Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism: A Differential Framework 9781529216493

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Bristol Studies in

East Asian International Relations

Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism A Differential Framework

SARAH TEO



Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations Series Editors: Yongjin Zhang, University of Bristol, UK, Shogo Suzuki, University of Manchester, UK and Peter Kristensen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark This series publishes cutting-edge research on the changing international politics of East Asia. It covers the security dynamics, the causes of conflict and cooperation, and the ongoing transformation of the region, as well as the impact of East Asia on the wider global order. The series contributes to theoretical debates within the field of International Relations. Topics studied in East Asia can shed fresh light on disciplinary debates while the theoretical insights can challenge and enrich the propositions of mainstream IR theories which have been derived mostly from the European experience. In welcoming theoretically informed and theoretically innovative works, this series plays an important role in developing and establishing new Asian schools of thought in International Relations theory.

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International advisory board Amitav Acharya, American University, Washington D.C., US Mark Beeson, University of Technology Sydney, Australia Barry Buzan, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Zhimin Chen, Fudan University, Shanghai, China Ja Ian Chong, National University of Singapore, Singapore Paul Evans, University of British Columbia, Canada Rosemary Foot, University of Oxford, UK Evelyn Goh, Australian National University, Australia Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden Miwa Hirono, Ritsumeikan University, Japan Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University, Japan Weixing Hu, University of Hong Kong, China Xiaoming Huang, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Christopher R. Hughes, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Yang Jiang, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, South Korea Jing Men, College of Europe, Belgium Nele Noesselt, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany John Ravenhill, University of Waterloo, Canada Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University, Japan Yu-Shan Wu, National University of Taiwan, Taiwan

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MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM A Differential Framework Sarah Teo

First published in Great Britain in 2023 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2023 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1647-​9 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1648-​6 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1649-​3 ePdf The right of Sarah Teo to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: iStock/​KateDemianov Bristol University Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Table List of Abbreviations About the Author Acknowledgements

vi vii ix x

1 Introduction 2 The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour 3 Towards a Differential Framework for Middle Power Behaviour 4 Formation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 5 Shaping the East Asia Summit 6 The Differentiation of Middle Power Behaviour in Asia Pacific Multilateralism 7 Conclusion

1 13 31 56 88 125

Notes References Index

157 158 198

v

151

List of Figures and Table Figures 2.1 3.1 6.1

The three aspects of middlepowerness How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism

29 53 139

Table 2.1

Asia Pacific countries ranking between tenth and 30th in GDP

vi

25

List of Abbreviations ADB ADMM ADMM-​Plus APC APEC APT ARF ASEAN CSCA EAS EAEC EAEG EASG EAVG EU FTA G7 G20 GATT GDP GNP IMF IR MIKTA NAFTA NAM NATO OECD PAFTAD PBEC PECC PMC

Asian Development Bank ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus Asia Pacific Community Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia East Asia Summit East Asia Economic Caucus East Asia Economic Group East Asia Study Group East Asia Vision Group European Union free trade agreement Group of Seven Group of Twenty General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product gross national product International Monetary Fund International Relations Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia North American Free Trade Agreement Non-​Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development Pacific Trade and Development Conference Pacific Basin Economic Council Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Post Ministerial Conference vii

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

PRC ROC SIPRI TAC UK UN UNGA UNSC US

People’s Republic of China Republic of China Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia United Kingdom United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council United States

viii

About the Author Sarah Teo is Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Regional Security Architecture Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Her research interests include middle powers in the Asia Pacific, multilateral security cooperation in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific, as well as middle-​power and IR theory. She is the co-​author, with Ralf Emmers, of Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific (Melbourne University Publishing, 2018) and the co-​editor, with Bhubhindar Singh, of Minilateralism in the Indo-​Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-​Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN (Routledge, 2020).

ix

Acknowledgements This book started life as a PhD thesis submitted to the University of Sydney in March 2020. Through its beginnings as a tentative research proposal back in 2015 to a fully formed thesis, and then to this publication, I owe a debt of gratitude to many people. I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Colin Wight, for his mentorship, encouragement and guidance throughout my PhD journey. Thank you for constantly assuaging my self-​doubts, offering useful suggestions on my research and allowing me the space to explore my own research inclinations while putting me back on the right track when I ventured too far. Pursuing a PhD under Colin’s supervision was truly a privilege. My thanks also to James Reilly, for his constructive comments on my drafts. Thank you for always making time to read my chapters and talk through them with me. I gratefully acknowledge the funding for my PhD provided by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. I owe a sincere thank you to Ong Keng Yong and Joseph Liow. I am particularly indebted to Ralf Emmers, Bhubhindar Singh, See Seng Tan, Ang Cheng Guan, Adrian Tan and Sinderpal Singh for reasons too numerous to list. Thank you for believing in me, especially during the times when I felt I was not good enough. I am lucky to have you all to look up to. I would also like to thank Ariadne Vromen, Susan Park, Megan Mackenzie, Jingdong Yuan, Rodney Smith and Charlotte Epstein for being such superb postgrad coordinators during my time with the University of Sydney. Much appreciation is due to the library, IT and administrative staff at the University of Sydney and RSIS, for their patience and assistance towards all my requests. A big thank you goes to the interviewees and individuals who took time out of their busy schedules to generously share with me their insights and answer my questions. In the course of my interviews, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Singapore and The Graduate Research and Development Network on Asian Security (GRADNAS) based at the Australian National University offered valuable support, which was greatly appreciated. x

newgenprepdf

Acknowledgements

I am grateful also to Andrew Carr, Evelyn Goh and Evan Resnick for their insightful comments on my initial research proposal that were instrumental in refining my thinking on the topic. In gathering additional data for this book, Tan Wei and Oliver Fu provided invaluable research assistance. I would like to express my gratitude to the editorial and production teams at Bristol University Press, including Stephen Wenham, Zoe Forbes, Lorna Blackmore, Catriona Allon and Caroline Astley, as well as Annie Rose and her team at Newgen Publishing UK, for their indispensable support. The feedback and suggestions from anonymous reviewers on earlier drafts were very much valued as well. The bulk of Chapter 3 in this book was first published in International Theory, which I gratefully acknowledge: Teo, S. (2021). Toward a differentiation-​based framework for middle power behavior. International Theory, 14(1): 1–​24. © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press, reprinted with permission. I would like to thank the journal and Cambridge University Press for their permission to reprint parts of the material. To friends and colleagues at the University of Sydney, RSIS and beyond, thank you for the conversations, laughter and advice. You are all an inspiration to me. Special thanks are reserved for Shawn Ho, Henrick Tsjeng and Wu Shang-​su, for taking on more than their fair share of work over the past few years so that I could have time to research and write. Last but not least, I am immensely thankful for my family and loved ones, who have been my unwavering pillar of support and source of strength. Sarah Teo Singapore, 2022

xi

1

Introduction As World War II approached its final days in April 1945, delegates from 50 countries convened in San Francisco for the United Nations (UN) Conference on International Organization. The aim of the conference was to discuss and sign the UN Charter, the draft of which had been prepared jointly by the Republic of China (ROC), Soviet Union, United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) earlier in 1944. Also known as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (so named due to the location of the meeting among the Allied ‘Big Four’), the draft outlined the new institution’s purposes, membership and organizational structure (‘Dumbarton Oaks’, 1945). The UN would have four principal bodies, namely a General Assembly (UNGA), a Security Council (UNSC), an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat. Significantly for non-​major powers such as Australia and Canada, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals appeared to give extensive decision-​making powers to the five permanent members of the UNSC –​the aforementioned ‘Big Four’ and France. While it was generally accepted that the major powers would primarily be the ones with the responsibility and ability to maintain global peace and consequently ‘must enjoy an authority commensurate with their economic and military resources’, there was also concern over their unchecked influence that could pose a risk to the interests of the smaller countries (Evatt, 1946, pp 27, 106; see also Hilliker, 1990, p 734). In this context, the Australian and Canadian representatives, among others, voiced the opinion that their respective states should be given priority among the non-​major powers, for non-​permanent seats on the UNSC. Australia’s claims to ‘special recognition’ in the UN were based on the argument that ‘middle powers’1 like itself possessed both the resources and willingness ‘to make practical contributions to security’, as evident in their contributions to the first and second world wars (Evatt, 1946, p 27). Meanwhile, Canadian officials argued for a ‘Middle Power amendment’ to the selection of UNSC non-​permanent members (Hilliker, 1990, p 780). As one of the world’s ‘responsible middle powers’, Canada was ‘willing and able to expend lives and resources on a considerable scale towards achieving 1

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

[the UN’s] purposes’, and hence should be distinguished from other states that, ‘because of small resources, backward political development, or inertia, could not or would not make a sizable contribution’ (Hilliker, 1990, pp 734, 900). As one scholar observed, the Australian and Canadian efforts sought to place their countries ‘as something less than major and something more than minor powers’ in the international system (Holmes, 1963, p 138). Despite their efforts, Australia and Canada ultimately did not succeed in securing a special position for ‘middle powers’ in the UN. The UNSC’s permanent five members ‘had no particular interest in delineating categories for non-​ great powers. And countries relegated by the self-​described middle powers to small power status had no interest in seeing another layer constructed atop them’ (Neack, 2003, p 164). Nevertheless, the middle power label stuck in the Australian and Canadian foreign policy discourse, with the term subsequently being used to also describe the status and diplomatic styles of states such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands through the Cold War years. In the post-​Cold War period, more countries have been referred to as middle powers, including South Korea and Indonesia. In September 2013, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia launched the MIKTA grouping, which was described by Seoul as a platform for ‘middle power nations that … have the willingness and capability to contribute to the international community’s development’ (Shin, 2013). In a jointly written article, the foreign ministers of the five countries highlighted the need to ensure ‘the effective functioning of the multilateral order and [address] shortcomings of global governance’, and suggested that MIKTA could ‘fill an important gap in the international arena’ as a ‘force for good’ (Meade et al, 2014). While debates abound on the actual impact that MIKTA has had on global issues thus far, its formation indicates that the middle power concept, for all its perceived failings, has been useful in the diplomatic sphere. Statements from official documents as well as former and current diplomats have continued to profile the middle power status and emphasize the value of countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in international affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015; Evans, 2018; Kang, 2019). Alongside these developments, the study of middle powers has also risen to prominence, as scholars examine how these states could navigate challenges posed by major power dynamics and security threats, to protect their own interests in the international system (see, for example, Gilley and O’Neil, 2014b; de Swielande et al, 2019).

Middle powers and multilateralism Both in MIKTA and at the UN’s inception, middle powers have sought to secure their foreign policy interests and, from their perspectives, 2

Introduction

maintain global stability, through multilateral diplomacy. The reason is that multilateral platforms allow middle powers to work together to restrain major power unilateralism and to establish rules, norms and institutions that would contribute towards the predictability of state behaviour and a more equitable process in collective decision making. Multilateralism further helps to strengthen and amplify a middle power’s voice on global issues. Indeed, the middle power inclination for multilateral diplomacy is often brought up in the relevant literature. Such arguments could follow two possible trajectories. The first leans towards a neorealist view; considering the limited influence and strategic weight vis-​à-​vis the major powers, there is little that middle powers can do even when they band together through multilateralism. In this regard, the middle power concept is of little value as structure acts as a constraint on middle power agency. The second type of explanation –​rooted in institutional liberalism –​takes the opposite view, where middle powers are argued to have demonstrated leadership and been able to drive the progress of multilateral cooperation. The bulk of middle power theorizing, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been premised on these more optimistic prospects (see, for example, Cooper et al, 1993; Behringer, 2012). In such accounts, middle powers are able to overcome structural constraints through multilateralism. This book unpacks both the neorealist and institutional liberal claims by exploring the persistent relationship between middle powers and multilateralism, and examining the opportunities that structure generates for middle power behaviour in terms of multilateral diplomacy. This would provide us with better insight into how middle powers engage with multilateralism. Developments at the level of structure are unobservable, but it is possible to study the middle power behaviour and outcomes that would help to trace the processes at work at the structural level. By doing so, the aim is to obtain a clearer idea of what characterizes the fundamental relationship between middle powers and multilateralism, in order to better understand why and how middle powers behave the way they do in such platforms. Drawing on the works of scholars such as Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, Michael Zürn and Jack Donnelly, this book advances the argument that differentiation, which is constitutive of the international political structure, serves as a mechanism to generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). The effects of the differentiated structure on middle powers are activated through negotiations of power politics. This results in such countries pursuing a dilution of major-​power stratificatory forces as well as functionally differentiated roles for themselves in multilateral diplomacy. Empirically, the book focuses on the context of post-​Cold War Asia Pacific multilateralism. This book seeks to contribute theoretically and empirically towards two groups of literature: first, on middle power theory more broadly, 3

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

and second, on middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The book introduces a new theoretical framework for middle power behaviour –​one that puts at its core a concept that is often taken for granted in the study of middle powers but thus far not explicitly theorized in the literature. This concept is differentiation. This fills a key gap in the middle power literature. While the current approaches to middle powers imply that these states are different from the major powers and smaller countries, as a whole they have not analysed the conditions that make it possible for such differentiation. Analysing middle power behaviour through the lens of differentiation theory offers insight into what is distinctive about such states and consequently the strategies they adopt to maintain their relevance and importance in international politics. The point is not to disproportionately inflate the importance of middle powers vis-​à-​vis other actors, but rather, to examine how these states have been able to shape international politics through multilateral diplomacy. Empirically, this book examines the contributions and roles of middle powers –​specifically Australia, Indonesia and South Korea –​in Asia Pacific multilateralism. To be sure, there has been a plethora of valuable studies that analyse the contributions and roles of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in regional multilateralism, alongside similar works that examine the influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the major powers in shaping the regional architecture (see, for example, Cooper et al, 1993; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014b; Emmers and Teo, 2018). There is, nevertheless, scope to delve deeper into the structural forces that generate the behaviour of middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Even as it is acknowledged that middle powers are oftentimes constrained by their place in the international system, the studies on Asia Pacific multilateralism have illustrated that opportunities exist for middle powers to be able to exercise some level of influence through multilateral diplomacy. While one could make the uncontroversial argument that these countries are driven to invest in regional multilateralism as a result of their limited material capabilities and diplomatic clout as compared to the major powers, it would be useful to probe further on the ways in which underlying processes give rise to particular middle power strategies in multilateralism. This would add to understandings about how middle powers interact with multilateralism and the conditions under which middle powers could achieve their objectives in such platforms. The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next section will outline how a differential framework could add value to the study of middle power behaviour. This will be followed by a section on the book’s research design, which includes explanations for the selection of case studies and research method. The chapter concludes with an overview of the book. 4

Introduction

Making the implicit explicit: differentiation in the study of middle powers Before we proceed further, it is necessary to outline the definition of middle powers that is used in this book. As with most concepts in the field of International Relations (IR), there is no single agreed definition for what a middle power is, although the literature comprises a variety of ways to approach the concept. These approaches will be covered in detail in Chapter 2, but briefly, middle powers have been identified by their material capabilities, identity and foreign policy behaviour. In light of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, as well as the fact that power is best treated as a multidimensional concept, the book proceeds on the basis that a composite definition of middle powers relying on all three approaches would be the most suitable and useful for our purpose. Hence, a middle power is defined here as a state that quantitatively ranks below the major powers, but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power. Based on the extant approaches to middle powers, it is clear that, at its core, the concept of middle powers involves the notion of differentiation. Most, if not all, works on middle powers have involved examining the factors that make middle powers different from the major powers and smaller countries, whether in terms of material capabilities, identity or behaviour. At the broader level, an important –​but often implicit –​objective is to justify and rationalize the category of ‘middle powers’ in the state system. In these discussions, however, differentiation is rarely dealt with from a theoretical perspective. Grasping the nature of middle power differentiation would be a first step towards understanding the factors that drive middle power behaviour in multilateralism. It is not just about a variation in resources or identity, but more fundamentally, about the mechanisms and processes that make it possible for middle powers to employ certain behavioural strategies. As none of the mainstream IR theories have dealt in depth with the concept of differentiation, this book borrows from sociology’s differentiation theory to set up its argument. In their edited volume that reflects on how differentiation theory could be utilized in IR, Albert, Buzan and Zürn define differentiation as ‘the form and structure of a large-​scale social entity … that is, how and on the basis of which structuring principle, are the main units within a social system (or subsystem) defined and distinguished from one another’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 1). Similarly, Donnelly states that ‘differentiation creates and fills the positions that comprise structures’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 91). Three main forms of differentiation are visible in international politics, namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification (or vertical differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and 5

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). While these terms are not commonly seen in the IR literature, the concepts behind them are not unfamiliar to the field. Segmentation denotes the idea of individual states as actors in the international system; stratification suggests some form of hierarchy among the actors; and functional differentiation refers to the separation of different sectors within the international system (for instance, global economic governance or international politics) as well as the notion that certain states could take on specific roles in global affairs (Donnelly, 2009, pp 55–​75; Albert et al, 2013, pp 1–​2, 6). The value of differentiation theory for IR lies in its ability to bring together these perspectives about how the international system is organized into a single framework. Considering the importance of differentiation in the study of middle powers, this book uses differentiation theory as a heuristic framework to understand middle power behaviour in multilateralism.2 It does this by first laying out the claim that differentiation constitutes the international political structure. This is certainly evident through the segmentation of political units as territorially sovereign states or the distinguishing of these states in terms of their capabilities or roles. Ideas about ‘major’, ‘middle’ and ‘small’ powers in themselves suggest the presence of pre-​existing concepts that, in the first place, enable discussion of these differentiated categorizations. Such differentiation is subsequently reproduced or transformed by the behaviour of states. This is not to say that the international system is static. When states reproduce or transform differentiation, the outcomes of their behaviour form the basis of structural change. In this way, the interaction of state behaviour with the differentiated structure reflects precisely the dynamic nature of the international system and its potential for change. Following from this, the book argues that this mechanism of differentiation generates the possibilities for middle power behaviour in multilateralism, with the effects actualized when middle powers engage in negotiations of power politics. The notion of power politics is closely associated with the realist paradigm, although it is important to note that the approach here follows more the classical realist (rather than neorealist) variant. In particular, the book’s framework relies on J. Samuel Barkin’s account of power politics as social, relative and relational (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–​20). This treatment of power politics takes into account both the material and ideational facets of power. Overall, the framework here seeks to pursue an ‘integrative pluralism’ that ‘accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multi dimensional accounts of complex phenomena’ (Dunne et al, 2013, p 416). This framework adds to the literature on middle power theory by bringing together the key elements that account for middle power behaviour in multilateralism. The expectation is that the presence of differentiation in 6

Introduction

the international political structure creates the conditions for middle power behaviour to manifest. As a result, middle powers seek to dilute major-​power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles in multilateral platforms. The claim that middle powers seek to dilute stratificatory forces emerges from the notion that given their limited capabilities and clout vis-​ à-​vis the major powers, middle powers would pursue ways to ensure that major powers are not the sole decision makers in global affairs. This was, for example, demonstrated in the efforts of Australia and Canada during the formation of the UN. Meanwhile, the claim that middle powers seek to strengthen functional differentiation for themselves is built on the premise that these countries, in order to set themselves apart from the rest of the non-​major powers and highlight their relevance and weight in international affairs, would leverage their ability to assume roles that no other country could perform as effectively. In these aspects, middle powers could contribute significantly to international politics in their own ways and typically through multilateralism. Such assumptions lay the foundations for this study, which seeks to find out how structure could condition and generate the strategies specific to middle powers in shaping the dynamics of multilateral platforms, within the context of the Asia Pacific.

