same violation.

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endorsed by the environmental protection departments above the provincial level, may be used as evidence.” Such regulations may help solve the problems in obtaining evidence and appraisal. 4

Where Is the Way?

On January 1, 2013, the new Civil Procedure Law which established the public interest litigation system was implemented, while unexpectedly, the practice of environmental public interest litigation met great challenges. The second review draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law, released by the NPC Standing Committee in the middle of the year, added to the worries of the prospect of this system. Although provisions were revised in the third review draft for the deliberation of the NPC Standing Committee in response to people’s requests, the disappointing fact remained that the qualification of the litigation subject was still strictly restricted, with no measures to promote the change. At a seminar on environmental public interest litigation in the library of Sanlian Taofen Bookstore, senior American environmental lawyer Philip Boxell said, “Don’t lose the faith in your heart, because there is certainly light at the end of the tunnel.” Yes, do not give up halfway when we do not see the light at the end of the tunnel.43 For people concerned about environmental protection and environmental protection organizations, the opportunity to promote environmental PILs is right in their hands. In 2014, issues in legislation need to be addressed properly. As the second part of this paper mentioned, the solution to environmental PILs may occur in the fourth review draft of the amendment to Environmental Protection Law and the amendment to Administrative Procedure Law, both of which will take place in 2014. Besides, citizens and environmental organizations should further the cooperation with experts and NPC deputies in the review and discussion of legislation and judicial interpretation, while informing the public of relevant information through the media, making sure the environmental public interest litigation system enjoys public approval and participation. The lawmakers’ caution in expanding the range of subject qualification in environmental PILs partly resulted from the fear for lawsuit abuse. But since 2007 when environmental public interest litigation was experimented in some areas, there have not been many cases concluded or to be filed with 43  Li Meng, “Environmental Litigation in the Past Half A Year,” Democracy and the Rule of Law, August 5, 2013.

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social, legal, and environmental effects, which may be another reason. The successful experience of environmental information disclosure showed that the right strategy in lodging the cases by citizens, environmental organizations, and lawyers can promote the establishment and improvement of environmental information disclosure system. By September 31, 2013, courts throughout the country had set up 156 special judicial organizations for environmental protection (including environmental protection tribunals, collegiate benches, detached tribunals and circuit courts).44 Although many such environmental courts do not serve real purposes, some judges working in these courts still want to make use of them, pioneering environmental PILs. In addition, “small cases” should not be ignored, as environmental NGOs with limited resources may request law enforcement by environmental protection authorities or file lawsuits to the court against unlicensed workshops. At the same time, they may stop the pollution or damage to the environment by asking for evidence preservation and temporary injunction according to Articles 81 and 100 of the new Civil Procedure Law. In addition to the environmental PILs stipulated in the new Civil Procedure Law, environmental protection organizations can file administrative litigation either alone or by supporting interested citizens, on the discontent about administrative permission such as discharge permit and environmental impact assessment licensing, and on the act of omission of administrative organizations after rejected application. The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, which was passed at the Third Plenary Session of the CPC’s 18th Central Committee, demanded promoting the rule of law, establishing a judicial system that is appropriately separated from the administrative divisions to ensure the independent exercise of the judicial and procuratorial power, kindling the vigor of social organizations, reforming the ecological protection management system and other reform measures, all of which are necessary for the development and success of the environmental public interest litigation system. Realizing the determination of the CPC Central Committee, we have every reason to believe that the spring for environmental public interest litigation will finally come.

44  Zhang Bao, “An Overview of China’s Judicial Organizations for Environmental Protection,” Law Blog, November 17, 2008, http://ahlawyers.fyfz/cn/b/172083.

CHAPTER 9

The Revision of China’s Environmental Protection Law from a Minor Change to a Critical Improvement QIE Jianrong Abstract On October 21, 2013, during its fifth meeting, the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) changed the third draft of the amendment to China’s Environmental Protection Law from ‘draft amendment’ to ‘draft revision.’ This signifies that the legislators are preparing to make a thorough change to the law. The third draft covers issues like public interest litigation, environmental impact assessment of government policies, environmental information disclosure, public participation, and fines by the day. On November 14, 2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the Guidelines on Government Disclosure of Information about Construction Project Environmental Impact Assessment (for Trial Implementation). According to the Guidelines, from January 1, 2014, environmental protection agencies will have to disclose full EIA reports of construction projects.

Keywords environmental impact assessment – environmental information disclosure – public participation – full disclosure of EIA reports

1

Requirement for Environmental Impact Assessments

In the third draft of the Environmental Protection Law Amendment, it is stipulated that “[w]hen formulating economic and technological policies, relevant departments of the State Council and people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall take into full account their environmental impacts, and solicit opinions from experts and stakeholders.” This is also a requirement for environmental impact assessments (EIAs). However, in the past, EIA obligation for © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_011

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government policies was considered premature for legislation in China. When the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China was drafting the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Evaluation of Environmental Effects, EIA requirement for government policies was one of the proposals. Eight years after the Law on Evaluation of Environmental Effects was enacted, Bian Guangfeng, Inspector of EIA Division of Ministry of Environmental Protection, told Southern Weekly that the enacted version of the law was different from the initial intention of the legislators. Originally, the legislators wanted to make EIA obligatory from the beginning of every decision making, e.g. for formulating important policies, planning productivity layout, and developing of state-owned land and regions. A complete strategic environment assessment (SEA) should cover three links: policies, plans, and the projects. However, EIA-related legislation in China has some deficiencies, one of which is that in the Law on Evaluation of Environmental Effects, EIA is only required for plans and projects, but not policies.1 Although EIA requirement for policies was proposed during the drafting of the Law on Evaluation of Environmental Effects, it was not included in the final version of the law, which only requires EIA for planning related to regional development, industries, rivers, and energy. The third draft of Environmental Protection Law Amendment has special significance in EIA requirement because it stipulates “[w]hen developing economic and technological policies, relevant departments of the State Council and people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall take into full account their environmental impacts, and solicit opinions from experts and relevant stakeholders.” This stipulation can prevent damages to the environment as a result of government’s neglecting environmental issues during policy formulation. At the same time, it encourages the government to do better in balancing economic development and environmental protection in decision making. 2

A New Chapter on “Information Disclosure and Public Participation”

On July 17, 2013, the Standing Committee of the NPC published the second draft of the Environmental Protection Law amendment on its website. In this draft, a 1  Feng Jie, “EIA Requirement for Policies in the EIA Law,” Southern Weekly, September 2, 2011.

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new chapter (Chapter V) of “Information Disclosure and Public Participation” was added and this chapter covers Article 43 to Article 48. Article 43 stipulates that “Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations shall have the right to obtain environmental information, participate and supervise the activities of environment protection in accordance with the law.” “People’s governments at various levels and other relevant departments shall disclose environmental information pursuant to the law, improve public participation procedures, and facilitate citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to participate in, and supervise environmental protection work.” Article 44 stipulates, “The competent department of environmental protection administration under the State Council shall release national environmental quality, monitoring data of key pollutant sources and other major environmental information. Competent environmental departments of governments at or above provincial levels shall regularly publish environmental status bulletins . . . Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations shall have the right to apply for environmental information from the people’s governments above county level and other relevant environmental protection departments.” Article 45 stipulates, “Key pollutant-discharging units shall truthfully disclose the names of their major pollutants, the ways of emission, the emission concentration and total volume, the standard—exceeding emission status, as well as the construction and operation of pollution prevention and control facilities.” Article 46 stipulates, “The project owner of a construction project for which an environmental impact report should be prepared to pursue to the law shall explain relevant situations to the potentially-affected public when preparing the environmental impact report, and solicit public opinions . . . The competent department that is responsible for the examination and approval of environmental impact assessment documents for the construction project shall make public the full text of environmental impact reports of the construction project upon receipt thereof with exception of commercial secrets and confidential circumstances as specified by the State. In the case of a construction project failing to solicit sufficient public comments, they shall request the project to fulfill the task.” The chapter on “Information Disclosure and Public Participation” has six articles. This aroused the interest of environmental protection organizations as they believe that information disclosure is more important than fines to some extent. Ma Jun, Director of the Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs, says, “The government should strike a balance between development and

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environmental protection. However, in reality, the plans are developed by government officials and a few experts in their offices. Rather than finding a balance, they give up the environment and the community’s benefit under the pressure from interest groups.” Ma believes that in order to prevent such problems, public participation should be introduced to the decision-making and management of the environment. Therefore, Ma suggests that an article should be added to the amendment that “every citizen has the right to know, to participate, and to seek judicial remedy.” Ren Zhiqiang, one of China’s real estate tycoons, probably knows best what the companies with illegal practices are most afraid of. He pointed out “If a company’s pollution practices are publicized, it may not be able to survive. The public will boycott its products. Whether a law is effective is not about how much fine it demands. The business world wants the cost of illegal practices to be increased, too. But it’s more important to allow surveillance from civil society and give more litigation rights to the public so that the public can protect itself with the law.” To Ren, fines are not the aim of the law, but rather transparency is more important than fines. Wang Canfa, Professor of Environmental Law in Renmin University of China suggests that the government departments of environmental protection build a platform for publicizing a company’s environmental information, so that all the information can be found on the same platform. This can prevent the situation where the public cannot find a company’s information, even when the information is disclosed. 3

Full Disclosure of EIA Report

There is a chapter on environmental information disclosure in the second draft of the Environmental Protection Law amendment. However, the draft does not require disclosing the complete version of the EIA reports. The civil society in China made their proposals regarding this problem during the public opinion solicitation for the second draft. Ma Jun proposed that regulations regarding EIA should be strengthened. “We need to learn from international practices in terms of EIA legislation. Environmental assessment information should be completely open to the public. The public should have opportunities to participate in the evaluation process.” He suggests that EIAs be disclosed in full text, and public hearings be held for major projects. About those projects that fail to fulfill the disclosure requirement, the public should have the right to seek judicial remedy.

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“We need to give teeth to the Environmental Protection Law and penalize the violators,” says Ge Feng of Friends of Nature. The teeth include the public’s right to know of environmental information, to participate, and to sue, as well as enforcing public supervision and judicial supervision. There is no requirement for the disclosure of the full text of EIA in the second draft of the Amendment. This may be a disappointment. However, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued Guidelines on Government Disclosure of Information about Construction Project Environmental Impact Assessment (for Trial Implementation), which was a remedy. According to the Guidelines, from January 1, 2014, environmental protection departments should disclose full texts of EIA reports for projects. The Guidelines require that departments of environmental protection should disclose EIA reports and lists they receive and solicit public opinions. All the EIA reports that do not include national secrets or commercial secrets should be disclosed in full text. The entire procedure of acceptance, approval and examination of EIA reports should be disclosed, too. In recent years, EIA reports have been the kind of environmental information most wanted by the civil society for supervision. However, it is extremely difficult for the public to obtain EIA reports about construction projects, especially those that cause pollution. Environmental organizations and individuals have to use litigation to request court orders to disclose the full version of their EIA reports by environmental protection departments or constructors. On July 20, 2012, environmental protection activist Chen Liwen proposed a public application on the website of the Environmental Protection Bureau of Guangzhou City. He requested four environmental documents be disclosed, including the full text of EIA report on Likeng Household Waste Incineration Plant. On August 31, 2013, the Environmental Protection Bureau of Guangzhou City replied, but only released the data about emissions 2009–2011, and gave no response to the requests for the other three documents. Chen was dissatisfied. He sued the Bureau of Environmental Protection and applied for a court order for the Bureau to disclose all the information requested. On March 19, 2013, People’s Court of Yuexiu District, Guangzhou ruled that the Environmental Protection Bureau broke the law by not replying to Chen Liwen’s application for government information disclosure within the deadlines defined in the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information. There have been more cases like this. Some people believe that the Guidelines may bring hope for changing the situation; however, it also has its shortcomings.

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On the one hand, as its name indicates, the Guidelines are only a guiding document, not legally binding or enforceable. If local environmental departments refuse to implement the Guidelines or do not disclose full texts of EIA reports of projects, there is no corresponding penalty measures stipulated in the Guidelines. On the other hand, while requiring environmental protection departments to disclose full texts of EIA reports of projects, the Guidelines stipulate at the same time that information related to national or commercial secrets can be exempted from disclosure. This is what concerns the public. It constitutes the biggest obstacle when the public or environmental organizations applied for disclosure of EIA reports in the past. Therefore, the public believe that national secrets, more often commercial secrets, have been used by companies as excuses for failing to disclose key information in their EIA reports. As everybody knows, without the disclosure of relevant production procedure and technologies, supervisors, especially public supervisors cannot find out the causes for pollution or decide if the pollution violates standards. However, from past experience, production procedure and techniques are often kept from disclosure as commercial secrets. When environmental protection departments receive an application for environmental information disclosure, they often turn down the application under such excuses. Therefore, it takes some time to find out if the Guidelines can prevent such problems fundamentally after their enactment. 4

Disapproval of the Third Draft

On October 21, 2013, the Fifth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress of China reviewed the third draft of the Environmental Protection Law amendment. However, the third draft did not pass. It is rare in Chinese history that an amendment not be passed after three times. The current Environmental Law in China was enacted in 1989 based on the trial law in 1979. The Environmental Law has been implemented for 24 years. It is very controversial whether the first amendment in 24 years should be a major change or a minor one. In the second half of January 2011, the NPC’s Environmental and Resources Protection Committee drafted the amendment of Environmental Protection Law, which contains changes in eight different aspects, including the environmental impact assessment.

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In August 2012, the Standing Committee of the NPC evaluated the amendment draft for the first time. Out of the expectation of some experts in the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee, the first draft was widely questioned. According to some reports, not only scholars, but the public and NGOs were disappointed. According to a certain source, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the NPC’s Law Committee and even the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee had many different views among themselves. When public opinion was solicited for the draft, the Standing Committee received 11,748 suggestions from 9,572 Internet users within a month. Most of the Internet users believed that there was unsettled controversy over the draft, and that it should not be submitted for second review. One of the reasons why the first draft of the Amendment caused disappointment was that though it was the first time that the Environmental Protection Law was amended in 24 years, some of the legislators, including some on the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee, wanted to keep the change on a small scale rather than having an overhaul. Some people believed that this would waste the opportunity to make a difference. Professor Wang Jin of Peking University, Professor Zhou Ke and Professor Li Yanmei from Renmin University, Professor Wang Canfa from China University of Political Science, and other prestigious Chinese scholars like Lv Zhongmei and Cai Shouqiu, have written a joint letter to the NPC Standing Committee’s Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to call for a deferment of the review of the first draft. In addition to the questions brought up by renowned scholars, the Ministry of Environmental Protection publicly criticized the first draft on its website and pointed out four problems that were not addressed. Clearly, the first draft, which constituted of small patch repairs, did not win over the heart of the public. As a result, it was rejected. From June 26 to 29, 2013, the Third Session of the 12th NPC was held. At this meeting, the second draft of the Environmental Protection Law amendment was reviewed. Unlike the first draft, in the second draft, it is clearly stipulated that “the protection of environment is a basic national policy of China,” the fine on violator companies is “daily-based,” improvement is made on the environment monitor system, and an “information sharing mechanism” is required. The second draft also specifies that “government officials may resign as a consequence of inaction” and that “those officials who forge environmental protection data can be removed.”

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However, in the second draft, rights of public interest litigation are given exclusively to All-China Environment Federation. This was strongly criticized by the civil society. The draft was accused of giving a monopoly of public interest litigation to All-China Environment Federation. The Federation was also exposed mercilessly—it gave memberships to violating companies, took donations from polluters, and therefore, it was not qualified as an environmental protection organization. The Federation became the target of public criticism, which was partly a result of the public venting their dissatisfaction over the second draft to it. The second draft of the amendment was not approved at the 3rd meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee, which was held from June 26 to 29, 2013. Some people believe that the outrage over the right to public interest litigation was the main reason that the draft was not approved. The Fifth Session of the 12th NPC was held on October 24, 2013. During the meeting, Zhang Ming, Vice Chairman of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee, made a report about the drafting of the amendment to the Environmental Protection Law. The third draft includes content about such topics as enhancing fiscal input to environmental protection, taking environmental impact into consideration when formulating policies related to the economy and technologies, empowering environmental protection agencies with enforcement measures, establishing enduring ecological compensation systems, giving more protection to soil, promoting the public interest litigation system, and increasing penalty for violation. However, just like the second draft, the third draft was disapproved by the Standing Committee, too. The draft was not passed at the meeting. However, the Standing Committee changed its name from “draft amendment” to “draft revision.” This is believed to be a sign that the legislators of the NPC was planning to change the law in a thorough way. One word’s difference signifies the leap from small changes to critical improvements. However, Cai Shouqiu, Professor of Law School, Huhan University and Chairman of China Environmental and Resources Law Society, believes that despite the change of the name, whether the transformation will be a minor one or a critical one depends on the specific changes made to the law. To him, the third draft is an improvement over the previous ones; however, there is still room to make a difference. There should be more discussions and contemplation, even if it takes some time.2

2  Song Shijing and Jin Yu, “Third Review of Environmental Protection Law Amendment: EIA Required for Government Policies,” Beijing News, October 22, 2013.

