Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 3: Public Action and Government Accountability [1 ed.] 9789004269385, 9789004268791

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Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 3

Chinese Research Perspectives: Environment International Series Advisors Guobin Yang, University of Pennsylvania Judith Shapiro, American University Erika Scull

VOLUME 3

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/cren

Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 3 Public Action and Government Accountability Edited by

Liu Jianqiang

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is the result of a co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were selected and translated into English from the original 《中国环境 发展报告(2013)》(Zhongguo huanjing fazhan baogao 2013) with financial support from the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences.

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2212 7496 isbn 978 �� �4 268�� 1 (hardback) isbn ��� �� 0� �6938 5 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents Preface  ix Acknowledgements  xi List of Figures  xii List of Tables  xiv List of Contributors  xv

Volume Overview  1 Rapid Urbanization: The Environmental Cost and the Way Forward  3 Li Bo

PART One Public Action 31 1 Social Mobilization, Collective Action, and Resistance against Environmental Pollution in 2012  33 Wu Fengshi and Peng Lin 2 The Rise and Challenges of Public Environmental Testing  45 Huo Weiya

PART Two Government Accountability and Good Governance  55 3 Improving Government Accountability in the Face of Environmental Challenges  57 Zhang Shiqiu 4 Facing a Water Crisis: A Political and Social Analysis  69 Guo Weiqing

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PART Three Government Policies  81 5 New National Standards for Drinking Water and the Reform of Policies Controlling Pollutant Discharge  83 Song Guojun and Zhang Zhen 6 Revision of Environmental Protection Law Stirs Controversy  95 Qie Jianrong

PART Four Livability  105 7 Rapid Increase of Waste Incineration Plants Causes Concern  107 Yang Changjiang 8 The Challenge of Restoring Brownfields  119 Gao Shengke 9 Food Safety Concerns Encourage Urban Organic Farming  133 Cheng Cunwang and Shi Yan

PART Five Sustainable Consumption  145 10 A “Modest” New Mechanism for Progressive Electricity Pricing  147 Yu Jie 11 Car Washing in Beijing: Ostentatious Water Use vs. Utilization of Reclaimed Water  153 Hu Kanping 12 Progress in Restricting Excessive Packaging  165 Mao Da

PART Six Ecological Protection  177 13 New Hope for Protecting Sanjiangyuan: Headwaters of the Yangtze, Yellow, and Mekong Rivers  179 Sanjiangyuan Project Team of the Shan Shui Conservation Center

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14 Civil Society Promoting Legislation on Protected Natural Areas  207 Xie Yan

PART Seven

Dams  221

15 Hydropower Development: Return of a Crisis on the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River  223 Bao Zhiheng 16 Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station: A Typical Case of Political Power Abuse  235 Liu Yiman and Ding Zhouyang 17 Building Dams on International Rivers: Assuming a More Responsible Role  245 Yi Yimin

PART Eight Pollution  255 18 Soil Contamination Must be Dealt With Without Delay  257 Ma Tianjie 19 Oil Spills and Ocean Pollution  271 Feng Jie and Tu Fangjing

PART Nine Investigative Reports  279 20 Public Bicycles in Cities—Government Support is Key  281 Meng Si 21 Small Particles, Big Breakthrough: A Report on the Air Quality Information Transparency Index in 113 Cities in 2012  289 Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs

PART Ten Appendix  305

viii Major Environmental Events of 2012  307 Annual Indexes: Environmental Trends  321 Terminological Glossary  337 Index  339

contents

Preface This edition of the Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment is the 2013 annual environmental report compiled by Friends of Nature, a leading environmental protection ngo in China, with Mr. Liu Jianqiang as editor-in-chief and the participation and cooperation from academics, environmental protection activists, public service activists, and the media. In 2012, incidents related to industrial pollution and environmental health caught the attention of the entire public. On the one hand, popular protests have evolved in a more radical, yet mature, way, with more intense conflicts of interest; on the other hand, local governments have become more responsive. These developments show that public education advocated by academics and environmental protection organizations is merging with spontaneous public protests initiated by rural and urban residents to safeguard their legal rights and strive for compensation. This points to more long-term initiatives like policy advocacy. Cross-border water pollution and competition in 2012 showcased the truth that the water crisis is not only an environmental issue, but also a social and political one. The water crisis has called us to reconsider planning, strategies, and development models and restructure political agendas and battlefronts. 2012 also saw greater ecological and environmental challenges in China. Hydropower projects in the upstream reaches of the Yangtze River have led to geological, ecological, and water sustainability risks. While nature reserves are meant to be protected public resources rather than sources of local economic benefits, the reality shows exactly the opposite, with local governments and speculative capital relentlessly stepping in and ignoring laws and regulations. Heavy metal pollution was another major threat to public health in 2012. Brownfields have become a more and more serious issue and a latent long-term threat to urban development. Since the severely polluted air drew the public’s attention to pm2.5 in 2011, smog has attracted unprecedented attention. Thanks to public advocacy and environmental ngos’ unremitting efforts, over fifty cities across China are publicizing PM2.5 data, another success of public participation. The public, media, academics, and government have reached a consensus on air pollution control and emergency response. The new Civil Procedure Law enforced since January 1, 2012 is the first to expand its jurisdiction to environmental public interest litigation, ushering in a new era in China. However, the revision of the Environmental Protection Law has proven controversial, with many crying out against perceived setbacks. In order to prevent the revised proposal from formal deliberation at the National People’s Congress, leading environmental legal experts appealed to Chairman Wu Bangguo of the Standing Committee of the

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National People’s Congress (npc) and the npc Standing Committee Legal Work Committee, pointing out the many faults in the draft and successfully convincing the npc Standing Committee to postpone deliberation. This volume of Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment aims, for the sake of public interest, to record, evaluate, and reflect on China’s environmental conditions. We hope that English-language readers will find it useful.

Acknowledgements Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 3 is a collection of articles selected from The China Environment Yearbook published in Chinese in 2013. The translation of the edition could not have been accomplished without the efforts of a group of devoted volunteers. We are indebted to Zhou Yong who translated the long and informative General Report plus several other chapters and Cai Jindong who translated Annual Indexes with numerous tables and figures and a chapter. We are grateful to all the other volunteers who translated the remaining chapters. While most of them have participated in the translation project of the previous China Environment Yearbooks, some new volunteers have joined the team this year. They are engaged in different professions, but their working language is English. They completed the translation with excellence. Their sincere dedication to Friends of Nature and environmental protection is truly admirable. They are Chen Juebin, Cheng Minghui, Gong Yan, Gu Qing, Lan Chun, Li Zhaohui, Liang Hong, Sheng Changying, Song Ying, Wan Feng, Wang Lili, Zhai Zheng, Zhao Fang, and Zhou Wei. Erika Scull did the final editing for the whole book, and joined Professors Judith Shapiro of American University and Guobin Yang of the University of Pennsylvania on the International Advisory Board. We are deeply grateful to this dedicated group for their support and wisdom.

Friends of Nature

List of Figures FIGURE Caption 7.1 Nitrogen oxide emission limits  113 7.2 PAHs emission concentration limit  115 9.1 Contribution of farming, animal and poultry breeding, and fisheries to nitrogen and phosphorus pollution  135 11.1 Percentage of reclaimed water in Beijing’s total water supply  156 13.1 A snow leopard captured by a camera trap in the Sogya Area, Zhidoi County, Yushu Prefecture. The background is a typical alpine meadow and bare-rock landscape where snow leopards live  191 13.2 Yunta villagers discussing fee scheme and village rules before the arrival of the Cordyceps season in 2012  197 13.3 A common scene: young people idle around on motorbikes in front of newly built resettlement areas for pastoralists   199 13.4 The Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society invited twentythree tulkus to sign their names on the Tibetan bunting thangka, making it a sacred bird  200 13.5 Roadside paintings on the protection of the Tibetan bunting and signpost for the Tibetan bunting protection zone  201 13.6 Group photo taken after pastoralists were granted the patrol license by staff members of the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve   202 13.7 Patrol license granted to patrollers of Cuochi by the Administration of Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve  204 14.1 Comparison of national nature reserves and national parks of China with conservation priority areas identified by the China Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan   210 14.2 Management mechanism for protected natural area system  217 14.3 Connecting communities to protected natural areas  219 17.1 Proposed dams on the Heilong/Amur River   252 21.1 Distribution of AQTI assessed cities  293 21.2 Comparison of AQTI scores in ten cities between 2010 and 2012  294 21.3 Comparison of AQTI scores between Chinese and international cities  295 21.4 News reports on haze in different places  299 21.5 Photos of Beijing taken by photographer Wang Yikun (December 2–5, 2011)  300 A.1 Water quality of China’s 7 largest water systems  322

list of figures

A.2 A.3 A.4 A.5 A.6 A.7

Water quality of state-level monitored lakes and reservoirs  324 Offshore seawater quality  327 Generation and utilization of industrial solid waste nationwide from 2004 to 2011  330 Urban air quality from 2004 to 2011  331 Acid rain frequency nationwide from 2006 to 2011  332 Urban sound environment nationwide from 2007 to 2011  334

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List of Tables Table Caption 7.1 11.1 14.1 14.2 17.1 21.1 A.1 A.2

A.4 A.5 A.6 A.7 A.8 A.9 A.10 A.11 A.12 A.13 A.14 A.15 A.16

Waste incineration power generation investment enterprises processing capability  109 Prices (RMB per ton) for tap water and reclaimed water in Beijing  160 Recommended framework for protected natural areas management  214 Combined use of functional zoning and management types  216 List of selected dams, planned or under construction, on the Salween River  250 AQTI assessment scores and rankings of 113 cities in 2012  292 Emission of major pollutants in exhaust gas nationwide in 2011  321 Comparison of China’s 7 largest water systems in 2010 by categories of water quality  322
A.3 Water quality of key lakes and reservoirs in 2011  323 Water quality of state-level monitored lakes and reservoirs from 2004 to 2011  323 Discharge of major pollutants in wastewater nationwide in 2011  326 Offshore seawater quality in 2011  327 Water quality of seagoing river cross-sections in 2011  328 Total discharge of pollutants from seagoing rivers into the 4 largest seas in 2011  328 Discharge of pollutants directly into the sea in 2011  329 Reception of direct pollution into the 4 largest sea areas in 2011  329 Generation and utilization of industrial solid waste nationwide in 2011  330 Generation and utilization of industrial solid waste nationwide from 2004 to 2011  330 Urban air quality from 2004 to 2011  331 Acid rain frequency nationwide from 2006 to 2011  332 Urban sound environment nationwide from 2007 to 2011 (unit: %)  333 Monitoring points reaching the standards in urban functional zones nationwide in 2011  335

List of Contributors Throughout this volume, Chinese names are ordered according to standard practice in China, with surnames preceding given names. To add clarity to this ordering, surnames are in capital letters in the following list of contributors. Liu Jianqiang (刘鉴强) is an award-winning investigative journalist and the Beijing editor of Chinadialogue, the first English-Chinese website focusing on reporting environmental issues. His books include Heavenly Beads—a Tibetan Journey in Hong Kong and Mainland China (2009) and The Last Rafting on Jinsha River (2012). Bao Zhiheng (鲍志恒) is a reporter with the Oriental Morning Post. Cheng Cunwang (程存旺) is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at Renmin University with a research interest in ecological farming, sustainable living, and mutual help between urban and rural areas. Ding Zhouyang (丁舟洋) is working toward a Master’s degree at the College of Literature and Journalism at Sichuan University and currently is an intern with Oriental Outlook Weekly. Feng Jie (冯洁), working with Southern Weekly, was the first reporter to cover the oil spill in the Bohai Sea in 2011 and followed up the event afterwards. Gao Shengke (高胜科) is a reporter at Caijing Magazine, with a main focus on investigatory reporting in major environmental incidents and environmental technology. Guo Weiqing (郭巍青) is a professor at the School of Government and Public Affairs at Sun Yat-sen University and a full-time research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Public

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Administration. His major research fields cover public policy analysis, government and local control, and civil society development. Hu Kanping (胡勘平) is director of research and communications at the Chinese Ecological Civilization Research and Promotion Association and a professor at Zhejiang Agricultural and Forestry University. Huo Weiya (霍伟亚) is editor-in-chief for the NGO magazine The Youth Environment Review. Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (ipe). This investigatory report was written by He Jing (贺静), Ma Jun (马军), Shen Su’nan (沈苏南), Qi Yu (戚宇), Li Jie (李杰), Zhang Yi (张一), Wang Jingjing (王晶晶), Sabrina Orlins of ipe, and Yao Zhiliang (姚志良), Ye Yu (叶宇), and Wang Linna (王霖娜) from the Department of Environmental Engineering and Sciences at Beijing Technology and Business University. Li Bo (李波) is a member of the board of directors and senior advisor of Friends of Nature. He graduated with a Master’s in Natural Resources Management from Cornell University. He is a research fellow at the India China Institute of the New School in New York City. Liu Yiman (刘伊曼) is a reporter with Oriental Outlook Weekly, who has published many articles on the excessive hydroelectric development in Southwest China. Ma Tianjie (马天杰) is a project officer for pollution prevention and control at Greenpeace, aiming to reduce pollution by toxic and hazardous chemicals and heavy metals in the environment. He graduated from Peking University and American University, majoring in Global Environmental Policy. Mao Da (毛达) is a postdoctoral scholar at the College of Chemistry at Beijing Normal University. Meng Si (孟斯) is a special reporter with www.chinadialogue.net.

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Peng Lin (彭林) is a postdoctoral scholar at the Department of Government and Public Administration of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His major research interest is ngos working for disaster and environmental control in China. Qie Jianrong (郄建荣) is a member of Friends of Nature, and a senior journalist with the Legal Daily. Erika Scull (International Advisory Board) has an M.A. in Global Environmental Policy from American University’s School of International Service and is a former Boren Scholarship recipient for her work on China’s environment. Judith Shapiro (International Advisory Board) is the director of the Natural Resources and Sustainable Development M.A. program at American University’s School of International Service in Washington, D.C. She has published extensively on modern and ­contemporary China, including Mao’s War against Nature (Cambridge, 2001) and China’s Environmental Challenges (Polity, 2012). Shi Yan (石嫣) has a Ph.D. from the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at Renmin University and is a postdoctoral scholar at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Tsinghua University. She is vice president of the Urban—Rural Network: Generating New Forms of Exchange between Citizens (urgenci). The Sanjiangyuan Project Team of the Shan Shui Conservation Center (北京山水自然保护中心三江源项目组) consists of the following staff members: Sun Shan (孙姗), Yin Hang (尹杭), Zhao Xiang (赵翔), Ma Haiyuan (马海元), He Xin (何欣), He Bing (何兵). Lü Zhi (吕植), a professor of Biological Protection from Peking University and executive director of the Peking University Center for Nature and Society, is also the director of the Shan Shui Conservation Center. The chapter in this book was mainly written by Sun Shan. Song Guojun (宋国君) is a professor in the Department of Environmental Economics and Management at the School of Environment and Natural Resources at Renmin

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University and the director of the Institute of Environmental Policy and Planning. He received his Ph.D. in Environmental Economics from Renmin University. Tu Fangjing (涂方静) works as an intern for Southern Weekly. Wu Fengshi (吴逢时) is a professor of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (cuhk) and deputy director of the Research Center for Civil Society at cuhk. His research fields cover civil society development in China, transnational social advocacy and modern Chinese politics, environmental politics, and global management control. Xie Yan (解焱) is an associate research fellow with the Institute of Zoology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the secretary general of the International Society of Zoological Sciences. She founded the China Species Information Service (csis), and her major publications include China Species Red List, A Guide to the Mammals of China and the Biodiversity Atlas of China. Yi Yimin (易懿敏) is project officer at Moving Mountains, where she researches the social and environmental impacts of economic development in China and overseas. Yang Changjiang (杨长江) is a journalist with China Inspection and Quarantine Times, with a focus on covering the issue of urban waste. Guobin Yang (International Advisory Board) is an associate professor of Communication and Sociology in the Annenberg School for Communication and Department of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. He has published widely on environmental ngos and activism in China, and is the author of The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. Yu Jie (喻婕) is the director of external affairs and policy research at The Nature Conservancy.

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Zhang Shiqiu (张世秋) is a professor at the College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at Peking University. She has long been engaged in teaching and research in environmental economics and policy. Zhang Zhen (张震) is a Ph.D. candidate of Population, Resources, and Environmental Economics at the School of Environment and Natural Resources at Renmin University.

Volume Overview

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Rapid Urbanization: The Environmental Cost and the Way Forward* Li Bo Abstract The “Top Five” environmental challenges facing Chinese cities today affect people’s basic living conditions. These challenges are air, water, food, traffic, and garbage. Since ongoing, rapid urbanization in China has sparked an environmental crisis, there is an urgent need for us to rethink the way to urbanize. The accelerated urbanization in western regions as part of China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) poses a particularly tough challenge. How can these regions be developed in an eco-friendly way that assures environmental safety in China and, especially, that matches local resource endowments?

Keywords urbanization – air pollution – solid waste – urbanization in the western regions – environmental standards

China is going through an important stage in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011– 2015). It is changing into a country with a relatively high degree of urbanization, where formerly rural areas used to contain the majority of the population. By 2020, there will be more than eighty Chinese cities with a population of over one million each, according to forecasts published by the World Bank in 2010.1 In 2008, McKinsey projected that there will be nearly one billion people living in Chinese cities by 2025, including 221 cities with a population of at least one million (compared with only thirty-five in Europe by that time), twenty-three cities with a population of at least five million, eight cities with a * My special gratitude goes to Han Zhen for his support in international cases and Sun Shan for the writing of this general report. 1 Ruan Yulin, “The World Bank Forecasts Over 80 Chinese Cities Will Each Have a Population of One Million People by 2020,” China News, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/10– 03/2569011.shtml (accessed October 3, 2010).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi 10.1163/9789004269385_002

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population of at least ten million, and two cities with a population of at least twenty million.2 By comparison, China had an urban population of only sixtyone million in the early 1950s. Behind China’s great achievements in economic development over the last three decades lies the environmental cost of this rapid urbanization. From the perspectives of the public and mainstream media, however, it seems that the environmental cost has long been associated with resource-rich remote areas where the victims are usually wildlife or the rural population. While benefiting from an unfair system characterized by the urban-rural divide, people in Chinese cities seemingly have nothing to do with this cost. But there have been obvious changes in the situation in recent years. As if overnight, Chinese urban residents have found out that tough environmental challenges are no longer a distant and abstract concept, as environmental pollution has been threatening their lives. Like rapidly growing malicious tumors, urban diseases have caused a fast increase in public anxiety about environmental safety. The World Expo 2010 Shanghai had the theme “Better City, Better Life.” But instead of a better life, people are suffering from deteriorating environments and quality of life. Residents in Chinese cities (especially in large ones) are showing great concern about the lack of control over the future of their cities. It is in this context that Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Volume 3 focuses on the relationship between urbanization and environmental crisis. 1

Rapid Urbanization Encounters an Environmental Crisis

The “Top Five” environmental challenges facing Chinese cities today affect people’s basic living conditions. These challenges are air, water, food, traffic, and garbage. 1.1 Air Pollution One of the biggest challenges Chinese cities are facing is air pollution. Lasting smog has drawn unprecedented public attention and led to a consensus across society. In early January 2013, Beijing, which was among the first large Chinese cities required to implement the newly revised Ambient Air Quality Standard (环境空气质量标准), increased the indices for main pollutants from three to six. The government now releases a measurement of PM2.5 particles—a 2 Zhang You, “McKinsey Report: Ultra-large City Strategy Should be Prioritized,” Beijing News, March 26, 2008.

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pollutant that has been widely reported on in the media. It also releases a fivedistrict measurement of the leading pollutant and air pollution index (API) for the current day and forecast for the next twenty-four hours. The complaints and actions by the public in 2011 and 2012 played a critical role in official PM2.5 measurements having been included in those measurements being made public. Smog covered large areas of central and eastern urban-dense regions four times in the first thirty days of 2013, according to measurements from China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Accompanied by deteriorating air quality, heavily polluted air mixed with fog covered 1.4 million square kilometers and affected at least 800 million people in January: 50% of the total area of the economically developed coastal regions in eastern China and 60% of the local population in those regions. As for Beijing, there were twenty-five days in which smog caused severe air pollution and only five days when air quality was slightly better. Severe air pollution spoiled the atmosphere when the traditional Chinese New Year was around the corner. To make things worse, Wu Xiaoqing (吴晓青), the vice minister of the MEP, told the public in an interview with the People’s Daily that “it took developed countries in Europe and North America thirty to fifty years to solve the problem of air pollution. We should look at the current situation correctly, fully understand the difficulty and complexity of improving air quality and the long time needed for addressing the problem, and thus be mentally prepared for a prolonged struggle.”3 Zhong Nanshan (钟南山), a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), warned that “smog is much more hazardous than SARS.”4 This is simply because nobody can escape from air pollution, and, whether indoors or outdoors, it is impossible to isolate the air pollution. Mr. Zhong quoted research statistics from Hong Kong: every 10–microgram increase in PM2.5 per cubic meter causes a 3.1% increase in the hospitalization rate of patients with respiratory diseases. The daily average fatality rate will increase by 11% if haze particles increase to 200 micrograms from 25 micrograms. In Beijing, for example, the number of patients with lung cancer has increased by 60% over the past decade. Smog will damage human health in a comprehensive and long-term manner. Yu Jianhua (于建华), director of the Office of Air Quality at the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, said that motor vehicles, coal, 3 Sun Xiuyan, “The MEP: It Took 30–50 Years for Developed Countries to Solve the Problem of Air Pollution,” People’s Daily, January 31, 2013. 4 Zhong Nanshan, “Haze Has Much Worse Effects on Heart and Blood Vessels Than Does SARS,” CCTV News 1+1, January 31, 2013.

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dust, and industries represent 22.2%, 16.7%, 16.3%, and 15.7% of the effect on air quality in Beijing, respectively. Today, there are over five million motor vehicles in Beijing, whereas this number has long exceeded eight million units in many other international metropolises. Nonetheless, PM2.5 pollution is much less severe in the latter ones than in Chinese cities. The quality of gasoline products relevant to exhaust from motor vehicles has therefore become a hot topic. Beijing has already implemented the new Beijing Standard V, but it cannot change the fact that the overall quality of oil remains low throughout China.5 Moreover, a large number of non-local vehicles travel to and from Beijing each and every day in addition to local ones that have been formally registered. This requires higher gasoline product standards to be implemented across China. Beijing remains unable to assure a unified quality in the local market. In short, both oil product standards and quality supervision over oil products are national rather than local issues. The government needs to develop and implement relevant laws and regulations, whereas companies need to fulfill their social responsibility instead of aiming solely at making profits. To address air pollution caused by emissions from motor vehicles, the top priority should be to push a “public transit first” strategy and to radically change urban plans. China has high energy consumption per unit of GDP. In 2011, China accounted for 10.48% of the global GDP, but consumed nearly 60% of the cement, 49% of the iron and steel, and 20.3% of the energy produced globally. As a result, greatly reducing the energy consumption per unit of GDP is also an important strategy for significantly saving energy, reducing emissions, developing a low-carbon economy, and improving air quality. Published in May 2012, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Major Areas (重点区域大气污染防治“十二五”规划) targets forty-seven cities across China and will put stringent restrictions on heavily polluting projects in industries such as iron and steel, cement, petrochemicals, chemicals, and non-ferrous metals. This plan proposes three innovative air quality management policies including: the total emission of pollutants is taken as a precondition for environmental assessment and approval of projects; there is an upper limit on the total coal usage in thirteen areas (the Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei Province regions; the Yangtze River Delta; the Pearl River Delta; central Liaoning Province; Shandong Peninsula; the city of Wuhan and its periphery; the cities of Changsha, Zhuzhou, and Xiangtan in Hunan Province; the cities of Chengdu and Chongqing in western China; the west side of the Taiwan Strait; central and northern Shanxi Province; the Guanzhong Plain in Shaanxi Province; the city of Urumchi in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; and the cities of Lanzhou and Baiyin in Gansu Province), while the total amount 5 Ibid.

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of energy consumption can only be increased by increasing the use of clean energy; and for every unit of pollution from new projects, there must be a decrease of two units of pollution, instead of one unit of pollution like before. The issue of air quality has pushed the public, the media, experts, and government agencies to reach a consensus on air pollution and emergency efforts. In January 2013, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Tsinghua University jointly published a report titled Toward an Environmentally Sustainable Future: Environmental Analysis of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国国 家环境分析), stating that fewer than 1% of the 500 large Chinese cities meet the WHO air quality standard. Experts said in an interview with the Economic Information Daily that to address excessive PM2.5 pollution, efforts should be made in terms of industrial structure, energy structure, and urban planning as soon as possible because top-down design is the right solution to address the root cause of air pollution. Seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities are in China despite the fact that the Chinese government has been aggressively handling air pollution by financial and administrative means. There was even a striking headline on the People’s Daily Online and Xinhuanet: “ADB: Air Pollution Causes the Greatest Damage Among all the Pollution Problems in China.” In China, frequent media reports on “London smog” were published at a time when air pollution was worsening. This discussion has led us to reflect on why we are discussing London smog. Is it intended to persuade the public to believe that pollution is unavoidable for economic development and that the resulting costs are nothing but normal? Or is it intended to analyze how we should learn from London’s experience and change our strategies in a timely manner? After all, the current period greatly differs from the time when London was notorious for smog in that it is not comparable to today’s China in terms of either technology or social management. China has been learning from developed countries in the aspects of industrial and urban planning since it began the Reform and Opening Up period. But to what extent are we also learning a lesson from these pioneers in industry development and urbanization so as to avoid their mistakes? 1.2 Shortage and Pollution of Water Resources Supplying water to cities is another tough challenge. Water resources in China are not only insufficient but also heavily polluted. It remains difficult to stop the pollution and excessive exploitation of groundwater, and there is a high cost of handling such problems. Of all the 4,727 groundwater monitoring points in 200 Chinese cities, those with excellent, good, or pretty good water quality account for 45% and those with poor or very poor water quality represent 55%, according to the Report on

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the State of the Environment in China 2011 (2011中国环境状况公报). Of more than 600 cities across China, over 300 are short of water. Of these, 108 cities are faced with severe water scarcity. With water per capita at only 1/13 of the global average, Beijing even lags behind several arid Arabic-speaking countries. The China Water Pollution Map, created by the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), provides data on water pollution and effluent. Nearly 2.2 billion tons of water are polluted by clothes washing alone every year. China is now working on a massive South-to-North Water Diversion Project that costs several hundred billion RMB. Unfortunately, water in southern China became more heavily polluted while this mega project was still in progress.6 1.3 Food Safety Concerns Caused by Heavy Metal Pollution Direct and indirect heavy metal pollution of water and soil ultimately ends up in food. A recent spot check was made to measure harmful heavy metals in the soil of 300,000 hectares of basic farmland in China. The findings show that 36,000 hectares, or 12.1% of the measured farmland, was excessively polluted by heavy metals. An environmental authority estimated that 12 million tons of grains are contaminated by heavy metals across China every year, resulting in a direct financial loss of over 20 billion RMB.7 In 2009, a cadmium spill in the city of Liuyang (浏阳), Hunan Province caused pollution to farmland and woodland around the polluting plant, two human deaths, and excessive cadmium in the urine samples of over 500 others. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), about 10 million hectares of farmland, or more than 10% of nationwide farmland, has been polluted by heavy metals. In addition, about 2.16 million hectares of farmland are irrigated by polluted water and about 133,000 hectares of farmland have been damaged by solid waste, most of which is in economically developed regions.8 Contamination of vegetables in the city of Shouguang (寿光), Shandong Province became a major public concern more than one year ago. Journalists noted that papermaking and chemical plants could be seen everywhere in a place known as China’s 6 Ye Tan, “The Water Crisis in China,” Hexun, http://opinion.hexun.com/2012-0828/145228978_2.html (accessed August 28, 2012). 7 Wang Erde, “The State Council Strongly Supports Efforts to Prevent and Control Soil Pollution, Signaling a Potential One Trillion RMB Soil Remediation Market,” 21st Century Business Herald, January 29, 2013. 8 Zhang Ke, “Twelve Million Tons of Grains are Contaminated by Heavy Metals in China Each Year, With a Direct Finacncial Loss of Twenty Billion Yuan,” China Business News, January 29, 2013.

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largest vegetable distribution center. Local vegetable farmers detest these factories because of the wastewater and gases they emit as well as the soil pollution they cause.9 1.4 Waste Treatment: Difficulties and Mistakes The garbage crisis in Chinese cities deserves close attention. Local municipal authorities are struggling with problems such as a sharp increase of solid waste, inefficient methods of garbage treatment, and various pollution problems. Large waste incinerator projects have been or are being implemented across China in recent years. Unfortunately, it is very risky to incinerate trash without proper separation, recycling, and treatment. Classification of waste in Chinese cities is far from satisfactory. There are people who pick recyclables from trash to make a living, and resource recycling systems are available in cities. But urban residents have not formed a habit of separating garbage. As a result, household garbage is always a mixture of dry and wet waste. In addition, effective methods of trash management based on classification are unavailable in residential areas. In other words, Chinese cities have great potential in terms of waste classification and conversion into resources, and there is still much to do to make trash harmless. In this context, a rush to build large waste incinerators will not only add to the burden of the financial sector, but also undercut efforts to reduce trash and turn it into resources. This is because once the focus is on incinerating waste, reliance on the BOT (build-operate-transfer) framework will force municipal authorities to assure the provision of sufficient trash to incineration facilities.10 Moreover, incineration of unclassified waste with high moisture content increases the risks that come with emitting and managing toxic substances. China reached a garbage incineration rate of 19.6% by the end of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010), and is implementing garbage incinerator projects at a faster rate in the current Twelfth Five-Year Plan period. The country expects to achieve the targeted waste incineration rate of 35% nationwide and 48% in the developed eastern regions by the end of this period in 2015.11 Such high targets are controversial and were set without participation by all stakeholders. This essentially conflicts with the second strategic move to 9 10 11

Yi Fan, “Vegetable farms are surrounded by chemical plants, and 80% of local revenues is from heavily polluting industries,” China Business News, September 8, 2012. Xie Qingyu, “Trash Incinerators Are Expected to Have an Annual Income of 31.6 Billion RMB by the End of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan Period,” Nanfang Daily, February 1, 2013. Yu Dawei, “China Is Building Trash Incinerators at a Faster Rate,” Caixin Century, January 9, 2012.

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promote all-around resource conservation and ecological progress; China’s former president, Hu Jintao, said to the CPC’s Eighteenth National Congress: Resource conservation is an important way to protect the environment. We should conserve resources and use them efficiently and bring about a fundamental change in the way resources are utilized. We should strengthen conservation efforts, drastically reduce energy, water, and land consumption per unit of GDP, and use such resources in a better and more efficient way . . . We should develop a circular economy to reduce waste and resource consumption, reuse resources, and recycle waste in the process of production, distribution, and consumption.12 In recent years, incineration facilities that are under construction, planned, or in operation across China have been located in sensitive urban areas with great environmental and health risks. This issue is a potential threat to social stability and harmony unless it is properly solved. 1.5 Deteriorating Travel Conditions Traveling conditions are deteriorating in Chinese cities, where traffic jams have affected commuting efficiency while indirectly reducing economic activity. Research has shown that high commuting pressure directly increases citizens’ anxiety. The Chinese government strongly supported the automotive industry in the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plan periods, while paying insufficient attention to the public transit. A great many citizens had to buy motor vehicles as a way of traveling. That is why congestion occurs in every Chinese city each and every day. The only solution to significantly reducing congestion is to: increase spending on low-carbon means of public transit while increasing the cost of going into cities by private vehicles; develop urban plans that encourage and are friendly to public transit; and prioritize public transit and lowcarbon means of traveling among all the ways of commuting. But this may be a long process. For cities where a severe imbalance between traveling by public

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On November 18, 2012, Hu Jintao, the then General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, presented a report titled Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects at the CPC’s 18th National Congress on behalf of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee.

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t­ ransit and private vehicles has not yet occurred, it is advisable to make efforts to avoid such an imbalance before it is too late. 2

Concerns about Western Region Urbanization and Urban Ecological Scarcity

As urbanization is accelerating across China, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Western Development specifies a remarkably faster rate of urbanization in the western regions. This plan defines the targets of western urbanization. Given China’s resource endowments and the current conditions of western China that are tied to the ecological safety of this country, how many city clusters and belts can be built in China? What kind of cities should be built in western China? How can eastern and western urbanization be sustainable under different ecological restrictions and economic bottlenecks? These questions deserve thorough discussion and should be taken seriously. Western China is vital for China’s ecological safety, as most Chinese rivers flow from this region and climate change will have significant effects on local ecosystems. Urbanization should not be an economic development target pushed by local governments, but a result of economic policies that favor sustainable development. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Western Development specifies a good guideline: “We should strictly control industrialization and urbanization and moderately control other development activities in ecologically vulnerable or critical areas in accordance with the national plan for main functional areas and the ecological and geographical characteristics of the western regions, thereby reducing damage to the local ecosystems caused by development activities.” During implementation, however, the main ecological restoration projects and economic targets are planned separately. No clear correlation is seen between ecosystem protection and the measure to “strictly control industrialization and urbanization.” In urbanization plans, not only are there no clear targets regarding ecological carrying capacity and ecosystem protection used as references for management and control, but there have been frequent adjustments made to the borders and protective functions of existing nature reserves at the municipal, provincial, and national levels as a result of invasion by economic and urban development activities. When it comes to the issues of water pollution and water resources in the process of urban development in western China, how should the relationship with communities downstream be handled? How can we logically

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combine urban development with resource exploitation and industrialization in western China? The accelerated urbanization and industrialization of the west are being accompanied by the region’s weak capabilities in management, execution, and public participation. All these have posed tough challenges for two important objectives—containing environmental deterioration and promoting ecological restoration of western China. China Newsweek has reported that, on average, China will build one skyscraper every five days in the next three years and that the city of Lanzhou will level 700 mountains to build a new city. Similar mega programs have been launched in other cities like Yan’an (延安) and Xi’an in western China. A series of commercial development plans intended to build real estate and new cities by leveling mountains have indicated that there is an apparent possibility of imbalance between western urbanization and local ecological carrying capacity.13 Such risks can be seen from the building of a hydropower station in the Three Parallel Rivers National Park (三江并流世界自然遗产地)—an UNESCO World Heritage Site—and of the Xiaonanhai (小南海) hydropower station in Sichuan Province: the borders and functional distribution of world heritage sites or important ecological areas tend to be only marked on smallscale maps without being actually realized. This has allowed local governments to change the borders of nature reserves and adjust these reserves themselves. Even with borders already in place, local governments eager to increase GDP and build new cities generally pay little attention to the national strategic significance of protected areas. When it comes to the major economic areas specified in the Twelfth FiveYear Plan for Western Development, their scopes and sizes are especially worrisome. This plan defines four measures. First, continuing to support eleven major economic areas such as Chengdu-Chongqing, Guanzhong-Tianshui (关中——天水), and Beibuwan (北部湾).14 New strategic bases for western 13

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Qian Wei, “A Hazard Behind the Program to Level Mountains Around Lanzhou: It Was Launched Before Environment Assessment Was Done,” China Newsweek, January 14, 2013; Liu Min, “On the Program to Build a New City by Levelling Mountains Around Ya’an,” China Times, October 10, 2012; Zhao Lei, “Questions About Yan Jiehe’s Ambition to Spend 22 Billion RMB Leveling 700 Mountains to Build Lanzhou New Area,” China Economic Weekly, February 19, 2013. Specifically, the eleven areas are: the Guanzhong-Tianshui area, a city cluster centered around Xi’an that includes Weinan, Xianyang, Baoji, and Tianshui, of which Xi’an and Xianyang will be integrated into the Xi’an Xianyang New Area; the Hohhot-BaotouYinchuan-Yulin area. This is also a resource-rich area and city cluster consisting of Hohhot, Baotou, and Ordos in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Yulin in Shaanxi Province, and Yinchuan in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, of which the first three cities

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d­ evelopment and new growth engines should be built to stimulate the growth of peripheral areas. These eleven economic areas are each centered on an ultralarge city or provincial capital, which in turn is part of a city cluster with smalland medium-sized cities around it. Secondly, promoting the development of major agricultural areas; encouraging eight major agricultural areas to focus on commodities such as grain, cotton, and oil refineries; and providing guidance so that processing, distribution, warehousing, and transportation facilities are moved to leading industrial areas. Thirdly, promoting the sustainable development of major ecologically important areas; carrying out comprehensive protection and restoration for five desertified grassland areas in northwestern China. Fourthly, promoting the efficient development of resource-rich areas; making an overall plan for developing eight areas such as Ordos (鄂尔多斯) to turn them into new, nationally strategic energy and resource suppliers; rationally developing resource-rich areas on the one hand and working to restore ecologically vulnerable and sensitive areas on the other. This plan specifies that: In implementation the three principles should be paid attention to. First, to continue to prioritize the construction of infrastructure; accelerate the building of modern infrastructure systems that are forward-thinking, functionally supportive, safe, and efficient, especially in the fields of transportation and water resources; second, to accelerate the building of a payment mechanism for ecological services; make greater efforts to restore ecosystems and protect the environment, thereby addressing the root cause of ecological deterioration; and third, to implement a marketoriented strategy to turn major resources into real-world benefits; follow a new approach to industrialization and aggressively participate in will be integrated into a single new area; the Ningxia Yellow River area, which is centered around Yinchuan; the Lanzhou-Xining-Golmud area. This is a city cluster centered around Lanzhou that covers the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, and the Lanzhou New Area will be built; the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area. This is centered around Yan’an; the northern Tianshan area which is centered around Urumchi; the Chengdu-Chongqing area. This is centered around Chongqing and Chengdu and includes over thirty cities in Chongqing Municipality and Sichuan Province, of which Chengdu, Deyang, and Mianyang will be integrated into a single new area, with the Liangjiang New Area and Tianfu New Area to be built; the Beibuwan area, a city cluster centered around Nanning and also includes Beihai, Qinzhou, and Fangchenggang; the central Yunnan area. This is centered around Kunming, which will be integrated with Yuxi; the central Guizhou area, centered around Guiyang, which will be integrated with Anshun; and the central south Tibet area which is centered around Lhasa.

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an industrial shift to create a new pattern in which traditional leading industries, strategic emerging industries, and modern services develop in a coordinated manner.15 Given previous and ongoing cases of environmental pollution and damage to resources, however, working under these three important principles in a coordinated rather than fragmented manner still comes with challenges and uncertainties. Looking at the current measures for ecological restoration, regardless of payments for ecosystem services (PES) or for ecosystem restoration, we do not see how we can control or coordinate conflicts caused by urbanization, industrialization, and the development of modern agriculture. Although some experts and officials have explicitly recommended not copying the urbanization pattern of the eastern coastal regions, Chinese government authorities and agencies ranging from planners to regulators have not made any specific urbanization policies to alleviate the push to develop the central and western regions, to differentiate them from the eastern coastal regions in terms of pace, size, and pattern, and to align development activities with ecological carrying capacity and the safety of the these regions. Instead, there are numerous signs that, stimulated by China’s macroeconomic policies for a new round of industrial development and for the shift of the heavy chemical industry to the central and western regions, a great many low-tech, heavily polluting industries which are prohibited from being shifted are actually being moved secretly to these regions as a result of regulatory inefficiency. This has caused damage to local ecosystems. The resulting pollutants then spread with rivers and winds to the populous eastern coastal city clusters and circles. Industries that heavily pollute water, soil, and vegetation, in particular, such as smelting, mining, and heavy chemicals, deserve extra attention. It is also worth mentioning that the MLR has made a major move to explore and exploit resources in western China and issued policies intended to stimulate local economic development.16 How can we make sure that their implementation rules align with the strategy for land planning specific to the central and western regions? How can macroscopic planning be coordinated with microscopic implementation? At least from the perspective of public information, neither of the answers is known and understood by the public. 15 16

Xia Qing, “The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Western Development Aas Approved and Prioritizes Eleven Economic Areas,” Securities Daily, February 21, 2012. The General Office of the State Council, the Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Circulating the Outline of the Ministry of Land & Resources and Other Ministries on National Exploration & Development Planning (2011–2020).

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In addition to the aforementioned frequent occurrence of resource scarcity and environmental deterioration in western China, the issue of scarcity in urban development in general deserves attention. Groundwater pollution and tap water supply pose tough challenges in most Chinese cities. In Beijing, for example, the amount of water resources per capita and groundwater exploitation have long been at critical levels, making it necessary to divert water from afar at a high cost. In the meantime, however, urban development in this city is carried out with anything but ecosystem protection in mind. Ground hardening, for example, has disrupted natural water distribution by preventing water infiltration. This has resulted in a lack of natural replenishment of water resources and increased pressure on flood protection and spending on relevant facilities. Such ecological scarcity constitutes a common phenomenon in the development of emerging cities, as people tend to consume ecological resources while disrupting their restoration at will so as to meet short-term project objectives and management requirements in fast urbanization. This has led to a fragmented urban ecosystem. Back in 1998, scholars including Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), Wang Yi (王毅), and Liu Wenyuan (刘文元) pointed out that the Chinese economy was facing a severe problem of resource scarcity. They said: China cannot afford to achieve growth by consuming tremendous resources, letting consumer prices stay high, developing heavily-polluting industries, and sacrificing the environment as did industrialized nations. Instead, it can only do it under the general principle of ‘save resources, maintain moderate consumption, focus on sustainable development, conduct overall control, protect the environment, and restore the ecosystem.’ This non-traditional approach to modernization will enable us to deal with resources and the environment in an efficient, coordinated, stable, and balanced manner.17 At a time when China is on a fast track to urbanization, however, how exactly can we balance urbanization with resource scarcity while giving guiding opinions and strict restrictions on economic policies? The answer is unavailable, either intentionally or unintentionally.

17

Hu Angang, Wang Yi, and Liu Wenyuan, Ecological Deficits: the Biggest Crisis for the Future Survival of the Nation—Analysis on the State of the Environment in China (1998), 1998.

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National Environmental Standards Must be Aligned with International Counterparts

Environmental standards are a very important element of environmental public policies. Take cases that occurred in 2012, for example. There was a debate on the PM2.5 standard before the issue of fuel standards was raised during discussions on the causes of smog. At the same time, reports relevant to the correlation between urban drinking water standards and human health appeared on the front pages of newspapers in Beijing and many other Chinese cities. Who develops these standards? Who should participate in setting these standards? Which interest groups care about the issue of environmental standards? Is there any lobbying group that dominates the making of public policies? When a health crisis breaks out, such an interest group usually escapes without cost, while public power attempts to recover the resulting losses by using taxpayers’ resources. These issues are most noteworthy when environmental standards are included into environmental public policies. It was proposed in the 2012 draft amendment to China’s Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法) that Article 9, Provision 1 specify that: “Environmental benchmarks that match China’s national conditions shall be defined. The competent department of environmental protection under the State Council shall align environmental standards with environmental protection targets and develop national standards regarding the quality of the environment.” An “environmental benchmark” refers to the highest content at which a particular pollutant in the environment will do no harm to particular objects (human beings or other living things and the environment). If we adopt “Chinese-unique” environmental benchmarks to develop national standards that are much less stringent than international standards, however, the public will doubtlessly ask the question: why can Chinese people withstand more pollutants without becoming less healthy or living shorter lives than other people? If we guide policies, make plans, and take measures in accordance with national standards based on “Chinese-unique” environmental benchmarks, does it mean that part of the environmental and ecological shortages will be “institutionally” concealed? Will the driving forces for changes and improvements in the environmental sector be significantly reduced? The debate between the government and the public about whether the national PM10 standard or the WHO’s PM2.5 standard should be adopted could have lasted longer if air pollution had not exhibited itself in the form of obvious smog that produced immediate and widespread effects across China. Given the inefficiency in decision making even when the consequences of air pollution are visible to everyone, how should we review corresponding

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s­ tandards if the same scenario occurs to other issues of pollution, such as the less obvious heavy metal pollution and the effects of other persistent pollutants on human beings? In other words, how sensitive will we be and what response mechanism will we use to respond in a timely and effective way when environmental pollution occurs in an invisible, progressive, and accumulative manner? Aligning national environmental standards with their international counterparts is probably the right strategic start. Under the vision of “a beautiful China” proposed at the CPC’s Eighteenth National Congress, public health and happiness have been given unprecedented priority. In this situation, environmental standards will doubtlessly become a major public concern. Scheduling timely alignment of national environmental standards with their international counterparts, together with an open process of modification, will be an important move that the government can make to win public trust. 4

Main Annual Environmental Data: Implication and Analysis

All the information and data in this section are from the 2011 version of the Report on the State of the Environment in China published in May 2012. We hope that the points of our explanation and corresponding questions can become the focus of future interactions between the government’s environmental reports and public/environmental organizations. Generally speaking, there is no obvious relationship between the report and the handling of major local environmental events. There is also no visible relationship between the proposed countermeasures and the safety and health of the locals. The report is supposed to be meaningful and understandable to the public. It should become one of the fundamental documents for public participation in and monitoring of environmental work. Obviously, there is much room for improvement in this respect. The report comprises twelve sections including freshwater, oceans, atmosphere, sound, solid waste, radiation, ecosystems, land and rural environment, forests, grasslands, climate, and natural disasters. These sections present measures of the environment in China based on figures from environmental monitoring. 4.1 Freshwater Freshwater is categorized into surface water and groundwater. According to a separate official report for the year 2011, “The entirety of surface water in China was slightly polluted . . . and there remained a severe problem of

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eutrophication in lakes (and reservoirs).” The same report said that “the quality of groundwater was monitored in 200 cities across China . . . water of excellent, good, or relatively good quality represented 45% of China’s total and water of poor or very poor quality represented 55%.” Regarding the state of rivers, assessments in the Report on the State of the Environment in China include: “good as a whole” (5 times), “excellent” (15 times), “water quality is good” (4 times), “slightly polluted” (17 times), “moderately polluted” (8 times), and “heavily polluted” (6 times). Comparative assessments include: “no obvious changes” (25 times), “noticeably better” (25 times), and “noticeably worse” (1 time). With regard to changes in assessments on water quality (regardless of the trunk streams of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers with excellent water quality or the provinces of Shandong and Yunnan and the Liaohe and Songhua Rivers with obviously better water quality), there may be differences between data from the official report and how people actually feel owing to a lack of enough information on public participation and monitoring. “No obvious changes,” for example, may refer to the extent of water pollution. Descriptions of groundwater pollution in this report are even simpler. It is impossible to glean from the report what exactly is meant by “poor and very poor water quality represented 55%,” “water quality became better at 17.4% of the monitoring points,” “water quality was stable at 67.4% of the monitoring points,” and “water quality became poorer at 15.2% of the monitoring points,” as well as what are the differences between “good” and “poor.” Under the “Measures and Action,” section however, the report says that, on October 10, 2011, the State Council officially approved the National Plan for Prevention and Control of Groundwater Pollution (2011–2020) (全国地下水污染防治规 划 (2011–2020年)) worked out after eight years of efforts by the MEP together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Land Resources, the Ministry of Housing and UrbanRural Development, and the Ministry of Water Resources. The report does not mention the specific pollution control targets in this plan, but it does say that the plan covers assessment on the profile of groundwater pollution. The monitored lakes (and reservoirs) include twenty-six state-controlled ones: the Tai (太湖), Dian (滇池), Chao (巢湖), Dalai (达赉湖), Hongze (洪泽湖), Nansi (南四湖), Baiyangdian (白洋淀), Bositeng (博斯腾湖), Dongting (洞庭湖), Jingpo (镜泊湖), Poyang (鄱阳湖), and Er (洱海) lakes; five lakes in cities, including the East Lake (东湖) in Wuhan, the Xuanwu Lake (玄武湖) in Nanjing, the Kunming Lake (昆明湖) in Beijing, the West Lake (西湖) in Hangzhou, and the Daming Lake (大明湖) in Jinan; and nine large reservoirs. In addition to water quality, measures for assessing

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lakes include the extent of eutrophication. Among the twenty-six lakes and reservoirs, the Dian and Dalai Lakes had water quality inferior to Level V (the very worst, unsuitable for any public use), together with the highest extents of eutrophication. The Qiandaohu Reservoir (千岛湖) had the best water quality and was the only one with Level I quality; the Danjiangkou (丹江口), Miyun (密云), Menlou (门楼), and Dahuofang (大伙房) reservoirs had Level II water quality. Regarding changes in water quality, the extent of eutrophication became lower in the Dian, Baiyangdian, Poyang, Dongting, and Daming lakes as well as the Yuqiao (于桥), Dahuofang, and Songhuahu (松花湖) reservoirs. Chao Lake had the worst new situation, as its overall water quality deteriorated to Level V from Level IV and surrounding rivers as a whole were heavily polluted. This report says that “among the twelve state-controlled crosssections, those with water quality at Levels III, IV, and V accounted for 8.3%, 41.7%, and 50% respectively. The combined ratio of cross-sections with water quality at Levels I through III decreased by 25 percentage points from the one year ago; the ratio of cross-sections with water quality inferior to Level V remained changeless; the overall water quality deteriorated significantly.” The Twelfth Five-Year Plan specifies an objective of “greatly improving water quality by preventing the ratio of state-controlled cross-sections with groundwater quality inferior to Level V from exceeding 15% while making sure that the ratio of state-controlled cross-sections in the seven largest drainage systems with water quality better than Level III reaches 60%.” The report gives no information on the role of the aforementioned rivers and lakes in achieving this objective. And it makes no mention of numerous severe water pollution incidents that drew public attention in 2011.18 4.2 Marine Environment “Regarding the four seas in 2011, the overall water quality of sea areas within the jurisdiction of China was pretty good, as the ones that meet the standard for Level I seawater quality accounted for 95% of all these sea areas.” This information in the 2011 version of the report was the first of its kind in such reports. “In 2011, the overall seawater quality in offshore areas across China was average.” This compares with “the entirety of seawater in offshore areas across China was slightly polluted” in the 2010 version of the report. But it is actually difficult to determine from the report whether the “average” is about water quality or its changes. This is because Levels I and II seawater 18

“An Overview of the Top Ten Water Pollution Incidents across China in 2011,” Hunan Economic Website, http://news.h2o-china.com/html/2012/03/1331332382634_1.shtml (accessed March 22, 2012).

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represented 62.8% (up 0.3%); Levels III and IV, 20.3% (up 1.6%); and seawater inferior to Level IV, 16.9% (down 1.9%), if calculated by monitoring points (281,000 square kilometers of sea areas in all). Regarding the seawater quality in offshore areas of the four seas, it was good in the Yellow Sea, average in the South China Sea, and poor in the Bohai and East China Seas. Regarding the seawater quality in nine important bays and estuaries, it was good in the estuary of the Yellow River and the Beibuwan Bay, poor in the Jiaozhou and Liaodong Bays, and extremely poor in the Bohai and Hangzhou Bays as well as the estuaries of the Yangtze, Min, and Pearl Rivers. From the Bohai Sea, for example, we can see changes in the ratios of different levels of seawater quality. Unfortunately, the report makes no mention of the implications of these changes or their correlations with the pollution of rivers that flow into this sea. The 2011 oil spill in the oilfield operated by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and ConocoPhillips was China’s first ever large-scale oil spill from a subsea well. About 700 barrels of crude oil were released into the Bohai Sea and about 2,500 barrels of mineral oil-based drilling mud was deposited on the seabed. The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) said that this incident polluted 5,500 square kilometers of sea area, or about 7% of the total area of the Bohai Sea.19 Strangely enough, the report makes no mention of the effects of this incident or the long-term cleanup and restoration programs. 4.3 Atmospheric Environment The report states that “the overall air quality in cities across China was stable, with no obvious changes in the regional distribution of acid rain.” This section covers air quality (in cities at the prefecture or higher levels and major cities in terms of environmental protection), acid rain (frequency, acidity, chemical composition, and distribution) and the emissions of major pollutants in waste gases. “In 2011, 89% of the 325 cities at the prefecture or higher levels (including capitals of some prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and leagues as well as municipalities directly under the provincial government) met the ambient air quality standard, whereas the remaining 11% did not.” The report explains in a footnote that: “Assessment on air quality in this annual report is based on the Ambient Air Quality Standard (GB3095–1996), with measures including inhalable particles (PM10), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen dioxide (NO2).”

19

Gong Jing, Wang Xiaocong, He Xin, Cui Zheng, and Xiao Erya, “Nobody is Responsible for the Bohai Sea,” Caixin Century, September 6, 2011.

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Regarding smog that occurred in cities nationwide in 2011 and PM2.5 as a major public concern, the report says no more than “improve standards as well as monitoring, assessment, and warning measures relevant to environmental pollution issues that receive much public attention” in the sub-section of the Second Meeting of the National Environment and Health Work Leading Group.20 In the sub-section of Technological Progress in Environmental Protection, the report says preparations for publishing the Ambient Air Quality Standard were almost finished in 2011, while giving no information on PM2.5 being included into regular assessment on air quality. The report also says that: “Regarding the annual average content of inhalable particles in ambient air in 2011, 90.8% of the cities at the prefecture or higher levels met or were better than the Grade II standard, whereas 1.2% others failed to even meet the Grade III standard.” The criteria on which this comment was based deserves careful review. 4.4 Solid Waste Regarding solid waste, this section contains only one sentence: “In 2011, there were 3,251,406,000 tons of industrial solid waste generated across China; 1,997,574,000 tons of such waste was comprehensively used (including the ones stored in previous years); the ratio of comprehensively used waste was 60.5%.” Nonetheless, solid waste comes from more than just industrial sources. Heavy metal pollution occurred frequently in many places in 2011. “Garbage surrounding cities”—a major public concern—also involves solid waste. Published by the then-State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in July 2006, the Guiding Rules for the Release of Environmental Information on Solid Wastes in Medium- and Large-sized Cities (大中城市固体废物污染 环境防治信息发布导则) specified the information that should be released:21 1)

Information on industrial solid waste (solid waste generated in mining, major industrial waste, the names of enterprises that generate such waste, the types of the generated industrial waste, and other relevant information);

20

Feng Yongfeng, “Twenty Incidents like PM2.5 Were Identified as the Leading Environmental Concerns in 2011,” the Guangdong Daily, January 18, 2012; “Urban Air and Noise Pollution Was the Leading Public Concern in 2011,” China Insurance News, December 13, 2011. State Environmental Protection Agency, Notice on Issuing the Guiding Rules for the Release of Environmental Information on Solid Wastes in Medium- and Large-sized Cities, No. 33, 2006, July 10, 2006.

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2)

Information on hazardous waste, including discarded lead-acid batteries, the names of enterprises that generate major hazardous industrial waste, the types of hazardous waste, and other relevant information; 3) Information on urban domestic trash, including construction and demolition waste and leftovers/food scraps; 4) Information on sewage sludge generated by urban sewage treatment plants; 5) Information on rural solid waste (including rural domestic trash, excrement from poultry and livestock, and straw and film for agricultural purposes); 6) Information on non-traditional industrial waste (such as discarded electronics and tires). The report is obviously far from meeting the aforementioned requirements for information release. The descriptions of trash in the report, for example, are included in the sub-sections such as “Actions to improve sanitation in nationwide urban and rural areas,” “Developments in the monitoring of sanitation in nationwide rural areas,” “Developments in groundwater pollution prevention and control,” and “Urban sanitation.” These isolated descriptions fail to give a clear overview of the situation. The report mentions in “Measures and Actions” that: “In 2011, 266 cities released environmental information on solid waste pollution to the public. The number of such cities was nineteen more than in the previous year.” Regarding heavy metal pollution, “blood lead levels” became a hot term in the news in 2010. This was followed by the chromium slag pollution incident in the city of Qujing (曲靖), Yunnan Province in August 2011. But this is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the chromium slag problem across China. Chromium slag is mentioned in the report in only one sentence: “By the end of 2011, more than four million tons of chromium slag had been disposed of across China on an accumulative basis.” The report mentions heavy metals many times, especially the State Council’s reply to the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Comprehensive Prevention and Control of Heavy Metal Pollution (重金属污染综合防治“十二五”规划) and the central government’s 2.5 billion RMB financial support for heavy metal pollution prevention and control in twenty-six provinces. Such descriptions included: “An action intended to assure public health by punishing enterprises that illegally discharge and/or emit pollutants”; “An inspection on the environmental management of chemicals and hazardous wastes across China”; “A statistical reporting system on persistent organic pollutants was created and implemented”; “Standardized hazard waste management, supervision, and

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assessment mechanisms were created”; and “Lead-acid battery makers were most severely punished, thereby effectively curbing the frequent occurrence of high blood lead incidents caused by them.” The aforementioned plan also says that “Heavy metal pollution has been effectively controlled, and significant achievements have been made in preventing and controlling pollution by persistent organic pollutants, hazardous chemicals, and hazardous waste.” Regarding these actions, systems, and mechanisms, however, the report provides no information on specific targets and results. It is therefore necessary to greatly increase the contents of the section on solid waste and relevant ways of description. 4.5 Radiation The report points out: “In 2011, the overall radiation was good across China,” and, in particular, “Radiation measurements indicate that the Fukushima Nuclear Accident has had no impact on the environment and public health in China.” Regarding public concerns such as nuclear safety, the report describes safety regulations, environmental monitoring, and others, with a sub-section specific to the developments in environmental emergency management across China. When it comes to issues relevant to the future of the nation, such as nuclear safety, discussion from the perspectives of risk management, emergency response, and regulation is insufficient. 4.6 Land and Rural Environment The report covers developments in soil erosion and the rural environment in China. It was estimated that the total area that suffers soil erosion was nearly 3,570,000 square meters, or 37.2% of China’s total land area. The report gives no quantitative description of the rural environment and, instead, only gives warnings about living and production issues as well as the shifting of urban and industrial pollution caused by rural changes. In the section on measures and actions, the report covers soil erosion, water-saving agriculture, drinking water safety in rural areas, improvements in sanitation, pilot environmental monitoring projects in rural areas, and so on. Pilot environmental monitoring projects are especially noteworthy. During the development of China, the value of rural areas was underestimated with the exception of food security. In reality, all the mountains, rivers, grasslands, and wetlands in the countryside constitute the last “line of defense” for China’s environment. Environmental protection in rural areas is about much more than making villages look clean and properly treating trash. Instead, it is about recognizing the value of ecosystems, rural areas’ advantages in providing

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eco-friendly products and services, as well as the contribution and desirable rewards of rural areas as service providers in developing a green economy. 4.7 Ecosystems, Forests, and Grasslands This section covers the following: 1. Nature Reserves China had 2,640 nature reserves in 2011, accounting for 14.9% of its total land area. This included 335 nature reserves at the national level, with a total area of 930,000 square kilometers; 2. Wetlands In 2011, “42 wetland protection programs were implemented across China; the net increase in the total area of protected wetlands was 330,000 hectares; 23,000 hectares of wetlands were restored; four more internationally important wetlands were identified; and sixty-eight pilot national wetland parks were opened. By the end of 2011, there were forty-one internationally important wetlands with a total area of 3,710,000 hectares; demonstrative wetlands were 3,490,000 hectares in area”; 3. Biodiversity 2011 data is unavailable; 4. Invasive Species “The latest statistics show that there are already about 500 invasive species across China” and “they cause direct and indirect financial losses of about 119.88 billion RMB in China on an annual basis.” 2011 data is unavailable; 5. Forest Resources 2011 information is the same as in 2010; 6. Forest Pests and Plant Diseases In 2011, “11,680,000 hectares of forests were infested by major forest pests and/ or suffered plant diseases. This included 8,450,000 hectares infested by insect pests, 1,200,000 hectares that suffered plant diseases, and 2,030,000 hectares infested by rats (and hares). Harmful plants appeared in 160,000 hectares of forests”; 7. Forest Fires In 2011, about 5,550 forest fires occurred across China; 27,000 hectares of forests were affected; and ninety-one people were injured or killed in these fires.

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The three figures decreased by 28%, 41%, and 16% respectively, making 2011 the third consecutive year in which they all decreased; 8. Grassland Resources “There were nearly 4 billion hectares of grasslands across China, or about 41.7% of China’s total land area; grasslands constitute China’s largest terrestrial ecosystem and make great contributions to ecological safety.” There was no update for 2011; 9. Grassland Productivity In 2011, the overall growth of grassland vegetation was better than in most of the previous years. China’s total output of natural fresh grass from grasslands reached 1,002,482,600 tons, or up 2.68% from the previous year, equivalent to about 313,220,100 tons of dried grass. Livestock carrying capacity was about 246,199,300 sheep units. Both of these increased by 2.53% from the year before; 10. Grassland Disasters In 2011, eighty-three grassland fires occurred across China, where 17,473.5 hectares of grasslands were affected without human casualties or livestock losses. The number of grassland fires and the resulting losses were both smaller than in the previous year. The total area of grasslands infested by rodents was 38,724,000 hectares, which was about 10% of China’s total grassland area and was almost the same as in the previous year. The total area of grasslands infested by insect pests was 17,658,000 hectares, which was about 4.4% of China’s total grassland area and was 2.3% smaller than in the previous year. The above-listed data from the report suggests that the current assessment of China’s ecosystems, forests, wetlands, and grasslands is still not great. It is necessary to expand ecosystem monitoring, the targets and tracking of protection, and the comprehensive service functions of the ecosystem, rather than only analyzing countermeasures against fires, diseases, and other things. In addition, analyzing the achievement of targets in terms of maintaining the functionality of ecosystems is helpful for assessing whether or not the current financial budget for maintaining the functionality of an ecosystem is clear and sufficient. Also, the fact that the writing of environmental reports is led by the MEP, while forests and grasslands are managed by China’s forestry and agricultural authorities may be a reason for the contrast between these sections and the ones about pollution prevention and control in terms of data granularity.

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4.8 Climate and Natural Disasters The report covers climate, natural disasters as well as measures and actions. Natural disasters include droughts; rainstorms; floods; intense heat; tropical cyclones such as typhoons; disastrous ice and snow; disasters caused by less convection, such as hails; sandstorms; haze; geological disasters such as landslides; earthquakes; and marine disasters. Climate anomalies may be related to global climate change. The report does not cover the effects of local, extreme climate events, although forecast and early warning, rather than emergency response, are critical. Regarding disasters caused by climatic reasons, which ones can be worsened or alleviated by environmental factors? Take the lasting drought in southwest China (Yunnan and Guangxi) in 2011 for example. The drought had weaker effects on drinking water for human beings and livestock as well as agricultural production in areas with better-maintained forest vegetation, such as the ones surrounding nature reserves.22 Analysis is required to determine which marine disasters are caused by the disappearance or deterioration of coastal protective vegetation such as mangrove forests. Damage to nature can exacerbate climate events, such as soil erosion caused by deforestation. Natural protections can alleviate damages and losses caused by climate anomalies and the occurrence of secondary disasters (such as mudslides caused by earthquakes). Between natural ecosystems, climate and natural disasters, and the rural environment, there should be a comprehensive vision at the national level to connect different aspects of the service functions of ecosystems. 4.9 Potentials for Green Development The report has many descriptions of the meaning of environmental economy, green finance, and green investment. This suggests that environmental protection has evolved to promoting the transformation of the economic development pattern from a passive response. In the measures and actions part in the same section, the report says that: “In 2011, 266 cities in 31 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) released environmental information on solid waste pollution to the public. The number of such cities was nineteen more than in the previous year.” Regarding the power to deny projects in accordance with environmental standards amid industry restructuring, the report says that: “Environmental 22 “Divert from Nature Reserves—the Shan Shui Conservation Center’s ‘Protect the Forest from Drought Risk Reduction’ Program in 2010,” http://www.hinature.cn/NewsLetter/ project/water.pdf.

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impact assessment was made in strict accordance with relevant standards, and forty-four projects with a total expected investment of nearly 250 billion RMB that will consume excessive energy and resources and/or be resource-intensive, that are similar or even identical to the ones already implemented, and that will lead to or exacerbate overcapacity, were denied by means of returning the report, giving no reply, or suspending approval procedures.” Regarding financial and economic incentives, such as green credit, the report says: “In 2011, the MEP continued to provide the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) with information on enterprises that broke environmental laws in 2010 as well as environmental information such as environmental assessments and the acceptance of finished projects in accordance with environmental standards. The CBRC issued the Green Credit Guidelines (绿色信贷指引) to provide financial institutions in the banking sector with specific operating criteria in terms of green credit. By taking environmental information as an important reference for credit approval and post-loaning regulation, these financial institutions can prevent a lot of heavily polluting enterprises from accessing funds.” Regarding making more stringent requirements to urge enterprises to increase environmental spending on reducing industrial pollution, the report says: “Relevant authorities worked together to restrict environmentally noncompliant enterprises from exporting products and financing. They organized local environmental assessments on rare-earth enterprises. As a result, more than 300 enterprises in this industry combined to increase environmental spending by more than two billion RMB.” The report quotes a remark made at a meeting of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) in 2011: “China has adhered to green development since the end of the financial crisis.” Regarding the transformation of the economic development pattern toward a green one, the report gives less information on how to leverage instruments such as the market, finance, and credit; and “the majority of spending” refers to public spending on public environmental products. In addition, the report gives insufficient information on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration announced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992; “Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities.” Without public participation in green development, it would be impossible to monitor the execution of relevant policies, however good they may be.

