Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Special Volume : Critical Essays on China's Environment and Development [1 ed.] 9789004316041, 9789004316027

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Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Special Volume

Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment International Series Advisors Guobin Yang (University of Pennsylvania) Judith Shapiro (American University)

VOLUME 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/cren

Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Special Volume Critical Essays on China’s Environment and Development Editors

ZHENG Yisheng and Liang Fan Translator

Liang Fan

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is the result of a co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were selected and translated into English from the original 《中国环 境与发展评论》第一卷、第二卷及第三卷 (Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan pinglun diyijuan dierjuan disanjuan) with financial support from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Innovation Project.

issn 2212-7496 isbn 978-90-04-31602-7 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-31604-1 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Foreword vii Zheng Yuxin List of Figures and Tables xi List of Contributors xiv 1 Introduction: China’s Environment and Development Challenges 1 Zheng Yisheng 2 Understanding Environmental Pollution in China: An Analysis of Its Key Features 21 Guo Xiaomin 3 China’s Forest Quality: The Missing Agenda 51 Shen Xiaohui 4 The Ecological Impact of Institutions and Policies on the Inner Mongolian Steppe Ecosystem 69 Dalintai 5 Understanding China’s Ecological Restoration Projects: A Study of the Grain for Green Program 87 Xu Jintao, Jiang Xuemei and Yi Fujin 6 Water Scarcity in China 99 Chen Shaojun 7 A New Approach to Conservation in Western China 117 Shen Xiaoli, Li Shengzhi and Lü Zhi 8 Natural versus Human Disturbances of Old-growth Forests 141 Shen Xiaohui, Piao Zhengji 9 Protecting Biodiversity by Means of Promoting Cultural Diversity: A Case Study of the Reindeer-herding Ewenki People 161 Han Nianyong

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10 Environmental Rule of Law in China Today 173 Wang Jin and Wang Mingyuan 11

Local and Central Governments: Impulsive Investments and Sustainable Development 189 Shen Keting

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Public Expenditure and China’s Environmental Targets 206 Wu Jian and Ma Zhong

13 Green GDP Accounting Research in China: Looking Back and Forward 213 Wang Jinnan, Yu Fang, Jiang Hongqiang, and Cao Dong 14 Green GDP Accounting in China: Controversies and Progress 230 Gao Minxue 15

Environmental Resource Allocation: Inefficiency and Inequity 245 Zhang Shiqiu

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Ecological Values and Capitalism 258 Lu Feng

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Water Scarcity, Water Transfer and Water Trade in China 268 Zhang Xiao

18 Water Rights: A Legal Analysis 293 Zhao Hongmei and Chen Jie 19

Breaching Barriers: Chinese Environmental NGOs Come of Age 311 Fu Tao Index 331

Foreword Zheng Yuxin China is the largest developing country in the world. The country’s adoption in the late 1970s of the reform and opening-up policy put her squarely on the path toward market-oriented, and progressively intensifying industrialization. The fast expansion of economic activities, made possible by the massive scale of resource use, has brought China, a country that is increasingly resource scarce and ecologically fragile, face to face with some historically unprecedented environmental and resource problems. A cursory glance at today’s world suffices to show, that the country is at great risk of going down a path of unsustainable growth given the gravity of the country’s environmental and resource conditions. Critical Essays in China’s Environment and Development (hereafter Critical Essays), which is based on China Environment and Development Review (中国 环境与发展评论) (hereafter Review), is intended to provide its readers an account of how these problems China now faces started, and have evolved. It showcases some of the most noteworthy efforts the country has made toward meeting these challenges. The commentaries by scholars and experts in China on the policies, institutions and underlying ideas pertinent to environmental problems will help readers gain a more comprehensive and deeper appreciation for China’s development experience in recent decades. All of the articles in this volume originally appeared in vols. 1–3 of Review, had been compiled and edited by Environment and Development Research Center, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The goal of the series is to offer a multi-dimensional examination of China’s environment- and developmentrelated policies and efforts to achieve integration and coordination between the two objectives. The first volume was published in March 2001, and six more have come out since then, at a rate of approximately one volume every two years. Starting with the fourth, each volume would focus on one theme. Articles in this English edition have been selected from the first three volumes of Review. Six years separated vol. 1 and vol. 3. During this time, China underwent drastic shifts in its development ideology. There was among both high-level government officials and members of the public a notable increase in environmental awareness and growing acknowledgment of the need for development that is holistic, coordinated and sustainable. The first three volumes trace these changes.

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The government takes the country’s environmental and resource problems very seriously, and has worked tirelessly at addressing them. Subsequent to the passage of the Environmental Law of the PRC (Trial) (中华人民共和国环境保 护法 [试行]) in 1979, many more statutes, rules, regulations and administrative orders pertaining to the environment have been added to what is by now a rather large corpus of legal norms with rather extensive scope. In 1984, the government declared environmental protection a fundamental policy commitment for the nation, and published in 1994 “White Paper on China’s 21st Century Agenda-China’s Population, Natural Resources, and Environment” (中国21世纪议程). The document included specific environment- and development-related targets for the years 2000 and 2010. The 2000 targets, however, were missed, and what efforts the country had made toward arresting the worsening overall trend of environmental deterioration would prove to have achieved less than had been hoped. Such was the backdrop to the publication of the inaugural volume in the Review. Most articles featured in it addressed the country’s environmental and economic policies. A common leitmotif is the continuing worsening of China’s overall environmental condition despite the increasing importance top leadership was attaching to environmental problems. Contributors attribute the ineffectiveness of China’s environmental policies to two reasons. On one hand, many of them are inherently flawed, especially with respect to enforceability and operationalizability, and on the other hand, they are often at odds with other government policies. Better policy coordination in the areas of ecology, environment, resource and economic growth is key to achieving sound development in China. The theme of Review vol. 2 was deeper, institutional factors affecting environmental changes and sustainable development. Contributors discussed key issues including the ideological and normative commitments consistent with the country’s environmental and development goals, the value of environmental resources, and legal and societal monitoring. Special attention was given to the issue of environmental and ecological resource management, and management of the commons in general, and the case of rural China. The focus on institutional factors in vol. 2 contrasted with the focus on policies in vol. 1. Contributors argued that the harsh reality made it clear that it would be beyond China to avoid repeating the pattern of “pollute first, clean up later”— or “destroy first, rehabilitate later”—that had been followed by developed countries. Yet in the long term, it would be unsustainable to do so. China is now going through the middle stage of industrialization, and at the same time in the throes of economic institution reform. And it behooves China, faced now with enormous population, resource and environmental pressures, to try to

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make sure that any institutional transformation it undertakes adhered to the principle of sustainable development, something many Chinese people have yet to realize fully. Work on vol. 3 took place at a time when the country was trying in earnest to put to practice the “scientific outlook on development” (科学发展观). In Nov. 2003, China’s central government officially promulgated this idea, which is claimed to stand for a scientifically informed development philosophy that stresses the need for development to be “people-oriented”, and comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable. This marked the start of a new phase in the country’s efforts to get onto a sustainable development path. The declaration of the country’s adoption of “scientific outlook on development” makes evident China’s top leadership’s willingness to make revisions to the orthodox development model. Unlike the notion of “transforming the model of economic growth”, the development motto of the 1990s, the notion of scientific outlook on development no longer took the primacy of economic gains for granted, and had in instead at its core the idea of the primacy of people’s wellbeing. It attaches greater importance to social development, is keen on the issue of social harmony, and the relationships between urban and rural areas, between more and less developed regions, and between the rich and the poor, and lays more stress on the harmonious co-existence of different groups of people and of human beings and the natural environment. Articles featured in this volume provide an overview of both the practice and the theories of sustainable development in this new era in China’s economic and social growth, and touch on even deeper problems, including environmental rule of law, environmental impact evaluation of development strategies, evaluation of environmental policies (including green GDP), the environment and civil society, ecological preservation and development in the humanities, circular economy, resource constraint on innovations in regional development, and others. In sum, the shifts in focus throughout the first three volumes of the Review reflected the continual deepening of the country’s basic understanding and evolving practice in this area. Contributors to the Review come from natural science research institutes, universities, and government agencies and are all specialists in their respective fields of study. Most of the contributions are surveys and reviews of empirical data and primary sources, a thorough grasp of which is a necessary precondition for doing a credible examination of China’s practices in environmental protection and a critical evaluation of the country’s policies. Evidently, people who work on the frontlines of management tend to have superior mastery of facts and data, but of course, effective evaluation of policies and their effects also requires the willingness and ability to go beyond the individual perspectives

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of particular agencies and regions and think from the collective point of view, i.e. on behalf of the society as a whole. Obviously, an objective yet critical assessment of China’s environment and development is not possible without either solid knowledge about relevant facts or a broad perspective and penetrating insights. As long-time students in their respective areas of expertise, many of the contributors will have much that is unconventional and thoughtprovoking to offer their readers. The relationship between the environment and development is a large topic, straddling a broad range of theoretical and practical issues. In order to make sure Critical Essays stays focused and concise, the editors have made all necessary cuts as they see fit. But obviously there is room for further tightening up. Ecology, environment, resources and sustainable development are complicated and complex issues. Current research falls far short in both breadth and depth. The articles featured in this volume are best seen as explor­atory, and many of the ideas discussed have yet to be fully developed. It is nonetheless our hope that they will facilitate research in and practice of sustainable development both inside and outside China by serving as an invitation to more people to join us in this important conversation.

List of Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 Chinese GDP Growth Rate (1995–2008) 23 2.2 SO2 and COD Emissions (1998–2008) 24 2.3 Relative Composition of Chinese Industrial Structure (1995–2007) 25 2.4 Chinese Urban Population and COD Emissions 27 4.1 Change in Livestock Populations on Natural Rangelands in Inner Mongolia (10,000) 72 4.2 The Number of Harmel Plants in each Transect 75 4.3 Change in Production Costs for Herder Households before and after Ecological Restoration Program (in RMB) 83 4.4 Change in Production Costs for Herder Household before and after Ecological Restoration Program (by percentage) 84 7.1 Regional Distribution of China’s Nature Reserves in 2004 118 7.2 Sacred Lands around Dzongsar Monastery 121 7.3 Monasteries Surveyed in Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province 123 7.4 Four Categories of Sacred Mountains Shown by Percentage of Total 124 7.5 Distribution of Sacred Mountains by Area 125 7.6 Sacred Mountains and Lakes Recorded in Six Counties in Ganzi (left) 126 7.7 Sacred Mountains and Lakes Recorded in Ganzi County (within Ganzi Prefecture) (right) 126 7.8 Relative Proportions of Different Types of Patrol Arranged by Surveyed Monasteries 128 7.9 Relative Proportions of Different Kinds of Monastery Involvement with Proction Activities by Type of Relationship with the Government 129 7.10 Zoning System around the Monastery 131 7.11 Responses from Fifteen Villagers at each Site to the Question: “What would you do if you encountered logging or hunting on the sacred mountains?” 133 7.12 Areas of Important Biodiversity in China (Based on Data Compiled by WWF and Conservation International) 140 17.1 Trends in the Net (Direct and Total) Virtual Water Flows China to the World 292

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Tables 2.1 Waste Water Discharge and Emission of Major Pollutants (1998– 2005) 44 2.2 Emissions of Major Air-borne Pollutants (1998–2008) 45 2.3 Structural Shift of Chinese Industry, 2000–2007 45 2.4 1998–2008 Output for Major Industrial Products 46 2.5 Air-borne Pollutant Discharge by Economic Sector as a Percentage of Industrial Total, 2006 46 2.6 COD Emission through Wastewater Discharge by Economic Sector as a Percentage of Industrial Total 47 2.7 Heavy Metal Content in Wastewater Discharge by Economic Sector as a Percentage of Total Industrial Heavy Metal Discharge, 2006 (%) 47 2.8 Changes in Urban Population and COD Emission 48 2.9 Urban Air Quality in China 48 2.10 Urban Air Quality According to PM10 Density Ranking 49 2.11 Indoor Air Quality in Rural China 49 2.12 Economic Loss from Environmental Pollution, 2004 50 4.1 The Number of Soil Samples Taken from each Transect 74 4.2 Land Cultivation in Inner Mongolia 79 5.1 Seedling Survival Rates 91 5.2 Payment Disbursement Rates 92 5.3 Per Capita Farmer Income for 1999 and 2004 95 7.1 Avian Biodiversity at the Four Sites 132 13.1 Research Progress on Resource and Environmental Accounting in China (1981–1990) 218 13.2 Research Progress on Resource and Environment Accounting in China (1991–2003) 220 13.3 Research Progress on Resource and Environmental Accounting in China (2004–Present) 223 17.1 Water Resources in the Six Northern Zones, 1999–2005 (100 million m3) 272 17.2 Areas of Irrigation and Reservoir Capacities in China, 1980–2004 273 17.3 Water Usage in China by Sectors, 1949–2005 274 17.4 Water Usage in North and South China-II, 1980–2005 275 17.5 Change in Total Amount of Water Resources (TAWR), 1999–2005 275 17.6 Change in Average Precipitation (mm), 1999–2005 276 17.7 Water Use Input-Output Table for China by Sector, 2002 282 17.8 Internal Effect of Water Use (WIE, total) by Sector 283

list of figures and tables

17.9 17.10 17.11 17.12 17.13

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External Backward Linkages for Water use (WEBL, total) by Sector 284 External Forward Linkages for Water use (WEFL, total) by Sector 286 Input-Output Table by Sector for China 291 The Virtual Water Trade (Water Embodied in Trade) between China and the World (100 million m3) 292 Top-five Virtual Water Exporting and Importing Countries (1995–1999) 292

List of Contributors Cao Dong (曹东) Senior Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, Ministry of Environmental Protection. Chen Jie (陈洁) Master of Laws, China University of Political Sciences and Law. Chen Shaojun (陈韶君) Professor, Chinese Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower; Senior Engineer, Department of Water Resources. Dalintai (达林太) Senior Research Fellow, Research Centre of Ecology in Churiya Pastoral Area, Inner Mongolia. Fu Tao (付涛) Chief Editor, China Development Brief. Gao Minxue (高敏雪) Ph.D. Professor, Deputy Director, School of Statistics, Chinese Renmin University. Guo Xiaomin (过孝民) Former Deputy Director, Department of Planning and Finance, Senior Research Fellow, Ministry of Environmental Protection. Han Nianyong (韩念勇) Senior Research Fellow, Former Secretary-General of Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere. Jiang Hongqiang (蒋洪强) Senior Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, Ministry to Environmental Protection. Jiang Xuemei (姜雪梅) School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University.

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Li Shengzhi (李晟之) Associate Researcher, Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences. Liang Fan (梁帆) Ph.D. Deputy Chief Editor, International Division, Social Sciences Academic Press, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Lu Feng (卢风) Ph.D. Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University. Lü Zhi (吕植) Ph.D. Professor of Biology, Peking University; Executive Director, Peking University Center for Nature and Society. Ma Zhong (马中) Ph.D. Professor, Dean of School of Environment and Natural Resources, Chinese Renmin University. Piao Zhengji (朴正吉) Senior Engineer, Department of Zoology, Changbaishan Academy of Sciences, Jilin Province. Shen Keting (沈可挺) Ph.D. Associate Professor, Institute of Economics, Zhejiang Gongshang University. Shen Xiaohui (沈孝辉) Senior Engineer, State Forestry Administration, Member of Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere. Shen Xiaoli (申小莉) Center of Conservation Biology, Peking University. Wang Jin (王劲) JD, Professor, Peking University Law School. Wang Jinnan (汪金南) Ph.D. Vice President and Chief Engineer of Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning.

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Wang Mingyuan (王明远) JD, Professor, Tsinghua University Law School. Wu Jian (吴健) Associate Professor, School of Environment and Natural Resources, Renmin University, Beijing. Xu Jintao (徐晋涛) Ph.D. Professor, College of Environmental Sciences, Peking University. Yi Fujin (易福金) Ph.D. Associate Professor, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University. Yu Fang (於方) Senior Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, Ministry of Environmental Protection. Zhang Shiqiu (张世秋) Ph.D. Professor and Deputy Dean, College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, Peking University. Zhang Xiao (张晓) Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Center for Environment and Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Head of environmental division, Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhao Hongmei (赵红梅) Associate Professor, China University of Political Sciences and Law. Zheng Yisheng (郑易生) Senior Research Fellow, Deputy Director of Center for Environment and Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zheng Yuxin (郑玉歆) Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Doctoral thesis advisor; Chinese Association for Quantitative Economics and Chinese Association for Ecological Economics; Delegate, National People’s Congress.

Chapter 1

Introduction: China’s Environment and Development Challenges Zheng Yisheng As its rapid economic growth continues apace, China’s environmental problems are increasingly becoming the world’s problems, too. The earth could not support the global population if every Chinese gobbled up resources at, or even near, the current level of the average citizen in wealthier, developed countries.1 As David Fridley, deputy group leader of the China Energy Group at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California has noted, China’s huge carbon emissions have the potential to adversely affect the rest of the world.2 Nobody, however, is more troubled by this than those working on sustainable development issues in China. After the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and especially after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit), a looseknit group began to form in China of people from diverse backgrounds but who shared deep a concern for the environment. Among them were scientists, government officials (especially from agencies responsible for the environment and natural resources), people associated with environmental NGOs, social scientists, and people from the private sector. After years of trying to be heard and taken seriously, the group and its cause have gained increasing 1  Between 1978 and 2008, China’s GDP increased 15-fold. By the end of that period, China consumed four times as much energy, 21 times as much iron and steel, 22 times as much cement, and produced 10 times as many goods as it did in 1978. China is now the world’s largest consumer of coal, hydroelectric power, metals, cement, fertilizer and also claims the largest fish catch. In 2007, the Chinese economy comprised 6.2% of the world economy, but its consumption of energy from non-renewable sources, and its steel, cement, and non-ferrous metal consumption were 17%, 34%, 48% and 31% respectively of global consumption. Moreover, China is also the world’s biggest producer of organic wastewater, sulfur dioxide, and ozone-damaging pollutants. And China accounts for 21% of global carbon dioxide emissions, and this proportion continues to increase (Sustainable Development Strategy Study Group, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2010). 2  Warburton, John and Leo Horn Phathanothai, “China’s Environmental Crisis: What Does it Mean for Development?” Development. No. 3, Vol. 50, 2007.

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recognition and begun to have some influence on public discourse and lawand policy-making. For them, the magnitude of China’s environmental problems and what these problems mean for the world as well as for China itself are momentous issues. This book will explore these challenges, and introduce the perspectives of leading Chinese thinkers working on cutting edge environment and development issues. 1.1

China’s Environmental Challenges

Environmental conditions in China have changed considerably since environmental protection became a “fundamental national policy” (基本国策) nearly 30 years ago. Yet, despite improvements here and there, the country’s overall environmental condition has continued to worsen.3 China’s environmental problems have uniquely Chinese causes, including complex relations between human resources, industrial development, and efforts to protect the environment. This situation reflects the composite and compact nature of environmental problems China currently faces. For countries that industrialized earlier, different kinds of environmental problems have tended to be associated with different stages of economic development. However, because of the breakneck speed of development in China, especially in recent decades, environmental 3  Since the beginning of the 21st century, the increasing resource and ecological stresses caused by China’s rapid economic growth have become more apparent. Ecological degradation has been steadily growing in scale and severity, with greater adverse impacts on society. For instance, in the 1970s, desertification claimed an average 1,560 km2 of land annually, but this rate grew to 2,100 km2/year during the 1980s, to 2,460 km2/year in the early 1990s, and to 3,436 km2/year by the end of the decade. Major rivers and smaller streams ran dry, not just in arid and semi-arid regions of northern and western China, but also in areas of abundant rainfall in southern China. Lakes and wetlands have also shrunk or disappeared at alarming rates. Water tables in many places continue to drop rapidly. In the 1970s, underground water was being extracted at the rate of 57.2 billion m3/year, but by 1999, it had increased to 111.6 billion m3. In many areas, underground water table decline, agricultural water shortages, rises in agricultural production costs, and intensification of soil erosion have created a vicious spiral of environmental degradation. Marine ecosystem degeneration is another serious problem. Before the 1960s, red tides were a relatively rare phenomenon in China, occurring once every five to six years. But by the 1970s, they occurred on average once every two years. In the 1980s, the frequency was four times per year on average. Twelve occurrences were recorded in 1989, 34 in 1990, 38 in 1991, over 50 in 1992, and more frequently thereafter. Soil erosion now destroys about 5 billion tons of soil each year (Sustainable Development Strategy Study Group, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2010).

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problems are all occurring at once here that have typically arisen at different times in other countries. And new problems are always being added to existing ones. This situation indicates several things. First, the scope of environmental pollution monitoring is still rather limited 20 years after environmental protection measures were first implemented. Monitored pollutants include only common industrial discharges (such as sulfur dioxide, soot, chemical oxygen demand [COD]) and biochemical oxygen demand [BOD]), and monitoring has been largely confined to major cities, major rivers and waterways. While there has been some decrease in the monitored pollutants over the years, ground­ water pollution from nitrate and phosphorous compounds and air pollution from nitrous oxides have been growing steadily. Furthermore, pollution in China has become more toxic, and more harmful to health. This also reflects uneven economic development among different regions. Urban environment has sometimes improved not because environmental problems have been solved but because they have been moved to other locations. Indeed, China’s environmental problems are highly geographically mobile, showing a tendency to move from bigger to smaller places, from urban to rural areas, and from more to less developed regions. Soil and underground water pollution in rural areas have become so serious that they are a ticking time-bomb. Indeed, signs of this are already visible in many places. And finally, these environmental problems increase the country’s overall ecological instability and vulnerability. The few remaining places untouched by human activities are rapidly disappearing. When many different environmental problems occur at the same time, they can interact with one another and their individual effects are also compounded together, making it more difficult to solve any one of them. Indeed, the Chinese economy may be on the verge of breaching the ecosystem’s carrying capacity, if it has not done so already. While scholars continue to argue about what “carrying capacity” means and how it should be measured, most experts are willing to concede that China already faces the clear and pres­ ent danger of its being maxed out. Despite China’s low ranking in terms of per capita ecological footprint,4 its large and growing population places it among the world’s poorest countries with respect to per capita ecological space. Just what these facts about China’s environmental predicament entail for both China and the world deserves close examination. Debates about the environmental challenges facing China have often focused on the relation between 4  Wackernagel, Mathis, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth. Gabriola Island, British Columbia: New Society Publishers, 1996.

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energy supply and economic growth. This problem has engaged much, if not most, of the research effort devoted to climate change and responses to it. Yet it is far from the only, or perhaps even the most pressing environmental issue in China. In addition to the various problems directly associated with global warming and energy shortages, China faces a host of sources of environmental stress brought about by economic growth. Water shortage is one example. China’s per capita fresh water supply is less than 2,000 cubic meters, comparable to that for some tropical African countries. And 61% of the Chinese population, or 800 million people, has a per capita water supply of less than the world average. Moreover, many economically advanced regions and densely populated areas in China face a crisis of water quality. Yet, efforts to solve these problems have often been undermined by the very hydropower projects that the country hopes can help it meet its international obligations to reduce carbon emissions through increased use of renewable sources of energy. Many of these hydro projects are located in ecologically vulnerable areas, and pose risks for aquatic environments and ecosystems. Clearly, gains in one environmental area too often entail compromises in others. Developed countries may have long outgrown these difficult choices, but they remain a reality in many developing countries, including China. For a long time, many in China did not regard the natural environment as something that needs maintenance and care. When the adverse effects of environmental problems on the population became manifest, initial responses were poorly coordinated. They were based on the assumption that the environment was no more than the sum of its parts and not an organic whole, which the ecosystem is. In practice, this meant that different environmental problems, such as those with water, land, or vegetation, were addressed by different government departments, who did not work in concert with one another. This compartmentalized approach to addressing environmental problems is evident in the case of water. Four different government agencies are in charge of various aspects of water management. The Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for the development of surface water, the Ministry of Land and Resources for underground water, the State Oceanic Administration for sea­ water, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection for wastewater treatment. This bureaucratic compartmentalization and fragmentation manifest themselves in academia as well, in which departments are divided much like government agencies are. This helps to render invisible those problems that affect the ecosystem as a whole, thereby inoculating them from any possible solution. While the notion of ‘inter-disciplinary studies’ does exist, for the most part, it is just that, a concept. Instead of letting real world problems dictate research design, it is de facto funding priorities as well as disciplinary boundaries that decide research topics. These tendencies help explain the widespread

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dismissal of the precautionary principle that has now been fully incorporated into environmental laws in the European Union. In fact, even environmental activists are not immune to these tendencies, which have compromised their own effectiveness. However, reigning in environmentally destructive economic forces remains the toughest challenge. This is perhaps historically inevitable. Since its earliest days, the environmental movement in China has been caught in the vortex formed by two powerful currents, namely, rapidly dwindling per capita ecological space on the one hand and rapidly growing per capita material wealth on the other. 1.2

Searching for a Path from the Fringes to the Mainstream: The Influence of the Environmental Movement on Economic Development

There is no denying that China has achieved some success in its efforts to slow ecological deterioration. However, the forces of economic development continue to be so powerful that environmental policies remain marginalized.5 Neither the formulation nor the implementation of these policies has been fully integrated into economic planning and the legislative process. They have tended to be used toward managing disasters rather than crisis prevention. Addressing this situation, and elevating the general status of environmental protection and ecological preservation relative to other national objectives, has been a strategic goal for concerned individuals over many years. These scholar-activists have worked in four different but related areas: developing a system of green economic accounting; linking environmental wellbeing with social justice; reforming the role and the function of the government; and, promoting more environmentally-friendly developmental models. 1.2.1 Green Economic Accounting In 1984, key government leaders came across a report about the cost of environmental pollution to the national economy. Then it was about RMB 40 billion (US$ 6 billion) annually. This figure so startled them they decided to make environmental protection a fundamental national policy. Since then, economists 5  Zhang Shiqiu 张世秋, “Huanjing zhengce bianyuanhua xianshi yu gaige fangxiang bianxi 环境政策边缘化现实与改革方向辨析 [Marginalization of Environmental Policies in China: Reality and How to Change It],” Ch. 22 in Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan pinglun 中国 环境与发展评论 [China Environment and Development Review], ed. Zheng Yisheng, Vol. 2, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004.

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have repeatedly performed similar calculations in an on-going effort to change the traditional official attitude of dismissal and neglect towards environmental protection. These efforts reached something of a high point in 2004–2005, when the State Environmental Protection Administration (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection) and the National Bureau of Statistics collaborated in undertaking a calculation of China’s green GDP. In this period, environmentally-aware economists mounted an unprecedented criticism of the dominance of GDP in economic thinking at every level that was couched in terms of the new national policy of “scientific outlook on development”. These economists argued that when the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping broke with the past and declared economic development as the government’s goal for the nation he did not mean that indefinite increase in GDP, but rather something closer to the idea of sustainable development. Around this time, many eagerly anticipated inclusion of the environmentrelated conduct among the criteria for performance evaluation of governmental officials. But that hope was soon dashed when proposals to that effect were summarily dismissed, especially by agencies and departments tasked with managing economic development. Nor did technical difficulties in green GDP calculation help matters. Little substantive progress was made, and by 2008, the issue tumbled down the priority list even further when the global financial crisis began to unfold and the need to keep the country’s economy afloat by maintaining a high rate of growth trumped all other considerations. However, those in China who are concerned about the environment remain hopeful that the greening of the national accounting system will come to pass. In the interim, understandings of the issues continues to deepen, and many who are well-informed about the subject are fully aware that a green national accounting system is no panacea for the country’s environmental ills, which will continue so long as the country adheres to an environmentally destructive mode of economic and material production. Until officials at every level of government answer to the people and society, and not just to their superiors, green economic indicators will be little more than a numbers game. Secondly, historical, international, and cross-cultural experiences have shown that environmental protection ultimately depends not on abstract concepts, still less empty slogans, but rather on ordinary people’s genuine concern for their own wellbeing and that of their fellow creatures, and their descendants. And finally, as long as the market is the sole measure of value, many things will be underor disvalued, even in a green accounting system.

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1.2.2 Linking Environmental Protection with Social Justice Ever since environmental protection was officially declared a subject of paramount strategic importance for China, the cause and its proponents have been accused of elitism and of neglecting the on-going problem of poverty in China. This may have been because many of those who first became interested or actively involved were from the cities or had overseas background, particularly in developed countries. However, the proponents’ own lack of understanding of the social implications of environmentalism and environmental activism was also partly responsible. Growth-obsessed government officials and developers have been quoted as saying, evidently to dismiss environmentalists, that China’s poor “would choose dying from inhaling pollutants over dying from starvation.” Yet, the choice between environmental protection and poverty reduction is often a false one. Instead, the real choice tends to be between satisfying the wants of a few and meeting the needs of the many. For example, there has been a pervasive phenomenon where officials in local government (call this A), particularly in poor areas, and corporate interests (call this B) try to profit from natural resources by exploiting local residents (call them C) and the natural environment (D). A and B often receive huge profits at the expense of C and D. We might represent this dynamics using the formula: A & B > C & D. Indeed, the wellbeing of the environment in effect represents that of future generations, whose wellbeing will depend in part on the condition of the environment bequeathed to them. Recent initiatives to grab or enclose land, water or scenic landscapes illustrate this phenomenon. In fact, these actions reveal something that many have long suspected, namely, the existence of considerable overlap between the interests of the environment and those of socially disenfranchised groups. Where farmers’ interests are hurt, the environment is harmed as well. Environmentalists and cultural anthropologists have increasingly recognized the pernicious effects simplistic use of the notion of “modernity” can have on understandings of and attitudes toward traditional, “pre-scientific” forms of knowledge and indigenous cultures. The trivialization and dismissal of genuine sources of knowledge and understanding have contributed to the wanton destruction of the environment (see Chapter 10). Economically under-developed regions that have played the role of raw materials supplier in the national economy will, sooner or later, become ecologically overspent. In the final years of the 20th century, three environmental disasters of catastrophic proportions shook China. In 1997, the Yellow River ran dry for a record 226 days, in 1998, historic floods in the Yangtze River basin threatened much of southeast China, and in 2000, sand and dust storms of

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unprecedented frequency and magnitude nearly paralyzed vast areas of northern China, including metropolitan Beijing. These events helped awaken Chinese to the magnitude of the ecological ills that had ravaged much of the country and deepen the thinking of many about environmental issues. The trans-regional ecological repercussions of these events also helped people become more aware that the economy is necessarily a part of, and dependent upon, the natural environment. It was this profound realization that finally brought the issues of intra-regional ecological debt and compensation to national attention. Largely in response to this, around the turn of this century, a number of large-scale ecological compensation projects were launched, including programmes to restore forests, lakes, and grasslands through reductions in or prohibitions of farming, logging and grazing activities. These programs have achieved some measure of success in mediating the conflicts—sometimes real and sometimes apparent—between poverty reduction and environmental protection. In addition to offering a mechanism by which wealthier regions could help poorer ones economically, these programs also represented a new and holistic approach to development that integrated economic and social development with environmental protection and ecological preservation. Until then, these goals had typically been at odds with each other. People’s thinking has changed, and efforts are being made to achieve these goals jointly. Only time will tell, however, if these programmes will successfully rehabilitate the ravaged ecosystem. In fact, pervasive ecological illiteracy and ineffective or absent environmental monitoring constantly threaten to reverse what limited progress these programs have achieved. The programs themselves are often at risk of being co-opted by special interests. 1.2.3 Changing Role of the Government Most environmental activists in China agree that there are already plenty of environmental laws and regulations on the books. The problem lies in enforcement. Too many businesses and corporations act with impunity because they are shielded from the legal consequences of their environmental misconduct by local governments, which are often in their pay. The symptoms of this problem are manifest at the local level, but the root cause lies in the country’s tax and resource management systems. Local governments have strong incentives to turn a blind eye to corporate environmental misconduct because they are a major source of tax revenue, without which the governments cannot fulfil their role as public service provider. Moreover, local governments often go beyond the bounds of their designated powers in

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commercial development of natural resources. Businesses pay taxes on their revenues, factory operations, and for license registration, which are significant sources of tax revenue for local governments. Local governments can be unscrupulous in approving business operations. Charged with the twin tasks of providing public services within their jurisdiction and sustaining it economically, many local governments understandably succumb to the temptation to sell the rights to extract natural resources to private developers in exchange for short-term financial gains. Secondly, because government funding tends to make up only a small proportion of the operating costs of institutions that provide education, public health, resource conservation and environmental protection services, these entities often find themselves having to make up for their budget shortfall by undertaking market reforms and behaving much like corporations. Natural resource management agencies, for example, often end up exploiting the very resources they are supposed to be looking after in the public interest. They do so by creating policies that require regular collection of various fees, promoting large projects with high price tags, and implementing ‘market reforms’ that allow them to lease out the rights to use local resources. People who are involved with resource conservation work have found themselves fighting an uphill battle because, in addition to whatever other substantive advantages they have enjoyed, the forces of environmental destruction have gained a rhetorical upper-hand by co-opting terms that carry positive connotations in contemporary Chinese society, such as “development” and “market reform.” The narrow focus on GDP growth and the market only began to subside after the central government officially adopted the “scientific outlook on development” (科学发展观). Today, the question of what kind of policies are needed for sustainable development has given rise to whole series of further questions, including, notably, what kind of government is best suited for this task. In recent years, calls for reform of the public sector have emphasised the need to strengthen governmental regulations to improve public management and administrative efficiency, and to streamline organizational structures. In particular, all reform measures must be consistent with the principle of sustainable development. Specifically, these reforms would entail: (1) Procedural reform of decision-making about the responsibilities, obligations and entitlements of the government. For example, decisions about the establishment and elimination of government agencies should be made in accordance with the long-term interests of

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(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Chinese citizens and through transparent processes in the National People’s Congress, and not through haggling or deals between existing departments, ministries, and agencies. The establishment of independent research organizations to study factors that determine the long-term interests of the people. Business conduct and discharge of institutional obligations at all levels of government in accordance with the law. Decision-making processes that are open to and inclusive of all stakeholders (instead of a powerful few). The government and its operations must be subject to supervision from, and evaluation by, the public. The status of environmental resource regulations and agencies charged with environmental management must be elevated.

Chinese environmental NGOs have played an especially important and positive role by bringing their vitality and innovation to bear on this last challenge. 1.2.4 Shifting Towards an Ecologically Friendly Development Model Chinese environmentalists are keenly aware that band-aid solutions will not address the problem of turn the tide for China’s deteriorating environment. If the speed of cleaning-up is to catch up with that of pollution, deeper and more sustainable solutions are needed. The existing model of economic development must be replaced with one less ecologically destructive. Timing is of critical importance if Chinese environmentalists wish to exert effective influence on this issue. In 1994, the Chinese government adopted “China’s Agenda 21—White Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and Development in the 21st Century” (中国21世纪议程—中国人口、资源、环境白皮书) as part of its effort to respond to the Rio UN Conference on Environmental and Development. This historic document was notable for its foresight: “China is still applying a model of economic development that is resource intensive, energy intensive, and highly polluting. Adherence to this model is not only environmentally devastating but also economically unsustainable.”6 Around the same time, at the fifth annual meeting of the 14th National People’s Congress, the government made “the transformation of the model of economic growth” a “fundamental shift of national significance,” and demanded all levels of government take this new national economic imperative seriously. Specifically, this change meant 6  State Council 国务院, “Zhongguo ershiyi shiji yicheng—Zhongguo renkou, ziyuan, huanjing baipishu 中国21世纪议程—中国人口、资源、环境白皮书 [China’s Agenda 21: White Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and Development in the 21st Century],” 1994.

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that measures would be taken in the areas of economic structuring, productive technology, human resources, natural resources, job performance evaluation, and business development to allow the national economy to grow not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively.7 Since 2000, the Chinese government has issued a series of similar strategic statements to promote a number of national objectives. These included statements on ecological modernization (2002), the scientific outlook on ­development (2003), resource and energy conservation (2004), innovations (2006), and ecological civilization (2007). While each of these statements had been issued in response to a specific event, they are all part of the Chinese government’s efforts to shift the economy onto a sustainable path. Matching policies have been formulated and announced to realize these strategic objectives. The 2008–2009 global financial crisis taught China a painful lesson about the long-term economic, social, and security consequences of export dependency. The climate change summit in Copenhagen in 2009 left little doubt that the world had entered a new era of crisis in which climate change is a defining and all-encompassing reality. In late 2009, the Chinese government reiterated, this time with unprecedented focus and intensity, the importance of building a new and greener economy. Indeed, this shift has been presented as nothing less than the “third great transformation,” after the founding of the new republic in 1949 and the beginning of economic reforms in 1978. “Changing the model of economic development is a profound and profoundly wise choice the Chinese people and their leaders have made that will leave an indelible mark on the country’s future and determine the eventual outcome of its modernizing efforts.”8 All this has given a strong boost to existing measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions and other activities aimed at “greening” the economy.9 7  Zeng Peiyan 曾培炎, “Jiakuai zhuanbian jingji zengzhang fangshi 加快转变经济增 长方式 [Expediting the Transformation of China’s Economic Growth Model],” State Office of Financial and Economic Leadership (ed.). Jiakuai zhuanbian jingji zengshang fangshi, tigao guomin jingji zhongti zhiliang he xiaoyi 加快转变经济增长方式，提高民经济总体素 质和效益 [Expediting the Transformation of China’s Model of Economic Growth], 1995. 8  Ren Zhongping 任仲平, “Jueding xiandaihua mingyun de zhongda jueze—lun jiakuai jingji fazhan fangshi zhuanbian 决定现代化命运的重大抉择—论加快经济发展方式转变 [On Expediting the Transition to a New Model of Economic Growth: The Critical Decision on Which the Outcome of China’s Modernization Efforts Depends],” Renmin Ribao, March 19, 2010. 9  Wang Yi 王毅, “Lüse fazhan yu chuangxin—erlingyiling Zhongguo kechixu fazhan zhanlue baogao 绿色发展与创新—2010中国可持续发展战略报告 [Green Development and Innovations—China’s Strategy Report on Sustainable Development 2010],” Kexue chubanshe, 2010.

