China and Multilateralism: From Estrangement to Competition (Globalisation, Europe, and Multilateralism) [1 ed.] 0367143828, 9780367143824

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China and Multilateralism

This book thoroughly analyzes China’s political ideas regarding the international order and their reflection in China’s engagement in multilateralism. It introduces the debates and discussions that take place among Chinese intellectuals in the study of international relations as an important part of nonwestern international relation theories, generating reflections on the convergences and divergences between China’s political ideas and Europe-centric perspectives. With a focus specifically on China’s main bilateral and multilateral relations in its principal regions of interest – East Asia and Central Asia – the book also examines China’s relationship with the United States, Russia, and the European Union, and the One Belt One Road initiative drawing on a mixture of primary and secondary Chinese language sources, extensive interviews with Chinese officials, academics, and think tanks. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of Chinese politics/ studies, foreign policy analysis, Asian studies, and international relations. Yuan Feng is a Researcher at the Institut des études Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. She is also the General Secretary of EU-CHINA People to People Association.

Globalisation, Europe, Multilateralism Series Editor: Mario TELÒ

Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, and LUISS-Guido Carli, Rome, Italy.

Series Manager: Frederik PONJAERT Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.

With the institutional support of the Institut d’études européennes-Université libre de Bruxelles The series offers an interdisciplinary platform for original peer-reviewed publications on the institutions, norms and practices associated with Globalisation, Multilateralism and the European Union. Each published volume delves into a given dynamic shaping either the global-regional nexus or the role of the EU therein. It offers original insights into: globalisation and its associated governance challenges; the changing forms of multilateral cooperation and the role of transnational networks; the impact of new global powers and the corollary multipolar order; the lessons born from comparative regionalism and interregional partnerships; as well as the distinctive instruments the EU mobilises in its foreign policies and external relations.

International Editorial Board Amitav ACHARYA, American University, Washington Shaun BRESLIN, University of Warwick

Leonardo MORLINO, LUISS-Guido Carli, Rome Tamio NAKAMURA, Waseda University, Tokyo Ramona COMAN, Université libre de Bruxelles Yaqing QIN, CFAU, Beijing Marise CREMONA, EUI, Florence Ummu SALMA BAVA, JNU, New Delhi Louise FAWCETT, University of Oxford Vivien SCHMIDT, Boston University Andrew GAMBLE, University of Cambridge Leonard SEABROOKE, Copenhagen Business School Robert O. KEOHANE, Princeton University Karen E. SMITH, LSE, London Nicolas LEVRAT, Université de Genève Anne WEYEMBERGH, Université libre de Bruxelles Christian LEQUESNE, IEP-Paris Michael ZÜRN, WZB, Berlin

China and Multilateralism From Estrangement to Competition Yuan Feng Regionalism and Multilateralism Politics, Economics, Culture Edited by Thomas Meyer, José Luís de Sales Marques and Mario Telò

China and Multilateralism From Estrangement to Competition Yuan Feng

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Yuan Feng The right of Yuan Feng to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Feng, Yuan, 1952– author. Title: China and multilateralism : from estrangement to competition / Yuan Feng. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Globalisation, Europe, multilateralism | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020003907 (print) | LCCN 2020003908 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367143824 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429031748 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations—21st century. | Geopolitics— Asia. | World politics—21st century. Classification: LCC JZ1734 .F46 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1734 (ebook) | DDC 327.51—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020003907 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020003908 ISBN: 978-0-367-14382-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-03174-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of figures vi List of tables vii Foreword by Mario Telòix Foreword by Li Xingxi List of abbreviations xiv 1 Introduction

1

2 China’s multilateralism: a challenge to the existing theoretical legacy

26

3 China’s engagement in multilateralism

38

4 The development of multilateral institutions and regionalism

87

5 Conclusion Appendix Bibliography Index

131 148 150 182

Figures

3.1 The percentage of each partnership type of China 4.1 Bilateral trade information between Russia and China (2005–2018) 4.2 Main regional cooperation institutions involving Central Asia 4.3 The interrelations of different issues in East Asia regionalism 4.4 China’s neighborhood seen from bilateral and multilateral perspectives 4.5 Countries that have established FTA agreements with China by July 2019 4.6 Countries (in dark grey) that signed the Belt and Road Initiative by the end of April 2019 4.7 China-Europe Rail Freight Planning Map 4.8 The Pan-Asia Railway Network 5.1 Main countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB 5.2 The integration of ASEAN+3 and SCO with BRI on China’s main issues of competitive multilateralism 5.3 Chinese crude oil imports by country in 2018

76 91 99 109 118 119 122 127 128 139 140 142

Tables

1.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3

The module of analysis of China’s political ideas The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the first phase The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the second phase The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the third phase The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the fourth phase The summary of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy ideas Chart of the evolution of China’s foreign policy ideas Number of China’s strategic partnerships (from 2000 to 2019) Countries that have signed bilateral swap agreements with China The FTAs between China and its partners: signed, under negotiation and in feasibility studies

17 43 48 60 72 78 79 114 117 120

Foreword Mario Telò

This book addresses the fundamental question of the origins, scope, geographical variety and current challenges of the Chinese approach to multilateral cooperation. The way of the People’s Republic of China towards the multilateral system issued by World War II has been extremely difficult. The Republic of China (ROC) chaired by Chiang Kai-Shek, took part in the foundation of the UN, and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was influenced (according to the co-author, Eleonor Roosevelt) by the representative of the ROC, the Confucianist lawyer and philosopher Dr Peng Chung Chang, vice president of the UN Committee on Human Rights. But the victory of the Communist party in the civil war (1949) dramatically changed the situation. After the dramatic mobilization of October 1950, when 1.4 million Chinese troops, under the name of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPV), crossed the Yalu River to assist North Korean armies, against UN intervention, it took 20 years and the open rivalry with Soviet Union for making it possible the Mao Tse Tung decision to enter into the UN Security Council and replace the Republic of China (Taiwan), with the agreement of the USA (thanks to secret negotiations between Chou En Lai and Henry Kissinger). The successive evolution is impressive. Fifty years later, the People’s Republic of China is the country providing the largest contingent of military personnel to 13 UN peacekeeping operations (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon in particular). For the membership into the Bretton Woods institution and notably the WTO (2001), the radical turning point led by Deng Xiao Ping since 1978 was needed and the innovative policy of “opening up” which, in only 40  years, framed the most extraordinary socio-economic modernization ever, China under Xi Jinping’s rule a political defender of multilateral cooperation, in trade, economics, and environment protection (signing and implementing the COP 21 treaty of 2015). How reliable and consistent is China’s approach to multilateralism? How robust and sustainable is the ideational and interest background? Yuan Feng addresses this set of questions, on the one hand, by scrutinizing the distinctive features of the Chinese multilateral cooperation with Chinese characteristics in general, and, on the other hand, by looking in parallel to the multiple and various networks China is proactively setting in the regional neighbourhood (ASEAN and SCO) as well

x  Foreword: Telò as by interregional ties (including the BRI). The neo-institutionalist approach of this book reveals effective in framing fresh empirical research. The reader may or may not agree with the author’s conclusions, open to alternative scenarios as the compatibility of China’s approach with the current multilateral system, notably in a transition time, when the legacy of the global multilateral framework is affected by hard challenges, notably, the efficiency and legitimacy crises and the defection of the first global super power. However, the reader will recognize that this book combines in an original way new knowledge with a coherent interpretation. Professor of international relations, Université Libre de Bruxelles and LUISS, Rome

Foreword Li Xing

China’s Pursuit of Multilateralism and Its Institutional Statecraft Ever since the beginning of the new millennium, the implications and impact of the rise of China on the existing world order have been intensively discussed and debated in international relations. What will China eventually become: A force for the status quo or a force for change? What will China do with its new and growing capabilities? How does Beijing project its power and turn power into an objective? Will China ever be able to fulfil Western expectations? How will the rise of China affect the underlying rules of the game of the existing capitalist world order? Will the future new world order be shaped with Chinese characteristics? These questions are of greatest salience at the level of the international system and world order. Ever since Napoleon warned the world that it would be better not to wake the “sleeping giant”, China has always been seen as a source of fascination and opportunities as well as uncertainties and disturbance for the West. Today the great difficulty facing the US-led existing world order is how to respond and adjust to the impact brought about by the rise of China. The constant failure of the West in general and the US in particular in forming a comprehensive understanding of China and China-related policies led to continuous China-West distrust and conflict. The ongoing China-US trade war is the latest manifestation of great power rivalry brought about by power transition and “Thucydides’ Trap”. As a consequence of China’s global rise, the world is witnessing a rising “China syndrome”, especially in the Western world, which can be characterized by a mixture of psychological anxiety, emotional hysteria and emphatic demonization. In past years either fascination or irritation with China has emotionally influenced Western politics, scholarship, and journalism, which often produces abrupt sentiments ranging from excessive approval and unqualified optimism to unwarranted revulsion and deep pessimism. The key condition for China to achieve the realization of an emerging world order embedded with Chinese aspects of hegemony is to maintain a peaceful and stable international environment, especially among China’s near neighbours and regions. Any assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy could create distrust toward

xii  Foreword: Xing China’s intentions and policy objective. There is an increasingly shared belief in Chinese polity that multilateralism can provide a positive foundation for mutual trust and confidence in the emerging world order where China is playing indispensable roles. Even in the view of some western powers, the failure of existing US-led international institutions to adjust to the growing clout of emerging powers undermines the legitimacy of the entire multilateral system. But rather than abandon the existing system, China is working to strengthen it while setting up new alternative institutions to cope with its deficits. However, China’s effort in building a network of international institutions is alleged by the principle powers to be counter-hegemonic as these potential rival institutions are perceived to challenge, oppose, and undermine the existing US-led global and regional institutions. In recent years, China-led multilateralism is unleashing a great deal of norm diffusion effect that is underpinning China’s outward power projection. In other words, multilateral components of Chinese foreign policies, norms, values, behaviours, and institutions are being intertwined in the emerging world order as a result of the institutional diffusion effect driven by China’s global economic rise and its increasing leadership role in global governance. Since 1996, the world has witnessed a positive transition in China’s diplomatic strategy and international relations approach, signalled by its first embrace of multilateralism through membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years Beijing’s leadership in the promotion of alternative international financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank), the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (the AIIB), and the New Silk Road Fund, have received both global attention and the fear of the existing world hegemons. Furthermore, China-led regional multilateral organizations, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) along with its membership, and active participation and engagement in other existing regional and global organizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Group of Twenty (G20), and the 17 + 1 format (Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries), are occurring within the established system of the existing world order. Today, China is actively participating in global governance as an emerging international aid and public goods provider. China is the second-highest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, and the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China had already signed on to the 1992 Rio Conventions on biodiversity, desertification, and climate change as well as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which set binding emissions reduction targets. In addition, it stepped up its climate leadership in 2014, collaborating with US President Barack Obama’s administration to produce a joint Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. Unlike the current situation in the US, in which the Trump administration has withdrawn from a number of international institutions and treaties including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Climate Agreement, China is consolidating its multilateral engagement worldwide as a responsible stakeholder. The recently signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP), the

Foreword: Xing xiii world’s biggest free trade bloc, is aimed at strengthening trading ties among China and others with ASEAN members. Last but not least, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also in the process of evolving into a multilateral project, making it a good example of China’s multilayered multilateralism. This book, China and Multilateralism: From Estrangement to Competition by Yuan Feng, neatly situates itself in reflecting the aforementioned trajectories. The book engages in an analytical research on the evolution of China’s foreign policy with a focus on the nexus between the gradual transformation of China’s foreign policy and its interactive relationships with multilateralism. Multilateralism is becoming not just a pragmatic policy means but also a foreign policy objective. The book entails a huge amount of work which is historically rich and which covers many issues across multiple academic disciplines. The contribution of the book lies in the construction of a methodological framework for policy research, that is to explore the causal effect of the role of ideas (worldviews, perceptions, norms, values, and their ideational impact/effect) as a driving force in shaping China’s multilateral foreign policy. It is no doubt that the book manifests a heuristic approach to political and policy studies in terms of examining the complexities and interactive relationships among actors, ideas, and policies in time and space. It is evident that the book illuminates China’s emerging institutional statecraft in the nexus of the rise of China and the emergence of a new world order. Professor and Director Research Center on Development and International Relations Editor in Chief, Journal of China and International Relations Department of Politics and Society Aalborg University Denmark

Abbreviations

ACSC AIIB ALADI ARF ASEAN ASEAN+3 BRI CASS CIS CPC DI DSB FTA GATT GDP GUAM HI IDBC IMF Mercosur NEPADC OAU OBOR PRC RI SCO UN WTO

Association of Caribbean States Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank Asociación Latinoamericanoa de Integracion ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations + China, Japan, and South Korea Belt and Road Initiative Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of China discursive institutionalism dispute settlement body free trade area General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Organization for Democracy and Economic Development historical institutionalism Inter-American Development Bank International Monetary Fund Mercado Común del Sud New Partnership for Africa’s Development Organization of African Unity One Belt One Road People’s Republic of China Rational Choice Institutionalism Shanghai Cooperation Organisation United Nations World Trade Organization

1 Introduction

As I write this book, the most important news concerning China is the arrest of Huawei’s chief finance officer in Canada under the request of the US. Following this unusual breaking news is the huge debate among several Western countries about whether to engage Huawei’s products and services in the incoming era of 5G. In the understanding of many Chinese scholars and media outlets, this signifies that the tensions between China, the rising actor in the current world order and the US and its allies, the existing dominating actors, have reached a point of unprecedented intensity. This crisis of Huawei is only the tip of the iceberg of this tension. With the trade war between the US and China and the tide of criticism of China’s human rights and political regime, rumours of a “new Cold War” have begun to spread. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War between the US and the USSR, China has become one of the most important actors in international affairs in the contemporary world. It attracts much attention, and even worries, not only due to its strong economy, its huge population and its vast territory, but also its nonliberal regime. China has never been a state that embraces liberalism in its history and it is not likely to do so in the near future. With Chinese president Xi Jinping’s amendment of the Chinese constitution, it seems that China is even less politically open than it was. On the other hand, one should not neglect China’s active involvement in multilateral institutions and its efforts in maintaining the existing world order. This is an interesting phenomenon, as the US has become less supportive of multilateral institutions and turned more to unilateralism since Donald Trump’s presidency. Though China’s domestic politics remain undemocratic, Chinese president Xi Jinping has stated clearly that China supports democratization of international relations and multilateral economic institutions. China has strongly supported the Paris Agreement on climate change, and on the Osaka Summit of 2019, China has emphasized that China, Russia, and India should take more global responsibility and uphold multilateralism (Wong and Wu, 2019). In comparison with China’s attitude towards multilateralism, Donald Trump is pulling the US out from several multilateral institutions and arrangements and insisting on unilateralism. The trade war between the US and China has caused much turbulence in the world economy in 2018 and 2019, and it begs the question of how two strong

2  Introduction actors might work in global multilateral institutions. Yet the accusation of US Vice President Pence of China’s “meddling in America’s democracy” has revealed the long-lasting worries of Western countries: “America had hoped that economic liberalization would bring China into greater partnership with us and with the world.  .  .  . Instead, China has chosen economic aggression, which has in turn emboldened its growing military” (Johnson and Groll, 2018). In 2019, both Donald Trump and Xi Jinping chose a hardline strategy to confront each other in the disputes. Following the confrontations in trade, collaboration in education and cultural domains have also been influenced. Thus a “trade war” is no longer sufficient to describe the ongoing contest between the US and China. The most fundamental divergence between the US and China lies in political ideas and norms. Being a non-democratic regime, China is easily reproached on grounds of human rights, the rule of law with respect to government subsidies, and norm competition in the international world order based on values largely issued from the West. However, being the second-largest world economy, China’s importance is amplified through globalization and its norms are also easily diffused through globalization. On the one hand, the US is turning away from existing multilateral institutions as it judges that they are no longer beneficial to it. On the other hand, China is actively involving itself in multilateral institutions, including supporting the reform of the United Nations, in order to establish its image as a driver of multilateral institutions. So by the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the picture of the future world order has become quite uncertain as we have China, one of the most important players, pursuing multilateralism as its key foreign policy, while keeping an authoritarian regime in its domestic affairs. This seemingly conflictual combination of China’s domestic and foreign policy makes it difficult to understand what China’s embrace of multilateralism really means. In this book, I would like to try to explain this question, mainly through the lens of an ideational research method. Given the extremely complex of China’s history and its current political situation, it is necessary to lay a road map to explain the logic of this book. In the first chapter, I will clarify some basic questions concerning this project. The answers to these questions highlight the need for research. The core concern of these questions touches on the broad issue, asking “Why is multilateralism important for global governance?” It explains the importance of focusing on multilateralism among so many “isms” in international relations theories. The second question links multilateralism with China’s rise. I  try to explain “How is China’s rise related to its engagement in its understanding of multilateralism?” This question covers the necessity to explore China’s multilateralism policies. The third question that I would like to touch on is the importance of ideas in China’s foreign policy making from 1949 to 2016. This section will focus on the importance of ideas in the formation of China’s foreign policy, and help us to understand what “multilateralism with Chinese characteristics” means.

Introduction  3 Thus, with a clear understanding of why it is important to study Chinese political ideas in China’s multilateralism policy, I will introduce the theoretical tool of this book, the combination of discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism.

The basic questions Why is multilateralism important for global governance? One of the undeniable features of our time is that many issues attract global attention and require coordination among several countries. The coordination among countries is generally defined as global governance, an under-specified concept that has become a popular concept in the Chinese government’s discourse. As the G20 Summit was held in Hangzhou in 2016, China presents itself as a promoter of reform of global governance. China has already begun to participate in global governance through the provision of public goods. Yet a more efficient global governance involves not only the delivery of public goods but also institutional accountability and normative aspects (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999; Nayyar, 2002; Higgott, 2004, p.  2). This makes multilateralism the best coordination model of global governance. As Ikenberry has pointed out, states are conducting their business “in or around multilateral forums”, and different multilateral institutions have become places to negotiate, communicate, and share the common rules (Ikenberry, 2011b). To sum it up, the seeking of responses to challenges and problems that are mutual to the global society has generated the need for global governance. And so far, the most commonly adopted way to realize global governance is multilateralism. And the main channel through which states and non-state powers apply multilateralism is through institutions. So why is multilateralism so important and relevant to global governance? There are several points to be mentioned here to clarify the most important concept of this book. First, as John Ruggie has observed as early as 1993, institutions are “in demand” because they are “robust and adaptive”, both in economic and security affairs, and “a core feature of the current international institutional order is its multilateral form”, which “appears to have characteristics that enhance its durability and ability to adapt to change” (Ruggie, 1983, p. ix). Multilateralism has been “increasingly accepted as the modus operandi in world politics” (Powell, 2003, p. 3), as nations have gradually realized that many issues pose challenges to several nations at the same time, thus demanding multilateral cooperation to address them; and there are also many issues that have linkages with different aspects of human activities,1 requiring multilateral cooperation to provide a comprehensive solution. The concept of multilateralism has been developing and transforming. Keohane defines multilateralism as “an institutionalized collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states” and “persistent sets of rules that constrain

4  Introduction activity, shape expectations and prescribe roles” (Keohane, 2005). According to Ruggie, multilateralism is “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more States on the basis of generalized principles of conduct and reciprocity” (Ruggie, 1993). Regarding the history of multilateralism, it has developed through three different epochs: first, the nineteenth-century arrangements and conferences within the context of the evolving European Multipolar Concert of the “Great Powers”, setting the first multilateral arrangements about Rhein navigation, post and telegraph, weights and measures, and so forth; second, the institutionalized multilateral system set up at the political and economic levels under the hegemony of the US after the Second World War; and the heterogeneous and uncertain development of multilateral cooperation after the end of the Cold War and within the multipolar world of the twenty-first century (Telò, 2014c, p. 35). It was believed that hegemony is a decisive factor in the formation of multilateral cooperation regimes, as it shoulders the responsibility for providing public goods. Yet in After Hegemony, Keohane has predicted that it is possible to have multilateral cooperation without the coordination of a hegemonic power: “International institutions help to realize common interests in world politics” as the “complementary interests” make “certain forms of cooperation potentially beneficial” (Keohane, 2005, pp. 243–245). It seems that the emerging multilateral institutions, which are rising with new regionalism, confirm Keohane’s statement. As the current era is concerned, according to Telò’s observation, multilateralism is developing into pluralistic multilateralism with the following characteristics: (a) A decentralized multipolarity has proven to be compatible with multilateral cooperation, provided that balance of power and alliance for security are no longer the priority. Hegemony is not necessary for multilateral cooperation, but leadership (either an individual or collective driving force) would be needed. (b) A shift from the specific to diffuse reciprocity occurs (where any exchange takes place in the context of an issue linkage and where gains are expected within a larger time span through enhanced trust). Multilateral agreements historically started with a single policy field and adjusted themselves to the nature of issues according to their political relevance. In this way, multilateralism has become deeper and stronger. (c) The development of pluralistic multilateralism presents the paradox that on the one hand human rights, rule of law, democracy, and global justice are increasingly founded on shared values as pluralistic multilateralism comes into formation, while on the other hand instrumental cooperation, contingent multilateral practices, and exclusive military alliances also occur; (d) Pluralistic multilateralism interacts with the rise of regionalism. This new round of regionalism after the end of the Cold War has become an important phenomenon for research in international relations: new regionalism has developed in the form of multilateralism in order to oppose unilateralism, limiting the old-fashioned logics of balance of power and preventing local conflicts and fragmentation. The balance between the regional and global dimension of multilateral cooperation is an important source for the development of multilateralism (Telò, 2014c, pp. 62–65).

Introduction 5 We also need to admit that multilateralism is undergoing challenges from unilateralism as well, especially that of the US under the presidency of Donald Trump. As noted by Edward Luce, what is worrying is not Donald Trump’s presidency, but what is behind it (Luce, 2017). The rise of populism has become an unavoidable by-product of globalization, and its voice is getting stronger as current global governance is unable to provide an efficient solution to certain issues. As multilateralism is expressed in the form of institutions, it is important to investigate the definition of institutions as well. The definition of institutions A clarification of the concept of “institution” is necessary, since it is how multilateralism is expressed and thus makes it one of the fundamental concepts in this thesis. There are many definitions of “institution”; their common point is that they all point out the function of institutions to help actors make decisions in a more efficient way. Keohane and Nye define institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 3). North’s definition of institutions is “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, and institutions can “reduce uncertainty by providing structure to everyday life” and “institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North, 1990, pp. 3–4). Ikenberry complements the function of institutions by pointing out that institutions can embody formal legal or organizational procedures and understandings that strengthen expectations about the orientation of future state behaviour. They also set out a road map about how problems will be resolved, and channels of communication, routines for decision making and consultations. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 65) Wendt describes institutionalization as the process to socialize recognition, interests, and norms and to transfer them into a relatively stable structure (Wendt, 1994, pp. 384–396). The importance of institutions for efficient and effective global governance has been noted. Keohane has pointed out that international institutions are necessary for cooperation after hegemony, as “institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what governments must do; rather, they help governments pursue their own interests through cooperation” by “allowing like-minded countries that are responsible for both making the essential rules and maintaining them” through mutual agreements (Keohane, 2005, pp.  245–246). Bell and Hindmoor argue that trusted and legitimated institutions are needed for continuing globalization, given the context in which liberalization of trade, deregulation of finance, and a more limited role for the state are reshaping the world (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

6  Introduction Jones et  al. also point out the importance of institutions in confronting global issues such as terrorism, economic crisis, natural disasters, environmental issues, and epidemic diseases (Jones, Pascual and Stedman, 2009). The importance of institutions has increasingly attracted the attention of Chinese scholars as China has become increasingly involved in reshaping the world order after the Cold War, and China has long realized its real challenge and opportunity lie in how much it can influence the formation of new institutions of post US hegemony (Yu, 2013). China has realized that to form a new set of international institutions means it is necessary for governments to redefine their national interests within this new framework (Qin, 1999, pp. 279–280). Thus, how to justify and legitimize China’s ideas about the new world order is a critical part. Men Honghua argues that the fundamental value of international institutions still lies in their ethical value, as they represent human beings’ pursuit of common interests and common justice and provide a platform to realize them (Men, 2005a, p. 48). With this perspective, China’s participation in institution building has taken a strong normative orientation since the beginning, in order to achieve consensus with other regimes on a new set of values (Yang, 2007; Li, 2014a). In October of 2015, at the occasion of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee of the CPC has acknowledged the importance of China’s “active participation in global economy governance and public provision” and “improve China’s institutional discourse power in global governance”. As I will introduce in the historical review section, a “guiding thread” has been China’s call for establishing a fairer, better world order since 1949, and the end of the Cold War provides China an opportunity to become involved in global institution building, to stabilize the multipolar world, and to avoid going back to a hegemonic one (Qin, 2009b, 2013). Thus, there is a link between China’s participation in global governance through the building of institutions, and an important strategic goal for Chinese government is to enhance China’s institutional discourse power, which is believed to be very limited. Attention should be given to the fact that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has already defined itself as a builder of global institutions instead of merely a participant. This transition of roles is also to be elaborated in this book.

How is China’s rise related to its engagement in its understanding of multilateralism? China’s understanding of multilateralism is not solely an academic notion but has many different aspects. Since the word “multilateralism” finishes in “ism”, suggesting “a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs” (Caporaso, 1993, p. 53); and Ruggie has pointed out that the most distinguishing characteristics of the multilateral form is that it coordinates based on “generalized principles of conduct” (Ruggie, 1993, p. 14), the understanding of multilateralism is thus highly related to ideational factors of countries that practice it. In this way, how China understands multilateralism is decided by the following aspects: (a) how China understands international society; (b) how China

Introduction  7 understands the principles upon which international society is organized; (c) how China understands the dispute resolution of international issues; and (d) how China understands its role in this society and its relations with other countries. The reason why ideational factors were chosen as the main approach for this research is that ideas play an important role in both China’s philosophical tradition and foreign policy development. Qin Yaqing, one of the most important international relations theorists in China and the rector of China’s Foreign Affairs University, has pointed out that in the Chinese context, the ideas of CPC leaders play a major role in understanding China’s foreign policy (Qin, 2012b, pt. 163). Certainly, CPC leaders’ foreign policy ideas are based on the real world and are about the real world, but the way that they interpret reality and what China should do is the most important factor to achieve a better understanding of China. This point will be elaborated in later paragraphs that explain our theoretical framework. Since China has launched the Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978, we can observe two phenomena that are taking place at the same time. On the one hand, China’s economy grows rapidly and the discussions concerning China’s growing influences and China’s rise have attracted many Chinese and non-Chinese scholars; on the other hand, we see China’s participation in multilateral institutions increasing and initiating multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. So how do we see the relationship between the two phenomena? Concerning the question of China’s rise, different parlances have been adopted to describe it: from China’s rise to Xi Jinping’s recent Great Revival of the Chinese nation. A consensus has already been reached among Chinese scholars that China needs to pursue a peaceful rise (Peaceful Rise “和平崛起” in Chinese),2 but the question lies in how to realize the peaceful rise. What the Chinese scholars are trying to prove is that China’s rise will not necessarily lead to regional instability or military conflicts, thus there is no need to either worry about it or contain it. For China’s engagement in multilateralism, as China has become the secondlargest economy in the world,3 it increasingly engages multilateralism to manage its foreign relations and to construct institutions that facilitate China’s involvement in regional and global affairs. This has presented a distinct change from China’s foreign relations since 1949: China had been very negative towards multilateral institutions. This attitude softened in 1971, when China joined the United Nations, and gradually the country has become very active in initiating multilateral institutions after the Cold War, the most recent examples being the AIIB. As the rise of China and its engagement in multilateralism exist respectively as foreign policy input (idea) and a main foreign policy output (practice), the relationship between the two has attracted attention from both Chinese and nonChinese scholars. China’s participation in multilateral institutions has been studied, as an indication of how a rising China might manage its relationship with international society and of how optimistic attitudes can co-exist with pessimistic ones toward a rising China. In earlier years, China’s accession to the WTO has been seen as a signal of China’s acceptance of international rules and integration into international society (Johnston, 2008; Lampton, 2008). Later, China’s

8  Introduction active participation in regional multilateral institutions such as ASEAN+3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum, in combination with its increasing territorial conflicts with neighbouring countries, has caused worries among its neighbouring countries that China might be only using multilateral institutions to cover its ambition of becoming a dominant power in Asia Pacific (Acharya, 2000, 2003b; Rohrabacher, 2010; Gatbonton, 2014, McClatchy) and might threaten the existing world order by rewriting the rules of the game (Bloomberg, 2015). The doubts about China’s successful integration into existing institutions are usually linked with suspicions about China’s peaceful rise. At the same time, many Chinese and non-Chinese scholars agree that institution-making will be where the new competition between the US and China will appear (Bergsten et al., 2008; Yu, 2013). This might send the signals of new means of competition between the two most important countries in the world and arouse interests in the strategic significance of multilateral institutions initiated by China.

The importance of ideas in China’s foreign policy making from 1949 until 2016 Concerning the importance of ideas in the formation of China’s foreign policy, there are several points that I would like to emphasize. First, the importance of ideas is well recognized in research on China’s foreign policy conducted by Chinese researchers. Chinese foreign policy (中国外交思 想) is seen as a combined result of Chinese culture (Ma, 2011), Chinese history (J. Zhang, 2011), and China’s domestic and external situations after 1949 (Jian, 2010). Foreign policy ideas of the founding fathers of P.R. China, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, are considered as the cornerstones and guiding torches of China’s foreign policy and thus enjoy far reaching influence and legitimacy in subsequent generations’ foreign policies (Fu, 2000). These foreign policy ideas are not only strategic thinking about foreign relations, but they are also strongly connected with beliefs and values (Su, 2015, p.  28). Thus, both the theoretical aspect and the academic resources in China support the research pattern that adopts ideas as an independent variable. Second, though there are many studies done by Chinese researchers on China’s foreign policy ideas, they are not combined with the research on its role of forming institutions. For example, China’s accession to the UN and WTO, its participation in ASEAN+3, and its initiative to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have usually been analyzed from the perspective of China’s relationship with major powers4 and/or China’s strategic arrangement.5 To put it differently, the change in China’s foreign policies is more often analyzed at the strategic or policy level, without assessing the changes further at the ideational level. The strategic or policy level analysis is certainly necessary. However, they alone are pale and insufficient to observe China’s change in engaging in multilateralism, especially when China’s rise concerns the future world order. If ideas are not examined, the rise of China seems to become a mechanical and passive process, and the analysis

Introduction  9 does not reveal how China actually perceives its rise: why it should rise, how it should rise, and what it can offer as it rises?6 Third, there is also abundant research on China’s foreign policy and China’s international relations, but very few studies touch upon the causal relation between domestic factors and China’s foreign policies, let alone the role of ideas in these changes. As Song Wei from Peking University has pointed out, China’s domestic politics has huge impacts on its foreign policy; sometimes it may direct the foreign policy to surmount the restrictions of the international system, and this is a point that is often neglected by Western researchers (Song, 2010, p. 82). Zhang Baijia and Zhang Qingmin have also pointed out that the interaction between domestic politics and foreign relations is one of the most important characteristics of China’s foreign policy development (Zhang, 2002; Q. Zhang, 2009, 2013). As China has a very large population, economic quantity and increasing international impact, its domestic policy will have more sophisticated interactions with its foreign policy (Chu, 2006; Q. Zhang, 2013). Without a better understanding of China’s domestic politics, the understanding of China’s foreign policy and its role in international relations might be misguided. The originality of this thesis is to fill this gap by adopting discursive institutionalism to explain the change in China’s foreign policy. Like any other country, China’s foreign policies, and in particular its decision to engage multilateralism, are the results of many complicated factors and the intrinsic interrelations between them. We do not intend to insist that ideas are the only factor that decides China’s foreign policy, but we would like to discuss how ideas, as a domestic factor, have caused the change in China’s foreign policies, especially in its engagement in multilateralism. According to the definition of Central School of Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy expert, Men Honghua, “ideas of foreign policy philosophy” are the most influential power since they form the base of China’s foreign policy philosophy and the context of decision-making. He adds that “foreign policy philosophy” has been formed within a specific historical background, and they are political philosophy ideas or values that exert long-term influences on foreign policy making and practices of diplomacy, while foreign policy ideas express more directly a country’s dominant ideas concerning foreign affairs and its overall interests (Men, 2013b, p. 2). He argues that ever since the foundation P.R. China in 1949, different Chinese leaders have had a different understanding and recognition of the problems China was confronted with, and have reacted differently, thus, the understanding of the objective world is of extreme importance for foreign policy making in China (Men, 2005b, p. 17). At the same time, one should not neglect the fact that there is both continuity and discontinuity in China’s foreign policy: after the Reform and Opening Up, each mandate of the Chinese government has kept a certain continuity with its previous mandate but at the same time developed distinct differences (Yu, 2005). From Men’s definition, we can see that Chinese foreign policy ideas are nurtured by two important factors. First, Chinese traditional philosophy and culture have contributed a lot to their formation. As Zhou Enlai, P.R. China’s first prime

10  Introduction minister pointed out, “not all our foreign policy ideas come from Marxism and Leninism, many of them are inherited from China’s traditional culture” (Zhou, 1990, pp. 327–328). Confucianism and other traditional teachings have been the focus of greater attention as China has begun to seek to reshape its identity in international society starting with the year 2000. This will be further discussed in the following contexts. Second, China’s foreign policy ideas have been inevitably influenced by China’s contemporary history: as Womack suggested, the West’s invasion starts an era when China painfully realized the end of the illusion of the universalism of the Confucian empire and China is a weak, backward and defeated nation (Womack, 1982, p. 31). This shattering reality and the impetus to regain the status of a great power have become starting points of China’s foreign policy. China’s unique history, once married to Karl Marx’s communist theory, has given birth to an emphasis on national interests, which is the second characteristic in China’s foreign policy. At the same time, the ideas formed during this period have a direct link with the Communist Party of China’s legitimacy to keep ruling the country, thus they exert great influences on China’s worldview, values building, and policymaking. In the next section, the influences of traditional Chinese culture and Marxism will be discussed. Ideas in Chinese political philosophy and context “Ideas” can have many counterparts in Chinese language. It might mean “thoughts” (xiang fa) or “concept” (guan nian). In research and discussions among Chinese scholars, ideas in this project can correspond to “ideas of China’s foreign policy philosophy” (zhongguo waijiao zhexue sixiang). Chinese traditional philosophy doesn’t set the material world and spiritual world into sharp contrast. It is a philosophy that is both otherworldly and this worldly, or “extremely idealistic and extremely realistic” at the same time. The two are in contrast, but not in opposition, which implies that in essence the two are considered as a whole (Fung, 1967, pp. 1–4). Accordingly, in Chinese philosophy, ideas have never been isolated from daily life and policymaking. Different schools of philosophy, for example Confucius, Mencius, and Logicians all preach their teachings to the ruling class in order to realize their ideas in political application. As pointed out by McDermott, Chinese traditional philosophers didn’t turn to historical materialism but to historical philosophy; the Chinese have developed a tradition of not lodging their feelings and minds in things (materials). Thus, it might be difficult to squeeze traditional Chinese philosophers into idealist or materialist camps (McDermott, 1982, p. 2). Unlike Western philosophical thinking, China’s traditional philosophy is complicated and non-institutionalized. Thinking and philosophies are dispersed in different teachings, volumes, and poems. Different schools of teaching also intertwine with each other, but the most important and far-reaching school for China is undoubtedly Confucianism (Wang and Huang, 2009, p. 138; J. Zhang, 2011).

Introduction  11 Here it is important to point out that ideas in Confucianism do not necessarily originate entirely from Confucius’ teaching: they are results of intertwining from all teachings of ancient Chinese philosophical schools, and citations from works of other teachings have been engaged. Confucianism provides instructions not only to the political order but also to the social and moral order, and it had legal function for a very long time in ancient Chinese society (Luo, 2009). These three aspects are usually mingled, and the political order that regulated political life can be seen as an enlargement of moral order that regulated a family and a society. The vague borders between family, society, and nation have resulted in a special political order in China: the patriarchal autocratic political system (Zeng, 2005; Feng, 2006).7 This political order that has lasted thousands of years in China has in return strengthened the legitimacy of Confucianism’s teachings, which insist on morality, expressed and regulated through order, as the basis of political legitimacy. The emphasis on the relation between morality and legitimacy, as well as the focus on relative relations among different actors in a society instead of an explicitly defined rule of law are two distinct characteristics of ancient Chinese political ideas that still exert influences on Chinese foreign policy ideas today. With the help of the idea categorization established by discursive institutions, we can distinguish different levels and types of ideas in Confucianism, in order to better understand their far-reaching influences on China’s modern political thinking. The main theory adopted in this thesis is Vivian Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism. It focuses on the role of ideas as domestic factors in the change of institutions. The most important point in discursive institutionalism lies in that (a) it considers ideas as independent variables; and (b) it considers institutions as in constant change, instead of static. A more thorough introduction to discursive institutionalism will be done in the theoretical part. Here we would like to discuss why engaging discursive institutionalism in the study of China’s multilateralism brings out originality. But before that, I would like to first introduce the analysis model of discursive institutionalism. The definition of discursive institutionalism (DI) Discursive institutionalism, proposed by Vivian Schmidt in an attempt to complement failures and loopholes of previous approaches, would like to construct a whole new approach to presenting the role of ideas in the process of policymaking. Discursive institutionalism focuses on a political reality that is based on two elements: first, the ideas and discourses that are used to legitimate actors’ political action in an institutional context; second, the process of the communication of ideas within institutions (Schmidt, 2006; Telò, 2010). The most distinct characteristic of DI is its ability to provide “insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics while providing a more dynamic approach to institutional change than the older three new institutionalisms”, where “ideas are the substantive content of discourse” and “discourse is the interactive process of conveying ideas” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303). According to Schmidt, the DI

12  Introduction approach has four characteristics: first, ideas and discourse are taken seriously, though different definitions of ideas and different ways of discourse may exist; second, ideas are set in institutional contexts, where rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism may act as background information; third, ideas are considered to operate in their “meaning context” and discourse to follow “a logic of communication”; fourth, unlike the three older “new institutionalisms”, DI sees norms and institutions as dynamic and constantly changing (Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). Schmidt has emphasized that unlike institutions in Rational Choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, where institutions serve primarily as constraints (as rationalist incentives or historical paths), institutions of discursive institutionalism allow agents whose “background ideational abilities” explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their “foreground discursive abilities” enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change or to maintain them (Schmidt, 2008, 2011, p. 48). Simply put, institutions can be understood as “carriers of ideas” or “collective memories” (Schmidt, 2011, p. 52). Classifications of ideas in DI There are different kinds of ideas because our cognition is confronted with different subjects and different problems. The classification of ideas in Schmidt’s DI has evidently definitely been inspired by the typologies proposed by different scholars such as Campbell, Hall and Jobert, Goldstein, and Keohane. Ideas are classified into three different levels of generality, which are policies, paradigm, and ideational, and two types of content which are cognitive and normative. However, DI adds a new way of categorizing ideas by adding two types of ideas: normative ideas and cognitive ideas, which differentiate the function of ideas from the types of ideas. Three levels of generality The first level of generality, that of philosophical ideas, concerns the worldviews that “undergird the policies and programs with organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society” (Campbell, 2004), or become “philosophies” or “zeitgeist” (Mehta, 2011). The second level, programs, encompasses the more general programs that underpin the policy ideas. Programs may be understood as “the underlying assumptions or organizing principles orienting policy” (Majone, 1989; Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2002, p. 5), or as “frames of reference that enable policy actors to construct their visions of the world that allow them to situate themselves in the world” (Jobert, 1989; Muller, 1995). Also, program level ideas play the role of “problem definition”, since how we define the problem is a particular way of understanding a complex reality (Mehta, 2011, p. 27). The third level, policies, concerns the specific policies or policy solutions proposed by policymakers. As

Introduction  13 Mehta pointed out, in the narrowest conception an idea can be a “policy solution” that appears when a problem is given, objectives are given and the idea “provides the means for solving the problem and accomplishing those objectives” (Mehta, 2011, p. 27). In Chinese leaders’ foreign policy making process, the three levels of generality are very well represented and have Chinese peculiarities when being realized. At the first level of generality, the philosophical level, Chinese leaders tend to emphasize an “accurate estimation of the contemporary world”, which is “the most important strategic analysis” of the CPC (Wang and Tian, 2009, p. 45). This is the necessary level of ideas to answer the question: how does China see the world? A typical example is Mao’s analysis of whether the world is at the brink of war or basically peaceful, and “in different eras, Mao has different judgments about whether the world is prone to war or prone to peace” (Ye, 2001, pp. 79–90). Based on these judgments, China has chosen to prepare forward, or has chosen to focus on economic development. During his late years, Mao Zedong believed that the world would be ruled by the USSR and the USA, and his belief resulted in a foreign policy of “importing revolutions” (Wang and Tian, 2009, p. 46). Ideas at the paradigm level are supposed to answer the question of how China sees itself in this world. How China defines itself, or China’s national identity as mentioned before, is also an important part in the forming of China’s engagement with multilateralism. China’s self-image varied a lot from Mao to Xi; it has evolved from seeing itself as the centre of revolution, to a developing country in need of economic help, to a responsible power that will shoulder regional development. An important characteristic of the CPC’s policymaking idea is “close coordination between domestic and international situations” (Wang and Tian, 2009, p. 48), which implies a close connection between the foreign policy making process and domestic affairs and issues. Thus, we see a close interaction between domestic affairs and international relationships in China’s foreign policy, which implies domestic factors, such as local or industrial interests; think tanks or national development plans might all influence China’s foreign policy. Su Changhe goes further in pointing out that, as a global great power, China’s local issues can be involved in foreign affairs, and often foreign affairs equalize domestic affairs (Su, 2008, pp. 12–13). Thus, China is challenged to regulate relationships among the state, market, and society. For example, the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was largely due to the need for fighting terrorism in western China, which involves cooperation in military and economic development. At the policy level, ideas are to answer the question of how does China achieve or maintain the role it believes it deserves in the world. Accordingly, foreign policies reflect the understanding of how to deal with other countries. It must be noted that China emphasizes “a dialectic thinking when observing international system” (Wang and Tian, 2009, p.  50). This is a way of thinking that has strong Taoist logic. China sees the world filled with oppositions (black and white, female and male, sky and earth, yin and yang). These oppositions, instead of being contradictory, are in essence complementary and transferable. Each embraces and

14  Introduction conceives a part of the other. Accordingly, within each challenge there are opportunities, within each positive factor there are also negative factors (Wang and Tian, 2009, p. 50). The Chinese see the world as constantly changing, but also relatively stable. An example lies in China’s relationship with Russia (the most important neighbour) and the US (the most powerful country in the world). China has never been reluctant about its partnership with Russia or with the US; China never really trusted either of them. The strategies to deal with great powers have remained the same, but definitions of “great powers” have indeed changed, and accordingly detailed policies also changed. We can observe that the velocity of transition is different for each level of generality: here we completely agree with Schmidt’s proposition of “incremental changes” (Schmidt, 2014), which describes a state of constant transitions in ideas, especially at the worldview and program level. The preceding layers of ideas keep influencing current ideas and policymaking, thus digging these layers out is quite important to better understand the current ones. Two types of ideas Besides three levels of generality, Schmidt believes it is important to differentiate between two types of ideas: cognitive ideas and normative ideas. Cognitive ideas answer questions of “what is and what to do”, while normative ideas answer “what is good or bad about what is” in light of “what one ought to do”(Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). As concluded by Schmidt, cognitive ideas “provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs by speaking to their interest-based logic and necessity” (Jobert, 1989; Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2008), while normative ideas instead attach values to political action and serve to legitimate the policies in a program through reference to their appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989). As Jobert pointed out, “the cognitive one” is “the first dimension of policymaking”; it implies “a drastic reduction of social complexity to a small number of significantly articulated variables” (Jobert, 1989). Preceding scholars’ understandings of cognitive and normative ideas might be helpful to deepen our thinking about these two kinds of ideas. As Jobert mentioned, this first step realized by cognitive ideas “always includes assumptions about the relations between the policy instruments and a highly simplified model of social reality” (Jobert, 1989). This is where normative ideas jump in. Normative ideas bridge technologies, data and all other actors one engages to form policy frameworks with values. It bears the values of a given society, thus providing direction for what should be done once cognitive ideas have identified the question. Hall found that the policymaking process can be structured by a particular set of ideas just as it can be structured by a set of institutions. The two often reinforce each other

Introduction  15 since the routines of policymaking are usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be done in a sphere of policy. (Hall, 1993) Jobert believes that “policy frameworks are not independent of political culture and values”; policy framework “has to give form to more general concepts and values of the social order” and must be “in tune with the dominant conceptions of political authority and state-society interaction” (Jobert, 1989). A similar example can be drawn from the way China perceives the world. Seen from the cognitive side, China tends to see a world dominated by great powers (defined by economy, military, surface, and demography), with the remaining weak countries being oppressed and exploited: victimhood has become the key clue in China’s observation of this world. At the normative level, China sees this relationship between the great and weak ones as bad, a world of harmony and peace is good (meanwhile it paradoxically considers great powers as the most important actors and it is difficult to define clearly what is harmony), and it is China’s responsibility to contribute to the making of a peaceful and just world: a gap between the reality and the imagined better world, the “ought to be” has been detected, policies are made to construct a road to fill in this gap. Discourse in discursive institutionalism According to Schmidt, discourse is a “more versatile and overarching concept than ideas”, since by using the term discourse, we can simultaneously indicate the ideas represented in the discourse (which may come in a variety of forms as well as content) and the interactive process by which ideas are conveyed (which may be carried by different agents in different spheres). (Schmidt, 2008, p. 309) Hajer pointed out that a discourse may serve to articulate different levels of ideas (policy, programmatic, and philosophical) (Hajer, 2003), while a discourse may bear different forms of ideas, be it narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images, and so forth (Schmidt, 2008). According to Connolly, discourse means “institutionalized structures of meaning that channel political thought and action in certain directions”, it presents different patterns of how arguments are generated and ideas are exhibited (Connolly, 1983). Combination of discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism As introduced earlier, DI has categorized ideas into three levels (policy level, paradigm level, and ideational level) and two types (cognitive and normative).