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5 Conclusions China will be faced with serious urban and rural environmental problems for a very long period of time. It is inadvisable to tackle these problems separately. The relationship between Chinese cities and the environment, in particular, requires us to look at urban and rural problems as a whole. Regarding urbanization in China, we must comprehensively consider a series of problems at multiple nexuses such as large cities, small towns, agriculture, and ecosystem conservation. Only by so doing can we avoid the recurrence of the urban-rural divide in emerging city belts, city rings, and communities. It may be necessary to change or even cancel policies that have resulted in excessively fast urbanization in China. Urbanization should not be regarded as a quick solution to attracting investment and maintaining the economic growth rate. The objective of fast urbanization with a lack of an eco-friendly vision is opposite to other objectives such as energy conservation, emissions reduction, a lowcarbon economy, and livable cities. Regarding the point from which to start urban planning, we must understand and present the concept of “livable” in a human-oriented manner. Specifically, we should include into institutional arrangements citizens’ feelings and experiences as well as the process and manner of their participation, rather than hyping the concept of “participation” but actually making it impossible for the public to participate. When it comes to the construction of a single urban infrastructure and municipal works, institutional arrangements that encourage public participation allow us to eliminate conflicts, collect opinions, improve designs, find alternatives, and monitor implementation processes to make sure that they meet environmental standards. At the same time, we should encourage citizens and community representatives, and provide support for them, to monitor and report cases of non-compliance as well as environmental and public health problems in a timely manner. This will enable us to solve such problems quickly, foresee conflicts relevant to the urban environment, and prevent crises rather than attempt to tackle them later. This is the only way to prevent the frequent breakout of conflicts that could otherwise cause social divide. Ecological problems in western China are the Sword of Damocles for the Chinese economy. Western China is at the core of China’s ecological safety despite resources in western China being the lifeblood of the Chinese economy. We must stop heavily polluting industries from moving westward, because pollution and, worse yet, the resulting ecological consequences will spread along rivers and with winds to downstream areas including the eastern coastal regions. This logic is not complex at all, but it is never easy for people

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in economically developed regions outside the scope of China’s western development program to understand this and reach a consensus on the severity of environmental problems. We hope that the widespread and lasting smog in 2012 and early 2013 has pushed all Chinese people to reach such a consensus. Unlike air pollution, most types of pollution do not produce immediate, obvious effects. We are unable to feel the overall severity of groundwater pollution because it is impossible for us to see groundwater as we see air and surface water. And it is also impossible for us to feel damage to water and land resources caused by heavy metal pollution like we do to the ones caused by smog. The good news is that the new government has proposed an eco-friendly development pattern from the perspective of top-down design. An ecological civilization presupposes that ecological sustainability, living environment, and public happiness are all valued. Regarding specific approaches to institution building for an ecological civilization, therefore, “an economic and social development assessment system able to reflect resource consumption and ecological benefits” must be a support system that is highly sensitive to the public’s dream of being in a livable place, and that encourages and assists citizens to restore and protect nature in their respective hometowns and cities. “A target system, assessment methods as well as a reward and punishment mechanism that meet requirements for an ecological civilization” must be those that are based upon the public’s happy life in a livable country, that guide organizations toward healthy growth, and that enable the public to fully participate in social management, assessment, and feedback provision. “A system that can strengthen environmental regulation and hold relevant individuals and organizations accountable for failure to protect the environment and for environmental damages” must be one that has made the anomaly—that it is more expensive to observe laws than to violate them—disappear, and that protects citizens who report acts of damaging the environment from being harmed for doing so. “A beautiful China that helps all citizens become increasingly aware of the significance of environmental protection” must be one that is good at managing environmental problems and protecting citizens’ environmental rights.

PART ONE Public Action

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chapter 1

Social Mobilization, Collective Action, and Resistance against Environmental Pollution in 2012 Wu Fengshi and Peng Lin* Abstract Environmental mass incidents have become increasingly frequent across China over the past decade, but in the year 2012 they experienced several fundamental and important changes. Firstly, environmental mass incidents occurred with more severe conflicts of interest and more violent public protests. Secondly, local governments responded (or rather, gave in) faster under increasing pressure from the public. Thirdly, the actions by several non-governmental organizations became more rational and professional. A series of actions that local citizens took against a trash incineration plant project in Panyu District, Guangzhou, for example, were well organized with a focus on policy change, making them different from previous actions in which urban residents of particular apartment complexes played a leading role in protecting environmental rights at the neighborhood level.

Keywords public action – environmental action – environmental rights protection – policy advocacy

In 2012, a series of public protests against industrial pollution and its resulting environmental health problems became the focus of attention in China. These collective actions were carried out in two modes. In the first mode, victims of pollution and other stakeholders played a leading role in action aimed at protecting environmental rights. This is now the most common way of public

* Our gratitude goes to Zhang Boju for his indispensable assistance during writing and interviews.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi 10.1163/9789004269385_003

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participation in environmental protests. This mode has obvious characteristics of grassroots movements, as participants have clear identity boundaries and focus on their respective economic concerns. Actions carried out in this mode are similar to “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) movements in the West. Collective action usually ends once the government gives in (e.g., by aborting or relocating the large-scale development or chemical projects). In the second mode, participants are better organized and have more knowledge about the environment. Moreover, they focus on issues that involve a larger part of the public rather than are specific to individual projects and communities. Instead of focusing on immediate response to a particular polluted site or incident, participants in the second mode begin seeking long-term monitoring and systematic solutions. Environmental mass incidents in the cities of Shifang (什邡), Qidong (启东), and Ningbo (宁波), where people protested against local plans to construct large-scale heavily polluting enterprises, are typical cases of the first mode. Such environmental mass incidents have become frequent rather than occasional in China over the past decade. The year 2012 saw some important changes in the aforementioned collective actions. On the one hand, such actions became more violent and saw more severe clashes between the government and the public. On the other, local governments responded (or rather, gave in and struck a deal) faster. A typical case of the second mode is a series of collective actions that local citizens took against a trash incineration plant project in Guangzhou’s Panyu District (番禺区). These actions aimed at protecting environmental rights began in 2009 and developed in a new direction in 2011, when they became well organized with a focus on policy change. This made them different from previous actions in which urban residents in particular apartment complexes played a leading role in protecting environmental rights. 1

From Shifang to Ningbo: More Violent Environmental Mass Incidents and Public Thinking on these Issues

In 2012, collective actions against large-scale projects that would cause industrial pollution occurred in multiple cities across China. These cities were all at relatively high administrative levels, including Shifang, a county-level city administered directly by the government of Sichuan Province, and Ningbo, a city at the sub-provincial level in Zhejiang Province. Clashes between the government and the public became increasingly violent during these incidents, as protesters even broke into local government buildings before they were dispersed by the riot police. From July 1–2, 2012, a large number of Shifang residents crowded before the local government building to protest against the

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newly launched Hongda molybdenum copper production project (宏达钼铜 项目建设). There were clashes between the police and the protesters, escalating an otherwise peaceful demonstration into a violent one and leading to injuries. On August 26, 2012, a demonstration against a wastewater discharge project of a large paper mill took place in the city of Qidong, which is under the jurisdiction of the city of Nantong (南通) in Jiangsu Province. The demonstration became violent shortly after the police intervened. There was a confrontation between the police and the demonstrators, some of whom broke into the local government building. In late October 2012, a great many citizens participated in a “walk” against a local paraxylene (PX) project in Ningbo, the second largest city in Zhejiang Province. This collective action started in a much more orderly and rational way than the ones in the cities of Shifang and Qidong. Two days later, however, the demonstrators crowded before the local government building and violent clashes occurred between the police and the demonstrators. Special police units were also dispatched to arrest or disperse the demonstrators. An important background factor for the frequent occurrence of such largescale collective actions is that the Chinese government has issued a large amount of economic stimuli since 2008. These stimuli have encouraged the implementation of many large-scale petrochemical or chemical projects. The molybdenum copper project in Shifang was identified as one of the major projects in Sichuan Province’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan. As a prioritized project after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, what was called by local government officials as “the strictest ever environmental impact assessment” was finished and given the green light in less than half a year. In the Qidong case, the government of Jiangsu Province began granting the power of environmental approval, which originally was granted only to municipalities administered directly by the provincial government, to cities at the county level in 2008. Such a practice has obviously lowered the entry barriers for large-scale industrial projects, and the environmental assessment on the wastewater discharge project of the aforementioned paper mill was done much faster in 2008.1 But all these are macroscopic factors influencing kinds of environmental collective actions like those in Shifang and Qidong. The direct reasons for the increased frequency and violence of environmental actions are insufficient public participation in environmental assessment, lack of transparency, stronger public awareness of environmental health, as well as a determination to protect environmental rights. 1 “Qidong-based Paper Mill Leads to Investigations of over Ten Government Officials Since the Power of Environmental Approval Was Granted to Cities at Low Levels,” 21st Century Business Herald, August 9, 2012.

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In terms of major industrial projects, there is a lack of effective means and mechanisms for public participation in the process, ranging from planning to environmental assessment, together with obvious defects in the corporate environmental information disclosure mechanism. Consequently, a large number of people know nothing about the industrial projects around them that are being implemented or are in operation. Both the government and enterprises will find it difficult to win the public’s trust once the latter begins questioning the environmental risks of these projects. Such questioning will result in obstacles to intelligent conversation and persuasion. Take the molybdenum copper project in Shifang, for example. It took relevant organizations two years to initiate, approve, and begin implementing this project. But it was not until late June 2012 that most local residents became aware of the existence of this large-scale chemical project. They then doubted the intent of the local government. In the case of the wastewater discharge project in Qidong, it took relevant organizations even more time to prepare for it. And also, it was not until two years ago that locals were given clear information on this project. Nonetheless, they were given no chance to participate in environmental risk assessment, nor could they access information pertaining to it. In reality, these have long been defects in environmental management in China and no obvious corrections have thus far been made. Pressure from the macroeconomic situation has only worsened the problems that already exist, making public protests become more violent. Stronger environmental awareness of the public is one of the direct reasons for the escalation of environmental collective action, and is attributable to the social impact of previous environmental incidents and to higher requirements for the quality of life as a result of better living standards. Local people have acquired more knowledge of the environmental and human health risks of industrial projects. The increased awareness has come from a series of largescale non-governmental actions against PX plants and other heavily polluting projects since 2007, plus the panic and global debate about nuclear radiation after a tsunami hit the Pacific coast of Japan in 2011. Each became the focus of public attention thanks to online and printed media reports. It is noteworthy that such knowledge is not equivalent to that acquired from science education, as it is typically accompanied by irrationality. The resulting collective actions are usually characterized by impulse and overreaction and, hence, are unlikely to pave the way for constructive government-public dialogue and consultation. Looking back at the collective actions in Shifang, Qidong, and Ningbo, we can see many similarities in the escalation of these actions. Given a lack of transparency in terms of project review and implementation information, the initial doubts and objections were all from within project-relevant

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o­ rganizations. The molybdenum copper project in Shifang received objections from the government itself and particular industry interest groups, while the wastewater discharge project in Qidong was challenged by experts of organizations relevant to this project back in 2005.2 After criticisms from within project-relevant organizations were rejected, information on the environmental risks of these industrial projects was usually disseminated by the elite to the public through local media and the Internet. But the elite alone are not enough to trigger large-scale collective actions. The initial, direct resistance to these industrial projects is usually from residents who are required to move. Since they focus their demands on financial compensation, these residents are usually unable to initiate large-scale public actions. Nonetheless, such actions escalate once environmental-risk information is widely disseminated on the Internet and, in particular, once the risks are understood by the public as being characterized by wide coverage or high danger. Indirect stakeholders who participated in the collective actions against the PX projects were generally receptive to the information that paraxylene may cause cancers or even congenital malformations. An important reason for the quick escalation of public actions against the molybdenum copper project in Shifang was that information on water and air pollution relevant to this project was rapidly disseminated on the Internet. In addition, material demands would become unimportant after such changes, as a lack of trust in the government and the technocratic elite would become an important factor for maintaining collective actions or even turning them into violent ones, according to our observations and worldwide professional analyses alike. Facing such a public sentiment, both local governments and technocrats find all their efforts to no avail however they try to explain relevant issues from the perspective of technological reason. It is noteworthy that the government is not responding in an increasingly tough manner while public protests are becoming violent. It is true that the collective actions in Shifang and Ningbo led to clashes between the police and the protestors and even injuries, but both local governments opted to give in quickly by stopping the projects. Judging from the current situation, however, we think that such concessions made by the government may still be on a short-term basis and be no more than emergency responses to sudden public crises, so as to maintain social stability. No systematic mechanism that is more open and operable for addressing social conflicts has come into being. The action against the PX project in Ningbo occurred when we were about to start writing this article. It was very similar and consistent with the 2 “Investigation on the Abandonment of a Ten Billion RMB Molybdenum Copper Project in Shifang,” China Business Journal, July 7, 2012.

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environmental actions taken in Shifang and Qidong, although with new changes, especially that the public made a conscious return to rationality. During the initial online mobilization, for example, some people emphasized that the “walk” should be made in a reasonable and legal manner. There were people responsible for picking up litter left by the procession and for handing out bottled water during this collective action organized by local citizens themselves. There were also Internet users who posted microblog messages about the details of the event, to refute online allegations that used terms such as “mob.” More importantly, the Home Watcher (守望者家园) a newly founded local environmental NGO, endeavored to participate in this action by expressing its opinion online, despite the fact that it played no leading role in this process. Nonetheless, these changes still occurred in the traditional pattern where victims act to protect their individual rights; the objections still focused on local interests and this collective action was still centered on short-term objectives. This action led to neither non-governmental self-organization as a longterm mechanism for follow up tasks, nor to active policy recommendations. After the local government announced that it had stopped the PX project, the public remained skeptical about its sincerity, but the collective action in itself had lost momentum. We have yet to further observe whether this public action will be followed by continuous advocacy or not and the Home Watcher has yet to decide whether it is willing to take up the responsibility for public monitoring. 2

Power from within Civil Society and an Open Mechanism for Public Participation

Residents in Panyu District, Guangzhou began taking action against a trash incineration plant project in September 2009. This community action has been carried out in a way that has changed over time. At first, it was similar to the aforementioned environmental collective actions. Later on, it became better organized and, with assistance from professional environmental organizations, environmental activists, scholars, and public media, has gradually played a leading role in local movements against trash incineration plant projects. Today, policy advocacy for long-term organization and development is being made. We believe that the Panyu case has provided a great many ideas that deserve consideration by China’s environmental NGOs. In late September 2009, homeowners in apartment complexes near the site of a planned trash incineration plant project heard that the Guangzhou Municipal Government was planning to build the plant. This information was

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disseminated quickly through the homeowner bulletin board system (BBS) and received attention from a growing number of homeowners. There was a rapidly increasing willingness to take collective action. Since these homeowners included local journalists, the incident was soon covered by the media and was even reported by China Central Television (CCTV), drawing even wider attention to the cause. At least until this moment, the action against this project progressed in a way similar to that of most other environmental actions in China; namely, consideration for local economic concerns (e.g., potential falling of housing prices) was still an important reason for the homeowners’ participation. Later on, however, the situation evolved such that a growing number of new ideas came out. The action against the trash incineration plant project in Panyu turned its direction to two important factors: 1) environmental activists’ attention to a trash incineration plant in Likeng (李坑垃圾焚烧厂); and 2) moves and concessions made by the Guangzhou Municipal Government on its own initiative, plus its efforts to create a more systematic approach to public participation. Environmental activists began paying attention to the Likeng-based plant shortly after the homeowners in Panyu protested against the local trash incineration project. In October 2009, some activists learned from a blog post of a professor at a local university that there was already a trash incineration plant in Yongxing Village (永兴村) in Likeng, north of Guangzhou. With his own experiences and direct talks with local villagers, the author of the blog post lashed out at the physical and mental damages to these villagers caused by the local trash landfill and incineration plant, and pressed for an inquiry into public responsibility that both the government and ordinary citizens should take. Stirred by this blog post, some activists who had participated in the action against the Panyu-based incineration project set up an investigation team for a field survey in Yongxing Village. The findings confirmed the sufferings of local villagers. The activists then took the villagers’ serious health problems as evidence against the explanations and overwhelming remarks made by scholars working for the government and by relevant organizations about the safety of trash incineration. This also provided non-governmental forces against trash incineration with more opportunities to express opinions while letting them be recognized and accepted by more people. More importantly, these forces intentionally expanded the scope of the action by paying attention to the Likeng-based incineration plant and supporting the villagers in protecting their rights. In other words, the action against the Panyu-based incineration project now went beyond protecting private rights and was turning into a protest against a “public nuisance.” This made it significantly more of an action for public interest. While revealing, acting against, and discussing the Likeng-based

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incineration plant, the leading participants in the action against incineration began thinking further about the public implications of protecting private rights by protesting against trash incineration. And they also began helping homeowners in Panyu District and even more citizens realize that problems with trash are not just about incineration, about treatment as the final step, and about protecting the rights of a particular group. Instead, every person living in the city should be held responsible for the fact that it is surrounded by trash. Now that everybody produces trash on a daily basis, what right do they have to make citizens in a particular place withstand the negative effects of trash treatment or incineration? From the technical perspective, the forces against incineration in Panyu managed to win more supporters and resources (especially, organizational, moral, and discourse resources) by expanding the community movement for rights protection to cover the Likeng-based incineration plant and by framing the issue of trash treatment as being against a public nuisance. Furthermore, their action-taking skills were greatly improved. In addition to intentional efforts and adjustments by the citizens, changes in the practices of the Guangzhou government had significant effects on the direction of the protest against incineration. The Guangzhou Municipal Sanitation Bureau sets the twenty-third of each month as the day when it receives visits by the public. And it was on this day that the information about building a trash incineration plant was released to the public. Later on, this reception day arrangement became an important way for peaceful communication between the local government and citizens. Under increasing pressure from the public, the Guangzhou Municipal Government set up the City Management Committee in November 2009 as an official platform for public participation in the plans for the trash incineration plant project. It provided a more stable and specific approach to government-citizen communication. In addition, the Guangzhou Municipal and Panyu District Governments began communicating directly and irregularly with non-governmental forces from October 2009 onward; they invited representatives of these forces to workshops on trash management. Although it did not give up the plan to build trash ­incineration plants and regain trust from non-governmental forces against incineration, the municipal government started making substantial moves in trash management by category. Meanwhile, its interactions with these non-governmental forces became more open and regular. It is noteworthy that such a relatively relaxing and open political atmosphere was not unique to Guangzhou. Foshan (佛山), a city neighboring the former, also began pushing trash management by category and opening it up to public participation. The city even began including the Guangzhou-based forces against incineration in their monitoring and assessment on the implementation process. The authors

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participated in a research program that some Guangzhou-based anti-incineration activists conducted in Foshan, and were surprised by their frankness during face-to-face communication with local government officials and scholars. The action against incineration in Panyu did start and evolve with some accidental factors, such as the existence of the Likeng-based incineration plant. By comparison, previous actions against incineration elsewhere in China (e.g., the one that occurred in Liulitun (六里屯), Beijing and produced considerable influence) were short of such existing targets instrumental in rapidly increasing the intensity and level of mobilization. Nonetheless, the existence of the Likeng-based incineration plant does not outweigh another factor that is more important—a more mature civil society (in places such as Guangdong Province). Without assistance from the environmental organizations and expert activists, without the acquired skills and knowledge from previous environmental actions, and without local civil society and the interaction channels with the government, the existence of this plant alone could not have necessarily become a driving force for innovation in and the development of actions intended to protect environmental rights and for going beyond traditional environmental actions. The action against incineration had an initial success around the end of 2009, when the Panyu District Government invited citizen representatives to discussions on the trash incineration plant project. In November 2010, the Guangzhou Municipal Government announced that it had stopped the trash incineration project and was seeking more detailed and open discussions. Disagreement began to appear within the non-governmental forces at a time when they saw this initial success. Facing this concession made by the government, some activists believed that more constructive actions should be taken to avoid direct confrontation with the government and that attention should be turned to actions against incineration plus long-term efforts to reduce trash from such actions alone. Some other activists insisted that interactions with the government be made in a fiercer manner to object to this trash incineration project and protect their rights. At last, those who favored a gentle and cooperative attitude got the upper hand and received support from scholars, expert activists, and the media. These activists gradually became the mainstream and began seeking to form a legal organization while promoting more extensive public education on trash categorization, on the one hand, and policy advocacy, on the other. The direct reason for the calmer force’s having opted to get registered was that rights protection was being faced with bottlenecks such as the lack of sustainability in terms of volunteers and resources, and the lack of a legal status to conduct public actions and money raising. And these indeed are problems with traditional movements to protect environmental

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rights in China. On the other hand, the leaders of the calmer force wanted to know, through registration, the government’s real attitude toward non-governmental forces and to explore political opportunities available to NGOs. Such an attempt was not successful at the beginning, as information from the civil affairs authority brought no hope. After being rejected by the government of Panyu District, the activists turned to Haizhu District (海珠区), where there are more universities and NGOs, for opportunities. It turned out that the process was “surprisingly smooth” (as one interviewee put it). Livable Guangzhou (广州宜居) was registered as a non-governmental, non-business organization to provide a new, permanent platform for rights protection and advocacy for trash categorization. 3

The Role of Environmental Organizations in Actions for Protecting Environmental Rights

If the most remarkable change in environmental public actions in 2012 was that these actions in themselves promoted more sustainable grassroots organizing and civil associations, then the absence of local environmental organizations in increasingly frequent environmental actions is also noteworthy. These organizations played a leading role in actions against dam building at the beginning of the 21st century. In the subsequent series of environmental actions directly initiated by and participated in by Chinese citizens, however, we hardly saw or heard them. These environmental organizations may have opted to be absent from such actions so as to avoid political risks. But we should also recognize their weaknesses in capacity building, which has reduced their influence on actions intended to protect environmental rights and the environment itself. They have yet to improve their capabilities of communicating with the government, familiarize themselves with relevant laws and regulations and skillfully use them, master further environmental expertise, and build up experience and skills in working in communities. In the actions against the PX project in Ningbo and the trash incineration plant project in Panyu, however, environmental organizations participated more actively and constructively. Local environmentalists who do not work for the government paid attention to the movement against the PX project in Ningbo from the very beginning and endeavored to guide it toward being more peaceful and orderly. Large-scale collective actions were also accompanied by preparation for setting up a local environmental organization. And environmental organizations played an even more obvious and active role in the evolution of the action against incineration in Panyu. Both experts and the

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media provided important support from the very beginning and, when this action turned to focus on organization building, environmental organizations such as the Friends of Nature (FON) provided, directly or indirectly, support in terms of skills, resources, and so on. While it was being established, Livable Guangzhou partnered with other environmental NGOs such as FON and the Wuhu Ecology Center (芜湖生态中心) to set up China’s Zero Waste Alliance (零废弃联盟) (ZWA). We may safely say that environmental NGOs such as the FON participated directly in making “trash management” an agenda of civil society and in pushing the action against incineration toward being public, rational, and organized. The primary change in this action was that it contributed to the founding of a new environmental NGO as a permanent platform for non-governmental actions intended to protect rights and as more stable, institutional support for citizens’ participation in politics. Similar changes had never occurred in previous actions intended to protect environmental rights. Looking at these types of public actions, we can see that large-scale collective action initiated by and participated in directly by urban stakeholders aiming to protect environmental health rights did not appear until 2007 (i.e., the Xiamen (厦门) PX incident as the icon of activists). Before this, public actions against industrial projects, large-scale infrastructure projects and, more recently, trash treatment projects had failed to incubate any permanent NGO or lead to system building at a higher level, even if they were specific to the same issue and occurred in places with more mature civil society (e.g., the cities of Beijing and Shanghai). It is in this context that the evolvement of the action against incineration in Panyu toward founding an organization, together with mutual assistance and support between the old and new organizations, is more noteworthy. The movement’s evolution in Panyu has also breathed new life into the growth of local environmental organizations in Guangdong Province, especially in the city of Guangzhou, which has unique social, economic, and media advantages as well as a more mature civil society. As a whole, however, Guangzhou-based environmental organizations are not the most mature in China, as they are limited in number, areas, and specific ways of operating. In fact, local environmental organizations in Guangzhou have suffered bottlenecks and even decreased in recent years, according to the authors’ observations. They are now faced with challenges including how to find new resources, how to attract new members, how to reorient their efforts, and how to realize sustainable growth. Fortunately, the appearance of the trash issue and specialty NGOs has revitalized local environmental organizations. The emergence of the new agenda, in particular, helps existing organizations identify new tasks and objectives, and even lays the groundwork for the founding of new organizations. In fact, the appearance and evolution of the trash issue has fueled

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the growth of environmental organizations not only in Guangzhou but also throughout China, as organizations and networks around the issue of trash management are already emerging. These networks, such as the ZWA, have begun going beyond isolated regional actions and organizations. This alliance is dedicated to improving trash management by changing the public’s lifestyle and to pushing changes in the government’s policies and behavior. Its members are researching how local governments and residents treat trash through online and offline information exchanges. All this underpins more mature policy advocacy and reflects the new, endogenous power for the growth of China’s environmental organizations. The new organizations and networks around the trash issue differ from contentious politics in an open society. And they also go beyond the traditional, elementary ways NGOs participate in environmental activities in China, such as public education and knowledge dissemination, as they are more specialized, work in a more systematic manner, and more clearly aim to change the behavior of the government and even the general public. In addition, the ZWA members have offered to share with relevant government agencies research results and useful information obtained in other manners, with an aim, once again, to help guide the government’s behavior. Moreover, these organizations focus their attention on technologies and policies. This practice is also instrumental in making both the trash issue and non-governmental forces involved in this issue politically relevant. Also, it is favorable for the incubation and development of this issue itself, and deserves study by other environmental NGOs.

chapter 2

The Rise and Challenges of Public Environmental Testing Huo Weiya Abstract As an integral part of environmental protection, public participation comes in various forms. In recent years, with the help of portable equipment, public environmental testing has grown in popularity for environmental issues related to water, air, and soil. While this new method helps to bring pubic participation to a professional level, it also faces doubts and a legal predicament. In addition, questions as to how to finance such practices and further enhance the expertise of individuals and organizations remains unanswered. By reviewing public environmental participation and media reports in the past year, this paper endeavors to analyze the rise and challenges of public environmental testing.

Keywords environmental testing – public participation – environmental protection organizations – legislation – policy recommendation

The smog in Beijing starting from October 2011 led the U.S. embassy in the Chinese capital to measure the city’s PM2.5 levels on its own, the results of which were well spread through the Internet. Since then, the obscure technical term PM2.5 has become a buzz word of the public. With the measuring of PM2.5, a new form of public environmental participation has also become popular—environmental testing. 1

Public Environmental Testing

Public environmental testing in China has benefited from the popularity of the term PM2.5. While the U.S. embassy’s measurement was considered © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi 10.1163/9789004269385_�04

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unrepresentative of the entire city and China’s official measurement had not yet become part of the environmental monitoring system, the public had no access to any information on the PM2.5 levels in their surroundings. This was where public environmental testing came into the picture. Feng Yongfeng (冯永锋), one of the founders of the environmental organization Green Beagle Institute (达尔问自然求知社), was among the first to seize the moment and promote the work of its Environmental Monitoring Center. In December 2011, when PM2.5 was under the spotlight, he announced his fundraising plan on the Internet to purchase portable laser dust testing instruments. He succeeded in raising 50,000 RMB and bought two “LD 6S” instruments, one of which was given to the Shanghai Branch of Friends of Nature, and the other sent to another environmental organization called Cycling in Guangzhou (拜客广州). It was the start of grassroots PM2.5 testing, with the striking slogan “I’m testing the air quality for my motherland” (我为 祖国测空气). Since then, different kinds of environmental organizations followed suit, buying portable instruments to test the local air quality. Some even released the results live on their microblogs. In an issue of Southern Weekly published in October of 2011, it was reported that for several years, Zhang Yue (张跃), the head of Broad Global (远大集 团), has been testing the air quality of his city, with the help of a five-kilogram package he always carries with him. The set contains several instruments to test particulate matters, formaldehyde, and other pollutants. Peng Ji (彭继), deputy manager of Air Quality Tech Co. (空气品质科技有限公司), part of Broad Global, said in an interview that they were developing a mobile phone to test air quality, to be named “Broad Life Mobile.”1 There is no word yet on how far along this project is. As a matter of fact, this kind of public environmental testing is not new. Environmental organizations and individuals committed to environmental protection have long used equipment in their work, rather than depending wholly on personal judgment through the senses. For instance, in 2003, such organizations as Friends of Nature, Global Village (地球村), and others started the “26-Degree Campaign” (26°C空调节能行动), which called upon the public to reduce energy consumption by setting the temperature no lower than 26 degrees Celsius in summer in air-conditioned office buildings, hotels, shopping centers, and so on. This grassroots effort paid off. In June 2007, the General Office of the State Council issued a directive to order all agencies in public buildings to strictly implement the 26-degree standard for air c­ onditioning 1 Feng Jie and Lü Zongshu, “I’m Testing the Air Quality for My Motherland,” Nanfang Weekend, October 28, 2011.

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temperature in summer, giving exceptions only to those with special needs such as hospitals and those who technically need a special temperature to operate or produce. In July 2012, environmental protection volunteers in nine cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou, Xiangfan (襄樊), and Chenzhou (郴州), walked into such public places as airports, hotels, subways, and banks to test the actual indoor temperature. It was to further promote and monitor the “26–Degree Campaign.”2 The “26-Degree Campaign” has been a success for public environmental protection. The standard of 26 degrees is actually one of the simplest environmental testing methods, applicable to ordinary people with no expertise needed or governmental approval, and no one would question the instruments used or its process. In addition, grassroots environmental organizations concerned with water pollution have also discarded their previous testing method, which was to judge merely through the senses (the smell and color of the polluted water), and resorted to some simple devices to test pH, COD, and other standards. If solid evidence is needed, they also send their samples to professional testing agencies, as is commonly practiced by the Chongqing Liangjiang Voluntary Service Center (重庆两江志愿服务发展中心), an environmental organization in Chongqing. Besides the air and water, heavy metals have also stirred public concern. On April 10, 2012, Green Beagle and the International POPs Elimination Network, together with some other domestic environmental organizations, released a report that 23% of the sampled whitening and freckle-reducing cosmetic products on the market contain excessive mercury, and about 10% of the samples contain excessive arsenic or lead. This was the result of a survey of 477 randomly selected whitening and freckle-reducing products consumers can easily find on the market across China. Volunteers used portable X-ray fluorescence analyzers to test such heavy metals as mercury, arsenic, and lead in them.3 Feng Yongfeng has also launched a campaign called “I’m Testing Heavy Metals for My Motherland” (我为祖国测重金属) after his air quality testing campaign. He explained in his microblog, “A portable heavy metal detection kit with its software costs about 400,000 RMB. Divide this cost by 10,000, and you’ll see that every participant has only to donate 40 RMB, or N times

2 Zhang Ke, “I’m Checking the Temperature of My City: Deviations from the 26-Degree Standard in Implementation,” China Business News, July 25, 2012. 3 Fang Ling, “Grassroots’ Environmental Testing: Moving Forward among Controversies,” China Comment, September 17, 2012.

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40 RMB.” A portable X-ray fluorescence analyzer, in the shape of a hair dryer, has been bought and used by volunteers in several campaigns so far. 2

Public Testing, Not Monitoring

It is important to distinguish “testing” from “monitoring.” These two terms have often been interchangeably used by the media or the public to describe similar campaigns by the public or environmental organizations. Testing is more like a one-time or temporary measurement, while monitoring often refers to a longterm measurement and indicates regulation and supervision. Up to now, the behavior of the public, especially environmental organizations, mostly fall into the category of “testing.” Whether they test the indoor temperature, PM2.5, polluted water, or electromagnetic radiation, it is often a temporary act to reveal the current result of certain indexes, rather than a long-term effort to gather data of certain indexes. 3

The Value of Public Testing

Public environmental testing is partly the result of unavailability of certain data. For instance, before the official release of PM2.5 data, the public had no way of knowing the local PM2.5 levels. In other cases, certain data or reports with key information are not accessible to the public even when they do exist. For example, on July 20, 2012, Chen Liwen (陈立雯), a member of Green Beagle, requested the Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau disclose information related to the Guangzhou Likeng Waste Incineration Plant (广 州市李坑垃圾焚烧厂). She was denied the request and she soon filed a lawsuit against the Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau for dereliction of duty. In the same month, Guangxi volunteers of the China Mangrove Conservation Network (中国红树林保育联盟) discovered that the mangroves in Yuzhouping District of Fangchenggang (防城港市渔洲坪地区) in Guangxi Province were being destroyed on a large scale. They requested the Fangchenggang Environmental Protection Bureau to disclose the EIA report of the company in question. They received the reply “inaccessible to the public.” It is always difficult for ordinary citizens to obtain data. They may not even know what means to take to get certain data or information. And the government has been doing too little to help the public get access to environmental information. However, the public demand for environmental data and information has been rising. Lack of public transparency has already led to several

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mass protests against environmental destruction in recent years. This is why public environmental testing has become so valuable. On the other hand, public environmental testing is also part of life because it provides basic information such as the surrounding temperature, air quality, drinking water quality, and helps to improve one’s quality of life. When similar services and information are not adequate or the credibility of official data is questioned, it is very natural for ordinary people to test their environment with simple devices. It can also be considered a form of “self-help.” For environmental organizations, portable devices are their working tools. Of course, they do not aim at authority and professionalism but use their collected data as references, as a way to remind the public to give due attention to the quality of their environment. Compared to their previous testing merely through the senses, it is a step towards professionalism and should be encouraged and given support. As a matter of fact, unofficial environmental data has truly helped to promote environmental protection. The PM2.5 issue is a good example. The great attention it has gained comes partly from the U.S. embassy’s testing and release of its PM2.5 levels since 2011, and partly from public participation. Many people bought their own devices to test their local particulate matters and release the data on their own. This unofficial data may not be scientific enough, but it enables people to compare data and encourages the public to supervise environmental protection. At the end of 2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) announced that 496 monitoring stations of the national air quality monitoring network in 74 cities had been newly built or renovated. Beginning on the first day of 2013 they would start to monitor a new national standard for air quality and provide a live release of six types of air quality data, including PM2.5. Minister Zhou Shengxian (周生贤), stated in a national environmental protection work conference on January 24, 2013 that the focus of this year’s work is on the monitoring of PM2.5, prompt release of data, and prevention and control of air pollution. He also said that the air quality monitoring would be spread to 113 cities and the collected data of the six types, including PM2.5, would be released to the public by the end of December. All in all, PM2.5 has been instantly put onto the top of the government’s agenda as a reaction both to the deterioration of air quality and to the pressure of public testing. 4

Lack of Legal Support

With the rise of public environmental testing comes a real question: is it legal?

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The question was hotly debated after Feng Yongfeng announced his fundraising plan to buy a heavy metal detection kit. Many people were worried about whether public testing was legal. Some even cited Regulations on the Administration of Environmental Monitoring (Opinion-soliciting Draft) (环境监 测管理条例) released in 2009, quoting Article 81, “No organization or individual shall publicize without permission any information related to the monitoring of environmental quality in any form.” It was reported in the 21st Century Business Herald in July 2012 that a revised draft of the Regulations on the Administration of Environmental Monitoring had already been submitted to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council. An official in the MEP clarified, “In the draft regulations we submitted, there was no limitation on any testing of environmental quality by organizations or individuals. It is ruled, though, that such testing results shall not be released through the public media without permission.”4 Director Luo Yi (罗毅) of the Environmental Monitoring Department of the MEP, when interviewed by China Comment, said that the opinion-soliciting draft in 2009 has not yet become a law. “The law we should and can abide by currently is Regulations on the Administration of National Environmental Monitoring (全国环境监测管理条例) issued in 1983. At that time, there was no regulation on public testing. Public testing is not illegal at present.”5 As early as the end of 2011, environmental organizations had seen through the heavy smog issue the importance of voices in this opinion-soliciting draft. On December 19, 2011, twenty-one environmental NGOs, including Friends of Nature, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), and Green Beagle submitted an open letter to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council. This open letter pointed out an infringement of people’s right to environmental information in this draft and put forward eight proposals, including deleting articles that do harm to public participation and supervision of environmental monitoring and adding an article to safeguard people’s right to environmental information. Director Ma Jun (马军) of IPE said, “The environment’s quality concerns people’s health, and the public has a right to environmental quality information. The regulations should include articles that help the public gain ­information on

4 Wang Erde, “Regulations on the Administration of Environmental Monitoring Are to be Revised: Testing Is Allowed But Results Are Not to Be Disclosed,” 21st Century Business Herald, July 17, 2012. 5 Fang Ling, “Grassroots’ Environmental Testing: Moving Forward among Controversies,” China Comment, September 17, 2012.

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environmental quality monitoring, instead of limiting this right. Public environmental testing is an effective supplement to official monitoring.” It is still unknown how future policy or laws on environmental monitoring will regulate public environmental testing. So the public concern remains. Should people’s voluntary act be considered illegal, it would first infringe the public right to environmental information and then hamper public participation in environmental protection. Both would do harm to the improvement of our environment. 5

Lack of Expertise and Financial Support

Besides its legal predicament, public environmental testing also faces suspicion over its expertise and reliability. For instance, after Feng Yongfeng publicized his plan to raise funds for a heavy metal detection kit, responses from netizens were not always supportive. A typical question was raised by a netizen called “A-Yi Officer” (阿奕长官) who was also involved in the environmental protection industry.6 His doubts fall into three categories: whether the instrument is professional, whether the instrument could be operated by a non-professional, and whether there would be any third-party supervision of the whole process. “A-Yi Officer” wanted Feng Yongfeng to provide the CMC Certificate for the portable kit he planned to purchase from Innov-X. Although the CRF Analyzer, with the help of different software, can detect heavy metals in cosmetics, soil, and water samples and produce data on the spot, the data provided by portable instruments often deviate from those obtained in a lab to a certain degree. So, portable devices can hardly get a CMA Certificate. Besides, how the sample is taken matters greatly, because all the testing is targeted to the samples only. If it is not scientifically sampled, the result is then not representative. What is more, “A-Yi Officer” pointed out that there was no third-party supervision in the release of data. It seemed people simply had to trust Feng Yongfeng. In this case, a netizen called “White Cloud Environment” (白云环境) shared similar doubts about the expertise of public environmental testing. He said, “Isn’t it better to hand it over to professional laboratories? It will be more objective and scientific. You only have to pay a certain fee for each testing and it will be free from any investment and maintenance fee of the instruments.”

6 Wang Peijing, “Whose Right to Environmental Monitoring?” New Business Weekly, August 9, 2012.

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“A-Yi Officer” further said, “NGOs do not have the capacity to deal with these technical matters, nor do they have the need.” He believed that NGOs should help to put those people who have the need for heavy metals detection in touch with professional agencies and entrust the third party with the detection, or request environmental protection departments to disclose their environmental monitoring reports. Another example is people’s reaction to the two reports released by Greenpeace in 2012, entitled Toxic Threads: Putting Pollution on Parade (潮 流•污流——全球时尚品牌有毒有害物质残留调查) and Toxic Threads: An Investigation of the Pollution in the “Textile Town,” (潮流•污流：纺织名 城污染纪实) both disclosing that many international brands in the fashion industry contain hazardous substances. “Frog Meteorite” (青蛙陨石), a PhD in environmental geography and a regular author on Guokr.com, reviewed these two reports on this social network website for science fans. He concluded, “The major function of NGOs is to supervise, not to test. The most simple and effective way is to fight on the front line to supervise the plants’ waste discharge. To ‘monitor’ and push the plants to reduce the discharge of pollutants through technical tests of the pollutants, unless done with a powerful technical support and with rigorous and scientific methods, can hardly push forward the environmental movement; it will only create public panic.”7 In response to various doubts about his act, Feng Yongfeng emphasized that he collected data as a means to approach truth, not as any “official evidence.” Everyone had the right to question the authenticity of the data, and everyone was a supervisor of this project. Ma Jun from IPE also argued, “Professional agencies and environmental organizations have respective values to society. Public testing is an effective supplement to official monitoring. Sometimes, it is exactly the lack of official data that has led to the rise of public testing.” Besides the questioning of expertise, environmental organizations often face another difficulty, that is, a lack of financial support. Feng Yongfeng failed to raise enough money, though he eventually obtained the detection kit. It was reported that by 8 pm, July 29, 2012, Feng had raised 41,000.57, a long way from his original target of 400,000 RMB. It was thanks to a preferential rate offered by the manufacturer and his paying by installments that he finally laid hands on the instrument. Nevertheless, Feng was still optimistic. He believed that it took time for the public to build their trust. The first step was to get the instrument, and then 7 Frog Meteorite, “Do We Have to Worry About the Hazardous Chemicals in Our Clothes?” Guokr.com, December 21, 2012. http://www.guokr.com/article/253889/?page=2.

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events could be organized as the second step. When people witnessed the good effects the testing brings in life, they would join in the donations. The fundraising for just one instrument proved difficult. Yet more will be needed if public detection of heavy metals is to develop further. Where will the money come from? This is a big question. 6

Conclusion: How Can Public Environmental Testing Develop Further?

Public environmental testing has become one way for public participation in the environmental movement, but it is also facing overt or covert obstacles, the most imminent of which is its legality. Should this public act be defined as illegal, there would be absolutely no future for it. Therefore, future laws and regulations on environmental monitoring ought to respect the public’s right to environmental information and their right to participation in environmental protection. More room should be left for the public to test and monitor their environment, besides building an official and authoritative monitoring system. Self-motivated testing of a popular and supervisory nature should co-exist with the official one so as to develop an integrated environmental monitoring system. Of course, in order to raise public environmental awareness and deepen and strengthen public participation in the environmental movement, the government is also expected to help its people enhance their expertise and bring their environmental testing to a professional level.

part two Government Accountability and Good Governance

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chapter 3

Improving Government Accountability in the Face of Environmental Challenges Zhang Shiqiu Abstract On the basis of reviewing the characteristics of conflicting interests in China’s environmental issues today and citizens’ basic rights to sound environmental quality and environmental services, this paper examines the reason why it is the unavoidable responsibility of the government to conserve and upgrade environmental assets and services. It points out that modern environmental administration should be based on good governance and the integration of the three moderating mechanisms of government administration, market stimulation, and society monitoring. In China, in order to fulfill and implement the government’s environmental responsibility, further importance should be attached to the following aspects: returning power to people, information availability, transparent administration, and formulation and implementation of efficient and equitable policies.

Keywords environment – government – environmental responsibility

In today’s China, environmental pollution is a grave issue. Health risks emerge, and disputes and public incidents triggered by environmental problems escalate. As citizens are increasingly aware of the importance of protecting the environment, safeguarding their environmental rights, and paying attention to public issues, more and more are beginning to question the government’s capability and efficacy in providing sound environmental quality, controlling pollution damage, minimizing environment-induced health risks, and protecting citizens’ basic environmental rights and interests. What responsibility the government should assume and how it should fulfill this responsibility is increasingly becoming a pivotal issue in China’s environmental governance.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi 10.1163/9789004269385_�05

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Environmental management has become a major aspect of government responsibility in the process of China’s social transition. At the end of 2011, a debate about air quality in China that began on the Internet quickly turned PM2.5 from a technical term into a household word, which was then used almost as a synonym of the environmental problem of air pollution. Disputes over and queries about the accuracy of government statistics arose. Face masks sold like hotcakes on the Internet; some well-known public figures appealed for wide attention to air pollution on the microblogs; some citizens measured the degree of air pollution with portable equipment and released the information on a daily basis. All this prompted the government to respond swiftly, leading to information disclosure, the promulgation of environmental monitoring plans, and the new Ambient Air Quality Standard (大气环境质量标准). By 2012, public incidents touched off by environmental problems of various kinds had become more intense than before, with wide-reaching impacts. These incidents included public protests against heavily polluting industrial projects in Shifang (什邡), Qidong (启东), and Ningbo (宁波), in issues such as water sources, drinking water security, and illegal pollution discharge by enterprises. All those mentioned above highlight the public questioning of the lack of government accountability and also public expectations for better government performance. These expectations, debates, and criticisms not only focus on the cause, effect, and accountability of the environmental issues, but also on safeguarding rights. Furthermore, they question the capability and efficiency of the government in dealing with environmental affairs as well as social fairness and justice in general. All this reflects society’s reasonable expectations and demands for urgent improvement on the part of the government in environmental administration and providing environmental services for the public. This also reveals public discontent with the government’s performance in assuming responsibility and its inadequate ability in management and governance. The public generally holds the government’s lack of management, ineffective law enforcement, and mistakes in decision-making as the major causes of environmental deterioration and a constraining force for China’s environmental protection.1 As the main actor of public affairs management and the provision of public services, the government should undoubtedly assume due responsibility for public affairs management, analyze and discern the causes and consequences of the social conflicts ignited by environmental issues, and take corresponding 1 Niu Xiaobo and Yang Lei, “The Third Trump Card of Ministry of Environmental Protection: Legislation Accountability/Protection from Pollution,” 21st Century Business Herald, February 27, 2007.

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containing and preventive measures. At the same time, the government should also do everything to increase the values of environmental assets rather than decreasing them so as to ensure the concerted and sustainable development of society, economy, and environment. 1

The Responsibility of the Government for Protecting and Upgrading Environmental Assets and Services

Each citizen is entitled to the right to live in a safe and sound environment. The government is under the obligation to guarantee citizens’ rights. Environment is a public asset. As the manager of the environment and provider of public services, it is one of the government’s functions to be responsible for the environment. A good environment serves as universal welfare that the public are entitled to in modern society. Therefore, it is the government’s obligation to provide this public welfare. Improving the government’s environmental accountability is not only a basic requirement of environmental rule of law, but also an inevitable trend of the changing public environmental needs and the development of basic environmental rights. First, environmental quality and environmental resources belong to the public. They are characterized by scarcity and competitiveness. As the carrier and provider of the various ecological and environmental functions, the environment and environmental resources can be both beneficial and harmful. When they are able to satisfy people’s needs, they are beneficial. But when the environmental resources are damaged, with their quantity and quality reduced, they can undermine the well-being of humans and cause irrecoverable losses of property and human lives; thus, they are harmful. Compared with the great domestic and industrial demands, the quality of environment is far from satisfactory, and the quantity of environmental resources is far too scarce. The worsening of environmental quality further intensifies competition and conflicting interests as environmental assets are utilized. Second, the scarcity of environmental assets and services calls for government intervention and allocation. Due to the ever increasing demands, environmental resources and services can never satisfy the consumption and demands of all the people. Therefore, competitiveness is inevitable among consumers and consumption methods. Thus environmental resources must be allocated in accordance to certain rules, principles or major actors are involved in the allocation: the market and the government. On the environment issue, neither government nor market is dispensable. Due to the characteristics of the environmental resources mentioned above, the market may fail in its

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function in environmental distribution. For without government and public intervention, the market may lose its function, causing excessive use and damage of environmental resources. Therefore, proper government intervention is necessary. However, this does not mean a comprehensive government administrative intervention. Under a market economy, government intervention can be summarized as the following: clearly defining the principles and regulations of allocating environmental assets and services by means of legislation; putting forward and implementing corresponding public management systems; formulating and carrying out effective intervention policy so as to redress market dysfunction; and providing essential public items and services based on relevant regulations. Third, the competitiveness of environmental resources determines that equitable allocation or resources is of great importance. Good environmental quality is the basic right of a citizen; a citizen has the right to protection from a low-quality environment. Environmental protection is vitally interrelated with people’s daily life. Each citizen, poor or rich, enjoys the same and equal basic public environmental services. Therefore, environmental protection and management involves people’s fundamental interests, and thus is closely linked with people’s well-being. As mentioned above, environmental resources and environmental services are characterized by competitiveness, which is reflected not only in differences in uses, but also in differences in regions, nations, generations, and interest groups. Because of this competitiveness, users have to pay a high cost for environmental resources. And also owing to the fact the environmental resources are often shared by different communities, there exist sustainable and non-sustainable cross-border trades. This reality points to the importance of environmental justice. Therefore, in environmental administration, the government must pay great attention to environmental equity and fairness. In this sense, the work of environmental protection should truly represent the basic interests of the public, since environmental protection has a bearing on national interests and security, guarantees the safety and well-being of the people and future generations, and sustains social economy in the long run. As a result, environmental protection and management become one of the basic responsibilities of modern government. What is worth noting is that environmental problems come hand in hand with economic activities, and thus must be solved in the process of economic development. China is at a time of rapid institutional changes. The solution of environment problems must meet two requirements. On the one hand we are required to raise technological efficiency and economic efficiency of environmental resources exploitation so as to improve human beings’ pattern of

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exploiting nature. This should be achieved through technological innovation. On the other hand, we are expected to adjust interest relationships among people through institutional innovation, effective utilization, and equitable allocation of environment resources. This can not only ensure that environmental protection will serve the needs of welfare improvement for the entire society, but also prevent environmental resources from being improperly managed and the social wealth gap from further widening. Thus, intense social resentment and conflicts due to environmental resource issues can be avoided at a time when interest groups and social classes have already been formed.2 2

The Change of Environmental Management Patterns: The Evolution and Status Quo of Government Environment Responsibility

Since the 1980s, countries around the world have been sparing no effort to establish and advance modern government public management systems. Public management highlights the government’s utilization of its administrative authority to effectively allocate and manage public resources, and realizing the goals of public management through active participation of relevant interest groups and democratic decision-making.3,4,5 At the same time, modern public governance requires attention to how to flexibly react to public needs when financial resources are limited, especially to the fact that the government needs to change its management pattern in order to realize its goals with relatively low costs.6 As a result of rapid development over the past twenty years, various theories and views of public governance abound in China. The core point of these theories is that the system of public governance consists of the actors in governance, such as government, public organizations, non-profit organizations, private sectors, and individuals; the objects of governance, which are 2 Zhang Shiqiu, “The Change of China’s Environmental Management System: A Transition from Government Management to Public Management,” People, Resources and Environment in China 15, no. 4 (2005). 3 Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Sectors?”, Public Administration 69 (1991): 3–19. 4 Norman Flynn, Public Sector Management (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall, 1997). 5 Jan-Erik Lane, translated by Zhao Chenggen etc. New Public Management (Beijing: China Youth Publisher, 2001). 6 Chen Zhenming and Xue Lan, “The Key Areas and Topics of China’s Public Administration Theory Study,” China Sociology 3 (2007).

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currently applied to all areas; the approaches of governance which highlight the voluntary and equal cooperation among various organizations and groups. In the study of public governance, special importance is attached to the performance of governance approaches employed by different governance actors for the same object.7 Simply put, public governance refers to the process of all the public authorities integrating all the forces in society, managing public affairs, solving public problems, providing public services, and realizing public interests.8 Li Yanhui (李妍辉) summarizes the change and new trend of government environmental responsibility in the process of transition from a public management pattern of “management” to “governance” by pointing out that such a change indicates that governance regulations have become multiplied and diversified with multi-layers and a feature of being dynamic rather than static.9 Because environmental governance involves various actors pursuing their own interests, especially because the actor and outcome are separate from each other, the process of environmental governance—both in essence and in practice—are bound to involve the participation of various parties. Only through such multi-participation can the pursuit of different interests be fully realized; effective opinion exchange and communication among different actors be achieved; and an effective balance between government, market, various socio-economic characteristics, and different interest groups are realized. In this way, a widely accepted goal and strategy, and regulations and policies of environmental protection will be formed. In this sense, the government transforms itself from an all-embracing controller into a service provider and manager with limited powers, thus reaching the optimal state of public environmental affairs management. Due to the increasing numbers of participants and the widening of participation, a multi-layered organizational structure and effective organizational coordination are needed to realize smooth operation of environmental management and governance systems. Unlike the traditional unitary structure, this multi-layered organizational structure and mechanism emphasizing interest mediation can effectively remove the disadvantages of the single-centered and top-down management model, that is, one-sidedness and subjectivism in 7 Gerry Stoker, “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,” International Social Science Journal 50 (1998). 8 Zhang Chengfu and Li Danting, “Public Interest and Public Governance,” Journal of Renmin University of China 2 (2012). 9 Li Yanhui, “From ‘Management’ To ‘Governance’: New Trend in Government Environmental Responsibility” Social Scientists 10 (2011).

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policy-making and unreliable single-sourced information. At the same time, any governance mode is the outcome of the particular economy and institution of that society, thus requiring dynamic adjustment along with the changes of external conditions, and reflecting the new social need and public demand. 3

Government Environmental Responsibility: Definition and the Status Quo

Government environmental responsibility refers to the government obligation and power with respect to environmental protection that is oriented toward public environmental interests and guaranteed by law, as well as the negative outcome resulting from the breach of the above-mentioned obligation and power as required by law. Government environmental responsibility includes the following key aspects: the basic duties, function and power, and relevant administrative resources of the government in environmental management and environmental public service provision, and also the negative outcome—namely, the legal consequence it should assume as a result of the breach of its environmental duties and functions as defined by laws and regulations.10 Among these aspects, government environmental duties, functions, and power are collectively called the primary environmental responsibility, and the negative outcome is the secondary environmental responsibility of the government. Many recent studies analyze the flaws and problems of the government environmental accountability system. They point out that the economic responsibility of the government is given a lot of attention while its environmental responsibility is overlooked; the environmental obligations of enterprises are stressed while those of the government are ignored; the primary environmental responsibility of the government receives far more attention than its secondary one—legal accountability; government environmental power is overstressed while the government environmental responsibility is neglected; compared with the environmental responsibility of the central government, that of the local governments is disproportionally emphasized; and in an event of environmental pollution, an administrative department often

10

Yang Dongchen, “The Regulation of Being Public: The Examination of Government Environmental Responsibility and its Realization,” Modern Law 33, no. 2 (2011).

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assumes collective responsibility while the individual directly in charge is seldom held responsible.11 The absence of a sound government environmental accountability system and failure to implement the existing system has not only brought negative impacts on the development of environmental management, but also led to the decrease in government environmental credibility and mistakes in decision-making. The decreasing government credibility is reflected in the facts that the public continuously questions the accuracy of statistics published by the government, the interest preference in government management policies, and the objectivity of major environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports. Under certain circumstances, such questioning may ignite mass protests, and then cause a government crisis. Meanwhile, errors in the government’s environment and development decision-making and the government’s failures to deal with environmental conflicts will lead to a greater waste of social resources. The Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC held in 2012 clearly put forward the long-term plan of building an ecological civilization. The concept of ecological civilization should guide the building and advancement of the overall civilization—material, political, and cultural, with special emphasis on the political aspect. Thus, China should promote the development of an ecological civilization through good governance of the environment. 4

Defining and Putting into Effect Government Environmental Responsibility and Promoting Environmental Protection

In recent years, there have emerged many studies, discussions, and practices of “good governance.” The most striking example is the four basic elements defined by the Asian Development Bank: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency. Moreover, the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) states, “Good governance has eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law.” These elements and characteristics are the core and essence of a modern governance pattern. As mentioned above, the environment is a public asset and basic public service. Good environment is a universal welfare that all citizens are entitled to in modern society. The government has the duty to guarantee the realization 11

Cai Shouqiu, “On the Flaws and Integrity of Government Environment Responsibility,” Heibei Law 26, no. 3 (2008).

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of citizens’ rights. Therefore, the government should be the protector of citizens’ environmental rights and interests, the voluntary provider of good environmental benefits, and the bearer of responsibility when rules and laws are breached. The improvement of the government’s environmental responsibility is not only the basic requirement of environmental rule of law, but also the objective and inevitable outcome of the changing environmental public needs and the development of basic environmental rights. In the respect of strengthening government responsibility, what is worthy of emphasis is that environmental protection involves the cooperation of different departments, disciplines of sciences, areas, and interest groups. A government environmental responsibility system consists of a series of obligations that are inter-dependent, complementary to each other, and restrain each other. The focus and orientation of strengthening the government’s environmental responsibility lie in continuously enhancing the practicability of government environmental responsibility, making it institutional, standardized, and operational.12 Based on this, many legal experts have put forward suggestions on improving government environmental responsibility, which cover a wide range of aspects such as establishing a sound and comprehensive decision-making system on the issue of environment and development, a government environmental goal responsibility system, strategies (planning), environmental impact assessments (especially strategic environmental assessments), pollution discharge capacity control systems, comprehensive environmental permitting systems, ecological zoning and environmental function zoning systems, ecological administrative compensation systems, government environmental information availability systems, government-supported public participation systems, government environmental emergency response mechanisms, performance evaluation systems of environmental protection, and systems of government environmental responsibility investigation and accounting. Besides the suggestions about government environmental responsibility made by those in legal academia and the research circles of public administration, we also need to approach this from the perspective of environmental good governance. In order to effectively fulfill the government’s environmental responsibility, breakthroughs and improvements need to be made in the following aspects:

12

Cai, “On the Flaws and Integrity of Government Environment Responsibility.”

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1. A modern environmental management must lay stress on “good governance,” which involves the key elements of multi-party participation, legislative improvement, transparency in decision-making and management, effectiveness/efficiency/equity, and accountability. We must especially promote the healthy integration of the three moderating mechanisms of government administration, market stimulation, and society monitoring. And the key is to make changes and improvements in government administration on the basis of deep reflections on the responsibility, pattern, thinking, and principles of government administration. We need to constantly stress and carry out the government responsibility of protecting and appreciating the value of natural capital since the government is entrusted by the entire society as a manager of the environment and natural capital; effectively apply the public power of the government and clearly define and regulate its boundaries, emphasize conducting administration by law, and improve administrative efficiency; emphasize and promote democratization and transparency in the decision-making process based on scientific knowledge; ensure effective operationalization of the coordination mechanism of interests and guarantee environmental equity and environmental justice with the extensive participation of stakeholders and the public; strengthen the interaction between government and citizens, and consolidate citizens’ supervision of public management. Only through all this can we truly fulfill and implement the government environmental responsibility. 2. A complete transformation of the environmental management system should be made through “endowing power to the people” and “returning power to the people.” Based on the recognition that environmental resources are important assets and capital, we need to clearly define effective environmental rights and interests and their structure, which include citizens’ basic environmental rights and interests, and the way to assume responsibility in case of damage to the environmental rights and interests, so as to promote the integration of the responsibility of environmental protection and the right to environment services. The environmental rights and interests of the public include not only the right to enjoy a good quality environment, but also the right to environmental information, the right to claiming compensations in case of environmental damage, and the right to oversee the government and enterprises. 3. Market malfunctions should be redressed through formulating effective policies, bringing into full play the resource allocation function of the market, showing that the government has the obligation to formulate effective policies and set administrative goals. Environmental economic policy, whose formulation and implementation is essential, refers to the behavior of influencing the market actors by means of economic methods such as price, tax, finance,

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credit, and insurance, as well as policies such as promoting the coordinated development of economic progress and environmental protection. The core of the change of environmental economic policy is based on the principle of the polluter, user, and benefiter jointly bearing the expenses, thus forming an appropriate price signal that will improve environmental quality and the advancement of ecological system functions. This price signal should not only include the production cost of the enterprises, but also reflect the cost of environmental resources in the process of production and service provision. We should stress the concept that environmental resources are assets, and apply this concept to the process of policy-making and economic operation, so as to create a competitive market that will benefit the environment-friendly enterprises and technology. Therefore, China should formulate and implement environmental and resource tax policies under the principle of a “taxation balance” (that is, collecting environmental taxes while lowering other kinds of taxes, thus maintaining the total amount of taxes). At the same time, we should give full play to the transfer payment function of government public finance, and guarantee the interests of those areas and groups who give up the pursuit of economic gains and economic speed in order to protect environmental assets, so as to essentially increase the efficiency of environmental resource allocation, narrow the income gap, and improve social welfare. 4. The public’s right to participation in environmental affairs should be guaranteed through transparent administration and transparency in information, establishing consolidation and checks and balances among the government, enterprises, and the public, thus accumulating social capital for China to develop in the long run. In order to build an ecological civilization and a win-win situation for society, economy, and the environment, we need to make use of the positive relationship of checks and balances among the government, enterprises, and the public. Of the three, the government should play its role by aiming to create a sound institutional environment, attaching special importance to policy guidance. For the Chinese government, it is a long-term and arduous task to make better use of public power and work toward the establishment of a market of high efficiency and fair competition. Transparent administration and information are the basic prerequisites to the overseeing of the legality and rationality of the process of citizens’ environmental governance and decision-making. Still further, they are the indispensable measures to reestablishing social trust and government credibility. At the same time, it is essential for advancing an ecological civilization to safeguard citizens’ environmental rights and interests, and promote the growth of a civil society. The guarantee and effective use of citizens’ rights is not only the essence of modern societal governance, but also the best way to lower the cost of government

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supervision and management. In order to carry out the public’s environmental responsibility, the government should also “return power to the people,” which includes: the public’s right to be informed about environmental issues, right to claim compensations when the environment is damaged, and the right to oversee the government and enterprises. The above-mentioned process of change will contribute to the realization of citizens’ environmental rights and interests. Most important, it will be a good attempt in the advancing of changes in social governance patterns in China through the public issue and affair of environmental protection. In this way, much-needed social capital will be accumulated to ensure that China will become a harmonious society.

chapter 4

Facing a Water Crisis: A Political and Social Analysis Guo Weiqing Abstract Cross-border water pollution and incidents of competition showcase the truth: a water crisis is not only an environmental issue, but also a social and political one. This dilemma has provoked extensive reflections. Ensuing social, fiscal, and value crises have caused experts to reconsider planning, strategy, and development models as well as restructure political agendas. Water and cross-border water management in China are becoming Balkanized, with new regional and social inequality developing as a result of competition over water. To solve water-related problems in the midst of economic competition, inequality, and government accountability, new institutions must be installed to enhance governance. The key lies in political wisdom and the determination of governments.

Keywords water crisis – institutional arrangement – reflexivity – Balkanization

1

Water Pollution and Water Crisis

On the last day of 2012, Shanxi Tianji Coal Chemical Group (山西天脊煤 化工集团股份有限公司) leaked 38.7 tons of aniline into the drainage system of the city of Lucheng (潞城). The Zhang River (漳河) carried 8.7 tons of the pollutant downstream into Henan and Hebei provinces. 20,000 residents along the banks in Shanxi were affected. Unfortunately, this was not the whole story. When news of the leakage reached the city of Handan (邯 郸) in the downstream basin of the Zhang River in Hebei Province five days later, local residents rushed in panic to buy bottled water. Meanwhile, disputes erupted across and among different levels of government about who was to be held responsible. This incident is a typical cross-border water pollution crisis, © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi 10.1163/9789004269385_006

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showcasing the system loopholes and governance crisis in environmental protection. Water pollution, a direct threat to human health and survival, must not be treated casually. On January 15, 2012, articles and images on the Internet exposed a dying fish population in the net culture farm of the Lalang Hydropower Reservoir (拉浪水电站) along the Long River (龙江) in Guangxi Province. Experts found that the heavy metal content 200 meters upstream of the Lalang Reservoir exceeded the standard by eighty times. The leakage of about twenty tons of cadmium into the river affected the Long River flow up to 300 kilometers downstream. Experts identified the Hongquan Lithopone Plant (鸿泉立德粉 材料厂) in the Jinchengjiang District (金城江区) as the source of the heavy metals. This pollution incident seriously affected the safety of drinking water of millions of residents along the river and led to panic among the public. On February 3, 2012, the tap water in the city of Zhenjiang (镇江) began to emit a strong odor. The Zhenjiang Water Supply Company’s immediate explanation was “the increased dosage of chlorine in the tap water.” However, until the Zhenjiang Municipal Government admitted that the pollution had first happened on February 2, relevant departments did not share the truth with the public. According to the long overdue notice announced by the Emergency Response Office of Zhenjiang City, the smell was due to phenol pollution of source water, caused by the incorrect operation of a Korean cargo ship carrying the chemical. On February 29, Wuhan residents found their tap water emitting a similar odor to that in Zhenjiang. The Wuhan Water Service pointed to the pollution of a local water source. A report by the Environmental Protection Bureau showed a massive sewage discharge at the Chenjiashan Water Gate, three kilometers upstream of the Baishazhou Water Plant (白沙洲水厂). In response, the water plant decided to increase the dosage of chlorine, causing the tap water to smell. Though it was announced that polluted water had been cut off and that the tap water reached the state standard, local residents continued to respond with panic.1 Among all water pollution incidents in 2012, the Qidong (启东) incident came with the greatest consequences and most far-reaching impact. The trigger of the incident was the “Sea Discharge Project” of a Japanese enterprise, the Prince Paper Factory. This project involved a 110 kilometer sewage pipe running through Nantong (南通), Haimen (海门), and Qidong, with a design 1 For more details of the abovementioned three cases, please go to “Drinking Water Incidents of 2012: Safety Valve of Scientific Distribution,” posted on December 18, 2012 at http://www .hbzhan.com/Product_News/Detail/74217.html.

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capacity of 600,000 tons (150,000 tons in practice) of processed sewage. The draining outlet in Qidong set local residents into massive protest. The pamphlets distributed called on Qidong residents to boycott the project, prevent the discharge of polluted water into the Qidong sea waters, and protect their home. During this multiple day protest, angry protesters even marched into the municipal government office compound. The Qidong incident is reminiscent of the panic over salt a year ago. Fearing the pollution of China’s sea waters, a result of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant crisis, a massive move to buy salt and seafood products to save and store occurred in the coastal regions of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Expert analysis calmed the panic, but public knowledge of the incident sparked a trend in collective action and social confrontation. Overall, China has seen a growth in the knowledge of the general population on the dangers of water pollution. In addition to these high-profile incidents, many more small scale pollution practices have been disclosed. For example, the “sewage lake” in Togtoh County of Hohhot (呼和浩特市托克托县), Inner Mongolia poses a major threat to the local environment and people. Investigations show that the monitoring by the Togtoh County Environmental Protection Bureau in June and July 2006 found that the chemical oxygen demand was more than 100 times higher than the state standard. However, efforts to tackle the problem proved insufficient, until media coverage caught the attention of the public. Zhongrui Pharmaceuticals (Inner Mongolia) (中润制药), one of the main polluting enterprises, was warned to stop production and start rectifying its polluting practices. Another well-known case is the underwater sewage pipe in the Xisai Mountain (西塞山) stretch of the Yangtze River in Huangshi (黄石), Hubei Province.2 Hubei Zhenhua Chemicals (湖北振华化工有限公司) in the Xisai Mountain Industry Park discharged its highly concentrated sewage through this pipe. Ironically, this company was named one of the most responsible enterprises in Huangshi. In recent years, China’s water problems have caught the attention of experts at home and abroad as more data becomes available.3 The media made efforts 2 Yang Jinxin, “Underwater Sewage Pipe under the Yangtze River: An Investigation of Underwater Sewage Discharge in Huangshi City,” People.com.cn, at http://env.people.com .cn/GB/16853667.html on January 11, 2012. 3 For example, Yi Ming, A Yangtze of Black Water: China’s Future Environmental Challenges, Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2012; Ma Jun, China’s Water Crisis, 1999; Jianguo Liu and Wu Yang, “Water Sustainability for China and Beyond,” Science, Vol. 337, August 10, 2012; The World’s Water 2008–2009 Report.

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to report major water pollution incidents from 2002 to 2012.4 Researchers and relevant government departments have reached a consensus on the main causes of water shortages; that is, the unprecedented pollution of resources. There is no time for delay in taking action against this water crisis. 2

Water Politics

The water crisis is not only a social but also a political problem. In her 2010 book, Water Politics, German scholar Petra Dobner begins with these words: “Water politics is an art that transcends time and location. It helps with the management of water consumption and use, so as to practice sustained protection of water resources while satisfying the competitive demands of water.”5 This book tells us that rational consumption, use, and protection of water resources depends on good management and governance. This paper shall follow this logic and discuss China’s water politics. In the Chinese context, the issue of water is generally taken as a scientific, technological, hygienic, environmental, or managerial problem, but not a political problem. In China, de-politicizing usually means more freedom and this has become part of a fixed mindset. This paper aims to break this mindset. According to Dobner’s analysis, the people and the government should join together in the discussion of water politics in an honest manner. To put it simply, politics is about the authoritative arrangement of resources, involving the following questions: Do we share the ownership of water resources or is it a resource that can be privatized? Who has the legitimate power to stop water pollution? How should polluters be held accountable? Properly answering these questions is a matter of survival for humans and requires scientific and technological innovations, managerial reforms, and ultimately political and institutional arrangements. More specifically, any discussion of water politics involves two key concepts, the first of which is “reflexivity.” Reflexivity refers to a contradiction: as humans develop and use more water resources, this ultimately has a damaging effect on basic conditions for human survival. This dilemma has been restructuring political agendas and creating new perspectives. In other words, the conflict between economic, ecological, and social development is becoming more intense. It takes new political initiatives to 4 A Ji, “A Decade of Major Environmental Pollution Incidents, 2002~2012,” Democracy and Legal System, September 28, 2012. 5 Petra Dobner, Water Politics: Political Theories, Practice and Criticism of Global Governance (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011), p. 1.—Translator’s translation.