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Since the 1994 publication of the “White Paper,” the transformation of China’s model of economic development has been given repeated emphasis as a strategic goal for the country. During this time, rapid industrialization and urbanization have been accompanied by equally rapid environmental degradation. But even as the economy approaches the limits to growth imposed by natural systems, the pressure of international competition is increasing as well. Chinese entrepreneurs have realized that their businesses will soon be placed in a competitive disadvantage in the global market if they do not adopt clean productive technologies the way many in the developed countries have done. Chinese understand better now than they did a few decades ago the environmental problems they face and what it would take to address them. However, the country is still relying mostly on technical fixes to address these problems, and this dependency has become an excuse for the government to drag its feet on overhauling the economy at the structural and institutional levels. An incentive structure that encourages wasteful, GDP-boosting spending at the expense of environmental sustainability has been the key institutional constraint impeding economic restructuring for over a decade, yet it remains till this day. Furthermore, the unrelenting and growing pressure for government to generate employment for millions and maintain social stability is only helping to strengthen the hold of the status quo. There are also significant disagreements among scholars on key economic issues with important ecological implications. For example, many economists have insisted that the country must wean itself of an unsustainable dependency on exports by boosting domestic consumption. They warn that the economy could otherwise lose momentum, with disastrous social consequences. They also caution that there are still too many Chinese who under-consume, and for who, public services fail to meet their basic living needs. Policies to encourage domestic consumption have already taken effect. Others have questioned the wisdom of this view. They ask where China would find the resources to fuel domestic economic demand if all or even a large number of Chinese became heavy consumers. For example, the rapid increase in private automobile ownership is in effect pushing up global oil prices. It is all but certain that China will end up with a large number of people who cannot afford to drive the car they own. Heavy dependency on both foreign currency (especially US$) and foreign resources (especially crude oil) means that any tightening in the supply of either would increase the risk of serious inflation.10 Holders of this view contend that the most important 10  Zhang Jie 张捷, “Zhongguo dangqian ladong neixu shi xifang de xianjing 中国当前拉 动内需是西方的陷阱 [Western Trap: Boosting China’s Domestic Consumption],” Lüye, No. 11, 2009.

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economic challenge at present is not boosting domestic consumption but ensuring the nation’s financial security and resource sustainability. This and other debates on similar topics illustrate the difficulties and challenges China will face if the economic, social, and even cultural transformations discussed here are to be realised. China is only at the beginning of a long and arduous journey towards sustainability. 1.3

Global Interconnectedness: One World

Neoclassical environmental (micro)economics has been the primary theory guiding the country’s efforts to address environmental problems. One of the core tenets of Neoclassical environmental microeconomics is that most environmental problems are essentially due to price distortion, and thus can be corrected by ‘getting the price right’, that is by making sure that the market prices of economic activities and products properly reflect their full environmental costs. This will no doubt require government involvement, and just as importantly, government involvement that is open and transparent. Until this happens, prospects for an ecologically sustainable, green economy will remains elusive. Of course, even if these problems are solved, success reversal of the worsening trends in environmental conditions in China and the world at large is not guaranteed. The solution to these problems is a necessary but insufficient condition for genuine transformation of the prevailing, ecologically destructive model of economic development. China achieving this transformation by itself would not be enough for averting the global environmental crisis, the rest of the world must do so too. Unfortunately, all things considered, there are good reasons to be sceptical about the prospect of the necessary changes coming to either China or elsewhere in the world anytime soon. 1.3.1 Factory of the World No More? As the proverbial “factory of the world,” China has gained global prominence, borne the brunt of environmental damages, and also taken the blame for man of them. Reliable calculations indicate that export-oriented production accounts for 20 percent of the nation’s total industrial energy consumption.11 It should also be noted that most of these global consumers live in countries 11  Zhang Youguo 张友国, “Zhongguo duiwai maoyi zhong de huanjing chengben—pinggu yu duice yanjiu 中国对外贸易中的环境成本—评估与对策研究 [The Environmental Cost of China’s International Trade: Assessment and Solutions],” Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan shuliang jingji yu jishu jingji yanjiusuo yanjiu baogao 中国社会科学院

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with much more generous per capita ecological space than China. Reducing export-dependency would therefore have huge structural implications for China’s economy. However, where export policies are concerned, the economic growth imperative continues to trump ecological preservation. As soon as a drop in exports threatens to slow down growth, even if only briefly, policies are put in place to rarrest the trend. And considerations of environmental and resource sustainability are simply too weak to tilt the policy calculation in the other direction. The Chinese government and environmental scholars and activists understand well that this is indeed a terrible dilemma for China: the country has to choose between economically unsustainable export-dependency and a socially-destabilizing surge in unemployment that would certainly result from a sudden “emancipation” from that dependency. But this is, after all, the price that has to be paid for integration into the world economy: China becomes part of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the rest of the world. Indeed, under economic globalization, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any country to make economic adjustments of its own choosing. Increased global interdependency means a decrease in economic autonomy. 1.3.2 Advocacy for a New Consumption Pattern? Environmental scholars and activists in China—particularly those associated with NGOs—have long been advocating the adoption of new, more ecologically appropriate consumption patterns by the Chinese people.12 This is a tall order, however, because most of the target audience of such efforts are members of China’s younger generations, whose members have grown up immersed in consumerism and materialism whose flourishing in China was fuelled by capital, particularly globally mobile capital. While these behaviours may appear to be the voluntary choices of individual Chinese consumers, they are to a large degree the product of corporate manipulation executed through adverting campaigns, and are as such powerful proof of how successful foreign capital interests have been in prying open and penetrating the markets of developing countries. Many economists have noted the enormous impact multinational corporations have had on importing countries. A. P. Thirlwall, the British economist, has pointed out how these corporations undermine social cohesion by feeding 数量经济与技术经济研究所研究报告 [Research Report of Research Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2009. 12  Yang Dongping 杨东平 (ed.), “Huanjing Lü Pi Shu 环境绿皮书 [Green Book of the Environment],” Beijing: Sheke wenxian chubanshe, 2010.

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the wants of the rich and stoking the desires of the poor. The global popularity of Coca Cola offers one example, which has increased steadily despite the fact that regular consumption of the ubiquitous beverage is arguably harmful to health.13 Luxury goods are another. In fact, these forces have worked so effectively in China that the country has become the world’s second largest market for the latter. One may be forgiven for thinking that even if all of the world’s voices advocating for an ecologically-appropriate consumption pattern and lifestyle were to unite, they would be no match for the powerful forces of consumerism and materialism. As a Chinese environmental philosopher observed: “Developed countries are the dominating forces within today’s economic world order. If they do not set a good example by transforming their own growth model, then developing countries acting alone cannot solve the world’s environmental problems. For not only do the latter have to address domestic issues such as poverty, they must also do so while they are at an international competitive disadvantage relative to developed countries.”14 However, it does not seem realistic to expect developed countries to set such a positive example. For all practical purposes, they continue going down the wrong path. It would be a considerable achievement if they could even slow down. 1.3.3 Home-grown, Environment-friendly Technologies? Some Chinese scholars have powerfully and convincingly argued that technological advances are the key to greening the economy, and should be the very centrepiece of ecological modernization.15 However, increases in resource use efficiency are not the same as, and do not necessarily translate into, increases in overall economic efficiency. While the former certainly may lead to the latter in a competitive market, whether they actually do so depends on their short-term profit return, which in turn is contingent on a variety of factors. While the clean, or at least cleaner, technologies developed in developing countries can often claim certain second-generation advantages, and can do quite well in the local market (as is the case with many 13  Thirlwall, A. P., Growth and Development. Chinese edition, Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 2001. 14  Zhang Rongnan and Lu Feng 张容楠, 卢风, “Xiaofei zhuyi yu xiaofei lunli 消费主义与 消费伦理 [Consumerism and Consumer Ethics],” Sixiang Zhenxian, Vol. 2, No. 32, 2006. 15  Wang Yi 王毅, “Lüse fazhan yu chuangxin—erlingyiling Zhongguo kechixu fazhan zhanlue baogao 绿色发展与创新—2010中国可持续发展战略报告 [Green Develop­ ment and Innovations: Chinese Sustainable Development Strategy Report 2010],” Kexue chubanshe, 2010.

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Chinese home-grown green technologies), they tend to perform poorly internationally. This is attributable to a combination of two factors: the invisible hand of the global market and the visible hand of intellectual property laws, which systematically favour developed countries, home to many of the world’s patent-holding, financially powerful and politically connected corporations. Citing intellectual property concerns, these corporations and their home countries are often unwilling to make green technologies inexpensively available to developing countries, many of which need them badly but cannot develop them on their own. Yet, when developing countries do manage to develop their own clean technologies and even break into foreign markets, developed countries and their corporations do all they can to prevent these technologies from becoming commercially successful. Among their tactics is flooding the market with their own products. For example, high quality agricultural products produced in ecologically-appropriate ways in developing countries have often been at a competitive disadvantage in terms of price relative to those created in more resource-intensive and less sustainable ways in developed countries. What befell the Chinese soybean market offers an illustration of this cruel logic. While some may argue that this is only the law of comparative advantage at work, the fact is that what count as advantages or disadvantages is not just a matter of academic debate, but is in practice vulnerable to manipulation. Therefore, in addition to domestic institutional, economic, and cultural hurdles, obstruction by global capital also hinders China’s efforts to develop its own commercially viable clean technologies. The country is instead encouraged to “buy green” from developed countries. The feasibility of this option is, however, highly questionable; for a country and an economy of China’s magnitude, total dependency on imported technologies for its ecological modernization seems neither realistic nor desirable. Conclusions: Why China Cannot Easily Transform its Economic Growth Model In her efforts to shift towards a less ecologically destructive model of economic growth and to stop the degeneration of the global environmental commons, China already has the full support of the environmentally committed the world over. However, she faces obstacles in the form of the forces driving economic globalization. While globalization can yield some environmental benefits, all things considered, its environmental costs have far outweighed the benefits. The synergy between the growth of the Chinese economy and economic globalization is the result of a complex set of circumstances, the most important of which being the state of social- and economic-preparedness the 1.3.4

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country was in when it began to integrate economically with the rest of the world. China’s integration with the global economy got off to a smooth start, thanks to the combination of the country’s pre-existing status as a sovereign country and a modern nation-state, its domestic social stability, the existence of a fairly well-established industrial structure and a government committed to social and economic development.16 These conditions allowed whoever can make a profitable use of them easy access to China’s market, labour force and natural resources (including its ecological space). However, as we have also seen, global capital has not hesitated to undermine the efforts by developing countries to achieve ecological modernization of their industrial systems through home-grown technologies. Indeed, global capital is unlikely to welcome an economically and technologically more self-sufficient China, whether that self-sufficiency is in the interests of the environment or not. As Einstein once said: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” As significantly beneficial as integration into the global economy has been for China, it has also created many serious problems. If we wish to solve them, then we should not continue or intensify the integration process. That many people in China are not yet fully aware of this is perhaps one of the more difficult obstacles to a genuine and sustained green transformation of the Chinese economy. 1.4

China’s Responsibilities

Protecting the Global Environmental Commons by Promoting Global Environmental Justice No single country can be expected to accomplish a transformation of modes of economic production and models of economic growth all by itself. Common sense alone tells us that no country can justifiably accuse others of failing to solve a problem of which it is a main cause. The global ecological crisis that humanity now faces is an outcome of complex historical processes. Those who argue that it can be solved through technical fixes, cost-benefit analysis and 1.4.1

16  Zhao Jingxing 赵京兴, “Zhongguo de fenceng gongyehua daolu–dui Zhongguo fazhan yu gaige de yige jieshi 中国的分层工业化道路——对中国发展与改革的一个解释 [Multi-layered Industrialization: Explaining Development and Reform in China],” Paper presented at Zhongguo gaige kaifang sanshi zhounian xueshu yantaohui 中国改革开放 三十周年学术研讨会 [Thirty Year Anniversary Symposium for Economic Reform and Opening Up in China], Taipei, Taiwan, 2009.

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litigation are guilty not only of rigidity but perhaps also of superficiality and even bad faith, for these approaches do little more than relieving symptoms. To cure the disease, nothing less than a transformation of the model of economic development and the prevailing material culture is necessary. While adopting this approach likely causes more pain in the short-term, for the sake of our long-term interests, and of future generations, it must be done, and soon. Currently, the world is held hostage by a relatively small number of interest groups whose power and greed have become, and will continue to be, sources of global instability. They are the reason why it often seems that a more ecologically stressed world will necessarily be more economically unequal and geopolitically volatile. Depending on how we act today, the world may go down one of two possible paths. One leads us to a future in which international and inter-regional economic inequalities will reach a point where world peace is jeopardized, while the other leads us to an alternative future in which these inequalities begin to reduce as groups work together to address, among other things, the threat of global climate change and its ecological risks. Environmental sustainability cannot be separated from, or independent of, economic and social sustainability; in other words, a clean environment and a harmonious and just society are mutually reinforcing. This is why efforts to reduce differences in social capacity and economic prosperity, either within or between countries, are also likely to help slow the worsening trend in global environmental conditions. This obviously calls for a new kind of relationship between developed and developing countries, in which the latter not only receive aid from the former, but are also helped in their efforts toward economic independence. As the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is now being tested in the global response to climate change, the world may be taking its first collective step towards a more just world. 1.4.2 In Search of a New Philosophy According to an optimistic view among some Chinese commentators and members of the general public, many of the environmental problems the country is suffering from today are only temporary, and will of their own course as China moves into the next stage of economic development. They believe that the environmental Kuznets curve applies in China, that once per capita income reaches a certain level, many forms of environmental pollution will begin to level off and environmental conditions will improve. On this view, the worst thing that can happen to China now is if something was to stymie her efforts to catch up with the developed economies. This has led many to become alarmist about a conspiracy among developed countries to obstruct China’s growth and

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development. These commentators may have different views on the market and the role of the government in economic development, but they agree that economic growth must continue to avoid economic collapse. They are fully in favour of all Chinese people achieving their consumption desires, and dismiss suggestions that the virtue of thrift be reinstated. According to a far more pessimistic view, the framework for economic progress may crumble beneath us. Subscribers to this view doubt that unlimited expansion of material wealth is either necessary or sufficient for social and cultural progress. In particular, they question whether China can grow over the hump of Kuznets’ inverted U curve as some developed countries have allegedly done. They argue that the world’s natural resources and ecological conditions have declined since these countries began industrializing. Resource frontiers where China could commandeer wealth without risking dangerous geopolitical consequences have disappeared. They also oppose China emulating the profligate consumption patterns of wealthy countries and advocate instead for a philosophy of material adequacy and sufficiency for all. However, when faced with these difficult choices, not everybody wants to choose. Both the optimists and the pessimists have identified some key points, and both may have missed others. Indeed, each has chosen to emphasize different aspects of the situation. The authors in this book have aimed to go beyond the apparent impasse, to stand higher, look further, and probe more deeply. These issues are enormously complicated, and it would be naive to expect to find simple solutions to them. Hard though it may be, we should not let feelings cloud our judgment: The environmental challenge is a highly elastic one. For China is being asked to keep up with the rest of the world in cultural values while guarding its own interests from being trumped in ruthless international competition. What could seem more paradoxical than trying to industrialize while at the same time criticizing the modern industrial economy, and trying to shift towards a market economy while at the same time reflecting critically on that very way of organizing material production? We must not draw large and premature conclusions about such serious matters. Existing theoretical frameworks may, or may not, suit our purposes and needs. Yet, these are the very kinds of difficulties that propel us forward. Where no path already exists, we are free to open new ones.17

17  Zheng Yisheng and Qian Yihong 郑易生, 钱薏红, Shendu youhuan 深度忧患 [Deep Worries]. Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1, 1998.

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This passage seems even more poignant now than when it was written. And if the optimistic view and the pessimistic view each represent a distinct development model, then a different theoretical approach that transcends the impasse between them may be what we need. What this third way, now taking shape in countries like China and India will turn out to be is an issue of concern for all. It certainly won’t form in one quick step, but will continue to evolve through an arduous process of trial and error. China is well placed to make a significant contribution to this grand experiment. As long as we are open-minded, and understand that the future is largely decided by our current actions, and are committed to serving the many and not just a few, and to global justice and a pluralistic and innovative approach to putting theory into practice, we stand to gain increased support in our struggle to achieve eventual success.

Chapter 2

Understanding Environmental Pollution in China: An Analysis of Its Key Features Guo Xiaomin As the largest developing country in the world, China is currently undergoing rapid growth of its heavy industries, rapid urbanization and significant changes in its political and economic systems. In China, geographical distribution of environmental problems is uneven because of the country’s dual economy, and its stratified pattern of regional disparity in economic development. Moreover, environmental problems that developed countries have already gone through at earlier industrialization and modernization stages, and new ones that are global in nature that are unfamiliar to these countries are all happening in China at the same time. Evidently, these amount to severe environmental constraints and challenges that the country must overcome in its quest to modernize. Environmental protection and sustainable development are China’s fundamental national commitments. The country has simultaneously been pursuing industrial modernization, environmental protection, and economic development simultaneously. More recently, the Chinese government has fully embraced the scientific outlook on development, to which the country’s environmental policies must also adhere. More specifically, it has prioritized prevention, adopted methodological pluralism and holism, and a general approach to tackling environmental problems that is at once comprehensive in scope and focused regarding specific issues, such as environmental threats to public health. The government has also been institutionally innovative, and willing to let scientific and technological advances inform policy; it has strengthened environmental laws and tried to make the most use of the expertise and the resources of different social groups. These efforts have generated some payoff. Overall, environmental pollution and ecological degradation in China have worsened less than have aggregate resource use and waste discharge increased. Some of the waterway cleanup projects have achieved some success; the environmental quality of some cities and regions has improved moderately, industrial efficiency has seen some increase, and public awareness of environmental issues is greater than ever. But as former Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) pointed out in his speech during the Sixth National Convention

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on Environmental Protection, we must clearly recognize the gravity of China’s environmental situation. New problems continue to emerge even as old and chronic ones remain unsolved; in some places, environmental pollution and ecological deterioration have become grave, emissions of major pollutants have exceeded the sink capacity of the local ecosystem, with severe water, air and soil pollution as a consequence. Pollution from solid waste, tailpipe emission and persistent organic pollutants have been growing. The majority of rivers sections within cities are polluted, one-fifth of all Chinese cities are affected by air pollution, and one-third of Chinese territory by acid rain. The country has paid a high price for these trends in terms of not only the national economy but also people’s quality of life. In short, despite some achievements in this area, China continues to face serious problems of environmental pollution and ecological degradation, and has still a long way to go before the worsening trend is reversed. A close examination of the key features of environmental pollution in China in recent years is important for arriving at a deeper understanding of the overall situation, and a more incisive analysis of environmental risks, preventing future problems and solving existing ones. 2.1

Emissions Reduction for Key Pollutants: Daunting Task Ahead Despite Slower Rates of Increase

Emission levels of key pollutants in many places are so high they have exceeded the sink capacity of the air, the water and the soil. To address the problem, the Chinese government initiated a momentous drive during the 9th Five-Year Plan period to curb aggregate emission of major pollutants, and resolved to maintain economic growth. Since 1995, Chinese GDP increase has traced a curve the shape of a horseshoe (Figure 2.1). During the 9th Five-Year Plan period (1996–2000), the annual GDP growth slowed somewhat, dropping from 10.9% in 1995 to 7.6% in 1999. This was mainly due to the Asian financial crisis and subsequent adjustments to the national economy (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). Total emissions also decreased. During the 10th Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005), the Chinese economy recovered and surged forward again, finishing off the period with a 10% annual GDP growth. The trend continued into the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010). GDP grew by 11.9% in 2007, and by slightly less 9% in 2008. The decline reflected the impact of the global financial crisis. During the 10th Five-Year Plan period, as a consequence of the combination of high growth rate, escalating resource demands, and the quickening pace of

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Figure 2.1 Chinese GDP Growth Rate (1995–2008). Data source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao (中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.

urbanization, emission of major pollutants rose drastically. For some major pollutants, total discharge rose yearly (Tables 2.1, 2.2 and Figure 2.2). Unlike most of the economic targets in the 10th Five-Year Plan, which were more than met and actually surpassed, the country missed two of the environmental targets: 10% reduction in sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission and chemical oxygen demand (COD). Total SO2 emission in 2005 was 28% higher than in 2000, and over the same period, COD emissions dropped by only 2%. Total discharge of wastewater, smoke dust and industrial particulates grew by 27%, 2% and 28%, respectively. All things considered, the problem of environmental pollution was worsening in China. During the period of the 10th Five-Year Plan, serious tension existed between rapid economic growth and pollution abatement efforts. It was clear from the rise in total pollution indicates that China failed to make progress both economically and environmentally at the same time, and was in fact paying a high environmental price for its rapid economic growth. The 11th FiveYear Plan again included reduction targets of 10% for SO2 and COD emissions, and called for improvement in resource use efficiency as an integral part of economic restructuring and transitioning towards a new development model. A combination of structural abatement (such as restricting the growth of energy-intensive, highly polluting and resource-consuming industries), and greater investment in environmental protection and improved waste management (such as building waste water treatment plants in key cities and installing

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Figure 2.2 SO2 and COD Emissions (1998–2008). Data source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao (中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 1998–2008.

desulfurization equipment in power plants), produced considerable pollution reduction. SO2 and COD emissions were 8.94% and 6.58% lower, respectively, in 2008 than in 2005. And by 2009, SO2 and COD emissions had dropped by 13.14% and 9.66%, respectively compared with the 2005 level. In fact, the emissions reduction target for SO2 was met one year ahead of schedule. Despite these achievements, however, total emissions level for both forms of pollutants remains high in absolute terms, exceeding the ecosystem’s waste sink capacity. And because of the composite nature of China’s pollution problems, reducing SO2 and COD emissions alone will not fully address the problem. There are as yet no effective ways of controlling nitrogen oxide and ammonia nitrogen emissions from fuel combustion and automobiles. Due to extreme levels of ammonia nitrogen emission, pure sulfuric acid rain has turned into a hybrid of sulfuric acid and nitrate acid rain. High levels of nitrogen oxide emission have led to eutrophication at many lakes. Indeed, these problems have worsened over the last decade or so. The 2007 blue algae bloom on Taihu Lake (太湖), which threatened water supply for Wuxi (无锡), should serve as a warning. Furthermore, heavy metal contamination of water remains a significant public health hazard. All told, pollution control in China continues to be an up-hill battle.

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Heavy Industry: Pollution Heavyweight in a Structurallyimbalanced Economy

Rapid growth of heavy industries characterizes economic growth in China during the current period. This has led to a structural imbalance in the Chinese economy. Heavy industries accounted for 60.2% of aggregate industrial output in 2000 and for 70.5% in 2007 (Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3). Total output of many heavy industrial products has increased by many orders of magnitude. For example, in 2008, the output of the coal, electricity, steel and cement industries was 2.23, 2.97, 4.33 and 2.61 times, respectively, what they were in 1998 (Table 2.4). Heavy industries are both resource-intensive and highly polluting. In 2006, the combined contribution of coal-fired power plants, ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling, and non-metallic mineral industries towards the nation’s total SO2, smoke dust and airborne particulates discharge from industrial sources was 75.4% and 69.9%, respectively (Table 2.5). Non-metallic mineral industry and ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling industries combined accounted for 85.9% of total industrially generated airborne particulates. In the same year, the percentages of COD discharged in waste water accounted for by the paper, agricultural, food processing, chemical, and textile industries were 33.6%, 12.8%, 11.7% and 6.8%, respectively—or a combined 64.9%—of the total by all industries (Table 2.6). The amount of heavy metal released by nonferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling, nonferrous metal mining, chemical, and ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling industries through waste

Figure 2.3 Relative Composition of Chinese Industrial Structure (1995–2007). Data source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (中国统计年鉴) [China Statistical Yearbook], Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007.

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water discharge accounted for 31.9%, 30.7%, 16.4%, and 6.8%, respectively— or a combined 85.8%—of the national total from industrial sources. Different economic sectors make markedly uneven contributions towards China’s pollution problem. Demands for heavy industrial products though already high, are far from peaking. The iron and steel industry, which has received much attention in this connection, illustrates this well. Even though China now leads the world in iron and steel production, domestic consumption began to escalate only recently. Currently, per capita annual consumption in China stands at 94kg, compared with 450kg for other developing countries such as Malaysia. The rapid growth of heavy industries has generated environmental pollution and caused ecological destruction, and placed enormous pressure on the world’s remaining stocks of coal, crude oil, and mineral resources. So long as structural imbalance of the Chinese economy persists, heavy industries will for the foreseeable future be the main focus of the country’s efforts to combat pollution. 2.3

Wastewater Treatment: A Growing Problem under Rapid Urbanization

Urbanization has been speeding up in China in recent years. The urban population increased from 416 million in 1998 to 607 million in 2008, at an annual rate of 3.9%, or from 33.4% to 45.7% of the total population. If the percentage of urban population continues to grow at an annual rate of 1.2%, 60% of the Chinese pollution will be living in urban areas by 2020 (see Table 2.8 and Figure 2.4). There has been a corresponding increase in the number of wastewater treatment facilities servicing urban areas. Their combined capacity went from 11.67 million m3/day in 1998 to 82.95 million m3/day in 2008, and the treatment rate for wastewater went from 16.2% to 70.2% during the same period. Within the last decade, wastewater treatment capacity grew by an average of 21.7% a year, faster than the growth of the urban population. However, many treatment plants are poorly run. According to a study by the Ministry of Construction (建设部), in 2004, wastewater treatment plants in urban areas were operating at an average of 65% capacity, with some of them failing considerably to provide any treatment service. By the end of June 2005, wastewater treatment plants in 38 of the total of 364 cities that had them were operating at less than 30% of full capacity (including 17 with plants on which constructed had been completed but never became operational). In addition, State Environmental Protection Administration (国家环境保护总局) (now

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Figure 2.4 Chinese Urban Population and COD Emissions. Data sources: Zhongguo chengshi tongji gongbao (中国城市统计公报) [China Urban Statistical Bulletin], Zhongguo tongji chubanshe: 1998–2008; Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao (中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 1998–2008.

Ministry of Environmental Protection [国家环境保护部]) statistics and a case study by the Panel on the Monitoring of Law Enforcement of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (全国人大常委会执法检查组) indicated that, by the end of 2004, only one third of the 709 wastewater treatment plants that had been built in 600 cities were operating properly. One third operated below full capacity and the other one third was operating sporadically or not at all. Many factors explain the poor performance of so many of these plants, chief among these being the absence of a fee-based payment system, a fact that meant that many plants were financially unviable. In addition, many plants simply had no wastewater to treat because the supporting infrastructure had not been constructed, including water pipes for collecting and transporting municipal wastewater. The level of COD emissions from urban residential sources increased at an average annual rate of 3.0%, from 6.95 million tons in 1998 to 8.87 million tons in 2008. Since the 11th FiveYear Plan (十一五规划), the central government has stepped up efforts to combat pollution, and made notable progress in constructing and operating municipal wastewater treatment facilities. As a result, urban COD emissions began to decline in 2007. The 2007 and 2008 levels were 8.71 million tons and 8.63 million tons, respectively. But even the 2008 level was 1.24 times the 1998 level. In short, the problem of municipal wastewater will continue for the foreseeable future.

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Urban Air Pollution: Despite some Progress, the Situation Remains Serious

The picture of urban air quality has been a mixed one. According to China’s official reports on environmental quality, particulate matter continues to be the chief airborne pollutant in Chinese cities (Tables 2.9 and 2.10). Air quality in urban areas changed little between 2000 and 2004, and improved appreciably after 2005 (Table 2.9). In 2008, the percentage of Chinese cities that achieved Grade II in terms of air quality was 76.8%, compared with 36.5% in 2000, and the number of cities that only made Grade III had markedly decreased.1 It attests to the effectiveness of some of the pollution abatement measures that such improvements should have been achieved despite the country’s high rate of economic growth and increasing pace of urbanization. All things considered, however, optimism is not warranted. Much remains to be done. Smog has become the Number One Air Pollution Problem for some Areas In recent years, sharp increases in automobile ownership and use, growing fossil fuel consumption, and escalating industrial discharge of airborne pollutants have turned smog into the No. 1 air pollution problem in the Pearl River delta (珠江三角洲), the Yangtze River delta (长江三角洲), Sichuan basin (四川盆地), the region that includes metropolitan Beijing and Tianjin, and all of Hebei province. Statistical analyses show that prior to the 1960s–1970s, smog was extremely rare in Guangzhou, occurring, due invariably to natural causes, at a frequency of on average one to two days a year. Since the 1980s, however, the smog situation has worsened precipitously. Now, smog occurs on 100–200 days, sometimes for as much as two thirds of a year. According to an analysis of daily records between 1961 and 2005, Nanjing (南京) experienced smog at most a few days each year during the 1960s. But by 1991, the number of affected days exceeded 100, and was a whopping 158 in 1994. Even though enhanced pollution control measures subsequently alleviated the situation slightly, it has begun to rise again in recent years as automobile ownership and use in the city have skyrocketed. Smog is made up of ultrafine particles with diameters less than 2.5 micro­ meters. They are hosts to many forms of toxic and/or harmful substances, and able to enter air pockets inside the human lungs or even the circulation system. They can harm the heart, the lungs and the respiratory tract, and reduce 2.4.1

1  Translator’s note: According to the grading system, the higher the grade the higher the level of pollution.

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lung capacity, and is a prevailing cause of lung cancer and other diseases of the respiratory system. Zhong Nanshan (钟南山), a Fellow of the Chinese Institute of Engineering (中国工程院) and President of the Chinese Medical Association (中华医学会), notes that lung cancer is now a common illness in Guangzhou, claiming the highest incidence of the disease, according to comparative studies of Nanhai (南海), Guangzhou (广州), Zhuhai (珠海), Hong Kong and Macau. In the 1990s, there were on average 27.5 cases of lung cancer for every one million Guangzhou residents, and the number has since doubled. The same trend holds for the country as a whole. Lung cancer now accounts for 33.1% of all cases of malignant lung tumors, and has overtaken liver cancer to become the number one cause of death from malignant tumors. Related studies show that despite continuous decline in the number of smokers, the incidence of lung cancer has increased by 46.5% over the last 30 years. Air pollution has much to do with this. 2.4.2 An Unprecedented Challenge: Controlling Composite Air Pollution There are now only a very small number of Chinese cities with PM10 concentration greater than 150mm/m3. In 2008, among Chinese cities monitored for PM10 concentration level, the percentage in this category was 0.6%. As the country’s rate of private automobile ownership rises, the problem of air pollution caused by tailpipe emissions is becoming acute. In China, composite pollution either has already replaced or is replacing smoke pollution in many urban areas as the chief form of air pollution. Fine particulates less than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5) in diameter, NO X, O3 and composite photochemical particles—which are far harder to control than smoke and dust particles, which are larger—have overtaken TSP (Total Suspended Particulate) and SO2 to become the dominant urban air pollutants. 2.4.3 A Pollution Monitoring “Blind Spot” Official reports indicate that there has been notable improvement in the country’s urban air quality. This claim, however, is not corroborated by available data on the incidence of smog pollution. One reason for this discrepancy is that the country is still using outdated air quality monitoring standards set in 1996, which are no longer suitable for current monitoring needs. Fine particles of diameters less than 2.5 micrometers, or PM2.5, totally fall outside the scope of these standards, yet these are the very particles, including sulphate, nitrate, and organic carbon, that are the main causes of smog. According to the international system of air quality monitoring (API), air quality monitoring must include concentration levels of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide, particular matter (PM10), ultrafine particles (PM2.5, PM1)

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and visibility. But in China, the list includes only sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter. This is why the results of conventional monitoring do not accurately reflect the air pollution situation, especially with respect to smog. This has thus become a “blind spot” in air quality monitoring.2 In addition, the existence of a geographical “blind spot” in pollution control has become increasingly evident. In the last decade or so, the main focus of air pollution control has been densely-populated cities, and the typical approach involves moving the most polluting businesses and industries to their outskirts, in some cases into industrial parks built especially to host them. In the meantime, cleaner businesses in the service industry have been growing in many of these cities. The practice has been dubbed “pushing out secondary industries and bringing in tertiary industries” (退二进三). The strategy has indeed helped improve urban air quality in some areas. However, because industrial upgrade and technological innovations have not always accompanied this process of reshuffling of relative pollution burdens among different areas, there has been little reduction in the aggregate level of pollution. In other words, improved air quality in the cities has been achieved at the expense of deteriorating air quality elsewhere. Indeed, the high concentration of seriously polluting businesses and industries in relatively small non-urban areas has given rise to the emergent and serious problem of regional pollution. And because the location and distribution of air quality monitoring stations have not kept up with the development of these new trends in urban economy, the result has been another “blind spot” in environmental monitoring, and another area of uncontrolled and uncontrollable environmental pollution. 2.4.4 Urban Air Quality Standards: The Problem with “Grade II” In urban air quality assessment, Grade II has typically been considered the minimum safety requirement. Meeting it, accordingly, is conventionally taken to be the objective for urban air quality improvement. However, in comparison with its nominal equivalence in the international system, air that meets Grade II by China’s standard is more polluted than air that meets Grade II by international standards. According to international studies from recent years, there are no safe levels of PM10 meaning that such particles pose health risks even at very low concentration levels. In the 2005 global update of its air 2  Editor’s note: Triggered partly by the public outcry in 2012 in response to its own monitoring results of Beijing’s air quality which the US embassy posted on its website, authorities in Beijing began monitoring for PM2.5 in 2013. Many cities soon followed suit. As of the beginning of 2014, air quality monitoring covering both PM2.5 and PM10 will take effect in nearly 200 Chinese cities will. The results are made available to the public.

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quality guidelines, the World Health Organization (WHO) determined the safe level for PM10 to be 20 μg/m3 annual mean. By contrast, in the set of standards used in China, the safe level is set at 100 μg/m3 annual mean, which is five-times the level in the WTO standard. Therefore, we must acknowledge that Grade II air by the Chinese standards can still be harmful to health. Achieving Grade II air quality by reference to criteria based on PM concentration is a short-term, and only a basic goal, for urban air pollution control. By Chinese criteria, Grade I is defined by a PM10 concentration of less than 40 μg/m3 annual mean, which is still twice the level considered safe according to the WTO guidelines. In 2008, only 4.0% of all cities in China made Grade I. The current criteria for air quality assessment must be revised to provide sound guidance for cities seeking to address their air pollution problems. 2.5

The Challenge for Rural Areas: Growing Pollution and Poor Regulation

For a long time, the main foci of pollution control in China have been cities and industries, and pollution problems in the countryside have largely been overlooked. Government agencies responsible for managing and protecting the environment in rural areas are largely absent, environmental monitoring in rural areas is practically non-existence, factories and businesses in rural areas pollute the local environment with impunity, basic infrastructure for environmental protection is severely underdeveloped and poorly financed. Yet, rural China has been struggling under enormous environmental pressures from two main sources: pollution generated in situ, that is, by agriculture and related industrial operations located inside rural areas, and pollution generated exogenously in urban areas, for which rural areas have for a long time served as a waste receptacle. 2.5.1 Modern Agriculture China is the world’s largest consumer of chemical fertilizer and pesticides. Annual consumption of chemical fertilizer stands at 46.37 million tons, which translates into 40 tons/km2 of arable land. This is much higher than the maximum adopted by many developed countries that is considered safe for both human beings and the environment, which is 22.5 tons/ km2. Use of chemical fertilizer by Chinese farmers is also highly inefficient, and the high rates of runoff can lead to soil erosion, water pollution by organic chemicals, eutrophication, and even air pollution. There are now already places in eastern China where the share of nonpoint source pollution surpasses industrial pollution.