16  Introduction Another theoretical tool I would like to apply in this book is from historical institutionalism. It provides the concept of historical juncture, which is defined as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p.  348). They are critical because some “relatively small or contingent events have a profound influence on subsequent events and patterns of change” (Mahoney, 2001), as “they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter” (Pierson, 2004, p. 135). Thus, the choices made during these junctures in history have very long-lasting impacts, and these junctures constitute the starting point for many path-dependent processes and lead to the creation of institutional patterns that endure over time (Mahoney, 2001; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). By introducing historical juncture from HI, it is possible to divide the development of China’s foreign policy ideas into different time spans. The historical junctures in China’s history after 1949 are identified as the Reform and Opening Up in 1978; the 1989 tragedy and the end of Cold War in 1991; 2001–2002, when September 11 took place, China joined the WTO, and China’s power and influence increasingly grew; and 2010–2012, when China has gradually become the second-largest economy in the world and Xi Jinping became China’s president and pushed forward a series of reforms in foreign policy. By combining HI and DI, a module of analysis that includes both ideational and historical coordination is presented. A  module of analyzing each period’s multilateral foreign policy in P.R. China will be formed according to an ascending generality of ideas (from policy level to ideational level) with both types of ideas analyzed in each generality. The four historical junctures are presented in between five different Chinese government mandates, which correspond to five time spans interrupted by the four historical junctures. The design of this module intends to examine how China’s engagement in multilateralism is decided by CPC leaders’ political ideas. These ideas are not only analyzed according to DI’s definition of different levels of generality and types, but are also analyzed in their historical contexts: the development of ideas is considered as a historical process, meaning they are subjected to the influences of historical junctures. The idea behind this module was not only to analyze how ideas of multilateralism are formed and shaped, but also to reveal the correlation between the changes of different levels of ideas, that is, how the change of ideas at ideational level influences the change of ideas at the paradigm level and policy level, or vice versa. Béland and Cox have provided a very intriguing and inspiring suggestion for how to prove that ideas have strong impacts on political behaviour and outcomes: it is critical to identify and trace their influence on a particular political outcome. And in order to realize this point, the “utterances of an idea” is needed, without which one cannot be certain whether it is at the centre of a political process (Béland and Cox, 2011, p. 13). Following this clue, this book will examine political ideas from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and the discourses through which these ideas are conveyed. It is true that China’s multilateral foreign policy hasn’t

Idea Discourse

Ideational Level

Paradigm Level

Policy Level

Historical Juncture 1

DENG Xiaoping

Historical Juncture 2

Cognitive Ideas What should China do to achieve or keep its role? Cognitive Ideas How does China see itself in this world? Cognitive Ideas How does China see the world? Domestic Discourse: Coordinative

MAO Zedong

Table 1.1  The module of analysis of China’s political ideas Historical Juncture 3

HU Jintao

Historical Juncture 4

XI Jinping

Normative Ideas What factors are hindering China to achieve or keep its role? Normative Ideas What role or status should China have in this world? Normative Ideas What should the world be/How should the world work? International Discourse: Communicative

JIANG Zemin

18  Introduction started until the time of Deng Xiaoping, but it is still important to examine the different levels of ideas in Mao Zedong’s time. Because Mao Zedong is still considered as a leader that cannot be negated, his thoughts and visions for China have founded the fundamental layer of foreign policies in China. There are certain lines that the CPC regime cannot transcend. This book is based on three levels of generalities and two types of ideas that exert their strong influence on policymaking. It is reasonable to hypothesize that ideas in the higher level of generality will undergo transformations less frequently, while ideas of lower generality level will transform more frequently. Thus, philosophical ideas will separate into different eras that provide a historical background and a basic layer of further generated ideas, and even sources of legitimation for generations to come. For the discourse of ideas, the reality is that China hasn’t embraced a liberal democratic system that enables open debates for foreign diplomacy. Decisionmaking in China’s foreign policy is highly controlled by the CPC regime, with ideas and opinions provided by think tanks, an epistemic community exists in China’s foreign policy making process. Thus, there is no necessity for communicative discourse with domestic audiences and only coordinative discourse exists. However, when taking the world as a platform, China has an important communicative discourse on stage because there is a need for presenting and explaining its foreign policy to the rest of the international community. Following this trace, in this project we will focus on coordinative discourse in the domestic politics and communicative discourse in international politics. Ideational level ideas of China traditional philosophy Let’s start first with cognitive and normative ideas at the ideational level in Confucianism. First, the cognition of the world (its birth and its involvement) in Confucianism is chaotic. As indicated in the Tao Tse-Tsing, the way/the word/the divine law (Tao) is the origin of the world: “One is the child of the divine law. After one come two, after two come three, after three come all things” (Lao and Xu, 2003). China’s traditional philosophical ideas about the world are evidently different from the West in that there is no differentiation between good and evil: everything is included in “everything” (wan wu): they are not divided into “light” and “darkness”, “paradise” and “hell”, or other irreconcilable contradictory concepts. This understanding of the world has been shown great attention by Chinese and some Japanese scholars in explaining the fundamental difference between Chinese and Western philosophy: in Chinese philosophical ideas, there is nothing that is irreconcilable. Contradictions and conflicts do exist, but they are not absolutely contrary. Thus the most important normative idea in China’s history is “和合”. This is a word constituted by two different characters with the same pronunciation, “he”: the first character, “和” means peace, harmony; the second character, “合” means together, concert, concordance. In Chinese literature, later generations adopted “harmony” (as harmonious society, harmonious world during Hu Jintao’s governance) to represent this conception. Without an explicit elaboration of this

Introduction  19 most important normative idea in Chinese philosophy, this is a word that is easily misunderstood. For normative ideas, the state of harmony (和合) in Chinese philosophy is the “should be” situation of the world: the ultimate ideal and perfection state of the cosmos (Chai, 1999, p. 214; C. Li, 2010, p. 89). Confucius once said: “The noble men can find harmony though being different. The non-noble men can gather together easily but they do not stay together for long”. Former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has cited this remark about a harmonious world, indicating that a harmonious world doesn’t mean a homogeneous world but a world of diversity, and noble men should be able to find peace despite their difference (Lin, 2005). This idea explicitly explains China’s understanding of a multipolar world, which is the first step towards the harmonious world as the ultimate goal. Hall and Ames point out that the idea of pursuing harmony has decided the difference between the ultimate goals of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy: Western philosophy seeks ultimate, exclusive, and absolute truth, while Chinese philosophy seeks the methodology (Hall and Ames, 1998, p. 180). Confucianism pays more attention to morality and order rather than offering a value system. Put it differently, the focus of Confucianism is the relationship among different actors in society rather than the establishment of a set of norms about the ultimate value that exists in daily life. The morality and order designed by Confucianism is a harmonious order based on hierarchy while recognizing the centre’s dominance, supremacy, and legitimacy to rule. Each actor in the system has its own status and behaves according to the status given by the order. The centre, on the other hand, has the responsibility to maintain the order by practicing benevolence and kindness, which brings us to the ideas at the paradigm level in the next section. Paradigm-level ideas of Confucianism As the state of harmony is the ultimate ideal situation of the world, the next question is how to realize it. Here arrive the paradigm-level ideas in Confucianism. It is fair to say that the whole teaching of Confucianism is about how to establish the political order so as to achieve this ultimate ideal of Tao. Confucianism proposes an order upon which a polity and a society can run smoothly. This order is generated from family order, where each family member acts according to his role and accomplishes the obligations required by this role. Thus, a father has the responsibility to provide for and educate his sons, and the sons should respect and obey their father. This family order is extended to political life following the same hierarchical logic: the emperor has the responsibility to provide for his people, and the people should respect and obey the emperor. This order is a morality-based order instead of legal order, implying that morals, virtues, and good behaviours are the most important factors in all well-organized societies and families. As I introduced in the ideational ideas section, Confucianism’s teachings about morals and orders are combined and intervene with each other. Naturally, the normative idea about politics or ruling is whether they act

20  Introduction according to morals and virtue. This leads to another important idea in Confucianism: the differentiation between “the way of king” and “the way of domination”. “The way of king” in Chinese is “王道”; “王” means “king” and “道” adopts the same character as Tao (the way, the word, the law of divine). In Confucianism, king is the external expression of saint. “Inside saint and external king” (外王内 圣) is the ultimate ideal of nobleness according to Confucianism (Tang and Li, 2011, chap. 1). From this perspective, a king should be perfect in morality itself before he can shoulder the responsibility of ruling and managing people. Because morals are the foundation of the political order, a person perfect in morals will be a perfect king. “The way of domination” in Chinese is “霸道”, where “霸” implies domination, coercion, making others obey through power and violence. It is very interesting to note that the Chinese translation of “hegemony” also adopts the same Chinese character as “the way of domination”: hegemony means “霸权”, the “domination power”. This implies that according to Chinese understanding, hegemony implies domination, imposition of order through coercive power, and it is immoral. The first appearance of “the way of domination” in China starts with the Qin dynasty, when the Qin used military force and conspiracy to invade and dominate other smaller powers in order to reach the unification of China (Hongsheng Wang, 2009, pp. 130–131). And how should one behave if living with immoral factors in society? Confucius has proposed “the noble man cultivates a friendly harmony, without being led by the tide” (Zi and Li, 2009, vol. 10).8 This is an expression that illustrates the moral orientation of harmonious relations in the teachings of Confucianism: on the one side, keeping a peaceful and constructive relationship with the outside world is good and necessary; on the other side, a noble man should insist on his principles instead of compromising with the tide. This attitude is a very good illustration of China’s strategy with international institutions that might be contrary to its principles since its Reform and Opening Up: China might acquiesce to integrate, but it can never easily be assimilated. I will continue to discuss this point in the historical and case studies sections. After China has achieved unification and has become the strongest and most advanced country in East Asia, China’s idea about order with the neighbouring countries incorporated Confucius’ hierarchy by assuming non-Chinese polities as savage and backward: the ultimate goal of relations with them was their eventual integration into the Chinese system, which represented the only correct order. Many Chinese scholars summarize the cognitive ideas during this period as “Chinese Under Heaven” (天下观), implying China considers itself as the centre of the world and naturally all other countries should be included in the order it deemed correct. The strategic measure to strengthen relations with other countries in the order is that of benevolence and kindness (the way of king), as the elder should do to the youngsters in a family. This hierarchical conception of China’s relationship with the outside world remained in place until the Opium War in 1848, when China was forced to integrate into the European international order.

Introduction  21 The influence of contemporary history As mentioned before, this research adopts a theoretical framework that joins historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism. It suggests that history plays an important role in the formation and development of China’s political ideas: history is not a plain and inactive record of facts but an active and constructive factor in forming political ideas. The influence of contemporary history on China’s foreign policy ideas starts with two painful recognitions: the first is that China is not the centre of the world; the second is the negation of the idea that Heaven endows the power of the Chinese emperor. Confined to the hierarchical ideas about the world order, China couldn’t fully understand Western foreign relations. China tried to prove its advantages over “savage people from the west”, yet it failed and was forced to beg for peace (H. Zhang, 1992, p. 70). China is involved in the contemporary world order where each nation is a nation-state and the relations between two nations are regulated by treaties instead of tributes. The exposure of East Asia to Western civilization has caused a sudden collapse of the tributary system that had lasted for centuries. The weakness of China vis-à-vis foreign powers has instigated the emergence of nationalism in China as a widely accepted idea through which new political powers could be formed (Xu, 1998, pp. 48–49; Huang, 2002; Liu, 2007, p. 63). The fear of “National Doom and Ethnicity Annihilation” has bridged the integrity of territory, political independence, and the existence of the Chinese nation as a race with causal links (Tao, 1995; Lu, 2010), forming a new ideology that integrates with China’s contemporary ideas about China and the world (Sun, 1999; Yang, 2003). The unequal relations with Western powers and the Japanese invasion kept nurturing Chinese nationalism. The Communist Party of China, after integrating Marxism with Chinese nationalism, has developed into a new idea about China and the world. Contemporary Chinese philosophy has been undoubtedly influenced and reshaped by Marxism’s materialist conception of history, within which conscious human agency was expunged from shaping history. Chinese Marxist philosophers didn’t accept Marxism’s materialist thinking without any hesitations, as mentioned earlier. For example, Li Da, one of the most important Chinese Marxists, pointed out that ideology has a definite capacity to react on the economic base (Knight, 2005, p. 2), and Li Dazhao suggests that “Marxism required revision to ensure that any reorganization of the economic realm be accompanied by concomitant changes to the realm of the human spirit” (Meisner, 1967, pp. 91–95). As China’s nationalism had already formed during this era, the Communist Party of China adopted Marxism’s class-struggle idea to interpret China’s actual situation in the world and invited in Leninist thinking for actual strategy. First, the CPC considers China’s tragedy as a result of an immoral social order where the capitalist class (the Western imperialist powers) exploits the proletariat class, so the pragmatic idea directs towards national liberalization. Second, the ultimate goal for the CPC is to establish communism in China, and this has been a revolutionary element in Chinese ideal history as the hierarchical social order of Confucianism

22  Introduction has been negated, and the legitimacy of the ruling party no longer comes from “the Heaven” but from “the People” (Zhang, 1980; Song, 1986). The introduction of Marxism and Leninism into the CPC’s ideas greatly empowered the party’s capability to mobilize and realize their political goal in domestic politics, while simultaneously exerting revolutionary changes in China’s traditional ideas about the world. China has not only forsaken the traditional hierarchical thinking of a world order where it is the centre, but it has also taken the normative idea that a hierarchical world order is neither legitimate nor moral. At the same time, China has developed for the first time the idea of internationalism, that is China’s relations with other countries are also reshaped by the revolutionary ideas of communism: China is a part of the great tide of global revolution, and China should associate with all revolutionary powers to realize the ultimate goal of communism (Hu and Lin, 2013). On one hand, strong nationalism in China invited in Marxism and Leninism as a solution to put an end to the nation’s misery, but on the other hand it also kept the CPC’s ideas at a distance from Leninism and sought to marry Marxism with China’s reality (Li, 1986). Marxism in China has the characteristics of emphasizing the importance of ideologies within China’s Communist Party: it is believed that ideology guides the “correctness of routine” (路线正确), and is a very important criterion to assure the success in the grand cause. Conflicts among fractions that held different understandings of Marxism in early years of the CPC and the rupture with the Soviet Union – considered as revisionism by China – could be a testament to Chinese politicians’ attention to ideas. Since the rupture with the Soviet Union, China has been consciously building an idea system of its own, namely theories (both about domestic governance and international relations) with Chinese characteristics. The emphasis on summarizing ideas of foreign policy philosophy according to China’s experience also began at this time. Qin Yaqing and also the presidency of China Foreign Affairs University have called for attention to traditional cultural factors in the construction of China’s foreign relation theories as they set principles and values in China’s foreign policy decision-making (Qin, 2010, 2011, 2012a). The development of ideas after the foundation of P.R. China will be introduced in detail in the historical review section. Differentiating “Ideas” and “Ideologies” Since in this project we will discuss how ideas have transformed into policy in China, it is necessary to differentiate “ideas” from “ideology”. These two notions are actually quite closely connected and intertwine with each other. Hannah Arendt, Karl Mannheim, Karl Popper, Kathleen Knight, and Karl Marx all provided their own definition of ideology by associating it with the social and political contexts they were in. Having lived in an era of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt defines ideologies as “closed systems of thought, which, by claiming a monopoly of truth, refuse to tolerate opposing ideas and rival beliefs” (Arendt, 1951; Heywood, 2003, p. 10). Mannheim’s version argued that ideology “serves

Introduction  23 to defend a particular social order” which expresses the interests of a society’s ruling class or dominant group (Mannheim, 1960; Heywood, 2003, p. 9). According to Knight, ideologies are a subset of ideas, broad “worldviews” that provide coherent interpretations of the world and guidelines for dealing with it (Knight, 2006). Karl Marx, who believes that human beings’ social relationship is determined by material production forces that are independent of their wills (Marx and Engels, 1961, p. 100),9 defines ideology as the “ruling force” of the ruling class (Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 64), as any ideology of a given society at a given time is established on the ruling class’s perception of society, and at the same time reality is distorted in order to legitimatize the ruling classes’ rule. The above four main definitions of ideologies all contain an element of truth. Sartori pointed out that ideology serves the function of building “a specific structure in the political belief system” (Sartori, 1995, p. 114).10 Accordingly, successful ideologies are powerful in agitation, capable of “linking people who would not otherwise be linked and create political communities that simply would not have existed in the ideologies’ absence” (Berman, 2011, p. 105). Sartori provides an explicit distinction between idea and ideology. He believes ideas are subjected to discourses and reasons of self-awareness; while ideology is “believed” since it serves as political belief. In other words, ideas are repeatedly inspected and reviewed, but ideology is deeply rooted in sub-consciousness and is not so often reflected upon (Sartori, 1995, p. 116). To put it differently, ideas are the subject’s understanding of the world (both material and spiritual world), including both the cognitive side and normative side. Ideology, however, concerns the subject’s belief in what the world should be: it naturally contains normative judgments between what is correct and what is not, and influences the subject’s judgment as it serves as a standard according to which one judges. Once associated with political power, ideology has the function of legitimatizing the rulers’ ruling, as the rulers are the main conceiver and maintainer of the official ideology. For example, the ideology of realizing communism in China has been China’s official ideology and it naturally legitimises the Communist Party of China’s status as the single ruling party. Through the CPC’s ideas about the world, about China’s status in the world, and how China should realize its goals according to its ideas, this ideology has remained unchanged. If Western studies of ideologies emphasize the mode of political beliefs rather than the contents, then the study of ideology in China is exactly the opposite. In Chinese language, “idea” (si xiang) and “ideology” (yishi xingtai) are quite different. Ideology literally means “the format or pattern of consciousness”. The concept of ideology has been introduced to China through Marxism. Inevitably, China’s understanding of ideologies is deeply shaped by Marxism’s class struggle theory, that is the existence of ideology is based on class interests (Shen, 2006, p. 40), it legitimizes the ruling class’s rule (Tian, 2004, p. 152) and it rules through being believed, implying it is neither necessarily true nor objective (Song, 2002; Tian, 2004). The “protection” of “mainstream ideology” (主流意识形态) has received great attention from the Communist Party of China. The CPC endeavours to establish

24  Introduction and guarantee the “correctness” of ideology in order to ward off invasions from the Western world’s “erroneous ideologies” (Shen, 1999; Xu and Dai, 2012). “Mainstream ideology” in China can be summarized as a Marxian recognition of the world (including a class struggle perspective of the world and materialist view), the belief in realization of communism in China, and the necessity of the CPC’s ruling. Ideologies are considered an important battlefield between China and the West, especially after the Reform and Opening Up: the mainstream ideology is seen challenged and in competition with “Western ideologies” due to globalization, the diversification of ideologies, and deepening of social cleavages in China (Dong, 2013, p. 75). The CPC endows “mainstream ideology” with as much importance as issues concerning national security (Dong, 2013, p. 75) and also treats mainstream ideology as a kind of national interest (W. Zhang, 2005). Thus, in the case of China, we distinguish between “idea” and “ideology”, with the former as the variable of this research. The “ideas” that we are going to discuss here in this project are the political ideas that leaders truly hold in their minds, which are the ruling class’s real beliefs instead of beliefs fabricated and maintained for the ruled. Also, Chinese rulers’ ideas have changed enormously since Mao Zedong, but the official ideology has remained the same.

Notes 1 For example, Kevin C. Kennedy has used the case of trade-environment disputes to point out that unilateralism is not at all legitimate in regulating global issues, as national law is only applicable in a given territory. Multilateralism is the correct way to regulate global issues, as it requires coordination among nations involved to provide a legitimate solutions (Kennedy, 2001). 2 The notion of “Peaceful Rise” was first proposed by Zheng Bijian, a think tank of the Chinese government. Zheng’s original starting point lies in (a) the cultural perspective that China doesn’t have the cultural tradition to invade or colonize, so its rise can only be peaceful; and (b) the economic perspective that China needs a peaceful development environment to continue its domestic growth, so it is not beneficial for China to engage in military rise. Different Chinese scholars have supported this notion by elaborating the necessity of peaceful rise from different perspectives. For example, Qin Yaqing has argued that the rise of China cannot be realized through the growth of material or military power because the essential dilemma of China’s relation with the international system has always been its identity instead of power relations. Thus it has to be resolved through China’s identity construction (Qin, 2006). Guo Shuyong emphasizes the importance of soft power rather than hard power in a major country’s sustainable rise (Guo, 2006). Feng Yongping elaborated this point by arguing that the rising state should and could positively construct new ideas concerning their rise to replace hostility (Feng, 2009, p.  14). Yu Zhengliang and Yang Yuan argue that the international relations nowadays have entered an era of “zero death of sovereignties”, thus stating that in the present day, strong powers or military advantages are no longer the cause of a country’s rise (Yu, 2000; Yang, 2011, p. 13). 3 Here we consider European Union members as individual countries instead of a whole economic entity. 4 The US, Russia, Japan, and the EU are certainly the most important major powers in China’s perspective. This issue will be introduced more thoroughly in the historical review section of this chapter.

Introduction  25 5 For example, China’s accession to the UN and to the WTO has been only interpreted as the need for peaceful development environment; and China’s initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is only deciphered as China’s geopolitical strategy or energy strategy. 6 Many leading Chinese researchers have already pointed out the importance of ideational factors in Chinese rise. How China conceives its rise and constructs its new identity to adjust to its new role in the world defines what values it can offer to the future world, and these values concern if China’s rise is well accepted or legitimized (Ni and Zhao, 2010; Yu, 2010; Shi, 2014). The ideational factors are especially important as China seems to be constructing a set of values that is different from the “Western” one, or the Chinese model (Yu et al., 2006; Su, 2009; C. Liu, 2010; Xu, 2010). 7 In Chinese, “宗法家族专制集权政治制度”. This definition is first proposed by Feng Tianyu from Wuhan University. In his book The Textual Discussion on Feudalism, Feng has pointed out the peculiarity of Chinese society as an enlarged family that adopts strict morality and order to regulate the society, as blood relationship and political relationship are often overlapping in political unities of ancient China after Qin has unified the nation. 8 “君子和而不流”, from the tenth chapter of Zhong Yong. The context being: “Tsze-lû asked about power”. The Master said, “Do you mean the power of the South, the power of the North, or the power which you should cultivate yourself? To show forbearance and gentleness in teaching others; and not to revenge unreasonable conduct: – this is the power of Southern regions, and the good man makes it his study. To lie under arms; and meet death without regret: – this is the power of Northern regions, and the forceful make it their study. Therefore, the superior man cultivates a friendly harmony, without being weak. – How firm is he in his power! He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side. – How firm is he in his power! When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement. – How firm is he in his power! When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing. – How firm is he in his power!” 9 Marx’s original words: Dans la production sociale de leur existence, les hommes entrent en des rapports déterminés, nécessaires, indépendants de leur volonté, rapports de production qui correspondent à un degré de développement déterminé de leurs forces productives matérielles. L’ensemble de ces rapports de production constitue la structure économique de la société, la base concrète sur quoi s’élève une superstructure juridique et politique et à laquelle correspondent des formes de conscience sociales déterminées. 10 In the original words: “l’ideologia definisce una struttura specifica, un particolare stato o modo di essere, dei sistemi di credenza politica”.

2 China’s multilateralism A challenge to the existing theoretical legacy

In the previous chapter I clarified the research questions and also explained the theoretical framework of this research. In this chapter, I would like to discuss several important external factors of China’s foreign policies. These factors are also important trends and tendencies of international affairs that leave deep impacts.

The uncertain world order in front of us since the end of the Cold War As explained in the previous chapter, multilateralism is valuable because it is the most common way that institutions will function and shape our world now and in the future. We are currently in an era of competition of institutions not only because the previous world order is gone, but also because new actors are trying to shape new world order through their political ideas. After the collapse of the bipolar system, there are different views on the world’s development in the current transitional global context: there are voices saying that we are standing at a crossroads with one alternative being the restoration of the US hegemony (Kagan, 2012), and other voices adding the continuity of an adjusted and more inclusive US-led multilateralism (Ikenberry, 2011a). There is also a possibility to go back to the future: a renewed form of the former balance of power (Mearsheimer, 1990), or a multiple post-American and post-multilateral scenario to governance fragmentation (Bhagwati, 2002) and a-polarity where “a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power” (Haass, 2008) exists. There are also various imaginations about future world order among Chinese scholars. Zhang Guangsheng of Renmin University has taken another perspective, imagining that the world order might (a) go back to the Westphalia model, which is based on the nation-state; (b) develop into a homogeneous society due to the deepening globalization; or (c) develop into a new world order constituted by civilization groups, which redefine their relations according to recognition or distinguishing (Zhang, 2008). Chinese scholars including Pan Xingming, Pan Zhongqi, Ding Chun, and Chen Zhimin believe that multipolarity is the future direction (Pan, 2008; Chen and Pan, 2013), whereas Yan Xuetong believes that

China’s multilateralism  27 the most likely world order, and also the most beneficial one for China, is bipolar order with China and the US acting as the two poles (Yan, 2013). From many Chinese scholars’ perspective, this is a time that is different from what happened when Britain ceded its world hegemon status to the US, which was ready to take over and maintain the existing world order; we are actually in a world in which hegemony is absent and no clearly established and widely accepted world order is imposed and sustained by the hegemon (Y. Zhang, 1992, p. 10; Shi, 2007). These opinions echo what Keohane has pointed out: that the world is trying to “cooperate without hegemony” (Keohane, 2005, pt. 244). Here I would like to elaborate a step further concerning the end of America’s hegemony. Hegemony is not only about dominating military power, but it is also a widely accepted ideology. The end of American hegemony to certain extents also generates doubts about liberalism. From this aspect, we can see that after the Cold War, new ideologies and new norms are sought, suggested, and put into practice. This is a quite slow process, however in the past 27 years there have already been many achievements. The searching for new ideologies and new norms interact with the rise of regionalism, which will be more deeply discussed in the following paragraphs, and eventually gives birth to new institutions. The new institutions came to the stage after the Cold War strengthened different actors in institutions and reinforced the need to find or form new ideologies and norms. Zhu Yunhan, an academic from Taiwan, has argued that our current world is undergoing a historical juncture that contains four phenomena that impact the future of human beings: the first is the collapse of American hegemony, the second is the retreat of the third democratization tide, the third is the sinking of capitalism, and the fourth is the decline of West-centralized world (Zhu, 2015, p.  3). Yan Xuetong, another top international relations theorist, argues that the establishment of a new international order is a repartition of powers, and global governance is a repartition of responsibilities. These are two different processes but both require revision and development of existing international institutions (Yan, 2018). Acharya has also echoed this point of view by pointing out that the American world order has never really been a world order, as it is more precisely an order for all the common-minded Western countries. The decline of the American world order gives way necessarily to non-Western values and ideas. Contrary to many Western countries’ expectations that China could be co-opted by liberal values once it is integrated into the existing institutions, China has never accepted liberalism that goes hand in hand with capitalism as a set of universal or global norms. This definite divergence in ideology between China and the West leads easily to a pursuit of different norms and institutions. The uncertainty of the world order left by the Cold War has offered China an opportunity to reshape the existing institutions with its own values and norms and even establish institutions that incorporate its own values. By naming China as a “revisionist power” (The Department of Defense of the United States, 2019, pp. 7–10) and a “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission and HR/VP, 2019), the US and the EU have already noticed that China is promoting a totally different institution.

28  China’s multilateralism To explain clearly a value system requires a clear set of definitions, as concepts are the cornerstones of a solid value system. Chinese scholars have continually realized that modern ideas and concepts are largely dependent on Western philosophy and concept definition, which usually do not correspond to Chinese culture and understanding. So a redefinition of many concepts based on Chinese concepts is developed as the first step toward a Chinese international theory, which I will elaborate in later sections of this chapter. Thus the different value systems bring in different definitions, which have been generated from varied cultural backgrounds and political contexts. A concordance of definition is hereby necessary, as communication and mutual understanding cannot be reached without a common language. One of the objectives of this book is to provide a thorough understanding of China’s definition of “multilateralism”. The importance of researching China’s engagement in multilateralism lies precisely in the fact that China adopts it in this historical process of reimagining and redefining the world order and China’s role in it. As China rises, its attempts to influence and shape the future world order are largely realized through multilateral cooperation. This fact is especially important within the context of a declining US dominance. China therefore needs to respond to the question: What role does China want to play? Even though there hasn’t been a clear answer to this question, engagement in multilateralism has become the most important method China uses in this process of reshaping the world order and seeking its own identity. Among Chinese academies, the discussion concerning the change of China’s role in world affairs has already become one of the most important themes in international theories. Hu Angang from Tsinghua University has argued that China’s main role in todays’ world is a defender of multilateral trade institutions, openness, and globalization. Beginning with Trump’s presidency, the US has become the representative of anti-globalization. Anti-globalization includes rising populism, protectionism, and the abandonment of multilateralism. Within this context, China expects that this new self-defined role as a defender of multilateralism, openness, and globalization can bring much legitimacy to China’s rise, especially to the norms that China would like to establish and be accepted by other states as it rises. As I will explain in the following chapters, as China is a huge country under an authoritarian regime with a large population and strong military power, its rise can be interpreted easily as a menace to world order. The key tasks for China are, first, to legitimize its rise by arguing that it is beneficial for all the countries; second, following the mutual benefits for all other countries, its norms are accepted by being institutionalized; third, its values are accepted and integrated. The US, which has chosen to denounce many multilateral institutions and to take a position of protectionism, has left China an important opportunity to legitimize itself as a defender of globalization and multilateralism. With the deepening of divergence between the US and China and the aggravation of trade war between these two economic bodies, multilateralism is not only a method to manage relations with other countries; it has also become the necessary pathway to concretize China’s rise.

China’s multilateralism  29

The rise of regionalism as a new driving factor With the acknowledgement of the decline of American hegemony, it is generally accepted that the international order is changing, yet how it might change, and how to understand the mechanism of changing, remain enticing questions. Qin Yaqing, one of the leading Chinese scholars in international relations, has argued that there are three aspects of the international system that are subjected to transformation. The first aspect is the transformation of main actors of the international system, such as a transformation from a system that is built on empires to a system that is built on nation-states. The second transformation is the transformation of the structures of the system, which concerns the repartition of powers among different actors, for example from a system with only one hegemon to a multipolar world. The third aspect is the transformation of governance of a given system. For example, the main concern during the Cold War was the existence of nation-states, which has led to a system that prioritizes security issues. After the Cold War, non-traditional security issues and economy development have become the main concern of the system, leading to a preference for multilateralism (Qin, 2009c). Here I do believe that one of the important driving forces of this transformation is the development of new regionalism. New regionalism has thrived after the Cold War, and China’s active involvement in these regional institutions coincided with the rise of new regionalism. The rise of new regionalisms has provided a new platform to implement China’s norms and values as China’s rise as a regional power is the first step of its rise as a world power. To put it differently, the rise of Asia Pacific and the rise of China go reciprocate one another. We will elaborate further on this point in the two case studies, but we find it worthwhile to point out the importance of this issue, as it is a result of the constant evolution of China’s foreign policy ideas and constant interaction between China and the world. Telò has pointed out that the emergence of new regionalisms has many complicated domestic reasons: (a) the will of nation-states, and mainly of regional leaders, to rescue their sovereignty and recover their international bargaining power; (b) the bargaining and lobbying of the business community and socially relevant groups; (c) the internal functional spill over as a consequence of successful cooperation agreements; (d) the will of less developed countries to gradually cope with global competition by cooperating and converging with regional leaders (Telò, 2014b). It is not difficult to understand that the first and the fourth points are especially interesting for China, because demanding more security for sovereignty conforms to China’s foreign policy principles, and the less developed countries have been the centre of China’s foreign policies since its establishment. New regionalism is not contrary to globalization. It does not mean a fragmentation of an interdependent world. As pointed out by Acharya, the regionalization of East Asia has demonstrated that it is important to take into consideration “the role of domestic political, organizational, and cultural variables in conditioning the reception of new global norms” (Acharya, 2009, p. 12). A crucial issue for new

30  China’s multilateralism regionalism is the construction of political identity rather than cultural affiliation, and the creation of a sense of political citizenship and of belonging to the same polity (Meyer, 2014, p. 72). The question is, which principles and norms should this inclusive policy follow? Meyer concludes that the main strategic design of global governance and political regionalization all share democracy as a backbone (Meyer, 2014, p. 79). Demanding democratization of international relations has been China’s core argument for a new world order. However, China’s idea of democracy does not necessarily mean the same thing as Western-style liberal democracy. Democratization in international relations as defined by China is more about equality: all countries, no matter their surface or economic power, should have absolutely the same rights in the decision-making process. China is trying to implement this into its relationship with ASEAN, the African Union, and Latin America. A more eminent case is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which China has institutionalized its ideas about equality in voting rights of the AIIB: Asian countries hold 75% of the votes, while non-Asian countries possess 25%; GDP and population are two factors that decide the voting rights for Asian countries, which totally differs from the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, in which voting rights are decided by each member state’s contribution, implying poor countries always have fewer voting rights. From 2007 until the present, China’s participation in regional economic integration has greatly increased. Besides the rise of new regionalism as the general context, it is also a necessary counter move to the “Back to Asia” strategy of the US and the TPP project that aims to rewrite trade rules. Moreover, regional economic integration plans provide China more decision power in rule-setting in accordance with China’s turning to neighbourhood strategy. The three points will be elaborated in the following paragraphs. First, as introduced before, the rise of new regionalism after 1991 is a global tendency. No matter what the result of the debate on whether regionalization is helping globalization or not, Chen Weidong believes that multilateral trade institutions and regional trade agreements are parallel mechanisms that are reshaping the global economy (Chen, 2006). Which mechanism China chooses to develop its economy is of great importance to China’s global strategy (Le, 2001). In 2007, then Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that China would adopt the Free Trade Area strategy during the 17th CPC National Congress in order to strengthen bilateral and multilateral trade collaboration (Hu, 2007) and at the 18th CPC National Congress it is decided to accelerate the Free Trade Area strategy. By 2015, China has already concluded its FTA agreement with ASEAN, Singapore, Pakistan, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, South Korea, and Australia. According to the PRC State Council’s policy paper published in February  2015, negotiation of a China–South Korea–Japan FTA and promoting FTA negotiation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Israel, and Sri Lanka are considered as important strategies to nurture “New Competitive Advantage” in foreign trade (State Council of PRC, 2015). Second, the competition between the US and China in the region of AsiaPacific has intensified since Obama’s strategy of “Back to Asia” and its new trade

China’s multilateralism  31 agreements had almost been in competition with China’s partnership network in Asia. Initiated by the US, the Trans-Pacific Partnership has been considered by China as a new round of containment. China is confronted with US competition in setting new trade rules in the Asia-Pacific area, which have very demanding terms and apply exclusively to China. US President Obama explicitly warned that if TPP fails, China would rewrite the trade rules that “advantage Chinese workers and Chinese business” (Bloomberg, 2015). China sees the TPP initiated by the US as a great disturbance to China’s regional economic integration plans and even as a challenge to China’s peaceful rise. First, TPP has caused division inside ASEAN, then China is not invited to join TPP and finally China cannot meet many TPP standards (Wen, 2014, p. 42). Once TPP is established, it will reshape economic environment in China’s neighbourhood. At the same time, the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU is also considered as an attempt to rewrite world trade rules. In responding to the TTP and TTIP, China’s strategy is to accelerate negotiation concerning the China–South Korea FTA (agreement signed in 2015), China–South Korea–Japan FTA and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which include ASEAN, China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Donald Trump’s presidency has temporarily halted the competition of institutions, yet he has set the fire by starting the trade war. Regardless of Obama’s promotion of multilateral institutions or Trump’s unilateralism and protectionism, the competition of China and the US for the leading role in this region has reached a historical point. Third, the regional economic integration plan provides China with more decision-making rights and is in conformity with China’s strategic turning to neighbourhood. As shown in South East Asia and Central Asia, the rise of new regionalism provides China a new opportunity to reshape regional economic order by choosing like-minded partners and building institutions based on China’s long-term strategy. As introduced in the historical part, China’s foreign policy focus has gradually turned to its neighbourhood since 2000, as China realized that its neighbourhood is the starting point for its future rise. China-ASEAN FTA and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are two good examples of how new regionalism has awarded China more decision power in setting up institutions. Regional economic integration has become a new method of sustaining China’s economic development and deepening China’s domestic reform via Opening Up after China’s accession to the WTO (Hua, Zhuang and Yang, 2011). As Dong et al. have pointed out, starting from 2007 when the FTA became China’s strategy, China’s FTA negotiations became more focused on regional economic integration by concluding more comprehensive terms: FTA agreements are not only about tariff and quota of products, but also concern the trade of commerce, the movement of people, intellectual property, customs programs, hygiene, technical trade barriers, and so forth (Dong, Feng and Qiu, 2009, p. 116). The institutional competition from the US has required China to be more creative with multilateral institutions, not only as a participant but also more and more as a creator. China has tried to institutionalize its regional cooperation plans

32  China’s multilateralism within the WTO, but with more focalized goals so as to promote economic regionalization according to its neighbourhood strategy. Two distinct examples here are ASEAN+3 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. There has been a quite hostile and distrustful relationship between China and ASEAN when ASEAN saw China as a regional threat and China considered ASEAN as a tool to contain communism. Starting with the Chiang Mai Initiative that enables multilateral financial cooperation, China has begun to build a mutually beneficial relationship with ASEAN and truly expressed the will to cooperate through a huge investment. The interaction between China and ASEAN as a multilateral institution, and member states in ASEAN, as well as Japan and South Korea’s participation in the multilateral cooperation are contributing to our understanding of new regionalism. It does not only involve social interaction and economic cooperation, but it also becomes a new field of policy and polity making (Telò, 2014a, p. 142). The case of ASEAN+3 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will be discussed in the case studies section.

New global tendencies towards competitive regionalisms As globalization interplays with territorial and political dimensions of trade and cooperation, a new trend of competitive regionalism is rising to the stage. Telò argues that states are forming competitive regionalisms for two possible objectives: the first is to tame uncertainties by upgrading trade and multidimensional relations with relevant partners by means of alliances among friends, for example US with the Trans-Pacific Partnerships (TPP) and China with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Another is that other states impose power and hierarchical logics against economic ties with relevant negative externalities (Telò, 2017, p. 51). Asia Pacific is undoubtedly the most strategic region in the world, where it accommodates or connects many sub-regions: Central and West Asia, North East Asia, and South East Asia. China has begun to pay attention to regional development during Jiang Zemin’s presidency. Jiang Zemin pointed out that “regional and inter-regional cooperation organizations are unprecedentedly active . . . multipolar tendency is favourable to world peace, stability and prosperity”. Finally, Jiang concluded, “China should actively participate in multilateral diplomacy affairs, and fully use China’s influences in the UN and other multilateral institutions”.1 It is during this phase that gradually, China’s participation in international affairs became increasingly active by accepting multilateral arrangements, prioritizing its neighbouring countries and keeping the relationship with developing countries as fundamental in its foreign relations by setting its foreign affair guideline as “great powers are key factors, neighbouring countries are the priorities, developing countries are fundamentals, and multilateral institutions are stages”.2 During Hu Jintao’s presidency, the Chinese government published “China’s Peaceful Development White Book”, where it stressed that China should promote a harmonious Asia and resolve territorial disputes through negotiations

China’s multilateralism  33 and dialogue. China should strive to promote regional economic integration, to improve existing regional and sub-regional collaboration institutions, and to stay open to other regional collaboration possibilities. China should welcome nonregional countries to play a constructive role in regional peace and development, and China should not seek regional hegemony or spheres of influence.3 As becoming the regional leading power is a necessary pathway for China to reach out to a larger area, Chinese scholars have also done extensive research on the development and formation of regional institutions and regional leaders. For example, Kong and Li from Renmin University argue that the key to establishing a regional influence relies on three aspects: first, the adjustment of power structure via constructing institutions that would support the dominant goal of regional power; second, the ability of providing side-payment, that is the financial concessions to other regional countries in order to attract them into the institution proposed by the leading country; and third, it requires the construction of soft power to sustain the regional institution (Fanying and Wei, 2015). Li Feng from Nanjing University took a constructivist angle, and argues that the construction of regional institutions is the process whereby the leading power transforms its national identity into its regional leading status, and is the key process to construct regional recognition. To put it differently, the construction of regional norms and institutions represents the regional power’s ideational power and its comprehensive competitiveness (F. Li, 2018). China claims that it would never seek to become a hegemon. Yet its huge entity makes it inevitably a regional power. As China’s vision is also to shoulder more regional responsibilities and provide more public goods, it is quite evident that China constructs regional institutions according to its values and norms. Another point that is worth pointing out is that in the Chinese government’s discourse, “non-regional powers” or “区域外大国” are often referred to as an intruding element and a non-stabilizing factor. The term “non-regional power” is usually used to refer to the US, which does not share the same regions with China, but is interfering in regional affairs. It worth mentioning that the EU and the US are also promoting their own strategies concerning Asia Pacific. The EU launched its EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy by the end of 2018, aiming to strengthen the EU’s presence in this region, especially in Japan, South East Asia, and Central Asia. The US has published its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2019, which clearly expressed its worries about increasing influences of China, Russia, and Turkey in this region. Thus, expanding from Asia Pacific, the Indo-Pacific area is becoming a new stage of competition among institutions. Unlike the relations during the Second World War, the previous hub-and-spoke structure have vanished, replaced by new local actors who can compare the different institutions offered by great competitors.