Research design To explore the structural forces and underlying processes surrounding middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism, this book employs an intensive research design that uses data and analyses to produce explanations about how a process ‘works out in a particular case or limited number of cases’ (Sayer, 2010, p 242; see also Danermark et al, 2002, pp 161–​5). The point of an intensive research design is to put together an explanatory account of how structure produces a particular phenomenon under specific conditions; in this case, how it has been possible for middle powers to act and achieve certain outcomes in multilateralism. An intensive research design follows a ‘strategic’ sampling approach (Danermark et al, 2002, p 170). This means that the case studies are chosen based on how they ‘manifest the phenomenon of interest’, rather than the extent to which they are most similar or most different (Wagner, 2016, p 60). The focus here would thus be a within-​case analysis of the processes that have enabled middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism to emerge. A case study in this book would comprise the countries of interest and a specific instance of multilateralism. The book’s empirical focus, as mentioned, is on the Asia Pacific. While acknowledging that the Asia Pacific is a social construct and has been geographically defined in different ways, this book primarily follows the definition of the Asia Pacific that is reflected by the composition of most 7

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

regional multilateral institutions. This would include Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-​Leste, US and Vietnam. It is from this list of states that Australia, Indonesia and South Korea are identified as the middle powers for study. Among all the Asia Pacific states listed here, it is these three that fulfil, to varying extents, the dimensions of material capabilities, identity and behaviour as encapsulated in the middle power definition mentioned earlier. Multilateral platforms in the post-​Cold War Asia Pacific that Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea all participate in are the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-​Plus. Out of these four platforms, the three middle powers were arguably the most active during the establishment of APEC, which covers the period from the late 1980s to early 1990s, and the formative days of the EAS, which stretches from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. These two platforms will thus provide the multilateral contexts for the case studies. The book focuses primarily on the early days of these forums because it is when the processes and outcomes of middle power differentiation are arguably the most visible, be it in terms of shaping membership composition or demonstrating the specific functions of middle powers in the platforms. The launch of both multilateral forums has been regarded as key junctures in the regional architecture. APEC was established at the end of the Cold War, amidst concerns –​mostly from US allies and partners –​about US withdrawal from the Asia Pacific. APEC’s significance lies in the fact that it was the first multilateral organization in the post-​Cold War Asia Pacific with a relatively inclusive membership, ranging from the major economies such as the US and Japan, to emerging economies such as Indonesia and, later, China. While it began as a ministerial-​level meeting, by 1993 APEC had added an annual leaders’ meeting to its line-​up. As former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating underscores, APEC’s ‘importance and originality … lay not so much in its function, which was trade and economic cooperation, as in its scope’ (Keating, 2000, p 76). ‘[A]‌ny meeting’, he explains, ‘that includes the presidents of the US, China, Russia, Indonesia, and the prime minister of Japan and so on is, by its essence, a strategic one’ (Keating, 2001). The idea of a regional economic cooperation platform originally took shape in the late 1980s, as the Cold War was winding down. During this time, regional states were aware that new and effective forms of regional cooperation were needed to respond to changing global strategic dynamics and deepening economic integration outside the Asia Pacific (Hawke, 1994, pp 431–​2; Dalrymple, 2003, pp 84–​5). In this regard, countries such as Australia, Japan and the US were considering, separately, proposals to strengthen trade and economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific. However, due to fears about major power 8

Introduction

domination of any potential multilateral platform, Australia took on the leading role in the initiative and Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed the formation of APEC in a speech on 31 January 1989 in Seoul (Cooper et al, 1993, p 104; Dalrymple, 2003, p 85). Twelve member economies participated in the inaugural APEC ministerial meeting, held in Canberra in November that same year. Due to initial concerns about Chinese domination of the economic grouping and global political developments, the participation of China –​along with Hong Kong and Taiwan –​was only finalized in 1991, with the assistance of South Korea. To be sure, not all regional states were equally committed to the APEC idea initially. Some ASEAN member states, for instance, were concerned about the potential for APEC to sideline ASEAN in regional multilateralism. As the de facto leader of ASEAN, Indonesia worked to preserve the organization’s central role in APEC and ultimately became a strong advocate of the APEC agenda. It also persuaded fellow ASEAN members to agree on converting Malaysia’s counter proposal for an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) to a ‘caucus’ that would be incorporated within the APEC framework (Pura, 1992; Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p 130). These circumstances surrounding the establishment of APEC, and the high-​profile roles taken by Australia, Indonesia and South Korea during this time, make it a valuable context for this book. The second context focuses on the EAS, which was inaugurated in 2005. The time period of concern, however, extends over a relatively long period of time, from the late 1990s to early 2010s. This is due to how the EAS concept and membership have developed over the years. The idea for an EAS has generally been credited to a recommendation from the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) initiated by then South Korean President Kim Dae-​ jung in the late 1990s (Kim, 2006, p 11; Cho and Park, 2014, p 584). The recommendation, which was presented by the EAVG in 2001, was that an EAS would evolve, over the long term, from the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit. Given this expectation, many in the region were caught by surprise when, in May 2004, Malaysia expressed the intention to host the first EAS the following year. Disagreement emerged regarding EAS membership. The backdrop of China’s rise and its rivalry with Japan for regional leadership, as well as concerns from other regional countries about what kind of power China would become, were important factors shaping this debate. China and Malaysia wanted an ‘Asians only’ organization that would mirror the APT membership, while Japan, Indonesia and Singapore advocated for an open and inclusive membership (Malik, 2006, p 208). Indonesia, in particular, expressed concerns that an EAS comprising only the APT states could sideline ASEAN centrality, given the combined economic weight of China, Japan and South Korea vis-​à-​vis the ten ASEAN member states (Natalegawa, 2018, p 88). Following negotiations within ASEAN, specific membership criteria were established and the inaugural summit was attended 9

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by the leaders of the ten ASEAN states as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. The inception of the EAS in 2005 was a salient moment because it institutionalized the annual gathering of the leaders of regional states that were considered key to the power dynamics of the time. This was slightly different from APEC, which had focused on ‘member economies’. APEC’s exclusion of India and inclusion of entities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as further-​flung countries such as Peru and Chile, also complicated its regional relevance by this time. Following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, there was moreover a pushback against perceptibly ‘western’-​ dominated forms of cooperation such as APEC. While the EAS’ agenda originally focused on areas of non-​traditional security –​specifically, finance, energy, education, avian flu prevention and disaster management –​its ability to gather key regional leaders for annual meetings made it ‘the region’s premier forum for strategic and security issues’ (Turnbull, 2017). This was even more so after the US and Russia were formally admitted as members in 2011, an outcome attributed in large part to efforts from Indonesia and Australia –​even if the latter’s ill-​fated Asia Pacific Community (APC) initiative ultimately failed to materialize in its intended form. Consequently, the time period for the EAS case study is from the late 1990s to the early 2010s, although the focus is on three specific instances –​the EAVG, the launch of the EAS and its expansion to include the US and Russia. The activism and contributions of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to APEC and the EAS would provide the necessary empirical data to examine how differentiation helped to generate middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism and how negotiations of power politics shaped the outcomes of those behaviour. The specific developments within each multilateral context will be discussed in more detail later in the book. Suffice to note here that in both contexts, the middle powers sought to dilute major-​power stratificatory forces. This is admittedly a logical objective for all multilateral efforts, but as we will see later, the ways that each middle power pursued this goal were slightly different. The founding of the respective multilateral platforms also enhanced functional differentiation for middle powers in light of the specific roles that they took on in shaping the organizations. To trace the workings of the underlying processes within each multilateral context, the book relies mainly on two complementary modes of inference, namely, abduction and retroduction. The former involves ‘the redescription or recontextualization of a known phenomenon’, while the latter aims to unpack the constitutive properties of the ‘abduced’ structures (Wagner, 2016, pp 56–​7). While often compared to induction and deduction, abduction and retroduction are more appropriate for this book’s purposes given that the aim is to explore the underlying processes that make it possible for a phenomenon to manifest itself within a specific context, rather than to identify law-​like 10

Introduction

regularities or general patterns across cases (Danermark et al, 2002, pp 80–​1; Robson, 2011, p 37). The aim of abductive and retroductive reasoning is not to uncover ‘the ultimate truth’ –​this is viewed to be almost impossible in open contexts of social science –​but rather, to make an ‘inference to the best explanation’ given the available knowledge (Danermark et al, 2002, p 94; Halperin and Heath, 2012, p 38). In applying abduction, the central question that is asked is: ‘[w]‌hat meaning is given to something interpreted within a particular conceptual framework?’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 80) The core tenet of abduction is that there exists an empirical and observable phenomenon, which the researcher (re)interprets according to ‘a frame of interpretation or a theory’, which in turn results in a new account about the phenomenon (Danermark et al, 2002, p 90). The analysis can therefore move from individual empirical phenomena to unobservable structures, for example interpreting a meeting at work (individual empirical phenomenon) as a ritual produced by the mechanism of social cohesion (unobservable structure) (Danermark et al, 2002, p 94). This book recontextualizes middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism as being generated by the mechanism of differentiation. The aim of interpreting the phenomenon within a new framework is to enhance understanding of the phenomenon with ‘a different, possibly more developed or deeper conception of it’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 91). Following abduction, the structures are ‘retroduced’ to find out their characteristic properties. The central question here is: ‘[w]‌hat qualities must exist for something to be possible?’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 80). Andrew Sayer points out that retroduction allows the researcher to ‘get beyond the recognition that something produces some change to an understanding of what it is about the object that enables it to do this’ (Sayer, 2010, p 106). It is not just that X is followed by Y; rather, the focus is on the ‘continuous process’ by which X produces Y (Sayer, 2010, p 107). This study will thus need to ask the question: what processes need to occur for differentiation to generate middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism? For this study of middle power behaviour, it is postulated that these processes involve negotiations of power politics. Both abductive and retroductive reasoning would thus help to uncover the underlying processes and conditions that have framed middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. In short, the book’s argument and framework will rely on abducing differentiation in the regional structure, before retroducing the conditions which enable the effects of differentiation to shape middle power behaviour and outcomes.

Overview of book The book is organized as follows. Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the extant literature on middle powers and their behaviour with three 11

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aims in mind. First, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the existing approaches to middle powers will help to establish a definition for middle powers as used in the book. Second, the review will highlight the implicit notion of differentiation embedded in the middle power approaches thus far. Third, the review will call attention to the prevalent association between middle power behaviour and multilateralism. Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical framework that this book uses to explain middle power behaviour in multilateralism. Against mainstream understandings of structure in IR, the chapter makes the case for segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation as being constitutive of the international political structure. It also outlines how this differentiated structure serves as a mechanism to generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism. Given that segmented states remain the primary actors in the study, the book’s analytical focus is primarily on how middle powers interact with the forces of stratificatory and functional differentiation. The chapter also discusses the role of power politics in shaping the multilateral strategies of middle powers, as they pursue the dilution of major-​power stratification and functionally differentiated roles to their advantage. The APEC and EAS case studies are explored respectively in Chapters 4 and 5. Both chapters first examine the regional dynamics and structural conditions that characterized the Asia Pacific in the period leading up to the proposal of the initiatives, and highlight how differentiation was present in the structure at the time. This will shed light on how the context was conducive (or not) to the formation of APEC and the EAS. The initiatives of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the context of the two multilateral platforms are then outlined. Chapter 6 brings together both case studies and links it back to the theoretical framework of the book. The analysis here will draw out the consistencies or discrepancies for each country in their approaches towards the two instances of regional multilateralism, as well as similarities and differences across the three middle powers. Based on the empirical data, the chapter will trace how differentiation conditioned middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism, as well as how social, relational and relative power politics activated the effects of the differentiated structure for middle powers. These dynamics enabled Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to carve for themselves a seat at the table of regional decision making. This chapter will also briefly consider instances of Asia Pacific multilateralism which did not appear as conducive for middle power behaviour to materialize. Last but not least, Chapter 7 brings the book to a close by reiterating the main argument and findings, as well as the contributions to the literature. The chapter also offers some theoretical and policy implications of the research findings, and highlights key areas for further research.

12

2

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour Introduction The contemporary study of middle powers has focused primarily on defining the concept and examining the foreign policies of such states. While there has yet to be a standardized definition of what middle powers are, the literature suggests three primary ways of approaching the concept, based on material capabilities, identity and behaviour. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, as we will see in the following discussion, their respective elements are interlinked. The themes in each of these approaches to middle powers moreover correspond to the three dominant IR paradigms, namely, (neo)realism, constructivism and (neo)liberalism. This chapter reviews the existing approaches to middle powers with three aims in mind. First, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each approach would help to establish a working definition for middle powers. This would, in turn, be the basis upon which the countries for study are selected. While acknowledging that definitional issues remain the biggest challenge for middle power theory building, the best way forward would nonetheless be to arrive at a composite definition of middle powers that draws on the strengths of the three approaches while offsetting their weaknesses. Consequently, the working definition of a middle power in this book refers to a state that quantitatively ranks below the major powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power. Second, through a review of the extant approaches to middle powers, we will be able to discern the notion of differentiation that is implied in the study of middle powers but thus far undertheorized. For instance, defining middle powers based on material capabilities –​also known as the position approach –​is premised on the assumption that these states have a different level of capabilities as compared to others. The identity approach 13

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makes the case that middle power identity is different from the identities of major powers and smaller states. Last but not least, the behaviour approach emphasizes that middle powers rely on particular foreign policy strategies or diplomatic styles that other types of states may not be as drawn towards or be as effective in. In this sense, differentiation is present in all three approaches to middle powers, but the current literature does not go deep enough in examining this notion of differentiation and its value for the middle power concept. Third, the survey will highlight that, according to the behaviour approach, middle powers are generally acknowledged to be inclined towards multilateralism in their foreign policies. This argument is linked both to the limited level of material capabilities that middle powers possess, as well as to what a self-​perceived middle power regards as appropriate foreign policy strategies for itself. Through emphasizing the established link between middle powers and multilateralism, this chapter will clarify the rationale for the book’s focus on middle power behaviour in multilateral organizations. This chapter is organized as follows. It will first examine the position, identity and behaviour approaches to defining middle powers, including the value and gaps of each approach. The discussion will further demonstrate that differentiation is a fundamental assumption in the scholarship on middle powers, although an in-​depth investigation into the theoretical implications of this differentiation has been lacking. In the third section of the chapter, we will arrive at a composite definition of middle powers based on the strengths and weaknesses of the three extant approaches. This definition will then be used to select the three countries of primary interest for the book, namely, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea.

Approaches to middle powers This section will discuss the three main approaches in the study of middle powers, which are premised respectively on material capabilities, identity and behaviour.

Middle power capabilities: the position approach The position approach focuses on ranking countries by their material capabilities, such as gross domestic product (GDP), military expenditure, population or territorial size. Based on these rankings, a tier of countries –​ typically those coming in just below the major powers –​are identified to be middle powers. The possession of material capabilities in the measurement of power is important; without the requisite resources, it would be challenging for a country to back up its claims to middle power status. 14

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

In general, those using this approach could be divided into two groups. The first group stresses the utility of economic size as the primary defining characteristic of middle power capability (Holbraad, 1984, pp 78–​9; Wood, 1987, p 5). Carsten Holbraad observes that gross national product (GNP) is ‘more reliable and useful’ than other indicators because: This quantity reflects most of the material and moral factors that make up power, including population, area, location, resources, organisation and leadership. Since it is essentially a measure of economic strength, it indicates potential as much as actual military power … [and] correlates highly with a number of much more complex and elaborate indices of power … What is more, it corresponds fairly closely to most people’s impressions of the relative power of nations. Finally, carefully calculated figures for GNP are readily available. (Holbraad, 1984, p 78) Likewise, Bernard Wood relies on GNP to identify middle powers not only because it is a ‘remarkably simple and accessible single indicator of the relative power of nation-​states’, but also because of its perceived ‘objectivity’ over other indicators (Wood, 1987, pp 5–​6). The second group of scholars has preferred to use composite indices in determining which states are middle powers (Ping, 2005, pp 66–​70; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, pp 5–​6; Emmers and Teo, 2018, pp 19–​24). The indicators used in these works span the economic, military and social sectors. A combination of several indicators across different sectors is aimed at enhancing the comprehensiveness of the measurement (Neack, 1991, pp 53–​4). Even Holbraad, who privileges GNP over other indicators, adds that population size could also be a valuable supplementary criterion for the longer term, while in the shorter term troop numbers, military expenditure and the standard of weaponry might be helpful as they reflect concrete military power (Holbraad, 1984, p 79). Regardless of whether they rely purely on economic size or a combination of indicators, both methods encompass a ranking of some sort in order to pinpoint the middle powers based on material capabilities and resources. To be sure, these countries are not necessarily –​and in fact, rarely –​in the literal ‘middle’ of the quantitative rankings. Rather, as Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil note, middle powers are typically those countries ‘with a ranking roughly in the tenth to thirtieth range across a range of capability indicators’ at the global level (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 5). Others have made the case for determining the ‘line of separation’ between middle powers and other states at where it seems the most logical to the researcher, or with a statistical technique known as cluster analysis (Holbraad, 1984, p 81; see also Gilley and O’Neil, 2014, p 5). 15

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The lack of agreed parameters and standardized indicators have led critics to highlight the arbitrariness of this approach (Chapnick, 1999, pp 77–​8; Jordaan, 2019, p 113). Potentially, this could mean that a ranking based solely on GNP and a ranking that gives more weight to other types of indicators could produce middle power groups that comprise different states. Another challenge involves the different rationales that different scholars would have in determining the lines of separation between middle powers and other states. In this sense, a quantitative approach could to some extent be influenced by preconceived notions of which state should or should not be a middle power. To be sure, the possession of capabilities remains important for state power at the most basic level. This approach provides an important basis for identifying middle powers because material capabilities ‘are the necessary condition for middle powers … to have sufficiently broad sets of interests at stake; and for their initiatives to be credible and thus feasible’ (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 4). Without an adequate level of resources, a country would face difficulty fulfilling its middle power aspirations. Material capabilities could thus be a point of departure in identifying middle powers, although it alone cannot offer a comprehensive definition of power (Cox, 1989, p 827; Wight, 1995, p 26; Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33). It would be important to also consider other, qualitative, factors when it comes to middle powers. It is thus to the identity approach that we now turn.