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Annual consumption of pesticide in China now stands at 1.3 million tons. But only one third of this amount is absorbed and used by crops, with the rest entering the water system, soil and, of course, agricultural products. All of the country’s 93,000 km2 of farmland has been affected, albeit to varying degrees, by these problems, as has public health. According to the results of tests done in 2002 at wholesale markets in 16 provincial capitals, substantial traces of chemical fertilizer were found in 20%–60% of the produce tested, and in 20%–45% of those, the amount of pesticide residue reached unsafe levels. These numbers place us far behind developed countries in respect to pesticide pollution of crops. The situation has improved slightly in recent years. 2.5.2 Residential Waste In the last decade, rural towns have enjoyed rapid economic growth. However, due to lagging pollution abatement and environmental protection measures, and a lack of rules and regulations, residential waste generated in these areas has typically been released directly into the environment, rendering it “filthy, messy, and vile.” The 120 million tons of rural residential waste produced each year is almost entirely un-treated and is left in the open right where it is dumped, and nearly all residential wastewater produced each year in these areas—some 25 million tons of it—is also discharged into the environment untreated. Lack of access to safe drinking water remains a serious problem in the countryside. Currently, there are still 300 million rural residents with no access to safe drinking water, and 60% of them are the victims of water shortage caused by anthropogenic source pollution. The situation has begun to attract the attention of the government, which has led the national campaign to build “New Socialist Countryside” (社会主义新农村), of which strengthening the infrastructure for environmental management and protection is an integral part. However, given the magnitude of the problems we now face, we still have a long way to go. 2.5.3 Businesses and Factories Businesses and factories in rural towns and municipalities have been instrumental in alleviating poverty among China’s rural population. However, within the historically entrenched paradigm of the village economy, the industrialization process in rural China relies mainly on crude technologies and is based on a “free range” model. The decentralized nature of the process, in which each rural household industrializes its own family operation, has serious adverse environmental consequences. Not only has it posed great challenges for pollution abatement and control, but their close proximity to residential areas alone means that, these businesses and factories tend to cause more serious

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and more direct harm to human health and wellbeing. In recent years, due to stronger pollution abatement and environmental control measures in cities and urban economic reconfiguration, both parts of the “pushing out secondary industries and bringing in tertiary industries” strategy (退二进三), many industrial polluters have relocated from cities to the countryside, making an already bad pollution situation in the countryside worse. In addition, one environmental implication of the uneven geographic distribution of China’s economic development between its eastern, central and western regions is the westward migration of many large industrial polluters. 2.5.4 Factory Farms There has in recent years been a proliferation of factory farms in densely populated and industrially developed regions. These developments have brought with them serious problems of environmental pollution. According to the first national survey of pollution sources conducted in 2007, wastewater effluent from factory farming operations accounted for 42%, 22% and 38% of the nation’s total output of COD, nitrogen, and phosphorous, respectively. These operations tend to be located in areas with inadequate sink capacity for the animal waste and where human populations sometimes share the same source of water supply system with animals. Moreover, due to inadequate or sometimes total lack of planning, many of these operations have been built either too close to residential areas or in ecologically sensitive or strategic locations. This has caused serious problems of environmental pollution from animal waste, including surface water pollution by organic chemicals, eutrophication, ozone depletion, and groundwater pollution. Pathogens in animal waste have also become a significant health hazard. Pollution in Rural Areas Caused by Municipal Waste Discharge from Urban Areas The countryside has traditionally functioned as a receptacle for the industrial and residential wastes generated in cities. Irrigation with untreated waste­ water, dumping of solid waste, and the shift of industrial pollution into rural areas have all led to serious soil pollution by heavy metals. The adverse effects of the problem on the nation’s food product have begun to show. The total area of farmland irrigated with untreated wastewater was 1.4 million ha in 1982 and 4 million ha, or 10% of all irrigated farmland in China, in 2003. Nationally, 1.3 million ha of farmland have been claimed or rendered unusable for agricultural purposes by solid waste. Because mechanisms for implementing pollution abatement and control in rural areas have yet to be established, “minor pollution (problems)” have not 2.5.5

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only turned into large ones but also become a serious “burden,” compounding farmers’ existing social, economic, and political disadvantages. There are 300 million rural residents without access to safe drinking water, and according to China’s Health Statistical Yearbook (中国卫生统计年鉴) for 2005, the death rate for sufferers of malignant tumors directly attributable to water pollution was 0.8388 for every 100 among rural residents, 1.5 times the rate for urban population, which is 0.5717 deaths for every 100 cases. According to WHO investigations and studies, indoor air pollution from the burning of coal, straw, and dung for heating and cooking is extremely serious in rural China (Table 2.11), and has led to very high death rates from respiratory diseases. Again, according to China’s Health Statistical Yearbook 2005, in 2004, the death rate for people suffering from chronic diseases of the lower respiratory tract was 1.1664 for every 100 people, 2.64 times the rate for urban areas, which was 0.4549 for every 100 people. The exclusion of these pollution-related diseases from coverage under the current healthcare system has only added to the burdens of China’s rural population. Chinese farmers are badly in need of help, and the environment in rural China is badly in need of stewardship and protection. 2.6

Increasing Threat to Food Safety from Soil Pollution

Currently, soil quality is not yet subject to regular environmental monitoring in China. This is partly because there has never been any comprehensive and systematic reporting on the state of soil pollution in the country. Pollution is often treatable, for so long as we know its sources, and how bad it is, we can try to contain it and limit its adverse impact on society. But what is more terrifying than pollution itself is ignorance about it and its insidious effects on human health, under which people cannot make rational decisions about how to defend themselves against them. Soil pollution is a case in point. Two decades of rapid economic growth has left a rich legacy of badly polluted soil across the country. What, then, is the situation with respect to soil pollution in China? This has been a source of concern for many over the years. Recently, surveys on soil pollution have been conducted in many places, and the results are shocking.

· Guangzhou Daily reported in Feb. 2006 that according to studies of

the soil of the Pearl River delta, eastern Guangdong (Shantou 汕头), and western Guangdong (Zhanjiang 湛江) conducted by a team of researchers working on soil pollution from the Guangdong Institute of Ecological Environment and Soil, 40% of the soil in the Pearl River

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delta is contaminated with heavy metals, 10% seriously. The problem is even worse west of the river, where 60–70% of the soil is polluted by heavy metals.3 Lin Yusuo (林玉锁), who leads the “Investigation of the state of soil and environmental pollution in representative regions,” a project sponsored by the State Environmental Protection Administration as part of its program for the development of science and technology, and who is also director of the Center for Rural Environmental Studies at the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science, told First Financial Daily that “soil pollution in the Yangtze River delta is essentially of a composite nature, involving perhaps anywhere between 1 and over 10 different pollutants, including heavy metals and organic chemicals. Worse still, soil pollution in the Yangtze River delta is regional in scope, the result of metastasis of what was initially a local problem affecting only a relatively small area.”4 Soil pollution, therefore, is becoming both more severe and more widespread. The late Sun Tieheng (孙铁珩), a Fellow of the Institute of Ecology in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, told reporters that the area of farmland polluted by cadmium, arsenic, chromium and lead in China is nearly 20 million ha, or approximately 1/5 of the nation’s total farmland. Of the affected areas, 10 million ha is polluted by water, solid, and airborne waste discharged by industries, and the area irrigated with untreated wastewater has reached 3.3 million ha.5 A study by the Nanjing Soil Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中科院南京土壤所) of the Taihu Lake (太湖) area based on the composite pollution index for representative regions indicates that 50% of the soil in rice growing fields is considered safe, 33% is on pollution alert status, and 17% is somewhat polluted. For soil in vegetable growing fields, the percentages are 29–39%, 21–23%, and 36– 39%, respectively, and in some places intermediary pollution and heavy pollution each affects approximately 10% of the soil. Heavy

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3  “Xijiang liuyu qi cheng di wuran 西江流域七成地污染 [Seventy Percent Soil Polluted in Xijiang River Basin],” Guangzhou Ribao, February 24, 2006. 4  “Changsanjiao jubu turang wuran diaocha 长三角局部土壤污染调查 [Investigation of Soil Pollution in Parts of the Yangtze River Delta],” Diyi Caijing Ribao, September 22, 2005. 5  “Guotu ziyuanbu he Guangdong sheng zhengfu lianshou, Zhu Sanjiao diaocha zhongjinshu wuran 国土资源部 和广东省政府联手 珠三角调查重金属污染 [Ministry of Land and Resources and Guandong government jointly investigate heavy metal pollution of soil in the Pearl River delta],” Guangzhou: 21 Shiji Jingji, April 24, 2005.

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metals are the dominant source of soil pollution. The same soils would receive even lower grades if measured by the “green food” criteria, which are based on higher standards for soil quality.6 Researchers from the Nanjing Soil Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences recently collected 32 soil samples from agricultural fields near and/or around an iron- and-steel corporation, and additional ones from locations near its coking plant, iron ore sintering plant, main transportation lines, and artificial greenery and tested them for concentration of organic chemicals. The results showed that the average concentration level for 15 different kinds of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in these samples was 4.3 mg/kg, comparable to the levels in the irrigated croplands in Shenyang (沈阳) and Tianjin (天津), which have been polluted by untreated wastewater. Moreover, in the soil samples used in this study, more than 85% of the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons were tetra-cyclic or beyond, and highly carcinogenic. Only 6% of the soil sampled was considered safe.7 The city of Taizhou (台州), in Zhejiang province, is home to a booming industry in the collection, dissembling, and recycling of used electronics. For many years, workers used crude methods to dissemble the electronics and reclaim the heavy metals. Despite modest improvement recently, soil pollution is already very serious in this region. According to a study called “Soil and Air Quality in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta Regions: Patterns of Change and Basic Principles for Management and Regulations,” or Project 973 and a key national project—under the program for basic research and initiated by the Nanjing Soil Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, dioxins and dibenzofurans were found to be present in the soil used for agricultural purposes in and around Fengjiang Road (峰江街道), Taizhou City (台州市). These substances are persistent organic pollutants, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants has called for their reduction, and eventual elimination. The size of the area affected is estimated to be many tens of km2.8

·

6  “Diaocha xianshi Jinagsu sheng turang wuran riyi yanzhong 调查显示江苏省土壤污染 日益严重 [Studies show worsening soil pollution in Jiangsu province]” Jinling Wanbao 金陵晚报 [Jinling Evening News], Jan. 18, 2005. 7  Ibid. 8  “Yang laji yongru er’eying wuran Fengjiang turang zhongdu 洋垃圾涌入 二恶英污染峰江 土壤中毒 [Influx of Foreign Garbage: Dioxin Pollution of Fengjiang Riverbed],” Renminwang Huadong Xinwen 人民网-华东新闻 People’s Net Huadong News, July 27, 2005.

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· During the 2006 International Workshop on Lessons on the Abatement

and Prevention of Soil Pollution, an attendee from the State Environmental Protection Administration (now Ministry of Environmental Protection) in charge of the matter noted four main areas of concern with respect to soil pollution in China: (1) the worsening of regional soil pollution is putting the environmental quality of food-growing regions in jeopardy; (2) soil pollution is becoming increasingly serious for land used for commercial development and other types of construction and for waste disposal (3) soil pollution has become increasingly heterogeneous and composite; (4) the impact of pollution on soil ecology is growing.

In sum, China’s soil pollution problem has reached a critical point, and we no longer have the luxury of waiting to solve it. The issue of food safety has now become a source of anxiety among the public. Because human health is so intimately linked with food safety, which in turn depends importantly on soil quality, it deserves as much attention as it can get. Moreover, the problem is far more difficult to tackle than air or water pollution. For example, the soil at the old Shenyang Smelter site has been heavily polluted by heavy metals. The most seriously polluted portions have had to be literally dug up and disposed of as hazardous waste material, which was taken to special locations for proper burial in accordance with safety guidelines. The less seriously polluted portions have been covered with a hard surface, planted with vegetation, or otherwise decontaminated by having the heavy metals in them extracted using a variety of soil-cleansing technologies and techniques. The old factory ground occupies an area of 300,000 m2, and it is eligible for municipal zoning only after the contaminated soil has been thoroughly treated or removed. The total cost associated with these measures has been estimated to be around RMB 50 million. At this rate, the economic cost of treating all the metal-contaminated soil in the country will be astronomical. Therefore, greater emphasis on soil pollution prevention is absolutely paramount. The government has reportedly already initiated a nation-wide soil survey, which will offer a first comprehensive evaluation and assessment of the state of soil pollution in China. 2.7

Serious Underground Water Pollution Threatens Public Health

Underground water is a significant source of water supply in China. Historically, underground water has met one third of all water needs, and been, because of its superior quality, the main source of drinking water. Its national

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and economic importance can hardly be exaggerated. Unlike surface water pollution, which is relatively easy to detect and monitor, pollution of underground water, especially that in deep aquifers, is particularly difficult to detect before it is too late. While a certain degree of self-cleansing is possible for surface water because of its fluidity, the same is not true for underground water, and progressively less so at deeper levels. Therefore, underground water pollution is often very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to reverse. As such, prevention, early detection, and early treatment are essential for addressing this problem. There has, however, never been a national survey or study of the subject in China. Consequently, for such a critical and highly sensitive issue, there does not even exist a set of comprehensive data to which we can refer when discussing it. Still, experts and agencies that have done some limited monitoring suggest that the situation in China with respect to underground water pollution is extremely grave.

· Results from the second round of underground water quality assess-

ment conducted between 2000 and 2002 by the Ministry of Land and Resources (国土资源部) using a regional evaluation based on the criteria specified in Standards for Underground Water Quality, showed that 63% of groundwater in China is potable, 17% requires some treatment, 12% is unfit for drinking but can be used in industrial and agricultural production, while the remaining 8% is unusable for any purposes without special treatment. The groundwater quality in 2/3 of Chinese cities has deteriorated, and in about half of all cities, underground water pollution is fairly serious and continuing to worsen. Moreover, pollutants have become more varied and complex in composition, and are finding their way deeper and deeper underground. Meantime, cases of diseases attributable to drinking water pollution have been reported in many provinces, regions, and cities. Nationwide, about 70 million people regularly consume groundwater that does not meet safe drinking water standards.9 Results from a recent the Chinese national geological survey show that 25% of all 253 underground water extraction sites from across 185 cities showed a worsening trend for underground water pollution.10

· 9 

“Qiqianwan ren reng yinyong bu he biaozhun de dixiashui 七千万人仍饮用不合标准 的地下水 [Seventy million people still drinking from sources of groundwater that fail to meet safety standards],” Fazhi ribao, November 2nd, 2003. 10  “Diaocha jiance xianshi zhongguo chengshi baifenzhi ershiwu dixianshui wuran qushi jiazhong 调查监测显示中国城市百分之二十五地下水污染趋势加重 [Studies Show Pollution Worsening at 25 Percent of Underground Water Extraction Sites

understanding environmental pollution in china

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· In 2002, the Chinese Academy of Environmental Sciences (中国环境 科学院) did an analysis of the monitoring results for the underground

water in 118 medium-sized and large cities, and found varying degrees of pollution in almost all of it. The situation is serious for 64% of the 118 cities and mild for 33%. Underground water pollution is extremely serious in some places and getting worse. The situation tends to be worse for cities in northern China, because of the greater number of pollutants, and the higher concentration levels. For example, among the main cities in China’s central north region, those of the Haihe River (海河) valley alone account for aquifers with about 70,000 km2 of surface area that fail to make the First Grade. Underground water in the region that includes metropolitan Beijing (北京), Tianjin (天津), and Tangshan (唐山) contains up to 133 organic chemicals. Unsustainable abstraction has led to large areas of ground subsidence, which causes shallow underground water to flow downward, thereby contaminating deeper underground water. The area affected by ground subsidence in the Haihe River valley and this region has increased to 35,000 km2. Most of the underground water in Beijing is polluted, with the problem being particularly serious in parts of the city. Drinkable groundwater is no longer available in many places in Beijing.11 In sum, the overall situation for underground water pollution in China is acute. In 2006, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the State Environmental Protection Administration and other government agencies set in motion a national campaign to study and evaluate groundwater quality. The campaign should help to reveal just how serious this problem is in China. Better late— which it already is—than never. 2.8

Increasing Frequency and Risks of Environment Related Accidents and Disasters

Yet another notable feature of the recent pollution situation in China is the increasing frequency and risks of environmentally related accidents and disasters. The Tuojiang River (沱江) pollution incident that took place between Supplying Chinese Cities],” 中国新闻网 April 22, 2005, http://www.chinanews.com/ news/2005/2005-04-22/26/565839.shtml. Last accessed Nov. 5, 2015. 11  “Chengshi dixiashui wuran shuishi 377 yi yuan 城市地下水损失 377 亿元 [Underground Water Pollution Cost Chinese Cities 37.7 Billion Yuan Annually],” Jingji Cankao Bao, Jan. 16, 2006. http://finance.proc.sina.cn/w/?c=roll&d=20060116&i=0938498253.

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February and April of 2004 had serious industrial, agricultural, and residential water supply consequences for downstream cities, including Chengdu (成都), Ziyang (资阳) and three others; the explosion that took place at the Jilin Chemical Corporation (吉林化学总公司) in 2005 led to serious pollution of the Songhuajiang River (松花江) valley, and even halted operations at the Harbin municipal water utilities company. Environmental accidents in 2009 included many, such as those in Fengxiang (凤翔) of Shaanxi province, and Shuangfeng (双峰) and Liuyang (浏阳) of Hunan province, that involved heavy metal pollution; in the same year, there was a serious water pollution accident in BeiJiang (北江), Guangdong province, an oil well spill in Kaixian (开县), Chongqing (重庆), and a liquid chlorine spill in Huai’an (淮安), Jiangsu province. But these are only some of the better-known environmental accidents and disasters. According to some reports, environment-related accidents have been occurring at the frequency of one every two days. These incidents have not only wrecked havoc on the environment, threatened people’s lives and health, set us back in our push towards sustainable development, jeopardized national security and social stability, but also, in cases where the interests of other countries have been implicated, hurt our international reputation. Still, the high incidence of these types of disasters in recent years is by no means a coincident, but rather almost inevitable.

· With the rapid expansion of the national economy, and the growth of

heavy industries—especially petroleum and chemical industries—in particular, the production, storage, and transportation of hazardous materials have risen precipitously. This greatly increases the risk of accidents. The uneven geographical layout of industries has increased the risks of environmental accidents on the regional scale. Low levels of awareness about risk factors for environmental accidents are partly to blame for the tendency for many high-risk businesses and industries to be built near major waterways such as large and medium-sized rivers, in ecologically sensitive areas, and upstream from locations that supply drinking water. This tendency has greatly raised the probability of environment-related accidents and disasters that are regional in scale and geographically clustered but also for those that are international in scope. According to a 2006 study by the State Environmental Protection Administration, of the 7,555 businesses in the chemical and petroleum industries that were studied, 81% were located in ecologically sensitive locations such as river valleys and densely

·

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populated areas. Forty-five percent of these businesses were considered major safety hazards.12 Temporary storage of large volumes of waste material constitutes a significant risk factor for environmental accidents. Many businesses do not have measures in place for treating waste discharge for safe disposal. Instead, they simply leave their solid and water waste in temporary storage facilities, which tend to be shoddily constructed makeshift structures and vulnerable to destruction by violent weather events such as heavy downpours. The resultant spillage of waste material can often cause serious accidents involving environmental pollution. During the annual low water season, sluggish water flow in the Huaihe River (淮河) valley would cause a concentration of pollutants in the reservoir. During the high water and rainy seasons, this body of highly polluted water would be suddenly released through the sluice-gates. This practice has led to frequent pollution-related accidents downstream from the dams. Because of a lack of awareness about risk factors for environmental accidents by businesses in high-risk industries and indeed society as a whole, institutional preparedness for responding to accidents and their consequences is generally inadequate. This can compound the damages from the accidents. For example, the pollution accident that took place in the Songhuajiang River (松花江) valley has helped expose our massive ignorance about the issue and raise public awareness. If the response to the explosion at Jihua diphenyl plant had been faster and more effective, it would have caused less devastation than it in fact did.

·

·

2.9

Escalating Environmental Cost of Economic Growth

The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has brought the spectacular success of rising GDP but also acute problems of environmental pollution. We must acknowledge both. Therefore, environmental accounting is a critical undertaking, even though a theoretically sound and well-tested system for doing so has yet to be established. It is also cutting-edge. The State Environmental 12  Guo Wei and Li Ying 郭薇, 李莹, “Woguo huanjing fengxian you duo da? 我国环境 风险有多大? [How Great are China’s Environmental Risks?],” Zhongguo huanjing bao, September 14, 2010.

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Protection Administration and the National Bureau of Statistics have jointly conducted research on green accounting in China, gaining valuable insights into the matter. The results are documented in the “2004 Report on the Study of Green Accounting in China,” and calculations that factor in the economic cost of environmental degradation indicate that environmental pollution amounted to a loss of RMB 511.8 billion to the national economy in 2004, or 3.05% of GDP (see Table 2.12). Water pollution accounted for a loss of RMB 286.28 billion, or 55.9% of the total economic cost of environmental degradation. More specifically, the economic cost of the adverse health impacts of water pollution on rural populations was RMB 17.86 billion, the cost of pollution-induced water shortage RMB 147.83 billion, the extra cost of pollution cleanup for industrial water use RMB 46.26 billion, economic losses due to the adverse impacts of water pollution on agricultural production was RMB 46.84 billion, and the combined cleanup and maintenance costs for water for urban residential use was RMB 27.49 billion. Air pollution represented RMB 219.8 billion worth of economic losses or 42.9% of the total economic cost of environmental degradation. Of this amount, the cost of the adverse health effects of air pollution on urban populations was RMB 152.74 billion, while the cost associated with a pollution-related drop in agricultural productivity was RMB 53.78 billion, and the monetary value of the loss of agricultural material was RMB 13.28 billion. The environmental degradation costs of solid waste disposal were RMB 0.65 billion and accounted for 0.1% of the total cost of environmental pollution. Of this amount, the opportunity cost associated with land loss due to the dumping of industrial solid waste was RMB 130 million, and that associated with land loss due to the dumping of residential waste discharge from cities and rural areas was RMB 520 million. The cost of pollution-related environmental accidents and disasters was RMB 5.06 billion, accounting for 1.1% of the total cost of environmental pollution to the national economy. Of this amount, RMB 330 million was directly associated with incidents involving pollution, while the cost associated with losses to the aquaculture industry was RMB 1.08 billion, and that associated with resource depletion to the fishing industry was RMB 3.65 billion. It must be noted, however, that these numbers did not capture the whole situation in all its detail, and are only as reliable as current computational methodology and available data would allow. Therefore, 3.05% of total GDP was, at best, a low estimate for the cost of environmental pollution to the national economy in 2004. First, the health risk of environmental pollution was estimated on the basis of risk of death, which is in turn calculated in human capital terms. This practice tends to underestimate health risks. The

understanding environmental pollution in china

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alternative method of contingent valuation, on the basis of willingness-to-pay, would have likely yielded a higher estimate by orders of magnitude. Secondly, handicapped by the lack of from environmental monitoring data, the real cost of the adverse health impacts from environmental pollution is likely to be much higher than the current estimate of RMB 17.86 billion. Thirdly, the estimate for the economic losses due to air pollution did not, again largely due to lack of data, include the cost of reduced agricultural productivity as the result of ozone depletion or traffic-related costs due to smog-induced decreases in visibility, or the cost of decline in the scenic value of landscapes. The foregoing analyses warrant the conclusion that the situation in China with respect to environmental pollution is complex, dire, and acute, and it pre­ sents an enormous challenge to the country. Moreover, China does not have the luxury of “polluting first, cleaning up later,” as developed countries have had the luxury to do. Instead, we have no other choice but to commit ourselves to a scientific outlook on development. We must change the way we grow our national economy, and improve the substantive quality of growth. At the same time, we need to put in place effective measures in areas of law, administration, economic planning, financial investment, scientific research, technological development, and public participation that will strengthen environmental pollution abatement and control. Only if we choose the path of integration between economic growth and environmental protection can China experience rapid, balanced, and sustainable development.

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Appendix Table 2.1 Year

Waste water discharge and emission of major pollutants (1998–2005) Waste Water Discharge (108 t)

COD Emission (104 t)

Ammonia Nitrogen Emission (104 t)

Total Industrial Residential Total Industrial Residential Total Industrial Residential 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008/ 1998 2008 compared with 2005 (%)

395 401 415 433 440 460 482 525 537 557 572 1.45

200 197 194 203 207 212 221 243 240 247 242 1.21

–8.95 0.41

195 204 221 230 232 248 261 281 297 310 330 1.69

1496 1389 1445 1405 1367 1334 1339 1414 1429 1382 1321 0.88

801 692 705 608 584 512 510 555 542 511 458 0.57

–17.44

6.58 17.48

695 697 740 797 783 822 830 859 887 871 863 1.24

– – – – 129 130 133 150 142 132 127 0.98

– – – – 42 41 42 53 43 34 30 0.71

–0.47

15.33 94.29

– – – – 87 89 91 97 99 98 97 1.11 60.08

Source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao (中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.

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understanding environmental pollution in china Table 2.2 Emissions of major air-borne pollutants (1998–2008) Unit: 10,000 ton Year

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008/1998 2008 compared with 2005

Total

SO2 Industrial Residential

Total

Smoke dust Industrial Industrial Residential Particle

2091 1858 1995 1948 1927 2159 2255 2549 2589 2468 2321 1.11 8.94

1594 1460 1613 1567 1562 1791 1891 2168 2235 2140 1991 1.25 8.16

1455 1159 1165 1070 1013 1049 1095 1183 1089  987  902  0.62 23.75

1178 953 953 852 804 846 887 949 865 771 671  0.57 29.29

497 398 383 381 365 367 364 381 354 328 330  0.66 13.39

277 206 212 218 209 203 209 234 224 216 231 0.83 1.28

1321 1175 1995 1948 1927 2159 2255 2549  808  699  585  0.44 77.05

Source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao (中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.

Table 2.3 Structural shift of Chinese industry, 2000–2007 Unit: % Year

2000

2002

2004

2007

Light Industry as a percentage of industrial aggregate Heavy Industry as a percentage of industrial aggregate Total

39.8

39.1

33.5

29.5

60.2

60.9

66.5

70.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (中国统计年鉴) [China Statistical Yearbook], Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007.

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Table 2.4 1998–2008 Output for major industrial products Year

Coal 108 t

Electricity 108 Kilo-watt hours

Steel 104 t

Cement 104 t

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 as a percentage of 1998

12.5 10.45 9.98 11.61 13.8 16.67 19.56 21.9 23.8 25.4 27.9 223

11670 12393 13556 14808 16540 19106 21870 24747 28344 32777 34668   297

11559 12426 12850 15163 18237 22234 26800 34936 42266 48966 50092   433

53600 57300 59700 66104 72500 86208 97000 105000 124000 136000 140000 261

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian ( 中国统计年鉴) [China Statistical Yearbook], Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998–2008.

Table 2.5 Air-borne pollutant discharge by economic sector as a percentage of industrial total, 2006 Sector

SO2

Smoke Dust

Particulates

Coal-fired power plants Non-metalic mineral products Ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling Total

59.0  9.1  7.3 75.4

44.7 15.8 9.4 69.9

– 70.2 15.7 85.9

Source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao ( 中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Stsatistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2006.

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Table 2.6 COD emission through wastewater discharge by economic sector as a percentage of industrial total Sector

COD

Paper and paper products Agriculture and Food Industry Chemical Industry Textile Total

33.6 12.8 11.7  6.8 64.9

Source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao ( 中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2006.

Table 2.7 Heavy metal content in wastewater discharge by economic sector as a percentage of total industrial heavy metal discharge, 2006 (%) Industrial Sector

Heavy Metal Discharge through Wastewater

Non-ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling Non-ferrous metal extraction Chemical industry Ferrous metal smelting and steel-rolling Total

31.9 30.7 16.4 6.8 85.8

Source: Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao ( 中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2006.

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Table 2.8 Changes in urban population and COD emission Year

Urban Population

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average Annual growth rate

COD Emission

10,000

As percentage of Total Population %

41608 43748 45906 48064 50212 52376 54283 56212 57706 59379 60667 3.80%

33.35 34.78 36.22 37.66 39.09 40.53 41.76 43.0 43.9 44.9 45.7 1.2%

695 697 740 797 783 822 830 859 887 871 863 2.19%

10,000 t

Sources: Zhongguo chengshi tongji gongbao ( 中国城市统计公报) [China Urban Statistical Bulletin], Zhongguo tongji chubanshe: 1998–2008; Zhongguo huanjing tongji gongbao ( 中国环境统计公报) [China Environmental Statistical Bulletin], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 1998–2008.

Table 2.9 Urban air quality in China Year

No. of City Monitored

Grade II and below

Above Grade II

2000 2004 2005 2008

338 342 522 519

36.5 38.6 60.3* 76.8**

63.5 61.4 39.7 23.2

Note: * 4.2% achieved Grade I, ** 4.0% achieved Grade I Source: Zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao ( 中国环境状况公报) [China Report on the State of the Environment], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2000, 2004, 2005, 2008.

understanding environmental pollution in china Table 2.10

Urban air quality according to PM10 density ranking

Year

Grade II ≤100 mmg/m3

Grade III 100–150 mmg/m3

Above Grade III ≥150 mmg/m3

2005 2008

59.5 81.5

35.0  7.9

5.5 0.6

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Source: Zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao ( 中国环境状况公报) [China Report on the State of the Environment], Guojia huanjing baohu zongju: 2005, 2008.

Table 2.11

Indoor air quality in rural China

Pollutant

Fuel Type

Rural Household (mmg/m3)

Total Suspended Particulate (TSP)

Coal Biomass Coal Biomass Coal Biomass Coal Biomass Coal Biomass

10–20000 170–2600 120–26000 830–22000 700–87000 500–16000 10–23000 10–9100 10–1700 10–320

PM10 Carbon Monoxide Sulfur Dioxide Nitrogen Oxide

Note: These results are based on data reported in articles published in academic journals on the average quality of indoor air samples collected within set time periods from individual rural households that use different types of fuel sources for cooking and heating. Source: World Bank, Costs of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages, Washington D.C., World Bank, 2006.

50 Table 2.12

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Water Pollution

Human health Pollution-induced water scarcity Cleanup of industrial wastewater Agricultural production Cleanup and treatment of municipal/residential wastewater Sub-total

178.6 1478.3 462.6 468.4 274.9

Air Pollution

Health of urban residents Reduced agricultural yields Materials loss Sub-total

1527.4 537.8 132.8 2198.0

Solid Waste Pollution

Opportunity cost of land used as dumping sites for solid industrial waste Opportunity cost of land used as dumping sites for solid municipal waste Sub-total

Pollution Accidents Direct economic cost Fishery related costs Costs to natural fishery Sub-total Total

2862.8

1.3 5.2 6.5 3.3 10.8 36.5 50.6 5118

Chapter 3

China’s Forest Quality: The Missing Agenda Shen Xiaohui China has historically done poorly in managing its forests and in protecting the value of their ecological, economic and social services. Yet, until we identify problems in our traditional thinking about forests and forestry, and correct them, the situation is unlikely to improve. We need to understand and follow conceptually coherent and empirically well-grounded scientific theories about forestry and forest management and stewardship. According to what has long been an influential school of thought, what matters about forest is its size: it has to cover 20% of an area to generate significant ecological benefits, and over 30% to set off a healthy ecological cycle. Application of this misguided doctrine of “forest cover determinism”—really a kind of dogma—in China over many years has resulted in a single-minded preoccupation with forest expansion in the country’s forestry policies. This fixation on cover undergirds the policy of “Prolific logging and prolific building” (大砍大造), which calls for intense logging of natural and primary forests on one hand and equally intense construction of planted forests on the other. Because it can be done relatively quickly and easily, planting trees where few or none had grown before has been the method of choice for increasing forest cover. After six decades of regular nation-wide tree-planting campaigns, China now can now boast more planted forests by area than any other country on earth. While this has been a source of great pride for most forestry professionals, it is also deeply problematic from an ecological point of view. Despite such spectacular increase in forest cover, there have been no meaningful decreases in the incidence of droughts, floods, dust and sandstorms, landslides and mudslides, or slowdown in the loss of biodiversity in China. But what, if it is not the absolute size of forest, does the ecological quality of China’s environment and the country’s ecological security depend on? The answer is the overall quality of the forests, which in turn depends on their ecological, social, and economic functionality. This important topic has yet to receive the attention it deserves. Indeed, there has scarcely been any open discussion of it.1 1  Shen, Xiaohui 沈孝辉, “Tigao senlin zhengti zhiliang, tuijim linye kechixu fazhan 提高森 林整体质量, 推进林业可持续发展 [Improve Overall Forest Quality, Promote Sustainable

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004316041_004

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In December 2000, the World Resources Institute (WRI) launched the first independent online network for monitoring forests called Global Forest Watch. The report, which offers an assessment of the state of the world’s forests in terms of the range and quality of products and services they provide, points out clearly that the issue of forest quality is as important as their size. Forest experts have been calling on the world to make greater efforts toward protecting virgin, old-growth, primary and other kinds of natural forests.2 Traditionally, forestry professionals have been evaluated on the basis of changes in the size, cover, and timber reserve of the forest in their charge. But these criteria do not accurately reflect the genuine wellbeing or quality of forest ecosystems. Sometimes these indicators may even be misleading, as is illustrated by efforts to make up for lost natural forests by planting trees. Such “greening” campaigns produce only superficially verdant landscapes that are little more than a façade behind which lie deep ecological malfunctions. While quality deterioration is certainly a worldwide problem, it is particularly acute in China. Forest management in China has gone through three stages in the recent past: the first period focused on cutting them down, the second on (natural) reforestation, and then the third on silvicultural afforestation. It was not until the beginning of this century when the underlying philosophy of forestry was re-oriented and began to focus more on natural forests protection and sustainability. China’s forests cannot be sustained and national ecological security will not improve until we abandon the notion that more is always better when it comes to trees, and shift our focus to overall forest quality. 3.1

China’s Forest Quality Today

Historically, forest management primarily served the needs of timber production, for which arbor species enjoy a decided preference. But as our Forest Management],” Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan pinglun, di er juan 中国环境与发 展评论 第二卷 [China Development and Environment Review, Vol. 2], Sheke wenxian chubanshe, 2004. 216–28. 2  Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan guoji hezuo weiyuanhui shengwu duoyangxing gongzuozu China 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会生物多样性工作组 [Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development Biodiversity Working Group], “Liyong tianran zhibei gaishan Zhongguo tuihua huanjing 利用天然植被改善中国退化环境 [The Use of Natural Vegetation and Ecological Rehabilitation in China],” Zhongguo linye chubanshe, 2001.

china ’ s forest quality

53

understanding deepened of forests’ ecological services deepened, forestry is increasingly being seen as a kind of ecological and social service industry. Today, forestry management philosophy leans heavily toward seeing its goal as optimizing the value of forests as providers of a wide range of social services, including as an energy source, climate stabilizer, life support system and supplier of other amenities, such as a venue for cultural and recreational activities. 3.1.1 Understanding “Forest Quality” It has been common in the past for forests to be evaluated according to both their absolute size and relative size, i.e. the percentage of a land area they cover. However, these measures only reflect the quantitative aspects of a forest, and say nothing about its substantive quality, an emergent quality that supervenes on a variety of first-order factors. The notion of quality refers to the extent to which something meets certain standard such as defined by a set of criteria. Since our needs and expectations with regard to anything are always changing, our idea of what makes it good evolves too. Not only are forests a rich source of ecological, economic, spiritual, cultural values, but they also have intrinsic value, and the notion of quality as it applies to forests must reflect these different dimensions.3 Forests have ecological functions, which include the ability of a forest to protect biodiversity and to provide a protective shield for society, to facilitate energy flow and materials recycling within the forest ecosystem. Forests have economic functions. Their economic value depends on such properties as soil fertility, net primary productivity (NPP), timber reserve, and the variety and the quantity of commercial (excluding rare and endangered) plants, animals and microbial species. Forests have spiritual and cultural significance. This includes the contributions different types of forest ecosystems and forest communities and their constituent parts (e.g. rivers, waterfalls, lakes, grasslands, tundra, rock, glaciers, peaks, and valleys) can make towards the development of science, education, tourism, and culture. Finally, forests have inherent value independent of human interests and desires. This value depends on forests’ structural complexity and robustness, their ability to support life and its diversity. Primary forests are believed, especially when considered as a whole, to score the most points in from these points of view. They embody, therefore, the gold standard by which the inherent value

3  Xu Huacheng 徐化成, “Senlin de jiazhiguan 森里的价值观 [Valuing Forests],” Shijie linye yanjiu, June 1993.

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of restored and planted forests in comparable climate zones and elevations is measured. 3.1.2 A Qualitative Assessment of China’s Forests Today Primary forests are forests of natural origin, untouched by human activities. They are typically highly diverse in terms of animal and plant species, ecologically stable and resilient, capable of self-regeneration and self-rehabilitation, and effective as a natural shield. Even though some of the best managed planted forests are comparable to primary forests in terms of timber reserves and annual growth rate, and may even surpass the latter in terms of output for certain high-value forest products, primary forests are decidedly superior with respect to the quality of a wide range of ecological, economic and social services and functions they can provide. It has been estimated that, four to five thousand years ago, about 600 million hectares, or 60% of the Chinese land area, was covered by primary forests. Natural and anthropogenic forces have reduced this area to 14 million hec­ tares. Today, forests in China are found mostly in nature reserves in deep and remote parts of mountains, and in a state of fragmentation, isolation, and on the whole, deterioration. Over-logged primary forests are all that remain after intense selective logging of primary forests. Still, despite their structural defects, over-logged primary forests may remain relatively strong with respect to their shelter functions. Properly managed, they are capable of full recovery. However, the result of repeated and/or serious assaults could and often would degrade primary forests into open forests or barren land. Vegetation does not recover easily at these sites, and little if any of the ecological functions of the original forests would remain. For open forests, there are two scenarios for natural succession. In one, natural recovery fails even after a long time due to the severity of destruction or unfavorable topographical conditions such as excessively high elevation. This is true of those parts of the forest on the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau that sit at the highest altitudes. These areas would turn into alpine grassland or rocky desert. Alternatively, relatively favorable topographical conditions might allow open forests to become natural secondary forests, which are typically made up of pioneer tree species. However, because they are not integrated with the surrounding natural environment the way primary forests are, secondary natural forests tend to be less ecologically stable. Still, if left undisturbed, the prospects for their structural recovery are relatively good. Currently, secondary forests cover about 93 million hectares of China’s land area, and 70% of them is dominated by young and immature growths. China has lost almost all of its original stock of primary forests and naturally

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generated secondary forests now dominate. The latter plays a critical role in timber production, in fuelwood supply, in sustaining the livelihoods of local residents, and they harbour enormous commercial potential. But even those were taken for granted and neglected for a very long time. Some have been converted to agricultural use, some allowed to deteriorate, and still others replaced with planted trees. It was not until 1998, during which a number of major initiatives to protect the country’s primary forests were announced when the situation began to turn around. Implication of Planted and Managed Forests on Overall Forest Quality Silviculture has a long history in China. Legend has it that the oriental Arborvitae in front of the Temple of the Yellow Emperor (黄帝庙) on Qiaoshan Mountain (桥山) in Huangling county (黄陵县), Shaanxi province (陕西) was planted by the Yellow Emperor (黄帝) himself. While trees have been planted for a variety of purposes, including supplying fuelwood, building material for shelter, landscape beautification and improving vegetation coverage, planting has typically been done on a limited scale. Few planted forests have survived to the present day. But with the rapid disappearance of primary forests in the 1950s, tree planting took on added urgency and became a massive national undertaking. It also turned out to be spectacularly successful when measured by quantitative criteria. China claims to have a total of 53 million hectares of planted trees, more than any other country in the world. While their value is not in dispute for carbon sequestration, mitigating climate change, improving microclimate and local ecological conditions, facilitating industrial and agricultural activities, and for supplying tree products and promoting local economic development, the prolific growth of planted and managed forests has also generated a host of problems, with negative consequences for the quality of China’s forests as a whole. I review some of them below. 3.1.3