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Without a doubt, we need to wait for the Sixth or even the Seventh session of the 12th NPC’s Standing Committee to find out if the draft revision will be approved. The process may be arduous, but the public looks forward to a law that reflects the times and actually works in promoting environmental protection. It took 24 years to make a change, and that change should leave no regrets.

CHAPTER 10

Ecological Red Lines: Concept, Features and Supervision ZOU Changxin Abstract In China, drawing and observing ecological red lines has become a key eco-protection strategy and a major measure of reforming eco-protection management and promoting eco-civilization. It reflects China’s general policy orientation to implement strict eco-protection through compulsory means. After an introduction to the origin and significance of drawing ecological red lines, this paper outlines the concept of an “ecological red line,” its features, and the problems and challenges it faces. Then, some suggestions are made on how to promote the ecological red line strategy.

Keywords ecological red line – ecological safety – supervision mechanism

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Background and Significance of Drawing Ecological Red Lines

In China, the concept “ecological red line” was first put forward by the central government in 2011, when the State Council of China issued the Opinions on Strengthening the Priority Work of Environmental Protection. In this document, the State Council drew ecological red lines for such areas as ecological function zones and environmentally sensitive and/or vulnerable land and sea areas. On May 24, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the significance of observing ecological red lines at a study session with members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee. Obviously, China has displayed a great commitment to drawing ecological red lines and protecting the areas permanently. Anyone who crosses the red lines would be punished. The concept also reflects the general policy orientation of the Chinese government to strengthen eco-protection through compulsory means. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_012

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In recent years, rapid industrialization and urbanization has led to an unprecedented crisis of resources and environment in China. Despite more efforts put into eco-protection, not much improvement has been made in resource conservation and environmental protection. At present, China is confronted with a wide range of ecological challenges: natural resources and environmental capacity cannot sustain the intensive land development plans; the conflicts are becoming more intense between regional development and ecological land protection; the distribution of natural reserves is not well designed, resulting in overlapping areas and inefficient eco-protection; protection cannot be ensured for ecological function zones, ecologically sensitive and/or vulnerable areas, and bio-diversity protection areas; frequent natural disasters threaten environments of human settlement; and urgent improvement needs to be made in ecological services and regulations. Generally speaking, China does not have an overall eco-protection plan and a spatial distribution that can ensure national and regional eco-safety as well as social and economic development. Against this background, China has made the strategic decision to draw ecological red lines so as to formulate the national eco-safety distribution, curb ecological deterioration, achieve a balance between population, resource, and environment, and accelerate the coordination between economy, society, and the ecosystem. 2

International and Domestic Experiences and Practices

2.1 International Experiences in Protected Area Management The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) defines a protected area as “a clearly defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.”1 IUCN classifies protected areas into seven categories according to their management objectives: strict nature reserve, wilderness area, national park, natural monument or features, habitat/species management area, protected landscape/seascape, and protected area with sustainable use of natural resources.2 As human activities intensify, the global community has become more aware of natural protection and has established more protected areas, which expand rapidly from land to sea. The World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA), administered by IUCN’s Global Programme on Protected Areas, has cataloged 1  http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/pas_gpap/. 2  http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/gpap_quality/gpap_pacategories/.

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104,791 protected areas, covering 200 million km2. Most of the areas are on the land, accounting for 12.2% of the earth’s land, while the protected areas on the sea only occupy 0.5% of the earth’s oceans.3 The percentage of protected areas in national territories varies from country to country and different countries have different categories and sizes of protected areas,4 but protected areas play a significant role in all countries in conserving bio-diversity, maintaining ecological regulation, and facilitating cultural services. In terms of protected area management, developed countries usually adopt legislative means to ensure the implementation of environmental protection policies. They have developed an established system of environmental laws with detailed contents and high operability, e.g. the National Park Act of Canada and New Zealand, the Natural Park Law of Japan and South Korea, the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of the UK, the National Parks and Wildlife Act of Australia, and the Law on Specially Protected Natural Territories of Russia.5 Moreover, these developed countries have better designed planning, management systems, and investment mechanisms for protected areas.6 Although the term “ecological red line” is not used in these developed countries, they have clearly defined protected areas and strict legislation systems, which have ensured effective eco-protection. Therefore, it has been an internationally established practice to plan and define protected areas, implement strict management, and develop a national eco-safety distribution plan. 2.2 Development of Ecological Red Lines in China In recent years, China has made considerable progress in building eco-protection areas. Environmental authorities of different levels have established a variety of protected areas, including nature reserves, forest parks, scenic areas, wetland parks, geological parks, and World Natural and Cultural Heritage Sites. In particular, China has built a total of 2,669 nature reserves of different categories and levels, covering an area of 149.79 million ha. The nature reserves on

3  Robert I. Mcdonald, et al., “Urban Effects, Distance, and Protected Areas in an Urbanizing World,” Landscape and Urban Planning 93, no. 1 (2009): 63–75. 4  Christopher R. Pyke, “The Implications of Global Priorities for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Associated with Protected Areas,” Ecology and Society 12, no. 1 (2007): 4. http://www .ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art4/. 5  G. Q. Zhu, “Overseas Legislation and Management Systems for Natural Reserves,” Environmental Protection 4 (2002): 10–13. 6  C. F. Wang, “Overseas Legislation for Protected Areas and Improvement of China’s Legislation,” Environmental Protection 11 (2006): 73–78.

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the land occupy 14.94% of the total land area of China.7 With clear functions, protection objectives, and management measures, these protected areas have played a significant role in conserving bio-diversity, improving ecological functions and promoting cultural and natural heritage protection. Furthermore, to guarantee eco-protection, China has established 50 national ecological function zones, 25 national key ecological function zones, and 35 bio-diversity conservation areas. In the Outline of the Planning for Ecologically Vulnerable Area Protection, eight ecologically vulnerable zones were defined as the key areas to intensify ecological restoration and alleviate natural disasters. As a new concept of eco-protection, “ecological red line” has been widely used by the Chinese government to refer to forbidden boundaries. The term was first used in urban planning to refer to the lines marking the land planned for development. Afterwards, the 11th Five-Year Plan of China for National Economic and Social Development (2006–2010) drew red lines for 120 million ha of arable land to suppress the decreasing of cultivated land. In January 2012, the State Council of China issued the Opinions on Implementing the Most Strict Water Resource Management System, in which it drew “three red lines,” i.e., the lines for water resource development and use control, water use efficiency control, and restricted pollutant assimilation in water function zones. In July 2013, the State Forestry Administration of China launched the ecological redline protection campaign and drew four red lines for forestry land and forests, wetlands, desert vegetation, and species. Its wide use shows that as a cover term, “red line” includes not only simple spatial boundaries but also management requirements in quantity, percentage or threshold value. Based on ecological red lines, local environmental authorities around China have made new explorations in intensifying spatial eco-protection. Early in 2000, Anji County of Zhejiang Province adopted the concept of a “red-line controlled area” in its ecological planning. In 2005, the Outline of the Environmental Protection Planning for the Pearl River Delta drew red lines around the natural reserve heartlands and key water conservation areas for strict protection.8 In the same year, the Management Regulations for Ecological Control Lines of Shenzhen City proposed the concept “fundamental ecological control lines,” i.e., the primary water conservation areas, scenic areas, and

7   “Report on the State of the Environment in China 2012,” http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/ zkgb/2012zkgb/. 8  “The Outline of the Environmental Protection Planning for the Pearl River Delta (2004– 2020),” Guangzhou Provincial Government’s Official Web Portal, http://www.gd.gov.cn/ govpub/zfwj/zfxxgk/gfxwj/yf/200809/t20080916_67116.htm, February 18, 2005.

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natural reserves.9 In recent years, Kunming City, Shenyang City, Wuhan City, and Fuzhou City have also drawn ecological red lines around key urban ecological function zones. In 2013, Jiangsu Province issued the Planning for the Protection of Ecological Red Line Areas, the first ecological red lines drawn by a provincial region around China.10 These regional efforts have laid a solid foundation for planning and drawing national ecological red lines and implementing the subsequent management. Generally speaking, the explorations listed above are mainly based on the ready-made protected areas and have high operability, but more systematic research needs to be conducted on drawing and managing ecological red lines. 3

Concept and Features of “Ecological Red Line”

Academically, researchers usually use the term “ecological red-line area.” The term has been defined in different ways by researchers, e.g., “an area which must be fully protected because of the vulnerable eco-system or the significant ecological function,”11 “an area which requires strict management and protection to ensure regional eco-safety,”12 and “an area which must be strictly protected to maintain regional ecological balance and ensure regional eco-safety.”13 In 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee reiterated the importance of ecological red lines and stipulated “drawing red lines for ecological protection, implementing 9  “The Management Regulations for Ecological Control Lines of Shenzhen City,” Shenzhen Municipal Government’s Official Web Portal, http://fzj.sz.gov.cn/g145.asp, October 17, 2005. 10  “Notice of Jiangsu Provincial Government on Printing and Circulating the Planning for the Protection of Ecological Red Line Areas,” Jiangsu Provincial Government’s Official Web Portal, http://www.jiangsu.gov.cn/jsgov/tj/bgt/201309/t20130923_400467.html, August 30, 2013. 11  N. Fu and X. B. Li, “Preliminary Research on Defining Ecological Red-Line Areas in Land Use Planning,” (presented at the Annual Conference of the China Geography Association, 2007). 12  X. H. Liu, et al., “Research on the Method of Defining Ecological Red-Line Areas in Regional Industrial Planning—Based on Ecological Evaluation of Key Industry Development in Circum-Bohai Sea Region,” (presented at the Annual Conference of the China Society for Environmental Sciences, 2010), Volume 1. 13  Z. L. Zuo, “Research on Land Use Layout Based on Drawing Ecological Red Lines,” (­master’s thesis, Guangxi Normal College, 2010, Nanchang).

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the systems of paid resource use and ecological compensation, and reforming the eco-protection management mechanisms.” This statement has expanded the concept and connotation of ecological red lines. Drawing ecological red lines has become a key task to reform the eco-protection management mechanisms and promote the eco-civilization development. Based on the background and latest developments, we combine the research findings and practical experiences and propose the following definition of “ecological red line”: Spatial boundaries and management threshold values that require strict protection in terms of enhancing ecological functions, improving the environmental quality, and promoting efficient resource use, so as to ensure national ecological safety. As ecological spatial boundaries under strict control and management, ecological red lines are distinguished from other red lines by three attributive features, which must be strictly observed after a red line is drawn. The first feature is unchanged protected nature. The objects of red-line protection are eco-systems which perform important ecological functions or require urgent protection, so they have regional differentiation, functional uniqueness, and object irreplaceability. Once an ecological red line is drawn, its nature and main functions shall not be changed. The second feature is stable ecological functions. Eco-environment sustains humankind and society. As the bottom line of national and regional eco-safety, ecological red-line areas should maintain a complete ecological structure and stable eco-system services so as to increase eco-product producing capacity and improve ecological functions. The third is strict management requirements. Ecological red lines usually have fixed spatial boundaries, but they do not remain unchanged after being drawn. Instead, the boundaries and management requirements can be moderately modified to meet new needs of economic-social development and ecological protection. However, the modification can only increase rather than decrease the red-line areas and only intensify rather curtail the management. 4

Problems and Challenges

At present, drawing ecological red lines is faced with the following problems and challenges. Firstly, regional governments are not fully aware of the importance of ecological red lines and are not sufficiently motivated to implement red-line protection. After red lines are drawn, strict protection and management should be implemented, so regional governments may worry that drawing red lines will affect the established land development and use plans and hence hinder

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local economic development. Therefore, drawing ecological red lines should balance protection and development as well as short-term interests and longterm interests. Secondly, drawing ecological red lines requires complex organization and implementation. Drawing ecological red lines involves vast areas, diverse ecosystems, and multiple governmental departments for environmental protection, land administration, agriculture, forest, water conservancy, and oceanic administration. Departmental legislation and profit division may hinder unified deployment and implementation of the drawing of ecological red lines. Therefore, the current eco-environment management system needs the coordination of a cross-department and authoritative central organization. Thirdly, consolidating ecological red lines requires a considerable amount of field work. Substantial protection for ecological red lines is impossible without clearly defined spatial boundaries or quantitative values. Technologically, changing a “dotted line” into a “solid line” requires meticulous on-site exploration and prospection. In the process of consolidating an ecological red line, inconformity may be found with the planning of established regional development and use, which requires the coordination of relevant authorities and further research and survey so as to ensure definite boundaries and strict management of the ecological red line. Fourthly, improvement needs to be made for management and control standards of ecological red lines as well as supporting policies. Currently, there is no legislative basis for ecological red-line protection, although it has been defined as a national strategy. There is no definite stipulation for ecological red lines in terms of categorization, regionalization, and grading standards as well as management and control requirements. Moreover, economic and social policies should be made so as to bridge the gap between ecological red lines and current management systems. 5 Suggestions Firstly, China should intensify the publicity of ecological red lines through diverse means, such as news media, online platforms, public service advertising, academic research, and theoretical training. More publicity efforts can help both officials and the public understand the importance of ecological red lines and encourage them to participate in the protection and management of ecological red lines. Secondly, China should straighten out the multiple relationships concerning ecological red lines. In the first place, the relationship between different

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departments should be straightened out so that they can jointly define and draw ecological red lines. Then, the relationship between the central government and regional governments should be straightened out. The central government should formulate national technological standards and principles for drawing ecological red lines to strengthen the coordination of regional work; the regional governments should consolidate the boundaries of ecological red lines and fulfill their management responsibility. Thirdly, China should develop supervision mechanisms for ecological red lines. In the first place, current ecological supervision resources should be integrated to develop a supervision technology system and a supervision network to ensure long-term effective supervision for ecological red line protection. Then, current policy loopholes should be detected so that more targeted efforts can be made to formulate supporting management systems and methods for ecological red lines and hence ensure strict protection. Finally, the principle “those who protect benefit” should be followed to develop the economic compensation mechanism for ecological red lines so as to motivate those who protect and manage ecological red lines.

CHAPTER 11

How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population at Changbai Mountain PIAO Zhengji Abstract Using data about changes in forests, human population, animal diversity, land utilization, and the history of hunting in this area, this paper analyzes the causes of the disappearance of Siberian tigers, the possibility of population recovery in the future, and ecological issues caused by the absence of such tigers. Some research results show that the disappearance of the Siberian tiger population within the Changbaishan Nature Reserve (CNR) was mainly caused by economic activity and excessive poaching. These factors lead to a sharp decrease in the habitats of felines such as Siberian tigers and a severe shortage of their food supplies. Today, this area still has forests large enough for Siberian tigers to live in, which makes possible the recovery or re-introduction of such species. To achieve this, it may be necessary to develop larger protected forest zones including some outside the CNR. The effectiveness of such zones requires support and engagement from local governments, state-owned and private enterprises as well as the public. This paper also analyzes major challenges faced by the CNR and provides recommendations on how to manage them.

Keywords changes in the number of Siberian tigers – factors that lead to a species becoming endangered – possibility of recovery – Changbaishan Nature Reserve

Siberian tigers are one of the top 10 endangered species in the world and enjoy first class protection in China. There are fewer than 20 wild Siberian tigers in China. They live in the eastern mountain areas of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces. However, seven of them were found dead and the deaths were mainly attributed to human factors. The future of this species has reached a point where its very survival is at stake. Historically, Siberian tigers in China were widespread throughout their habitat in the Changbai Mountains. But by the 1990’s they had almost disappeared © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_013

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from the Changbaishan Nature Reserve (CNR) and its surrounding areas. The endangerment or extinction of certain species is regarded as a very complex biological process involving both internal biologic and external environmental factors. However, human activities, such as deforestation, road construction, human population increase, and intensive poaching, have directly or indirectly reduced the number of the tigers and the size of their habitat. Is it still possible for the tigers to return in robust numbers to their territory in Changbai Mountains? What can be done to help their re-introduction? The answers to these important questions are not only significant to the rebuilding of the Changbai Mountain ecological balance, but also to the cause of rare animal protection. This paper explores the possible ways of re-introducing Siberian tigers to the Changbai Mountain area, and the ecological and social issues challenging their return. .