Development of Chinese international theory In the first chapter I have already discussed why China’s understanding of multilateralism is related to China’s rise. In previous sections, I have also stated that

34  China’s multilateralism China has always sought a way to explain its rise and expects to convince developed countries and developing countries that its rise is peaceful. Within this context, many scholars have agreed that China is urgently in need of a Chinese international theory to explain China’s rise. They argue that existing international relation theories, which are conceived by Western history and defined in Western languages, cannot explain or conclude that China’s rise can be peaceful, nor can they provide theoretical justifications for the rising of China. The growing interest among Chinese researchers in finding solutions from traditional Chinese philosophies and cultures is derived from the logic that as China is becoming an economically strong nation, it also needs to become a culturally strong nation as well. China should stop importing ideas and knowledge from foreign countries and start exporting them instead (T. Zhao, 2011). Also, as China’s issues would certainly influence the world, the Chinese perspective and Chinese solutions to these issues should be expanded to resolve world issues (Callahan, 2008, pp. 758–759). At the same time, this seeking of a “Chinese World System” also reflects China’s need for redefining its role in the future world order (Wang, 1999, 2006; Zhang, 2012). These political ideas of the future world order have their roots in traditional Chinese philosophy, and are usually kept at distance from contemporary international relations theories and conceptions. For example, Zhao Tingyang, one of the most famous Chinese philosophers of CASS, has championed the “Tian Xia” system over the so-called unipolar, bipolar or multipolar ones (Zhao, 2006; T. Zhao, 2011). “Tian Xia”, which literally means “all under the heaven”, originates from traditional Chinese philosophy and East Asian order, which claims to go beyond the fragmentation of the nation-state, and sees the world as a whole entity.4 Zheng Bijian, one of the most important think tank consultants to the Chinese government on China’s foreign policy, has developed his theory on China’s peaceful rise: China has chosen a peaceful road to pursue development, while protecting world peace through its own development. This is a road of peaceful rise. Its essence is to stay on the trace of economic globalization, while constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics. Peace towards external, harmony towards internal. This is how we understand the peaceful rise of China, this is how we understand the great revival of the Chinese nation. (Zheng, 2007, pp. 534, 537) What Zheng Bijian has described as the great rise of China echoes perfectly what Feng Youlan, one of the most important Chinese scholars in Chinese philosophy, has concluded to be the ultimate goal of China’s philosophy: “inner saint and outer king” (内圣外王). Exactly as Feng Youlan has pointed out, “outer king” signifies the character and capability of a person to be a king. It doesn’t necessarily mean that this person has to be the king, and it is better that he is not (Fung, 1967, 1998). Song Lilei and Cai Liang also pointed out that China’s traditional thinking justifies China’s peaceful rise, and it explains to the West why the rise of China

China’s multilateralism  35 doesn’t necessarily follow what happened in European history, in the Westphalia world, where the rise of a country certainly changes the existing world order by engaging wars and conflicts: the Chinese culture decides that China seeks the status of being a “king” but not a “hegemon” (Song and Cai, 2013). Yan Xuetong has developed the philosophical idea of “way of kings” further into the theory of “moral realism”. Yan argues that if China would like to assure its rise, the key factor is neither economic development nor a strong military power (needless to say, these two factors are indeed important), but a leadership that is based on “the way of king”. Yan has interpreted the “the way of king” into modern language as “humane authority” (王权，wang quan), which stands against “hegemon” or “hegemony”. According to Yan, a hegemon rules with their strong economic and military powers, but they are easily in deficit with morals. A humane authority rules with morals, and provide a leadership of honour. Yan explains that the core concepts of “the way of king” or “humane authority” include three basic values deriving from traditional Chinese philosophy. First, “ren”（仁）, often translated into English as “virtue” or “benevolence” according to different contexts, is elaborated as a principle of compassion and protection toward the weaker ones in a given society. Yan Xuetong believes that in moral realism, “ren” should be interpreted as “fairness” in international rules. He argues that China should consider other countries’ interests and positions as a powerful nation, and try to provide international rules based on “fairness” instead of “equality”, which means providing weaker nations with more benefits and aid (Yan, 2015, p. 93). He then argued that “yi” (义), often translated as “righteousness”, should promote “justice” in international relations. Yan believes that the principle of justice is more helpful than democracy in promoting fairness. This is because democracy guarantees equality among nations, but justice pays attention to diminish or even to eliminate the polarization of rich nations and poor nations. Democracy only grants the rights to develop, while justice demands developed countries to provide aid to developing countries (Yan, 2015). The third element in Yan Xuetong’s moral realism lies in “li”, usually translated as courtesy or manners. Yan argues that it stands for “civility”, which is more important than “freedom” in promoting orders among nations. Yan states that the behaviour of nations should be regulated based on certain principles to avoid direct confrontation (Yan, 2015). To summarize, Yan Xuetong has proposed moral realism whose basic principles such as fairness, justice, and civility are more advanced than equality, democracy, and freedom for international relations, and should be adopted as new norms for China’s rise. Another important international relations theorist is Qin Yaqing. He has argued that The three mainstream International Relations theories that have arisen in the past thirty years, structural realism, neo‐liberal institutionalism and structural constructivism, have all missed an important dimension, i.e., the study of

36  China’s multilateralism processes in the international system and of relational complexity in international society. (Qin, 2009d) By introducing “process” and “relations” from Chinese philosophy, Qin attempts to develop a processual constructivism. Processual constructivism puts relationships as an important factor in international relations. Qin believes that “relationship” is an important basic core concept in Chinese philosophy, which is to regulate relations among different subjects. For example, Confucius stated that there should be clearly regulated relationships between emperor and subjects, between father and sons. The importance of relationships implies collectivism, instead of individualism, provides the basic context of Chinese philosophy. Also, the emphasis on process is also different from Western thinking that is based on rationality, because process is always changing, and relationships are relative instead of absolute (Qin, 2009a). The main theoretical expressions of processual constructivism are as follows. First, relationship is the platform of the implementation of power. Power is not owned by certain subject alone, but is necessarily expressed through relations. An example is that in six-party talks, though the US is the most powerful country at the negotiating table, it is China which is the most influential. This is because China enjoys strong relationships with North Korea and other North Eastern Asian countries. Second, relationships can amplify powers, and can also confine powers. China is currently the most powerful country in East Asia region; its material power has already exceeded any country in the ASEAN and the ASEAN itself. However, as China and the ASEAN have defined their relationships as comprehensive strategic partnerships, China would not seek to coerce the ASEAN with its material powers. Third, relationships are powers. As Fei Xiaotong has stated, Chinese society is organized as ripples: it consists of different levels of relations from close to afar (Fei, 2006). Put it differently, society itself is also defined as a sort of relationship. Chinese culture and philosophy have highly valued the importance of relationships, as each person lives and is defined by different relationships. As Qin Yaqing puts it in international relations, each country exists in relation to other countries, and through the process of relationship, powers are generated, norms are conceived, and identities are constructed. The acknowledgement of collective identity is not only constructed through interdependency or rational calculation of interests; it is also constructed through collective emotions. By introducing the arguments of important Chinese philosophers or strategists, I intend to point out that multilateralism in China is rooted in a totally different context from that of the West. As Zhao Lei pointed out, the study of China’s multilateralism has an important relationship with China’s foreign policy ideas and China’s national identity, they are the centres of the transformation of Chinese multilateralism (Zhao, 2013, p. 154). Here, it is believed that national identity is

China’s multilateralism  37 equivalent to ideas concerning how China sees itself in the world and can thus be considered as a part of China’s foreign policy ideas. In this introduction the context of this research was presented: the uncertainty of the world order after the end of the Cold War, the rise of new regionalism as a new phenomenon that will shape the world order, and the importance of China within this context. It was then explained why research on China’s understanding of multilateralism is important: it is a necessary step to reaching a common language for a larger research schedule to seek a better understanding of multilateralism. Certainly, China’s foreign policy making is a complicated process that involves both domestic and external factors. Systematic changes, such as the collapse of the bipolar world order, the rise of the EU as a new power, and the end of US hegemony are all objective factors that exert huge influences on China’s foreign policy. We acknowledge their importance and will incorporate them into the discussion in different chapters of this thesis. However, confined to time and space, in this thesis the main variable still remains ideas as the domestic factors for China’s foreign policy changes.

Notes 1 See Jiang Zemin’s speech the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: 当前国际形势总体上继续趋向缓和。和平与发展是当今时代的主题。多极化 趋势在全球或地区范围内，在政治、经济等领域都有新的发展，世界上各种 力量出现新的分化和组合。大国之间的关系经历着重大而又深刻的调整。各 种区域性、洲际性的合作组织空前活跃。要积极参与多边外交活动，充分发 挥我国在联合国以及其他国际组织中的作用。 2 “大国是关键、周边是首要、发展中国家是基础、多边是舞台” 3 See China’s Peaceful Development White Book, published by Chinese Government in 2011: www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-09/06/content_1941204.htm 4 According to Zhao, Tian Xia system suggests an all-inclusive world system, which distinguishes not “self” and “others” in both ethnical and geographical senses (T. Zhao, 2011). It proposes to change or transform those who hold different ideas instead of conquering them (T. Zhao, 2011).

3 China’s engagement in multilateralism

In the previous chapters, I introduced the combination of discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism. I have also outlined a chart of analysis according to the categorization of ideas in discursive institutionalism (three levels of generality and two types of ideas) and with the time span separated by different historical junctures from historical institutionalism. In this part, I  will analyze China’s foreign policy ideas based on the aforementioned chart, and I will map China’s foreign policy ideas according to different time spans. A thorough examination of China’s foreign policy ideas from 1949 until now is not a simple narration of what had happened in the past. With two conceptual tools provided by historical institutionalism, historical junctures, and path dependency, history provides critical information about how at a certain moment “in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development” which will “persist[] over a long period of time” according to the path-dependency theory (Capoccia, 2015, p. 148). With a historical review under the lens of historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism, the impacts of moments that brought in drastic changes are presented and explained, and then how different generality and types of ideas in each time span have developed are analyzed. Put differently, HI explains how ideas are generated and developed, whereas DI explains how ideas are structured and how they function. Here, I would like to further elaborate the time spans according to which I am going to examine China’s foreign policy ideas. Although the Communist Party of China has gradually institutionalized the power transformation after the Reform and Opening Up into a mechanism of allowing each Chinese highest leader a maximum of two five-year mandates, the transformation of foreign policy ideas doesn’t necessarily take the same chronological order as China’s leadership change. Overlapping and gradual changes are quite frequent, thus identifying critical moments of idea changes is an important point in presenting and analyzing changes in China’s foreign policy ideas and forming a solid basis to understand how China understands multilateralism. In order to capture these “critical moments”, I mobilize the concept of “historical juncture” from historical institutionalism.

China’s engagement in multilateralism  39

Time span divisions based on historical juncture Following the concept of historical junctures, there are four such junctures in China’s history after 1949 are identified: the first one is from 1976 to 1978, which includes the death of Mao Zedong and the decision on Reform and Opening Up; the second one is from 1989 to 1991, which includes Tiananmen tragedy and the end of Cold War; and the third one is 2001–2002, when September  11th took place, China joined the WTO, and its power and influence grew increasingly; and the fourth is from 2010 to 2012, when China finally became the second largest economy in the world and Xi Jinping became China’s president and pushed forward a series of reforms in foreign policy. They are systematic changes that not only have greatly influenced China, but also world politics and international relations. Capoccia, Mahoney, Collier, and Collier have all called for attention to the duration of historical junctures, as it decides the political outcome that follows by impacting “the probability that political decisions will be constrained by a re-emerging structural constraint” (Collier and Collier, 1991; Mahoney, 2001; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Capoccia, 2016). These four historical junctures have durations of two years, and separate China’s foreign policy ideas from 1949 until the present in five phases (trajectories): the first phase is from the establishment of the P.R. China in 1949 until the Opening Up in 1978; the second phase is from the Opening Up until the end of the Cold War (1991), the third phase is from 1991 until 2002, when Hu Jintao became China’s top leader; the fourth phase from 2002 until 2010–2012; and the fifth phase from 2012 until the present. During each phase, new changes brought by historical junctures are integrated into the contemporary political ideas and policies while preparing for the arrival of the next phase. In the following section, these five phases will be introduced by explaining the significance of the historical events to justify the choice of historical juncture and analyze them according to three generality levels and two types of ideas, without neglecting the relationship between China’s engagement in multilateralism and the grand historical epoch of multilateralism in which it finds itself.

Analysis of China’s foreign policy ideas In this part, China’s foreign policy ideas will be analyzed throughout different phases according to the analytical tool provided by Vivien Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism. In each phase, we will analyze China’s foreign policy ideas according to the three levels of generality (ideational, paradigm, and policy). Within the ideational and paradigm levels of ideas, we will differentiate normative and cognitive ideas, which we consider very important because they reflect China’s judgment and evaluation of the world. After introducing China’s foreign policy ideas in each phase, a general review of China’s involvement in multilateral institutions will be presented. It includes China’s attitudes towards multilateral institutions and China’s policies towards

40  China’s engagement in multilateralism them. This part is intended to present how China’s foreign ideas are projected on China’s attitudes towards or involvement in multilateral institutions. This part also provides the contexts of the three case studies: China has been involved in many multilateral institutions, and not all of them will be discussed as case studies in this thesis, so I provide discussions of these equally important cases in this section. At the end of the presentation of each time span, a summary of the foreign policy ideas discussed will be made. After the introduction of all phases, a general summary and discussion of the development of China’s foreign policy ideas will be provided.

Time of refusal from 1949 until the Reform and Opening Up in China (1949–1978) The first phase, from 1949 until the Opening Up, was a period when China reassumed peace and tried to re-establish internal order after the end of the war, following the Japanese invasion and a civil war. It was also the time when the Cold War officially started, and China’s foreign policy ideas were strongly influenced by the confrontation between the Communist bloc and the capitalist bloc, and its decisions were made under the influence of ideological differences. China was weak, poor, and fragile vis-à-vis both the USSR and the US. More importantly, Communist China was born directly into a world where the US instrumentalized political multilateralism to build economic and political institutions to secure its hegemony (Telò, 2014c, p. 35). The foundation of a new regime allowed the Communist Party of China to implement its ideologies and policies. The antagonistic situation in world politics unquestionably decided the new-born China’s choice of foreign policies, including its attitude towards multilateral institutions. Yet how did China see the world? How did China see its position and role in this world? And how did China want to achieve its role? All these questions provide us a more profound understanding of China’s engagement in multilateralism. Ideational level For the first question, we should not ignore the fact that Communist China’s foreign policy was greatly influenced by its nationalist sentiment. This nationalist sentiment was nurtured by foreign powers’ invasions, colonialism, and imperialism. Chinese leaders loathe foreign powers’ involvement and interference, both military and non-military. From the Chinese perspective, the world after the Second World War was a world divided by powers (列强) that followed different ideologies, and were greatly influenced by US imperialism and Soviet chauvinism. The way that the US and the USSR dominated the world was considered as unfair and unjust: they were seen as practicing ruling by power (ba dao (霸 道)) instead of by virtue (wang dao (王道)). The judgment of ruling by force is China’s cognitive idea in its foreign policy, and the ruling by virtue is China’s normative idea about how the world should operate. The distance from “ruling

China’s engagement in multilateralism  41 by force” to “ruling by virtue” in real-world politics plays a fundamental role in China’s foreign policy since 1949. During the first phase, China’s understanding of hegemony was strongly related to military power and material domination. The wave of decolonisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s gave birth to many young countries in former colonial zones, which signified freedom acquired by fighting against imperialism. This provided China a new context to promote the idea of a fairer world order. Following this idea, Mao developed his theory about two “intermediate zones” in 1964 (Zhu, 2009, p. 70). According to his theory, “a range of countries sandwiched politically, and usually geographically, between the socialist and imperialist blocs  – that is capitalist countries which are both exploiters and exploited” (O’Leary, 1980, p. 64). According to Mao, there were two “intermediate zones”: the first included Asian, African, and Latin American countries; the second is Europe (Mao, 1994b, pp. 506–507). In this theory, nationalism is considered as a [source of] independent power besides imperialism and communism, and China’s foreign policy should emphasize relationships with Asian, African, and Latin American countries that were considered as nationalist countries (Chu, 2003, pp.  12–13).1 In Mao’s opinion, intermediate zones were countries that were amenable to fighting against the US and the Soviet Union (Mao, 1994a, p. 508; Xie, 2009, p. 445). During Mao’s late years, the theory of the two intermediate zones developed into the idea of “three worlds” (Zhu, 2009), which exerted much influence on China’s forthcoming foreign policies. In 1974, Mao thoroughly explained his strategic understanding of the world and China’s role in it. Countries were categorized according to their distance instead of their ideological choices toward the first world countries, that is the super powers who were rich and owned nuclear power (the US and the USSR). The second world countries were in the middle between the first world countries and the third world countries, for example Japan, European countries, Canada, and Australia, that is countries that were less rich and owned less nuclear power; and the third world countries included all Asian countries except Japan, Latin America, and Africa, implying that China had much potential room to manoeuvre between these two segmented block (Mao, 1999, pp. 441–442). Paradigm level At the paradigm level, the theories of the two intermediate zones and the three worlds directed China to act as one of the intermediate countries or third world countries against either the US or the USSR. China defined its strategies to act according to its ideational level ideas about the world. During the early years of Communist China’s foundation, China underwent a short period of being dependent on the Communist bloc led by the USSR (1949–1965). Unsurprisingly, China turned to strategic ideas that accepted neither the domination of the US nor of the USSR. Mao proposed a series of strategic ideas to insist that there were possibilities to fight against the two hegemons, and that China belonged to the third world countries suffering from the domination of the

42  China’s engagement in multilateralism US and the USSR. Mao believed that China should try to unite with all third world countries and associate with the second world countries. In order to address how to act according to its role and position, and how to achieve this role, China opted for the solution to provide as much aid and financial support as possible to developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Central Asia, in order to preserve amicable relationships with developing countries (Wu, 2011, p. 17). China also chose the independent principle (独立自主), meaning to stay independent from both the US and the USSR (Mao, 1999). For example, in 1974, when the three worlds ideas were proposed, China launched the call for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) on February  22, which demonstrated China’s willingness to lead the third world countries to revolt against the hegemonic old economic world order and to establish a new one. Deng Xiaoping said of Mao’s Third World Theory that it “opened a new way of anti-hegemony world politics” (Deng, 1994, p. 172). The promotion of a “New International Economic Order” was linked to two important external contexts. The first one was the emergence of many newly independent nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin American in the 1950s and 1960s. The second one was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, marking the end of US hegemony. China sensed that both the US and the USSR were weakened by the Cold War, and that it would be possible to promote a third power to break through the economic control of the two super powers (Song and Zheng, 1975). Starting with the 1970s, when the promotion of the New International Economic Order had been announced, it became one of the most important projects that concretized China’s normative ideas about what the world should be, and it exerted a long-lasting influence on China’s foreign policy. Policy level China’s foreign policy transformed a lot during this period. From 1949 until the end of the 1960s, China took the “leaning on one side” (一边倒) policy (Ross and Jiang, 2001, p. 47), a policy adopted by Mao in consideration that China didn’t have other alternatives (Mao, 1994b, pp. 278–279). This policy was maintained until China’s relationship with the USSR deteriorated in the late 1960s, and ceded to independence and non-alliance under the strategic idea of the “three worlds”. A member of the first generation of leaders in the P.R. China, Mao’s top concern was China’s existence, and he promoted very flexible policies to adapt to the changing relationships with the USSR and the US (Li and Gao, 2010). China’s foreign policy during Mao’s time was strongly tainted with “anti-hegemonism” (Zheng, 1988), and China’s attitude towards multilateralism was the perfect evidence of this central idea. Summary of the first phase The first phase discussed in this historical review corresponds to a relatively long period (from 1949 to 1978, i.e. 29 years). The year 1949 is a historical juncture for P.R. China, as the Communist Party of China gained political power, but in a systematic context that the capitalist camp and socialist camp are antagonists,

China’s engagement in multilateralism  43 and a poor, vacillating new-born China needs to survive in this situation. This is a period during which China underwent much domestic turmoil, while seeking recognition in the international community. Its ideas about the world, its position in the world and its foreign policies reflected its attempts to seek survival, development, and more rights in a world where the US and the USSR rivalled each other, and dominated and monopolized the international order. China’s political ideas, cultivated from this context, lasted for a very long period of time in China’s contemporary history, and also became integrated in China’s political system. Nurtured by strong nationalism and the emphasis on independence, China’s foreign policy ideas judged the international system as unfair and unequal. China refused any form of domination or monopoly, which inevitably created tensions and conflicts with the US-led multilateral system, and alliances under the USSR’s control. By refusing an active participation in this system, China’s paradigm-level ideas developed into an idea to unite the oppressed and exploited countries to build a new international order (the intermediate zone and the third world theory). At the policy level, China promoted a “frontline of anti-hegemony” and tried to unite the third world countries and independent economies that relied less on USled multilateral economic institutions to promote a new rule of conduct in the United Nations. Table 3.1 summarizes the three levels and two types of China’s foreign policy ideas during this phase:

Table 3.1  The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the first phase

Ideational Level (How China sees the world)

Paradigm Level (How China sees itself and its role in the world) Policy Level (How to play this role)

Cognitive

Normative

The world is ruled according to rules made by the strong and the powerful, and is unfair to smaller, weaker countries. Besides the US and the USSR, there are countries who seek a fairer world order (from intermediate zones to three worlds theory) China is one of the third world countries; promotion of the five principles of peaceful co-existence.

There should be no domination nor hegemony (the way of despotism). The world order should be fair, equal, and democratic (the way of king)

To promote anti-hegemony frontlines in the UN; refusal of IMF aid; provision of aid to third world countries; promotion of amendment to the UN charter.

China would never become a super power. China doesn’t accept any form of hegemony, monopoly or domination. International relations should be based on democratic bases; international affairs should be decided through concords instead of monopoly; sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs should be respected.

44  China’s engagement in multilateralism During the first phase, China took a very passive and negative attitude towards the US-led multilateralism. Nevertheless, its foreign policy ideas in this time span laid the foundation of China’s foreign policy ideas in following eras, since there is continuity in all three levels of ideas. Many important concepts already emerged during this phase and kept evolving in following eras: “new international order”, “democratization of international order”, and “five principles of peaceful existence” outlived “three world theory” and “anti-hegemony frontline”, and still exert some influence today. Although multilateralism remained subdued during this long and chaotic phase in China’s foreign policy ideas, three levels and two types of foreign policy ideas already came into formation in this period and continued to influence and shape foreign policy ideas in later phases. In the second phase, the continuity and discontinuity in China’s foreign policy ideas and its participation in multilateral institutions based on these ideas will be presented.

The beginning of transition: from the Opening Up to the end of the Cold War (1978–1992) The short period of 1976–1978 is the historical juncture between the first phase and the second phase. The death of Mao Zedong marked the end of Communist China’s first generation of leaders and the end of Mao’s dictatorship. It is a permissible historical juncture that allows China to put an end of extreme leftism political ideas and have an overall adjustment of China’s domestic and international politics. On the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1977, shortly after the death of Mao Zedong, the CPC decided that China should focus on “the construction of socialism modernization”. More specifically, it meant that China should concentrate on “economic development and technology revolution”, and the goal was to ensure that the “Chinese economy develops rapidly and stably”.2 Therefore, China started one of the most important transitions in its history: the great Reform and Opening Up. Both external and internal contexts played a role in this transition. The 1970s had been a time when the Cold War was the top issue in the world. The tensions between the two poles were intense, and it also greatly pushed forward technological development. Nuclear technology boomed, and incredible achievements were made in space technologies both in the socialist and the capitalist camp. These great achievements had a very strong example effect on Chinese elites, and they found it necessary that China should stop the extreme leftism farce and start doing realistic work, otherwise it risked being left behind and isolated from world affairs (Cao, 2008; Zheng, 2008; Hu, 2009; Sun, 2009; Xiao, 2009). Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution had radicalized China’s relationship with other countries, and the relationship with the USSR deteriorated due to ideological divergences, almost dragging China into the damp of war (Haiguang Wang, 2009, p. 36). As for domestic politics, the Cultural Revolution had seriously weakened China’s economy, political order, legal system, and industrialization. These tragedies transformed into a great impetus for reform (Haiguang Wang, 2009; Xiao, 2009,

China’s engagement in multilateralism  45 pp. 84–85). The reformist Deng Xiaoping pointed out the inevitability of reforming CPC’s political institutions, which were eroded by bureaucracy, over-concentration of power, lifelong mandates, and all sorts of privileges (Deng, 1994, p. 327); he worried that without political reform, the previous errors and tragedies would reappear (Deng, 1994, p. 333). Thus, an important part of domestic political reforms was the establishment of democratic institutions, the pursuit of the rule of law, and the institutionalization of governance (Deng, 1993, 1994). Consequently, when Deng Xiaoping – the representative of the reformist side in the Chinese Communist Party – took power, economic and political reforms were launched very quickly. The economic reform after 1978 was said to be “going far beyond anything being attempted in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe”(Whyte, 1992). Reforms included rural de-collectivization, the reduction of the role of the state sector and central planning, opening to foreign investments and tourism, and the setting up of special export processing zones and private enterprises. Kim named it “the rapid post-Mao shift from the ideological superstructure (the ‘politics in command’ model) to the economic base (the ‘modernization in command’ model)” (Kim, 1984, p. 183). At the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1982, Deng Xiaoping proposed the very important idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”: Our construction of modernization must start from China’s reality. No matter if it is about revolution or construction, we must learn from foreign countries. But simply copying foreign countries’ patterns and experiences could never work. We have learned our lessons. We should combine the universal truth of Marxism with the reality of our country, find our own way, and construct socialism with Chinese characteristics. This new idea provided ideological legitimacy to the CPC, since it had begun to engage on a different road from what classic Marxist books presented. It also implied that it was necessary for the CPC to remain the only leading party. This reform after Mao’s death marked the shift of Chinese rulers from totalitarian dictatorship to authoritarian reformers, and “continued adaption of Communist revolution to the Chinese cultural context” (Oksenberg and Bush, 1982). The Reform and Opening Up marked a new era for China: the understanding of communism, socialism, and market economy were renewed, and these renewals came from the renewal of China’s understanding of the world, China’s role and position in it, and thus also had an impact on how China played this goal. Ideational level First, at the ideational level, Deng established two important ideas. The first idea is the developmentalist thought that portrays the world as peaceful and sets economic development as the main goal. We describe the change of ideas during Deng’s era as “back to history”: a return to Marx’s materialist development idea.

46  China’s engagement in multilateralism Deng Xiaoping emphasized that “the development of technology is undergoing a great revolution”, “which will renew all aspects in production” (Deng, 1994, p.  87). According to Deng, the tension between “Western Countries” (capitalist countries) and “Eastern Countries” (communist countries) had loosened, and the core issue in the world concerned economic development, or the imbalance between “Northern countries” (the developed countries) and “Southern countries” (the developing countries) (Deng, 1993). This worldview corresponds to Deng’s famous East-West-North-South theory, and it served as theoretical framework for China’s foreign policy for a quite long time since Deng Xiaoping started Reform and Opening Up. Deng’s worldview apparently differed quite significantly from Mao’s imagination of exporting revolution to the world and from his attempt to topple the existing world order. Yet, the new elements in foreign policy ideas at the ideational level don’t mean a total break from the previous period. Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong the spirit of refusing a world order provided by great powers, and the victimhood nurtured by history. Seeking a better, fairer world was still the most important normative idea defining China’s foreign policy, which implied that the current world order was seen as unfair and unreasonable. Deng believed that the era of hegemonism had come to an end, that traditional great powers could no longer control the world according to their will, and that it was time to conceive a new idea about how the international community should function; a multipolar world was considered as a possible option (Jin, 1999, p. 15). Paradigm level At the paradigm level, China positioned itself as a country that needs to maintain a peaceful development environment, which was crucial to the success of China’s Reform and Opening Up. The great reform led by Deng Xiaoping transformed the emphasis of China’s governmental work from class struggle to economy construction. This meant that China needed to pursue a developmentalist path and avoid being involved in disputes with dominant powers. Thus by accepting the fact that the current international system could not be easily altered or toppled in one day, China realized that it was only by participating in the system that it could be possible to transform the international order into a fairer and more equal one (Zheng and Niu, 2012, p. 35). Therefore China became more active in UN affairs. As mentioned in the ideational level, Deng Xiaoping inherited Mao’s idea that the current world order was unfair, but adopted a different approach to pursue a fairer one. Deng Xiaoping’s East-West-North-South worldview provided a new theoretical framework for China to pursue the New International Economic Order. Deng claimed that “China belongs forever to the third world and will never become a dominant power, never mistreat other countries and will always stay with the third world countries” (Deng, 1993). China emphasized its special status as the only third world country in the Security Council of the United Nations and endeavoured to promote a fairer order more favourable to the third world countries within the United Nations. China also continued to promote the New

China’s engagement in multilateralism  47 International Economic Order, which had gained more weight in China’s foreign policy because at the ideational level Deng emphasized economic development over ideological or military confrontation. Accordingly, the North-South problem became the central issue (Zhang and Xu, 1986). China took the initiative to promote North-South dialogue and South-South collaboration in order to smooth the North-South tensions (Gao, 2001). This point will be elaborated in later paragraphs. Policy level At the policy level, following the judgment about the world’s peaceful trend at the ideational level and the need to develop China’s economy and modernization at the paradigm level, three points characterized China’s foreign policy ideas. The first is that China chose to stay independent and adopted a non-alliance policy at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. According to the conference report, China was willing to establish a friendly relationship with any country, based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Deng Xiaoping explained that “China doesn’t play any card, and refuses to be played as a card” (Deng, 1994, p. 415). China’s non-alliance and independence policy implied that, on one side, China didn’t associate with any power or power group, nor did it accept pressures from any power or power group (A. Zhang, 1997). The second point, the promotion of multipolarization and of a fairer economic world order has become one of China’s long-term foreign policy orientations. The third point is that China should keep an open mind and adopt a pragmatic attitude towards relationships with foreign countries, because Deng pointed out that “China needs foreign capital, technology and management experience to promote China’s productivity and economic development. Thus, Opening Up is a necessity to realize our socialism modernization” (Deng, 1993). Accordingly, China adopted a more open-minded attitude towards accession to the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. Ideological factors eclipsed receiving financial donation or aid from these institutions and economic development became the top priority. Summary of the second phase The second phase covered a relatively short period from 1978 to 1992 (14 years). Nevertheless, the historical juncture (1976–1978) in this phase initiated a huge ideational turn in this phase that has exerted far-reaching influences in all aspects of Chinese society and China’s relationship with the external world. After Mao’s death, chaotic domestic politics were put to an end, which is a permissive condition to allow new political ideas to thrive; Deng Xiaoping and other reformists took the reins of this huge country and launched a series of economic and political reforms. The fact that China normalized its relationship with the US and regained its member status in the UN laid down a favourable context for future reforms. Deng proposed many audacious ideas about the world, and China’s position in the world and its foreign policies were designed to reach these goals. These ideas

48  China’s engagement in multilateralism differed greatly from Mao’s: Deng’s ideas focused more on China’s economic development and paid almost no attention to ideological factors; he also believed that world wars were unlikely to happen, while different countries should and could work together for a peaceful environment. Deng’s ideas, however revolutionary compared to Mao’s, still kept certain links with Mao in some principal issues. For example, China insisted that the current world order was an echo of previous exploitation of imperialism to the third world countries, and that China should contribute to the formation of a better and fairer world order. However, China changed its attitude and approach about how to achieve this goal. Deng’s East-West-North-South theory actually presented two different ways of seeing the world: if the world is seen as divided by East and West, it implies a perspective of ideology divergence; if the world is seen as divided by South and North, then it adopts a perspective of economic development. In Deng’s worldview, the East-West divergence is only secondary, but the South-North issue is the core issue, and it is a non-negotiable one. Table 3.2 summarizes Deng’s foreign policy ideas at three different levels of generality and two types of ideas (normative and cognitive). Table 3.2  The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the second phase

Ideational Level (How China sees the world)

Paradigm Level (How China sees itself and its role in the world)

Policy Level (How to play this role)

Cognitive

Normative

The main stream of the world is peace and development. Hegemonism has come to an end. The main conflict in the world is the North-South conflict (economic sense) instead of the East-West confrontation (ideological sense). China is a developing country. China is a country that needs a peaceful development environment. China believes that by participating in the existing world order, it could make it a fairer and more equal one.

A more equal, fairer world order should be established; a multipolar world is ideal.

Non-alignment policy. Any association that might be beneficial to attract foreign investments, technology, and management experience

China would never become a super power/hegemon. China should continue to promote a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would be more beneficial for developing countries. China should promote SouthNorth dialogue and SouthSouth cooperation

China’s engagement in multilateralism  49 Thus China actively participated in multilateral institutions as a developing country, a “South” country. It tried to push forward reforms from the inside, while benefitting from these institutions in order to deepen and consolidate its Reform and Opening Up. During this phase, China joined the IMF and the World Bank and proposed to re-access the GATT. China also gradually participated in the UN’s peacekeeping missions, which were conducted according to the principles of providing aid to developing countries. To summarize, the historical juncture of 1976–1978 marks an important turning point of China’s policies from extreme leftism and ideology-oriented towards relatively milder and economy oriented. The consensus of this change was achieved through an expensive price of the Cultural Revolution and a huge turmoil of China’s domestic politics. The new government began to institutionalize these reforms in order to guarantee that this country would follow the path of Reform and Opening Up.

Active participation in international multilateral institutions: from the end of Cold War to 2002 (1992–2002) The period of 1989–1991 is the historical juncture that connects the second phase and the third phase. Two continual events, the 1989 tragedy and the collapse of the USSR, certainly exerted a great influence on China’s history and world history. These two events generated numerous and far-reaching changes both for China’s internal and external politics. The 1989 tragedy is understood by the Chinese government as the result of the peaceful evolution policy of the US and the erosion of the Communist Party’s ruling legitimacy by “the Western values”. The end of the bipolar world brought more changes: the US was left as the hyper power and still exerted certain hegemonic influences since the international institutions were designed according to US hegemony; China became the only communist power in the world (we certainly do not forget Vietnam and North Korea, but their influence is much more limited in comparison to China’s), and with the end of the communist regime in the USSR China became an evident target in ideological senses. At the same time, US hegemony had ended because it was no longer capable and willing to (a) influence the realm of ideas and ideologies to the extent comparable with the decades of the exportation of the “American way of life”, when their soft power was able to conquer the consensus of others, allies, and neutrals; and (b) pay the increasing costs of the production of “international common goods”, including particularly supporting the US dollar as an international currency and a pillar of the stability of the global trade system (Telò, 2014b). Accompanying the weakening of the US hegemony, globalization expanded, the plurality of international actors increased, and powers diffused: new emerging states appeared (China, India, Russia, Japan, South Africa), along with regions and non-state actors. China’s geopolitical situation also changed vis-à-vis the change of the world order. As Telò pointed out, the huge change of world order brought multilateralism into a new epoch: the plural multilateralism in a posthegemonic world (Telò, 2014c, p. 61).

50  China’s engagement in multilateralism China’s foreign policy ideas also underwent many changes at all three levels after these two historical events. In this section, we will introduce these great changes that took place in the third phase of China’s foreign policy ideas. Ideational level The 1989 crisis generated many debates and discussions in China. There were conservative opinions that proposed to cut off China’s connection with the outside world in response to “peaceful evolution”. The crash of the USSR had made China’s external environment even more difficult. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping and other reformists’ support, these events didn’t change China’s fundamental judgment about the world. Deng Xiaoping believed that peace and development should remain the main theme of the world tide, and the chance of a third world war remained low. But the question of how the world order would develop remained a difficult one to answer; debates about unipolarism, bipolarism and multipolarism arose (Gamble, 2012, 2013). Many Chinese scholars strongly believed that the US could no longer maintain its hegemony, and new powers, states, and non-states were emerging. Chinese scholars described this world order in transition as “one super power with multiple great powers” (一超多强). However, debates arose about how long this world order would last. Some believed that “one super power and multiple great powers” was only a transitional phase that would not last forever. Chen Qimao, a senior CPC think tank member, pointed out in his book: “one super power and multiple great powers” is a transition towards a new political and economic world order; the mixed world structure, within which different powers (Europe, Japan, Russia and China) are emerging, and the inability of the US to play the role of hegemon would certainly lead to multipolarity, and the US will eventually lose its status as the only super power (Chen, 1996, p. 20). Others, for example Yan Xuetong, another senior Chinese scholar in international relations, believed that the US would keep its status for a relatively longer time, although the world would eventually develop into multipolarization (Yan, 1997; Zhou, 1998; Cui, 2002; Xu, 2008). How China understood “one super power and multiple great powers” reflects China’s judgment about the world at the time (the ideational level ideas), and accordingly drove China’s self-positioning (the pragmatic ideas). After 1992, Chinese scholars gradually accepted the notion of “one super power, multiple great powers”, as the US still enjoyed comprehensive preponderance and a dominant position in international politics (Chen and Pan, 2013). Nonetheless, China believed that the world developed toward multipolarity. It is not difficult to understand why China champions multipolarity over unipolarity and bipolarity after the Cold War. First, a multipolar world could restrain the development of hegemonism and unilateralism by a dominant power (Chen and Pan, 2013). As China turned to non-alliance strategy in the second phase, it is clear that China refused any form of dominance from a hyper power. Thus, multipolarism would certainly offer China more choices. Second, developing countries could share more freedom to pursue their economic and social development without the intervention of foreign powers, not forgetting that these interventions are

China’s engagement in multilateralism  51 often motivated by the intention to universalize “Western values and systems” (Chen and Pan, 2013). This is a very important point because after the collapse of the USSR, both communism and the central planned market are believed to be a failure, and China, as a non-democratic country that still claims communism, is confronted with a serious issue of legitimation. A multipolar world could justify this diversity without attaching a standard to judge each country’s political and economic pattern. Third, in a multipolar world, the possibility to alter the world order set by the US is much higher. Fourth, China would certainly be in a more favourable position in a multipolar world than in a unipolar or a bipolar world. Thus a multipolar world became a desirable world order for China after 1991, and promoting multipolarism became China’s foreign policy starting from the mid1990s, as will be discussed in the next section. Paradigm-level ideas At the paradigm level, the shock brought by the 1989 crisis and the Western world’s sanctions changed how China sees itself. As discussed previously, China decided to adopt the perception that the world order is developing into a multipolar world; but before the formation of a fully multipolarized world, the world order would remain stable for a long time, as the US was the only super power, co-existing with multiple other powers. Due to these changes in the world order, China started to rethink its position; from a domestic perspective, China started to rebuild and redefine its own identity. As ideological factors gradually faded away, the divergence in ideologies and political systems have deepened, expanded, and were substituted by the divergence in cultures. China was confronted with new questions: How to explain itself to a world dominated by Western ideas and values in order to avoid conflicts? How to eliminate mistrust and suspicions caused by the so-called clash of civilizations? (Huntington, 1996). Thus the changing world order demanded that China adjust its self-positioning according to its judgment about the world, raising two questions in particular, the first being, what role does China play in this new world order? Deng insisted that China should become a pole in multipolar world order: “Maybe the future world is tri-pole, quarto-pole or five-pole . . . As long as it is multipolar, China should be one pole anyway” (Deng, 1993). Although China’s economic development remained low, China’s political influence, population, and territory size made it a player that was not to be neglected (Tang, 1992; Ni, 2002). A multipolar world implies a world that has different power centres, and these power centres and the states that constitute them don’t necessarily have the same profile: a socialist power should and could co-exist with a capitalist power. Following this logic, a multipolar world is favourable to the great revival of the Chinese nation (Zhang and Sun, 2007, p. 85) envisioned by the Chinese government: a China with a successful economy and a strong political influence, led by the Communist Party. In this new context, China also enriched its vocabulary of self-description. China’s qualification of being a “socialist country” was emphasized as a distinction,

52  China’s engagement in multilateralism while the qualification of developing countries and rising power were also mobilized. As Yu Jianjun pointed out, this was a period during which China’s selfrecognition retained the characteristics of “a socialist country”, “a third world country”, and a “country of sovereignty”, but enriched into “a quasi-great power”, “a nuclear power”, “a developing country”, and “a standing committee member of the UN security council” (Yu, 2009, p. 13). Men Honghua elaborated China’s identity recognition by pointing out that China is “the only socialist great power” (Men, 2013a). Chu Shulong also agrees that China’s positioning was a “powerful rising socialist country” with “communist party rule” (Chu and Lin, 2008, p. 39). The concept of “A Major Responsible Country” At the same time, the “construction of a major responsible country”3 was set as China’s foreign affairs goal in 1999 (Zheng and Niu, 2012). The idea of becoming “a major responsible country” implied that China confirmed with confidence that it is a major and responsible power (instead of adopting the words “great power”). The concept of “responsibility” that emerged in the second phase was elaborated and integrated into China’s official rhetoric. It is an important turning, as China’s self-recognition has changed from a country that emphasizes its own sovereignty and independence to a country that thinks about its responsibility in international society: the first step to integrate into international institutions as to express its willingness to accept its bindings (Guo and Niu, 2007). Zhou Guiyin pointed out that international responsibility could be categorized as “self-defined” responsibility and “coerced responsibility” by the developed countries to force China to take responsibilities that are beyond its capability.4 He argued that it is necessary to have a clearly defined and legitimate recognition of China’s “international responsibilities” (Zhou, 2009). In this phase, China’s international responsibility could be summarized as follows. First, the responsibility to build a new international economic and political order: China defined itself as a rising major country that carried the responsibility to shape the world in a fairer way by allowing different political systems to coexist, not just by providing more fairness and equality in economic development opportunity (Shen, 2001, p. 22). Second, as Chen Zhimin suggested, as the biggest developing country in the world, one of China’s greatest responsibilities is to maintain the welfare of the huge population of Chinese people, which has both domestic and international implications (Chen, 2012, p.  80). Third, by talking about responsibility, China has become more serious about the treaties it signed and the promises it made. This is especially prominent in China’s series of legal reforms after it entered the WTO and its financial rescues during the 1997–1998 financial crises in East Asia. Fourth, China has begun to take additional international responsibilities as “China’s domestic and foreign policy could produce positive impacts on their countries, not negative ones” (Chen, 2012, p. 82). This concerned China’s long-term strategy, because China needed to consider bridging its national interests and the construction of mutual interests in order to exert more