3.1.3.1

The Preponderance of Young and Immature Trees Reduces Timber Volume per unit Area A disproportionate number of trees in planted and managed forests are young and immature. Though they account for 33% of all forests in China by area, planted forests contribute only 8% toward the national aggregate for commercial timber volume. Planted forests produce 28 m3 of timber per hectare, which is less than one third the number for primary forests. Of all the planted forests in the country, those on 7 million hectares are very low-yield, producing trees sometimes likened to short and elderly men because they remain dwarfed even at fairly advanced ages. In some provinces, because of the low

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quality of the trees planted nominally to “rejuvenate wasteland” and to “meet tree planting quotas,” remedial measures are often needed to “reform and improve” these unproductive planted forests, which have, therefore, become a source of enormous waste. 3.1.3.2 Monoculture of Planted Forests Threatens Biodiversity Two-thirds of all planted forests in China consists of highly concentrated pure conifers. The percentage can reach 95% in some provinces. Four conifer species—Chinese fir, Mason pine, larch, and Chinese pine—make up 80% of the trees in pure conifer plantations. In total, 17 conifer species are used for planting. China is one of the three most biologically diverse countries in the world. However, four to five thousand species of higher plants are now endangered. Many animal species, including 94 large mammals, 17 reptiles, and 7 amphibians, have become endangered. In fact, China is home to one quarter of the world’s 640 endanger species as listed in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Today, 15–20% of all the animal and plant species found in China are endangered, compared with the world average of 10–15%. In addition to the deterioration and deliberate destruction of their natural habitat and the illegal removal of the plants and the animals themselves, the growing ratio between planted and natural forests has also contributed to these alarming statistics. 3.1.3.3 The Growing Problem of Pest Infestation An average of 86 million hectares of China’s forest have been affected by some kind of pest infestation in recent years. Insects and rats kill more than 400 million trees annually, reducing the volume of commercial timber by more than 17 million m3 and costing the economy RMB 88 billion. Such “smokeless forest fires” can be more damaging than even actual fires. As the size of planted forests in China continues to grow, so has the reach of pest infestation. In the 1950s, every year an average of 8.5 million hectares of forests would be affected, and in the 1970s that number dropped to 3.65 million hectares. But by 2004 it reached around 9.5 million hectares, a whopping eleven-fold increase over the level half a century earlier. 3.1.3.4

Diminished Capacity for Headwater Protection and Soil Conservation Undergrowth plays a critical role in forests’ capacity to protect water sources and conserve soil. However, planted forests, especially pure conifers, perform poorly in these areas. In 1958, the local authority planted Yunnan pines

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through aerial sowing in the Daliang mountain region (大凉山区). But because the seedlings were too densely sown, many of the trees were no bigger in diameter than a rice bowl 40 years later. Moreover, the absence of undergrowth left the soil between the trees exposed. Another example is in Gucheng County (谷城县), Hubei province, which was famous for “having achieved its target” for wasteland reparation. Forty-six percent of the country, however, suffers from soil erosion comparable in seriousness to that in the Yellow River drainage area. In the past, the favored approach to “wasteland reparation” in many parts of China involved preparing the target area for afforestation by burning the original vegetation. But this practice led to surface erosion and severe nutrient loss in the topsoil. Large-scale planting preceded by burning can result in soil erosion 4 to 6 times worse than what small-scale planting not preceded by burning may lead to. Many tons of soil per hectare may become eroded in the preparation for afforestation. 3.1.3.5 Pure Conifer Pantations are Fire-prone, and Reduce Soil Fertility The ground covered by planted stands tends to be dry and combustible, particularly in pure conifer plantations. Yunnan pine forests are a good example. The pine needles on Yunnan pines decompose inefficiently: when they fall, they cover the soils like a blanket, leaving the soil deficient in soil organic matter and its water content low. Highly inflammable, Pine resin is a fire hazard in its own right. To compound the problem, pure conifer plantations are inhospitable to wildlife species, including some of the invertebrates that can play a key role in nutrient recycling and soil maintenance. As the soils in these forests degrade over time, tree quality also declines markedly. 3.1.3.6 Ecological Risks of Genetic Modification Potential species contamination through genetic modification is a new risk factor in planted forests, and has yet to receive adequate attention. Because genetic modification can make trees grow faster and mature more quickly than otherwise, planting genetically-modified trees is often considered cost-effective and profitable from the point of view of commercial timber production. However, when pollen from genetically modified trees travel, sometimes great distances, they can contaminate natural species. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to massive disruption or even wholesale collapse of an entire forest ecosystem. The ecological implications of the genetic engineering of tree species are still poorly understood. In the United States, genetically-engineered tree species may only be grown experimentally in test locations typically no larger than two acres, and under close monitoring. Moreover, these trees are never allowed to live past pollination age. By contrast, in China, the paucity of

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research on the impacts of genetically modified tree species notwithstanding, more than one million genetically-modified poplars have been planted in at least seven provinces and regions. While the adverse consequences of pollution can often be mitigated, the same is not true of genetic contamination. Once genetically-engineered materials enter the gene pool, the corruption could be irreversible, possibly with unimaginable repercussions for society. Forests make up one of the more important land ecosystems on earth. They are an irreplaceable provider of many crucial ecological, economic, and social services. However, despite rapid rise in forest cover during the second half of the twentieth century, and occasional improvements here and there, the country’s overall ecological conditions have seen little if any improvement. While there are many reasons for this, a general decline in the quality of China’s forests is an important one. The disappearance of high quality primary and natural forests through over-logging, the subsequent abuse and neglect of the natural secondary forests that replaced them, the rise of single-species planted forests, and the overall shortage and uneven geographical distribution of forest coverage have all contributed to the creation of forests of little or no value in helping arrest the country’s ecological deterioration and its vulnerability to natural disasters. 3.1.4 Diagnosis: Reasons for the Poor Quality of China’s Forests 3.1.4.1 Theoretical Level: Stalled Forestry Research Germany has historically been a pioneer in forest management, particularly in their thinking about sustainability. However, in the early years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government chose to follow the Soviet school of forestry research methods and approaches, and rejected the German idea of sustainable forest management on the ground it was “bourgeois.” The “exploitation model” championed by the former Soviet Union essentially involved treating forests as mineral deposits. According to this idea, it is important to ascertain the timber reserve, estimate the productive lifespan, and forecast the economic outlook for every forest. No consideration was given to the issue of forest sustainability and the stewardship and maintenance of the forest’s ecological and social values. China’s official falling out with the former Soviet Union in the 1960s left forestry research in the country philosophically and methodologically adrift, which went through a difficult period of trial-and-error while searching for a new theoretical footing. It was not until the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 when China officially adopted the philosophy of sustainable development in forest management.

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3.1.4.2 Policy Level: National Economy and Social Development Industrialization started late in China relative to other countries, and the country was more economically underdeveloped when the process began than was the case in many other countries. In the trade-off between environmental protection and resource conservation on one hand and rapid economic growth on the other, the latter has decidedly trumped the former. Compounding this is the enormous pressure of rapid population growth, and the consequences for China’s forest resources have been devastating. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, timber was primarily a form of material input for economic production, and the forestry industry served the sole purpose of meeting the country’s timber demand. In the “mass campaign” spirit characteristic of that era, hundreds of thousands of people across the country were mobilized. In a frenzy, 135 state-owned forestry operations were set up in the northeast, Inner Mongolia, and the southwest. The forestry industry grew quickly and soon became one of the top contributors to GDP. While the country was rhetorically committed to “a pluralist and holistic approach to forest management characterized by the prudent integration of use and cultivation, and of logging and planting, and that is based on the principle of sustainability,” successive waves of political movements and the institutional straightjacket of the command-and-control economic system more than ensured that this remained little more than an empty slogan. Instead, as both logging and planting intensified, the quality of China’s forests worsened and the rationale for sustaining them began to dissipate. In fact, political movements and campaigns had serious consequences for China’s forests. The “Great Leap Forward” (大跃进) and “Backyard Iron and Steel Furnace” (大炼钢铁) campaign of the 1950s, “Grain Production is the Bottomline” (以粮为纲) and “Emulate the Dazhai Model” (学大寨) in the 1960s and 1970s, and forest industry deregulation in the early 1980s all contributed to the depletion of China’s vast stock of primary forests. Some recent reports have indicated that despite, or perhaps because of the forest management reform, China’s dwindling reserve of primary forests faces on-going threats of being replaced and displaced by planted ones. From the late 1970s until the 1990s, cultivation and utilization gradually became more evenly balanced as the two main objectives of China’s forest industry and management. Timber output remained robust. Between 1978 and 1988, domestic demand and consumption continued to rise despite a one third reduction in timber volume in mature and over-mature commercial forests. This resulted in a forest resource deficit of 170 million m3. By the late 1980s, most timber companies were facing the dire prospect of stock

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depletion and the forestry sector of the national economy seemed to be on the brink of collapse. Moreover, frequent floods and intensified desertification across the country signaled looming ecological crisis. In the meantime, however, the country also saw, in the early 1980s, an inchoate massive national greening campaign and a surge in volunteerism in tree-planting. Most notably, these campaigns included the Northern Three Shelterbelt Program (“三北” 防 护林工程) that covered areas in the northeast, northwest and central north, and the Mountain Wastelands Eradication Projects (消灭宜林荒山). The express goal of all these campaigns was to increase forest cover. Manual tree planting, aerial-sowing, and mountain closure for afforestation contributed 4.2 million hectares, 60,000 hectares, and 4 million hectares, respectively, to the annual increase in forest cover nation-wide. Indeed, the 4th National Forest Inventory (NIC) was able to deliver the twin good news about China’s progress in both forest size and forest cover. However, the moderate and often localized ecological benefits of planted forests could not make up for the ecological and economic costs associated with the irreversible loss of primary forests. The quality and functional decline of China’s forests continues even today. 3.1.4.3

The Administrative and Technological Levels: Forest Management and Production The basic model of forestry management is that of systems management. It is not a technological reductionist approach, but is concerned with exploring and making use of the full range of values forests offer, including their ecological, economic, social, scientific, technological, legal and cultural values.4 The following are some of the most commonly-used criteria for assessing forest quality, and how the country’s forests do when so assessed. Because of the prolonged mismanagement of China’s forests, many of the problems they face were not identified until a coherent set of criteria were articulated recently. Seedling production. Seedling quality is key to afforestation efforts. It determines whether it succeeds or fails, and whether the planted trees will be able to provide ecological and social services to society sustainably. In developed countries, 80% of all seeds used in tree planting are prime seeds of superior quality. By contrast, the percentage was 28% for China in 2002. This means that many planted forests in China are congenitally substandard. Uniform standards for the production and sale of seedlings are lacking and irregularity is pervasive. Clear lines separating regulatory agencies from 4  Xu Huacheng 徐化成, Jingguan shengtaixue 景观生态学 [Landscape Ecology], Zhongguo linye chbanshe, 1996.

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b­ usinesses and corporations are absent in many places. Conflicts of interests and corruption are commonplace. The seedling market is full of counter­ feits and inferior products. Seed orchards or nurseries do not yet exist for many popular planting species. The potentials of many important indigenous tree species have yet to be fully realized. Local agencies in charge of plantation development and management and business interests typically prefer “short-rotation” species that grow fast to “long-rotation” ones that grow more slowly but also yield longerterm ecological and economic benefits. Since seedlings must be made widely commercially available, transported over great distances, and used across ecologically heterogeneous regions, a number of problems can arise. The first is pervasive mismatch between seedling species and the environment in which they are planted. Secondly, eight fast-growing species (including eucalyptus, Mason pine, China fir, exotic pine, poplar, paulownia, and larch), account for the vast majority of planted trees. This lack of species diversity renders forests more susceptible to soil degradation and disease outbreaks, and more ecologically unstable. Six large forestry projects have been implemented in China in recent years. Together, they have added 6.67 million hectares of planted forests. But they have also increased the demands for seedlings. This upward pressure will likely exacerbate the nation-wide problem of poor seedling quality, and it certainly does not bode well for the future of China’s forests. Timber production. If we reflect on the havoc wrought upon China’s forests from the point of view of sustainable development and the modern theory of forest ecology to, it is evident we have treated a complex and intricate lifesustaining system with simplistic thinking and brute physical force. For example, because clear-cutting involves uprooting all the trees in a forest stand, it ravages the forest environment, reduces forest biodiversity, greatly compromises the forest’s capacity for self-regeneration and self-renewal, and causes serious soil erosion. Clear-cut logging in select and small areas of the Changbaishan (长白山) mountain region was commonly-practiced for many years. But gradually, this practice spread to more areas and resulted in serious environmental damage. In another example, in the Xiao Xing’an Ling Korean pine forests, culling and selective cutting has been a popular logging method. According to official guidelines, the use of this method requires maintaining a canopy density above 0.4. However, because Korean pines have shallow roots and are vulnerable to strong winds, the canopy density of culled and selective cut forests can easily result in a drop in canopy density to only 0.1 to 0.2 after just 1–2 years,

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and open forests. This practice of logging solely for the purpose of securing raw material for economic production is to blame for the precipitous decline in forest resources in the Xiao Xing’an Ling (小兴安岭) mountains, long called the “Home of Korean pines.” The forests of the Greater Xing’an Ling mountain region (大兴安岭) are primarily made up of larch. The use of a staggered and incremental logging schedule and method called “secondary shelter-wood cutting” results in a good natural rate of replacement. A tree was not cut until its replacement had already grown. However, cutting and use of tractors for logging eliminated many saplings. The forest environment was seriously damaged, and the barren topsoil was washed out and eroded by rain. This made artificial reforestation very difficult, and is the reason why a great number of barren mountain ranges have emerged in the Greater Xing’an Ling (大兴安岭) mountain region. The forests in southwest China have long served as conservation forests for the headwaters of many great rivers. They are also the habitat and gene bank for countless valuable and rare plant and animal species. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, they became a timber production hub. The result of decades of intensive and excessive logging is ravaged mountains and destroyed rivers. Illegal logging and quota violations. One of the most influential legal documents for forest management in China has been a piece of ministerial legislation for felling quota or allowable annual cut (AAC). The document was a product of a number of different factors. It reflects the government’s recognition that China faces forest resource scarcity, and is informed by its own past mistakes and international experiences in forestry management. It is designed to protect and develop the nation’s forest resources. The measure was mandated by the Forest Law, and ratified by the State Council, and has been in effect since 1987. Its implementation has, however, left much to be desired. The 5th National Forest Inventory (NFI) revealed that each year, quota violation and other forms of illegal logging practices resulted in over 86 million m3 of timber harvest. In addition, there are on average 500,000 cases annually of forest abuse and destruction. Results of the 6th NFI show that quota violation accounted for the production of 76 million m3 of timber each year, which, while slightly below that in the previous survey, is still a staggering figure. Indeed, more of China’s forests have been devoured by illegal logging and quota violations than by legitimate timber production. These problems continue to exacerbate the decline of forest quality in China. Forest cover inflation due to lowered standards. Another piece of indirect evidence for the poor overall quality of China’s forest relates to the illicit­

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lowering of official standards. Some technical criteria used in compiling the data have been relaxed since the 5th National Forest Inventory. As a result, large areas of open forest and shrubs were included in the official figure that should not have counted as forest. For example, the technical standards included in the revised edition of the 5th National Forest Inventory (covering 1994–1998) were quite different, and much lower than those found in the results of the 4th National Forest Inventory. Take the standard for minimum forest canopy density for example. It was 0.3 (exclusive) in the 4th National Forest Inventory but 0.2 (inclusive) in the revised edition of the 5th National Forest Inventory. Canopy density is a key factor in calculating forest cover, because it is one important criterion for deciding what does or does not count as forest. Reduction of the minimum forest canopy density from 0.3 to 0.2, results in the inclusion of an additional over 250 million hectares of open forest in the official forests count that would have otherwise been excluded. This radically inflated the reported aggregate size and cover of forests in China, but also reduced its biomass density and growth rate. The national average canopy density fell from the 0.6 reported in the 4th National Forest Inventory to 0.5, and the biomass density per hectare of forest stand fell by 0.4m3. These technical manipulations do not of course alter the state of China’s forests in any way, but they mislead and deceive. Just as important, the resulting incommensurability among the results of different surveys obstructs efforts to identify general trends in the state of the country’s forests. 3.2

Modern Forestry Development Theory and Practice

In general, the succession, degeneration, and recovery of forests follow the same pattern everywhere: it goes from primary forests to deforestation, which is then remedied through planted and managed forests, which are then (re) naturalized. A fundamental paradigm shift in the philosophy of forest management, from sustaining timber production to sustaining the forest itself, underpins the evolution from an exploitation model to a plantation and cultivation model, and ultimately to a natural forest stewardship model. Many countries are moving forward with their own transition from a singlevalue, single-function to a multi-value, multi-function approach to forestry and silviculture through trial and error. While there have been some successes, there are no quick fixes. Many developing countries have yet to implement the philosophy of sustainable development at the policy level in many developing countries, where the trend of forest deterioration continues unabated.

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It is paramount that we learn from the experience of developed countries that have made significant progress in improving their forests. This would help clarify our own thinking and allow us to update our ideas so they are more in line with what we know about forests through science. These ideas will guide us in adjusting our national forestry strategy, and to avoid making the same mistakes others have had to recover from. Human understanding of forests remains woefully limited. The fierce debates over philosophy and strategies for forest management in developed countries in Europe and North America in the 1980s ushered in a new era in the environmental movement. The modern, or “modernist” theories of forest management all reflect changing social values. These include the semi-natural, or close-to-nature forest management model adopted by Germany, the new systematic environmental management model adopted by the US, and the sustainable development model that was endorsed by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. Their rise is a mark of genuine progress in the underlying philosophy of forest management, which seeks to achieve both economic production and environmental protection. How then do we improve forest quality? In short, we should adopt whichever evaluation approach best suits the forest we are examining and the specific objectives we have. The basic principle should be to protect and preserve primary forests, rehabilitate deteriorating forest ecosystems, and construct seminatural forest ecosystems, in accordance with the ecological laws of the forest. 3.2.1 Protecting Primary Forests The World Resources Institute has referred to primary forests that have retained their original ecological features as “frontier forests” (a phrase that, insofar as the qualifier indicates relation to land under human appropriation, conveys a sense of crisis). According to their studies, about 8,000 years ago, primary forests covered over 6 billion hectares of the earth’s land surface, but that number is only 1.35 billion now. This downward trend is continuing, with the loss of about 10 million hectares annually. Forest plantations can be “made to order,” but once primary forests are destroyed, they can never be restored, or replaced. For this very reason, some scholars have proposed clearly designating no-go zones for frontier forests that are apart from everything else for the sake of other species and our descendants. WRI data indicate that China lost 98% of its primary forests during its recorded history. The 2% that remains exists in a fragmented and isolated state. Most is located within national parks and nature reserves, and areas covered by primary forest protection projects. But still, some continues to be used

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for timber production. Nothing is more important than making sure that what remains of China’s original stock of primary forests is protected and preserved. One way of doing this is by extending the boundaries of natural reserves to include these areas. We can do this by consulting the map of protected areas released by the World Resources Institute’s Global Forest Watch (GFW-WRI). This would allow us to mandate protective status by law, and to ensure protection from further exploitation. Protecting and preserving what remains of primary forests is a prerequisite and basis for the overall efforts to improve forest quality across China. Of course, these are costly propositions. However, protection and preservation are infinitely more cost-effective than any effort to reverse possibly irreversible losses that might result from the adoption of a “destroy first, repair later” policy. By definition, “ecological health” is not something that can be built or constructed by human effort. It is something that can only be protected, preserved, restored, or sometimes improved upon. In this sense, what ecological and environmental strengthening essentially involves is not building something anew but making sure what is given to us is never lost. 3.2.2 Restoring Natural Secondary Forests As an afforestation measure, closing off mountains amounts to a kind of “doing something by doing nothing” approach, and is particularly suitable for cultivating public service forests. Indeed, acting hastily can often be hazardous, and other times choosing inaction is better than taking any positive action at all. This is especially true in areas in which nature is so much more skilled than humans. It would, for example, be completely unnecessary for us to try to do such things as “recreating” nature and natural beauty, or “cloning” biodiversity, ecosystems and food webs. Primary forests are the product of billions of years of natural evolution. These marvelous homeostatic systems are marked by their spectacular vitality and robustness in the face of natural disturbances. These intricate and resilient systems are made up of numerous plant, animal, and microbial species that co-exist in an integrated whole. No planted forests can even come close in these respects. It follows, therefore, that closing off hillsides or river valleys to facilitate afforestation should be our first choice when trying to construct forests meant to improve ecological conditions, i.e. in which logging is strictly banned, as these methods make maximum use of nature’s own self-regenerating mechanisms and capacities. These methods essentially involve choosing a site with the right topographical profile in terms of sunlight, temperature, water availability, soil conditions, inclination, and elevation, and then prohibiting

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unsustainable levels of activities as felling, hunting, and herding in order to allow the original vegetation to regenerate naturally, until the climax vegetation at the site is restored. However, natural regeneration may be impossible in sites that are too high, cold, dry, infertile or otherwise seriously desertified. At sites where trees have never grown, in addition to sealing the area off, foresters must make sure that the choice of tree or grass species suits the area’s ecological conditions. One-size fits all would be exactly the wrong approach. Since the 1950s, heavy machinery has increasingly been used in timber harvesting, and the adverse impact on forest ecosystems has created widespread concern. A key lesson is that protecting forest quality and sustainable management of forest resources require that we reduce destruction of ground surfaces, wildlife habitat, remaining trees, and other native vegetation by reducing the intensity of road construction, felling, and harvesting. Experiences have shown that lessening dependence on heavy machinery and advanced technology and substituting them with light machinery, human labor, and draft animals is actually a progressive and not a regressive move. It is a particularly effective way of protecting forest ecosystems. A very successful experiment to test this approach was undertaken by the Great Sea Forest Bureau (大海林林业局) of Heilongjiang province (黑龙江). Reducing logging intensity and re-integrating a traditional “free-range” model into the practice of modern forest management is a feasible approach to protecting timber production forests. 3.2.3 Active Construction of Quasi-natural Forest Plantations China is already home to more than 53 million hectares of planted forests, and that number is projected to grow by 67 million hectares within the next 10 years. If we fail to correctly apply the principles of ecology in the planning and execution of forest planting and management, we will see further deterioration in forest quality in the coming decade and the forests of China will be less diverse and less ecologically useful as a consequence. During its early days, China’s forest industry faced huge problems of low forest cover, forest resource scarcity, and inadequate capital investment. At that time, increasing forest cover took precedence over improving forest quality. But while this choice, which may have been as reluctant as it was inevitable, did help turn the national landscape much superficially “greener,” it has done little to improve the livelihoods of the many people who worked on the frontlines of these campaigns. Chronically poorly-paid, many of them have lived in hardship. Today, many state-owned tree farms have carried heavy debt burdens having had to resort to borrowing from banks to finance their Wasteland Eradication

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(灭荒) operations. Each generation of planted trees seems to do progressively worse than the previous one, and many trees are so small even when fully grown they resemble erect chopsticks. While these trees have done something toward mitigating certain problems, such as soil erosion, the lack of species diversity has either exacerbated or will likely exacerbate others, including declining biodiversity, increases in pest infestation, and elevated risks of forest fires. In short, the massive planting of forests of inferior ecological quality may well have done more harm than good. 3.3

Looking Forward

So what exactly does the quality of planted forests depend on, and what should be done to improve it? In a nutshell, forest quality is a measure of how well the forest is able to perform its ecological functions. Currently used criteria such as “first year survival rate” and “three-year preservation rate” focus exclusively on technical issues related to quantitative expansion, and are only contingently linked to quality. A more comprehensive set of criteria for evaluating and monitoring forest quality should include seedling quality, species composition, vertical integration among trees, shrubs and grass, the degree of biodiversity, the aesthetic value of the forest landscape, its biological productivity, impact on soil erosion and seasonal rain runoff rates, and flow rates during dry season, biomass, and the frequency and intensity of forest fires and pest infestations. Internationally, two key topics in forestry research are diversification or heterogenization, and (re)naturalization, which are also the focuses of applied forestry. In Europe, Germany has gone, building on three centuries worth of experience in afforestation and planted forest management, and a relatively successful timber industry, furthest in rethinking these issues, especially in regard to the potential benefits of shifting the country’s forestry priority in the direction of semi-natural forest. Many European countries have followed suit. Semi-natural forests are neither primary forests nor planted forests in the traditional sense. They are a kind of forest system that has been artificially constructed, mimicking the species composition and stand structure of a native natural forest community. Closer to being natural than planted forests featuring a mix of conifers and broad-leaves, semi-natural forests represents a giant step forward in the history of silviculture. They may be particularly suited for those areas (such as the central China region) where the primary forests have long been destroyed and where reforestation through mountain closure would take too long.

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In the US, in order to improve biodiversity in planted forests, the Forest Service makes selection of trees, shrubs and grass species according to the specific foraging, habitat and reproductive needs of different animal species. This targeted approach has proven effective, and it can also help build the ecological corridors that are instrumental for the interchange of genetic material among different species and among groups within the same species. It holds great potential has a method for protecting primary forests and restoring farmlands. David Kaimowitz, the prominent American forestry expert, has noted that forestry is “the greatest art and science.” In this new century, forest management professionals and practitioners in China must wean themselves off the notion that their job is simply to service the timber industry and to plant trees and adopt a forestry philosophy of sustainable development. The preoccupation with quantity should be replaced by an appreciation for the necessary trade-off between quantity and quality and a concern with finding the right balance between the two and optimizing forest ecosystems. None of this, in fact, need be very complicated, nor are the basic ideas behind this new philosophy esoteric. However, given the power of entrenched and vested interests, we still have a long way to go before the modernization and upgrade of China’s forest management is finally complete.

Chapter 4

The Ecological Impact of Institutions and Policies on the Inner Mongolian Steppe Ecosystem* Dalintai The temperate grasslands of northern China, dominated by those of Inner Mongolia, function as a powerful ecological shield for the northern part of the country and was a cradle for the nomadic civilizations and grassland cultures of its inhabitants. It was once the most complete steppe ecosystem in the world. A nomadic mode of production facilitated the self-renewal of the grasslands, supported ecological diversification through natural processes, ensured the relative stability and security of valuable genetic resources, and provided stable feed source for its livestock population. But none of this is still true today. The grasslands of Inner Mongolia have both shrunk in size and declined in grazing productivity, and the area is now frequently hit by natural disasters, and has become ecologically dysfunctional. Severe desertification has turned Inner Mongolia from an asset to a threat to the ecological health of the country. In 2000, the government launched a package of ecological compensation policies (生态补偿政策). Farmers and herders were paid to abandon farming or herding on their land and grazing was banned to allow grasslands to regenerate. Their moderate success notwithstanding, these programs have also generated many new and serious problems. In this chapter, I trace the historical trajectory of the role institutions and policies have played in the anthropogenic degradation of the Inner Mongolian grasslands. 4.1

The Ecological Evolution of the Northern Steppe

About four thousand years ago, inhabitants of the area that is now northern China and those from the Central Plain learned how to cast bronze. Of the two groups, the former learned how to cast iron first. The introduction of metal

* This research was funded by a Humanities and Social Sciences Key Research Project of the Ministry of Education (Grant number 009JJD790021).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004316041_005

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tools greatly increased productivity, setting the stage for the first social division in northern China, in which herding and farming became separated. Many communities from the Altai language family of the northern steppe came to specialize in animal husbandry, which became the main form of production for them. As a result, livestock numbers greatly increased, and because precipitation fluctuated wildly and droughts were common, nomadic pastoralism on increasing area of grasslands was an obvious, and often the only feasible adaptive strategy. Thus, it gradually replaced primitive forms of settled farming. For the people of northern China, the evolvement of a form of mixed economy into a pure nomadic one was all but inevitable. Over the course of eons inhabitants of the steppes developed a set of production methods that suited the environment of the area, and those methods formed the core of their unique lifestyle. Their familiarity with the dynamics of the grassland ecosystems shaped their natural resource consumption pattern. The southern parts of the northern steppe were particularly suitable for agriculture and fixed a mixture of crop cultivation and animal husbandry. In this region, the nomadic populations of the north and the dynastic powers that ruled over the Central Plain further south interacted with and influenced each other. For example, after the Qin and Han dynasties, the Yellow River (黄河) was diverted through large scale water diversion projects to support irrigation in western Mongolia. Partly as a result of this, farmland subsequently expanded and would in times take over the grasslands on the southern slope of the Yinshan Mountains (阴山). Later, thanks largely to frequent moves among the ethnic groups in the north, a patchwork of agro-pastoralism formed in the region, in which some areas were more distinctly agro-silvo-pastoral.1 For an extended period of time after the Yuan dynasty, the Han people of the Central Plain and other northern communities were rarely able to manage anything more than short-lived and small scale farming operations. The region was consistently dominated by pastoralism, which more than anything explains why a considerable portion of the grasslands in this region remained largely ecologically intact. The situation began to change in the early 20th century. In 1902, the Qing court adopted a policy of extensive land cultivation (放垦蒙地), which brought large numbers of Han people from other areas to the north to take up farming. This was then followed by similar, albeit more violent, efforts by the Northern warlords (北洋军阀). Between 1902 and 1937, the ethnic Han population in what is now Inner Mongolia autonomous region increased from 1,000,000 to 1  Agronomically speaking, fluctuations in precipitation in excess of 20% jeopardize income stability.

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3,180,000. Land cultivation expanded northward and westward, drastically reducing the size of grasslands and pastoral-dominated areas. In addition, rapid economic development accelerated grassland degradation and desertification, and natural disasters occurred frequently. Agropastoralism gradually formed in southern Inner Mongolia.2 In this process, many Mongols lost access to grasslands and fell into poverty, reducing the human population of Inner Mongolia to 830,000 from 1,020,000, and the livestock population to fewer than 10,000,000 in 1948, down from 70,000,000 in the 1920’s. These developments generated acute social and ethnic conflicts. 4.2

The Ecological Impact of Institutions and Policies on the Grasslands since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China

In the past five decades or so, the governments at different levels have enacted a series of ecological management policies in a range of areas including land use rights, economic development, taxation, population management, and grassland restoration and protection. These policies have left profound marks on the steppe ecosystem. 4.2.1 Land Use Rights and Policies When it was established in 1948, the Inner Mongolia autonomous region was the first ethnic minority autonomous region to be set up by the Chinese government. Since then, a series of policies was adopted in the region. At first, “all the land in Inner Mongolia was to be owned collectively by the people of Inner Mongolia,” and that “all were to be free to graze their animals on the grasslands,” and that “people and animals were to flourish together.” After that, pastures became commonly-owned by the people under collective management. Subsequently, during the socialist commune period, grassland ownership was reassigned. While herders and livestock owners were registered as permanent residents, i.e. having fixed residences, for administrative purposes, under common ownership of pasture land, and as a way to help the local population cope with frequent droughts, the government allowed them certain measure of latitude within set parameters in regard to pasture land allocation. Under constantly changing pasture conditions characteristic of the region, herders 2  The Ke’erqin (Horqin 科尔沁沙地) and Maowusu (Mu Us 毛乌素沙地) sandy areas were subject to extensive cultivation around this time. This caused loss of ecological function as well as damage to landscape. The same fate befell the Wulanchabu (Ulanqab 乌兰察布草原) grasslands.

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could, under government supervision, pasture their herd within a relatively large area to sustain them. In addition to these functions, the government also helped adjudicate conflicts among the herding population. In sum, these practices during the commune period not only had minimal adverse impact on the local ecology but also helped the pastoral economy flourish. Indeed, in the 1960’s, the pastoral economy in the region was highly efficient and productive and reached the second peak of the 20th century. The total livestock population in Inner Mongolia reached 53.01 million in the 1960s (Figure 4.1). In 1949, the number of livestock in Inner Mongolia, based on a standard calculation using ewe equivalents, was 10,090,000. The number grew to 53,011,200 in 1968, the highest after 1949.3 Between 1965 and 1968, the livestock sector was in a steady state, with the total number of livestock hovering around 50 million. But after 1990, the number began to decline. By 2005, the carrying capacity of the natural grasslands in Inner Mongolia had been so reduced it could support no more than 20 million heads of livestock.

Figure 4.1 Change in livestock populations on natural rangelands in Inner Mongolia (10,000).* Note: Data reflect livestock numbers as calculated in terms of ewe equivalents. * Figure 4.1 is constructed on the basis of information compiled by the Inner Mongolia Grassland Management Bureau, contained in gazetteers, and collected from field studies. It includes information for the 24 herding banners and nine agro-pastoral banners (a banner is an administrative unit equivalent to a Chinese county). The livestock population used here does not included animals raised on farms inside the autonomous region.

3  The previous peak occurred in the 1920s, when the area that is now inside what is now the Inner Mongolia autonomous region had a livestock population of 70 million. At that time, however, a large wildlife population was also present in the region.

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This raises another question relating to the property rights system, and specifically the separation between ownership and user rights that was institutionalized after de-collectivisation. Under this new post-commune system, pasture land ownership, which was previously held by the commune, was transferred to the herding village collective or gacha (嘎查) (formerly the production team). Groups or individual households were granted user rights in accordance with pasture availability and population conditions in the area. The same system was applied to the collectively owned livestock. The establishment of the contract system, where both grassland and livestock were contracted to herder families by the government—marked the end of the commune era. But this mechanical grafting of lessons learned from the Household Production Responsibility System into the pastoralist context greatly restricted herders’ ability to move freely across large distances, which had traditionally functioned as a coping mechanism against climatic uncertainty. Other problems were created. Under this new system, herders no longer worked jointly, but separately, which had adverse consequences. For example, given the cyclical nature of livestock production and the regularity of birth, herders had to resort to putting their females on birth control and buying feed from outside to protect themselves against the threat of natural disasters. The government, which had in the past been pro-active in natural disaster prevention, was now more passive and reactive, spending large amounts of money on constructing disaster prevention systems and on developing unclaimed land resources, proc­ esses which relied heavily on exogenous sources of energy. This user rights regime also gave rise to a smallholder-based herding system. A smallholder-based herding system never formed in this history of the area, quite unlike the small farmer economy, because herders were never allowed under feudalism to own one’s own grassland and large numbers of livestock, a precondition for the establishment of such a system. After 1949, the collective system replaced the small farmer household economy. But this had little discernible impact on herder households. While strictly speaking, for cropping areas, the user rights system meant the return of the family farm, the allocation of household pastures and household herding enterprises represented something new in the history of nomadic pastoralism in these locations. As the commune system replaced the league-and-banner system, and the user rights system replaced the commune system, herding households became less mobile, in a process that eventually led to the emergence of the an economy of smallholder-based herding system. Correspondingly, the traditional approach to natural resource use was also gradually displaced by one more suited to a small-scale herding lifestyle. The dissolution of a harmonious humannature relationship that had been sustained by nomadic pastoralism, and the

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disintegration of close-knit herding communities helped intensify the exploitation of the grasslands and exacerbated their ecological degradation. Land tenure reform, with the user rights system at its core, brought the Inner Mongolia grasslands into the market system. The grasslands underwent many changes during the process. On one hand, segmentation of the land reduced pasture productivity, which pushed up operating costs and diminished returns. On the other hand, public social services such as healthcare and basic education became increasingly dependent on the market. Both exacerbated the overuse of the grassland resources. Table 4.1 shows the numbers of soil samples taken from each of the four strips of land enclosing the pasture owned by the Wu family of Wang Banner.4 The pasture is in the shape of a parallelogram. Soil samples were taken every 50 metres across a transect and was 1 square metre each. To keep disturbance to the soil texture to a minimum, only the amount of Peganum harmala (“harmel” hereafter) found inside each sample quadrant was recorded, as this is a tough species that functions as a good indicator for severe grassland degeneration. The numbering of the samples started with those closest to the barn homestead.5 The entire area in this case was fenced in. Table 4.1

The number of soil samples taken from each transect

Eastern Strip

Western Strip

Northern Strip

Southern Strip

26

6

14

13

4 Part of the Wu’s summer pasture was contracted out by the production team to tourism industry entrepreneurs during the second wave of the user rights campaign in 1998. Since then, the family has had no choice but to graze their livestock year round in the areas previously used only in the winter. According to the Wu’s, grassland deterioration intensified with each passing year after 1998. 5 Harmel is an indicator species of extremely over-grazed grassland because it survives where little else can. Animals do not graze it during their peak seasons in the summer and the fall. Only horses eat it when the leaves dry in other seasons. Therefore, areas with a lot of harmel are considered unsuitable for grazing. Before the household contract responsibility system was put in place, pastoral management authorities would arrange for pastoralists to move en masse from areas taken over by harmel, and to return only after the grass had regenerated through natural processes.

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Figure 4.2 The number of harmel plants in each transect.