1

Changes on the Number of Siberian Tigers in the CNR

From 1960 to the early 1980s, a few Siberian tigers could still be found in the CNR. According to the 1974–1975 CNR Rare Animal Survey, the Siberian tiger was still found in Toudao, Touxi, and Huangsongpu counties. On November 18, 1974, a new snow footprint was found on the river bank of the Korean broadleaved forest by the Toudaobai River, and another new snow footprint was found in the same area on March 18, 1975. On October 12, 1981, an adult Siberian tiger was seen in the same forest, and it was rumored that another tiger had been spotted in Naitou Mountain in 1987. In 1989, one adult tiger and one cub’s footprints were found in the Red Stone forest area. In 1998, people saw a Siberian tiger in the Heng Mountain area. From 1985 to 2012, there were 433 official wild animal surveys conducted in the CNR which covered 80% of the whole area, and no traces of Siberian tigers were found. Based on the surveys taken over the years, there were 28 evidence data points collected of which 12 from the 1960s, five from the 1970s, three from the 1980s–1990s, and three from the 1990s and afterwards (see Table 11.1). 2

Number, Time, and Location of Siberian Tiger Hunted in the Changbai Mountain Area

From May to October 2008 a specific interview survey on tigers and leopards in the Antu, Helong, Changbai, and Fusong counties of the Changbai Mountain area was undertaken. 45 counties and departments, and 110 people

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Table 11.1 Result of the Siberian tigers survey in CNR and its surrounding area Location

Trace or physical

Number

Time

Protected area

Naitou Mountain Toudaobai River Toudaobai River Dayangcha Bai Mountain West Face Toudaobai River Dayangcha Longtou Mountain Naitou Mountain Yaotuan Laoling Mountain Helongfu Cave Heng Mountain Red Stone Forest

Physical Trace Trace Trace Trace Trace Trace Physical Trace Trace Physical Trace

2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2

1960s 1974 1975 1975 1978 1981 1985 1987 1960–1980 1980–1990 1990 1998 Winter

No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No

with hunting or rich field experience were interviewed including 18 hunters, 68 local residents, and 25 CNR staff. Out of the 13 tigers killed, 11 were killed in the 1970s, and two in the 1980s (see Table 11.2). This shows that there were at least 10 Siberian tigers living around the CNR and surrounding areas in the 1960s and 1970s. During the interviews, it was discovered that some tigers were accidentally injured, trapped, or killed to protect hunting dogs. The survey showed that the Siberian tiger population basically disappeared after the 1970s, and there were no signs of recovery no matter what kinds of species protection were later attempted. The information released from the “International Tiger Protection Forum” held at St. Petersburg, Russia in November 2010 showed that there were less than 500 wild Siberian tigers in the world. These tigers lived primarily in the Russian Far East and China’s northeastern forests. Reports claimed that there were less than 20 tigers living in China. Over the last 20 years seven dead tigers had been found. Two of the seven tigers were killed by traps set up by poachers in the CNR and surrounding areas.1 1  Li Linxia, “Siberian Tigers Pain—There were Fewer Than 20 in Whole, 7 dead in Recent 20 Years,” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2013-07/29/c_116728283.htm, July 29, 2013.

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How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population Table 11.2 Location, number, time, and cause of death for Siberian tigers killed by hunting Location

Number Time

Naitou Mountain Big Theatre

1

Naitou Mountain Team III

1

Naitou Mountain Village Ministry Dayangcha Longtou Mountain Old Sanheshui Qingshui River Heilong River and Wusuli River Heilong River and Wusuli River Qianchuan Forest Manjiang Mountian

1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2

Erdao County Shuitian Village

1

Cause of death

1960s Accidentally killed in hunting wild boar 1960s Killed when intruded in livestock area 1960s Killed by rifle 1980s Killed by gun 1960s N/A, could be illness 1970s Hunted 1970s Hunted 1960s Hunted 1970s Hunted 1960s Killed by gun when attacking hunting dog 1960s N/A

Protected area

No No No Yes Yes No No No No No No

Based on this analysis, the main reason for the disappearance of Siberian tigers in the CNR and surrounding area was poaching. 3

Siberian Tigers’ Habitat Situation in the CNR and Surrounding Areas

The origins of the threat to Siberian tigers can be dated back to the Qing Dynasty. The region went through a century-long period of heavy timber harvesting. From the Russo-Japanese War (1905), northeastern China was increasingly colonized by Japan. This lasted until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949). The forest habitat, key to the Siberian tigers’ survival, was structurally changed. Some areas were deforested continuously, some were developed into farmlands. Land utilized by railway and highway construction added to the deforestation. Only the CNR has been kept in its natural state, protected from any industrial and mining enterprises and farmland projects. The whole CNR covers 196,450 ha, and the forest coverage rate is 85.97%. In the CNR, the woodland area is 169,244 hm2, representing 86.2% of the whole area; the open forest is 8,406 hm2, 4.3% of the whole; the bush land is 4,893 hm2,

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2.5% of the whole; secondary grassland and marsh land are 10,956 hm2, 5.6% of the whole, and other lands are 2,966 hm2, 1.5% of the whole. From 1985 to 2007 the virgin forests in Changbai Mountains were reduced by more than 10,000 hectares. This was mainly due to the damages caused by a typhoon in 1986 and wind-falls collection by local people. The Korean broad-leaved pine forests existing on the Korean peninsula, in the Russian Far East, and on Changbai Mountain play a critical role in local ecology and economics. These forests, however, have been under overexploited for the past decade. Pine nuts are also in high demand as a popular product in local markets and have become very important for the local trade revenue. Most or all Korean pine nuts were removed from the forests by 2006. Pine nuts are an important food source for at least 23 local wild animals. Over harvesting of pine nuts has had a terrible impact on Siberian tigers who sit on the top of the food chain. Heavy timber harvesting in the area surrounding the Changbai Mountains started in the 1960s. It left a very obvious boundary between the protected reserve areas and their surroundings. Harvested areas were patches of between five to 20 ha and left the small remaining parts of the original forests highly fragmented. The harvested areas were left as simple over-cut forests, secondary forests, and plantations. Landsat data showed that the Changbai Mountains forest coverage rate was 85% in 2007, but that the well preserved natural forest coverage rate was only 44.9% after over harvesting. The remaining part of the preserve has deteriorated at different rates. Over exploitation of forest resources has greatly threatened many wild animals in the CNR, which is known to hold one of the most diversified animal populations in Eurasia. 4

Changes in Siberian Tigers Food Resources in the CNR

The number of ungulates, the Siberian tigers’ main prey in the CNR, dropped dramatically from 1980 to 2000. Then it increased slightly in the next decade. Among the prey species, mountain sheep and sika deer could no longer be seen (although sika deer may have recently made a comeback of sorts), and the number of red deer and musk deer have decreased sharply, even as the number of wild pigs and roe deer increased (see Figure 11.1). Since the 1960s a large number of developers swarmed into the areas surrounding the CNR. They destroyed forests and developed them into farmland, and many natural villages were formed during that period of time. When the forest industry bureau commenced operations, they organized large amounts

How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population

Figure 11.1

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Changes on the number of ungulates in the CNR.

of forest harvesting, road and woodland constructions, and, therefore, largely changed the original habitat of the indigenous animals. Hunting activities further decreased the food supply for Siberian tigers. The Ministry of Forestry issued a document “Guidance on Actively Developing Hunting Programs” in 1959, and soon after, the Changbai Mountain region established a professional hunting team composed of forest police and district and local county officials. Active hunting lasted until 1976. During this period of time, hunters formed large teams. Through interviewing these hunters it was learned that the annual animal catch could reach 1,000. These were mainly wild pigs, roe deer, red deer, and bears. One of the hunters claimed to have captured over 100 bears in this area from 1970 to 1975. These long years of heavy hunting significantly reduced the prey supply for Siberian tigers. 5

A Feasibility Study on Siberian Tigers Re-Introduction in the CNR

As an important conservation area of both forests and animals, the CNR administration has made great efforts since its establishment in 1960. However, it has not been effective in its work to insure the reproduction and survival of Siberian tigers. This is related to the size, shape, and livability of the preserved area. The research suggests that there was at least a stable population of 13 Siberian tigers in the targeted area before the 1980s. The research also shows one Siberian tiger’s territory area is about 560 km2. In this case, the CNR can only hold 2–3 tigers. Based on initial analysis, the ungulate animals’ density in the Korean broad-leaved forest zone in the CNR would support 0.5–1.5 tigers/km2. That is far lower than the density of 3.7–3.8 tigers/km2 in

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the main Siberian tiger distribution areas. If every female tiger’s daily feed is 5–6 kg, as suggested by Sunquist, a tiger would need 2000 kg food every year, which means consuming 30–50 ungulates. Currently the prey supply in the CNR can satisfy 5–6 Siberian tigers. This means it is quite possible for Siberian tigers to re-populate this area. The remaining key question is how to expand their habitat area. Siberian tigers are extremely endangered in northeastern China. Their survival mostly depends on their population expansion. Even though they have largely disappeared in the CNR, their re-introduction is still possible. First, there are large areas of natural forests that provide a suitable habitat for tigers, leopards, and their prey. Second, the ecosystem of the CNR can support a rapid recovery of the ungulates. Third, human population density is not high in the current and anticipated tiger and leopard distribution area (similar to densities found in the adjacent Russian border region). And lastly, the implementation of the “Natural Forests Conservation Program” will play a positive role in protecting the animals’ habitat and a recovery of the ungulate food resources. 6

The Environmental and Social Pressure of Siberian Tiger Reintroduction

Even though the CNR has some natural conditions that would support the recovery of Siberian tiger populations, the country’s rapid social and economic development still presents a serious environmental dilemma—to develop or to protect. First, the biggest pressure is from the growing population. Most of the Changbai Mountain area was depopulated. There were very few places with people living there. In 1910 there were fewer than 2,000 people in Antu County, located on the north side of Changbai Mountian. At that time the Erdaobai River Town, next to the CNR, was only a small village with a few dozen families. It has now grown to become a town focused on the development of tourism. By the end of 2010, the registered population reached to 65,000 (see Figure 11.2), and 70,000 to 80,000, if seasonal mobile populations are added in. Currently, there are about 300,000 people living around the CNR area. With the growth of tourism and the region’s seasonally attractive climate, the number of people who come to the Changbai Mountains in the summer has increased rapidly. It is estimated that it will reach two million visitors in 2020, and 2.5 million in 2030. During this period of time the number of local permanent residents will reach 600,000, including 100,000 transient people.

How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population

Figure 11.2

187

Population changes in Erdaobai River town next to the CNR.

Population growth is good for economic development, but at the same time, brings pressure on the CNR environment and hurts the possibility of the Siberian tiger’s return. Along with a growing population comes rapid infrastructure construction. Very dense road networks now surround the CNR. The roads in the CNR were once for the purpose of natural resource protection. Now they are used for supply transportation, forest tourism, and other operations. The length of the roads in the CNR grew from 210 km to 400 km in 20 years. Roads now take up 0.3% of the CNR area (1968.4 km2). Of all the tourist and patrol roads, 90% are concrete, and according to the recent road building plan, another two highways and a high-speed rail system will be built in the near future. The CNR is divided into four parts by three highways (Figure 11.3). 70% of the core area is 1,100 meters above sea level, which is not suitable for large animal winter habitation. Therefore, the animals move to lower altitudes with a mix of needle-leaved and broad-leaved forests in winter. This lower zone takes up only about 30% of the CNR area. This area is very close to human residences and busy roads, and hence the animals are impacted deeply by human activities. The conserved habitat has been broken and fragmented by the density of road networks. This increases the accessibility for human beings but hinders animal migration, gene exchange among different species, and increases the death rate of animals from traffic and poaching. Tourism in Changbai Mountain started in the 1980s. The number of visitors has grown from hundreds at the beginning to millions today. The visitors growth rate is 10.77% (see Figure 11.4). In 2010, there were an average of 1,737 visitors per day, and the highest number in one day was over 20,000.

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Figure 11.3

PIAO

Changbai Mountain biotic region map.

露水河：Lushuihe River 两江：Liangjiang 泉阳：Quanyang 松江：Songjiang 三道：Sandao 白河：Baihe 宝马：Baoma 头道：Toudao 头西：Touxi

光明：Guangming 东方红：Dongfanghong 白山：Baishan 双目峰：Shuangmufeng 池西：Chixi 白西：Baixi 松江河：Songjianghe River 维东：Weidong 漫江：Manjiang

天池：Tianchi Lake 横山：Hengshan Mountain 长白：Changbai 十五道沟：Shiwudao Gou 朝鲜：Korea 长白山保护区： Changbaishan Nature Reserve 公路：Road

How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population

Figure 11.4

189

Number of Changbai Mountain tourists 1980–2010.

The growing number of tourists brings great pressure to the CNR. Tourism service facilities, such as hotels, restaurants, baths, shops, and bus shuttle stations take up a lot of forestland and other space. These facilities and highways crisscross along the border of the conservation area (Figure 11.5). Large scale construction is expected to further develop in the area surrounding the CNR in order to build a tourist attraction service zone. This human interference breaks the natural continuity of the wild animals’ habitat. It sacrifices their territory and survival to the human social and economic development. The forests fragments block the natural gene exchange among different species, between the conserved and non-conserved areas. It is estimated that in the next 20 years, 10% of the CNR area will be developed into tourist attractions. The land to be used for tourism, plantation, roads, and construction around the CNR area will increase to 10 times its current size. Economic development will surely increase the demand for forest resources and animal products. This will encourage wild animal poaching. Even with an enhanced management of hunting and the protection of wild animals by the local government, poaching continues. The biggest threat to ungulates like roe deer, wild pigs, and red deer is widespread trapping. Because of the large number of animals spread throughout the forests, trapping is a year round activity. The threat to the animals is continuous. Trapping is not only a threat to ungulates, but it is also a direct threat to large cats like Siberian tigers, leopards, and lynxes. These traps can be regarded as the biggest barrier for Siberian tiger population recovery. Overexploiting forests resources endangers many animal species. Animals that depend on seeds for food are decreasing in number because their food

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Figure 11.5 The CNR and surrounding area population distribution and land usage. 清水河：Qingshui River 宝马屯：Baoma Village 头道村：Toudao Village 宝马：Baoma 二道镇区：Erdaozhen district 兴隆林场：Xinglong Forest Farm 安北屯：Anbei Village

奶头山村：Naitoushan Village 光明林场：Guangming Forest Farm 参地：Candi 木检站：Timber inspection station 前川林场：Qianchuan Forest Farm

胜利林场：Shengli Forest Farm 林蛙养殖户：Frog Farmer 槽子河林场：Caozihe Forest Farm 马鞍山林场：Maanshan Forest Farm 滑雪场：Ski Resort

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How to Restore the Siberian Tiger Population 黄松浦林场： Huangsongpu Forest Farm 白山旅游区：Baishan Tourism Resort 东方红林场：Dongfanghong Forest Farm 维东旅游区：Weidong Tourism Resort 漂流：Drift 机场：Airport 白西度假村：Baixi Resort 锦北林场：Jinbei Forest Farm 老龄林场：Laoling Forest Farm 漫江镇：Manjiang Town 长松村：Changsong Village 黑河林场：Heihe Forest Farm

白山景区：Baishan Scenic Area 双目峰：Shuangmu Peak 西坡天池景区：Xipo Tianchi Lake Scenic Area 南坡天池景区：Nanpo Tianchi Lake Scenic Area 锦江旅游景区：Jinjiang Scenic Area 横山旅游区：Hengshan Scenic Area 横山服务区：Hengshan Service Area 杜香道班：Duxiangdaoban 十五道沟旅游景区： Shiwudaogou Scenic Area 居住人口1–10：Number of inhabitants 1–10

居住人口5000以下： Number of inhabitants < 5,000 居住人口万人以上： Number of inhabitants > 10,000 旅游景区范围：Boundary of scenic area 1000m等高线：1000m contour line 保护区界：Boundary of nature reserve 国界：National border 苔原岳桦林带：Erman’s Birch forest in alpine tundra 针叶林带：Coniferous forest

supply, trees like the Mongolian Oak with its big seeds, has been over logged for a long time. The populations of key protected species like red deer, musk deer, and bear will dramatically decrease in the next 10 years because a great demand for game meat and medicinal products. It is not an easy task to reverse the current trend of the decreasing number of Siberian tigers. The conflict between human beings and tigers is grim. On one hand, economic development takes more and more forestland, which is the tigers’ habitat; and people continue to hunt the animals that tiger feed on. On the other hand, when tigers do not have enough food, they will have to take greater risks in killing livestock and attacking humans. Under this situation, tigers are more likely to be killed. Thus, to insure the recovery of the Siberian tigers’ population in the CNR and surrounding area, people will have to commit to making major lifestyle changes. 7

Ecological Benefits of the Siberian Tigers’ Return to the CNR

Why is it so important to make every effort to recover the Siberian tiger population in the CNR? Why must priority be given to rebuilding the food chain, restoring the ecological balance of the forest’s ecosystem, and preventing any further loss of biodiversity? Located far from the targeted habitat, zoos are not

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very effective in protecting and promoting the proper balance in the ecosystem’s food chain. In situ conservation is most effective for managing biodiversity, especially in the reserved regions reserved for natural protection and conservation. The lives of Siberian tigers are closely related to the robust lives of other animals. The lack of tigers greatly impacts the overall stability of the forests’ ecosystem. Many examples give evidence to the natural dynamic that if the top predator is missing in the community, other species will not be able to reproduce with sustainability. When the food chain structure changes in a community, it can affect the stability of the whole community. From this principle arises the urgency to restore the Siberian tiger population, protect their prey, and broaden their habitat. The restoration of the Siberian tigers’ population will support the eco-tourism development in Changbai Mountains, providing local residents with more working opportunities and other economic benefits. 8

Solutions and Suggestions on the Population Recovery of Siberian Tigers

As a result of deforestation, urban construction, tourism development, forest products manufacturing, and road construction, amongst other considerations, suitable habitat for native animals is decreasing every year. This negatively impacts important species like large animals. Serious solutions require the joint participation of multiple social parties. This will better insure effective protection of natural resources and sustainable development. In this manner the scale and reliability of programs designed to increase the Siberian tiger population in northeastern China can be strengthened. Therefore, the following suggestions are put forward: First, in order for Siberian tigers to return and remain in the CNR, large areas of undisturbed native habitats and abundant number ungulate prey are required. Regional cooperation amongst local governments, forestry, and other partners must be strengthened. By linking their social and economic interests, the protection of wildlife and its natural habitat will be strongly underwritten. Second, in order to ensure the survival of wild tigers, a population of two to five female wild tigers must be introduced during the breeding season. And geographic connectivity for these populations via physical land bridges is required in order to ensure healthy genetic exchange. Increasing construction of green channels linking the Siberian tigers’ distribution areas must be a priority.