China’s engagement in multilateralism  53 political influence in the future world order (Wang, 2008). Fifth, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China’s responsibility in maintaining world peace has also become prominent. This is illustrated by China’s efforts in manoeuvring the North Korean nuclear crisis through six-part talks (to be discussed in the fourth phase). The idea of a “major responsible power” has entered into China’s core ideas as a new guideline that coordinates China’s foreign policy strategies, and it was further elaborated in Hu Jintao’s time. Policy level In the ideational section and the pragmatic section, we have introduced China’s judgement about the world order and the decision it made about its position and role facing a new world in constant change. In the policy level section, we will discuss the concrete foreign policies that China adopted in reaction to the world order it accepted to believe in, and in order to realize its role and aims within this context. As introduced in the previous two sections, China had accepted that, for a relatively long period, the US would remain the only super power, while other new powers would emerge. China decided to keep a low profile by adopting the strategy of “hide one’s ability, bide one’s time”: this meant that China wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the US, and wanted to facilitate by all means the development of China’s economy. China also paid attention to the fact that other state and non-state powers were emerging, especially regional powers. China welcomed this trend and actively participated interregional building. More importantly, China opted for multilateralism as the method to create collaboration platform. As Jiang Zemin pointed out, “regional and inter-regional cooperation organizations are unprecedentedly active . . . multipolar tendency is favourable to world peace, stability and prosperity”. Finally, Jiang said in his report that “China should actively participate in multilateral diplomacy affairs, and fully use China’s influence in the UN and other multilateral institutions”. It is during this phase that gradually, China’s participation in international affairs became increasingly active by accepting multilateral arrangements, prioritizing its neighbouring countries and keeping the relationship with developing countries as fundamental in its foreign relations by setting its foreign affairs guideline as “great powers are key factors, neighbouring countries are the priorities, developing countries are fundamentals, and multilateral institutions are stages”. China developed concrete foreign policies concerning the four aspects in the guideline. Great powers are key factors In this phase, the great power perspective still played an important role in China’s foreign policymaking, meaning that great powers (countries that own political, military, and economic powers) were considered the most important factors in international relations (Wang, 1998, p. 32). In other words, the analysis of the relationships

54  China’s engagement in multilateralism between great powers considered as poles in this “one super power multiple great powers” became the main pathology for China’s thinking about diplomacy. In principle, China adopted the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” to regulate its relationship with other countries. Meanwhile, China developed specific policies for respective powers. We will introduce, respectively, the three most important powers in China’s foreign relationship: the US, Russia, and the EU. SINO-US RELATIONSHIP

Deng Xiaoping highly valued the relationship between China and the US. He claimed that this bilateral relationship concerned world peace and the interests of all of humanity (CPC Party Literature Research Office and CPC Party Literature Research Office, 1998). As China’s economic power was rising, the China-US relationship became sensible. As the US’s power in international relations was diminishing, there were many discussions and debates concerning whether China would replace the US as the new hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001), and whether different cultures would clash (Huntington, 1996). China sought to prove that the answers to these questions were negative (Hu, 2005). For example, China’s policy toward the US emphasized that China did not see the US as its enemy, but that it was against any form of power politics, especially concerning the Taiwan issue (Xie, 2009, p. 411). China tried to balance the Sino-US relation between not directly confronting the US super power, while promoting a multipolar world. An important case illustrating this attitude was the negotiation between China and the US about China’s accession to the WTO. China believed that joining the WTO was of critical importance to China’s development, and therefore that the US posed many obstacles to the negotiation of China’s accession to the WTO. Chinese scholars believed that, although China and the US are complementary to each other in trade and commerce, due to the differences in ideologies and political systems, all trade issues are inevitably political issues (Chen and Li, 2001, p. 8). During the 15 years of negotiations, the Sino-US relationship became the most important bilateral relation that influenced the process of negotiation. For example, a US missile hit the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia on 8 May 1999, which caused a four-month delay in the WTO accession negotiations (H. Zhou, 1999, p. 5). Also, Taiwan’s accession to the WTO was in negotiations along with China’s accession, which complicated Sino-US relations (Liu, 2002). To summarize, Sino-US relations greatly influenced the negotiation of China’s accession into the WTO. During this last phase of negotiations, all sensible issues in this bilateral relation have been projected into China’s WTO accession. THE SINO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

Under Jiang Zemin’s administration, China greatly strengthened its relationship with Russia. In 1996, China and Russia promoted their “constructive strategic

China’s engagement in multilateralism 55 partnership” to “Equality and trust, facing twenty-first-century strategic collaboration partnership”. In 2001, China and Russia signed the “Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship”. From the Chinese perspective, to maintain a good relationship with Russia was of great strategic importance for both China’s national security and its economic development. Russia was not only China’s armament and oil provider, but it was also a like-minded collaborator against the US and the EU. As China deemed that the promotion of democracy and free market economy are the core pathway of the US global strategy to bring back the US hegemonic world order, the success of the non-democratic model, represented by China and Russia, would be very important to legitimize diversity in political and economic patterns (Cheng and Yin, 2011). China recognized Russia as an important political power with which China could promote multipolarization through balancing the US’s power (Li, 2001, p. 3; Qin, 2002, p. 19). Although China highly valued its relationship with Russia, problems of the Sino-Russia relationship are no less than those of Sino-US relation. First, the lack of mutual trust was a key issue between China and Russia (Li, 2001). Voices of concern about China’s future menace, or “Chinese Threat” to Russia, have never ceased since the mid-1990s (Fu and Wang, 2008). There were concerns about demographic threats due to China’s huge population, or “the yellow peril” to Russia (Larin, 1998, p. 72; Alexseev, 2001; Alexseev and Hofstetter, 2006; Verlin and Inozemtsev, 2011); there were also warnings that China coveted Russia’s territory and natural resources (Shalawen and Wang, 2004; Wu, 2005); finally, there were worries that once China’s political system would crack down, a wave of immigration would pour into Russia and cause chaos (Fu and Wang, 2008). At the same time, “Russian political commentators’ views on Beijing are generally based on mythical perceptions rather than realistic assessments” (Pavlova-Silvanskaja, 1997, p. 172). Second, the Sino-Russia relationship was top down rather than bottom up. Although many treaties and grand projects were settled between the two governments, actual trade, direct investments, and commercial exchanges between the two countries remained very low and imbalanced (Li, 2001; Qin, 2002). SINO-EU RELATIONSHIP

Besides the Sino-US relationship and the Sino-Russia relationship, the Sino-EU relationship also went through major adjustments and developments during this phase. The 1989 crisis attracted the attention of the EU and its member states towards China’s human rights issues, which were rarely discussed before 1989 (Y. Li, 1999). For example, Germany required that China accept two UN Human Rights treaties and insisted that China’s human rights situation would be the premise of the Sino-Germany relationship (Leutner and Trampedach, 1995, pp. 327– 330). The EU’s arms embargo on China started in 1989 and is still in place today. The economic relationship between China and the EU didn’t pause for long due

56  China’s engagement in multilateralism to the importance of China as a market, and China welcomed the EU’s policy “A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations” launched in 1995 (Communication of the EU Commission, 1995) as a more positive policy, within which human rights issues were softened (Wang and Feng, 1995, p. 17). In 1998, the EU issued “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”, thus solidifying the Sino-EU partnership and explicitly acknowledging the importance of sustaining a relationship with China. From the Chinese perspective, the foundation of this relationship was the mutual recognition between China and EU of their respective importance and power in international affairs as the world multipolarized (Wang and Liu, 2009, p. 44). However, many difficult issues are also lying in the middle of the road concerning the Sino-EU relationship. In this phase, the most important divergence between China and the EU lay in ideologies (Zhu and Zhang, 2002; Ren, 2008). Human rights, liberal democracy, and freedom are core values treasured by the EU, and the EU insisted that the promotion of human rights would be one of the most important missions in China-EU relations, as indicated in “A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations”. This position was directly associated with the arms embargo issue. China’s perspective was to argue that each country has the right to its own interpretation and implementation of human rights (Cui, 1995; J. Zhang, 1998; Y. Zhang, 1998), thus associating human rights with diplomacy is a total interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, and that human rights issues have become instruments for “Western powers” to promote power politics (Wang and Zhang, 1992, p. 146; Z. Zhang, 1992; Q. Zhou, 1999). Years of human rights talk didn’t make any substantial progress in China’s human rights, but it reinforced China’s confidence that the EU would not forsake the huge trade opportunity for human rights issues. Neighbouring countries are the priority If China’s low profile attitude towards the US corresponded to “hide one’s ability and bide one’s time”, then China’s active engagements with its neighbouring countries fall in the category of “achieve one’s achievements”. China’s good neighbour policy served at the same time to counterbalance the US influence in Asia Pacific, and to create a peaceful environment for China to develop its economy. The end of the Cold War exerted a deep influence on China’s neighbourhood policy: on the one hand, the end of contest between communism and capitalism meant that ideologies no longer played an important role in international relations, leaving countries more room to define their foreign partnerships based on their national interests; on the other hand, China needed to improve its relations with its neighbours to protect itself against the US military presence in its neighbourhood (Japan and South Korea). In May 1991, the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs contacted ASEAN and expressed China’s will to cooperate. He received a positive response from ASEAN. The end of the bipolar contest had led to a subtle situation where there was neither full mutual trust nor intensive contest between China and the US, thus

China’s engagement in multilateralism  57 allowing ASEAN to develop its relations with China without having to worry about choosing sides (Ma, 2009). Starting in 1992, China began its official relations with ASEAN, and the economic crisis in 1997 provided China with an excellent opportunity to participate in regional multilateral collaboration by supporting the Chiang-Mai Initiative. Through the Chiang-Mai Initiative, China successfully eased the worries of its neighbouring countries towards a rising China by providing public goods and by establishing a positive public image in East Asia. China’s collaboration with ASEAN from the multilateralist perspective will be elaborated further in the case study section. Besides China’s relationship with ASEAN as an institution, China’s bilateral relations with other neighbouring countries also greatly developed. These relations had very strong regional characteristics. For example, China’s relationship with South East Asian countries (most of them are member states of ASEAN) channelled China into the South East Asia region; with Japan, South Korea, and North Korea that formed a possible institution for communication in North East Asia; and with Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan that created the possibility to collaborate with Central Asia. All these bilateral relationships in different regions developed into multilateral institutions and even advanced to regionalism (ASEAN+3, Six Party Talk, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). China’s good neighbourhood policy was born at the end of the cold war at a time when new regionalism started. As China’s geographical position decided that it is adjacent to or present in the aforementioned regions, China’s bilateral and multilateral relationships with countries in these regions were gradually regionalized. This point will be elaborated in detail in the case study section. Developing countries are fundamental The so-called developing countries, according to the Chinese perspective, are economically underdeveloped countries which have experienced colonialism and independence struggles. They were the “third world” countries during Mao Zedong’s time and the early years when China launched Reform and Opening Up (Zhang, 2007, p. 22). China defined itself as a developing country, and it is one of the most important principles of China’s foreign policy (Eisenman, Heginbotham and Mitchell, 2007, pp. 13–19; Zhang, 2007; Wu, 2010). It was all about how poor countries could benefit from this unfair world order. These countries were relabelled as developing countries in this new phase. To put it differently, developing countries were fundamental in China’s foreign policy because their presence was proof of the inequality and unfairness of the current world order, thus legitimizing China’s requirement of establishing a fairer and more equal one. As pointed out before, these four guidelines interact and intervene with each other. Many of China’s neighbouring countries are developing countries, and China paid careful attention to them because of its national security: China’s border settlement with Central Asian countries and Russia, China’s collaboration with ASEAN, and its efforts to keep peace in the Korean Peninsula, as mentioned

58  China’s engagement in multilateralism in a previous section. In the meantime, China also paid a great deal of attention to the relationship with developing countries of other continents. China’s investment in Central Europe, East Europe, Latin America, and Africa, greatly increased during this phase (Mao, 1997). China’s relations with developing countries went beyond the pattern of China providing unconditionally unilateral financial aid in the 1950s. It transformed into collaborations that pursued mutual interests (Liu, 2009; Hu and Liu, 2012). Following the change in China’s recognition about the world, the function of China’s diplomacy also transformed to serve the economic development instead of the opposite before the Reform and Opening Up (Qu, 2000, pp. 440–441). Under this guideline, China’s external investment in developing countries grew rapidly and gradually generated a format of its own. Multilateral institutions are stages This is the exact period when China realized the importance of multilateralism in working against hegemony, and started to engage more multilateral policy in foreign affairs (Zheng and Niu, 2012). China believed that the United Nations was an important platform to counterbalance threats and menaces from the US, and thus deepened its involvement in the reform of the UN. China’s participation in world affairs deepened since its Reform and Opening Up, due to the great systematic changes brought by the end of the bipolar world order. Consequently, China’s foreign policies became more sophisticated than in the previous phases, directed by the ideas that the world is and should be developing into a multipolar world, and that China’s strategy should focus on its own economic development. We can see that these four aspects of China’s foreign policy guidelines interact and intertwine, shifting China’s foreign relationship network that on one side nurtured new institutional powers to counterbalance the US influence on world affairs, and on the other side expanded China’s influence and gained national interests. The details about China’s participation in multilateral institutions will be introduced in the next chapter. Summary of the third phase The period 1992–2002 was filled with turbulent systematic changes. As a socialist power, the legitimacy of the CPC regime was greatly questioned after the 1989 crisis and the collapse of the USSR. The historical juncture (1989–1991) has brought many challenges to China’s Reform and Opening Up strategy and also a drastic change of China’s external circumstances. China was confronted with economic sanctions, a weapons embargo, and political isolation. Due to the need to diversify its economic partnerships (export market and investment sources), and also due to political reasons (China needed friends to support its rise in the international community), China began to reach out to regional institutions in order to get involved in the process of shaping the new world order. Factors of great powers, neighbouring countries, and developing countries intertwined with each other, and multilateralism became the best platform for China to get involved with

China’s engagement in multilateralism  59 these factors in a subtle and acceptable way. This was the context within which China started its active participation in regional multilateral institutions (ASEAN, African Union, MERCOSUR), and even took the initiative to create one (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). China’s active involvement in these regional institutions coincided with the rise of new regionalism. As Telò observes, this was a post-hegemonic regionalism (competitive regionalism) as a component of a new turbulent and heterogeneous, multipolar world system: they followed new power logics and asserted asymmetric norm setting and top-down rule-making (Telò, 2014b). These new emerging regions provided China new platforms to manoeuvre and to take more initiative. At the global level, multilateralism developed from the US-led multilateralism to post-hegemonic multilateralism during the third phase. China continued to promote multipolarization of the world order by demanding more decision powers for developing countries in global multilateral institutions such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. China got actively involved in the reform of the UN and also fought for more voting powers in the IMF and the World Bank. The results of these efforts were not satisfying; or to put it differently, these global institutions may not be capable of solving regional questions, which inversely strengthened China’s participation in regional institutions. At the same time, China’s changed attitudes and understandings of the UN also reshaped China’s behaviour: as Gill and Reilly pointed out, China’s understanding of “sovereignty” had gradually changed, and this change had led to more participation of China in peacekeeping operations (Gill and Reilly, 2000). Table 3.3 summarizes China’s foreign policy ideas from 1992–2002 according to the three levels of generality and two types of discursive institutionalism ideas. Table 3.3 shows that China’s foreign policy ideas in this phase inherited the basic judgment of the world made by Deng Xiaoping and other reformists at the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up, while it accepted the collapse of the super power status of the USSR and the US in the post–Cold War world order. China accepted keeping a low profile and had no intention to challenge the existing world order, but it associated with regional powers by participating in regional multilateral institutions in order to develop more economic partners as well as political collaborators. China’s four guidelines of foreign policy were a new invention during this phase, and they kept exerting an influence in the next decades. These four guidelines correspond to four different perspectives of categorizing different powers, both state and non-state. They indicate the four most important perspectives to which China should pay the greatest attention and deal with different strategies. The four guidelines interact and intertwine with each other: great powers might include neighbouring countries (Russia), many neighbouring countries are developing countries (ASEAN member states), multilateralism is an instrument for great powers to decide on the world order (the UN, the IMF, the World Bank), and also an instrument for developing countries to collaborate and coordinate (ASEAN, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, African Union, MERCOSUR, etc.).

60  China’s engagement in multilateralism Table 3.3  The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the third phase

Ideational Level (How China sees the world)

Paradigm Level (How China sees itself and its role in the world)

Policy Level (How to play this role)

Cognitive

Normative

The main theme of the world is peace and development. The world order remains one super power with multiple great powers for a long time, but the world is multipolarizing. The main conflict in the world is North-South conflict instead of East-West confrontation. China is a developing country. China is a socialist country. China is a country that needs a peaceful development environment. China believes that by participating in the existing world order, it could make it fairer and more equal.

A more equal, fairer world order should be established; a multipolar world is ideal.

China would never become a super power/hegemon. China should “conceal one’s abilities and bide one’s time, achieve one’s achievements”. China should continue to promote the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which would be more beneficial for developing countries. China should promote SouthNorth dialogue and SouthSouth cooperation.

Non-alignment policy. “Great powers are key factors, neighbouring countries are the priorities, developing countries are fundamentals, and multilateral institutions are stages”. Any association that accepts the legitimacy of the CPC regime and is willing to collaborate with China in economic and political issues.

Participation in regional multilateral institutions: 2002–2012 China began the new millennium under Hu Jintao’s administration. The new century started with many global issues that involved every corner of the world. The period 2001–2002 is a historical juncture within which China’s external environment has greatly changed; China has the chance to adjust its foreign policies. With the September 11th tragedy, anti-terrorism became one of the most urgent global issues. At the same time, the war against terrorism weakened the US grip and influence in world affairs. For China, this global context was quite new: new

China’s engagement in multilateralism  61 powers kept rising and exerting a growing influence; China’s regional power status became clearer. China had successfully accessed the WTO in December 2001, which allowed it to integrate the world economy and the commercial system, and influence China’s foreign policies in different ways. At the same time, China’s foreign policy environment became much more complicated. At the regional level, territorial conflicts were increasing: the historical issues and territorial disputes between China and Japan, the territorial dispute with the Philippines, North Korea’s nuclear crisis, the US presence in Asia Pacific, China’s anti-terrorism and anti-separatism battle, and its relationship with Central Asian countries were all hot issues that required multilateral solutions. China’s accession to the WTO strengthened China’s attraction to foreign investment, which diminished its neighbouring countries’ competitiveness. The question of how to balance regional economic development became a sensible issue for China. At the global level, from the Chinese perspective, the re-rise of imperialism was quite worrying, seeing the Bush administration take a unilateral and harsh foreign policy; serious trade wars between China and the US or China and the EU within WTO appeared very soon after China’s accession to the WTO. As China’s involvement in regional multilateral institutions deepened, concerns about China’s “new colonialism” emerged, demanding effective answers from China’s foreign policy. Learning to use multilateral institutions to defend its interests and to claim its needs became an urgent task. Ideational level For ideational level ideas, or how China sees the world, Hu Jintao inherited the idea coming from Deng Xiaoping who believed that the world is multipolarizing and that the most important issues are peace and development. The normative question, about the unfairness and inequality of the world order, was confronted with difficulties: developing countries were considered as an important power to fight alongside China for a fairer world economic order; but as Dong Manyuan and many other scholars have observed, there was a huge divergence rising among developing countries. After the Cold War, and as the world economy kept globalizing, large scale developing countries groups (e.g. non-alignment, 77 Group, African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and African Union) became less active and incapable of offering any solution to global problems; developing countries were prone to developing regional order and regional economics instead of bothering with a global world order (Dong, 2008). Within this context, a more comprehensive but less class-oriented idea about what the world should be was needed to answer this question in a world difficult to describe or differentiate in terms of developing countries and developed countries. Hu Jintao deepened and elaborated a new idea, the idea of “harmonious world”, to present a world order that China deemed just and fair. This foreign policy idea was transferred from domestic politics: Hu Jintao first proposed the concept of

62  China’s engagement in multilateralism “harmonious society” as a goal for domestic politics, and then developed the concept of “harmony” in foreign policy (Liu, 2006). In 2005, on the occasion of the Asian African Summit, Hu Jintao introduced the “harmonious world” concept as China’s idea about the world: We need to promote the excellent tradition of the Asian-African Summit (The Bandung Conference), which is to seek the convergence while accepting divergence. We promote the spirit of openness and comprehension, the respect to the diversity of civilizations, religions and values, the respect of the autonomy of each country in choosing their own social system and development mode; we promote friendly coexistence of different civilizations, dialogues on an equal basis, the prosperity of development, in order to build a harmonious world. According to Chinese media, the Asian-African Summit was the echo of the Bandung Conference from 50  years earlier, where Zhou Enlai had proposed his famous five principles of peaceful co-existence. 50  years later, this set of ideas has evolved into the concept of “harmonious world”, and suggested that Asian and African countries should unite under this idea to form a “new type of strategic partnership between Asia and Africa, in order to work out developmental solutions in orders unfavourable to developing countries that are set by the WTO”.5 The same year, Hu Jintao provided a more thorough definition of his “harmonious world”:6 first, multilateralism is seen as critically important to realize mutual safety. Hu preached that the international community should abandon Cold War thinking and engage in a new security idea of mutual trust (互信), mutual benefice (互利), equality (平等), and concordance (协作), in order to establish an impartial and efficient collective security mechanism to protect world peace. Second, collaborations should be of mutual benefice in order to realize prosperity for all. Globalization should bring prosperity for all countries, including developing countries, instead of deepening the wealth gap between the rich and the poor. Thus an open, fair, indiscriminative multilateral commercial system should be established. Third, a spirit of tolerance is seen as essential to build a harmonious world. Cultural diversity should be respected, and each country should have its own right to decide its social system and development mode. Fourth, the reform of the United Nations should proceed, in order to allow developing countries, especially representatives of African countries and smaller countries in the Security Council to participate in the decision-making process. In 2006, the concept of “harmonious world/society” was incorporated into China’s official rhetoric when Hu Jintao proclaimed “a harmonious society is the fundamental attribute of Chinese characteristic socialism and the guarantee of our country’s prosperity, our nation’s revival and our people’s happiness”.7 China’s foreign policy had adjusted to the idea of “harmonious world” rhetoric.

China’s engagement in multilateralism  63 Analysis of harmonious world “Harmonious world” was the first foreign policy proposed by a Chinese government that adopted an ancient Chinese conception. It was a change from the Marxist worldview that emphasized class struggle to the legacy of traditional Chinese philosophy that believes all are one. This was an important change in perspectives (Huang, Deng and Liang, 2007, p. 47). The adoption of “harmonious world” marked an important “twist in party scripts [with] the prominence given to words drawn from the classical vocabulary of the Chinese tradition, as opposed to those originating in Western revolutionary discourses”. This corresponds to CPC leaders’ tendency to “do things in their own way, or, in the well-worn phrase, ‘with Chinese characteristics’ ” (Delury, 2008), a point which we will discuss later. The idea of harmonious world was a new outbreak in China’s foreign affairs ideas. It was neither a world of “great unity” (da tong shijie), conceived by traditional Chinese philosophy, nor a world of ultimate communism proposed by Karl Marx. The focal point of the harmonious world was the co-existence of different systems and different cultures. It proposed multilateral cooperation in order to diminish the risk of large scale military conflicts (Chen, 2005). Four conceptual innovations in Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world” are worth our attention: first, this new idea expanded new security ideas towards the democratization of international relations; second, China was determined to take more initiatives in multilateral diplomacy; third, China strived to create a peaceful and harmonious environment; fourth, China put an emphasis on the effects of culture on foreign relationships (Chao and Hsu, 2009). Wang Yizhou, the vice dean of international relations at Peking University, points out that the idea of “harmonious world” was actually strengthening China’s recognition as a member of the international community (Wang, 2007, p. 12). Diverging from previous ideas of China’s foreign policy, the idea of harmonious world was not merely a Chinese perspective: the Chinese government intended to promote it as a new norm for the future world order, as an alternative to “the US pattern democracy” (Huang, Deng and Liang, 2007). The new idea of harmonious world has greatly enriched China’s foreign policy during Hu Jintao’s mandate by generating many important new paradigmatic ideas. In the following sections, we will discuss foreign policy ideas at the paradigm level. Paradigm level At the paradigm level, China’s self-recognition underwent a relatively large transformation. A major responsible country During this phase, China inherited the role of “a major responsible country” proposed by Jiang Zemin. That China was a “major responsible country” was

64  China’s engagement in multilateralism confirmed in Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, when he said that China will continue to keep in mind both the interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of the people of all countries, get more actively involved in international affairs, play its due role of a major responsible country, and work jointly with other countries to meet global changes.8 However, new concepts were necessary to support and describe what a major responsible country needed to do as China’s economic and military power rose, globalization deepened, new powers were emerging, and new security issues emerged. Debate about new directions in China’s foreign policy strategy When Hu Jintao proposed the idea of “harmonious world”, it immediately raised the question of what role China should play in the promotion of a harmonious world, and how a harmonious world should be promoted. Since “harmonious world” was the first blueprint of the world proposed by China, should China take more initiative in international affairs? So the first question that Chinese scholars were confronted with was how to deal with the paradigm level ideas proposed by Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “hide one’s ability and bide one’s time”, developed right after the end of the Cold War in order to keep China from direct conflict with the West, was questioned: was it still suitable for a new international context? Ye Zicheng, a senior researcher from Peking University, believes that “hide one’s ability and bide one’s time” should be abandoned as a strategy because the context within which it was designed had changed, and also because it had no logical relationship with “achieve one’s achievements”. As a growing great power, China should adopt self-confidence, openness, and calmness instead (Ye, 2002). Ye Zicheng’s opinion was shared and echoed by many Chinese scholars who agreed that it was time to abandon this strategy (Jiao, 2005). There were opinions that demanded a more active and aggressive foreign strategy in order to hold an advantageous status in decision-making in international institutions (Lin, 2000). There were also voices that stressed the importance of insisting on this strategy. For example Qu Xing, the vice rector of China Foreign Affairs University, and many other scholars believed that “hide one’s ability, bide one’s time” was still a basic foreign policy strategy in the new century, because China’s need for a peaceful development environment still persisted (Yu, 1997; Qu, 2001; Zhao, 2002; H. Li, 2006), and because this strategy has proven effective in protecting China’s national security (Wan, 2003). A third voice claimed an inheritance of Deng’s strategy, but also proposed to develop it according to harmonious world ideas, and to adapt it to fit China’s new international context. Xu Kaiyi suggested that China might be focusing on the second part of Deng’s strategy, that is to “achieve one’s achievement” instead

China’s engagement in multilateralism  65 (Xu, 2004, p. 54) and pursue China’s influence projection further than a merely regional power (S. Chu, 2003). The opinions of the vice director of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) Wang Zaibang, echoed by many, argued that China should keep Deng’s strategy but apply it creatively in harmonious world ideas by constructing new conceptions about China and providing more public goods, in order to avoid extreme conservatism or a radical foreign policy (Li, 2008; Zhu, 2008; Z. Wang, 2010, pp. 52–53). Wang Jisi, the director of international relations at Peking University, has put it more explicitly: China’s attitude should turn from “what China doesn’t do” to “what China does” (J. Wang, 2011, p. 9). It is argued that during this phase, Hu Jintao’s administration has adopted different approaches to different powers. China kept the idea of “hide one’s ability and bide one’s time” when dealing with issues involving the US’ interests, but became more active in institution building in regional multilateral institutions and inter-regional collaborations. When Hu Jintao met US President Obama in 2011, he explicitly expressed that China was still a developing country, that there was much work to be done in order to sustain China’s future development, and that China promised to keep opening up and to pursue peaceful development.9 Meanwhile, China actively initiated the Six Party’s Talk, ASEAN+3 and ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and actively participated in the reform of the UN. China also learned to use institutions to defend its interests in the WTO. China’s gradual integration into the international community has shown that “China changed from a long-term victim of old international order and resistant to the constructor and supporter of new international order”, and “China’s involvement as a great power” will “exhibit China’s weight as a socialist country” (Yan, 2011, p. 342). During this phase, the four guidelines concerning great power relationship – neighbourhood, developing countries, and multilateralism  – were kept as the basic thinking pattern for China’s foreign policy strategy, as confirmed in China’s Peaceful Development White Book published by the Chinese government.10 In addition to the four guidelines, China adopted two new important strategies to support the construction of a “harmonious world”: peaceful development and soft power construction. Peaceful development In 2004, on the occasion of Deng Xiaoping’s 100th anniversary, Hu Jintao mentioned “peaceful development” as China’s new foreign policy strategy, as an inheritance of Deng Xiaoping’s spirit of Reform and Opening Up.11 Zheng Bijian, the academic board of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, was the key person in the CPC’s think tank that developed the theoretical framework of China’s “Peaceful Development” strategy. In his book dedicated to the elaboration of this strategy, he argued that “peaceful development” was a choice determined by China’s national conditions, cultural traditions, and historical necessity because China’s main task was still to “concentrate on economic development”

66  China’s engagement in multilateralism instead of reaching hegemonic status or invading other countries. Meanwhile, the multipolar world didn’t allow any hegemonic power to emerge (Zheng, 2012). The White Book of “China’s Peaceful development” elaborated this idea with more foreign policy aspects, which include the following points: PROMOTION OF HARMONIOUS WORLD

The White Book defines that, in order to construct a harmonious world, China should promote the democratization of international relations. China sets the goal to construct a New International Economic Order, as all countries are equal whatever their size, economic power, or military power. The New International Economic Order implies the respect of each other’s cultural pattern, mutual trust in security issues, and collaboration in environmental issues as important constituents of a harmonious world. NON-ALIGNMENT

China has elevated non-alignment to paradigm level in the White Book of “China’s Peaceful Development” published in 2011 (Ling, 2013). Certainly, the emphasis on non-alignment in 2011 came about in a context entirely different from when it was initially proposed in the 1980s. The non-alignment policy in the 1980s was adopted to guarantee China’s peaceful development from involving in the confrontation between the US and the USSR. The announcement of non-alignment in 2011 played more as a guarantee of China’s peaceful development by emphasizing that China would not initiate any military alliances of its own. This point was quite sensitive and important at the time, as China had already established a huge partnership network since the mid-1990s, which had attracted much suspicion about China’s intention to initiate new military alliances, especially with Russia (Wilkins, 2008). China declared that in this context, it needed to assure that these partnerships were a continuity of non-alignment instead of a discontinuity (Deng, 2005; Li, 2009; Ling, 2013). The emphasis of the Chinese government on non-alignment strategy also had close connections with the proposition of “new security ideas”, which will be introduced in the following section. NEW SECURITY CONCEPT

The “new security idea” (Xin Anquan Guan) was developed by the Chinese government in response to “non-traditional security problems” (fei chuan tong an quan wen ti), which refer to “global problems, trans-national problems or low politics problems”, including environmental pollution, global warming, population expansion, and AIDS (Xia, 2013). From a realistic point of view, the emergence and propagation of this idea have strong ties with the emergence of the problems with Tibet and Xinjiang, the escalating tensions between China and its neighbours, and also the balance of power between China and the US in East Asia. In the White Book, the Chinese government claimed that the international

China’s engagement in multilateralism  67 community should abandon Cold War thinking and military alliances, and it should protect mutual security through multilateral collaborations. The “new security idea” should play an integrating part in building the harmonious world and also interact with public diplomacy (see the following section) to establish an image of the responsible great power of China (Han, 2014). INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND ACHIEVEMENT

This point shows that China has adopted a more active attitude in participation in international institutions. According to the White Book, as a country responsible to the international community, China should actively participate in the reform of the international order and the rule-making of international institutions; it should participate in global governance, support the development of developing countries, and maintain world peace. REGIONAL COLLABORATION UNDER GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD PRINCIPLES

The White Book stressed that China should promote a harmonious Asia and resolve territorial disputes through negotiations and dialogue. China should strive to promote regional economic integration, to improve existing regional and subregional collaboration institutions, and stay open to other regional collaboration possibilities. China should welcome non-regional countries to play a constructive role in regional peace and development, and China should not seek regional hegemony or spheres of influence. Soft power construction As China’s economic power and influence in different regions (East Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America) grew, China harvested many fruitful results of its investments, but it was also confronted with more sophisticated suspicions and mistrust. Chinese scholars believe that this was the second tide of the “Chinese threat” after 1989. For example, as the largest investor in Africa, China’s investments and construction projects in Africa were quite vast. At the same time, Chinese companies employed mainly Chinese workers instead of African ones, and those companies exported a great quantity of products from African countries (N. Liu, 2010). China’s investment-production-exportation model has been described as “neo colonialism” and accused of destroying Africa’s environment (Behar, 2008), hindering Africa’s democratic development, hampering freedom of speech (Franks and Ribet, 2009), and ignoring Africa’s human rights. The so-called Chinese model was not an ideal development for African countries at all because it lacked transparency (Dijk, 2009). Similarly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation also underwent criticisms of forming a “military alliance” in Central Asia, and there have been many criticisms concerning China’s military threats in the region (D. Wang, 2010).

68  China’s engagement in multilateralism The expression of mistrust and criticism towards China’s non-democratic political system exploded in 2008 when the Beijing Olympic Games took place. This became an accelerator in China’s adoption of a new strategy: the construction of soft power. The concept of soft power is quite attractive for China. As a socialist country under one-party authoritarianism, China’s political values are not widely accepted. Though the growing economy has gained much global attention for China, its foreign policies do not always receive positive responses. Many Chinese scholars have argued that, because China’s rise was seriously misunderstood and distorted by many nations, it was necessary to elevate China’s soft power in order to promote China’s own culture and value system to break the Western cultural dominance, and to strengthen China’s position in decision-making (Ran, 2014). Chinese scholars have developed Nye’s theory about soft power in order to adapt it to the analysis of the Chinese case: China’s traditional culture, its economic development model (the “so called” Chinese Way),12 and the domestic base for soft power construction (social cohesion and regime legitimacy) have been emphasized when applying the concept of soft power to the Chinese case (Yan and Xu, 2008; Yu, 2008). Policy level During Hu Jintao’s administration, China’s foreign policies were set to promote the “harmonious world” proposed by Hu. At the conference for diplomats during 17–20 July 2009, Hu pointed out four goals to be achieved for China’s diplomacy: first, China should be more influential in [international] politics; second, China should be more competitive in the economy; third, China should have a more amicable image; and fourth, China should be more appealing in terms of morals and values.13 Hu inherited Jiang’s diplomacy of emphasizing the importance of great power relations, a good neighbourhood policy, developing countries’ relations and multilateral diplomacy, which we will not repeat in this section. There were three prominent and distinct policies during this phase: partnership networks provided a definition of China’s relationship with new powers (both states and non-states), not as an alliance but as a tool to sustain China’s communication and collaboration with other countries; economic diplomacy was greatly emphasized; public diplomacy was new and attracted much attention, when China needed to develop its value system and its economic rise. I will elaborate on these three important policies in following sub-sections. Partnership network The concept of partnership appeared for the first time after the end of the Cold War, and it was adopted to define Russia-US relations (Xie, 1998, p. 89). China adopted this concept in the mid-1990s. It served the purpose of creating a peaceful environment for China’s development. China’s partnerships expanded for the first time during Hu Jintao’s mandate.

China’s engagement in multilateralism  69 According to China, partnership was a new type of relationship, different from alliances. The latter requires the signature of an alliance agreement, and signing parties have responsibilities towards each other’s security. A partnership, on the other hand, doesn’t require any obligations from the parties involved; it emphasizes the independence of each country, and the mutual respect of each partner’s political system (G. Pang, 1999), which conforms to China’s non-interference in internal affairs and non-alignment principles. Partnership was a concept derived from China’s traditional cultural principles, and it has to be differentiated from “alliance” in power politics: its fundamental principles are not interests but the coordination of relationships and the construction of ambiance; it is about nurturing mutual relationships and constructing identities within relationships (Qin, 2010, 2011, 2012a). The partnerships that China established were more than non-binding agreements. The concept of partnership showed a country’s status and importance in China’s foreign policy, and the establishment of partnership relation may well be accompanied with China’s investment in the partnership countries. Different adjectives were added in front of partnerships to distinguish different levels of importance. Mechanisms such as economic committees or dialogues were developed with every strategic partner; hotlines and strategic dialogues were often common for political and military affairs and for cultural matters, festivals and education exchanges were considered as important parts in people-to-people exchanges (Feng and Huang, 2014, p. 9). The partnership network has become a new basic structure upon which China’s participation in multilateralism is constructed. Its function will be elaborated in the following chapter along with the analysis of transformation of China’s foreign policy ideas. The economic aspect: economic diplomacy In 2004, the Chinese government called for attention to “economic diplomacy” towards developing countries. According to then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, China’s relationship with developing countries was the basis of China’s diplomacy, and developing countries were China’s most reliable friends. In economic diplomacy, China should shift from political friendliness to economic cooperation.14 Liu Xiaoqiang, from the China Contemporary International Relations Institute, points out that economic diplomacy should be understood as “diplomacy” instead of “economy” (Liu, 2004). Wu Baiyi believes that China’s economic diplomacy took a great turn after 2001: China had successfully acceded to the WTO, which provided an important legal framework to protect its commerce. Since 2001, China’s economic diplomacy has transformed from a simple pattern (merely accepting foreign aid from Japan and the EU and providing financial aid to Africa) to a more complicated pattern in which China has the responsibility to sustain global economic order while maintaining keeping traditional friendship with developing countries (Wu, 2008). Economic diplomacy was considered as strategically important because it was believed to be constitutive of the new regionalism and the formation of mutual

70  China’s engagement in multilateralism identity recognition. It was a new methodology used by China to create new links with neighbouring and developing countries, especially when applied through multilateral economic arrangements. Xiao Gang summarizes three characteristics of China’s economic diplomacy: first, China’s economic diplomacy was based on China’s self-recognition as a developing country, and it was an indirect way for China to participate in rule-setting in representing the developing countries; second, as a socialist major power, economic diplomacy shouldered the task of diluting the Western ideological foothold; and third, economic diplomacy was an important way to direct investments to China according to China’s national interest, for example the investment in China’s Western areas (Xiao, 2003). Of course, one should not ignore that China’s national interests were well included in economic diplomacy: China’s great demand for natural resources, food, and energy (Goh, 2005) were also important factors in promoting economic diplomacy. The cultural aspect: public diplomacy First developed in 2008, public diplomacy (人文外交) has been considered as an important part in China’s soft power building. This concept does not have an exact counterpart in Western languages, and it is often understood as people-to-people diplomacy (人民外交), cultural diplomacy (文化外交), or public diplomacy (公 共外交). The central goal was to win other countries’ cultural recognition and gain political legitimacy (K. Zhao, 2011, p. 52). It was related to China’s image building, which was believed to be critical in gaining peaceful environment for China’s development. Public diplomacy suggests “soft diplomacy”, “non-official diplomacy”, which aimed to promote China’s image through conferences, education, and people-to-people exchanges; the Confucius Institute is one of the most important projects of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy can also be considered as a discourse of China’s ideas about the world. Many Chinese scholars have realized that in order to build a new world order, strong economy and powerful military are not enough. Being able to provide a value system that is attractive towards other countries is the key point (Zheng, 2014, p. 7). The promotion of the Chinese Dream, and China’s emphasis on the meaning of its dream in relation to its neighbours, were quite critical in fostering a sense of common identity and community among its Asian neighbours, a community in which China would play the role of economic engine and an indispensable power. As Li Wen has pointed out, the building of an Asian identity was crucial to change Asia from a geographical conception to a psychological conception (W. Li, 2010). China tried to construct a value system that was strong enough to create cohesion among Asian countries and at the same time attractive enough to ward off the influence of liberal democratic systems on its neighbours’ domestic politics. The diversity of cultures and social systems was usually used to justify the legitimacy of non-democratic systems, thus justifying China’s authoritarian

China’s engagement in multilateralism  71 system and all the value systems established on it. Since the construction of a value system had a strong ideological meaning, public diplomacy was considered no less important than economic relationships and security collaborations. Summary of the fourth phase The historical juncture of 2001–2002 has set a new international environment for China and China’s status in the world has also changed as it has officially joined the WTO. China’s political ideas have made corresponding adjustment vis-à-vis the new environment. In the phase after 2002, China became more confident in two points: first, multipolarization assured by the weakening of the US influence in world affairs and the emergence of new powers in the world. These new powers do not necessarily take the form of a nation-state (South Africa, India, China, Brazil); many of them are multilateral or regional regimes or institutions (ASEAN, G8, G20). As Chen Zhimin and Pan Zhongqi pointed out, China didn’t see multipolarization as a simple repetition of the past (Chen and Pan, 2013). Reasons for this judgment included that current multipolarization was associated with irrevocable global trends of peace, development, and cooperation; international relations were greatly shaped by economic globalization; common threats such as terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, financial crises, natural disasters, climate change, energy security, resources, food, and public health all required cooperation of many countries (Chen and Pan, 2013). Second, although the US was no longer the hegemon, from the Chinese perspective, the multilateral institutions that the US created in order to sustain its hegemony were still greatly influencing the way the world functioned. In order to realize a true multipolar world, or a truly fair and equal world, China needed to diminish this influence by providing new alternatives. China realized the clues provided by different definitions of hegemony: being able to provide cultural influence, having an appeal at the level of ideas and way of life (Telò, 2010) and the ability to provide “international common goods” (Telò, 2014c, p. 36) were all necessities to exert hegemony. Thus, during this phase, China significantly increased its investment in public diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, and the development of mechanisms to present China’s soft power (noticeably the Confucius Institute). These culture-oriented diplomacies were conducted through multilateral institutions, for example, the cultural activities in ASEAN+3, the China–Japan–South Korea cultures activities, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation University. We will elaborate on these examples in the case study section. Similarly, China also adopted the idea of public goods and enlarged its provision of public goods, especially at the regional level, via multilateral institutions. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, China’s idea about the world and itself developed and evolved on the basis set by the previous generation. Accordingly, the policy level ideas also changed to conform to the philosophical level and the paradigm level ideas. The summary of the fourth period ideas is presented in Table 3.4.

72  China’s engagement in multilateralism Table 3.4  The summary of China’s foreign policy ideas in the fourth phase

Ideational Level (How China sees the world)

Paradigm Level (How China sees itself and its role in the world)

Policy Level (How to play this role)

Cognitive

Normative

The main theme of the world is peace and development. The world order remains one super power with multiple great powers for a long time, but the world is multipolarizing. The main conflict in the world is North-South conflict instead of East-West confrontation. China is a developing country. China needs peaceful development environment. China has set “a major responsible country” as its role in the world. Development of partnership network, economic diplomacy, public diplomacy.

A harmonious world is the ideal world order, meaning (a) multilateralism is important to realize mutual safety; (b) collaborations should be of mutual benefit in order to realize prosperity for all; (c) diversity of culture and political system should be respected; (d) developing countries should have more deciding power. Non-alignment, soft power construction.