Figure 4.2 shows both the degree and the spatial pattern of degradation in the area. While degradation affected the entire area, the parts immediately adjacent to the barn homestead and to the fence were more severely degraded than others. This is mainly because these areas are the most heavily trampled by the animals. We can see from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 that after the user rights system for both grassland and livestock was established on natural grasslands, degradation was initially confined to the most heavily grazed area before it spread and eventually covered the entire region. The consequence of this was reduction to both the productivity and carrying capacity of the grassland.6 These developments also hampered income growth in Inner Mongolia. Between 1978 and 2007, herder incomes increased mildly. After adjusting for inflation, the margin of increase was never above RMB 1,000. Nominal income in Inner Mongolia was RMB 1,761 per capita in 2002, only 71% of the national average for farmer and herder income (RMB 2,451). Our own investigation of 1,000 herder households in representative locations in Inner Mongolia indicated that the average income was only RMB 627, or barely subsistence level. The data illustrate the impact two waves of rangeland user rights reform after 1949 had on the pastoral economy and the grassland ecosystem. The system of collective grassland user rights was relatively benign ecologically and was in fact more productive than the pre-1949 feudal system had been. 6  Dalintai, Alatengbagena 达林太、阿拉腾巴格那, “Nei Menggu tudi huangmohua dixing dingliang yanjiu 内蒙古土地荒漠化定性定量研究 [Qualitative and Quantitative Studies of Desertification in Inner Mongolia],” Yunnan dili huanjing yanjiu, No. 17 (Suppl. 01), 2005, 1–9.

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By contrast, because it is unsuited to the pastoralist modes of production and management in the pastoral systems, the household-based user rights system for grassland and livestock has created many problems in the pastoral economy and for the grassland ecosystem over the past 20 years. It made it unfeasible for herders to maintain their traditional nomadic ways, which for all intents and purposes were a superior fit with the elevation and climatic conditions of the Mongolian plateau. 4.2.2 Other Economic Policies 4.2.2.1 Environmental Implications of the Overall National Development Strategy Frequent changes in economic development plans have had a significant ecological impact on the steppe region. Government policies for Inner Mongolia after 1949 soon drew distinctions between the agricultural and the pastoral areas in this region. Earlier government policies had put a premium on “stability, durability, and flexibility” and as such played a constructive role in rebuilding the pastoral economy and mitigating ethnic conflicts. However, a new policy was introduced in the late 1950’s that called for the integration of pastoralism with agriculture and the elimination of the distinctness of Inner Mongolia’s economic policies as compared with those in other parts of the country. Frequent changes to economic policies during the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) (1966–1976) had relatively limited impact on the pastoral economy. And because they had relied mostly on human labor instead of heavy machinery, forestry operations in the area was largely ecologically benign during this time. The grassland and livestock user rights system was unveiled in the mid1980s. The regional government’s push to leapfrog toward eliminating the development gap between Inner Mongolia and the rest of the country by following unconventional development paths also began around this time. Due to a combination of historical factors and macro-economic policy constraints, the autonomous region, a pastoralism-dominated national border area and a raw materials supplying region, finds itself losing to coastal cities and passed over as a destination for capital needed for development. Inner Mongolia has seen its productivity overspent as it continues to support urbanization and industrialization in other parts of the country.7 7  Since the economic reform policies were launched in the late 1970s, three main sources account for there have been three main drivers of a the surge in demand for livestock products: increases in the demand for raw materials from county and rural food processing and manufacturing factories in the coastal and inland areas; increased consumer demand linked to rising incomes; as a form of good with a highly elastic demand, consumer

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4.2.2.2

Environmental Implications of Policies for Agricultural and Pastoral Development Since 1949, Inner Mongolia has undergone a number of land cultivation campaigns. The first one lasted from 1958 to 1962, and its express aim was to turn grassland into farmland and production and processing centers for agricultural products. This accorded with core principle of the national agricultural policy at the time of prioritizing grain production above all else, that is, to “Grain Production is the Baseline” (以粮为纲). The second campaign was from 1966 to 1976, which was driven by the idea that “no self-respecting herder would eat grain grown by another.” These first two waves of land opening and cultivation had left two very deep marks on the steppe: they ravaged the ecosystem, and triggered a surge of farmer immigrants who would come to dominate livestock feed operations. Today, many farmers who have lived in the area for several generations are growing crops and grazing livestock in cramped conditions around their homes. This sorry sight is often what greets visitors to the grassland. The high grazing pressure this generated has progressively degraded the grasslands, and the impact continues to spread outwards onto the grazing areas. Sand dunes frequently form on the outskirts of these settlements. Each spring, menacing gusts sweep through the region dump large volumes of dust and sand in downwind areas. As the size of the farming population and the scale of feed-growing continue to grow, so does the threat to the local ecosystem.8 Within a few years of the establishment of the rangeland and livestock user rights system, local grassland deterioration, previously confined to the farming settlements and their immediate surroundings, began to spread in different directions. Growing livestock population also contributed to a new wave of conflict between farmers and herders. Further aggravating the problem, the government continued to intensify feed production in the region by launching yet another round of land cultivation campaign, which lasted from 1986 to 1992. The animating philosophy behind this new push was maximizing profit under ecological and socioeconomic constraints, and promoting mechanized farming, and this campaign would prove to be more damaging to the steppe than the previous two. One demand increases as incomes do; and, increasing demand for breeding livestock due to rapid growth of the livestock industry. 8  Enhe 恩和, “Neimenggu diqu de qwenhua bianqian: nonggeng wenhua dui youmu wenhua de yingxiang 内蒙古地区的文化变迁: 农耕文化对游牧文化的影响 [Cultural Changes in the Inner Mongolia Region: the Impact of Agriculture on Herding Culture],” In “ ‘Zhongya shijie’ guoji xueshu huiyi lunwenji ‘中亚世界’ 国际学术会议论文集 [Proceedings for International Conference on ‘The World of Central Asia’],” Russia, 2002.

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casualty was the riparian zones along inland rivers in the desert region. These zones had featured relatively thick topsoil, considerable vegetation cover and until then been little disturbed by human activities. But after this the third land cultivation campaign, many of these rivers and some of the lakes dried up. The vegetation of entire areas within the riparian zones then began to die out. These river-dependent steppe ecosystems were on the brink of collapse.9 In 1992, in what became the fourth land cultivation campaign, the regional government conceived a Household Land Cultivation Program to facilitate feed production and encouraged herder households to enroll. The program called for herder families to construct five pieces of fixture on their home plot: a feed storage area, shelter-belts, wells, pumping equipment, and fence. Almost half of the herder households in the region heeded the government’s call and enrolled. While individually small and seemingly ecologically benign, together, a large number of these miniature systems generated large aggregate impact. In the end the program failed, due to a combination of a lack of effective implementation of shelter-belts, herders’ inexperience in growing feed, and timing conflicts between planting, shearing, and other seasonal tasks. But even during its brief duration, the program managed to weaken the ecological protection capacity of this region. Many believe these developments are to blame for the sandstorm of spring of 1993, the largest in the last century. Even this menacing and historic sandstorm failed to draw attention to the worsening ecological plight of the region. Not long afterward, some local groups began to emulate other countries and experiment with growing turf nurseries. This is the fifth land cultivation campaign. While these operations did yield some increase in grassland productivity, they were water, labor and resource-intensive, and were destructive of original vegetation. Mastering the planting techniques also proved to be challenging for many herders, who typically had only limited capital. Outside the peak growing season, the grassland invariably degraded and became covered with sand. Finally, there was a sixth push in land cultivation campaign in the form of ecological resettlement programs and the spectacular growth of the dairy industry in the region. Cumulatively, these six waves of land cultivation devastated the steppe ecosystem,10 as partially summarized in Table 4.2. 9 

Zhang Zixue 张自学等, “Ershi shijimo Nei Menggu shengtai huanjing yaogan diaocha yanjiu 二十世纪末内蒙古生态环境遥感调查研究 [Remote Sensing Studies of the Ecology of the Inner Mongolia Region at the End of the 20th Century],” Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 2001. 10  Dalintai 达林太, “Wushi nian lai Nei Menggu tianran caodi liyong fangshi huigu 五十 年来内蒙古天然草地利用方式回顾 [Use of Natural Grassland in Inner Mongolia in

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the ecological impact on the inner mongolian STEPPE Table 4.2 Land cultivation in Inner Mongolia Period

Cultivated Grassland

1949–1985

138 million mu (9.2 million ha) 95 million mu (6.3 million ha)

1985–2000 2000–2005

Period

Cultivated Grassland (108 mu)

Turf Nursery

Household Land Cultivation Program

Other

12.7 million mu (851, 333 ha) 84 million mu (5.6 million ha)

8.4 million mu (560, 000 ha)

20.4 million mu (1.37 million ha)

Turf Nursery (108 mu)

Household Land Cultivation Program (108 mu)

Other (108 mu)

0.084 (560000 ha) 0.2048 (1.37 × 106 ha) 1949–1985 1.38 (9.2 × 106 ha) 1985–2000 0.1277 (851333 ha) 2000–2005 0.95 (6.3 × 106 ha) 0.8417 (5.6 × 106 ha) Note: Data from the Inner Mongolian Land Survey Institute and field studies.

4.2.2.3 Fiscal and Taxation Policies In the 1950s, the grasslands of Inner Mongolia enjoyed reduced tax rates. The policy had a significant and positive impact on the pastoral economy and herder livelihoods. But after economic reform and opening-up began in the early 1980s, many new fiscal and tax policies left deep and long-lasting marks on the steppe ecosystem. Let us look first at tax policies.11 From the early 1980s until quite recently, taxes were assessed on the basis of the number of livestock each household owned. The more one owned, the greater one’s tax contribution Contrary to common thinking, according to which taxation on ownership discouraged owning more livestock, perversely, this tax rule did the opposite. On one hand, tax payment effectively conferred the Last Half a Century],” in Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan pinglu 中国环境与发展评 论第二卷 [China Environment and Development Review No. 2], Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004. 11  These taxes have since been removed.

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legitimacy on livestock ownership,12 on the other hand, for many families, especially those who could graze their animals on natural pasture at practically no or minimal costs, the marginal return from each additional animal owned most definitely exceeded the marginal cost, which was largely confined to the taxes. This made it profitable to own as many animals as one could manage. Under this tax system, the county government turned a blind eye toward illegal ownership of animals by pasture renters, so long as taxes were paid for them according to law. Owners of these illegal animals tend to have come from outside the autonomous region. Many of them were farmers that worked on livestock feed production sites. Although they were registered as herders, they had not contracted any pasture, and would graze their animals on unfenced grasslands, i.e. the commons. Some were not even local residents at all, but outsiders such as salaried government staff, laid-off workers, and even livestock owning enterprises or former craftsmen, such as blacksmiths. The animals owned by these groups account for about 30% of all of the animals in the Inner Mongolia herding region, representing a significant burden on the grasslands. Another feature of this tax system was the way the revenue was shared among different levels of government.13 In some banners, 40% of the tax returns from illegally-owned animals went to the league or prefecture and 60% to the county government. Moreover, for those tax items (such as taxes on felt and skin) over which the county had some discretion, it could demand an additional amount on top of what was officially required. Households that were unable to pay cash had the option of paying in kind, i.e. with livestock. All these provisions in the tax rules effectively encouraged livestock ownership. The national Grassland Law does contain rules for protecting grassland by restricting the livestock population. However, the stipulations are too general, abstract and inoperable, and as such offered inadequate protection of the grassland against exploitation and abuse. 12  These are households that are officially registered as herders own large numbers of livestock, but do not have user rights to grasslands. Most also have other sources of income. They compete with genuine herding households for grazing land. They lease out the livestock that they acquire in good years, but graze them on natural grassland in poor years. This is a highly profitable strategy for these households. Local government tolerates, or even encourages this behavior because of the local income taxes this generates. 13  Before the introduction of tax exemption for livestock operations and herders, taxes were the sole source of government revenue for government salaries employees and for administrative expenditure. Any surplus would be shared between local and higher levels of government. This provided a powerful incentive for residents to contribute to this revenue stream.

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While the exact mechanisms by which this new tax system contributed to grassland overuse and degeneration was complex, fundamentally, it works by allowing the pursuit of short-term interests to trump concerns with longterm ones thanks to a combination of factors such as user rights ambiguity, lax and/or ineffective laws, self-interestedness, and the pressure of population growth in the region.14 What with excessive and inappropriate land cultivation, aggressive water extraction and other forms of unscrupulous resource use, severe grassland desertification and deterioration are inevitable. 4.2.2.4 Population Policies In 1949, the total population of Inner Mongolia was 263,000. By 2000, it had ballooned to 1,929,200, of which 385,000 were farmers and 349,000 were herders. Compared with the 132.3% increase in national population during this period, from 0.54 billion to 1.26 billion, the margin of increase in Inner Mongolia was a whopping 633.54%, due largely to immigration. Several different factors explain these immigration trends. Some are traceable directly to land cultivation policies under which resulted in large inland populations moved moving to Inner Mongolia en masse to help construct stateowned farms and pastures. From the early 1960s until the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) (1966–76), many farmers and other impoverished people fled to remote grassland regions to take up farming or become agro-pastoralists. Another wave of immigration originated with the campaign to send urban educated youth to the countryside to learn from the peasants. The development of heavy industries, such as mining in grassland areas, also attracted a large number of people from elsewhere. All these immigrants had one thing in common when they first arrived in the region, which is that they had until that time not been either familiar with grasslands or exposed to any aspect of the grassland economy, and took up animal husbandry for a variety of ad hoc reasons. Some of them engaged in mixed animal husbandry to supplement their income, while some were laid-off workers from mining operations that either shut down or underwent structural adjustments who turned to the grasslands to try to eke out a living. Worse still, some expropriated pastures had turned a tide profit from farming on them. The Ewenki Autonomous Banner of Inner Mongolia is a case in point. Its population increased 21.2 fold between 1949 and 2000. In 1960 14  Dalintai, Teng Youzheng, Meng Huijun 达林太、腾有正、孟慧君, “Zhengshui fangshi dui caoyuan xumuye de yingxiang 征税方式对草原畜牧业的影响 [The Impact of Taxation on Animal Husbandry on Grasslands],” Neimenggu daxue xuebao, No. 1, 2003, 87–93.

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alone, a year marked by frequent natural disasters and economic hardship across the nation, people moved to the region in droves, and the population grew by nearly 60%. In 1970, the construction of Dayan (大雁) coal mine also attracted large numbers of laborers to move here from other places around the country. Within that one year, the local population grew by 6,851, equivalent to an annual increase of 269.32%. In 1976, the Yimin (伊敏) coal-firing plant was established. The total household number was 82 (374 people) in that year, but subsequently increased to 4,156 (17,547 people) by 1990.15 These numbers amply illustrate the negative demographic impact of industrialization and urbanization on the grassland regions. 4.3

The Impact of Grassland Development and Ecological Restoration and Management on the Steppe Ecosystem and Herder Livelihoods

At the turn of the millennium, the government began to encourage natural recovery of grasslands through a system of seasonal or full-year grazing bans. According to the policy: “In order to create the necessary condition for the natural regeneration of grassland vegetation, the ecologically fragile and severely degraded areas are to be protected from grazing activities by means of physical enclosure.”16 15 E’erdunbuhe 额尔敦布和, “Caoyuan liyong budang yu caoyuan huangmohua 草原利 用不当与草原荒漠化 [Ill Usage of Grasslands and Desertification]” in Neimenggu caoyuan huangmohua wenti jiqi fangzhi duice 内蒙古草原荒漠化问题及其防治对 策 [Desertification in Inner Mongolia and Countermeasures], ed. Eerdunbuhe, Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 2002, 159. 16  On December 16, 2002, the State Council approved a grassland restoration programme for the 11 western provinces and regions. The programs were set to start in 2003, and to last for at least 5 years. The programmes were to be implemented in the desertified grassland areas of western and eastern Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Gansu Province, Ningxia Autonomous Region, northern Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and in the eastern parts of the Tibetan plateau (where many from where many rivers originate). The programmes were to be implemented in phases. One billion mu, (67 million ha), or about 40% of the degraded land in western China, was to be restored first. In Inner Mongolia, the program programme commenced in April, 2003. Inner Mongolia faced the greatest restoration challenge of all provinces and regions. A total of 12 cities and 65 banners were involved, and the affected area was 600 million mu (40 million ha). In the first phase of this huge project, due to conclude by 2010, a total of 450 million mu (3 million ha) of degraded land was to be restored, and another 150 million mu (1 million ha) was to be restored in the second phase of the project to conclude by 2015.

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The implementation of this policy changed the traditional modes of pastoral practices that relied on endogenous sources of energy generated through herding activities and increased reliance on exogenous sources of energy. This shift brought many changes, and had mixed results. One consequence of the grazing bans was increase in operating costs for herders. Fences or other kinds of barriers were required to restrict the movement of animals that could no longer graze freely. As is shown in Figure 4.3 that since the program began, the operating costs for herders have risen substantially, as have their other expenditures. Spending on feed saw the largest margin of increase, which may suggest that many pastoralists experience feed shortage. Given the nature of pastoral production and the significant financial and time commitment required to keep the ewes, it is not easy for herders to reduce the number of livestock too quickly, something that might have helped to offset the higher per head expenditure on feed supply from outside. In their article ‘Grassland restoration through grazing bans: problems in its implementation and their solutions’, Xue Fengrui and Jiang Dongmei point out that the biggest issue in the implementation of the policy is the financial

Figure 4.3 Change in production costs for herder households before and after ecological restoration program (in RMB). Data Source: Survey of 338 herder households by the Grassland Operation and Management Station, Inner Mongolia Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, 2004.

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Figure 4.4 Change in production costs for herder household before and after ecological restoration program (by percentage). Data Source: Survey of 338 herder households by the Management Station, Inner Mongolia Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, 2004.

burden it imposes on herders. Herder households previously needed to spend little on buying forage since most of them grazed their animals on natural grasslands. Average annual expenditure on forage purchase was only RMB 2,210 per household. Increasing reliance on hay since the grazing ban program began has resulted in annual expenditure of RMB 18,000 per household, or 8.14-fold increase. Fence depreciation, expenditure on utilities, fuel, and vaccination increased by 1.83, 1.20, 4.0 and 1.45 times respectively.17 Before the program began, the aggregate capital investment by herding households was RMB 3,305,000, but increased by 65% thereafter, to RMB 5,459,000. Meanwhile, the aggregate herding income for the region was originally RMB 3,129,000 and declined to RMB 2,068,200 after the program was implemented, representing a reduction of 35%. The rate of return on investment for pastoralism 17  Xue Fengrui and Jiang Dongmei 薛凤蕊、姜冬梅, “Tuimuhuancao gongcheng shishi zhong mianlin de wenti yu duice yanjiu 退牧还草工程实施中面临的问题与对 策研究 [Grain for Green Programs: Problems and Policy Responses],” Beifang Jingji, No. 11, 2006.

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generally in the region was 1.95:1 but dropped afterwards 1.38:1, representing a 34% decline. All of this seems to suggest that the “grain for green” grassland restoration program has had adverse impact on herder income. Compounding this trend, household expenditure for herder families increased 19% to RMB 11,191.85 per year from RMB 9393.95 per year.18 In addition to greater labour intensity, increased reliance on hay also meant that herding families had to spend on things such as feed processing equipment, extending fences, and drilling wells. All these compounded the introduction of exogenous resources. To cope, herders had to increase the market appeal of their products. In other words, the grassland grazing bans further intensified livestock production. And when this happened on a large scale, it negated the natural advantage of grassland pastoral production in regard to low operating costs. Moreover, developments that depended on exogenous sources of energy, such as forage production, planted pasture, and water extraction all exacerbated grassland degradation. Moreover, increases in overheads and inadequate or late disbursement of compensation from the government further deepened the harshness of herder livelihoods. Herder experiences have shown that ecological compensation scheme may fall short of its intended objectives as a strategy for ecological protection and stewardship. The main problem seems to be that these programs are increasingly designed and directed by funders, who have invariably been outsiders, i.e. people who do not actually reside in the region. A better approach would be to encourage locals to participate in environmental policy-making, to inspire them to protect the ecosystem for their own sustainable development, and to put their indigenous knowledge to good use.19 4.4 Conclusion Research on grassland environment and development issues by Chinese scholars is still under-developed compared with international achievements in this area. Nevertheless, a number of works by Chinese scholars have been published on this topic over the last decade. Some have been rather useful, but they have tended to focus on purely technical issues such as pastoral economics, ecological protection, and resource exploitation. As a result, they have shed little light 18  Cited from the speech by Teligeng 特力更 delivered in 2005 at the Conference on Sustainable Developoment in Inner Mongolia. 19  Cited from the speech by Wang Xiaoyi 王晓毅 delivered in 2008 at the Conference on Sustainable Development in Inner Mongolia.

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on the situation on the ground in herding areas. There, the fact has been that within a little over two decades, rapid “development” has somehow coincided with grassland deterioration and desertification on an unprecedented scale. One historical problem with grassland studies in China is that they have tended to overlook the multi-layered and multifaceted nature of grassland protection and development. Issues such as what constitutes a sound location for livestock production, the impact of regional variations in natural and economic conditions, optimal use of local resources, ecological balance and integrity and sustainability are closely interrelated. This means that we can no longer ignore the rich indigenous knowledge of herders in the region. It is thanks to these experiences that local people have been able to practice pastoralism in ways that both benefits themselves and sustains the ecosystem. For example, one lesson that can be learned is that some kind of a hybrid between semisettled and semi-nomadic mode of production could, especially under the present condition of high population pressure and grassland degradation, offer a path toward more sustainable grassland communities in these regions. Meanwhile, grassland-based animal husbandry and user rights systems may be key to this process. Grassland vegetation is suited to grazing livestock, and mobile livestock production requires a low population density. Therefore, if herders decide to settle, their settlements must be scattered across a large area. They will not take the form of highly concentrated residential neighborhoods such as one would likely find in a village made up of farmers. Forced conversion of the former into the latter would end herding as a way of life and work. Alternatively, if herders do abandon grazing-based livestock production altogether, their rationale for staying on the grasslands disappears. At this historical juncture, it is important that we learn from past experience. We must, above all else, respect the laws of nature, and find a proper balance among societies’ economic, ecological and social aspirations.

Chapter 5

Understanding China’s Ecological Restoration Projects: A Study of the Grain for Green Program Xu Jintao, Jiang Xuemei and Yi Fujin The flow stoppage in sections of the Yellow River in 1997 and the Yangtze River flooding the following year awakened the Chinese public to the large-scale ecological deterioration in western China. The Chinese government responded to the situation, which was approaching crisis proportion, by implementing a series of massive ecological restoration projects. The objectives included protecting natural forests, reforesting retired or reclaimed farmland, and rehabilitating the source region for dust and sandstorms in the Beijing and Tianjin area. These projects, together with a number of other policy initiatives that focused on Western China, including infrastructure construction, regional education programs, and economic restructuring, made up the national strategic plan for the development of western China (known as “Develop the West” 西部开发战略) launched in 1999. The budget for these projects stood at around RMB 700 billion, and the projected timeframe for their completion was just under 20 years. By any measure, these were unprecedentedly ambitious efforts toward ecological protection and repair for a developing country like China. The first pilot projects for reforestation of retired agricultural land, or “grain for green” (退耕还林) date back to 1999. By 2005, 343 million mu (22.86 million ha) of agricultural lands had been slated for reforestation, and total investment toward the project had already reached RMB 103 billion. Of the total area covered, 135 million mu (9 million ha) was intended for tree plantation, 189 million mu (12.6 million ha) for afforestation in topographically suitable mountainous or non-mountainous areas, and 20 million mu for afforestation through mountain closure. Together, the projects involved 25 provinces and equivalent administrative units, 31 million households and 120 million farmers. The magnitude of the program is unmatched not only in China, but worldwide. Even moderate success of the program would have enormous and profound impacts on the ecological conditions of the country as a whole and on rural development. In 2000, the system for ecological compensation (生态补偿) was established in China. This provided the institutional platform for addressing an issue that had been the subject of fierce debate for years. An immediate

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004316041_006

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implication of the establishment of this system is the regular inclusion of the expenditure toward ecological compensation, to be paid to those who must resettle to make way for ecological recuperation, in the government budget. This provided a secure source of funding for the program. The annual government outlay has been RMB 1–2 billion (US$ 152–304 million). As its projected cost continues to grow, ecological compensation may potentially take on pivotal importance to the long-term prospects of ecological restoration in China. Some have even suggested that it may pick up where natural forest protection projects and grain for green programs leave off in terms of issues addressed. In the past 6–7 years, we have studied the socio-economic impacts of grain for green programs, where farmland is retired to allow reforestation, and the design and execution of the system of ecological compensation. By analyzing the results of these studies we have been to evaluate the effects and effectiveness of those programs so far. We apply economic concepts and theories in evaluating the data we have collected. It is our hope that a better understanding of the challenges in implementing these policies can contribute toward efforts to improve them. The social and economic impacts of the “grain for green” programs have been a matter of concern. Issues that have been raised include whether it will help increase farmer income, facilitate structural adjustment of the rural economy, and stimulate the movement of surplus rural labor. Indeed, whether the program will be viable in the long term depends greatly on how it affects the economic outlook for farmers. A series of mid-term evaluation of the program was done around the end of 2002, by both government and non-governmental bodies, yielding mixed results. The government’s official assessment was on the whole favorable, and optimistic on the program’s long-term viability. According to the assessment, the program had helped expedite structural adjustment of the rural economy, facilitated the mobility of surplus labor in the countryside, alleviated poverty and increased farmer incomes.1 Some scholars share this view, citing as evidence for the effectiveness and the basis for the program’s long-term viability and wider implementation either increased consumption of grain and other food,2

1  “Liu da gongcheng, zaizao xiumei shanchuan de weida zhuangju 六大工程，再造秀美山 川的伟大壮举 [Six Major Projects and the Rebuilding of a Beautiful Landscape],” Zhongguo lvse shibao, Sept. 10, 2004. 2  Dong Mei, Zhong Funing, Wang Guangjin 东梅, 钟甫宁, 和王广金, “Tuigenghuanlin yu pinkun diqu liangshi anquan de shizheng fenxi–yi Liaoning Huizu zizhiqu weili 退耕还林与 贫困地区粮食安全的实证分析——以宁夏回族自治区为例 [Grain for Green Program

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or higher incomes among the relocated,3 Not all agree, however, claiming that the program has done little to promote either structural adjustment of the rural economy or the absorption of surplus rural labor by non-farm sectors.4 Studies by Guo Xiaoming et al. even reported a decline in the numbers of new livestock businesses and a notable decline in living standards among some participants.5 In 2003, researchers from the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy (农业技术研究中心), at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院), conducted household surveys in Shaanxi (陕西), Gansu (甘肃) and Sichuan (四川) provinces. The purpose of the surveys was to determine the effects of the program between 1999 and 2002. The results of the survey are reported in Xu Jintao et al. (2004).6 The analysis in the report took into consideration the short time horizon of the data, for by 2002 it had only been four years since the program started. It allowed that the program’s effects on structural adjustment, mobility of surplus rural labor and farmer income could take longer to and Food Security in Poor Regions: An Empirical Study of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region],” Zhongguo renkou ziyuan yu huanjing, No. 1, 2005. 3   Zhang Guoming, Yuan Weiguo and Wang Feiyue 张国明, 袁卫国, 和汪飞跃, “Tuigenghuanlin gongcheng yu ‘sannong’ wenti—yi Sichuan weili 退耕还林工程与 ‘三 农’ 问题—以四川省为例 [Grain for Green Program and the Three Rural Issues: A Look at Sichuan’s Experience],” Lvse Zhongguo, No. 6, 2005; Li Ruoning 李若凝, “Tuigeng huanlin dui nongcun jingji de yingxiang ji houxu fazhan duice—yi Henan Luoyang weili 退耕还 林对农村经济的影响及后续发展对策—以河南洛阳为例 [Economic Impact of the Grain for Green Program on Rural China and Follow-up Measures: A Case Study of Luoyang, Henan],” Nongye xiandaihua yanjiu, No. 5, 2004. 4  Xu Jintao, Tao Ran, Xu Zhigang 徐晋涛、陶然、徐志刚, “Tuigenghuanli: Chengben youxiaoxing, jiegou youxiaoxing yu jingji kechixuxing—jiju Xibu san sheng nonghu diaocha de shizheng fenxi 退耕还林: 成本有效性、结构调整效应与经济可持续性—基于西 部三省农户调查的实证分析 [Grain for Green Program: Cost Effectiveness, the Effects of Structural Adjustment and Economic Sustainability: An Empirical Investigation of Rural Households in Three Western Provinces],” Jingjixue jikan, No. 4, 2004; Uchida, Emi, Xu Jintao and Scott Rozelle, “Grain for Green: Cost-effectiveness and Sustainability of China’s Conservation Set-aside Program,” Land Economics, May 2005. 81 (2): 247–264. 5  Guo Xiaoming, Gan Tingyu, Li Shengzhi and Luo Hong 郭晓鸣、甘庭宇、李晟之和罗 虹, “Tuigenghuanlin gongcheng: wenti, yuanyin yu zhengce jianyi—Sichuansheng Tianquan xian 100 hu tuigenthuanlin nonghu de genzu diaocha 退耕还林工程: 问题、原因与政策 建议——四川省天全县100户退耕还林农户的跟踪调查 [Understanding the Grain for Green Program: What Can be Learned about Its Problems, Their Causes and Policy Responses from a Longitudinal Study of 100 Rural Household in Tianquan County, Sichuan Province],” Zhongguo nongcu guancha, No. 3, 2005. 6  Ibid.

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become evident. Therefore, researchers from the Centre performed a followup survey in 2005 in order to remedy the limitations of the data from the earlier survey. Our evaluation of the program in question in this article is based on results of the follow-up survey, which are fully reported.7 5.1

Implementation and Execution of “Grain for Green” Programs

5.1.1 Tree Seedling Mortality Rates Tree seedling survival rates are an important measure of the level of success of ecological restoration programs. Since the level of compensation is linked to this figure, program participants have an obvious incentive to try to make it high. However, because initial tries usually produce poor outcome, many farmers have to make up for this by planting more seedlings year after year. Since the official figure for seedling survival rates does not control for this, it most likely exaggerates the effectiveness and efficiency of the reforestation program as well as underestimating its costs, technical difficulty, the demands it puts on participating farmers’ time and money, and the fiscal burden it places on local governments. We calculate seedling survival rate using the following formulae: R = 1 – M/N Here R stands for the revised seedling survival rate, M the number of seedlings from current year remedial planting, and N the total number of seedlings according to the last official count from the previous year. As is shown in Table 5.1, by 2004, the seedling survival rates for Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces met government requirement; between 2003 and 2004, both the official figure and the revised one based on our calculation had increased, indicating that on the whole, the program had made some progress, and that plantations are performing better. As they continue to learn from their experience, participants become more skilled at planting seedlings, which helped improve the outcome of the reforestation project. As can also be seen in Table 5.1, for 2003, the revised figures calculated according to our formula, which factor in multiple tries, were generally lower than the official

7  Yi Fujin, Xu Jintao and Xu Zhigang 易福金, 徐晋涛, 徐志刚, “Tuigeng huanlin jingji yingxiang zai fenxi 退耕还林经济影响再分析 [Revisiting the Economic Impact of the Grain for Green Program],” Zhongguo nongcun jingji, July 2006.

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china ’ s ecological restoration projects Table 5.1 Seedling survival rates

Unit: %

Province

2003 (Official)

2003 (Revised)

2004 (Official)

2004 Remedial Planting Rate (Revised)

Shaanxi Gansu Sichuan

89.0 80.0 85.3

75.2 72.4 84.9

97.6 80.4 91.1

86.3 79.6 91.0

Source: Yi Fujin et al. (2006) Notes: 1. Seedling survival rates are calculated on the basis of information provided by local residents, whereas remedial planting rates are determined by counting by researchers. 2. The minimum requirement for seedling survival rates is 70% for Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, and 85% for Sichuan province.

figures for all three provinces. The discrepancy for Shaanxi province was as great as 14%, which is commensurable with what we know about remedial planting prior to government verification. By 2004, the discrepancy had moderately reduced. 5.1.2 Payment Disbursement Rate Farmers’ level of commitment to the program is directly influenced by how quickly compensation money is paid. As is shown in Table 5.2, despite some improvement, the amount farmers actually receive in compensation falls consistently short of how much they are supposed to be paid according to the official requirement. When the first pilot programs began, the compensation package included 100 kgs of coarse grain (150 kgs for the residents in the Yangtze River valley region) plus RMB 20 per year per mu (0.0667 ha) of land claimed from agricultural use. In 2004, the in-kind component of the package was replaced by equivalent cash payment, at the rate of RMB 1.4 for each kg of coarse grain. This is why total cash payments were considerably higher for 2004 than for the preceding two years. In 2002, only a part of the compensation money was actually disbursed. The highest rate of disbursement, reported for Li County (理县), in Sichuan province, was barely 60%. The lowest was 10%, which was reported for Yanchuan county (延川县), Shaanxi province. The situation improved somewhat in 2003, in which the rate for Sichuan province was near 100%, considerably higher than those for Shaanxi and Gansu. The decreases for Liquan county (礼泉县), Linxia county (临夏县) and Chaotian district (朝天区) was likely partly attributable to complications

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Table 5.2 Payment disbursement rates

Unit: yuan/mu × household Sample County

Shaanxi Gansu Sichuan

Value of actual in-kind (grain) Compensation (in RMB) 2002 2003 2004

Yanchuan 14 Liquan 75 Jingning 52 Linxia 24 Chaotian 135 Li 129

28 114 71 142 204 204

3 20 48 74 47 25

Cash

Total: Actual Compensation (in RMB)

2002 2003 2004

2002 2003 2004

4 6 17 2 3 13

29 14 25 7 12 16

109 64 63 16 113 219

18 81 69 26 138 142

57 128 96 149 216 220

112 84 111 90 160 244

State Requirement

160 160 160 160 230 230

Source: Yi Fujin et al., (2006). Note: value of in-kind payment with grain is calculated on the basis of prevailing local market price of the current year.

associated with the conversion from in-kind payout to cash payment. All told, the situation was considerably better in 2004 than in 2002. One explanation for this may be the delay in payment disbursement. For Li County, for example, the amount of money disbursed to enrollees in 2004 was in excess of the required compensation amount for that calendar year, which likely suggests it included back pay in part or in full rolled over from the previous year. We also found that it is not uncommon for the local government to use disbursement as a bargaining tool in its negotiations with farmers over disputes. Money owed to farmers was sometimes withheld arbitrarily; sometimes on the ground that it was used toward repayment of back taxes owed the government. To summarize, much more needs to be done to address fully the problems of disbursement delay and arbitrary withholding of payment. 5.1.3 Participant Eversal to Farming The viability of the reforestation program hangs importantly on whether participants abandon it and revert to farming, which in turn depends critically on how what effects enrollment had on their economic conditions. This is measured by farmer income six years from the time of enrollment. According to official guidelines, each participating household must be allowed to retain a

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certain amount of land to grow food for private consumption: 0.5 mu (0.033 ha) per person for the southwest region and more than 2 mu (0.12 ha) per person for the northwest region. However, we found in our field investigation that up to 60% of enrollees reported that these were inadequate, and participants could not subsist on what the land produced alone. The hardship might have been mitigated had supplemental income from, say, earnings from odd jobs been available. But we found that in all three provinces covered in our studies, this has not been widely true and that a considerable proportion of enrollees experienced varying degrees of economic hardship once compensation payment had been fully disbursed. The situation is worst in Shaanxi province, with more than 50% of its participants in the reforestation program reporting hardship, and even Gansu province, which did better than the other two, reported hardship among 35% of enrollees. If this condition does not change, there are real chances that a substantial number of enrollees will revert to farming and abandon their plantations.8 5.2 Impact on Current Farmer Income The grain for green program is designed to benefit more than the ecological environment. It is also expected to boost farmer incomes, facilitate structural adjustment of China’s rural economy, and create jobs. In fact, the latter ones are important indicators for the prospects of the program’s long-term viability. When we evaluate the program from these points of view, we must consider not only the immediate and short term, but also the longer term, including projected future earnings from the tree plantations. But since policy-makers have likely been overly optimistic on these issues, the pilot programs were declared a success only three years after they began. In 2002, the program expanded to 25 provinces. Therefore, information about the short-term impact of enrollment in the program on enrollees’ economic opportunities and standards of living consists in important for verifying the government’s claim that the program is ready for large-scale implementation. The verification process itself would also have to meet sound standards of science. Specifically, we have applied what is now the gold standard for project assessment used in economics, namely, Difference-in-Difference (DID). Basically, the method involves comparing the experiences of a group of enrollee in a particular program or project with that of a control group that has not enrolled 8  Yi Fujin, Xu Jintao and Xu Zhigang 易福金, 徐晋涛, 徐志刚, “Tuigeng huanlin jingji yingxiang zai fenxi 退耕还林经济影响再分析 [Revisiting the Economic Impact of the Grain for Green Program],” Zhongguo nongcun jingji, July 2006.

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in any. This is done by first determining, for each of the two groups, changes in the values of select variables before and after their participation in the program being studied. The difference between the averages for the differences before and after for the two groups would be attributable to participation in the program. We review our findings below.9 5.2.1 Per Capita Farmer Income First we shall provide a statistical description of the changes in income after leaving farming and turning to tree planting for two groups of participants in the reforestation program. Table 5.3 compares changes in income from different sources between 1999 and 2004 for participants and non-participants. First, leaving out income from growing crops, both groups saw some increase in per capita income from raising livestock, extra-agricultural economic activities, and other sources, and also in total income. More specifically, nonparticipants had seen their income from raising livestock increase from RMB 30 in 1999 to RMB 95 in 2004, or by 3.1 times, and the increase was even steeper— 3.6 times—for participants in the grain for green program. Non-participants’ income from extra-agricultural activities rose from RMB 759 to RMB 1,073 during the same period. Per capita income from non-farm activities for the reforestation program participants grew to RMB 880 in 2004, and the gap between the two groups in this respect changed only slightly between 1999, when it was RMB 199, and 2004, when it was still over RMB 190. As would be expected, for participants income from crop farming dropped, declining to RMB 442 from RMB 486. But once compensation payment was factored in, this component of this group’s total income for 2004 would rise to RMB 610, higher than it was in 1999. We also noted some other differences between the groups. In 1999, on average, non-participants earned RMB 227 more from crop growing than did participants. This number is not considered statistically significant. But by 2004, it had grown to RMB 330. As was earlier mentioned, that this difference is larger in 2004 in 1999 is as it should be, given that program participants cut back on crop growing while their non-participating counterparts did not need to. But even when compensation is taken into account, it only reduced the difference between the two groups to RMB 161. To summarize, when we compare the two groups in terms of changes to their income—total as well as when broken down by source, including animal husbandry, crop growing and non9  Yi Fujin, Xu Jintao and Xu Zhigang 易福金, 徐晋涛, 徐志刚, “Tuigeng huanlin jingji yingxiang zai fenxi 退耕还林经济影响再分析 [Revisiting the Economic Impact of the Grain for Green Program],” Zhongguo nongcun jingji, July 2006.