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ease the conflict and eventually realize sustainable development. Reflexivity has created great political pressure at the global, national, and local levels. The second key concept is “flow,” just as water flows. Cross-border management of water bodies is a traditional issue in international politics. New statistics show that 263 rivers flow across national borders all over the world. In China, water management involves various offices at the national and local levels as well as complicated and intertwined interests. As a result of the crossborder quality of water, pollution and possession of water resources caused by unilateral actions have resulted in numerous conflicts. 3

Water Crisis and Its Political Aftermath: A Reflexive Perspective

In the long history of human development, water shortage was due mostly to an imbalance in nature or natural disasters. People have generally believed that water, as an endowment from nature, is inexhaustible. It was not until the latter half of the 20th century that humanity began to think otherwise. Some believe that it was human efforts for survival and development that caused the pollution and damage of water resources, which in turn posed a major threat. In this sense, water shortages become a real problem for all human beings. This new understanding calls for global governance. In 1977, the first U.N. Water Resources Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina marked the threshold of global governance agenda of water resources. Later in 2002, delegates at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa unanimously passed a resolution admitting that a water crisis is one of the most challenging issues facing human beings. Over the last several decades, the “water problem” has quickly escalated into the “water crisis,” highlighting the severity and urgency of this issue as well as the difficulties in global water governance. Against such a background, China is also experiencing a serious water crisis. According to the data published by the Chinese Academy of Science in 2007, two-thirds of the 669 cities were troubled by water shortages and over 300 million rural residents in China had no access to safe drinking water.6 The Ministry of Water Resources projects that China’s water shortage will reach its peak in 2030 when China’s population reaches 1.6 billion with a per capita

6 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China’s Sustainable Development Strategy Report: 2007, (Beijing: Science Press, 2007).

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water resource of only 1,760 tons, a level much lower than the warning line set by the United Nations.7 In general, water pollutants come from the following main sources:8 pesticide application, industrial discharge, breeding industries, urban garbage and sewage, and chemical leakage. Moreover, in southern China, pollutants may easily enter and accumulate in ground water, which threatens the water safety of millions of rural residents. Since 2002, over 63 billion tons of waste water has been discharged into rivers annually, with 62% coming from industrial development and 38% from untreated urban sewage.9 According to a report by the Ministry of Water Resources, in the 118 cities investigated, 115 are troubled by polluted drinking water with arsenic (causing serious nausea and vomiting, cancer, and even death) and fluorine (causing bone fluorosis and eventually arthralgia) as the two main pollutants.10 This paper argues the reflexivity of water crisis is dangerous, because the crisis is not caused by any external force but by humans. In the broad definition by Ulrich Beck, reflexivity means “self-confrontation:” the confrontation between consequence and foundation when the consequences of modernization affect the foundation of modernization. It is important to note that consequences here mean unforeseeable “unintended consequences” that have a reflexive effect.11 A water crisis is the consequence of human deeds. It questions our earlier understanding, planning, strategy, and development model. The consequences of a water crisis come in three ways, namely social crisis, fiscal crisis, and value crisis. (1) Social crisis—This means the massive social panic over the health threat to which water pollution may lead. The Songhua River chemical pollution incident in 2005 and the Tai Lake drinking water pollution incident in 2007 both caused major social panics. Under pressure from the people, government departments were eventually held accountable. Another issue that must 7 8 9 10 11

Xinhua News Agency, “China’s Water Shortage Reaches Alarm Line in 2030,” December 16, 2001. Jennifer L. Turner, “New Ripples and Responses to China’s Water Woes,” China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 25 (December 19, 2006). U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “2005 Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Market in China,” Washington, DC. World Bank, The Price of Pollution in China, July 2007, p. 82. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1999); Gu Zhonghua, ed., Second Modernization: A Way Out for Risk Society (Chinese Taipei: Juliu Books, 2001), p. 7.

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be considered seriously: the causal relation between pollution and disease, and the public awareness of this relation. With economic development and improved living conditions, urban residents ask more questions about their daily life: is my drinking water safe? Is it safe to continue drinking water with unsafe substances whose content exceeds the limit? What are the health risks facing vulnerable groups like the elderly, women, and children? In the environmental protests in Shifang (什邡), Qidong, Ningbo (宁波), and other cities, the protesters claimed that pollution (including water pollution) causes cancer, leukemia, cardiovascular disease, and other serious health effects. These beliefs and “evidence” are immediately shared via the Internet. As a result, the government comes under great pressure in three ways. First, people doubt the sincerity and ability of government information disclosure. Second, people question the government’s determination in environment quality control and management. When China’s chemical factories line the rivers and continue discharging polluted water, people have reason to think that the government standards for factories are too low. Sometimes, people even think that it is the government who are the principal criminals behind pollution. Third, people are disgusted by the government’s suppression of expression and protest in its crisis management. In Dobner’s words, these three types of pressure exhibit the “misunderstanding, inability, and arrogance” of the government. As a result, the water crisis turns into a social crisis and the discontent of the public puts political pressure on the government (2) Fiscal crisis—According to the 2011 No. 1 Document of the Central Committee of the CPC, China will “use public finance to increase investment in water conservancy projects and endeavor to double the annual input in the next decade, compared with that of 2010.”12 According to Michigan State University Professor Liu Jianguo’s (刘建国) calculation, this means a total input of 4 trillion RMB in ten years, an increase by four times as compared to the previous decade.13 In spite of the difficulties, this policy is good news for efforts to handle water crises. However, the seriousness of pollution makes governance a major challenge. A case in point is Guangzhou’s water treatment effort. 12

13

Xinhuanet, “CPC Central Committee and State Council Determined to Speed up Water Conservancy Reform and Development,” December 31, 2010 at http://www.gov.cn/ jrzg/2011-01/29/content_1795245.htm. Liu Jianguo and Wu Yang, “Water Sustainability for China and Beyond,” Science, Vol. 337, August 10, 2012.

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At the end of 2008, in order to prepare for the 2011 Asian Games, the Guangzhou Municipal Government decided to invest 48.62 billion RMB before the end of June 2010 to improve the water conditions of the rivers in the city. In fact, the general budget revenue of Guangzhou was only 62.2 billion RMB. In calculation, this means over 100 million RMB would be spent on water treatment and a per capita investment of 6,400 RMB for Guangzhou. To ensure the success of the project, the party secretary of Guangzhou even requested district party secretaries and governors to swim in the river(s) under their jurisdictions. However, one and half years after the implementation of the project, local media reported that in a Dayoo.com survey, about half of the participants chose “no evident improvement of water quality” or “disappointed by the low cost-efficiency.”14 Serious pollution was still found in several major rivers. In desperation, some enterprises suggested that chemical substances should be applied for instant effect. Fortunately, some other informed people opposed this reckless and shortsighted plan and insisted that chemicals might have a long-term fatal effect on the rivers. Guangzhou’s story showcased that large-scale water treatment plans might go beyond the fiscal capacity of local governments. Unfortunately, many other cities face the same dilemma. While China’s per capita use of reclaimed water accounts for only a quarter of the world average, its per unit GDP water consumption is three times as high as that of the world average, as a result of an industrial structure of high water consumption, outdated technologies, a low level of water recycling, and wasteful habits.15 However, if the government does not invest in economic development, its fiscal capacity will be further constrained. Unfortunately, economic development results in greater water consumption, pollution, and waste, putting pressure on public finance. Eventually, this vicious circle drags the government into greater fiscal difficulty. (3) Value Crisis—The consequences of water pollution may have great impact on governance philosophy and lead to a value crisis. First, the concept of “economy first” is challenged. In the Seventeenth Party Congress report, President Hu Jintao insisted on adherence to the “scientific outlook on development” to ensure safe drinking water by strengthening water pollution prevention, avoiding exploitive water consumption, and reducing waste. The Chinese leadership, 14 15

Yang Yang, “Citizens Disappointed with Effects of 48.6 Billion River Treatment Project,” Century Weekly, July 12, 2010. Liu Jianguo and Wu Yang, Water Sustainability for China and Beyond. Science, Vol. 337, August 10, 2012.

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fully aware of the seriousness of the water crisis, is endeavoring to incorporate environmental protection into China’s development strategy. However, in the complicated bureaucratic system, implementation still faces many challenges when the traditional growth-based, political performance, evaluation system is in conflict with environmental protection and evaluation systems. This is reflected not only in the conflicts between the central and local governments, but also between environmental protection and economic authorities. A second phenomenon of value crisis is the rise and development of nongovernmental, environmental protection organizations, enhanced public environmental awareness, and more active environmental campaigns. These constitute a challenge to the old idea of exclusive government control. Since the mid-1990s, non-governmental environmental protection organizations have been developing quickly. They play an indispensable role in the investigation and information disclosure of dam projects and water pollution, the supply of clean water, public litigation, and water-related environmental education. In some ways, the central government has been supportive of these organizations. However, the local governments have contradictory feelings toward environmental NGOs and other civic activities, because the two have very different ideas about civic participation, information secrecy and disclosure, and stability and rights protection. The government is still not prepared, in terms of ideas and mechanisms, to interact with NGOs dealing with environmental issues. If this lack of consensus persists, the value crisis will remain. 4

Flow and Cross-Border Water Governance: Worries about Balkanization

Water flows, and cross-border coordination and conflict are an inevitable part of water governance. The following is a typical example in American history. One hundred years ago, William Mulholland, director of the Los Angeles Water Board, implemented an aggressive new plan called “water snatch” to solve the water shortage problem facing Los Angeles. By re-channeling the waterways in the Owens Valley 200 miles away, Mulholland made the rapid development of Los Angeles possible.16 This is the so-called “Mulholland Model.” In the Human Development Report 2006, the UNDP projects that the ever intensifying competition over water resources may escalate into direct conflicts, even becoming violent. Experts 16

UNDP, Human Development Report 2006: Water Shortage: Power, Poverty and Global Water Crisis, 2006.

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are worried that the Mulholland Model may be repeated under new disguises, not as a result of the concern of poverty and human development, but the desire for power.17 In fact, the Mulholland Model predicates future conflicts of the Balkan style. Due to the lack of law-biding cooperation, conflicts over water are doomed to become anarchical and violent. Cross-border water bodies are likely to trigger social conflicts. In China, the risk of Balkanization comes in the following ways. First, there is the risk of competition between water conservation and economic development. The GDP-oriented development model ensures the reckless development of high water consumption and polluting enterprises, which has gone beyond the capacity of government control. High water consumption has led to irrational competition for water resources. High pollution enterprises are discharging pollutants into neighboring environments. Since the manufacturing industry will define China’s economic development for a long period, water shortages will persist and trigger water-related competition. The second risk is water-related inequality. Geographically, water resource distribution decides whether a region is rich or poor in water resources. Moreover, a region may be a “pollution source region” or a “pollution victim region.” In a society, there are beneficiaries and victims of water resources and pollution. In other words, water-related conflicts may result in new types of inequality across different regions. The inequality may lead to tension, contradiction, and even conflict between different social groups. In addition, the already familiar inequality between rural and urban regions and that between coastal and inland regions will heighten tensions amidst the water crisis. Third, there is the challenge of government accountability. In China, the administrative control of water resources involves both horizontal and vertical power distribution. “This dual administration system has been troubled by different criteria of policy implementation and fragmentation, which in turns results in vacuums and blind spots in governance.”18 The fragmentation of authority, because of the high cost of coordination, may lead to failure in watershed management. Moreover, the complicated and ambiguous power relations between different government offices make accountability investigations difficult. Ambiguous accountability conceals systemic deficiencies, forming another vicious circle in water governance.

17 Ibid. 18 Chen Wenhui, “Distribution and Integration: Power Structure in Cross-border Water Governance,” Administration Reform, May 2012.

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The chemical leakage in Shanxi mentioned at the beginning of this paper is a typical example of these three risks. In an article in Caijing Magazine, a report states, “Serious delayed reporting and concealment in this incident led directly to the dysfunction of the crisis management mechanism and eventually the repetition of the Songhua River incident eight years ago.”19 The lesson of the Songhua River incident was not learned; that is, GDP-oriented political performance evaluation systems may lead to pollution, just as a fragmented system may lead to a dysfunction in coordination. Following this logic, we may forecast three possible scenarios: 1)

2)

3)

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The negative impacts of rapid economic development start to manifest themselves. As for water resources, the consequences of water degradation become more visible. The existence of victim regions and groups open the eyes of the public to the problems of water pollution, particularly through new communication channels. The whole of Chinese society will face the “blowout of consequences,” a reality of social instability. A dual driving force system is in operation. On the one hand, economic development drives politicians to work for promotion. On the other hand, pollution accountability may cause politicians to lose their positions. These two driving forces work in opposite ways and put officials at great risk; if a government leader prioritizes pollution control, he may lose in the economic development race, and if he takes a shortcut to boost economic development, the risks and consequences of pollution may also result in political disaster. To build a “Beautiful China,” the government needs to show its dedication to reforming the water management system and increase investment by large margins. This dedication and implementation depend on interaction and transparency between the people and the government. In crossborder water competition and pollution, the power of victim regions and groups may have both destructive consequences as well as constructive effects. Which of the two will become the reality is decided by political wisdom and skills. The precondition is for the whole of society to realize that water resources and environments are among the most important public goods in the new age. Whether a government can provide this public good will become a major factor in proving the legitimacy of said government.

Gao Shengke and He Tao, “Another Incident of Cross-border Water Pollution,” Caijing Magazine, January 13, 2013.

part three Government Policies

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chapter 5

New National Standards for Drinking Water and the Reform of Policies Controlling Pollutant Discharge Song Guojun and Zhang Zhen Abstract The new national standard for drinking water has posed challenges for China’s pollutant discharge control policies. There are design loopholes in the policy for managing industrial nonpoint sources (NPSs), urban sewage treatment plants, medical organizations, and hazardous waste, in addition to defects in controlling and managing landfills, large-scale livestock/poultry farms, urban runoff, rural domestic NPSs, and agricultural NPSs. It is recommended to: take pollutant discharge permits as the primary tool for water pollution prevention and control, and define discharge limits based on technology and water quality for each source of pollution; formulate guidelines for developing water pollutant discharge standards, and differentiate discharge standards based on technologies from the ones based on water quality; create a pretreatment system for urban sewage treatment plants; issue policies managing rural sources of pollution; restrict the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers in agricultural production; and manage hazardous waste in strict accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and standards.

Keywords new national standard for drinking water – reform of policies for controlling pollutant discharge

Establishing sanitary standards for drinking water requires setting government-enforced quantitative limits on various physical, chemical, and biological attributes of drinking water, thereby ensuring human health and better quality of life. Sourcing water for drinking from natural bodies such as rivers and lakes is a complex process with steps ranging from identification of sources and diversion

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to facilities, to setting up cleaning and delivery systems. The quality of drinking water is a direct result of this process. This paper focuses on water safety at sources, which is the basis for assuring quality and safe standards of drinking water. To ensure that sourced water meets the standards, pollutant control is required. From this perspective, the new national standard for drinking water raises the requirements for controlling pollutant discharge in China. 1

Changes in the New National Standard for Drinking Water

The Sanitary Standard for Drinking Water (GB5749-2006) (生活饮用水卫 生标准) was officially promulgated on July 1, 2007 and became effective on July 1, 2012. The new national standard provides sanitary requirements for drinking water, water sources, organizations with centralized water supplies, secondary water supplies, and products relevant to drinking-water safety, as well as methods for monitoring and inspecting water quality. The number of water-quality indicators has increased from 35 to 106, while 8 of the original 35 indicators were modified. The new national standard categorizes these indicators into conventional and non-conventional methods of measuring basic conditions of drinking-water quality, including microbial indicators, toxicological indicators, organoleptic characteristics, and general chemical indicators including radioactive substances. Conventional pollutants include: total coliform bacteria, Escherichia coli, thermotolerant coliform bacteria, and total number of colonies. Toxicological indicators include: arsenic, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, lead, mercury, cyanide, and nitrates. The new national standard has lowered the upper limits for arsenic, lead, cadmium, nitrates, and carbon tetrachloride. Organoleptic characteristics and general chemical indicators include chromaticity, substances visible to the naked eye, total dissolved solids (TDS), pH scale, chemical oxygen demand (COD), and volatile phenol. The new standard has also modified the upper limit for turbidity. Radioactive substances include total α and β radioactivity. In addition, disinfectants in drinking water and conventional indicators mainly involve the treatment process; modified indicators include chlorine and free chlorine, chloramine, ozone, and chlorine dioxide. Non-conventional methods refer to drinking-water quality indicators employed depending upon region, time, or special conditions. They are categorized into microbial indicators, toxicological indicators, and organoleptic characteristics and general chemical indicators, while excluding radioactive substances. The addition of two more microbial indicators represents the

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main change in the new national standard. With regard to toxicological indicators, the number of inorganic compounds increases from ten to twenty-one and that of organic compounds from five to fifty-three. There are three more organoleptic characteristics and general chemical indicators. These indicators are critical for modifications included in the new national standard. 2

Challenges for Pollution Discharge Control Policies

Measured changes in the new national standard focus on microbial and toxicological indicators. Which pollutants affect these indicators? Are China’s current environmental policies effectively controlling the discharge of pollutants? 2.1 Pollution Sources Threatening Drinking Water Safety 2.1.1 Industrial Point Sources (PSs) Industrial production’s negative effects on drinking water stem from wastewater that is not sufficiently treated or left completely untreated. Enterprises in the secondary sector are among the major pollution sources for natural water bodies. Industrial wastewater contains pollutants that are characterized by massive discharge, complex composition, and high toxicity. Moreover, it is difficult to treat them and remove them from water. The toxicological indicators (arsenic, lead, cadmium, nitrates, and carbon tetrachloride) included in the new national standard are stringent. Heavy metals have been added to non-conventional indicators, including antimony, barium, beryllium, boron, molybdenum, nickel, silver, and thallium, as well as organic pollutants such as dibromochloromethane, dichloromethane, epichlorohydrin, chlorethylene, trichloroethylene, and chlorobenzene. When it comes to toxic and harmful pollutants in raw water, the primary concern is that there will be no obvious changes in content before and after conventional water treatment. In other words, once the contents of particular toxic substances exist in small amounts in raw water, they will remain unchanged when compared with their contents in water that comes out of waterworks and pipe networks, which are unable to remove such substances.1,2

1 Liang Wei, Lu Songwen, and Lv Jianzhong, “Content Measurement and Analysis of Small Amounts of Harmful Substances in Drinking Water in Suzhou,” Studies of Trace Elements and Health, no. 3 (2010): 25–27. 2 Zheng Hao, Yu Yang, Ding Zhen, and Chen Xiaodong, “Health Risk Assessment on Heavy Metal Pollutants in Drinking Water in Jiangsu Province,” Jiangsu Journal of Preventive Medicine, no. 4 (2012): 5–7.

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2.1.2 Municipal Sewage Treatment Plants Municipal sewage treatment plants focus on treating wastewater generated by residents and enterprises in cities as well as nearby towns and villages. Wastewater discharged by sewage treatment plants has relatively stable composition, with strong, unpleasant odor being the primary organoleptic characteristic. Such wastewater is alkalescent and contains large amounts of hydrocarbons as well as organic nutrient elements such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur; it generally does not contain toxic substances. Nonetheless, wastewater from sewage treatment plants allows for multiplication and spread of various microorganisms. Without effective control, domestic sewage generated by residents will cause or accelerate the incidence or spread of diseases in various ways.3 2.1.3 Other PSs In addition to industrial PSs and municipal sewage treatment plants, areas that contaminate sources of drinking water include landfills, large-scale livestock/ poultry farms, and medical organizations. Landfills contaminate water mainly through leachate. With complex composition, leachate contains substances difficult to biodegrade, such as sulfates, methanol, chlorobenzene, chlorophenol, and other toxicity indicators. Leachate also causes severe pollution to groundwater, which is mainly indicated by turbid water, unpleasant odor, severe COD pollution, and excessive coli groups. Leachate will have long-term effects on surface water, even if landfills have been closed for a period of time. The primary problem with large-scale livestock/poultry farms is surface water pollution caused by the sewage generated at these farms. Wastewater from medical organizations refers to dirty water generated during diagnosis and treatment, and domestic sewage from outpatient services, wards, operation/examination/autopsy/laundry rooms, and mortuaries. The following substances may all appear in wastewater from farms and medical organizations: thermotolerant coliform bacteria (added to the new national standard); Escherichia coli that often spreads with feces throughout the surroundings; Giardia lamblia as a flagellated protozoan parasite that colonizes in the intestine of most livestock; and cryptosporidium that exists in the feces of patients and those who carry such protozoan parasites.

3 Zhang Yufeng, Zeng Jimei, and Li Pengkan, “Study on Drinking Water and Sanitation in the Countryside of Dongkou County,” Practical Preventive Medicine, no. 2 (2010): 288–290.

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2.1.4 NPSs Non-point sources of water pollution mainly include urban runoff, agricultural NPSs (e.g., crop farms, free-range farms, and fisheries), and rural domestic NPSs. Urban runoff mainly refers to rainwater that washes hardened ground in cities and thus contains dust, soot, chemicals used for urban landscaping, oils, and trash-derived pollutants, which contaminate surface water. Rural domestic NPSs refer to household sewage discharged by rural residents, which is similar to urban domestic sewage in terms of pollution characteristics and also causes severe pollution due to lack of management. The main challenges for managing pollution are mostly created by agricultural NPSs. With the massive use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers, wastewater from farmlands has become one of the major pollution sources for natural water bodies. Pesticides and chemical fertilizers will partly remain in soil or air, before entering natural bodies through water from farmland irrigation, runoff, and seepage. This leads to eutrophication. Toxicity indicators added to the non-conventional indicators in the new national standard address pollution produced by agricultural NPSs and include herbicides (e.g., glyphosate and bentazone), chlorothalonil, DDT, deltamethrin, benzene hexachloride, dimethoate, methyl parathion, Furadan, chlorpyrifos, and DDVP. We can see that the new national standard has raised more stringent requirements for controlling pollution caused by agricultural NPSs in China. In general, industrial PSs, municipal PSs such as urban sewage treatment plants and landfills, as well as NPSs such as urban runoffs, agricultural NPSs and rural domestic NPSs all pose threats to sources of drinking water. Policies for controlling water pollutant discharge remain critical to the implementation of the new national standard. Unfortunately, there are still some problems with such policies and this is the real challenge for the compliance of drinking water to the standard. 2.2 Problems with China’s Policies for Controlling Water Pollutant Discharge 2.2.1 Industrial PSs On the side of policies for controlling sources of pollution, those controlling industrial PSs are the most mature. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (水污染防治法) as well as relevant regulations provide measures for controlling industrial PSs and procedures for regulating industrial sources of pollution. In addition, there are industry standards for discharge and clean production. These constitute a rather complete policy system. Moreover,

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the environmental authorities are clearly designated to be responsible for monitoring and managing industrial PSs. Nonetheless, there remain defects in critical policies: 2.2.1.1 A Lack of an Effective Discharge Permit System Makes it Difficult to Assure Continuous, Compliant Discharge by Sources of Pollution Control over water pollutants from PSs relies on an effective permit system.4 Unfortunately, there is now a loophole in the supervision and granting of permits for industrial PSs to discharge pollutants—these permits are granted and relevant laws enforced largely at will since no implementation rules are available.5 By comparison, the pollutant discharge permit system is regarded in the United States as an important instrument for controlling the discharge of water pollutants and has produced great effects. In the United States, pollutant discharge permits specify the discharge standards for PSs as well as corresponding monitoring schemes. Furthermore, the pollutant discharge permit system is implemented such that it assures that PSs follow discharge standards that are based upon technologies aiming to protect water quality. This enables supervision over pollutant discharge by PSs while assuring continuous, compliant discharge by sources of pollution. China is still insufficiently capable of managing the implementation of the pollutant discharge permit system. Today, professionals in the field of environmental management are much needed by both enterprises and government agencies in China. 2.2.1.2 Defects and Loopholes Exist in the Development, Management, and Implementation of the Discharge Standard The discharge standard defines the boundaries for the “internalization” of discharge by PSs. In other words, it sets a red line for all the PSs factors that have an environmental impact. In most cases today, China’s water pollutant discharge standard specifies a single upper limit and, in practice, generally uses prohibitive terms such as “the highest allowable” and “must not be greater than” with

4 Shen Guojun, Han Dongmei, and Wang Junxia, “Recommendations on the Positioning and Reform of China’s Water Pollutant Discharge Permit System,” Research of Environmental Sciences, no. 9 (2012): 1071–1075. 5 Shen Guojun and Shen Yuhuan, “On America’s Water Pollutant Discharge Permit System,” Environment and Sustainable Development, no. 1 (2006): 20–23.

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a lack of provisions concerning temporal dimensions and conditions of use.6 In the meantime, this standard does not discriminate discharge limits based on technologies from the ones based on water quality; discharge limits are defined in procedures that are not built on a solid technical basis, in addition to a lack of an update mechanism; and neither the basis for determining compliance nor the monitoring scheme is specific or operable. By comparison, the American guidelines on discharge limits provide criteria for determining compliance that varies with industries, facilities, pollutants, and other factors; and they specify temporal dimensions including the daily maximum, the monthly average, and other parameters, which accurately reflect the statistical patterns of water pollutant discharge by sewage treatment facilities. From China’s perspective, all of these elements are worth emulating. 2.2.2 Municipal Sewage Treatment Plants 2.2.2.1 A Pollutant Discharge Permit System has Yet to be Made for Urban Sewage Treatment Plants The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law provides that operators of centralized urban sewage treatment facilities shall be responsible for the quality of water from such facilities and that the relevant environmental authorities shall be responsible for monitoring and managing centralized urban domestic sewage treatment facilities. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has also issued the Wastewater Discharge Standard for Urban Sewage Treatment Plants (城镇污水处理厂污水排放标准), but has yet to make a pollutant discharge permit system for urban sewage treatment plants. 2.2.2.2

 here is no Pretreatment System for Polluters that Discharge T Wastewater into Urban Sewage Treatment Plants The quality of water discharged by sewage treatment plants is closely related to factors such as the quality and quantity of wastewater that they receive and the operating conditions of their treatment facilities. Given the lack of effective monitoring and management of the quality of incoming wastewater, it is difficult for sewage treatment plants to assure that outgoing wastewater meets quality standards. It is therefore unreasonable to hold the operators of these facilities wholly responsible for non-compliance. It is also necessary to implement a pollutant discharge permit system on the side of polluters that 6 Nie Rui, Ning Ping, and Zeng Xiangdong, “What Can We Learn from America’s Pollutant Discharge Standard in Making China’s Pollutant Discharge Standard for the Tin Industry?” Environmental Science Survey, no. 2 (2010): 16–18.

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discharge wastewater into urban sewage treatment plants. The competent municipal governments may be responsible for the implementation of this system. 2.2.3 Other PSs
Another weakness in China’s policies for controlling pollution by PSs is control over trash disposal sites. As a type of PS, trash disposal sites are managed in accordance with the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law and the Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law (固体废弃物污 染防治法). The latter provides that facilities and sites where trash is disposed of shall meet standards for environmental protection and sanitation. However, landfill monitoring is unavailable in China because a monitoring network has yet to be built. Wastewater discharge by large-scale livestock/poultry farms and medical organizations is also controlled in accordance with the water pollutant discharge standard. Unfortunately, no authority is clearly designated to manage this activity, nor is any specific way of monitoring available. 2.2.4 NPSs In the United States, the Clean Water Act of 1972 provides the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), which aims primarily to control pollution caused by NPSs. It focuses on making separate control strategies for polluted water bodies that have yet to meet water quality standards. It is intended to make pollutants in wastewater from PSs and NPSs decrease such that it meets water quality standards. Nowadays, this law controls pollutants such as sediment, trash, germs, and heavy metals. 2.2.4.1

P ollution by Urban Runoff and Rural Domestic NPSs is Left Unmanaged Today in China, urban runoff is left unmanaged as it flows directly into sewage systems or natural water bodies without being treated beforehand. As rural communities develop together with higher residential density, treating sewage and trash has become an urgent need. 2.2.4.2 Lack of Policies for Controlling Pollution by Agricultural NPSs Regarding pollution by agricultural NPSs, the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law states that the relevant agricultural authorities shall direct agricultural producers in using chemical fertilizers and pesticides to ensure that they are not overused. Measures such as oil-specific fertilization and agricultural technology training have now been taken in some regions of China. Although these measures are intended to encourage farmers to use smaller amounts of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, they have not produced the expected results since there are no financial incentives for the farmers. In the meantime, there is no legal requirement on how to treat waste from free-range farming.

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2.2.5 Hazardous Waste Management Hazardous waste refers to the solid waste listed in the National Catalogue of Hazardous Waste (国家危险废物名录) or waste identified by the statespecified standards as being, or likely to be, corrosive, toxic, flammable, reactive, and/or infective. Sources of such pollutants mainly include medical and industrial waste. Today in China, hazardous waste is managed under pollutant discharge standards, mainly specified in the Standard for Controlling Pollution from Sites for Storing and Disposing of General Industrial Solid Waste (一般工 业固体废物贮存、处置场污染控制标准), the Technical Specifications for the Centralized Disposal of Medical Waste (医疗废物集中处置技术规范), the Standard for Controlling Pollution by Burying Hazardous Waste (危险废 物填埋污染控制标准), and the Standard for Controlling Pollution by Waste Containing Polychlorinated Biphenyls (含多氯联苯废物污染控制标准). Nonetheless, most of the current standards are technical specifications, with no clear upper limits for the discharge of pollutants or bans on the leakage of particular pollutants, nor are there any requirements or monitoring specifications providing that particular pollutants shall not be found in water bodies near the corresponding sources of such pollutants. There are no clear requirements that hazardous waste must be disposed of at special sites or facilities. For historical reasons, hazardous waste has long been stored in some areas with no individual or organization responsible for managing them. This has led to a much higher risk that hazardous substances enter local water sources. Drinking water safety has been threatened in some of the areas that this takes place. 3 Recommendations for the Reform of Policies for Controlling Pollutant Discharge 3.1 Take Pollutant Discharge Permits as the Primary Instrument for Water Pollution Prevention and Control The existing policies for controlling pollutant discharge by PSs are unable to assure continuous, compliant discharge by PSs. International experience shows that a pollutant discharge permit system is a comprehensive management system that integrates the aforementioned policies to control discharge by PSs. A pollutant discharge permit should include all requirements that sources of pollution should meet and that cover application for pollutant discharge, the discharge standard to be followed, the discharge monitoring scheme, the criteria for determining compliance, the management of discharge-pipe locations, environmental-facility monitoring and management, restoration by deadlines, and punishment for non-compliance.

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To grant pollutant discharge permits for industrial PSs, it is necessary to define discharge limits based on technology and water quality, as well as the corresponding monitoring, checking, accountability, and punishment mechanisms, specific to each industrial PS in accordance with the water pollutant discharge standard and the water quality standard for the water body as the receiver of pollutants. 3.2 Formulate Guidelines for Developing Water Pollutant Discharge Standards It is necessary to: formulate national guidelines for developing water pollutant discharge standards on the basis of technologies for controlling water pollutant discharge; define quantitative limits specific to different pollutants generated by different facilities on the basis of the long-term average performance of relevant equipment; and develop discharge standards in accordance with the aforementioned guidelines and the water quality standard. In addition, it is necessary to create a strict update and review mechanism and to define the number of years within which the limits should be reviewed and the plan for setting the limits. As an example, it may be necessary to review the limits once every two years and to redevelop the guidelines or update the plans once every five years. This may help enterprises establish expectations for and give them opportunities to put relevant facilities into operation and/or improve them, thereby promoting the growth of the environmental industry. 3.3 Create a Pretreatment System for Urban Sewage Treatment Plants It is necessary to: monitor and control wastewater received by sewage treatment plants to ensure that industrial waste contained in such water meets pretreatment requirements and to prevent wastewater with high concentrations of pollutants from disrupting the treatment process of the sewage treatment plant; improve supervision and management systems for urban sewage treatment plants; and develop and implement a pollutant discharge permit system for polluters that discharge wastewater into urban sewage treatment plants. 3.4 Make Policies for Managing Rural Sources of Domestic Pollution Given the lack of policies for controlling domestic pollution by rural sources, it is necessary to: make laws and regulations governing the treatment of sewage and trash in rural areas as well as feces from small-scale livestock/poultry farming as soon as possible; explore workable management systems, t­ echnical patterns, and regulatory procedures; and manage rural sources of domestic pollution in strict accordance with relevant requirements, thereby assuring drinking-water safety for rural residents.

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3.5 Put Strict Restrictions on the Use of Agricultural Pesticides and Chemical Fertilizers that Pose Potential Threats to Water Safety It is necessary to: set standards for chemical fertilizers and agents used in agricultural production, while developing strict market entry requirements for enterprises that make such products; create and follow a list of hormones and agents whose use is prohibited; and promote the development of eco-friendly agriculture, while reducing the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers. 3.6 Manage Hazardous Waste in Strict Accordance with Regulations It is necessary to: work out a detailed list of hazardous waste on the basis of the existing standards for managing such waste; develop procedures for disposing of each hazardous waste, and determine the extent to which they should be removed; create a mechanism specific to disposing of hazardous waste; dispose of hazardous waste in corresponding facilities and assure zero leakage of pollutants that threaten human health; and create a series of safety and reporting systems for the storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste, especially industrial slag, medical waste and so on, to ensure that no hazardous substance is leaked throughout the process ranging from the generation of such waste to the disposal of them. In conclusion, the recommendations listed above, if implemented, should go far to close the loopholes in the existing pollution discharge regulations.

chapter 6

Revision of Environmental Protection Law Stirs Controversy Qie Jianrong Abstract In 2012, the amendments to the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) and the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) attracted great attention. The amended CPL was introduced on January 1, 2013, and for the first time, environmental public interest litigation became enshrined in the law marking the beginning of public interest litigation for environmental protection. In contrast, the revision of the EPL aroused great controversy, even receiving such criticism as being a “regression of decades.” To stop the approval of the draft amendments by the National People’s Congress (NPC), famous Chinese environmental jurists wrote to Wu Bangguo, the Chairman of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC, noting that there were many flaws in the proposed amendments to the EPL, for which the NPC Standing Committee was advised to postpone the bill passing process.

Keywords amending Environmental Protection Law – amending Civil Procedure Law – environmental public interest litigation enshrined in law

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Environmental Public Interest Litigation Enshrined in Civil Procedure Law

On August 31, 2012, the twenty-eighth session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress adopted the decision of the NPC Standing Committee on the amendments to the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) (民事诉讼法). The amendments to the CPL took effect on January 1, 2013. According to the newly amended CPL, institutions and certain organizations defined by law can bring litigation to court with regard to violations against public interest such as environmental

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pollution and infringement upon consumers’ legitimate rights and interests. This provision of the CPL is an institutional breakthrough for environmental public interest litigation. In fact, prior to the adoption of the newly amended CPL, environmental organizations—both from civil society and government-backed ones—had tried to initiate environmental public interest litigation. For example in 2009, the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF) (中华环保联合会) under the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) initiated environmental public interest litigation against Jiangsu Jiangyin Port Container Company (江苏江 阴港集装箱有限公司) over pollution involving iron ore powder. ACEF filed the same lawsuit in Guizhou and other places. Non-government affiliated environmental organizations, such as the Friends of Nature (自然之友), also initiated the same legal proceedings in the beginning of 2011. On September 20, 2011, Friends of Nature and the Green Volunteer League of Chongqing (重庆市绿色志愿者联合会) initiated environmental public interest litigation in the Qujing City (曲靖) Intermediate People’s Court against the Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industry (云南省陆良化工实业有限 公司) and Yunnan Luliang Peace Technology Co. (云南省陆良和平科技有 限公司). They sued for compensation for environmental losses (10 million RMB) caused by chromium slag pollution. Environmental jurists and insiders hold that this lawsuit filed by non-governmental environmental organizations was a remarkable start for environmental public interest litigation, for it was initiated by non-stakeholders. This milestone is seen as a truly meaningful practice of environmental public interest litigation. However, those initiations of environmental public interest litigation were not directly defined by laws or derived from legal provisions. Instead, they were based on some provisions found in policy documents, such as the Decision of the State Council on Implementing the Scientific View of Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection (关于落实科学发展观加强环境保 护的决定). For example, it was made clear in the decision that, “The function of civil societies should be fully exerted to encourage the reporting and disclosure of all types of environmental law-breaking activities so as to promote the lodging of lawsuits in the environmental public interest.” Only certain courts can accept environmental public interest litigation. Most organizations, with the exception of the ACEF and Friends of Nature, choose courts with a subsection to hear environmental protection cases. Environmental public interest litigation has embarked on a ground-breaking journey, but still encounters many obstacles in the law. Amendments to

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the CPL, adopted on August 31, 2012, clearly define two types of public interest litigation: environmental protection and protection of consumer rights and interests. On January 1, 2013, after the implementation of the newly amended CPL, environmental organizations could initiate litigation according to the law. Therefore, many environmental organizations began active attempts to file such lawsuits. In January 2013, ACEF sent three legal letters to illegal institutions in Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. One letter addressed pollution problems because of a highway built by Yuanping’s (原平) Housing and Urban-Rural Development Administration (HURDA) in Shanxi Province. The letter demanded that Yuanping’s HURDA eliminate environmental pollution in due time or environmental litigation would be initiated. On January 15, 2013, Zhao Jingwei (赵京慰), a lawyer dedicated to public interest law, was entrusted by ACEF to issue two copies of legal letters: one to United Laboratories Co. (Inner Mongolia) (联邦制药) listed in Hong Kong, demanding rectification of excessive sewage; another to the wastewater treatment plant of East Linhe District (临河东城区) in the city of Bayannur (巴彦淖尔), also requiring rectification in fifteen days. After this groundbreaking environmental public interest litigation, the number of cases initiated by relevant organizations is expected to grow exponentially. The Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC Believes the Amended CPL Expands the Limits of Legal Standing by Changing Social Groups into Organizations After the amended CPL was adopted, Wang Shengming (王胜明), deputy director of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC, provided a clear account of some provisions of the amended law during meetings. In his view, the shift from relevant social groups into relevant organizations is meant to expand the limits of legal standing to those qualified to institute environmental public interest litigation. A further explanation from Wang is that “social groups” are a narrow concept; even social groups registered in departments of civil affairs are merely part of social organizations. According to official statistics, by 2011 more than 460,000 social organizations were registered in departments of civil affairs. Of these, 250,000 were referred to as social groups, while more than 200,000 other social organizations were private non-enterprise units. In addition, over 2,000 social organizations were registered as foundations. In light of this fact, not all existing non-governmental organizations are social groups. The majority of NGOs might even be non-social groups. According to 1.1

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Wang’s interpretation, the change of social groups into social organizations did expand the limits of legal standing in public interest litigation.1 In addition, the newly amended CPL does not provide that individual citizens can be qualified as plaintiffs in environmental public interest litigation. Despite that, the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC explained that most environmental public interest lawsuits are concerned with citizens’ personal interests. According to the CPL prior to revision, individual citizens could initiate litigation and did not need to be regulated. The Amended CPL Does Not Define which Organizations Can Initiate Environmental Public Interest Litigation The amended CPL endows environmental organizations with the qualification to be plaintiffs in order to initiate environmental public interest litigation. However, it does not define which environmental groups are eligible to file such lawsuits. In this regard, Wang Shengming said that lawmakers need to further clarify this issue when formulating relevant laws. Where there is an issue of public interest litigation against the violation of consumers’ rights and interests provided in the amended CPL, there is a corresponding rectification in substantive laws. At present, the Department of the Civil Law of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC is amending the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (消费者权益保护法). Lawmakers have considered and studied which social organizations should have standing to initiate public interest litigation. For instance, when consumers’ rights are violated, there would be a certain number of organizations eligible to initiate public proceedings. 1.2

2

Environmental Protection Law: After Twenty-Four Years of Implementation, the First Amendment to the Law is Being Questioned

China’s existing Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法) was implemented in 1989, yet it only recently attracted the attention of society after being amended. On September 14, 2012, the draft amendments to the EPL were published on the homepage of the MEP, forwarded from the Legislative Affairs Committee 1 Li Jing and Yang Cheng, “Deputy Director of the Legislative Affairs Committee of NPC Analyzed What Organizations Can Initiate Environmental Public Interest Litigation,” People .Com.cn, August 31, 2012, http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2012/0831/c42510-18886976.html.

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of the NPC. The draft amendments to the EPL were circulated by the committee to seek public suggestions and critiques for half a month. Uproar against this proposed amendment ensued from both government institutions and the public. Comments on the amendments included the words “regressive,” “disappointing,” and “redraft.” The outcry from the disapproving public continues even today. The key reason for dissatisfaction is that even though the EPL has been enacted for twenty-four years, the proposed amendments do not cover strategic environmental assessment, environmental rights, or public interest litigation that best exemplifies theories and ideologies of environmental protection.2 Officials from the MEP State that Environmental Groups Are the Main Force in Initiating Environmental Public Interest Litigation On October 12, 2012, Bie Tao (别涛), the deputy director of the Regulation Department of the MEP, published a signed article titled in the China Environment News called “Environmental Organizations—The Main Force in Initiating Environmental Public Interest Litigation.” Bie stated in the article that amending the EPL is a great opportunity to improve the system of environmental public interest litigation. He suggested that lawmakers should draw on the experience of amending the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests and include provisions for environmental public interest litigation in the amendment to EPL, namely, the necessity of providing both departments of environmental protection and environmental social organizations’ legal status as qualified plaintiffs in an environmental public interest lawsuit. Bie mentioned in the article that without rights explicitly defined by laws, neither individual citizens nor administrations can directly initiate environmental public interest litigation. If individual citizens are affected by environmental practices, they can file civil suits immediately and directly against the infringement upon their private interests, instead of public interest litigation. This is also the case for administrative departments. Without special authorization, administrative departments are not permitted to bring civil proceedings to the court. In accordance with the principle “No Suits, No Hearings,” judicial authorities generally will not take the initiative to intervene in civil cases. According to Bie, the legal provision that citizens may start civil suits on behalf of pollution victims is not present in the CPL; in other words, no provisions are made for individual citizens to institute such public interest proceedings. On this matter, Bie stated that in order to protect the environmental rights 2.1

2 Qie Jianrong, “Vigorous Practice of Legislation: A View on Amendments to Environmental Protection Law,” Legal Daily, November 2, 2012.

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and interests of the public, the country should resort to legislation to address a number of issues, such as the legal standing of administrative departments and social organizations and their authorization to bring environmental public interest litigation to the courts. The MEP Identifies Four Problems in the Draft Amendment to the Environmental Protection Law On October 31, 2012, the MEP released primary opinions and suggestions on its homepage included in the draft amendments to the Environmental Protection Law, submitted to the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC. In this letter, the MEP commented that there were four main issues in the draft amendments to the EPL: the lack of truly effective and practical measures to balance economic development with environmental protection; the unclear boundary between the EPL and specific laws; the impact on the current system posed by revised regulatory functions of the EPL; and the failure to draw on the lessons of successful environmental protection practices in local administrations. The MEP said that the current draft fails to incorporate several practices and international experiences into the proposed amendments to the EPL. Such practices should be regulated by law, suitable for legislation, gain support from the public, and demand immediate action. This would have a significant effect on environmental protection work if the law were amended. According to the MEP, such practices and international experiences are systems that include sustainable development, market-based instruments, waste discharge permits, strategic environmental assessments, public participation, protection of environmental rights and interests, and public interest litigation. In addition, some changes in the draft conflict with other laws. It is said, in the MEP letter, that revisions of systems and measures in the draft amendments to the EPL—such as environmental impact assessment, the “three simultaneous aspects,”3 (三同时) waste charges, and rectification in due time—are not consistent with several laws on environmental protection including the Laws and Regulations on Water Pollution Prevention (水污染防治法) and Laws and Regulations on Air Pollution (大气污染防治法). To this end, the MEP made official suggestions to the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC, adding ten types of management systems and measures and improving previous 2.2

3 San tongshi or “three simultaneous aspects” states that environmental protection infrastructure should be planned, constructed, and put into use simultaneously with the main construction project.

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legislation in the draft amendments to the EPL. It even suggested ten general penalty rules to be included in the liability part of the law. The general penalty rules are stated as follows: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)

9) 10)

A “double penalty system” should be instituted, in which not only illegal enterprises, but persons in charge and other related personnel face punishment; Daily penalties, or a penalty for every day of continuous violation of environmental protection laws and regulations, should be imposed; The criterion for “damage of an ecological system,” should be included in the compensation for environmental pollution damage; More methods should be added for determining environmental pollution damage; methods such as recovery, ecological repair, and substituting environmental functions need clarification; The “rules of evidence” need to be made clear in litigation on environmental pollution damage, wherein the defendant bears the burden of proof; Environmental pollution damage needs to be considered through the mechanism of damage identification and assessment; Lawmakers should clarify whether certain environmental institutions and social organizations are qualified as plaintiffs in accordance with articles on public interest litigation in the new amendment to the CPL; In light of the provisions of the Administrative Enforcement Law and the actual need emerging from environmental law enforcement and regulations, more “coercive administrative measures,” such as closing down the polluter, can be applied to serious violations of environmental protection laws; The amendments should correspond to the articles on environmental damage under the Law on Penalties for Administration of Public Security; Provisions should be made for environmental offenses or crimes which correspond to the articles on serious environmental offences under the Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law.

Fourteen Environmental Jurists Petition for Postponement of the Consideration of Draft Amendments On September 25, 2012, a non-disclosure letter was sent to Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), chairman of the National People’s Congress, as well as the Law Committee. The letter was drafted by fourteen environmental jurists from the China Association for Environment and Resources Law (中国环境资源法 2.3

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学研究会). These renowned environmental jurists included: Ma Xiangcong4 (马骧聪) together with Cai Shouqiu (蔡守秋), Wang Jin (汪劲), Lv Zhongmei (吕忠梅), Wang Canfa (王灿发), Zhou Ke (周珂), Wang Shuyi (王树义), Li Yanfang (李艳芳), Zhang Zitai (张梓太), Wang Xi (王曦), Li Qijia (李启家), Li Zhiping (李挚萍), Chen Demin (陈德敏), and Xu Xiangmin (徐祥民). These fourteen environmental jurists pointed out the many errors in the draft amendments to the EPL, including in guiding ideologies, text structure, organization, content, and literary expressions. All the issues pointed out failed to live up to the expectations from both academia and society, and to meet the demand of environmental protection in real practice. Therefore, the current draft amendments to the EPL do not meet the requirements of the legal process or even the submission of secondary review. At the same time, they claimed that there are seven flaws in the draft amendment, all of which hardly reflect the reform of ideas for environmental protection and the changes in China’s guiding ideologies in the new era. The fourteen environmental jurists believed that since the implementation of the EPL in 1989, the economic, social, and environmental conditions in China have undergone tremendous changes. Correspondingly, the ideas and guidelines concerning environmental protection in China have also undergone major changes. A consensus has been reached about sustainable development, the scientific outlook on development, people-oriented awareness, and building an eco-civilization. However, the draft amendments do not reflect these significant changes, nor do they cover strategic environmental assessments, environmental rights, and public interest litigation. In addition, this draft does not reflect the basic requirements stipulated in the constitution for respecting and safeguarding human rights. It is stated in the non-disclosure letter that the phrase “the State respects and safeguards human rights” is stipulated clearly in China’s constitution. Environmental rights fall under economic, social, and cultural rights, which have been included in the National Human Rights Action Plan (国家人权行 动计划). However, the draft amendment to the EPL does not address environmental rights. The fourteen environmental jurists also mentioned that the draft does not clarify the boundary between the EPL and the specific laws dealing with environmental issues, nor does it reflect the actual need for environmental protection practice in the new era. There are even more aspects that the draft 4 A researcher at the Institute of Law of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Ma Xiangcong participated in drafting the EPL ( for Trial Implementation) in 1979, revising the EPL in 1989 and attended the preliminary discussion of draft amendments.

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neglects: it does not weigh scientific rules to a large extent, it lacks reasonable logic, and the text reads as unprofessional and far from rigorous. Furthermore, it does not draw on the experiences of recent legislative achievements. The fourteen environmental jurists said that the newly amended CPL has stipulated a litigation system for environmental civil lawsuits and authorized substantive laws to qualify legal standing. In representing a comprehensive legislation for environmental protection, the EPL should also make detailed provisions in this matter, but none is mentioned in the draft. The jurists severely criticized the fact that the draft shows no substantive progress compared to the EPL made in 1989. Instead, vital errors can be found in the principles of laws and the legal system on environmental protection. For example, such goals as “reinforcing government’s accountability in environment,” “protecting citizens’ environmental interests,” and “increasing the cost of illegal enterprises” used to appear in the description of this law, but are not reflected in the draft amendments. Furthermore, almost all revisions are not feasible in implementation. According to the fourteen environmental jurists, “conclusions could be drawn that the draft is the least mature, and the worst and the most disappointing of its kind since the Reform and Opening Up.” Thus, it is clear that this draft has provoked strong dissatisfaction among environmental jurists. Can Environmental Public Interest Litigation Stipulated in the Amended CPL Be Guaranteed by Substantive Laws? According to the classification of laws, the CPL belongs to the category of procedural law. Hence, some of its legal provisions need to be further guaranteed by substantive laws. This is also the case of the newly-established public interest litigation system in the amended CPL. In August 2012, after the amendments to the CPL were adopted by the NPC, Wang Shengming, the vice chairman of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC remarked publicly that the provisions on the public interest litigation system under the amended CPL need to be further specified when relevant laws are made, specifically, which organizations have the standing to initiate public interest litigation. Among the public interest lawsuits related to violations of consumer rights, organizations that are qualified to institute such proceedings will be clarified in a revised version of the CPL. Therefore, one proposal for amending the EPL is that the amendments to the EPL shall explicitly provide which organizations are qualified as plaintiffs to institute environmental public interest litigation. However, such provisions are hardly found in the draft amendments released seeking public opinion. Due to the aforementioned reason, “it is hard to imagine that a specialized law on environmental protection is more appropriate than an environmental 2.4

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public interest litigation system, in addition to a comprehensive law on environmental protection as the EPL,” Bie Tao once stated openly. With regard to the process of seeking suggestions, an official from the MEP revealed to this author that the ministry pays great attention to the amendment process—organizing various types of symposiums all over the country with environmental protection sectors, enterprise representatives, environmental experts, and representatives from environmental organizations. Moreover, it has also initiated a wide-ranging discussion through such platforms as its homepage and the China Environment News to seek opinions and suggestions from both inside and outside parties. According to the source, the draft amendments to the EPL have also attracted the public’s attention. For example, in one month, the MEP received more than 12,000 high-quality opinions and suggestions. On the basis of these comments, the legislative proposal on the amendments to the EPL could be drafted successfully and eventually submitted to the Legislative Committee of the NPC.5 That the MEP suggested incorporating environmental public interest litigation into the amendments already reflects public opinion to some extent. The Environmental Protection Law has been in place for twenty-four years. It is unclear how it will be amended and whether the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC will accept these opinions and suggestions from environmental jurists and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. It is of concern whether the amendment process will persist in the current path, or if it will take the whole situation into account by actively drawing on the suggestions from all parties. .

5 Qie Jianrong, “Vigorous Practice of Legislation: A View on Amendments to Environmental Protection Law,” Legal Daily, November 2, 2012.

Part Four Livability

∵

chapter 7

Rapid Increase of Waste Incineration Plants Causes Concern Yang Changjiang Abstract The waste incineration power generation policy jointly stipulated by the State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission in 2012 has set off a frenzy for waste power, attracting enormous government and private investments. However, government efforts have been greeted by the public with suspicion and triggered disputes concerning the location of waste incineration plants, which though classified as clean, produce four times as much nitrogen dioxide as the same-sized thermal power plant. Criticism of this waste incineration power “great leap forward” focuses on the reliability of garbage incineration power technologies and the sustainability of the industry which now depends heavily on government subsidies. Opponents of waste incineration power now argue that waste incineration should be replaced by gasification and anaerobic fermentation and they believe that the future of waste treatment lies in reclamation.

Keywords waste power – future direction – incineration

Facing the pressing issue of mounting waste produced in cities, the Chinese government has encouraged and led the development of waste incineration power generation, which has set off a frenzy of waste incineration plant building all over the country. Waste power generation offers both energy and environmental protection, but has been mostly dependent upon government subsidies for survival. This extensive and rapid growth without a market-oriented development path will reveal hidden problems in the near future. There is a long road to travel before we will achieve waste treatment reclamation.

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Waste Incineration Power Generation Policies Set Off a Frenzy of Waste Incineration Plant Building

With the issuance of waste incineration power generation policies, investment in waste power generation has skyrocketed. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced the NDRC Price [2012] No. 801 Notice on Improving the Waste Power Generation Price Policy (关于完善垃圾焚烧发 电价格政策的通知) on March 28, 2012. The notice requires waste incineration projects that use garbage as raw materials to convert the input garbage processed volume to the power network incorporated rate—one ton of garbage is to equal 280 kWh—and to implement the national benchmark price of 0.65 RMB per kilowatt-hour (including tax). The remaining electricity volume implements the rate for coal-fired power generation. The General Office of the State Council SCS [2012] No. 23 Notice on Twelfth Five-Year Plan National Urban Garbage Decontamination Treatment Facilities Construction Plan (“十二五”全国城镇生活垃圾无害化处理设施建设规 划的通知) clearly states that when choosing urban garbage treatment methods, places in eastern and economically developed areas should give priority to incineration technology and decrease landfill disposal. Other areas with appropriate conditions can use incineration technology through regional building and resource sharing mechanisms. The issuance of these two documents means that waste incineration technology has been fully affirmed at the national policy level. Specifically, the plan has given a clear quantitative target: by 2015 the municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration treatment capacity should be more than 35% of the overall treatment capacity in urban areas, and the eastern areas should achieve over 48%. In 2010, the percentage for the whole country was 20%. The plan points out that the daily processing capability of the MSW incineration treatment should improve to 307,100 tons per day by 2015 from 89,600 tons per day in 2010, which is an increase of 3.42 times. To achieve this target, during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, the daily process capacity needs to reach 43,500 tons per day. This will result in 272 new incineration plants being built based on the average process capacity of 817 tons per day per plant. And if every project requires an investment of 327 million yuan, then the total investment in building incineration plants will be 88.9 billion RMB.1 The incineration equipment suppliers, contractors, and operators will benefit from this investment. 1 Haiye Zhang, “Twelve-Five Incineration Power Generation Projects Investment Gets to 88.9 Billion RMB,” May 30, 2012, China Solid Waste Web, http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/view/ id_39823.

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Waste incineration power generation investment enterprises processing capability

Ranking Enterprise

Capacity Main competition 2012 national urban (ton/day) processing capability waste incineration coverage (%) capability (%)

1

19,700

12.78

11.15

18,700 14,550 13,950 11,800 10,400 10,050

12.13  9.44  9.05  7.66  6.75  6.52

10.59  8.24  7.90  6.68  5.89  5.69

 8,100  7,250  5,800

 5.26  4.70  3.76

 4.59  4.10  3.28

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Everbright International Hangzhou Jinjiang Green Power Shanghai Environment Chongqing Sanfeng Weiming Group China Environmental Protection Zhongke General Shenzhen Energy Chuanguan Environmental Protection

The plan has attracted great attention among government and relevant industries. Investors have been drawn into the waste treatment industry, triggering a frenzy of waste incineration investment. For example, the Guangdong Lianjiang MSW Incineration Plant Project (广东廉江生活垃圾焚烧发电 厂项目) was successfully green-lighted, China Everbright International got a loan of 800 million HKD from the Asian Development Bank to invest in waste incineration power generation projects, and Chengdu started the construction of the Wanxing Green Power Plant (万兴环保发电厂) with a waste processing capacity of 2,400 tons per day. Also, Zhuzhou (株洲) in Hunan Province invested 500 million RMB to build its first MSW incineration plant, Huzhou (湖州) in Zhejiang Province is expected to turn all its MSW into “power,” and there are two waste incineration plants that will begin construction within the year in Nanjing. In addition Mitsubishi Heavy Industries plans to build 200 waste combustion chambers in China within five years, and Ningxia and Xinjiang regions are also planning to build their first waste incineration plants. During the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, Guangdong Province is planning to build thirty-six waste incineration power generation projects with a processing capacity of 43,100 tons per day, and to reserve nineteen such projects

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during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan period to increase another 19,500 ton per day processing capacity.2 By the end of October 2012, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shandong, and Fujian provinces ranked in the top five for the number of market-oriented waste incineration power generation projects, and there were a total of ninety projects in these five provinces accounting for 58.1% of the total number of this statistical survey which also showed a high project concentration in certain areas.3 Enterprises used market-oriented means to obtain a new project processing capacity of 19,800 tons per day. The total processing capacity for operations in 2012 achieved 154,130 tons per day, accounting for 87.2% of the whole year MSW incineration scale. 2

Public Protests against Incineration Site Selection

Waste incineration power generation is said to be both green and energy saving; therefore, it is easy to understand why the government would encourage it. However, the public is not buying this. Disputes on waste incineration plants site selection have not been quelled. Guangzhou’s Huadu Incineration Plant (花都垃圾焚烧厂) site is very close to the border of the city of Qingyuan (清远). The plant chimney after construction will be 80 to 100 meters high, and when the southeast wind is blowing the exhaust gas will blow to Qingyuan from the north side of the plant. The villages of Sanxing (三星村), Qixing (七星村), Zhuwu (朱屋村), Hengkeng (横坑村), Yinzhong (银中村), and the famous Yinzhan Hot Spring tourist site are just two kilometers away from the plant. And three to four kilometers away are Longtang (龙塘镇) and Hetang (荷塘镇) counties and the Yinzhan reservoir which provides drinking water for over 100,000 people in the Yinzhan (银盏) area.4 On May 3, over 100 Qingyuan residents, holding banners with slogans such as “I don’t want to live with a mask on,” “No waste incineration in Qingyuan,” and “Protect our homes” went to the Guangzhou City Management Committee to protest the site selection of the Huadu Incineration Plant. People in the rural area of Qinhuangdao (秦皇岛) also have a strong sense of protecting their rights. With the help of environmental NGOs and lawyers, 2 Yi Lu, “Guangdong Province Focuses on Developing Waste Incineration Power Generation and Controlling Landfill Projects in Twelve-Five Period,” Southern Daily, November 27, 2012. 3 Jialing Fu, “Everbright Leads in Waste Incineration This Industry is Accelerating,” November 29, 2012, China Solid Waste Website, http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/view/id_43812. 4 Ping Qiu et al., “Residents in Huadu Qingyuan Guangzhou against Incineration Plant Site Selection,” Southern Daily, May 24, 2012.

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they successfully stopped the construction of a waste incineration plant west of Qinhuangdao which was a project of the Zhejiang Weiming Green Company (浙江伟明环保股份有限公司). On May 18, Pan Zhezhong (潘志中) and Pan Zuofu (潘佐富), two village representatives, sued the Ministry of Environmental Protection at the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court for “approving a corporation that had environmental violations.” Although on June 21, the court ruled “not on file,” the villagers said that, “if we lose the lawsuit, we farm; if we win, we still farm. We previously persisted for the county, for the village, but now we persist to let people know that we will not allow environmental assessments to be faked. We farmers also know about environmental protection and are not ignorant of the law.” The Qinhuangdao case demonstrated that participation in environmental protection is turning from urban citizens to the rural public. Their victory defending their rights followed the success of the Beijing Liulitun (六里屯) area residents, who also stopped the building of an incineration project. The vigorous promotion of waste incineration has been criticized by international environmental organizations. On April 12, Chen Jianhua (陈建华), the mayor of Guangzhou, went to the United States to visit Columbia University and Professor Nickolas Themelis, a Coventa Energy Corp. Consultant of the U.S. Academy of Engineering. On June 5, the U.S. East Michigan Environmental Action Council wrote a letter to Mayor Chen saying that, “Before you make the final decision to work with these people or corporations to set up partnerships and build many waste incineration plants in Guangzhou, we would like to share with you some of our concerns.”5 The letter said that Eastern Michigan has suffered from pollution caused by incineration plants operated by Coventa Energy Corp. Coventa not only brought Detroit citizens a $1.2 billion dollar financial burden, but also caused air quality deterioration, a higher incidence of asthma, and inhibited the region from building waste recycling and composting systems. Known for its 850 degree combustion technology, Likeng Incineration Power Generation Plant (李坑垃圾发电厂) in Guangzhou often fails to fully incinerate plastic bags and rubber shoes. On August 23, three representatives from Yongxing Village (永兴村) went to the Guangzhou City Administration Committee to make a complaint. Officials went to the Likeng incineration plant to inspect on the same afternoon and found the report true. Therefore, 5 Basuofengyun, “U.S. Environmental Group Sends Letter to Mayor of Guangzhou: Be Alert to Waste Incineration Company’s Misdeeds and False Information from their Spokesman,” June 8, 2012, via Jiangwaijiang Forum website, http://gz.focus.cn/msgview/23265/233358578 .html.

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the plant was fined 100,000 yuan. At 10:20 am on November 8, there was black smoke coming out of the No. 1 furnace chimney that smelled like burning clay and choked people to tears. Around 10:50 am, the suffocating smell began to disperse and around noon, the smoke was completely gone. It lasted around 90 minutes.6 Despite opposition voices, public opinions have been marginalized under the strong government guidance and the industry’s advocacy. The problem is not being solved but is continuing to grow. 3

Deep Problems Kept Secret: Nitrogen Oxides Released are Four Times over Standard

China is still lacking in the area of waste incineration plant operation supervision. Emission data for gas, leachate, fly ash, and bottom ash is kept secret. Moreover, emissions of nitrogen dioxide from such plants are four times more than that from thermal power plants. People call it the black hidden behind the green. For decades in the history of air pollution control, nitrogen oxide, as notorious as sulfur dioxide, has been the main cause of acid rain, photochemical pollution, hazy weather formations, and the generation of ozone. After a series of complicated chemical reactions, it can also become a component of PM2.5, which has now become very familiar to people. Even though, in the past ten years, China has put great effort into controlling sulfur dioxide and other pollutants, the massive emissions of nitrogen oxide cause a more frequent occurrence of photochemical smog and intensified acid rain. In Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta, there are over 100 days of smog in a year, and it is even worse in places like Guangzhou, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan. It puts people’s health in danger and has become a pressing environmental problem. China’s nitrogen oxide emission in 2011 was 24.04 million tons, up 5.73% compared with 2010, which did not achieve the target of a 1.5% decrease.7 The Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (国民经济和社会发展“十二五”规划纲要) clearly stated that the emission reduction targets of chemical oxygen demand, sulfur dioxide, ammonia, and 6 Zhuxi Liu and Wen Li, “Black Smoke from Likeng Incineration Plant?” Southern Daily, November 9, 2012. 7 Chunyu Hua and Ruizhen Gu, “MEP: 2011 China Nitrogen Oxide Emission Increased not Decreased,” June 5, 2012, via Xinhua Net, http://news.cnfol.com/120605/101,1277,12520033, 00.shtml.

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400 400 300 200

200 100

135

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Waste Incineration

Figure 7.1 Nitrogen oxide emission limits (mg/cubic meter).

nitrogen oxides are in the “Twelfth-Five” constraint index. By 2015, the emissions of chemical oxygen demand and sulfur dioxide need to be decreased to 23.48 million tons and 20.86 million tons respectively, down 8% compared with 2011; the emissions of ammonia and nitrogen oxide need to be decreased to 2.38 million tons and 20.46 million tons respectively, down 10% compared with 2010. The control targets of ammonia and nitrogen oxide are two new indicators in the overall control target of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. Obviously, there is tremendous pressure to accomplish this target. On January 1, the newly revised national Thermal Power Plant Air Pollutant Emission Standard (火电厂大气污染物排放标准) was formally implemented. It is called the strictest requirement in the world, and two times stricter than the EU’s requirement, whose limit on nitrogen oxide emission from new large combustion plants is 200 milligrams per cubic meter, and the United States, which is about 135 milligrams per cubic meter.8 China’s new standard on nitrogen oxide emissions is 100 milligrams per cubic meter. This means that China, known as the “world’s factory,” has finally started to deal with nitrogen oxide pollution in 2012. Because the thermal power industry is the leader for such emissions, they will be the focus for the standard implementation. In the Waste Incineration Pollutant Control Standard (GB18485-2001) (生活垃圾焚烧污染物控制标准), the emission limit on nitrogen oxide from 8 Zheng Cui, “China’s De-nitration Takes Off,” Caixin New Century Weekly, Edition 3, 2012.

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incinerators is an hourly average of 400 milligrams per cubic meter, which is four times higher than the thermal power standard. Waste incineration power generation enjoys high government subsidies but openly and legally escapes strict policy supervision. It is a great irony that incinerator emissions get such a lenient treatment under such a great pressure to achieve the constraint index. Waste incineration companies repeatedly claim that the pollution is under control, but their public credibility has been lost according to the Twelfth FiveYear Plan constraint index of nitrogen oxide emission. 4

Incineration Technology Unreliable and Subsidies Not the Best Solution

Advocators of waste incineration think that the incineration technology has gradually been correctly recognized and evaluated, and controversies around the technology itself have abated. They believe that society focuses more on the standardized design, construction, operation, and supervision of the incineration technology. However, waste incineration generation is still considered to have hidden technical risks. The Likeng Waste Incineration Plant, advertised as the national environmental protection model project, had pipe explosion accidents time and time again, which was an inevitable result of this technological path. Studies by Chen Shanping (陈善平) and others from the Shanghai Environmental Sanitation Engineering Design Institute (上海环境卫生工程设计院) demonstrate that the technology the plant is using is not reliable. The heating surface of the highparameter boiler is seriously corroded and has high requirements for material and system maintenance. This increases the probability of an unplanned boiler shutdown, and an annual 8,000 hours of operation cannot be guaranteed. China has not implemented a waste sorting system, and the calorific value of domestic waste is generally low. Therefore, the efficiency advantage of a high parameter boiler cannot be fully reflected, which brings down the earning expectations of the steam high parameter technology.9 For the economic side of the system, a medium temperature and secondary high pressure operation is 6% more efficient than medium temperature and medium pressure, however, the real financial benefit is not certain, considering factors like investment, maintenance, operation time, and management team.