China’s multilateralism initiative at the regional and global level: after 2012 The historical juncture of 2010–2012 is a period when China greatly developed its status in international relations through its rapid economic development: China became the second-largest economy in the world (as a single country). Since Xi Jinping’s accession to power, there have been many changes both in China’s domestic ideas and in China’s foreign policy. The amendment of the constitution allows Xi Jinping to stay in power longer than before and centralizes his power. Xi Jinping’s personal characteristics thus influence China’s foreign policy. The trade war between the US and China represents the fact that the conflicts between China and the US are not only limited in trade but also involve ideological differences. It is still early to draw certain conclusions, as Xi Jinping hasn’t finished his term yet, but the presidency of Xi will certainly direct China to a direction that is quite different from previous phases. Ideational level At the beginning of his presidency, Xi Jinping inherited Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s idea about the world: peace and development instead of contest are the main

China’s engagement in multilateralism  73 themes of the world. He emphasized the importance of win-win cooperation to convince other countries that China’s rise would be beneficial for all stakeholders. According to Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Asian-African Summit 2015, win-win cooperation implies that a mutual beneficial world order should be sought, and that zero-sum game ideas no longer serve the peace and stability of the contemporary world (Xi, 2015a). Based on this guideline, Xi Jinping has promoted the idea of fate community (命运共同体) to elaborate how nations should cooperate in order to face the challenges of global issues such as terrorism and diseases. The idea of fate community emphasizes that all the nations in the world should be united vis-à-vis the mutual challenges, instead of antagonism, confrontation, and distrusts. Cai Liang from the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies claims that “Fate Community” has provided a new way of understanding international relations: it is a symbiosis status based on mutual need and benefits, instead of a balance of power sustained by military force and deterrence (Cai, 2014). The idea of fate community has become official rhetoric of Xi Jinping’s vision of the world order, based on which both the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB have been built. It is not surprising that on the 70th anniversary parade of P.R. China’s foundation, representatives from Belt and Road Initiative countries are invited to constitute the float of fate community. Paradigm level At paradigm level ideas, Xi Jinping has greatly innovated the idea of how China sees itself in the world and the role it should play. His “Chinese Dream” intends to stimulate nationalism and to emphasize the uniqueness of China from a cultural, political, and social perspective. Xi Jinping has explained that the realization of the Chinese dream means the “great revival of Chinese nation” (Xinhua News Agency, 2013). Yet there is no explicit definition of what “the great revival of Chinese nation” means, which allows the notion of “Chinese Dreams” to be quite inclusive/elusive. From a domestic perspective, by emphasizing China’s uniqueness Xi justifies the realization that the Chinese Dream would and should not follow the “evil way” of Western liberal democracies, and that Chinese people should be confident about “the democracy with Chinese characteristics” led by the single party rule.15 From a foreign policy point of view, by emphasizing “the Chinese Way”, China under Xi’s government seems to be changing from an active participator to a creator of international institutions: China takes the initiative to combine the pursuit of the Chinese Dream with the promotion of fate community. It means that the realization of Chinese dream, that is the revival of Chinese nation conforms to the normative idea of Fate Community, as the revival of Chinese dream is actually beneficial to the world (Li, 2014b, p. 69). Another characteristic of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy is that the protection and sustainment of multilateralism has become one of China’s global responsibilities. This paradigm has become prominent since 2016, when Donald Trump became the US president and took actions to weaken current multilateral institutions.

74  China’s engagement in multilateralism Following this new change in international relations, China is increasingly emphasizing China’s support to existing multilateral institutions and expressing its readiness to make contributions. China is also taking the role of speaking for developing countries and emergent markets in G20 and BRICS. China’s strategy of promoting multilateralism is also closely linked with its policies. Policy level The new foreign policy ideas expressed by Xi Jinping’s government have been very coherent, as shown by the close relation between fate community (ideational level) and Chinese Dream (paradigm level). The policy level ideas also remain coherent with the previous two levels and serve the purpose to pursue a fate community by realizing Chinese dream, and multilateralism is the platform. They will be introduced in the following sub-sections. New model of major country relations In 2014, Xi Jinping has proposed the idea of new model of major country relations at the Joint Opening Ceremony of the Sixth Round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Fifth Round of the China-US High-level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange. There is no explicit definition of which countries are “major countries” and which are not. So far, in the political context, this concept is largely related with Sino-US relations. There are also a few academic discussions about the new model of major countries relation between India and China (Hu, 2014). Xi Jinping defines the new model of major country relations between China and the US as “no conflict or confrontation”, “mutual respect”, and “win-win cooperation” (Xi, 2014). This concept has been proposed within the following context: first, China is emerging with great economic power and military power with the potential and the will to become a regional leader. More importantly, China has a non-Western thinking and is a non-democratic country, making political trust even harder to build (Shi, 2013); second, globalization combines China and the US closely in trade and economy, rendering antagonism or another Cold War unrealistic (Yang, 2013); third, many traditional and non-traditional security issues intervene in China’s neighbourhood, and none of these issues are unrelated to the US. As China aims to be more active in regional affairs, a no conflict or confrontation relation with the US is necessary to prevent any further deterioration of bilateral relations and would also be beneficial to China (Li, 2015). The proposition of a “new model of major country relations” concept implies that Xi considers China’s status as a major country is a fait accompli and China is ready to act and behave as a major country. According to Wu Xinbo from the Centre for American Studies, Fudan University, the concept of “new model of major power relations” tries to keep a peaceful relationship between the rising major countries and the existing major countries” (Wu, 2014, p. 89).

China’s engagement in multilateralism  75 Evidently, the trade war between China and the US clearly demonstrates that the Trump administration is not convinced by China’s rhetoric, and would rather have a hardline strategy against China. Good neighbourhood policy Since Xi’s accession to power, China has put much of its diplomacy resources toward neighbouring countries. One can observe a series of China’s initiatives to strengthen the importance of neighbouring countries in its foreign policy. Starting from the meetings with diplomats from neighbouring countries ordered by Xi, he has extended the idea of Chinese Dream to Asian Dream,16 invited in the new concept of common community (共同体), which has been followed by all kinds of grand vision vocabulary such as common community of fate17 or community of responsibilities. Following these ideas that try to sum up a sense of belonging in Asia, Xi has begun to conceive new institutions that can strengthen China’s influence and decision power in Asia. The first was China’s proposition to strengthen ASEAN-China FTA, then it has been China’s proposition to set up the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)18 in order to win over Asian countries from the US negotiation table of the TPP, then again it was the Belt and Road Initiative to integrate grand economic projects with China’s power, and finally the initiative to establish the “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” to challenge the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. All these measures subjectively and objectively push Asia regionalization forward. The question of the process of regionalization emerged as a consequence of the inter-relations of Asian countries’ economies; multilateral arrangements deepened in order to strengthen this dynamic area against future risks. It is important to point out that the level of regionalization was generally low in Asia, and this vast area didn’t present a balanced development of economy or similitude in political regimes or cultural heritage. With its extensive partnership network and several multilateral institutions that joined China’s friends together and developed governance beyond bilateral relationships, China was the leading force in fostering the formation of regional communities, particularly in Asia (Pang, 2006; Chan, Lee and Chan, 2012). Again, due to the imbalanced reality in all aspects in Asia, China got involved in the development of sub-regions that separate Asia into several blocks; the most apparent blocks are Central Asia, North East Asia, South East Asia, and South Asia. According to the graphs and discussions presented above, it is clear that the partnership network and multilateral arrangements have already covered almost all of these blocks. China’s new president Xi Jinping proposed new projects of the Silk Road Economic Belt （丝绸之路经济带）and the Maritime Silk Road（海上丝绸之路）, which were combined and called the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路). Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as an important step forward for China in its strategy to combine different blocks together through grand economic projects. It reached out to “pan-peripheral” areas beyond China. These grand projects served China’s

76  China’s engagement in multilateralism national interests well in the long run (in terms of economy, natural resources, and security), as smaller ones did before. They would significantly promote the development of China’s neighbours (via the construction of infrastructure, for example). In 2018, the “Polar Silk Road” was added to the Belt and Road Initiative, which is the first time that China set a clear strategy concerning the arctic. We will come back to this project later. Partnership network Observers from the Economist have quite reasonably and understandably sensed that China was trying to establish a new order, starting from Asia (The Economist, 2014). The relevant question is: in which way could China create this new order? Since Xi Jinping took power, the number of strategic partnerships skyrocketed and most of the new partners are neighbouring countries. Figure  3.1 presents the percentage of each type of Chinese partnership. The most prevalent are comprehensive strategic partnerships and strategic partnerships. Countries that are single to their partnership title are often the most distinguished partners. These 59 countries include almost all the countries in the Belt and Road Initiative. These strengthened bilateral relations have been combined with existing multilateral institutions in the region and are expected to support greater projects. With a wide strategic partnership network and multilateral institutions based on this network (the most important ones being the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN+3), China had both economic and political advantages to promote new economic projects in accordance to its long-term interests. As pointed out by Zhang Xiaotong from Wuhan University, economic diplomacy has become

Cooperation Partnership 6% Strategic Cooperative Comprehensive Partnership Cooperation 8% Partnership 11%

Strategic Partnership 23%

Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership 8%

Other 7% Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 29%

Friendly Cooperation Partnership 5%

Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership 2%

Comprehensive Friendly Friendly Partnership Cooperation 1% Partnership 3% All Dimension Friendly Cooperation Partnership 1%

Figure 3.1  The percentage of each partnership type of China Source: Illustrated by the author.

strategic partnership of cooperation featuring ever-lasting friendship for development and prosperity 2%

All Weather Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership 1%

China’s engagement in multilateralism  77 increasingly important for China to realize its goal of becoming a “major-country” (Zhang, 2014, p.  78). When implementing its economic diplomacy, China chose to launch grand economic projects in a multilateral way based on its strategic partnership network. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “Maritime Silk Road” are typical examples of China’s aim to rearrange its economic interests in Asia and also to connect to the world. The Silk Road economic belt was a new economic growth initiative proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. This ambitious initiative aimed to boost regional economic growth, with new ideas to promote “local-currency settlement so as to improve their immunity to financial risks and their global competitiveness” for Central Asian countries. The Maritime Silk Road was also an entirely new proposition from Xi Jinping after his visit to China’s neighbouring countries. The Maritime Silk Road project covers a totally different area than the Silk Road Economic Belt. It reaches out to ASEAN countries and aims to provide a deeper and more profound cooperation with ASEAN on maritime matters. It would allow China to manage, develop, and exploit maritime territories under dispute (Zou, 2014, p. 40). It can be understood as an extension to “pan-peripheral” regions, thus building an economic body with China at the centre. The two routes cross partner countries, which means that this project reaches all continents. In 2015, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The original goal for establishing the AIIB was to provide funding for the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, as many non-Asian countries applied as founding members, the AIIB soon developed into a multilateral financial institution that competes with the IMF and the World Bank led by the US and the Asian Development Bank led by Japan. More detailed discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB will be presented in case studies of ASEAN+3 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Summary of the fifth period of ideas Xi Jinping’s new government hasn’t finished its mandate yet, but his foreign policy ideas have already implemented many distinct innovations compared to previous generations. It seems that Xi Jinping has begun to shift China’s self-recognition from a to-be major country to a fait accompli major country, and aims to construct its foreign relations based on this recognition. Yet there are dubious voices which claim that it would be more difficult for China to become a political leader since China’s culture and political system are far from being accepted and recognized as advanced ones. The idea of fate community can be seen as China’s proposition to divert the world’s focus from the differences, like the fact that China is a nondemocratic regime, to the possibility that China’s rise and revival may well be beneficial to the world in both the economic and security senses. Three levels of foreign policy ideas of Xi Jinping are summarized as presented by the following table:

78  China’s engagement in multilateralism Table 3.5  The summary of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy ideas Cognitive

Normative

Ideational Level (How China sees the world)

The main theme of the world is peace, develop and win-win cooperation.

Paradigm Level (How China sees itself and its role in the world) Policy Level (How to play this role)

Chinese Dream: which may include many sectors include “education dream”, “maritime dream”, and “military dream”. New model of major countries’ relations, good neighbourhood policy, partnership network.

All nations should endeavour to build fate community in order to face mutual challenges as terrorism and diseases. The revival of Chinese nation.

A summary of the change of China’s political ideas and its participation in multilateral institutions In this section, we review the transformations of China’s foreign policy ideas from 1949 to 2015 by adopting the toolbox provided by discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism. By dividing 70 years of China’s foreign policy history into five phases with four historical junctures, foreign policy ideas in each phase according to Vivien Schmidt’s three levels of generality and two types of ideas have been analyzed. Three different levels of ideas are developed in order to answer three different questions, as we have argued at the beginning of this chapter: What is the world’s situation according to China (cognitive level) and what should it be (normative level)? What is China’s role in the world (cognitive level) and what should China do (normative level)? How does China deal with the world? The most important key words for each level of ideas have been noted and categorized according to different phases. Table 3.6 can be seen as a visualized conclusion of this historical overview. It presents the evolution of the three idea levels from Mao to Xi (with a question mark about the latter’s policy level ideas as more research should be conducted about his concept of competitive multilateralism). China’s self-perception has been the most important development in more than 60 years of the P.R. China’s relations with the world (B. Zhang, 2009, p. 1). China’s self-perception interacts with China’s understanding about the world, and it is influenced by historical and political factors. China’s contemporary history has contributed to shape how China understands the world and its position in the world. One should not ignore the shock brought by Western colonialism to China since the Opium War in 1840: it shifted the perspective from one that saw the world as part of China to a view of China as part of the world. China’s initial encounter with international institutions as a nation-state was filled with dishonour and humiliation, which significantly boosted China’s

Centre of Revolution

The Third World War is possible, new world order is needed

Paradigm Level

Ideational Level

Source: Illustrated by the author.

Mao Zedong, the First Phase, 1949–1978

Anti-imperialism, two ideology camps

Policy Level

Peace and development, new world international order is needed Deng Xiaoping, the Second Phase, 1978–1992

Economic ties are emphasized, ideological differences are fading away One of the poles

Table 3.6  Chart of the evolution of China’s foreign policy ideas

Jiang Zemin, the Third Phase, 1992–2012

Peace and development, multipolarization

Economic ties are emphasized, geographical position is important Peaceful rise

Harmonious world and multipolarization, a new world order is needed Hu Jintao, the Fourth Phase, 2002–2012

Economic ties are emphasized, neighbouring countries have become focus Responsible major country

Xi Jinping, the Fifth Phase, after 2012

Chinese nation’s revival, community of common fate

Major country with principles

Competitive multilateralism?

What’s China’s role in this world? How China sees the world?

How China deals with the world?

80  China’s engagement in multilateralism national sentiment by redirecting the religious belief in the superiority of Sinocentrism towards the belief of the Chinese nation. The Communist Party of China’s victory in 1949 not only reinforced the Chinese national sentiment, which was strongly against foreign imperialism, but it also imposed a highly centralized economic and political system. The fact that the CPC had overthrown a corrupted Western-prone government granted the CPC much legitimacy in its early years. In domestic politics, the new government insisted on a revolutionary renewal of an old system; in international affairs, all treaties signed by the ancient regime were declared invalid. It that sense, the Aussenpolitik of China could be conceived as an external extension of domestic politics (Chen, 1998, p.  339). Thus, the extreme left ideas and distorted state-society relationships within China greatly damaged China’s foreign policy (Bai, 2009, p. 50): it deterred the relationships with the US from 1945 to 1949, and they were followed by the continuous refusal of Chinese accession to the UN; the deteriorated Sino-USSR relationship in the late 1960s and the isolation from international community. These were all interpreted as humiliation and dominance from the imperialism of the US and the USSR. This strong national sentiment associated with socialist ideas transformed into the idea of a revolutionary foreign policy in the late years of Mao Zedong. China considered the outside world as hostile and corrupt and itself as a victim, a moralist, and a revolutionary. Starting with Deng Xiaoping’s era, China began its Reform and Opening Up, and started “the transformation from class revolution to institutions revolution” (Rong, 2009). Rational factors, that is China’s national interests, became important in Chinese leaders’ decision-making process. Xiao Gongqin, one of the most important contemporary Chinese political scientists, has described China’s political system after the Opening Up as “new authoritarianism of post omnipotenism technocrats”.19 Under the new regime, China changed its judgment about the world from the revolutionary view to a developmental view: peace and development were the main goals, and China abandoned its revolution-leader role and tried to be a good player in the existing institutions. Yet, China always kept the view that the democratic-capitalist world order established by the West should and could be fairer, and that China had the responsibility to make a better world happen. This point was especially evident after Xi Jinping’s accession to power, with the rhetoric of Chinese Dream and fate communities. China gradually began to offer Chinese-style solutions to the world’s problems, not necessarily conforming to the current world ideas. Xi also proposed the idea to “correctly balance between ‘benefits’ (利) and righteousness (义)” in foreign policy, emphasizing that “a great power should prioritize the pursuit of righteousness to the pursuit of benefits”.20 In different phases, China has provided different answers to the question of what the world is and of what China’s role in this world is. These two questions naturally lead to a third one at the policy level: how should China interact with other countries in order to ensure that its deserved role in the world is achieved or maintained? We would like here to adopt a Chinese saying about “gauging one’s

China’s engagement in multilateralism  81 relationship” (or “定亲疏” in Chinese, which means to decide who is close and who is not). This gauging of relationship with other countries has also changed. In Mao’s time, the similarity of ideology played the central role in China’s foreign relationships; in Deng’s time, economic ties were important; starting with Jiang’s era, the question of how much does a country recognize China’s political claim progressively became the central point. Starting with Xi’s time, the discussion about righteousness and benefits stating that China wants both benefits (e.g. economic benefits), and the recognition of China’s deeds as righteousness from its partners. At the same time, the righteousness in China’s relations legitimizes its strategies and delegitimizes those of the US, which are considered as unrighteous. Multilateralism was first seen by China as a tool for constraining socialist China (before 1971, when China joined the UN); then it turned into the platform where China learns about the world and wants to present its own opinions (1971–1978). When China launched its Reform and Opening Up, multilateralism became an important aid and accelerator to push China’s domestic reform and integration into the existing system (from 1978 to 2002), as the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT/WTO exerted a tremendous effect on China’s reforms. During Hu Jintao’s mandate, multilateralism became the optimal pathway to arrange foreign relations for a rising China, which served both to ease “China’s threat” and to project China’s understanding of how the world should be. Finally, during Xi Jinping’s administration, it is getting increasingly evident that China began to construct a new world order by integrating all of China’s political and economic advantages into new institutions and norms that provide alternatives to the existing world system. The cases of WTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN+3 have represented well the development of China’s attitudes towards multilateralism from 1949 to the present. WTO is a global level multilateral institution led and maintained by the US, which also serves the hegemony of the US. China’s participation in the WTO signifies China’s attempt to communicate and convey its peaceful rise to the world. ASEAN+3 case is China’s participation in regional affairs. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a multilateral institution that is initiated by China, and the One Belt One Road project that integrates all China’s partners that would like to share China’s economic growth by accepting China’s political ideas. I would like to label this top-down approach “competitive multilateralism”. China’s different world order view and competitive multilateralism As China’s political influence grew, it began to reshape its relations with other countries according to its understanding of the world order. This is an important point to clarify because it demonstrates how China judges its relation with a country. Many scholars and Sinologists have already pointed out that China’s foreign relations are based on a philosophy quite different from that of the West. Su Changhe, a famous Chinese scholar in international law, has pointed out that the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence have fundamental differences at the philosophical level from international laws based on Western thinking. According to

82  China’s engagement in multilateralism Su, contemporary international law is based on European philosophy, which relies on dualism that differentiates between good and evil, just and unjust, civilized and non-civilized, democracy and non-democracy. This differentiation implies that the camp of the good, just, civilized and democratic will fight against the other camp, which is presented as evil, unjust, non-civilized and non-democratic (Su, 2014). He believed that this differentiation originated from the fact that international laws were made to regulate relationships between the Christian world and the non-Christian world during the time of Westphalia (Verdross, 1981, pp. 57–87; Liu and Yuan, 2007, chaps. 40–79; Nussbaum and Zhang, 2011, chaps. 2–4). Accordingly, the existing international legal system based on dualism has justified the interference of Western countries in the domestic affairs of countries that fall into the category of non-democratic regimes, such as China. Su argues that China’s vision of the world is totally different from Western dualism: Chinese avoid contradiction between opposite sides, but emphasize “relationship, symmetry, equality, symbiosis and yin-yang harmony” (Su, 2014, p. 8). The reason why China is more flexible about norms and principles lies in China’s traditional social order. The famous Sinologist and sociologist Fei Xiaotong has analyzed the differences between Chinese and European social structures from a sociological perspective. He reminds us that the Chinese society is fundamentally a rural society, in which each individual is bound to the soil and the most important social unit is the clan. In a rural society, the social order is based on kinship instead of law and social contract: individuals from the same clan are protected against nonmembers, and the closeness of a relationship is decided by the closeness of blood relation (Fei, 2006). Fairbank echoes Fei’s argument by saying that China has an agrarian-based culture and always keeps the sense of all-embracing unity and culture entity, while at the same time, the Chinese society is fundamentally hierarchical and antiegalitarian (Fairbank, 1968). Unlike the European international order based on equal sovereignty among nation-states, the Chinese world is based on the concept of Sinocentrism and on an assumption of Chinese superiority (Fairbank, 1968). This hierarchy and anti-equality element are believed to be an extension of the Chinese society based on kinship: foreign countries can only establish a relationship with China by acknowledging China as the centre (tian zi), and the closeness of this relationship is determined by its proximity to the centre. Following this order, China has developed into a tributary system that managed a coerced regionalism in Asia. The ancient East Asian world did not develop as ancient Europe, with a network of overlapping loyalties, geographical areas and political territories (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, chap. 12). The political units in ancient Europe kept the state of “feudal atoms” and enjoyed a high level of autonomy, thus developing a deep pluralism (He, 2004, p.  7). However, in East Asia, China’s advanced culture, its vast united territory, and its highly centralized regime permitted the development of a system where China played the central role, and other smaller and less developed non-Chinese nations were drawn into the circle. Non-Chinese nations linked with China by offering tributes to the emperor, symbolizing their submission to

China’s engagement in multilateralism  83 the emperor, and receiving rewards, acknowledgement of their status and military protection from this vast neighbour. The Korean scholar Quan Haizong has pointed out that the tributary system is so important in China’s foreign relationships that even commerce and cultural exchanges took the form of tributary (Quan and Quan, 1997, pp. 133–134). This inclusive tributary system is the realization of China’s traditional worldview (Tian Xia Guan), or literally “the view of under the heaven”, which considers that “all things under the heaven are subjects belonging to [the Chinese court]” (Ouyang and Song, 1975, chap. 219).21 With China as the centre, other neighbouring countries circle the centre in a hierarchical way: countries that are closer to China have a higher place in the hierarchy of the tributary system, while countries that are more distant to China have a lower place in the hierarchy. Starting from the ancient Asia’s tributary system, Guo Shuyong and Wei Ling went deeper in developing Fei Xiaotong’s theory by naming it “Circle Order Structure” (Quanxu Jiegou), in contrast with dualism in the Western culture, and attempted to integrate this way of social structure into China’s foreign relationships (Guo and Chen, 2009). According to Guo and Wei, the Circle Order Structure emphasizes the level of affinity and has become the measure of relationships, instead of grouping countries into clearly defined categories. For example, China keeps close ties with Russia, Iran, and Pakistan because these countries have expressed their support for China, and this has nothing to do with whether they are considered authoritarian or rogue states. Guo and Wei argue that the Circle Order Structure based on Chinese philosophy is more flexible and easier to adapt to circumstances, and China is indeed structuring its foreign policy according to this idea, be it purposefully or non-purposefully. Following this spirit, China has constructed a vast partnership network to manage its bilateral relations. This network, however, has become the foundation for China’s competitive multilateralism. We can see that since Deng Xiaoping took power, China took a great turn in all three levels of ideas, and his followers have basically been following the Opening Up track. Starting from Jiang, China has begun to consider its rise at a paradigm level and the accompanying effects of it. Since Hu Jintao, China has begun to clarify its definition about what role China should play in the world. They both have adopted evident changes in ideas, yet in continuity with Deng’s basic ideas. What needs to be emphasized again is that one idea has barely changed from Mao’s time until Xi’s. It is the idea that the current world order is unfair. Each Chinese leader has proposed his own ideas about how to build a fairer world, and as China’s economic power grew and its influence expanded, China has looked forward to assume changes and reshape the world order. We consider this as an important aspect that should not be neglected when observing how China has turned to multilateralism and how China has used multilateral institutions to realize its normative ideas about the world. During Mao’s time, multilateralism was part of the capitalist block and imperialism containment: it represented the international community to which China would have liked to integrate but was refused. Deng Xiaoping has forsaken Mao’s radical idea by accepting to integrate

84  China’s engagement in multilateralism and learn from the existing world order, although not necessarily agreeing with its values. During Jiang Zemin’s administration, multilateralism has been adopted to facilitate and soften China’s growing presence in its neighbourhood. In Hu Jintao’s time, China explicitly expressed its normative ideas about the world and began to promote them by demanding reforms of the existing multilateralism (the UN and the WTO) and by innovating in regional ones (ASEAN, SCO, China’s relationship with the African Union and regional institutions in Latin America). Since Xi’s administration, the tendency of China to regroup and restructure its political advantages in regional multilateralism into new global multilateral institutions (the One Belt One Road and the AIIB) has become even more prominent. China’s decision to participate actively in international institutions is not merely a choice based on rational calculations but is also based on the changes of China’s ideas about itself and international institutions (Yu, 2009, p. 9) These ideational factors shape China’s preferences and priorities and narrow down possible choices (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Telò has pointed out the comparability between the current international transition, or “systemic disorder” with the pre-polar system which was an evolution of the state-centric system born with the Treaty of Westphalia, with the interstate balance of power currently developing at the global scale instead of Europe (Telò, 2014c, p. 36). The same core question is, how are power hierarchies and fragmentation managed by developing or stopping multilateral cooperation? The historical review of China’s attitude towards multilateralism has shown that China takes a positive position towards globalization and multilateralism. It has become the pathway China relies on to integrate into the globalization process, especially after China launched the Reform and Opening Up. The fact that China is attempting to adopt new multilateralism proves that (a) China is confident in its economic power in promoting a new multilateralism, totally different in the norms and values from the existing ones established by the US; (b) China’s normative ideas about world order, which have always remained the backbone of China’s foreign policy ideas, have been explicitly expressed by institution building. Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that a strong economic power like China would be capable of providing a new type of multilateralism. Many difficult issues are yet to be resolved. One of the difficulties in China’s participation in multilateralism is the lack of common ideas and values (Telò, 2014c, p.  46). China doesn’t accept “Western values” or “Western ideas” to act as the universal value system. China has tried to cultivate and promote an idea and value system of its own, but it is an idea system that is far from being well clarified: it is a combination of the traditional Chinese philosophy of a harmonious world at an ideational level, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs from the Westphalia system as paradigm, and multilateralism as the method to implement it. However, this combination is confronted with two difficulties. The first one is strong mistrust towards China, especially from its neighbouring countries, which causes disbelief in China’s official rhetoric. Recent conflicts and tensions between China and Japan, China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines show a worrying situation and reflect the

China’s engagement in multilateralism  85 incapability of existing multilateral institutions in East Asia to tackle these hard political issues, and the unwillingness of China to solve these conflicts multilaterally. The second one is the increasing conflict between these paradigm-level ideas and the way in which China tries to realize them: that is there are increasing dilemmas or deadlocks between non-interference in domestic affairs and the efficiency and legitimacy of the multilateral institution adopting it as principle. There are many examples in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (such as the Georgia Crisis, the Kyrgyzstan Crisis, or the Ukraine Crisis), which will be discussed in the corresponding case study. Third, the set of ideas and value system that China aims to construct inevitably seeks inspiration and justification through the mobilization of Chinese traditional philosophies and value systems. Whether these traditional values can integrate and even guide globalization to serve as the ideational basis for China’s competitive multilateralism is yet to be seen: are these ideas really adaptable to become shared values? Another difficulty lies in the influence of China’s domestic politics on China’s developing multilateralism. First, China’s domestic governance is not as admirable as that of the US. China’s huge economic growth might be stunning, but few countries acknowledge China’s general domestic governance. This is not helping to prove the effectiveness of the “Chinese Model” in conducting effective good governance. Second, as China’s economic and administrative resources are not yet well balanced between domestic governance and foreign policy strategy, assuming responsibilities as a public goods provider might cause reactions in domestic politics. There are debates concerning which side of the spectrum China should invest in more. Certainly, as regionalization and globalization keep deepening, the relationship between domestic governance is linked more closely with China’s role in regional development: the SCO’s economic integration has thoroughly combined with China’s “West Development” strategy; China’s series of FTAs with East Asian countries include the strategic design to develop South Eastern China and North Eastern China. Finally, China’s construction of a competitive multilateralism is still confronted to the question posed by Mario Telò presented at the beginning of the theoretical section: How to multilateralize a multipolar world? Would China be capable of establishing multilateralism to manage its relations with the US, Russia, Japan, ASEAN, and other non-state powers? How much would these powers acknowledge and recognize multilateralism as the optimal solution to their issues? In the following case study, we will go into further detail about China’s involvement in multilateral institutions. The goal is to reveal how China’s understanding of multilateralism has changed according to China’s changes of idea through analysis of different cases.

Notes 1 Mao based this division on the relative powers of countries instead of ideologies. In his intermediate zone theory, “communism” refers solely to Soviet Union and “imperialism” refers solely to the US.

86  China’s engagement in multilateralism 2 See the report of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee: http://cpc. people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html. 3 In Chinese: 建设负责任的大国. It is important to note that “major country” is intentionally selected by the Chinese government as its English translation. The normally used “major power” or “rising power” have been carefully avoided, stating that China doesn’t consider itself as a “power”, which is a concept easily associated with “power politics”. 4 As Yan Shuangwu and Zhao Liangying have introduced, “China’s responsibility” is a public opinion as popular as “China’s threat” in Western media and politics. It originates from Robert Zoellick’s speech at a US Trade Representative Asia Society Annual Dinner, who demanded China to shoulder more responsibilities in world trade and global affairs, in global and regional arrangements as China had become the 7th largest economy, so more power means more responsibilities to take (Zoellick, 2004). 5 www.china.com.cn/chinese/HIAW/845294.htm 6 See Hu Jintao’s speech at the 60th anniversary of the UN (15 September 2005). Xinhua Agency: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-09/16/content_3496858.htm. 7 See the Central Committee of CPC’s decision on the construction of Socialist Harmonious Society, resolution passed on 11 October 2006, the 6th General Meeting of the 16th Central Committee Meeting: “社会和谐是中国特色社会主义的本质属性，是 国家富强、民族振兴、人民幸福的重要保证”. Source: http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/64162/64168/64569/72347/6347991.html. 8 See Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th CPC national congress in 2012: www.china.org.cn/ chinese/18da/2012-11/19/content_27152706_12.htm. 9 See Hu Jintao’s speech at the official reception in Washington, DC, on 20 January 2011: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-01/21/c_121006532.htm. 10 See China’s Peaceful Development White Book, published by the Chinese government in 2011: www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-09/06/content_1941204.htm. 11 See Hu Jintao’s speech about peaceful development on 22 August 2004: http://news. xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-08/23/content_1861564.htm. 12 The Chinese Way is an important idea that emerged during this phase. It is a theoretical construction of the “China Mode” or the “Chinese Way” system. Its basic theoretical framework is “Sinoficated Marxism” (Yan and Xu, 2012), based on socialist core values (Huang and Liu, 2011), and finally reaches to all social, political, and economic aspects (Pan, 2009). 13 See Hu Jintao’s speech at the Conference for Diplomats in 2009: China News: www. chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-20/1783217.shtml. 14 See Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao at the conference for diplomats in 2004: http://news. sina.com.cn/c/2004-09-02/16413566097s.shtml. 15 Confidences in Ways, and in Theories (道路自信，理论自信). 16 See China News: Xi Jinping’s new Foreign Policy Idea: Community of interest, responsibility and fate: www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/10-10/6660509.shtml. 17 See Xi Jinping’s Speech: Community of common fate and a favorable environment for China’s development: www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1093113.shtml. 18 See Li Keqiang, Chinese prime minister’s propositions on East Asia Summit: 13 November 2014: http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-11/14/c_1113240192.htm. 19 后全能主义型的技术专家治国型的新权威主义体制. 20 See Wang Yi’s discussion about Xi Jinping’s Idea about benefits and righteousness: http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0910/c40531-22864489.html. 21 “际天所覆，悉臣而属之”。

4 The development of multilateral institutions and regionalism

Regionalism is a factor that should not be ignored in shaping the new world order to come. It is a complicated process intertwining economic, political, and cultural factors, with both centripetal and centrifugal forces. China has benefitted from the globalization and is constructing regional institutions in Asia Pacific as a leader of emerging countries and developing countries (Telò, 2018). China’s collaboration with ASEAN and its initiative of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative are strongly connected with regionalism. On one hand, these regional institutions help to shape regional orders and offer solutions to certain issues in the region. On the other hand, these institutions are also influenced by the characteristics of the regions. As a country with a huge surface, a large population and the world’s secondlargest economy, China is difficult to categorize in any specific region. Yet this is also advantageous for China to get involved in the affairs of different regions and even develop interregional institutions. In this chapter, I will discuss China’s involvement in multilateral institutions and China’s role in different regions.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Central Asia After the Cold War, Central Asia emerged as a new region: it was a part of the USSR and then born under the influences of two powers: Russia and China. At the same time, Russia gradually diminished from a world power to a regional power, while China developed into an influential power in the region. Unlike ASEAN+3, which thrived on the need for coordinating economic issues, the birth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation originates from the intention to ease security concerns. From the Chinese perspective, the end of the Cold War left China a great opportunity to become involved with creating a new world order and to obtain more political status in world affairs. China positioned itself as a rising major country, a to-be pole in a multipolar world, which needs a peaceful development environment. China needs to express to its largest neighbour, Russia, with which a great degree of mistrust has developed due to long years of military confrontation (Xue, 2012, p. 248), that China’s rise does not bring any harm and China has no intention of becoming involved in

88  Development of multilateral institutions any conflicts with Russia. Border issues have been resolved in a very quick and peaceful way, ending in China ceding large territories to Russia, and the peace between China and Russia is shared by Central Asian countries who later became SCO members too. As China’s foreign policy adjusted to paying greater attention to “great powers, developing countries, neighbourhood and multilateralism”, the establishment of the SCO reflects well this adjustment in China’s strategy. As China’s largest neighbour, Russia has always occupied a special status in China’s foreign policy. Sino-Russia relations have long-term influences on both countries’ development and on regional economic integration. China considers Russia as an important provider of oil, weapons, and nuclear technologies (Wishnick, 2001, pp. 125, 131). Russia’s weapons and military technologies are precious to China, as the West still imposes an arms embargo on China (Eisenbaum, 2010, p. 154). At the same time, China is the largest buyer of Russian weapons, which accounts for more than 50% of Russia’s arms trade (Lukin, 2007; Eder, 2014, p. 25). Besides being an important provider of energy and oil for an energy-hungry China, Russia is also a like-minded collaborator against the US and the EU. As Alexander Lukin, the director of the Centre for East Asian and SCO studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations has pointed out, China and Russia are both against a unipolar world, that is one country dictates other countries’ behaviour according to its preference; they both prefer a multipolar world based on the UN charter and international laws (Lukin, 2014). From the US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of 2019, the active norm-setting activities of China and Russia have already led the US to define China as the “revisionist power” and Russia as a “revitalized malign actor”. Both countries are thus considered as actors that will lead to changes in the existing world order in a director that is independent of US control. China deems the promotion of the democratic political system and free market economy to be the core pathways of the US global strategy to bring back the US hegemonic world order. China insists that there is no universal value system that fits all nations, and each nation’s value system and political system should be respected, instead of providing an excuse to interfere in domestic affairs. For example, China never reached any fundamental consensus with the West concerning the human rights issue. As Wan Ming points out, no issue in the relations between China and the West in the past decades has inspired so much passion as human rights [. . .] to many Westerners; the Chinese government appears ultimately untrustworthy on all issues because it is undemocratic. To Beijing, Western human rights pressure seems designed to compromise its legitimacy, and this threat hangs over what might otherwise be considered ‘normal’ disputes on issues like trade and arms sales. (Wan, 2001) The revival of the traditional culture and national spirit has provided social and political justification for China’s refusal of the West’s value systems. Human rights is but one of the examples.

Development of multilateral institutions  89 Both China and Russia agree that they should not be coerced to change simply because they took another perspective from which to view the world and manage their domestic politics and economy. They are also two large countries that seek “revival” in a multipolar world, and they emphasize their rights to have a different pathway from the one envisioned by the West. The success of the non-democratic model,1 represented by China and Russia, would be very important to legitimize diversity in political and economic patterns (Cheng and Yin, 2011).2 Both China and Russia worry a lot about the series of “colour revolutions” that happened in Central Asia (Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004), against electoral fraud and the consolidation of autocratic regimes, the general abuse of law, lack of freedom of speech and respect of human rights (Keukeleire and Petrova, 2014, p.  266). They see it as a threat from the West with the intention of toppling any non-democratic regimes. For Russia, the regime changes lead to a “process of democratization and liberalization and in the adoption of a clear EU- and Western-oriented political and economic policy course, to the detriment of the traditional Russia-orientation of the preceding governments of these countries” (Beacháin and Polese, 2012; Keukeleire and Petrova, 2014, p. 266). For China, colour revolutions are the results of US and EU plots against China, as they are unwilling to accept the existence of a powerful socialist in Asia; colour revolutions are expressions of “new imperialism” that topple local governments by spreading ideas of democracy, freedom, and civil society and transfer Central Asia into their influential area before reaching China (S. Li, 2006, p. 124; Zeng, 2008). China’s perspective on colour revolutions inherited Deng Xiaoping’s warning against the Western countries’ “peaceful evolution” (Deng, 1993), realized through infiltration of Western ideas via international non-governmental organizations funded by the West (Lan, 2001; Pan and Dai, 2005; Xinhua News Agency, 2005). China has already associated with Russia to control the activities of non-governmental organizations in their countries in order to prevent “infiltration” from the West (S. Li, 2006, p. 125). Thus facing political pressures imposed by the West via value-oriented diplomacy, China and Russia have reached convergence in taking the position of opposing the spread of the so-called Western values and insisting a multipolar world should allow different worldviews and political systems to exist. The two countries’ existence and economic development complement each other and justify their raison d’être reciprocally. The most important steps concerning China and Russia’s coordination in promoting a multipolar world include the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation Regarding Global Multipolarity and the Establishment of a New International Order signed in April 1997 and the China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order signed in July 2005. The first joint statement confirmed the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, and that the multipolar world order is the future direction of development. Differences in the social systems, ideologies and value systems among countries should not become an obstacle to the development of normal relations, that is the cold war mentality should be abandoned (P.R. China and Russian Federation, 1997). By inheriting

90  Development of multilateral institutions the same principles of the Joint Statement in 1997, the latter statement has taken a further step by emphasizing the importance of respecting the diversity of cultures and civilizations, and by stating that as two permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia should shoulder the responsibility to establish a new security framework, and seek resolution of world affairs on a multilateral basis instead of on a unilateral basis (P.R. China and Russian Federation, 2005). The same positions in fighting against US unilateralism have united China and Russia in a partnership, the two countries complementing each other in international politics, and at the same time the trade of commodities that concern national security also strengthened this special partnership.

Divergence in Sino-Russia relations The similarity between the two countries’ strategic positions and the geographical proximity has made competition inevitable. As Jiang Yi from the Russia and East Europe Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has pointed out, neither China nor Russia is the founder of the existing world order nor is either a main beneficiary, and they both seek to establish new world orders beneficial to their respective national interests (Jiang, 2002, pp.  27–28). Both Russia and China are initiating new regional arrangements. However, it is difficult for both of them to attract the other completely to the power structure of their own regional order. This is due to the fact that Russia and China both have strong powers and their own regional orders. Neither Russia nor China is willing to accept being dominated by a foreign power: this is expressed as independence during the time of weakness, but once they are powerful enough to exert more influence, there might be conflicts between the two countries as they both take hardliner attitudes (L. Wang, 2010). Both countries are using economic collaboration projects to initiate their own regionalism, via which they are able to reaffirm their identity in the near future (Keukeleire and Petrova, 2014, p. 272), and a clash of regionalism is almost inevitable. Though Russia is considered to be China’s most important strategic partner, the focal point for Russia’s foreign policy is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members instead of China (Qin, 2005; L. Wang, 2010). As the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation developed and China’s presence in Central Asia strengthened, Russia soon initiated the collective security treaty and Eurasian Union to maintain its influence on CIS countries. Thus, all SCO member states, except China, are included in the two projects Russia has initiated. What is special about the Eurasian Union is that it is not only an economic union that aims to realize united customs, tariff and currency, and free movement of people and merchandise as in the European Union, but also a regional integration that anchors Russia as the centre of Central Asia and places the Russian language as the dominant language in this region (Wang, 2012, p. 34). We will elaborate on this point in the following section of this case study. Third, mutual trust between Russia and China also remains low, both at the national and interpersonal levels, which is largely due to the two countries’ nationalistic propaganda (Jiang, 2002; Zhu and Shi, 2007). In both countries,

Development of multilateral institutions  91 nationalism has been deliberately nurtured and instrumentalized in order to facilitate social mobilization. However as Russia’s economic development is lagging behind, it would be difficult to maintain a mature mind vis-à-vis China’s rapid growth (Jiang, 2002, p. 28). Voices of “Chinese threat” generated from Russia are no less pervasive than those from the US and Japan. Besides the worries about Chinese population advantages, Russia is also mistrustful towards China concerning energy security: Russia would like to avoid relying too much on the Chinese market (Li, 2013, p. 5), and Russia refuses China’s investment in the Russian oil industry (Zhu, 2006). Concerning weapons trade, China has learned technologies from their Russian sellers, and now weapons “made in China” have become competitive with those “made in Russia” (Paramonov and Strokov, 2006). Though China has invested many political and economic resources in maintaining mutual trust with Russia, to assure Russia that China would not acquire any regional hegemonic status is a difficult task. Fourth, the imbalance in trade between China and Russia is also a factor that destabilizes Sino-Russian relations. The scanty amount of bilateral trade doesn’t conform to the close political collaborations between the two countries (Zhang and Sun, 2004). Bilateral trade between the two countries is far from being stable, and it is positively correlated with Chinese illegal immigration to Russia, creating quite a dilemma in the bilateral relationship (Wilson, 2004, pp. 28–29, 62; Norling, 2007, p. 35; Lo, 2008, pp. 31–32). Figure  4.1 presents the bilateral trade data between China and Russia from 2005 to 2018, with their trade with the EU as a reference. It is clear that the

2018 2017

Bilateral Trade Russia-China (million dollar)

2016 2015 2014

Bilateral Trade Russia and EU

2013 2012 2011 2010

Bilateral Trade China and EU

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

Figure 4.1  Bilateral trade information between Russia and China (2005–2018) Source: Data from the Ministry of Commerce, China. Illustrated by the author.

92  Development of multilateral institutions bilateral trade between China and Russia is significantly limited in comparison with their trade with the EU. Though there is an increase in China-Russia trade, neither the rate of growth nor the volume has a significant growth. Yet, as neighbours, Sino-Russian relations are an unavoidable theme for both countries. The fact that both China and Russia pursue a multipolar world order so as to acquire more development space means that the two countries have possibilities to cooperate. Meanwhile, the complicated geopolitical context and the different ideas about their status in the region have created no less convergence than divergence. The delicate yet important relationship between Russia and China is managed both through the Sino-Russia Strategic Partnership (bilateral) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (multilateral).