Middle power image: the identity approach The identity approach examines if and how a country has described itself as a middle power, and whether others have acknowledged and recognized this identity. Located in the constructivist school of IR, the identity approach builds on the assumption that a state’s identity influences the formation of its interests, and consequently the strategies it uses to protect those interests (Jepperson et al, 1996, pp 60–​2; Wendt, 1999, p 231). Many works on middle powers have taken identity as a starting point, regardless of whether they explicitly state so (see, for example, Gecelovsky, 2009; Patience, 2014). Andrew Hurrell highlights that in light of the criticisms against the other approaches to middle powers, constructivism might offer a ‘potentially promising way’ to salvage the concept’s utility (Hurrell, 2000, p 1). From this perspective, Hurrell writes, ‘[m]‌iddle-​powermanship … becomes an embedded guiding narrative, a particular foreign policy ideology that can be traced historically, that is rooted within and around particular parts of the bureaucracy, and that can be perhaps related to broader trends or tendencies in the domestic politics of the country’ (Hurrell, 2000, p 1). In terms of self-​identification, statements from leaders and key policymakers, political elites, as well as official documents, are usually taken as an indication of whether the country assumes a middle power identity 16

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(see, for example, Ungerer, 2007; Teo, 2018). Due to the intersubjective nature of identity formation, it is also important that the middle power has its status affirmed by other actors (Wendt, 1999, p 224). As Hurrell explains: [y]‌ou can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others –​by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. (Hurrell, 2000, pp 2–​3) In this context, other actors that affirm a middle power’s self-​identity would include fellow middle powers, major powers, smaller states, as well as regional and global institutions. A common theme in the literature on middle power identity is the existence of a distinct difference between the identities of major powers, middle powers and small states, even if it is not always clear what this difference is. This point is often implicit in the authors’ arguments, such as when Allan Patience posits that middle powers could identify themselves as ‘junior partners’ of major powers or when David Scott points out that former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s ‘sense of Middle Power opportunities was precisely because Australia was not a Great Power’ (Scott, 2013, p 114; Patience, 2014, p 217). Another example is when Paul Gecelovsky highlights the case of post-​World War II Canada seeking a status that was ‘between the “riffraff” and the great powers’ (Gecelovsky, 2009, p 83). In this sense, a middle power is viewed to be different from the major or smaller powers. Patience argues that identity is particularly important for middle powers because, unlike the great or small powers whose ‘greatness’ or ‘smallness’ is often assumed to be a given, middle powers suffer from ‘status anxieties’ (Patience, 2014, p 211). The apprehension stems from the unclear distinction between middle powers and –​what self-​identified middle powers perceive to be –​smaller states. As such, middle powers ‘have much to gain if their [self-​identification] is recognised at regional and global levels, but they have a lot to lose if it is not’ (Patience, 2014, p 211). It is thus crucial that a state declaring itself to be a middle power is similarly viewed by other actors in the international system. Without this recognition, its ‘middle power’ status could easily be brought into question. A second theme in this approach involves the impact of middle power identity on foreign policy behaviour. Some scholars note the positive correlation between identity and behaviour. Carl Ungerer, for example, observes that Australia’s self-​identification as a middle power has been ‘one of the strongest influences on the form and conduct of Australian diplomatic practice’ in the post-​World War II years, while Sung-​Mi Kim highlights that the middle power concept has been used by South Korean governments ‘as a 17

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framework for their foreign policy vision and strategy’ (Ungerer, 2007, p 540; Kim, 2016, p 2). Likewise, Gecelovsky notes that the middle power identity ‘has guided policy makers in crafting Canada’s foreign policy’ (Gecelovsky, 2009, p 77). Such a middle power identity is typically built on elements such as international activism, functionalism and bridging (Ungerer, 2007; Kim, 2016; Teo, 2018). Unsurprisingly, these elements are similar to what the behaviour approach espouses. While an identity approach would certainly allow the researcher to directly pinpoint which countries regard themselves as middle powers, relying solely on such an approach to define middle powers also has several problems. It has been highlighted, for example, that while policymakers use the middle power identity as a guide for their countries’ foreign policy strategies, elements of the concept do not necessarily provide an accurate description of those strategies. James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves contend that elements of Australia’s middle power identity reflect how policymakers ‘conceived of Australia’s middle power role’ rather than ‘an objective assessment of the direction of Australian foreign policy’ (Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33). This raises questions such as, could a state still be a middle power if it assumes the identity but does not behave as expected? Conversely, what about a state that acts like a middle power in its foreign policy but does not explicitly describe itself as a middle power? For some countries, moreover, the use of the middle power label varies across different government administrations –​if a newly elected government decides to stop using the term ‘middle power’ to describe their country, for instance, would it mean that the country is no longer one (Carr, 2014, p 76)? Similarly, if the present US government decided to describe its country as a ‘middle power’, would it mean that the global hegemon is now classified as a middle power? Consequently, there is a need to link identity with both the position and behaviour approaches, to ensure a more accurate reflection of which countries are middle powers.

Middle power diplomacy and foreign policy: the behaviour approach The behaviour approach, as the name suggests, defines middle powers by their foreign policy behaviour. Conventional theories about middle power behaviour postulate that, given their limited material capabilities and diplomatic influence vis-​à-​vis the major powers, middle powers rely heavily on multilateral institutions, niche diplomacy and soft power tactics to preserve their interests in global agendas. Although it is debatable if such strategies are applicable only to middle powers, the assumption is nevertheless that middle power behaviour is unique and distinct from the behaviour of other types of states. This approach leans toward a neoliberal outlook where middle powers take on leading roles in international issues through 18

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

multilateral cooperation and institutions, the promotion of absolute gains, as well as the expansion of international agendas to include non-​military concerns. Given the optimistic view of what middle powers could and have achieved, it is not surprising that a major part of middle power theory building has put this approach at the front and centre. Ronald M. Behringer provides a concise summary of ‘middlepowermanship’, which he argues consists of three core elements (Behringer, 2013, pp 14–​ 20). First, due to their limited resources, middle powers would only be able to ‘exercise effective leadership’ in specific areas of international affairs (Behringer, 2013, p 14). This means that a middle power would need to limit its international involvement to issues in which it could presumably wield the most influence, depending on the resources it has. In contrast, major powers do not need to specialize, and smaller powers are ‘thought to lack the wherewithal to exert global influence even through specializing’ (Cooper, 2011, p 321). While this idea of ‘niche diplomacy’ or ‘functional leadership’ harks back to discussions on Canadian foreign policy in the late 1940s, Andrew F. Cooper and Gareth Evans have been instrumental in relating it to middle power behaviour in the post-​Cold War period (Cooper, 1997; Evans, 2011). As Australian foreign minister from 1988 to 1996, Evans advocated niche diplomacy, which he defines as ‘concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having’ (Evans, 2011). Cooper adds that according to the premises of niche diplomacy, a state’s ‘standing with respect to specific forums of decision-​making rested on specialized interests and task-​related experience’ (Cooper, 1997, p 4). Middle powers thus need to practice ‘[a]‌n element of selection’ in their global activism (Cooper, 1997, p 6). Second, middle powers rely on the deployment of soft power tactics to influence the preferences and behaviour of other stakeholders (Behringer, 2013, p 18). These include diplomatic or persuasive skills, credible reputation, as well as technical and intellectual leadership (Cooper et al, 1993; Behringer, 2013, pp 18–​20). As Cooper et al found in their study of middle powers, Australia and Canada possess ‘technical and entrepreneurial capacities … to provide complementary or alternative initiative-​oriented sources of leadership and enhanced coalition-​building in issue-​specific contexts’ (Cooper et al, 1993, p 7). Such capabilities enable middle powers to be a ‘catalyst’ of initiatives, a ‘facilitator’ of agendas, and/​or a ‘manager’ of institutions (Cooper et al, 1993, pp 24–​5). ‘Great powers clearly have these capacities, too –​often in significantly greater quantities’, write Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, but they may be less willing to use them (Beeson and Higgott, 2014, p 224). The premise here is that because middle powers lack the coercive or hard power assets of the major powers, they have to rely more on soft power capabilities to protect their interests and maintain their relevance in global affairs. 19

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An element of social obligation is arguably also at play here. Middle power theorists have described the ‘good international citizenship’ of middle powers, meaning that these countries are ‘willing to engage in cooperative international action to advance global public goods’ (Evans, 2017, p 109; see also Cooper et al, 1993, p 19). Behringer also makes the case that ‘unlike great powers, [middle powers] rarely resort to the deployment of military forces for coercive purposes’ (Behringer, 2013, p 18). Certainly, the practice of good international citizenship is largely predicated on a state’s own national interests (Cooper, 1997, p 7; Evans, 2011). As Cooper recalls, Australia and Canada –​generally treated as the exemplar middle powers of the post-​World War II period –​‘have been censured on a number of occasions for their passivity and/​or abdication of responsibility in responding to international crises’ (Cooper, 1997, p 7; see also Abbondanza, 2021). The third element of middlepowermanship, as argued by Behringer, is that middle powers depend greatly on multilateral processes to shape outcomes favourable to themselves (Behringer, 2013, p 16). This is the key analytical focus of the book. The argument that middle powers have a preference for multilateralism, coalition building and institution building is a popular one in the literature. Matthew Sussex, for example, declares that ‘[i]‌t is axiomatic that in order to enhance their relative positions in international politics middle powers attempt to gain influence within multilateral institutions’, among other strategies (Sussex, 2011, p 545). This preference for multilateralism is ‘a function of the size and capacity of these states’, as they are unable to individually influence global negotiations (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997, p 151). As such, they rely on building ‘like-​minded’ coalitions to include their concerns on global agendas and ensure that their interests are protected (Evans and Grant, 1995, pp 345–​6; Wilkins, 2019, p 52). The perception that multilateralism facilitates the institutionalization of rules and norms that are relatively beneficial to all participants, regardless of economic size or military capability, is also useful in explaining why middle powers are inclined towards such platforms. Multilateral channels are considered more open and fair, and could help to restrain major powers from imposing their preferences on the smaller states (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997, p 151; Finnemore, 2005, p 196). This brings us to the argument, put forth by Gilley and O’Neil, that middle powers pursue multipolarity in order to enhance their importance and strengthen their voice in the international system. It is in the interest of middle powers to have a ‘G20’ (Group of Twenty) in global governance, rather than a ‘G2’ (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 13). For middle powers, multilateralism becomes a useful way through which major power relations could be (re)shaped and the international system could be (re)fashioned towards multipolarity (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 11). Major powers could dismiss multilateralism and institutions because their preponderance allows them to achieve their aims without large-​scale 20

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cooperation. In an article tellingly titled ‘US unilateralism at the UN: Why great powers do not make great multilateralists’, Steven Holloway argues that: The desire to maximize the freedom to use their greater power made the top powers poor multilateralists. However, the interest of the small powers was to lessen their power disadvantage by binding the great powers to legal, alliance, and other multilateral institutions. Great powers relied on their own power advantage; minor powers relied on law and international organization. Put simply, great powers tended to be unilateralist, small and medium powers multilateralist. (Holloway, 2000, p 364) The more ambiguous distinction here is between middle powers and smaller states. As Laura Neack points out, the commitment to multilateralism since the end of World War II has been ‘ubiquitous’ in the foreign policies of all states, with the exception of North Korea (Neack, 2017). Consequently, ‘[c]‌oalition building is not the exclusive domain of middle powers but is an oft-​used method of politicking in an international order based on multilateralism’ (Neack, 2017). A way to clarify the distinction between middle powers and smaller states in this aspect would be to look at the differences in terms of their contributions towards multilateral institution building. Gilley and O’Neil posit, for example, that while both middle powers and smaller states share the vision of building a rules-​based order through institutions, such initiatives are ‘not one that smaller states can generally lead’ and leadership here is more likely to be assumed by middle powers (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 12). In other words, small states lack the necessary resources and diplomatic clout to take on leading roles in these endeavours. Likewise, Robert O. Keohane also observes that while middle powers ‘cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution’, small powers could ‘never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system’ (Keohane, 1969, p 296). The impact of middle powers and small states in multilateralism is thus expected to be visibly different. While both sides of the debate make valid arguments, they also lead to the important question of what makes multilateralism more useful for middle powers vis-​ à-​vis other states. More broadly, the behaviour approach to middle powers has been criticized for its tautological orientation and inconsistency. The latter has been applied particularly to the argument that middle powers employ niche diplomacy. Essentially, this means that middle powers are only middle powers for as long as they contribute to a particular issue (Chapnick, 1999, pp 74–​5; Jordaan, 2019, p 114). Once they stop doing so, their middle power status vanishes. Chapnick points out that this blurs the line between middle powers and 21

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small states, making it hard to defend the distinct categorization of middle powers over time (Chapnick, 1999, pp 74–​5). Meanwhile, the criticism of tautology arises from the practice of defining middle powers according to behavioural characteristics drawn from states that are, in the first place, taken to be middle powers, such as Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian states (Carr, 2014, pp 74–​5). While some scholars have tried to circumvent this circular argument by distinguishing between the ‘traditional’/​‘established’ and ‘non-​traditional’/​ ‘emerging’ (typically also referring to non-​western) middle powers, Sean Burges argues that such ‘conceptual stretching’ only adds to the murkiness and confusion in middle power theorizing (Burges, 2013, p 287). Eduard Jordaan, who wrote the seminal article that set out the defining parameters for emerging and traditional middle powers in 2003, has more than a decade later critiqued his own argument and suggested that such a distinction may be unhelpful in the analysis of middle power behaviour (Jordaan, 2003; Jordaan, 2019). Another response to the tautology of the behaviour approach has been to prioritize the actual impact of middle power actions. Andrew Carr defines middle powers in terms of their ‘systemic impact’, defined as the ability for states to ‘protect their core interests and initiate or lead a change in a specific aspect of the existing international order’ (Carr, 2014, p 79). His approach builds on the analysis of Keohane, who, writing during the Cold War, grouped states into four categories –​great, secondary, middle and small powers –​according to their ability to change the international system (Keohane, 1969, p 296). Others have also examined how middle powers exert influence in multilateral negotiations (see, for example, Lee, 1998; Cooper, 2011). While measuring influence may be a more useful gauge of the significance of middle powers in the international system, the effectiveness of this method remains obscured by the vague distinctions between middle powers and other types of states. Major powers, for example, would certainly be able to ‘protect their core interests’ and ‘alter a specific element of the international order’ (Carr, 2014, pp 79–​80). To a certain extent, some smaller states may also be able to fulfil these criteria depending on the issue. It is thus unclear why such influence is unique to middle powers. Based on this review of the middle power literature, two points are broadly evident. First, in all three approaches to middle powers, differentiation is a fundamental assumption. Middle powers are understood to be different from other types of states in terms of their material capabilities, identity or behavioural strategies. Although the specific distinctions may not always be clear or standardized, the notion of differentiation is nevertheless present. Given the importance of differentiation for the study of middle powers, it is thus worth examining the theoretical and empirical implications of this concept in the context of middle powers. Second, analyses of middle 22

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

power behaviour have made the case that such countries depend heavily on multilateralism to pursue their interests. The link between middle powers and multilateralism may be ‘axiomatic’, as Sussex writes, but less apparent are the conditions that make multilateralism a conducive platform for middle power behaviour (Sussex, 2011, p 545). This book thus seeks to clarify these conditions that make it possible for middle powers to behave the way they do in multilateral organizations. This will be of value to middle power theory building, in light of the well-​established expectations about middle powers and multilateralism. Chapter 3 will incorporate elements from both differentiation and multilateralism, to establish a framework for examining these conditions for middle power behaviour in such forums. Before that, however, let us first focus on identifying the middle powers in the Asia Pacific based on the three approaches discussed in this section. These middle powers will serve as our case studies in the subsequent empirical discussions.

Middle powers in the Asia Pacific In light of the respective deficiencies of the position, identity and behaviour approaches, the best way forward would be to arrive at a composite definition of middle powers that draws on the strengths of the three approaches. This follows scholars that examine the notion of power, in general, as well as those conducting research into middle powers, in particular. For instance, Tanguy Struye de Swielande points out the importance of adopting an integrative and pluralistic approach to the study of middle powers, so that the middle power literature could overcome the constraints inherent in individual IR paradigms or specific approaches (de Swielande, 2019, p 19). Likewise, Manicom and Reeves postulate that the ‘archetypical middle power … possesses three characteristics: the material capability, the behavioral element, and the ideational component’ (Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33). As Joseph S. Nye, Jr points out in the context of rising powers such as China or India, ‘whether the capacity that [their economic and military] resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country’s skill in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes’ (Nye, 2011, p 10). The understanding of power should, in this sense, encompass several dimensions. Material capabilities are important but so are perceptions and actions. Based on the preceding discussion, the working definition of a middle power in this book refers to a state that quantitatively ranks below the major powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power. Let us address 23

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

each of these dimensions in turn. It should be noted that the following discussion will be relatively brief, with the aim of broadly identifying which countries are of interest to this book’s study. A more detailed examination of the selected countries’ middle power credentials under specific time periods would be undertaken in the later empirical chapters. The first dimension is material capabilities. Considering the various inconsistencies in selecting such indicators, David A. Cooper observes that it might be more useful to employ a ‘deliberate oversimplification’ in assessing national power as a way of identifying middle powers (Cooper, 2013, p 25). Following this, it is suggested here that all that is needed is one indicator that reflects broadly a state’s overall resources, and which through a ranking reveals the countries that occupy appropriately ‘middle-​ranking’ spots in the global hierarchy. This indicator is GDP. In studies that focus on measurements and assessments of state power, economic wealth is often found to be closely correlated with other indices of power, such as population, territorial size and other resources (Holbraad, 1984, p 78; Wood, 1988, p 17). As Hugh White succinctly notes, economics is the ‘ultimate source’ of national power and the most significant factor in power politics in the long term (White, 2010, p 19). He adds that ‘[n]‌o country in history has exercised great power without great wealth, and the country with the most wealth always ends up with the most power’ (White, 2010, p 19). The wealth examined here is aggregate, and not per capita. This is because per-​capita wealth reveals more about the standard of living of a state’s residents, rather than the overall resources it could potentially channel into its foreign policy. In fact, in terms of per-​capita GDP, Luxembourg places at the top while China is somewhere in the middle of the global rankings. This does not seem to correspond to their potential power at the global level, particularly in terms of each country’s ‘political and strategic weight in the world’ (White, 2010, p 19). Using aggregate GDP would thus offer a relatively accurate reflection of the (quantitative) hierarchy of power and allow us to identify a group of ‘appropriately qualified’ countries as a starting point to the selection of middle powers (Cooper, 1997, p 1). Following Gilley and O’Neil’s assertion that states ‘with a ranking roughly in the tenth to thirtieth range’ at the global level could be considered middle powers (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 5), a ranking of GDP between 1986 and 2020 reveals that among Asia Pacific countries, Australia, South Korea and Indonesia have consistently qualified as (quantitative) middle powers since the last days of the Cold War (see Table 2.1). Countries such as India and Russia have also made the cut relatively frequently, but their appearances in this ‘middle-​ranking’ list have not been as persistent as the former three countries. The second dimension in this composite definition is identity. To pinpoint which Asia Pacific countries have adopted and projected a middle power 24

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

Table 2.1: Asia Pacific countries ranking between tenth and 30th in GDP Year

Countries (in descending order of GDP)

1986

India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

1987

India; China; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

1988

China; India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

1989

China; Australia; India; South Korea; Indonesia

1990

China; India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

1991

Russia; China; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand

1992

China; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand

1993

China; Russia; South Korea; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand

1994

South Korea; Russia; India; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

1995

South Korea; Russia; Australia; India; Indonesia; Thailand

1996

South Korea; Australia; India; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand

1997

South Korea; Australia; India; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand

1998

India; Australia; South Korea; Russia

1999

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia

2000

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia

2001

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia

2002

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia; Thailand

2003

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia

2004

South Korea; India; Australia; Russia; Indonesia

2005

South Korea; India; Russia; Australia; Indonesia

2006

South Korea; Russia; India; Australia; Indonesia

2007

Russia; India; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia

2008

India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

2009

India; Russia; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia

2010

Russia; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia

2011

India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia; Thailand

2012

India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia; Thailand

2013

India; Australia; South Korea; Indonesia; Thailand

2014

India; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2015

South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2016

South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2017

South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2018

South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2019

Russia; South Korea; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

2020

South Korea; Russia; Australia; Indonesia; Thailand

Source: The World Bank (2021a).