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Third, conservation efforts must strengthen the protection and breeding of ungulates, and strictly control poaching activities. The CNR must set up a special anti-poaching action committee that centralizes the leadership of nature reserves, protection stations, forest security, and armed police. Responsibilities ideally would include the timely collection of information (the number and distribution data of the animals), enforcement of hunting laws (hunted animals, hunting areas, permitted times, and hunting weapons), commercial sales of wild animal products, and other information related to protected areas, in order to study and propose countermeasures for anti-poaching action plans. Fourth, work must be done to strengthen the management capability of the CNR by enhancing the long-term monitoring of the ecological and socioeconomic environment both inside and outside the conservation areas, and, on a regular basis, obtaining quantitative data and other information in order to evaluate the effectiveness of work on achieving key management goals. This can only be realized by increasing the number and quality of the CNR’s technical personnel. In this manner staff will be better equipped to make efforts to improve and enhance the effectiveness of protected areas. Fifth, CNR management needs to strengthen the enforcement of existing laws, and, through public awareness campaigns, to enhance public understanding of its work, to improve the personnel, equipment, and funds needed for law enforcement agencies, and to raise public awareness of regulatory compliance in the context of the importance of protecting and enhancing bio­logical diversity.

CHAPTER 12

The Siege of Cities by Chemical Plants: How to Make a Breakthrough? PENG Liguo Abstract The petroleum pipeline blast accident in costal Qingdao city of East China’s Shandong Province on November 22, 2013 unveils an astonishing fact—severe distributionrelated environmental risks in petrochemical projects exist in many cities in China. If no effective risk-prevention measures are taken, the sharp increase of unexpected environmental incidents will be hard to curb. To break the siege of cities by chemical plants, it is highly necessary to strengthen the environmental assessment for industrial planning and the strategic environmental assessment on a larger scope.

Keywords siege of cities by chemical plants – environmental risks – industrial distribution of petrochemical projects – strategic environmental assessment

The oil pipeline blast in the coastal city of Qingdao of East China’s Shandong Province on November 22, 2013 shocked the whole nation. With the explosions fading away, the Huangdao district of Qingdao, where the blast took place, has finally lost the media interest. Yet this tremendous devastating accident, causing 62 deaths, 136 people injured and a total economic loss of nearly 700 million RMB, has brought a sorrowful end to the year of 2013. The loss of 62 lives, in regrettable exchange, resulted in the launch of two programs: an environmental assessment program on the safety and environmental impact of the surrounding areas of Huangdao Petrochemical Base, and the readjustment of the planning of important urban functions of Huangdao Petrochemical Base. The launch of these two programs does not concern Huangdao alone, but it touches upon the sore spot of almost all cities in China, especially those cities surrounded by chemical plants. The hidden effect of the siege of Chinese © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_014

The Siege of Cities by Chemical Plants

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cities by chemical projects showed in 2013. How to solve these interlocked matters has become a challenge to local governments as well as the petrochemical industry. 1

Petrochemical Projects Are Located in Disorder in China

50 days after the Qingdao blast, the Qingdao “November 22” Investigation Group, set up by China’s State Council, issued its investigation report. The report points out the irrational planning of the Qingdao Development Zone, its loose check on the examination and approval of the planning, and the short distance between locations of hazardous chemical businesses, oil lines, residential areas, and schools, all of which are sources of potential dangers. As a matter of fact, long before the incident, local residents of the Qingdao Development Zone complained about the short distance between their residential areas and many chemical projects. For example, the PX project of Qingdao Lidong Chemical Co., Ltd. is only 600 m away from the closest residential area. Yet their complaints were completely unheeded. This, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. The PX plant of Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. in Jinshan district is only 100 m away from the closest residential area. The production areas of Luoyang Petrochemical Engineering Corporation/SINOPEC and the Dongyang village is only separated by a brick wall; about 200 m away are living quarters and family dormitories. The shortest distance between Sinopec Jinling, Sinopect Yangzi, and their respective residential areas are only 200–300 and 500–600 m. The list can go on and on. Such is the layout of petrochemical projects in China. According to the statistics provided by the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2006, among the 7,555 projects that were checked and investigated in that year, 2,489 were located near urban or in densely populated areas, accounting for 32.4% of the total. What’s more, according to the statistics of a research conducted by the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party (CPWDP), in 10 years, petrochemical and chemical industries will be spread out all over the whole of the Bohai-Rim Region, with the exception of Qinhuangdao, a harbor city. Take oil refining and ethylene plants as an example. These plants can be found in over 20 coastal cities, such as Dalian, Yingkou, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Lianyungang, Ningbo in the east to Huizhou, Maoming, Zhanjiang, Beihai in the south, and even in inland cities such as Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, Nanjing, and Lanzhou. Many petrochemical projects are built along rivers.

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It’s no exaggeration to say that petrochemical projects are scattered all over this country in a disorganized manner. As a result, frequent accidents are inevitable. Even well-informed people inside the petrochemical industry itself make no effort to cover up the fact that the layout of petrochemical projects in China is in disarray. Concerning this issue, the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party put forward a motion titled “Optimizing the Petrochemical Industrial Layout to Decrease Environmental Risks” to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2012. The motion states, “The current petrochemical industrial layout in China is not rational, which not only greatly increases bio-environmental risks, but also leads to endless environmental accidents.” This view is shared by many. As early as in 2006, Pan Yue, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) warned, “Severe distributionrelated environmental risks exist in petrochemical and chemical industries in China. If no effective risk-prevention measures are taken, the sharp increase of unexpected environmental accidents will be hard to curb.” 2

Large-Scaled Propaganda to Deal with “Chemical Panic”

Among many cities surrounded by petrochemical projects, the panic for chemical plants became increasingly intense in 2013. Successive mass incidents protests against chemical plants burst out in Kunming and Chengdu in southern China from April to May in 2013. The Kunming incident targeted the refining-chemical integration project in Yunnan Province; while in Chengdu, the Sinopec Pengzhou, in particular its PX projects, was the target of protest. During that period when the two incidents occurred, a large-scaled propaganda was carried out nationwide to deal with the so-called chemical panic, which focused on the PX projects. This is part of the governmental efforts to solve the problem of the siege of cities by chemical industry, but unfortunately it was superficial. In 2003, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) issued an official document to the Zhangzhou government in costal Fujian Province, asking for them to share their successful experience with PX projects, emphasizing on how to deal with the mass work. The Zhangzhou experience was then summarized in a report to the General Office of CCCPC in May 2013. Suggestions included “mass participation in environmental assessments, lectures given by petrochemical experts, governmental cadres visiting every household in every village, traveling to petrochemical bases abroad for on-site visits, and positive media coverage.”

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The Zhangzhou style was then introduced to Kunming and Chengdu. After the Kunming protest, Yunnan TV, the provincial TV station, broadcast a fourpart program introducing the PX projects in Japan. According to the program, the Japanese PX projects fit into the local environment; no safety-related incidents ever occurred in the 20 years since its establishment; its open information system was sound, and so on. In addition, groups of city residents were organized to visit other petrochemical enterprises in other parts of China with the purpose of dispelling their doubts and worries. Sinopec Pengzhou in Chengdu Province even opened its doors to welcome public visitors. Since the beginning of 2013, people of all circles of life in Chengdu were invited, in groups, to visit the production areas of Sinopec Pengzhou. Altogether, over 50 such groups were organized in that year, including deputies to the local People’s Congress and CCPCC, office staff, people’s armed forces departments, local residents, and members of the association of women entrepreneurs. Long before the Kunming and Chengdu incidents, various governmental levels had started propaganda efforts to justify PX projects in an effort to dispel chemical panic. During the NPC and CCPCC sessions in 2013, Cao Xianghong, member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), drafted a motion titled “Dispelling Chemical Panic,” proposing to set up special funds to promote education on the basic knowledge of the chemical industry, especially PX, among the public. During the provincial NPC and CCPCC sessions in Zhejiang Province, many political figures, including Liu Liwei, Director of Public Security Bureau, called for more efforts to eliminate all exaggerations of the negative aspects of PX projects. Moreover, abundant media coverage was made along this line by official media outlets, such as China Central Television (CCTV), the government-run People’s Daily, and Xinhua News Agency. Many experts, like Jn Yong, member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, also professor at Qinghua University, and Co Xianghong, made great efforts to justify PX projects. Meanwhile, industrial associations were very active in the propaganda campaign. On May 16, 2013, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation launched a public campaign named the “Beautiful Chemicals” to “re-shape public image and raise public awareness” of the chemical industry through such means as seminars and speeches at colleges. The author of this paper personally interviewed many experts in the chemical industry, all of whom claim that the justification for PX projects was unprecedented. Some media outlets believe that the current justification is not only to pay for the lesson learned in the past, but also to ease the public mind at present and to pave the way for more PX projects in the future.

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Uncontrollable Accidents

Propaganda cannot solve any basic problems. The core of the issue is that it is common that globally petrochemical projects are located along rivers or in coastal areas. This is because the layout ensures a lower cost of transportation for the large volumes of petrochemical products and freights, in addition to the closeness to consumers’ markets. When incidents occur in China, people tend to think that it is the defects in management that had led to such a situation. In the investigation report of the Qingdao oil pipeline blast published in January 2014, the quality of Sinopec Qingdao’s sense of responsibility is summarized as a “loose check on production safety, especially in nationwide checks; carelessness in eliminating and treating hidden sources of danger; and failure to spot the lurking danger and take protective measures in the pipelines where the accident occurred.” In fact, nationwide checks are one of the normal preventive measures for petrochemical accidents. In recent years, nearly every severe petrochemical accident led to a new round of nationwide checks. The lessons of history are close at hand—the Qingdao blast, the fires at PetroChina Dalian on June 2, 2013, the propylene pipeline explosion in Nanjing on July 28, 2010, the Zijin mining pollution in 2010, and the incident in which barrels of Jinlin Petrochemical raw materials were flown into the Songhua River—all were followed by a new round of nationwide safety checks. Yet in terms of the management of the petrochemical industry in 2013, the effect for such checks was quite limited. After reviewing the accidents investigation reports issued by the Office of Work Safety Commission of the State Council, the author finds that managerial shortcomings are always the same, such as “unsound production and management systems, contracting in violation of the rules, safety loops in loading and unloading crude oil, insufficient coordination, ill-management, poor communication, and flaws in safety management during construction.” After the Qingdao accident, the Work Safety Administration of Zhejiang Province examined the Sinopec pipelines within the province. It found that the Nanjing fuel delivery station, under the administration of the pipeline management unit, does not even own a legal status and that some stations have not yet applied for, nor obtained the operating licenses for hazardous chemicals, nor have they ever reported the hazardous chemicals which constitute a major source of danger for archival purposes. In 2013 another petrochemical project gaining national attention was Dragon Aromatics (PX) in Zhangzhou in eastern Fujian Province. In recent years, PX has become a very sensitive term to the Chinese. This Dragon PX

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project, which caused the “Walk” in Xiamen,1 should have be more cautious in supervision, safety, and environmental protection, but it turned out not to be so. At the beginning of 2013, it was reported that its environmental assessment procedure violated relevant rules and regulations, and on July 30, there was a flash burning accident. There should be little wonder that people were worried about PX projects. According to a Zhangzhou official whom the author interviewed, when the flash burning took place, it was fortunate to have a group of petrochemical experts on site. Due to their prompt handling of the incident, a major disaster was avoided. The Work Safety Administration under the State Council sent several investigation groups to petrochemical enterprises in various parts of China in 2013. Their investigations revealed shocking problems. They found that in Jiangsu, Fujian, and Liaoning provinces, lessons learned from devastating petrochemical accidents had not been fully taken in by the local managerial staff. Leaking, unauthorized sub-contracting, and construction in violation of relevant rules are among some the most common problems. One investigator said, “The more I saw, the more worried I became.” 4

A Breakthrough to Be Made in Urban Planning

In 2003, more and more managers and experts accepted a new opinion; to solve the siege of cities by chemical plants, a breakthrough should be made in urban planning. The 2012 motion drafted by the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party proposed for overall planning of petrochemical projects in China and the adoption of a comprehensive strategic environmental assessment. In terms of the general layout of the petrochemical industry, it suggests that based on the full consideration of the local resources and environmental capacities, major urban functions and low-cost river or marine transportation, only two to three large petrochemical bases should be planned and built along the coast while the planning and construction of any new bases should be prohibited in the same coastal areas. At the end of 2013, the author wrote a letter to the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party to ask for a follow up of its motion in 2012. It replied that some ministries and commissions, such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the National Energy Administration, basically 1  Translator’s note: The “Walk” in Xiamen refers to the peaceful protest of the people of Xiamen against the PX project in Xiamen in June 2008.

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agreed to the motion, and began to take measures to change the and disorgan­ ized layout of petrochemical projects. It is clearly stated in the 12th Five-Year Plan of Petrochemical and Chemical Industry, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, that the industrial arrangement of petrochemical projects should be built within bases, all integrated, landscaped, and intensified. The emphasis should be put on existing enterprises, with a strict check on building new ones. The launch of two Huangdao programs in Qingdao is also an attempt to make a breakthrough in overall planning. This is a case of strategic environmental assessment of the whole Huangdao district, a case similar to what followed the Xiamen PX incident in 2008. Better late than never. To strengthen the strategic environmental assessment on a larger scope can at least avoid more cities being surrounded by chemical plants. Since 2009, the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) has launched strategic environmental assessment in five areas, including the Bohai-rim area, and published the assessment reports. According to some environmentalists, the MEP has issued some guidelines on the basis of these reports, and one of the guidelines is to make overall planning of petrochemical projects. Yet this is not enough. For those cities already surrounded by chemical projects, the difficult question is whether to move out the residents or the petrochemical plants. The cost for moving out a petrochemical plant is terribly high. For example, after the local residents protested against the PX project of Sinopec Fujia at Dalian, in northern Liaoning Province, the Dalian government required Sinopec Fujia to stop production immediately and move out. The latter promised to carry out the decision. However, more than two years have passed, Sinopec Fujia is still there. On the other hand, it does not take less to move out the residents either. Take the Maoming case in southern Guangdong Province as an example. In March 2013, because of the Maoming government’s inefficiency in moving out the residents in the sanitary prevention and protection areas of Sinopec Maoming, the Environmental Protection Bureau of Guangdong Province submitted to the Ministry of Environment Protection for direct supervision. As early as 2006, Pan Yue, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) pointed out that “remedial efforts are not enough to curb the increase of unexpected environmental incidents.” The problems of the petrochemical industry have accumulated over a long time, and therefore they can only be solved gradually by strengthened safety prevention measures and industrial restructuring.

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The petrochemical industry itself is also looking for an answer. At the end of 2012, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation organized a seminar themed “Coordinated Development between Petrochemical Enterprises and Local Communities.” One of the agreements is calling for an overall interconnection between large-scale petrochemical bases and urban development planning. It is suggested that while new urban planning should avoid existing large-scale petrochemical bases, comprehensive and thorough environmental impact assessment for new or enlarged petrochemical projects should be conducted, and the local governments should work out necessary rules to regulate and restrict urban planning adjustments.

CHAPTER 13

The 2012 Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) Fourth Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 113 Chinese Cities: Bottlenecks & Breakthroughs Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL)* Since 2009, the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) have jointly assessed the level of pollution source information disclosure of 113 Chinese cities. IPE and NRDC have developed and implemented an evaluation system called the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI). The fourth annual report, which analyzed data from the assessment year of 2012, found that the average PITI score for these 113 cities continued to rise for the third year in a row, reaching 42.73, out of 100 points total. In the years that this report has been produced, environmental information disclosure has continued to expand, but there has been a simultaneous downward trend in the annual rate of progress. The 2012 annual assessment saw the largest number of cities with decreasing PITI scores out of the past three years. Eastern China has led previous PITI scores; however, the performance of Eastern China in 2012 was not worth highlighting. Overall, most cities made no substantial progress in the disclosure of key information such as routine supervision records, enterprise emission data, and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) documentation. We believe that in the face of such serious air, water, and soil pollution, the current situation, whereby disclosed environmental information is scattered, lagging, incomplete, and not user friendly, must be changed immediately. The breakthrough of enhancing pollution information transparency is feasible due to the rapid increase in Internet access across China, the adherence to good * Written by MA Jun, WANG Jingjing, ZHANG Yi, SHEN Sunan, QI Yu, HE Jing, LI Jie, WANG Yan, WU Qi, ZHANG Xiya, MEI Lan, Tim Quijano, John Kuo and YANG Sujuan. Wang Jingjing (IPE) revised the report according to Green Books format.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_015

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open information practices in provinces, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and cities, such as Ningbo and Wuhan, and the opportunity to learn from the experience of key industrialized countries. We hereby recommend that China implement comprehensive disclosure of pollution information as soon as possible by adhering to the following steps:

• •

releasing of online monitoring data from enterprises who are the main source of pollution; systematically, timely, and comprehensively releasing routine supervision information for polluting enterprises, and regularly publicizing emission data for each pollutant discharged by an enterprise. We believe that the comprehensive disclosure of pollution source information can put the power of environmental protection enforcement into the hands of the public, pierce the veil of local protection for polluting enterprises, and curb rent-seeking and fraudulent data reporting. Disclosure of pollution information can also provide evidence for environmental lawsuits. Most importantly, comprehensive disclosure puts polluting enterprises under public scrutiny and allows for public participation in decision-making and environmental management, which can then encourage energy conservation and emissions reduction. 1 2012 PITI Assessment Results Since 2009, IPE and NRDC have been jointly making consecutive assessments of the level of efforts by 113 Chinese cities to disclose supervisory information on pollution sources to the general public, which is known as PITI.1 In 2012, IPE and NRDC made the fourth PITI assessment. 1.1 Assessment Results for 113 Cities The 2012 PITI results for 113 cities can be found in the following table.