9 Shanping Chen et al., “Comparative Research on Waste Incineration Plant Waste Heat Boiler Steam Parameter,” Heilongjia Electric Power, Edition 3, 2010.

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Figure 7.2 PAHs emission concentration limit (ng/m3).

Waste incineration is a major source of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) generation. PAHs emissions, calculated by benzo(a)pyrenes (BaPs), though waste incineration can get to 1,350 tons per year, is second only to emissions of boilers’ coal burning. Studies by Shao’ai Sun (孙少艾) et al. from the Science Institute of the Agriculture University of China demonstrated that the PAHs contained in the air surrounding incineration plants and close by are much higher than our air quality daily average standards and the WHO standards, and are a potential threat to human health. The studies discovered that the PAHs and BaPs equipotent concentration in the gas phase and particle phase of the air surrounding incineration plants is 94 ng/m3 and 22.68 ng/m3 respectively,10 while our air quality control standard of BaPs is 10 ng/m3, and the WHO’s standard is 1 ng/m3. The results of this research were 1.79 and 2.27 times higher than our national standard respectively, and 17.94 and 22.68 times higher than WHO’s standard respectively. In China, the main source of profit for incineration plants is waste disposal fee subsidies and grid purchase income. Waste disposal fee subsidies vary from 50 RMB per ton to 200 RMB per ton over the whole country. As for grid purchase income, to take Likeng Incineration Plant as an example, every ton of waste can generate 360–400 degrees of electricity, and the grid purchase income can reach over 50 million RMB per year. This amount of income alone can make both ends meet for the plant’s operation. High dependence on government 10

Shao’ai Sun et al., “An Preliminary Study on Incineration Plants and PAHs in the Surrounding Air Based on Passive Sampling Technique,” Environmental Science, No. 11 2012.

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subsidies is not a healthy way of development. The state financial subsidies should be symbolic and encouraging. According to the NDRC Price [2012] No. 801 document, the electricity generated over 280 degrees per ton should not access the benchmark price 0.65 RMB per kWh. Document GOSC [2012] No. 23 requires the “acceleration of the construction of a credit system, to set up a bad-credit punishment mechanism and a blacklist system for bad-credit waste incineration companies. Enterprises that are not qualified and cannot perform their franchise contracts will be cleared away from the market.” And having an extra 80 to 120 degrees of electricity generated per ton is obviously a subsidy cheating behavior. The existing waste incineration plants are also facing some issues. There are some plants in Shandong Province that are not “well fed.” Jinan No. 2 Waste Incineration Plant of the Everbright Green Energy (Jinan) Co. (光大环保能源 (济南)有限公司), with a total investment of 900 million RMB, put into operation in the second half of 2011 four incinerators which have a daily processing capability of 500 tons; therefore, every day they can “eat” 2,000 tons of waste. However, the city of Jinan can only provide 2,300 tons of waste every day and during pre-combustion it must undergo three to five days of fermentation, oozing around 800 tons of leachate. Now the actual usable waste for power generation is only 1,600 tons. “Normally three incinerators are enough for the operation, and the fourth one basically sits idle there.”11 There is another large waste storehouse in the plant which can store over 30,000 tons of garbage in full capacity to guarantee that there is fermented waste ready for operation every day. However, because the input is too small, there are only 4,000 tons stored. The operation will have to stop once the supply can no longer keep up. The “great leap forward” situation of waste incineration plant construction is a concern now. Relevant national standards have not been established and there is a lack of regulatory regimes. Business management methods and technologies vary greatly, and the environmental impact it has is difficult to contain. 5

Future Lies in Renewable Resources: Call for Incineration Replacement

On December 2, the China Association of the Waste Recycling Industry (中国垃圾资源化产业协会) held a high level forum in Beijing. The forum 11

Ran Su and Xiaodan Shi, “Be Prudent to Waste Incineration Projects Construction,” Jinan Daily, June 23, 2012.

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suggested replacing waste incineration with gasification and anaerobic fermentation technologies. Cao Fengzhong (曹凤中), a consultant on MEP environmental project evaluation and a graduate of Tsinghua University’s Chemical Engineering Department, advocated “saying no to building waste incineration plants, and strongly called for national level attention to seriously consider and study how to solve this major social issue of urban solid waste.”12 He thinks the waste incineration direction is wrong, and we must come back to the recycling industry, and it should be under the leadership of the central government. We must do well on initial waste sorting and turn different categories of waste into valuable resources to make economic benefits and form a stable recycling system to achieve a virtuous cycle. Since the establishment of this association on November 16, 2011, Chairman Zhao Zhangyuan (赵章元) and colleagues have been focusing on selecting outstanding companies from more than forty waste recycling companies hoping to find a waste incineration technology replacement plan that involves non-oxidative incineration. 5.1 Carbonization Gasification Waste gasification can achieve turning waste into energy and resources. During the whole process, the carbonization stage is completely non-oxygenated. Wastes are carbonized, releasing combustible gas, and then oxidized with oxygen and water vapor under a high temperature. This is not incineration; therefore it avoids the generation of dioxin. Raw wastes, after the selecting, sorting, and drying processes, turn into dried combustibles which do not produce leachate. A single gasifier is capable of processing up to 200 tons of feedstock per day, and can be assembled to be able to process 400, 800, 1,000 and 2,000 tons per day. 5.2 Anaerobic Fermentation In China, municipal solid wastes contain a high percentage of organic matter and water, and have to be fermented first before sorting when the water content is below 20%. An automatic sorting machine can sort out different types of solid wastes mixed together. The system is digitally controlled and is simple to operate. It is a very practical and reliable land saving resource.

12

Fengzhong Cao and Yuanshi Li, “Analysis on Waste Incineration Technology and Recycling Technology Issues,” Heilongjiang Environmental Journal, June 2012.

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5.3 Comprehensive Processing This method is to use solid waste as a raw material to produce solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels and fertilizers. High-wet mixed wastes can be extracted to recycled plastic (or oil), refuse-derived fuel RDF-5, methane and power generation, bio-organic fertilizer, and building materials. Organic matters can be used for methane anaerobic fermentation. This technology can solve the problem of the large quantity of biogas slurry produced in other ways. The methane gas generated can be purified to generate electricity, and the leftover biogas can be the heat energy for RDF drying. This realizes energy’s internal recycling and saves energy. Biogas residue can undergo second time automatic oxygenation and aerobic fermentation to produce bio-organic fertilizer. 5.4 Rural Proposal It has been suggested to develop rural waste gasification and energy utilization equipment. This is suitable for the dispersed houses in rural areas and can efficiently process rural solid waste without a further pollution. It can lower the cost and lighten the government’s financial burden by fully utilizing the heat energy produced by gas burning. This technology is very effective at reducing the quantity of waste. Waste gasification’s organic matter convert rate can achieve 90%, with an energy utilization rate over 70%. China’s waste power generation industry has entered into its golden stage. However, at the same time, this is also a period of high environmental pollution. The industry model of high pollution and high subsidy dependency will inevitably turn into a dead end. Returning to the right track of recycling requires both mature replacement technologies and the support of an improved legal system, in particular a mature public interest litigation policy. On August 31, the NPC Standing Committee passed Decision on Revising ‘The Civil Procedure’ (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法), and added an article in Section Nine, “For behaviors and actions that damage social public rights and benefits such as polluting the environment and harming the public’s legal rights and benefits, law authorities and relevant organizations can sue in the people’s court.” This marks a great breakthrough in our legal history and opens up a new chapter for environmental public interest litigation. In China, waste incineration companies cover up too much pollution related information and government supervision is only in name. However, facts cannot be forever hidden. The public, environmentalists, and NGOs can all play a part in unveiling the truth of waste incineration pollution through the environmental public interest litigation system.

chapter 8

The Challenge of Restoring Brownfields Gao Shengke Abstract Beijing’s Kangquan New Town is only one example of the widespread misuse of brownfield land in China, where many more unidentified polluted areas of land have brought about hard-to-eradicate hazards during the process of fast urbanization. Problems such as groundwater pollution derived from the misuse of brownfield land deserve immediate attention. The issue of brownfields reveals the lack of regulation under the current land development system. Immature restoration technologies, high costs, and a lack of land-specific laws add to challenges from brownfield land. Creating a multi-level management information database as soon as possible, plus phased restoration, may be a way to make breakthroughs in brownfield restoration in China.

Keywords brownfields – Kangquan New Town – groundwater pollution – state of pollution – soil remediation

In June 2012, the problem of brownfields was brought into focus at a site outside the East Fifth Ring Road in Beijing, where residential buildings for civil servants were being constructed. Such new threats to cities, soil, and groundwater pollution have great adverse effects on human health while causing environmental harm. Given the increasing land value brought by urban sprawl, even heavily polluted areas have become popular. A more serious problem is that the harmful effects of brownfield lands are unknown to urban residents. Because of a lack of transparency and information asymmetry, only a few cases were revealed to the public in recent years. In reality, the phenomenon of misusing brownfield land was already occurring in the mid-1990s, and more incidents have yet to be revealed.

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A Sample Survey: Hidden Brownfield Land

Residential buildings for civil servants are being constructed in Guanzhuang Township (管庄乡), Chaoyang District (朝阳区), Beijing, which is outside the Fifth Ring Road. This housing development is planned to be 261,900 square meters in gross area, including 243,700 square meters of floor space for the residential buildings. Named the Kangquan New Town Phase 2 (康泉新城 二期工程), this housing development is located on a heavily polluted piece of brownfield land, where a railway sleeper plant of the former Ministry of Railways was in operation. Founded in 1957, the plant was shut down and nearly 1,000 employees lost their jobs in 2001 because there was no more market demand for railway sleepers. Many older, former employees recalled that the site was heavily polluted during the four decades when the railway plant was operating. Large amounts of preservatives and anti-aging organic chemicals were used on many production lines. In construction workshops, for example, large amounts of preservatives and coal tar were used. Pentachlorophenol (PCP) was the most toxic of all the preservatives, as poisonings would still occur even if workers were wearing gas masks. Moreover, this plant had management problems that resulted in an inability to avoid leakage during operations. There were times when the plant was forced to compensate nearby farmers for pollution. A heavily polluted site was left after the sleeper plant was shut down. In March 2011, the China Research Academy of Environmental Sciences (CRAES) made a sample survey at the site of the Kangquan New Town Phase 2 before working out the Preliminary Survey Report (初步调查报告). After analysis, the CRAES concluded that there were multiple kinds of pollutants in the soil with contents much higher than the allowable limits. Nineteen kinds of pollutants were detected, including thirteen semi-volatile organic pollutants led by polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and six volatile organic pollutants. Specifically, the contents of benzene and methylbenzene were up to 452 and 90 times as high as the allowable limits, respectively. It is noteworthy that this site, about 6.67 hectares in area, is now being used for three purposes: the Kangquan New Town Phase 2; the Dongyishi Complex (东一时区), an apartment complex that was built and occupied for years; and the Dongyishi Complex Park on the east side. The latter two were built without any prior tests done on the site. Pollution information has yet to become available. The method for removing pollutants from this site should have received a scientific assessment. The Dongyishi Complex, formerly known as the Kangquan New Town Phase 1 (康泉新城一期工程), began development in 2003 and is now occupied by more than 2,000 households. The polluted

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surface soil in this apartment complex was disposed of in the simplest way—it was removed to the Dongyishi Complex Park, where it was piled into a manmade hill and planted with trees and other plants. The site of the Dongyishi Complex Park had been a level piece of ground as part of the railway sleeper plant; the park was built to meet landscaping requirements for the Dongyishi Complex. Unfortunately, such information was unavailable to the homeowners when they bought the apartments. In fact, the primitive brownfield land restoration methods for the Kangquan New Town are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of current problems with the use of brownfield land in China. Many more brownfields are misused on account of urban sprawl without being treated even as casually as was the site of the Kangquan New Town. Typically, no surveys or treatments are conducted before buildings are constructed. When buying an apartment, homeowners generally pay no attention to how the land was used before. This results in hazards for the future. According to industry sources, there was a cluster of heavily-polluting enterprises, such as pesticide and chemical plants, outside the South Third Ring Road in Beijing, for thirty years before China began the Reform and Opening Up. No surveys or restorations were made after these enterprises were relocated. This area has long been developed for residential or commercial purposes. Land area No. 15 near Guangqumen (北京广渠门), which was the most expensive land area in Beijing in 2009, was originally the site of a chemical plant. Today, there are luxurious buildings in this polluted area. Such examples are countless in numerous Chinese cities, but few of them are known to the public. An apartment complex in the city of Guangzhou, for example, is on a site where an important chemical fertilizer plant was located. The site was contaminated by excessive petroleum pollutants and heavy metals, but information on this was never made available to the public. The local government identified this site for the Asian Games Village, before finding out through a survey that it had been severely polluted. The Asian Games Village was then relocated to the city’s Panyu District (番禺区).1 2

Brownfield Land: Risks and Hazards

2.1 Harms of Brownfield Land: Persistent Hazards Polluted land that used to be for industrial purposes, also known as a brownfield site, can bring many different types of harm. The main pollutants of these 1 Gao Shengke and Wang Kai, “Brownfield Land: Potential Threats,” Caijing Magazine, Issue 14, 2012.

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sites usually include heavy metals, volatile or solvent organic pollutants, petrochemical organic pollutants, and electronic waste. Industry experts state that China is now faced with complexities in this field, as chemical and physical pollutants coexist, and some areas have been found to have pathogenic organisms. Since most sites are contaminated by a hybrid of pollutants, it is more difficult and expensive to restore them. There is no lack of worldwide cases where brownfields have caused severe harm. The Love Canal incident is a well-known case that occurred in the United States. Local houses were built in an untreated area that had been used to bury chemical waste. It turned out later on that health problems such as miscarriages, stillbirths, congenital malformations, and epilepsy occurred in the area. On May 30, 2012, many Chinese experts at the 2012 Forum on Heavy Metal Soil Remediation and Ecological Restoration said that it is necessary to further identify and assess polluted sites depending on pollution types. Pollution brings about both conspicuous and non-obvious harms. An example of conspicuous harms is when workers get poisoned during underground operations, such as the incident that occurred at a subway construction site in Songjiazhuang (宋家庄), Beijing in 2004. Non-obvious harms refer to the ones with long incubation periods. They may cause chronic poisoning to people with longterm exposure to toxic substances and long-time residents in a polluted area; symptoms and signs may become first apparent decades later. A great many scientific investigations indicate that people living in polluted areas have significantly higher incidence and fatality rates of diseases such as cancers. If polluted soil is left untreated, it will release toxic substances for many years and will likely pollute the environment and cause diseases. Polluted soil usually brings about harms to humans indirectly through water, air, and other sources, before ultimately threatening human health. Direct ways of threatening human health include inhaling dust and, typically in the case of young children, putting polluted soil into one’s mouth. 2.2 Problems Derived from Brownfield Land It is worthy of attention that brownfield land has brought about a variety of problems, especially groundwater pollution. In May 2012, Chen Mengfang (陈梦舫), a researcher at the Nanjing-based Institute of Soil Science at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (ISSCAS), and his team were carrying out a project related to groundwater pollution in the city of Shanghai. He said that it was more difficult and expensive to remove toxic substances from groundwater on brownfield land than for the land itself. Regarding the aforementioned Dongyishi Complex outside the Fifth Ring Road in Beijing, where the author conducted a survey in 2012, many h ­ omeowners

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have acted to protect their rights in terms of groundwater pollution. On June 10, 2012, they sent an open letter signed by local residents to the property management service provider at this complex to complain about lingering water anomalies, including yellowish and muddy tap-water, and unpleasant smells. The homeowners said that such anomalies occur in none of the nearby apartment complexes with different water sources. In late June 2012, the property management company showed the complaining homeowners three water quality inspection reports published in 2001, which said that every relevant measure met the standard. The homeowners raised doubts about these reports. A preliminary survey by the CRAES at this polluted site shows that shallow groundwater is severely contaminated, as eight pollutants were detected at contents much higher than the allowable limits. The homeowners have talked with the property management company, the Institute of Public Health Supervision, the Environmental Protection Bureau of Chaoyang District, the Beijing Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and other organizations, but all in vain. There is no reason to be optimistic about the prospect for the homeowners’ efforts to protect their rights in this water safety case, as they will spend much time and be faced with great difficulties, including trade-offs made by interest groups involved. This sort of thing has made problems derived from brownfield land more complex. 2.3 How Brownfield Land Comes into Being: the Sequel to Urban Sprawl Heavily polluting and energy-hungry enterprises have been removed from central urban areas amid the ongoing expansion of numerous Chinese cities in recent years, leaving a great many polluted sites behind. These sites have been or will be used for commercial or residential purposes. By the end of 2008, 276 heavily-polluting enterprises were removed from the chemical industry area in the southeastern suburbs, and from within the Fourth Ring Road in Beijing, leaving more than 8,000,000 square meters of land behind them, according to public information.2 Most of this land was used for constructing residential buildings or public infrastructure such as urban public transportation stations. In the city of Chongqing, 137 heavily polluting enterprises, all of which were in downtown areas, have been removed since 2004. It is unavoidable to use their original sites for urban development. In the province of Jiangsu, a leader in China’s chemical industry, more than 4,000 heavily polluting chemical plants were removed from cities in the past three years, leaving behind a great many sites for which pollution data is unavailable. In some cities of northwestern China, large enterprises which have been 2 Wang Xi, “Restore ‘Poisoned’ Land,” the Beijing Sci-tech Report, January 4, 2011.

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in these cities for decades are being moved into counties or suburbs, where industrial parks will be built. Their original sites will be used for commercial purposes. In such traditionally industrial cities as Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Wuhan, local governments are providing enterprises with incentives to move elsewhere for the purpose of environmental protection. In 2008, in particular, the State Administration of Work Safety required local governments to further eliminate heavily polluting chemical plants by encouraging them to manufacture other products, shutting them down, and relocating them. This accelerated the relocation of heavily polluting enterprises. With location advantages, the areas of land left behind them receive strong demand from developers amid rapid urbanization. In China, 86,000 enterprises were shut down or relocated from 2001 through 2007, according to research by Liao Xiaoyong (廖晓勇), the head of the Polluted Land Restoration Project Team at the Institute of Geographic Sciences and National Resources Research at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In addition, Luo Yongming (骆永明), director of the Soil and Environment Bioremediation Research Center at ISSCAS, found through incomplete statistics that by the end of 2008, several thousand heavily polluting enterprises were relocated from the urban areas of municipalities and provinces such as Beijing, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Guangzhou, and Chongqing, vacating industrial sites more than 20,000 hectares in area.3 The primary problem left by this development pattern is that the state of polluted sites is unknown. On the one hand, official detailed data about China’s polluted sites has yet to become available. On the other, industry experts can only get inaccurate estimates by estimation. A senior industry expert said that there are more than 10,000 polluted sites of various types in China and that the original sites of pesticide and chemical plants represent a very high ratio. 3

Difficulties in Restoring Brownfield Land

Two General Surveys: One Was Aborted, the Other Has Yet to Be Published In 2006, the then-State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the Ministry of Land and Resources began to spend one billion RMB investigating the pollution of soil across China. The first round of investigations 3.1

3 Gao Shengke and Wang Kai, “Brownfield Land: Potential Threats,” Caijing Magazine, Issue 14, 2012.

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came to an end in 2011. In January 2012, deputy environmental minister Wu Xiaoqing (吴晓青) said during an interview with the People’s Daily Online that the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) would publish the investigation results as early as possible. Nonetheless, the MEP has yet to publish these results. According to the author’s investigation, the results of this survey indicate that China is faced with severe problems regarding polluted sites. On the side of soil pollution, the mining and smelting industries combine to represent the highest ratio of inorganic pollutants, resulting in the most severe soil pollution in mineral resource-rich regions; organic pollutants also represent a considerable ratio. After the populous eastern regions with heavy pollution because of the concentration of chemical plants, findings from this survey show that soil in sparsely populated areas is most heavily contaminated. Long-time military bases in northwestern China, for example, also come with very high soil toxicity. Experts who participated in this nationwide survey explain that, they were unable to make thorough investigations. Instead, they could only look at general issues such as characteristics and trends of pollution. These characteristics and trends will serve as a reference for the ongoing law and decision-making. Given the number of chemical plants and enterprises with high pollution risks across China, it is very difficult, even with ten years of effort, to collect accurate statistics about the number and areas of polluted sites, even if every such plant or enterprise was investigated. Experts who participated in the survey also said that there was a problem with the sampling method. Samples in sparsely populated and heavily polluting areas were taken at the standard density, which would directly affect survey data and the final conclusions. In addition, information gathering and sharing and, ultimately, the survey results, were affected since mining areas and their surroundings are within the jurisdiction of land authorities, cooperation between ministries/commissions is not smooth, and particular barriers exist. Experts said that the delay in the MEP’s publishing of the survey results was for multiple reasons. The number of brownfield sites available to be restored by Chinese research organizations and companies that are able to restore polluted land is limited, and more sites will be left unrestored in the near future; and the release of relevant information would easily cause public panic and huge financial losses. Moreover, it is now difficult for China to pay huge amounts of money at one time for restoring polluted sites nationwide. China began paying attention to soil remediation and development only in recent years. The most direct impetus was the sudden poisoning of workers at a subway construction site amid preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games.

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This tragedy was followed by a series of similar incidents before they drew the government’s attention. By comparison, the international community became aware of this serious problem and began paying much attention to it in the 1980s. In fact, Chinese scholars in this field perceived this problem more than a decade ago. In 1998, the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences and the MEP submitted a proposal to the State Council through the then-SEPA, recommending that a comprehensive survey on the pollution of soil across China be made. Unfortunately, they did not receive approval for the proposal. Later on, the survey mentioned here was made in only five municipalities and provinces including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hefei, and Dalian. The state of soil pollution across China remains unknown. In the aftermath of shelving the aforementioned nationwide survey, firsthand data, especially of brownfield sites across China, remained unavailable, with no additional experience in making similar surveys. Today, brownfield land restoration in China is still carried out through stopgap measures. 3.2 Challenges of Restoration Technologies and Costs On May 19, 2012, the Demonstration Heavy Metal Pollution Remediation Project in Huanjiang County (广西环江重金属污染修复示范工程), Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region—a major project of the 863 Program managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology—was accepted. Chinese ladderbrake fern was planted to absorb arsenic in an experiment as part of China’s efforts to remediate polluted soil. So far, similar demonstration projects are being carried out in places such as Guangdong, Beijing, Zhejiang, Henan, Hunan, and Yunnan—all places with strong needs for soil remediation. The experience from the project in Huanjiang County represents a technological breakthrough for China’s soil remediation industry and provides ideas for brownfield land restoration. However, this is far from sufficient to solve nationwide soil pollution problems, as specific technological solutions remain in testing phases. Phytoremediation has had the best results, is eco-friendly, and has lower costs among all the ways of remediation methods, but it takes much time. The amount of time may even be increased by three to five decades if the contents of the pollutants are too high. It is therefore not the best approach for polluted sites in downtown areas that need to be redeveloped quickly, and that come with fast-increasing land value. Unfortunately, the other methods of clean-up are not as good as phytoremediation. The microbiological method, for example, sees limited applications as it can only degrade petroleum pollutants and does not work for heavy metals. Pyrolysis has proven applications in countries other than China, but it is prone

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to cause secondary pollution if it is not well controlled. The elution method consumes too much water and brings high costs for relevant piping. Moreover, it is more wasteful, as pipes and other facilities can be used only at one time. Off-site landfills are the most common method of soil remediation in China. This method is the most traditional and simplest, while taking the least time, but it causes pollution elsewhere. Even the use of impermeable membranes cannot avoid the risk of secondary pollution. Moreover, China is in an embarrassing situation: in the case of trash burial, there are not enough sites to receive and bury polluted soil. Of course, this practice also creates strong objections from people in the places receiving the soil. Experts believe that this is like drinking poison to quench one’s thirst or moving a time bomb from one place to another. The toughest challenge facing China is the difficulty in identifying those who should be held responsible for a site’s pollution. When it comes to brownfield land caused by the relocation or shutdown of enterprises in industries such as petroleum and chemicals, most of these enterprises are state-owned. They receive land from the government and turn over the majority of their profits to the state. To remove an enterprise to the periphery of a city, the government usually employs the land replacement method in an attempt to leverage the land value of the original site and strike a balance between income and expenditure. Unfortunately, it does not calculate the cost of restoring the polluted site. Under the principle of “The polluter should restore the polluted site,” in terms of environmental responsibility, enterprises should be held responsible for these polluted sites. However, since most of such enterprises are state-owned, it becomes difficult to identify those who should be held responsible. The most typical example is the failure to reach a conclusion in terms of whether the central government, the local government, or the state-owned enterprises managed directly by the central government should be held responsible for the polluted site left behind after relocation. Another possibility is that the enterprise which created the polluted site went bankrupt. As a result, it is difficult to follow the aforementioned principle in real-world land restoration. Even in the regulations concerning polluted soil remediation being drafted by the MEP, the issue of responsibility is not made clear. An expert said that local governments will probably become responsible for land restoration, but since they are short of money, it is unknown whether they can afford the huge costs. As a result, no changes have occurred in polluted site restoration in China: the government remains inclined to focus the budget on particular polluted areas, especially during special periods. In a move regarded by industry professionals as a stopgap measure, the government was willing to spend one

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hundred million RMB in an attempt to restore a subway construction site as soon as possible after workers were suddenly poisoned amid preparation for the Beijing Olympic Games. In addition, national research organizations carry out demonstration projects in a small number of regions more often in order to seek technical innovations and breakthroughs, although they are unable to cover larger polluted sites. Another factor hindering China’s soil remediation industry is a lack of talent, and general lack of order in this industry. Consequently, a lot of small, technically incompetent companies benefit from this disorderliness by taking on large brownfield land restoration projects as a source of profits. As a result, brownfield land restoration is more often a token gesture than a mission to eradicate pollutants. 3.3 Regulatory Inefficiency and Delay in Lawmaking In China, there is no regulatory document that has compulsory requirements for examining post-relocation sites before they are redeveloped, nor is there any provision on how to manage and restore brownfield land. Ideally, a site should be assessed shortly after the enterprise is relocated, but China has yet to do this. In June 2004, the then-SEPA issued the Notice on Preventing and Controlling Environmental Pollution during the Relocation of Enterprises (关于切实做 好企业搬迁过程中环境污染防治工作的通知), requiring that polluting enterprises and organizations have land monitoring and analysis of their sites done by environmental monitoring organizations, with provincial or higherlevel qualifications for quality certification in cases where they want to change the use of the land. In 2008, the MEP issued the Opinions on Strengthening Soil Pollution Prevention and Control (关于加强土壤污染防治工作的 意见), requiring systematic surveys of polluted sites, especially ones in cities left or discarded by enterprises in the secondary sector. These surveys are intended to learn which pollutants are in soil and groundwater at these original sites and their periphery, as well as how widespread and severe the pollution. Nonetheless, these documents are not compulsory laws and provide no detailed requirements on specific operations. The basic requirement—to carry out land monitoring and analysis of original sites—is not well observed in local practice. Today in China, only the cities of Beijing and Chongqing have polluted-site management departments in the local environmental authorities, requiring that the original sites of enterprises in the secondary sector receive environmental assessments before being redeveloped. In other words, there is hardly any environmental regulation on soil remediation since most

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Chinese cities have no such requirement. It is therefore necessary to make relevant laws as soon as possible.4 Environmental assessment is an effective way of controlling risks with respect to site pollution. Put into force in 2003, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (环境影响评价法) provides that potential environmental impact after plans or projects are implemented shall be analyzed, forecast, and assessed. This does not cover surveys of previously developed areas of land: brownfield land remains outside the scope of regulation. Before an environmental impact assessment (EIA) is made, it is necessary to spend much time (several years in some cases) making surveys, assessments, and analysis, developing multiple restoration schemes for discussion, then holding meetings to score bidders in terms of prices and restoration solutions, before finally identifying a restoration solution. During restoration, regulatory requirements on the process and restoration work are very unclear since there are no specific laws and standards. One expert has said that only after receiving clear clues or reports regarding on-site pollution will the relevant environmental authority intervene and conduct an investigation. Clearly, China lags far behind the desirable schedule in terms of monitoring and managing polluted sites as well as making laws, policies, and a technical framework concerning restoration. Consequently, we have no law to observe when it comes to detection standards and methods for restoring brownfield land. Recognizing this problem, the MEP published drafts of technical guidelines with respect to investigation, risk assessments, technology, and monitoring from late 2009 through early 2010. In April 2011, the Interim Measures for the Environmental Administration of Soil in Polluted Sites (污染场地土壤环境管 理暂行办法) was reviewed and approved by the MEP. It provides clear and specific requirements on how to make investigations and risk assessments on polluted sites, how to restore them, and how to manage them. However, it has yet to be officially issued for implementation. Today, China’s soil-relevant laws and regulations are defective in two respects: some of the existing standards apply only within a limited scope and cover limited types of pollutants; existing standards do not align with national laws and policies and thus need to be improved. Wang Shuyi (王树义), the head of the Research Institute of Environmental Law at Wuhan University, participated in making the Soil Pollution Prevention Law (土壤污染防治法), and 4 Gao Shengke and Wang Kai, “Brownfield Land: Potential Threats,” Caijing Magazine, Issue 14, 2012.

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acted as the head of the law-making team that was responsible for developing the “Draft of the Expert Group.” He thinks that there is now no legal reference for soil pollution monitoring, planning systems, special soil protection zones, soil remediation, and reuse systems. He argues that a soil-specific law should be made instead of amending existing laws and regulations.5 In March 2010, the draft based on the experts’ opinions was finished. The five-year nationwide soil survey conducted by the MEP provided first-hand data for promulgating this law. Nonetheless, this highly-anticipated law has not yet been promulgated. A lot of industry experts have said that, in addition to improving laws, the most important thing for restoring polluted sites is effective law enforcement rather than the availability of specific laws. They believe that an effective punishment mechanism is needed to make sure that laws are strictly enforced. Even in the absence of relevant laws and regulations, many local governments have realized, under administrative pressure, how severe the negative effects of polluted sites are for the general public. This is because problems arising from the redevelopment of unrestored brownfield land will be not only about the environment, but also about the prices of land and housing as well as public health and rights. Some local governments began early investigations on the original sites of local heavily polluting enterprises. In the capital of a certain province in northwestern China, for example, the local government is assessing soil pollution. To make any substantial move, it relies on policy, financial support, and guidance about restoration technologies from higher authorities and the central government. Unfortunately, it has not received much support and, accordingly, has no experience in restoration to share with other Chinese cities faced with similar challenges. So far, this city has yet to work out a mature restoration solution, while the environmental authority is afraid that this project will ultimately be left uncompleted. There is now an urgent call for fast promulgation of national laws and regulations regarding soil remediation. If there is further delay in law-making, local governments may lose interest in addressing brownfields, which in turn will make it even more difficult to restore these sites.

5 Zhang Youyi and Gao Shengke, “On the Unavailability of Brownfield Site Information to the Public,” Caijing Magazine, Issue 16, 2012.

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Next Step toward Removing Pollutants

Make Information Transparent to Promote Brownfield Site Restoration Increasing public attention to brownfields highlights problems with the redevelopment of these sites. Greater information available to the public will ultimately affect China’s real estate industry. Land issues involve the environment, land, planning, housing development, and other administrations, as well as procedures such as invitation-to-bid, auctioning, and listing. The public can get brownfield land information only from environmental authorities. Since information available to the public is far from complete and accurate, a new round of public complaints is very likely to occur in urban development. Although there is still much to do to ensure the public right to access information on brownfield sites, we can see—from the case of homeowners at the Kangquan New Town acting to protect their rights and other cases of residents demanding access to information—that a significant advance has already been made toward assuring this right. The bottom-up push from the public can gradually make brownfield land information more transparent. It is also a substantial development in calling on the government to publish more information so as to promote brownfield restoration. Otherwise, it would be difficult to avoid developing solutions with no knowledge of basic facts. 4.1

4.2 Create Databases for Phased Restoration International experience indicates that China should create databases at varying levels depending upon polluted sites. The concept of risk management is widely employed in the international community for the purpose of level- and category-based management. By examining sites and assessing risks, relevant organizations identify pollutants and their contents at the sites before determining how they will affect the site environments and people living around them. If there is no risk for human beings, it is unnecessary to immediately restore a site even if pollutants exist. Take London 2012 for example. The Olympic venues were also at a polluted site. The local government phased in restoration measures depending upon the nature of each polluted area, the land-use schedule, and the severity of pollution. In addition, polluted sites in the rest of the world tend to be left unused long enough for restoration, unless they need to be redeveloped rapidly. By comparison, a problem with China remains: the periods in which such sites are left unused are not long enough. To satisfy the need for urban development,

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organizations cannot wait to redevelop polluted sites once enterprises are relocated. Today, China is still weak in monitoring and managing the soil environment while lacking fully-fledged risk assessment and management systems. It is therefore necessary to create a level- and category-based management system for polluted sites as soon as possible. Gradually improved databases that record information on polluted sites, along with management systems, will be instrumental in gaining a clear understanding of soil pollution across China. They will also make it easier for local governments and project operators to carry out prevention and restoration projects specific to the polluted sites. It is inadvisable to hope that there is a panacea for restoring brownfield sites in China. Instead, the most important thing is working out problem-specific solutions. Problems with one site are not solved as long as pollutants are moved elsewhere. From the national perspective, we should avoid working in a passive, symptom-specific manner. National decision-makers should address the issue of site pollution from a systematic perspective, with recycling in mind. Only by so doing, can money be spent where it is most needed, and assistance provided in finding solutions to the most urgent problems in restoring brownfield sites across the country.

chapter 9

Food Safety Concerns Encourage Urban Organic Farming Cheng Cunwang and Shi Yan Abstract In 2012, food safety continued to be a critical social issue in China. The dysfunction of the market mechanism and government regulations have led to the emergence of urban organic farming. New product distribution systems, including community supported agriculture and farmers’ markets, have sprung up as a result.

Keywords food safety – urban organic farming – community supported agriculture (CSA) – farmers’ markets

1 Background 1.1 Food Safety Disclosures in 2012 In 2012, the media disclosed a large number of safety problems in the industrialized food supply system. In December 2012, China’s state-owned CCTV showed a 13-minute video revealing the safety hazards in the industrial chain of raising and processing chicken. CCTV reporters went undercover for one year, visiting chicken farms in four prefectures of Shandong Province and tracking the chickens all the way to Shanghai where they were retailed. In the process, a variety of safety hazards were observed in the industry: antibiotics and hormones were abused in industrialized chicken farming; no measures were taken to ensure animal rights and animal welfare; inspection and quarantine regulations did not function at all in the distribution chain; and practitioners in all steps of the industrial chain turned out to be indifferent to food safety and consumer health. In November 2012, a plasticizer scandal put China’s liquor industry into the eye of the food-safety storm. Excessive use of a plasticizer was first disclosed in

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the products of Jiugui, (酒鬼酒) and then in a few other leading liquor brands. The scandal terrified consumers and shocked the producers. The whole industry suffered tremendous market value losses as a result. In July 2012, yet another safety scandal hit the dairy industry. The Municipal Industrial and Commercial Bureau of Guangzhou announced that butter and cheese from Bright Dairy (光明奶油) were found to contain excessive bacteria and five batches of Nanshan infant formula milk powder (南山奶粉) were found to be tainted with aflatoxin, a substance that can cause severe liver damage and even cancer. Early in 2011, aflatoxin was detected in the products of another leading domestic dairy brand, Mengniu (蒙牛). Since then it has remained a chronic problem in China’s dairy industry. The dairy industry, however, cannot solve all the safety problems itself due to limitations of milk sources and peripheral conditions. In May 2012, 120 tons of cabbage sold in Guangzhou were found to be contaminated by methanol. The cabbage was supplied by vegetable growers in Shandong and Yunnan provinces. This incident revealed some once-ignored threats to food safety in distribution. In April 2012, a Greenpeace investigation found that Lipton, the world’s best-selling tea brand, sold tea bags containing residues of highly toxic pesticides that were banned by Chinese laws and/or EU safety standards. This called people’s attention to pesticide residue in tea products, a long-standing problem that even the world’s top producer Lipton cannot avoid, despite its modern technologies, equipment, and distribution channels. The same month witnessed another disturbing scandal disclosed by CCTV—some companies in Hebei Province used waste leather and quicklime to produce industrial gelatins, which were then sold to capsule manufacturers in Zhejiang Province to make “toxic capsules” consumed by end users. This seemingly accidental case reveals a serious industry-wide problem in pharmaceuticals—caused by the dysfunction of both the market and the government—just like the problem in food safety. In March 2012, it was disclosed that Fuji apples from Yantai (烟台), Shandong Province grew in bags containing the banned pesticides tuzet and asomate. These “toxic bags” are still in wide use in the area but the pesticide residues are difficult to detect because of a difficulty in sample testing and a lack of test standards. This is a typical food safety problem in farming and is far from rare, but a solution is not in sight. Throughout 2012, frequent food safety scandals continued to challenge the tolerance of consumers. Their need for health and safety is triggering the development of new production and consumption modes that can hopefully ensure food quality. In other words, consumers’ demand is the prime momentum for China’s organic agriculture.

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3%

38% 38% 59% 56% Contribution to Nitrogen Pollution Farming

Contribution to Phosphorus Pollution

Animal and poultry breeding

Fishery

Figure 9.1 Contribution of farming, animal and poultry breeding, and fisheries to nitrogen and phosphorus pollution. Source: Adapted from the First National Pollution Source Survey

1.2 Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution According to the First National Pollution Source Survey (第一次全国污染源 普查公报) released in 2010, agriculture was the largest source of the two water pollutants nitrogen and phosphorus, contributing to 57% and 67% of the total amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus respectively. Farming-source pollution came from excessive use of agricultural chemicals and breeding-source pollution came from animal and poultry wastes and feed additives. Faced with serious pollution and the need for water source protection, the government is beginning to provide more support to organic agriculture. For example, Jiangsu Province conducted a survey on organic agriculture in the Tai Lake (太湖) drainage zone in order to plan its future development in the area. Suichang County (遂昌县) of Zhejiang Province issued a resolution that the county would launch a five-year plan in 2010 to abolish the use of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and other agricultural chemicals and transform the local agriculture into organic agriculture. Similar supportive policies and measures were also observed in Beijing, Shanghai, Guizhou, Shandong, and Jiangxi. 2

Urban Organic Farming: A Case Study of Beijing

Urban organic farming is a hybrid of organic agriculture and urban agriculture. By bridging the gap between producers and consumers, it shortens the

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traditional industrial-economic chain that features excessive energy consumption and high-carbon operations. Intensive, equipment-based, and multi-functional, urban organic farming fits in well with the development of modern agriculture. It has not only productive and ecological functions but also social functions such as developing agricultural tourism and facilitating urban-rural interaction. In developed countries, urban organic farming grew out of urbanization, as a highly urbanized society called for a multi-functional agricultural system that could provide services in culture, education, ecology, and recreation. In developing countries of Latin America and Africa, urban agriculture was driven by social crises. In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, for example, urbanization resulted in serious job shortages. Consequently, urban agriculture was developed as the main source of income and food for the unemployed in cities. The development of urban organic agriculture in China seems closer to that in developed countries, i.e. growing out of the urban residents’ need for a clean environment, good health, and food safety. The middle class in cities is the main driving force for the development of urban organic farming. It is a global trend that middle-class people are the most active in environmental protection, labor movements, and other social activities. This trend is reflected in the emergence of various NGOs. In China, this trend has just sprung up. After more than thirty years of economic and social development, the middle-income class is taking shape in China and playing a more and more active role in social affairs. According to the Media Handbook for Grassroots NGOs (草根组织媒体工作手册), China now has around 110 environmental protection organizations, 90% of which are NGOs. All these NGOs involve middle-income groups, with some NGOs fully comprised of entrepreneurs. The middle class also drives environmental protection by setting the trend of green consumption, which fits in well with urban ecological farming in several ways. Urban ecological farming highlights the basic functions of agriculture, such as green food production and ecological construction. Extensive research has indicated that buyers of green and organic foods tend to be well-educated middle-income people, who are more aware of environmental protection and food safety. In China the middle-income class is growing quickly. According to statistics from the China Academy of Social Sciences and World Bank, the middle-income population of China has exceeded 200 million, or about 23% of the total population. In Beijing, Shanghai, and other metropolises, the percentage may have reached 40%. This giant group, faced with food safety hazards, is turning to ecological farm produce and urban organic farming.

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In 2003, Beijing formulated the “221” action plan for organic farming, conducting two surveys (one on organic farm produce demand and the other on suburban agricultural resources), fostering two supporting systems (a technological system and financial system), and building one agricultural information platform. One survey shows that when buying farm produce, 43.7% of the respondents would give priority to “safe and pollution-free” and 92.6% are willing to spend more on organic and green farm produce. According to a survey in late 2012, Beijing has eighty-six producers of certificated organic agricultural products, including twenty-two cooperatives and sixty-four enterprises. The cooperatives usually supply a few types of vegetables or fruit, such as organic melons, cherry tomatoes, potatoes, apples, and peaches. The enterprises have a much bigger scale and cover a much wider range of products, including fruit, vegetables, dairy products, mushrooms, poultry products, and eggs. For example, the Wanda Group (万达集团) invested 490 million RMB and built a 373-hectare organic agricultural farm in the suburb of Yanqing County (延庆县). The Huiyuan Group (汇源集团) contracted a 1,000-hectare mountainous plot of land in suburban Shunyi District (顺义) and a 100-hectare plot of flat land in suburban Miyun County (密云) to launch its organic farming projects. Besides the certificated organic producers, Beijing has a considerable number of producers who are not certificated but adopt the model of communitysupported agriculture (CSA). They run over twenty small- or medium-sized farms that are labeled “organic” by themselves or by a non-authoritative organization. They have created some mechanisms conducive to uncertificated small farms, such as farmers’ markets. Most of these small and medium “organic” farms, though not certificated by the authorities, meet the basic requirements of organic farming and do not use fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, or other agricultural chemicals. These farms can be divided into the following three types: 2.1 CSA Farms in Beijing Community-supported agriculture originated in Germany, Switzerland, and Japan in the 1970s and was introduced to the United States in the 1980s. In 1971, a group of housewives in Japan, concerned about family health, food safety, and environmental protection, signed contracts with local farmers who were willing to change their way of farming. Following the contracts, farmers were prepaid for a year for the eco-produce they pledged to provide. This innovative partnership was called teikei in Japanese, which means consensus or cooperation. Within a few years, similar projects connecting citizens and

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farmers occurred in Switzerland and Germany. According to incomplete statistics, there were nearly 5,000 CSA farms in the United States in 2009, serving two million households. In Beijing, God’s Grace Garden (GGG) (天福园农场), located in Daxing District (大兴), has been dedicated to organic farming since 2001. It was the first farm certified organic in both livestock and crop farming in China. Due to the high certification cost for its wide variety of produce, GGG has now joined a community certification system and operates under the CSA model. The founder of GGG, Terese Rosie Zhang (张志敏), once worked for China Oil & Foodstuffs Corporation (中粮集团) and came face to face with the grim food safety situation in the country. Because of this, she quit her job and rented a farmland of twelve hectares, turning it into a biodynamic plantation for cows, geese, goats, chickens, fruits, and vegetables. She integrates livestock and crop farming in a self-sustaining and eco-friendly system. GGG sells its produce through the GGG Organic Agriculture Club (天福园有机农业俱乐部) and the Beijing Farmers’ Market (北京有机农夫市集). Yet, though it was one of the first members of the CSA network in Beijing, GGG still faces financial difficulties after more than ten years of operation. Fangjia Farm (芳嘉苑), located in Shunyi District, was founded in 2003. It is a typical family farm which takes up an area of four hectares. The owner and his family work and live on the land. Without much knowledge of organic farming at first, Fangjia Farm started with a traditional farming method, using organic fertilizers for seasonal vegetables and fruits and raising chickens and ducks in orchards. In 2007, inspired by the concepts of organic farming and CSA, the owner of Fangjia Farm reformed his farm according to strict organic requirements and abandoned the use of low toxic bio-pesticides. Since then, fifty households have joined Fangjia Farm. DeRun House Farm (德润屋农场), though not a farm technically, has been running since 2004 in Changping District (昌平). Its owner, Dr. Ji Yunliang (吉云亮), was a graduate of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Dr. Ji rented five greenhouses covering 0.7 hectares of land for organic farming after graduation and joined CSA and the Beijing Farmers’ Market. DeRun House Farm now has over 100 household members, among which around 70% are foreigners in Beijing. DeRun House Farm has also adopted community organic certification instead of commercial organic certification and became one of the first members of the CSA network in Beijing in 2009. The Green Cow Organic Farm (绿牛农场), founded in 2005, occupies 5.3 hectares of land in Shunyi District. Free-range livestock on the farm include 5 cows, 200 chickens, and 4 pigs, mainly fed on hay and straw from the farm. In this farm, no chemical fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural plastic films,

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additives, herbicides, or GMO seeds are used. Besides crops like corn, peanuts, and Chinese dates, there are also orchards and a number of greenhouse vegetables. The couple who own the farm have had many years of experience living in the U.S., so the influence of the American countryside can be seen throughout their farm. It is no surprise that most members of the Green Cow Organic Farm are Americans living in Beijing. High membership fees and diversified businesses such as restaurants and exclusive shops help sustain the growth of the farm. The Green Cow Organic Farm has also replaced commercial organic certification with community certification. The 4.7-hectare Phoenix Hills Commune (凤凰公社) is situated at the foot of Phoenix Hill in Haidian District (海淀区). It came into operation in 2008 and received organic certification from the EU the same year and Demeter certification in 2010. Phoenix Hills Commune adopts biodynamic farming, with Chinese Yams as its main produce. Other businesses of the commune include an organic restaurant, health club, home delivery service, and fruit picking. It is also an active participant of the Beijing Farmers’ Market. Little Donkey Farm (小毛驴市民农园) was co-founded by the Agriculture and Forestry Committee of Haidian District and the Rural Reconstruction Center of Renmin University in 2008 in Sujiatuo Town (苏家坨镇), Haidian District. It is committed to production, education, and research related to organic farming and CSA. Since 2009, its farmland has expanded from 15.3 hectares to over 66.7 hectares, covering Houshajian (后沙涧) and Liulin (柳林) villages. Its membership has also mushroomed from 64 in 2009 to 800 in 2012. On Little Donkey Farm, cultivation is carried out in strict accordance with organic farming standards. Methods in natural farming are implemented with no use of chemicals and GMO seeds. Biological fermentation beds are used to raise pigs, producing sixty pigs annually for the market. In addition, nearly a thousand chickens are raised free range on the farm. By turning pig waste into compost, crops and livestock farming are integrated. As a result, members of the farm can buy not only seasonal vegetables but also pork, chicken, eggs, and other produce from the farm. Certified by communities rather than commercial agencies, Little Donkey Farm has maintained steady growth. Located in Shunyi District, the two-hectare Sunlin Farm (圣林生态农庄) has been operating since 2009, after several failed farming projects in the five years before that. In 2009, as one of the first members of the CSA network in Beijing, Sunlin Farm began to specialize in free-range chickens and seasonal vegetables and sell its produce mainly through home delivery and the Beijing Farmers’ Market. The Shared Harvest Project (分享收获), a research base affiliated with the Department of Sociology of Tsinghua University, was launched in 2012 as a CSA

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project in Mafang Village (马坊村), Xiji Town (西集镇), Tongzhou District (通州). The executive director, Shi Yan (石嫣), is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Sociology at Tsinghua University and a co-founder of the Little Donkey Farm. Different from the CSA projects mentioned above, Shared Harvest forms partnerships with farmers instead of renting lands or greenhouses from them. It helps farmers reform farming ecologically, prepays them, and sign contracts with them to share possible risks. Plans for farming, production, and management are drafted together with the farmers as well. All the farmers’ vegetable produce in the project are preordered at three to five times the market price. Meanwhile, Shared Harvest offers memberships to urban consumers who pay regular fees to support ecological farming and project operation. Within six months, the project has attracted 300 members and facilitated the development of ecological farming communes in Mafang Village. 2.2 Beijing Farmers’ Market Farmers’ markets are organized in ways similar to farmers’ fairs in small- and medium-sized cities across China. In countries where organic farming has been practiced for many years, organic farmers’ markets have developed into a common event for farmers to sell organic produce directly to consumers. Such a market benefits both farmers and consumers. On the one hand, consumers have access to fresh local produce and organic farmers. Many big buyers and chain food stores also purchase at the farmers’ market. On the other hand, farmers earn better profits from the market. Farmers’ markets can also help establish a sense of community. Some markets even offer simple courses to consumers about food preservation and basic planting skills. The Beijing Farmers’ Market started in 2009. At first it was held once a month but is now held twice a week. Altogether, the market has initiated nearly eighty events. In the beginning, only a few farms such as Little Donkey Farm, God’s Grace Garden, Sunlin Farm, Fangjia Farm, and DeRun House Farm participated in the market, providing vegetables and animal products. Now nearly thirty producers have joined the market with a much broader variety of products ranging from organic dairy, pastries, and jam, to organic makeup and kitchen garbage treatment tools. The market has been warmly welcomed by consumers, the number of which has grown from around 200 at the early events to nearly 3,000 now on a regular basis. The average sales amount is 150,000 RMB at each event. The market has become the main marketing channel for some producers and a reliable platform to buy safe food for many consumers. More importantly, an administrative committee and a set of rules for electing committee members as well as the responsibilities of the members have

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been established for the market. The committee consists of an equal number of producers, consumers, and third party participants. Together they formulate the organization charter of the Beijing Farmers’ Market and other regulations and improve the market in every possible way. 2.3 Other Platforms for Social Participation Apart from the CSA network in Beijing and the Beijing Farmers’ Market, a number of other platforms have also been set up to facilitate organic farming in China, including the annual National CSA Forum held by the School of Agriculture and Rural Development of Renmin University, the Community Food Safety Workshop organized by the Department of Sociology of Tsinghua University, and the biodynamic agriculture training offered by the Phoenix Hills Commune. Consumer organizations have also sprouted up, such as the middle-class moms in Huilongguan Community (回龙观社区) who come together for organic-only vegetables and the Beijing Citizen Inspection Group on Organic Farming (北京有机考察组). 3

Problems and Prospects

Urban organic farming calls for social restructuring in food production, delivery, and consumption. On the one hand, the demand for safe food is high, which acts as an internal drive. On the other, there is the distrust for and concerns about urbanizing food, which could be seen as an external factor. Restructuring implies three levels of changes. First, spatial rearrangement of the existing food system. Second, a closer bond between urban and rural residents beyond the simple and vulnerable business link. Third, economic restructuring with an emphasis on localization and a localized circulation system. The development of urban organic farming in China is unique in the following ways. First, consumer groups are widely spread and are not determined by income or profession. Second, consumers lack confidence in authority and certification bodies and call for decentralization. Third, organic farming tends to be network-oriented in China as consumers prefer to trust friends and reputation. Fourth, the organization of organic farming is weak on both the consumers’ and farmers’ parts. Fifth, community restructuring needs to be carried out. More attention is needed for a correlation analysis on urban organic farming because it is not simply about an agricultural technology upgrade, but is pertinent to issues such as environmental protection, way of life, rural development, and social equity and justice.

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From the analysis on organic farming in Beijing, three driving forces are found to be promoting its development and reform. The first force comes from capital. In developed countries, organic farming has become a huge economic sector. As China grows socially and economically, it is almost certain that its organic farming will also expand into a lucrative food market for middle- and high-income groups in China. However, while capital introduces new technologies into organic farming, overemphasis on production might lead to destruction of soil and water resources. According to an investigation by the China Agricultural University on the resources and environment at the Huiyuan Organic Vegetable Production Base (汇源有机蔬菜生产基地), organic fertilizers are overused in the greenhouse soil, resulting in an excessive concentration of nitrite in the soil, which might cause non-point pollution or food safety issues due to the amount of nitrate residues on vegetables. The second driving force is from the central and local governments. To promote organic farming, governments not only work with big companies but also support small-scale farming such as communes and family farms. The central government has been advocating resource saving and eco-friendly agriculture under the framework of an ecological civilization. Local governments have issued subsidies and other policies accordingly. However, the subsidies tend to be limited to large-scale production. For example, current subsidies for agricultural facilities require a minimum of 6.7 hectares for multi span greenhouses with steel frames or 33.3 hectares for glasshouses, which is completely beyond the capacities of small- and medium-sized communes and family farms. Localized policies for small organic farms are urgently needed. While the first two driving forces of organic farming mainly concern production, the major constraint for the development of organic farming lies in the flaws of the market. It has been pointed out by scholars long ago that organic farming faces a double dysfunction of the market and the government. The market dysfunction refers to the failure to distinguish fake organic foods on the market. To make things worse, chaos in certification has even resulted in reverse elimination. Government dysfunction means that ineffective government supervision cannot provide reliable information for the market. It is against this background that the third force comes into play. The third force comes from multiple social subjects, involving the media, local and central governments, universities, NGOs, and individuals with a keen awareness of the environment, food safety, rural development, and social equity. These multiple social subjects have mobilized social resources for nonprofit activities and created a number of platforms with high social credibility such as the CSA network, the Beijing Farmers’ Market, and regular forums. These platforms have become the main channels for the participants in

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organic farming to exchange ideas, draft self-regulation rules, and take action to maintain social credibility. On these platforms, information about producers is open and transparent. Consumers and producers are not merely sellers and buyers but share close bonds with each other. This kind of trust is the key to overcoming the faith crisis in organic produce. However, social forces for the development of organic farming are still limited to big cities, while in medium- and small-sized cities there is a much lower level of participation. To ensure the future development of organic farming, consumers should go beyond the pursuit of safe food and learn more about organic farming, taking environment protection, food safety, rural development, and social equity into consideration. There is no doubt that urban organic farming is a promising and prospering sector in China. The above-mentioned three forces will co-exist in the long run and lead to a diversified future of urban organic farming. After all, diversity represents the innate feature of organic farming.

Part Five Sustainable Consumption

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chapter 10

A “Modest” New Mechanism for Progressive Electricity Pricing Yu Jie Abstract In mid-2012, a progressive electricity pricing scheme for residential use was implemented nationwide to curb wasteful electricity use and achieve household energysaving through price leverage. Considering the rise in household costs, a relatively modest pricing scheme was adopted, hence the not-so-obvious leverage effect. However, the establishment of the pricing framework has left room for further adjustments.

Keywords progressive electricity pricing – residential electricity use

There was no greater event in Chinese residential energy consumption than the announcement of a progressive electricity pricing scheme in 2012. Under the new policy, the one-size-fits-all residential electricity rate will be changed to price brackets based on the electricity consumption of each household, with the rate rising progressively as the consumption amount increases. According to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the policy planner, progressive electricity pricing was introduced to deter excessive residential consumption and incentivize energy efficiency with a price lever. It will therefore change the long-standing situation of “the more one consumes, the more subsidies one gets.” Two factors contribute to the present electricity pricing system: first, the overall electricity rate in China is relatively low; second, the residential electricity rate is significantly lower than industrial prices. Electricity prices in China are strictly regulated by the government. The pricing mechanism initiated in the 1990s is based on the cost of investment in new power plants plus a fixed profit. It was aimed at incentivizing investment in electricity and alleviating electricity supply shortages. Later, the cost of power generation began

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to rise with the marketization of coal sales. The “coal-electricity price linkage mechanism,” in turn, was initiated to enable the retail electricity rate to better reflect the rising cost. However, the government—concerned that the energy rate would lead to a rise in the cost of living—kept the price down, which resulted in the profit losses of power generation enterprises and eventually the financial subsidies from the government to cover the losses. That means the retail electricity rate has been kept increasingly lower than the cost of power generation and the electricity rate is the beneficiary. Since the merchandising attribute of electricity has been seriously weakened, the price fails to reflect the shortage of power. In many other countries, the residential tariff is higher than the industrial tariff due to such factors as scattered households, power transmission and distribution, and higher retail cost, while it is the reverse case in China. That is, some of the electricity fees paid by industrial and commercial enterprises are used to cover residential consumption. It is estimated that six nationwide electricity price adjustments have occurred from 2003 to 2010, among which the residential rate was adjusted twice with an average annual rise of 1% and the industrial rate had an average annual rise of 5.5%. The current residential electricity price in the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region accounts for approximately 60%–70% of the industrial price. Statistics from the National Energy Administration show that residential electricity consumption in the first ten months of 2012 accounted for 12.85% of the total electricity consumption, increasing by 0.82% from the end of 2011. The overall proportion remains low compared to developed countries, but the law of development indicates that residential electricity consumption will come to occupy a bigger portion with a rise in residential income levels at a later stage of industrialization. Therefore, the progressive electricity pricing can save for a rainy day, as well as alleviate the problem of the inverted electricity rate, in a modest way. However, the impact of the policy depends on how to set the base amount, how to set the price brackets, and how to set the price. By law, public hearings should be held when a proposed policy involves major livelihood issues. In the first half of 2012, Beijing and provinces across the country held public hearings to discuss the above-mentioned issues. As early as 2010, the NDRC also posted the Proposal for Progressive Residential Electricity Tariffs (关于居民生活用电实行阶梯电价的指导意见(征求意 见稿)) on its website to solicit opinions. The proposal sets three price brackets for residential monthly electricity consumption: the base quantity, the threshold, and the highest electricity consumption. The electricity pricing is graded progressively. The first-tier rate is set the same as the pre-adjustment one and will remain unchanged for three

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years. The second-tier rate is adjusted gradually to cover the normal cost of power generation enterprises and make a reasonable profit. The starting price is about 10% higher than the current one and will be adjusted according to the average rise in the electricity sale price. The third-tier rate will reflect the scarcity of power and compensate for environmental damage in addition to covering the normal costs for power generation companies and allowing them to make a reasonable profit. The starting price rise is no lower than 0.20 RMB per kWh and the final price will be set at 1.5 times higher than the secondtier price. This draft proposal features two principles: first, progressive reform which is based on a three-year-starting-project, building up the framework of tiered electricity pricing and gradually achieving the ultimate goal; second, the cautious concern about household costs with the first price bracket covering a fairly large number of households. Based on these principles, the central government has provided two schemes for local authorities: 1) Scheme I—On the provincial (district or municipal) scale, the firstbracket pricing standard is set at a monthly average household electricity consumption covering 70% of households. This ensures that the households meeting the standard of the first bracket account for 70% of the total. The second bracket is set at a monthly average household electricity consumption covering 90% of households. The third bracket is the surplus electricity usage above the second bracket. 2) Scheme II—On the provincial (district or municipal) scale, the firstbracket pricing standard is set at a monthly average household electricity consumption covering 80% of households, which ensures that the households meeting the standard of the first bracket account for 80% of the total. The base level pricing is set at a 0.01 RMB rise per kWh. The second bracket is set at a monthly average household electricity consumption covering 95% of households. The third bracket is the surplus electricity usage above the second bracket. The hearings held in twenty-nine provinces preferred the more conservative second scheme with the base amount of electricity consumption covering 80% of households, while the pricing standard adopts the first scheme without changing the price. The results of the hearings also reflected regional differences: i.e., the base amount in developed regions is set higher. For instance, the eastern provinces set a much higher pricing standard than the western regions. The first-bracket electricity consumption is set at 260 kWh in Shanghai, the highest across the country. It is set at higher than 200 kWh in Beijing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Tianjin, and Chongqing. It is set at only 120 kWh in less developed

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provinces like Anhui, Shannxi, Ningxia, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia. Based on the assumption that winter heating uses coal or gas rather than electricity, the base amount of electricity consumption is not adjusted according to geographical and weather differences. Take Beijing for example.1 Families whose annual electricity consumption is under 2,880 kWh (240 kWh monthly) pay the same as the current rate of 0.48 RMB per kWh, while those consuming between 241–400 kWh and more than 400 kWh a month pay 0.05 RMB and 0.3 RMB more per kWh of power respectively. The progressive pricing scheme was tried in several provinces before 2012. Since 2006, Sichuan has adopted the progressive pricing scheme for household consumption, setting four brackets of monthly consumption: under 60 kWh, 61–100 kWh, 101–150 kWh, and above 150 kWh. Statistics show that households in Sichuan whose monthly consumption fall into these four brackets account for 23%, 29%, 22%, and 26% respectively. Therefore, the desired effect of curbing wasteful consumption is not distinct and the household consumption regulated in different brackets turned out quite balanced.2 As for Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, two other trial provinces, despite the different regulations of consumption brackets, the pricing difference remains minor and has had little effect on household electricity usage. Compared to the regions mentioned above, there is an increase several times over the base amount in the nationwide progressive pricing scheme. According to the Beijing Development and Reform Commission, 83% of Beijing households will not see an increase of cost after the adoption of a progressive pricing scheme. Twelve percent of households consuming more electricity will see an increase of cost not more than eight RMB per month. Five percent of households consuming the largest amount will use more than 400 kWh per month.3 That is to say, 83% of households need not change their habit of electricity use for fear of paying more for it. For the second-bracket households, the leverage effect is not distinct because the price is only 0.05 RMB higher per kWh than the first bracket. The third-bracket standard at 0.30 RMB per kWh only covers 5% of households, whose income level may top the income pyramid and have a higher tolerance for a price increase. Nevertheless, some residents are 1 The standard of first and second bracket electricity consumption is based on households instead of individual usage, therefore may result in insufficient distribution in households with more family members. This problem has not yet found a perfect solution. 2 Chen Kai, Feng Yuan, and Hu Su, “The Effect of Household Progressive Electricity Pricing on Trial for Five Years,” China Energy News, sec. 4, January 25, 2010. 3 Jia Zhongshan, “Progressive Electricity Pricing will be Adopted Next Month,” Beijing Youth Daily, June 16, 2012.

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more attentive to energy efficiency labeling when purchasing electronic appliances. As to households in southern China that provide heating for themselves by using natural gas, a more detailed calculation may be needed to acquire a financially optimal scheme. A reasonable understanding of the progressive electricity pricing reform would be that governments of all levels have not made radical adjustments in order to minimize resistance, however, a new adjustment scheme may be adopted in three years to reset the base electricity amount, second- and thirdbracket pricing, and price difference. The progressive electricity pricing scheme functions as a much weaker leverage compared to the situation in Japan and Korea. Japan has had progressive electricity pricing for residents since 1974, with three price brackets based on monthly electricity consumption. Tokyo Electric Power Company’s first-bracket pricing charges 17.87 JPY (about 1.38 RMB) for 120 kWh, which covers the provision of elementary needs. The second-bracket pricing charges 22.86 JPY per kWh for a consumption range of 120–200 kWh, effecting a tie between the electricity rate and the average cost of energy. The third-bracket pricing charges 24.13 JPY for consumption above 300 kWh for the purpose of saving energy. Korea adopted the progressive electricity pricing scheme at about the same time as Japan. After many rounds of adjustment, the current rate scheme sets the price in six brackets with a price rise for consuming every extra 100 kWh per month: 55 KRW (about 0.31 RMB) is charged for 1–100 kWh as the base stage, and the price progresses to 114 KRW, 168 KRW, 248 KRW, and 366 KRW for each successive stage. Users need to pay the highest rate of 644 KRW per kWh when their electricity consumption goes above 500 kWh per month. In these two cases, it can be observed that both Japan and Korea apply the first-bracket low price to compensate low-income groups, the secondbracket to balance the cost of energy, and the third bracket and higher rate to cover the compensation for low-income groups as well as to punish profligacy. The first-bracket electricity rate in China, at a starting stage, covers the majority of households who are still enjoying a compensation rate. Only 10%–15% of people pay for the consumption of energy that exceeds the base amount, in fact still enjoying the compensation rate. If this scheme can be viewed as a compromise at an early stage, the future price adjustment will gradually change the current situation. Nevertheless, hearings will still be held to ensure a progressive adjustment. This scheme tries to balance the interests of all parties, yet what about the desired result of saving energy? Data from the Guangdong and Shanghai power grids six months after the implementation of the progressive pricing scheme have not yet shown significant changes. Some residents report that they pay

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only a few extra RMB per month based on the second-bracket pricing, so they have no need to worry. As many big cities have remodeled their electricity meters by using IC cards, residents mostly use IC cards to buy electricity in advance. Since they do not need to pay a monthly bill, residents do not usually track their monthly consumption, but only become aware of it when their consumption exceeds the annual limit. Another hot issue brought up in the online opinion hearings is where the proceeds of the increased electricity fee will go. Will they become the excess profit of monopolizing enterprises? The answer from decision makers is that the proceeds cover the loss of profits from the increased cost of power generation. They also cover the increased environmental cost of emissions reduction. In China, the emission of nitrogen oxide from coal power plants accounts for 50% of the total. The state regulation of a price increase for desulfurization requires an extra 0.015 RMB per kWh of feed-in tariffs to support desulfurized power enterprises. Some of the proceeds will compensate the cost of desulfurization in these power grid enterprises. Besides that, the power grid enterprises will also cover the cost of meter remodeling after the implementation of the progressive electricity pricing without charging fees to residents. In conclusion, the problem of an undercharged residential electricity fee cannot be solved by a single policy of progressive electricity pricing. More changes should be made to the current electricity pricing mechanism by assigning proper roles to the administration and the market and achieving the merchandise attribute of electricity. Moreover, monopolization of the power industry should be replaced by marketization so as to promote the transparency of the pricing mechanism and eliminate public distrust. Only in this way can energy efficiency policies, which also promote social justice, win public support.

chapter 11

Car Washing in Beijing: Ostentatious Water Use vs. Utilization of Reclaimed Water Hu Kanping Abstract Due to poor management, Beijing’s thousands of car washing sites use millions of tons of water each year, further endangering the city’s water supply and security. By studying relevant literature and conducting field research, this paper aims to expose the ostentatious use of water for car washing in Beijing, as well as its impact on resources and the environment. As China endeavors to foster a conservation culture by “promoting the reduction, recycling, and reclamation in production, circulation, and consumption,” initiatives should be employed to strengthen monitoring and encourage the use of reclaimed water in car washing.

Keywords Beijing – car washing – ostentatious water use – reclaimed water

In July 2012, reporters from the People’s Daily conducted a random survey in the streets and communities of Beijing, and the result was astonishing: 76% of the interviewees were not aware of the severe water scarcity in Beijing, and none of them had any idea of the newly implemented Measures of the Beijing Municipality on Water Conservation (北京市节约用水办法). The truth is that Beijing is a mega-city with severe water scarcity and a water reserve of only 100 cubic meters per capita. This is far below the UN’s standard for “disastrous water scarcity.” The Beijing municipal government claims that water scarcity has become “the first bottleneck” constraining the sustainable development of the city. To cope with the water crisis, Beijing has adopted a number of measures including water conservation, transference of water from outside the city, and reclamation of used water, thereby alleviating the situation to a certain extent.