25

Middle Powers in Asia Pacific Multilateralism

identity, the rhetoric adopted by policymakers, diplomats and government officials will be examined. The US, which is the undisputed global hegemon in the post-​Cold War period, has never been described as a middle power. Another group of countries –​China, India and Japan –​are also rarely viewed consistently as middle powers, although observers have occasionally discussed the middle power potential of some of them (see, for example, Segal, 1999; Soeya, 2005, p 105; Efstathopoulos, 2011). Japan and China, moreover, have under different time periods been considered potential challengers to US dominance, both in the Asia Pacific as well as globally (Hawes, 1990, p 166; Ziegler, 1994, p 529; Twining, 2007, p 79). Meanwhile, India and Russia are typically seen as being located right outside the major power group, not comparable to the US, China or Japan in the Asia Pacific context, but yet exceeding the middle power status (see, for example, Nayar and Paul, 2003; Hancock, 2007). Most other countries in the region, such as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, New Zealand, North Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-​Leste and Vietnam, likewise have not displayed a consistent inclination towards projecting a middle power identity in the post-​Cold War period, despite observers occasionally referring to some of these countries as middle powers (see, for example, Pongsudhirak, 2015; Lemahieu and Leng, 2020, p 6; Le, 2021). This leaves us with Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. Among the 20 Asia Pacific countries identified in this book, Australia’s middle power identity has been in existence for the longest period of time –​at least since the end of World War II (Ungerer, 2007). This identity emerged out of an attempt to limit the influence of the major powers in the then newly established UNSC, and since then Australia has been associated very much with a middle power image (Evatt, 1946, p 27; Hudson and Way, 1989, p 134). To be sure, Australia’s middle power identity has drawn different levels of enthusiasm from the country’s two major political parties. Labor governments have typically embraced and actively promoted Australia’s middle power identity, while Liberal/​ Coalition politicians have dismissed the description of Australia as a middle power. The latter’s denial of the middle power label stems from scepticism over multilateralism and institutions, as well as the view that ‘middle power’ connotes insignificance (Downer, 2003; Beeson and Lee, 2015, p 234). Despite this rejection of the middle power rhetoric, observers highlight that Australia’s status as a middle (or middle-​sized) power has been characterized by ‘a high degree of bipartisanship’ and continues to occupy a paramount position in the country’s foreign policy (O’Neil, 2014, p 19; see also Ungerer, 2007, p 538). Although some scholars have sought to question Australia’s middle power status, it has significantly also been acknowledged by foreign actors (see, for example, Lim, 2002; ‘Korea, Australia’, 2009; Levy and Watkins, 2011). This suggests that 26

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

the middle power identity has been strongly embedded in the discourse surrounding Australia’s foreign policy. Compared to Australia, South Korea is a relatively recent adopter of the middle power identity. Former President Roh Tae-​woo was the first South Korean president to describe the country as a ‘middle power’ in 1991, in the context of its economic rise (‘Korean president’, 1991; Shin, 2016, p 195). Subsequently, and especially from the late 1990s, Seoul’s efforts to promote its middle power status picked up pace (see, for example, Choi, 1999; Han, 2001). For the most part, South Korea built its middle power identity on its rapid economic growth and the potential for it to be a bridge between the advanced and emerging economies. The appointment of Ban Ki-​moon as UN Secretary-​General in 2007 bolstered efforts to portray the country as a proactive and constructive middle power in international affairs. Under President Lee Myung-​bak (2008–​13), the promotion of the middle power concept in South Korea’s foreign policy discourse and decision making reached new heights. During this time, there was also a concerted effort by South Korea’s research institutes and media to advocate its middle power status (see, for example, Robertson, 2008; Lee, 2012). Moreover, South Korea initiated the formation of MIKTA in 2013, which its foreign affairs ministry described as a group of ‘middle power nations’ aiming to collectively address global challenges (Shin, 2013). South Korea’s middle power identity has also been acknowledged and accepted by external sources (see, for example, Sheridan, 2008; ‘Singaporean leader’, 2010). Moving on to Indonesia, it is intriguing that its middle power identity seems to have initially emerged from external sources, rather than from Jakarta itself (see, for example, ‘Our media’, 1989; Mehta and Morais, 1990). Nevertheless, with its ‘robust economic growth, a stable domestic environment, and the resilience of its newly established democratic political system’ from the mid-​2000s, Indonesian officials and academics began promoting the country’s middle power status in global affairs during the later years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration (Emmers and Teo, 2018, pp 44, 47–​8; see also Darmosumarto, 2009; Wihardja, 2011). This narrative continued through the subsequent Joko Widodo administration, as the Foreign Ministry’s Strategic Plan 2015–​2019 called for strengthening Indonesia’s ‘middle power’ diplomacy and bolstering its role as a ‘middle power’ in global affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). Indonesia’s middle power identity has been affirmed by other actors, as evident in its inclusion in MIKTA and the earlier KIA acronym used to refer collectively to Asia’s middle powers that also included South Korea and Australia. It should be noted that some of Indonesia’s political elites have preferred to describe their country as a rising ‘negara besar’ (big power), rather than ‘negara menengah’ (middle 27

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

power) (Sukma, 2013; Asril, 2015). As Dave McRae points out, however, Indonesia’s projection of a ‘big power’ image runs counter to its foreign policy community’s awareness of the country’s limitations (McRae, 2014, pp 4–​5). Consequently, the middle power status continues to prevail in the discourse surrounding Indonesia’s international profile (see, for example, Djalal, 2016; Taufiqurrahman, 2016). In the case of Malaysia, it was only in the mid-​2010s that the country started to officially adopt the middle power identity. Prior to this, Malaysia’s political elites tended to describe their country as a ‘small’ and ‘developing’ country, albeit ‘medium-​sized and middle income’ (see, for example, Badawi, 2004; Albar, 2006, p 6). Under the second half of the Najib Razak government, however, the prime minister urged Malaysia to ‘embrace our position as one of the region’s [m]‌iddle [p]ower of states’ (as cited in Carvalho, 2014). While such rhetoric continued to make occasional appearances beyond the Najib administration, Malaysia’s middle power identity seems to remain largely under debate (see, for example, Liew, 2017; Ahmad, 2019). Given its tentative embrace of a middle power identity and the fact that this has only come about recently, Malaysia’s middle power identity is thus considered relatively weak in comparison to Australia, Indonesia and South Korea. The behaviour aspect makes up the third and final part of the composite definition used in this book. The indicator here would be whether a country is active in multilateral diplomacy. While several works relying on the behaviour approach have been critiqued for being tautological –​because middle powers according to this approach are typically defined according to behavioural characteristics drawn from the same states that are already taken to be middle powers –​the criterion of multilateral diplomacy is a requisite here. This is because the aim is not to examine if a middle power uses multilateralism, but rather, to examine the conditions that make it possible for a middle power to pursue certain strategies in multilateral organizations. In this sense, it would be necessary for the middle power countries under study to be active in, or at least engaged with, multilateralism. Many of the Asia Pacific countries would certainly fulfil this criterion at some point in time. One could even make the case for North Korea, which –​in spite of its relative reclusiveness –​is a regular participant in the ARF process. In fact, all 20 Asia Pacific countries participate in various regional multilateral forums. Taking into consideration material capabilities, identity and behaviour, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea are thus the countries in the Asia Pacific that embody most strongly all three aspects of ‘middlepowerness’ (see Figure 2.1). These will be the primary countries of interest in this book. 28

The Study of Middle Powers and Their Behaviour

Figure 2.1: The three aspects of middlepowerness

Material capabilities

Behaviour

All other Asia Pacific countries Australia, South Korea, Indonesia Malaysia

Identity

Conclusion This chapter has examined the three main approaches in the literature on defining middle powers, namely the position, identity and behaviour approaches. Given the weaknesses of the respective approaches, relying on any single perspective to define middle powers would be insufficient. To offset some of the shortcomings inherent in each definitional approach and for a more comprehensive way of identifying middle powers, this book argues for a composite definition of middle powers that relies on all three approaches. A middle power in this book refers to a country that quantitatively ranks below the major powers but above most of the rest of the states; identifies and is regarded by others as a middle power; and employs behavioural strategies such as investing in multilateralism and relying on persuasive or soft power. As shown in this chapter, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea qualify as middle powers in the Asia Pacific. The discussion in this chapter has further underscored both the importance and gap surrounding the notion of differentiation in the study of middle powers. A better understanding of differentiation in this context would help to strengthen the explanation for middle power behaviour in one of the most acknowledged foreign 29

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

policy strategies for such countries, that is, multilateralism. Building on the conclusions of this discussion, the next chapter establishes a theoretical framework premised on differentiation that would help to explain the structural forces and processes that condition and produce middle power behaviour in multilateral organizations.

30

3

Towards a Differential Framework for Middle Power Behaviour Introduction This chapter sets out a framework to explore the differentiation mechanism that generates middle power behaviour in multilateralism. As highlighted in the preceding chapter, while it is commonly accepted that middle powers are inclined towards multilateral diplomacy, less attention has been given to the underlying processes that produce middle power behaviour in such forums. In addition to analysing the structural forces that make it possible for middle powers to adopt certain strategies in multilateralism, this line of research would also offer useful insights to help clarify the distinctions between middle powers and other types of states. Building on the earlier analysis that differentiation has been a core yet understudied dimension in the middle power concept, the framework offered here seeks to make more explicit the basis of differentiation in the study of middle power behaviour. This is achieved by using differentiation theory as a heuristic to explain middle power behaviour. Originating from sociology and anthropology, differentiation theory has typically not occupied a major space in mainstream IR. This is in part due to neorealism’s dominance in IR, which posits that states are functionally alike, with the only difference among them boiling down to the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp 93–​9). Such a reading leads to the assumption that a theory of international politics must be necessarily based on the major powers and that non-​major powers, including middle powers, have little role to play in international politics due to the constraints of structure (Waltz, 1979, p 73). Certainly, it is evident that much of the behaviour approach to middle powers focuses on how these countries could overcome their structural constraints as defined by neorealism. Beeson and Higgott underscore the basis of middle power theory as ‘the ability to use non-​material assets’; Cooper, Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal juxtapose the ‘non-​structural forms of power and influence’ that middle powers leverage against the 31

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

‘structural leadership’ of the US; and, Gilley and O’Neil distinguish middle power theory from ‘more structurally determinative theories of great powers and secondary states’ (Cooper et al, 1993, p 23; Beeson and Higgott, 2014, p 223; Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 18). In these statements, structure is understood to prioritize material capabilities and consequently has little regard for the agency of non-​major powers in the international system –​‘the very antithesis of middle power thinking’ (Beeson and Higgott, 2014, p 218). A framework based on differentiation, however, suggests an alternative to traditional middle power theory. In this alternative account, middle power behaviour is enabled –​rather than simply constrained –​by structure. Following scholars such as Albert, Buzan, Zürn and Donnelly, this chapter makes the case that structure comprises three primary forms of differentiation, namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification (or vertical differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). As this chapter will demonstrate, such a reframing of the international structure allows us to more fully understand how middle power behaviour emerges from the dynamics of structure. Segmentation denotes the idea of individual states as actors in the international system; stratification suggests some form of hierarchy among the actors; and functional differentiation refers to the separation of different sectors within the international system (for instance, global economic governance or international politics) as well as the notion that certain countries could take on specific roles in international affairs (Donnelly, 2009, pp 55–​75; Albert et al, 2013, pp 1–​2, 6). Given that the reference system for this framework is the system of states, the segmentation of sovereign units remains largely unchanged. Instead, the book’s framework focuses more on explaining middle power behaviour through the dynamics of stratification and functional differentiation. The broad expectation of the framework here is that the presence of stratification and functional differentiation in the international political structure creates the conditions for middle power behaviour to manifest. Consequently, middle powers seek to dilute major-​power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles in international politics. The claim that middle powers seek to dilute stratificatory forces emerges from the notion that given their limited material capabilities and diplomatic clout vis-​à-​vis the major powers, middle powers would pursue ways to ensure that major powers are not the sole authority in collective decision making. Meanwhile, the claim that middle powers seek to strengthen functional differentiation is built on the premise that these states, in order to set themselves apart from the rest of the non-​major powers and highlight their unique value and relevance to global affairs, would take on roles that no other country could perform as effectively. 32

Towards a Differential Framework for Middle Power Behaviour

These possibilities for middle power behaviour are enabled by the contingencies of the differentiated structure, but the specific behavioural outcomes would be activated through the process of power politics that middle powers engage in, at a particular time and place. To a large extent, analyses about middle power behaviour in international affairs are unavoidably an examination of power politics, that is, how middle powers are able to achieve their interests vis-​à-​vis other states. Power is, moreover, the chief variable in the international political sector (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29; Albert et al, 2013, p 10). The inclusion of power politics into the framework would thus strengthen its utility in explaining middle power behaviour in international politics. Here, the framework follows the classical realist treatment that conceptualizes power politics as social, relative and relational (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–​20). This reading of power politics considers both its material and ideational dimensions, which are important when examining how middle powers exercise their power. These countries may possess a higher level of material capabilities than most of the states in the international system, but they lag behind those of the major powers. Consequently, material assets could only carry their influence so far in international politics. The ideational aspect is thus equally crucial because how middle powers view or are viewed in terms of, for instance, their credibility or diplomatic skill, would shape their policy options as well as the responses of others towards their initiatives. Consequently, although the differentiated structure generates the potential for middle power behaviour, its effects would only be actualized according to how middle powers navigate the social, relative and relational power politics in a particular situation. The chapter is organized as follows. It begins by examining how structure has been conceptualized in IR, and makes the case for differentiation as being constitutive of the international political structure. The three main forms of differentiation –​segmentary, stratificatory and functional –​will be outlined, and their relevance to the study of middle powers will be highlighted. The concept of power politics, focusing on its social, relative and relational dimensions, will then be discussed in detail. Multilateral platforms are also examined as sites of power politics. The final section before the chapter concludes brings together the elements of differentiation theory and power politics, incorporating them into a framework that will be used to explain middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism.

Re​framing structure in international politics Despite being a concept that is commonly referred to in IR, an agreed definition of structure among scholars remains elusive. William H. Sewell goes as far as to say that the concept of structure could never be pinned down with a ‘formal definition’, while José López and John Scott observe 33

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

that social structure is typically regarded as a ‘taken-​for-​granted concept that is not in need of any explicit definition or discussion’ (Sewell, 1992, p 2; López and Scott, 2000, p 1). Nevertheless, the constitutive elements of structure –​in particular, international structure –​has been a topic of much debate among IR scholars. In this section, we will first examine mainstream conceptualizations of structure, before turning to the reframing of structure that is premised on differentiation.