China’s relationship with Central Asian countries Another perspective that should not be ignored is that China needs to reposition and redefine its relations with neighbouring countries as the geopolitical situation of China’s neighbourhood has greatly changed since the Cold War. In this sense, China’s Central Asia diplomacy is a part of China’s new strategic adjustment starting from the new millennium. According to Qiu Huafei, China’s economic growth provides the possibility that China might become the centre of Asia Pacific regional integration, which demands more interaction and interdependency between China and its neighbouring countries (Qiu, 2005, p. 12). Central Asia has not become a focus in China’s grand strategy until 2001, when China’s diplomatic, military, and economic influence in this region grew dramatically (Scobell, Ratner and Beckley, 2014, p. xi). The westward transition of China’s foreign strategy has both domestic and external grounds. According to Zhao Huasheng, director of the Russia and SCO Research Centre of Fudan University, China’s interests in Central Asia include border security, anti-terrorism (especially against East-Turkestan separatism), energy supply, economic interests, geopolitical security and the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The order of priority of these six interests changes as China’s understanding of its national interests changes, and also as China’s relationships with Central Asian countries change (Zhao, 2008, pp.  51–52). There are two critical junctures for China’s diplomacy in Central Asia: 1997 and 2001. In both cases, the US strategic arrangement towards Asia was the most important external reason behind China’s strategy adjustment in Central Asia (Liu, 2014). Prior to 1997, Central Asia didn’t appear to be an important region in China’s foreign policy (Zhao, 2008, p. 56), and Central Asian countries were more inclined to develop their relationship with two NATO members: Turkey and the US (Marat, 2010, p. 107). The year 1997 marks the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, of which all five Central Asian countries are members (NATO, 2014). In the same year, Central Asia’s geopolitical importance attracted a great deal of interest as huge oil reserves were detected in the Caspian Sea (Bronson, 1998, p. 230). So during this time, the Shanghai Five (the institution that would

Development of multilateral institutions  93 eventually become the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001) was established in 1996 to strengthen China’s presence in the region by maintaining China’s political, economic, and cultural communication after the border issues were settled. In 2001, the terrorist attack on the US had many impacts on the region. First, Central Asia became the frontline of the US global anti-terrorism campaign after 9/11 (McDermott, 2004, p.  2): the US established a military foothold in the region, and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became frontline states in Operation “Enduring Freedom” (Wishnick, 2002, p. v). The strong presence of the US in the region also led to series of regime changes among Central Asia countries, previously introduced as “colour revolutions”. As Central Asia’s geopolitical importance attracted international attention, Russia, China, Japan, and many other countries also began to conceive economic development plans based on the region. Central Asian countries don’t show any clear preference among the different regional development projects proposed by China, Russia, Japan, the US and the EU, as long as these projects invest in Central Asia’s infrastructure development and do not interfere with their political systems. China is concerned about this situation as it certainly doesn’t welcome the US presence in its neighbourhood, either from a geopolitical perspective or from a political perspective as the US is promoting liberal democracy in the region. Second, the US antiterrorism war in the Middle East casts a shadow on the security of oil transportation from the Gulf region, which can be quite worrisome for China’s energy strategy (Zhao, 2008, p. 73). The demarcation of frontlines with Russia and Central Asian countries was not only important for China’s neighbourhood security, but it was also of great significance for newly independent Central Asian countries who were eager to obtain a guarantee from China, their huge neighbour, that it would not claim any territories from them. The successful settlement of frontiers has laid mutual trust as a precondition of cooperation, and the Shanghai Five soon developed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as Central Asia became a hot spot in international relations. China’s Central Asian policy is also decided by its domestic factors. As China’s economy grows quickly, the disparity between rich and poor has also grown drastically. This gap geographically conforms to China’s east coast and west innerland, which is mainly inhabited by minorities of Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz ethnicities. The lagging economy, insufficient education, and failing minority policies3 have caused serious conflicts between minorities and Han-Chinese people. Furthermore, separatism menaces China’s regime stability and territorial integrity. These are two issues that are central to the CPC’s regime. Thus, Central Asian countries are linked with China’s domestic politics as they border western China and share the same languages, religions and ethnicities with the indigenous populations of Xinjiang, the province where most turmoil took place (Sheives, 2006, pp. 207–214; Fravel, 2008, p. 151). Many issues concerning Central Asian countries are worrisome for China: they are seen as cradles for Islamic radicals, foreign supporters for separatist forces in Xinjiang, and vulnerable to manipulation by

94  Development of multilateral institutions other great powers (Jonson, 2001, p.  222; Scobell, Ratner and Beckley, 2014). The revival of the Islamic identity after the dissolution of the USSR has warned China on the power of religious and ethnic identities, and China is worried about the extent to which Islam can be managed (Harris, 1993, pp. 110–112). Though Central Asian countries welcome China’s investment and are willing to cooperate with China in anti-terrorism, they have divergence with China concerning China’s strict policies towards the Islamic religion.4 At the same time, Central Asia is connected with China’s energy security. As China consumes a huge quantity of oil, it is very sensitive to oil price and the security of oil provision and transportation. China considers it necessary to diversify oil providers as Gulf regions are not stable and it is confronted with the Malacca dilemma, which is the problem of China’s over-relying on the Malacca Strait to transport oil, as it is often harassed by pirates (J. Zhang, 2005; Xue, 2010). Within this context, China’s Central Asia policy is strongly correlated with China’s domestic need to stabilize and to energize its western region, and China’s domestic need to guarantee a constant and stable oil provision. As Zhao Huasheng points out, the importance of China’s trade with Central Asia cannot be measured by its tiny percentage of China’s total trade amount, because it accounts for almost all the trade of Xinjiang, thus playing a critical part in promoting Xinjiang’s economy (Zhao, 2008, p. 79) and assures that Central Asia will not become a place of refuge for Uyghur separatists (Ong, 2005). Similarly, China has become one of the largest investors in Central Asian countries’ oil industry for its long-term energy strategy.

Integrating Chinese political ideas into multilateral institutions As the first multilateral institution initiated by China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has indeed become a platform to present and practice China’s political ideas. The most profound and distinct way of realizing this point is to integrate China’s political ideas into multilateral institutions and consolidate them as the generalized principles of conduct for all members. Here I  would like to recall Ruggie’s emphasis on the generalized principles of conduct: “principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions; without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (Ruggie, 1992, p. 597). The generalized principles are so important because they will entail (a) “indivisibility among the members with regard to the range of behavior in question” as a “social construction” and (b) “diffused reciprocity” (Keohane, 1986), which differs from specific reciprocity that is very common in bilateral relations (Waever, 1997, p. 184). It can be understood as each party contributes or makes certain concessions and expects a collective return that would be equivalent to what it has conceded (Wilkinson, 2000, p. 41). In the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China’s political ideas transform to SCO’s generalized principles of conduct mainly through two legal documents: the Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation signed in June 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Charter”) and Treaty of Long-Term Good-Neighborliness,

Development of multilateral institutions  95 Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the SCO,5 signed in August 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty”) (Vorobiev, 2013b, p. 21). The two legal documents are the founding documents of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and have defined what SCO is and how it works. To be more specific, the Charter defines the general goal and mission of SCO, while the Treaty defines how the member states should work together in SCO. These two important documents decided that the members should accept the same principles and pursue the same goals. I will explain the two aspects respectively. Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation The Charter has consolidated what has been called “Shanghai Spirit”,6 featuring “the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration for joint development” into the legal document of the SCO. The Charter defines one of the purposes and the missions of the SCO as “to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order” (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2009b). This is a very important statement, as I have thoroughly introduced in the historical part, one of China’s political ideas that remains unchanged being that China is convinced that the current world order is neither fair nor democratic, and it argues that a better political and economic international order is necessary. By integrating this idea into the Charter of SCO, it signifies that this political idea goes beyond the realm of China and becomes an accepted acknowledgement among all the SCO members. Theoretically and legally, they all agree that the existing world order is neither democratic nor fair nor rational, which justifies the existence of the SCO, whose purpose is to offer an alternative. Another Chinese political idea that has been integrated into the Charter is China’s ideas of international relations, summarized as “the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” as introduced in the historical review part. Article 2 of the Charter of SCO has stated that the members should cooperate based on “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas”. This correspond to China’s political idea about how countries should manage their relations, which differs from what China understands as the big powers dominate international affairs and intimidate the small countries with their military forces. This point has been better elaborated in the Treaty, which I will explain next. Treaty of Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the SCO Signed five years after the Charter, the Treaty also incorporated the political idea of promoting fair, democratic, rational political and economic international

96  Development of multilateral institutions relations and also the spirit of “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”. What is new in the Treaty is to emphasize the importance of these two principles and elaborate them in a more explicit way and indicate how it relates to the relations among SCO members. I will explain them in the following paragraphs. First, the Treaty acknowledges the impact of the globalization. It states that “the globalization process has deepened the inter-dependence between nations, and each nation’s security and prosperity is closely related” (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2007). It also declares that “the new security challenges and threats are global, and only through mutual efforts and following the collaboration principle and mechanism of consensus can confront them effectively”. The Treaty has “re-emphasized that in order to construct a fair and rational international order”, SCO is willing to “enlarge collaborations between its members and collaborations with other countries and international organizations”. It has explained that “in order to promote the democratization of international relations”, SCO would like to construct a new global security structure based on “equality, mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefits, with no distinction on groups or ideologies”. The Treaty also emphasizes, in its third article, that “each signing member should respect each party’s right to choose its own political, economic, social and cultural development patterns according to its own historical experience and realities”. This is also a key political idea that China has argued against the “West”oriented political and economic order, which sets democracy and free trade as the only correct pattern of human society. By integrating this point into the Treaty, it means that all regime and economy patterns existing in SCO member countries are considered as legitimate, no matter whether they are democratic or non-democratic. By accepting that all regime and economy types are legitimate, it implies that without a standard for political or economic pattern, SCO does not impose political or economic demands or conditions on its members when promoting collaborations. The treaty also states that each SCO member has total equal voting rights, even though they do not pay the same amount of member fees to the institution. No SCO member has the veto right (Sun, 2013, p. 50). As Cheng Guoping, the vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China has said, SCO is trying to establish a new pattern of inter-nation relations, a new pattern of international relations and new pattern of regional collaboration (Cheng, 2013, p. 5). Vorobiev has emphasized that the Charter and the Treaty and other legal documents of SCO do not allow interference in member states’ internal affairs, nor do they allow the SCO to function as an “international police” or force “imposed peace” on member states through the SCO (Vorobiev, 2013a, p. 45). The political ideas of the SCO reflect generally those of China. It shows that as China’s economic and military power have grown, it accordingly attempts to transfer its political ideas towards a wider audience by consolidating them as norms in a multilateral institution. These new norms, based on China’s political ideas, are trying to offer an alternative to the existing international order, which

Development of multilateral institutions  97 will benefit China’s future development and is supposed to guarantee China’s partners (especially those who are marginalized in the existing order) to benefit from it as well.

Difficulties in managing institutions The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is an important and ambitious attempt in the region of Central Asia. It has tried to go beyond the security issues and expand to other fields. For example, economic interdependency is of critical importance to sustainable regionalization (J. Zhang, 1997; Yang, 2005). In 2003, SCO members signed the Guideline of Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Members (hereinafter “the Guideline”), which clearly defined the priority of the SCO’s economic development as energy, transportation, telecommunication, agriculture, tourism, bank and credit, irrigation, and environmental protection. The Guideline has also set the short-term goal of facilitating investment, the mid-term goal of establishing stable, predictable and clear rules by 2010, and the long-term goal of achieving free movement of merchandise, capital, service, and technology by 2020 (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2003). The Guideline demands a gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among SCO members and the strengthening of inter-bank communication. China also proposed the establishment of an SCO FTA in the 2003 summit, but it was not supported by Russia. This issue will be elaborated later. In the 2005 SCO summit, the creation of an “Inter-Bank SCO Consortium” was established in order to finance the SCO’s future economic cooperation projects,7 including the SCO “Energy Club”, a mechanism that discusses energy security initiated by Russia (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009a). In 2006, the SCO Business Council was established.8 In the summit of 2010, China proposed the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Development Bank to enlarge local currency settlement. The SCO Development Bank is an initiative designed to concretize China’s finance diplomacy. It aims to (a) coordinate Russia’s and China’s vision about this bank, and its relationship with the BRICS development bank whose initiators also include Russia and China; (b) balance the economic development of SCO member states, which is extremely imbalanced, so as to satisfy their interests within SCO framework; and (c) avoid large scale economic crisis (firewall building). The SCO Development Bank certainly reminds us of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, showing that China has already conceived this bank model in a relatively smaller realm. Besides economic relations, SCO has also initiated the University of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to promote young students’ mobility among member states. This project tries to launch a comprehensive multilateral approach to activate all SCO member states in a process of coordination through higher education projects. Universities (10 in China, 16 in Russia, 10 in Tajikistan, 7 in Kyrgyzstan,

98  Development of multilateral institutions and 10 in Kazakhstan) are selected by their ministries of education to work together to cultivate young scholars in fields considered most needed by SCO members. Students in this university program are supposed to study in Russian and Chinese, and they spend their study time in different member state universities in order to obtain their final diploma from hosting institutions and from the University of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This project aims to develop a higher education standard for SCO members, which is also compatible with the European Bologna Process. When Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan in 2013, he promised to offer 30,000 Chinese scholarships to SCO member states in order to promote mobility of youth, and considered it as strategically important in “guaranteeing permanent friendship and peace” in SCO member states. These exchange programs are developed in order to cultivate young scholars with a deep understanding about Chinese society and Chinese culture. As Yu Xintian points out, nurturing the same value system is the key issue to the success of China’s public diplomacy among SCO members: for the moment, though SCO members all agree on “anti-terrorism”, “anti-separatism”, and “antiextremism”, there is no consensus on the definitions of these three concepts, let alone a consensus on a more abstract value system (Xintian Yu, 2010). However, the development of these institutional arrangements is quite limited. There are many reasons that cause the impassive development of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which may also suggest the general problems that every regionalization might encounter. First, SCO exists in an environment of “clash of integration processes” (Casier, 2007; Freire and Kanet, 2012; Gower and Timmins, 2013). As the traditional regional power, Russia has put much effort in promoting this regionalization process according to its will. As Zhao Huasheng points out, the regionalization pursued by Russia is not only common tariff and free movement of people, goods, and services but also Russianization of the whole region (Zhao, 2008, p. 284). As early as 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States was founded and included almost all former USSR states, and then it developed into the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) in 1996, with a strong Russian influence in the regionalization process. This union was terminated and replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union launched on 1 January 2015. Though this plan has serious financial problems to sustain Russia’s ambition (Sommerfeldt and Zschäpitz, 2015), it has realized a non-tariff agreement among its members and a common customs tariff towards third countries. Central Asian countries have also the option to regionalize with Russia as the centre. In 1994, the Central Asian Union was created under the proposition of Kazakhstan, which transformed into the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) in 1997 and then the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). This union has been greatly supported by the EU but is now considered a failure due to Russia’s active opposition (Ilkhamov, 2001). Besides highly institutionalized regionalization led by Russia, the EU and the US also influence the regional cooperation with their foreign policy. The EU’s

Development of multilateral institutions  99 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) project aims to attract more former Soviet Union countries to become closer to the EU (Keukeleire and Petrova, 2014); the US has launched “new silk road plan” in hopes of guiding Central Asian regionalization to move southward in order to include Afghanistan. Figure 4.2 presents the main regional cooperation institutions involving Central Asia and China’s neighbourhood. The graph shows clearly that the SCO is China’s only multilateral institution to become involved in the regionalization process, and it is challenged by Russia’s divergence in visions and competition of institutions. Second, the conflict between sovereignty and multilateralism also emerged as the regionalization went further. A common point for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member states is that they are nation-states that treasure independence and sovereignty. For Central Asian countries that have a relatively shorter history, sovereignty is an especially sensitive issue. For China, as it has been introduced in the historical part, non-interference in internal affairs has been one of the “five commandments” of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, it appears in almost all of China’s documents concerning its relationship with foreign countries. For example, although anti-terrorism is the most central issue for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the institutionalization level still remains low. The

Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan

GUAM

Moldova

Collective Security Treaty

Ukraine

Armenia Kyrgyzstan

Common Wealth of Independent States

Uzbekistan Tajikistan

Russia Kazakhstan

China Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Belarus

Common Economic Space

Figure 4.2  Main regional cooperation institutions involving Central Asia Source: Illustrated by the author.

Georgia

100  Development of multilateral institutions legal framework has evolved greatly since the SCO’s foundation, but the principle of non-interference in internal affairs hinders the internalization of SCO legal papers with domestic laws in member states. Details such as whether the SCO should establish an armed anti-terrorism group or whether the SCO should conclude a list of terrorists involve the debate concerning the non-interference in internal affairs and the efficiency of the institution’s action (Pan, 2003). The sensitive notion of non-interference in internal affairs concerns not only security issues but also economic ones. China has proposed the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Development Bank and the Development Funds in order to provide a solution for financing the grand projects of the SCO. This proposition is refused by Russia and some Central Asian countries because their internal laws don’t permit such investment. The most striking failure took place in Kyrgyzstan. The chaotic politics in Kyrgyzstan following the “Tulip Revolution” of 2005 burst out into a crisis that toppled its government. In comparison to the active aid and participation from the US, the EU, the UN, Eurasian Security and other multilateral institutions, the SCO’s inactivity and low efficiency in calming its member state’s chaos was evident. Reasons for the SCO’s reluctance in action were many: involvements, if there were any, could only be on security and economic terms instead of military, because the SCO doesn’t want be considered a military alliance; the toppled Kyrgyzstan president was replaced by a temporary government, and it was difficult to decide who could represent Kyrgyzstan. Finally, besides several declarations that the SCO insisted on non-interference in internal affairs and respect on Kyrgyzstan people’s choice, the SCO didn’t provide any effective aid to help Kyrgyzstan restore its order. The critics are many, the sharpest ones coming from the West, as Thompson pointed out: China has dutifully followed its long-held foreign policy of non-interference and sat on the side-lines as events played out in Kyrgyzstan. Beijing’s response also reflects the utilitarian limits of the SCO as well as China’s reluctance to project power beyond its borders to protect its interests. (Thompson, 2010) Sun Zhuangzhi, who served as China’s special observer in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, expressed that the chaos in Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated the lack of institutions vis-à-vis emergency situations in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and also in each of the member states. As China decided to evacuate all Chinese nationals from Kyrgyzstan, it realized that there were neither regulations nor laws about transportation, safety guarantees or visa issues concerning this situation. Thus after 2005, the SCO drafted regulations concerning measurements of emergency situations. Zhuangzhi also believes that the fact that China mobilized to evacuate its own nationals shows that China was concerned with what happened in the region, though China didn’t take any military methods to intervene. He pointed out that the situation in Kyrgyzstan was so difficult that even Russia was very

Development of multilateral institutions  101 prudent in making any decisions: when being asked to intervene by the former Kyrgyzstan government, Russia transferred this demand to the Collective Security Organization instead of taking any action by itself.9 The painful failure poses a question of how far a multilateral institution can intervene when issues concerning a member state’s domestic affairs appear. If decisions made in multilateral institutions require concession of a member state’s sovereignty, what would happen? How can one define the border between “regional safety” and “internal affairs”? The Kyrgyzstan crisis works as a historical juncture that reminds China that it is time to change ideas drastically. The abandonment of non-interference in internal affairs is certainly not an option, but redefining a notion usually provides a new way of thinking. Zhao Huasheng argues that the definitions of “internal affairs” and “domestic politics” are relative and non-static; seeing that the globalization has drawn nation-states much closer than they were 30 years ago, the realm of “internal affairs” and “domestic politics” have been shrinking, thus permitting the application of “non-interference in internal affairs” also alters according to the situation (H. Zhao, 2011). The Kyrgyzstan crisis is considered an event whose influence has gone beyond the realm of internal politics. The damage it has done to the SCO and China’s image in Central Asia invites a question that needs a clear answer: What role does China play in Central Asia, a participator or an observer? According to Zhao Huasheng, China should change its role from a passive observer to a positive participant, because China’s national interest is strongly related with Central Asia, and China is geographically adjacent to Central Asia (H. Zhao, 2011). From the debate concerning the relaxing of China’s policy of non-interference in internal affairs derive many new notions about how to prepare a theoretical foundation for China’s active participation in regional or global affairs. For example, Zhao Huasheng has proposed to enrich, instead of replace, the notion of noninterference in internal affairs with “constructive intervention” (H. Zhao, 2011). In Chinese, “interference” corresponds to “干涉”, implying a participation in affairs that one doesn’t have the authority, or the legal or moral basis to become involved in. It also implies an involvement based on strong power and imposition. The word “intervention” in Chinese is “介入”, a word whose meaning is closer to that of “participation”, invokes a much more neutral tone than “interference”. When connected with the adjective “constructive”, it implies China’s active, constructive participation as a contributor rather than a manager, strictly within the boundaries of international law, and China’s total freedom to choose whether or not to intervene (H. Zhao, 2011). Wang Yizhou, a famous international relations scholar has elaborated his idea of “creative involvement” as a new idea of and approach to China’s foreign policy (Y. Wang, 2011, 2013). Wang has chosen “involvement” instead of “intervention” as the English word, but in Chinese he chose the same word “介入” as Zhao. According to Wang Yizhou, adjustment of China’s role in global governance is inevitable, because a country as huge as China cannot always stay behind the curtain and passively follow the existing rules.

102  Development of multilateral institutions The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is thus the first multilateral institution conceived and co-founded by China, and also an important step in China’s participation in the regionalization of Central Asia after the Cold War. China has had many successes and failures in the case of SCO, yet the most important one is the inspiration to connect infrastructure and financial institutions with multilateral institutions. This model, as I am going to introduce in the next section, is applied in the Belt and Road Initiative.

Belt and Road Initiative and its impact on Europe Europe is an important part in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The “Belt” is designed to end in Europe and meets the “Road”. As China and the EU are mutually important trade partners, while China has recently been redefined as a “systemic rival” that promotes a different governance pattern, the Belt and Road Initiative undoubtedly expects much concern and cautiousness from The EU. Thus, the Belt and Road’s development in Europe provides an important platform to observe how Chinese values and norms coordinate with those of the EU. The Belt and Road Initiative has shown that infrastructure is the most important public good that China would like to provide when constructing new institutions. Following the Belt and Road Initiatives, China has launched a series of infrastructure projects with EU member states. This includes a wide freight train network that connects 48 Chinese cities and 42 European destinations. The newest route is the China-Britain route launched in January of 2017, and the route that connects Hamburg and Wuhan was extended to Vietnam in March 2018. Yet the most important part of Belt and Road Initiative in Europe is 16 + 1. Initiated by China in 2012, it includes 11 EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 5 non-EU countries from the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). Despite the wariness of Brussels, Greece announced that it would join 16 + 1 initiative shortly after Beijing was defined as a systemic rival in 2019. The participation of Greece renames this initiative as 17 + 1, and also increases the number of EU members in the initiative to 12. Besides infrastructure projects, the 17 + 1 initiative also covers issues such as investment, trade, culture, and education. Chinese think tanks and government define these countries as “emerging economies”, who have chosen to “look east” after being disappointed by existing finance and economic arrangements provided by the EU or the US. It is not astonishing that China has followed the same model of combining political collaboration with investments in infrastructure projects. Along with the 17 + 1 initiative and the larger context of the Belt and Road Initiative, many infrastructure projects are established in these states, for example the Slavia Prague football club in Slavia, the healthcare industry investment with Hungary, and the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway that would be built by Chinese companies. Then Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao proposed to establish a China-Central

Development of multilateral institutions  103 and Eastern Europe Investment Cooperation Fund in 2012, at the occasion of the first China-Central and Eastern European Countries leaders’ meeting. The fund was confirmed in 2013 and put into operation starting from the beginning of 2014 and totalled USD 435 million. These infrastructure projects have brought huge investment to 17 + 1 countries. From 2012 to 2017, China’s investment in this region increased from USD 3 billion to USD 9  billion, while the European Union’s total investment in Balkan countries was USD 9  billion. These large investments are certainly welcomed by countries concerned in the region as they have a generally low GDP and look forward to boosting their economies. At the 2017 16 + 1 annual meeting in Warsaw, the Polish prime minister referred to a plan for a new airport hub in Poland, which would be combined with a highspeed railway connecting Europe and Asia; Bulgaria tried to brand Plovdiv as “the oldest city on the Silk Road” and tried to attract the Chinese enterprise Alibaba to invest more than EUR 100 million in building a logistical base (Cheresheva, 2016); Slovenia’s infrastructure minister tried to promote his country as a major logistics hub in Central Europe which connects Ljubljana, Maribor, and Koper; even Slovakia, which remained aloof from China’s 16 + 1 initiative by not attending its summit, began to approach China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) by attracting EUR 1.4 billion from China’s Hesteel Group to acquire the US-owned steel factory in Kosice (Turcsanyi, 2017). This eager request for Chinese investment has brought two related issues in the region: the first is the collision of rules between China and the EU; the second is the political concerns of a divided European Union. The collision of rules As I have always emphasized, China is seeking a more important role in international affairs; promotion of its norms and values is a necessary step to widen its influence. At the BRI summit in Beijing in April 2019, the foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, argued that the Belt and Road Initiative provides an alternative to unilateralism and protectionism. This is a very smart interpretation, which fuses the BRI with values that are highly appreciated by Europe. This combination is especially important as the US is taking a strong unilateral and protectionist position to launch a trade war against China. However, it is also clear that the “multilateralism” and “open economy” provided through the BRI follows largely norms and rules set by China. The huge infrastructure projects that China has invested in Central and East Europe are important trials of how much the Chinese way can be compatible in Europe. The first huge collision of rules is reflected in the difficulties of a Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway project. This project is a perfect combination of the Belt and Road Initiative, 17 + 1 initiative and China’s high-speed train diplomacy. At a 2013 meeting of the 16 + 1 in Bucharest, China, Serbia and Hungary signed an MOU to build a $2.89 billion, 350-kilometer high-speed rail line to connect Belgrade and Budapest. This project

104  Development of multilateral institutions was designed to reach the China-run Piraeus port in Greece, another important project in the Belt and Road Initiative. Like other projects in Belt and Road Initiative, this huge project has followed the typical pattern of Chinese government-led investment: public-private partnership (PPP) (Ye and Xu, 2013). It means collaboration between public and private capital, which is relatively more efficient in the provision of public goods. However, many infrastructure projects, like the high-speed rail line between Belgrade and Budapest, did not go through public tendering as demanded by the European Union, and all the arrangements were already made between Chinese and local governments. Hungary and Serbia decided to give this rail line development project to the China Railway International Corporation with financing coming from China’s Export-Import Bank. EU officials considered this a serious infringement of EU rules (Shepard, 2017), and the whole project was put into investigation. The investigation has greatly hampered the implementation of this project. The railway project was supposed to finish by the 2017 China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) annual meeting, yet it is not achieving its goal at all. Brussels’ investigations focus mainly on Hungary, which is an EU member state. Thus the Hungarian section of the railway is not developing at all. As Serbia is not yet an EU member state, the section of the railway in Serbia has developed normally. Another point that has attracted much concern is the risk that the BRI might draw host countries into a debt trap. There, voices argue that the huge infrastructure projects of the BRI need huge investment, making the host countries sink into debts toward China, thus ceding many decision powers to the Chinese government. Put differently, this kind of concern is about the worries that China transfers its economic advantages into political influences. It implies that the concern about a powerful China is quite popular in current international politics. This concern originates from the fear of tyranny and the erosion of freedom, which is difficult for China to prove otherwise even though it has proclaimed support for multilateralism and the existing world order. The political concern of Brussels The European Commission has acknowledged the importance of paying attention to the 17 + 1 Initiative, meanwhile many politicians have also expressed their concern about potential risks. For example, Anastas Vangeli from the Polish Academy of Sciences has remarked, “Southern and Eastern Europe are a testing ground for the Belt and Road”, where Beijing tries “to see whether this type of diplomacy can help them boost economic relations”. According to Vangeli, “the whole idea is to find ways to boost the economy outside China, to generate demand for Chinese goods: high speed railways, satellite systems or nuclear technology” (Zalan, 2016). There are increasing debates in Brussels about whether China’s approach to Eastern Europe might erode European Union’s cohesion. The BRI is considered a platform for China to develop infrastructure projects to connect Asia to Europe

Development of multilateral institutions  105 and export China’s excess capital and labor, and also serves China’s goal of building its global power (Poggetti, 2017). Brussels has begun to worry about China’s 16 + 1 mechanism starting from 2015. A  2015 European Parliament resolution called on EU member states to “speak with one voice to the Chinese government, particularly in view of Beijing’s present diplomatic dynamism” and stressed that the “16 + 1 group should not divide the EU or weaken its position vis-à-vis China and should also address human rights issues” (European Parliament, 2015). The 16 + 1 Initiative creates a sub-region in the European Union, which will clearly not be welcomed at all by the EU. In fact, there are already several examples that are worrying enough for the EU. When divergence appears, certain countries that have received huge amounts of investment from China have taken positions that are compatible with Chinese interests instead of those of the EU. For example, Greece has become an important supporter of China’s foreign policy in the European Union on many sensitive political issues. In 2016, Greece and Hungry objected to the European Union’s statement criticizing China’s policy in the South China Sea (Emmott, 2016). The most recent issue is that Greece has blocked the EU’s criticism at the UN of China’s human rights record by a veto. This is the first time the EU had failed to make such a statement at the UN’s top rights body and the veto from Greece is seen by the EU as a gift in return for China’s huge investment (The Guardian, 2017). Greece has also sided with China amidst the turmoil in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, geopolitical considerations are also sneaking into the big picture of Sino-Greek relations (Tonchev and Davariou, 2017, p. 7) As Fox and Godement have pointed out, “the EU’s China strategy is based on an anachronistic belief that China, under the influence of European engagement, will liberalize its economy, improve the rule of law and democratize its politics” (Fox and Godement, 2009a, p. 1). The EU now judges that this belief is closer to a false vision than a reality, as China “has paid little heed to European values” (Fox and Godement, 2009b, p. 1). The combination of China’s strong economic power, its rapprochement to Central and Eastern Europe, and its Belt and Road Initiative generates many worries about China’s future development. The previously designed strategic partner is turning to competitors, because both the EU and China would like the future world order to take their normative standards. It is totally understandable that the European Union worries that China’s 17 + 1 is a Trojan horse that invites Chinese norms to the EU. Apparently, the 17 + 1 initiative has chosen the countries that are less developed in economy yet enjoy a relatively large territory and geopolitical importance. There are also concerns and critics stating that the 17 + 1 itself is far from a multilateral initiative but a combination of bilateral relations between China and 16 Central and East European countries. Following this lead, the EU has more reasons to worry about the 17 + 1 Initiative as it forms a package of bilateral relations arrangements with certain EU countries while excluding the rest. EU’s concern about a spreading Chinese influence in Europe has been strengthened as Italy has announced that it would join the Belt and Road Initiative on 23

106  Development of multilateral institutions March 2019. Italy is the first country from the G7 group that endorses the Belt and Road Initiative. Italy’s joining in the BRI has far-reaching meaning on the development of the initiative. First, it strengthens the legitimacy of the BRI as a worldwide public goods provider, which is one step further as a norm builder and world order former. Since the BRI was established, most of its participants are countries that are neither economically nor politically influential in international affairs. China has been successful in gathering a good number, but it misses the support and acknowledgement from representatives of the West. Thus, Italy’s participation certainly has been an immense success for China. Second, it implies that the BRI can be compatible with other mainstream European countries such as Italy, one of the G7 club members. The experience with 17 + 1 and other cases in the Belt and Road Initiative in other continents have shown that China has its own way of getting things launched. The strong involvement of the state and a huge amount of investment on one hand can guarantee the project to be finished on time, while on the other hand might have the risk of ignoring local regulations. As the EU defines China as a competitor in norms and values, China, at the current stage, prefers to prove that its norms are more compatible than incompatible with European norms. Third, it demonstrates that the public goods provided by China conform to the need for development of Europe today. Put differently, it implies that China’s development provides a solution to certain issues of present Europe, and China is proudly offering its solution in its own way. This is important for China because it signifies that one key EU member state accepts China’s rise/or great revival as beneficial to their interests. Concluding this section, we can see that China’s 17 + 1 and the Belt and Road Initiative is de facto influencing the EU’s integrity. However, one question that begs reflection is: Are China’s policies and strategies the reasons for disintegrated opinions and positions of certain EU members? Or it is because of the discord and unbalanced development within the EU, which have made certain member states turn to China’s initiative more easily? In the context of the US and China’s conflicts in trade and in ideologies, Europe is, in the long run, an important middle way that connects China and the Western world. Its position of middle way is not only in the sense of commerce and trade but also in the sense of political ideas and norms. The EU faces the US that shares largely the same values, yet pursues unilateralism and protectionism; meanwhile, China has different political values and norms from the EU, but at the same time China is willing to protect existing multilateral institutions. The EU certainly needs to balance between the US and China in this period of uncertainly. As the EU strives to establish a political entity that unifies its member states under one market and one currency, it is also confronted by problems of imbalanced development among member states and the inefficiency of decisionmaking. China’s 17 + 1 initiatives and the BRI are objectively deepening the conflicts between Brussels and the member states’ sovereignty. As long as China’s

Development of multilateral institutions  107 investments are efficient in quenching the thirst for financing, 17 + 1 and the BRI certainly enjoy their influence in Europe. As long as 17 + 1 and the BRI are China’s long-term strategic projects, it will continue to exert influence in the EU. However, how this influence would impact the regionalization of the EU lies largely in the hands of Brussels. If Brussels can manage the divergence in political opinion, economic development, and social issues as refugees, China’s 17 + 1 and Belt and Road Initiatives should not be a destabilizing factor for the EU. In the next section, we will look into the BRI impact on East Asia’s regionalization.

Belt and Road Initiative and its impact on East Asia East Asia is one of the most active regions in the world today, both politically and economically speaking. In North East Asia, Korean peninsula’s peace is a long lasting issue, while South East Asia is undergoing rapid economic growth. East Asia is undoubtedly influenced by great powers such as China and the US. Since Xi Jinping has put his foreign policy focus on neighbouring countries since 2013, South East Asian countries are gaining weight in China’s political investment. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, South East Asia is included in BRI as the Maritime Silk Road plan. What role would BRI play in this subregion’s internationalization? East Asian regionalization proves what Telò has pointed out, that as “new regional associations of states as a concrete phenomenon are often still unclear, ambiguous and overlapping within the current transition of the post-bipolar world system”, new models of regionalism are in development, and they don’t necessarily follow the Balassian model where “the path and the end are established from the beginning” (Telò, 2014a). The regionalization of East Asia has also germinated since the end of the Cold War. Though its birth was due to Cold War confrontation, ASEAN has developed into the most important multilateral institution in East Asia. Unlike the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation that originated from the security concerns of its member states, ASEAN has started from focusing on economic issues. The weakening global financial system that once worked well under the US-led multilateral arrangements was unable to stop the 1997 financial crisis. The failure of the global system to protect this region’s economy from crisis has spawned the first idea of “East Asia”, which is defined and understood in ASEAN+3 (an association with ASEAN of China, Japan, and South Korea) as a grand region that includes both North East Asia and South East Asia. Following the Chiang Mai initiative, the bloom of FTAs in this region has developed so much that it has become the distinct characteristic of the regionalization. These FTAs are “state-promoted regional cooperation [involving] de jure regime setting” (Balassa, 1962, pp. 1–18), which have both economic and political significance. The China-ASEAN FTA is a project that emphasizes political interests over economic interests: the establishment of the China-ASEAN

108  Development of multilateral institutions FTA has a strong intention to ease ASEAN member states’ worries about China’s strong economy after it joins the WTO, and also to strengthen collaboration with ASEAN, responding to the US presence in the region. In answer to political and economic advantages brought by the China-ASEAN FTA, other countries that have great economic ties in the region also started their own FTAs with ASEAN. As China’s economy grows strong, FTAs have become its new tools to regulate bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries in the region. For example, the China-South Korea FTA has been a great strike to Taiwan’s economy and is instrumentalized to resolve the Taiwan issue. Unattended Issues in East Asia regionalism There are many issues left to be resolved in East Asian regionalization: who leads, what are the economic orders, who provides public goods, what are the norms, how is the East Asian Identity to be defined and constructed? These unresolved issues are hindering further deepening of East Asian regionalism. Pessimistic scholars see that East Asia has a long way to go before it becomes a real global power, since mistrust and conflicts fill the international relationship (Bhambhri, 2010). Moreover, Singh and Zhang claim that multilateral institutions in Asia tend to focus only on very short term, shallow and superficial issues (Singh and Zhang, 2012, p. 11). Figure 4.3 demonstrates that all these issues influence one other. The leadership issue involves the rivalry between China and Japan, China and the US, and how to include relations among China, South Korea, and Japan into the East Asian regionalization. Thus it connects with the issue of who provides the public goods. ASEAN+3 operates in a way intended to expand the existing ASEAN mechanism to include China, Japan, and South Korea, which inevitably inherits problems and shortcomings in ASEAN’s institution, which would leave many doubts on whether East Asian regionalism could be pushed through this institution (Pang, 2001). The unsolved historical issue, territorial disputes, and the presence of the US in the region all lead to a situation where neither China nor Japan would like to invest more in this mechanism and only act according to the ASEAN mechanism to participate in the regional cooperation (Pang, 2001). Norm setting is also an important issue in ASEAN+3. A challenge brought by East Asia’s regionalism, no matter in which form or following which mechanism design, challenges some of the fundamental political principles of East Asian countries, including China. The most prominent one is the non-interference in internal affairs. The case of East Timor is a challenge that profoundly confronted ASEAN Way, and the brutal anti-Chinese violence attracted a great deal of criticism towards China’s act of omission. The discussion of non-interference in internal affairs is closely and naturally connected with a deeper principle, which is the absoluteness of the sovereignty shared by each nation-state. China, as well as its East Asian neighbours, has very strong nationalist self-recognition and the fundamental foreign policy principles are designed to maintain China’s independence

Development of multilateral institutions  109

Public Goods Provision

What’s the relationship between national sovereignty and East Asia Community

Power Balance in East Asia

Chinese Threat

Sovereignty Pool Norms

Non-interference in Domestic Affairs

Soft multilateralism, the Asian way, where does its legitimacy comes from and how it forms an East Asia identity

Who sustains the economic order?

China

New International Economic Order New Values

What is East Asia and who belongs to it?

Economic Order

China’s definition of East Asia

East Asia Identity

Why a specific East Economic order is needed? What is its relationship with existent global world order?

Figure 4.3  The interrelations of different issues in East Asia regionalism Source: Illustrated by the author.

and sovereignty. Yet as the internationalization deepens, the conflict between multilateralism and the sovereignty inevitably emerges. Finally, the East Asian identity construction is a sensitive issue that China pays great attention to. Though East Asian regionalism is an idea that is supported widely by ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea, there are different understandings of “East Asia”. The definition of East Asia is not only geographical but also political: for example, Japan believes that the East Asian Community should be an open region that includes New Zealand, Australia, and the US, and should pursue the value of freedom (implying democracy and human rights politically) (Koizumi, 2002; Yong Wang, 2005, pp. 23–24). South Korea is sandwiched between China and Japan (H. Zhang, 2011, p.  14; Shu, 2012, p.  15). On the one hand, South Korea has territorial disputes with Japan; on the other hand, South Korea positions itself as a liberal democratic country, sharing the same values with Japan and the US instead of with China (Shu, 2012, p. 103). From South Korea’s perspective, an East Asia plan that is open to a broader realm that includes all the Asian countries is preferable in order to dilute China’s influence on the region,

110  Development of multilateral institutions and it favours a US–South Korea alliance playing a more important role in coordinating East Asian affairs (H. Zhang, 2011, p. 15). For China, “East Asia” is also a new concept, as for a very long period of history China had been the centre of a tributary system instead of a nation-state based international order. From the Chinese position, East Asia is evidently a region that is different from the West and should exclude non-regional states, especially the US. China tries to construct the identity of East Asia through three perspectives. First, China argues that Confucianism (nobility and the doctrine of means) is the fundamental value of their societies. Thus East Asian countries are “united” in the framework of Confucianism, and Confucianism has become the core identification of “East Asia Identity” or “East Asia Consciousness” (Zhang, 1996a, 1996b; L. Zhang, 1998; Li, 1998, 2005; P. Li, 1999; Chen, 2001; Shuyong, 2006). Another perspective is to see the rise of East Asian identity as a response to modernization and globalization (Wu, 1996; Zhang and Sang, 1999; Zhao, 2010). It is seen as necessary and unavoidable because East Asia needs to distinguish itself from homogenization brought by globalization, and at the same time East Asia needs to integrate in an economic sense in order to be more competitive and dynamic in the global economy, and less dependent on external factors. The third perspective, the historical perspective, is to see this region as an entity developed from the collective memories of invasion from Western imperialism and Japanese imperialism. In this perspective, the East Asian identity is formed based on collective memories of being invaded, dominated and exploited by the foreign powers, and also the rise of nationalism and independent spirits through fighting against the foreign intruders (Li and Geng, 2001). China’s different perspectives of East Asian identity are derived from China’s need for an East Asia that accepts a rising China. Yet none of the three perspectives can provide an identity that is accepted by all the states in the region. ASEAN member states, on the other side, prefer to retain the identity of South East Asia. Especially as China’s territorial conflicts with Vietnam, Thailand, and Philippines escalate, how to accommodate nationalism within multilateral regionalism has become a prominent question (Yu, 1998, p. 15; Xiao, 2006, p. 93). Pang Zhongying has proposed that regionalism could be an expansion of nationalism: it is a fusion of nationalism at the nation-state level and it constructs a new form of nationalism by creating a new subject of loyalty and recognition. The creation of a new identity actually serves to protect nationalist interests (Z. Pang, 1999). These issues can be turned into opportunities, as China would like to become involved as a provider of solutions. China has gradually collaborated with ASEAN through institutions as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and China-ASEAN FTA (so far the largest FTA in the world). China has also established a Code of Conduct (COC) and a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to build supply and value chains in the region (K. Li, 2018). Soon after the trade war between the US and China broke out, Xi Jinping launched a conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations in May  2019. Upon this conference, Xi Jinping emphasized that it is dangerous to keep the idea of “clash of civilizations” and again emphasized the importance of an “Asian Fate

Development of multilateral institutions  111 Community”. The intention is clear: China would like to emphasize the importance of an Asia united with strong solidarity. The message implies that Asia has its own identity, and it needs to develop it in a direction away from American’s influence. However, because of the long-lasting tributary system and dominating role of China in East Asian history, the issue of possible threat and order change brought by China’s rise has been very sensitive for both China and other countries in this region (Lim, 2009, pp.  12, 14). Undoubtedly, China cannot be excluded from future East Asia’s order arrangement, no matter which form this arrangement might take. From China’s perspective, East Asian regionalism is one of the most important issues for China’s foreign policy, because becoming a regional power is the first step for China to become a global power (Dai and Zhou, 2006). China has been very cautious in every step it takes but actively participates in a multilateral way. China’s initiative in holding a conference of “Asian Civilizations” also indicates that China is a little impatient to establish itself as the maintainer of the Asian order. China’s involvement in East Asian regionalism has strictly followed a multilateral path from the beginning, especially in the negotiations establishing the China-ASEAN FTA. According to China’s understanding, in the issue of East Asian countries’ collaboration, multilateralism is critically necessary because it keeps China from being suspected as acting unilaterally or seeking the revival of “China dynasty” (Cao and Tang, 2005, p.  225). Zhu Feng has pointed out an important perspective on China’s reason to participate into regionalism: it re-groups small or middle-small sized countries through organization and institutionalization and forms new power sources or power centres in international relations. This would greatly change the power structure dominated by great powers, thus facilitating multipolarization and democratization in international relations (Zhu, 1997, p. 43). If we look again at China’s understanding of multilateralism, the actors in any multilateral institution are still nation-states, and China’s multilateral collaboration in East Asian regionalization also engages nation-states instead of non-state actors. As long as nation-states remain the main actors in a multilateral institution, the tension between multilateralism and sovereignty would always persist. One of the best examples is China’s refusal to engage multilateral diplomacy to resolve territorial issues, especially that with the Philippines. China considers that a territorial dispute should not be solved in a multilateral way because it is a problem between two countries. Reasons behind this argument surely include the fact that China is more powerful vis-à-vis any single member state in ASEAN, but this argument also implies that China ignores the spill-over effects of territorial disputes between a huge China and a small neighbour on East Asian communitybuilding and on China’s image. When sovereignty transfer is far from being accepted and most achievements are still the result of consultation instead of decisions made by a legally based institution, multilateralism for China is one of the best methods to get a result out of consultation with other countries.