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However, ostentatious water use has not been contained in some industries due to irrational production and poor management. Bath centers, ski resorts, golf courses, and car washes are the worst offenders. Officially, these entertainment entities are called “special water use industries.” The Chinese Research Perspectives on Environment has reported on ostentatious water use in the first three industries; this paper will focus on car washing. 1

Water Use in Car Washing

Beijing has the largest number of cars in China, the world’s foremost auto consumer. According to the Beijing Traffic Management Bureau, the number of automobiles in Beijing reached 5.17 million in October 2012. While causing problems with energy, the environment, and transportation, the sharp increase also made water waste a pressing issue in automotive service industries, such as car washing. Car washing is indispensable for drivers in Beijing, a city which is heavily polluted and frequently visited by sand and dust. The surge in the number of automobiles has caused a rapid growth in the car washing industry. Drivers only need to spend 10 to 30 RMB to have their car washed. Few are aware that car washing has contributed to both water pollution and water scarcity. There are two categories of car washing: manual and automatic. In manual wash, the car washer sprays detergent on the car so that dirt on the surface can be washed and rinsed off with a high-pressure water dispenser. The car is then waxed and its interior cleaned. In automatic wash, a conveyor moves the car through the entire washing process with a fixed set of cleaning equipment, including soap brush, tire and wheel nozzles, soft cloth wraparounds, triple foamer, wax sprayer, and dryer. In Beijing, the “mobile car wash” is quite popular. All that is needed is the wave of a towel on the roadside to attract drivers. This is a no-cost business. The water used is either taken directly from the river or stolen from landscaping or fire hydrants; waste water is either discharged directly into the roadside sewer or poured onto the road. Although the low quality detergent and the dust-and-sand laden towel inevitably damage the vehicle, the low cost attracts many, especially cab drivers. Mobile car washing wastes water and pollutes the environment. Despite many efforts by the authorities, it is difficult to contain such a mobile business as the demand for car washing grows. How much water is used for car washing in Beijing every year? According to surveys and field experiments, water used for hand washing is 23 liters per

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car each time, while automatic washing is 31 liters.1 Norms of Water Intake for Public Living (公共生活取水定额) by the Beijing Municipal Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision stipulates in “Part 7: Car Washing” that the quantity of fresh water intake for one car for hand washing shall not exceed 22 liters, and that for automatic washing shall not exceed 31 liters. The average is calculated from field measurements of water intake at car washes of various sizes. The fresh water intake does not include recycled water, rain water, or reclaimed water. Theoretically, if each one of Beijing’s five million cars is washed once a week by hand washing, using 22 liters of water every time, then the quantity of fresh water intake is 450,000 tons every month, and over five million tons every year. If the water intake is calculated as a simple average of hand wash and auto wash (27 liters per car), and each car is washed four times every month, then the water used for each car every year is 1.3 tons, and that for the car washing industry is 6.5 million tons. Compared with the figure in media reports, the “theoretical water use” figure is rather conservative. A newspaper in Beijing reported in November 2012 that the water used per car is 0.16 ton per year, and the entire car washing industry in Beijing amounts to 30 million tons, speculating that all cars are washed once a week.2 It was later found that these figures were disclosed in 2009 by Mr. Xing Aiyi (邢爱义), CEO of Aiyihang Auto Service (爱义行汽车 服务有限责任公司) and a Beijing Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) member.3 Even though the source of the data cannot be verified, the figure 30 million should not be taken for granted as it does reflect the huge amount of water used in car washing. Difficult as it is to obtain an exact figure from the authorities on water use in Beijing’s car washing industry, it is an indisputable fact that car washing is intensifying the conflict between water supply and demand, endangering water security, and it requires further supervision and better management.

1 Li Liquan, “Research on Water Intake Quota for Beijing’s Car Washing Industry,” Journal of Water Resources and Water Engineering 20, no. 5 (2009). 2 China Quality News, “Car Washing: Minimal Water Use and No Water Use,” November 27, 2012. 3 He Yan, “Beijing CPPCC Member Suggests Total on Clean Water Car Washing,” Beijing Morning News, February 16, 2009.

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Reclaimed Water as a “Second Source of Water”

In the face of Beijing’s severe water scarcity, reclaimed water should serve as an important means to conserve drinking water and reduce water waste in car washing. Reclaimed water refers to former waste water treated to meet certain standards for beneficial use. Processed and treated urban waste water can serve as replacements for fresh water in fields with no direct contact with the human body, various living uses, municipal gardening, industrial use, landscaping, and agricultural irrigation. It is estimated that 60% of water used in daily life and production could be replaced by reclaimed water. Using reclaimed water is an effective way to achieve resource recycling and build a water-conserving society. Due to increasingly intensifying water scarcity, Beijing has adopted the policy of conserving water by managing surface water, ground water, reclaimed water, rain, flood water, and water transferred from outside the city. Reclaimed water is obtained from processing waste water. Every ton of reclaimed water used means one ton of tap water saved and one ton of waste water reduced. Reclamation of waste water kills two birds with one stone: it creates a stable new water source, alleviating the pressure on urban water supply and it reduces waste water discharge, hence lightening the load on the environment. In recent years, Beijing has taken effective resource-conserving and environment-friendly measures in using reclaimed water to alleviate water scarcity, consequently achieving outstanding results.

Figure 11.1 Percentage of reclaimed water in Beijing’s total water supply.

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Since the construction of the first reclaimed water plant in Beijing in 2001, the quantity of reclaimed water used and its percentage in the water supply has grown year by year. Starting from 2004, reclaimed water has been part of the city’s yearly water allocation plan, mainly used in industry, agriculture, urban rivers and lakes, and municipal services with an ever increasing quantity and range of use. Beijing’s total water supply has grown over the years as the economy develops, reaching 3.6 billion cubic meters in 2011. As can be seen from Figure 11.1, surface water supply has dropped from 833 million cubic meters in 2003 to 550 million in 2011, while the supply of reclaimed water has risen from 204 million cubic meters in 2004 to 700 million in 2011, amounting to nearly 20% of the total water supply. Of the other water sources, ground water accounts for 60% of the total supply and water transferred from the south is 7%. Since 2008, reclaimed water has surpassed surface water and become a reliable “second source of water” for Beijing. 3

Prospects for Reclaimed Water

Although Beijing has taken the lead in water conservation and reclamation by building a pattern of “fresh water for living and reclaimed water for production and ecology,” it must be noted that the use of reclaimed water is still at a preliminary stage and awaits further development. Reclaimed water has many advantages: it is abundant and reliable; its quality meets multiple demands; and in terms of Beijing, the massive quantity of waste water is unaffected by seasonal or climate change and can be a reliable water source after processing. With the construction of urban waste water treatment plants, norms and quality standards for waste water reclamation have been made both at home and abroad, with technology ensuring that waste water is treated to meet different standards for industrial cooling, watercourses, and various municipal uses. The trend for use of reclaimed water can be described in marketing terms as keeping “traditional users,” developing “new users,” and tapping “potential users.” “Traditional users” refers to various municipal uses, industrial cooling, agricultural, and landscaping uses; “new users” refers to high-quality landscaping use and special industrial use; “potential users” refers to ground water recharge and drinking water reserves. The following examples demonstrate the rapid development and outstanding achievements of Beijing’s reclaimed water use.

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3.1 Landscaping Water Use Using reclaimed water in landscaping is one of the major ways of recycling waste water. It is also a solution to the city’s need for a recreational water environment and one of the best ways to complete the natural restoration of water ecology. Reclaimed water is the main source for many of the water landscapes in Beijing’s urban watercourses and parks. The clear water in the sparkling lake of the Olympic Green comes from the Beixiaohe Water Reclamation Plant (北小河再生水厂) several miles away; Yongding River (永定河) was revitalized with reclaimed water after being dried-up for thirty years; more than 70% of the water in the fifty-two rivers inside the Sixth Ring Road is reclaimed, using up to 230 million cubic meters every year. In the first clean water, zeroconsumption instance, Beixiaohe Park, rain water is collected and used in irrigation together with reclaimed water. 3.2 Urban Greening Water Use Reclaimed water is abundant, easy to pool, and stable in quantity and quality. These features make it a perfect choice for urban irrigation, as it not only greatly alleviates the pressure on water supply but also improves soil fertility, enhances plant growth, and reduces the use of fertilizers, for it is rich in nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, and other nutrients necessary for plant growth.4 Reclaimed water is increasingly being used in urban greening, now irrigating 1,100 square kilometers of urban greenery. According to the Promotion Plan for Building Clean Water Zero-Consumption Ecological Parks (推进“清水零消 耗”生态节水公园鼓励办法) and the Plan for Reclaimed Water Use in Urban Greens (公园绿地再生水利用规划) implemented by the Beijing Water Authority, thirty “clean water low-consumption” parks will be built during the Twelfth Five-year Plan period. 3.3 Industrial, Agricultural, and Municipal Water Use Reclaimed water is used industrially, mainly in cooling, washing, processing, construction, and dust dislodging. Nine thermal power plants in the city, including the First Thermal Power Plant (第一热电厂), Huaneng Thermal Power Plant (华能热电厂), and Shijingshan Thermal Power Plant (石景山热 电厂), have used entirely reclaimed water for cooling. In agricultural irrigation, more than 300 million cubic meters of reclaimed water is used every year in Tongzhou (通州) and Daxing (大兴) districts, irrigating 580,000 mu of land

4 Wang Yanchun, Zhang Linan, and Gu Runze, “Research on the Influence of Reclaimed Water Irrigation on Urban Plants and Soil,” Beijing Landscape, 4 (2005).

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and conserving ground water resources effectively.5 Reclaimed water use also grows yearly for municipal water use. In 2011, a total of 1.18 billion cubic meters of waste water was processed and treated in Beijing, with a treatment rate of 82%, of which 0.7 billion was reclaimed and reused. In July 2012, Suggestions on Further Strengthening Waste Water Treatment and Reclaimed Water Use (关于进一步加强污水处 理和再生水利用工作的意见) issued by the General Office of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality put forward that by the end of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the city’s overall waste water treatment rate should reach 90%, while areas within the Fourth Ring Road should reach 100%, other areas in the city center 98%, new city 90%, and rural areas 60%, with more than 1 billion cubic meters of reclaimed water used yearly and a utilization rate of 75%. To improve the quantity of reclaimed water supply and use, the Beijing Gaobeidian Reclaimed Water Plant (second section) (高碑店再生水厂) will be launched and become the largest water reclamation facility in China upon completion in 2015, with a daily treatment capacity of 1 million tons. 4

Tap Water Use in Car Washing

Since 2009, the price of tap water for residential use has been 4 RMB per ton. For the car washing industry it is 61.68 RMB per ton, while reclaimed water is only priced at 1 RMB per ton (Table 11.1). Theoretically, reclaimed water should be the first choice for car washing, as it is the cheapest. In reality, reclaimed water is rarely used in Beijing’s car washes, most of which still use tap water. It is unlikely that car wash owners will switch to reclaimed water without powerful monitoring. One reporter found that a Chaoyang District Yintai Center (朝阳区银泰中心) car washing facility used tap water for its services, and the water fee was paid to property management. According to Beijing’s commercial water price policy, Yintai’s tap water was priced at 6.21 RMB per ton, which was sold to the car washer at more than 7 RMB per ton, with a profit of 1 RMB per ton for Yintai. The car wash owner did not have to pay the regulated price of 61.68 RMB per ton. Needless to say, both sides were happy about the win-win situation. This is not the only case in Beijing. Many car washing facilities are using tap water openly or secretly. With the number of automobiles soaring, car wash businesses spring up all over the city legally or illegally, resulting in increasing water waste. 5 Translator’s note: one mu equals 666.7 square meters.

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Table 11.1 Prices (RMB per ton) for tap water and reclaimed water in Beijing6 Type

Price for Tap Water

Price for Water Resources

Price for Waste Price in Total Water Treatment

Resident Administrative Commercial Hotels & Restaurants Baths Car Washing Reclaimed Water

 1.70  2.80  3.00  3.50 58.90 38.90 —

 1.26  1.32  1.44  1.16 21.10 21.10 —

1.04 1.68 1.77 1.55 1.68 1.68 —

 4.00  5.80  6.21  6.21 81.68 61.68  1.00

A reclaimed water supplier in Beijing claims that of the 0.22 billion tons of reclaimed water they supply every year only 0.2 million is sent to car washers—less than 0.1% of the total quantity. High transportation costs are considered the bottleneck for reclaimed water use in car washing. One car wash owner admitted that, even including the cost of violating water use regulations, tap water is still the most cost-efficient. As reclaimed water pipes have not yet covered the entire city, most car wash owners would have to pay for truck transportation for reclaimed water, with the exception of those near the plants. The price of a mere 1 RMB per ton, when coupled with the transportation cost, reaches 15 or even 20 RMB per ton. In this sense, reclaimed water has no price advantage over tap water and ground water. During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, 488 kilometers of reclaimed water pipes were built, improving greatly its transportation capacity. Just as transportation of reclaimed water depends on pipelines, pipeline construction faces increasing difficulties. The first difficulty is route planning. As reclaimed water is a new industry, pipelines can only be built when roads are re-constructed, especially in old city centers; moreover, with all kinds of pipes already underneath the roads, some areas are simply not suitable for constructing reclaimed water pipelines. Relocation is another problem that constrains pipeline construction.

6 All statistics are from http://bj.bendibao.com.

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Water Conservation in Car Washing: Successful Cases

Are there any efficient ways for water conservation in car washing? In developed countries many successful cases can be found, as their car washing industries started much earlier and use advanced, fully-automatic car washing equipment and techniques. 5.1 United States The government encourages water conservation through limiting waste water discharge. Car washers are granted a permit for waste water discharge with a quota, while surplus quota can be traded at the New York Stock Exchange. This serves as a powerful incentive for car washers to control waste water discharge and reduce water waste. 5.2 Germany The government uses water pricing as a lever to control water use. The price for residential water and waste treatment is as high as 5.5 EUR per cubic meter, contributing to an intense awareness for water conservation. Prices for car washing and industrial water use are several times higher, a powerful hindrance for any water waste. 5.3 Australia In the capital city Canberra, the government has enforced mandatory restrictions on water use, limiting the time and method for watering lawns or gardens as well as shutting down all commercial car washers without recycled or reclaimed water, which successfully reduces water use. 5.4 Japan Japan has world-class franchise car washers, and is the leader in car-washing equipment production. Franchise car washers occupy 95% of Japan’s car washing market, providing excellent service while also conserving water efficiently, contrary to China where few car washers grow to become franchise brands. Self-service car washers are also popular in Japan, normally located near gas stations. Drivers take their cars to the washer and pay with credit cards. The price is correlated with the quantity of water used; when it exceeds a certain limit, the price will rise. The more water used, the higher the price. The Japanese government has also adopted other effective measures to encourage water conservation. First, it promotes leak-proof and water-conserving appliances, like installing leak-proof and water-conserving sprinklers on trigger

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guns and equipping car washers with waste water recycling systems; second, it enhances waste water treatment, and installs treatment facilities in residential areas as well as car wash facilities; third, it popularizes reclaimed water pipelines and encourages citizens to use reclaimed sewage water and rain water for car washing. 6

Suggestions on Strengthening Water Use Management and Use of Reclaimed Water in Car Washing

The issue of car washing for the five million automobiles in Beijing concerns the city’s water conservation and water security. Reclaimed water use brings with it a silver lining, meeting rising expectations to curb ostentatious water use in car washing. In view of the current water use in Beijing’s car washing industry, strengthening water use management and increasing the percentage of reclaimed water use is a requirement. Hence this paper proposes: Improving the Management Mechanism for Water Use in Car Washing Several government departments are involved in car washing water use management. The Transportation Bureau and the Administration for Industry and Commerce decide whether the car wash facility has business qualifications, while the Water Authority monitors its water use and conservation. The Environmental Protection Bureau supervises its waste water discharge, while the Bureau of City Administration and Law Enforcement carries out spot checks and penalties for illegal operations such as road occupation and illegal car washing. The departments often join forces in investigating water conservation and waste water discharge, focusing on temporary water use quotas and administrative permits for waste water discharge. Likewise in car washing water use management, relevant departments should clarify responsibilities, cooperate in regular and random checks on car washers, and improve the management mechanism and system. 6.1

6.2 Putting the Economic Lever to Better Use Better financial support should be provided to encourage reclaimed water use at car washes. A pricing mechanism must be formed so that the lowerpriced reclaimed water can attract car wash owners and replace tap water. Transportation subsidies should be provided in order to lower the cost of reclaimed water use to a price acceptable to owners. While promoting water

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intake quotas, water use planning should also be implemented with an extra fee for water use exceeding the plan for improved efficiency. Improving the Distribution of Car Washers through Scientific Planning and Rational Layout Planned sites for car wash facilities should fit into the strategic planning of the city, especially that of the reclaimed water pipelines. A uniform distribution company for reclaimed water should be established to transport all reclaimed water so that it can be a stable water source for car washers. It is also advised that the government plans the layout of bath centers and car washers together so that waste water treatment facilities can be built near bath centers while reclaimed water can be transported to car washers nearby, saving transportation costs and putting waste water to full use. Moreover, collected rain water should be allocated to nearby car washers as another stable water source. 6.3

7 Conclusion The Eighteenth National People’s Congress has laid out a comprehensive plan to promote ecological progress, with emphasis on building a water-conserving society by “promoting the reduction, recycling, and reclamation of water in production, circulation, and consumption.” Reclaimed water use is an important measure in realizing these goals, as it reduces water pollution and alleviates pressure brought by water scarcity. We call on cooperative efforts from the government, enterprises, and society to strengthen monitoring and management of car washing water use while increasing reclaimed water use so that the car washing industry can contribute to China’s ecological progress.

chapter 12

Progress in Restricting Excessive Packaging Mao Da Abstract Three aspects of China’s progress in restricting excessive packaging in 2012 are as follows: first, the issue of excessive packaging was explicitly stipulated in the newly amended Cleaner Production Promotion Law; second, efforts were made by governments to effectively implement existing laws and regulations; third, continued nongovernmental observation and investigation provided a valid reference for the government and public to understand the crux of the problem of excess packaging and work together towards a solution. Still, effective reduction of excessive packaging requires continued efforts through legislation, law enforcement, and public participation.

Keywords excessive packaging – ban on plastic bags – Cleaner Production Promotion Law – garbage – mooncakes

Packaging refers to the containers, materials, and auxiliaries used to protect, transport, store, and sell goods in the process of consumer circulation. Packaging is inextricably linked with sustainable consumption, which is defined by the UN as “the use of services and related products, which respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of life while minimizing the use of natural resources and toxic materials as well as the emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of the service or product so as not to jeopardize the needs of further generations.”1 Based on this, sustainable packaging consumption can be defined as: the use of packaging that fulfills its basic functions while minimizing the use of natural resources and toxic materials as well as the emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of the packaging.

1 Element for Policies for Sustainable Consumption, UNEP, Nairobi, Symposium: Sustainable Production and Consumption Pattern, 1994.

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In China, commercial packaging has an immense impact on the environment, requiring a large amount of supervision and management. The surge in the commercial economy has brought about the increased output of the packaging industry, followed by a rapid increase in the production and consumption of packaging. Much as rational use of packaging promotes the circulation of goods and reduces waste, excessive packaging is considered a common phenomenon by governments, experts, the public, and even the packaging industry itself, including the excessive use of disposable packaging, small quantity packaging, numerous and complicated packaging materials, as well as a multitude of extravagant packaging materials. Packaging rates high in the consumption of resources while producing large amounts of waste, as it is largely disposable with a short life cycle. According to statistics, packaging waste accounts for half of China’s total solid waste volume, amounting to 400 billion RMB in value every year. Of the 30 million tons of packaging produced every year, less than 30% is recycled. One-third of urban household garbage is packaging waste, half of which is excessive packaging. In Beijing each year, 830,000 tons of packaging garbage are produced, 600,000 tons of which is excessive packaging, a huge burden on the environment.2 Restricting excessive packaging has become an important part of developing a green economy and sustainable consumption. Progress was made in restricting excessive packaging in China in 2012. This paper will reveal the progress from two perspectives—government legislation and supervision, and nongovernmental investigation and recommendations. 1

Government Legislation and Supervision

A major accomplishment in central government legislation was amending the Cleaner Production Promotion Law (清洁生产促进法). At the end of February 2012, the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress deliberated on Amendments to Cleaner Production Promotion Law (Draft) for the second time and voted for its implementation on July 1, 2012. Article 20 of the amended law restricts excessive packaging: “During the design of products and packages, their effects on human health and environment within their service life should be taken into account; toxic-free, harm-free, biodegradability, and recycling schemes should be chosen according to priority. Enterprises shall

2 Chuandong.com, “Who’s to Manage Excessive Packaging and Save Resources in Packaging Industry,” http://info.shipin.hc360.com/2011/05/27140482861.shtml (accessed May 27, 2011).

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reasonably pack their products and ensure that the material, structure, and cost of packaging are appropriate for the reduction of excess waste.” It was reported by Beijing News that during deliberation of the draft, Committee Member Wang Guangxi (汪光焘) proposed that articles on monitoring excessive packaging be added, saying, “local governments and administrations for quality supervision should be responsible for monitoring manufacturers.” He also mentioned that although demanded by the State Council years ago, the State Administration of Quality Supervision had failed to formulate regulations on restricting excessive packaging. Committee Member Fan Hsu Lai Tai (范徐丽泰) (from HKSAR) also suggested adding liability articles, saying, “this may not necessarily be stipulated in the law, but relevant departments may consider formulating regulations, such as setting a size limit for packaging and prohibiting the use of wood in packaging.” Another committee member, Cheng Yiju (程贻举), thought the problem of packaging was undervalued in the draft, and proposed that more mandatory measures be adopted, in addition to advocacy.3 Despite further expectations from some committee members on the amending of the Cleaner Production Promotion Law, the inclusion of restricting excessive packaging clearly suggests that the issue is now the focus of several relevant departments and may speed up the legislation of other laws and regulations, like the long delayed Regulations on Restricting Excessive Packaging (限制商品过度包装条例). Local governments have also made progress in legislation. On November 21, 2012, the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress passed China’s first local regulation on restricting excessive packaging, named Provisions of Shanghai Municipality on Reducing Packaging for Commodities (上海市商品包装物减量若干规定). As reported by China Consumer News, during legislation the Committee organized investigations on garbage reduction and found that although the total volume of garbage had been reduced as a result of 1,000 residential areas now having waste classification systems, garbage in the form of packaging was growing. The committee considered excessive packaging a great hindrance to garbage reduction and recognized its need to be monitored with legislation. Moreover, results of city supervision inspections of tea, mooncakes, and health food conducted by the Shanghai Municipal Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision since 2009 suggested that the low pass rate for the “interspace ratio” (包装空隙率) was

3 Yang Huayun, “NPC Regulates Excessive Packaging: 20% Waste from Over-packaging,” Beijing News, February 28, 2012.

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a major problem, and that excessive packaging was most severe in tea and health food.4 It is also reported that instead of the integrity of law, Shanghai formulated the articles more pragmatically by targeting specific problems, partly because there are no precedents in China.5 The Provisions of Shanghai Municipality on Reducing Packaging for Commodities are scheduled to come into force on February 1, 2013. Besides ground rules, the provisions have two mandatory regulations: 1) Quality and technology supervision departments should announce timely results of supervision and inspections, as well as a report through media the manufacturers and sellers in serious violation, and the products involved; and 2) For sellers of goods sold in violation of the mandatory provisions, quality and technology supervision departments should order a stop to the sale within a time limit, otherwise a fine between 2,000 and 20,000 RMB should be enforced on the sellers, and a fine between 20,000 and 50,000 RMB for serious violations.6 Though they pioneered legislation on restricting excessive packaging, Shanghai’s provisions are merely a reinforcement of existing national laws and regulations without much innovation. The city of Guangzhou in Guangdong Province, on the other hand, has made more efforts in limiting packaging waste. In 2011, the city’s legislative office organized legislation research and listed the Measures of Guangzhou on Restricting Excessive Packaging for Commodities (广州市限制商品过度包装管理办法) as part of its legislative plan for 2012. The first draft was formally presented in October 2012 and discussed openly in an experts’ meeting. Although still open for expert discussion and public comment, Measures of Guangzhou on Restricting Excessive Packaging for Commodities has quite a few innovations. The first is its emphasis on “government green procurement.” The measures stipulate, as quoted in local media, “The government should promote green procurement, not procure commodities violating the mandatory standards for restricting excessive packaging . . .priority in procurement should be accorded to commodities complying with the city’s guiding standards for packaging.” The second innovation is the “separate sale of commodity and packaging.” As local media quotes, it stipulates that “Separate sale of commodity and packaging should be achieved gradually within the city, and should first 4 Liu Hao, “Shanghai Formulates Regulatory Policy as Food Price Soars with Excessive Packaging,” China Consumer News, December 4, 2012. 5 Ibid. 6 Standing Committee of Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress, Provisions of Shanghai Municipality on Reducing Packaging for Commodity, November 21, 2011.

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be implemented in gift commodities. For those commodities whose packaging cannot be sold separately, the packaging cost should be revealed and its proportion in the total price should be labeled appropriately on the commodity by manufacturers and sellers.”7 If these two measures can be enforced in Guangzhou, they will provide a useful reference for packaging management. Cities other than Shanghai and Guangzhou are also attempting to legislate packaging restrictions. It was reported that in December 2012, Gansu Province began formulating Measures of Gansu Province on Commodity Packaging (甘肃省商品包装管理办法) to regulate the production, packaging, sale, and consumption of commodities. Legislators proposed that industry policy be oriented towards “anti-excessive packaging” with taxation and industry access policies encouraging “no-packaging” for common commodities and “simple packaging” for luxuries. Gansu Province has also issued the Notice on Strengthening Monitoring of Excessive Packaging for Commodities (关于进一 步加强商品过度包装治理工作 的通知), requiring relevant departments to tighten control on packaging, urge enterprises to eliminate excessive packaging by checking, and exposing cases of profiteering from raised prices through luxury packaging.8 All the above legislations were enacted or formulated within 2012, and their results await further observation. Nevertheless, the central and local governments have made great progress in implementing existing laws and regulations. The Department of Environment and Resources Protection of the National Development and Reform Commission has been instrumental in formulating and overseeing the administration of the Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Restricting the Production, Sale, and Use of Plastic Bags (国务院办公厅关于限制生产销售使用塑料购物袋的通知), or the “plastic bag ban,” which came into being on June 1, 2008. In 2012, though the ban had achieved satisfactory results (especially at retail locations) the department shifted its focus to reducing the use of plastic bags among families and primary and middle school students. On June 20, Li Jing (李静), deputy director of the department, attended an activity at the Beijing Zhongguyouyi Primary School named “hold hands together to restrict plastic use,” where she said that four years after the implementation of the ban the use of plastic bags in China had been reduced by 2.4 billion, saving 800,000 tons of raw materials for plastic, equal to 4.8 million tons of oil, one-eighth of the annual output of the Daqing 7 Zheng Xuseng and Zheng Danhong, “Guangzhou to Announce Ban on Excessive Packaging,” Yangcheng Evening News, October 11, 2012. 8 Lian Zhengxiang, “Gansu to Control Excessive Packaging for Commodities,” Xinhua News Agency, December 6, 2012, http://news.163.com/12/1206/15/8I26AGI800014JB5.html.

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Oil Field. She called on the students present to become “scouts for restricting plastic use, publicizing the harm of ‘white pollution’ and the significance of the ban in families, communities, and public places.” She also promoted the investigation of the use of plastic bags in supermarkets and outdoor markets, and asked students to write essays and research papers about their own understanding of and suggestions for the ban. On November 7, Li Jing, along with officials from other ministries, came to the primary school again to present students with excellent performance awards in reducing plastic use. She took the chance to announce that the Development and Reform Commission will carry out publicity campaigns for the ban on plastic bags in primary and middle schools across China, so that every family internalizes the concept of protecting the environment by using fewer disposable products like plastic bags.9 Contrary to the publicity given to the ban on plastic bags by the National Development and Reform Commission, its implementation still faces great difficulties in local governments. The problems in 2012 are the same as before: rampant manufacturing and use of ultra-thin plastic bags, unregulated pricing for plastic bags in by markets and vendors, frequent use of unqualified plastic bags in food packaging, and weak law enforcement with scarce resources. Some nongovernmental organizations have been tracking the situation and making suggestions for improvement. Compared with previous years, local governments have paid more attention to monitoring and restricting excessive packaging for food and cosmetics, because the public was more concerned with these issues, and because of the national standards, the Requirements on Restricting Excessive Packaging—Food and Cosmetics (GB23350-2009) (限制商品过度包装要求——食品和化妆品). Take Beijing as an example. The Municipal Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision conducted joint spot checks on food and cosmetics packaging in December 2012 to see whether excessive packaging was on the market before the New Year and the Spring Festival. There are three standards for excessive packaging: first, the packaging should be no more than three layers; second, the interspace ratio should not exceed 55% for alcohol, 60% for cakes and pastries, and 10% for grains; and third, the packaging cost should not exceed 20% of the price. An employee of the Municipal Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision mentioned to a reporter that the qualified rate has increased greatly this year—of

9 Shenyang Evening News, “National Development and Reform Commission Promotes the Ban on Plastic Bags in Primary and Middles Schools,” November 8, 2012.

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the 35 enterprises and 107 batches of food and cosmetics checked by the administration, 16 batches’ interspace ratio did not qualify, mostly of tea products.10 2

Nongovernmental Investigations and Suggestions

As the government endeavors to restrict excessive packaging through legislation and implementation of existing regulations, the media, nongovernmental organizations, and environmental protection volunteers also continue to investigate and evaluate the issue, and make suggestions accordingly. The China Youth Daily published an article on October 9, 2012 titled “97.5% Consider Excessive Packaging a Serious Problem.” It reports on a survey with 4,306 people, conducted by newspaper through minyi.net.cn and sohu.com, showing that 97.5% of the interviewees think excessive packaging is a serious problem in China, 76% of whom consider it very serious, and 84% agreeing on legislation to restrict extravagant packaging.11 The survey also asked about the motive for buying excessively packaged commodities, and 79.4% of the interviewees chose the answer “for gifts to look good.” One interviewee explained, “We usually only buy excessively packaged commodities as gifts, never for ourselves. We also receive nicely packaged gifts without much practical value during festivals, which we keep as gifts for the future if they have a long shelf life.” The second answer, which 44.6% interviewees chose, was “to pursue luxury.” As for the question of frequency of purchase, 11.3% answered they “often” bought excessively packaged commodities, while 53% choose “occasionally.”12 These statistics suggest that buying excessively packaged commodities is not just extravagant, but also conspicuous consumption, causing significantly negative consequences despite its low frequency. The survey also shows that almost half (48.4%) of the interviewees think it difficult to find commodities with simple packaging and have to resort to those with excessive packaging, while 79.6% consider the price of these commodities to far exceed their worth and be detrimental to the rights of consumers. China Youth Daily quoted Liu Junhai (刘俊海), professor at the School of Law in Renmin University and director of its Business Law Center, who commented that such business practices harm consumers’ right of fair trade, as 10

Jia Zhongshan, “Beijing Tightens Control on Excessive Packaging before Spring Festival,” Beijing Evening News, December 28, 2012. 11 Wang Yunxiu and Yan Hang, “97.5% Consider Excessive Packaging a Serious Problem,” China Youth Daily, October 9, 2012. 12 Ibid.

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they generally believe that better packaged commodities have good quality, giving the manufacturers the chance to profiteer.13 The end of the survey asked for suggestions on restricting excessive packaging, and responses from interviewees included “strict regulation on the percentage of packaging cost in the commodity price” (73.4%), “heavy taxes on extravagantly packaged commodities” (72.9%), “labeling packaging cost on the commodity to alert consumers” (63.2%), “recycle and reuse of packaging” (35.9%), and “more attention on environmental processing of garbage” (32.8%).14 Excessive packaging of mooncakes has always been a heated issue in China, and the China Zero Waste Alliance (中国零废弃联盟), formed by environmental organizations and individuals concerned with the problem, keeps up with the issue by initiating investigations and public campaigns around the Mid-autumn Festival called “Mooncakes, Still Excessively Packaged?” The campaigns mostly focus on collecting mooncake packages and evaluating the severity of excessive packaging by judging whether these packages are “excessive” according to national standards. Samples are collected either through online microblogs or in communities. Microblog samples are photographed and uploaded by volunteers, marked with such information as place of documentation, mooncake brand, layers of packaging, and packaging materials so that they can be categorized statistically. In 2012, ninety-one samples were collected, of which fourteen had more than three layers of packaging, 15% of the total, while the maximum number of layers reached five (seven if counting original packaging and a layer of fillers).15 Packaging material is also considered an important indicator for evaluating whether the packaging is environmentally friendly. It was found that, of all the samples, the number of material types 0 (no packaging) to 6 appear in frequencies of 1, 3, 40, 23, 16, 7, and 1, which means that most mooncake packages contain 2–4 types of materials. The materials include composite paper, paper, plastic, iron, cloth, ceramic, and glass; most packages use plastics (90), while a majority use composite paper (62).16 After the China Zero Waste Alliance concluded the campaign in 2012, it was found that 15% of mooncakes were excessively packaged with over three layers, exceeding the national standard stipulated in Requirements on 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 China Zero Waste Alliance, “Moon Cakes, Still Excessively Packaged?” Survey Report of Joint Investigation, 2012. 16 Ibid.

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Restricting Excessive Packaging—Food and Cosmetics. The requirements also stipulate that “a single type of material, or easily separable materials, should be used in packaging,” which mooncake packaging violates by using not easily separable materials such as composite paper and painted metal. Moreover, unnecessary auxiliary materials such as silk cloth and plastic trays are used but are not counted as packaging layers; still, they are excessive packaging and a further waste of resources.17 Based on the above results, China Zero Waste Alliance have made proposals to legislative and law enforcement departments as well as to the public. The legislative department should impose strict regulations on various types of packaging and auxiliary materials; the law enforcement departments should strengthen monitoring of manufacturers of excessive packaging, conduct regular spot checks of commodities prone to excessive packaging, and compose a list accordingly; furthermore, consumers should take the initiative in upholding frugality and refusing to buy excessively packaged commodities. Huanyou Science and Technology Research Center (环友科学技术研究 中心), another environmental NGO, has been tracking the implementation of a significant regulation in restricting excessive packaging, i.e., the ban on plastic bags. On May 31, 2012, the day before the ban’s fourth anniversary, Huanyou published 2011 Survey on Implementation of the Ban on Plastic Bags in Beijing (2011 年北京市“限塑令”执行情况调查报告), reporting to the public the effects and changes in the ban’s implementation in Beijing. The survey was conducted in October 2012 at 113 chain supermarkets, shopping centers, and outdoor markets, as well as 464 other shops and businesses located in four districts in Beijing—Haidian, Dongcheng, Xicheng, and Changping.18 It is noteworthy that the survey was actually a repeat of the Survey on Implementation Effects of and Consumer Response to the Ban on Plastic Bags in Beijing (关于“限塑令”在北京地区的执行效果及消费者之反应的调研 报告) published in 2008 by another volunteer organization, the Plastic Ban Policy Study Group, hence their lists of survey subjects were almost identical. The survey suggests that paid use of plastic bags is still practiced in 93% of chain supermarkets, basically the same as 2008, but less attention is being paid to publicizing the ban on plastic bags. The percentage of consumers buying new plastic bags in chain supermarkets rose from 38.3% in 2008 to 48% in 2011, suggesting a reduced effect of charging for plastic bags. In free markets

17 Ibid. 18 Huanyou Science and Technology Research Center, 2011 Survey on Implementation of the Ban on Plastic Bags in Beijing, 2012.

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and shopping centers, however, less than 20% of stores charge for plastic bags, a disappointing statistic.19 The survey attributes the phenomenon of higher consumption of plastic bags in chain supermarkets to two reasons: less publicity for the ban on plastic bags, and reduced concern for the economic and environmental pressure brought by plastic bags on the part of the consumers, as their cost is negligible compared with the commodity price. As for the unsatisfactory implementation of the ban in outdoor markets, the survey finds several factors at work, such as the markets’ organizational forms, ways of trading, and commodity features.20 Based on the above findings, the survey makes suggestions to the government on improving the implementation of the ban on plastic bags, by for example, better publicity for and stronger enforcement of the ban in chain supermarket and shopping centers. Also of concern is the appropriate adjustment of pricing standards for plastic bags, in order to constrain consumer demands, as well as the formulation of the ban explanation, so that stores which cannot distinguish commodity price from plastic bag price can be temporarily exempt from paid use of plastic bags.21 A similar survey on the implementation of the ban on plastic bags was published around the same time by a professional organization, the International Food Packaging Association. Based on its investigation of twenty chain supermarkets and seventeen outdoor markets in Beijing, Guangdong, and Zhejiang in 2012, the survey found that the paid use of plastic bags was universally exercised in chain supermarkets with information labeling and quality in line with national standards, reducing the use of plastic bags by 70%. Meanwhile, free ultra-thin plastic bags were still prevalent in outside markets, roadside stalls, and at vendors. At the same time, plastic bags made from waste plastic were widely used in wrapping food, fruits, vegetables, and fresh products, causing great risks in food security but largely overlooked by sellers, managers, and consumers alike. The survey also reported a resurgence of a previously shutdown majority of ultra-thin plastic bag manufacturers.22 In conclusion, China’s progress in restricting excessive packaging is mostly found in three aspects. First, the issue of excessive packaging has been discussed by legislators in the National People’s Congress and explicitly stipulated 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Han Lewu, “Survey Finds Minimal Effect of the Ban on Plastic Bags in Reducing White Pollution,” Legal Daily, December 20, 2012.

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in the newly amended Cleaner Production Promotion Law. Ground rules laid out in the amended law have created a solid foundation for legislation in the future for the regulation of commodity packaging and its influence on the environment. Second, efforts have been made by governments to effectively implement laws and regulations on restricting excessive packaging, like the ban on plastic bags and national standard Requirements on Restricting Excessive Packaging—Food and Cosmetics. A few cities, like Shanghai and Guangzhou, have established local regulations in line with realities, aimed at restricting excessive packaging and alleviating the burden on waste treatment. These are all productive attempts. Third, nongovernmental observation and investigation on excessive packaging continue to grow in number. The surveys, whether on excessive packaging of mooncakes or the changes in the four-year implementation of the ban on plastic bags, have provided valid reference with solid statistics for the government and the public to understand the crux of the issue and work together towards a solution. Still, the progress seems far from considerable and the effects limited. Efforts must be made in the following directions. Firstly, the State Council should formulate a list for the mandatory recycling of commodity packaging under the framework of Circular Economy Promotion Law (循环经济促进法) so that producer responsibility can be truly implemented. Although the inclusion of any packaging in the list might cause dispute, a truly meaningful system must begin with a small step. Secondly, the long delayed Regulations on Restricting Excessive Packaging should be put up for more open and extensive public comments, or a hearing if necessary.23 Only when the public is fully aware and their comments successfully pooled can regulations be effectively implemented. Although Requirements on Restricting Excessive Packaging—Food and Cosmetics have already been promulgated, it is a national standard, not a legal basis that commercial or quality supervision administrations can fall back on when giving out penalties for excessive packaging. Furthermore, promoting the ban on plastic bags should be more than educational campaigns in primary and middle schools or spot checks and fines. If specific measures cannot be issued by relevant departments of the central and local government to differentiate situations in retail locations and contain policy failure in multiple aspects, the public will only be further disappointed. 23

A hearing was conducted on September 11, 2008, by the National Administration of Quality Supervision and Inspection, who drafted the regulations.

Part six Ecological Protection

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chapter 13

New Hope for Protecting Sanjiangyuan: Headwaters of the Yangtze, Yellow, and Mekong Rivers Sanjiangyuan Project Team of the Shan Shui Conservation Center Abstract China’s rapid economic growth has been accompanied by environmental destruction and degradation of nature reserves. In order to safeguard Sanjiangyuan, China’s second largest national nature reserve, China must develop a solid understanding of the region, a respect of the local culture, and develop flexible natural resource management practices. Policy and administrative innovations are needed to replace “one size fits all” solutions to ensure long-term effectiveness in ecological protection. In November 2011, the Qinghai Sanjiangyuan National Ecological Comprehensive Experimental Zone was approved by the State Council. With such principles as “respecting local cultures,” “protecting ecological environments,” and “protecting the livelihood of local people,” the experiment aims to highlight the role of local pastoralists and farmers, invite NGO participation, and innovate an administrative framework. These top-down policies, coupled with bottom-up, community-based experiments in mobilizing the local people since 2000, offer new hope for protecting Sanjiangyuan.

Keywords Sanjiangyuan – ecological bottom line – ecological experimental zone – communityled initiative – innovation in administrative framework – conservation steward programs

1 Background November 16, 2011 marked an important turning point; the Executive Meeting of the State Council established the Qinghai Sanjiangyuan National Ecological

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180 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center Comprehensive Experimental Zone (三江源国家生态保护综合实验区).1 This zone gives priority to environmental protection, promotes regional development, and protects the welfare and livelihoods of the residents in the pastoral areas on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (QTP). A “pilot implementation” and “innovative eco-protection mechanism” were also introduced. The area of the experimental zone accounts for 54% of Qinghai Province.2 Sanjiangyuan, which contains the headwaters of the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, and the Mekong River, is of vital importance for China’s ecological safety. The headwaters offer irreplaceable ecological services for hundreds of millions of people. These services include: water resource conservation, soil conservation, and protection of biodiversity. In 2003, the region was upgraded to the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve (三江源自然保护区), covering a total area of 152,300 square kilometers with a core area of 31,200 square kilometers. The reserve consists of eighteen sub-areas, including the headwaters of the three rivers, habitats for endangered wild fauna and flora, and alpine wetlands. In the experimental zone established in 2011, the Sanjiangyuan, Hoh Xil (Kekexili) (可可西里), and Longbaotan (隆宝滩) nature reserves were listed as “Key Protected Areas,” covering 197,400 square kilometers, or 50.1% of the experimental zone. According to 2012 data, the 395,000 square kilometer experimental zone is home to 1.27 million people, among whom 80% are pastoralists, 89% are Tibetan, and 65% are considered “impoverished.”3 The participation and support of over 1,200 villages in the experimental zone are key to the success of Sanjiangyuan’s protection. Hence, the welfare and future of the natives of the region were given priority in the master plan for the experimental zone.4 From 2005 to 2012, the central government channeled 7.5 billion RMB to the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve, which is likely the largest investment in a single nature reserve in China.5 However, whether or not the investment

1 “Wen Jiabao chairs executive meeting of the State Council,” Xinhuanet, November 16, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-11/16/c_111172555.htm. 2 It includes twenty-one counties in the four Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures of Yushu, Golog, Huangnan, and Hainan, as well as Tanggulashan Town in Golmud. 3 National Development and Reform Commission, Master Plan for the Qinghai Sanjiangyuan National Ecological Comprehensive Experiment Zone. 4 Ibid. 5 On January 26, 2005, the Master Plan for the Ecological Protection and Restoration of Qinghai Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve was approved by the Executive Meeting of the State Council. The plan, with a total investment of 7.5 billion RMB, involves ecological protection and restoration programs, infrastructure programs to improve the working and living condition of

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has helped in protecting Sanjiangyuan, (especially in curbing the alpine rangeland degradation), has not yet been proven. As one of the last and most precious pieces of pristine land in China, Sanjiangyuan’s true ecological, cultural, and spiritual values continue to be systematically studied, recorded, and communicated. It is very likely that a failure to protect Sanjiangyuan effectively lies in the fact that little is known about its true ecological value. Since 2000, a number of NGOs have engaged in community-based protection initiatives. Conservation steward programs jointly run by NGOs such as Snowland Great Rivers Environmental Protection Association (青海省三江 源生态环境保护协会), Conservation International Foundation (保护国 际基金会), and Shan Shui Conservation Center (山水自然保护中心); and such government bodies as the Forestry Department of Qinghai Province and the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve seek to combine government investment in ecological protection, as well as the voluntary and resource utilization practices of local pastoral communities.6 General Overview of the Rangelands and Pastoralists in Sanjiangyuan The following is taken from an academic paper: 1.1

Over the past few decades, the global climate change, coupled with unsound human exploitation strategies, such as overstocking, overcutting, and excessive gold mining, has resulted in severe rangeland degradation in the Sanjiangyuan area. It is estimated that degraded rangelands now account for 26–46% of the usable rangelands, not only seriously affecting the local environment and the sustainability of rangeland husbandry, but also posing a grave threat to the ecological safety of other related areas.7 Except for the forest in the southeastern part of Sanjiangyuan, most of the vegetation in the area consists of rangelands, with the major types being farmers and pastoralists, and supporting programs for ecological protection. The program duration is from 2005 to 2012. 6 Li Shengzhi, “Conservation Steward Programs: a New Model of Ecological Protection Featuring Government Guidance and Community Participation,” Report on Environment Development of China (2010) (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010). 7 Fan Jiangwen, “Dynamic Changes of Grassland Yield in Three River Headwater Region from 1988 to 2005,” Acta Agrestia Sinica no. 1 (2010).

182 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center alpine meadows, alpine rangelands, and swamp wetlands. Animal husbandry (overstocking) has often been cited as the top manmade cause for rangeland degradation. However, local pastoralists have lived in such arid and semi-arid ecosystems for thousands of years, forming a semi-natural rangeland/pasture ecosystem integrating alpine animal husbandry and natural rangelands.8 Rangelands, which account for 40% of the world’s land area, provide livelihoods for more people than forests, or any other ecosystem. Because of the massive congregation of wild animals, such as bisons, gnus, saiga antelopes, and Tibetan antelopes, the rangeland ecosystem is a key area for biodiversity. This ecosystem is particularly vulnerable to human activities. For instance, since 1830, the North American Prairie has disappeared by 97%, and the rangelands of sub-Saharan Africa have been damaged considerably. The management of the rangeland/pasture ecosystem has been regarded as a “hard nut to crack” worldwide.9 Many people think the previously lush rangelands have become dry and degraded because of overgrazing. However, having a clear understanding of the history, ecology, and society of the rangeland/pasture areas is the only way to establish a nature reserve such as Sanjiangyuan. The innate complexity of alpine rangeland/pasture must be taken into consideration. Over the past three decades, studies on rangelands and pasture communities worldwide have produced remarkable findings. However, due to its remoteness, harsh natural environment, and sparse population, there have been very few studies on the rangelands of the QTP. Even fewer are the comprehensive analyses that integrate social, cultural, natural, and economic approaches. Natives of the land, relying on traditional resource management wisdom and an ecological culture that holds high respect for nature, have accumulated rich knowledge and experience. Such indigenous knowledge, which is generally passed down by word of mouth, from generation to generation, should be carefully documented and studied in a scientific manner.10

8

9 10

Charles Curtin and David Western, “Pastizales, Gente y Conservación: Intercambios De Aprendizaje Entre Pastores Africanos y Americanos,” Conservation Biology 22, no 4 (2008): 870–877. Wang Xiaoyi, “Livelihood of Pastoralists and Environmental Protection from the Perspective of the Nation,” Green Leaves no 2 (2012). Fang Bing, A Study on the Ecological Environment of Tibetan Pastoralists from the Perspective of Environmental Justice, MA dissertation, Minzu University of China, 2010.

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1.2 Overview of the Ecological Problems of Sanjiangyuan After analyzing over 170 papers published in and out of China, Dr. Richard Harris, a Montana-based scholar who has spent years on the QTP, found that we know little about the actual extent and magnitude of rangeland degradation there.11 There are a number of reasons for this. First, surveys on enormous areas are not supported by on-site monitoring, resulting in inaccurate data. Second, in-depth study on a single area cannot be applied to the entire region. Thirdly, many claims for the causal agents of rangeland degradation do not stand on solid ground. Although overstocking seems to have damaged some rangelands, it must be studied under the unique social-ecological system, where a real solution could possibly be identified. According to Dr. Harris, twelve reasons have been widely cited for rangeland degradation. They include: an inherently harsh climate and fragile soils; reduced precipitation on the QTP leading to a drier climate; climate warming causing changes in the productivity of rangelands; receding glaciers; reduced depth or extent of permafrost; damage by “rodents” such as plateau pikas and plateau zokors; unsustainable conversion of rangelands to cultivated crops; “backward” pastoral production systems; privatization and/or sedentarization (including fencing); livestock numbers being considered the best measure of wealth by local populations; population growth among pastoralists; and shortterm economic benefits overwhelming long-term interests. Of the twelve claims, desiccation, permafrost, conversion to cultivated crops, and privatization and/or sedentarization may be used to explain rangeland degradation in limited areas. The rest of the eight claims fail the basic tests of logic, lack supporting evidence, are untestable, or simply based on too few studies. It is based on such dubious “findings” of rangeland degradation that the government formulated policies to ban animal husbandry, reduce the size of herds, and relocate pastoralists. The rationale behind such “mainstream” policies is: “Rangeland degradation is a result of backwardness,” and modernization must be initiated to “reshape the livelihood of pastoralists,” in order that the rangeland ecosystem be recovered.12 However, studies on the effect of rangeland recovery, albeit small in number, have found that although relocating pastoralists and banning husbandry may result in rangeland recovery in the short term, such effects will soon disappear, as the absence of appropriate animal husbandry is equally damaging to the recovery of rangelands. 11 12

R. B. Harris, “Rangeland Degradation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau: A Review of the Evidence of its Magnitude and Causes,” Journal of Arid Environments 74, no 1 (2010): 1–12. Wang Xiaoyi, “Livelihood of Pastoralists and Environmental Protection from the Perspective of the Nation,” Green Leaves no 2 (2012).

184 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center On the other end of the debate are some non-mainstream opinions, also known as the “Pastoral School.” Professor Wang Xiaoyi (王晓毅) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences summarizes: Modernization has led to the degradation of rangelands . . . We are not suggesting that overstocking does not affect the ecosystem. However, locals will, according to the changes in the environment, adjust the size of their stock, which is more effective than external intervention . . . To a large extent, the degradation of rangeland results from the weakening of traditional knowledge. For instance, sedentarization has led to the imbalanced utilization of rangeland, privatization and fencing the fragmentation of rangeland, and agricultural and mining activities the desertification of rangeland . . . The most prominent feature of arid and semi-arid areas is that the climate changes drastically at different times and locations without any predictable “rules.” Pastoral mobility is the answer to such volatility. Such a paradigm is not a result of “backwardness” but an ingenious response to the environment . . . A technical solution simplifies a complex issue, which may well lead to a situation where the rangelands are taken hostage by power and capital. If that happens, the rangelands will not be protected effectively. Worse, the rangeland culture will disappear.13 Such appealing opinions were somewhat inspired by rangeland studies of other countries. Some scholars approach the issue from the perspective of “environmental justice,”14 which may partly explain the serious defect in current rangeland policies and the dilemmas of pastoralists. However, when it comes to the rangeland ecosystem, scholars of the Pastoral School prefer to cite concrete evidence and real cases. The lifestyle in the rangeland/pasture is undergoing some irreversible changes due to both external (socio-economic changes) and internal factors. Many of the factors are not related to the animal husbandry policy itself. For instance, a study on the Yunta Village (云塔村) of Yushu County (玉树县) indicates that since 2008, when the local primary school was closed, children had to travel a very long distance to the nearest school, resulting in major lifestyle changes. It is unlikely nowadays to see sheep in Sanjiangyuan, a kind of livestock usually tended by children. Some pastoralists are considering 13 Ibid. 14 Fang Bing, A Study on the Ecological Environment of Tibetan Pastoralists from the Perspective of Environmental Justice, MA dissertation, Minzu University of China, 2010.

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r­ esettlement so that their children can attend local schools or have more convenient access to medical care. Very few studies take these various factors into account. Hence, in order to strike a new balance between traditional animal husbandry practices (the tradition of pastoral mobility) and modern science and management, we have to take into consideration a variety of factors: environmental, economic, social, and cultural. The effectiveness of ecological protection policies relies upon such comprehensive understanding. 1.3 Implementation of the Sanjiangyuan Protection Program The information on the policy design for the protection of Sanjiangyuan mainly comes from the Master Plan for the Ecological Protection and Restoration of Qinghai Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve (青海三江源自然保护区生态保护和 建设总体规划).15 The result of the implementation of the program is based on a news report.16 As of 2012, about 3,780,667 hectares of grazing land were converted back to grasslands; 92,267 hectares of “black beach,” a condition in which the entire turf layer erodes, revealing bare mineral soil, were repaired and restored; rodent control was enforced on 5,864,334 hectares of land; 6,540 hectares of farm land were converted back to forest; and 194,673 hectares of land were fenced off for afforestation. Other initiatives included prevention of land desertification, wetlands protection, soil and water conservation, irrigation and grass planting, and the introduction of intensive animal husbandry. The resettlement of 55,774 people from 10,142 households, and a stock reduction of 4.59 million sheep units were included as part of the project. In 2010, the Qinghai Provincial Government invited the Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to evaluate the program, and the conclusions were: Thanks to the program, the overall Sanjiangyuan ecosystem has witnessed some improvement: the trend of rangeland degradation has been curbed to a certain extent; the conflict between rangeland maintenance and animal husbandry has been lessened; the ecological functions of wetlands have been enhanced; the water body has visibly expanded; the function of soil and water conservation was improved; the ecosystem of

15 16

Yang Ba, “Overview of ecological protection and restoration in Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve,” Qinghai Daily, December 10, 2006. He Wei, “Qinghai Explores Long-term PES for Sanjiangyuan,” Xinhuanet, November 12, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2012-11/12/c_113664349.htm.

186 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center severely degraded areas has seen some initial signs of recovery; and the overall condition in the key areas has improved.17 Nonetheless, the report fails to address a key issue: whether the program was found to curb rangeland degradation because of the lack in accurate baseline data and sufficient monitoring sites. The “black beach” witnessed some visible improvement in restored areas. However, the overall improvement in the region is not remarkable. According to the report “Changes in the Vegetation Index in the Sanjiangyuan Reserve: 2005–2011” (三江源保护区2005–2011 植被指数变化) commissioned by the Peking University Center for Nature and Society, 93.1% of the vegetation condition there has not experienced any change; 5% changed for the better; and 1.9% changed for the worse. Due to slightly different methodologies, the result of the Qinghai Ecological and Environmental Remote Sensing Monitor Center indicates that a little over 3% of the vegetation condition changed for the better, and 0.8% for the worse. The conclusions of this center are: There are some initial signs that the trend of ecosystem degradation has been curbed, and the ecological condition of key areas is improving. However, there is still an extremely long and difficult way to go before the ecological system can be restored.18 None of the above analyses and conclusions explains the correlation between the program itself and the ecological condition. Nor has the relationship between improvement in certain areas and the overall solution been adequately addressed. The most crucial question is: given the diverse climate and the ecological and animal husbandry practices in different alpine areas, how should location-specific solutions be identified for rangeland protection? Obviously, for Qinghai, where 86% of the revenue comes from the investment of the central government, it is equally crucial to establish a solid protection mechanism and seek long-term financial support from the central government. No short-term project is sufficient to evaluate the real effectiveness of ecological protection. Therefore, although Qinghai has proposed to prioritize ecological protection (and succeeded in publicizing that goal), it 17

18

Liu Jiyuan, Shao Quanqin, and Fan Jiangwen, “Recommendations for the Ecological Protection and Restoration for Nature Reserves: a Case Study of Sanjiangyuan,” http:// www.cas.cn/xw/zjsd/201212/t20121210_3702250.shtml. Tian Junliang, “Role of the Ecological Monitoring System in Framework Innovation of the Experiment Zone,” New Heights, no. 3 (2012).

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remains difficult to link the ecological condition with the government-led protection program. The effectiveness of protection can only be evaluated on the basis of long-term on-site monitoring. Local communities and capacity-building could play a crucial role in this regard. This point will be further elaborated later in the paper. In terms of the long-term solutions, Opinions on the Trial and Provision of the Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Sanjiangyuan (关于探索建 立三江源生态补偿机制的若干意见) and the Trial Measures for the PES in Sanjiangyuan (三江源生态补偿机制试行办法) promulgated by the Qinghai Provincial Government in October 2010 may prove hopeful.19 1.4 Absence of Proper Policies and Dilemma of a “Project Economy” Due to the short project duration and the lack of solid evidence when designing projects, remarkable defects have surfaced in some of the already implemented projects. Studies on the status quo of ecological migrants have shown that problems have arisen from the ban of animal husbandry and the relocation of pastoralists, such as follow-up industry development and poverty of migrants. As the Sanjiangyuan area traditionally relies only on animal husbandry, it is difficult to develop substitute livelihoods. As a result, many migrants are living a hard life, relying on resettlement compensation as the major source of income. The management of migrant communities is inadequate, leading to an absence of social order and poor maintenance of public facilities. New migrants are often neglected by the local governments. Ancillary services, such as medical care, education, and provision for the aged, are seriously lagging, to the extent that basic working and living conditions are far from guaranteed. Furthermore, it is difficult to evaluate rangeland recovery because the ban on animal husbandry cannot be strictly enforced due to the lack of supervision. Some pastoralists also point out the fact that rodents and rabbits have invaded the meadows after the ban, accelerating the degradation of rangeland. When it comes to the grazing-to-grassland project, most of the pastoralists surveyed complained about the extremely low compensation for the ban on animal husbandry. Some pastoralists in Yushu Prefecture said that in areas where a total ban on animal husbandry is enforced, the recovery of rangeland, despite the removal of grazing animals and the compensation growth of grass, 19

Baidu Encyclopedia, “Some Opinions of the People’s Government of Qinghai Province on the Trial and Provision of the Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Sanjiangyuan,” http://baike.baidu.com/view/7779958.htm; Lu Hai, and Wu Zhong, “Qinghai to Establish Long-term PES for Sanjiangyuan,” Qinghai Daily, October 27, 2012.

188 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center does not meet the expected target. Many pastoralists proposed to introduce planned grazing during set time periods and at set locations depending on the recovery and growth of meadows. An official from Maqên County (玛沁县), Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (果洛州玛沁县), who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the current administrative framework falls seriously short when protecting the ecosystem of Sanjiangyuan. In the absence of coordination and supervision, the funding for many projects is channeled by different departments. These small grants not only increase supervision costs, but also require supplementary funding by local governments. Therefore, the project enforcement and effectiveness is in question. Governments at the county/township level may feel reluctant to sponsor such “projects.” The above shows that short-term project design, in the absence of long-term goals and the support of the right administrative framework, may end up wasting time and money. No matter how far-reaching the study on rangeland may be, or whether a long-term mechanism may be put into operation, it is clear that the “one size fits all” and top-down policies cannot solve the problems in Sanjiangyuan. On the contrary, they will lead to a mismatch between the central government and local governments in information and fund allocation. The protection of Sanjiangyuan calls for new frameworks, and a new “ecological pilot zone” has brought about new possibilities. 1.5 Mining that Damages Sanjiangyuan Must be Stopped Even though there has not been a thorough investigation of mining activities in Sanjiangyuan, there are frequent complaints from local village heads, retired county officials, or villagers in the hinterland of Sanjiangyuan. A public letter of complaint written by “pastoralists in Xiaosumang Township (小苏莽乡), Yushu County, Qinghai Province,” dated March 17, 2010, reads: In 2003, a company, which refused to give its real identity, sent a team to Zhaqiu Village (扎秋村), Xiaosumang Township, Yushu County . . . In the name of prospecting . . ., they bullied the local villagers through . . . some officials. After bringing in explosives and machinery, they engaged in unabashed mining activities for five years, massively destroying the meadows and grassland hills in Zhaqiu and robbing the livelihood of pastoralists. Since their arrival, the area has witnessed deaths of people and animals due to the pollution from the tin mine . . . Because of the abuse of chemicals used for mining, the village now faces serious maternal health challenges: in recent years, many young women could not give birth

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properly, with the rate of congenital abnormality and infant mortality as high as over 90% . . . There were also incidences of mining-related injuries . . . A villager lost three fingers of his left hand in an explosion accident and couldn’t live an independent life, a life-long disaster for both him and his family . . . In all of the six counties of Yushu Prefecture, namely, Yushu (玉树), Nangqên (囊谦), Chindu (称多), Zadoi (杂多), Zhidoi (治多), and Qumarlêb (曲麻莱), mining activities are still in practice. Different parties are involved in mining, therefore it is difficult to investigate and collect evidence. At least twenty mining projects are known to have caused environmental and social damage. The parties behind the mines range from multinationals to individuals, and very few of them have the proper legal papers. Many of them engage in mining in the name of prospecting. Not only have they not adequately negotiated with the villagers, but also resorted to the local officials to suppress the questions and opposition of the people. The environmental management is extremely weak: the discharge of polluted water has destroyed the rangeland source of drinking water, directly threatening people’s health. The mines are established on the rangeland, obstructing animal husbandry. The mining activities are very crude and there is little to no compensation for affected villagers, disrupting the social order. When they leave, they do not fill in the mining pits. Worse, some of the mines are located in sacred mountains or by sacred lakes. At the “Sanjiangyuan Forum” held in 2011 at Peking University, Karma (嘎玛), the village head of Cuochi (措池村) in Qumarlêb, expressed, on behalf of his people, their “hope for the future” before hundreds of forum participants: – – –

Do not force pastoralists to move out of the rangeland—when the owner of the rangeland is gone; anyone with ill intentions may come in. Our worst nightmare is mining. The rights of pastoralists should be protected.

These are the genuine wishes of the local people in Sanjiangyuan.20 20

Besides mining activities, hydropower projects pose a new threat. From 2010 to 2011, the area of Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve, covering 142,300 square kilometers and 18 key zones, was readjusted. Even though the specifics are still not made public, information gathered from the grassroots level indicate that such readjustment is directly related to the effort in making way for mining and hydropower projects. Against the background of building a “Beautiful China” and “Giving Priority to Ecological Protection,” there is still a long way to go before our ecological bottom line is kept.

190 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center Wild Animal Protection in Sanjiangyuan: A Case Study on Snow Leopards Due to human activities, especially hunting, few large wild animals can be traced in most places in China. Scenes like massive migration that we see in Animal World, a popular TV program, seem to occur only in the grasslands of Africa. However, Sanjiangyuan is a little-known haven for wild animals, sheltering 85 species of animals, 238 species of birds, and 15 species of reptiles. A field study on the snow leopard, which started in 2009, has vividly demonstrated the ecological value of Sanjiangyuan.21 According to Li Juan (李娟), a doctoral candidate of Peking University, the population of snow leopards in Sanjiangyuan has remained relatively stable.22 In a 365-day period in 2011, a total of 145 pictures of snow leopards were captured by six camera traps, the highest percentage among the 485 pictures of carnivorous animals. Other wild animals sharing the same habitat with snow leopards are wolves (106 pictures), grizzly bears (14 pictures), red foxes (81 pictures), Tibetan sand foxes (44), Pallas’s cats (16), beech martens (6), and bharals (891). Due to the hunting of wild animals and the loss of habitat, many forests and grasslands have lost their vitality. Carnivorous animals are scarcer as they depend on a sustainable herbivorous prey population. Most of the thirteen feline species in China are on the verge of extinction, and medium to large feline species such as tigers, leopards, clouded leopards, and Asian golden cats are regionally extinct. What deserves celebration is that the hinterland of Sanjiangyuan still provides a massive and continuous habitat needed for the snow leopard. Further, the population of its major prey—bharals—is relatively stable. The very existence of snow leopards, a flagship species at the top of the food chain, implies that the ecosystem is intact. The direct threat that the snow leopard now faces is the human encroachment on its habitat due to mining and road construction. In particular, many mine sites overlap the habitat of snow leopards. Besides, snow leopards have preyed on livestock in some regions, causing great loss for pastoralists. In May 2010, a snow leopard ate three cows (with a market value of tens of thousands of RMB) in succession in Nangqên. Later, three snow leopards were cornered into a cave and smoked to death by the villagers. 1.6

21

22

The program, sponsored by the Peking University Center for Nature and Society and Shan Shui Conservation Center and supported by Qinghai Forestry Department, Panthera Snow Leopard Trust, conducts long-term ecological and conservation biology on such flagship species as snow leopards and grizzly bears in Yushu and Golog, Sanjiangyuan. Juan Li et al., “A Communal Sign Post of Snow Leopards (Panthera uncia) and Other Species on the Tibetan Plateau, China,” International Journal of Biodiversity 2013 (2013): 1–8, doi:10.1155/2013/370905.

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Figure 13.1 A snow leopard captured by a camera trap in the Sogya Area (索加地区), Zhidoi County, Yushu Prefecture. The background is a typical alpine meadow and bare-rock landscape where snow leopards live. (Photo by Peking University, Shan Shui camera trap.)

Furthermore, on the macro level, the snow leopard requires massive continuous habitat (the minimal surviving population requires at least 1,900 square kilometers). According to Li Juan’s analysis, there are a total of thirty-four such habitats in China, and the largest one is located in the western part of Sanjiangyuan with a total area of 43,000 square kilometers.23 However, less than one-third of the area falls in the nature reserve. Although the eighteen sub-areas of Sanjiangyuan cover an area of some 38,000 square kilometers suitable for the snow leopard, 80% of the important habitat areas do not fall in the core zone. As more research is conducted, adjusting the scope of protection will emerge as a major challenge. These are referred to as “accidents caused by wild animals.” Snow leopards, grizzly bears and wolves, among others, pose a threat to both people and livestock. Although the government has formulated some compensation measures, it remains very difficult to avert such risks, collect evidence, and evaluate 23

Li Juan, Ecological Study and Protection of Snow Leopards (Panthera Uncia) in Sanjiangyuan, Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Doctoral dissertation, Peking University, 2012.

192 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center the damage.24 In 2011, the Shan Shui Conservation Center, in collaboration with the Nangqên Forestry Bureau, set up the first pilot compensation fund for human-animal conflicts, and took part in drafting detailed management measures: With the total insurance investment of 41,000 RMB, the fund covers Qianduo’s (前多) Niuriwa No. 1 and 2 Communities (牛日哇1、2社), and Dilaike Community of (地来可社). Participating villagers may have their yaks insured and the premium for each yak is 2 RMB. The insurance is designed to compensate for the loss of yaks because of the attack from such carnivorous animals as wolves and snow leopards. Each case shall be jointly confirmed by Nangqên Forestry Bureau, Gongya Monastery (贡雅寺寺庙), and the village Conflict Management Committee. Prior to the introduction of the program, the average annual loss of yaks per household among the thirty-nine households in the village was three to four. From 2011 to 2012, the loss of sixty-six yaks was compensated for with the total sum of 22,160 RMB. The program has been enthusiastically supported by the villagers, the forestry Bureau, and the monastery. The old pattern of top-down management and bottom-up aversion has been broken. Despite the success, such community-based programs are still in their preliminary stages, though there are not many of them in the first place. Only when experiments of different ecosystems in different regions are conducted and analyzed can the useful tools for the protection of Sanjiangyuan be identified. 2

Join Hands and Build a Better Tomorrow for Sanjiangyuan

Role of Pastoral Communities—Appreciation Rather than Derogation After conducting in-depth interviews and surveys in a few dozen villages, Hashi Tashidorjee (哈希．扎西多杰),25 the earliest advocate for the p ­ rotection of 2.1

24

25

Qinghai Provincial Government Decree No. 81 (2011): Compensation Measures for Personal and Property Damage Caused by Terrestrial Wild Animals on the Provincial Protection List of Rare Animals. Hashi Tashidorjee is secretary-general of the Snowland Great Rivers Environmental Protection Association and was a member of the Wild Yak Brigade in the 1990s.