Structure in international relations The dominant understanding of structure in IR has been framed mostly by the neorealist school of thought. Defining structure as ‘the arrangement of the system’s parts and … the principle of that arrangement’, Kenneth N. Waltz establishes a three-​part formulation of the concept (Waltz, 1979, p 80). The first aspect looks at the structure’s ordering principle, for instance, if the structure is hierarchical or anarchical (Waltz, 1979, pp 81, 88–​93). The second aspect of this definition focuses on the functional differentiation of the units within the structure, and the third aspect focuses on the ‘distribution of capabilities across those units’ (Waltz, 1979, p 82). Based on this formulation, Waltz argues that domestic political structures are hierarchically ordered, with units differentiated by functions and capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp 81–​8). On the other hand, international systems are anarchic, meaning that each state ‘is the equal of all the others’ and there is an ‘absence of agents with system-​wide authority’ (Waltz, 1979, p 88). Anarchy, moreover, implies that states are ‘alike in the tasks that they face’ (Waltz, 1979, p 96). Through competition and socialization, states become functionally undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979, pp 74–​7). Given that all states are assumed to perform the same tasks, the only difference among them is attributed to the capabilities they have to perform these tasks (Waltz, 1979, pp 96–​7). In ranking states by their capabilities, Waltz asserts that all of the following elements need to be considered: population size, territorial area, amount of resources, economic capacity, military strength, and political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979, p 131). Consequently, a theory of international politics has to be necessarily based on the major powers –​ ‘the states that make the most difference’ as measured by the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, p 73). Structural change in the international system occurs only following alterations in the distribution of capabilities or ordering principle. This understanding of structure has had its fair share of critiques. First, given that structure is viewed as ‘a set of constraining conditions’ to ‘limit and mold’ actors –​resulting in similar outcomes –​social factors or the actual mechanisms of power have little or no explanatory value (Waltz, 1979, pp 73–​4; see also Barkin and Weitsman, 2019, pp 26–​7). In response 34

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to this shortcoming, Alexander Wendt argues that the social structure of international politics comprises three elements, namely, material conditions, interests and ideas (Wendt, 1999, p 139). He adds that international structure is ‘exactly what Waltz says it is not: a social rather than material phenomenon’ (Wendt, 1999, p 20). Neorealism overemphasizes the distribution of capabilities across states, and disregards the social aspects of the international structure. While capabilities are certainly important –​they indicate the resources available for a state to carry out its various tasks –​the shared understandings surrounding these material phenomena are crucial as well. For Wendt and other constructivists, the foundation of a social structure is in intersubjective ideas, and it is only through interactions with shared ideas that material elements acquire meanings and effects (Wendt, 1999, pp 20, 112; Onuf, 2013, p 11–​17). These meanings and effects would depend on which of the three ‘cultures of anarchy’ –​Hobbesian enmity, Lockean rivalry or Kantian friendship –​is dominant in international politics (Wendt, 1999, pp 246–​312). As an example, Wendt suggests that ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings’ (Wendt, 1995, p 73). Consequently, unlike the neorealist understanding of structural change as a change in ordering principle or distribution of capabilities, Wendt contends that structural change entails a change in the ‘cultures of anarchy’. The problem with Wendt’s formulation of structure, however, is that he has gone too far in pursuing ideational forces as a causal variable. Critics of Wendt argue that he has clearly relegated material forces to a secondary role and, contrary to his own claims, his formulation of the international political structure is indeed ‘ideas all the way down’ (Wendt, 1999, pp 96, 110–​13, emphasis in original; see also Wight, 2006, pp 155–​7; Donnelly, 2012b, p 630). One reason for this ambiguity could be that Wendt’s theory uses Waltz’s neorealism as a foil, thus resulting in an account of structure that focuses more on how the deterministic effects of anarchy on international politics could be overcome (Wendt, 1999, p 41; Zehfuss, 2001, p 56; Barkin, 2003, p 336). In light of these shortcomings, a more suitable approach would be to treat structure as a set of relations that establishes the linkages between the material and the ideational (Wight, 2006, pp 175–​6). The international political structure comprises both material and ideational elements, and to privilege one’s causal effects over the other’s establishes a false dichotomy (Wight, 2006, p 175; Barkin, 2010, p 32). Framing structure as a set of relations would help to highlight the intersections between materiality and ideational force. Consequently, structural change would entail a change in the relations that link together the material and ideational elements. 35

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Another criticism of the dominant neorealist view of structure calls out its assumption that only the major powers matter in international politics. As others such as Donnelly have pointed out, structure is not represented solely by its most powerful constituents: The class structure of a society is not defined by its ruling class. An army’s structure is not a matter of the number of generals and their relations to one another. We cannot discern the structure of a slave system by attending solely to the large slave-​owners. In addition to the privileged we must also consider the deprived (and those in between). Ranking, being relative, cannot be understood by looking only at those at the top of a hierarchy. … That some, many, or most have relatively few capabilities is essential to any adequate understanding of the distribution of capabilities. Ignoring the weak is a radically inappropriate way to understand relations of coordination and superordination, and thus the structure (arrangement of the parts) of international systems. (Donnelly, 2009, p 56) Although the environment within which middle powers operate may be shaped by the number of major powers in the system and their relations, the concept of structure –​defined as the arrangement of the parts of a system –​ would also need to take into account the presence and behaviour of the non-​major powers (Waltz, 1979, p 80; Holbraad, 1984, p 5). For such a task, the neorealist understanding of structure is thus inadequate as it privileges major powers at the expense of other actors. This also goes back to the earlier point about the necessity of considering both the material and ideational/​ social dimensions of structure. Examining the connections between these two elements is important to more fully comprehend the intricacies of middle powers and their behaviour (Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p 33; de Swielande, 2019, pp 20–​1). Even though the capabilities of middle powers lag behind those of the major powers, they still tend to be materially better equipped than most of the other states in the international system. The ideational and social aspects are equally important because (intersubjective) ideas and beliefs about the middle power’s interests and behaviour would determine how its activities are received by others. A multidimensional account of structure would thus help to better explain the opportunities for middle power behaviour and how such behaviour in turn impacts the structure of international politics. Interestingly, there are several inconsistencies in Waltz’s formulation that lead us to this alternative account of structure. For one, although Waltz frames (international) anarchy and (domestic) hierarchy as oppositions, his argument that states are differentiated by capability suggests that some form of hierarchy is present in the international system. Other scholars have also 36

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highlighted that the presence of hierarchy and Waltzian anarchy are not mutually exclusive (Donnelly, 2015, pp 408–​9; McConaughey et al, 2018, pp 184–​5). Moreover, Waltz acknowledges that major powers shoulder ‘special responsibilities’ in international politics (Waltz, 1979, p 198). Although these ‘special responsibilities’ are attributed to the presence of ‘units that are functionally similar but of different capability’, the identification of specific tasks that major powers have both the incentive and ability to undertake chips away at the assertion that states are functionally undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979, p 198). By recognizing that hierarchy is an element of the international structure and accepting that major powers serve distinct functions, this line of reasoning opens up the possibility that middle powers could exist as a distinct category in the international system of states and also fulfil certain functions in international politics that the other states are unable or unwilling to. The existence of middle powers and the acknowledgement that they have a distinct form of behaviour (that is, middlepowermanship) brings us to the concept of differentiation. Specifically, it is structure as a set of differentiated relations connecting the material and the ideational that conditions middle power behaviour in international politics.

Structure of differentiation in international politics Differentiation ‘creates and fills the positions that comprise structures’, and differentiation theory throws light on ‘how to distinguish and analyse the components that make up any social whole’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 316; Donnelly, 2013, p 91). Partly in response to the shortcomings and inconsistences in the neorealist formulation of structure, leading theorists making the case for a differentiated structure have –​building on earlier studies of sociologists such as Niklas Luhmann and Talcott Parsons –​ identified three main forms of differentiation in the international structure. These are, namely, segmentation (or unit differentiation), stratification (or vertical differentiation) and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). As we will see later, elements of differentiation are embedded, implicitly or explicitly, in several IR paradigms; nevertheless, differentiation theory facilitates the bringing together of these diverse yet related elements within a single framework. Indeed, Zürn et al note the potential for differentiation theory to contribute significantly to IR by allowing IR scholars to ‘see familiar things from a new perspective’ (Zürn et al, 2013, p 243; see also Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 316). Given the knowledge gap surrounding the processes and mechanisms underlying middle power behaviour in multilateralism, the value of differentiation theory for this book is its ability to offer ‘an alternative taxonomy, yet one that fits with, and up to a point unites, existing IR taxonomies’ (Zürn et al, 2013, p 243). 37

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Before we delve into the elements of the differential framework for middle power behaviour, it is useful to briefly acknowledge the absence of a homogenous approach in the application of differentiation to IR. The main divergence is between the ‘type’ and ‘dimension’ approaches. Type approaches have traditionally dominated the debates on structure in IR (see Donnelly, 2013). This is evident in both the accounts of structure by Waltz and Wendt, in which the former considers the international system as being only of one type (that is, anarchically ordered) and the latter identifies three types of international anarchy (namely, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian) depending on the degrees of ‘cultural internalization’ and cooperation (Waltz, 1979, pp 88–​93; Wendt, 1999, pp 246–​312). Buzan and Albert adopt a similar ‘type’ approach and suggest that ‘different types of social structure can be classified according to their dominant principle of differentiation’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 317; Donnelly, 2012a, p 153). Type approaches thus regard segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation as ‘idealized representations of forms of social order’, and reference sociology’s premise that functional differentiation is the dominant type characterizing contemporary society (Donnelly, 2013, p 95; see also Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 318). While type approaches are useful in the context of comparative analysis or as a starting point to unpack the assumptions of anarchy, they also contain several limitations (Donnelly, 2013, p 93). For instance, they do not address ‘variations within types (which often are analytically important)’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 93). Moreover, as Donnelly points out, the idea that there is a dominant type of differentiation is often misplaced when it comes to IR (Donnelly, 2013, pp 94–​5). In contrast, a dimensional perspective embraces a more ‘open-​ended approach to the relationship between dimensions of differentiation’ and thus provides a framework to systemically investigate ‘dimensions and pathways of both continuity and change’ (Donnelly, 2013, pp 109, 111). In Donnelly’s framework, for instance, he conceives of segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation –​along with geography and technology, and norms and institutions –​as co-​existing elements that, depending on the specific combinations, shape different types of multidimensional social and political structures (Donnelly, 2013, pp 99–​103). Consequently, Donnelly’s approach is less inclined towards the notion that there exists a prevailing type of differentiation governing international relations, much less the argument that international society is predominantly functionally differentiated (Donnelly, 2013, pp 93–​4, 97). For dimensional approaches, it is the ways that ‘multiple interrelated elements hang together’ and the effects of that coherence that are the main subjects of structural analysis (Donnelly, 2012a, p 165). This is a point made also by Albert et al when they emphasize the importance of ‘inquir[ing] into the specific ways in which different forms of differentiation overlap and interact with each other’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 4, emphasis in 38

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original). As Donnelly himself underscores, however, dimensional analyses run the risk of overemphasizing the ‘parts’ at the expense of understanding the ‘whole’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 93). In this sense, it may be more useful to regard dimensional and type approaches as offering complementary sets of analytical tools, rather than viewing them as competing and mutually exclusive approaches. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this book to delve deeply into the debate on type and dimensional approaches. For the framework proposed here, it is sufficient to note the simultaneous presence and interlinkages among segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation in the international system, and that they interact with each other without following a zero-​sum logic (Zürn et al, 2013, p 233). These forms of differentiation are moreover shaped by material and ideational content that, for example, result in the recognition of ‘major powers’ with their concomitant obligations, or, in this book’s case, ‘middle powers’ with a particular set of behavioural expectations. In this sense, it is the relationship and interactions between the various forms of differentiation that explain how and why structure provides the basis for middle powers to behave in particular ways. Using differentiation theory as a heuristic also allows us to acknowledge the prospect that other structural forces, beyond anarchy, could generate middle power behaviour in international politics. Through the lens of differentiation theory, a more inclusive account of how structure generates middle power behaviour in multilateralism could be put together. Let us now proceed to examine how segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation constitute the international political structure. Segmentary or unit differentiation ‘generates social actors and distributes them across positions’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 99). This involves delineating the units of analysis of the international system. In the case of international politics, this would refer to the partitioning of territorially sovereign states within an anarchic –​defined as the absence of government rather than the absence of hierarchy –​international system (Waltz, 1979, p 88; Albert et al, 2013, p 6). For most IR theories, segmentation forms the basis of differentiation, with stratification and functional differentiation then taking place across the individual segments of states. The rise of transnational actors, economic interdependence and globalization may have appeared to diminish the significance of the territorial state, but it is important to note that this is not simply about the irrelevance of segmentation. As Zürn et al observe, ‘the responses to both the global war on terror since 2001, and the economic crisis since 2008 [illustrate that] the state can seize back control over areas’ that non-​ state actors were dominant in (Zürn et al, 2013, p 237). Given that middle powers are very much state actors, the segmentation of units into sovereign states is assumed to remain as the basis for other forms of differentiation. Certainly, the differential framework in this book acknowledges that middle 39

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power behaviour is driven by the different self-​centred national policies and attributes of each state; these are examined in the cases of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in Chapters 4 and 5.1 Nevertheless, given that the book’s main aim is to explain how a differentiated international structure generates middle power behaviour vis-​à-​vis other states in multilateral contexts and the outcomes of this process, the analytical focus of the framework here concerns chiefly stratification and functional differentiation. Stratificatory or vertical differentiation is ‘where some persons or groups raise themselves above others, creating a hierarchical social order’ and establishing relations of superordination and subordination (Albert et al, 2013, p 2; see also Donnelly, 2009, p 55). The idea of a stratified system of states, layering on top of segmentation, has been advanced in several IR theories. This is evident, for instance, in realism and neorealism, both of which advocate for some sort of capability or resource ranking among states (see, for example, Waltz, 1979, p 131; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 122–​ 62). Such a stratification of states is also reflected in the composition and operations of the UNSC, in which the power to veto collective decisions is held only by the five permanent members, namely, China, France, Russia, UK and US. English School theorists stress the hierarchical features within the anarchic international structure, although in contrast to neorealism, this paradigm considers the social elements and processes that shape perspectives of authority and legitimacy (see, for example, Dunne, 2003; Goh, 2013). An additional perspective of stratification in the international system is provided by liberal institutionalism. In this view, international institutions and organizations that ‘develop authority of their own’ are believed to be ‘of a higher order than the states’ that participate in them (Zürn et al, 2013, p 242). One example is the European Union (EU), in which the governments of member states transfer certain decision-​making powers to EU institutions. In both theory and practice, stratificatory differentiation is evidently present. The notion of a stratified system –​both in terms of a hierarchy of states, as well as in terms of redirecting authority away from states to institutions –​ fits well with a study on middle powers. The existence of a stratified system of states implies the presence of countries above and below this category of ‘middle’ powers. At the same time, middle powers have sought to ensure that major powers are not the sole decision-​making authority in global affairs. As discussed in Chapter 2, middle powers have also typically gravitated towards institutions and multilateralism because they, unlike the major powers, are assumed to need to rely heavily on collective rules and norms to address problems. The efforts of Australia and Canada in the mid-​1940s to ensure that their interests would not be sidelined by the permanent five members in the UNSC, for instance, illustrate this inclination (see Chapter 1). For middle powers, a dilution of major-​power stratification would be to their advantage in international politics. They would aim to diffuse power and 40

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authority away from the major powers down the hierarchy of states, for example, through the formation of multilateral institutions. This weakening of stratification, however, would only be to the extent that middle powers are still able to preserve their material and ideational advantages over the rest of the non-​major powers. Gilley and O’Neil point out that it is in the interest of middle powers to have an international system framed around a multipolar ‘G20’ rather than a bipolar ‘G2’ (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p 13). Equally, it would also be in the interest of middle powers to have an international system framed around a ‘G20’ rather than a ‘G100’ where their own influence may be weakened. The third form of differentiation –​ functional –​ could be further subdivided into two types. The first is ‘where the subsystems are defined by the coherence of particular types of activity and their differentiation from other types of activity’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 2). This refers to the idea that the international system could be broken down into different subsystems or sectors that each has their own institutions, actors and ‘logic’ (Albert et al, 2013, p 5). For example, the political system operates according to power, the economic system according to wealth and the legal system according to law (Albert et al, 2013, p 10). Although sociology generally views such functional differentiation as the ‘essential characteristic of modernity’ that displaces other types of differentiation, in most areas of IR theory such a view has yet to take a strong hold and the political sector continues to hold sway over other sectors of the international system (Buzan and Albert, 2010, p 318). One IR school of thought that may come close to refuting this line of argument is liberalism, which underscores economic interdependence as a constraint on military conflict. Within the international economic sector, organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) focus on promoting security in economic, rather than military, terms. However, even within this liberal view, the political sector continues to have an influential role across the other sectors. Moreover, a study on middle powers and how they secure their interests through multilateralism is, in large part, about the exercise of power –​the central variable in the political sector (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29; Albert et al, 2013, p 10). For these reasons, the framework for middle power behaviour in this book will focus in particular on the international political sector. The second type of functional differentiation that Albert et al put forth refers to the ‘more narrow sense of role differentiation’, which involves, for instance, some countries ‘serving as leaders or providers of collective goods, others as followers or neutral states’ and so on (Albert et al, 2013, p 6). This is different from niche diplomacy as explained in Chapter 2, which puts the focus more on individual state initiative to take up certain tasks. Agency certainly plays a part, although in functional differentiation, as Donnelly explains, the definition and allocation of social functions to 41

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actors ‘is a feature … of the system, the structure of which is characterized by however functions are defined and distributed across social positions’ (Donnelly, 2013, p 100, emphasis in original). Here, however, mainstream IR literature has tended to put the spotlight more on the roles of major powers –​thus linking functional differentiation with stratification –​rather than the rest of the states. As mentioned earlier, Waltz’s claim of states in the international system being functionally undifferentiated is challenged by his own assertion that major powers ‘undertake tasks that other states have neither the incentive nor the ability to perform’ due to their ‘extraordinary positions in the system’ (Waltz, 1979, p 199). These tasks are: ‘the transforming or maintaining of the system, the preservation of peace, and the management of common economic and other problems’ (Waltz, 1979, p 199). Meanwhile, Hedley Bull claims that major powers serve two primary functions in the international order, namely, ‘managing their relations with one another’ and ‘exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society’ (Bull, 1977, p 207). Unlike Waltz, however, Bull recognizes the role of socially negotiated processes in the formulation of major power functions (Bull, 1977, p 202). Turning to an analysis that includes the non-​major powers, Paul Schroeder contends that strategies for state survival throughout the Westphalian era have comprised not only balancing or bandwagoning, but also ‘specializing’ (Schroeder, 1994). This involves ‘[q]‌uestions of how functions and roles were assigned to individual actors within the international system, whether these roles were necessary and justified, and how well the actors were fulfilling them’ (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). States that are successful in specializing within the international system would be able to ‘exist and prosper long after they were unable or unwilling to defend themselves, while states that failed to specialize … might be destroyed’ (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). A middle power, for instance, could through functional differentiation construct a ‘recognizable and distinct international identity’ that highlights its ‘necessity and relevance’ to international politics (Lennox, 2008, p 49). The success or failure of states to specialize could thus explain broad outcomes in the international system (Schroeder, 1994, p 125). To be sure, the characteristics of a state would affect, to some extent, the roles that it could undertake. Without possessing some kind of economic and military strength, for example, how could the US sustain its leadership in various aspects of global affairs? Yet, capabilities do not account completely for these functions; it is necessary to also consider ‘relationships and interactions’ that the state is involved in (Donnelly, 2000, p 98). In this sense, middle powers qualify as such not only because they possess a certain level of material capabilities, but also because their relationships and interactions with other international actors affirm their status as ‘middle powers’. The discussion here also further emphasizes the connections between functional differentiation and 42

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stratification (see Zürn et al, 2013, pp 233–​4). For instance, the development of functional differentiation could deepen forces of stratification as some states come to be regarded as leaders in certain areas of global affairs. The allocation of functions and roles, as well as the ability of states to carry out these functions and roles effectively, thus hold important consequences for international politics. In putting forward a new framework for middle power behaviour in international politics, an important first step is to recognize that differentiation constitutes structure. Differentiation theory thus offers a heuristic to explain middle power behaviour. As this section has demonstrated, all three forms of differentiation –​segmentary, stratificatory and functional –​are present in the international political structure. It is this differentiated structure that enables the emergence of middle power behaviour. Given that segmented states remain the primary actors in international politics, the analytical focus here is on stratification and functional differentiation. The expectations of middle power behaviour generated by the differential framework are that such states would seek to dilute major-​power stratificatory forces and assume functionally differentiated roles in international politics. It is important to note, however, that structure conditions, rather than determines, middle power behaviour. Moreover, developments at the structural level are typically unobservable. Thus, the final piece in the framework for middle power behaviour involves the process of power politics that middle powers engage with, under particular circumstances. This process ultimately determines the outcomes of middle power behaviour within a specific context and allows for the observation of empirical effects that would highlight the presence of the differentiated structure in international politics. This will be the focus of the next section.