112  Development of multilateral institutions It should also be noted that bilateralism exists extensively in China and ASEAN’s relationship. The most evident case is the China-ASEAN FTA: it is not a bilateral agreement between China and ASEAN, nor is it negotiated on a multilateral basis among China and ASEAN members, but through bilateral negotiations between China and each single member state of ASEAN (Liao, 2002; Lu, 2006). This is mainly due to the fact that ASEAN member states have very diversified economic development levels and they also have different expectations for their collaboration with China. The fact that China has chosen bilateral negotiations instead of a multilateral way indicates that China finds it impossible to solve these problems effectively through multilateralism. Though ASEAN+3 has greatly boosted East Asian economic cooperation, the aforementioned issues still remain unsolved and have thus provided room for a new round of institutional competition. Under these circumstances, the Belt and Road Initiative is making an attempt to construct a multilateral institution that goes beyond these issues. As the Belt and Road Initiative tries to establish an inter-regional platform that connects Central Asia and South East Asia (we should not ignore that the BRI is already extending to South America), strategically speaking, the BRI has the potential for joining all the neighboring regions of China through the infrastructure projects and the multilateral financial institutions that coordinate the funding. Qi Huaigao has pointed out that China’s neighboring countries strategy covers countries that are not only geographically adjacent to China, but also those who share the same interests with China. Thus, North East Asia, South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the South Pacific regions are all included in China’s neighboring strategy (Qi, 2019, p.  2). As an important multilateral institution that joins different regions, the Belt and Road Initiative reflects China’s pattern of constructing new institutionalizations, which I will elaborate in the following sections. The Chinese way of approaching regionalism: from partnership network, FTA to Belt and Road Initiative China has two pivotal points to act as supporting joints to expand its regional influence: the extensive partnership network and the FTA agreement. The two kinds of agreements lay down important bilateral relations upon which multilateral institutions are constructed. Seen from their differences of functions, the partnership network focuses on the political aspect, while FTA agreements focus on the economic part. I will elaborate these two aspects in the following sub-sections. Partnership network In previous chapters we have discussed the partnership network. Chinese government defines the partnership network as a non-alliance relationship, and has developed several categories of partnerships with distinct labels. For example, “partnership relation” means the two countries have no conflict in interests, and

Development of multilateral institutions  113 abide the principle of “agreeing to disagree”; “strategic partnership” means the two countries are willing to collaborate on military, strategic, and international affairs; “strategic partner of cooperation” implies the two countries are going to cooperate in military and strategies. The partnership network has expanded markedly as China has begun to seek to exert more influence in international affairs. The number of countries with whom China has established partnerships increased from 3 to 23 during Hu Jintao’s administration. These partnerships involved mainly emerging powers or regional powers. Xi Jinping continued to strengthen the partnership network, but mainly focused on neighbouring countries: Table 4.1 illustrates that the neighbourhood policy has attracted more importance since 2011: there are ten neighbouring countries among 20 strategic partners (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Cambodia, Russia, and Mongolia). All of them were established since 2011, and the number of neighbouring countries associated with China in a strategic partnership skyrocketed after 2012, when Xi Jinping began his mandate. This is a meaningful decision, as it shows that China would like to first reach its status as regional power for the first step. Chen Zhimin believes that the establishment of partnerships was the core of China’s foreign policy strategy after the Cold War. It was designed based on the hypothesis that globalization and interdependence among countries would lead to more mutual interests than conflicts. It conformed to China’s need to prioritize its economic interests and is supported by power balancing diplomacy and multilateralist diplomacy (Chen, 1999, p. 15). While the partnership network gained its importance during Hu Jintao’s time, it has developed into a strategic foreign policy tool during Xi Jinping’s presidency. There have been three distinct tendencies for partnership network development since 2012: first, Xi has signed many new partnership agreements with EU member states; second, Xi has signed new partnership agreements with developing countries that are key to the Belt and Road Initiative; last but not least, Xi has upgraded the partnership level of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. A good example is the regional currency cooperation (区域货币合作). It is believed to be the necessary foundation of the Chinese yuan’s internationalization that can save the Chinese currency from being exposed to risks in the international currency market (Yonghui Wang, 2005). If the Chinese yuan can play a more important role in international trade, China will have a more advantageous status in the regionalization process (Chen and He, 2014). Accordingly, the internationalization of the Chinese yuan is a new step in the new international order promoted by China, especially when the yuan is confronted with the hegemony of the US dollar. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 accelerated the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi. One of the most important steps was the signature of the Bilateral SWAP Agreements between the People’s Bank of China and certain countries (Garcia-Herrero and Xia, 2013, p. 5). During Li Keqiang’s visit to Europe in 2014, London and Frankfurt respectively established offshore centres for the Chinese yuan, making the yuan’s offshore hub network globalized instead of being only international or regional (Chin, 2014).

Cambodia Myanmar Thailand

2010 2011 2012

ASEAN African Union

Strategic partnership

South Africa

Denmark

Angola Poland Ireland, United Arab Emirates (upgraded in 2018), Chile, Uzbekistan (upgraded in 2019)

Serbia

Spain, Portugal, Canada Kazakhstan (upgraded in 2019) Nigeria Greece

UK, France, Italy

Comprehensive strategic partnership

Afghanistan Brazil (upgraded in 2019)

Turkey

Laos

2009

Russia

South Korea

India

Strategic cooperative partnership

Vietnam

Pakistan

Comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation

2006 2007 2008

2005

2003 2004

Special partnerships (with distinguished and exclusive naming)

Table 4.1 Number of China’s strategic partnerships (from 2000 to 2019)

Nepal (upgraded in 2019) Bengal

Croatia

Ethiopia

Comprehensive cooperation partnership

Romania

Comprehensive friendly partnership of cooperation

Hungary (upgraded in 2017)

Albania

Fiji

Jamaica

Partnership Partnership Partnership of friendship of friendship of cooperation and cooperation

Brunei

Source: Illustrated by the author.

2019

Uzbekistan Nepal, Suriname

Hungary Kyrgyzstan

United Arab Emirates, Argentina Kazakhstan, Brazil

Kyrgyzstan (upgraded in 2018), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine

Israel, Switzerland Djibouti Bolivia, Austria, Oman

Algeria, Mongolia, Qatar Argentina (upgraded in 2018), Venezuela, Australia, New Zealand

2017 2018

Egypt

Peru, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, Belarussia

Saudi Arabia

Germany

Sri Lanka

2015 2016

2014

2013

Singapore

The Netherlands, Timor-Leste

Tanzania, Congo

Bulgaria, Belgium, The Maldives The Maldives, Senegal

Finland

Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda India

116  Development of multilateral institutions Most countries that have signed SWAP agreements are China’s neighbouring countries and are also strategic partnership countries. Although the internationalization of the Chinese yuan is stronger among China’s neighbouring countries, it is not difficult to see that China has launched this project with a global vision. From Table 4.2 we can see that countries who have signed SWAP agreements with China are mostly strategic partners of China. The SWAP agreement has become a concrete content of a seemingly vague and empty “partnership network”. The Chinese yuan is still very far away from being one of the most important currencies in the world, especially in the sense of being a main reserve currency of different countries’ central banks. However, these SWAP agreements are undoubtedly pushing the Chinese yuan one step further towards internationalization. The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is another example of China deepening its multilateral engagements based on strategic partnerships. Through its partnership network, China has established the basic foundation of its bilateral relations with its partners, and then upon this foundation it manages to build further networks with China at the centre. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation originated from China’s need to settle frontier issues with its neighbours in Central Asia, and most importantly, with Russia, its large and powerful neighbour which it wants permanent peace with. The US presence in the region, and China’s domestic need to stimulate development in its western part, have diverted China’s attention towards its neighbourhood. More importantly, as the goal of China’s global strategy is to become a major power, its neighbourhood becomes critically important as the fulcrum for China’s rise (Fan, 2002; Li, 2004; Liu, 2013, pp.  10–12). As Gao Cheng from the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS, has pointed out, this tendency of turning of China’s strategic focus towards its neighbouring countries is increasingly evident starting from 2009 (C. Gao, 2013). Within this context, the SCO is both a part of and a critical tool for China’s good neighbour policy, which has been greatly emphasized since Xi Jinping took power, and all the projects, no matter if they are economic, commercial, or cultural ones, are under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s new proposition of “fate community” rhetoric. All members, observing members and dialogue partners of the SCO are listed in China’s strategic partnership, not forgetting that Russia is China’s only comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership. From the map we can see clearly that China now manages its neighbourhood via bilateralism (the partnership network) and multilateralism (the SCO and ASEAN+3). China’s understanding of neighbourhood is confined not only to countries that it shares borders with but also countries that are geographically close to it and are strategically important. Poland, Turkey, Belarus, Iran, Qatar, the UAE and other ASEAN member states are all included in China’s neighbourhood. The Belt and Road Initiative (with 17 + 1) as its sub-project is thus launched according to China’s new understanding of the geography of the Eurasian continent. Wang Jian believes that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation deepens China’s understanding of both regionalism and multilateralism because the SCO is a multilateral attempt at promoting the regionalization process of countries that have great diversity in economic development level, political system and culture.

Table 4.2 Countries that have signed bilateral swap agreements with China. SP (strategic partnership) indicates strategic partner countries of China. China’s RMB BSAs with other countries (as of March 2013) RMB BSAs

Size

Effective Date

Expiration Date

China–South Korea SP

180 bn RMB/38 Tr Won 360 bn RMB/64 Tr Won 200 bn RMB/227 bn HKD 400 bn RMB/490 bn HKD 80 bn RMB/40 bn MYR 180 bn RMB/90 bn MYR 20 bn RMB/8 tr BYB 100 bn RMB/175 tr rupiah 70 bn RMB/ equal amount peso 3.5 bn RMB/66 bn ISK 150 bn RMB/30 bn SGD 25 bn RMB 0.7 bn RMB 5 bn RMB 10 bn RMB 7 bn RMB 70 bn RMB/320 bn THB 10 bn RMB/140 bn PKR 35 bn RMB/20 bn AED 10 bn RMB/3 bn TRY 200 bn RMB/30 bn AUD 15 bn RMB/19 bn UAH 190 bn RMB/60 bn BRL

Dec-08

Dec-11

Oct-11

Oct-14

Jan-09

Jan-12

Nov-11

Nov-14

Feb-09

Feb-12

Feb-12

Feb-15

Mar-09

Mar-12

Mar-09

Mar-12

Mar-09

Mar-12

Jun-10

Jun-13

Jul-10

Jul-13

Apr-11 Apr-11 May-11 Mar-12 Jun-11 Dec-11

Apr-14 Apr-14 May-14 May-14 Jun-14 Dec-14

Dec-11

Dec-14

Jan-12

Jan-15

Feb-12

Feb-15

Mar-12

Mar-15

Jun-12

Jun-15

March-13

Mar-16

Renewed China–Hong Kong Renewed China-Malaysia SP Renewed China-Belarus SP China-Indonesia SP China-Argentina SP China-Iceland China-Singapore China–New Zealand SP China-Uzbekistan SP China-Mongolia SP Expanded China-Kazakhstan SP China-Thailand SP China-Pakistan SP China-UAE SP China-Turkey SP China-Australia SP China-Ukraine SP China-Brazil SP

Source: The PBoC and BBVA Research; (Garcia-Herrero and Xia, 2013).

118  Development of multilateral institutions

Figure 4.4  China’s neighborhood seen from bilateral and multilateral perspectives

The regionalization taking place in Central Asia can be seen as a new regionalization process that goes beyond ideology and history, which are important elements in traditional regionalism (Wang, 2014, p. 2). China’s participation in a regionalization of developing countries also conforms to China’s idea about building a fairer, more just world for developing countries. As China believes that it has responsibility to promote this fairer world through helping the developing countries to develop their economies, China’s aid programs also serve the function of providing new “glue” that helps to join the region together and to establish an economic ecosystem other than the option provided by the West or by Russia. FTA agreements Another pivotal point of China’s bilateral relation is signing FTA agreements with different countries. As mentioned in previous chapters, China has established FTA as one of its strategies since 2007. FTA agreements do not expand as easily as the partnership network, but they are quite concrete in regulating bilateral trade. In

Development of multilateral institutions  119

Figure 4.5  Countries that have established FTA agreements with China by July 2019 Source: Ministry of Commerce, China. Illustrated by the author.

the era of a rising regionalism, establishing FTAs brings the opportunity to shape trade rules and economic focus through bilateral agreements between China and its FTA partners. Compared to the partnership network, FTA agreements provide the economic foundation for China’s bilateral relations. China’s FTA partner countries are neither as widely spread as Belt and Road Initiative countries nor as China’s partnership countries. Yet it reflects a tendency of China to develop its trade arrangements with partners in South East Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Apart from the China-ASEAN FTA, the rest of the FTAs are signed with single countries but are nonetheless quite meaningful arrangements. The expansion of FTAs will provide China the possibility of developing a new trade network based on rules set by China. Along the Belt and Road Initiative, FTAs with China and countries that have joined the initiative are mushrooming. As mentioned in the historical review of China’s political ideas, FTAs have become one of China’s strategies since Hu Jintao’s presidency. With the Belt and Road Initiative as an outline, China has accelerated its FTA negotiations in order to push the economic focus of its partner countries toward China. If the partnership network builds the normative relations between China and its concerned countries, the FTA network builds the economic ties. As indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, FTAs are deemed as a new platform to further open up to the outside and speed up domestic reforms, an effective approach to integrate into global economy and

120  Development of multilateral institutions strengthen economic cooperation with other economies, as well as a particularly important supplement to the multilateral trading system. Table 4.3 indicates clearly that China had only a few FTA agreements before Xi Jinping’s presidency. After 2012, China has accelerated the negotiating and signing of FTAs with different countries. This tendency is especially evident in 2017 and 2018.

Table 4.3 The FTAs between China and its partners: signed, under negotiation and in feasibility studies China’s Free Trade Agreements

Date of Signature

Remarks

China-Mauritus FTA

2018/10/17

China-Maldives FTA

2017/12/08

China-Georgia FTA

2017/05/15

China-Australia Free Trade Area China-Korea FTA

2017/03/27

The first FTA signed with African countries. Maldives’s first bilateral FTA with a foreign country. The first free trade agreement negotiation that China has completed in the Eurasian region.

China-Switzerland FTA China-Iceland FTA

2015/12/20

An important step towards China-JapanSouth Korea FTA.

2014/07/01 2014/07/01

China–Costa Rica FTA

2011/08/01

China-Peru FTA

2009/04/28

China-Singapore FTA

2008/10/23

China–New Zealand FTA

2008/04/07

China-Chile FTA

2005/11

China-Pakistan FTA

2005/04

China-ASEAN FTA

2004/11

Iceland is the first developed European country to recognize China as a full market economy as well as the first European country to negotiate a free trade agreement with China. Costa Rica is China’s second largest trading partner in Central America and is the second largest trading partner of Costa Rica. The China-Peru Free Trade Agreement is the first comprehensive FTA China has signed with a Latin American country. The China–New Zealand FTA Agreement is the first comprehensive FTA that China has ever signed as well as the first FTA that China has signed with a developed country.

China’s Free Trade Agreements

Date of Signature

Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement Mainland and Macau Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement

2003

Remarks

2003

Free Trade Agreements under Negotiation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP China-GCC FTA

China-Japan-Korea FTA China–Sri Lanka FTA China-Israel FTA China-Norway FTA China-Moldova FTA China-Panama FTA China-Palestine FTA Free Trade Agreements under consideration China-Colombia FTA Joint Feasibility Study China-Fiji FTA Joint Feasibility Study China-Nepal FTA Joint Feasibility Study China–Papua New Guinea FTA Joint Feasibility Study China-Canada FTA Joint Feasibility Study China-Bangladesh FTA Joint Feasibility Study China-Mongolia FTA Joint Feasibility Study

RCEP negotiation started from 2014 In July 2004, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced the launch of China-GCC Free Trade Agreement negotiations. Till now, the two parties have held five rounds of negotiations and have reached agreement on the majority of issues concerning trade in goods. Negotiations on trade in services are also launched. China-Japan-Korea FTA negotiation started from 2015. Negotiation launched in 2014. Negotiation launched in 2017. Negotiation launched in 2017. Negotiation launched in 2018. Negotiation launched in 2017.

MOU signed on 2016/03/25.

Discussion launched in 2017.

Discussion launched in 2018.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. Illustrated by the author.

122  Development of multilateral institutions B&R initiative and AIIB Seen from a regionalism perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to connect (Central and East) Europe, East Asia, and Central Asia under one grand system, which might develop into a multilateral institution. By the end of April 2019, there are already 125 countries and 29 international organizations that have signed 173 cooperation documents with the Chinese government. The Belt and Road Initiative has even reached to South America and the South Pacific. Figure  4.6 indicates clearly that the countries that have signed the Belt and Road Initiative are mainly developing countries. The countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa have formed a large area that allows inter-regional connections. According to the Asian Competitiveness Annual Feport 2018, the BRI has “facilitated Asian countries’ transport system” as “the land, maritime, air and internet transport networks of the countries and regions concerned had been interconnected, which facilitated the transnational exchanges and economic cooperation, and brought more social and economic benefits for the people” (Liu and Tan, 2018, p. 21). At the same time, many sub-projects or sub-initiatives are also brought up under the framework of the BRI. As the Belt and Road Initiative covers mainly developing countries in different continents, there is also the possibility of searching for a new model of south-south collaboration.

Figure 4.6 Countries (in dark grey) that signed the Belt and Road Initiative by the end of April 2019 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. Illustrated by the author.

Development of multilateral institutions  123 According to a report by the UN Development Programme, these sub-projects and sub-initiatives are established in order to lead the regional economic development towards the development model of centralizing a rising economic entity rather than centralizing solely on a developed economic entity. We can see from the contents of the Belt and Road Initiative, the whole strategy is designed to cultivate an inner economic ecology of the developing countries concerned by the BRI. Chinese enterprises that have great need for raw material or markets play key roles in the spreading of the Belt and Road Initiative. Industrial parks are built in countries directly or indirectly concerned by these Chinese enterprises, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank pumps a great deal of investment into it. As the Belt and Road Initiative concretises into different projects, norms, standards, and ways of conduct are also in development. As mentioned, the 17 + 1 Initiative has experienced normative conflicts in East and Central Europe, and the Belt and Road Initiative has likewise been doubted in other regions and countries due to the incompatibility of Chinese enterprises’ way of working and local expectations. To take it one step further, norm construction is also an important step if BRI truly develops into what it is designed to be: establishing an Asian (even a global) economic order with China as the centre. Xi Jinping has given a quite large and ambiguous definition of “fate community”. When the concept was first proposed in 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative, it meant simply “the connection of all humanities’ fate”. In his speech at the UN headquarters in Geneva, he argues that the “international community should promote partnership, security, growth, inter-civilization exchanges and the building of a sound ecosystem” (Xi, 2017). The ambiguity of this concept provides the flexibility of adaption to different circumstances. Following the guidelines of fate community, the possibility for establishing an East Asia Fate Community is proposed in order to replace the centre-periphery order established by the US. The notion of fate community is concretized and detailed in the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, which was announced during the ASEAN summit in Singapore in 2018. It has confirmed that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is in compatible with ASEAN’s Master Plan on ASEAN’s Connectivity, it also reaffirmed that the close cooperation between China and ASEAN should not interfere with any country’s independence, nor should any coercion be employed in terms of development model (ASEAN, 2018). The Fate Community is not only China’s proposal for a pathway to a more involved China, but also for a solution to the political impasse that lies among East Asian countries. Xie Lizhong from Peking University believes that the increasing territorial conflicts among East Asian countries prove that the previous “soft multilateralism” is no longer effective when it comes to solving East Asia’s inner conflicts (Xie, 2013, pp. 9–12). A more institutionalized, integrated “East Asia Community” is needed to provide a fundamental resolution to these problems (Ge and Ju, 2014).

124  Development of multilateral institutions The concept of “fate community” focuses on the necessity for collaboration among East Asian countries, instead of on divergence in political system, ideologies, or territorial disputes. All these issues could be solved easily if East Asian countries can think of “regional interests” instead of “national interests”.

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Context of AIIB establishment The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is an institution of great significance, as it is the first multilateral financial institution initiated by China, thus also the first multilateral financial institution initiated by a developing country (Gao, 2015, p. 32). AIIB is designed to finance infrastructure construction in Asia, which is the first step in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. For ASEAN countries, the infrastructure needed includes transportation, communication, port construction, airports, and power stations (Gao, 2015, p. 32). The construction of infrastructure, according to its plan, should create a win-win situation for both China and the East Asia community. From the institutional perspective, the establishment of the AIIB is China’s attempt to provide an alternative to existing multilateralism established under US hegemony. Neither the institutions nor the norms of these financial multilateral institutions allow China to accomplish the projects it aims to realize. This is due to the fact that China’s discourse power, decision power, and voting power in the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development Banks do not conform to China’s actual role in the world economy (Gao, 2015, p. 33). China tried to initiate a reform in 2010 to elevate emerging countries’ proportion in IMF, but it failed due to the refusal of the US Congress. In the Asian Development Bank, the US and Japan account respectively 15.7% and 15.6% of total shares, while China accounts for only 6.4%. China needs a multilateral financial institution that allows more decision power and control over its function. The institution of AIIB Within this context, China has initiated the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. According to the AIIB charter, it is established to foster sustainable economic development, create wealth, and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors, and promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p. 1). The institution setting of the AIIB is a concretization of China’s ideas about how Asian regionalization should develop: the AIIB is designed to be a multilateral institution that has its financial resources from Asia, for Asia and promises to stay away from political preferences. These ideas are incorporated in the institutions of voting rights, membership, and loan rules.

Development of multilateral institutions  125 Membership The charter of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sets the institution of AIIB with evident inclination to favour Asian countries and developing countries. There exists the categorization of regional (including Asia and Oceania countries)10 members and non-regional members. According to the charter of AIIB, it is guaranteed that regional members share at least 75% of the total AIIB capital: thus, if a new member’s investment dilutes the regional members’ share lower than 75%, its membership will be denied. As the AIIB has 37 regional members and 20 non-regional members as its founding members, the voting power is evidently more favourable to regional members than to non-regional ones. There AIIB has 12 board members, 9 of which should be from regional members and 3 from non-regional members (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p.  17). Also, the director of the AIIB can only be chosen from regional member states (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p. 21). There are also differences in decision powers between founding members and normal members. The share of capital of a founding member might increase if it invests more in the AIIB, while that of a normal member has top limits. The founding members have the rights to decide on AIIB charters while the new members could only accept the existing rules. Voting rights Each founding member’s GDP is also an important factor that decides a member’s share in the AIIB, making China, India, South Korea, Australia, and Germany the largest shareholders of the AIIB. China occupies more than 30% of stock share in the AIIB. The voting right of each founding member is decided by its basic voting power, share voting power and founding member’s voting right, and each founding member enjoys 600 extra votes as “founding member voting rights” (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p.  20). The Appendix presents all the founding members’ share in capital and voting shares in the AIIB, according to which, regional members account for 73.29% in voting, while non-regional members share 26.71%. At the same time, it is remarkable to point out the China possesses 26.06% of the voting power, almost as much as the combination of non-regional members, making it a dominant state in AIIB. Yet, China has also demonstrated its determination to lead an institution that is totally different from US thinking by abandoning the veto power of a founding country. This move has assured that no single country can dictate this multilateral institution, which is quite different from the situation in US-led multilateralism where the US enjoys veto power. Beijing has also endeavoured to clear doubts about the transparency of the institution in order to attract more European countries to join in (Wei and Davis, 2015). According to the sharing of Sir Danny Alexander, one of the vice presidents of AIIB, in Brussels on 17 July  2019, the decision of AIIB-funded projects is absolutely decided on a consensus basis by board members, and so far he sees no monopoly from China’s side.

126  Development of multilateral institutions Loan rules The main task of the AIIB is to finance infrastructure construction in Asia. The main financial source of the AIIB comes from its member states in Asia, and the projects that the AIIB will finance are also largely confined in Asia. According to the AIIB charter, the AIIB can provide loans to any member states, or the institutions, administrative departments, or any enterprises that function on a member state’s territory or provide financial aid to international or regional institutions that participate in regional economic development (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p. 9). The AIIB promises not to make any political requirements as the condition of loans. It is noted in the charter that the AIIB shall not finance any projects within a member state’s territory if the concerning member state opposes it; and it is also demanded that the bank should not favour certain member states’ interests over others. The AIIB, its director, and all the staff should not interfere in member states’ political affairs and should not be influenced by any member’s political affairs when making a decision. All decisions should be taken solely on economic bases (Ministry of Commerce, 2015, p. 22). According to Sir Danny Alexander, AIIB has already funded 44 projects in 16 countries, which focus mainly on sustainability (urbanization and energy) and connectivity (railroads) projects. AIIB also co-finances with other multilateral institutions. He explains that AIIB-funded projects follow eco-social regulations whose core values are lean (efficient system), clean (anti-corruption, integrity unit), and green. Public goods provision Providing public goods is the most important task if the Belt and Road Initiative is to develop and sustain. It is not difficult to observe that China’s main public goods to be provided through the BRI are infrastructure. As AIIB offers the financial means of launching huge infrastructure projects, many projects in different regions are included in the B&I Framework. For Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member states, upgrading infrastructure is indeed necessary to guarantee a more rapid economic development. For ASEAN countries, this is compatible with its Master Plan of ASEAN’s Connectivity, which envisions achieving sustainable infrastructure and seamless logistics. The first step towards upgrading infrastructures is the transportation resolution. China has already developed a quite concentrated network in the China-Europe Rail Freight Planning Map. Many of the routes exist already and there are other routes under construction. At the same time, the Pan-Asia Railway Network has also been financed through AIIB. Many railway plans have already been launched before the concept of the BRI, yet the initiative has expanded this model of infrastructure development that conforms to China’s BRI.

Zhengz hou

Zhejiang

Wuhan

Chengdu

Alash ankoy

Alash ankoy

Manchuria

Alashankoy

Source: Chinese Ministry of Transport.

Figure 4.7  China-Europe Rail Freight Planning Map

China

Suzhou

Hefei

Chongqing

Kazakhstan

Kazak hstan

Kazakhstan

Russia

Russia

Russia

Belor ussia

Belorussia

Poland

Belor ussia

Poland

Germ any

Germ any

Czech

Poland

Poland

Germany

Germany

France

Spain

128  Development of multilateral institutions West Route Dali

Kunming, China

Yuxi Yuxi

Baoshan

Mohan

Mengzi

Ruile

Vientiane

Hekou

Yangon

Central Route

Hanoi

Phnom Penh

Bangkok

Kuala Lumpur

Singapore

Ho Chi Minh

Eastern Route Figure 4.8  The Pan-Asia Railway Network

The extension of institutions In the beginning of this book we emphasized the importance of institution building for the great powers in the new era of globalization and regionalization left by the Cold War. Institutions not only provide their members a better decision-making pattern, but they also provide member states a way to extend their influence beyond their own borders. In other worlds, a well-built institution provides the legitimacy for its members to interfere in certain foreign affairs that they would not otherwise have under different circumstances. In the active institution building process in Indo-Pacific, the institutions are still growing, developing, and competing. Due to the historically accepted ideas of non-interference in domestic affairs and strong nationalism, it is relatively difficult for the nation-states in the Indo-Pacific to accept the concession of sovereignty. However, the diffusion of regional conflicts and issues requires regional collaboration with more deepening collaborations. Regional collaboration has become an undeniable tendency, which requires that different nation-states and non-state agents find new institutions that can balance the efficiency of resolution, completeness of sovereignty, and the regional interest. As a regional power, China inevitably plays an important role in the regionalization of Indo-Pacific. Any attempt to exclude China from this process seems to be unwise and unrealistic. The question lies in how to build an institution that can accommodate and balance the interests of different countries. This is also an important question to explore in the concluding chapter.

Notes 1 It is worth clarifying that here it discusses regime types that are not democratic according to “Western” definitions. China deems its political regime is democratic in its own

Development of multilateral institutions  129

2

3

4

5

6 7

way, as “people’s democratic dictatorship”, which is consolidated in China’s constitution. It is one of the concepts that Mao Zedong has invented as “Sinification communism” teachings. It has been enriched by Deng Xiaoping to support legitimacy of CPC’s ruling after Reform and Opening Up (Li and Ye, 1996; Chen, Liu and Zhu, 2007; Li and Sun, 2011). There have been many discussions about how to categorize China and Russia’s distinct political system and economic pattern. China defines its economic system as socialist market economy, meaning the socialist government provides institutions to guarantee the development of market economy, and transformed from “public economic reform” to totally market economy (Cheng, 2004; Wu, 2004). Russia accepted state capitalism to describe its economic pattern (Радыкин, 2004; Busvine, 2012), which is not a new concept, but revived as a re-interpretation of capitalism, an advanced one (The Economist, 2012). As Rutland points out, nationalism has been greatly strengthened in the both countries, as their proper economic development pattern has formed, and neither of them has proven the so-called “Washington Hypothesis” that globalization will certainly lead to democratization (Rutland and Wang, 2010). Russia has a sovereignty democracy, which emphasizes that Russia’s democracy serves first the integrity of Russia’s sovereignty; China is in the process of establishing a Socialist democracy, which prioritizes social stability. For the discussion of China’s minority policies in Xinjiang, Donald McMillen has pointed out that China’s rule in Xinjiang has failed in regulating relations between races, religions, economic developments, education of young people, military, and local civilians (McMillen, 1984, pp. 575–576, 581). According to Harris’s interviews with Xinjiang’s officials in religious affairs, China has already purged 10% of the clerics from their posts; starting from 1989, regulations are set to curtail contacts between Muslims in Xinjiang and the broader Islamic world. Han academics and professional researchers are restricted also. No Arab teachers are allowed to work at the Xinjiang Theological Seminary in Urumqi; Only hajj aged over 50 are allowed to go to Mecca, and no Chinese citizens are given permission to study in either Iran or Pakistan (Harris, 1993). The original copy of this treaty has two language versions. In Chinese the title is “上 海合作组织成员国长期睦邻友好合作条约”; in Russian the title is “Договородолго срочномдобрососедстве, дружбеисотрудничествегосударств-членовШанхайской организациисотрудничества”. In Chinese “上海精神”. According to the SCO website (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 2014), the main goal of creating the Interbank Consortium in the SCO framework consists in setting up a mechanism of funding and banking services for investment projects supported by the governments of the SCO member states. The priority areas of cooperation in the SCO IBC are as follows: • To provide funding for the implementation of projects with emphasis on infrastructure building, basic branches, high technology, export-oriented economic sectors, projects of social significance; • To grant and attract loans based on the generally accepted international banking practice; • To arrange pre-export funding with the aim of stimulating trade economic links among the SCO member states; • To share information on potential clients and cooperation projects in accordance with the agreement on the condition of observing the necessary confidentiality; • To train personnel, organize delegation exchange and internship, conduct business seminars; • Other areas of common interest. The SCO IBC member banks constitute the Council comprised of one representative from each party (as a rule, in the capacity of chief executive officer from each party).

130  Development of multilateral institutions The Council meets ad hoc upon consensus of all parties, at least once a year. The scope of competence of the SCO IBC Council includes: • • • •

Coordination of the parties’ current activity in accordance with the Agreement; Determining new potential projects; Considering the process of project implementation; Approving the Annual Report on the IBC activity to be forwarded to SCO Secretary-General for its further submission to the SCO decision-making bodies; • Interacting with other financial and banking institutions. 8 According to the SCO website, the key tasks and activities of the Business Council include to facilitate regional cooperation in the trade-economic, credit-financial, scientific-technological, power engineering, transport, telecommunications, agricultural and other spheres; to implement projects in different sectors of the economy in the territory of the member-states; to facilitate the search of funding sources and other forms of participation; to elaborate recommendations and proposals to improve conditions of economic cooperation within the SCO; to provide information exchange for development of cooperation between business and financial communities of the SCO countries; and to prepare plans and programs of cooperation between business and financial communities. 9 According to the author’s interview with Prof. Sun Zhuangzhi, director of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation research centre, China Academy of Social Sciences, 27 November 2015, Beijing. 10 According to the charter of the AIIB, “Asia” and “region” shall include the geographical regions and composition classified as Asia and Oceania by the United Nations (Asia: Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; Eastern Asia: China, Hong Kong, Macao, Democratic People’s Public of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea. Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. South-Eastern Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam. Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Oceania includes Australia and New Zealand. Melanesia: Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu. Micronesia: Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau. Polynesia: American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands.

5 Conclusion

In the preceding chapters the transformation of China’s foreign policy and the development of China’s multilateral diplomacy based on the change of ideas have been discussed. Given the actual contest between China and the US, China’s emphasis on its image as the promoter of multilateralism is an issue worthy of attention. As introduced before, multilateralism has been the way that China integrated into regional and international affairs, and it is attempting to establish its own multilateral institutions to accelerate the consolidation of its status in international affairs. What is important to keep in mind is that previous types of multilateralism influence China’s engagement in multilateralism, and China’s involvement in creating new multilateral institutions is contributing to the creation of a new type of multilateralism. As Telò has summarized, there are three types of multilateralism in history: the early multipolarity multilateralism, the US-led multilateralism, and a new type of multilateralism, arising in the years since the Cold War as the US hegemonic power fades away, which Telò has named as “pluralistic multilateralism”. The way that China engages in multilateralism coincides with many of the characters identified by Telò. According to the observations so far, we attempt to summarize the characteristics of this new type of multilateralism: pluralistic multilateralism.

It is basically instrumental China’s engagement in multilateralism is basically instrumental in the sense that it always serves the grand strategy of China’s vision of the world and its role within it. As shown in the analysis conducted in the historical review section, these visions change, as Chinese leaders have conceived different ideas about China’s role and China’s status in the world, followed by different ideas about multilateralism. China has gradually realized the importance of multilateral institution building as the best way for a rising power to guarantee a peaceful development environment, which is critically important for China’s long-term strategy. China’s participation in the WTO, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in ASEAN+3, and eventually BRI and AIIB all reflect China’s strategies at different levels.

132  Conclusion At the global level, represented by the case of the WTO, China remains an active participant and contributor in multilateralism left behind as the legacy of the US-hegemon. China does not intend to challenge the existing multilateralism for the time being, and it continues to internalize WTO law in domestic institutions in order to optimize its infrastructure. China neither has the intention nor the capability to make totally new institutions to replace them, and the global multilateral arrangements can provide many benefits such as to reducing transaction costs, facilitating inter-regime linkages, and guaranteeing a good function of cooperation (Keohane, 2005, pp. 244–245). The fierce trade war between the US and China signifies that the US no longer trusts that the WTO is able to resolve the US deemed imbalance within its framework. It also announces a possible end of global level multilateral institutions such as the UN and the WTO. Thus at the global level, the US and China are competing upon not only technologies and military powers but also on institutions. At the regional level, it is obvious that China has different roles in the case of ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In ASEAN+3, China plays a central role in multilateralism building within the context of “overlapping multilateral regional institutions” (Yahuda, 2008), as the US, Japan, India, Russia, and other regional players all have their institutional plans for the region. In the case of the SCO, China has become the initiator and creator of multilateralism and the norm setter. In both the SCO and ASEAN+3, multilateral institutions with clearly set norms and binding terms will not only assure non-regional actors (mainly the US) that these are not alliances designed against the third party, but also useful in assuring member states that China will not covet the hegemonic position. This tendency is especially proven in the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: China declares that it abandons the veto power in order to assure other founding members that China would not dictate the AIIB. In the case of the SCO, as Archaya has stated, China’s opting for multilateralism to manage its presence in Central Asia could be understood to stem from the fact that it is unrealistic to choose unilateralism or bilateralism, as China still needs to balance its relationship with Russia and as it tries to approach to Central Asia in a mild way (Acharya, 2003a, p. 12). Multilateralism practiced by China serves the purpose of realizing China’s strategic goals in different periods in ways acceptable to the international society and manageable by China. It nurtures mutual trust and legitimizes China’s participation in regional affairs while avoiding accusations of unilateralism.

It is linked with the rise of regionalism This is a very prominent characteristic of this competitive multilateralism, which differentiates it from the previous type of US-led multilateralism. The new multilateralism is generated within a context where new regionalism has arisen and regional economic integration has accelerated as regional powers emerge, providing different ideas and pathways for how the regional economic order should develop. Though these new multilateral institutions have been inspired by global

Conclusion  133 multilateral institutions established during the US hegemony (e.g. the IMF, WTO, and World Bank), and have inherited many experiences of organization and management from them, this competitive multilateralism is however generated from different aims than US-led multilateralism. It serves the aim of integrating regional economies in order to gain more competitiveness in globalization, and also to keep the regional decision-making right. Hettne and Ponjaert have identified this phenomenon as “multi-regionalism”, referring to the “reconstruction of a multilateral world order in a regionalized form”, “a horizontal institutionalized structure rooted in organized regions linked to each other through multidimensional partnership agreements” (Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014, p. 124). This is very prominent in the case of ASEAN+3 (including a series of sub-multilateral arrangements under the umbrella of ASEAN+3, for example ASEAN+China, ASEAN+Japan and ASEAN+South Korea), China-ASEAN FTA and the freshly signed China-South Korea FTA on 1 June 2015. This process of joining multilateralism with regionalism has also been proven in the way China forms the new order in Asia, which will be discussed in the next section. As exposed in the historical review part and in the two cases studies of ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with the rise of regionalism China has also turned its attention towards its neighbourhood as a new growth point of its foreign policy, expressed through the recent prioritizing of neighbourhood diplomacy over “great powers relations” by Xi’s government. China’s multilateralism has become an effective method to strengthen China’s presence in regional affairs and build economic links and regional identity, and has formed into a series of “regional multilateralisms” (Ni and Zhao, 2006, pp.  211–215). At the same time, regionalism has become China’s new platform to participate in global governance via multilateralism (Su, 2005, 2006). The cases of ASEAN+3 and the SCO both have the characteristics of starting multilateral cooperation with a single issue (financial issue with ASEAN+3 and security issue with SCO), and then expanding and diffusing into multiple domains. China adopts different approaches according to the actual context (the presence of other powers, the existing institutional arrangements) and China’s national interests in the given region. It is important to notice that the regionalism that China promotes is different from what Telò has defined as “new regionalism”: it is a top-down process in both ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the decisionmaking process lacks transparency.

It adopts more diverse and open norms towards members Closely linked with the first point, norms and institutional arrangements of this new type of multilateralism are designed to make specific “corrections” according to regional development needs that are either ignored or unable to be fully satisfied by US-led multilateralism. For example, though the WTO has already developed into a complicated and complete institution to guarantee free trade as much as possible, some member states, especially many developing countries, find that their needs cannot be met within the WTO. Thus, some adjacent countries

134  Conclusion gradually develop more favourable terms for trade among them, in order to enjoy relatively lower costs through regional multilateral arrangements. Undoubtedly, the role of regional powers in the formation of the new multilateralism should not be neglected: the design of norms and institutions are largely influenced by the regional powers’ vision(s) of how regionalization should develop. However, smaller and weaker actors have more voices in the new multilateralism as they weigh more in regional integration than in the tide of globalization. In both the case of SCO and ASEAN+3, the revival of developing countries’ economies has become the core issue, and the member states are seeking to achieve this goal through the way they deem to be correct and feasible, which is different from multilateral arrangements provided by the WTO, IMF, or World Bank.

Competitive multilateralism is based on different norms than US-led multilateralism China’s adaptation of competitive multilateralism to the reality of regional economic integration naturally follows from ideas other than the free trade ideology that has dominated US-led multilateralism. The current globalization guided by this ideology has led to the exploitation of weaker, developing countries by stronger, developed countries. As pointed out by Khojamakhmad Umarov, a famous economist from Tajikistan, from the perspective of a weak and underdeveloped country such as Tajikistan, it is expected that new regional integration projects would not repeat the errors committed by adopting a free trade ideology and ignoring the actual difficulties and need for development of the weak countries, but to provide effective solutions to revive these countries’ economies. He warns that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has already shown this dangerous tendency by ignoring the problem caused by Rogun HPP Dam and HPP cascade Zarafshan to transportation between Uzbekistan to Tajikistan, and proposes that the new regional integration adopt soft protectionism rather than neoliberalism to avoid the overlooking of weaker countries’ interests (Umarov, 2014). Though the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN+3 and other multilateral institutions China has initiated in East Asia are far from perfect in providing equal development opportunities for all regional members, from the establishment of these institutions we can see that the guiding ideas of these institutions do endeavour to establish a fairer order than that provided by the West, as the new economic order emphasized repeatedly by Chinese leaders. The foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is an ultimate expression of the desire for a new world order based on the Chinese recognition of “fairness”: the rich do not control the stage.

It is less “ideology oriented” than previous US-led multilateralism At least at the policy level, China’s institutional designs for regional order are quite different from those proposed by Russia, the EU, or the US. China’s plan

Conclusion  135 doesn’t demand any social or political reforms in the region so as to promote democracy, good governance or rule of law as the EU does (Keukeleire and Petrova, 2014, p. 266), nor does it seek to anchor smaller countries firmly into its influential sphere, or set a high standard of norms to regulate its partners as the US does with TTP. The focal point of China’s regionalism at the current stage is not about promoting a pre-designed economic pattern or social order, but concretizing and institutionalizing existing multilateral arrangements (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN+3, the China-Gulf Cooperation Council, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Eurasian, and even the US and Japan’s regional designs) under China’s coordination, in order to develop into a “collaboration oriented integration” (Feng, 2015). The regional development plans of Russia, the EU, the US, and Japan in Central Asia and East Asia all involve value-oriented norms that demand its members to develop into a political and economic system based on the same ideals and principles. From China’s perspective, these requirements are, on the one hand, interference in internal affairs, and on the other hand, they imply exclusion to a country like China which is unwilling to accept any imposition from a foreign country. China labels the democratic countries’ demands for reform towards nondemocratic countries as “Cold War thinking”, which doesn’t conform to China’s “New Security Concept”. According to China, to categorize countries according to their regime type and engage institutional means to force a change in regime type is an inheritance of Cold War thinking, where ideology is the decisive factor in international relations (Wang and Wu, 2010, p. 22; Qi, 2014, pp. 199–200). In practice, China has supported authoritarian governments in Central Asia against “colour revolutions”, and also prefers “soft multilateralism” such as the Six Party Talk, which doesn’t touch upon the “democracy vs. authoritarian” issue. Initiated by the US, TTP is believed to be designed to constrain China, which practices a different value and economic system and triggers in response China’s initiation of the One Belt One Road project and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The competition of institutions and clash of regionalization strategies nurture China to develop a competitive or parallel multilateralism in Asia (B. Gao, 2013; Feng, 2015).