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Sanjiangyuan, collected representative opinions of pastoralists which are quite different from the policies designed by non-locals: Through discussions, the pastoralists say ‘environmental protection’ is no good as they have to part with the rangeland. In fact, from Day 1, there were wolves, grizzly bears, and men. No one looks forward to predators, but they do exist. Wolves eating sheep disrupts the life of pastoralists, but it is natural. It’s just like a loop. Wolves, sheep, men, and grasslands—we are in the same loop. There is no reason why we should kill the wolves. The tulku (a Lama reincarnate in Tibetan Buddhism) have taught us that if you do not behave well and do good deeds in this life, you’ll suffer eventually. I’m always reminded of such teaching nowadays. We see more rats now. Is it because we have tried to kill them all with poison? The grass is less and less nutritious. Is it because we have hunted wild animals? The quality of rangeland is poorer and poorer. Is it because we have become lazier and do not move to different pastures? On the basis of interviews with hundreds of pastoral households, Tashidorjee believes that Sanjiangyuan is an alpine rangeland ecosystem characterized by “asymmetry,” “integrated ecosystems,” and “unique social and cultural traditions.” Policies that on the one hand deem pastoralists, animal husbandry, rodents, and rabbits as the “destroyer” of the rangeland, and on the other hand introduce ecological migration (separation between people and rangeland, and sedentarization), reduction in livestock (controlling the livestock number, balance between grassland and animal husbandry, seasonal and long-term ban on grazing, converting grazing land to rangeland, etc.), and rodent control may improve the condition of a specific region while deteriorating the overall cultural-ecological-social condition. These policies will also lessen the traditional public management function and disintegrate the community. Monasteries play a key role in environmental protection.26 Many eminent monks would explain the necessity of protecting wild animals and loving all creatures during dharma teaching events. For instance, in 2012, members of Shan Shui and the Snow Leopard Project of Peking University attended a 10,000-person dharma teaching event held in Nangqên, where the local tulku elaborated at length why humans should love nature. He also urged the listeners to make an effort not to hurt wild animals. Based on his community 26

Fang Bing, A Study on the Ecological Environment of Tibetan Pastoralists from the Perspective of Environmental Justice, MA dissertation, Minzu University of China, 2010.

194 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center interviews, Professor Ma Hongbo (马洪波) of the Qinghai Provincial Committee Party School also recognized the importance of monasteries in environmental education.27 How can the same reflections be made with regard to environmental and nature-loving protection of Sanjiangyuan? The newly drafted action plan for the Sanjiangyuan National Ecological Comprehensive Experimental Zone proposes three fundamental principles, namely, “respecting local cultures,” “protecting ecological environments,” and “protecting the livelihood of local people.” Other highlights of the action plan include: “Public welfare positions for ecological monitoring and protection should be set up, and farmers and pastoralists should be deemed as the key players in ecological protection,” and “individuals and NGOs should be encouraged to take part in the protection of Sanjiangyuan.” These principles, hopefully, will correct past policies characterized by derogation against pastoralists, and seek a more balanced approach. 2.2 Interpreting the Policies for the Experimental Zone In celebrating these encouraging principles for the protection of Sanjiangyuan, a symposium with the theme of “New Hope for Sanjiangyuan: Toward a Green Economy and Governance” was held at the Qinghai Academy of Governance in April 2012.28 Scholars and practitioners from over twenty universities, and research institutes and government agencies in and outside of Qinghai took part. The following are some conclusions: 1) The one-size-fits-all policy will not work for Sanjiangyuan; 2) A long-term ecological and multidisciplinary research platform and monitoring system must be established for Sanjiangyuan. Scientists and practitioners with rich experience in the management of other rangeland ecosystems must be involved to fill the shortfall of researchers; 3) As Sanjiangyuan is located in a remote area, in order to effectively protect the environment, the government must strike a balance between the top-down policy-making and the bottom-up public participation. The government should guide the protection efforts while the community should be deemed as the major player; 27 Ma Hongbo, “Can Conservation Steward Programs work wonders?” Study Times, October 12, 2009. 28 The symposium was sponsored by the Office of Sanjiangyuan Ecological Protection and Restoration, Qinghai Academy of Governance, Qinghai Forestry Department, and Peking University Center for Nature and Society, and was co-sponsored by Qinghai Ecological and Environmental Remote Sensing Monitor Center and Shan Shui Conservation Center.

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4) Through PES, the local community will gain real benefits while protecting the environment and resources. As Sanjiangyuan provides remarkable ecological value for the local pastures, long-term PES must be established so that the protectors, being the service providers, are acknowledged and encouraged, and can receive the long-term financial support from the resource (such as mine) users. The government, as the public administrator, should set up the evaluation indicators and management standards, and provide other support such as technology and capacity building; 5) To achieve long-term ecological safety of Sanjiangyuan, short-term actions must be avoided. Each round of investment and support for the area should be at least thirty years rather than the project life cycle of five years. Intervention measures (such as poisoning rodents and rabbits, fencing, and ecological migration) have far-reaching social and cultural implications and dubious effects; therefore, they should be seriously re-evaluated; 6) To carry out the environmental policies, destruction must be stopped now. If the on-going mining and hydroelectricity projects fail to comply with the regulations of the experimental zone and the nature reserve, it will be impossible to build long-term trust and achieve enduring effects; 7) To develop a long-term and sustainable “green economy,” investments must be made in education, medical care, and infrastructure. We must strive to provide local pastoralists with high-quality comprehensive public services. We must also give sustained support for eco-tourism and the eco-industry. 2.3 Real Knowledge Comes from Practice The right approach and policy must be tested in practice. This is especially true for Sanjiangyuan, an area characterized by its massive size, low population density, diversity in stability and degradation level of rangelands, and the close connection between traditional cultures/religion and knowledge in the management of nature and resources. The “new hope” for Sanjiangyuan can only come from community-based experiments. Even though such practices, including community-government partnership, are conducted in a very limited scope, they still offer some very valuable lessons. 2.3.1 Case No. 1: Baseline Assessment on Biodiversity There have been very few field studies and assessments on biodiversity in Sanjiangyuan. In the absence of accurate understanding, it will be difficult to design a suitable plan for protecting the area. In August 2012, the rapid

196 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center biodiversity assessment (RAP+)29 in Sanjiangyuan, financially supported by the SEE Foundation (conducted jointly by the Administration of the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve, Peking University Center for Nature and Society, Imaging Biodiversity Expedition Inc., and Shan Shui Conservation Center) was formally initiated. This first comprehensive baseline biodiversity assessment in Sanjiangyuan is expected to last for three years. The first assessment in 2012 covered two core zones in the nature reserve—the Tongtian River Core Zone and the Sogya-Qumar River Core Zone (索加-曲麻河核心区). The nearly twenty days of field study has led to some initial findings: Scientists registered seven snow leopard sightings, and there were two instances where a female snow leopard was leading two cubs. The density of bharals, its major prey, is over twenty per square kilometers, ranking one of the highest population densities of bharals in the world. Scientists observed twenty species of animals and seventy-six species of birds. The condition of rangelands varies from place to place—some are degraded while others are recovering. Calculations of aboveground and underground biomass show previous estimates on underground biomass were significantly low. The findings may help the evaluation on the potential of grassland carbon sinks. Observations on small animals, including rodents and rabbits, show that they not only are the prey of all carnivorous animals and birds in Sanjiangyuan, but also provide shelter for multiple species of birds and insects, and the plant biodiversity around their burrows is rich. Rodents and rabbits are more likely to be the result of rather than the cause of rangeland degradation. Therefore, poisoning these animals may lead to a series of negative consequences. We urgently need to have on-site monitoring on the animals and the rangeland as a whole. 2.3.2

Case No. 2: Studying the Local Approach in Resource Management and Setting up the Villager Resource Management Center Located by the Tongtian River, Yunta Village in Yushu is subdivided into three communities with 123 households and 465 people, all of whom were, at one point, pastoralists. In 1984, when the grasslands were contracted by individuals, forty-six certificates of the right to contracted grasslands were issued. Right now, fifty households are no longer pastoralists, while seventy-three

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RAP is the acronym for Rapid Assessment Program. RAP+ further incorporates imaging, community surveys, and other methods. Therefore, the result is better understood by non-professionals.

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Figure 13.2 Yunta villagers discussing fee scheme and village rules before the arrival of the Cordyceps season in 2012 (Photo by Zhao Xiang).

households still engage in animal husbandry. Of these certificates, some are shared, some transferred, and the rest in many other forms. Yunta is one of the best source areas of the Cordyceps fungus in Yushu Prefecture, where Cordyceps-related revenue represents over half of its GDP.30 Even though the grasslands are contracted to individual households, the Cordyceps resource is shared by the entire village—villagers may dig up Cordyceps anywhere in the community, while non-villagers have to pay a fee to the village for the right to dig. In April, before the digging season, representatives of Yunta sat together and discussed the fee scheme and village rules for digging up Cordyceps, including a ban on littering and supervision of non-villagers. As a public resource, the grassland is carefully guarded by the entire village, as irrational digging will affect the yield the following year.

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In 2010, the Cordyceps revenue was RMB 1.6 billion (an estimate based on a total output of 20 tons, and 40,000 RMB per 500 grams), while the GDP of the entire prefecture in the year was 3.19 billion RMB.

198 sanjiangyuan project team of the shan shui conservation center The fees collected are distributed among the community. The specific formula is as follows: 20% of the fees go to the 192 people who acquired the certificate in 1984, and the remaining 80% are equally distributed among the villagers in the community. In other words, those who have held the certificate since 1984 get 20% extra. The community is able to engage in public discussions over complex propriety and distribution, and draft reasonable and practical rules for the distribution of profits. If rangeland protection and compensation distribution can be done in the same manner, then a Community Resource Center may be established in the village. The center may, through fair and public discussions, be entrusted with the management of rangeland resources of the village and the distribution of compensation channeled by the government. Compared with one-size-fits-all policies (such as striking a balance between grassland and animal husbandry and converting grazing land to rangeland) this may better realize the original goal of protecting the rangeland. 2.3.3 Case No. 3: Cultivating Talents—Training Programs for the Young There have been some changes to the lifestyle of pastoralists due to such policies. These include consolidation of local schools, migration, and resettlement. In 2004, two education initiatives were introduced to the remote areas in western China, namely, a nine-year compulsory education is to be made universal by and large, and illiteracy among young and middle-aged people is to be basically eliminated. Since then, children have to attend township primary schools and county/prefecture middle schools. In the past, children aged six or seven were responsible for tending sheep. Now that many children have to travel a long distance to school and do not have spare time, sheep are very rare in Yushu. Some parents have also given up animal husbandry to accompany their children to school. However, when the young people graduate from middle school or even college, they do not have many career options apart from becoming civil servants or teachers. Few would consider returning home and becoming pastoralists. Therefore, many young people are idle. In every county or prefecture seat, you may see large groups of youngsters playing pool games. In the meantime, Sanjiangyuan is in urgent need of all sorts of professionals—ecological protection, environmental monitoring, development of eco-industries, tourism, and entrepreneurship. All these offer golden opportunities for the young. Since 2011, Shan Shui and Peking University have worked together to offer the “Sanjiangyuan Youth Potential” program. The program, gathering local Tibetans and young people who are attracted to Sanjiangyuan, provides training in multiple practical skills as well as a year-long field practice. Those who

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Figure 13.3 A common scene: young people idle around on motorbikes in front of newly built resettlement areas for pastoralists.

give lectures and instructions are experts, scholars, officials, and social activists from local villages and towns. The young people from the program are eager to share their experiences.31 The program has not only cultivated many professionals for Sanjiangyuan (as many young people decide to stay and work there) but also enhanced the communication and understanding between Sanjiangyuan and the outside world. We hope to see more capacity building opportunities in the future. 2.3.4

Case No. 4: Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society: Protecting the Tibetan Bunting and the Environment the Local Way Established in December 2007, the Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society (年保玉则生态协会) currently has fifteen staff members and sixtythree members. Participants are pastoralists, monks, teachers, farmers, civil servants, and students who love nature and are concerned about the environment 31

Yang Guangchen, “Studying in Ethnic Tibetan Area,” Youth Environmental Review, November 21, 2012, http://www.greenyouther.org/page/?id=1104; “Summer Activities of LEAD China Network,” LEAD China, http://www.lead.org.cn/?p=1282.

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Figure 13.4 The Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society invited twenty-three tulkus to sign their names on the Tibetan bunting thangka, making it a sacred bird. (Photo by Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society.)

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Figure 13.5 Roadside paintings on the protection of the Tibetan bunting and signpost for the Tibetan bunting protection zone. (Photo by Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society.)

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Figure 13.6 Group photo taken after pastoralists were granted the patrol license by staff members of the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve.

of their hometowns. The main job of the society is to monitor the changes in snowy mountains, glaciers, and lakes, as well as animals, plants, and phenology. It also seeks to protect, through such methods as establishing protection zones, wild animals on the verge of extinction including the Tibetan bunting, black-necked crane, otter, snow leopard, and white-eared pheasant. The Society has also conducted innovative environmental education campaigns combining traditional culture, Buddhist teachings, and modern science. The Tibetan bunting, a species that has been observed, monitored, and protected by the Nyanboyeshizer Environmental Protection Society since its founding, was “upgraded” to a sacred bird in 2012. The society visited twentythree monasteries of different sects and secured the signatures of all the tulkus on the thangka, a painting on silk with embroidery, featuring the Tibetan bunting. Since then, the special bird has become the proud local symbol of environmental protection. The tradition of protecting sacred mountains and lakes in Sanjiangyuan has seen a new revival in Nyanboyeshizer.32

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Shen Xiaoli, “New Approaches to Environmental Protection in Western China,” China Environment and Development Review (Vol. 3) (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007).

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2.3.5

Case No. 5: Conservation Steward Programs: Villagers Take Part in Monitoring the Environment In Cuochi, Qumarlêb, through the coordination of NGOs, the community signed a protection agreement with the government, which in turn safeguards the right of community protection and provides funding and equipment.33 Being the oldest Conservation Steward Program in Sanjiangyuan, it has been in operation for over five years since 2007. Over the past five years, Cuoci has not seen littering or poaching of wild animals. The village also drove away miners and hunters. Such efforts have been acknowledged by the township, county, and even the central government. The model of the Conservation Steward Program, featuring government authorization and community execution, is being carefully studied and promoted elsewhere. Based on the experience of the past six years, it is clear that local pastoralists should be encouraged and relied upon to create a system of community monitoring (including the monitoring of wild animals and the phenology). At the same time, by monitoring the changes of the environment and their hometowns, local people have also changed: 1)

The environmental protection awareness of the community. Long-term monitoring suggests that the habitat of the wild yak and the quality of grasslands are poor. As a result, local people, after discussions and negotiations, relinquished twelve patches of pasture for wild yaks over a period of three years, drastically improving their habitat and expanding their scope of activity. In the past, no wild yaks were seen in the neighboring Zhidoi County. However, thanks to these efforts, there have been wild yak sightings there. 2) After long-term monitoring, the pastoralists have had a better understanding of the species and distribution of the local wild animals, and are able to tell the species and population of wild animals in different locations and during different seasons. Such knowledge brings them a sense of pride. In the action plan for the experiment zone, the establishment of the public welfare positions for ecological monitoring and protection is set as the priority. How should these positions be set up? How should the rangeland/wild 33

Li Shengzhi, “Conservation Steward Programs: a New Model of Ecological Protection Featuring Government Guidance and Community Participation,” Report on Environment Development of China (2010) (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010).

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Figure 13.7 Patrol license granted to patrollers of Cuochi by the Administration of Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve. (Photo by Song Ruiling.)

animal monitoring efforts of pastoralists and scientific ecological monitoring be integrated? How should these local efforts with community upgrading and rangeland management be combined? All these deserve careful study and discussion. With the help of the Snowland Great Rivers Environmental Protection Association, the entire Qumahe Township (曲麻河乡), including the four villages of Cuochi, Lechi (勒池), Duoxiu (多秀), and Angla (昂拉), intends to become a “Model Township of Eco-civilization.” Specifically, it seeks to develop the animal husbandry industry through such methods as pastoralist co-operatives, and increase the pastoralists’ income levels and standard of living. It also plans to set up 200 public welfare positions for ecological monitoring and protection in each of the four villages under its jurisdiction. The goal is to involve everyone in the community-led protection initiatives and to increase the income level of pastoralists. As long as the correct administrative framework is identified, local wisdom can be used to support it.

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3 Conclusion As a little-known treasure house in China, and even the entire world, Sanjiangyuan still maintains a relatively complete ecosystem and biodiversity. This is the last remaining, most precious, and most beautiful place in China. A better tomorrow for Sanjiangyuan will be realized with cross-sectoral cooperation, a sound administrative framework, and efforts of the local people, as well as technological, scientific, and industrial support from the outside.

chapter 14

Civil Society Promoting Legislation on Protected Natural Areas Xie Yan Abstract During the period when the draft Natural Heritage Protection Law had been sent to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China for review, a group of experts from research and conservation fields organized themselves voluntarily into the Natural Conservation Legislation Research Group and provided recommendations for drafting a comprehensive Protected Natural Area Law. The legislative proposal includes establishing a reasonable management category system and a functional zoning system, developing scientific planning of a protected natural area system, establishing an effective supervision system of the government, scientific community, and civil society, guaranteeing funding for conservation management of protected areas, and engaging local communities in conservation and ensuring they can benefit from it sustainably. The group has also been promoting this legislation through education, workshops, and high-level communication and recommendations to the government. This is an important example of civil society’s heavy involvement in promoting the development of national legislation.

Keywords Natural Conservation Legislation Research Group – Natural Heritage Protection Law – Protected Natural Area Law – management category system

1

Promotion of Protected Natural Area Legislation by More Than One Hundred Experts

Having been implemented for nearly ten years, Regulations on Nature Reserves (1994) (自然保护区条例) has been unable to keep up with the current needs of nature reserve protection. A legislative revision is urgently needed.

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Regulations on Scenic Areas (2006) (风景名胜区条例) falls short of content concerning nature protection. Other types of protected natural areas in addition to scenic areas have either only management guidelines or are entirely lacking in relevant management regulations. More than a decade ago, China noticed the urgent need to strengthen legislation of protected natural areas and called for the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC ERPC) to promote such legislation. In 2004, driven by experts, the first Nature Reserve Law (Draft) (自然保护地法)—later renamed the Protected Natural Area Law (Draft) (自然保护区域法)—was formulated, regulating all types of protected natural areas. But for various reasons it was never passed. The main reason was that the draft law did not address the overall demand of nature protection or provide scientific solutions to existing problems; instead it was trapped by the conflicting interests of different departments. In 2008, new leadership took office in the NPC ERPC and launched another attempt at the drafting work. Unfortunately, this time the drafting deviated even further from conservation needs. Despite various expert opinions, none of the important recommendations were accepted. The Natural Heritage Protection Law (自然遗产保护法) was submitted to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council at the end of 2011 and has been included in the 2012 legislative plan. Having been involved in conservation-related legislative work for ten years and worked in nature protection for eighteen years as a researcher, I proposed a major revision of this draft on the internet in 2012, facilitated submissions of two NPC motions and one Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) proposal during their two meetings, and urged experts to voluntarily form the Nature Conservation Legislation Research Group (NCLRG). The research group has now grown to more than 100 people, consisting of experts in ecology, law, policy research, administration, civil society promotion, news media, and other areas, along with experts with longterm research interests in China’s ecological and environmental problems. The research group’s goal is to facilitate legislation and promulgation of a Protected Natural Area Law (自然保护地法) and relevant supporting laws, regulations, standards, and specifications that will effectively protect China’s biodiversity and ecosystem functions. The draft of the Natural Heritage Protection Law was submitted to the NPC Standing Committee in September 2012, and was scheduled for discussion in October. The NCLRG organized over 260 experts to submit a joint letter and successfully impeded the draft’s progress towards official discussion. The joint letter pointed out that the draft had serious shortcomings in terms of

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coverage, operation mechanisms, supervision mechanisms, and other aspects including: 1)

As the only law in China concerning the management of protected natural areas, the draft only covers national parks of China and national nature reserves (approximately 600 places), accounting for less than 10% of the total number of protected areas. Although the area of the national parks and national nature reserves covers 70% of the total area of protected areas, more than 60% of the area is in the western and northern sparsely populated regions. Thus a large number of other protected areas would not be effectively protected by law. Also, the draft only covers a very small portion of conservation priority areas identified by the China Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2011–2030) (中国生物多样性保护战略和行动计划 (2011–2030)). Figure 14.1 shows that the draft only covers a very small portion of the areas identified by the China Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2011–2030). In these priority areas, many provincial nature reserves and other protected natural areas are not subject to the draft of the Natural Heritage Protection Law. This situation would make it difficult for the law to achieve the protection objectives in those priority areas. 2) The definition of “natural heritage” is vague in the draft, giving more focus to heritage protection and ecosystems’ cultural service functions and ignoring the supply, regulation, and support functions of ecosystems. The draft’s protection system setup cannot fulfill the core need of ecosystems—protection of biodiversity; nor can it effectively delay or stop the degenerative trend of China’s ecosystem functions. 3) Although the draft included national nature reserves and national parks of China into the national natural heritage system for management, the question of “how to manage” them is passed back to the Regulation of Nature Reserves and Regulations on Scenic Areas which both need much revision themselves. Thus, not only are we unable to provide protected natural areas the needed protection under the legal framework which is the very reason for this legislation, we essentially make the management of protected natural areas have no law or regulation to rely on. 4) The draft cannot solve protected natural area’s current major management problems in supervision, administration, evaluation, funding sources, etc. On the contrary, it exacerbates divisions and conflicts among different departments, which will negatively affect the work on strengthening protection and maintaining ecological safety.

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Figure 14.1 Comparison of national nature reserves and national parks of China with conservation priority areas identified by the China Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (published in 2010, effective from 2011–2030).

5) The draft goes against the basic principles of ecology and ecosystem management. Implementing it will aggravate the degree of habitat fragmentation. It would artificially improve the protection level for a small number of protected natural areas, but negatively affect overall protection efficiency. Based on these reasons, experts jointly suggest a major revision of the Natural Heritage Protection Act to speed up China’s progress in comprehensive legislation for protected natural areas.

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In addition to pointing out existing problems in the draft of the Natural Heritage Protection Law, the NCLRG is also carrying out extensive research on what kind of law China needs to protect biodiversity and ecosystem functions. 2

The Status Quo and Problems with China’s Protected Natural Areas

Protected natural area refers to representative ecosystems; natural areas with important ecosystem service functions; concentrated areas and important corridors of rare and endangered wildlife species and important natural genetic resources; and land, terrestrial water, or seawater with protected natural monuments and landscapes of special significance that are demarcated under special protection and management according to law. Currently, domestic types of protected natural areas include nature reserves, scenic areas, forest parks, wetland parks, water source conservation areas, geoparks, water parks, and nature conservation areas. International types include UNESCO World Heritage Sites, UNESCO Mixed Cultural and Natural Heritage Sites, wetlands of international importance, global geoparks, the International Biosphere Reserve, and others. The domestic ones are managed by over ten different departments, including the State Forestry Administration, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Land and Resources, and State Oceanic Administration. China’s nature reserves take up about 15% of its total land area; other types of protected natural areas have no complete statistics currently, but are estimated at over 5% of China’s total land area. However, according to Ouyang Xuejun’s (欧阳学军) incomplete statistics, 64 national parks of China, 55 national geoparks, 14 wetland parks, and 152 national forest parks overlap with protected natural areas. At the provincial level and below, many scenic spots, geoparks, wetlands, and forest parks also overlap with protected natural areas. As a result, it is difficult to have accurate statistics of the number and size of China’s overall protected natural areas, which are estimated to be lower than 20% of the land area of China. Although China has established a large number of protected natural areas, their level of protection and management has been low and it has been rather ineffective in controlling various human activities. Large destructive activities such as paving roads and building dams have happened from time to time in national nature reserves and in other protected areas. Activities such as grazing, picking, tourism, and poaching are even commonplace in what should

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be strictly protected areas, which has caused a serious and continued loss of biodiversity. The root causes of these problems include the following four aspects: 1)

Protected natural area systems that belong to different departments vary in their goals. Different departments put varying levels of significance on nature protection. They also lack a unified management standard, oversight mechanisms, and an effective cross-departmental mechanism to share and exchange information. When each department does its own internal planning, there is no unified development plan for protected natural areas at the national and regional level. As a result, protected natural areas now have a serious imbalance in land distribution, a lack of connectivity between each another, and are unable to achieve the goal of protecting biodiversity and ecosystem functions. 2) Protection and management agencies have a serious lack of funding. The local government has the authority of personnel management for most nature protection and management agencies, making their work easily susceptible to local interests. Nature protection and management agencies do not have law enforcement power, so they are unable to act directly against illegal activities. There are also certain difficulties in coordinating with law enforcement agencies. Moreover, due to the lack of maneuverability of existing regulations, the cost of illegal activities is very low, causing weak management and stalled law enforcement in most protected natural areas. As an example, for certain activities, Regulations on Nature Reserves is either absent of specific punitive measures or the standard for punitive measure is too low. 3) Supervision and management authorities are not completely separated. Protected natural area systems have a division for general management, but that management division itself also manages the specifics of some protected areas, causing inadequate supervision. Other protected natural area systems are run by the same department—from establishment to supervision—with the same department acting as both the player and the referee. Due to the lack of information disclosure, it is difficult for the public to effectively oversee the management of protected natural areas. In addition, lacking an assessment and reward system, many managing agencies receive neither a timely nor objective evaluation of whether their work is scientific and effective in nature protection. There is also no corresponding reward or punishment towards the management work. 4) Local residents can benefit from the local ecosystem in various ways. However, projects for nature protection and development are usually

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rather simple when they are led by external agencies. It is difficult for local communities to obtain relevant information and engage themselves when the level of information disclosure on protected areas is low. Thus, community residents often have little awareness about participating in nature protection and protecting their own rights in the local ecosystem. The benefit-sharing mechanism is also incomplete, so local people are not receiving a fair share of the benefits generated from protecting the natural areas. 3

What Kind of Legislation Does China Need?

To solve these problems, the Natural Conservation Legislation Research Group proposed countermeasures and suggestions, and drafted the Protected Natural Area Law accordingly. A new NPC motion and the CPPCC proposal will be submitted during the annual meetings of two in 2013. The legislative goal and four main recommendations proposed by the research group are listed below. In national legislation, we should first understand what the purpose of the legislation is. Is it to protect our natural heritage? Is it to protect the already established nature reserves? Or is it both? While these are all aims of the national legislation, none of these summarizes our legislative goal well enough. Therefore, the goal of protected natural area legislation is not just to carry out existing protection on protected areas, but even more to establish a longterm mechanism that can guard the baseline of China’s ecological safety. The baseline of ecological safety must ensure enough water supplies for people across the country, provide sustainable resources, purify exhaust gas and waste water, and also allow people to enjoy the beauty of nature and pass on our cultural traditions. The baseline must guarantee adequate spaces to support a sufficient number of biodiversity features so that basic ecosystem services can be realized. Only by fully understanding the importance of regional biodiversity and basic biological needs can we establish the appropriate protected natural area system and carry out effective management, thereby protecting the ecological safety baseline for the Chinese people. Legislation Proposal 1: Establish a Classification System for Protected Natural Areas Many of our country’s protected natural areas that are inside priority areas for biodiversity conservation cover very small land areas and are fragmented and isolated. Looking at the distribution, nature reserves larger than 2,000 square kilometers almost all exist in sparsely populated areas in western and northern 3.1

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Table 14.1 Recommended framework for protected natural areas management Types

Suggested name

Protection target and activities allowed

Protection strictness

Type 1

Strictly Protected

Human No interference utilization is prohibited

Type 2

Habitat and Species Protection

Strictly protect the completeness of the ecosystem and biodiversity. No human interference is allowed except scientific research activities with no negative effects. Appropriate human interferences are needed to protect certain species and habitats, but these interventions are prohibited in the Strictly Protected Type.

Type 3

Nature Display

Type 4

Limited Usage

Strictly protected with allowance for certain human interference Under the premise that Human ecosystem functions and interference biodiversity can be maintained allowed, no and without deviating from direct usage other protection objectives, the of natural public can be given limited resources access to visit, perform recreational activities, and experience the natural environment. Human Under the premise that interference ecosystem functions and biodiversity can be maintained, and direct usage of allows limited collecting, catching, harvesting, planting, natural excavation, and other produc- resources tion activities. However, dredging soil, burying, and mining are prohibited.

Utilization pattern

No utilization

Limited to tourism

Direct usage of natural resources

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China. The nineteen nature reserves larger than 10,000 square kilometers account for 66% of all nature reserve areas. Many more nature reserves that are larger than five but smaller than twenty square kilometers are located in central, eastern, and southern China. The main reason for this is that nature reserves are all classified as “strictly protected,” but it is very difficult to meet the standard for this type in more populous areas. Other protected types such as scenic areas, forest parks, wetland parks, geoparks, and water source conservation areas, play an important protective role at the same time as being utilized by humans. The NCLRG suggests that China should integrate all of its protected natural areas into one single framework and establish management categories and standards according to the strictness of protection and utilization patterns. In doing so, a good oversight mechanism can be established to ensure various types of protected areas will achieve their management requirements. In order to meet a variety of local needs for land use and to solve local conflicts between community development and natural protection, protected areas in each of the above types should be divided into several functional zones according to the local situation. The recommended functional zoning system is as follows: 1) The core zone—area with no (or very little) human interference. The goal is to protect core biodiversity and other protection targets; and 2) The buffer zone—all areas except the core zone belong to the buffer zone, which can be further divided. Under the premise that the core zone receives strict protection, activities such as ecotourism and direct use of natural resources can be allowed in buffer zones. Considering varying local characteristics, more flexibility should be given in dividing buffer zones, which can be based on local land use patterns including tourist areas, moso bamboo areas, resource utilization areas, etc. However, it is recommended that the division be clearly defined, and allowed activities are made explicit to ensure appropriate management and supervision. Protected areas that belong to Type 1, the Strictly Protected Type should have at least 80% of its area belonging to the core zone. Other types should also have at least 20% of their area as the core zone. Based on the usage pattern of the largest area in each protected area, each protected natural area can be categorized into the appropriate management types easily. Once we have such a uniform classification and zoning system, we can achieve a more reasonable planning strategy for protected natural areas. In the country's most important biodiversity areas, ecological function key areas, scenic spots, geological heritage, cultural landscapes, and other areas, the four types of protected natural areas can establish a network and achieve real

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Table 14.2 Combined use of functional zoning and management types Management Type

Type I: Strictly Protected

Type II: Habitat and Species Protection Type

Type III: Nature Display

Type IV: Limited Usage

Functional Zones

Core Zone

Buffer Zone

>80%

>80% (Allowing >20% human interference to improve habitat quality) Mainly used for tourism and recreational activities

>20%

Mainly used for sustainable use of natural resources

protection. First we should establish Type I protected areas, the strictly protected type for the core range; then we establish Type II protected areas to supplement Type I areas through human interference and strengthened management; then Type III areas which allow visiting and tourism and Type IV which allow sustainable usage of resources. A reasonable combination of the four types will interlink and form a connected network, which is the only way we can truly achieve protection objectives in these important areas. Any strict protection in isolation will only fail in the end. Legislation Proposal 2: Ensure Protected Natural Areas’ Personnel, Funding, and Law Enforcement Power in Management and Protection The root cause for protected natural areas’ weak management and protection ability is the unclear agency responsibilities and that their protection and operational responsibilities are mixed together. As a result, management agencies tend to focus more on operations, seriously weakening their work in protection. Oftentimes local governments have personnel management authority for protected natural areas’ management agencies and local governments are responsible for many national nature reserves’ personnel management and staff wages. Consequently, natural protected area management is subject to local governments’ development pressures. There is also a serious lack of 3.2

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Figure 14.2 Management mechanism for protected natural area system.

funding for protection and management. Mainly due to the unclear agency responsibilities, much of state funding is used for operation and business development, and even less operating profits will be returned for use on protection. The NCLRG suggests the following management framework for protected natural area systems. We can see from this figure that the sole restricting mechanism on “operation” is the protected natural areas management agencies. These agencies are entrusted with crucial responsibilities including supervision and restricting human activities that can cause environmental damage. Thus, ensuring the effectiveness of this restricting mechanism is the most important substance in developing the Protected Natural Area Law. First we need to separate the protected natural area management agency’s responsibility for protection from its responsibility for operation, and ensure their authority in personnel, funding, and law enforcement. The most important safeguarding mechanism to improve the level of protection and management is to ensure that China has enough specialized personnel with knowledge, enthusiasm, a promising future, and the power and resources needed to play an active role at the front line of managing protected natural areas. According to our thorough estimations, the government only needs to invest 0.065% of GDP (of which 24 billion RMB will be used for protected natural area’s regular protection and management work, 3.6 billion RMB for comprehensive management, and 3 billion RMB for unconventional management) to make 17% of land and 10% of ocean areas effectively protected, and reserve at least 6.46% of land and 3.8% of ocean areas to be free from any human interference. Compared to the 2012 budget of national education at

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4% of GDP, and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan’s investment plan in R&D at 2.2% of GDP, an almost negligible investment is needed to ensure the baseline of the country’s ecological safety. The investment can establish a protected natural area network with a reasonable structure to ensure effective protection and management, protecting biodiversity and ecosystem services. It can also serve the general public by providing recreational areas, contributing to local sustainable development, reducing natural disasters, and ensuring clean water sources. It can further provide more than 200,000 employment opportunities in remote areas, which will play an important role in resolving ethnic conflicts, increasing social stability, alleviating poverty, protecting the border, and consolidating national defense. The effective management of protected natural areas needs the integration of various law enforcement powers, which are scattered among different departments. No single department can independently accomplish the comprehensive law enforcement tasks on any of the protected areas because every single enforcement task involves various departments and complex authorities. The Protected Natural Area Law should give protection and management agencies matching law enforcement powers. After the establishment of protected natural areas and their protection and management agencies, local governments should give them general law enforcement power so that those agencies can carry out protection and management work inside and at the borders of protected areas, and to accomplish all enforcement work with support from local law enforcement agencies. Legislation Proposal 3: Establish a Comprehensive Supervision System that Includes Government, Academia, and the General Public Supervision, management, and evaluation rights should be separated (see Figure 14.2). Comprehensive departments of protected natural areas should be responsible for planning, guidance, coordination, inspection, evaluation, and supervision, but not involved in the operation of protected areas to ensure the independence and objectivity of supervision. The NCLRG suggests the Ministry of Environmental Protection take on the responsibility of comprehensive management and supervision. From central to local, its Department of Nature and Ecology Conservation can undertake the supervision of protected natural areas and be responsible for organizing and developing technical standards for management and monitoring. An independent third party’s performance evaluation of both the protection and management agencies and the supervising department is necessary to ensure the “athletes” and “referees” all carry out their duties faithfully. Such a management system will ensure the separation of supervision, management, and evaluation rights, thereby strengthening 3.3

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overall supervision. At the same time, we need to improve information disclosure. Protected natural area boundaries, regulations, annual reports, financial reports, evaluation reports, and other information should be available to the public. In addition, hearings, consultations, and debate systems should be established to ensure effective social supervision from the law and society. Legislation Proposal 4: Ensure the Local Community Participates and Benefits from Protection For the local communities, the lack of consideration of their interests is the biggest problem. Local people have lived in some of these areas for generations and depend on natural resources for survival. The establishment of protection areas limits their use of various resources, but they are not compensated enough. Oftentimes only a few organizations benefit from the natural resources, mostly development companies from outside the area. Management of protected areas and local communities used to be separate and isolated, but we need to establish connections. The connection can be implemented from four aspects (see Figure 14.3): 3.4

Figure 14.3 Connecting communities to protected natural areas.

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Types and zoning system—Some protected area types can be utilized by civilians. Even inside the strictly protected areas, there are still some zones that can be utilized. The zoning system effectively guarantees civilians’ benefit from resource protection and sustainable utilization. Protection agreement and supervision—The protected area’s managing agency needs to sign a protection agreement with the community and supervise local people’s activities. This approach can limit local people’s destructive activities. Co-management committee—We suggest that local governments, local communities, NGOs, and other organizations jointly establish a protected area co-management committee. The committee should be involved in the decision-making process of important matters concerning management or utilization of protected areas. For example, during the establishment of protected areas, the application should include a supportive opinion from the committee. The co-management committee should also be involved in discussing zoning, management and other matters and ensure community participation in the decision-­ making process. Ecological compensation—If civilians suffer losses because of the establishment of protected areas, ecological compensation should be made to ensure the community doesn’t lose benefits.

It is obvious that China is facing severe and widespread environmental problems. Environmental issues are threatening the Chinese people’s quality of life and health. Acting as the baseline of ecological safety, a protected natural area system with reasonable planning can safeguard China’s biodiversity and vital ecosystem functions. These protected areas play very important roles in homeland security, ecological safety, food safety, poverty alleviation, natural disaster control, social stability, sustainable economic development, people’s health, as well as cultural and spiritual comfort. If the ecological baseline is destroyed, people’s living environment and quality of life will suffer directly. So whether these natural areas are effectively protected will become the sign of whether the baseline of lives will be sustained. Protecting these natural areas from destruction is protecting our citizen’s basic living conditions.

PART Seven Dams

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chapter 15

Hydropower Development: Return of a Crisis on the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River Bao Zhiheng Abstract While the Comprehensive Utilization Plan for the Yangtze River Basin was under revision, a large number of hydropower projects in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River were hastily launched. Because of the rush, basin geology risks, ecological safety, and concerns over sustainable utilization of water resources increased awareness of the area. Over the years, multidisciplinary scholars and elites in the hydropower industry were constantly debating whether the hydropower plants in the region were overdeveloped. To prevent the possibility of complete channelization of the upper reaches of Yangtze River around 2020, the media has repeatedly called for a decision for all hydropower projects in the region, triggered by a voting procedure in the highest organ of state power. However, when hydropower plants with a total installation capacity of over four times the Three Gorges Dam are currently in use, it creates an unprecedented challenge for leaders in China. The real test is: can these leaders abandon the mentality of hydropower plant worship? Whether they can curb the impulse to make profits at the cost of the environment and encourage public participation in decision-making will determine the effectiveness of environmental regulation.

Keywords hydropower development – upper reaches of the Yangtze River – EIA – ecology – geology

After building the Three Gorges Dam, China is again faced with a historical choice in constructing hydropower sites along the Yangtze River. According to 2012 statistics, there will be over thirty hydropower plants along the Yangtze River with a total installed capacity of over four times the Three Gorges Dam completed in the next decade. The magnificent Tongtian River (通天河) and Jinsha River (金沙江) will lose their turbulent torrents

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and become a reservoir of dead water linking different dams. The troubling fact behind the most adventurous hydropower development program in the history of mankind, however, is that it was neither regarded as a national engineering project nor was it “endorsed” by a comprehensive program representing the region. Controlled by both hydropower capital and local authorities, these projects are creating a perilous future for the people of China. 1

Hydropower Craze

On November 19, 2012, the first units of the Xiangjia Hydropower Plant (向家 坝水电站) began to generate power, signaling the beginning of the four worldclass hydropower stations along the downstream reaches of the Jinsha River. In fact, Xiangjia plant is the last section of the development program downstream of the Jinsha River. It joins with Xiluodu (溪洛渡), Baihetan (白鹤滩), and Wudongde (乌东德) stations in the upper reaches of the river, completing a giant group of hydropower stations that has the total installation capacity twice the size of the Three Gorges. Even in terms of single sizes, these four power stations make up some of the largest in the world. The capacity of Xiluodu station under construction is comparable to the world’s second largest hydropower station Itaipu Dam in South America, while the Baihetan station (in pre-construction) will have an installed capacity of 16 million kilowatts, overtaking the capacity of Xiluodu upon completion. In addition, eight hydropower stations, including Tiger Leaping Gorge (虎跳峡), Liangjiaren (两家人), Liyuan (梨园), Ahai (阿海), Jin’anqiao (金安桥), Longkaikou (龙开口), Ludila (鲁地拉), and Guanyinyan (观音岩), along the midstream of the Jinsha River—with a total investment of 150 billion RMB—also have an overall installed capacity at 205.8 billion kilowatts. Eleven hydropower stations will be built along the upper reaches of the Jinsha River from Guotong (果通) to Benzilan (奔子栏), with a total installed capacity of no less than 15 million kilowatts. These do not include the two stations built on the Panzhihua (攀枝花) section of Jinsha River and Yin River (银江) in Sichuan Province, approved last year; the ten stations from Marigei (马日给) to Sewu (色乌) along the Tongtian River; the Xiaonanhai (小南海) station on the Chuan River (川江); not to mention the Three Gorges and Gezhou (葛洲坝) dams. Around 2020, there will be more than thirty hydropower stations along the main stream of the Yangtze River. Scholars believe that the southwestern region of the Yangtze River contains the richest biodiversity in China; therefore, it requires the greatest amount of ecological protection. However, it also suffers frequently from natural

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disasters, including flooding and landslides. As a result, high-density hydropower cascade development in this region will have a multiplying effect on the ecology of the entire basin. In recent years, various levels of capital have been pouring in to invest in hydropower stations, seriously disrupting the local environment.1 The largest hydropower energy base in China currently underway, the Jinsha River project, has gone through multiple programs by different hydropower departments over the years. Officials at two mega-hydropower stations Xiangjia and Xiluodu, specifically “one reservoir with eight stations” in the midstream and “four stations” downstream, were punished by the former Department of Environmental Protection in 2005 due to unauthorized construction; in 2006, Jin’anqiao station dammed the river without approval from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (the former State Planning Commission); in 2009, Ludila and Longkaikou power stations completed construction without submitting their environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports to the environmental protection department. In 2003, the NDRC approved the Jinsha River Hydropower Planning Report, clearly stipulating that development in this region should follow an overall principle of “one reservoir with eight stations.” Accordingly, the leading Tiger Leaping Gorge Hydropower Station became the standard technical and economic indicator for the seven other stations down river. However, while the Liyuan, Ahai, Longkaikou, Ludila, and Guanyinyan stations were under construction according to the “one reservoir with eight stations” plan, the construction of Tiger Leaping Gorge power station was halted because of migration problems. In 2012, in spite of technical and economic difficulties, the NDRC approved the construction of the Jinsha and Yinjiang stations at the 50 kilometer Panzhihua section, in the lower reaches of the Jinsha River. The hydropower projects along Jinsha River have complicated sources of investment. The development of feeder rivers in the upper streams in Sichuan Province and Tibet were launched by unknown developers; the midstream projects have been mostly developed by the Yunnan Jinsha River Midstream Hydropower Development Company (云南省金沙江中游水电开发公司), with shareholders of state-owned tycoons including Huaneng (华能), Huadian (华电), Datang (大唐), Guodian (国电), and Huarun (华润), as well as several private companies; the downstream project is controlled by the Three Gorges Group (长江三峡集团). 1 Chen Kaiqi, Chang Zhongnong, Cao Xiaohong, “Respect for the Environment and Orderly Development of Hydropower Construction,” China Hydropower & Electrification, April 2010.

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There are a range of potential risks and practical issues behind this dense and chaotic development: Will the running water of the Yangtze River satisfy the needs of all stations in generating electricity? How can proper management of the water resources be achieved while investment comes from different parties? How can we avoid the devastating environmental effects when building reservoirs in the upstream reaches of the Yangtze River, especially with extremely complex geological conditions? When faced with major faults in these complex structures, how can these projects guarantee protection against earthquakes, landslides, mudslides, and other natural disasters? What about the effects created by reservoirs on local climate, terrestrial ecosystems, and aquatic environments? What is the protocol in the resettlement of migrants from the reservoir inundation areas and conflict resolution due to forced removal?
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Difficult River Planning

The hydropower prots should also carry the responsibilities of regional flood control, irrigation, navigation, and tourism, which are the basic principles of developing and utilizing water resources. From a developmental point of view, the planning of the projects should be decided while considering the regional and comprehensive development plans of the entire basin. China’s Water Law (2002 Revision) (水法) says that water resources development should be guided under a professional plan including hydropower, but in actual practice, the regional development and comprehensive planning of the basin often lag behind the development of hydropower. The Comprehensive Utilization Plan of the Yangtze River Basin (长江流域综 合利用规划) (CUPYRB), introduced in the 1950s, was only revised in 1990; upon that revision the Three Gorges Project was launched. Due to limitations of awareness at that time, the revision involved little consideration for environmental protection. The Three Gorges Project remains controversial to this day. Since the end of the last century, the Yangtze River Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources has repeatedly argued over a second revision of the CUPYRB in order to compensate for the “debt” leftover from 1990. However, though the 2009 revision was completed, it has yet to be approved by the State Council. Due to localized interests and differences in understanding, the comprehensive utilization and planning of regional water resources are not compatible with the special planning of hydropower construction. It is said that there are numerous contradictions between the new

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version of CUPYRB and the Special Plan of the Jinsha River Hydropower Project (金沙江中游水电专项规划). One is the different requirements for site selection and storage capacity of the Ahai and Tiger Leaping Gorge stations on the Jinsha River. However, local governments and various hydropower companies still push controversial projects for legitimate construction permits, via the 1990s version of CUPYRB. “On the one side, the revision of CUPYRB has not yet been approved, but on the other side, the NDRC has given approval to all proposals handed in by five hydroelectric giants to build these hydropower stations. So we must find the root cause of today’s chaos all over the Yangtze River; that is the National Development and Reform Commission,” said Weng Lida (翁立达), a well-known expert in water conservation and the former director of the Water Resources Protection Bureau in the Yangtze River Basin. Theoretically, in addition to obtaining the NDRC’s approval, a hydropower project must undergo a series of strict environmental assessment procedures. However, in 2005 the NDRC and the former National Environmental Protection Administration jointly issued a notification allowing preparatory construction work to begin before an overall environmental assessment had passed. In practice, this notification created a competition between different hydropower enterprises to build dams illegally. As previously described, all projects on the Jinsha River (Xiangjia, Xiluodu, Jin’anqiao, Ludila, and Longkaikou) took advantage of the so-called “preparatory stage” to carry out major construction work. Since the enterprises share interests with the local government, it is almost effortless for them to obtain EIA approval, which the said local government controls. When those projects worth tens or even hundreds of millions of RMB are launched, both sides work together to guarantee the initial investment income. Thus the EIA process becomes a mere formality. Even the representatives of the investors do not deny this, as they declared, “We’ve never heard of a dam project suspended on account of EIA . . . we just have to go through EIA to follow the procedure.” Zhou Weidong (周卫东), general manager for the Ludila Hydroelectric Company of the Huadian Group, and Zhang Zhiping (张之平), director of the construction office of the Longkaikou Hydropower Station of the Huaneng Group both publicly expressed similar views.2 In recent years, some illegal projects took advantage of the EIA system of approval. It is not uncommon for hydropower projects to successfully revive after paying a very low violation cost. In July 2010, three hydropower stations 2 “Called-off Projects on Jinsha River still under Construction,” Beijing Times, A20, June 22, 2009.

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involved in illegal construction (Jin’anqiao, Longkaikou, and Ludila) passed the approval and project EIA of the NDRC. Among them, the Jin’anqiao project gained approval on the same day as a ban on hydropower projects was lifted. It is worth mentioning that the “public participation” mechanism of the EIA, which is supposed to represent public opinion in the decision process, is nothing more than an “empty promise” in China. The project EIA report on the Baihetan Hydropower Station shows that, among 372 interviewees in the opinion survey, 100% of the groups and 93.1% of the individuals supported the construction, while 5.5% of the individuals said “I don’t care,” and only four people voted “no” due to their concern about possible damage to the environment. Wudongde Hydropower Station Construction Group distributed 280 questionnaires, recovering 238. 100% of groups and 98% of individuals supported the project; 1.5% of individuals marked “don’t care” and only one voted against it. The main construction group of Guanyinyan Station distributed a survey on EIAs to 120 groups and 300 individuals. Only 3% of them “opposed or strongly opposed” the project. Liyuan Hydropower Station collected 206 questionnaires from individuals and only three opposed it. After visiting the reservoir area with its thousands of square kilometers, two or three hundred questionnaires hardly seems sufficient to represent the true opinions of tens of thousands of both migrants and residents of the reservoir area. The public were coerced with a compensation package and preferential policies; many generally lack awareness when it comes to the environmental effects of these national projects. Such “public participation” has become a shameful feature of the hydropower construction craze. If risks emerge or disaster strikes, such public “endorsement” would be a perfect tool for policymakers to avoid taking responsibility for their actions. 3

Geological Ordeal

On June 14, 2012, seven workers who were setting up transmission lines for the Ahai Hydropower Station fell into the Jinsha River due to a sudden flood. Hundreds of workers in the plant were evacuated overnight during heavy rains. Eight days later, two trucks from the Wudongde Hydropower Station construction area fell into the valley due to landslides. Another six days later, a mudslide hit the Baihetan hydropower station, killing seven people; thirty-three were missing. Altogether three unexpected natural disasters hit the Jinsha River basin in two weeks. All accidents occurred on a construction site and all casualties were

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workers on site. In the Baihetan mudslide, over forty workers were engulfed in mud but none of the 670 villagers nearby were hurt and they were all safely evacuated. The project sites frequently hit by disasters demonstrated that some construction was carrying forward without concerns for security. A large number of casualties further illustrate that the owner of the companies ignored the potential geological risks of the hydropower projects. In April 2012, the author traveled along the Lining Highway (丽宁公路) to reach Yantou Village (岩头村) in Yongsheng County (永胜县), Yunnan Province, the only area where a new hydropower station was under operation on the Jinsha River. Rubble was continuously falling from the mountains, scattering across roads and residences. Zhu Zhen (朱真), the party secretary of the village, said the geology and ecology of the local landscape underwent dramatic changes after the dam project began. The local villagers had to leave their fertile valley for barren mountains, while the village tourism was also wrecked because of the danger of landslides. Before, the scene in Yantou Village was entirely different: healthy fruit orchards, crowded pubs, and active tourists between the Li River (丽江) and Lugu Lake (泸沽湖) all made the village a livable and safe place. A villager named Cai Wenxiang (蔡文祥) lamented that after construction their houses began to crack and some even collapsed. Now living in their old homes is too dangerous. Chen Biao (陈彪), director of the Lijiang City Bureau of Immigration admitted, “Every hydropower station incurs such problems after construction.” In July 2011, the Lining Highway was interrupted for several days due to landslides when the Jin’anqiao hydropower plant began a second impounding. The nearby Ahai station also encountered similar disasters after construction. Geological expert Fan Xiao (范晓) believes that after a hydropower plant impounds, geological changes bring about disasters like landslides or mudslides. Future disaster management and the subsequent migration or relocation would cost the companies a fortune. As a matter of fact, a comprehensive study of southwestern China, especially the Jinsha River Basin, has long been suspended. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Shen Yuchang (沈玉昌) and Tang Bangxing (唐邦兴), researchers from the Institute of Geography of the Chinese Academy of Science, investigated the sectioned landscape of the Jinsha River valley. However, there still exist many gaps in key research fields, like the seismic fracture zone and geological disasters in the valleys. In such a context, the mega-hydropower stations along the Jinsha River are still hastily being pushed forward, triggering widespread concern among domestic and overseas scholars.

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A July 2012 report entitled “China’s Western Earthquake Disaster and the Dams” started many debates in the international academic community. The author of the report, an American geologist, John Jackson, who spent over forty years researching earthquake and fault zones, visited over 130 construction sites of dams that had been built (under construction or in planning) along rivers in western China. After making comparative research with the seismic areas, Jackson stated that such a concentrated program of cascade dams is a great risk that may have disastrous consequences not only to the economy but also to the residents. As we all know, the so-called “cascade development” model indicates a continuous link between upstream and downstream reservoirs, in other words, the tail area of the reservoir is immediately linked with the head area of the next reservoir. As a result, in the event of a dam collapse, the upstream flooding may go through reservoir areas with a high watermark, transmitting all energy quickly to the downstream dams, creating a disastrous domino effect. Since the cascade dams along the upstream of the Yangtze River are all located in earthquake-prone seismic zones, once an earthquake or a dam collapse occurs, the upstream basins and areas in Yunnan, Sichuan, and even Chongqing will encounter unprecedented disasters. As an independent geologist who has long been engaged in geological expedition and hydroelectric engineering studies, Yang Yong (杨勇) believes that the Jinsha River valley is located in a main earthquake zone, where numerous earthquakes have taken place from upstream to downstream, from decades ago to recent years. The strong earthquakes have caused mountain collapses and other geological disasters, forming dangerous geological environments. The thirteen power stations planned along the mid- to down streams of the Jinsha River are all located in fault zones including Yulong Mountain (玉龙山), Chenghai (程海), Xiao River (小江), Anning River (安宁河), Lvye River (绿叶江), and Leibo (雷波) and all are at risk of experiencing earthquakes. Geologists have found cracks underneath mountains including Yinmin (因民山) and Baishagou (白沙沟山) alongside the Baihetan and Wudongde reservoir areas, which are in a critical state of transforming into a disaster. If the reservoir impounds and takes on pressure, a landslide could occur at anytime. “The height of the mountain is 3,200 meters and the valley is 700 meters deep. The landscape is steep and carves into the river. Such a collapse may result in billions of square meters of landslides.” Yang worries that because the eight stations under construction are all massive reservoirs with high dams, and are closely connected to the Jinsha River, a catastrophic chain of events is pending.

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Ecological Cost

Water conservation scholars are concerned that the dense cluster of cascade development projects along the Yangtze River will exceed the river’s ability to recover and adjust, thus threatening the natural cycle and sustainable use of the Yangtze River water resources. The geologists are also concerned about whether major fault zones in the area will trigger earthquakes or landslides when the water rises. Environmentalists note that such in-depth development will make the rivers artificial by greatly compressing ecological space. Moreover, many sociologists believe that improper resettlement of migrants has already led to religious or ethnic problems in minority-concentrated areas around some hydropower construction sites. Additional worries come from aquatic biologists and ichthyologists, who are particularly concerned about the devastating blow that the dams have on some rare fish species in the Yangtze River. Cao Wenxuan (曹文宣), an academic at the Chinese Academy of Science thinks that the hydropower projects have changed the spawning, breeding, and living environment of some rare fish, which used to live in the turbulent currents of the Yangtze River. Among them, the cascade development of the Jinsha River, the Yalong River (雅砻江), and the Dadu River (大渡河) have completely altered the original ecosystems, making some native fish endangered or even extinct. Though some projects propose a special “bionic channel” as a passage for the fish, or make efforts to artificially reproduce them, such “compensation methods” result in little success. Therefore, the CUPYRB in revision must focus on the protection of species. In fact, with the rise of hydropower, the protection of fisheries has suffered. White sturgeon, Acipenser, mullet, and dozens of rare and endemic species of fish were forced to migrate to the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve (长江上游珍稀特有鱼类国家级自然保护区) to survive. However, due to frequent hydropower development, protected areas are also at risk.3 In 2005, when the development of the Jinsha River hydropower projects began, the reserve on the upstream had to make way for the planned Xiangjia and Xiluodu dams, moving to a lower section of the river. In 2009, the then-secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Government, Bo Xilai (薄熙来), pushed the plan to build the Xiaonanhai Hydropower 3 Tian Jianjun and Xu Xuzhong, “Fish in Yangtze River Longing for Oxygen: Too Much Hydropower Development in China,” Bi-monthly Talks, Aug. 2010.

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Station, and the fish reserve was once again compressed. “I remember at that time some leader in the Ministry of Environmental Protection guaranteed the Chongqing Municipal government that: ‘I support you, but the key is to convene a meeting for ichthyologists, clearing the final obstacles for building the (Xiaonanhai) dam,’” Cao recalls. Some scholars worry that the ecological cost of the cascade hydropower development will be the loss of fish in the next ten to twenty years, making the Yangtze an “empty river.” Hydropower construction must answer for its devastating effect on the environment and take into consideration the integrity of nature and the river, its water, and its biological functions. 5

Worship Mentality of Hydropower

In April 2009, in the context of global climate change, the Chinese government declared for the first time that it plans to reduce its energy consumption, per unit of GDP by 40% by 2020. The goal is for the proportion of non-fossil fuel use to reach 15% of all primary energy consumption. Under pressure to reduce carbon emissions, vigorously developing hydropower and achieving other clean energy goals became a national strategy. The Director General of the Energy Bureau, Zhang Guobao (张国宝), (also the then deputy director of the NDRC) made it clear that in order to achieve the 2020 emission reduction target the installed capacity of hydropower stations must reach 380 million kilowatts. Therefore, projects must be approved, accelerated, and begin construction as soon as possible. Thus one of the world’s most expansive reservoirs in history was created in the upper stream of the Yangtze River, where the geological conditions are fragile. Risk assessment and EIA procedure law was ignored or bypassed because of pressure from both capital investment and local interests. In May 2012, the author published a report about hydropower development on the Jinsha River, stating that mega-hydropower development causes ecological and migrant problems.4 The long-neglected controversy about the giant national projects once again became a public focus. The next day, the Southern Metropolis Daily published an editorial entitled “Can Chaos in the Jinsha River

4 Bao Zhiheng, “An On-site Survey of the Hydropower Stations on Jinsha River,” Oriental Morning Post, A16–A21, May 3, 2012.

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Hydropower Stations Withstand the Test of History?”5 The article said that on the one hand public opinion is not well represented when starting the projects, and on the other hand, even opinions expressed are never taken seriously and the policies remain unchanged. There are also secret operations in the decision-making procedures. The article argued that to avoid new and irreparable harm to the environment, hydropower projects must be fully investigated and verified. “The scale of the Jinsha River hydropower projects as a whole is many more times beyond that of the Three Gorges Dam. Thus it should be packaged as a major national project like the Three Gorges Project and a similar decision-making process should be activated . . . the matter is serious and should be launched by the NPC, discussed and verified by an adequate number of experts, and put to the Congress for a vote,” said the editorial. Since then, many mainstream media in China, including the Beijing News, the Southern Metropolis Daily, the Southern People Weekly, the Oriental Outlook Weekly, and Caixin Media have published a series of stories focusing on hydropower development along the Yangtze River, resident relocation, and other issues. The public believes that a lack of proper decision-making procedures results in a “great leap forward” of hydropower projects, all the while ignoring the EIA process. Among the supporters of the hydropower projects, Zhang Boting (张博庭), a deputy secretary-general of the China Society for Hydropower Engineering, made the most famous remark about the worship of hydropower. Zhang’s main viewpoints include the following: the Wenchuan earthquake proves that building hydropower stations can effectively reduce geological disasters; the Three Gorges reservoir can effectively prevent the occurrence of a major earthquake; and hydropower development and dam building have an irreplaceable role in protecting the local environment. Any influence, alteration, or damage to the environment is merely separate or partial; but the positive effect the dams have on flood control, water supply, and water regulation benefits the whole basin; to protect the ecology alongside the Jinsha River we need to build hydropower stations; scientific hydropower construction will even save the rare fish species. The list goes on. There is no doubt that this debate between industry elites and many other scholars, environmental organizations, and the general public will continue.

5 “Can Chaos in Jinsha River Hydropower Stations Withstand the Test of History,” Southern Metropolis Daily, AA02, May 4, 2012.

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On June 5, 2012, in a State Council Information Office press conference, Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Wu Xiaoqing (吴晓青), responded to the controversies that arose from the environmental risks, geological disasters, and resettlements due to the hydropower development boom in southwestern China. Wu said the Ministry of Environmental Protection would request a retrospective review of the environmental impact of the hydropower projects in southwestern China. He said review of the cascade development should take place and lessons must be learned from a regional perspective. This means that the Yangtze River hydropower development will still follow the same procedure, requesting approval for each project. It is almost impossible to urge the highest organ of state power to view all projects as a whole. In this contaext, the real test of wisdom for Chinese leaders is: whether they can abandon the worship mentality of hydropower; whether they can curb the irrational impulse to make a profit at the cost of the environment; whether they can involve more people to participate; and whether they can implement effective environmental regulations.

chapter 16

Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station: A Typical Case of Political Power Abuse Liu Yiman and Ding Zhouyang Abstract For various reasons, human activities are killing the aquatic life of the Yangtze River, a plight further exacerbated by hydropower development projects in the upper middle stream of the river. Among all its peers, the Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station has proven the most deadly. With field research and in-depth interviews, the authors attempt to recreate the background and decision-making of the project. The Chongqing Municipal Government, for the sake of local interests and government work performance, actively promoted the project, which required the trimming of the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve. In response to local appeals, relevant departments and commissions conceded and the Three Gorges Group reluctantly agreed to cooperate. The whole case highlights the reckless profit-orientation of administrative power.

Keywords Xiaonanhai – hydropower development – Yangtze River – fish species – Chongqing

1

Background: Endangered Fish Species in the Yangtze River

The Yangtze River basin has always been the most important freshwater fish producing region, accounting for 56% of China’s freshwater fish yield. In 2011, the eleven provinces in the basin bred 13.8 million tons of fish and caught 1.3 million tons of fish. The Yangtze River is home to twenty-six of the thirty-five main species of freshwater fish in China as well as four of the major Chinese carps. Moreover, the Yangtze River also produces over ten species of commercial fish and several rare fish like mullets and mandarin. Other endangered aquatic species like the spadefish and the Yangtze finless porpoises find their

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last refuge here. Therefore, the Yangtze River is called the genetic resource bank of China’s freshwater fisheries.1 The protection of the Yangtze fish species is a matter of present and future importance. As a major part of the food chain, fish support an entire system of the self-purification functioning of water bodies. The extinction of these fish will bring about the collapse of biodiversity and aquatic ecosystem of the Yangtze River. According to Professor Cao Wenxuan (曹文宣), a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and expert on aquatic life, a ten-year off-season of fishing will revive the Yangtze River, but the eco-impacts of dams are irreversible. For example, after the completion of the Three Gorges Dam, the water grew deeper at the spawning ground and the water temperature also changed. As a result, the spawning time of the four major Chinese carp was postponed to late May, because these fish only spawn when water temperatures reach 18 degrees Celsius. The same problem also occurred with rare fish breeds. For example, the spawning time of the Chinese sturgeon was delayed, as it does not spawn until the water temperature drops below 19 degrees Celsius. Prof. Cao has a detailed analysis in his 1983 report “Water Resources’ Impact on Fish,” (水力资源对鱼类的影响) which still serves as a criterion for environmental assessment today. According to a CAS observation record, Chongqing, Wanxian (万县), and Zigui (秭归) were the spawning grounds for the grass carp; baby fish were still able to pass through and survive the Gezhou Project (葛洲坝), a low-head, stream-flow hydroelectric plant. However, in June 2003, when the Three Gorges Reservoir water level reached 139 meters, most of the baby fish died of nitrogen saturation. In 2007, when the water level reached 156 meters, 98% of the 316 million baby fish died and in 2008, most of the 912 million baby fish died. In Prof. Cao Wenxuan’s words, aquatic life in the Yangtze River is already seriously endangered and there is no time to delay its protection. Prof. Cao lists six major challenges to the Yangtze River’s fishery resources, namely: 1) exploitive fishing; 2) reclaiming farmland from lakes; 3) discharge of waste water from plants and mines; 4) isolation of water bodies; 5) hydropower projects; and 6) agricultural non-point source pollution.2 It is obvious that all of these challenges are human induced. 1 Liu Yiman and Ding Zhouyang, “Concentrated Hydropower Stations: Tombs for Yangtze Fish,” China Dialogue, January 8, 2013. 2 Yu Jian, “Prof. Cao Wenxuan Advocate a 10 Year Fishing Off Season for the Yangtze,” Xinhuanet, at www.hb.xinhuanet.com/2012-10/04/c_113277283.htm on October 4, 2012.

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Before the Xiaonanhai Project: Debate on Pros and Cons of the Three Gorges Project

During the feasibility study period of the Three Gorges Project, the CAS argued that the cons outweighed the pros while the Ministry of Water Resources argued otherwise. Weng Lida (翁立达), an expert in water resource protection and former director of the Yangtze River Water Resources Protection Bureau, said, “Why do we argue for the greater good? The key is the flood control function of the project. With this function, the cons will definitely outweigh the pros. Unfortunately, now many people miss the point by having their eyes on its power generation function. In fact, one thing is clear to all experts; that is, if not for electricity, the Three Gorges Project would never have become a reality.” According to Weng, the government was first aware of the problems with the Three Gorges Project in 2001 instead of 2007, when former Premier Zhu Rongji decided that measures must be taken to alleviate, if not necessarily prevent these problems. There were three goals at the Yichang (宜昌) conference: first, to prevent water pollution; second, to avoid and control possible geological disasters; and third, to strengthen migration from the reservoir area. However, the failure to combat water pollution was due to managerial and technological problems. The hydro-fluctuation belt also caused major problems. It is possible that the Three Gorges Project will be blamed for all the superimposed effects of all hydropower plants along the upstream of the Yangtze River. At the end of the conference, Premier Zhu concluded, “At the end of the day, we must not forget the dam’s flood control function. All the people in Hubei Province will tell you that the Three Gorges Project has indeed ended their nightmare of floods.” As for the flood control function of the Three Gorges Project, Prof. Cao expresses his reservations by saying: The Three Gorges aims to control the flood coming from the upstream only, like that in 1998. However, for floods in the middle and lower Yangtze River, for example the flood in 1954 caused by the flooding Xiang River (湘江) and Han River (汉江), the Three Gorges can do very little. However, many hydropower stations have already been completed in the upstream Yangtze River and its main upstream branches. As a result of this, there may be no floods for the Three Gorges Project to control in the future. In addition, Prof. Cao finds that many people tend to “oversimplify” the problems of hydropower generation. Just by calculating the carbon emissions and

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pollutant discharge of hydropower and thermal power plants, they conclude that hydropower is better in terms of its smaller eco-impact. Prof. Cao argues that pollution control technologies are improving quickly for thermal power plants while the long-term eco-impacts of hydropower development remain unknown. It is important to remember that hydropower plants are not pollution-free. Hydropower projects, particularly deep water reservoirs, change the natural flow and fluctuation of waters, claim large areas of farmland, created massive migration, affect local climate, reduce the self-purification capacity of rivers, and generate large amounts of hazardous substances. For example, the low water temperature in the deep water Xinanjiang (新安江) and Danjiangkou (丹江口) reservoirs leads to the methylation of several heavy metals. These hazardous organic substances will eventually enter human bodies through the food chain. In comparison, the water flow of the Gezhou Dam is good, while that of the Three Gorges Dam is poor, though still better than that of the Xiluodu (溪洛渡) and the Baihetan (白鹤滩) dams. In addition to methylation, the degradation of plants releases methane in a reducing state, and in turn increases greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. Similar stories of increased GHG emission have been recorded for several projects in Brazil and some African countries. In short, it is unwise and irresponsible to jump to the conclusion that hydropower is pollution free and completely clean and green. Further studies are needed. 3

The Inside Story of Decision-Making Concerning the Xiaonanhai Project

While they disagree on the pros and cons of the Three Gorges Project, Cao Wenxuan and Weng Lida have expressed the exact same opinions on the Xiaonanhai (小南海) Project. The Chongqing Yangtze River Xiaonanhai Water Control Complex is located in the juncture of the buffer zone and the experimental zone of the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve (长江上游珍稀特有 鱼类国家级自然保护区). The reservoir is expected to flood a 70 kilometer stretch of the buffer zone, accounting for one-fifth of the trunk stream in the nature reserve. According to an investigation in April and May 2012, it was confirmed that the Chongqing Municipal Government, for local interests, first started considering the project in 2005 and aggressively began the preliminary work in 2008. During the whole process, relevant ministries and the China Three Gorges Corporation were passively involved.