Power politics The emphasis on power politics follows from the notion that power is regarded as the key variable in the international political sector (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29; Albert et al, 2013, p 10). ‘Power politics’, Martin Wight writes, ‘is a colloquial phrase for international politics’ (Wight, 1995, p 23). He adds that the presence of power politics entails two conditions. The first is that there are independent and sovereign political units, and the second is that ‘continuous and organized relations’ exist among these units (Wight, 1995, p 23). The former would refer to states while the latter would refer to the various relationships –​diplomatic, military, economic and so on –​ that govern the interactions among states. Following Anders Wivel and T.V. Paul, this book defines power politics as ‘the contestation among individual states using their particular resources and bargaining strengths to influence the structure of relations and the conduct of other actors’ (Wivel and 43

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Paul, 2019, p 10). When it comes to middle powers, the process of power politics within a specific context would determine if such states are able to actualize the possibilities of their behaviour that have been generated by the differentiated international structure. In so doing, middle powers seek to strengthen their ‘power’ in international politics. This section first considers how processes of power politics could be examined, before looking at how multilateral platforms serve as sites of power politics. The concepts of power and power politics are ubiquitous in IR, with various ways to approach them. The two dominant schools of thought in evaluating power are ‘power over resources’ and ‘power over outcomes’ (Keohane and Nye, 1998, p 86; Wivel and Paul, 2019, p 9). In the power-​ over-​resources approach, a state’s power is measured based on its possession of material capabilities. Accordingly, the state that has the largest amounts of economic and military resources is considered to be the most powerful in the international system. With its focus on the distribution of material capabilities, neorealism is premised on this understanding of power. Nevertheless, while material capabilities are useful as a first-​cut assessment of power (see Chapter 2), they are ultimately a measurement of potential power –​if a state does not leverage or exercise the potential of its capabilities, or is not perceived to be doing so, there is no exercise of power. This brings us to the power-​over-​outcomes approach, which measures power based on a state’s ability to influence and prevail over other actors. This aligns closely with Robert A. Dahl’s oft-​cited formulation of power as ‘the extent that [A] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, p 203). In this sense, power is a relation involving not just the deployment of material capabilities but also an awareness of the interest and preferences of the other actors, expectations and the ability to convince or persuade (Dahl, 1957, p 203; Keohane and Nye, 1998, p 86). Michael Beckley additionally points out that a ‘power-​over-​outcomes’ approach is more applicable in a context-​specific study –​given that ‘different countries, at different times, want different things’ –​rather than to assess the overall balance of power (Beckley, 2018, p 13). The framework for middle power behaviour proffered in this book assumes the importance of context as well; it is the conduct of power politics under particular circumstances that determine the extent to which middle power behaviour trigger the effects of the differentiated structure. What these circumstances are, in turn, depend on factors such as the actors involved and the intersubjective expectations about power. Related to the power-​over-​outcomes approach, others have framed the exercise of power through social structures or institutions. Parsons argues that power is generated through social systems and has value only when its exercise is recognized and accepted by others (Parsons, 1963, pp 236–​42). Meanwhile, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall establish a taxonomy of four types of power: compulsory power, which involves direct control of 44

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another actor; institutional power, which involves indirect control through formal and informal institutions; structural power, which involves the internal relations that constitute social positions and identities; and productive power, which involves more generalized systems of meaning and networks of social forces (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, pp 49–​57). They add that ‘in most social contexts all [four types of power] are operating simultaneously, intersecting with and reflecting off of each other’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p 67). Such a view thus considers the possibility that power produces ‘effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p 42). Consequently, even countries without great economic or military resources would have the potential and ability to assert power in international relations. To do so, however, they would have to engage in ‘politics’, which refer to those activities that involve or affect the power of an actor in relation to others (Carr, 2001, p 97; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 29–​30). Power politics is a central concept of realism. While differences in emphasis may occur across the various realist approaches, Barkin argues that, at its core, a classical realist reading of international politics boils down to power politics; everything else, such as the primacy of military force or the priority on state survival, derive –​rightly or wrongly –​from this fundamental notion of power politics (Barkin, 2010, p 21). Hans J. Morgenthau’s seminal work on realism, for instance, declares that: International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical cooperation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power. (Morgenthau, 2006, p 29) E.H. Carr likewise puts forward the claim that ‘power is always an essential element of politics’, even if politics ‘cannot be satisfactorily defined exclusively in terms of power’ (Carr, 2001, p 97). For a framework that explains how middle powers are able to differentiate themselves from other states and strengthen their ‘power’ in the international system, it thus makes sense to rely on classical realist insights about power politics. In particular, the framework follows Barkin’s concise encapsulation of classical realist 45

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power politics as ‘relative, relational, and social’ (Barkin, 2010, p 18). As the following discussion will show, Barkin’s framework of power politics incorporates constructivist elements as well. This is based on the assumption that shared ideas and knowledge could affect the exercise of power in international politics, and also condition the responses of other actors towards that exercise of power. In turn, power politics affect the development and acceptance of shared meanings and interpretations (Barkin, 2010, pp 165–​73; Gow, 2017, pp 261–​76). The social aspect of power politics, for Barkin, means treating the state as a ‘corporate actor’ and ascribing state power to social institutions, rather than to individuals (Barkin, 2010, p 20). The claim is not so much that states are persons, but rather, that a state possesses the ability or capacity to act as a collective whole to achieve its objectives. This ability or capacity to act is reflected in the behaviour of the state’s politicians and officials, and –​in the case of foreign affairs –​diplomats. Morgenthau points out that these are the individuals who represent the state at the international level: ‘[t]‌hey speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its power’ (Morgenthau, 2006, p 114). In essence, they ‘wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation’ (Morgenthau, 2006, p 114). Social power politics suggest the importance of intersubjectivity too. An example from Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch illustrates this: the exchange of paper bills or tokens would not have any meaning unless there was a ‘shared acceptance’ that these bills and tokens could be exchanged for goods and services, and that such a meaning becomes the dominant interpretation associated with this activity (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p 8; see also Barkin, 2010, p 28). In the context of middle powers, Catherine Jones notes that behaviour such as coalition or bridge building ‘inherently requires an acceptance or acquiescence of this role by other states’ (Jones, 2019, p 101). Indeed, without acceptance by others of the middle power’s role, neither bridges nor coalitions could be built. An apt example of this was when Australia and Canada failed to garner sufficient support to codify their middle power status in the UN Charter during the discussions for the organization’s formation in the mid-​1940s (see Chapter 1). Yet, the lack of a codified term did not mean a wholesale rejection of the middle power concept. As Neack argues, Australia and Canada subsequently ‘internalized the idea of the middle power and began conforming their external behaviors to role expectations’ (Neack, 2003, p 164). Over time, the notion of a middle power began to take on certain meanings regarding the diplomacy and behaviour of those states. It follows from this that, to examine power politics between states, it would be necessary to pay attention not only to rhetoric and behaviour, but also to the shared meanings and discourses among these actors that shed light on the possibilities for a state’s behaviour. 46

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The second dimension of power politics put forward by Barkin –​ relativity –​refers to the idea that the power of an actor is meaningful only when compared against another actor (Barkin, 2010, p 18; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 166–​8). ‘It makes no sense’, Barkin argues, ‘to speak of the power of a state without the context of the object with respect to which or whom that power may be used’ (Barkin, 2010, p 18). The mere knowledge that a state has the largest economy in the world, for instance, is generally meaningless for the analysis of power politics, without examining how the economic resources could be deployed against other actors. Moreover, as E.H. Carr remarks, to understand a ‘political’ issue, it is essential to know not merely the content of the issue, but also ‘between whom it has arisen’ because that will have implications for how the issue develops (Carr, 2001, p 97). Certainly, a military or economic conflict between China and the US would play out very differently from a similar conflict between, for example, Singapore and the US. It is pertinent to point out that power in this view is not based exclusively on material capabilities. In their respective formulations of state power, Morgenthau and E.H. Carr include factors such as the extent to which citizens support the government’s foreign policy, charisma and ideology, as well as the ability of the government to manage resources and influence popular opinion (Carr, 2001, pp 120–​30; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 147–​52, 156–​62). Morgenthau himself has called out the ‘misunderstanding of the central element of power … to be equated with material strength, especially of a military nature’ (as cited in Williams, 2005, p 110). This view of power is also reflected in the arguments of Michael C. Williams, who argues that classical realist theory ‘has always been defined by a concern with the construction of political orders’, and Richard K. Ashley, who highlights the significance of recognition in power relations (Ashley, 1984, pp 271–​2; Williams, 2005, p 207). This inclusive approach is important for a study on middle powers because their behaviour and consequent outcomes could not be attributed solely to the level of material capabilities they possess. Rather, explanations would likely involve a mix of elements including economic and diplomatic resources, normative expectations, political will, as well as opportune circumstances. An assessment of material resources and common ideas regarding the ranking of states –​including the framing of certain countries as stronger or weaker than others –​would thus be useful to understand relative power politics. Last but not least, power politics is also relational, which for Barkin refers to the idea that power involves ‘getting other actors to do what you want them to do’ (Barkin, 2010, p 19). ‘In any context in which ends cannot reasonably be achieved by physically destroying an adversary’, he writes, ‘political power is ultimately about persuasion, about convincing rather than forcing’ (Barkin, 2010, p 19). Similarly, E.H. Carr identifies ‘the art of persuasion’ 47

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and propaganda as a form of power (Carr, 2001, p 120). Nye offers more specificity to the notion of relational power politics by operationalizing it as ‘commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences’ (Nye, 2011, p 11). His concepts of soft power and smart power also exemplify relational power politics. Soft power is about ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want’ through co-​option rather than coercion, while smart power is ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies’ (Nye, 2004, p 5; Nye, 2011, pp 22–​3). Both soft and smart power rely not just on military or economic capabilities but also persuasion and attraction. The deployment of power capabilities thus ‘requires clarity about goals (preferred outcomes), resources, and tactics for their use’ (Nye, 2011, p 208). A state may be unrivalled in military capability, but whether or not it deploys that capability against another actor depends on its objectives, as well as how the potential target might respond. Understanding the relational aspect of power politics means paying attention to how actors define their place in the social group, how they define relations with other actors and how they define their behavioural possibilities within a particular context. The significance of context is underscored by Stefano Guzzini, who writes that: Power does not reside in a resource but stems from the particular relation in which abilities are actualized. Hence, in order to find out whether a certain action (not just the possession of the resource) indeed realizes an instance of (social) power, the distribution of resources says quite little independently of the specific conditions which apply to the social relation at hand. Power is situation-​specific. (Guzzini, 2006, p 123, emphasis in original) Context is also important for ideas. The generation of meanings and interpretations, and more importantly the determination of which meanings and interpretations are accepted and become dominant, are dependent upon the specific context. Both E.H. Carr and Morgenthau, for example, highlight that understandings of ethics and morality are contributing factors in a state’s decision to deploy its capabilities (Carr, 2001, pp 130, 135–​53; Morgenthau, 2006, pp 12–​13). Indeed, contemporary expectations of what middle powers are, and how they behave in global affairs, would be at least slightly different compared to, say, the 16th century, given the dissimilar circumstances of international politics. Similarly, a middle power seeking to play a role in the international stage would presumably face different dynamics from a middle power seeking to play a role within its own region. In other words, the ‘political and cultural context’ of the specific situation is important when it comes to the process of power politics (Morgenthau, 2006, p 11). 48

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In terms of the framework for middle power behaviour advanced in this book, power politics that is relative, relational and social activates the effects of the differentiated structure in order to produce middle power behaviour. Let us now turn to examine how power politics plays out in multilateral forums, which provide the broad context for our study.

Multilateral platforms as sites of power politics Defined as ‘the practice of co-​ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’, multilateralism has served as a key pillar of the post-​World War II global order (Keohane, 1990, p 731). International institutions such as the UN, World Bank and the IMF, as well as regional organizations such as ASEAN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been important players in international politics. Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Although ASEAN was established in 1967 with five founding members, its first summit was held only in 1976. While its second summit was held a year later, it was another decade before its leaders met for a third time, in 1987 (Caballero-​Anthony, 2005, p 56). Prior to ASEAN’s formation, other post-​World War II initiatives for regional multilateral cooperation –​especially in security –​were unsuccessful due to intramural tensions and mistrust (Caballero-A ​ nthony, 2005, p 52–​3; Emmers et al, 2010, p 5). Indeed, it was only as Cold War tensions wound down in the late 1980s that a nascent multilateral architecture emerged in the region, with the formation of APEC in 1989 and the growth of ASEAN-​ led platforms such as the ARF that was launched in 1994, the APT that was institutionalized in 1999, as well as the EAS that was inaugurated in 2005. Subsequently, the now ten-​member ASEAN has pursued a central role in the regional multilateral architecture, alongside ongoing debates about ASEAN centrality and the association’s effectiveness in managing regional affairs. IR approaches, certainly, differ in their assessments of multilateralism. Liberal institutionalism regards multilateralism and institutions as pathways for states to share information, enhance interdependence, and focus on enhancing absolute gains within an anarchic environment (Keohane, 1998; Haggard, 2014). Constructivism emphasizes the ability of multilateral platforms and institutions to shape behavioural norms and establish shared identities among participants (Katzenstein, 1996; Adler and Barnett, 1998). The strategies emphasized by both these schools of thought involve reducing the uncertainty arising from global anarchy. Applying constructivist and liberal institutionalist tenets to the Asia Pacific have involved examining the interdependence, socialization processes and norms that underpin regional multilateralism (see, for example, Simon, 1995; Acharya, 1997; Tan, 2013). In evaluating whether ASEAN is a ‘powerful actor’ in the region, Sarah Eaton 49

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and Richard Stubbs note the differences between the constructivist and neorealist understandings of power. If we accept the constructivist assumption that ‘power in the context of ASEAN is a distinct social construction’, then the organization could be regarded to have been a powerful actor in Asia Pacific multilateralism and community building (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, p 146). In contrast to these more optimistic appraisals of multilateralism, neorealism regards these platforms as epiphenomena of major power politics (Mearsheimer, 1994/​95). ‘The most powerful states in the system’, writes John J. Mearsheimer, ‘create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it’ (Mearsheimer, 1994/​95, p 13). Under anarchy, any kind of sustained cooperation among states is ultimately hindered by concerns about relative gains and cheating (Mearsheimer, 1994/9​ 5, p 12). Such a reading of Asia Pacific multilateralism would accord little agency to ASEAN –​an organization comprising ten of the weakest or smallest countries in the region –​and attribute regional developments to the behaviour of major powers such as China and the US. As Michael Leifer observes, a multilateral arrangement like the ARF is ‘a valuable adjunct to the workings of the balance of power’ (Leifer, 1996, p 57). Consequently, materially stronger states remain disproportionately influential in the evolution of Asia Pacific multilateralism. To be sure, power does matter for multilateralism. Constructivists and liberal institutionalists acknowledge this point too, even as they make the case for common interests, shared norms and collective identity as both drivers and outcomes of multilateral cooperation (see, for example, Finnemore, 2005; Keohane, 2006). Keohane explains that in a typical multilateral organization: [w]‌eak states collectively can outvote the strong. But inequalities of power intrude on the expression of preferences by states. Even if weak states have the nominal ability to thwart the will of the strong in international organizations, they may be unable to analyse complex issues or make their voices heard. They may also be unwilling to defy their powerful neighbours, creditors and trade partners. … Defenders of multilateral institutions have to recognize this intrusion of power politics. (Keohane, 2006, p 60) The processes of multilateralism are in part affected by power politics, and stronger states are expected to have the advantage because they have more resources and tools to leverage. In a study on ASEAN’s socialization of its external partners, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith indeed find that ‘more powerful regional players [have] manipulate[d]‌ASEAN’s shared norms and nonbinding processes for their own strategic advantage’ (Jones and Smith, 2007, p 184). Ralf Emmers likewise argues that balance of power considerations have shaped the development of ASEAN and the 50

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ARF despite their rhetorical rejection of conventional balance of power politics (Emmers, 2003, p 175). As Martha Finnemore observes in light of the power asymmetries that characterize multilateral organizations, a key task of multilateralism has thus been to ‘devise rules that both accommodate power (so the strong will “buy in”) but are accepted by others’ (Finnemore, 2005, p 198). The UNSC, which accords veto power to the permanent five, is a reflection of this accommodation. In this regard, multilateral organizations could be considered ‘sites of power [that] reflect and entrench power hierarchies’ (Hurrell, 2000, p 4). Diverging from neorealist expectations, however, the power dynamics in multilateralism go beyond mere ‘reflections of the distribution of capabilities in the system’ (Barkin and Weitsman, 2019, p 24). Rather, power politics played out through multilateralism involves attempts to establish the terms and frameworks for cooperation, such as having a say in matters of membership composition, agenda, and the rules and norms of cooperation. These are strategies that middle powers generally pursue, given their limited material strength but relatively substantial diplomatic resources and clout. While they may not be able or want to influence the preferences and behaviour of other countries through coercive means or pressure, their ability to shape the environment within which multilateral cooperation occurs would be useful to achieve their interests. Multilateralism could thus be deemed as an approach that middle powers rely on to strengthen their relative and relational power position in international politics (see Barkin and Weitsman, 2019, pp 23–​4). Let us now build on the discussion thus far to establish a framework that explains middle power behaviour in multilateralism.