Associated with the rise of regionalism, a multilayered multilateralism under China’s coordination is in formation, with diffuse reciprocity as working principle With the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s engagement in multilateralism has transformed into a multilayer multilateralism. Its structure includes quasi-global multilateral institutions such as the AIIB, regional multilateral institutions such as ASEAN+3 and the SCO, and at the same time is complemented and supported by China’s partnership network, which is bilateral by nature. This multilayer multilateral institution system is coordinated by China to construct increasingly sophisticated, interdependent institutions that are on one hand consolidating China’s economic advantages, while on the other

136  Conclusion hand structuring an economic institution that is more favourable to China’s economic development. Within this multilayered multilateralism cooperation web, diffuse reciprocity is the principle that sustains the running of the system, and also a goal that is supposed to reach should China’s competitive multilateralism work well. It is also so far the only possible and most efficient principle upon which China can build its multilateral institution. China’s investment and financial aids would be provided in priority to countries that are partners; direct repayment, or specific reciprocity is not expected, but their political support for China’s grand strategy concerning regionalization is certainly expected: for example Russia’s support for One Belt One Road, European partners’ support for AIIB and the yuan’s accession to SDR of IMF are typical issue linkages in this system. At the same time, China is able to manage its partners via multilayered multilateral institutions. For example, Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK and the elevation of the China-UK strategic partnership to “global comprehensive strategic partnership” certainly associates with the benefits of prioritizing British companies in infrastructure projects in One Belt One Road (Thomas and Anderlini, 2015). I believe there are two issues that are very important in this process of forming diffused reciprocity in China’s competitive multilateralism. The first one is whether China has enough economic and ideational appeal to attract other countries to accept the principles suggested by China. Speaking from another perspective, it depends on whether other countries find that multilateral institutions initiated by China conform to their strategic interests or development. Would China bring a better world order through the multilateral institutions it has initiated? Different countries have different ideas. The second issue is that whether the actors that participate in this competitive multilateralism, including China itself, have the confidence that this diffusing reciprocity can function well to reassure that all the parties are satisfied with the institution, otherwise the institution will lose the self-reinforcing power. For example, the reason that Japan does not participate in AIIB is because it considers the AIIB not to be beneficial for Japan’s industry. Uzbekistan question whether BRI can really consider small countries’ interests when launching the infrastructure projects. Finally, we would like to emphasize again that not only is China constructing new multilateralism that is in competition with the reminiscent US-led multilateralism, but other regional powers are also initiating multilateral institutions corresponding to the changing and uncertain world order. Besides Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union we have touched upon in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation case study, the US TPP is also a new multilateral arrangement that provides more beneficial terms than the WTO to its member states. Is this a sign that the emerging powers and the rise of new regionalism are delegitimizing the US-led multilateralism, which has regulated and shaped world order until the end of the Cold War and provided foundations for multilateralism that follows different guiding ideas and norms? It is too early to conclude that China has already succeeded in establishing a competitive multilateralism, but it is safe to say that China’s ideas about the future world order are designed to be realized through the

Conclusion  137 construction of a competitive multilateralism, and the construction process will also enrich China’s hard and soft power.

The most important issues in building competitive multilateralism In the historical part and the three case studies we have introduced the formation of China’s competitive multilateralism through the lens of cases and its participation in multilateral institutions. In this section I would like to summarize several important issues that exist in this process. These issues associate with China’s long-term strategy, which can be concluded as following: 1

2

3

4

A guarantee of energy security, that is trustworthy suppliers of a safe, stable supply of oil and gas, while stable and safe transportation routes are also needed (R. Zhang, 2009). As for China, energy security has always been an international issue; in addition to the problem of climate change (Ji and Fan, 2015), China is challenged to adjust its strategies and its ideas to provide more constructive and innovative solutions to this issue. Internationalization of the Chinese yuan, meaning that the yuan should share a status in international trade that conforms to China’s status in the world economy (for example being included in the IMF’s special drawing basket, which was already realized in 2015; and with more countries agreeing to apply the yuan as transaction currency), thus minimizing potential financial risks linked to the US dollar’s dominant role in world economy (Jin, 2004). The strengthening of sea power development and acquiring more maritime dominance. This is considered to be connected with energy security (to ensure a stable energy transportation route; Zhou and Yu, 2014) and with the balance of domestic development (the economic development of certain areas where fishing is the main resource of income, as “fishery right is maritime right”; Huang, 2012). The balance of domestic development. It includes on one side the promotion of economic development in less developed areas of China, and on the other side the promotion of the productivity surplus in certain sectors. The design of BRI attempts to resolve these two issues within one project: infrastructure construction in China’s neighbouring countries provides an opportunity to export productivity surplus, while at the same time China’s frontier regions’ economies are expected to benefit from these grand projects (in the case of the Silk Economic Belt, Xinjiang’s economic development is closely linked with Central Asia, while China’s Southwestern and certain Southern provinces have strong economic and cultural ties with Maritime Silk Road map countries).

The aforementioned four issues are the ones that China believes are critical for its future development and also the country’s status in the new international order.1 Many multilateral arrangements are made in order to facilitate their development,

138  Conclusion and usually the realization of these strategic goals intervene with each other and involve negotiations and terms in different multilateral institutions that belong to China’s multilayered multilateralism. They are also a very good example of how diffused reciprocity has been applied. A partnership network has been seen as vital in carrying out these important issues. As introduced before, almost all countries that signed SWAP agreements with China are countries that have established partnership relations with China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a good example that within a multilateral institution where many members are China’s strategic partners, it would be easier for China to coordinate the exploitation of energy needed. At the same time, the SCO also carries China’s strategy in promoting its Western part’s economic development. ASEAN+3 is not only of great significance in the internationalization of the Chinese yuan (though the negotiation with Japan could be tough), but is also an important terrain for the development of China’s new economic rules by establishing FTAs and also important in China’ sea power development. The combination of the Belt and Road Initiative with the AIIB is so far the ultimate attempt to coordinate all these issues within one large strategy. The Belt and Road Initiative incorporates ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation instead of replacing them. It tries to establish a new means of collaboration by combining financial cooperation, development of natural resources, and the construction of infrastructure (Zou, 2015, p. 128). China provides financial support to countries included in these two projects to finance Chinese companies constructing infrastructures. Once finished, these infrastructures would mainly serve the transport of Chinese products towards these countries and, in the opposite direction, natural resources to China. The export of infrastructure construction provides domestic enterprises new contracts, and the natural resources imported would ease China’s thirst for energy. The circulation of money provides more chances for the internationalization of the Chinese yuan. The development of ports among China’s strategic partners diminishes China’s “Malacca dilemma” while at the same time promoting China’s control over maritime transportation and enhancing China’s sea power (Zhang, Huang and Fan, 2015). Figure  5.1 presents the relations between (a) the partnership network established by China; (b) ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the two most important regional multilateral institutions in which China participates; (c) the One Belt One Road project;3 and (d) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This figure presents clearly that the countries that have established partnership relations with China are the most important ones that cooperate with China in its new grand strategy. At the same time, almost all the member states in ASEAN+3 and SCO have already established partnership relations with China. Partners are also the majority of the founding members of AIIB. The design of the Belt and Road Initiative has a clear inclination to expand the realm of cooperation and economic development of ASEAN+3 and SCO: West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe are hence connected. China is building a “horizontal institutionalized structure rooted in organized regions linked to each other”

Conclusion  139

China

Silk Road Economic Belt SCO

Maritime Silk Road ASEAN+3 Laos

Nepal Japan

S.Korea

Turkey

Azerbaijan Indonesia

Philippines

Myanmar Brunei

Kuwait

Malaysia

Singapore

Italy

Pakistan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

Russia

Iraq

Thailand

New Zealand Sri Lanka Nepal

Brazil Jourdan

Maldives

Israel

Norway

East Timor

Poland

Kyrgyzstan

Qatar Saudi Arabia

Australia Finland

Afghanistan

Vietnam

Bangladesh Malta

Mongolia

Kazakhstan

France Cambodia

India

Egypt

Denmark Switzerland

Greece

Nederlands

Oman Austria

Syria

Yemen

Bhutan

Luxembourg

Germany

Iran

Sweden

Lebanon

Iceland

Portugal

Bahrain

Spain

Turkmenistan

South Africa

UK Georgia

Figure 5.1  Main countries2 involved in the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB Source: Illustrated by the author. Note: Countries in the square-blank boxes are founding members of AIIB. Countries in boxes with black lines are in partnership relations with China. Countries in the rectangle boxes of ASEAN+3 and SCO are involved in the two regional arrangements respectively. Countries in the grey boxes are included within the Belt and Road Initiative but are not founding members of AIIB. Japan is only a member of ASEAN+3 but is not a part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

(Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014, p. 124) through the combination of different layers of relations: bilateral partnership network as the first layer, regional multilateral arrangements as the second and also the most important one, and more expanded economic development projects as the third one. I will use another graph to illustrate how BRI combines with SCO and ASEAN+3 in tackling the main issues in China’s competitive multilateralism development. The Belt and Road Initiative combines China’s neighbouring countries and expands the economic collaboration to reach out to China’s “grand periphery”. It consolidates regionalization by nurturing “mutual interests” based on China’s provision of infrastructure construction and coordinated financing. It is a cooperation model that is capable of continual expansion and growth (as partnership countries can continue to grow, and the AIIB model could well be replicated), and it represents China’s approach of constructing multilateralism via economic spillover effects instead of values or forces. Figure 5.2 shows that AIIB is the economic part of the grand project BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). It finances infrastructure construction in the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (One Belt, i.e. OB) region, whose centre is SCO countries but may reach to Europe; and West Asia and “Maritime Silk Road” (One Road, i.e. OR), whose centre is ASEAN+3 countries, but may reach to Africa. The strategies that

140  Conclusion

Domestic Development

Sea Power Development

Energy Security

Internationalization of Chinese Yuan

SWAP Agreement

West China Development Fishing Resources

Extra Productivity

SCO

Energy in Central Asia

Malacca Dilemma

ASE AN+3

AIIB

Productivity Consumption

BRI Fate Community

Loaning in Yuan

Figure 5.2 The integration of ASEAN+3 and SCO with BRI on China’s main issues of competitive multilateralism Source: Illustrated by the author.

China aims to reach the goals set by the four main issues are related to SCO and ASEAN+3. The small balloons on each connection specify how these main issues are connected with the two multilateral institutions that China participates in. With the establishment of AIIB to finance the infrastructure development in the corresponding regions, the BRI project supports the pursuit of the four main issues, the AIIB projects, SCO and ASEAN+3 to become a complete and interacting circle. The financial support provided by AIIB enables the infrastructure projects which will largely consume the excess productivity in China. The development of infrastructure projects will promote the internationalization of the yuan, as China will prioritize the yuan as the principal currency for loans (Huang, 2015). This development will elevate the yuan’s importance in world capital market and promote its internationalization, especially by making the yuan into a regional currency (Liu, 2015). The infrastructure construction realized through AIIB will reinforce China’s influence in the regions that are strategically included in BRI. The construction and management of important infrastructure projects, for example ports, railways, and oil pumps will also strengthen China’s influences and provide privilege to China in exploiting energy or maritime resources. Though economic development is very important, it is not the only part of BRI. The “fate community” concept tries to provide an alternative understanding of

Conclusion  141 international relations. With an economic order that is different from the Western pattern, this alternative concept provides a different worldview, a different value recognition to China’s competitive multilateralism. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran in the beginning of 2016 (19–23 January) were vivid illustrations of how China adopts BRI to push forward its competitive multilateralism. Xi Jinping chose a critical time to visit the three most important countries in Middle East: the bilateral relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran had deteriorated drastically;4 terrorism continued to menace regional security and political stability; Iran had ended its economic isolation as the UN and the US lifted its sanction on 16 January (Al Jazeera, 2016a; Wroughton and Torbati, 2016). During his visit, Xi Jinping signed 52 agreements: 14 with Saudi Arabia, 21 with Egypt, and 17 with Iran; all three countries respectively signed the memorandum to participate in One Belt One Road with China, and the collaboration agreements cover trade, energy, communication, aeronautics, and climate change (Sina News, 2016). China has not only become the largest importer of crude oil in the world, but its dependency on foreign suppliers is also growing. In Figure 5.3, the top 15 exporters of 2018 have supplied 90% of China’s total crude oil import. As I mentioned earlier, one of the important strategic goals for China in promoting its competitive multilateralism. But it would compromise the richness of China’s foreign policy if one concludes that China’s aim to maintain a good relationship with the Middle East is only for oil. China is promoting its competitive multilateralism in this region, with “fate community” as the guiding idea, and BRI serves as the main structure to realize this goal. By combining energy supply and collaborations in different domains under the BRI, China is trying to develop new common interests in this region. China’s provision of investment and technology to its Middle East partners is expected to retrieve energy supplies and political support from them via diffused reciprocity. Another clear signal is that China published its first Arab Policy Paper five days before its president’s departure to the Middle East (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2016), where it states clearly that China looks forward to establishing a new pattern of collaboration based on BRI,5 which, if realized successfully, will greatly increase China’s presence in the region. China’s plan for its march to the Middle East proves again what I have summarized previously as the form of China’s competitive multilateralism: adopting the structure of multilayered multilateralism (built on and supported by partnership network), following the principle of diffused reciprocity and aiming to strengthen by nurturing mutual interests. Will China’s competitive multilateralism be compatible with pluralistic multilateralism? Two possible scenarios We have come to the preliminary conclusion that China is forming a competitive multilateralism. A  further point for discussion is, will China’s competitive multilateralism be compatible with pluralistic multilateralism formed in this posthegemonic era?

142  Conclusion Malaysia, 4.8 Colombia, 5

Libya, 4.7

Congo, 6.4 United States, 6.7 Russia , 37.9

Venezuela, 7

Iran, 15 Saudi Arabia, 29.7 Brazil, 16.2

Oman, 17.3 Angola, 24.9 Iraq, 22.4 Figure 5.3  Chinese crude oil imports by country in 2018 Source: Data from the Economist.

In the author’s opinion, there might be two possible answers to this question. The first scenario is that China’s competitive multilateralism becomes compatible with pluralistic multilateralism. The second one is that it becomes incompatible. This reason will be analyzed in the following sections. First scenario: China’s competitive multilateralism is compatible with pluralistic multilateralism It is possible that China’s competitive multilateralism is compatible with pluralistic multilateralism. This is because China’s engagement in multilateralism has never been designed to revolt against the existing world order: as shown in all three case studies, the development of China’s engagement in multilateralism has

Conclusion  143 its own historical context and realistic considerations, and the main purpose is to seek more developmental spaces for a rising China. Certainly, it is foreseeable that China will create more institutionalized and more binding multilateral institutions when its leadership role is stronger, however it doesn’t mean that China aims to create a multilateralism that contradicts the existing one. On the other hand, from a subjective perspective, China is not able to create multilateralism fully independent from existing international institutions. This is because there would be many difficulties for China to sustain such an institutional system. We will introduce these capabilities as follows: First, China still lacks the experience and capability of sustaining institutions. Sustaining institutions requires huge investments of economic, political and human resources. As China still defines itself as a developing country, sustaining the supply of a large quantity of public goods is quite resource-consuming for China and will also lead to free riders among its neighbouring countries. As introduced in previous paragraphs, though China is willing to shoulder more international responsibilities, it would not like to be hijacked by so-called Chinese responsibilities and obliged to provide more public goods than it can afford. Second, China needs the acknowledgement and acceptance of the existing order to support and legitimize the multilateral institutions it has initiated. Two very interesting examples to illustrate this point are that (a) when Xi Jinping visited the US in 2015, he assured President Obama that by launching the Belt and Road Initiative and establishing AIIB, China doesn’t mean to create any institutions that challenge the US; and (b) when French President Hollande visited China in November of 2015, China has promised its support to Paris Climate Summit in exchange of France’s support to RMB’s inclusion in the special drawing basket of the IMF (Xinhua News Agency, 2016). Cooperation with existing global multilateral institutions and other regional multilateral institutions are important for China to maximize benefits while minimizing transaction costs. Third, China still needs a peaceful development environment to sustain its economic development. The economic development is the source of legitimacy of the so-called Beijing model. As the Chinese economy has already begun to slow down, more policy adjustments (including the end of the 30-year-long one-child policy) are viewed in order to sustain a healthy economy in the long run. China needs a peaceful development environment now more than ever to consolidate its status as a major country. A good example of this point is that China is still positively promoting regional multilateralism in hopes of solving its territorial disputes through it: on 1 November  2015, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang met with the South Korean president and Japanese prime minister and reached an agreement that the three countries should work on the establishment of a ChinaJapan-South Korea FTA, a trilateral cooperation, and take the lead in resolving regional problems (Yang, 2015); six days later, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam and ASEAN sent the message that China is willing to share its development with its neighbours through the Belt and Road Initiative (Xinhua News Agency, 2015b) and looks forward to deepening the regional collaboration with ASEAN (Xinhua News Agency, 2015a, 2015c).

144  Conclusion China’s positive participation in COP21 and the WTO also presents positive signals. During COP21, Chinese president Xi Jinping called for more binding power of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that would promote the protection of the environment and the control of emission of greenhouse gases (Xi, 2015b). Xi also championed multilateral collaboration in resolving climate issues, as China believes that developing and under-developed countries need to collaborate in order to find a solution that contributes to environmental protection while allowing their economic development. Thus, instead of joining the US Green Climate Fund (GCF), China has invested 20 billion yuan to establish the South-South Cooperation on Climate Change Fund to promote multilateral cooperation among developing and developed countries (Xin, 2015). China has transformed from a beneficiary of donation to a donator concerning the climate change issue. Wang Xiaomin from Sun-Yat-Sen University points out that as the largest developing country and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China’s policy choice in approaching the climate change issue shows that China is not only a “responsible major country” but also a “rational actor” in the international political system (X. Wang, 2011, pp. 61–63). China took a constructive but not dominant role, and its positive work within multilateral institutions has reached a concrete result in Paris, thus avoiding the failure of Kyoto caused by US unilateralism (Todd, 2002, pp. 6, 248). Fourth, and most importantly, China is not yet able to provide a clearly defined value system that is attractive enough to replace the political ideas of existing institutions. China hasn’t established a clearly defined and systematic value system to support, explain and justify its new role in international society to the domestic and international public. Most of its ideational level ideas have emerged in passive response to an unfriendly external environment. Though China’s development pattern, the “Beijing Consensus” or “China Model”, has attracted much attention, there is not yet a value system that has the same effect. Though China’s rapid economic growth has greatly increased China’s soft power, it doesn’t prove the sustainability and universality of the so-called Beijing Consensus (Nye, 2009, p. 10). Meanwhile, China’s vague values are not as appealing to developing countries as clearly defined “liberal democracy” and “human rights” (Lum et al., 2008, p. 77; Zhou, 2012; Gu, 2013, p. 36). As Suzuki has pointed out, people in developing countries are not empty jars that wait for China to fill in its soft power (Suzuki, 2010, p. 207). Thus, for a foreseeable future, China is unlikely to build a competitive multilateralism that is built on different a value system6 and that exists independently alongside existing multilateralism. Second scenario: China’s competitive multilateralism is incompatible with pluralistic multilateralism Another possible scenario is that China’s competitive multilateralism would be incompatible with pluralistic multilateralism. The main reason lies in the fact that China is a non-democratic country and it is highly probable that it will remain so for the foreseeable future. This fact naturally creates tension between

Conclusion  145 what China is and what the international society (especially an international society that undergoes another round of democratization) deems good. This also creates demands for China to find a balance between shouldering its responsibilities by providing more public goods in international society, and keeping its own people from satisfying participation in domestic politics and human rights guarantees. As China assumes a role that shoulders more responsibilities in the international society, this change of China’s external environment begs changes at China’s ideational level ideas: some values that China held as normative cornerstones of both its domestic and foreign policy are confronted with actual foreign relation dilemmas – the understanding of human rights, the border between internal affairs and effective intervention and more importantly, what normative standards or values are justified and qualified to rule international societies? As a socialist power under single party authoritarian rule, China is increasingly confronted with the issue of how to prove that it can be a “responsible major country” in international society without adopting a democratic political system or the West’s definitions of human rights and civil society. China claims the existing order cannot be considered ethical from a deontological or consequentialist ethical standpoint (Rosamond, 2014, pp.  211–227). But at the same time, China is judged by what Ian Manners called “virtue ethics” (Manners, 2008). For example, China’s principle of non-interference in domestic affairs has begun to bring negative images to China instead of positive ones: China’s ambiguous attitude toward Syrian issues has been seen as irresponsible and non-moral. As China is expected to provide security as a public good to its neighbouring countries, this principle is greatly challenged. Similarly, China requires the democratization of international relations, but at the same time China doesn’t practice liberal democracy in its domestic politics. For the foreseeable future, it would not be possible for China to totally accept “the Western” ideas in international relations, as doing this would greatly weaken the CPC’s legitimacy in domestic politics (Yan, 2013). Thus, the incompatibility between China’s political ideas and those of existing institutions is almost irreconcilable as it is linked to the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule back home. The most distinct example in this sense is China’s development model, that is the combination of authoritarian government and state capitalism, has attracted much criticism and doubts about China’s foreign policy development in the future. The grounds of criticism and doubts of China’s foreign policy include (a) China’s cooperation with authoritarian governments has been considered as support to dictators, thus an obstacle to the people’s demand for freedom and the protection of human rights (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008; Long and Gao, 2011, p. 64; Keck, 2014); and (b) China’s authoritarian regime has become increasingly isolated in a neighbourhood that is greatly influenced by democratization (Zhang, 2010, p. 26), and its non-transparent regime pattern leads to foreign policies that are difficult to understand (Bräutigam, 2011). Thus an economically powerful and non-democratic China bears easily the “immoral” image according to certain Western values (Qi, 2014, p. 80).

146  Conclusion The essential issue here is that insisting on the Communist Party of China’s absolute leadership in China is indisputable. From the domestic politics perspective, China tries to maintain a stable economic development in order to prove China’s development model is right; from the foreign politics perspectives, (a) China asks for democratization of international relations as China deems that the West’s accusations against non-democratic countries are merely another form of cultural hegemony and an interference in domestic affairs and (b) China strives to erect a positive image in order to legitimize its political pattern. Yet if the West cannot accept China’s position on political systems and human rights (which might be quite difficult), it is very likely that China would insist on taking its own way instead of converging with the existing multilateralism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a very good example that China defends its own values and political system by constructing institutions that not only gives birth to Eurasia’s new authoritarian architecture but even reaches to the United Nations to fight for political rights (Cooley, 2013). Whether pluralistic multilateralism can accommodate China’s desired benefits draws another question mark. As introduced in the ASEAN+3 case study, China has already become increasingly impatient because of the inefficiency of this institution. And one of the reasons behind the establishment of the AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICs countries is that China is not satisfied with the IMF’s (guided by the US) and the Asian Development Bank’s (guided by the US and Japan) failure to reach meaningful reforms that would care more for the interests of developing countries, among which the largest one is China (Khasru, 2015). As China’s steady economic growth lies closely with the Communist Party of China’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally, China is not likely to compromise on any issues that would hinder the developments of its economic interests. If the obstacles are institutional, China is very likely, if it is possible, to initiate new institutions whose rules and norms allow China more space to develop. Finally, the difference in approaches can make compatibility very difficult: as Sun Zhuangzhi has pointed out, China usually starts with an idea, or a vision, when initiating an institution or a collaboration mechanism, however, the West and Russia prefer to start with tedious and detailed legal documents that are not realizable and don’t conform to reality. China prefers to form concrete strategies under the guidance of general ideas and visions, thus maintaining great flexibility.7 This divergence in approaches does not help institution development, especially as there still lacks political mutual trust between China and the rest of the world. A relevant doubt is whether Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a real multilateral organization. On one hand, SCO has conventions and charters that provide generalized principles of conduct, and organize meetings to coordinate cooperation among member-states; on the other hand, there is no guarantee that decisions are actually made in a democratic way, as China is actually taking the reins and is reshaping the region’s domestic politics via the SCO (Roney, 2013). It is also open to further discussion because in the SCO the decisions are made almost entirely top down instead of bottom up. In this way, it is difficult not to think that the SCO

Conclusion  147 is free of “great powers”, that is China and Russia’s manipulation and dominance. If this is the case, SCO loses its credibility as a true multilateral institution since the true principles of function are not generalized. So we have discussed two possible scenarios of the future of China’s competitive multilateralism’s compatibility with pluralistic multilateralism. The reasons for compatibility are many, while those for incompatibility are less but more fundamental. Only time and history will tell which scenario will actually take the scene. This is an issue for the next step of the present research.

Notes 1 These four issues have been discussed many times in Chinese government reports and have been put into future strategies. Of course, there are many important issues concerning China’s development: demographic issues, social security reform issues, etc. But these four issues are the most relevant with China’s competitive multilateralism formation. 2 The Belt and Road Initiative project plans to include 177 countries. In this chart I have included only countries that have agreed to participate in this project. 3 It is important to point out here that One Belt One Road is described as a “project” and a “policy” in Chinese government’s rhetoric. It is not an institution, and, as Prof. Sun Zhuangzhi has pointed out, it is something totally new that cannot be defined yet and China is not hurry to provide a definition to it. 4 On 3 January  2016, Saudi Arabia announced cutting off diplomatic relationship with Iran because the latter has allowed attacks on the former’s embassy. The attack was from the anger aroused due to the Saudi Arabian execution of the Iranian religious leader as terrorism (Al Jazeera, 2016b; Fitch, Omran and Leigh, 2016). 5 In China’s Arab Policy Paper it states: China’s proposed initiatives of jointly building the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, establishing a “1+2+3” cooperation pattern (to take energy cooperation as the core, infrastructure construction and trade and investment facilitation as the two wings, and three high and new tech fields of nuclear energy, space satellite and new energy as the three breakthroughs), and industrial capacity cooperation, are well received by Arab countries. Both sides have broad consensus on safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity, defending national dignity, seeking political resolution to hotspot issues, and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2016). Also, it is worth mentioning that there are eight countries in the Middle East who are founding members of AIIB, which increases the possibilities of a comprehensive collaboration. (Jiang, 2016) 6 Especially when considering that China shares many values and norms in existing international political system, based on which China builds its legitimacy, image, and soft power. 7 Edited by the author according to a conversation with Prof. Sun Zhuangzhi on 27 November 2015 in Beijing.

Appendix Members, capitals and sharings of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Members

Membership Date

Total Subscriptions Amount (million USD)

Afghanistan Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Brunei Darussalam Cambodia China Cyprus Fiji Georgia Hong Kong, China India Indonesia Iran Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Korea Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR Malaysia Maldives Mongolia Myanmar Nepal New Zealand Oman Pakistan Philippines

Voting Power Percentage of Total

Percentage

Number of votes

Oct 13, 2017 Dec 25, 2015 Jun 24, 2016 Aug 24, 2018 Mar 22, 2016 Dec 25, 2015

86.6 3,691.2 254.1 103.6 660.5 52.4

0.0895 3.8168 0.2627 0.1071 0.6830 0.0542

2,526 39,345 4,974 2,869 9,038 2,957

0.2235 3.4811 0.4401 0.2538 0.7996 0.2616

May 17, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Jun 25, 2018 Dec 11, 2017 Dec 25, 2015 Jun 07, 2017

62.3 29,780.4 20 12.5 53.9 765.1

0.0644 30.7940 0.0207 0.0129 0.0557 0.7911

3,056 300,237 2,033 1,958 2,972 7,954

0.2704 26.5637 0.1799 0.1732 0.2630 0.7037

Jan 11, 2016 Jan 14, 2016 Jan 16, 2017 Jan 15, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Apr 18, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Apr 11, 2016

8,367.3 3,360.7 1,580.8 749.9 119.2 729.3 3,738.7 26.8

8.6521 3.4751 1.6346 0.7754 0.1233 0.7541 3.8660 0.0277

86,106 36,040 15,079 9,932 3,625 9,726 39,820 2,701

7.6183 3.1887 1.3342 0.8787 0.3207 0.8605 3.5231 0.2390

Jan 15, 2016 Mar 27, 2017 Jan 04, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Dec 25, 2015 Jan 13, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Jun 21, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Dec 28, 2016

43 109.5 7.2 41.1 264.5 80.9 461.5 259.2 1,034.1 979.1

0.0445 0.1132 0.0074 0.0425 0.2735 0.0837 0.4772 0.2680 1.0693 1.0124

2,863 3,528 2,505 2,844 5,078 3,242 7,048 5,025 12,765 12,224

0.2533 0.3121 0.2216 0.2516 0.4493 0.2868 0.6236 0.4446 1.1294 1.0815

Members

Membership Date

Total Subscriptions Amount (million USD)

Qatar Russia Samoa Saudi Arabia Singapore Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Timor-Leste Turkey United Arab Emirates Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam Total Regional Grand Total

Voting Power Percentage of Total

Percentage

Number of votes

Jun 24, 2016 Dec 28, 2015 April 03, 2018 Feb 19, 2016 Dec 25, 2015 Jun 22, 2016 Jan 16, 2016 Jun 20, 2016 Nov 22, 2017 Jan 15, 2016 Jan 15, 2016

604.4 6,536.2 2.1

0.6250 6.7587 0.0022

8,477 67,795 1,854

0.7500 5.9982 0.1640

2,544.6 250 269 30.9 1,427.5 16 2,609.9 1,185.7

2.6312 0.2585 0.2782 0.0320 1.4761 0.0165 2.6987 1.2261

27,879 4,933 5,123 2,742 16,708 1,993 28,532 14,290

2.4666 0.4365 0.4533 0.2426 1.4783 0.1763 2.5244 1.2643

Nov 30, 2016 Mar 06, 2018 Apr 11, 2016

219.8 0.5 663.3

0.2273 0.0005 0.6859

4,631 1,838 9,066

0.4097 0.1626 0.8021

73,855.3

76.3691

835,931

73.9597

96,708.4

100

1,130,252

100

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Index

1949 to Opening Up phase of multilateralism in China 40 – 44; ideational level of 40 – 41; overview of 40; paradigm level of 41 – 42; policy level of 42; summary of foreign policy ideas 42 – 44 2002 – 2012 phase of multilateralism in China 60 – 72; economic diplomacy and 69 – 70; foreign policy strategy debates 64 – 65; harmonious world and 63, 66; ideational level of 61 – 63; major responsible country role and 63 – 64; new security idea 66 – 67; non-alignment policy 66; overview of 60 – 61; paradigm level of 63 – 68; partnership concept and 68 – 69; Peaceful Development strategy 65 – 66; policy level of 68 – 71; public diplomacy and 70 – 71; soft power construction 67 – 68; summary of foreign policy ideas 71 – 72 Acharya, A. 29 After Hegemony (Keohane) 4 AIIB see Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Alexander, D. 125, 126 Ames, R. T. 19 anti-globalization 28 Arendt, H. 22 ASEAN+3 8, 32, 57, 65, 133 ASEAN Regional Forum 8 Asian Dream 75 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 7, 30, 75, 77; Belt and Road Initiative and 122 – 124; context of 124 – 126; institution building 128; institution of 124; loan rules 126; members, capitals and sharings of 148 – 149; membership 125; public goods provision 126 – 128; voting rights 125

“Back to Asia” strategy 30 – 31 Béland, D. 16 Bell, S. 5 Belt and Road Initiative 75 – 76; Brussels concerns 104 – 107; collision of rules with 103 – 104; impact on East Asia 107 – 124; impact on Europe 102 – 124; 17 + 1 initiative and 102 – 103; see also East Asia, Belt and Road Initiative Bilateral SWAP Agreements 113, 116 – 117 bilateral trade, China and Russia 91 – 92 Brussels, Belt and Road Initiative and 104 – 107 Cai, L. 34 – 35, 73 Central Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and 87 – 90 Central Asia-China relations 92 – 94 Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) 98 Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) 98 Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 94, 95 Chen, Q. 50 Chen, W. 30 Chen, Z. 26, 52, 71, 113 Cheng, G. 96 Chiang Mai Initiative 32, 57, 107 China; China’s multilateralism: foreign policy making, 1949 – 2016 8 – 24; FTA agreements 118 – 121; global governance and 3, 6; globalization and 2; international responsibilities of 52 – 53; multilateralism and 1 – 2, 6 – 8; national identity 36 – 37; Peaceful Development White Book 65 – 67; Reform and Opening Up policy 7, 9; Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Index  183 (RCEP) 31, 32; United States trade war 1 – 2; see also China’s foreign policy, 1949 – 2016 China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 65 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 65, 69 China’s foreign policy, 1949 – 2016 8 – 24; differentiating ideas from ideology 22 – 24; four guidelines of 59 – 60; importance of ideas in 8 – 10; political philosophy/context, ideas in 10 – 22; studies of 8 – 9; see also Chinese political philosophy/context, ideas in China’s foreign policy ideas, analysis of 39 – 40 China’s multilateralism 26 – 37; building competitive multilateralism 137 – 147; Chinese international theory, development of 33 – 37; global tendencies towards competitive regionalisms 32 – 33; post-Cold War, uncertain world order and 26 – 28; regionalism and, rise of 29 – 32; see also multilateralism, China’s engagement in Chinese Dream 70, 73 Chinese international theory, development of 33 – 37 Chinese political philosophy/context, ideas in 10 – 22; Confucianism and 18 – 22; discourse in discursive institutionalism and 15; discursive institutionalism and 11 – 12, 15 – 18; generality and, levels of 12 – 14; idea types and 14 – 15; multilateral institutions and 94 – 97; overview of 10 – 11; state of harmony in 19 Chu, S. 52 Circle Order Structure 83 cognitive ideas 14 – 15 Cold War, uncertain world order following 26 – 28 colour revolutions 89, 93 competitive multilateralism building 137 – 147; Belt and Road Initiative and 139 – 140; fate community concept and 140 – 141; issues with 137 – 138; partnership networks and 138 – 139; pluralistic multilateralism and 141 – 147 competitive regionalisms 32 – 33 Confucianism 18 – 22; aspects of 11; contemporary history influence on 21 – 22; ideas in 10 – 11; ideational level

ideas in 18 – 19; paradigm-level ideas in 19 – 20; way of domination in Chinese 20; way of king in Chinese 20 Cox, R. H. 16 Deng, X. 8, 16 – 18, 42, 45 – 48, 50, 54, 59, 64, 65, 80, 84, 89 developing countries 57 – 58 Ding, C. 26 discursive institutionalism (DI): analysis model of 11 – 12; characteristics of 11 – 12; classification of ideas in 12 – 14; definition of 11; discourse in 15; generality levels of 12 – 14; historical institutionalism and 15 – 18; idea types in 14 – 15; overview of 11 Dong, M. 61 Dong, Y. 31 East Asia, Belt and Road Initiative and 107 – 124; AIIB and 122 – 124; ASEAN+3 definition of 107; Chiang Mai initiative and 107 – 108; FTA agreements and 118 – 121; neighbourhood policy and 113 – 115; overview of 107 – 108; partnership networks and 112 – 118; public goods provision 126 – 128; regionalism issues in 108 – 112; SWAP agreements and 113, 116 – 117 East Asian regionalization 108 – 112; China and 110 – 112; identity construction issues 109 – 110; leadership issues 108, 109; norm setting issues 108 – 109; US/China trade war and 110 – 111 economic diplomacy 69 – 70 EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy 33 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 92 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 99 Fairbank, J. K. 82 fate community concept 73, 123 – 124 Fei, X. 36, 82, 83 Feng, Y. 34 Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence 54 Fox, J. 105 Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 75 Free Trade Area strategy 30; ChinaASEAN 31; China-South Korea 31; China-South Korea-Japan 31 FTA agreements, East Asia 118 – 121

184 Index Gao, C. 116 generality levels in ideas 12 – 14; philosophical 12, 13; policies 12 – 14; programs 12 global governance: China and 3; defined 3; institutions and 5 – 6; multilateralism and 3 – 5 globalization: China and 2; populism rise and 5 Godement, F. 105 good neighbour policy, China’s 56 – 57, 67, 75 – 76 great power foreign policymaking perspective 53 – 54 Guideline of Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Members 97 Guo, S. 83 Hajer, M. 15 Hall, D. L. 19 Hall, P. A. 14 – 15 harmonious world concept 61 – 62, 63, 64, 66 Hettne, B. 133 hide one’s ability and bide one’s time strategy 64 Hindmoor, A. 5 historical institutionalism 15 – 18 historical junctures: in China’s history 16; defined 16; time span divisions based on 39 Hu, A. 28 Hu, J. 30, 32 – 33, 60 – 62, 113; see also 2002 – 2012 phase of multilateralism in China Huawei 1 ideas: in Chinese language 10; Chinese philosophical 18 – 19; classification of in discursive institutionalism 12; cognitive 14 – 15; in Confucianism 10 – 11, 18 – 22; generality levels in 12 – 14; vs. ideology 22 – 24; normative 14 – 15; types of 14 – 15 ideology: definitions of 22 – 23; vs. ideas 22 – 24; mainstream, protection of 23 – 24; study of, in China 23 – 24; Western 23, 24 Ikenberry, J. G. 3, 5 incremental changes 14 institutions: definitions of 5 – 6; global governance and importance of 5 – 6

Inter-Bank SCO Consortium 97 international theory, Chinese 33 – 37 Jiang, Y. 90 Jiang, Z. 32, 53, 54, 63, 84 Jobert, B. 14, 15 Jones, B. 6 Keohane, R. O. 3 – 4, 5, 27 Kim, S. S. 45 Knight, K. 22, 23 Leninism 21 – 22 Li, D. 21 Li, F. 33 Li, K. 143 Li, W. 70 Liu, X. 69 Luce, E. 5 Lukin, A. 88 mainstream ideology 23 – 24 major country relations, new model of 74 – 75 “major responsible country” concept 52 – 53, 63 – 64 Mannheim, K. 22 – 23 Mao, Z. 8, 13, 16 – 18, 41, 57 Maritime Silk Road 77 Marx, K. 10, 22, 23, 63 Marxism 21 – 22 McDermott, R. N. 10 Mehta, J. 13 Men, H. 6, 9, 52 Meyer, T. 30 moral realism 35 multilateral institutions, development of 87 – 128; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and 124 – 128; Belt and Road Initiative and 102 – 124; Central AsiaChina relations 92 – 94; Charter of SCO and 95; Chinese political ideas and 94 – 97; managing difficulties and 97 – 102; regionalism and 87; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 87 – 90; SinoRussia relations 90 – 92; Treaty of LongTerm Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation 95 – 97 multilateralism: building competitive 137 – 147; China and 1 – 2, 6 – 8; global governance and 3 – 5; history of 4; importance of 58; institutions and 5 – 6; introduction to 1 – 3; Keohane definition

Index  185 of 3 – 4; multilayered 135 – 137; pluralistic 4, 131; Ruggie definition of 4; unilateralism and 5; see also China’s multilateralism multilateralism, China’s engagement in 38 – 85 (see also individual phases); as basically instrumental 131 – 132; competitive vs. US-led multilateralism 134; evolution of 78 – 81; foreign policy ideas 39 – 40; at global level 132; historical juncture time span divisions of 39; ideology oriented nature of 134 – 135; as multilayered 135 – 137; from 1949 until the Opening Up phase of 40 – 44; norms and institutional arrangements of 133 – 134; from Opening Up to end of Cold War (1978–1992) phase of 44 – 49; overview of 38; from post-Cold War to 2002 (1992–2002) phase of 49 – 60; post2012 regional and global level phase of 72 – 85; at regional level 132; rise of regionalism and 132 – 133; 2002 – 2012 phase of regional participation 60 – 72; world order view and competitive 81 – 85 multilayered multilateralism 135 – 137 multipolarism 50 – 51 multi-regionalism 133 New International Economic Order (NIEO) 42, 46 – 47, 66 new security concept 66 – 67 non-alignment policy 66 normative ideas 14 – 15 North, D. 5 Nye, J. S. 5 Opening Up to end of Cold War (1978–1992) phase of multilateralism in China 44 – 49; ideational level of 45 – 46; overview of 44 – 45; paradigm level of 46 – 47; policy level of 47; summary of foreign policy ideas 47 – 49 Osaka Summit 1 Pan, X. 26 Pan, Z. 26, 71 Pang, Z. 110 Paris Agreement 1 partnership network 76 – 77, 112 – 118 Peaceful Development White Book 65 – 67; harmonious world promotion 66;

international institutions participation 67; new security idea 66 – 67; nonalignment 66; overview of 65 – 66; regional collaboration 67 philosophical level of generality 12, 13 philosophy, Chinese 10 pluralistic multilateralism 4, 131; competitive multilateralism building and 141 – 147 Polar Silk Road 76 policies level of generality 12 – 14 Ponjaert, F. 133 Popper, K. 22 populism 5 post-Cold War to 2002 (1992–2002) phase of multilateralism in China 49 – 60; “construction of a major responsible country” concept and 52 – 53; developing countries and 57 – 58; great power perspective and 53 – 54; ideational level of 50 – 51; neighbouring country relationships and 56 – 57; overview of 49 – 50; paradigm level of 51 – 53; policy level of 53 – 58; Sino-EU relationship and 55 – 56; Sino-Russia relationship and 54 – 55; Sino-US relationship and 54; summary of foreign policy ideas 58 – 60 post-2012 regional and global level phase of multilateralism in China 72 – 85; good neighbourhood policy 75 – 76; ideational level of 72 – 73; new model of major country relations 74 – 75; overview of 72; paradigm level of 73 – 74; partnership network 76 – 77; policy level of 74 – 77; summary of foreign policy ideas 77 – 85 processual constructivism 36 programs level of generality 12 public diplomacy 70 – 71 Qi, H. 112 Qin, Y. 7, 22, 29, 35 – 36 Qiu, H. 92 Qu, X. 64 Quan, H. 83 Reform and Opening Up policy 7, 9, 16, 58, 80 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 31, 32 regionalism 4; competitive 32 – 33; East Asian, issues in 108 – 112; multi- 133;

186 Index multilateral institutions and 87 – 128; rise of 29 – 32, 132 – 133; see also multilateral institutions, development of relationships: Sino-EU 55 – 56; SinoRussia 54 – 55; Sino-US 54 Ruggie, J. 3, 4, 6, 94 Sartori, G. 23 Schmidt, V. A. 11 – 15; see also discursive institutionalism (DI) SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) SCO Business Council 97 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 7, 8, 13, 31, 32, 65, 67, 85, 87 – 90; Central Asia and 87 – 90; Charter of 94, 95; East Asia and 116, 118; Guideline of Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation 97; regional currency cooperation and 113; Treaty of LongTerm Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation 94 – 97 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Development Bank 97 Shanghai Five 92 – 93 Shanghai Institutes for International Studies 73 Silk Road economic belt 77 Singh, S. 108 Sino-EU relationship 55 – 56 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship 55 Sino-Russia relationship 54 – 55; divergence in 90 – 92 Sino-US relationship 54 Six Party’s Talk 65 soft power concept 67 – 68 Song, L. 34 – 35 Song, W. 9 Su, C. 13, 82 Sun, Z. 100 – 101, 146 Tao Tse-Tsing 18 Telò, M. 4, 29, 32, 49, 59, 84, 85, 107, 131, 133 three worlds theory 41 – 42 “Tian Xia” system 34 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 31 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 30, 31, 32 Treaty of Long-Term GoodNeighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation 94 – 97 Trump, D. 1, 2, 5, 31 two intermediate zones theory 41

Umarov, K. 134 unilateralism: multilateralism and 5; United States and 1 United States: “Back to Asia” strategy 30 – 31; China trade war 1 – 2; IndoPacific Strategy 33; multilateralism vs. China’s competitive multilateralism 134; Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 30, 31, 32; unilateralism and 1 Vangeli, A. 104 Vorobiev, V. 96 Wan, M. 88 Wang, J. 65, 116, 118 Wang, X. 144 Wang, Y. 63, 101, 103 Wang, Z. 65 way of domination in Chinese 20 way of king in Chinese 20 Wei, L. 83 Wen, J. 19, 69, 102 Wendt, A. 5 Western ideologies 23, 24 Womack, B. 10 world order, post-Cold War uncertainty of 26 – 28 Wu, B. 69 Wu, X. 74 Xi, J. 1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 72, 107, 113; see also post-2012 regional and global level phase of multilateralism in China Xiao, G. 70, 80 Xie, L. 123 Xu, K. 64 – 65 Yan, X. 26 – 27, 35, 50 Ye, Z. 64 Yu, J. 52 Yu, X. 98 Zhang, B. 9 Zhang, G. 26, 108 Zhang, Q. 9 Zhang, X. 76 – 77 Zhao, H. 92, 94, 98, 101 Zhao, L. 36 Zhao, T. 34 Zheng, B. 34, 65 – 66 Zhou, E. 9 – 10, 62 Zhou, G. 52 Zhu, F. 111 Zhu, Y. 27