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According to Fan Xiao (范晓), chief engineer of the geological survey team of the Sichuan Bureau of Geology, hydropower stations are justified because hydropower is better than thermal power. After all, national development demands energy and China is under great pressure to reduce its emissions. However, his investigation of the Xiaonanhai Project proves these reasons invalid. Moreover, because of the high cost rising from the low-head reservoir and the ensuing resettlement, the project is uneconomical and nonprofitable. Why then did the Three Gorges Corporation construct this project? It is because of the local interests of Chongqing at the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir. The sedimentation of the Three Gorges Reservoir not only makes navigation impossible along the Chaotianmen (朝天门) stretch of the river but also affects the local climate in Chongqing. To compensate Chongqing, and to avoid the involvement of other corporations in the development of another hydropower project between the Xiangjia Dam (向家坝) and the Three Gorges Dam, the Three Gorges Corporation reluctantly agreed to enter a joint venture with the Chongqing Municipal Government to develop the Xiaonanhai Project. An official of the Three Gorges Corporation made a similar observation by saying, “We never wanted this project. It is the Chongqing Municipal Government that wants it. At the tail of the Three Gorges Reservoir, Chongqing is asking for compensation for its sacrifices. The Xiaonanhai Project is not for hydropower but, in a euphemistic way, for the “comprehensive benefit” of local, economic development. According to Clause 32 of the Regulations on Nature Reserves (自然保护区 条例), no production facility is allowed in the core buffer zones of any nature reserve. In the experimental zone, no production facility that may pollute and destroy the environment or landscape is allowed. According to Prof. Cao Wenxuan, this means “it is illegal to build any water control project that may markedly change the aquatic ecosystem in a nature reserve.” In fact, Prof. Cao is particularly disappointed because this national nature reserve had recently been shrunk because of the changes in the aquatic environment brought on by the construction of the Three Gorges Project, the Xiluodu Dam, and the Xiangjia Dam. In the [2005] No. 315 Environmental Assessment Reply Letter, the former State Environmental Protection Administration emphasized, “In future planning and construction, no water conservancy or hydropower project is allowed in the nature reserve.” For this reason, Prof. Cao Wenxuan turned down the invitation to attend the discussion on the Xiaonanhai Project’s impact on the nature reserve convened by the Chongqing Municipal Government. Prof. Cao believed that the Chongqing government was not in a position to convene such a discussion. He said, “Such a project in the nature reserve must have its negative impacts.

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There is nothing to discuss.” Moreover, Prof. Cao argued, “The restructuring of the nature reserve starts when someone, ignoring all national policies concerning nature reserves, wants to build a water conservancy project. This is absolutely unacceptable. Any law, either about people or fish, must be abided by.” According to Prof. Cao, the Three Gorges Corporation was reluctant because of the low cost efficiency of the project. During a conference on the Xiaonanhai Project, Bo Xilai (薄熙来), former party secretary of Chongqing, claimed that Chongqing lacked energy resources and that the central government’s ban on the use of natural gas, which is abundant in Chongqing, made the problem even more serious. To solve the problem, Chongqing needed the hydro-electricity generated by the Xiaonanhai Project. In reply, Cao Guangjing (曹广晶), president of the Three Gorges Corporation said, “When the water level rises in the Three Gorges Reservoir in the flooding season, we will give you all the extra electricity.” Weng Lida is another insider in the decision-making process. During an informal meeting between Bo Xilai and Qian Zhengying (钱正英), Weng heard Bo say, “We want the Xiaonanhai Project to relieve the sedimentation problem.” On hearing this, Qian refuted this by saying, “Sedimentation is not a problem.” This inside story shows that it was for the sake of local interests and GDP that some leaders intentionally neglected scientific evidence and national policies and pushed the Xiaonanhai Project. At the same time, China’s environment and ecological system are being sacrificed. 4

Compromise of Relevant Government Ministries and Experts

In 2008, the National Development and Reform Commission issued a notice to relevant ministries for suggestions on the preliminary work of the Xiaonanhai Project. In the first line of its [2008] No. 54 reply, the General Office of the Ministry of Environmental Protection suggests, “The Xiaonanhai Project is to be built in the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve and therefore runs against national policies.” The office reiterated, “The environmental impact statement reply by the former State Environmental Protection Administration in 2005 has explicitly ruled that no new water conservancy and hydropower project will be constructed in the nature reserve.” The same document calls the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve an “irreplaceable . . . last refuge . . . of priority importance” and observes that “the comprehensive plan for the Yangtze River basin is unsuited

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for environmental protection and therefore needs revision.” Unfortunately, the Ministry of Environmental Protection eventually agreed in principle, with “the strictest reservation,” to start the preliminary study on the environmental impacts of the project. Although the reply suggested great caution, a memorandum of the conference between the State Environmental Protection Administration and the Chongqing Municipal Government on March 8, 2005, literally irritated Prof. Cao Wenxuan. This memorandum reads, “As for the Xiaonanhai Project, the State Environmental Protection Administration will actively organize and promote serious studies on the protection of fish so as to remove obstacles to a final decision.” Cao later recalled, “To remove what obstacles? We are the obstacles to be removed! I was furious!” According to Weng Lida, the Ministry of Agriculture was against this project in the beginning, only to concede under great pressure from Chongqing and eventually passed the Restructuring Plan for the Nature Reserve in Chongqing (保护区重庆段调整方案) in October 2009. After restructuring, the project would “no longer be located in the nature reserve.” Later in November 2010, the Ministry of Environmental Protection approved this plan. In addition, Weng said, “The Chongqing Municipal Government lobbied me. I told them that I totally appreciated their sacrifices for the Three Gorges Project and supported the eco-dam project in Kai County (开县). But I did not support the Xiaonanhai Project. This is still my standing.” “Stubborn” experts like Prof. Cao Wenxuan were also importuned. Prof. Cao was visited by government officials and his name appeared in the expert list of various reports to add more authority to these reports. Unable to change anything, Prof. Cao tried to do all within his power to minimize the damage. Prof. Cao explained: The Xiaonanhai Project would design an artificial eco-passage for fish. In theory and practice, a canal beside the reservoir will work. However, the canal in the Xiaonanhai Project runs through a small isle in the middle and therefore is too short to work. I do not know how they plan to solve the problem. All I can do is to carefully study what fish need to use the passage, but I have to admit that I do not know whether fish will be that smart to find the passage. Though I personally hope fish will be able to pass, there is no guarantee at all. But for them, once the eco-passage is built, the environment is protected. At the cornerstone-laying ceremony of the Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station on March 29, 2012, Mayor Huang Qifan (黄奇帆) of Chongqing,

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President Cao Guangjing of the Three Gorges Corporation and leaders of other ministries and administrations were present, and so was Prof. Cao Wenxuan. Later, Prof. Cao recalled, “As usual, several people would unveil the cornerstone together. I, standing at the far right, was not supposed to be one of these people, until Mayor Huang Qifan dragged me into the show.” It is a tragedy that scientists are compromised under great pressure from authorities and powerful interests groups. When this happens, nature reserves, the ecological bottom-line, fall in the scientific sense. Similarly, in order to satisfy local interests and put up a political show, the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve was restructured after government ministries and the Three Gorges Corporation were coerced to concede. The story of the Xiaonanhai Project is a typical example of relentless trickery for political benefits. 5

Suggestions Concerning the National Reserve

Of all the rare fish species, some like the Coreius guichenoti and the Rhinogobio ventrali lay floating eggs. It takes a drift of 400–500 kilometers for these eggs to mature into baby fish that can swim. However, the Yangtze River stretch in the national reserve is too short, so that these baby fish have to pass the Xiaonanhai project and enter the Three Gorges Reservoir. From June to September, the water level of the Three Gorges Reservoir drops to 145 meters and the water flows at a speed of no less than 0.2 meters per second, fast enough to sustain the eggs and baby fish. Moreover, these baby fish will find enough food in the reservoir. For other fish that lay demersal or viscid eggs, their baby fish can also feed in the varying backwater zone of the reservoir. This means the Three Gorges Reservoir makes an ideal habitat for the early life of these rare fish. In turn, it becomes vital to ensure the unimpeded pass from the national reserve to the reservoir and protect ecological integrity. At the same time, the grass carp, the silver carp, and other fish that live in the still water of the reservoir also have to swim into rivers to lay their floating eggs. However, the Xiaonanhai Project stands in their way and eventually affects the reproduction of fish. Accordingly, Prof. Cao Wenxuan, in his report on the Xiaonanhai Project’s impact on the national reserve, lists his opposition to the project as follows: 5.1 The Xiaonanhai Project is Illegal The Xiaonanhai Project is located in the juncture of the buffer zone and the experimental zone of the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National

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Nature Reserve. The reservoir is expected to flood 70 kilometers of the buffer zone, or one-fifth of the trunk stream in the nature reserve. According to Clause 32 of the Regulations on Nature Reserves, no production facility is allowed in the core zone and buffer zone of any nature reserve. Therefore, it is illegal to construct this hydropower project that may markedly change the aquatic ecosystem of the nature reserve. In the former State Environmental Protection Administration’s [2005] No. 315 document, the administration agrees in principle to start the project and points out, “Because of the construction of Phase 1 of the Jinsha River (金沙江) Development Plan, the former Leibo-He National Reserve for Rare Fishes in the Yangtze River (原长江雷波—合江珍稀鱼类国家级自 然保护区) will be restructured and renamed the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve. The restructuring plan shall be implemented in accordance with the State Council’s approval opinions. In future planning and construction, no new water conservation and hydropower projects shall be allowed in the nature reserve.” The Negative Impacts of Hydropower Projects on the Natural Habitats of Fish in the Yangtze River Are Scientifically Proven The Three Gorges Dam has markedly changed the aquatic ecosystem in the 600 kilometer stretch of the Yangtze River to the upstream of the reservoir. The natural habitats and spawning grounds for forty breeds of rare and endemic fish like the paddlefish, the Dabry’s sturgeon, and the Coreius guichenoti are negatively affected. It is because of this that the government decides to build the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve. However, the construction of Phase 1 of the Jinsha River Development Plan makes the problem even worse. In the past, these fish used to thrive in the 2,400 kilometer stretch of the Yangtze River from the Tiger Leaping Gorge (虎跳峡) to Yichang. But now, with the exception of the paddlefish and the Chinese highfin banded shark, which are occasionally found in the middle and lower Yangtze River, the 353.16 kilometer stretch of the Yangtze River in the national reserve has become the last refuge for these rare and endemic fish. Unfortunately, because of the Xiaonanhai Project, one-fifth of this stretch will be cut off from the national reserve, making the life of these fish even more difficult. 5.2

5.3 The Eco-Passage cannot Solve the Problems of Breeding Migration One or two eco-passages will not relieve the project’s negative impacts on fish. Even if these facilities do work, they can only serve certain but not all migrating fish, because these fish, come in different sizes and shapes. More importantly, for a low water head hydropower project like Xiaonanhai, mechanical injuries

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and injuries caused by the supersaturation of air are deadlier to floating fish eggs and baby fish. At present, China does not have the technological capacity to build an eco-passage for the four major Chinese carps and other carps that lay floating eggs. While large amounts of dead baby fish and broken fish eggs are discovered between the Qililong (七里垄) Hydropower Station and the Gezhou Hydropower Station, it is wishful thinking that the eco-passage of the Xiaonanhai Project may solve the problems facing these fish. In other words, hydropower projects like Xiaonanhai have great negative impacts on the aquatic ecosystem and environment of the Yangtze River and therefore must be cancelled. In the economic development mania, it is particularly important for people to keep calm and clear-headed and remember that there is only one Yangtze River and that the Yangtze River has only one national reserve for rare fish species. These natural resources must not be sacrificed for short-term economic returns.

chapter 17

Building Dams on International Rivers: Assuming a More Responsible Role Yi Yimin Abstract From global climate change to small-scale pollution, environmental problems often spread across political boundaries. Thus people are now paying more attention to cross-border issues in environmental protection. Among xsuch concerns is the development of hydropower on international rivers. This article surveys China’s overseas dam industry in Southeast and Northeast Asia while discussing its existing and potential impacts. Reviewing the latest policies on the transnational hydropower industry, the author argues that China should properly assess the dams’ ecological and social risks in order to make scientific decisions and minimize negative impacts. In addition, China should encourage multilateral participation in managing and developing water resources.

Keywords hydropower – river basin planning – cross-border impacts – responsible investment

In March 2012, at a press conference at the Fifth Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, Qin Guangrong (秦光荣), party secretary of Yunnan Province, reassured journalists that “no hydropower project has resumed on the Nu River (怒江).”1 He then explained that work on the Nu would not restart until the proposed projects went through proper national procedures and solved relocation and environmental issues. Yet, by the end of the year, the Tibet Daily reported that hydropower companies were secretly working towards taming the Nu River and had garnered support from the local 1 Tang Wei and Wang Yun, “No Hydropower Project has Resumed on the Nu River,” Yunnan Web, March 11, 2012, http://news.yntv.cn/content/15/20120311/103554_15_507817 .shtml.

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governments.2 The paper quoted Norbu Dunzhub (罗布顿珠), secretary of the Changdu (昌都) Prefectural Party Committee in Tibet, who promised the China Datang Corporation (大唐集团) that generating hydropower on the Nu was at the top of the local government’s agenda. Although he mentioned issues such as environmental protection, people’s welfare, and social stability, the main message was to “prioritize hydropower development.” He was silent, however, on how to manage the Nu as a cross-border river. 1

Building Dams on Cross-Border Rivers

The Nu, or Salween as it is known in Burma, runs 3,673 kilometers, 2,020 of which flows in China, 200 along the Thailand-Burma border, and 1,450 in Burma. The Nu was added to the list of China’s hydropower bases in 2003 with a planned capacity of 21,320 MW, ranking sixth nationally.3 According to the China Electricity Council, the Nu was planned as a 2-reservoir, 13-dam cascade project in Yunnan Province, but would start with a 1-reservoir, 4-dam cascade project (pending state approval).4 Nevertheless, concerns about the dams’ environmental and social risks have accompanied the proposals from the very beginning, especially since the assessments of how such bold efforts might impact the river valley and the communities that relied on it for livelihood were nowhere to be found in the planning reports. Moreover, China’s hydropower development on the Nu River is not limited within its national borders. Table 17.1 lists China’s hydropower plants on the Salween River in Burma. With a capacity of 7,000 MW, Tasang is the largest in Southeast Asia, outshining the formerly well-known Myitsone dam. Located at the crossroads of China, Burma, Thailand, and Laos, Tasang plays a key role in the Greater Mekong Sub-region Power Grid. With a combined capacity of 20,000 MW and located near countries in desperate need of energy, the dams on the Salween are lucrative to hydropower developers in Southeast Asia.

2 Yan Dang’en and Liang Jun, “Speed Up Hydropower Development and Promote the Economic Prosperity of East Tibet,” The Tibet Daily, December 6, 2012. 3 Zhang Wei and Feng Changyong, “The Nu River Becomes a New Hydropower Base,” Xinhua Web, November 20, 2003. 4 “Survey of Hydropower Bases on the Nu and Lancang Rivers in Yunnan Province,” the China Electricity Council, April 25, 2011, http://www.cec.org.cn/hangye/dongtai/2011-04-25/ 53318.html.

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Chinese companies turned their gaze toward the Salween as a result of intense opposition to building dams on the Nu in China. Once dams were built on the Salween, the Nu would no longer be a free flowing river. In this way, hydropower companies hoped to counter the environmentalists’ appeal to save one of the very few unimpeded rivers in the region, thus paving the way for building reservoirs and dams on the Nu in Yunnan Province. Furthermore, hydropower projects in Burma took advantage of the country’s relatively lax environmental laws. Companies faced much lower costs in terms of government approval, community relocation, and environmental protection. Not surprisingly Burma has seen an influx of developers in recent years. The Salween, however, is not the only international river that catches the eye of overseas investors. In 2012, the China Electricity Council recommended in its Twelfth Five-Year Plan that “[Chinese companies] should promote overseas hydropower development and in particular look for opportunities on the upper Irrawaddy River in Burma.”5 In September 2010, the Burmese government suspended the China Power Investment Corporation-invested Myitsone dam, drawing attention to hydropower plants along the Irrawaddy. Few people know that the Irrawaddy is an important cross-border river, whose tributaries in China include the Dulong River (独龙江) (known as the N’Mai in Burma), the Daying River (大盈江) (known as the Tarpein in Burma), and the Long River (龙江) (known as the Shweli River in Burma.) Development plans have been made to turn these tributaries into 7-dam, 9-dam, and 12-dam cascade projects. Outside China, in the lower reaches of the Irrawaddy, five dams are under construction on the N’Mai, and the Chibwe dam was completed and is generating electricity. 2

Impact and Risks

Many downstream communities have voiced strong opposition to China’s frenzied development of hydropower on the upper rivers. Downstream countries and communities are seldom consulted and some projects operate in complete secrecy. The affected communities often seek official channels to voice their discontent. In December 2012, two Burmese NGOs issued a report, stating that after the dam went into operation on the Long River in Yunnan Province five months earlier, the water discharge dropped rapidly, making it hard for 5 “The China Electricity Council Announces its Twelfth Five-Year Plan,” the China Electricity Council, March 9, 2012, http://www.cec.org.cn/yaowenkuaidi/2012-03-09/81451.html.

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the 16,000 Burmese villagers to carry on their usual trade and transportation along the waterway’s lower reaches. The two NGOs petitioned that the Chinese government make efforts to relieve the negative impacts on the lower-river communities as well as conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for any future projects on cross-border waterways.6 Chinese hydropower developers consider building dams on cross-border rivers outside China as a highly desirable investment. Once the plants start operation and transmit electricity back home, the country receives clean energy and the hydropower corporations reap huge profits. The Shweli Dam is a case in point. Hanergy Holdings Group, the dam’s investor and developer, sold 1.5 billion kWhs to the China Southern Power Grid Corporation in the first three quarters of 2012, collecting 280 million RMB in revenue.7 At this rate, the company will recover its costs in ten years, even as the hydropower industry lobbies the government to raise the electricity rates in Yunnan and neighboring provinces. Dam investors and builders claim to have a good working relationship with the local governments and comply with indigenous rules and regulations, but successful overseas hydropower projects report otherwise. Community organizations reveal that few dams built in Burma have gone through proper EIAs, and that local residents and communities are rarely informed or consulted on how such projects may change their way of life. For example, the dams on the Salween will pose a potential threat to Indochina-Burma biological hotspots, destroy biodiversity in the river, and harm the fishing industry. Moreover, quite a few dams, such as the Hatgyi, are located in active civil war zones. Local ethnic groups in Burma believe that the Burmese government uses these projects to control them, thus deepening existing conflicts. Many people in Burma consider such investments irresponsible. As a result, protests against Chinese investments prevail. Building overseas dams entails considerable risks due to unpredictable local politics. In addition to the Burmese government’s moratorium of the Myitsone dam, the operation of the Datang Corporation-invested Tarpein dam stopped in June 2011, when fighting broke out between the Burmese government forces and the Kachin Independence Army. Another dam, the Ywathit in the Kayah State, is also likely to be suspended due to the Karenni National Progressive 6 Sun Guangyong and Du Tianqi, “Burmese NGOs Voice Opposition against Chinese Dams,” Global Times, December 16, 2010. 7 “China Southern Power Grid Imports 1.5 Billion kWhs from Burma in the First Three Quarters,” State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, October 24, 2012, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2410/n314289/14899407.html.

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Party’s (KNPP) request to suspend all large-scale projects during the ongoing regional peace talks. In the current planning, building, and operating of dams on cross-border waterways, corporate interests supersede environmental, social, and national considerations. As a responsible international power, China should work to maintain the ecological and social wellbeing of the downstream nations. Proper EIAs will not only highlight the potential environmental and social impacts on the affected regions and communities, but also identify risks and avoid future financial loss for investors. 3

Building Dams on International Rivers in Northeast China

To facilitate the electricity trade, China is also building a cross-border power grid in the Northeast to connect with Russia. The Russia-China 500-kV direct current electricity grid started commercial operation on April 1, 2012. Two months later, the State Grid Corporation of China and the Unified Energy System of Russia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on expanding cooperation in generating and transmitting electricity. According to the MoU, China would increase energy imports from Russia while helping to update power grids there, and together the two corporations would market electricity to neighboring countries. To support Russia’s energy exports in the Far East, President Vladimir Putin provided a subsidy of 50 billion RUB to RusHydro, which in 2010 had reached an agreement with the China Three Gorges Corporation to develop hydro and wind power. All of these projects signal increasing Russia-China cooperation in producing and transmitting electricity. However, Russian civic organizations and experts are concerned that such cooperation, such as damming on the Heilong River (known as the Amur in Russia), will threaten regional ecology. The Heilong River marks the China-Russia border, and is undergoing rapid changes due to bilateral energy development. At 4,444 kilometers, the Heilong/Amur is the sixth longest river in the world, connecting Mongolia, China, and Russia. Its drainage area, roughly two million square kilometers, is larger than that of the Yangtze. The Heilong/Amur River is also one of the very few unimpeded rivers in the world. Well known for its biodiversity, the river hosts fifteen ecological reserves, eleven of which are cross-border, and seven of which are freshwater ecological reserves. The river is also home to numerous wetlands, fifteen of which are internationally rated. What creates the Heilong/ Amur ecosystem is the floodwater; once dams are built, the entire river basin will change.

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Table 17.1 List of selected dams, planned or under construction, on the Salween River Dam

Capacity (MW)

Chinese Developers

Notes

Kun Long 8

1,400

Electricity sold to China

Tasang 9

7,000

Ywathit10

4,000

Weigyi12 Dagwin Hatgyi13

4,540 790 1,360

Hanergy Holdings Group China Southern Power Grid Corporation, China Three Gorges Project Co. and Sinohydro Corporation collectively holding 56% of the stock China Datang Corporation Unknown Unknown Sinohydro International

Enhancing a power grid connecting China, Burma, Thailand, and Laos

Most of the electricity to be transmitted to China11 Thailand Thailand 90% of the electricity transmitted to Thailand, 10% to Burma

A World Wildlife Foundation report on the Zeya and Bureya dams—both built on tributaries of the Amur in Russia—assessed such impacts.14 The report 8

“Feasibility Study Meeting Held on the Thanlwin-River Kun Lung Dam,” Yunnan Electricity Web, December 31, 2010, http://www.yunnanpower.cn/showinfo.asp?id=10545. 9 “MoU Signed on the Biggest Dam in Southeast Asia,” State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, November 24, 2010, http://www.sasac .gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2410/n314244/7715670.html. 10 “Tender Notice on the Ywathit Dam,” China Bidcenter Web, May 19, 2011, http://www .bidcenter.com.cn/newscontent-7888273-1.html. 11 Ibid. 12 “Healthy Rivers, Happy Neighbors: Comments on the Chinese Overseas Dam Industry in Burma,” Rivers in Burma Web, May 2009. 13 “MoA Signed by China, Burma, and Thailand on the Hatgyi Dam,” Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, April 27, 2010, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/ jyjl/j/201004/20100406887074.html. 14 Evgeny Simonov, Evgeny Shvarts, and Lada Progunova, eds., “Environmental Concerns of Russian-Chinese Transboundary Cooperation: from ‘Brown’ Plans to a ‘Green’ Strategy” (Moscow-Vladivostok-Harbin: WWF, 2010).

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stated that dam-controlled waterways no longer go through the natural cycles of a flood and dry season, thus turning the formerly diverse ecosystems into a single reservoir ecosystem and fragmenting the river ecology. Although both dams are located in Russia, their large storage capacities—the combination of which equal the entire annual water discharge at the mouth of the Yellow River—affect the ecosystems in both Russia and China. In 2007, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested its Russian counterpart to reduce the negative impact of the Zeya Dam on China.15 4

Alternative Plans

Northeast China’s demand for energy is high because it lacks resources such as coal, nuclear, solar, wind, or tidal power. The gap has led some experts to believe that building dams on the Heilong River may solve the region’s energy deficiency. In the 1990s, Russia and China planned a 6-dam cascade plan on the Heilong River, but the proposal was shelved due to strong opposition from Russian NGOs and local governments.16 However, China’s Ministry of Water Resources still advertises the plan on its website as part of the Northeast China Hydropower Base (see Figure 17.1).17 One project on the midstream, the Taipinggou (太平沟) Dam, was featured at a 2010 business fair in Harbin to attract investment.18 If this plan were carried out, even partially so, 60% of the Heilong River upstream flow, 45% of the midstream, and 30% of the downstream would be affected. This would not only reduce the capacity of the river as a natural source to absorb floods, but also destroy fish habitat and in turn devastate the fishing industry. So, we may ask, is hydropower the only way to provide the much needed energy sources? Are there alternatives? How do we use and protect water resources in a sustainable way instead of generating electricity at the cost of diverse eco and social systems? To start answering these questions, research 15

16 17 18

Li Rongfu, “Environmental Impact, Economic Security, and Seismic Risks: A Cascade of Dams on the Amur River in Russia and Their Impact on China,” http://www.doc88.com/ p-895118683113.html. Liang Zhentang, “Building Taipinggou Dam as the First Step Towards Developing Hydropower on the Heilong River,” Water Resources, June 2004. Evgeny Simonov, Evgeny Shvarts, and Lada Progunova, eds., “Environmental Concerns of Russian-Chinese Transboundary Cooperation: from ‘Brown’ Plans to a ‘Green’ Strategy.” “Taipinggou Dam at Luobei,” Heilongjiang Provincial Government Website, http://www .hlj.gov.cn/zt/system/2010/06/04/010073367.shtml.

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Figure 17.1 Proposed dams on the Heilong/Amur River

should take place across national borders, in order to take into account the resources and interests of Mongolia, Russia, and China. 5 Responsibilities Chinese policymakers realize the importance of conducting environmental impact assessments before implementing hydropower projects. At the end of 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Environmental Protection announced provisional measures for the evaluation of hydropower development plans and EIAs.19 For the first time in history, the regulations put forward the legal procedures through which dams on the country’s major rivers could be planned and built. It made clear that planning and EIAs were vital to the development of hydropower. Most importantly, the regulations identified “major rivers” as those that cross national and provincial borders, making it mandatory to conduct EIAs before building dams on 19

Joint announcement by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Environmental Protection to issue the “Provisional Measures for the Evaluation of Hydropower Development Plans and Environmental Impact Assessments,” NDRC Website, December 27, 2011, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2011tz/ t20111227_452886.htm.

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these rivers. The regulations state that EIAs should include assessments of the entire river basin ecosystem as well as the particular regions involved. They should also involve participation of the greater public. These regulations supplemented the Environmental Impact Assessment Law in terms of how the law should be implemented. Though these regulations are well intentioned, the author has yet to see change at the official level. When Qin Guangrong, party secretary of Yunnan Province, said that hydropower development on the Nu/Salween should go through “national procedures,” he was vague and did not specify that proper EIAs should be conducted, and that the results should be submitted to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the National Development and Reform Commission for approval. In the dialogue between the Changdu prefecture government of Tibet and the Datang Corporation, not one person brought up cross-border EIAs. For the dams under construction on the Nu/ Salween, few, if any, had undergone EIAs or reviews. China passed the standards on hydropower planning as early as 1996, but the guidelines to conduct EIAs on hydropower projects remain under discussion, their details undisclosed. Without standards and guidelines that take into account the interests of all parties concerned, EIAs on the proposed dams cannot be carried out effectively. In this respect, the Chinese government should draw from the process of the 2010 EIA organized by the Mekong River Commission. In this strategic assessment, the working group set up programs in which government advisers, regional governments, NGOs, and developer consultants discussed with commission representatives the important aspects and benchmarks of the development plan. Only then could the commission representatives conduct further research with the gathered information. We should remember that hydropower planning and EIAs are only remedial measures to reduce environmental degradation after a decision has been made to build dams. A better solution is to consider the environmental impacts and social interests, thereby coming up with alternative plans to impeding the free flow of rivers. Currently, China has not acceded to any regional river comanagement commission, so it is premature to discuss co-development and co-management. But when building dams on transboundary rivers, Chinese developers should at least inform the countries concerned in advance, conduct environmental impact assessments, disclose information, and encourage public participation. That China should be a responsible participant in the development of hydropower is not limited to rivers located in China or that share its border. Responsibility should apply to all projects that involve the environment, especially since the Chinese hydropower industry now plays a greater part in the

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world. The Gibe III Dam is a case in point. Situated on the Omo River in southern Ethiopia, the dam is the biggest in the country. Its impact goes far beyond Ethiopian national borders, reaching the lower Omo river valley and the Turkana Lake in Kenya. Once completed, the dam will terminate the flooding cycle of the lower Omo River and reduce the water discharge into the lake, thus having devastating impacts on the 300,000 indigenous people who depend on the river and the lake for their livelihood. The Gibe III dam may also cause famines and fights over natural resources. Thus the World Heritage Committee called upon the Ethiopian government and Chinese financiers to suspend the Gibe III dam to preserve local cultural heritage. But in 2010, the Industrial Commercial Bank of China provided a loan of 500 million USD for building equipment, causing an outcry by local NGOs. To fend off environmental and social risks in overseas investments, the China Banking Regulatory Commission formulated the Green Credit Guidelines (绿色信贷指引) in February 2012, requiring Chinese financial institutions to pledge that “appropriate international practices or international norms will be followed” and to disclose “their green credit strategies and policies, and . . . developments of their green credit business.” The guidelines also emphasized market and stakeholder oversight on credit, involving environmental and social risks. 6

A Better Way Forward

China seeks to develop cross-border rivers within and beyond its national borders. The Chinese government, hydropower developers, and NGOs should work together to minimize potential environmental and social impacts. In the short term, full use of the rules and regulations must be made to ensure proper EIAs of the hydropower projects on transboundary rivers. In the long term, a system should be established in which all concerned nations and regions participate to manage the rivers in a sustainable way. To reach sound decisions on hydropower development, investors and governments should disclose information and provide channels for public participation. This is vital for the communities whose livelihood depends on the rivers, not to mention all who share a planet and a future.

PART eight Pollution

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chapter 18

Soil Contamination Must be Dealt With Without Delay Ma Tianjie Abstract In 2012, several important media outlets focused on China’s contaminated land and initiated a series of investigations into brownfields and grain production safety. Yet even under such intensive scrutiny, information about China’s soil pollution remains opaque. It is against such a backdrop that top level policy making on soil pollution is attracting much attention. From the rumored Soil Pollution Control Law to the State Council’s arrangements for soil pollution remediation, everything is indicating that the policy making process is accelerating. There is also a discernible tension among competing philosophies underlying different policy options. In this regard, efforts made by China’s nascent civil society on this issue provide typical cases as references for policy makers.

Keywords soil contamination – heavy metal pollution – Soil Pollution Control Law

At the beginning of 2012, a number of awards were jointly presented by Chinadialogue.net, the British newspaper the Guardian, Sina.com, and the SEE Foundation for reports on China’s environment. Gong Jing (宫靖), a reporter from Caixin Media, received the Best Impact Award for his report “The Cadmium-polluted Rice” (镉米杀机), which “uncovered the hideous issue of heavy metal contamination in China’s food production.” In the report, published in 2011, the author wrote: “Food contamination in China has lasted many years. During rapid industrialization, mining and other activities released toxic heavy metals such as cadmium, arsenic, and mercury . . . They have contaminated quite a large area of China via water and air, and go on to pollute the rice eaten by people.”

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While presenting the award, the organizer remarked that: Gong’s report has raised deep concerns for the whole country, with local governments expressing their resolution to address this issue. In the same year, cadmium-polluted rice became a hot topic at the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Chinese health minister Chen Zhu (陈竺) told the media that China would ban growing rice on polluted soil. Since this report was published, soil pollution has drawn much more attention in China’s political and academic circles as well as in the public. The article “The Cadmium-polluted Rice” marks the beginning of the media’s focus on soil pollution, an “invisible” pollution. In 2012, several major publications published in-depth and series reports on soil pollution, including the “Poisonous Land” (毒地) series published in Southern Weekly and the cover story “The Lurking Poisonous Land” (毒地潜伏) by Caijing magazine on June 4. These reports highlighted the problem of polluted land left by factories that have been closed, and about the management of such land during the real estate boom. The dangers of soil pollution are transmitted to humans in two ways: by food and by one’s living environment. The latter seems to have attracted more attention. As one expert said, local governments seem to be more concerned about the heavy metal pollution left over by city expansion and relocated factories, and even “try to change the use of polluted farmland, with no intention of tackling soil pollution.”1 In addition to the government’s incentive to tackle soil pollution, the media also focuses on issues including reports on the pollution, choice of remediation technology, and policy making. For instance, according to 21st Century Business Herald, in the Plan on the Prevention and Control of Heavy Metal Pollution in the Farmland of Agricultural Products (农产品产地土壤重金属污染防治实 施方案), “the Ministry of Agriculture has already done a preliminary investigation on some of the heavy metal pollution in farmland,” and has identified a number of soil pollution “danger zones.” It will “make further surveys and monitor the heavy metal pollution of 120 million hectares of farmland, and restore the contaminated soil.”2 On September 29, the same newspaper released another significant message: having been studied by experts, China’s 1 Gong Jing, “The Cadmium-polluted Rice,” Caixin Century Weekly, February 2011. 2 Wang Erde, “Behind the Mist: 1/6 of China’s Farmland Suffers Heavy Metal Pollution,” 21st Century Business Herald, June 20, 2012.

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Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law (中国土壤污染防治法) entered the legislation stage.” The report said that Wang Shuyi (王树义), a law professor from Wuhan University, was appointed as head of the legislative panel. The draft bill highlighted “the establishment of a ‘soil pollution record system’ and ‘soil pollution control zones and recovery zones,’ and also regulated requirements on soil recovery and reuse.” The law was expected to be promulgated during the next term of the National People’s Congress.3 In view of this, topics on this issue will continue to draw more attention in the next few years. 1

Soil Pollution: The Data

In fact, soil pollution is not new in China. As early as the 1980s and 1990s, the seriousness of heavy metal pollution in soil was shown in studies. A notable case is the cadmium pollution in the Zhangshi (张士) irrigation area of Shenyang. In the 1980s, cadmium accumulated in the soil and rice of 2,800 hectares of paddy fields, as they had been irrigated with wastewater (from local refineries) containing cadmium for a long period of time. As a result, the cadmium levels in the blood and urine of local residents reached 1.06 and 13.26 micrograms per liter respectively, several times more than normal levels.4 In the 1980s, Chen Tao (陈涛) and other scientists from the Institute of Forestry and Soil Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences did research on this.5, 6 Another example comes from Guizhou Province, which has the largest mercury ore reserves in China as well as an alarming level of mercury pollution in soil. The data in 1986 showed that the mercury level in the contaminated soil in Guizhou reached up to 55.64 mg/kg, over 180 times that of the background value, or the naturally occurring level of heavy metals in soil. Inefficient mercury mining and smelting technologies were considered to be the cause of the pollution, as the recovery ratio at the local mercury mines was only between

3 Zhou Hui and Shi Zubo, “Legislation on Soil Pollution Should be done As Soon As Possible,” 21st Century Business Herald, September 29, 2012. 4 Chen HM et al., “Heavy Metal Pollution in Soils in China,” Ambio, Vol. 28, No.2 (Mar. 1999): 130–134. 5 Chen Tao et al., “Research on the Cadmium-polluted Soil Recovery and Cadmium Pollution Prevention and Treatment in the Rice in Zhangshi Irrigation Area [J],” Environmental Science, no. 5 (1980): 7–11. 6 Chen Tao et al., “A Study on the Form of Cadmium in the Soil of the Irrigation Area,” Acta Ecologica Sinica, no. 4 (1985): 300–306.

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30% to 45%. That is to say, more than half of the mercury was discharged into the environment during the smelting process.7 Although soil pollution has been a problem for quite a long time, the government has been reluctant to release relevant data. A number of official investigations have been carried out, which include: investigations into the background value of soil across China, the soil quality in the “Vegetable Basket” Project Planting Base (“菜篮子”种植基地), pollution in the main sewage irrigation areas, and a survey on the soil conditions conducted by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Land and Resources in 2006.8 However, relevant data was seldom released. Two “official” figures are often quoted by the media: “1/5 of the cultivated land in China has been polluted by heavy metals”9 and “up to 12 million tons of grain is polluted by heavy metals each year.” But the two figures are widely questioned. In 2011, Zhou Shengxian (周生贤), the minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, disclosed in the official report of the twenty-third meeting of the Eleventh National People’s Congress Standing Committee that “about 10 million hectares of cultivated land in China, or 8.3% of the total, has been polluted.”10 This figure is different from that in the Report on the State of Environment in China (中国环 境状况公报) in the year 2000, which showed that the level of heavy metals in 12.1% of the country’s land (based on sampling of 300 thousand hectares of farmland in the protective zones) exceeded the standard.11 Though lower than previously reported, the figures still alerted the public. In addition to the data, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has not yet announced the specific distribution of polluted areas. Due to the lack of convincing official data, the data in scientific documents seem to be extremely valuable. For instance, based on the published 7 8

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Chen HM et al., Heavy Metal Pollution in Soils in China, Ambio, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Mar 1999): 130–134. Li Fasheng et al., “Chinese Soil Environmental Protection Policy,” Policy Research Report of China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2010, p. 251. Li Xuelin and Zhang Xiaoyan: “With 1/5 of Its Land Contaminated by Heavy Metal, China is Designing Its Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law,” Wen Hui Bao, February 3, 2010. Sun Bin et al., “With over 10% of China’s Cultivated Land Polluted by Heavy Metal, the Fertile Land in Northeast China May Disappear,” Economic Information Daily, June 11, 2012. The Ministry of Environmental Protection, “The Report on the State of Environment in China in 2000,” the Ministry of Environmental Protection, http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/ zkgb/2000/200211/t20021125_83822.htm.

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data, researchers at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences estimate the amount of heavy metal elements put into the soil each year, considering sources including atmospheric sedimentation, livestock manure, fertilizer, agricultural products, irrigation water, and sludge. One trend is especially worth noting: according to their calculations, at the current rate of heavy metal input, it takes only fifty years to make the cadmium content rise from the background value to above the soil quality standard stipulated by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. This may get worse in areas where the cadmium content is higher than the background value in the first place, or the cadmium input is much higher than the average level.12 In addition, in China, atmospheric sedimentation has produced soil arsenic input about 100 times higher than that in Europe. This is due to the high amount of arsenic in China’s coal, the infrequent use of coal washing, and poor pollution control.13 Fertilizer is another major source of heavy metal in soil. In all kinds of inorganic fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer is seen as the biggest contributor of heavy metal in soil, especially cadmium. By contrast, more heavy metal (especially mercury and arsenic) is produced in the 12 million tons of compound fertilizer used in China each year. Another significant trend is that, with improving pollution control, the amount of heavy metal in wastewater and sludge has fallen over the past ten years, but since more sewage is being treated than before, much more sludge (about 4.6 million tons per year) is produced, of which about 10% is used in agriculture.14 In another collection of research on heavy metal in soil in the past several years, it was found that in the twelve Chinese cities covered in the research, the median heavy metal content in agricultural soil was generally higher than the background value. Among the elements, cadmium and mercury had higher pollution indexes, while chromium, copper, lead, zinc, and nickel had lower ones.15 The cadmium content in the agricultural soil in Chengdu and Xuzhou exceeded the standards. This is also true for the mercury content in the agricultural soil in Guangzhou and Chengdu.16 12

Luo et al., “An Inventory of Trace Element Inputs to Agricultural Soils in China,” Journal of Environmental Management, 90 (2009): 2524–2530. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Igeo= Log2 (Cn/1.5Bn), where Cn is the measured value (concentration), and Bn is the background value. 16 Wei Binggan and LinshengYang, “A Review of Heavy Metal Contaminations in Urban Soils, Urban Road Dusts and Agricultural Soils from China,” Microchemical Journal, 94 (2010): 99–107.

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Soil Pollution: The Luliang Pollution Incident

With the serious situation of soil pollution in China and the complex factors surrounding it, people disagree on the solutions to the problem. Despite the fact that the public has not paid attention until recently, non-governmental environmental organizations have made efforts to expose the problem. After the chromium residue pollution incident in Luliang (陆良), Yunnan Province in 2011, the public focused on the disposal of illegally dumped chromium residue, the non-hazardous treatment, bringing the law-breaking enterprise to justice, the influence on the water quality on the downstream Pearl River, and public interest litigation. Yet the soil pollution in this incident was seldom mentioned by the media. But this incident offered a glimpse into many key elements of China’s soil pollution problem and the priority of future policy making; hence, it is worthy of further exploration. The chromium residue pollution incident in Luliang started from more than 5,000 tons of toxic chromium residue by the Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industrial Co. (云南陆良化 工实业有限公司), which polluted nearby water resources and killed livestock. This incident left a giant chromium residue heap by the river for many years, causing a lasting impact on the environment. After the incident, different organizations conducted field investigations. Among them were government organizations like the investigation group called the Pearl River Water Resources Commission under the Ministry of Water Resources and the Yunnan Environmental Protection Department, as well as non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace and Friends of Nature. The investigations concentrated on local water pollution. For example, the sampling target of the Pearl River Water Resources Commission included the “Huangnipu Reservoir (黄泥 堡水库), Nanpan River (南盘江河), and other water areas; the water samples from the upstream, midstream, and downstream parts of the river near the slag dump of Luliang Chemical Industrial Co.; and the water samples from the border area of Qujing (曲靖) and Kunming and from the section of the Nanpan River at the border of Yunnan and Guangxi provinces.”17 The survey by Greenpeace also focused on the water quality in the farmland near the factories and in the river near the chromium residue heap. Of the nine soil samples collected from local farmland and submitted for examination by Friends of Nature, three had higher total chromium content than the maximum value of 400 mg/kg specified in Environmental Quality 17

“Water Resources Ministry said Yunnan Chromium Residue Pollution Threatens Drinking Water Safety for People and Livestock,” China News Agency, August 18, 2012, http://news .dayoo.com/china/201108/18/53868_18690658.htm.

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Standard for Soils (GB15618-1995) (土壤环境质量标准), the highest of which was 7,902 mg/kg. These findings provided a new perspective on the Qujing chromium residue pollution incident, linking the enterprises (chromate plants) with local soil pollution. This was also reflected in public interest litigation filed by Friends of Nature and volunteers in Chongqing, demanding that the defendant, Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industrial Co. bear the costs of environmental pollution and ecological restoration, including of the polluted farmland.18 This case also showed the complexity of soil pollution. For instance, soil pollution usually builds up over a long time, thus is not easy to be identified immediately. Over time, the subjects of liability are likely to change, shift, or even disappear. As in this case, the Yunnan Luliang Chemical Industrial Co. (Yunnan Luliang Peace Technology Co.), the enterprise directly responsible for the pollution, used to be the Luliang Transportation Machinery Repair Plant (陆良县运输机械修理厂), founded in 1988.19 In 2003, it was purchased and reformed by the Haining Peace Chemical & Industry Co. (海宁和平化工 有限公司), a private enterprise in Zhejiang Province. By that time, the plant had accumulated about 280,000 tons of chromium residue.20 So it is fair to say that the pollution started before the current enterprise came into being. Having received the residue, the new plant continued to generate more residue, creating more pollution. Fortunately, the polluter in this case still exists, so the public welfare organizations could bring the existing polluter to court, demanding compensation and remediation of the environment. But in other cases, the subjects of liability often cease to exist. In a report by the World Bank,21 in recent years more than one hundred polluting enterprises within the Fourth Ring Road of Beijing have been relocated for development on 8 million square meters of industrial land. In Guangzhou, around one hundred industrial enterprises have closed down and relocated since 2007. This situation has brought challenges concerning liability and the pollution-control funding mechanism. The funding mechanism is considered to be “a decisive 18

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Beijing Chaoyang FON Environment Institute, “Indictment of Civil Litigation for Public Interest on Environment,” Beijing Chaoyang FON Environment Institute, September 20, 2011, http://www.pil.org.cn/q_aj/q_ajpage_2720.html. Li Guangshou, “Behind the Disappeared 300,000 Tons of Chromium Residue: Luliang’s Chemical Industry Contributed ‘Black GDP’ for 23 Years,” National Business Daily, August 25, 2011. Tan Jun and Yang Ya, “With Special Fund, Enterprises Continue Illegal Dumping of Chromium Residue,” Xiaoxiang Morning Herald, August 23, 2011. Xie Jian and Li Fasheng, “An Analysis of the Remediation and Re-development of Contaminated Land in China,” The World Bank, September 2010.

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factor promoting soil protection and pollution control.”22 In this case, environmental protection organizations proposed that the polluting enterprise pay 10 million RMB to a special fund set up and managed by a third party, which was to be used for the restoration of the damaged environment, under the supervision of environmental protection organizations, the court, and a third party. However, this case is an exception in public interest litigation, and there have not been any conclusions as to how the “public welfare fund” is going to operate. As for soil pollution, what sorts of fiscal and funding mechanisms are to be adopted needs further consideration. Present options include taxes, subsidies, and specially appropriated funds.23 In addition, the Qujing pollution incident also revealed some other urgent problems, such as the large amount of contaminated land for agricultural purposes. So far, the local government has taken some measures to dispose of the polluted land:24 (1) The earth on the slope on the south of the plant was removed and transported to the plant for treatment. People were prohibited from farming, grazing, or using water in the contaminated area south of the plant; (2) Sampling was made of the soil, water, and crops in Xinglong Village (兴隆村). The contaminated rice was harvested and destroyed promptly, and the farmers received 21,000 RMB for each hectare of crops they grew as compensation; (3) The production of agricultural products such as walnuts and edible mushrooms as well as breeding was taken as a priority. These measures can be summarized as transferring contaminated soil, farmland recovery, destruction of polluted crops, and re-planning of crop planting. They represent different risk management strategies, and are mostly emergency measures. But the local government did not specify in its bulletin the criteria for such measures (for example, the link between the degrees of pollution and the types of measures), and the conditions of pollutants in the soil after the measures were taken. Some other crucial problems remain, given that pollution is common in China and the polluted soils are used for 22

Li Fasheng et al., “China’s Soil Environmental Protection Policy,” Policy Research Report of China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2010. 23 Ibid. 24 Yunnan.cn, “Qujing Reports on Handling of Chromium Residue; Supervision Will be Taken around the Clock,” Yunnan.cn, October 24, 2011. http://society.yunnan.cn/html/ 2011-10/24/content_1877148.htm.

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d­ ifferent p ­ urposes. Such problems include: How was the compensation standard worked out? Who is going to pay it? Is the new crop planning reasonable? How should it be implemented among the local farmers? 3

Soil Pollution: About the Policy

In 2008, the Opinions on Strengthening the Prevention and Control of Soil Pollution (关于加强土壤污染防治工作的意见) (OSPCSP) by the Ministry of Environmental Protection set the tone for policies on the prevention and control of soil pollution for the next few years. OSPCSP set the basic principles of future work: “giving priority to prevention, and combining prevention with control,” “making overall planning and achieving breakthroughs in key fields,” “adapting to local conditions and providing specific guidance,” and “the government dominating, with public participation.” It states that “in rural areas, the priorities of supervision should be given to basic farmland and important places of agricultural production, especially the ‘Vegetable Basket’ Project Planting Base; in urban areas, the priorities of supervision should be given to the polluted soil in the land left by relocated factories, whose use is adjusted for non-industrial purposes according to the planning of urban construction and land use.” Moreover, the OSPCSP made a top-down design of the roadmap for China’s soil pollution prevention and control system in the coming years, including: “by 2010, a comprehensive survey of soil pollution will be completed, to get a basic idea of the soil environment quality throughout the country”; and “by 2015, a basic system of supervision and management on soil pollution prevention and control will be established, a number of laws and regulations related to soil pollution prevention and control will be promulgated, and the standard system on the prevention and control of soil pollution will be further improved.” At the beginning of 2010, two years after this roadmap was proposed, it was said that the Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law (with expert opinions) was completed and submitted to relevant departments for comments.25 Professor Wang Shuyi, who was responsible for drafting the bill with expert opinions, told reporters that the law “will soon be published.” During the NPC and CPPCC in 2011, the demand for legislation on soil pollution prevention and control reached its climax. Some deputies submitted proposals related to soil pollution prevention and control. Among them were 25

Li Xue and Zhang Xiaoyan, “Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law under Drafting,” Wen Hui Bao, February 3, 2010.

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NPC deputy Zhao Linzhong26 (赵林中) and Jia Kang27 (贾康) a member of the CPPCC National Committee. What’s more, deputies Zhao Linzhong and Xu Jinglong (徐景龙) submitted two proposals signed by sixty-two deputies,28 suggesting the formulation of a soil pollution prevention and control law. The Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party Central Committee also carried out special investigations on soil pollution prevention and control in Jiangsu Province in June 2011. Based on the findings, it “put forward suggestions to the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, including: establishing and improving a system of laws and policies on soil protection, quick implementation of the strategy on soil pollution prevention and control, and further strengthening the prevention and control of agricultural non-point source pollution, etc.”29 In spite of the call for legislation, disagreements between different government departments in charge added uncertainty to this complicated subject involving multiple organizations and areas. Regarding the above proposals, two ministries under the State Council conflicted with each other. The Ministry of Environmental Protection asserted that “special laws on soil pollution prevention and control should be made as soon as possible,” while the Ministry of Agriculture argued that “soil is the ultimate destination of all kinds of pollution, so the key to address soil pollution is to manage the pollutant sources; the priority of our present work should be given to strict law enforcement and supervision as well as perfecting the regulations, rather than legislation on soil pollution prevention and control.” 26

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Yue Deliang and Huang Shengang, “Deputy Zhao Linzhong: Early Actions should be Taken for Prevention and Control of Soil Pollution,” China.com.cn, March 10, 2011, http://www .china.com.cn/2011/2011-03/10/content_22100289.htm. Zhang Yuzhe, “Jia Kang: Legislation of Soil Environment Protection should Speed Up,” Caixin.com, March 5, 2011, http://china.caixin.com/2011-03-05/100232709.html. According to the Organic Law of the National People’s Congress and Rules of Procedure for the National People’s Congress, a delegation or a group of thirty or more deputies may submit proposals to the NPC within its scope of functions and powers. The presidium shall decide whether to put them on the agenda of the meeting. It may also give them to relevant special committees for deliberation, before considering adding it to the agenda based on their opinions. By comparison, NPC suggestions are presented by individual deputies or jointly submitted. The content is not limited to the scope of the NPC’s functions and powers, and has no deadline for submission. The suggestions are then handed over by the NPC Standing Committee’s offices to relevant organizations. Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, “The Major Work of Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party Central Committee in Participation in State Affairs and Social Service in 2011,” Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party Website, February 28, 2012, http://www.ngd.org.cn/jczt/2012nqglkzt/lksd2012/9910.htm.

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The differences within the authorities on the legislation are probably the main reason for the delay of the law’s appearance. Some websites in the industry were so eager that they published articles calling for the early promulgation of the law, so as to “keep up with the times.”30 By the second half of 2012, however, the legislative process seemed to accelerate. In a report in September, Professor Wang Shuyi said that China’s Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law had shifted from expert study to the legislation phase.31 He also presented the expert draft, explaining that it focused on the establishment of “a soil pollution record system” and “soil pollution control zones and recovery zones.” The acceleration of legislation may have been promoted by top government officials, as was confirmed by Professor Wang in the interview, “With an instruction from the top authorities, the issue attracted the attention of senior officials.” On November 1, in the executive meeting of the State Council presided over by Premier Wen Jiabao, the officials made arrangements for the protection and comprehensive management of China’s soil, and specified the main tasks of soil pollution prevention and control in China: (1) Closely protect the cultivated land and the soil of concentrated drinking water sources; (2) Strengthen the control of pollutants of soil; (3) Strictly supervise the environmental risk of the polluted soil; (4) Carry out soil pollution control and remediation; (5) Improve the capacity of soil supervision. From the OSPCSP by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008 to the arrangement in the executive meeting of the State Council in 2012, we can clearly see a general idea in China’s soil pollution control: adapt to local conditions, control soil pollution in allocated areas, and manage risks. This idea was elaborated in a policy research report by the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development in 2010. The State first determines the priorities for soil protection (such as human health), before it formulates the corresponding soil management strategies (such as remediation or system control) based on the land use (residential, agricultural, or industrial) and the degrees of pollution.32 But how can this idea be translated into concrete laws, which will provide solutions to issues like the above Qujing pollution incident? For the answer, we may refer to the laws and regulations on 30 Er-China.com, “The Delayed Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law,” Er-China .com, March 19, 2012, http://www.er-china.com/PowerLeader/html/2012/03/ 20120319110752.shtml. 31 Zhou Hui and Shi Zubo, “Soil Pollution Legislation Should be made as Soon as Possible,” 21st Century Business Herald, September 29, 2012. 32 Li Fasheng et al., “China’s Soil Environmental Protection Policy,” Policy Research Report of China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2010.

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soil pollution prevention and control in other countries and regions, as have been indicated that the experience and practices of other countries are valued in the legislation of the law.33 Such laws and regulations often have the following characteristics: 1)

Actions after the pollution are highlighted: As the main object of regulation, government organizations assess and classify soil pollution according to certain standards, and specify the permitted activities in different areas. In other words, the laws mainly stipulate how the authorities address pollution after it takes place, with detailed rules to follow. 2) Address soil pollution in divided areas: Based on the degrees of pollution, the polluted land is divided into different zones, such as “control zones” and “remediation zones.”34 After classifying the polluted land, the government makes plans for investigations and control, and conducts assessments and tests on the health risks. It also takes other actions including “ordering the polluter to stop polluting,” “asking the residents to stop using the groundwater or other contaminated water,” “putting up notices, signs, and fences,” “controlling or destroying agricultural and fishery products,” etc.35 Legal constraints for areas with heavy pollution are more strictly enforced, such as banning transactions, auctions, or the illegal change of land use before the soil quality is restored to below the standards. 3) A “collective payment” mechanism: Some regulations provided that a “Soil Pollution Remediation Fund” was to be established for the expenses involved in the investigation and treatment of pollution.36 The payers of the fund include “the polluter, potential polluter, and interested party of the polluted land.” This mechanism shows the principle of “collective payment,” an extension and supplement of the “polluter payment” principle. Under collective payment, whenever polluter payment becomes impossible, all parties that are likely to produce pollution shall take responsibility. Since certain chemical substances or products will probably pollute soil and groundwater in production or use, from which the

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Southern Metropolis Daily, “Legislative Expert Wang Shuyi: Soil Pollution Legislation is An Urgent Need,” October 20, 2012. Such as the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan. Such as the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan. Such as the Superfund Act in the United States of America, and the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Remediation Act in Taiwan, etc.

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producers and importers profit in the production or sale, they are to pay according to the principle of collective payment.37 Although the ideas and experiences of other countries and regions are of great value, it remains uncertain whether the regulations on soil pollution prevention and control in mainland China will move closer to them. Among the uncertainties is whether the idea of taking pollution treatment as the priority will be adopted, for the principles of legislation are still swaying between pollution prevention and treatment as the focus. Experts confirmed that “great changes may happen to the fundamental ideas in the legislation phase.”38 Another focus is how the release of information on soil pollution will be stipulated in regulations. Regularly publishing such information in the Report on the State of the Environment in China and other official publications will determine how much the public is allowed to know and participate in this issue. 37

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Zhang Zunguo, “The Situation and Remediation Policy Research on Soil Pollution in Taiwan,” NPF Backgrounder, June 28, 2002, http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/SD/091/ SD-B-091-021.htm. Zhou Hui and Shi Zubo, “Legislation on Soil Pollution Should be Done As Soon As Possible,” 21st Century Business Herald, September 29, 2012.

chapter 19

Oil Spills and Ocean Pollution Feng Jie and Tu Fangjing Abstract The 2011 Bohai Sea oil spill has not been fully cleaned up. There have been continuing disputes over pollution treatment, environmental restoration, and compensation. Chinese courts remain indifferent to the compensation claims of local fishermen, while the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Oceanic Administration facilitated a compensation package plan that leaves many out. The oil spill incident which could have led to successful pollution management and compensation, has instead been sacrificed to the need to maintain stability. Disappointed and angry fishermen have thus been seeking legal support in U.S. courts. This has complicated an otherwise simple case. With continuous marine pollution incidents occurring in the past year, we have no reason to feel optimistic about our marine environment. Marine pollution remains out of public sight and largely overlooked.

Keywords oil spill – marine pollution – compensation – international litigation

As public attention to the Bohai Sea oil spill has gradually died down, the afterspill story has just unfolded, and to some extent, is more dramatic than the oil spill itself. The marine environment, vaguely described by the authorities as “quite good in general,” remains seriously polluted. As stated in China’s Communique on Marine Environment Quality (中国海 洋环境公报), in 2011, the area of highly polluted Category IV seawater in the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea increased by 990 square kilometers and 3,010 square kilometers respectively. Major areas of pollution and/or eutrophication include the northern coastal waters of the Yellow Sea, Liaodong Bay, Bohai Bay, the coast of Jiangsu Province, the mouth of the Yangtze River, Hangzhou Bay, the mouth of the Zhu River, and the coast of Dalian. Meanwhile, red tides and green tides occur frequently and seawater intrusion, soil salinization, and marine pollution are becoming increasingly serious.

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Ecosystem of the Contaminated Waters Not Restored, Compensation Not Yet Settled

In 2013, two new incidents, the algae red tide in Pingtan (平潭), Fujian Province and the typhoon-induced plastic pellet spill in Hong Kong caught the public’s attention. But at the same time, the Bohai Sea oil spill at the Penglai 19-3 oilfield (蓬莱19-3溢油), which occurred in June 2011, had not yet been fully resolved. From the initial “cover-up” to the administrative intervention of judicial compensation, the aftershock from this incident could still be felt in early 2013. On October 1, 2012, a preliminary hearing on the lawsuit filed by thirty Chinese fish farmers against ConocoPhillips was held in the Southern District Court of Texas. These fish farmers came from Mouping District of Yantai (烟台市牟平区), Shandong Province. They requested compensation of at least 50,000 USD each for the losses caused by the 2011 Bohai Sea oil spill. They filed the lawsuit in a U.S. court because they were excluded from China’s administrative compensation plan and could not seek legal assistance in China. Earlier, during the Spring Festival holidays, on January 25, 2012 the Ministry of Agriculture announced it had reached a deal with ConocoPhillips for a 1 billion RMB compensation fund for fish farming and fishing resources. And on April 27, 2012, just two days before the May Day holiday, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) released a 300-word announcement with no mention of the amount of oil spilled nor policies for compensation, but stating that it had agreed on a nearly 1.7 billion RMB compensation fund for ecological damages with ConocoPhillips. This means that the Penglai 19-3 oilfield incident, so far the biggest oil spill to ever occur in China, was officially settled with a total amount of 3.033 billion RMB, including all compensation claimed by the Ministry of Agriculture and SOA. The administrative settlement made attempts at litigation almost impossible. The fishermen who were supposed to be included in the administrative compensation plan could no longer file suits in Chinese courts. Twenty-nine fishermen from Liaoting (乐亭), Hebei Province who were lucky enough to have filed suits in the Tianjin Maritime Court have no idea when the hearing will be scheduled. And by January 2013, the lawsuit had exceeded the prescribed one year time period. In July 2012, the author called the Tianjin Maritime Court. Not surprisingly, there was no scheduled date for the hearing on the Liaoting suit. Another 107

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fishermen’s cases were not even put on file for investigation. Zhang Fuqiu (张福秋), legal counsel for the Liaoting case, said that he had been called upon by the Tianjin Maritime Court and Liaoting County government to persuade the fish farmers to drop the case. Zhao Jingwei (赵京慰), a lawyer for a case which was filed only six days after the Liaoting one, said that he had not received any confirmation from the court yet. Half a year after the oil spill incident, the water and sediment quality near the Penglai 19-3 oilfield and central Bohai Sea area had improved somewhat. But the impact of this incident is still being felt strongly, and the affected area’s ecosystem and ecosystem services have not fully recovered. Before the Penglai 19-3 oilfield spill, on July 16, 2010, two crude oil pipelines near the city of Dalian’s new port exploded. The nearby marine ecosystem had not fully recovered when the Penglai incident occurred. In April 2011, the oil content in seawaters of Dalian Bay (大连湾), Dayao Bay (大窑湾), and Xiaoyao Bay (小窑湾) was higher than in other areas. Oil content in sediments on the bottom of the northeast part of Dalian Bay is still much higher than in other areas. Tidal zone creatures that were seriously contaminated by the oil pollution are in slow recovery. Almost all barnacles (Balanus albicostatus) in the tidal zone of the Dalian Bay, 64% of the oysters in the tidal zone of Dayao Bay, and 68% of the spiral-shaped sea snails (Littorina brericula) are empty. 2

Bohai Ecosystem Deteriorating, Fishermen’s Lawsuit in the U.S. Pending

The Bohai Sea only takes up 2.6% of China’s sea area, but its marine ecosystem is the most severely damaged. Before the 2011 oil spill, the pollution problem there was already at its limit. Statistics in 2008 showed that 81% of the drainage points along the Bohai coast discharged pollutants beyond the regulated standards. The Bohai Sea is a small, enclosed bay which means that one water exchange will take at least sixteen years. On June 5, 2012, World Environment Day, news from the Ministry of Environmental Protection confirmed the public’s concerns: among the four seas in China, the quality of the offshore seawaters in the Yellow Sea was good, the South Sea was passable, and the Bohai and East China Seas were of poor quality. Even though the Bohai Sea has clearly been affected by the Penglai 19-3 spill, the attempts by the fish farmers to seek justice in Chinese courts have repeatedly failed.

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“The fishermen did not receive proper compensation and were treated unfairly because they had been deprived of the recourse to go to court,” said legal counsel Stuart Smith. “They could not file suits and did not receive any official document to tell them whether their suits would be accepted.” Smith is an attorney based in New Orleans specializing in litigation against major oil companies and other polluters. He is well-known for winning a radioactive oilfield waste case against ExxonMobil. He was also one of the attorneys representing commercial fishermen in claims related to the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Jia Fangyi (贾方义), the attorney who helped the Chinese fish farmers file suit in the U.S. court, said that the first group of plaintiffs share one thing in common: they had filed suits on November 18, 2011 in the Qingdao Maritime Court and had waited eight months, during which time their case had not been accepted and they had not received any notification from the court. Another attorney, Thomas Bilek, believed that the inaction of Chinese courts was the pre-condition for American courts to accept the case. And the fact that ConocoPhillips’ headquarters is in Houston and many of the decisions that eventually led to the oil leak were made there, made it appropriate for a Houston court to handle the case. Having experienced repeated rejections from the domestic courts, the Chinese fish farmers filed a 21-page indictment at an American court and finally saw their case accepted with the official case number “4:12-cv-01976.” To avoid conflicting jurisdiction, which happened in the case of the A Qiuer people from northern Peru when they filed against Occidental Petroleum Corporation, the three law firms decided that they would give up litigation against ConocoPhillips China and China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) and focus on litigating only against ConocoPhillips. Even so, filing suit in the U.S. is going to be a long and hard fight. Once the suit was submitted, ConocoPhillips made an announcement hat “(The suits) are not appropriate for U.S. courts and should be dismissed.” At present, the Houston court is still deliberating over ConocoPhillips’ contestation of jurisdiction and no further progress has been made. Several lawyers expressed concerns over the issue of jurisdiction when the fish farmers filed suit in the U.S. in July 2012. Xia Jun (夏军), a lawyer at the Beijing Zhongzi Law Firm (北京中咨律师事务所) said that the legal doctrine of “forum non conveniens” limits the principle of long-arm jurisdiction because facts and evidence are all in China. The American court may reject the case based on inconvenience. The uncertainty over the lawsuit at present confirms the concerns of some Chinese lawyers.