Differentiating middle power behaviour in multilateralism This section links up the analytical insights from power politics and differentiation theory, and outlines how we arrive at the outcomes of middle power behaviour in multilateralism. As Georg Sørensen explains, ‘[w]‌hen states are “unlike units” it becomes necessary to further analyse the kind of differentiation that has taken place in the state system’ (Sørensen, 2008, p 16). Moreover, the presence of ‘unlike units’ creates ‘a different (material and social) structure which redefines the context for interaction’ and this structural change modifies the ‘purposes and methods in using power’ (Schroeder, 1994, p 127; Sørensen, 2008, p 24). The framework proposed by this book expects middle powers to dilute major-​power stratification and pursue functionally differentiated roles in their favour. Although the differentiated structure of international politics makes such behaviour possible, the specific outcomes would depend on how middle powers navigate the social, relative and relational power politics in a particular 51

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situation. Conceptually, the framework thus treats differentiation as a mechanism that has its effects activated by the power politics surrounding middle powers. A mechanism is defined as ‘the process, entity or state of affairs involved in, or responsible for, an action, reaction, or outcome of a natural or social phenomenon’ (Wight, 2004, p 288). In theorizing about an open and complex social world, mechanisms are ‘claimed to exist’, with potential outcomes dependent on how they interact with other forces and mechanisms under a particular set of contextual circumstances (Wight, 2004, p 286, emphasis in original). This means that the effects of the mechanisms should be understood as tendencies, rather than regularities or generalities. Whether a mechanism’s tendencies are triggered or not depends on the context as well as its relations to other mechanisms that are at work (Sayer, 2010, p 122; Wight, 2015, pp 52–​6). Using the example of gunpowder, Colin Robson explains how mechanisms operate to generate outcomes: Does gunpowder blow up when a flame is applied? Yes, if the conditions are right. It doesn’t ignite if it is damp; or if the mixture is wrong; or if no oxygen is present; or if heat is only applied for a short time. … the outcome (the explosion) of an action (applying the flame) follows from mechanisms (the chemical composition of the gunpowder) acting in particular contexts (the particular conditions which allow the reaction to take place). (Robson, 2011, pp 32–​3, emphasis in original) Applying this to the book’s argument, the differentiated structure would serve as the mechanism for middle power behaviour. Specifically, the framework here anticipates that the presence of stratification and functional differentiation in the international political structure creates the conditions for middle power behaviour to manifest. As a result, middle powers would seek to dilute stratification of the major powers, and take on functionally differentiated roles in international politics. In order for these outcomes to be actualized, however, there needs to be an ‘action’ –​this is power politics –​ that takes place within a particular context. As Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon highlight, contextual conditions ‘help explain which power-​ political maneuvers come into play, their effectiveness, and other aspects of their dynamics. In crucial respects, they explain how processes, mechanisms, and logics translate into specific outcomes’ (Goddard and Nexon, 2016, p 14). The extent to which a middle power would seek to dilute major-​ power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles, and the extent to which it would be successful, depends on how power politics plays out at a particular time and place. For instance, if a middle power attempts to reduce the influence of major powers in collective decision making and enhance its own voice, its success would be contingent on which actors 52

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Figure 3.1: How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism Mechanism:

Action + Context:

Outcomes:

International political structure as constituted by differentiation

Power politics at a particular time and place

• Dilution of major-power stratificatory forces • Pursuit of functionally differentiated roles for middle powers

it is working with or against as well as whether it possesses the necessary capabilities or persuasive skills to secure its aims in negotiations. When middle powers engage in power politics within a particular context of Asia Pacific multilateralism, the effects of the differentiation mechanism are thus activated (see Figure 3.1). Given their limited material capabilities and diplomatic clout vis-​à-​vis the major powers, middle powers would attempt to dilute forces of major-​power stratification. This diffusion of power away from those at the top creates the scope for others further down the hierarchy –​such as middle powers –​to have a say in regional and global agendas. To be sure, this diffusion of power may also work against middle powers, as it is accompanied by ‘a diffusion of preferences [as well as] ideas and values’ from a variety of actors and sources, which affects the responses towards middle power initiatives (Hurrell, 2010, p 26). It would therefore be fair to expect that this dilution of stratification is only to the extent that middle powers retain some kind of competitive advantage over the rest of the non-​major powers. After all, even if they are not regarded as major powers or do not possess major-​power-​level capabilities, middle powers nevertheless wield relatively significant resources and sway as compared to many other states. Multilateralism, in this sense, offers middle powers the opportunity to diffuse power away from the major powers and exert some influence over the rest of the countries. In the context of the Asia Pacific, middle powers would work towards ensuring the participation of major powers in multilateral forums. In the region, the group of key major powers would typically include China and the US, both of which have extensive diplomatic weight and the ability to act unilaterally in regional affairs. Up until the late 2000s or early 2010s, Japan would also be considered a major power that, at various time periods, competed with the US and China for regional leadership. To reduce the potential for unilateralism from these major powers, middle powers such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea would seek to ensure these countries’ participation in and commitment to regional multilateral arrangements with their associated rules and norms. It is also through multilateralism that these middle powers obtain a seat at the table for themselves, as such platforms, naturally, would encompass all or most of the regional countries that have 53

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a stake in the agendas. Without these more inclusive channels of discussion and decision making, it is likely that the major powers would be the only ones determining the trajectory of regional issues. In addition to diluting major-​power stratificatory forces, middle powers also undertake functionally differentiated roles in multilateral diplomacy. The expectation is that middle powers would likely perform different roles in multilateralism from that of the major powers or smaller states. This may be due partly to material capabilities, but equally importantly, would also be a result of ideational and social factors such as perceptions of credibility and trust. In his argument that middle powers are more effective when they act in coalitions, for instance, Keohane contends that such behaviour also has to emerge out of leaders’ recognition of what their countries could or could not do (Keohane, 1969, p 296). This is where materiality begins to take on ideational force, as middle powers seek to portray themselves as possessing certain behavioural characteristics that are not commonly associated with other categories of powers. While middle powers have certainly been associated with a variety of roles, the roles identified in this book are particularly relevant in terms of multilateralism. The specific roles of interest here involve middle powers proposing or establishing new multilateral platforms in the Asia Pacific, or being honest brokers to resolve disagreements among participants to advance multilateral cooperation. These roles also build on the material and ideational characteristics of middle powers. Given their lesser coercive strength compared to the major powers, middle powers may be perceived to be less threatening to smaller states, who may, in turn, be more responsive to middle power initiatives. On the other hand, middle powers still have resources that allow them to carry out these roles; they would thus be regarded as more credible and effective here compared to the smaller countries. Such roles would allow middle powers to maximize their competitive advantages in both the material and ideational dimensions. As the discussion thus far illustrates, while the framework takes structure as a starting point, it nevertheless follows the proposition that ‘the properties of agents and those of social structures are both relevant to explanations of social behavior’ (Wendt, 1987, p 338, emphasis in original).

Conclusion This chapter has set out a conceptual framework to investigate what generates middle power behaviour in international politics, and more specifically, in multilateralism. Departing from the dominant neorealist understanding in IR that the international political structure comprises functionally undifferentiated states that vary only based on the distribution of capabilities, the framework here treats structure as segmented, stratified 54

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and functionally differentiated. This lens opens the possibility for middle powers to emerge as a distinct category of states in the international system, in terms of their status and behaviour. Specifically, middle power behaviour is produced when the effects of the differentiated structure are activated by social, relative and relational power politics. Although the specific outcomes would depend on the particular circumstances of the time and place, this framework overall expects that middle powers would pursue a dilution of major-​power stratification and take on functionally differentiated roles in multilateralism. The next two chapters use this framework to examine the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS.

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4

Formation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Introduction This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances that led to APEC’s creation in 1989 and its early years, focusing particularly on the structural forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Launched amid the end of the Cold War, APEC was a significant advancement for the regional multilateral architecture. As superpower and military tensions decreased in the late 1980s, the launch of APEC reflected the acknowledgment by regional countries of the need for greater and more inclusive cooperation on economic issues. Certainly, the idea for APEC did not emerge out of the blue. Its inauguration in 1989 was a culmination of three decades of efforts to boost economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific, including the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), both established in the 1960s. From 1980, the quasi-​governmental Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) also assumed a vital role in laying the foundations for APEC (Drysdale, 2009, p 18). Nevertheless, APEC’s importance lies in the fact that it was the first regional organization in this field at the government level when it was inaugurated in 1989 (Keating, 2001; Park and Lee, 2009, p 98). Its ability to annually convene the political elites of regional countries at a time of significant international political change moreover imbued the economic forum with strategic and political intent. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, APEC was the only venue where multilateral talks could be conducted among policymakers and leaders of key regional countries such as Japan, China and the US, among others. The success in getting APEC off the ground illustrated the ability of middle powers, such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, to shape the regional multilateral architecture. On the one hand, the behaviour of these three middle powers diluted stratification in the Asia Pacific by diffusing power away from the major powers. On the other, their behaviour also strengthened functional 56

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differentiation in the Asia Pacific as they took on initiatory and mediatory roles in the APEC initiative. While the origins of APEC could be traced to the combined efforts of Australia and Japan, due to various reasons Australia became the public face of the initiative. Former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed to form APEC in 1989, and his successor, Paul Keating, worked to elevate the meeting of economic, trade and foreign affairs ministers to a leaders’ level summit in 1993. Despite fierce objections from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who counter proposed an EAEG that excluded western countries such as Australia and the US, Australia’s vision for APEC prevailed. This was in part due to support for APEC from Indonesia, which had the largest economy and population among Southeast Asian states and was regarded as primus inter pares in ASEAN. Although initially wary of APEC’s potential impact on ASEAN and its member states, Indonesia eventually backed the APEC process over the EAEG proposal. Significantly, APEC was the first regional multilateral institution to include China, Hong Kong and Taiwan –​all three economies were admitted in 1991, two years after the first APEC ministerial meeting. Their entry into APEC has been credited in part to South Korea’s diplomatic and mediatory efforts (Beeson, 2009, p 41). The launch of APEC and its membership composition highlighted the political and strategic implications for the nascent post-​Cold War multilateral architecture in the Asia Pacific. The three middle powers sought not only to gain for themselves a seat at the table in regional decision making but to also reflect their valuable roles in regional multilateralism. These behavioural outcomes were generated from the existence of differentiation in the Asia Pacific political structure. The undercurrents of both stratificatory and functional differentiation were clearly reflected in the region at this time, as the US emerged as the sole superpower alongside Japan and China as major or rising (economic) powers. Despite not being –​or precisely because they were not –​major powers, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were able to contribute significantly towards shaping APEC’s development in its formative days. The behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea and their subsequent outcomes demonstrated the negotiations of social, relational and relative power politics that characterized APEC dynamics. Consequently, even as China, Japan and the US remained influential in the region, the three middle powers nevertheless succeeded in moulding the shape and form of regional multilateralism to their own benefit. This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the regional circumstances and structural conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s that contextualized the establishment of APEC. Understanding the context in which APEC was formed is important as it offers an explanatory basis for the subsequent developments that occurred. The views of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea regarding the ongoing trends will also be highlighted. The 57

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third section then proceeds to examine the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the formative days of APEC. The focus is specifically on Australia’s proposal of APEC, Indonesia’s response towards APEC and the EAEG, as well as South Korea’s facilitation of the entry of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan into APEC. While this chapter is focused mainly on empirically laying out the APEC case study, the concluding section will briefly raise the theoretical implications of the discussion here.

Regional dynamics and structure in the late 1980s and early 1990s Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, several important regional and global developments shaped the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. One of the most significant developments was the decline of Cold War tensions between the superpowers, as well as among ideologically diverse countries. This winding down of military tensions occurred amid high growth rates of several Asian economies and increasing economic interdependence among regional countries. The increasing salience of the economic agenda was accompanied by fears about the potential failure of the Uruguay Round, trade tensions between the US and Japan, and the emergence of economic blocs in North America and Europe. From the perspectives of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, these developments underscored the need for an effective platform that could facilitate and strengthen economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

Declining Cold War tensions and emerging unipolarity In the second half of the 1980s, ideological and military tensions between the major powers declined significantly. The Soviet Union would not formally dissolve until December 1991, but relations between the Soviet Union and the US, as well as between China and the Soviet Union, were on the mend. Many of these changes occurred following the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and de facto ruler of the country, in 1985. Soviet economic growth had deteriorated throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and by the time Gorbachev assumed the leadership position, the Soviet Union remained ‘a superpower only in the military sense’ (Zubok, 2007, p 307; see also Easterly and Fischer, 1995). Realizing the dire situation that the Soviet economy was in, Gorbachev implemented economic and political reforms that introduced market-​oriented principles into the Soviet economy, as well as greater freedom of information and speech for Soviet citizens. While some analysts have attributed the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union to these 58

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policies, they had implications for Moscow’s foreign policy as well (Zubok, 2007; Grachev, 2008). Initially, Gorbachev considered a stable external environment as a prerequisite for the success of his domestic reforms (Grachev, 2008, p 3). This meant improving relations with the US and the non-​communist world, as well as with China, which would allow the Soviet Union to reduce its military presence abroad and consequently ease some of the pressure on the economy (Birgerson, 1997, p 223). Later, as the reforms failed to achieve their desired effect and the Soviet economic and political situation continued to worsen, Gorbachev worked towards a quick end of the Cold War ‘to compensate for his declining prospects at home with breakthroughs in foreign policy’ (Zubok, 2007, p 317). The 1987 Intermediate-​Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the US and Soviet Union, the Soviet decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan and significantly cut its military presence in eastern Europe in 1988, as well as US President Ronald Reagan’s retraction of his earlier characterization of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’, were all evidence of a turnaround in superpower relations (‘Reagan offers’, 1988). Relations between the Soviet Union and China were improving as well, following their ideological split in the 1950s. Following efforts to address what China perceived as the three major obstacles in bilateral ties –​namely, Soviet troops on the Chinese border, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia –​a landmark summit was held in May 1989 in Beijing (Zagoria, 1988, p 122). Additionally, Moscow decided to reduce its forces at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay, which had been the Soviet Union’s largest overseas military base outside the Warsaw Pact countries (Storey and Thayer, 2001, pp 456–​7). The Soviet Union also sought to advance diplomatic and trade relations with non-​communist countries in the Asia Pacific, and by the end of 1988 exchanges had taken place with Japan, South Korea, Australia and several of the Southeast Asian countries (Zagoria, 1988, pp 125, 129–​30; Birgerson, 1997, p 224). Coupled with Vietnamese troop withdrawals from Cambodia following a 10-​year occupation, it was clear that military tensions in the Asia Pacific had diminished considerably as the decade ended. To be sure, even as communism crumbled across Europe, communist governments continued to rule in Asia Pacific countries such as China, North Korea and Vietnam. Nevertheless, ideological differences had become less of an issue in interstate relations. Even the Chinese leadership’s use of force to crush pro-​democracy protests at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 caused relatively minimal disruption to the overall progress of China’s foreign relations with the US and Southeast Asian countries (Lee, 1991, pp 37–​8; Skidmore and Gates, 1997, pp 523–​5). Amid these developments, then Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described the international environment as ‘becoming less ideological, more pragmatic [and] increasingly interdependent’ (Evans, 1989a, p 1). He noted 59

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the ‘more positive atmosphere for international relations generally’, and expressed optimism that the changes in the Soviet–​US relationship would ‘increase the chances of resolution of many regional conflicts; give real hope of major progress towards arms control and disarmament; and allow the world to turn its attention to other massive and pressing social, economic and political problems’ (Evans, 1989a, pp 2–​3). While Evans expected the international system to remain primarily bipolar –​this was prior to the fall of the Soviet Union –​he nevertheless regarded Washington as ‘incomparably ahead’ of Moscow across ‘virtually all’ dimensions of power (Evans, 1989a, p 2). Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating referred to the US as the world’s ‘only superpower’ (Keating, 1992a). From Canberra’s perspective, it was thus clear that in stratificatory terms, Washington was at the top based on capabilities and leadership. South Korean President Roh Tae-​woo likewise highlighted Washington’s role as ‘a leader of the free world’ and acknowledged ‘the need for the United States to continue its leading role if regional stability is to prevail’ (House and Darlin, 1989; Roh, 1992, p 247). To South Korea, which had recently undergone a democratic transition, it was clear that the Cold War had been won by countries with democratic multiparty systems that had brought them prosperity (Roh, 1990, p 41). Although the Korean peninsula remained divided, Roh welcomed the ‘new wave of reconciliation’ that was sweeping across East Asia and ‘thaw[ing] the Cold War regime characterized by confrontation and conflict’ (Roh, 1990, p 258). South Korea’s embrace of the new global environment was also reflected in its hosting of the Summer Olympics in 1988, which was celebrated as a symbol of the Cold War’s end. Described by Roh as ‘a grand festival of East-​West detente’, the Seoul Olympics attracted the highest participation level thus far in Olympic history and avoided the larger boycotts that previous Olympics had encountered (Roh, 1990, p 136; see also O’Neill III and 38 North, 2018). As we will see later, its hosting of a more reconciliatory Olympics was one of the catalysts that enabled South Korea to take on a mediating role between communist China and the rest of APEC in the period leading up to Beijing’s admission into the forum. Indonesia’s view of the changing global and regional environments was not very much different from that of Australia and South Korea. As Cold War tensions eased in the late 1980s, its then foreign minister, Ali Alatas, noted a ‘growing disposition towards conciliation and mutual accommodation among states, especially between the major powers’, and that ‘the East-​ West divide [was] progressively losing its ideological connotation’ (Alatas, 2001, pp 34, 36). As one of the drivers of the Non-​Aligned Movement (NAM) founded in 1961, Indonesia was anti-​communist but not a formal treaty ally of the US. Nevertheless, Jakarta recognized the US as one of the four major powers of the world, alongside China, Japan and Russia 60

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(Alatas, 2001, p 86; Suryadinata, 1996, p 3). Similar to Australia and South Korea, Indonesia also regarded the US as being ‘a decisive factor for global peace and stability’, with ‘tremendous responsibilities that it cannot shirk without risking unhappy consequences on the cause of world security and prosperity’ (Alatas, 2001, p 368). Moreover, the US–​Japan alliance was the ‘pivotal relationship’ underpinning stability in the Asia Pacific (Alatas, 2001, p 88). In stratificatory terms, it was thus increasingly clear that there was no other country that could rival the US as the Soviet Union edged towards dissolution. The failure of Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms ‘destroyed the Soviet capacity to act like a superpower on the international arena’ and it could no longer ‘present itself as an equal partner to the United States in negotiations’ (Zubok, 2007, p 308). To be sure, there were views in the region that the US was also ‘a great power in decline’, particularly given that its growth rates lagged behind some of the emerging economies in the Asia Pacific (Greene, 1989, p 90; see also The World Bank, 2021b). Nevertheless, the US remained the number one economy in the world, with the second largest economy –​Japan –​about half of its size (The World Bank, 2021a). In military terms, the gap between the US and the other countries was equally, if not more, considerable. Not only was the US the top military spender by far, its technological superiority also reinforced its ‘decisive preponderance’ over the rest of the countries (Wohlforth, 1999, p 7). US soft power was further bolstered by the decline of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, which validated the liberal democratic and capitalist values that the US represented in the ideological dimension of the Cold War. In both material and ideational aspects, the US thus emerged as the preponderant power in the international system. As the sole superpower, the US was viewed as having special responsibilities in the region. For many regional countries, US military presence in the Asia Pacific was necessary for peace and stability (Clift, 1989; Katigbak, 1989; Zagoria, 1991, p 4). The wide gulf in military capabilities between the US and the rest of the countries, coupled with its generally ‘benign’ image –​ thanks to the liberal principles it advocated –​meant that it was by and large viewed as the best guarantor for regional security (Gray, 1988; Catley, 1997). Even Mahathir, who was usually vocal in his criticisms of the US and other western countries, had from time to time expressed support for continued US military presence in Southeast Asia, and on at least one occasion said that Malaysia would be willing to provide repair facilities and other services to US troops (Richburg, 1989). The US was an ‘extraregional balancer’, helping to curb ‘the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger war’ in the Asia Pacific (Kupchan, 1998, p 62). Consequently, the roles of US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia would be to anchor US presence in and commitment to the region. 61

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With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the final days of the Cold War, the US remained as the only superpower in the world. As ideological and military tensions declined, pragmatism emerged as the key principle driving foreign policies and for regional countries, socioeconomic growth and political stability came to be as important as military superiority in maintaining national security (Evans, 1989a, p 1; Zagoria, 1991, p 4; Cooper et al, 1993, p 21). The following sub-​sections discuss the growing importance of the economic agenda, both at the regional and global levels, during this time period.