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agriculture-related—the difference is not statistically significant. In other words, contrary to what the government projected or claimed, participation in the reforestation program did not yield enrollees notable economic advantage over non-participants. 5.2.2 Results and Discussions First, the DID results show that during the first six years of its operation that ended in 2004, the grain for green program had significant impact on neither Table 5.3 Per capita farmer income for 1999 and 2004 (1) Non-enrollee 1999 2004

Crop Including compensation for enrollment Livestock Other Livestock and other Misc. other

(2) Enrollee 1999 2004

(3) Difference 1999 2004

712.50 (1343.43) N.A.

771.66 485.50 (1017.68) (651.44) 774.66 N.A. (1017.68)

441.90 (633.56) 610.01 (179.24)

227.00 (1.48) N.A.

329.76 (2.77)*** 161.65 (1.35)

30.32 (57.52) 759.20 (1405.18) 789.55 (1406.61) 56.15 –195.86 1562.71 (1932.44)

94.88 (166.70) 1073.25 (1478.65) 1261.43 (1798.05) 279.75 –1122.83 2322.75 (2772.23)

179.24 (1105.93) 879.57 (1280.42) 1351.11 (4832.05) 171.24 –939.66 1857.08 (3249.04)

–19.34 (–0.85) 199.26 –1.22 144.05 (0.85) –48.79 (–1.24) 326.96 (1.38)

–84.36 (–1.20) 193.68 –1.15 –89.67 (–0.25) 108.51 –0.79 465.67 (1.27)

2322.75 1235.74 2021.74 (2772.23) (1706.13) (3257.51) 254

326.96 (1.47)

301.02 (0.82)

Total income without compensation Total income with 1565.71 compensation (1932.44) No. of samples 79

49.66 (353.53) 559.98 (855.07) 645.49 (1230.00) 104.94 –535.36 1235.74 (1706.13)

Source: Yi Fujin et al., 2006. Notes: 1. Items (1) and (2) are averages, standard error is enclosed in parentheses; (3) is annual variation 2. N.A. indicates negligible value; 3. *indicates 10% statistical significance, ** indicates 5% statistical significance, *** indicates 1% statistical significance.

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participants’ income from non-farming activities nor their total income. Analysis of fieldwork results suggests that this is likely because remedial planting and plantation management consumed so much of their time little was left for alternative income-earning activities such as raising livestock and nonagriculture related activities. Second, the adverse impact of participation in the reforestation program on participants’ income from crop growing is no longer significant. Results of both the 2003 survey and the examination of the remaining 265 samples confirm that income from crop-growing (not in including compensation payments) had dropped considerably for enrollees. In 2004, while statistics show that income from crop-growing for non-participants was appreciably higher than net income from crop-growing (i.e. not counting compensation for participants), it is also the case that, as Table 5.5 indicates, once we control for the differences between rural areas and towns with respect to the level of economic development, the difference enrollment in the program makes to income from crop-growing is no longer pronounced.10 A number of factors may explain this. One is that farmers may have adjusted their crop choices, improved their farming techniques and overall efficiency. With smaller areas to farm, they may also have been able to invest more time per unit of area than before. They may also have shifted to crop varieties that are more labor-intensive but also more profitable, such as vegetables. Finally, it may also be that some of the plantations (the area of which tends to be 20% greater than is required by the government) have finally begun to turn a profit for their managers after six years. Thirdly, until 2004, enrollment in the grain for green program had negligible impact on enrollee income from crop-growing even when compensation payment is factored in. Some believe that compensation from the government was in fact greater than the opportunity costs of participation, and income from crop-growing and compensation combined is comparable to income from crop-growing prior to enrollment.11 Results from 2002­ 10  Guo Xiaoming, Gan Tingyu, Li Shengzhi and Luo Hong 郭晓鸣, 甘庭宇, 李晟之, 和 罗虹, “Tuigeng huanlin gongcheng: wenti, yuanyin yu zhengce jianyi–Sichuan sheng Tianquan xian 100 hu tuigeng huanlin nonghu de genzong diaocha 退耕还林工程: 问题、原因与政策建议——四川省天全县100户退耕还林农户的跟踪调查 [Problems in the Grain for Green Program, Their Causes and Policy Recommendations: Study Based on Follow-Up Survey of 100 Participating Households in Quantian County, Sichuan Province],” Zhongguo nongcun guancha, No. 3, 2005. 11  Li Ruoning 李若凝, “Tuigeng huanlin dui nongcun jingji de yingxiang ji houxu fazhan duice: yi Henan Luoyang wei li 退耕还林对农村经济的影响及后续发展对策—— 以河南洛阳为例 [The Impact of the Grain for Green Program on Rural Economy and

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indicate, however, that the contrary is true, that participation in the program had significant adverse consequences for participant’s farming-related income. As has been noted, this was largely due to problems with disbursement of the compensation money, such as delays and arbitrary withholdings. Participants’ combined income from crop-growing and compensation was lower than preenrollment incomes from crop-growing alone. But after 2002, better disbursement practices greatly reduced the income loss for participants. 5.3 Conclusion The foregoing analyses indicate that in the program’s first six years, as the compensation disbursement system gradually improved, farming related income for enrollees on the whole stayed steady. But contrary to what the government had expected, the program did little to increase incomes from raising livestock or non-farm work for participants. We think, therefore, that the government’s conclusion that the pilots had been successful was premature, and the subsequent decision to implement the program on a large scale in 2002 and 2003 is poorly justified. In fact, we are skeptical about the long-term viability of the program. Given its negligible benefits in boosting rural income and in facilitating structural adjustment of the rural economy, and given the host of problems in its execution, as well as dubious impact it has on ecosystems in participating areas, the government should instead keep the scope of the program limited and exercise caution when introducing to more sites. Moreover, the government should focus more on improving outcomes and designing a better followup program. The program’s long-term viability and ecological, economical and social benefits depend on it. In October 2000, in a policy recommendation submitted to the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) (中国环境与发展国际合作委员会 [国合会]) by its Forest and Grassland Working Group, contributors pointed out that the long-term viability of the reforestation program depends more on the availability of reliable and adequate funding than anything else. During the trial period, when the program enjoyed international as well as national attention and acclaim, any worry about continual funding for the program may seem unnecessary. But things have since changed, and loss of funding guarantee and/or government Post-Program Policy Options: The Case of Luoyang, Henan Province],” Nongye xiandaihua yanjiu, No. 5, 2004.

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backing have already taken place. Starting in 2003, when the program covered at are of 110 million mu (7.3 million ha), half its projected final size, the rate of increase has been declining each year. If this trend continues, it seems highly unlikely that the program will ever reach its target of 220 million mu (14.6 million ha) total coverage that had been approved by the National People’s Congress in 2002. The trouble with funding reflects policy changes at the highest level of government.12 As soon as the eleventh session of the National People’s Congress started in 2008, one of the first things it did was to replace its “pro-active fiscal policy” (i.e. raising the money needed to finance national projects by selling government bonds) with a “soft fiscal policy” which did not rely on selling bonds for financing purposes. This move has meant the disappearance of a major source of funding for the ecological restoration project. The new congress went on to unveil many new policies, the most important of which focusing on revitalizing the old industrial hub of the northeast and construction of the New Socialist Countryside (社会主义新农村). All these are enormously costly propositions requiring large amounts of investment. In the inevitable competition between the new congress’s new initiatives and continuing projects passed down from the previous congress, and among different continuing projects, the more expensive continuing ones tend to be subject to closer scrutiny. As it happens, the government decided not to increase the scope of the grain for green program, which it deems has not been costeffective from either a socio-economic or an ecological point of view. Instead, it will focus on making it work better at the current scale and on making sure long-term mechanisms are put in place to ensure what has been achieved through the program will be sustained after program completion. These, in our judgment, have indeed been wise decisions.

12  Li Shidong 李世东, “Senlin shengtai xiaoyi buchang jizhi yu zhengce yanjiu baogao 森林生态效益补偿机制与政策研究报告 [A Report of Studies of Forestland Ecosystem Compensation Program: Mechanisms and Policies]” in Proceedings for the International Workshop on Eco-Compensation, pp. 247–55.

Chapter 6

Water Scarcity in China Chen Shaojun How well a society manages its water resources can be assessed from three points of views: security, economic sustainability and ecological sustainability. In terms of water security, two things are of primary importance: how effectively a society can protect itself from floods, and the degree to which its basic water needs are met. In terms of economic sustainability, the key issue is whether a society can make sound and wise economic use of its water resources. Finally, from the point of view of ecological sustainability, the important issues include those relating to water ecology and the aquatic environment. This chapter offers an overview of China’s water management from these three perspectives, and examines some of the most prominent waterrelated problems the country faces. 6.1 Background 6.1.1 Water Scarcity in China 6.1.1.1 Current Conditions Out of a total of 150 countries for which relevant data are available, China ranks 6th in terms of total water resources, but 121st in terms of per capita water availability. Per capita fresh water supply in China stands at only 2,220 m3/year. According to some projections, by the time the Chinese population reaches 1.6 billion, that number will drop to 1,760m3/year, making us a country with critical water shortages. Agriculture is still the dominant sector of the Chinese economy, accounting for 70% of total water use. It is also the economic sector most vulnerable to the impact of the uneven distribution—both temporal and spatial—of water resources. Nearly half of all irrigated area in the country is in the Yellow River (黄河), Huaihe River (淮河), and Haihe River (海河) valley regions, which suffer from chronic water shortages. The problem can be acute in the spring, which gets only 10% of total annual precipitation and when demand peaks. Currently, agricultural water deficit on an average year stands at 30 billion m3, with 20 million hectares of land being affected by drought. This results in reduced agricultural output on the order of around 25 million tonnes. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004316041_007

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Drought and water scarcity also have serious adverse consequences for cities and industries. The yearly average for industrial water deficit has been 600 million m3, representing a loss of RMB 230 billion worth of industrial output. Water shortages occur in nearly 400 of the country’s 668 cities, and the condition is dire in 200 of these. The lives of 150 million urban residents are seriously affected. Other consequences of these conditions include ecological problems such as channel desiccation, lake shrinkage, dropping water tables, loss of arable land, grassland degradation, soil erosion, sedimentation, water pollution, and species extinction. The spell of severe drought in southwest China between 2009 and 2010 clearly illustrates this. 6.1.1.2 A Brief History of Water Shortage in China since 1949 In the 1950s and the 1960s, floods were by far the most serious water problem the country faced. Flood prevention was the priority, which led to the construction of large hydraulic projects aimed at taming major rivers such as the Huaihe River (淮河), Haihe River (海河) and Yellow River (黄河). The problem of water shortage did not become evident until the 1970s, when drought caused severe water shortages in Beijing and Tianjin. The central government responded by drawing water from Miyun Reservoir (密云水库) on the outskirt of the capital. The solution for Tianjin was in the form of an emergency diversion from the Yellow River, a measure that would become the foundation for the Luanhe River Water Diversion Project (引滦工程). Water shortage has been a prominent national issue even since. Until the 1970s, China met its water needs mostly by finding new sources of supply and by drawing on surface water. Beginning in the 1980s, thanks to the combination of persistent drought, rapid urban development and urban population increase, water demand in many municipalities outran groundwater supply, which had always been limited. In response, many cities began to tap into sources originally meant for agricultural use, especially reservoirs. But this was by no means long-term solution to the problem, and authorities in Beijing and Tianjin soon began to think seriously about improving industrial water productivity. Droughts continued into the next decade. Cities continued to siphon off water from reservoirs, on which agriculture had been dependent, and overpumping of underground water became common or even normal. Agriculture’s increasing reliance on underground water led to precipitous drops in the water tables, and ground subsidence was becoming a problem. Water conservation became a top priority for agriculture. Pressure increased to find ways to make greater and better use of rainwater and soil water. Then as the new millennium

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began, and the pace of urbanization quickened, the problem of agricultural water shortages became increasingly serious, and reliance on rainfall grew. Large areas in northern China faced persistent and severe water scarcity. It was then when the South-North Water Diversion project was proposed. 6.1.1.3 Reasons for the Recent Escalation in Water Stress Economic growth, population increase and continual rise in standard of living Between 1949 and 2008, China’s aggregate water use grew from 103 billion to 590 billion m3. Industrial water use increased from 240 million m3 to 140 billion m3, agricultural water use from just over 100 billion m3 to 360 billion m3, and residential use from 600 million m3 to 72 billion m3. Sixty years after the founding of the people’s republic, China’s population had grown by 3.5 times, the area of irrigated land by 5, GDP by just over 70, and water use by nearly 6.

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· Climate Change

Precipitation and temperature records covering nearly half a century (1950– 1997) show that during the last 20 years of this period, precipitation patterns grew more uneven across regions, with more droughts in the north and more floods in the south. In the 1980s, the central and northern parts of China suffered protracted drought. The ten-year rainfall average for Beijing, Tianjin, the Haihe River (海河) and Luanhe River (滦河) Basin region, and the Shandong peninsula was 5 to 10% below historical average. In the 1990s, the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River Basin, the Hanjiang River (汉江) Valley, the upper reaches of the Huaihe River Basin and the Sichuan Basin all had 8-year average precipitation amounts 5 to 10% below historical average. The volume of Yellow River water passing through Huayuankou (花园口) was 20% less than usual. The same was true for the Haihe River and Luanhe River (海滦河) and Huaihe (淮河) River Basin. In the inland region of the northwest, average precipitation fell during the 1980s, and picked up again slightly in the 1990s. It is only thanks to supplementation by the constant supply of glacier meltwater that the total water volume for major rivers did not drop dramatically over this period. Historically, rainfall was plentiful in southwest China, one of the most water-abundant regions in the country. However, due partly to climate change, the region began to see reduced rainfall, lower reserve volumes, higher temperatures, higher evaporation rates, and reduced soil moisture by July 2009. These led to droughts across the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region (广西 壮族自治区), Chongqing municipality (重庆), and Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. Of these areas, Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi experienced

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precipitation levels more than 50% below historical average. In some places, they were as much as 70 to 90% less than years past. The volume of water flow for many major rivers in the region fell to a historical low, and reservoirs held on average 20% less water than the previous year. Soil water content was only 20% what it had been. The situation was grave, and has had deleterious effects on people’s lives and the economy. A total of 51 million people in these five provinces, cities and regions were affected to varying degrees, 16 million people and 11 million animals lacked reliable access to drinking water, and over 4 million hectares of farmland had been affected. Of these, just under one million hectares had zero yield, costing the national economy RMB 190 billion. 6.1.2 Efforts towards Water Conservation In the past 30 some years, Chinese people’s understanding of water conservation has gone through several phases. Between the 1950s and 1970s, shortage was gradually replacing flood prevention to become the country’s top water issue. Then from the 1970s to the 1980s, the focus of attention shifted from irrigation to urban water supplies. During the third phase, which started in the 1980s, the exclusive focus on finding new sources of supply, the dominant approach to water management until that time, was gradually being supplemented by increasing concern with conservation, beginning with urban and industrial water use, later extending to agricultural water use. It was not until the fourth and final phase that began in the 1990s when equal emphasis was placed on both source exploration and conservation in use. Now, the nation has adopted a comprehensive three-prong approach to water management that places even emphasis on source exploration, conservation in use, and pollution management. But among theses, conservation claims even more importance than the other two. This same trend, where concern with conservation and pollution abatement grows and corrects an exclusive stress on source exploration, is also evident in the history of urban water management in China. As the urbanization process went through different stages, each with its distinctive characteristics, source exploration was increasingly de-emphasized as more importance was attached to the other two issues. All this goes to show that at least in theory, conservation has now become a crucial part of the national strategy for water management. 6.1.2.1 The Legislative Approach to Water Conservation There were two watershed events in China’s legislative history of water conservation. The first was the passage of China’s Water Law in 1988, and the second

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was that of its amendment in 2002. While the issue of conservation was mentioned in both editions of the law, it was treated differently, both in depth and in scope. The importance of the issue of water conservation was first officially raised by the Chinese government towards the end of the 1970s, and the issue was given legal recognition in the Water Law passed in 1988. The law included, in the seventh clause, such statements as “the country is to abide by water use schedules, and adhere to the principle of conservation,” and “all levels of government must strengthen measures to promote water conservation, and workplaces should implement water-saving technologies in order to reduce water use and increase re-use.” The amended Water Law passed in 2002 states that: “the purpose of this law is to promote the rational exploration, utilization, conservation and protection of water resources, to prevent water disasters, so as to meet the country’s economic and social needs while ensuring the sustainability of our water supply.” Water conservation thus became mandated by law, and the principle of “integrating source exploration and conservation in use, with special emphasis on the latter as well as reuse,” was formally adopted. 6.1.2.2 Technological Measures  Cities At the end of 1970s, widespread water stress in Beijing, Tianjin and the Central North region attracted wide public attention. The industrial sector was the first economic sector to implement conservation measures, which began with requirements for water recycling and reuse. The focus of the earliest efforts was the reuse of cooling water. Industrial water reuse rates for Beijing and Tianjin are now above 85%. On the whole, industrial water use intensity, measured by water consumption per 10,000 RMB of industrial output, has decreased by orders of magnitude. In addition to continual efficiency gains in industrial water use, similar progress in efficiency was also being made throughout the 1980s in residential water use. The system of free or very cheap water ended, replaced by fee-based supply schemes where residential users had to pay according to amount used. Offices and workplaces redoubled their efforts to raise awareness about the importance of water conservation, and took aggressive measures to fix leaks. As water stress in cities worsened throughout the decade, water conservation improved in many places. Water shortages due to pollution also began to receive greater attention, and city government spending on wastewater treatment and recycling grew. When the new century began, in northern China in general and in water stressed cities in particular, the principle of water conservation had come to define a new type of modern city.

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What this entails, essentially, is the inclusion of water conservation facilities in urban infrastructure and industrial planning, the establishment of standards for water-saving technologies and measures, the promotion of these technologies and measures, and the requirements for all new residential and commercial buildings to have on-site wastewater treatment facilities, and for industries to achieve zero discharge of untreated wastewater.

· Agriculture

In the 1960s, China was still in the early stages in its experiments with watersaving irrigation technologies. In the 1970s, measures such as lining irrigation canals to reduce water seepage into the ground, and changing cropping patterns to improve water use efficiency became increasingly widespread. Lowpressure center pivot irrigation was then introduced on a large scale in the 1980s, and drip, sprinkler irrigation and micro-irrigation systems and other advanced technologies were tested and widely demonstrated. By the 1990s, water-saving irrigation technologies became both more sophisticated and more common across the country. These technologies expanded rapidly after 1996. Three hundred counties were chartered to lead the nation in the effort to increase crop yield by implementing new irrigation methods; 200 model districts and 10 nationally designated model cities were named; 99 large- and 40 mid-sized irrigation areas began construction of water-saving facilities and infrastructure upgrades. Areas in northern China suitable for well construction implemented water-saving irrigation methods; in the arid and semiarid regions of the northwest, local began to collect rainwater, line the soil with plastic sheets to reduce evaporation, and apply subsurface drip irrigation technologies; in the south, controlled irrigation was implemented in rice paddies and pastoralist-based development was experimented with; in the arid regions of the northeast and the northwest, a variety of irrigation methods particularly suited for the local water conditions were applied. To summarize, years of experiments and experience has taught people in different places which water-saving irrigation technologies, techniques and methods best suit local conditions and needs. Moreover, different levels of government have augmented their financial commitment to improving agricultural water use efficiency. By the end of 2008, the total irrigated area in China was 58 million hectares, which amounts to 48% of all agricultural land. Of the 58 million hectares, 24 million hectares, or 42%, use water-saving irrigation methods. Of the 24 million hectares, 10 million hectares feature lined irrigation canals, 6 million hectares use low-pressure centre pivot irrigation, 4 million hectares use sprinklers and micro-irrigation, and the remaining 4 million hectares use a variety of other such technologies. On average, on

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i­ rrigated farmlands of 10,000 mu (667 hectares) or more, under 19% of the total length of all canals and 35% of the total length of major canals is plastic-lined.

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 Better Pricing From the start of the new millennium, the State Council has embraced the idea of using market instruments to create price incentives for water conservation. The formerly National Planning Committee (国家计委), now the National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展与改革委员会) issued an order regarding water pricing reform. It articulated the rationale for using the price mechanism as an instrument for achieving water resource conservation.

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 Achievements Since the 1980s, the industrial water budgets for many parts of the country declined, an indication of the effectiveness of the conservation-oriented structural adjustments and specific water-saving measures. Between 1980 and 1997, industrial water use intensity, measured by water use for every 10,000 RMB worth of industrial output, dropped by an yearly average of 9%. In 1997, the total budget for industrial water use was 20% what it was in 1980. Since the 1980s, agricultural water use as a percentage of the national total decreased by 13%, to 390 billion m3 in 1997. Thanks to substantial growth in the use of water-saving irrigation methods over the previous two decades, Chinese agriculture saw considerable reduction in water use per hectare, and aggregate agricultural water use stayed constant, at around 350 billion m3. From 2000 onwards, regional and municipal water resource utilization plans have been drawn up across the country. Guided by the principles of conservation and efficiency maximization, these plans are an integral part of the country’s effort toward making socially optimal and environmentally sustainable use of water. In addition, key regions and cities were selected to take the efforts to more advanced levels in partnership with state-sponsored R&D projects. Many of these plans are now complete. 6.1.3 Continued Waste despite Conservation Efforts Despite the progress China has made in water conservation, waste remains a serious problem. China uses more water to produce each unit of industrial output than many other countries, including the United States and Japan. In 2000, agricultural water use intensity in China, i.e., the amount of water consumed to produce every 10,000 USD worth of agricultural output, is 22,323 m3. This number was slightly higher than the world average. In countries with per capita water availability comparable to China, such as Germany, agricultural water use

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intensity is about 4,000 m3.1 In China, the efficiency co-efficient for irrigation water use is about 0.43, while that number is around 0.7–0.8 in advanced countries. On average, China produces only 0.95 kg of grain with each m3 of water, while in Israel, that number is 2.2 kg.2 These comparisons reflect the persistence and severity of water wastage in China. But what explains the stubbornness of the behavioral patterns underlying these numbers? 6.1.3.1 Agencies in Charge Lack the Incentives to Save Water At present, the financial wellbeing of agencies in charge of maintaining water channels is a direct function of the amount of water supplied through these channels. This means that not only would they have little concern for water conservation, but also that when their own financial interests are at stake, they have every incentive to try to find ways to collect more fees. The same is true of other water management-related agencies that rely on fees to cover their operational costs. 6.1.3.2 Inadequate Government Spending on Water Conservation Poor coordination at the local level often leads to the unavailability of matching funds for central government investment. As a result, many programs that would improve water productivity on irrigated farmland and benefit farmers are abandoned due to funding shortfall. Furthermore, because neither the central nor the local government has committed very much financially to well construction, farmers often have to pay for it themselves, which they are not always able to do. And matching combinations of canals and wells are often not built where they are most needed and can be most useful. Large-scale projects, usually funded by the central government, often cannot be put to optimal use after they are built because matching measures and structures the local government is responsible for building fail to materialize due to funding difficulties. For the same reason, many aging hydraulic structures are not repaired and upgraded but continue to operate. 6.1.3.3 Lack of Incentives among End-users to Conserve Water For most of the irrigated cropland in the country, the water fees farmers pay, which is typically between 3 and 5 RMB for each 100 m3, does not cover the cost of supplying water. Unless the fees were substantially raised, it would be insufficient for installing water-saving measures, which can be quite costly. This 1  Ma et al., 2007. 2  Ibid.

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discourages farmers from investing in them. And while true-cost water pricing policies would in principle help reduce water use inefficiency, implementation can be challenging. For example, inconsistencies between the pricing schemes for surface and underground water can lead to suboptimal allocation of regional water resources. In other cases, the incompatibility between canal structures and the meter systems makes it impossible to charge according to use. Instead, farmers are often charged according to the size of the irrigated area, making efficiency a non-issue for them. Water conservation has been a familiar issue in China over the years. Three main parties are involved in the country’s efforts to improve water management: (1) water management agencies, (2) users and consumers and (3) investment decision-makers. The three parties’ functional roles are closely interrelated, and their relations are delicate and complicated, and can be vulnerable to logistical and bureaucratic entanglements. If any one of them failed to do its part, the entire endeavour would be jeopardized. To conclude the discussion so far, it is not due to incompetence on the part of concerned agencies that China’s vast potential for water conservation has yet to be fully realized. It is rather the fact that society as a whole lacks the will and the incentive. Water policies are not solely to blame for this. The problem has just as much to do with external circumstances, which play a large role in shaping the incentive structure. Three conditions must be satisfied to create the right incentive structure. First, management agencies must not have builtin conflict of interests. As government bodies charged with the serving the water needs and interests of the society as a whole, they must not be allowed at the same time to profit from performing this task. Secondly, end users of water must pay the full cost of this precious resource, or at least enough to sustain supplies meaningfully. Thirdly, government agencies charged with making investment decisions must be genuinely concerned with and committed to water conservation. Evidently, whether these conditions are met necessarily depends on (1) the government’s ability to discharge its responsibilities in social coordination and social service provision, (2) the role of the market in water allocation, and (3) reform in government investment as well as more sensible macroeconomic planning at the state and local levels. None of these is easy, leading to a large report on China’s water resources published in 2000 by the Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院) to conclude that “making water-conservation a social and cultural norm will require nothing less than a revolution.”3 3 Qian Zhengying 钱正英, “Zhongguo kechixu fazhan shuiziyuan zhanlue yanjiu zonghe baogao 中国可持续发展水资源战略研究综合报告 [Master Report on Research on

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The Coming Era of “Demand Side Management”

A New Principle: Shifting from “Managing Supply to Suit Demand” to “Managing Demand to Suit Supply” Water management in China has been undergoing a gradual transition from finding more supply to meet ever-growing demand to adjusting both until an optimal fit is achieved. The critical moment in this transition came at the beginning of the new millennium, when the government issued China’s Water Resource Management Strategy. This set off a shift in the country’s basic approach to water management, which went from a conventional, engineering approach to one that is based on ecological modernization and resource stewardship. Within two years, the notion that water demand ought to be tailored to suit supply, that we should live within our means so far as water is concerned had gained traction and begun to be incorporated into water management practices. This principle, which has been widely accepted worldwide, should and promises to be the core of a new water resource management philosophy. It calls for “a holistic approach to water management that puts a premium on budgeting water use [in accordance with availability]. Each river, for example, is to be considered a whole system with the source, the end-users of its water, and every stage or link in between as its integral parts. The overall management goal must be a healthy equilibrium between supply and demand that is socially and environmentally sustainable.”4 Other experts stress the importance of incorporating the nation’s water supply and availability in macroeconomic plans so as to ensure that: “economic structural adjustments are informed by the recognition that China has a serious water scarcity problem, and that no decision of moment concerning the nature and the direction of China’s economic development should be made without due consideration of the country’s water constraints.”5 At the institutional level, as was noted earlier, the government has already made a number of administrative changes to the way agencies in charge of water management conduct their business. These include instituting user 6.2.1

Sustainable Water Management Strategy in China],” in Qian Zhengying shuili wenxuan 钱正英水利文选 [Seletions from the Works of Qian Zhengying on Hydraulics], Zhongguo shuili shudian chubanshe, 2000. 4  Gan Hong, Wang Hao 甘泓、王浩, “Shui ziyuan xuqiu guanli 水资源需求管理 [Water Demand Management],” Zhongguo shuili, No. 10, 2002. 66. 5  Huang Shouhong 黄守宏, “Liangshuierxing zhidao guomin jingji fazhan ‘量水而行’ 指 导国民经济发展 [Demand Side Water Management as the Basis for National Economic Development],” Zhongguo shuili, No. 10, 2002.

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permits, quotas (in conjunction with caps on total usage), user fees and pricing reform. 6.2.2 Experiments in Market Allocation of Water Resources Despite many unresolved problems, some progress has been made in water resource reallocation, driven largely by the market. While “water market” is still mostly a concept in China, in reality, there has been an increase in unofficial and spontaneous trading of water rights that is aimed at cutting inefficiency, albeit in the absence of laws and policies, which have lagged behind. Case 1: “The right approach is for cities to help farmers in surrounding areas pay for the installation of water-saving equipment, and use the water saved to supplement urban water supply. This scheme would be mutually beneficial and also feasible.”6 Thanks to this arrangement that has been in place in the Beijing metropolitan area since the 1980s, water-saving methods such as sprinkler and drip irrigation have been in wide use on surrounding farmlands. In 1991, Shunyi (顺义), a county in the greater Beijing metropolitan area adopted sprinkler irrigation for an area of 50,000 hectares. Consequently, agricultural water use in the downstream areas served by the Miyun (密云) reservoir was reduced to 100 million m3, a feat achieved without any significant reduction in the size of the irrigated area. Meantime, Beijing became the largest single user of the reservoir, drawing most of its water from it. This kind of activity is tantamount to informal trading of water rights among stakeholders. Case 2: The water in Miyun (密云) and Guanting (官厅) reservoirs, both of which on the outskirt of Beijing, originates mostly from the Chengde (承德) and Zhangjiakou (张家口) area of Hebei province (河北). The three cities negotiated an “Ecological Compensation Agreement,” where residents of the source region agree to “refrain from developing water-polluting industries” in exchange for financial assistance from downstream cities. Through fair negotiations these cities purchased from water source residents a portion of the latter’s water use entitlements (or equivalent to downstream cities sharing the cost of source protection with source residents). This indicates that one party tacitly recognizes the other’s “water rights.” Case 3: In November of 2000, Dongyang (东阳) and Yiwu (义乌), two cities in Zhejiang province, signed an agreement in which the latter agreed to pay the former RMB 200 million (US$ 30 million) for the right to use 50 million m3/year of water for an indefinite period of time. 6  Liu Changming, He Xiwu, Chinese Academy of Sciences Water Research Center 刘昌明, 何希吾, 中国科学院水问题联合研究中心, “Zhongguo ershiyi shiji shui wenti fanglve 中国21世纪水问题方略 [China’s Water Strategies in the 21st Century],” Kexue chubanshe, 1995. 40.

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Facilitating the Transition Towards “Supply Side Water Management” Even as China moves steadily towards a new era of water management, waste continues to be widespread and shortages remain common. Indeed, all signs indicate that the water crisis is worsening. This has much to do with the fact that while management agencies are committed, even if only nominally, to supply side water management, society at large has yet to grasp its import and embrace it fully. Even though market dynamics have helped to improve allocative efficiency for water resources, many longstanding social problems persist. This helps explain why despite official passing of the era of unconstrained supply expansion, that of wasteful water use is far from over. Among other things, entrenched bias toward and vested interest in source exploration among local governments can greatly undermine conservation efforts. 6.3

6.3.1 Overcoming the “Extract First, Conserve Later” Mentality 6.3.1.1 The Meaning of “Conservation First” There are two main ways to alleviate water scarcity in any area or region, and conservation is one of them. The other is taking water from outside, which might be done in a number of ways, including quota relaxation, drawing from commonly owned underground sources, and water diversion programs. There are two approaches to water conservation. The first is to increase water productivity through technological advances and innovations, and the other one is to improve allocative efficiency. These are examined below. Water conservation through technological advances is purely a “technical fix” to water shortages. Technical fixes make it possible to increase water efficiency through the implementation of better technology, to mitigate qualityrelated water stress by reducing or treating pollution more efficiently, and by increasing reuse and the rigor of source development. However, this approach does not address the issues of for what purposes water is used or where it comes from. Improving allocative efficiency, by contrast, involves optimizing the allocation of any given quantum of water supply among different uses and users. Less economically wasteful water allocation generates water savings. While any of these approaches may be individually effective for temporarily relieving local or regional water stress, solving the problem at the national level and in the long-term requires integrating them into a comprehensive and cohesive overall strategy. The larger point is that ‘water conservation’ should not and cannot be the private business of a few agencies that set their own targets and conduct self-evaluation based on their own standards. The whole country should participate in water conservation. But conservation efforts independent of the larger context of the future development of the economy

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will yield only limited success. In China, there is much room for improving water conservation through either ‘technical fixes’ or more efficient water allocation. Indeed, the principle of making demand fit supply will play a key role in efforts to reduce allocative inefficiency. 6.3.1.2

Entrenched Engineering biases Undermine Efforts Towards more Sensible Allocation of Water Supplies Theoretically speaking, in a market economy, market instruments should be adequate for solving the problem of water shortage, because they allegedly optimize economic efficiency. But in fact, decision-makers often do not base their decisions on considerations of economic efficiency but on their pre-existing and obstinate preference for finding more sources of supply and associated bias against conservation. These inclinations are most probably the product of years of professional involvement with hydraulic engineering projects, and constitute a potent obstacle to the implementation of water conservation measures. How many local official would want to do the hard work of improving water use efficiency if shortages can be mitigated by getting the water from some place else, especially if others (typically the central government) will pay for much of it? To this day, when project proposals are being evaluated it is not uncommon to hear them touted as being in the national interest and as such absolutely necessary.’ This is a classic example of an engineering-aspanacea mentality. Consider the South-North Water Diversion project (南水北调): even among many of those who are in favor of it in principle are concerned that it might further perpetuate dependency on outside water to relieve local shortages. Some have even suggested that if provincial and city governments in the north do not take conservation seriously by improving water productivity, wastewater treatment and recycling, they should not be permitted to use the water this project makes available to them, lest the magnitude of the project is only matched by that of the waste, pollution and corruption it would likely engender. There is a real danger that the intended beneficiaries of the diversion proj­ ect could become less motivated to become more water-independent. Indeed, if the government can afford to spend tens of billions of yuan on the diversion project, some of it should go towards strengthening water conservation everywhere. Indeed, the long series of large-scale diversion and storage engineering projects in the nation’s history have yielded limited benefits. They have not removed the root cause of the problem to which they were the intended solution. Worse yet, they have more often than not generated new serious social and ecological problems.