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Lawsuit against ConocoPhillips, a Shame on Chinese Courts

Lawyer Jia Fangyi had filed an environmental public interest lawsuit at the Qingdao Maritime Court right after the oil spill incident. Usually a court has seven days following the receipt of a lawsuit to decide if it will accept it. But long after the deadline of seven days, the court was still “deliberating” over the case. On September 5, 2011, Jia Fangyi submitted an open letter to the Shandong procuratorial department calling for an investigation into the criminal liability of ConocoPhillips for severely polluting the environment. In October, he once again called for an investigation into SOA’s dereliction of duty. Then he was called in to talk with a department leader from the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice. Upon telling the leader that he was waiting to see SOA’s further action to decide whether to sue them or not, the leader said, “Go on, wait and see.” Later on, Huacheng Law Firm (华城律师事务所), where Jia works, put forth a new policy which says that important cases should be endorsed by three law partners. This, in the eyes of Jia’s assistant Guo Chengxi (郭乘希), is equivalent to depriving Jia of his right to take on transnational class action cases. “It makes no sense for other lawyers to endorse important cases. Nobody would agree to do such a high-risk-no-benefits kind of thing,” he said. In China, the business license of a law firm is reviewed yearly by the Bureau of Justice. The legal predicament caused by the Bohai Sea oil spill goes far beyond that. In fact, as early as December 2011, at a symposium on environmental public interest lawsuits held by Peking University Law School, American and Chinese scholars and lawyers reached a consensus with regard to channels and consequences of legal assistance. Gan Peizhong (甘培忠), a law professor at Peking University, pointed out at the symposium that when the parties concerned have sued for compensation claims of billions of RMB, it would be very difficult for the government to intervene and reach an agreement. It has become “an ugly social and political phenomenon” when courts in China reject lawsuits against state-run enterprises’ infringement of rights. “A court rejects a victim’s litigation on the basis of not being within jurisdiction or other reasons. This has done severe damage to the court’s integrity and credibility,” Gan argued in one of his papers. Xia Jun, from the Zhongzi Law Firm, expressed happiness for the Chinese fish farmers, but at the same time observed that the handling of the Bohai oil spill had followed the usual “efficient but unjust” pattern. “Once the U.S. court

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accepts the case, it is the Chinese judicial system, not ConocoPhillips, who will be on trial,” Xia Jun said. Fang Guoqing (方国庆), a lawyer from Tianjin, was the plaintiff’s lawyer for the Tasman Sea case which set a successful precedent for compensation claims against foreign oil tankers’ marine pollution incidents. In the initial phase of the Bohai Sea oil spill, Fang had hoped that Chinese lawyers could once again set a successful precedent for judicial assistance in compensation claims in oil spill incidents. But once the administrative compensation package was settled, Fang, like many others in the judicial circle was disappointed. 4

Pollution Control Slow, Oilfields Ready to Resume Operation

There is a sharp contrast between the efforts made to control pollution and the readiness of oil fields to resume operation. Statistics from the SOA show that from 2006 to 2011, the average quality of the seawaters around more than 60% of the pollutant discharge points was at Level IV or below. Among these, seawaters around forty-one discharge points were continuously at Level IV or below. Meanwhile, the contamination of sediments of the waters around discharge points became worse, the percentage of Level III and under sediments had been increasing, and the percentage of Level I sediments had been decreasing. The major pollutants that caused all these were oil and heavy metals. In March, May, August, and October, 2011, 51%, 49%, 53%, and 54% of discharge points reached the limits of discharge standards. This was 6% higher than the year before. Among these, 121 discharge points reached the standards in all four inspections, 85 reached standards for three inspections, 81 for two inspections, and 75 for one inspection. There were still 83 discharge points that could not reach the standards all four times. But the percentage of belowstandard discharge points was 9% lower than that of the year before. The overall assessment by the SOA was that “the general quality of seawaters near discharge points has not seen much improvement while in some areas, the quality is quite bad.” In sharp contrast, the National Energy Administration made an announcement on its website in January 2013, claiming that the National Development and Reform Commission had approved in December 2012 the overall joint development program (ODP) for Phase II of CNOOC Penglai 19-3 oilfield and Penglai 25-6 oilfield. ConocoPhillips China’s corporate communications and corporate social responsibility director, Xue Dongming (薛东明), confirmed in a media

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i­nterview that the so-called Phase II of Penglai 19-3 was the one that had the oil leaks and had been shut down on September 2, 2011. ConocoPhillips is ready to resume production and is waiting for the official approval of the supervising agency. The SOA stipulates that before lifting the ban on operation, an ODP should be revised and a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) report for the oilfield should be drawn up. But in fact, ConocoPhillips has been working on resuming operations on Penglai 19-3 oilfield ever since it was ordered to shut down. An oil futures broker commented that oil fields that stopped operations by themselves due to technological inadequacies or industrial accidents usually did not have to get approval to resume production. It is very rare for the supervision agencies to order an oilfield to shut down. Penglai 19-3 is one exception. The order to shut down the Penglai 19-3 oilfield is still in dispute. Business insiders generally agree that it would not be good to seal the leaks because it would increase the pressure in the oil well. “Ordering to halt all operations is a political move to divert public attention,” one expert observed. Two days before the compensation agreement was reached, on April 24, 2012, CNOOC released its first quarter results: affected by the shutdown, the total net production of the company decreased by 6.3% compared with the same period the year before, and daily net production decreased by 62,000 barrels. In October, CNOOC announced in a statement that the company had received a notice of response to action of the class action lawsuit filed by its U.S. investors in the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York. CNOOC was accused of releasing false and misleading statements during the Penglai oil spill incident. Production at the Penglai 19-3 oilfield accounts for 3% of ConocoPhillips’ global production. A business insider commented that at a time when global oil prices are rising, the loss incurred by the shutdown is much greater than the compensation ConocoPhillips and CNOOC have to pay. Wang Yamin (王亚民), associate professor from the Marine College of Shandong University in Weihai (威海), believed that for the Penglai 19-3 oilfield to resume operation, the corporation should notify the public of their new ODP and EIA and solicit the public’s opinion, particularly that of the affected fishermen. As of early February 2013, China’s Communique on the Marine Environment for 2012 had not been published. What will be the future of Chinese oceans and how will people deal with the marine pollution problem? These questions are awaiting answers.

PART nine Investigative Reports

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chapter 20

Public Bicycles in Cities—Government Support is Key* Meng Si The modern Olympic Games have been held in cities worldwide since their advent in the late 19th century. As quadrennial and globally important events, the games not only promote sportsmanship and athletic talent, they are also a developmental tool, used to produce lasting effects on the infrastructure of the host city. In Beijing, for example, the 2008 Summer Olympic Games allowed locals the use of public bicycles for the very first time, bringing hope for their continued use into the future. At that time, environmental organizations believed a post-Olympic Beijing would return to the days—just ten years earlier—when it was known as “a city of bikes.” Bicycle rental service providers (BRSPs) thought that their “golden age” was about to begin. However, it now seems that their predictions were too optimistic. The highly anticipated government support has yet to materialize, despite the fact that BRSPs have already built rental locations for public bicycle use, and motor vehicles, which once represented comfort and speed, no longer save commuters time because of traffic jams. In addition to Beijing, the cities of Wuhan and Hangzhou created public bicycle systems (PBSs) in 2008. Today, researchers believe that a comparison of the different development patterns in these cities provides powerful evidence that government support plays a crucial role in the success of the PBS. 1

PBS: a New Idea for Public Transit

Globally, traffic jams have become a growing cost for many cities. With the rapid urbanization in China, traffic congestion is a normal part of daily life. In 2010, severe traffic lasting for more than twenty days on the Beijing end of the * This article is an excerpt from a report titled “Urban Bicycle Hire in China.” This report was co-authored by FON and ChinaDialogue. For the full version, please visit: http://fon .­chinawill.cn/index.php/index/post/id/890.

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Beijing-Tibet Highway drew widespread attention across China. Congestion during rush hour has become common in Chinese cities. A survey by IBM in 2011 showed that Beijing ranked third in the world for “the worst traffic conditions.” By the end of 2011, there were over 1.2 million vehicles in the city of Wuhan, as opposed to 450,000 parking spaces. In other words, the ratio of available parking spaces to the number of vehicles was 1:3 in Wuhan. In the city of Hangzhou, the percentage of residents who travelled by bike decreased from 60% in 1997 to 33.5% in 2007. Meanwhile, the energy supply has come under mounting pressure. China’s goal is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (per unit of GDP) by nearly 50% in a fifteen-year period (2005–2020). Nonetheless, the number of motor vehicles in China is increasing by more than ten million units per year. By the end of 2011, there were 225 million motor vehicles across the country. After buses and rail transportation, developing PBSs became the last hope for reducing pressure on transportation and energy consumption. Many Chinese cities have been developing PBSs since 2006. Medium- and large-sized cities have been developing or preparing to develop such systems on the basis of international experience. Public bicycles are available in sixtyone Chinese cities, according to statistics from Sun Jisheng (孙继胜), manager at the Changzhou Yong’an Public Bicycle System Co. (常州永安公共自行车 系统有限公司). These cities have opted to develop the novel concept of PBSs in different ways. 2

2008 Beginnings: Comparison among Three Cities

During the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, the Beijing Municipal Government required that motor vehicles with odd and even license plate numbers run on alternate days. At the same time, it provided 50,000 bicycles to encourage locals and visitors to travel by rented public bike. In May 2008, the Hangzhou Municipal Government began building a PBS in two phases, with phase one including the well-known scenic West Lake area as well as the western and northern parts of the city, and phase two including the southern and eastern parts of the city. In May of that year, thanks to donations from businesses, the Wuhan Municipal Government placed fifty bicycles in the Yinhe Apartment Complex (银河小区), in Qiaokou District (硚口区), for short-distance commuting between home and work by public servants. In so doing, the city formally started building its local PBS.

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Beijing: Struggling BRSPs

The bicycle rental industry appeared in Beijing in the 1990s, but it was not until 2007 that the industry began growing amid the preparation for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. During the Olympics, bicycles were rented at 5 RMB per hour or 20 RMB if a single rental session did not exceed 24 hours. This was far from cheap for citizens who had been used to 0.40 RMB per bus ticket. Given the small number of rental locations, bicycle rentals did not perform well despite favorable comments from the public. BRSPs were also in trouble: it was difficult for them to survive with thin profits and increasing numbers of rental locations. As a result, most BRSPs were operating while anticipating government inclusion of public bicycles into the public transit system, thereby supporting them via state subsidies. Bai Xiuying (白秀英), then manager at the Baike Lantu (贝科蓝图) bike rental shop, said that renting bikes was a public interest-oriented business with thin profits, as a membership card cost only 0.20 RMB per day on average. At the same time, it was too expensive for the company to commercially promote its rental locations. The shop wanted to study and use internationally accepted practices such as setting up billboards at its rental locations, painting advertisements onto bicycles, and using other marketing techniques to reduce the pressure on costs. Unfortunately, it failed to receive approval despite multiple applications. In addition, local authorities in charge of municipal environment and comprehensive law enforcement would not allow the shop to sell food and drinks at its locations. “It is nearly impossible for a private business to be able to coordinate between the authorities in charge of industry and commerce, taxation, water and power supply, city environment and administration, and so on,” Bai Xiuying explained. In May 2009, Fangzhou (方舟公司), then the largest BRSP in Beijing, was still hoping for a “public bicycle rental location every 200 meters within the Fifth Ring Road.” Less than one year later, Fangzhou was shut down as a result of poor business performance with a total loss of more than 10 million RMB. Baike Lantu had nearly 200 locations and 8,000 bicycles during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, when it served over 100,000 domestic and international visitors. By the end of 2010, however, it had only twelve locations and a few hundred bicycles for rental, before ultimately shutting down. Pan Haixiao (潘海啸), a professor at Tongji University, said, “The success of a PBS relies on whether the government sets PBS development as part of the

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overall urban development plan.” Dedicated to researching PBSs in Chinese cities, Professor Pan does not think that the Beijing Municipal Government has provided any clear support for the PBS. Back in 2005, the Beijing Municipal Government announced its goal of building a “livable city” while proposing a multi-mode, integrated transit system, with a focus on coordinating pedestrians, bicycles, buses, and the subway within the urban transit system. However, it was not until March 2010 that it mentioned bicycle rental industry development in the Green Beijing Action Plan 2010–2012 (绿色北京行动计划(2010–2012年)). Unfortunately, many of the local BRSPs no longer existed at that point. There was a long period of time when people saw rental bicycles on the ground in bicycle storage areas or under pedestrian bridges. They had all become rusty and dirty, with cracked or missing saddles and they still carried the names of the BRSPs that were struggling or no longer in existence. The environmental NGO Friends of Nature (FON) published a report titled Bike for a Better Beijing (宜居北京骑步走) in 2010. In it they said that Beijingbased bicycle rental services were backed by businesses with a lack of government administration and corresponding policy support; these businesses were slow in building rental locations due to limited financial and human resources. The Beijing Municipal Government spends several billion RMB each year building public transit infrastructure. In contrast, it was not until 2010 that it included the public interest-oriented bicycle rental in its policies. In Beijing, applying to open a bicycle rental company tends to be a process of overcoming difficulties, since the local Bureau of Commerce, Public Security Bureau, Transportation Commission, and the Industry and Commerce Bureau are all in charge of certain parts of the bicycle rental industry. In addition, issues such as water and power supply as well as heating are headaches for BRSPs. It was proposed in the Green Beijing Action Plan 2010–2012 that about 500 rental locations and over 20,000 rentable bicycles be available in Beijing by 2012. In June 2012, a PBS was finally introduced in Beijing when this plan was about to expire. A total of 2,000 bicycles are available at 63 locations. The new rental rate is: free riding within one hour and 1 RMB per hour beyond that, with an upper limit of 10 RMB per day and a duration of no more than three days. 4

The Mayors’ Resolutions

One day in May 2012, a group of public bicycle riders appeared by the Xiang River (湘江) in the city of Zhuzhou (株洲), Hunan Province. It turned out that more than fifty mayors or their representatives from around the world were

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promoting the city’s PBS. Wang Qun (王群), the mayor of Zhuzhou, read out a declaration titled “Low-Carbon Transportation and Green Traveling” on behalf of the attending mayors at the Mayors’ Forum on Sustainable Development during the Expo Central China 2012. Wang Zhigao (王志高), transportation officer at the Energy Foundation (EF), said that “PBSs can develop smoothly in many Chinese cities because there are needs from the top level—the mayors play a leading role. These cities expect to develop their PBSs into ‘star-like projects’.” To establish these systems, BRSPs need to visit multiple government departments and go through tedious administrative procedures. Fortunately, the government leaders’ resolutions can greatly increase the priority of these projects, especially those that need interdepartmental coordination. On September 4, 2008, Ruan Chengfa (阮成发), then-mayor of Wuhan, proposed at a meeting held by the municipal government that free bicycles be provided in the form of pilot programs in all districts, in order to address the issue of “the last kilometer of mobility.” Also proposed was that companies be invited to bid for operating a PBS. This was how the PBS project was initiated in Wuhan. In Hangzhou, Wang Guoping (王国平), then the head of the local committee of the Communist Party of China, and Xu Maiyong (许迈永), the deputy mayor at the time, both rode public bicycles shortly after the local PBS was established in 2008. Regarding PBS building and operation, however, the governments of Wuhan and Hangzhou took different approaches. The Wuhan Municipal Government is proud of the local PBS pattern characterized by government support and local company ownership—referred to as the “Wuhan Pattern.” Today, the PBS business in all the main districts of Wuhan is run by the local company Xinfeida Public Bicycle (鑫飞达公司), with the exception of Qingshan District (青山区), where Shanghai Ibike (上 海龙骑天际公司) runs it. By the end of April 2012, Xinfeida’s PBS business had grown to 1,318 locations and nearly 90,000 bicycles from 12 pilot locations and 1,000 bicycles, in less than four years. The PBS in Wuhan is unique because there is no direct investment from the local government. Instead, the operator is granted the right to develop an advertising business and other projects. This allows the operator to make profits and spend it building and managing the PBS. By so doing, the local government exchanges public resources for investment and public services provided by the companies. This is in contrast to the modes in which the government invests, operates, and manages the PBS by itself or employs companies for relevant services. Hiring companies for advertising services does not mean that the government of Wuhan no longer needs to make investments or efforts. Xinfeida, for example, made an early investment of 200 million RMB in building the

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PBS, including a large amount of external investment thanks to government intervention. It received a 50 million RMB unsecured loan from the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank for developing the local PBS business, with the corresponding interest to be paid by the local government. Since 2010, the government of Wuhan grants 100,000 RMB in subsidies to every new location and 100 RMB in subsidies to every new public bicycle. Xinfeida now has an annual operating expense of about 60 million RMB with sources including profits from billboard advertising and 12 million RMB in government subsidies. In addition, the government hires workers to manage kiosks at the locations and grants a 1,000 RMB monthly subsidy to those who do “public interest-oriented jobs,” and who meet certain requirements. In general, the local government is deepening cooperation with the company in the PBS field. The Wuhan Municipal Government has played a great role in PBS building, but it may have yet to do enough in this area. Xinfeida has just managed to break even and can only look forward to making profits sometime in the future. Professor Pan thinks that the businesses are still overburdened in the Wuhan Pattern and that public bicycles in this city are in the worst condition among such bicycles in the three cities. Sun Jisheng is not optimistic about the Wuhan Pattern either, saying that “it generally takes six months to one year to build a PBS, which is a very complex system. And the early spending is so high that few businesses can afford it.” To build and maintain a good PBS, the government must provide substantial financial and policy support. Relatively speaking, the “Hangzhou Pattern” is characterized by 100% government support. A state-owned enterprise set up for the PBS, the Hangzhou Public Bicycle Service (a subsidiary of Hangzhou Public Transport Group Co.) (杭州公共自行车交通服务发展有限公司) specializes in building and managing the local PBS. The local government provides support in terms of money, land, and road access by bicycle. With China’s densest public bicycle network, the city of Hangzhou has a public bicycle rental location every 100 meters on average; one bicycle is rented at least five times per day. Nowadays, public bicycles have become an important means of transport for citizens in this city. “This is because the Hangzhou Municipal Government regarded the PBS as part of the urban public transit system from the very beginning; it planned and deployed this system as a public service,” said Professor Pan in an article. He added that Hangzhou has been making great efforts to develop the PBS because it is a tourism-oriented city that values providing tourists with conveniences.

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Seeking a Fulcrum

The cities of Beijing, Wuhan, and Hangzhou present the results of comparison in terms of how much support the local governments provide for the PBS. From a nationwide perspective, there are a group of cities—Suzhou (苏州), Changshu (常熟), Nantong (南通), Xuzhou (徐州), and Zhangjiagang (张家港)—where the local governments have all opted to buy bicycle rental services. Researchers generally believe that government support is critical for the success of the PBS, regardless of development patterns. Sun Jisheng thinks that the PBS should be regarded as part of a city’s public transit system and receive government subsidies like buses and subways, and that problems with state-owned enterprises such as inefficiency and public resource wastage can be avoided by the government’s buying of bicycle rental services. Wang Zhigao has said, “Since the PBS is a public interest-oriented business, the government should assume most of the responsibility.” Wang also believes that public participation should be introduced into the PBS so that the public may make suggestions and efforts in terms of deploying locations and reporting damages—creating a real public-oriented business on the one hand, and on the other, avoiding the potential inefficiency caused by the government putting on a “one-man show.”

chapter 21

Small Particles, Big Breakthrough: A Report on the Air Quality Information Transparency Index in 113 Cities in 2012 Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs 1 Overview To promote urban air pollution control, the School of Law at Renmin University of China and the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs jointly developed the urban air quality information transparency index (AQTI). The firstphase assessment results, published in January 2011, show some air quality information of Chinese cities has been made public, but there is still a long way to go compared with cities in developed countries or regions. In 2011, extensive and lingering air pollution occurred in certain parts of China, causing deep public concerns. To respond to public calls for information disclosure, the Chinese government finished the amendment to the Ambient Air Quality Standard (空气环境质量标准) early in 2012, starting the historic improvement in urban air quality information transparency. To help the public precisely understand the trends and extent of such change and promote further improvement of air quality information transparency, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs decided to once again conduct an AQTI assessment in an expanded scope of 113 cities.1 The institute has also collaborated with the Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at the Beijing Technology and Business University, to analyze the hourly monitoring data in 120 cities, published by the China National Environment Monitoring Center. Ten cities with the highest air quality information transparency have been selected for this AQTI assessment: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan (东莞), Zhongshan (中山), Beijing, Foshan (佛山), Zhuhai (珠海), Nanjing, Suzhou, and Ningbo, each of which has a score higher than 54, while in the previous AQTI assessment, the highest score was only 38. The results show that, within a short period of time, remarkable progress has been made in these cities in monitoring and information disclosure of air quality. 1 Most of these are key environmental protection cities.

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The significant breakthrough, confirmed in this report, is that legal and regulatory requirements for information disclosure have been greatly raised, and that a batch of cities have improved their monitoring and information disclosure of fine particles (PM2.5) and other pollutants. However, concerted efforts are needed to promote the reduction of pollutant emission, so that information transparency can lead to the substantial improvement of air quality. Thanks to the systematic, timely, complete, and user-friendly information disclosure, these cities were able to score a much higher AQTI for the following reasons: some important pollutants, such as PM2.5 and ozone, have for the first time been included in the disclosure; a high frequency of information disclosure from the monitoring stations has gradually become the norm; not only the pollution indexes, but also the specific concentrations of specific pollutants have been disclosed; and more user-friendly methods, such as electronic maps and micro-blogging, have been adopted in many cities to publish air quality information. By conducting this assessment, the institute is able to sort out how laws and regulations on air quality information transparency have been pushed by multiple parties and greatly improved, including the addition of assessment factors such as PM2.5 and ozone, the tightening of concentration limits of pollutants such as PM10 and lead, the switch from the Air Pollution Index (API) to the ambient Air Quality Index (AQI) to make it consistent with the common name of the international community, and the canceling of low standards for industrial zones. The implementation timetable of new standards, published by the environmental protection agency shows the fast enforcement in Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and other provinces and municipalities. By August 31, 2012, a total of 192 monitoring points in 55 cities have published their PM2.5 information. Among them, Beijing in January 2012 was the first city to disclose information from one of its monitoring points. On October 6, such monitoring points were increased to thirty-five, making Beijing the city with the most information-disclosing points in China. The assessment conducted this time also reveals the defects in air quality information transparency. Most cities have a very limited information transparency, and the average score of the 113 assessed cities is only 21.5. In total, eighty-nine cities have a score lower than 30, eighty cities lower than 20, and sixty-four cities between 10 and 20, accounting for more than 50% of the total amount of assessed cities. The score for six cities is zero. As for the monitoring and disclosure of PM2.5—a major public concern— by the end of August 2012, the first-phase implementation plan of the new air quality standards had targeted twenty-nine cities, including Chongqing,

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Hohhot, Zhengzhou, Shenyang, Jinan, Hefei, Changsha, and Urumqi, which are yet to publish information. Wuhan, Chengdu, and most cities in Hebei, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces only disclose one of their monitoring points, failing to reveal the overall air quality of the whole city. Delayed updates have occurred for the real-time PM2.5 data of Shanxi Province. Xi’an, Xiamen, and cities in Zhejiang Province publish their information only based on a daily basis and Tianjin only discloses the average daily concentration of the previous month. According to the analysis, jointly conducted by the Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at the Beijing Technology and Business University and the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, of hourly monitoring data, collected at each monitoring point of 120 cities and published by the China National Environment Monitoring Center, air pollution in several regions is very serious. Of the nineteen cities whose concentration of sulfur dioxide exceeds the Level II standard, seven are in Shandong Province. This might due to the enormous energy consumption in this eastern province in recent years, according to preliminary estimates. An analysis has been conducted on the average monthly concentration of pollutants at some state-level monitoring points in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta. The results show three types of pollutants with consistent trends of change on monthly basis, indicating that urban air pollution occurs on a regional scale, and that coordinated air pollution prevention and control must be carried out to achieve satisfactory results and improve the air quality. Data from different monitoring points in the same city has also been analyzed, and considerable difference can be found among different points in the concentration of pollutants, indicating that reasonable deployment of monitoring points at the right locations is very important to reflect the actual air quality of a city. At the same time, that a city’s average air quality is up to the standard does not necessarily mean that people in all parts of the city are able to enjoy quality air, and attention needs to be paid to the impacts upon the environment and the health of the local residents. The report also studies the changing patterns of air pollution on seasonal and hourly basis in different areas. Based on the study and analysis, the following suggestions on air quality information transparency have been made in the 2012 AQTI assessment report: 1) air pollution information needs to be more transparent; 2) the making and implementation of emergency plans on polluted days should be promoted; and 3) more studies should be conducted using the available data.

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Results and Analysis of AQTI Assessment

2.1 Results of AQTI Assessment The 2012 AQTI assessment is a nationwide assessment conducted openly on urban air quality information of 113 cities in China. A full score for the AQTI is 100, and Guangzhou got the highest score with 76. The average score of all assessed cities was 21.5. Table 21.1 AQTI assessment scores and rankings of 113 cities in 2012 Rank City

AQTI score Rank City

AQTI score Rank City

AQTI score

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 19 20 21 22 23 23 25 26 27

76 75 69 67.6 64.8 64.8 56.4 56 55.2 54.8 50.2 47.4 44.2 43 42.6 39.6 38.6 38.6 37.8 33.6 31.8 31.2 30.6 30.6 28.8 28.6 27

19.2 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.2 18 18 17.6 17.4 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.2 15.8 15.6 15.6 15.6 15 15 14.4 14.4 14.4

13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 9.6 9 9 9 8.4 8.4

Guangzhou Shenzhen Dongguan Zhongshan Beijing Foshan Zhuhai Nanjing Suzhou Ningbo Shanghai Wuhan Nantong Xiaman Chengdu Changzhou Xi’an Nanning Shaoxing Tianjin Wuxi Yangzhou Hefei Chongqing Lianyungang Jiaxing Harbin

37 40 40 40 40 40 45 46 46 48 49 50 50 50 53 53 53 53 57 58 58 58 61 61 63 63 63

Shijiazhuang Yichang Baoding Yancheng Nanchang Yantai Linfen Huzhou Anyang Yangquan Datong Zhuzhou Kunming Baoji Jiujiang Qingdao Shantou Beihai Changye Quanzhou Yibin Shizuishan Fuzhou Yinchuan Jinzhou Wuhu Kaifeng

75 75 75 75 75 75 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 98 99 99 99 102 103

Zhengzhou Changsha Xiangtan Yueyang Guilin Xianyang Handan Chifeng Shenyang Anshan Changchun Jilin Qiqihaer Daqing Ma’anshan Zibo Zhangjiajie Panzhihua Luzhou Zunyi Kelamayi Yan’an Dalian Mudanjiang Mianyang Hohhot Baotou

(Continued)

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small particles, big breakthrough Table 21.1 (Continued) Rank City

AQTI score Rank City

AQTI score Rank City

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 34 34 37 37

25.4 24 22.8 22.2 22 20.4 19.8 19.8 19.8 19.2 19.2

14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 13.8 13.8

Taiyuan Wenzhou Fushun Xuzhou Taizhou Hangzhou Tangshan Guiyang Tongchuan Tai’an Jingzhou

63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 75 75

Luoyang Pingdingshan Changde Shaoguan Zhanjiang Liuzhou Lanzhou Xining Urumqi Jinan Zhaozhuang

Figure 21.1 Distribution of AQTI assessed cities.

104 105 106 106 108 108 108 108 108 108 　

AQTI score

Weihai 7.2 Qinhuangdao 5.4 Erdos 4.2 Jiaozuo 4.2 Benxi 0 Weifang 0 Jining 0 Rizhao 0 Qujing 0 Jinchang 0 　 　

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2.2 Analysis of the Results of the AQTI Assessment 2.2.1 Several Cities Have Upgraded Their Air Pollution Information Transparency to or Above an Intermediate Level The top ten cities with the highest air quality information transparency in China, according to this AQTI assessment, are Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Beijing, Foshan, Zhuhai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Ningbo. They all have a score higher than 54, while in the previous AQTI assessment, the highest score was only 38, indicating that, within a short period of time, some cities have made great progress in air quality monitoring and disclosure. 2.2.2 Great Progress Has Been Made in Some Cities Concerning Information Transparency Within a short period of time, the average score of twenty assessed cities increased from 23 in 2010 to 32.9 now. Among them, the AQTI score of Guangzhou, Beijing, Nanjing, Ningbo, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chengdu, Nanning, Tianjin, and Chongqing increased by more than 30%, while Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Nanning more than doubled their scores. The gap between Chinese cities and the international level is narrowing. Since the air quality in Paris, Los Angeles, New York, London, Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow is mainly stable, they have not been assessed this time, and their scores in 2011 will be used for comparison.

Figure 21.2 Comparison of AQTI scores in ten cities between 2010 and 2012.

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small particles, big breakthrough 100 90 80 70

Paris 89.2

Los Angeles New York 87.2 85.8 Hong Kong London 79.2 78.8 Guangzhou 76

Vienna 76.8

Beijing

60

Nanjing

64.8

56

50 40

Ningbo 54.8

Shanghai Wuhan 50.2 47.4

30 20 10

Guangzhou Beijing

Nanjing

Ningbo Shanghai

Wuhan

Berlin 69.8

Chengdu 42.6

Moscow 68.4 Mexico City 64.2

Nanning 38.6

Chengdu Nanning

Tianjin 33.6

New Deli 41.4 Chongqing 30.6

Tianjin Chongqing

0 Scores Chinese cities have made in 2010 Scores International cities have made in 2012 Scores Chinese cities have made in 2012

Figure 21.3

3

Comparison of AQTI scores between Chinese and international cities.

Some Cities Have Made Progress in Systematic, Timely, Complete, and User-Friendly Information Disclosure

a) Some important pollutants have for the first time been included in the information disclosure. –

Fine particles (PM2.5) The most evident defect of the 2010 AQTI assessment is the lack of monitoring indexes of air pollutants. At that time, PM2.5 was not included in the monitoring and information disclosure, and no Chinese cities had disclosed information on the pollution of PM2.5. By contrast, according to environmental protection agencies at all levels and monitoring stations, by August 31, 2012, there were fifty-five prefectural cities (sub-provincial level), as well as 192 monitoring points, publishing PM2.5 information.

–

Ozone In the 2010 AQTI assessment, only Guangdong Province had included ozone in the routine air quality monitoring. By contrast, according to environmental protection agencies at all levels and monitoring stations, by August 31, 2012, there were twenty-five cities, as well as 104 monitoring points, publishing ozone information.

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–

Carbon monoxide Among the cities in the 2010 AQTI assessment, only Beijing had disclosed the monitoring results of carbon monoxide, and the information is only an average daily value within a year in an annual report. By contrast, according to environmental protection agencies at all levels and monitoring stations, by August 31, 2012, there were twenty-four prefectural cities (sub-provincial level), as well as ninety-six monitoring points, publishing carbon monoxide information.

–

Volatile organic compounds Because volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are not in the list of pollutants requiring monitoring and disclosure in the new Ambient Air Quality standard, except for Ningbo which discloses VOC information in its annual environmental communique, only Jiaxing (嘉兴) is carrying out the monitoring and information disclosure of VOCs. The north part of Jiaxing is an economic and technological development zone that has a large concentration of industrial enterprises, and the pollution of industrial waste gas has been a thorny problem troubling the local communities as well as the local government. As part of the air pollution control measures, the environmental protection bureau of the city selected for monitoring the central area between three large enterprises (Haitai Tires (韩泰轮胎), Hexin Industry (禾欣实业), and Xiaoxing Chemical Fiber (晓星化纤三家)) and two residential communities (Zixi Park and Hecheng Century Park) on the eastern bank of Muhu Creek (穆湖溪) inside Muhu Forest Park (穆湖森林公园).2 Based on the productive characteristics of these enterprises, forty-eight pollution factors, including routine indexes, odorous substances, and VOCs, were selected for monitoring, so as to provide data for pollution control. Weekly information release on pollution factors collected by automatic monitoring stations for the northern part of the city since April 30, 2012 has been published on the website of the city’s environmental protection bureau.3

b) Frequent information disclosures from monitoring points have gradually become the norm. c) Information disclosure has become more user-friendly. 2 Automatic air pollution monitoring station for north Jiaxing publishes monitoring information for the first time. Nanhu Evening News. May 8, 2012. http://www.jx3721.cn/jxnews/ xinwen/490.html. 3 http://www.jepb.gov.cn/News/9/f4906fbdb29a8f513237c498afa22e4a55bf9556.html.

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In the 2010 AQTI assessment, ten international cities combined their daily disclosure of air quality information with maps, while among the twenty Chinese cities, except for Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Wuhan, most cities simply published statistics without any direct and dimensional display of air quality information. By contrast in this assessment, many cities in many provinces have started using electronic maps to publish their air quality information. Among them, Guangdong Province, Beijing, Jiangsu Province, and Shanghai have done a better job. Except for the websites of municipal environmental protection bureaus as well as the monitoring stations and specially created air quality disclosure platforms, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Nanjing, Suzhou, Jiaxing, Fuzhou (福州), Yinchuan (银川), Yichang (宜昌), Fushun (抚顺), and Wuhan constantly publish daily air quality information through a microblog. Among them, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Jiaxing, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Wuhan also publish PM2.5 information. 2.2.4 Most Cities Have a Relatively Low AQTI Score Although progress has been made in disclosure of air quality information, with remarkable improvements seen in some areas, the average score of the 113 assessed cities is still as low as 21.5. The reason lies on the fact that a large number of cities are still at a very low level of air quality information transparency, bringing down the overall average score. The average score of the top twenty cities is 52.8, while that for the lowest twenty is only 6, a gap of 46.8 and an evident polarization trend in information transparency. There are far more low-performance cities than high-performance ones. Among the 113 assessed cities, eighty-nine have a score lower than 30, while eighty lower than 20, and sixty-four between 10 and 20 (56.6% of the total). Sixteen cities have a score lower than 10 (14.2% of the total), and among these cities, Benxi (本溪), Weifang (潍坊), Jining (济宁), Rizhao (日照), Qujing (曲靖), and Jinchang (金昌), have a score of zero.4 On the websites of environmental protection bureaus of these six cities, the public is not able to find the air quality level, pollution index or information of pollutant concentration of the current day, nor is there any monthly, quarterly, or annual statistics on air quality. That these cities have low scores is related to the distance between them and cities with systematic, timely, complete, and user-friendly information disclosure. 4 Rizhao has a forecast.

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2.3 2.3.1 •

•

•

Evident Improvement, Pushed by Various Parties, Has Been Made in Laws and Regulations Concerning Air Quality Information Transparency History of Air Quality Standards

In 1982, China’s first ambient air quality standard was made and implemented. It was mainly to regulate, according to the administrative requirements on air pollutants emitted from coal burning, the threshold concentration value of total suspended particles (TSP, particles with a diameter larger than 100 micrometers). In 1996, the first amendment was made to the ambient air quality standards. The names of pollutants were adjusted, monitoring and analysis methods updated, and inhalable particles with a diameter smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10) included into the scope of monitoring. In 2000, the ambient air quality standards were amended for the second time, and the amendments to the Ambient Air Quality Standard (GB30951996) were published. Major modifications include: (1) The index of nitrogen oxides (NOX) were excluded. (2) Nitrogen dioxide (NO2):5 – The annual average threshold concentration value of Level II was modified from 0.04 mg/m3 to 0.08 mg/m3; – The daily average threshold concentration value of Level II was modified from 0.08 mg/m3 to 0.12 mg/m3; – The hourly average threshold concentration value of Level II was modified from 0.12 mg/m3 to 0.24 mg/m3. (3) Ozone (O3): – The hourly average threshold concentration value of Level I was modified from 0.12 mg/m3 to 0.16 mg/m3; – The hourly average threshold concentration value of Level II was modified from 0.16 mg/m3 to 0.20 mg/m3.

5 The amendments to the Ambient Air Quality Standard in 2000 have loosened the threshold concentration value of nitrogen dioxide for Level II, while no modification has been made to Level I. Wang Zongshuang from the Department of Environmental Standards at the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences made a comparison of the standards of nitrogen dioxide concentrations between China and foreign countries. Except for WHO, the hourly threshold value of nitrogen dioxide in the international community is 90–850 µg/m3, the daily value is 60–200 µg/m3, and the annual threshold is 30–100 µg/m3. Except for the daily and annual threshold concentrations that are higher than Sweden and Austria, China has its Level I standard stricter than any other country. As for the threshold values of Level II and Level III, China is at an intermediate and relatively stricter level.

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On February 29, 2012, the Ambient Air Quality Standard was amended for the third time to publish the revised GB3095-2012 version. Threshold concentration values of fine particles (PM2.5, particles with a diameter smaller than 2.5 μm) and 8-hour average threshold concentration values of ozone were added. The Air Pollution Index (API) was also changed to ambient Air Quality Index (AQI).

2.3.2

Main Reasons and Process of the Amendment

a) In the draft of first opinion soliciting, it was suggested that PM2.5 not be included in the scope of monitoring and information disclosure. b) Extensive dust-haze weather caused heated public discussion. From September to December 2011, more than ten extensive haze incidents occurred in central and eastern China. Continuing haze caused adverse influence upon the normal life and work of residents, and incurred extensive media coverage.

Figure 21.4

News reports on haze in different places.6

6 Chen Ning, “Haze Hits Many Places in China: Cities Shrouded in Thick Fog: Where Does PM2.5 Come From?” Zhejiang Daily, December 23, 2011.

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However, in the statistics of monitoring issued by environmental protection agencies, the air quality had often been described as “slightly polluted” based on the air quality standards of the year 2000, significantly different from what the public felt. At the same time, well-known micro-bloggers such as Pan Shiyi (潘石屹) started reposting real-time PM2.5 information released by the US Embassy.7 Zheng Yuanjie (郑渊洁), a Chinese fairy tale writer, often changed his ­microblog avatar into a masked photo because of the dust-haze. Photographer Wang Yikun (王一坤) started posting photos of a fixed place on the street to the Internet. On December 5, the Department of Respiration Medicine at the Civil Aviation General Hospital received 30% more patients than usual.8 More residents in Beijing, environmental protection NGOs, and the media started paying attention to the fluctuations of PM2.5. Some environmental protection organizations and individuals even went out to the street and monitored the values of PM2.5.9

Figure 21.5 Photos of Beijing taken by photographer Wang Yikun (December 2–5, 2011).

7 Wang Erde, “Beijing, the City of Dust-Haze,” 21st Century Business Herald, November 1, 2011. 8 Chen Wei and Zhao Jie, “Capital City Shrouded in Fog,” China Newsweek, December 16, 2011. 9 “The Whole Story of the PM2.5 Event,” Nanfang Metropolis News, March 5, 2012.

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Since March 2007, China Green has been taking a photo of Beijing on a daily basis. From July 12, 2010, China Green has been comparing the air quality between Beijing and New York, and publishing the comparison chart from the previous week on its website. c)

Hearing the public’s opinion, China’s environmental protection agency decided to include PM2.5 into the scope of routine monitoring and information disclosure.

In November 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the draft of opinion soliciting for the Ambient Air Quality Standard, asking the public for opinion for the second time, and decided to include PM2.5 into the scope of routine monitoring and information disclosure. 2.4 Expanded Open Data Yet to be Utilized More Efficiently 2.4.1 Making Use of the Data Based on ambient air quality information issued by the government, civil society is able to collect and make use of the data for further research and dissemination. Mobile applications are used to integrate the air quality data from environmental protection agencies across China, and are very convenient to use. There has been changes concerning the standards of the air quality index. The Specifications on the Ambient Air Quality Index (AQI) (Trial) (环境空气 质量指数（AQI）技术规定（试行）) has changed the Air Pollution Index (API) into AQI. While currently most governmental agencies are still releasing API, some mobile applications have started publishing AQI. 2.4.2 More Actions are Needed to Effectively Avoid the Dangers of Pollution a)

So far the description has not yet been modified.

In February and November 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the second and the third drafts of opinion soliciting on the daily reporting technology of the ambient air quality index. In both drafts are tables of reminders about the impacts of air quality upon human health. In February 2012, the ministry published the trial specifications for AQI daily reporting, which will be put in force from January 1, 2016. In the specifications, the impacts of air quality upon human health are reflected in the table of “Air quality index and the related information,” making progress in adding health reminders, color reminders, and suggested actions to be taken for the susceptible, compared with the table of reminders on the websites of the

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environmental protection agencies. It is worth noting that, in this table, there are reminders for children in the suggested actions to be taken when heavy and serious air pollution occurs. According to statistics, so far among the cities releasing daily information of air quality, Guangzhou and Zhuhai have health reminders for each monitoring point, and use the table given in the specifications of AQI daily reporting, while Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Shantou (汕头) have reminders about the impacts upon human health. Most cities have only classified air quality into high, good, moderate, and poor levels without health reminders. b)

The susceptible have not yet been organized effectively to avoid damages to health.

Air pollution has both acute and chronic harms to human health. The acute effect refers to the discomfort or poisoning symptoms in a short period of time after the human body is exposed to the polluted air, while chronic effect refers to the chronic harm caused by a long time of exposure to air with low concentration of pollutants. For example, because PM2.5 has a small particle size. It is easy for toxic and harmful substances to gather on them, and get into the pulmonary alveolus or blood circulation system when humans breathe, directly causing cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Humans survive on air. When the air is polluted, everyone is affected. As a result, it is of substantial importance for the susceptible to avoid serious air pollutants. In their article, “Controlling Pollution of Fine Particles and Reducing their Harms upon the Environment and Health,” (控制细颗粒污染 减缓环境健康损害) Zhang Shiqiu (张世秋) and Huang Desheng (黄德生) mention all groups of people can be affected by PM2.5, though the susceptibility depends on their physical conditions and ages. As the exposure to PM2.5 increase, so does the risk of all types of health effects. Since air is everywhere, it can only be avoided temporarily. Fundamentally, production of air pollutants need to be reduced. The concentration of PM2.5 has a direct relation with the number of respiratory patients. Research conducted by Professor Pan Xiaochuan (潘小川) from the School of Public Health at the Peking University Health Science Center, shows that, when the concentration of PM2.5 exceeds the standard, each increase of 10 micrograms per cubic meter will lead to an increase in cardiovascular emergencies and deaths by 6–7%, and high blood pressure emergencies by 5%.10 10

“Debate on PM2.5 Monitoring: Experts Say PM2.5 Can Get into Pulmonary Alveolus and Harm Human Body,” China Business, December 7, 2011.

small particles, big breakthrough

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People susceptible to air pollutants include children and teenagers, seniors, as well as patients with cardiac and respiratory diseases. The best way to avoid the harms is to reduce and even stop outdoor activities. For children and teenagers, when there is serious air pollution, it is not suitable to do outdoor sports. Some international schools have already taken actions to avoid air pollutants by moving physical education from outdoors to indoors based on monitoring statistics of air pollution published by different channels. 3

Conclusions and Suggestions from the 2012 AQTI Assessment

3.1 Major Conclusions 1. Overall air quality information transparency has been greatly improved. a) Improvements are mainly from the dramatic progress made by some places. b) Advanced cities are narrowing their distance from the international level. c) Progress is yet to be made in most areas. 2. Laws and regulations on air pollution information disclosure have been dramatically improved. 3. The disclosed information show the serious air pollution in some areas. 3.2 Major Suggestions 1. To further improve the air pollution information transparency. 2. To make and implement contingency plan for polluted weather. 3. To conduct more research based on the open data.

PART ten Appendix

∵

Major Environmental Events of 2012

January 2012



January 5: Amendment to the Environmental Protection Law



January 10: Air Quality



January 10: Public Interest Litigation



January 17: Pollution Source Regulatory Information Transparency Index

The amendment to the Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法) was drafted and submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The Environmental and Resources Protection Committee of the NPC recommended that it be included in the agenda of the Standing Committee.

The Beijing Municipal Environmental Monitoring Center released single-station indexes from twenty-seven sub-stations, together with daytime/nighttime air-quality forecasts by district. At the same time, it now publishes single indexes from each station for public reference.

The All-China Environment Federation (中华环保联合会) (ACEF) filed a lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Bureau of Xiuwen County (修文县), Guizhou Province, as it believed that the latter had failed to fulfill its legal duty in terms of releasing government information. The court upheld the plaintiff’s claim.

An assessment report on the “Pollution Source Regulatory Information Transparency in 113 Cities” (113 个城市污染源监管信息公开状况) was published for the third straight year. The report shows that the overall transparency of urban pollution source information continues to increase, that an environmental information transparency system has been established, but that China remains in the early stages in this respect.



January 20: Payment for Pollutant Discharge/Emission



January 20: Recommendations from Environmental Organizations

In 2011, the total payment for pollutant discharge/emission topped 20 billion RMB in China, where nearly 440,000 polluters paid 20.20 billion yuan (excluding Tibet). This was 2.43 billion more than in 2010, or up 13.6%.

A “Green Spring Festival” has become a popular term on microblogs of eco-friendly Internet users. Many environmental organizations and environmentally-aware

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celebrities recommended on their microblogs that few or no fireworks be lit for a Green Spring Festival.



February 2012



February 3: List of Major Enterprises under National Environmental Monitoring

The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) published a list of major enterprises and urban sewage treatment plants under national environmental monitoring in 2012. This list mainly covers enterprises and sewage treatment plants in a region where the amount of a main pollutant, discharged or emitted, represents 65% of the total amount of this pollutant discharged or emitted in China’s secondary sector.



February 14: Air Pollution



February 16: Latest Efforts against Mercury Pollution



February 17: Zero Carbon Credit System



February 22: Wildlife Protection

The MEP published the 2011 version of the Report on Motor Vehicle Pollution Prevention and Control in China (中国机动车污染防治年报), which describes the pollution caused by motor vehicles across China in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. According to this report, China was the world’s largest automobile maker and seller for the second straight year and exhaust has already become an important source of air pollution.

China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association (中国有色金属工业协会) and relevant authorities will launch a round of comprehensive research among mercury makers this year. This campaign aims to learn about the number and sizes of mercury makers, before obtaining more accurate estimates of the mercury output.

The Zero Carbon Credit System, China’s first ever carbon trading platform, will be formally launched in late March. By then, people will be able to carry out online payments and trading using their carbon credit.

Long Yongcheng (龙勇诚), chief scientist of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) China Program and head of the primate expert team in China, confirmed during an interview that primates with black hair spotted in the Nu River (怒 江) basin, Yunnan Province did belong to the world’s fifth sub-species of snubnosed monkey, Rhinopithecus strykeri, which was first discovered in Myanmar in 2010. He recommended that their Chinese name be “Nujiang Jinsihou” (怒江金丝猴) (Nujiang Snub-nosed Monkey).

major environmental events of 2012



February 24: Recycling of Used Materials



March 2012



March 5: Sewage and Trash Treatment



March 13: Air Pollution



March 21: Drinking Water Pollution



March 27: Information Transparency



March 29: E-waste

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The Government Offices Administration of the State Council held a ceremony launching a system to recycle used materials within central government offices in Beijing. It was proposed at this meeting that the ratio of recycled used materials in office areas of the departments of central government agencies reach 80% by the end of 2012.

In 2012, the Chinese government will budget 14.5 billion RMB to support the construction of urban sewage and trash treatment facilities and sewage pipes. This compares with 4.39 billion RMB in 2011, or up 230%.

The Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (BJEPB) has published a public opinion soliciting draft of Beijing V emission standard for light-duty vehicles. The Beijing V emission standard specifies an upper limit on the nitrogen oxide emissions that is 25% lower than before. It specifies an upper limit on the particulate matter (PM) emissions for the very first time.

More than ten water pollution incidents occurred across China in less than three months. Drinking water safety has become a major concern. The NPC Standing Committee will hold an inquiry specific to issues such as drinking water safety.

The non-governmental organization, Green Beagle Environment Institute, received the MEP’s reply to its application for releasing the results of an inventory investigation on electrical equipment containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and relevant wastes in industries other than power generation in eight major provinces finished in 2010. The MEP refused to release such information because it is “process information.”

About four hundred million mobile phones are discarded globally each year, including nearly one hundred million units in China. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) published the Recycling—From E-waste to Resources report, saying that mobile phones discarded in China will increase by a factor of seven by 2020 over 2007.

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April 2012



April 11: Air Pollution



April 13: Food Safety



April 16: Enterprises’ Environmental Performance



April 17: Food Safety



April 25: Groundwater Pollution



May 2012



May 9: Recycling Used Batteries

In 2012, new standards and measures regarding PM2.5, ozone, and carbon monoxide will be employed at 542 monitoring points in 86 Chinese cities including all the municipalities directly under the central government, provincial capitals as well as other cities in Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and other major regions.

Greenpeace published a report with a sample survey of eighteen kinds of tea from nine Chinese brands and found that every kind of tea contained at least three kinds of pesticides.

It was announced that a company that makes printed circuit boards for Apple Inc. would be investigated. Apple and the China-based Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (的公众与环境研究中心) (IPE) would monitor the investigation process together.

The Ministry of Health (MOH) published a standard for the content of nitrites in cubilose (mucilaginous secretion of certain birds—a characteristic ingredient of edible birds’ nests): no greater than 30 mg/kg. Industry insiders believe, however, that the content of nitrites is only one of the problems, as industry growth is still faced with challenges such as fakes, selling low-quality products with the price of high-quality ones, and adding unhealthy materials.

The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) published a report saying that more than 400 out of 657 Chinese cities use groundwater as the source of drinking water and that these sources are being contaminated by toxic substances. Groundwater pollution prevention and control is expected to become a new part of the environmental industry.

Eight Chinese environmental NGOs sent an open letter to the MEP, China Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural

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Development (MOHURD) to call for creating a used-battery recycling and treatment system as soon as possible.



May 11: Groundwater Quality



May 14: Air Pollution



May 17: Energy-saving Home Appliances



May 25: Air Quality



May 31: E-waste



June 2012



June 5: Surface Water Pollution

Groundwater quality is now monitored in 200 Chinese cities. Water quality monitoring points with excellent, good, or pretty good water quality combine to represent 45.0% of all the 4,727 points, whereas the ones with poor or very poor water quality combine to represent 55.0%.

Today, four-fifths of Chinese cities cannot meet the latest ambient air quality standard. In 2011, Beijing and Shanghai were the only cities that achieved the annual targets in terms of reducing nitrogen oxide emissions. In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, China’s total investment air pollution prevention and control projects in major regions is expected to reach 345 billion RMB.

The State Council decided at a routine meeting to grant 36.3 billion RMB in subsidies for the consumption of products that meet energy standards, such as energy-saving home appliances, lights, and automobiles.

The MEP published the New Air Quality Standard—the Monitoring Scheme in Phase 1 (空气质量新标准第一阶段监测实施方案), requiring seventy-four Chinese cities to finish the pilot PM2.5 monitoring projects at “state-controlled points” by the end of October 2012. The monitoring results will be released by the end of December.

China will levy money for a fund intended to treat discarded electrical and electronic products from July 1 onward. This is a government fund set to promote the recycling and treatment of discarded electrical and electronic products. Chinese makers of such products as well as consignees of imported electrical and electronic products or their agents are expected to pay money for this fund.

In 2011, the entirety of surface water across China was slightly polluted, with severe eutrophication in lakes (and reservoirs), according to the annual monitoring results.

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Cross-sections with water quality at Grades I–III, Grades IV–V, and inferior to Grade V represented 61%, 25.3%, and 13.7% of all the 469 state-controlled cross-sections in China’s Top 10 drainage systems respectively.



June 5: Soil Pollution by Heavy Metals



June 20: Water Pollution



June 20: Restriction on the Use of Plastic Bags



June 25: Claims against the Oil Spill in the Bohai Sea



June 26: Offshore Pollution

Today, about twenty million hectares of farmland, or 20% of the total farmland area in China, are polluted by heavy metals. Specifically, 2,000,000 hectares are polluted by wastes in mines; 5,000,000 hectares by petroleum pollutants; about 50,000 hectares by piled-up solid wastes; nearly 10,000,000 hectares by gas/liquid/solid wastes in the secondary sector; and more than 3,300,000 hectares by sewage irrigation.

The quality of surface water was slightly improved in Beijing in 2011, according to the Report on the Environment in Beijing 2011 (2011年北京市环境状况公报) published by the BJEPB. But it is still necessary to further promote water pollution prevention and control as well as the reuse of sewage.

The annual quantity of plastic shopping bags used at major retailers across China has decreased by more than twenty-four billion units since the restriction on the use of plastic bags intended to curb “white pollution” (白色污染) was issued four years ago. Petroleum savings in the past four years represent about one eighth of the annual output of the Daqing oilfield (大庆油田).

The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) released the Report of the Penglai 19–3 Field Oil Spill Investigation Team on the Investigation and Handling of this Incident (蓬莱19–3油田溢油事故联合调查组关于事故调查处理报告), disclosing claims against this oil spill. ConocoPhillips and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) paid 1.683 billion RMB in all, according to this report.

The SOA released the Report on the State of the Marine Environment in China 2011 (2011年中国海洋环境状况公报). This report indicates that China’s overall marine environment was pretty good in 2011, but still with serious offshore environmental problems. Meanwhile, there were frequent red tides, severe disasters such as soil salinization and coastal erosion, and higher environmental risks such as oil spills.

major environmental events of 2012



June 26: Non-governmental Actions in China



July 2012



July 1: New Drinking Water Standard



July 6: Power Generation from Renewables



July 10: Energy Conservation and Renewables



July 18: Green GDP



July 30: Energy Conservation/Emission Reduction

313

The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), the largest ever summit in the UN’s history, was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from June 20–22, 2012. Before this summit began, global NGOs attended multiple side events from June 13 onward. Chinese NGOs went to participate in these events for the very first time.

A new drinking water standard will become effective on July 1, with the number of measures to increase to 106 from 35. There are more than 3,000 tap-water companies in China, but only a minority supply compliant water. As living standards become higher in China, the public has higher requirements for drinking water quality and water supply services.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted on July 5 that global power generation from renewables will increase by more than 40% to reach 6,400 terawatt hours over the next five years despite economic uncertainties in many countries.

It was proposed in the Plan for the Development of the Energy-Saving and New Energy Vehicles (2012–2020) (节能与新能源汽车产业发展规划2012–2020年) that the total output and sales volume of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles is expected to reach 500,000 units in 2015; the total capacity of producing such vehicles is expected to reach 2,000,000 units in 2020.

The Hunan Provincial Bureau of Statistics announced that Hunan Province will test a green GDP assessment system in the municipalities of Changsha, Zhuzhou (株洲), and Xiangtan (湘潭) as well as the counties, cities, and districts under their respective jurisdictions in 2013, when relevant measures will be included into performance assessments in this province.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the NDRC are deliberating on guidelines regarding implementing punitive electricity rates at a time when

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major environmental events of 2012

investment in energy-hungry industries continues to increase faster than needed in China. This move aims to address the decreasing effectiveness of measures intended to save energy through punitive electricity rates in some energy-hungry provinces.



July 31: Surface Water Pollution



August 2012



August 8: Trash Reduction



August 16: Energy Conservation/Emission Reduction



August 16: Public Interest Litigation



August 24: Air Quality

The Beiyun River (北运河水系) is the largest drainage system with the largest number of tributaries in Beijing. An environmental NGO, Green Earth Volunteers, monitored the water quality of this river for one year from June 2011 onward. They monitored seventeen cross-sections of eleven tributaries, of which three cross-sections had water quality at Grade V and the others had water quality inferior to Grade V.

Methods of reducing food wastes in communities promoted by the China Environmental Protection Foundation are being tested in Beijing to reduce trash at sources.

The State Council recently issued the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Conservation/ Emission Reduction (节能减排“十二五”规划), requiring that local governments work in strict accordance with this plan to ensure that targets of energy conservation/ emission reduction such as saving 670,000,000 tons of standard coal in the Twelfth FiveYear Plan period. This plan requires that energy consumption per thousand yuan of GDP be reduced to 86.9 kilograms of standard coal in China by 2015 (calculated at the price in 2005).

The environmental NGOs Friends of Nature and Green Volunteer League of Chongqing sent open letters to the Standing Committee of the Eleventh NPC on August 16 saying that they do not understand why the draft amendment to the civil procedure law prohibits legal NGOs from filing public interest litigation. They called on the Standing Committee to redesign provisions concerning such litigation.

The MEP published the Ambient Air Quality in Major Cities in the Environmental Protection Program in the First Half of 2012 (2012年上半年环境保护重点城市环境 空气质量状况). Thirty Chinese cities such as Urumchi, Lanzhou, Beijing, and Tianjin

major environmental events of 2012

315

had non-compliant air quality in the first half of the year. Among them, Beijing saw an average PM10 content at 0.124 mg/m3, making it last but two across China.



August 24: Surface Water Pollution



August 24: Environmental Pollution



August 31: Public Interest Litigation



September 2012



September 3: Pollution Prevention and Control



September 6: Environmental Public Interest Litigation

The entirety of surface water across China was slightly polluted in the first half of the year, according to the Quality of Water Environments in Major River Basins in the First Half of 2012 (2012年上半年重点流域水环境质量状况).

Some new brominated flame retardants (BFRs), perfluorinated alkyl compounds, and other toxic and harmful substances were spotted in high-latitude Arctic sea areas for the first time.

The draft amendment to the Environmental Protection Law was submitted to the NPC Standing Committee for the first time on August 27 for review. Environmental public interest litigation, pollutant discharge/emission permits, environmental pollution responsibility insurance, and others were not included in this major draft amendment to the law for two reasons: they are not covered by the existing environmental law and other relevant laws, and relevant authorities have yet to reach an agreement.

The highly-anticipated National V Emission Standard will come out in the year and will be first implemented in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and other places, said Wang Kaiyu (王开宇), deputy director of the Department of Technology Standards at the MEP. Wang’s remarks came at the 2012 International Forum on Chinese Automotive Industry Development.

The first ever environmental public interest litigation in the city of Changzhou (常 州), Jiangsu Province came to trial at the circuit court for water resources protection at the Liyang (溧阳) Municipal Court. The plaintiff was the Changzhou Environmental Public Interest Association as an NGO. The Liyang Municipal Procuratorate attended the trial as a supporter for this litigation, thereby legally supporting this NGO as the plaintiff in bringing civil action against the defendant for environmental restoration.

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September 10: Species Protection



September 13: Energy Conservation/Emission Reduction



September 18: NGO Actions



October 2012



October 10: Enterprises’ Environmental Performance



October 12: Air Quality

Finless porpoises have become the only whales in the Yangtze River as well as the Dongting (洞庭湖) and Poyang (鄱阳湖) lakes since Chinese river dolphins were officially announced in 2007 to have become functionally extinct. It is estimated that there are now about 1,200 wild finless porpoises in China. Unfortunately, this number is decreasing at an annual rate of 6.4%, making this species even rarer than giant pandas.

China will invest 3.6 trillion RMB in major energy conservation/emission reduction projects in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period. This number is higher than the budget of over 2 trillion RMB specified in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the Development of Energy-Saving and Environmental Industries. It is also higher than the budget of more than 2.3 trillion RMB for major energy conservation/emission reduction projects in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period.

A Civil Society Review of 20 Years of Sustainable Development (中国可持续发展回顾 和思考1992–2011:民间社会的视角) was formally published. This report was cosponsored by six local NGOs and was co-written by twenty-five authors from different fields. They reviewed the past two decades of sustainable development in China and public participation in it from the perspective of independent observers.

Five environmental organizations held a press conference in Beijing on October 8 to disclose the environmental performance of forty-nine textile companies and their suppliers in China. Forty-seven China-based suppliers were found by these organizations to have violated environmental laws.

As of October 12, PM2.5 measurement devices have been installed, tested, and tried at 195 stations across China, where 138 stations have formally begun monitoring PM2.5 and releasing measurement data. All the municipalities directly under the central government, cities specifically designated in the state plan, provincial capitals as well as other cities in Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and other major regions are required to monitor PM2.5 and release the data under a new standard by the end of the year.

major environmental events of 2012



October 12: Air Quality



October 25: Water Safety



October 30: Environmental Litigation



October 31: Amendment to the Environmental Protection Law



October 31: Migratory Bird Protection



November 2012



November 1: Enterprises’ Environmental Performance

317

By the end of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, China will build a world-class national ambient air quality monitoring network consisting of city/background/regional stations and early warning platforms for major regions, with advanced equipment, wide coverage, and a full range of measurement items.

China will make greater efforts to prevent and control water pollution and conserve soil in the Danjiangkou Reservoir (丹江口库) area as the water source of the middle line of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, as well as its upstream areas in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period. Support will be available for ten types of projects such as constructing sewage and trash treatment facilities. The total budget is about 12 billion RMB to assure water safety in the middle line.

Xie Yong (谢勇), a litigant in China’s first ever environmental litigation case of disease caused by trash incineration, filed an administrative lawsuit against the MEP in terms of information transparency. The court decided in the first trial that the MEP had not violated any law. Xie’s suit was rejected by the court.

The MEP released its main opinions that it submitted to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee on the draft amendment to the Environmental Protection Law. The MEP recommended that ten environmental management systems and measures be added and fourteen others, as well as relevant provisions, be improved.

A traditional migration route of birds in Hunan Province is being destroyed by human beings. Locals are killing migratory birds to make money. Given the number of bird killers, “the killed birds rain down when there are a large number of birds flying over.” In some villages, the annual amount of birds killed en route to the south may top 150 tons.

Some globally renowned outdoor clothing brands use materials including toxic chemicals harmful to human health and the environment, according to the latest report from

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an international NGO. Fourteen well-known brands are listed, including Adidas, The North Face, Jack Wolfskin, and others.



November 1: Disposal of Hazardous Wastes



November 2: Climate Change



November 5: Amendment to the Environmental Protection Law



November 6: Mercury Pollution



November 8: Protection of Migratory Birds

The MEP, NDRC, MIIT, and MOH co-published the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the Prevention and Control of Pollution by Hazardous Wastes (“十二五”危险废物污染防 治规划). In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, the MEP will work with other competent authorities to continually improve relevant laws, regulations and standards, monitor law enforcement, implement the accountability system, and strengthen target assessment. All these efforts are intended to comprehensively improve the prevention and control of pollution by hazardous wastes in China.

China Climate Communication Program Center published the Report on Chinese Public Knowledge of Climate Change and Communication (中国公众气候变化与气 候传播认知状况调研报告) in Beijing. The report shows that 93.4% of the Chinese public knows about climate change and that 77.7% of them are worried about the future impact of climate change.

As the leading enforcement authority of the environmental protection law, the MEP has expressed thirty-four objections against the initial-review version of the draft amendment to the Environmental Protection Law since this version was published more than two months ago. The MEP also released these objections on its official website.

China launched the Green Lighting Program in 2008. The first batch of about one hundred million energy-saving lights placed in the market with subsidies are now being scrapped. It was little known that an ordinary energy-saving light contains mercury that may contaminate about a hundred tons of water. This suggests that one hundred million energy-saving lights scrapped annually will have severe environmental impact. Unfortunately, few scrapped energy-saving lights have been recycled.

In the one-month 2012 Migratory Bird Protection Program, nearly 3,000 forest law enforcement officials and forest policemen in Guangdong Province acted to investigate marketplaces and restaurants involved in illegally purchasing and selling wild birds and major protected wild animals. The focus was on cracking down on offences such as hunting, purchasing, transporting, and selling wild birds as well as major protected wild animals at the provincial and national levels.

major environmental events of 2012



December 2012



December 5: Air Pollution Prevention and Control



December 6: Ecosystem Protection



December 11: UN Climate Change Conference



December 18: Air Pollution



December 19: Environmental Impact Assessment

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The MEP officially published the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Major Areas (重点区域大气污染防治“十二五” 规划). As China’s first ever comprehensive plan for air pollution prevention and control, it proposes quality improvement as the orientation for the first time and includes PM2.5 into the metrics.

More than thirty environmental organizations made a proposal on the desperate situation which ecosystem protection is now in. They called for public attention to and participation in monitoring and supporting nature protection so as to avoid crossing the ecological red line in a “beautiful China.”

An event that received the world’s attention, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP18) ended. It was decided at this conference that the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will begin on November 1, 2013 and that a new process, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, will be launched.

Co-authored by Greenpeace and the School of Public Health at Peking University, a report titled Dangerous Breaths—Assessment and Research on Health Damages and Financial Losses Caused by PM2.5 (危险的呼吸—PM2.5的健康危害和经济损失评 估研究) revealed that, with the current air quality, more than 8,500 persons may die younger than expected in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Xi’an as a result of PM2.5 pollution in 2012, with 6.8 billion RMB in financial losses caused by such deaths.

The MEP announced on December 18 that it will postpone the approval of the report on the project’s environmental impact relevant to design changes in the Chengdu-Chuanzhusi (成都至川主寺) (Huangshengguan) section of the new Chengdu-Lanzhou railway, because “the environmental impact within the nature reserve is not sufficiently justified, required measures are not in place, and particular residential areas are surrounded by this railway and others, together with great noises and insufficient public participation.” The MEP also released this opinion to the public.

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December 27: Food Safety

A major supplier of KFC and McDonalds, the Shanxi Province-based Suhai Group (粟海集团) fed chickens with food containing medicine, according to a media report published on November 23. Later on, China Central Television (CCTV) revealed that the Shandong Province-based Liuhe Group (六和集团) fed white feather chicken using antibiotics. These “fast-growing chicken” incidents have since received much public attention. Chicken farms and processing facilities involved in these incidents have now been shut down. Investigations on the incidents are in progress and the results will be released in a timely manner.

Annual Indexes: Environmental Trends Starting from this annual report, total emissions of major pollutants will include industrial sources, domestic sources, agricultural sources, and centralized pollution treatment facilities. Reports for the year 2010 and before cover only industrial and domestic sources. Data from 2010 mentioned in this report has been adjusted accordingly.

1

Air Quality: Pollution Emissions

In 2011, the total discharge of chemical oxygen demand (COD) was 24.999 million tons, down 2.04% from the previous year; ammonia nitrogen was 2.604 million tons, down 1.52%; sulfur dioxide was 22.179 million tons, down 2.21%; and nitrogen oxide was 24.043 million tons, up 5.73%. Among these, discharge of COD from the agricultural sector was 11.856 million tons, down 1.52% and ammonia nitrogen was 826,000 tons, down 0.41%. In 2011, the total emission of sulfur dioxide nationwide was 22.179 million tons, down 2.21% from the previous year. Nitrogen oxide was 24.043 million tons, up 5.73%.

Table A.1 Emission of major pollutants in exhaust gas nationwide in 2011 SO2 (million tons) Nitrogen oxide (million tons) Total Industrial Domestic Centralized Total Industrial Domestic Vehicles Centralized emission sources sources facilities emission sources sources facilities 22.179

2

20.165

2.011

0.003

24.043

17.295

0.37

6.375

0.003

Water Quality

2.1 Water Systems Among the 469 state-level monitored cross-sections of the ten largest water systems (Yangtze River, Yellow River, Pearl River, Songhua River, Huai River, Hai River, and Liao River), rivers in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, rivers in southwest China, and inland

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rivers, the water quality in Category I–III, Category IV–V, and worse than Category V accounted for 61%, 25.3%, and 13.7% respectively. Major pollutants were COD, biochemical oxygen demand after 5 days (BOD5), and total phosphorus.

Table A.2 Comparison of China’s 7 largest water systems in 2010 by categories of water quality. Unit: %

Yangtze Yellow Cat. I–III 80.9 Cat. IV–V 13.8 Worse than Cat. V 5.3

69.8 11.6 18.6

Pearl Songhua Huai Hai

Liao Total

84.8 12.2 3.0

40.5 56.4 48.7 28.6 10.8 15.0

45.2 40.5 14.3

41.9 43.0 15.1

31.7 30.2 38.1

Figure A.1 Water quality of China’s 7 largest water systems.

2.2 Lakes and Reservoirs In 2011, water quality at Category I–III, Category IV–V, and worse than Category V of the twenty-six state-level monitored lakes and reservoirs were 42.3%, 50%, and 7.7% respectively. Major pollutants were total phosphorus and COD (total nitrogen is not included in the water quality assessment).

323

annual indexes: environmental trends Table A.3 Water quality of key lakes and reservoirs in 2011 Lake/Reservoir

Cat. I

Cat. II Cat. III Cat. IV Cat. V