1  Please visit http://www.ipe.org.cn/about/report.aspx for assessment reports for the last three years and http://www.ipe.org.cn/UserFiles/File/PITI.pdf for assessment criteria.

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Table 13.1 2012 PITI final results and rankings for 113 cities Rank

City

Total 2012 PITI score

Change

Rank

City

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Ningbo Dongguan Qingdao Shenzhen Yangzhou Beijing Guangzhou Hangzhou Chongqing Wenzhou Yichang Fuzhou Jiaxing Shanghai Nanjing Quanzhou Nantong Suzhou Zhongshan Changzhou Taizhou Wuxi Tianjin Luoyang Hefei Liuzhou Shaoguan Xining Foshan Jiaozuo Wuhan Shenyang Mudanjiang Jingzhou Yantai Mianyang Shijiazhuang Kunming

85.3 74.9 74.4 73.1 73 72.9 71.4 70.8 70.7 70.4 67.9 67.4 66.9 65.6 65.5 65.4 63.8 63.8 63.8 60.3 58.1 57.7 57.5 57.1 57.1 55.7 54.6 53.6 53.5 52.6 52.5 52 51.9 51.4 51.3 50.8 50.4 49.6

Unchanged Unchanged Up Down Up Unchanged Up Up Up Unchanged Up Unchanged Up Down Unchanged Up Unchanged Up Down Down Down Ping Up Unchanged Unchanged Up Up Up Down Up Down Up Unchanged Up Up Up Down Up

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

Huzhou Zhengzhoou Taiyuan Chengdu Shaoxing Nanning Benxi Zhanjiang Xuzhou Ma’anshan Lianyungang Weihai Yancheng Xiangtan Fushun Handan Zibo Baoji Dalian Yinchuan Rizhao Changzhi Jinan Tangshan Nanchang Urumchi Guilin Shantou Yueyang Xi’an Guiyang Wuhu Beihai Kaifeng Pingdingshan Luzhou Changde Shizuishan

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Total 2012 PITI score

Change

Rank

City

Total 2012 PITI score

Change

49.1 49.1 48.7 47.8 47.8 47.7 46.2 45.6 45.2 44.9 42.9 42.7 42 41.8 41.5 40.8 40.2 40 39.7 39.4 39.1 39.1 38.7 38.3 38.2 37.6 36.6 36.5 36.4 35.8 35 34.6 34.2 33.8 33.4 33.1 32.5 32.4

Up Up Unchanged Up Unchanged Down Up Up Up Down Up Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Up Up Up Up Down Unchanged Up Down Up Up Up Unchanged Down Down Up Up Down Up Down Up Up Unchanged Down Down

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

Changsha Zhuzhou Baoding Qujing Jiujiang Daqing Panzhihua Zhuhai Chifeng Qiqihar Jinchang Qinhuangdao Harbin Yan’an Baotou Anyang Zunyi Xiamen Linfen Hohhot Lanzhou Tai’an Anshan Tongchuan Jining Weifang Yibin Erdos Jinzhou Yangquan Zhangjiajie Jilin Changchun Karamay Xianyang Datong Zaozhuang

32 31.9 31.2 30.9 30.7 30.7 30.6 30.2 30 29.4 28.6 28.4 28.2 27.7 27.4 27.2 27.2 27 26.8 26.3 26 25.6 25.2 24.5 24.2 24 23.6 22.6 22 21.8 21.6 20.2 20 19 19 12.2 12

Up Up Down Up Up Down Up Down Up Up Up Up Down Up Unchanged Unchanged Up Unchanged Up Up Down Up Down Down Unchanged Down Up Unchanged Up Down Up Unchanged Down Unchanged Down Down Down

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In those 113 cities, the top 10 were Ningbo, Dongguan, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Yangzhou, Beijing, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Chongqing and Wenzhou with an average score of 73.69, 30.96 points higher than the average of the 113 cities as a whole. Table 13.2 Scores of the top 10 cities in 2012 PITI Rank

City

Total PITI Score-2012

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ningbo Dongguan Qingdao Shenzhen Yangzhou Beijing Guangzhou Hangzhou Chongqing Wenzhou

85.3 74.9 74.4 73.1 73 72.9 71.4 70.8 70.7 70.4

In those 113 cities, the bottom 10 were Zaozhuang, Datong, Xianyang, Karamay, Changchun, Jilin, Zhangjiajie, Yangquan, Jinzhou, and Erdos with an average score of 19.6, 23.13 points lower than the average of the 113 cities as a whole. Table 13.3 Scores of the last 10 cities in 2012 PITI Rank

City

Total PITI Score-2012

104 105 106 107 108 109

Erdos Jinzhou Yangquan Zhangjiajie Jilin Changchun

22.6 22 21.8 21.6 20.2 20

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City

Total PITI Score-2012

110 111 112 113

Karamay Xianyang Datong Zaozhuang

19 19 12.2 12

2

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Analysis: Pollution Information Transparency Progress in Slowdown

2.1 Overall Growth but Progress is Slowing Down Four years of consecutive PITI assessment showed that the average scores of 113 cities increased to 42.73 from 31.06.

Figure 13.1 PITI annual average score comparison.

In the assessment, the scores from the most recent three years showed annual average growths of 16.35%, 11.07%, and 6.45% respectively in 113 cities, a slight decrease in the trend. The reason for the slowdown in growth was that some cities showed a decline instead of growth in their PITI scores. According to the annual assessment, 2012 saw the most number of regressing cities out of the past three years, reaching a share of 35%.

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The Low-Level Convergence Trend among Eastern, Central, and Western Regions As demonstrated in Figure 13.2, the western region had stronger growth than that of the central region, and the growth of the central region surpassed the eastern region. 2.2

Figure 13.2 Four-year average score comparison among the eastern, central, and western regions.

When comparing the 2012 annual assessment results, we found a convergence. Unfortunately, the convergence is not toward a higher transparency level, but toward a lower level. In the past three years’ assessments, the eastern region witnessed a number of the best practices. However, in the 2012 annual assessment, this was not the case. 2.3 Limited Progress in Three Types of Key Open Information Most cities saw no substantive progress in key open information indicators such as routine supervision, enterprise emission and EIA documentations, indicating that pollution information transparency has reached a bottleneck. 2.3.1 Daily Supervision Information Disclosure Showed Little Growth Daily supervision information disclosure is the most important reflection of whether the enterprise was in compliance with environmental regulations as it covers violations of emission standards, violations of total emission control targets, along with records of enterprise violations. All previous assessments of the 113 cities starting from 2008 saw low average scores in the daily supervision information category. The 2012 average was merely 10.20 points. The average growth rate was no more than two points.

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Figure 13.3 Annual comparison of daily supervision information average scores.

According to the 2012 PITI assessment, 55 cities barely reached the lowest score level in daily supervisory information. 2.3.2 Limited Disclosure of Emission Data In industrialized countries, it is common practice to make emissions data public. Enterprises in America, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Korea are required to disclose to the public the categories and amounts of hazardous substance discharged to the environment on a regular basis. In China, despite of limited requirements that demand enterprises to disclose emissions by the 2003 Cleaner Production Promotion Law and the 2008 Measures on Open Environmental Information (trial), implementation has been weak. This PITI assessment found that only Hubei Province, and cities and counties like Changzhou, Liuzhou, Yichang, Beihai, Wuhan, and Daqing published emission data; however, the data categories were very limited. 2.3.3 EIA Information in Want of Material Disclosure Though China has been learning about and performing environmental impact assessment system for over three decades, the country, in general, still lags behind western countries holding similar systems in terms of preventing the approval and construction of projects producing severe pollution and ecological damage. Like developed countries, China employs environmental impact assessments, but uses a significantly different process. The core differences are limited information disclosure and public participation. In this year’s assessment, none of the cities made the whole environmental impact assessment report public, nor were there any environmental impact assessment hearings that invited public access of information.

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Recommendations: Implementation of Comprehensive Pollution Information Transparency

Pollution information transparency must be significantly expanded to respond to the strong public demand for pollution control. The rapid expansion of Internet usage by Chinese citizens has proven vital to pollution information transparency. Further, Chinese officials have adopted successful pollution information transparency practices from developed economies. Therefore, we urge the implementation of a comprehensive pollution information transparency system as soon as possible. Background: Severe Pollution Incidents have Resulted in Widespread Unrest In 2012, haze and smog affected wide areas of China for a long period of time, bringing pollution-based public health afflictions to millions of residents’ lives. Moreover, less visible types of pollution, such as water, garbage, soil, groundwater, and offshore pollution present long-term challenges. Backed by widespread popular demand, China has made historically-significant progress with respect to air quality information disclosure beginning in 2011. Starting in 2013, 80 Chinese cities have begun to release real-time air quality data, opening access to current pollution figures so that the public may better protect itself. In contrast with the progress found in the disclosure of air quality information, access to data on pollution sources is very limited. To contain air, water, and soil pollution, a large-scale reduction in emissions must be realized. Concordantly, to reduce emissions, policymakers must identify key sources of emissions and put the pollution sources in public monitoring by opening information, as demonstrated in the best practices of advanced economies, such as the United States and the European Union member states. 3.1

From Disclosing PM 2.5 Data to Pollution Source Information Disclosure 3.2.1 Lessons from Disclosing PM 2.5 Data Is it even possible to achieve comprehensive pollution information disclosure in present-day China? What is the most effective pollution information disclosure method? Reviewing the experience of disclosed PM 2.5 data, we have gleaned numerous lessons. 3.2

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Specifically, breakthroughs have been made in disclosing PM 2.5 data in the following four regards:

• • • •

Systematic publication: publication of PM 2.5 data has covered all monitoring spots and covered monitoring data throughout the year Timeliness: publication of PM 2.5 data has been conducted on an hourly basis Comprehensiveness: in addition to indexes, detailed concentration values were also included User-Friendliness: monitoring spots were released together on an online map with different colors indicating a specific level of pollution We believe that emissions reduction must take place with the implementation of a timely, comprehensive and user-friendly disclosure of yearlong monitoring, supervision, and emissions data from key polluting enterprises releasing pollutants into the environment. 3.2.2

Comprehensive Disclosure of Pollution Source Information could Start from the Following Three Initiatives We propose hereto of this report three key efforts for the purpose of comprehensive pollution source information disclosure, considering the needs of public monitoring to motivate emission reduction:

• •

Release real-time online monitoring data from key state, provincial, and city-level enterprises, along with historical data Release administrative penalty information, verified citizen petitions, and complaints information on polluting enterprises systematically, timely, and comprehensively Release emission data periodically, covering at least pollutants identified in the EIA report

•

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Breakdown of Recommendations for Comprehensive Pollution Source Information Disclosure

Table 13.4 Breakdown of recommendations for comprehensive pollution source information disclosure Category

Systematically

Timely

Daily supervisory records

Release online monitoring data covering all key state, provincial and city-level pollution sources

Hourly online data disclosure

Release records of violations such as violations of emissions standards, and other administrative penalty information

Manual monitoring data should be released the following day

Release verified citizen petitions and complaints

Immediately publicize pollution accidents

Release annual enterprise environmental performance results Release information of all unexpected environmental accidents Release information on enforcement campaigns against polluting enterprises such as demanding correction within a given time period, enforcement supervision by higher agencies, etc. Information should be disclosed throughout the year

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Comprehensively

User-Friendly

Release concentration and relevant emission standards

Pollution sources should be marked on a digital map to disclose monitored information and emission data integrated with the map

Publish the total discharge volume of wastewater and air emissions, and access to historical data Release decisions on administrative penalties Release total emissions violation details, including the standard violated, actual amount of emissions released, and a comparison of those figures, such as “the enterprise emitted double the standard” Release information on excess emissions, excess total amounts, including excess figures for sewer-connected enterprises Enterprises generating hazardous waste should publish violation information on contracted dealers Release of verified citizen petitions and complaints should cover the complaints, verification information, and any action taken to address the complaint Release all information relevant to environmental accidents Reports of government supervision activities should include: the enterprise name, action taken, future requirements, and completion time

Highlight violations and annual assessments using colors Utilize new technologies such as APPs to promote ease of public access to this information Provide convenient and effective channels for citizens to request information

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Table 13.4 Breakdown of recommendations for comprehensive pollution source (cont.) Category

Systematically

Timely

Emissions data

All key enterprises should disclose emissions data All key enterprises should provide data on total annual emissions volume

Disclose information on the Internet in a timely manner

Release Clean Production Assessment results

Environmental impact assessment information

Information disclosure should cover all projects subject to the EIA report

Information disclosure should start from the commencement of the project preparation Seek public comments for the EIA reports, in timely and for an adequate period

Assessing the Necessity and Feasibility of Comprehensive Pollution Source Information Transparency We propose that it is necessary and feasible for China to disclose comprehensive, timely, and user-friendly pollution information transparency. 3.3

3.3.1

Necessity of Comprehensive Pollution Source Information Transparency Environmental protection in China is subject to challenges such as lack of environmental law enforcement, a weak environmental litigation system, and limited public supervision. In implementing environmental rule of law, the Chinese judicial system must be strengthened to handle environmental

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Comprehensively

User-Friendly

Open emission data should include applicable conventional pollutants and particular pollutants

Provide public access to inquiry through a specialized column and other means

Clarify calculation methods and data sources

Provide quantitative rankings of pollution source data and emission volume trends by region and industry

State whether a report went through a third-party audit

Provide directions regarding possible health risks caused by polluting enterprises Provide convenient and effective channels for citizens to request information

Release the full text of the EIA report and the EIA approval

Special column should be created and provide access to inquiry

Release public comments and response to public comments

Provide convenient and effective application channels for citizens to request information

Release full text of construction project approval upon completion

Convene open hearings to spread EIA information to the public

litigation; and environmental governance mechanisms must engage in public supervision. Though deep-seated, institutional challenges to improving China’s environment remain; demand to mitigate widespread environmental degradation is pressing. We propose that greater access to environmental information is a critical and surmountable challenge that will lead to many environmental success stories. Comprehensive disclosure of pollution source information can help bring the power of environmental enforcement to the public to: minimize local protection for polluting enterprises and curbing instances of rent-seeking and data fraud; provide a sounder data base to support environmental lawsuits;

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and most crucial of all, to improve public participation in environmental decision-making and management, placing polluting enterprises under public supervision. 3.3.2

Regulatory Basis of Comprehensive Pollution Source Information Transparency

•

The Cleaner Production Promotion Law, implemented in 2003 and revised in 2012 by the National People’s Congress (NPC), stipulated emission disclosure requirements upon some enterprises The State Council’s Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information (in effect as of May 1, 2008) and the former State Environmental Protection Administration’s Measures on Open Environmental Information (trial) (entered into effect as of May 1, 2008) state specific rules on information that government agencies and enterprises must release to the public; Measures on the Registration of the Environmental Management of Hazardous Chemicals (trial), published in October 2012 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (in effect as of March 1, 2013), stipulated open information obligations of enterprises producing or using key hazardous chemicals; Article 14 of the 12th Five-Year Plan’s Monitoring Measures for Total Emission Reduction of Major Pollutants, jointly issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Supervision of the People’s Republic of China, stipulated requirements of disclosure of emission data by pollution sources, in particular, real-time disclosure of online monitoring data.

•

• •

3.3.3

Feasibility of Comprehensive Pollution Source Information Transparency It is feasible to implement comprehensive pollution source information transparency under current technology for three reasons:

• •

The widespread growth in access to IT tools and the internet can be utilized to publish environmental information; The five years since the adoption of the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information and the Measures on Open Environmental Information there provided a foundation for open environmental information in China with some provinces producing good practices;

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•

Lessons could be drawn from a wealth of diverse international experiences as robust pollution information transparency systems have been established in many industrialized countries such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union member states. 3.3.3.1

3.3.3.1.1

Rapid Development of Internet and Widespread Online Monitoring Expansion of Internet Access

According to the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) and the 29th Statistics Report of China Internet Network Development,2 by the end of December 2011, there were over 500 million Internet users in China, including 356 million mobile users. Moreover, nearly half of Chinese Internet users, 48.7%, use China’s microblogging services such as Sina’s Weibo.

Figure 13.4 Chinese internet users. Source: 29th statistics report of China internet network development.3

The rapid development of the Chinese Internet infrastructure and the growth in the number of users and social media tools such as microblogs have made access to open information and broader public participation activities through the internet unprecedentedly convenient.

2  http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/201201/P020120709345264469680.pdf. 3  Ibid.