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6.3.1.3 Reducing Arbitrary Inflation of Water Needs When the South-North Water Diversion (南水北调) project first started, governments of candidate recipient cities in the north were asked to submit estimation of the level of water deficit they needed the project to make up for. Many of them submitted very large figures. But when the central government later changed the funding scheme so that provincial governments would have to pay for the water they would receive, many adjusted the estimate downward by a significant margin. This tellingly exposed the tendency to inflate water needs among many local governments especially when one could get it for free. Declared water needs that are beyond the amount a society truly needs such as determined by existing technologies and development level is “economically unnecessary.” This water often ends up going towards large projects of dubious economic, social and ecological value, possibly with deleterious effects on the overall and long-term economic interests of the country. There are several reasons for this pervasive phenomenon. The first has to do with the criteria now used in job performance evaluation for government officials. Most politicians know that large and high-profile projects that bring in outside water to mitigate local shortage tend to yield visible results relatively quickly, and are therefore an easy way to score points with their superiors and to build a legacy among their constituents. By contrast, water conservation projects, which tend to involve more difficult and less visible work, and sometimes require government officials to confront entrenched interests, do not have similar utility. The second reason has to do with the history of competition for public resources in China. For a long time, having free or inexpensive access to publicly owned natural resources has been an important reason for rapid economic growth in many places. To attract central government funding, local governments often choose to undertake very large source exploration projects while shunning smaller, follow-up or matching conservation projects that might be more useful. Consequently, many places end up with a surplus of large projects with dubious value that cannot run efficiently once they are built because of the absence of support infrastructure. Parochialism is the third reason behind the persistence of “economically unnecessary” water demand. After 1998, water resource management and control have been centralized and become the sole responsibility of water resource management agencies at the central government level. However, since economic planning is highly decentralized, horizontal and vertical compartmentalization of water resource management and control is commonplace. The amended Water Law passed in 2002 explicitly requires that each river basin manage and control its water resources systematically and coherently. But empirical studies reveal that no clear or actionable legislations, rules

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or procedures are yet in place to make sure this happens. This means that right now, any water resource management and control agency has authority only over water users below its own administrative ranking, and has no power over economic decision-making entities at the same administrative rank. We are evidently still at a very early stage in the nation’s transition towards a “supply side” water philosophy. 6.3.2 Protecting Farmers’ Rights and Interests 6.3.2.1 Use-right Trading and the Disenfranchised So far as the issue of water rights is concerned, the existence of a set of standard code of conduct for rights transfer is of particular importance. In classic economics, trade is supposed to benefit all parties involved. But this is not always true in fact. Some specific questions deserve close attention including: (1) Whether local governments have the legal authority to transfer use-rights when water rights are state-owned, (2) The relationship between the right to build a hydraulic project and the right to the water linked to the given project, and (3) how to handle possible damages to the interests of a third party, such as farmers, who are often the de facto users of the water rights being traded, yet just as often excluded from the decision-making processes. 6.3.2.2 Water Prices and the “Three Rural Issues” (三农问题) Higher water prices have made a positive contribution toward water conservation efforts among some cities and towns, but have not had similarly effects on agriculture, historically the least water efficient sector of the Chinese economy. The first reason for this was touched upon earlier, having to do with confusion and ambiguities in the structure of supply management. The second reason is the inelasticity of agricultural expenditure on water, i.e., the fact that farmers simply cannot afford higher prices of water. This inelasticity of agricultural water prices is not attributable to water supply per se, but to the persistently low prices of agricultural products and commodities. When farmers cannot earn more from what they grow and well, increased cost of production becomes positively harmful. Since the government no longer sets the price for agricultural commodities, water price inelasticity can only be attributed to the limited size of the market for agricultural commodities. Many farmers have difficulty not only in selling their products but also in freely deciding what to grow or produce. This calls for some serious analyses about setting prices on the basis of marginal opportunity cost, as is now done. We believe that the concept of Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC) is inapplicable and invalid in places where there is a strong rural-urban divide. MOC comprises of Marginal Producer Cost (MPC), Marginal User Cost (MUC) and Marginal Environmental Cost

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(MEC). MUC is the greatest utility that can be generated from an alternative use of a scarce resource. Two conditions must be satisfied for this concept to apply. First, the natural resource in question must be scarce in a material sense. This is certainly true of water in water-stressed areas. Secondly, there must be real alternatives to the way the scarce resource is used. And it is precisely this second condition that is not satisfied with respect to the condition of farmers in many poor rural areas. Farmers, agriculture and the countryside (the socalled “three rural issues”) have on the whole been neglected by the government. This has placed them at a decisive disadvantage relative to other groups, to urban areas, and to other economic sectors. The root cause of many of the problems in agricultural water use can in fact be traced to this predicament. The labour power of many farmers in China still lacks “market (exchange) value” (meaning that its marginal opportunity cost is zero). As such, making farmers pay more for water to induce greater savings simply makes no sense. But if the resources they depend on are assigned exchange values by the market (if, for example, a developer decides that water resources in a poor rural area have commercial potential as, say, a tourist attraction), then these farmers may be “counted” so far as a market economy is concerned. However, even then their bargaining power would be very weak. To summarize, farmers remain a particularly vulnerable group in the Chinese society. Their interests have repeatedly been sacrificed in the name of promoting some other, allegedly larger, social good. Despite constant rhetoric about promoting the wellbeing of farmers (whether in terms of security, economic efficiency or ecological significance), the fact is that even when farmers get to see some real benefits, which is not often, they will have paid a high price for it. The rest of the nation has too often either forgotten or overlooked this. Functional Transformation and Empowerment for Management Agencies Because water is essentially a type of public goods, its management necessarily involves a combination of administrative (primarily law-enforcement), non-profit operational and for-profit operational measures. These management approaches are at once distinct from and entangled with one another, and such a dialectic relationship is itself a source of challenge for water management. Under a faulty institutional configuration, burdens and benefits can become severely unevenly distributed, with some reaping large economic benefits while others enduring hardship. The former will be those in charge of running high-profile, profitable and well-funded government projects and programs while the latter those in charge of government projects and programs 6.3.3

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that are high-stake in terms of public interest, inadequately-funded and also profit-neutral. What both groups have in common, however, is they must at once act as the selfless stewards of public resources and interest and the CEO of a private enterprise constantly trying to boost the firm’s bottom line. This is a pervasive phenomenon in China. Whether it is a government body or an irrigation region, the ability of those in charge to generate income is key to their solvency, and well-being. But more often than not, it is precisely the activities these entities tend to engage in pursuit of that goal that are environmentally harmful and resource wasteful. 6.4

Water Resource Use and Ecological Sustainability

As societies’ need for water grows and human exploitation of water resources intensifies, many ecological problems have arisen that affect both rivers themselves and their surrounding areas. Examples abound: dam construction on the Heihe (黑河) River has reduced water flow and caused lakes in the downstream region to shrink; dam construction in the Shiyanghe River (石洋河) Basin has caused rapid ecological deterioration of an oasis in Minqin County (民勤县); dam construction has damaged Aibi Lake (艾比湖) in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; and dams constructed to divert water are threatening biodiversity in Qinghai Lake (青海湖), to say nothing of the human suffering generated by the massive resettlement associated with each of these large dam projects. Experts have also pointed out that the Haihe (海河) River Basin ecosystem has been ravaged (through drying of lakes, over-abstraction of underground water and ground subsidence) by numerous resource development projects. Meanwhile, parts of the Yellow River have desiccated due to the construction of massive dams. Last but not least, large-scale water diversion projects (such as the middle route of the South-North Water Diversion Project) will involve the transfer of vast quantities of water from the Hanshui River basin (汉水流域) ecosystem, which will result in severe ecological disturbance that may set off a whole host of social and economic disasters. These are just a few examples that illustrate the enormous potential of hydraulic projects to wreak havoc on both nature and society. Many of these projects have resulted in unforeseen ecological impacts during the construction process. Measures must be put in place to protect the natural ecological functions of rivers and to promote their sustainable use. In particular, we need to address the following problems:

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· The lack of transparency and public participation in hydraulic constructions · Proposal evaluation focuses narrowly on the technical and economic aspects of the projects, and ignores their ecological and social consequences. Even when these issues are considered, they tend either to be treated casually or too late in the process to make any real difference Spotty monitoring and post-construction evaluation of the operations of hydraulic projects

·

Therefore, in planning for water resource use involving hydraulic projects and rivers, it is imperative that ecological matters be taken into consideration, especially with respect to their impact on both the quantity and the quality of water. Issues relating to social and even cultural impacts must also be included in project design and evaluation processes. Monitoring must be maintained once projects are operational, so that the public and decision-makers can learn from mistakes made. To solve the increasingly complex water scarcity in China, we must adhere to the national policy of resource conservation and environmental protection. It is necessary to institutionalize strict resource management and control, to quicken the transition from making supply fit demand to adjusting demand to fit supply. This would entail shifts from unscrupulous exploitation to rational utilization, from crude use to smart use, and from remediation to prevention. Only when these transitions are complete can we expect to achieve sustainable economic development by means of the sustainable use of water resources.

Chapter 7

A New Approach to Conservation in Western China Shen Xiaoli, Li Shengzhi and Lü Zhi 7.1

Calling for a New Model for Nature Reserve Management in Western China

Conserving the biodiversity and ecosystems of western China has global strategic significance. In addition to featuring highly diverse wild plant and animal species, the region is where six major trans-boundary rivers originate, with a combined population of over 3 billion people in China and in South Asia. Therefore, western China is sometimes called the ‘water tower of the world’. Over the last century, but particularly since the start of the new millennium, the Chinese government has established a large number of nature reserves in western China aimed at biodiversity protection and ecosystem conservation. It has taken only ten years for the number of nature reserves in the region to equal the total number of nature reserves in eastern and central China combined. Size-wise, nature reserves in the west now account for three quarters of the total size of the area covered by all of China’s natural reserves. Although the concept of “co-management” has been gaining traction, nature reserves in China, especially those established earlier, manage their resources independently of the local community. Not only does this mean less transparency, but it also poses great financial and efficiency challenges, due to inadequate funding for such daily management activities as monitoring and patrolling. Before 2000, cumulative spending toward infrastructure construction across the entire national nature reserve system, which is managed by the Forestry Administration (林业局), was only RMB 3.6 billion, and most of it went to a few national panda reserves. Total annual provincial outlay toward daily operations and management of natural reserves is shy of RMB 2 billion/km2. With these numbers, China ranks among the lowest internationally in public spending on nature reserve maintenance. In fact, we even lag behind many developing countries.1 To further compound the problems western China’s nature reserves face, operating costs are most often the responsibility of local governments, which tend to have limited financial resources. 1  Chen Qing 陈青, “Study on Sustainable Management for Nature Reserves in China,” Report to Environment and Resources Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2005.

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Figure 7.1 Regional distribution of China’s nature reserves in 2004.2

Not surprisingly, nature reserves in the region receive less financial support from the government than those in coastal and eastern regions. It is unlikely that the funding difficulties will be fully alleviated in the near future. Instead, a new and more efficient conservation and management model requiring smaller budgets should be developed for nature reserves in western China. Nature reserves in western China are very different from those in eastern and central China in terms of both geological conditions and conservation objectives. Compared with those in the western region, reserves in eastern and central China have steeper topographies, more forest ecosystems, and smaller animal habitats. Reserves in the west, by contrast, are expansive and flat, featuring vast spans of open land for wildlife species. This is particularly important for species that travel long distances for their yearly migration. Because of these rather significant differences in physical characteristics, management model that has worked well in eastern and central China has proved unsuitable for the western part of the country. Further differences confirm the need for a different management model for the west. For example, in eastern and central China, communities living around nature reserves tend to be more developed, and as such constitute a threat to the nature reserves in their own rights. In comparison, in western China, especially in ethnic minority areas, many people still live harmoniously with nature for either traditional or religious reasons. As a consequence, in

2  Chen Qing 陈青, “Study on Sustainable Management for Nature Reserves in China,” Report to Environment and Resources Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2005.

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western China, communities neighboring natural reserves are more supportive of conservation, and are often the ones sustaining conservation efforts. Established in the late 1990s, most nature reserves in western China adopted the same management model as the eastern and central reserves. But this led to disastrous consequences for reserves in the west, because management models that suit those in the other parts of the country fit them poorly given the differences in topography, level of financial wherewithal, and practical knowledge and skills in management. For example, despite their considerably larger size—with some parks covering hundreds of thousands of square kilometres—and more rugged landscape, some western nature reserves adopted “intensive management” model commonly used in reserves in eastern and central China, and focused their time and money on small scale habitat restoration activities, such as tree planting and enclosure. They almost entirely overlooked the need for integrative conservation. The combination of these kinds of management strategies and inadequate funding drastically undermined the ability of many reserves in western China to function as intended, with some ultimately becoming so-called “paper parks.” The indigenous cultures of many minority ethnic groups in western China are rich in knowledge and practices that contribute to conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources. Preserving sacred mountains and lakes in Tibet is one of these cultural practices, which is why today most of the biodiversity in the region occurs in and around sacred Tibetan mountains and lakes.3 Conservation-centered resource management is thus a natural fit with local traditions and social structures. For successful reserve management in this region, it is imperative to understand local cultural traditions and not to make decisions based only on the experiences of reserves in other parts of China. The reverence among Tibetans toward what they call “Sacred Mountains and Lakes” does not completely prohibit use, but it does require that any use must promote and/or maintain harmony between conservation objectives and the legitimate needs of the local population. As a system already practiced and enforced by local communities, it can work very cost effectively for large areas of land and maximize conservation sustainability. Also, as a system that balances development demands and conservation, it delivers both economic development and environmental protection. This kind of biodiversity conservation system that exists in western China is also consistent with cuttingedge international thinking on “landscape conservation” and sustainable 3  Lü Zhi 吕植, “Nature Reserves and Communities,” Report to Environment and Resources Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2006.

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development. In a way, Tibetans’ care for “Sacred Mountains and Lakes” is a conservation model that is at once ancient and modern. Conservation International (CI), the US-based NGO, is one of the organizations that have been working on biodiversity protection in southwest China. Since 2003, CI has worked with the Centre for Nature and Society at Peking University (北京大学自然保护与社会发展研究中心) on the “Sacred Mountains and Lakes” project. The most distinct feature of the project is the use of a multidisciplinary approach to understanding traditional Tibetan conservation models. The project aims to integrate these traditional conservation approaches with formal systems of management, concretely linking traditional conservation with modern nature reserve management practices. 7.2

Primary Findings

This section describes on-going studies focusing on the traditional “Sacred Mountains and Lakes” (神山圣湖) conservation model. This research started in 2004 in Yushu (玉树) prefecture in Qinghai (青海) province and Ganzi (甘孜) prefecture in Sichuan province. Several sites in Deqing (德庆) prefecture in Yunnan province and in Changdu District (昌都区) in Tibet also participated. Research methodologies were mainly designed by the Centre for Nature and Society. Biological approaches were combined with methodologies from other disciplines such as anthropology and Tibetan studies. The survey was conducted by the local government and two NGOs—Green Kham (绿色康巴) in Ganzi and the Great Land Snow River in Yushu—together with experts and graduate students from Peking University (北京大学), Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences (四川社会科学院), and Sichuan Forest Inventory and Planning Institute (四川省林业调查规划院), among others. In effect, a research network was built among research agencies, government, NGOs and local communities. This has created space for stakeholders to share their knowledge and gain a deeper understanding of traditional Tibetan conservation practices. 7.2.1 Clear Boundaries or Sacred Lands Even though they are a seemingly abstract religious/cultural concept, sacred lands are clearly demarcated from surrounding areas, and it is possible to map their locations and boundaries reasonably accurately. Through participatory assessments, the investigation found that both local monasteries and local communities are able to provide descriptions of the location and boundaries of specific sacred lands. Around 62% (136 out of 219) of sacred mountain boundaries surveyed have now been mapped using GIS

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technologies. As a result, the total size of the area covered by sacred mountains and lakes could be calculated and its biodiversity and ecological values assessed. Sacred lands in Tibet assume various forms. For example, at Dzongsar Monastery (宗萨寺) in Dege County (德格县), sacred lands can be divided into several categories according to their religious origins1: sacred mountains, holy lakes, forbidden areas (Ri Vgag in Tibetan), holy sites, holy relics and pilgrimage routes (see Figure 7.2). When people speak of sacred mountains and lakes, and forbidden areas, they are usually referring to large land masses that contribute to ecosystems on a landscape scale. Forbidden areas are the most

Figure 7.2 Sacred lands around Dzongsar Monastery.

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strictly protected of all the area types. There are very strict taboos about usage for these areas. In the case of Dzongsar, there are three kinds of pilgrimage routes around the monastery, marked as large, medium, and small. 7.2.2 Sacred Lands are Common and Widespread in Tibetan Areas Recognizing that monasteries play a leading role in cultural continuity in Tibetan society, the research team decided to interview them. Seventy-nine monasteries in 11 counties were visited in Sichuan (四川)and Qinghai (青海) provinces; Two hundred and nineteen sacred mountains and 39 sacred lakes were recorded; Seventy-four monasteries were visited in the 6 counties in Ganzi prefecture: Dege (德格), Danba (丹巴), Daofu (道孚), Yajiang (雅江), Litang (理塘) and Xiangcheng (项城), representing 14% of all monasteries in Ganzi. In addition, 136 sacred mountains and 23 sacred lakes were mapped topographically. The total size of the area of sacred mountains in the regions surveyed was 383,780 hectares, with each mountain covering on average over 2800 hectares. According to a common misperception, most Tibetan sacred mountains are snow-covered like Kong Rinpoche (冈仁波齐峰) and Kawaboge (卡瓦格博峰), and are home to a limited number of species. This is largely a result of the skewed media coverage. In reality, except for a few that are very widely known, most sacred mountains in Tibet are worshipped by small groups of local people. Each Tibetan village has its own sacred mountain, whose wellbeing is believed to be tied to that of the village. Every year, villagers organize a special ceremony to pay homage to their local mountain deities. In general, the more famous the sacred mountain, the more worshippers it attracts. The research team classified sacred mountains according to the origin of their worshippers. Four categories were identified: village level, regional level, Kham (province) level, and Tibetan regional level. As expected, a mountain’s degree of sanctity is inversely proportional to the number of mountains of that type. For example, there are many village level sacred mountains, and very few pan-Tibetan sacred mountains. Compared to other forms of sacred land, Tibetan sacred mountains are characterized by their large size. In India, for instance, the average size of a sacred grove is 9.6 hectares,4 compared with that of the sacred mountains surveyed for this research, which was anywhere from 24 hectares to 10,000 4  Malhotra, K. C., Y. Gokhale, S. Chatterjee, and S. Srivastava, Cultural and Ecological Dimensions of Sacred Groves in India, Indian National Science Academy, New Delhi & Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Manav Sangrahalaya, Bhopal, 2001, p. 10.

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Figure 7.3 Monasteries surveyed in Ganzi prefecture, Sichuan province.

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Figure 7.4 Four categories of sacred mountains shown by percentage of total.

hectares. Around half of all sacred mountains cover more than 2000 hectares. The largest sacred mountain covers 19,000 hectares, comparable to a nature reserve. Some of the more famous Tibetan sacred mountains not included in this survey are known to be even bigger. This is a good thing from a conservation perspective, as larger land areas can bear more complex and diverse ecosystems and are more stable than smaller ones. More prominent sacred mountains usually cover more area, while the size of village level sacred mountains is generally the smallest relative to sacred mountain at the other three levels. There is also often a correlation between the degree of care a mountain receives and its prominence, which is measured by the number of worshippers it draws. Sacred mountains that straddle more than one village are more often exposed to external damage. However, for sacred mountains at the village level, which are typically worshiped by people from a few villages (sometimes just one), these worshippers’ duty to protect them is unambiguous and community management is relatively easy. Therefore, village level conservation is often more effective than protection efforts directed at more prominent sacred mountains. More studies must be done on the relationship between protection effectiveness and the ranking of a mountain as a sacred site.

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Figure 7.5 Distribution of sacred mountains by area.

The sample used for the Ganzi survey was large enough to be representative of the quantity and size distribution of sacred mountains in that region. It is estimated that there are about 1,400 sacred mountains in Ganzi, and sacred lands cover an area of about 5,104,000 hectares, occupying 33% of the prefecture’s total land area (about 15,300,200 hectares). Nature reserves in Ganzi cover a combined area of about 3,700,000 hectares. Sacred mountains exceed nature reserves in terms of size (the overlapping sections between the two are not factored in for purpose of this comparison). Due to their religious beliefs, local people have insisted on limited development and resource use on sacred lands. When nature reserves were established in Ganzi, mostly after 1995, most of them set up on sacred mountains and lakes, some of which having been given traditional names that signify sanctity, such as Kasa Lake Provincial Nature Reserve (卡萨湖自然保护区), Gongga Mountain National Nature Reserve (贡嘎山自然保护区), Yading National Nature Reserve (亚丁自然保护区), and Chaqingsuoduo National Nature Reserve (察青松多 自然保护区). Before this, protection of natural resources depended entirely on traditional resource management practices associated with sacred mountains and lakes. Even during the large-scale commercial logging campaigns in the last century, some areas survived more or less unscathed thanks to their sanctity. Furthermore, it was around monasteries and on sacred lands where many of the wild animals that had disappeared during and after the Cultural Revolution because of mass hunting first began to reappear.

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Effective Protection of Sacred Mountains and Lakes by Local Communities From a conservation perspective, management of sacred lands is a traditional form of management that relies on religious taboos and ancient knowledge to restrict development. This specific type of management involves a mix of different norms and practices, including religious beliefs, moral teaching, village regulations and community participation. In Tibet, sacred mountains occupy a place of central importance to community life; their condition is believed to be have consequences for the interests of the local people. Tibetans believe that once a sacred mountain is violated, regardless of who the perpetrator is, it would have adverse effects on their lives, such as more sheep being taken by wolves and increased incidence of pest infection, floods, hail, and other natural disasters. Such belief provides the community a strong incentive to protect the sacred lands. The traditional culture of sacred lands is passed on from generation to generation mainly in two ways. One is through folk stories, and the other is through lessons and rituals organized by monasteries, which play a leading role in establishing and maintaining local traditions. Most monasteries would include protecting sacred lands among their regular tasks as their management capabilities improve. Lamas educate villagers on how to appreciate sacred lands. In 70% of monasteries, there are people who have been put in charge of implementing protection measures, and 94% of monasteries coordinate patrols around sacred lands, though the reach and frequency of the patrols vary considerably depending on the level of conservation awareness and the monastery’s resources and capacity. In general, there are three kinds of patrols: patrols that take place during the annual pilgrimage, non-regular patrols, and regular patrols. 7.2.3

7.2.3.1 Patrols during Annual Pilgrimage During the annual ritual to pay respect to the mountain deities worshippers would trek around the sacred mountains. While this group activity, essentially a form of ritual, is not meant to be a mode of patrol, its does fulfil some of the same functions. Hunters and poachers, and their hiding places are sometimes discovered during these treks. 7.2.3.2 Non-regular Patrols Monasteries generally do not have a professional, full-time patrollers or management systems. Lamas would volunteer to go to the mountains in their spare time to search for hunting snares and illegal logging. In some cases, lamas and villagers would monitor places known to attract hunters. This kind of patrol is at most sporadic and ad hoc.

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7.2.3.3 Regular Patrols Sometimes monasteries would give patrol assignment to specific individuals, including both lamas and villagers. The number of people involved, and the duration, frequency, and the patrol routes would all be fixed ahead of time. Some monasteries pay those who take these assignments, which are often well organized and can be an effective way to prevent and stop hunting and illegal logging. Monastery-organized patrols are very different from methods customarily used in nature reserves. Villager actions form an early-warning system, and traditional community-based conservation is effective in managing internal threats, i.e., threats from within the local community. However, as external threats such as those posed by mining, dam and road construction operations and hunting by outsiders rise, the mechanism is diminishing in effectiveness. The need for community patrols has become routine. Unlike patrols in nature reserves, patrollers don’t try to chase down the hunters because of the Buddhist belief that no creature should be hunted or hurt even if they are hunting endangered or protected species. This also explains the conflicts around fishing rights, which have become a common problem in Tibet.

Figure 7.8 Relative proportions of different types of patrol arranged by surveyed monasteries.

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Government-authorized Formal Participation by Monasteries in Conservation Work According to the monasteries interviewed, 38% and 26% of the monasteries had been given some kind of oral or written authorization from local governments, mainly from County Forest Department Bureaus to participate in conservation work. Most of these authorizations are in the form of fire prevention contracts signed with local Forest Departments. There are four monasteries that have been granted official permissions from the local governments to manage sacred mountains and lakes, namely Dzongsar Monastery (宗萨寺) in Dege County (德格), Sershul Monastery (色须寺) in Shiqu County (石渠县), Rili (嘎 依寺) Monastery in Zaduo County (扎多县) and Ga’er Monastery (改加寺) in Nangqian County (囊谦县). However, even while it acknowledges community involvement, the government has never authorized them to enforce conservation measures. According to the communities interviewed, most illegal loggers and poachers are not local residents, yet residents are not permitted to 7.2.4

Figure 7.9 Relative proportions of different kinds of monastery involvement with proction activities by type of relationship with the government.

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apprehend them. Thus, the main source of conflict in relation to conservation of Tibetan sacred lands is the lack of appropriate policies and laws that would allow traditional common property management institutions to act. Similarities between the Management Model Used for Sacred Mountains and Lakes and the Zoning Management System Used in Nature Reserves Based on religious practices, the vast areas surrounding monasteries can be classified into three major categories: forbidden zone, protected zone, and influenced zone. The different zones are subject to differing rules for resource utilization, characterized by descending levels of proscription. 7.2.5

Ri Vgag, or Forbidden Zone Areas in the forbidden zone have important religious significance attached to them by rituals and history. Different taboos apply in different locations. Some forbidden areas are strictly off-limits to any use and no human activities are allowed in them. Others may allow some activities such as seasonal grazing. Protected zone Generally, no hunting, logging, farming or any other kind of exploitative activities are permitted in these areas. Fishing and other activities that could pollute sacred lakes are also prohibited. However, livestock grazing and collection of forest products are often allowed on sacred mountains. Influenced Zone These are living areas for people in the local community, and they have typically been managed by the monasteries throughout history. In essence, the villages surrounding monasteries become specific entities, and the monastery would play an important role in educating the villagers and in guiding their activities. In these areas, as long as people follow ahimsa, the Buddhist principle of non-violence, no additional restrictions on resource use apply. Well-defined religious boundaries of sacred areas are generally strictly observed by the communities. As a result of “zoning” differences, protection efforts in different areas are not equally effective. Over the centuries people have lived harmoniously with nature. Villagers believe that hunting animals on sacred mountains or destroying sacred mountains will displease mountain deities and lead to outbreaks of disease and disasters. Land surveys suggest that Tibetans have generally reserved the designation of sanctity for the most valuable ecosystems. This, and the use of zoning management, has protected

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Zoning system around the monastery.

the functionality of key ecosystems, ensuring that the practice of protecting sacred lands does not compromise villagers’ ability to meet their basic resource needs. As such, this system illustrates a harmonious relationship between humans and nature, and a truly sustainable community. As noted above, the zoning system used around monasteries is similar to that used for nature reserves. In conservation discourse, forbidden zone, protected zone, and areas of influenced zones are equivalent to core areas, buffer areas, and experimental areas, respectively. Nature reserve managers use the same strategies as traditional resource management, identifying important areas of biodiversity and protecting them by limiting human activity. Traditional Cultural Integrity is Positively Correlated with Biodiversity Rapid ornithological assessments were conducted at four sites: Dingguoshan Monastery (顶果山寺) in Danba County (丹巴县), Tonglin Village (桐林村) in Kangding County (康定县), Middle Decha Village (德差乡), and Pamulin 7.2.6

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Monastery (帕姆寺林) in Yajiang County (雅江县). A four-day survey was conducted at each site to determine the status of bird resources, and 15 villagers were interviewed at each site about the state of the traditional culture. The results of these avian fauna assessments are outlined below. A higher reading on the Shannon-Wiener Index indicates richer biodiversity. A higher reading on the Equability Index means the bird community is more stable and less disturbed. The ranking in descending order in terms of bird species diversity among the four sites was as follows: Decha, Pamulin, Dingguoshan, and Tonglin. In this case, biodiversity is positively correlated with elevation. Table 7.1

Avian biodiversity at the four sites

Site

Elevation Range (m) No. of Bird Shannon-Wiener Species Index

Equability Index

Decha Pamulin Dingguoshan Tonglin

3280–4200 3000–4200 2900–4200 2300–3100

0.83 0.84 0.85 0.77

70 69 57 51

3.53 3.54 3.42 3.02

The interviews covered four topics: the state of traditional culture, conservation awareness, conservation activities, and conservation capabilities. The state of traditional culture is reflected in adherence to a traditional lifestyle, including whether the villagers invited the Living Buddha to name their children, wear amulets, have a sutra hall in their homes, offer smoke offerings on auspicious days, and recite the basic sutras. The answers given to questions about conservation activities and conservation awareness were similar. Patrols were organized by monasteries at all sites except for Tonglin. The level of villager participation was different at different sites, which depended on the number of people who knew about these monastery-organized patrols and the number of people who decided to take part in them. At Decha, Pamulin and Dingguoshan, the percentages of villagers who had information about these patrols were 100%, 80% and 13% respectively, and the proportion of villagers who had taken part in them at some point were 73%, 20% and zero respectively. Conservation awareness among villagers at Decha and Pamulin was much higher than at Dingguoshan and Tonglin. When asked what they would do if

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Dingguosha

Pamulin

Decha

Figure 7.11

Responses from fifteen villagers at each site to the question: “What would you do if you encountered logging or hunting on the sacred mountains?”

they encountered people hunting or logging on the sacred mountains, three villagers at each of Decha and Pamulin answered that those kinds of things could not happen because there had been no hunting or logging on the sacred mountains for a very long time. Four villagers at Tonglin and two in Dingguoshan responded they were indifferent to such behavior. Preliminary results show that the integrity of indigenous culture positively correlates with biodiversity. Where the level of observance of traditional cultural practices was low, biodiversity was also in decline, and vice versa. At the

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four survey sites, where traditional culture was stronger there were greater protection efforts and more local participation, which resulted in more effective conservation. The protection of sacred mountains and lakes is a typical form of community-based conservation. Community Conserved Areas (CCA) are now officially recognized and certified by many countries worldwide and are receiving increasing attention. In 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity agreed that community knowledge, technology, innovation and practices related to biological diversity should be emphasized in conservation. UNESCO issued the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2001, which called for cooperation between modern technology and folk and traditional knowledge systems, and CCA is one of the six types of conservation area recognized by International Union of Conservation of Nature. Added to this, the Durban Accord, during the 5th World Parks Congress in 2003, announced: The establishment of protected areas is the result of conscious choices of human societies to conserve nature, biodiversity and areas of special cultural value and significance. Individuals and communities often use protected areas for spiritual reasons, because they inspire and heal them and/or provide them with a place for peace, education and communion with the natural world . . . Protected areas serve as fundamental tools for conservation of nature, and thus are an expression of the highest desires and commitments of humankind for the preservation of life on the planet, and that as such, those areas constitute places of deep reverence and ethical realization.5 Congress attendees recommended that their governments draw up and carry out legislation and policy that recognizes the effectiveness of innovative conservation management models, such as “community conserved areas,” involving indigenous or local communities. China is currently drafting new legislation regarding protected areas, which should embody the principles of the Durban Accord.

5  W PC Recommendation V.13 Cultural and Spiritual Values of Protected Areas. http://cmsdata .iucn.org/downloads/recommendationen.pdf.

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Conservation Incentive Agreements: Exploring a New Method of Conservation

In order to combine the practice of community conservation and China’s existing nature reserve management system, as well as connect traditional cultures and modern science-based conservation, Conservation International (CI) introduced its conservation incentive agreement programme in Sichuan and Qinghai. As a new conservation concept, the conservation incentive agreement aims to transfer the responsibility for land conservation and resource management to groups committed to protecting the natural environment. An incentive agreement does not involve transfer of land ownership, and, in this way, is similar to the practice of creating use rights. Conservation incentive agreements can achieve the goal of conservation and establish an incentive mechanism to encourage broad public participation. Although the idea of conservation incentive agreements is new in conservation discourse, practices informed and driven by similar notions go back some decades. For example, around 1980, Danba County in Ganzi prefecture, Sichuan province employed a conservation strategy that had some of the characteristics of conservation incentive agreements. At that time, the county gave local villages the management rights to national forests that were too remote for the county itself to look after. Forests were managed by village collectives, while the assessment criteria were established by the local forest department. Village collectives would receive their “incentive” from the forestry department only when they had satisfied a certain minimum requirement in the yearly forest quality assessment. The incentive reward consisted of two parts. Firstly, the “Five-Point Award” (well maintained paths, areas, staff, and task completion, resulting in a reward), which is 0.1 yuan per mu. The village with the least area of forest received RMB 15,000, while villages with the most land could receive anywhere from RMB 50,000 to RMB 60,000. The second part of the reward was the “Triple Absence Award” (for the absence of excessive logging, hunting, and forest fires). The prize for enforcing the triple absence could be an award of anything between RMB 500 and RMB 5,000, depending on the area of the forest and the effectiveness of the management. The awards money came from receipts from a logging tax. We can identify some basic characteristics of conservation incentive agreements in this example: they involve two parties, cover entire regions, have a limited timespan, and are based on clear definition of rights and obligations for each party, and clear objectives and evaluation criteria.

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The Cuochi Conservation Incentive Agreement (措池村生态保护协议) CI has created a conservation incentive agreement with Cuochi village (措池村) in Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve (三江源自然保护区). This nature reserve covers about 150,000 square kilometres, but is managed by a staff of only eight and has two field stations. With such limited resources, and such a large area, effective conservation through traditional means would have been unfeasible. But conservation incentive agreement would prove instrumental in the reserve’s ability to fulfil its conservation obligation and in encouraging local communities to participate. The incentive agreement has inspired local communities to improve the effectiveness of conservation activities. Cuochi village is located in the core area of Sanjiangyuan nature reserve along the Chuma’er River and occupies an area of about 2,000 square kilometres. There are two main reasons why local villagers have a strong desire to conserve the local ecosystem. Firstly, they are concerned with the current degradation of grasslands, which they have relied on for generations as nomads; secondly, respect for creatures and sacred lands is an important part of their culture. As a result, villagers spontaneously organized a conservation association called Wild Yak Watchers (野牦牛队) and instituted regular monitoring of the animals living on their land. In a further effort to protect the habitat of the wild yak, a member of the Association even voluntarily moved out from the wild yak habitat. By their own initiative, each villager also offered some of their own pastureland to help resettle that family. On the basis of these voluntary actions, with the financial and technical support of CI, Cuochi and the management office of the nature reserve signed a formal agreement in September 2006. According to the agreement, Cuochi is authorized to conserve an area within its region. The nature reserve and the local community also set common conservation objectives. The nature reserve is responsible for providing guidance and evaluating the effectiveness of community conservation, and financial support from CI provides an incentive mechanism for the community to meet sustainable development needs. This official conservation incentive agreement was the first of its kind in China. And western China, as was discussed earlier, is ideal for implementing more of them. Many nature reserves in western China are large in size, with local communities living in their core areas. A common problem is inadequate funding, and capacity deficiency for managing areas of such considerable size. As a result, the situation on the ground falls far short of what management policies call for. For example, according to the zoning policies for nature reserves, production and residential living activities are prohibited in the core areas. But this is unrealistic given the fact people have lived and continue to live in these areas, including in Sanjiangyuan. Conservation incentive agreements would

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be quite suitable in this circumstance as it would involve the local residents in conservation efforts through an agreement with the nature reserve, especially in places where it is clear that local people care about the environment and have the ability to support conservation measures. 7.4

Community-based Conservation and the Creation of “A Harmonious Society”

China is now in a crucial period of development and transformation. On the one hand, rapid economic growth has brought Chinese people material abundance after a long period of tumult and material shortages. However, material abundance often comes at great social and environmental costs. Data on air, water, and soil pollution, and rapid loss of biodiversity, all indicate that the quality of the environment in China has worsened severely. Environmental problems have not only resulted in major life and property losses, but also severely reduced the quality of life for many urban and rural residents and, in some cases, have largely destroyed people’s sense of security. The central government has recognized that current GDP growth rate is unsustainable, and has tried to deemphasize the GDP by introducing the concept of a “harmonious society.” Creating a “harmonious society” will require comprehensive consideration of social and environmental needs in economic decision-making. Economists have often cited the Kuznets Curve, which allegedly traces the development trajectory (as an inverted U) of the dynamic relationship between environmental pollution and economic development for western countries. According to this theory, both public demand for environmental quality and environmental quality begin to increase once per capita income reaches a certain level. The dynamic relation between environmental condition and economic growth in China, according to some economists, may show a similar pattern. However, the pressure from growing environmental stress and resource scarcity will likely force China, as it has many other developing countries around the world, to consider other development models. Sacred land protection provides an excellent opportunity to create an alternative model of development to that presupposed by the Kuznets hypothesis, a model on which people’s concern for the environment is not only decided by economic and material development, but also by their personal and societal values. The Tibetan economy is by no means near the tipping point on the Kuznets Curve at which people begin to care about environmental protection. However, given traditional Tibetan conservation values, it is possible to create a conservation model that expedites the delinking between environmental

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degradation and economic growth. In other words, the realization of a “harmonious society” is possible through the implementation of a model on which people can value both economic development and environmental protection even without having achieved extensive material wealth. In most societies, the ultimate goal of development is to enable people to live happily. However, the basic elements of a happy life cannot be accurately represented solely using economic indicators, as is assumed by current practices. Peace, security, and a sense of satisfaction, for example, are all essential elements of a happy life but are not reflected in a nation’s GDP. Unfortunately, the belief that happiness is realized through consumption and the possession of material wealth is already pervasive in modern societies. Tibetan culture, rooted in a reverence for nature, offers an alternative set of values, one that could lend substance to the “harmonious society” concept. 7.5

Regional Development and Harmonious Development

To build a harmonious society, economic development must respect environmental carrying capacity now and in the future. In other words, a harmonious society must be based on sustainable development. To achieve both, a nation must design a development plan that balances demands for natural resources and environmental conservation. In its 11th Five-Year Plan the government introduced the concept of regional development. It essentially amounts to a zoning system, where each region is required to create a development plan that includes four zones: area of optimal development, key area of development, area of limited development areas, and protected area, each with specific functions supported by policies and a concrete evaluation system.6 Areas of optimal development have seen intensive national land development but the capacity of the environment to absorb the impacts of such development drives has begun to decline. In these areas, the focus should be on improving industrial technologies, solving environmental resource bottlenecks, and upgrading the level of participation in international competition. These are the areas that should provide strong support for economic and social development.7

6  National People’s Congress, 11th Five-Year Plan 2006–2010, 2006. 7  Ibid.

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Many key areas of development areas still have relatively abundant environmental resources and the economic structures and population densities are relatively favourable. In these areas, development activities are aimed at strengthening infrastructural construction, attracting investment, technological upgrades, and industrialization and urbanization that are well-paced and of the appropriate scope. These areas are up-and-coming economically and developmentally and will eventually become the new backbone to China’s future growth. Areas are marked for only limited development when the economic development and population dynamics in them are not favourable. Priority is given to ecological protection and restrained resource extraction. The goal is to strengthen and repair the ecological environment and to allow no more industries than can be sustainably supported by the local ecosystem. There is also a focus on encouraging people in resource and environmentally stressed urban areas to move, in an organized way, to areas of key and optimized development. All development activities are unlawful in protected areas, which are practically nature reserves. In these areas, protection mandates are in effect that prohibit any activities that are inconsistent with the functions of nature reserves. In order to mitigate the wealth inequality between different regions, the 11th Five-Year Plan also created a building, resource, and environmental tax system that compensate areas of limited development and protected areas for their ecosystem services. A series of measures and incentive mechanisms for industrial development, land use, and criteria for performance evaluation of government officials and civil servants should also be developed for areas of optimal development and key development. The principles behind this new type of development zoning are clear and persuasive. The next step is to build specific regional development objectives and indicators for the different types of areas. The location and boundaries of zones also need to be clearly defined. Figure 7.12 illustrates the most important biodiversity areas in China. Developing similar information on the spatial distribution of resources, land use, and economic development would be useful in zoning and demarcation decisions.

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Figure 7.12

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Areas of important biodiversity in China (based on data compiled by WWF and Conservation International).

Chapter 8

Natural versus Human Disturbances of Old-growth Forests Shen Xiaohui and Piao Zhengji On August 28th, 1986, strong winds from Typhoon 15 reached the southern and western slopes of the Changbaishan Natural Reserve (CNR) (长白山自然 保护区). The winds knocked down 9924.5 hectares of trees, in a phenomenon called “windthrow.” Ninety-eight percent of the affected area was in the reserve’s core. Notwithstanding damages to many of the trees, the integrity of the forest ecosystem was largely intact. The windthrow episode had been an instance of natural disturbance, one that was intrinsic to the old-growth forest’s natural succession and ecological processes. By contrast, two campaigns that took place following the weather event, each lasting as long as seven years, did irreversible damages to the local ecosystem. One was the systematic removal of windthrown logs from the forest ground, and the other was reforestation in the affected area through artificial regeneration. These campaigns amounted to wonton acts of assault by human beings on the local environment. Not only did they strip the windthrow area of its natural characteristics, but they also disrupted the local ecosystem’s self-regeneration process, retarding it in parts of it by almost a century, and altogether reversing it in others by reducing them to subalpine meadows. It violates government policies to remove windthrown logs from in the core area of the reserve. This much is not in dispute.1 Here we only consider the matter from the point of view of forest ecology. The questions we will try to address include: why is windthrow, a form of natural disturbance, ecologically beneficial and constructive, or at least benign, whereas human disturbances such as the systematic removal of logs ecologically harmful and destructive? How should we understand and think about natural disturbances, and protect nature reserves from anthropogenic ones, which are often perpetrated under ignorance and false pretenses? Not only can clarifying these issues help 1  Jilin Provincial Institute of Forestry Survey and Design 吉林省林业勘察设计院, “Clean-up and recovery plan for the windthrow area in the Changbaishan Natural Reserve (长白山自 然保护区风灾区山林清理与恢复规划),” 1988.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004316041_009

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educate the public in science in general and the science of the environment in particular, but it also has large practical implications for democratic and scientifically-informed policy-making. 8.1

The Ecological Significance of Removing Windthrown Logs

A forest is far more than a collection of trees; it is a complex ecological system consisting of a diversity of both biotic and abiotic elements inextricably linked together. The forest ecosystem has its own ecological processes and succession patterns.2 A proper understanding of these is a prerequisite for sound and effective forest management, and crucial for effective resource conservation and management in natural reserves, particularly those that feature large forest coverage. Forests are subject to a variety of natural disturbance, including hurricanes, lightening, earthquakes, fires triggered by lightening, glacial activities and volcanic eruptions. From the point of view of disturbance ecology, natural disturbances are significant for the preservation of biodiversity and for biological evolution even though they involve temporally and spatially localized destruction of biological systems and/or their basic elements. In the Changbaishan (长白山) area, winds constitute the most biologically significant form of natural disturbance. In fact, wind disturbance is the primary mechanism for the natural regeneration of the forests in the area.3 By contrast, more often than not, logging, the construction of bridges, roads, and dams, conversion of forests into farmlands and other forms of human disturbances not only impair the ecological integrity and functions of forests but also lower their aesthetic value. With the exception of measures that have been meticulously designed to mimic natural disturbances and executed in accordance with the principles of forest ecology, human disturbances tend to disrupt forest ecosystems and reduce their biodiversity.4 The seven-year long campaign to remove windthrown logs through intensive and highly 2  Xu Huacheng 徐化成, Jingguan shengtai xue 景观生态学 [Landscape Ecology], Chinese Forestry Press, 1996. 3  Yang Hanxi, Xie Haisheng 阳含熙, 谢海生, “Changbaishan hongsong hunjiaolin ganrao lishi de chonggou yanjiu 长白山红松混交林干扰历史的重构研究 [Studies in the Reconstruction of the Disturbance History in the Mixed Korean Pine Forests in the Changbai Mountain],” Zhiwu shengtai xuebao, Vol. 18, No. 3, 201–8. 4  Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉, “ ‘Tianzai’ zheyan xia de renhuo ‘天灾’ 掩盖下的人祸 [Human Disaster Disguised as Natural Disaster],” Zhongguo huanjing bao, September 18, 1988.

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mechanized means in the Changbaishan area is Exhibit A for anthropogenic environmental destruction, and richly deserves critical examination. Wind disturbance is a common form of natural disturbance in the Changbaishan and Xiao Xing’an Ling (小兴安岭) region, and it constitutes a critical environmental factor. The soil in CNR, composed predominantly of volcanic ash, volcanic gravel and pumice stone, is characteristically thin, and the root systems of local plants characteristically shallow. Therefore, once forest communities reach maturity, trees that fall due to windthrow become crucial to the forest’s succession process. In fact, a 1960 survey of its forest resources revealed that there were more than 1,000,000 m3 of windthrown logs in CNR. The immediate consequences of the episode of wind disturbance in 1986 included vast areas of canopy gaps and the felling of many trees. These are, however, inherent to the forest’s natural ecological and succession processes. As much as 28.8% of the trees in the windthrow area remained standing, and these and windthrown logs of varying sizes formed a harmonious and integrated whole. Species such as red deer and hazel grouse continued to live in the area. Canopy gaps of varying sizes facilitated the growth of mid- and smallsized stems of different species. Given their hefty weight, windthrown logs can stabilize and buttress the root structures of standing trees, thereby helping to prevent them falling. A survey of naturally generated saplings conducted three years after the wind disturbance episode showed that the regeneration rates were 1,285/ha for broad-leaved Korean pine and 2,020/ha for mixed conifers. These rates would have been sufficient for complete restoration of the original community, and there can be little doubt that, had it not been for the human disturbances that befell the area, these saplings would have quickly grown to maturity within the canopy openings created by the wind disturbance. In stands of large trunk diameters, natural succession consists of secondary succession through transition from pioneer species. In stands dominated by trunks of relatively small diameters, spatial succession is the primary mode of natural succession. The result of both would have been the restoration of the late successional community—characterized by maximum net primary product and biodiversity—that had existed prior to the wind disturbance.5 The natural succession process of the forest was utterly disrupted by persistent and aggressive human disturbances. In addition to work done by small contractors that relied mostly on laborers and draft animals, many heavy machine operators hired by five large state-owned enterprises in the timber 5  Yang Ye 杨野, “Jilin Changbaishan guojiaji ziran baohuqu fengzaiqu diaocha baogao 吉林长 白山国家级自然保护区风灾区调查报告 [Report of the Investigation of the Windthrow Area in the National Changhaishan Natural Reserve in Jilin Province],” 1990.

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industry were also involved in the harvesting of windthrown logs in the core of the reserve. On average, 4000 people worked in the reserve year-round, and the number would reach 5,200 during peak season. A total of about 200–300 truckloads of materials went in and out of the reserve everyday. According to conservative estimates, at least 1,700,000 m3 of wood, an amount in excess of that of all the windthrown logs, which stood at 1,210,000 m3, was hauled out of the area. But in addition to all the windthrown logs, nearly 500,000 m3 of standing trees were also taken down, and away. Nor did the trees in some of the surrounding areas completely escape the pillage. Some of them became the victim of secondary felling as turbulence from intensive machine operations nearby caused the soil in the forest floor to loosen, others were cut down in the logging frenzy unleashed by the windthrow log harvesting. Meantime, 20,000m3 of trees on 160 hectares were destroyed for the construction of 140 km of roads and 10 workstations. Such massive, intensive, aggressive and highly mechanized human disturbance has had horrendous and irreversible consequences for the Changbaishan forest ecosystem.6 1. Extensive damages to the forest ground and surface vegetation obstructed the forest’s natural regeneration process. Heavy equipment such as tractor-trailers and bulldozers decimated saplings and seedlings, and destroyed soil structure as well as surface vegetation, which resulted in severe soil erosion. Humus soil was completely pared away in some places, exposing to the air the volcanic ash underneath. Many of the carriage ways used for transporting logs became tracts of gravely eroded soil. Studies have shown that the campaign to remove fallen logs destroyed nearly 70% of the surface vegetation in the area, and reduced the number of naturally generated saplings to below 600 per hectare, a 50–70% rate of destruction. 2. The forest became unsuitable as a habitat for many wildlife species. Activities of the harvest workers and noises from the heavy machinery broke the tranquility that had characterized the CNR, compromising the ability of the area directly affected by the wind disturbance and those surrounding it to serve as a wildlife sanctuary. The log removal operations not only had complex organizational structures, but also involved large numbers of workers who were environmentally illiterate. They liberally 6  Zhai Fenglin 翟凤林, “Changbaishan ziran baohuqu fengzaiqu qingli mengdaomu de xiaoyi fenxi 长白山自然保护区风灾区清理风倒木的效益分析 [Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Log Clean-up in the Windthrow Area in the Changbaishan Natural Reserve],” 1994.

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hunted hazel grouse, tree frogs and other animal species, and picked Boschniakia, rhizoma gastrodiae and other plants. Rat poisoning used by forest restoration companies killed many alpine pika, which indirectly harmed the carnivores that feed on them, disrupting the local food web. 3. The forest’s natural succession process was obstructed. When all the fallen logs were removed, the subsequent cleanup targeted enormous volumes of various kinds of wood material that had been left on the forest ground as debris. These materials, however, are all “biological heritage” that perform crucial ecological functions. Not only do they serve to nurse seedlings and saplings, by facilitating nutrient recycling, they also help maintain soil productivity. 4. The windthrow episode became a trigger for waves of clear-cutting. Intensive and mechanized operations deprived standing trees in the wind-disturbed area of the added support to their root structures that would have been provided by the fallen logs. This can potentially lead to a positive feedback loop, in which fallen trees lead to more trees falling. Under natural conditions, the landscape of wind-disturbed areas has an uneven and ragged look. However, clear-cutting would typically produce vast and flat spans of bare land. Moreover, since clear-cut areas are directly exposed to sunlight, saplings of shade-tolerant species that have survived the clear-cutting itself stand very poor chances of surviving far beyond it.7 After their 1996 visit to and investigation of the windthrow area in CNR, experts from the State Forestry Administration concluded that the systematic removal of fallen logs slowed down the natural regeneration process of the forest below the altitude of 1,600m by more than a hundred years. 5. Subalpine meadowland, which formed as a result of regressive succession, became a significant fire hazard. The old-growth forest in CNR had been naturally fire-resistant due to the combination of the area’s high altitude, low temperature, high humidity, and relative freedom from prior human disturbances. The high water content of the stacks of decaying wood on the forest ground made them an effective fire retardant that can help prevent ground fire from spreading upwards. This explains why CNR had had a superb track record in regard o fire. But these conditions that had been so favorable to fire management inside the reserve

7  Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉, “Changbaishan ziran baohuqu fengdaomu de qingli yu gengxin 长白山自然保护区风倒木的清理与更新 [Removal and regeneration of windfell trees in the Changbai Mountain Natural Reserve],” Guotu Lühua, 1993.

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have now been destroyed. After the clear-cutting of the windthrow area, increased light exposure, ambient temperature, wind speeds and evaporation rate and decreased soil moisture content allowed weeds of the grass, nutgrass faltsedge and composite families to thrive. Dense and tall, these sun-loving weeds do not rot easily after yellowing in the fall, and become a major fire hazard. In particular, secondary meadowland at elevations above 1,600 m formed of artificially induced regressive forest succession had become such a tinderbox that it is now a major headache for the Jilin provincial government, Changbaishan municipal government and the CNR Bureau of Management. Each year, a backup police squad would be sent in, charged with the nearly impossible task of preventing fires. In 2005, the fear of fires led the western slope of Changbaishan to be completely closed to tourists, and the authorities locked down the entire mountain region. These drastic measures are strong evidence for the gravity of the situation. Artificial reforestation constitutes a derivative form of human disturbance. People are divided on the question of the regeneration of forests destroyed by windthrow. Those who are opposed to natural regeneration, and favor artificial regeneration argue that human beings ought not to leave nature alone when it comes to forest recovery from disasters, but should take charge in directing and controling the regeneration process. Following this philosophy, some businesses have clear-cut and leveled the harvested area, and then covered it with uniform deciduous trees. But these areas were soon invaded and overtaken by sun-loving weeds that grew out of control. Contrary to what had been intended, which was “rapid recovery” of the wind destroyed forest, the area further deteriorated and turned into grasslands instead, bringing the human disturbance to a decisive and disastrous conclusion.

This turn of event seems to signify nature’s retribution for the wanton assaults on it by human beings. In some sense, however, the only thing that would have been worse than the disastrous failure of the artificial regeneration project is its success, which would have meant a biologically homogeneous, highly managed plantation smacked in the middle of an old-growth forest with which it is ecologically completely out of sync. It would have done nothing to enhance forest species diversity but much to reduce it, compromising the wholeness, wholesomeness and the integrity of the entire reserve forest ecosystem.

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Natural or Human-made Disaster?

What are the environmental implications of such large-scale, intensive and persistent human disturbances for CNR? Any conscientious and concerned government official and scholar should take an interest in this question. There is a piece of between-stand open space called Yimianpo (一面坡) on the western slope of the Changbaishan mountain. At an elevation of 1,500– 1,600 m, the site features a mixed conifer forest comprised of spruce and fir. In the 1950s, before CNR was established, the area had been converted to agriculture lands. After the reserve was established, and human disturbance ceased, the converted agriculture land at Yimianpo was abandoned. What happened afterward is illuminating. Succession in abandoned agriculture land in the Changbaishan and Xiao Xing’an Ling (小兴安岭) region typically begins with the growth in the early successional stage of pioneer tree species such as mountain aspen and white birch, followed by the emergence of Korean pine saplings among them. When a two-tiered forest like this reaches a certain age, the mountain aspen and white birch in it, which have relatively short lifespans, would die out, and the longer-living Korean pine would take over. This process would, when uninterrupted, eventuate in the complete restoration of the broad-leaved Korean pine forest, which had dominated Yimianpo prior to its conversion to agricultural use.8 However, rather than self-regenerating in accordance with these natural patterns, and the abundance of indigenous arboreous species notwithstanding, Yimianpo deteriorated into alpine grasslands. Because it is on a sloping plateau in the mid-section of the Changbaishan mountain, and as such of relatively high altitude, Yimianpo was already in close proximity to extant mountain birch forest and alpine meadowlands. After the area became denuded, however, sun-loving weeds outgunned pioneer species in the competition for resources. But when and where the former achieves dominance, germination of arboreous species becomes virtually impossible. Such highly stable grassland communities that were formerly forest are a kind of “climax community,” though not the original climax sere of the forest but an alternative to it. Under these circumstances, the original climax vegetation is unlikely to recover fully even if human disturbance creases. Yimianpo is, therefore, a telling case of a transformation climax that results from regressive succession. The result 8  Xu Huacheng 徐化成, Zhongguo hongsong tianranlin 中国红松天然林 [China’s Oldgrowth Korean Pine Forests], Zhongguo linye chubanshe, 2000.

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is decidedly inferior to the original old-growth forest in both biomass and net primary productivity terms.9 What happened at and to Yimianpo contrasts sharply with what happened in Changbaishan 1,100 years ago following a volcanic eruption. That quintessentially natural event nearly obliterated the vegetation coverage within a 50 km radius of Tianchi (天池). Yet it has now been completely restored, right on top of the volcanic ash, even retaining the original vertical distribution structure. Examination of samples of carbonated wood retrieved from underneath the volcanic ash indicates that in terms of both classification and compositional structure, the Changbaishan forest has remained virtually unchanged since before the volcanic eruption. The Changbaishan of today represents, therefore, a seral community of maximum nutrient and informational content and biodiversity, and the result of secondary succession.10 How is it then that nature manages to heal itself after catastrophic natural disturbances such as volcanic eruptions, which in this case destroyed thousands of kilometers of forest, yet it cannot seem to do the same for a few hec­ tares destroyed by human beings? This must serve as a wake-up call for us. It means that so far as ecological system and biodiversity are concerned, human disturbances are fundamentally and qualitatively different from natural ones. While the latter is superficially destructive but actually constructive, the former is just the reverse. Unfortunately, even before the campaign to harvest and to remove fallen logs was complete, our worries proved to be well-founded: the emergence of secondary alpine grassland as the climax of a regressive succession process, as had occurred at Yimianpo, was unfolding in the windthrow area on a massive scale. The seven-year campaign stripped the area of standing trees as well as fallen logs, and even the 2% fallen logs required by the State Forestry Administration to be retained for scientific research was not spared. In 1996, soon after this first wave of human disturbance of the forest of CNR concluded, some people sought permission to cull whatever fallen logs they claimed still remained in the windthrow area. In an effort to help forestall further ravages, this author published an article titled “Changbaishan: One Night 9 

Tao Yan 陶炎, “Changbaishan diqu senlin zhi jinxi bianhua ji yanti qushi 长白山地区森 林之今昔变化及演替趋势 [Changes in and Succession Trajectory of the Changbaishan Forests],” Senlin shengtai xitong yanjiu, Vol. 7, 1995, 173–85. 10  Zhao Dachang 赵大昌, “Changbaishan huoshan baofa dui zhibei fazhan yanti guanxi de chubu tantao 长白山火山爆发对植被发展演替关系的初步探讨 [Preliminary Studies of the Relationship between Volcanic Eruption and Vegetation Succession in the Changbai Mountain],” Senlin shengtai xitong yanjiu, 1980, 81–88.

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of Typhoon Brings a Decade of Human-Made Disaster” in China Forestry.11 It took a while before the article attracted the attention of high-level officials in the State Forestry Administration. Then teams of ecologists were sent to CNR to study the impact of human disturbances on the area. Adopting suggestions made in the final report of the study, leadership in the State Forestry Administration issued injunctions, phrased in no uncertain terms, against further harvesting and removal of fallen logs. They also stopped granting permits for harvesting fallen logs, banned the culling of fallen logs in the reserve, suggested expanding the core of the reserve to include the area in which such practice is currently allowed and the alpine tundra region, and called on the CNR Bureau of Management to deepen their understanding of the importance of the reserve.” In fact neither the expansion of the CNR core area nor greater awareness of CNR’s ecological significance among relevant authorities came to pass. Worse still, it would be only three years before yet another chapter of manipulatively and maliciously engineered human disturbance, threatening even broader and longer-lasting ecological consequences, was to open. 8.3

Open Auction and Contract Bidding of the Right to Collect Korean Pine Seeds

Throughout their evolutionary history of over 20 million years of, Korean pine forests have achieved a high degree of structural and functional complexity and biodiversity. These forests now represent the most biologically diverse class of vegetation and ecological system in northern Eurasia. Most of the world’s Korean pine forests can be found in an area of 5,000,000 km2 around Changbaishan and Xiao Xing’an Ling in northeast China. The area reaches far into southeast Russia in the north and extends to the Korean Peninsula in the east. Sixty percent of this area falls within the Chinese territory.12 Korean pines grew in large areas in the eastern mountainous region of northeast China until about 1950s. For a long time, however, the area was used 11  Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉, “Changbaishan: Yiye taifeng gua lai shinian renhuo 长白山：一 夜台风刮来十年人祸 [Changbaishan: Typhoon Overnight Brings a Aecade of HumanMade Disaster],” Zhongguo linyebao, June 8, 1996. 12  Wang Zhan 王战, “Changbaishan beipo zhuyao senlin leixing jiqi qunluo jiegou tedian 长白山北坡主要森林类型及其群落结构特点 [The Dominant Type of Forests on the Northern Slope of the Changbai Mountain and Its Community Structural Characteristics],” Senlin shengtai xitong yanjiu, Vol. 1, 1980, 25.

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mostly for lumber production because people understood of their ecological significance poorly and the pressure of economic development was great. Decades of over-logging mutilated the old-growth forest, replacing them with a mix of over-logged, secondary forests and managed plantations. Between 1960 and 1986, the size of the Korean pine forest in the Changbaishan mountain region was reduced by 70.4%, falling from 1,960,000 ha to 580,000 hec­ tares within the span of a quarter of a century. The volume of aggregate timber reserve was reduced by 80.8%, falling from 67.374 m3 to 12.912 million m3. Most of the currently remaining Korean pine forest, which covers an area of about 42,000 ha, is inside CNR. It constitutes a relatively stable ecosystem, and represents the only remaining gene bank within CNR for this type of forest. But not long after the campaign remove fallen logs, which lasted for seven years, this last gene bank for old-growth Korean pine forests fell victim to the campaign to harvest and remove Korean pine seed. This campaign lasted six years before it was halted. Korean pine forests in CNR are located at elevations between 720–1,600 m, covering an area totaling more than 70,000 ha, which is larger than the size of the old-growth Korean pine forests. Ten percent of the area was used for experimental applied forestry, 20% is buffer zone, and the remaining 70% is the core area. More than 1.1 million of the Korean pines have diameters greater than 30cm, and they produce 20 to 30 million kg of seeds annually. Korean pine is a form of regional vegetation, of which broad-leaved Korean pine forests are constituted. Korean pine forests rely on animal species that feed on their seeds to maintain their biological system. Since Korean pine cones do not rack open when ripe, the seeds do not disperse by themselves. Instead, they are only dispersed with the help of birds, and squirrels, chipmunks, nutcrackers, Eurasian jay and others, who either eat them or lose them while transporting them or bury them under the soil. Experiments have shown that without these ecological services provided by these species in the shelling and the dispersal of Korean pine seeds, self-renewal of the forests would be impossible. However, in removing almost all the Korean pine seeds from the ecosystem, human beings have aggressively and massively intruded into this biological system. As a result, not only the survival of animal species that depend exclusively on these seeds for food but also the ecological equilibrium and continuity of the old-growth Korean pine forests have been seriously jeopardized. While in Korean pine forests managed by businesses this problem can be addressed, albeit very imperfectly, through artificial regeneration, the same is not true in old-growth Korean pine forests where it is disallowed insofar

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as it itself constitutes a form of human disturbance. As such, the regeneration and renewal of old-growth Korean pine forests in CNR faces enormous challenges. Prices for Korean pine seeds have been rising since the 1990s, reflecting growing market demands. This has driven many people to go into CNR to collect them, often illegally. In response to this situation, which went on unabated for years, rather than consulting with local residents and allowing them to participate in decision-making in relation to the protection and management of local resources, CNR management decided to emulate businesses, and put the rights to collect seeds up for sale in contract biddings. Those who made this momentous decision did not find it necessary to bother with “planning,” “expert testimony,” or environmental impact assessment. According to statistics, during 2000, the first year of contract bidding of Korean pine seeds, 980,000 Korean pines with trunks greater than 30cm in diameter and covering a total of 43389.1 ha were auctioned off to 38 contractors. In the same year, about 2,000 seed collectors worked in the area, some for up to two months, keeping watch of the crop and harvesting it when it ripened. This lasted several years. In six years, the many and varied problems associated with the campaign to commercialize Korean pine seed collection in CNR became increasingly evident: It has further aggravated human disturbance of the reserve. As this abusive conduct became more organized and systematic, it has also become more destructive. Prior to this form of legalized seed collection, illegal collectors would typically come to the reserve in groups of three to five on brief trips. Since overnight stays in the forest were unfeasible, few could reach far into the inner-most areas of the reserve. Therefore, their activities were mostly confined to areas most easily and conveniently accessible from the outside. This greatly restricted the scale of the collection activities and a considerable portion of the total output of Korean pine cones was spared and continued to support seed-eating species and the self-regeneration and self-renewal of the Korean pine forest. But now, laborers were hired by contractors to work exclusively on their plot. The streamlined process from watching, harvesting, mechanized shelling to hauling left no part of the reserve, even the deepest parts of it, safe from such pillage. This led to the severance of the food chain of the broad-leaved Korean pine forest. The shortage of seedlings—which are age heterogeneous, multilayered, and multi-generational—reduced generational overlapping, thereby 1.

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threatening the sustainability of the forest. In an attempt to address this problem, CNR management has tried planting Korean pines by aerial sowing. But not only was this approach scientifically baseless, it also turned out to be demonstrably ineffective. By turning ecological resources into economic ones, the commercialization of Korean pine forest management fundamentally altered the essential nature of CNR. It has turned a site that was originally meant for promoting natural resource protection and conservation into a factory that churns out Korean pine seed products. Every year, during the seeding season, the tranquility of the forest gives way to the cacophony of the spectacular and boisterous gatherings of seed collectors and processors. Large fleets of taxis, farm vehicles and tractor-trailers descend upon the reserve. Thousands of laborers would set up camps inside the forest. In addition to food and lodging supplies, many of them would have brought their family. They would construct numerous work sheds in gutters and intersections with timber from small trees they had cut down, cook on makeshift stoves constructed from rocks and dirt ripped directly out of the earth, and use snag, fallen logs and dead undergrowth as fuel (this last one alone accounts for the consumption of the more than 3,000 m3 of wood materials annually). It was also commonplace for laborers to dig up mushrooms and medicinal plant species, fish and hunt for toads. Worse still, some people were involved in the poaching of highly valuable wildlife species such as hazel grouse, wild boar, roe deer, Korean deer, and sable. To facilitate their work, many collectors would amputate or behead trees; and in order to make hauling their bounty easier, some would cut trees down altogether in order to make way for building tracts and bridges. Nothing could be further from the truth than the claim some have made that contract bidding for the rights to collect and distribute Korean pine seeds increased the number of volunteer forest warden by more than two thousand, served the interests of the forest, promoted resource conservation and stewardship. In fact, Korean pine seed harvesting has crippled a management system that was already deeply dysfunctional. 2.

Severe trampling of the forest ground has resulted in vast networks of footpaths that leave all areas inside CNR exposed to exploitation. Presently, there are, on the highways that ring the reserve entry points on average 1 kilometer apart from each other to footpaths leading into the reserve. Each footpath would merge with a thoroughfare that runs along a river and cut across the entire reserve area. On the northern and western slopes of 3.

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the Changbaishan Mountain, there are now 26 footpaths that penetrate into the reserve, 9 of which are wide enough for automobiles to pass. On the southwestern slope, the numbers are 27 and 6, respectively, and 113 and 27 respectively for the entire reserve. In addition to these, there are 8 routes used exclusively by tourists. These roads have helped increase traffic to the reserve’s core significantly by making these visits—regardless who make them and why—considerably less arduous and time-consuming than they used to be. The total number of unique visits to the mountain region during the fall season is between 380,000 and 950,000. It is hardly an exaggeration that there are no longer any parts of reserve untouched by human activities. An increase in the spread of communicative diseases among animals and the invasion of non-native plant species. Wastes generated by the large number of human beings and draft animals in the reserve—including discharge from production processes, residential waste, sewage, and vast mounds of seed shells—have become a major source of serious environmental pollution. Moreover, it has contributed to increases in the spread of communicative diseases among animals and the presence of invasive plant species. Cases of Wild boar diseases have already been reported. The yearly abuse of the forest ecosystem and systematic looting of biological resources have vastly decreased the value of the broad-leaved Korean pine forests in CNR as a seed bank for maintaining local biodiversity. Moreover, the presence of Korean pines has also had negative impact on the adjacent mix conifer forest. 4.

8.4

The Ecological Significance of Korean Pine Seed Production

8.4.1 Impact on Wildlife According to field studies, 26 wildlife species feed on Korean pine seeds, including 11 species of birds and 15 species of mammals. When humans take their food away, these species face a number of challenges, including starvation, change of diet, population decline, or emigration). A five-year long study at CNR involving samples from 120 animal specimen zones and 30 plant specimen zones shows that since 2000, humans have consumed as much as 96.17–98.93% of all the Korean pine seeds produced within the broad-leaved Korean pine forests inside CNR. The only exception was 2004, when pest invasion resulted in reduced rate of human consumption. Other species have consumed as little as 2.33–0.59% of the total seeds annually. In mixed conifer forests, human consumption accounted for 88.78–96.39%, of

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total seed yield compared with 6.88–3.01% for animal consumption. This has had the following consequences: (1) Sharp decline in the population of affected wildlife species. Between 2000 and 2004, hazel grouse, woodpeckers, jay, squirrels experienced negative population growth in the broad-leaved Korean pine forest areas, as did nutcrackers, chipmunks, wild boars, bears and sable did in mixed conifer forests. (2) Human interference in the food web has led to a change of diet among some species. Population decline for squirrels and other small rodent species has lead to population decline for their predator species, including sable and weasel, and forced them to change their diet. As the latter have been forced to turn to prey on hazel grouse, jay and nutcrackers instead, the chain reaction this generates reverberates throughout the entire food web, perturbing the forest ecosystem as a whole. (3) Some wildlife species are no longer able to find enough food to survive winter. Korean pine seeds are rich and nutritious, and invaluable to bears and wild boars in their preparation for winter. Consumption of these seeds in copious amounts allows these animals to grow sufficient fat that would protect them from the cold throughout the winter months. But now, food shortage has made it difficult for bears living in CNR to hibernate properly, while wild boar piglets regularly die from malnutrition. In fact, the wild boar population in CNR had seen an increase in the period leading up to 2000, but since then it has declined as a result of human appropriation of Korean pine seeds. Age distribution within the wild boar population has significantly deviated from the norm, and the high mortality rate of piglets would eventually lead to extinction of that species. (4) The massive loss of Korean pine seeds has driven some wildlife species original to Korean pine forests to look for food in and emigrate to areas dominated by Mongolian Oaks. But overcrowding in their new homes renders these migrant populations high vulnerable to metal wires traps set up by poachers. This has greatly increased the incidence of death-byentrapment. In 2004, the population of wild boar dropped by 60% during the few months between early and late winter.13

13  Changbaishan Natural Reserve Bureau of Scientific Research 长白山保护区科研所, “Changbaishan ziran baohuqu zhongdian yesheng dongwu qixidi baohu yu guanli” 长 白山自然保护区重点野生动物栖息地保护与管理》工作报告 [Work Report on

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8.4.2 The Impact on the Self-regeneration and Self-renewal of Korean Pine The self-regeneration and self-renewal of Korean pine require the satisfaction of two conditions, each individually necessary but insufficient: a sufficient amount of ripened seeds, and an adequate number of biological seed dispersal agents. Species such as squirrels, chipmunks, jay, and nutcrackers function both as consumers and as disseminators of Korean pine seeds. A very large supply of seeds is needed for Korean pines to regenerate by natural mechanism. Specifically, a surplus beyond what is needed by animal species for whom they are a source of food must be available. Old-growth Korean pine forest can yield 500,000–1,000,000 seeds per hec­ tare each seed harvest year. Typically, 10,000–88,000 seeds would get stashed away in the soil. Out of this stock, some would go towards meeting the ongoing dietary needs of wildlife, some would for one reason or another either fail to germinate or die prematurely. This leaves an average of 2,000–4,000/ha seeds that will germinate and grow into 4-year-old Korean pine seedling. This means that the total number of seeds produced must be at least 10–50 times the number of seeds stored in the soil, which is in turn 10–40 times the number of 4-year-old Korean pine seedlings per hectare that will actually materialize. Moreover, all of the seeds produced must stay within the forest ecosystem, and disperse by means of natural mechanisms. Since contract bidding of the right to harvest Korean pine seeds began, the quantity of seeds left stored in the soil in CNR has dwindled, and they have produced a pitiably small number of seedlings. A 2004 study by Piao Zhengji of soil samples—60 of 20m × 20m samples and 120 of 10m × 10m samples—from randomly selected locations reveals that there is on average 0.29 Korean pine cone found inside each sample, and 0.2 1-year-old Korean pine seedling, and the average population density of squirrel is 0.32/ km2. 8.4.3

The Impact on the Growth Dynamics of Korean Pine

(1) Their cones form primarily at the crown and at the top of side branches of Korean pines. The use of foot holders attached to the trunks for climbing up the trees damages the bark, causing large amounts of pine resin to be released. Breakage of the branches also does serious damages to the vertical branches at the cone-forming level of the Korean pine, adversely affecting their growth, seed production and pest resistance. Pest infestation involving Korean pine cones, which had been quite rare in the past, The Protection and the Management of Key Wildlife Habitats inside the Changbaishan Natural Reserve],” 2003.

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shot up to 60% in 2005, resulting in a drop in seed yield of over 50%. There have during the same period also been frequent outbreaks of rat epidemic. As the growing mutilation of the bark increasingly denied the local rat population access to seeds high up in the Korean pine trees, these animals lost an important source of energy and nutrition. To compensate, they turned to chewing the tree bark. (2) Typically, old-growth Korean pine forests produce seeds every three years, but in the Changbaishan area and since intensive Korean pine seed harvesting began, they have been doing so every year. Despite this, however, the actual number of seeds yielded has continued to decline. Frequent and repeated human disturbances have so disrupted the natural rhythms of the Korean pine, it seems, that they now require greater energy expenditure than before to produce seeds. These and other longterm consequences of human disturbances for the timber quality, growth dynamics and life-span of Korean pines are still poorly understood and have yet to be carefully studied. To summarize, human disturbances have accelerated the depletion of the Korean pine seed bank. The current stock of Korean pine seeds in the Changbaishan forest is woefully inadequate either for feeding the wildlife species dependent on them or for the self-regeneration and self-renewal of the forest. This has resulted in a sharp population decline for some wildlife species and complete disappearance of others. For the forest itself, not only has its composition and food chain structure been altered significantly, its growth dynamics and ecological stability have been upset. There can be little doubt that had it not been for the decision in 2006 by its newly-established management committee to halt the practice of contract bidding of the rights to harvest Korean pine seeds, CNR would have stood practically no chance at escaping the fate of being consigned to nothing more than a pine seed production hub. That would have meant either the replacement old-growth forest by artificial ones cultivated through seed-sowing—which had been the standard practice of businesses in the timber industry—or the gradual disappearance of the Korean pine forest altogether and its replacement by forests with smaller or no Korean pine representation. Either way, it would have meant the demise of the last old-growth broad-leaved Korean pine forest in CNR by human causes. Things would have been very different had decision-makers listened to the advise of experts and scholars earlier.

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Policy Recommendations

In our view, putting an end to human disturbances at CNR calls for the following policy responses: (1) The existing local statutes and the two national statutes pertaining to natural reserves issued in the 1980s and 1990s are not only limited and difficult to enforce, they have also become increasingly inadequate for their intended purposes in a time of rapid economic development and social change. Since the drafting of legislations to protect natural reserves is on the legislative agenda of the meeting of the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, we propose, based on the case study of CNR, the following supplements and revisions to the proposed legislation: A. The national ownership of natural reserves, including their ecosystems, their flora and fauna, and their natural landscape, must be mandated by law and promulgated. These are natural capital that belongs to the country as a whole, and not the property of any local government or private organizations. Concerned administrative bodies charged with protecting and managing the nation’s natural reserves must enforce the law, and have no right either to alter or otherwise to manipulate existing laws with respect to the administrative system, construction plan, classification criteria and functional districting of the reserves, or to develop or exploit the reserve for economic purposes. Reserves in which some of these changes have already taken place must reverse them. B. The core area and the buffer zone inside natural reserves must be free from all and any human interference not explicitly permitted by law. If and when human interference is warranted in particular circumstances, it should fall to the agency in charge of environmental protection (i.e. neither reserve management nor other administrative agencies) to bring together organizations and experts from different disciplines to carry out scientific studies of the matter. Critical views must be allowed, recorded and taken seriously. If the project is approved, the agency in charge of environmental protection must closely monitor, test, and supervise its execution from start to finish, and evaluate its outcome. Problems must be promptly corrected to avoid irreversible damages. C. Environmental and ecology experts must be given veto power in decision-making about economic and commercial development

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in natural reserves. Policy-making, scientific evaluation and expert analysis must all be conducted in accordance with a system of accountability. Those already responsible for damages in the natural reserves must be held legally accountable for their actions to deter them from further dereliction of duty. (2) Resource conservation and management inside CNR should be strengthened. Businesses and corporations involved in the practice of open auction and contract bidding of the right to harvest pine seeds can continue provided they apply proper standards for harvest rights and tighten codes governing the use of technology. For example, they should only allow seeds that have fallen to the ground to be collected, and prohibit tree climbing. This is important for softening the impact of the harvesting proc­ ess on the forests, maintaining the health of the larger ecosystem, and facilitating the Korean fine forest’s self-regeneration and self-renewal. (3) The incoherent practice of treating “hard” and “soft” targets differentially and disjointedly in forest management in the natural reserve must change. Since fire prevention is considered a “hard,” clearly defined policy goal, it is taken very seriously at all levels of the government. It enjoys generous funding and other resources in terms of both staffing and physical facilities. By contrast, since resource conservation is a “soft,” less clearly defined policy goal, both more ambiguous in terms of evaluation standards and more lax in terms of verification methods, it has largely been marginalized, and its enforcement assigned to poorly funded, understaffed and inadequately-equipped agencies. CNR offers a clear example of such imbalance. To change this, resource conservation and management must be treated the same way forest fire­ prevention has been, which is through instituting a system of responsibility and accountability. Secondly, we need the conditions of field stations must be improved. These stations should receive a greater share than they historically have of all kinds of resources, including personnel, technical equipment and fringe benefits. Thirdly, any work done in and to the natural reserves should be consistent with the goal of promoting the coherent integration of the wellbeing of the reserve on one hand and that of the local community on the other, and that of establishing a management and development model that emphasizes public participation and community involvement. (4) The ring roads surrounding CNR should be repurposed to promote fire prevention and resource conservation. The ring roads were originally designed to be used for patrol, but have become practically useless for that purpose. Worse still, they have had the unintended consequences of

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facilitating illegal entry into the reserve. Recently, it has been proposed that these roads be paved over with concrete to promote tourism, On the northern and western slopes of the Changbaishan mountain, paved roads have already cut off the migratory routes of many animals, who have become segregated and confined to islands of small areas. These hard surfaces have not only interfered with their seasonal migration but also jeopardized genetic exchange among the groups. Moreover, paving over the ring roads with concrete severs CNR from surrounding forests, with adverse consequences for wildlife. This should stop and the rockand-sand surface of the roads should be left alone. All the footpaths leading into the reserve that open onto the ring roads should be plowed to facilitate the restoration of vegetation. Monitoring stations should be set up at all the intersections between the ring roads and the outside for fire prevention and resource conservation. (5) The directive issued by the Ministry of Forestry that requires the extension of the core area of the Korean pine forests and of the tundra region in CNR should be enforced. We suggest that the core should be no less than 70% of the reserve. The ideal ratio, more specifically, should be >70% for the core, 10% for the buffer and