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3.3.3.1.2

Progress in Online Monitoring

Recent years have brought significant progress in the development of online monitoring in many provinces in China. In accordance with relevant regulations in the Notice on Strengthening Acceptance, Networking and Operation Management for Automatic Monitoring Capacity-Building Projects of StateControlled Key Polluters, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has established a dynamic scheduling platform for processing the automatic monitoring of state-controlled key polluters. According to statistics from the MEP scheduling platform, as of March 2013, about 13,326 enterprises have been linked up to the monitoring network, among which 6,358 enterprises have posted real time data and 8,678 enterprises have posted historical data to the platform (see Figure 13.5). This platform offers a basis for the nationwide real-time release of monitoring data from enterprises with automatic monitoring. We encourage real time release of the monitoring data collected through this platform. Environmental protection organizations, volunteers and internet users have been involved in the “take a picture, locate a polluter” initiative. Presently, nearly 4,000 key state-controlled enterprises have been plotted onto the online map (see Figure 13.6). We anticipate that the monitoring data can be released jointly on the pollution source distribution map to make a convenient comprehensive platform that will enable public supervision of key polluting enterprises. 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.2.1

a)

Best Practices by Local Environmental Agencies in Various Areas of China Publishing Real-Time Online Monitoring Data

Publishing real-time online monitoring data betters environmental law enforcement. Responding to the calls of real-time publication of online pollution data by several national ministries recently, the following provinces and cities have started this practice. i. Jiangsu Province: The Jiangsu Provincial Environmental Protection Department’s “1831 Jiangsu Key Pollution Source Automatic Monitoring System” went online on March 1, 2013 with 840 key statecontrolled polluting enterprises in Jiangsu Province participating. Based on the online monitoring data, the excess emission record of some pollution sources is made public daily and publishes the periods of excess emissions (see Appendix 7).4

4  http://www.jshb.gov.cn:8080/pub/wryyxtb/sthjjk/.

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Figure 13.5 Platform for automatic monitoring of key pollution sources. source: MEP pollution source supervision center website; link: http://www.envsc.cn/schedulingplatform/ReportFile/ AllProgressSummaryQuery.aspx. 省份：Province 全国：National Total 北京市：Beijing 天津市：Tianjin 河北省：Hebei Province 山西省：Shanxi Province

内蒙自治区：Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 辽宁省：Liaoning Province 吉林省：Jilin Province 黑龙江省：Heilongjiang Province 上海市：Shanghai

220 江苏省：Jiangsu Province 浙江省：Zhejiang Province 安徽省：Anhui Province 福建省：Fujian Province 江西省：Jiangxi Province 山东省：Shandong Province 河南省：Henan Province 湖北省：Hubei Province 湖南省：Hunan Province 广东省：Guangdong Province 广西壮族自治区：Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 海南省：Hainan Province 重庆市：Chongqing 四川省：Sichuan Province 贵州省：Guizhou Province 云南省：Yunnan Province 陕西省：Shannxi Province 甘肃省：Gansu Province 青海省：Qinghai Province 宁夏回族自治区：Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 新疆维吾尔族自治区：Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 新疆生产建设兵团：Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp 重点污染源自动监控工作进度汇总： Status Report on Automatic Monitoring of Key Pollution Sources 重点污染源自动监控工作进度录入： Data Input for Automatic Monitoring of Key Pollution Sources 重点污染源自动监控工作明细查询： Advanced Search in Automatic Monitoring of Key Pollution Sources 星期三：Wednesday 历史查询：History 导出：Export 汇总时间：Time of Compilation 指标说明：Explanations for Indicators 地方自行填报：To be completed by local agencies

IPE, NRDC, and CUPL 应监控企业数：Number of enterprises eligible for monitoring 已监控企业数：Number of enterprises monitored 完成率：Rate of effective monitoring 已监控排口数：Number of monitored points of pollutant discharge 已验收排口数：Number of monitored points of pollutant discharge that meet pollutant treatment standards 验收率：Passing rate 已审核排口数：Number of points of pollutant discharge that have been verified 审核率：Verification rate 监控中心服务器自动统计：Automatic calculation by monitoring center server 监控企业已联网数：Number of monitored enterprises that have registered in the monitoring center system 监控企业联网率：Rate of registration 实时数据正常企业数：Number of enterprises whose real-time data fall within normal range 历史数据交换企业数：Number of enterprises that upload required partial data from previous week to the Environmental Ministry’s monitoring center 历史数据交换75% 企业数：Number of enterprises that upload at least 75% of required partial data from previous week to the Environmental Ministry’s monitoring center 监控中心应联网数：Required number of online monitoring center(s) 监控中心已联网数：Number of monitoring center(s) online 监控中心联网率：Online rate for monitoring centers

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Figure 13.6 Key pollution source map for 2011. Source: China Water Pollution Map; link: http://www.ipe.org.cn/ pollution/sources.aspx. 甘肃：Gansu 宁夏回族自治区：Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 贵州：Guizhou 湖南：Hunan

ii.

江西：Jiangxi 陕西：Shannxi 山西：Shanxi 浙江：Zhejiang 四川：Sichuan

Ningbo City: The Ningbo Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) began publishing reports of online monitoring data of key pollution sources at the state, provincial, and city levels on an hourly basis starting in 2013. These reports include data for: pH, COD concentration, and discharge volume for water pollution sources; and SO2 soot, NO x and smoke concentration, and total volume of air emissions. iii. Wuhan City: The Wuhan EPB has produced two versions of a daily report on pollution sources. In the older version report, the Wuhan

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EPB has released daily data dating back to 2008. According to the standard value and the graph of changes in the daily means, it is easy to see if the emissions are in excess of the required ceiling. In the new report, the Wuhan EPB releases information on a map, allowing the viewer to select many options such as “under direct control of Wuhan,” urban districts, and development zones, many of which are available with video feeds (see Appendix 8). iv. Zhejiang Province: In January 2012, the Zhejiang Province EPB added onto its website the “Daily Pollution Source Online Monitoring Report” to release the daily average value of air and water pollution from key state-controlled enterprises from the previous day. Users can request data according to pollutant category (e.g. wastewater or gas) and location online. b) The above examples—Jiangsu’s online publication of excess emissions, Ningbo’s hourly report on emissions volume, Wuhan’s release of historical data and mapping of pollution data, and Zhejiang’s data request function—demonstrate the benefits of the institutionalization of the principles of the systematic, timely, comprehensive, and user-friendly release of pollution data online. 3.3.3.2.2

Publishing Emissions Violation Data, Citizen Petition, and Complaints Information

a) Violation records and other environmental administrative penalty records are crucial environmental supervisory information. Citizen petitions and complaints can round out routine monitoring. i. Ningbo City: Ningbo EPB publishes a quarterly list of the names of enterprises subjected to administrative penalty—a systematic, timely, and user-friendly tool; ii. Shenzhen City: Shenzhen EPB released one individual document for each penalty decision, containing comprehensive information including the name of the enterprise violating emissions regulations, the time of the violation, treatment options, a description of the regulations violated, and evidence of the excess violations, including the degree of the excess of the violation;5

5  The weaknesses of Shenzhen City are that it publishes only once a year, (without exact time records), and it publishes information late; for instance information from 2011 was not published until May 23, 2012.

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iii. Shanxi Province: The Shanxi Environmental Protection Department released a quarterly list of key enterprises that failed to meet environmental standards, including information on pollutant categories description of the degree of the violation—represented as multiple of the maximum pollution standard or amount emitted (see Appendix IX); iv. Dongguan City: Dongguan EPB released weekly reports on environmental petitions and complaints, including the names of the enterprises citizens complained about, the time of the violation or complaint, and on-site treatment/decision by the Dongguan EPB (see Appendix X). Sharing of the effective practices above, from Ningbo’s column on emissions violation penalty, to the comprehensive quarterly reports of ­Dongguan, could provide a more systematic, timely, comprehensive, and user-friendly release of violation records.

3.3.3.2.3

Regular Publishing of Data on Enterprise Emissions

a) In addition to being one of the most important tools to provide for a greater understanding of industrial emissions, regular publishing of data on enterprise emissions is a critical tool for environmental agencies to strengthen environmental management. The shortage of open emission data results in limited public supervision. i. Chongqing Municipality: Some districts and counties published emission data of enterprises subject to Cleaner Production Audits on their websites. Published information included a list of emitted pollutants, their concentrations, total annual discharge volume, and whether there were any emissions violations. These reports also included the names and volumes of toxic and hazardous substances used and discharged in production (see Appendix XI for an example from Yubei District, Chongqing Municipality); ii. Yichang City: The Yichang EPB published the full report on Cleaner Production Audits of enterprises, which summarized the industrial discharge situation of the last three years; iii. Tianjin TEDA Development Zone: The Tianjin TEDA Development Zone EPB is in the process of developing a provisional Chinese Pollutant Release and Transfer Registery (PRTR) and plans the first release of a number of enterprises within the Zone on June 5, 2013. b) Open enterprise emission data lags far behind. We anticipate that the efforts of the Tianjin TEDA Development Zone’s PRTR pilot will chart a

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path toward systematic, timely, comprehensive, and user-friendly emission data disclosure. 3.3.3.3 Abundance of International Experience Provides Lessons to Learn International experience has demonstrated that an effective and comprehensive system of pollution information transparency can increase mutual communication between the environmental agencies and the public, improve the public’s understanding of environmental management and public participation in environmental governance, and put pressure on companies to voluntarily reduce emissions. The Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) is used across the world and has been widely seen as effective. The defining characteristics of PRTRs are: requiring enterprises to regularly report the emission and transfer of specified pollutants to environmental protection agencies and requiring environmental agencies to aggregate this data and release it to the public. Holland is the first country to adopt a PRTR, followed by other countries such as the United States, European Union, Australia, and Japan. Through adequate open information, public members willing to participate in environmental governance and seeking sustainable developmental goals can create a cohesive force to promote efficient environmental governance.

CHAPTER 14

The “Last” Report on China’s Rivers* LI Bo, YAO Songqiao, YU Yin and GUO Qiaoyu The Chinese government promised at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009 that China’s carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP in 2020 would decrease by 40–45% from the level in 2005 and that non-fossil energies will represent about 15% of the consumption of primary energies in 2020. Today, since China has become the world’s largest carbon emitter, delivering on the commitment to energy conservation and emissions reduction is not only needed for domestic economic transformation, but is also necessary due to the pressure from the international community. In the meantime, it is impossible for the Chinese economy to slow down for this commitment, and the total energy consumption will continue to rise. At a time when the total coal consumption has not reached the peak and relevant organizations are still discussing technologies and policies regarding renewable energies, hydropower development has become the “panacea” for changing the energy mix and, all of a sudden, has been assigned a leading role in China’s energy program in the 12th Five-Year Plan period. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, there is a stronger call for accelerating hydropower development given a slowdown in the implementation of the national nuclear power program. Some people have even argued that the upper limit of developed water resources should be increased to 85%, or even 95%, from 60%. On the one hand, energy production, energy conservation and emission reduction, and rapid reduction of air pollution are among the top priorities in the current phase. On the other hand, tackling the water resources crisis, restoring water resources, and maintaining healthy river ecosystems in China constitute a long-term goal for the purpose of sustainability. Accordingly, public policies regarding hydropower development and river ecosystem protection should answer two questions. How do the two issues relate to each other? Will the high density and the fast rate at which dams are being built bring about unexpected, irrevocable, and unbearable ecological, social, and economic consequences for the sustainable development of China? *  Released in December 2013, this report is an abridged version of The “Last” Report on China’s Rivers which a dozen environmental NGOs spent nearly one year writing. Please download it at http://pan.baidu.com/s/1sjEWHe9.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_016

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From social and environmental impact assessment on the development of water resources of the Lancang River, through debates about the pros and cons of building a series of thirteen hydroelectric power plants on the Salween River and a series of eight hydroelectric power plants in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River, which indeed is the upper stretches of the Yangtze River, to witnessing random changes in the boundaries of the Yangtze River fish reserve as a result of building the Xiaonanhai Hydroelectric Power Plant, Chinese environmental NGOs have been paying attention to, and intervening in, ecosystem protection for rivers across China by striving for opportunities for participation on a per-(hydroelectric power) plant basis for more than a decade. These ­organizations have accumulated much experience and lessons in this process, and have pointed out, on many occasions, the flaws in the current hydroelectric power development approval system, big ecological and social issues regarding hydroelectric power plants, and risks of building dams in seismically active areas in Southwest China. Today, these experiences and lessons have yet to be fully reflected in the process of decision improvement. In the meantime, relevant organizations are accelerating the development of hydroelectric in the name of “energy conservation and emission reduction,” as a result endangering rivers across China. China’s rivers can no longer afford waiting. The numbers of river basins and reaches of rivers without dams are on a sharp decline. Moreover, the middle and upper reaches of rivers in Southwest China are being polluted and severed by a new round of urban expansion and new industrial parks, making it impossible for some reaches of rivers to avoid seasonal drying up. If more attention is paid to the satisfaction of short-term needs for power generation and energy conservation/emission reduction than to the ecological value of healthy rivers in various respects as an irreplaceable strategic interest of the state, what can we count on when it comes to the basis for the survival of the generations to come? This report is a response of Chinese environmental NGOs to the issue of hydropower development in river basins and to the 12th Five-Year Energy Plan released in early 2013, or the third year for the implementation of this plan. We hope that the maker of such a national energy plan will fully consider the necessity of building an eco-civilization and protecting the value of rivers in various respects. With this report, we call for government authorities regarding energy, water resources, and environmental protection to pay attention to and respond to our questions and recommendations in the remaining years of the 12th Five-Year Plan Period and in making and implementing the 13th Five-Year Plan, to ensure that equal attention is paid to development and protection, and to make decisions in favor of building an eco-civilization and a beautiful China.

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Benefits of River Protection

Big rivers are ancient and complex ecosystems that contain much greater resources and multidimensional value than the benefits of power generation. They maintain the health of relevant ecosystems, provide various ecosystem services, nurture great cultures, and bring huge economic benefits. The primary difference between river protection and utilization lies in how to understand the value of rivers. Letting rivers serve the goal of maximizing the benefits of power generation is already an outdated idea that belonged to early river basin development planning. The negative impact of dam building and hydropower generation has been widely recognized around the world. We should not continue the outdated attitudes, as they will bring about even more severe water crises. 2

Rehabilitating Rivers

Chinese environmental NGOs have taken a lot of direct actions and pointed out lessons in hydropower development over the past dozen of years. There were already numerous discussions, during the Hu Jintao administration, on issues resulting from uncontrolled hydroelectric power development. The Hu Jintao administration generally was prudent in studying and balancing the complex relationship between hydroelectric power development and ecosystem protection. The former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao gave instructions about developing the water resources of the Salween River on two occasions. He also gave instructions on developmental problems with the leading hydroelectric power plant in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River. Nonetheless, there remain a large amount of negative effects and lessons in the field of hydroelectric power development. First of all, there is a lack of institutional support for making decisions on, and approving, hydroelectric power plant projects in three respects. Firstly, steps of the approval process are taken in an incorrect sequence. The overall development planning for a river basin and, as part of it, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process, always lag behind the building of the hydroelectric power plant in question. Consequently, they have never been able to provide timely guidance and management on hydroelectric power plant development projects. Government officials as approvers and decision makers typically rely on outdated plans. On the other hand, other plans and systems, such as the National Zoning on Ecological Function Areas, also have no binding forces on any single hydroelectric plant. Secondly, public engagement has yet to

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receive the attention that it deserves in terms of value, approaches, and methods, as the voices of environmental organizations and the public are largely left unheard in making decisions on building hydroelectric power plants on rivers. Regarding controversial projects, the released abridged versions of relevant EIA reports typically offer very limited information, and requests such as applications for holding public hearings often receive no response. Thirdly, given the flaws in regulations on starting preparations, including supply water and electricity, building roads and leveling the ground, for hydroelectric power development projects, most hydroelectric power plants in China are built without prior approval. These preparations have actually become “permits” for launching hydroelectric power plant projects without approval, making the approval process useless. In building the aforementioned series of eight hydroelectric power plants in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River, for example, public engagement was made impossible in seven of them, including three in which public engagement was absent due to those flaws regarding the preparations. Back in 2005, the Xiluodu and Xiangjiaba hydroelectric power plants in a series of plants in the lower reaches of the Jinsha River were also built without prior approval. Second, the resulting resettlement of migrants as well as their sustainable development always poses challenges for the hydroelectric power industry. Migrants contribute to the profits of hydroelectric power companies but receive very little or even no compensation. Migrants often become unsatisfied with the government or even the rest of society because they may be intimidated, threatened, or otherwise mistreated during resettlement. Hydroelectric power development will expand into the upper reaches of the Yangtze River and the heartland of western China, according to the 12th Five-Year Energy Plan and other development programs for the future. When in ethnic minority group-dominated areas, tradeoffs between harmony with these ethnic groups and the need for hydroelectric power development will doubtlessly add to the difficulty of migrant resettlement. When it comes to civil rights and the right to special cultures and practices, ethnic minority groups receive protection from both the Constitution and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy. Their cultural traditions and livelihoods have everything to do with the collective use and management of natural resources. This being said, compensation available to migrants is determined and made under the modern concept of private ownership. This difference has not only brought about misunderstanding and cultural conflicts in communication with migrants, but has also led to heavy financial losses of the migrant community in calculating compensation available to migrants. On the other hand,

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the receiving areas are faced with big challenges in how to let migrants live in peace and with contentment in terms of psychology, employment, education, elderly care, cultural inheritance, and the rebuilding of social capital. To sum up, harmony and stability in ethnic minority group-dominated areas are an important issue to which much attention must be paid in the process of hydroelectric power development in the upper reaches of rivers in Southwest China. Third, the ecosystems of China’s rivers have been severely damaged, as dam building has changed the natural lotic habitats and, hence, directly led to the reduction or even extinction of rare fishes. Water storage by upstream hydroelectric power plants has also brought about dried-up downstream channels and lakes. Building dams in Southwest China has led to the flooding of massive fertile valley land. Moreover, the loss of the self-purification capabilities of rivers has resulted in severe pollution in reservoir areas. The accumulative impact of a cascade of dams will lead to species extinction and dried-up rivers and will ultimately influence human beings themselves at the top of the food chain. In addition, environmental remedies available from hydroelectric power plants will become useless. Problems with hydroelectric power development on the Shuiluo River, a tributary of the Jinsha River, and the building of the Xiaonanhai Hydroelectric Power Plant suggest that damages to river ecosystems result not only from the negative effects of hydroelectric power plants, but also from reckless decisions and the failure of law enforcement. In building the Ahai and Liyuan hydroelectric power plants as part of a series of hydropower stations in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River, for example, the Shuiluo River was taken as an important ecosystem for protecting rare fishes unique to this area, according to the development plan. In reality, however, the building of a series of eleven hydroelectric power plants on the Shuiluo River began at almost the same time as that of the Ahai and Liyuan plants. Gold mining is also out of control. The Salween River also is faced with hydroelectric power development on all its tributaries, leaving no possibility of ecosystem rehabilitation for the planning of hydroelectric power plants on the river itself. A state-level nature reserve with a clearly-defined ecological “red line,” the Yangtze River fish reserve also saw its boundaries changed in 2005 and 2010 for the building of the Xiangjiaba, Xiluodu, and Xiaonanhai hydroelectric power plants. The ineffectiveness of this fish reserve, which was set up to alleviate the negative impact of the Three Gorges Dam, is clear evidence for the plight of river ecosystems across China. Earthquake risks in Southwest China also are noteworthy. Respecting nature is especially meaningful in Southwest China as a high-risk area from the perspective of geology and seismic activity. Different opinions always exist in the

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analysis of earthquake risks. Given special geological formations, harsh geological conditions and frequent earthquakes, Southwest China has suffered a lot of high magnitude earthquakes, followed by the resulting large-scale subsidence, changes in river courses, and the creation of quake lakes, according to geological field surveys. Dams are both catalysts and victims of such damages. More terrible is the domino effect that may be triggered by certain dams in a series of hydroelectric power plants. Since the geological risks of the hydroelectric plants in Southwest China constitute a highly controversial issue, individuals and organizations with different opinions should be given sufficient opportunities for expressing their voices. In addition, the government should release data generated from medium- and long-term earthquake forecasts. When making decisions on hydroelectric power development, relevant authorities should follow the principle of “be prudent in the early stages.” Fourth and last, dam management will become an increasingly important task. It is advisable for China to stop building hydroelectric power plants in the rapids or upper reaches of rivers as early as possible. Instead, it should unleash the potential of existing dams while ensuring their safety by eliminating various hazards and risks. Relevant Chinese government authorities and organizations should work to minimize the impact of dams on surrounding ecosystems, restore and maintain environmental flows as well as their ecosystem services wherever possible, and assist in the resettlement of relevant migrants. After the implementation of the 11th Five-Year Energy Plan, China has long been a world leader in terms of the total number of dams and the total installed capacity of hydroelectric power.1 Chinese taxpayers and even the coming generations will probably have to share the costs of these dams throughout their lifecycles with hydropower companies.

1  In 1940, China only possessed 22 of the 5,268 large dams around the world, according to statistics from the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). The most populous country, China (2.8 trillion m3) ranked sixth in terms of the annual average runoff of rivers and was behind Brazil (8.0 trillion m3), Russia (4.3 trillion m3), the United States (3.0 trillion m3), Canada (2.9 trillion m3), and Indonesia (2.84 trillion m3), according to a report published in 2008 by the secretariat of the China National Committee on Large Dams (CHINCOLD). In contrast, however, there were already 4,685 large dams with a height of at least 30 m, whether built or being built, across China in 2008, leaving the following nine countries far behind. There were 98,002 reservoirs and 46,758 hydroelectric power plants across China, according to the Report on the 1st China Census for Water published in 2013. Back in 2011, there were over 5,200 large dams with a height of at least 30 m, whether built or being built, including over 140 dams with a height of at least 100 m, across China, according to data from media reports.

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Protecting Rivers

It was made clear at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee that transformation toward eco-civilization would become a priority in China’s structural reform and the orientation of the institutionalization of environmental protection. Accordingly, local environmental organizations have had new expectations for state policies regarding the development and conservation of river resources and the restoration of river water resources. River basin management and the overall planning of river resources development must be based upon clearly defined, complete ecological “red lines.” Nowadays, freshwater ecosystems of the Yangtze, Lancang, and Salween Rivers in Southwest China are faced with various biodiversity threats. It is therefore necessary to identify the first areas that need to be protected, providing basic support for carrying out protective actions in these areas. 4

Allying for River Protection

When it comes to alternative energies other than water energy, technologies and markets are both developing rapidly. Under these circumstances, launching hydroelectric power projects at a rapid rate on the pretext of achieving energy conservation and emission reduction will result in high ecological risks. In the meantime, it is unreasonable to emphasize hydroelectric power’s contribution to energy conservation and emission reduction without considering hydroelectric power as an energy source for energy-hungry and heavily polluting industries. The potential of alternative energies other than water energy remained obviously underestimated until the launch of the 12th Five-Year Energy Plan. These alternative energies have since been given more possibilities of growth. It is therefore possible for these alternative energies to partly replace water energy and, thus, reduce the need for developing run-of-theriver hydroelectric power. In the 12th Five-Year Energy Plan, there already is something interesting about the breakdown of targets regarding renewable energies. The newly added installed capacities of wind power and hydroelectric power are 69,000 MW and 70,000 MW respectively. The installed capacity of solar power is expected to reach 21,000 MW. The total installed capacity of solar and wind power is expected to reach 121,000 MW, which will be higher than the newly added installed capacity of hydroelectric power throughout the 12th Five-Year Plan period. Nonetheless, this trend has yet to be reflected in the macroscopic scenario analysis of energy conservation and emission reduction in China.

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Given institutional problems, Chinese provinces have been beset by structural overcapacity and overproduction for many consecutive years due to the reckless building of more production facilities than necessary in heavily polluting and energy-hungry industries, such as iron and steel, cement, and nonferrous metals. A large number of hydroelectric power plants on tributaries and mining along rivers have caused severe pollution in China, according to field surveys. Moreover, such hydroelectric power projects are planned and approved more covertly than are similar projects on the main streams and typically are outside the scope of public engagement. Industrial parks that house heavily polluting and energy-hungry production facilities in the upper reaches of rivers have led to big problems such as the environmental capacity being exceeded and excessive pollutants being discharged and/or emitted. In Anning City, Yunnan Province, for example, a petrochemical industrial park led by a China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) oil refinery project with an annual capacity of 10 million t has been criticized for exceeding the environmental capacity. In 2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) decided to suspend the EIA approval process for the aforementioned CNPC project because it failed to meet the pollution reduction target.2 Moreover, industrial wastewater discharged by this oil refinery into the Tanglang River, a tributary of the Jinsha River, is also a headache for the Changjiang Water Resources Commission (CJW) of the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR). We can therefore see that, when analyzing and addressing complex issues like the abovementioned ones, we should not focus our attention on the contribution of hydroelectric power, which is an alternative to coal-fueled power generation. Such issues have become even more complex as a new round of urbanization and industrial expansion is under way in the middle and upper reaches of rivers across Southwest China, in particular. To address the energy issue in China, it is necessary to effectively optimize the industry mix, build a mechanism of forcing a faster transformation of the economic growth pattern, and develop a wide range of effective incentives and restraints, thereby reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP.3 It is also necessary to roll out measures that can effectively reduce energy consumption 2  “The MEP suspends EIA approval of CNPC and Sinopec projects for failure to achieve emission reduction targets,” http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0830/c1004-22744740.html. 3  For every increased unit of GDP, China discharges wastewater four times as much as developed countries and, for every unit of industrial output, generates solid wastes more than 10 times as much as these countries. Regarding energy consumption per unit of GDP, China is seven times higher than Japan, six times higher than the United States, and 2.8 times higher than India, http://news.qq.com/a/20120904/000754.htm.

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in industrial production and at home. In addition, it is necessary to unleash the technical and market potential of renewable energies under the new economic growth pattern and incentives so as to achieve the goal that non-fossil energies will represent about 11.4% of the consumption of primary energies in 2015 and 15% in 2020. Relevant organizations should work to gradually make non-fossil energies into the main energies in the 2030–2050 period. This being said, national development must still be based upon natural resources endowment of the country regardless of developing a low-carbon, or green, economy or delivering on China’s commitment to emission reduction. In this regard, water resources and freshwater ecosystems are among the most important ecological elements. 5

Recommendations on River Protection

Hydropower has lost its appeal in most developed countries, such as the United States, Norway, Canada, and Australia, who have taken different measures to protect and preserve rivers. Hydroelectric power resources in the United States and Germany, for example, are not a major source of growth in the renewable energy industry despite both countries, especially the United States, still having further potential for water energy development, according to a review of the energy production mix in the past two decades. Given a huge population, China relies heavily on rivers when developing relevant industries. When developing hydroelectric power, we should always fully consider the local conditions and learn from other countries in terms of practices in legislation for river protection. It is necessary to emphasize the inviolability of ecological red lines defined for river ecosystems and make laws to ensure that the natural forms of rivers will not be destroyed by water resource development projects. In cases where ecological red lines may be threatened, we should adhere to the principle of rejecting a hydropower development proposal even if there is only one vote against it. China’s rivers have a remarkable feature in that large rivers led by the Lancang, Salween, Yarlung, Tsangpo, and Heilong Rivers generally are international ones. Regarding rivers in southwestern provinces, China as an upstream large developing country always faces disagreements and criticisms from downstream countries when it comes to the development of water resources. When assisting in developing water resources in downstream countries, Chinese hydroelectric power companies also face conflicts with local communities. We believe that diplomatic policies, including being a good neighbor, as well as mutual respect and benefits are supposed to promote the national

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interest more than they do to the economic benefits of Chinese hydroelectric power companies. The opposite outcome is not desirable in the implementation of such policies. National development would become impossible without water resources, regardless of China or its neighbors. Accordingly, the Chinese government should adopt a high-standard social and environmental impact assessment, public engagement and environmental information disclosure systems, and roll out the aforementioned principles consistently inside and outside China. 6

Recommendations on River Rehabilitation

Some Chinese NGOs suggest that relevant decision makers learn lessons from the development of hydroelectric power in the previous years and avoid previous mistakes in order to protect rivers from becoming the victims of uncontrolled development and flawed policies. In the meantime, the competent authorities should actively take measures including clearly defining ecological red lines, developing renewable energies, and promoting legislation for river protection. To implement the decisions made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, relevant organizations should carry out river rehabilitation under the guideline of achieving a structural reform toward eco-civilization. They should establish attitudes in favor of river ecosystem restoration and sustainable development, and have a global view of relevant river basins that will promote harmony, conformity, and equity. It is necessary to build and improve a public engagement system in making decisions on river rehabilitation and hydroelectric power development. The competent authorities must ensure that the overall program made for a river basin and the EIA on this program be effectively implemented, and they must abandon the incorrect practice in which approval procedures for projects to build a single hydropower station or a series of hydropower stations are taken before the river basin development program is made. The competent authorities should conduct sufficient field research on hydroelectric power development versus its geological risks, hold public justifications and listen to different opinions such that the risks of hydroelectric power development will be analyzed more sufficiently and the public will be more convinced. Decisions on hydroelectric power station projects must be made in strict accordance with relevant project approval procedures. The competent authorities should gather public opinions on preparations made for such projects, including supply water and electricity, building roads, and leveling the ground, as soon as possible. Policies that have long become outdated should be cancelled as early as possible, whereas new

The “ Last ” Report on China ’ s Rivers

235

approval-relevant rules should be made, including the requirement that projects can be implemented only after the EIA approval procedures for the main work are finished. With regard to the large number of large dams across China, the relevant authorities should improve the administrative mechanism as soon as possible and, in particular, should introduce the responsibility and phased application approval systems under which hydroelectric power companies will work throughout the lifecycles of large dams. The passion for accelerating hydroelectric power development will not decrease as long as hydroelectric power companies are able to shift the corresponding financial burden to taxpayers. In the meantime, ecological red lines for rivers must be defined as early as possible, including timely or remedial research and red-line definition in reaches whether a nature reserve has been built there or not. It is necessary to make great efforts in developing renewable energies and promoting legislation for river protection. Last but not least, we from Chinese NGOs want to offer two special recommendations: First, we call for the cancellation of the Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station project given the resulting damages to the ecological red lines of the affected river. In the meantime, we request the State Council cancel the MEP’s last (i.e., 2011) decision on changing the boundaries of the state-level Yangtze River fish reserve, thereby ensuring that the ecological red lines of this reserve in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River will no longer face threats from the building of new hydroelectric power stations. Second, we call for the suspension of the program to build a series of five hydroelectric power stations on the Salween River. Instead, relevant organizations should seek to unleash the potential of existing hydroelectric power plants while helping people living in the Salween River valley find new livelihoods that will be more compatible with nature and local cultures. New laws and regulations for river protection should be made to discover the value of freely flowing rivers and streams in new dimensions and to protect them as the heritage of nature passed down from generation to generation across China.

CHAPTER 15

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information on 122 Municipal Solid Waste Incineration Plants across China* Wuhu Ecology Center 1 Background As of May 2012, 122 municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration plants were put into operation across China, and they are distributed in 22 provinces and municipalities.1 In the State Plan for the Municipal Solid Waste Disposal Facility Construction during the 12th Five-Year Plan Period promulgated in April 2012, it is stipulated that by 2015, the municipal solid waste incineration capacity should have reached more than 35% of the overall waste treatment capacity and more than 48% in East China. The total number of MSW incineration plants, according to experts’ estimation, will exceed 300 during the 12th FiveYear Plan period (2011–2015). The MSW treatment industry in China is in a quandary. On the one hand, enterprises and governments at various levels are enthusiastic about constructing MSW incineration plants. On the other hand, the skeptical public is constantly fighting against the incineration plants and proposals of constructing new ones. There are two reasons behind such a quandary. First, the public is severely concerned about the environmental pollution and health hazards

*  In 2012, Wuhu Ecology Center applied to 76 environmental protection bureaus at city and regiona; levels in 31 provinces and municipalities for the disclosure of operation information concerning the 122 operating MSW incineration plants across China. Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information on 122 MSW Incineration Plants across China was written based on research data extracted from the replies by the environmental protection authorities to the aforementioned application for information disclosure. This article was adapted from the original report following the format of the Environment Yearbook by Yue Caixuan from the Wuhu Ecology Center and Tian Qian from Friends of Nature. 1   Waste Incineration Information Platform: Brief introduction to the Waste Incineration Information Platform. Retrieved on May 2012, data of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administrative Region, and Taiwan are not included.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004324602_017

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

237

caused by the emission of the incineration plants, as they believe that in China solid waste is incinerated without being properly sorted and that kitchen solid waste makes up a big proportion. Second, the public cannot obtain information concerning the operation and supervision of the MSW incineration plants, because the governments scarcely disclose monitoring data concerning the MSW incineration plants and do not perform their supervision responsibility rigorously. The lack of transparency adds to the public skepticism. In order to obtain the overall information concerning the operation and government supervision of the MSW incineration plants across China and respond to the long-lasting public concern, Wuhu Ecology Center applied to 76 environmental protection authorities of municipal and regional levels for the information of pollutants such as dioxin and smoke emitted by the 122 operating MSW incineration plants across China. 2 A.

Application Time and Content

From March 2012 to June 2012, Wuhu Ecology Center applied to the environmental protection bureaus and departments of 31 provinces and municipalities as well as the Ministry of Environmental Protection, for the list of the enterprises that carried out a compulsory clean production audit mainly focused on the emission of dioxin in 2010 and 2011. B. In September 2012, Wuhu Ecology Center applied to the environmental protection bureaus and departments of 23 provinces and municipalities for the monitoring data collected and solution reports made by environmental protection bureaus concerning the gas, fly ash, slag, and MSW leachate discharged by the 122 MSW incineration plants in operation in 2010 and 2011. C. In December 2012, Wuhu Ecology Center reapplied to the 76 environmental protection bureaus at the municipal and regional levels for the monitoring data and solution reports concerning the gas, fly ash, slag, and MSW leachate discharged by the 122 MSW incineration plants in operation in 2010 and 2011.

238 3

Wuhu Ecology Center

Analysis: Replies for Information Disclosure and MSW Incineration Plants’ Operation

Replies to Information Disclosure Applications for the 122 MSW Incineration Plants 3.1.1 Inactive to Response by the Environmental Protection Authority, Only One-Fourth of the 76 Bureaus Disclosed Monitoring Data of Pollutants of MSW Incineration Plants 3.1.1.1 Of the 76 Bureaus Of Environmental Protection, Only 18 Provided Monitoring Data Wuhu Ecology Center applied to 76 environmental protection bureaus at the municipal and regional levels for the monitor data of incineration plants and corresponding solution reports concerning the gas, fly ash, slag and MSW leachate discharged by the 122 MSW incineration plants in operation in 2010 and 2011. Of the 76, 45 environmental protection bureaus replied while 31 bureaus did not. Of the 45 that replied, only 18 offered monitoring data; 27 did not. 3.1

3.1.1.2

Of the 122 MSW Incineration Plants in Operation, Monitoring Data of Only 42 Were Obtained Monitoring data of only 42 MSW incineration plants were offered by the environmental protection bureaus, as listed in Table 15.1. Only 46 plants replies, but did not offer monitor data. The excuses ranged from “not within the scope Table 15.1 Monitoring data concerning 42 MSW incineration plants Province

City / District

Factory Name

Jilin

Changchun Jilin

Beijing

Chaoyang District Tianjin Tianjin

Xinxiang MSW Incineration Power Plant Jilin Shuangjia Environmental Protection Energy Utilization Co., Ltd. Beijing Gaotun MSW Incineration Plant

Tianjin

Shuanggang MSW Incineration Power Plant Qingguang MSW Incineration Power Plant

239

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

of disclosure,” “requires research credentials,” “have no monitor data” to “have to apply to the region-level environmental protection bureau.” For the remaining 34 plants, the corresponding bureaus either did not give any replies, even after repeated inquiries, or did not have personnel responsible for processing information disclosure applications. 3.1.2

The Monitor Data Information of the 42 MSW Incineration Plants was Incomplete The monitoring data of MSW incineration plants provided by the environmental protection bureaus were incomplete, mainly involving such pollutants as smoke, SO2, NO x, CO, HCL, Hg, and NH3. Data of dioxin, fly ash, and slag were scantly mentioned. Only the dioxin data of 10 plants, fly ash data of two plants, and slag data of only three were offered, as shown in Table 15.1. Additionally, the dioxin data were not monitored on an annual basis. Obviously, such a scenario is far from meeting the requirements in Article 13 of the Guiding Principles for Strengthening Dioxin Pollution Prevention and Control, which stipulates that the environmental protection authority should conduct supervisory monitoring of dioxin at least once a year. Dioxin is highly carcinogenic and receives wide public attention. However, due to the cost and technical issues, dioxin has always been difficult to monitor. The replies concerning dioxin monitor data reflect the inadequate supervision of incineration plants by local environmental protection authorities.

Replied or not

Pollutant data provided or not (yes: √ no: ×) Gas discharge

Fly ash

Slag

Under compulsory cleaner production supervision or not

Dioxin

Smoke

SO2

NO x

CO

HCL

NH3

Hg

√ √

√ ×

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ ×

√ ×

√ ×

√ ×

× √

× √

√ √

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

—

√ √

× ×

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

× ×

× ×

√ √

240

Wuhu Ecology Center

Table 15.1 Monitoring data concerning 42 MSW incineration plants (cont.) Province

City / District

Factory Name

Shandong

Tai’an Weihai Linyi Zhengzhou Xuchang

Tai’an MSW Incineration Power Plant Weihai MSW Incineration Plant Linyi Zhonghuan New Energy Source Co., Ltd. Zhengzhou Xingjin MSW Incineration Power Plant MSW Incineration Power Generation Project of Tianjian Thermal Power Co., Ltd. MSW Incineration Project of Tongling Conch Cement Co., Ltd. Wuhan Green Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. (Changshankou) Huangjinshan MSW Incineration Power Plant MSW Incineration Power Plant of Jingzhou Jimei Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Kunming Xijiao MSW Incineration Power Plant Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. of Kunming China Power International New Energy Holdings Ltd. Anning MSW Processing Center Tongxing MSW Incineration Power Plant Likeng MSW Incineration Plant, Phase I Bohai Environmental Protection Resource Development Co., Ltd. Dongguan China Sciences Conservational Power Co., Ltd. Hengli MSW Incineration Power Limited / Kewei Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Laibin MSW Incineration Power Plant Haikou MSW Incineration Power Plant Hangzhou Green Energy Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Hangzhou Jinjiang Green Energy Co., Ltd. / Xiaoshan MSW Incineration Power Plant

Henan

Anhui Hubei

Tongling Wuhan Huangshi Jingzhou

Yunnan

Chongqing Guangdong

Kunming Kunming Kunming Guangzhou Dongguan Dongguan Dongguan

Guangxi Hainan Zhejiang

Laibin Haikou Hangzhou Hangzhou

241

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

Replied or not

Pollutant data provided or not (yes: √ no: ×) Gas discharge

Fly ash

Slag

Under compulsory cleaner production supervision or not

Dioxin

Smoke

SO2

NO x

CO

HCL

NH3

Hg

√ √ √ √ √

× × × × √

√ √ √ √ √

√ √ √ √ √

√ √ √ √ √

× × × × ×

× √ × × ×

× √ × × ×

× √ × × ×

× × × × ×

× × × × ×

√ √ √ — —

√ √

√ √

× √

× √

× √

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

— —

√ √

√ ×

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ ×

√ √

√ ×

√ ×

× ×

× ×

— —

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

√ √

× √

× √

× √

× √

× ×

× √

√ √

√ √ √ √

√ × √ ×

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ ×

√ √ × √

√ √ × ×

√ √ × ×

√ × × ×

√ × × ×

√ — — —

√ √

× ×

√ √

√ √

√ √

× ×

√ √

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

— √

√ √ √

× √ ×

√ √ √

√ √ √

√ √ √

× × ×

× √ ×

× × ×

× × ×

× × ×

× × ×

√ √ √

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

242

Wuhu Ecology Center

Table 15.1 Monitoring data concerning 42 MSW incineration plants (cont.) Province

City / District

Factory Name

Hangzhou

Hangzhou Yuhang MSW Incineration Power Plant/Hangzhou Yuhang Jinjiang Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Changxing Xincheng Environmental Protection Co., Ltd. Huzhou MSW Incineration Power Project Deqing Jianeng MSW Incineration Power Co., Ltd. Lanxi Golden Concord Environmentally Responsible Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Bada Jinhua Thermal Power Co., Ltd.

Huzhou Huzhou Huzhou Jinhua Jinhua Jiaxing Jiaxing Jiaxing Wenzhou Wenzhou Shaoxing Wenzh Ningbo Ningbo Shaoxing

MSW Incineration Power Plant of Jiaxing Green Energy Co., Ltd. / Buyun MSW Incineration Power Plant Pinghu MSW Incineration Power Plant / Pinghu Delixi Changjiang Environmental Protection Co., Ltd. Xindu Green Energy MSW Incineration Plant Dongzhuang MSW Incineration Power Plant / Ouhai Weiming MSW Incineration Power Co., Ltd. Yongqiang MSW Incineration Power Plant Zhuji Bafang Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Cangnan Weiming MSW Power Generation Co., Ltd. Cixi China Sciences Group Zhongmao Environmental Protection Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Zhenhai MSW Incineration Power Plant / Ningbo China Sciences Group Green Power Co., Ltd. Shaoxing Zhonghuan Renewable Energy Development Co., Ltd.

243

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

Replied or not

Pollutant data provided or not (yes: √ no: ×) Gas discharge

Fly ash

Slag

Under compulsory cleaner production supervision or not

Dioxin

Smoke

SO2

NO x

CO

HCL

NH3

Hg

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

√ √ √ √

× × × ×

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

√

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

Blank in Chinese original √

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

√ √

× ×

√ √

√ √

√ √

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

× ×

√ √

√ √ √ √

× × × ×

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

× × × ×

√ — — √

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

√

×

√

√

√

×

×

×

×

×

×

√

√ √

244

Wuhu Ecology Center

China’s New Standard for MSW Pollution Control Comes Late and is Much Less Rigorous Than the EU Standard The Standard for Pollution Control on the Municipal Solid Waste Incineration (GB 18485–2001) stipulates the limits of 10 air pollutants of MSW incineration. These 10 limits are much higher than that of the EU2000/76/EC (as shown in Table 15.2), which is widely accepted around the world. The limit of dioxin in China’s 2011 standard is 10 times higher than the EU standard. At the same time, the Standard for Pollution Control on the Municipal Solid Waste Incineration (Draft for Comments) released in 2011 had some revisions concerning the limits of pollutants, but some are still higher than that of the EU standard. As of April 2013, the 2011 draft had not been implemented. The introduction of the new standard for pollution control seemed much slower compared with the implementation of state policies such as MSW incineration power price subsidies. As a result, the public is concerned and question their government departments. 3.2

Table 15.2

China and EU’s standards for pollution control on MSW incineration

Pollutant

Unit

GB 18485-2001 GB 18485-20xx draft for comments (2011)

EU2000/ 76/EC

Smoke HCL HF SO2 NO x CO TOC Hg Cd Pb Other metals Blackness of smoke plumes Dioxin

mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 mg/Nm3 Ringelmann number ngTEQ/m3

80 75 — 260 400 150 — 0.2 0.1 1.6 — 1

10 10 1 50 200 50 10 0.05 0.05 ≤0.5 ≤0.5 —

1.0

20 60 — 100 250 100 — 0.05 0.05 1.0 1.0 — 0.1 (incinerator capacity per set more than 150 t/d) 0.3 (50t/d ≤ incinerator capacity per set ≤ 150 t/d ) 0.5 (incinerator capacity per set ≤ 50 t/d )

0.1

245

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

Analysis of the Obtained Monitoring Data of MSW Incineration Plants in Operation 3.3.1 Half of the Obtained Dioxin Monitor Data Exceeded the EU Standard Among the 122 MSW incineration plants, dioxin data of only 10 plants were obtained. The dioxin data of five plants exceeded 0.1 ngTEQ/m3 (as specified in Table 15.3) as stipulated by the EU standard. The public, however, generally believe that the dioxin emission level should be lower than that of the EU standard, not the Chinese standard. In a word, the dioxin discharge of MSW incineration plants and the disclosure of its monitor information are far from satisfactory. 3.3

Table 15.3

Dioxin monitor data of 10 MSW incineration plants

Dioxin (ngTEQ/m3) Province City

Factory Name

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded GB 184852001 or not

Exceeded EU2000/76/ EC or not

1.0 ngTEQ/m3 0.1 ngTEQ/m3 Jilin

Yunnan

Hainan

Changchun Xinxiang MSW Incineration Power Plant Kunming Kunming Xijiao MSW Incineration Power Plant Kunming Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. of Kunming China Power International New Energy Holdings Ltd. Kunming Anning MSW Processing Center Haikou Haikou MSW Incineration Power Plant

—

—

0.401

×

√

—

0.167

—

×

√

0.063

0.187

—

×

√

0.247

—

—

×

√

—

—

0.145

×

√

246 Table 15.3 Dioxin (ngTEQ/m3) Province City

Wuhu Ecology Center Dioxin monitor data of 10 MSW incineration plants (cont.)

Factory Name

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded GB 184852001 or not

Exceeded EU2000/76/ EC or not

1.0 ngTEQ/m3 0.1 ngTEQ/m3 Henan

Xuchang

MSW Incineration Power Generation Project of Tianjian Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Anhui Tongling MSW Incineration Project of Tongling Conch Cement Co., Ltd. Hubei Wuhan Wuhan Green Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. (Changshankou) Huangshi Huangjinshan MSW Incineration Power Plant Guangdong Guangzhou Likeng MSW Incineration Plant, Phase I

3.3.2

0.047

0.048

—

×

×

0.0376 0.008

—

×

×

—

0.090

—

×

×

—

0.0864 —

×

×

0.043

0.088

×

×

—

Smoke Monitor Data of Six Plants Exceeded China’s National Standard and those of 36 Plants Exceeded the EU Standard Smoke monitoring data of six plants exceeded China’s GB 18485–2001 Standard and 36 plants exceeded the EU standard, as shown in Table 15.4. For example, the smoke concentration of Dongguan China Sciences Conservational Power Co., Ltd. sampled in 2010 was 185.2 mg/Nm3, which is twice as high as that of China’s 2001 national standard.

247

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information Table 15.4 Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Shandong

Linyi

Smoke monitoring data of 40 MSW incineration plants

Factory Name

Linyi Zhonghuan New Energy Source Co., Ltd.a Hubei Jingzhou MSW Incineration Power Plant of Jingzhou Jimei Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Guangdong Dongguan Dongguan China Sciences Conservational Power Co., Ltd. Zhejiang Jinhua Bada Jinhua Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Wenzhou Yongqiang MSW Incineration Power Plant Jilin Changchun Xinxiang MSW Incineration Power Plant Jilin Jilin Shuangjia Environmental Protection Energy Utilization Co., Ltd. Tianjin Shuanggang MSW Incineration Power Plant Qingguang MSW Incineration Power Plant

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

85

44

—

√

√

—

107

—

√

√

185.2

64

—

√

√

—

91.4

12.9

√

√

—

—

83

√

√

77.12

74

—

×

√

78.3

935

80

√

√

12.2

7.12

—

×

√

57.4

62.9

—

×

√

248 Table 15.4 Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Shandong

Tai’an

Wuhu Ecology Center Smoke monitoring data of 40 MSW incineration plants (cont.)

Factory Name

Tai’an MSW Incineration Power Plant Weihai Weihai MSW Incineration Plant Henan Zhengzhou Zhengzhou Xingjin MSW Incineration Power Plant Xuchang MSW Incineration Power Generation Project of Tianjian Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Hubei Wuhan Wuhan Green Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. (Changshankou) Yunnan Kunming Environmental Protection Energy Co., Ltd. of Kunming China Power International New Energy Holdings Ltd. Kunming Anning MSW Processing Center Chongqing — Tongxing MSW Incineration Power Plant

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

—

20

—

×

√

—

—

14.9

×

√

46

69

—

×

√

67

55.3

—

×

√

26

42

—

×

√

61

—

—

×

√

16.1

16.1

16.1

×

√

33.3

20

—

×

√

249

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Factory Name

Guangdong Guangzhou Likeng MSW Incineration Plant, Phase I Dongguan Bohai Environmental Protection Resource Development Co., Ltd. Dongguan Hengli MSW Incineration Power Plant / Kewei Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Guangxi Laibin Laibin MSW Incineration Power Plant Hainan Haikou Haikou MSW Incineration Power Plant Zhejiang Hangzhou Hangzhou Green Energy Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Hangzhou Hangzhou Jinjiang Green Energy Co., Ltd. / Xiaoshan MSW Incineration Power Plant

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

40

16.5

—

×

√

56.4

59.7

—

×

√

61.1

54.9

—

×

√

—

66

—

×

√

—

—

36.7

×

√

—

46

24.5

×

√

—

74.8

63.6

×

√

250

Wuhu Ecology Center

Table 15.4 Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Hangzhou

Huzhou

Huzhou

Huzhou

Jinhua

Jiaxing

Smoke monitoring data of 40 MSW incineration plants (cont.)

Factory Name

Hangzhou Yuhang MSW Incineration Power Plant/ Hangzhou Yuhang Jinjiang Environmental Protection Power Co., Ltd. Changxing Xincheng Environmental Protection Co., Ltd. Huzhou MSW Incineration Power Project Deqing Jianeng MSW Incineration Power Co., Ltd. Lanxi Golden Concord Environmentally Responsible Thermal Power Co., Ltd. MSW Incineration Power Plant of Jiaxing Green Energy Co., Ltd. / Buyun MSW Incineration Power Plant

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

—

70.4

28.8

×

√

—

66.2

10.2

×

√

—

—

46.7

×

√

—

54.8

77

×

√

—

12.2

—

×

√

—

40

70.63

×

√

251

Report on Applying for the Disclosure of Information

Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Jiaxing

Jiaxing

Wenzhou Ningbo

Ningbo

Shaoxing

Wenzhou

Factory Name

Pinghu MSW Incineration Power Plant / Pinghu Delixi Changjiang Environmental Protection Co., Ltd. Xindu Green Energy MSW Incineration Plant Zhuji Bafang Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Cixi China Sciences Group Zhongmao Environmental Protection Thermal Power Co., Ltd. Zhenhai MSW Incineration Power Plant / Ningbo China Sciences Group Green Power Co., Ltd. Shaoxing Zhonghuan Renewable Energy Development Co., Ltd. Cangnan Weiming MSW Power Generation Co., Ltd.

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

—

53

38

×

√

—

71.4

39

×

√

—

70

66.1

×

√

—

60

43

×

√

—

40.7

54.7

×

√

—

72.5

70.2

×

√

—

10

—

×

×

252 Table 15.4 Smoke (mg/Nm3) Province City

Yunnan

Kunming

Hubei

Huangshi

Zhejiang

Wenzhou

Wuhu Ecology Center Smoke monitoring data of 40 MSW incineration plants (cont.)

Factory Name

Kunming Xijiao MSW Incineration Power Plant Huangjinshan MSW Incineration Power Plant Dongzhuang MSW Incineration Power Plant / Ouhai Weiming MSW Incineration Power Co., Ltd.

2010

2011

2012

Exceeded Exceeded GB 18485-2001 EU2000/76/ or not EC or not 80 mg/Nm3

10 mg/Nm3

1.23

—

—

×

×

—

8.4

—

×

×

—

—