Increasing salience of economic agenda and economic rise of Asia Economic cooperation was certainly not an unfamiliar area for Asia Pacific states. As early as the 1960s, academics and businesses participating in the PAFTAD and PBEC had already been promoting economic collaboration and dialogue. ASEAN, formed in 1967, also made economic cooperation a key part of its agenda. These efforts laid the foundations for the formation of the quasi-​governmental PECC in 1980, which, in turn, played a crucial role in the founding of APEC (Drysdale, 2009, p 18). Nevertheless, the changing global dynamics of the 1980s introduced a ‘window of opportunity’ for a government-​level forum that encompassed the market economies in the region (Ravenhill, 2001, p 65). According to a World Bank report, between 1965 and 1990, East Asia was the fastest growing region in the world, thanks to the ‘seemingly miraculous growth’ of eight economies, namely Japan; the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan; as well as the newly industrializing economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Birdsall et al, 1993, p 1). Japan, in particular, had become a major ‘supplier, investor and aid-​ giver in Asia’, a profile bolstered by its status as the world’s second largest economy (Blustein, 1991; see also Hartarto, 1994, p 47). As the only Asian country in the G7, Tokyo also assumed a bridging role between Asia’s newly industrialized economies and the West (‘Third-​world’, 1988). Some have argued that Japan failed to translate its economic weight into military and political clout given its peace constitution, and thus could not be considered a ‘comprehensive, overarching power’ (Deng, 1997, p 366). Nevertheless, given the increasing salience of the economic agenda at the time, Japan’s status as an economic powerhouse put it in the upper stratum of power in the Asia Pacific. China and India were the next in line in the regional stratification, given their economic sizes and growth rates in the late 1980s (The World Bank, 2021a; The World Bank, 2021b). It was acknowledged at the time, however, that while the potential existed for these countries to become major powers, there was still a lot of uncertainty over their ability to exercise leadership at the regional and global levels. This was due to 62

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various constraints, including developmental challenges and political stability (Abramowitz, 1993, pp 261–​2; Yahuda, 1993, p 572; Ganguly, 2003/​04, pp 41–​2). It was nevertheless evident that Asia’s economic rise was occurring alongside the rapid growth of these major economies. Former US Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen W. Bosworth noted in an article that the Asian economies had gone from producing less than 5 per cent of the world’s output in 1960, to exceeding 25 per cent by 1990 (Bosworth, 1993, p 104). This encouraged a sense of optimism among regional countries as they pursued economic prosperity. The dynamism in economic production moreover led to increasing interdependence among regional countries, as Japan, followed by the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, sought to relocate labour-​intensive industries to elsewhere in Southeast Asia (McCall, 1995, pp 404–​5). As intra-​East Asian trade and investment grew, regional countries agreed on the importance of an open multilateral trading system (Emmers et al, 2010, p 7). Even communist governments in the Asia Pacific, such as in China and Vietnam, began to introduce market-​ oriented reforms for their economies. Previously excluded from multilateral cooperative efforts in the region, these countries were now being invited to join forums such as the PECC. During this time, tensions over trade also intensified between Japan and the US, the top two economies in the world. As Japanese businesses outperformed their American counterparts, the US trade deficit with Japan grew from US$9.1 billion in 1979 to US$37 billion in 1984 (Johnston, 2017; Boxwell, 2018). This strained bilateral ties between the allies, as each side perceived the other as protectionist and taking insufficient action to address the trade imbalance (Bergsten, 1982, pp 1059–​60; Kreisberg, 1990, pp 20–​2; Bosworth, 1991, p 125). Consequently, views emerged in the US that Japan, despite its increasing economic weight, was failing to assume a corresponding role for security issues, including its own defence (Kreisberg, 1990, pp 20–​1). Beyond trade tensions with Japan, growing sentiment among the US policy community that the multilateral trading system was disadvantageous to US interests led to the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988, which was meant to address large trade deficits that the US had with other countries, including the four ‘Asian Tigers’ (Greene, 1989, p 90; Brainard, 2001, p 4). This legislation, coupled with US protectionist measures on items such as cars, steel and semiconductors, shaped anxieties around the world about US unilateralism in global economic issues (‘ASEAN protest’, 1989; Brainard, 2001, p 4). Such unilateralism was also reflected in US threats to withdraw from the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations –​launched in September 1986 to set new rules for global trade –​if its key demands were not agreed to (‘US repeats’, 1986). Originally planned to end in December 1990, the Uruguay Round became deadlocked 63

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by differences over agricultural trade and was only concluded in 1994. The delay in the GATT talks reinforced the idea that regional economies needed an alternative channel for trade cooperation, in the event of the global trading system’s fragmentation (Funabashi, 1995, p 105). The urgency to establish a regional platform to cooperate on trade and economic issues was keenly felt by Australia, as Asia transitioned ‘from battlefield to marketplace’ (Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7). As Evans observed, events of the 1980s demonstrated the limits to military power and the importance of economic performance that was built on ‘private ownership, competition and a market economy’ (Evans, 1989a, p 2). While the US-​ led free market system had emerged victorious in the Cold War, it was also evident that Washington had ‘progressively lost its relative post-​War economic dominance’ by 1989 as Japan and Europe gained more prominence in the global economy (Evans, 1989a, p 2). In light of its view that the hub of world production had shifted to the Asia Pacific, and with about half of its trade being with countries on the western Pacific rim, Australia saw the need to integrate more closely with the region economically (Hawke, 1988, p 3; Evans, 1989a, p 5). Officials also expressed concern about the US Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act, as well as the deadlock in the Uruguay Round (Durie, 1987; Hawke, 1989a, p 5). Both these developments would negatively affect Australia’s interests in free trade. Along with others, Australia was disappointed at the inability of the European Community and the US to agree on agricultural reforms, with a commentator at The Australian Financial Review arguing that ‘the majors don’t stick to the rules when it doesn’t suit them’ (Durie, 1987; see also Crane, 1988; Frost, 2016, p 80). As a ‘medium sized’ economy heavily reliant on free and open trade, Australia was thus deeply concerned about its economic future given these developments (Hawke, 1987, p 13; see also Hawke, 1989a, p 3). As one of the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies undergoing rapid economic growth, South Korea was generally optimistic about the increasing economic interdependence and the economic rise of Asia, although it faced its fair share of challenges such as domestic labour disputes and wage inflation (Weisman, 1989). South Korea was also one of the countries that held up the Uruguay Round talks due to its initial resistance to compromising on opening farm trade (Auerbach, 1990). For its trade restrictions, Seoul faced much criticism, which was exacerbated by its wide trade surpluses with various countries (Frith, 1988; Ong, 1989). As a result, South Korea was reportedly one of the initial target countries of Washington’s Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act (Ong, 1989). In response, South Korean Trade Minister Han Seung-​soo said that the US move was ‘regrettable’ and could disrupt Seoul’s democratic transition and economic liberalization (Ong, 1989; see

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also Trautman, 1989). At the same time, South Korea sought to reduce its trade deficit with Japan, which it attributed to Tokyo’s import restrictions (Hong, 1987). Given these problems that South Korea faced with the major economies, the country started to pursue trade relations with countries in the communist bloc, including with North Korea. South Korea’s then Deputy Prime Minister Rha Woong-​bae proposed forming a ‘common economic community’ with the North –​a significant divergence from Seoul’s previous policy that allowed for the prosecution of South Korean businessmen who were caught importing North Korean goods (‘South Korea lifts’, 1988). Having been a part of East Asia’s economic rise, South Korea now looked towards diversifying its trade relations and continuing to benefit from regional initiatives. Indonesian officials at the time acknowledged the ‘fundamental shift of economic activity and economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ and the trend of increasing interdependence (Alatas, 2001, p 9; see also UNGA, 1987, p 79). Both Alatas and his predecessor, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, however, cautioned that global economic problems such as imbalanced relations and reduced growth needed to be addressed (UNGA, 1987, pp 74–​7; Alatas, 2001, pp 9–​11). Alatas also noted the ‘differences in stages of economic development and in economic and political systems among the countries of the Pacific’, and added that such disparities would ‘be a major impediment in the development of uniform, region-​wide structures and modalities to deal collectively with common economic problems’ (Alatas, 2001, p 10). As a member of the ‘Third World’, Indonesia’s focus was on equitable economic development and South–​South collaboration (Alatas, 2001, pp 213–​14). From Jakarta’s view, rising interdependence had the potential to ‘create new forms of dependency relationships between the North and the South’ given that the latter countries may not be equipped to manage the closer economic linkages (Alatas, 2001, p 333). Consequently, even as countries became more interdependent, the richer economies would continue to reap most of the benefits at the expense of the poorer countries (Thatcher, 1990). While Indonesia welcomed deepening economic cooperation in the region, it was thus with the caveat that such cooperation had to benefit both the advanced and emerging economies. Amid the global environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australia, South Korea and Indonesia sought to promote economic and trade cooperation. Certainly, their different immediate concerns spawned slightly different agendas. It was nevertheless clear that all three countries shared an interest in ensuring, first, that major economies such as Japan and the US did not retreat to unilateralism, and second, that they were well positioned to benefit from the Asia Pacific’s economic growth. Let us now turn to the third trend relevant to our discussion, the rise of extra-​regional trade blocs.

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Rise of extra-​regional trade blocs As economic imperatives rose to the fore in the late 1980s, countries in Europe and North America began to seek ways towards greater integration within their respective regions. In February 1986, members of the European Economic Community signed the Single European Act. The Act aimed to ‘add new momentum to European integration and to complete the internal market’ by 1993. The single market would remove barriers to trade and allow the free movement of goods, people, services and capital within the area (‘The Single’, 2018). Moreover, new economic connections were being developed with eastern European countries (Crone, 1992, p 73). Meanwhile in North America, negotiations were underway for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comprising Mexico, Canada and the US. The latter two countries had signed a bilateral trade deal in 1988, and two years later Mexico and the US launched free trade talks that eventually expanded to include Canada. NAFTA was signed in 1992, establishing a free trade zone in North America. In contrast to the developments in Europe and North America, there was little momentum towards a free trade area in the Asia Pacific during that time. Despite its efforts in economic cooperation, ASEAN remained a political organization, and any institutionalization of economic integration within ASEAN was ‘sluggish’ and ‘far more successful in words than in reality’ (Schellhorn, 1992, p 61; see also Stubbs, 2000, p 300). This has been attributed to several factors, including indifference from the ASEAN governments, the low volume of intra-​ASEAN trade, as well as economic competition among the ASEAN member states (Ravenhill, 1995, pp 851–​2; Bowles, 1997, pp 221–​2; Stubbs, 2000, p 300). The wider Asia Pacific region similarly lacked an institutionalized free trade mechanism, albeit some countries were reportedly beginning to push for a ‘European-​style free-​trade zone’ in ASEAN to facilitate businesses (‘Japan seeks’, 1987). Nevertheless, the movement towards regional trade blocs in Europe and North America generated concern among Asia Pacific countries that their economic interests would be disadvantaged in the global trading system. With the exchange of goods and services made easier among the signatory countries of the respective free trade deals, Asia Pacific countries feared that trade and investment would be diverted away from the region (McCall, 1995, p 390; Emmers et al, 2010, pp 6–​7). This was a valid fear –​after all, important drivers of Asia’s dramatic economic growth included the openness of the US market to Asian exports as well as US investment in the manufacturing industries of regional countries (McCall, 1995, pp 390–​1, 412–​13). Likewise, there were also anxieties from the rest of the world that the European single market, when realized, would turn into an inward-​looking ‘fortress Europe’ (McCartney, 1988; Palmer, 1988). 66

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Indeed, Australian officials such as Evans and Lindsey Duthie, special trade representative to Europe, in 1989 raised concerns about the formation of a ‘fortress Europe’ and argued that it posed a threat to the global trading system (‘Fortress Europe’, 1989; Narbrough, 1989). Australia was particularly concerned about the formation of region-​based trading blocs in Europe and North America. While it had close security, cultural and historical links with the countries in those regions, its exclusion from economic groupings such as the Single European Market, ASEAN and NAFTA reinforced the perception that ‘in a world of emerging regional associations and blocs, Australia was disadvantaged by having no region to call its own’ (Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7). Citing the example of Argentina –​which was suffering economically –​an article in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1988 concluded that ‘all the natural endowments in the world are not enough to sustain living standards’ if a country was excluded from ‘trading blocs’, and warned that Australia was at risk of following Argentina’s path (Wlash, 1988). In light of the fact that the country was being shut out of trade groupings in Europe, North America and potentially East Asia, any fragmentation of the global economy would be detrimental for Australia, a country reliant on the open and multilateral trading system. While South Korea shared Australia’s interest in an open and multilateral trading system, it appeared less alarmed about the discriminatory ramifications of the Single European Market and NAFTA. Unlike Australia, South Korea’s belonging in East Asia was also less of a question and it was unlikely to be excluded from any future East Asian trading bloc. For the most part, it seemed that South Korea, as a developing economy, was instead facing criticisms from the developed economies of the European Community and the US for its imposition of trade barriers (‘Roh says’, 1988; ‘South Korea seeks’, 1989). Subsequently, when faced with the prospect of NAFTA, South Korea saw it as a new channel for exporting its products to Canada and the US via Mexico (‘South Korean’, 1991). To be sure, Roh had raised concerns that Europe’s establishment of a single market would have negative effects on South Korea, which was the 10th largest trading country in the world at the time (‘Unified European’, 1989). South Korean businesses also expressed similar worries that their exports would be at a disadvantage in a unified European market (Lim, 1991). Moreover, while South Korea saw investment and trade opportunities in the opening up of eastern European economies, Foreign Minister Choi Ho-​Joong voiced ‘apprehension … that, in the process of this evolution [toward integration], Europe could become so preoccupied with its own problems as to turn inward despite its repeated assurances to the contrary’ (as cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 67, addition in original). In this sense, even as South Korea was not as unsettled as Australia by the establishment of trade groupings in other parts of the world, it was nevertheless wary of the implications for its own economic growth. 67

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Indonesia was also worried about the creation of exclusionary trade groupings, although –​as a member of the Global South –​officials framed it in terms of a widening North–​South divide. With the decline of East–​West tensions, the North–​South divide now stood as ‘the central, unresolved issue of our time’ and was being exacerbated by the ‘increased protectionism in the developed market economies’ (Alatas, 2001, pp 10, 15; see also ‘Suharto fears’, 1991). Commenting on ‘the formation of powerful economic groupings among developed countries’, Alatas said that initiatives such as the Single European Market and the Canada–​US free trade agreement (FTA) could provide ‘a major stimulus to global economic progress’ but only if they ‘remain[ed] open and outward-​looking and [did] not result in additional external barriers’ (Alatas, 2001, pp 14–​15). The integration of eastern European economies with their western counterparts was also a cause for concern for Jakarta, as there was the possibility of aid, investment and trade flows being redirected from Southeast Asia to eastern Europe (Alatas, 2001, p 348). Indonesia was additionally cognizant of the struggles facing ASEAN economic cooperation, and called for the removal of intra-​ASEAN trade and investment barriers to encourage Southeast Asia’s economic integration and growth (Clift, 1988; Jacob, 1989b). For Indonesia, more equitable economic cooperation between the advanced and emerging economies –​the latter which included itself and its fellow ASEAN member states –​was thus of paramount importance. Based on the discussion thus far, it is evident that Australia, South Korea and Indonesia were all disconcerted by the economic trends in Europe and North America. The formation of geography-​based, exclusionary trade blocs would have potentially detrimental effects on the economic prosperity of all three countries. With the concept of national security expanding to include the economic dimension as Cold War military tensions wound down, a different set of challenges came to the forefront of the global and regional agendas. Fears that the largest economies in the world would end up in a spiralling trade war, anxieties about the fractures threatening to destroy the open multilateral trading system, as well as concerns about US unilateralism were the main external preoccupations of Asia Pacific countries. At the same time, the economic rise of Asia –​driven in particular by Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrializing economies –​meant that for regional economies, the maintenance of an open multilateral trading system was vital. Growing interdependence in the region also underlined the need for better avenues to manage economic cooperation and collaboration, building on existing platforms such as the PECC. These trends and developments reflected some form of stratificatory and functional differentiation that were present in the Asia Pacific during the late 1980s. This differentiation focused, in particular, on delineating the major powers 68

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and their behaviour vis-​à-​vis the rest of the regional states. Given this context, non-​major powers such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea leveraged the conducive circumstances and played key roles in shaping the APEC platform in its early days.

Formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation This section examines the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, which shaped APEC’s development in its formative days. Alongside the conducive circumstances that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more unipolar world, all three middle powers sought to ensure that they had a say in how APEC would progress and evolve. As a multilateral platform, APEC offered the opportunity for Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to facilitate the diffusion of power and influence, so that regional decision making would not be solely in the hands of the major economies such as Japan and the US. Their efforts here were also based on their distinctive attributes as middle powers, such as their non-​threatening profiles or, in Indonesia’s case, its recognized leadership of ASEAN. The presence of such differentiation contributed towards their behaviour and approaches regarding APEC. The following discussion is primarily descriptive, with most of the theoretical analysis taking place in Chapter 6. Let us begin with Australia’s proposal to form APEC.

Australia and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Australia’s leadership role in the formation of APEC was a result of several factors, including Canberra’s own concerns about its economic vulnerability, its embrace of middle power activism in its foreign policy during that time, as well as the regional aversion towards any major power leadership in the initiative. For many regional countries, it was precisely because Australia was a non-​major –​and therefore non-​threatening –​power that made it appropriate for it to take the lead in launching APEC. The inaugural meeting in November 1989 saw the participation of economic and foreign ministers from 12 countries, including the US and the then six ASEAN member states. Two years later, Australia persuaded the US to host APEC’s first leaders’ level summit. This sub-​section examines the circumstances motivating Australia’s proposal and surrounding the launch of the APEC process. Before proceeding, however, the section will first discuss Australia’s middle power status through the late 1980s and early 1990s. Australian leaders and diplomats during this time certainly saw their country as a middle power or medium-​sized state and sought to project this identity in its foreign policy, setting it apart from countries such as the US and Japan (see, for example, Hawke, 1987, p 13; Evans, 1989c; Keating, 69

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1992b, p 8). As then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans asserted, ‘for a country of Australia’s size and weight in world affairs … it is not wise to have exaggerated ideas of influence beyond our station’ (Evans, 1989a, p 6). Australia was ‘manifestly not a great or even major power; nor, however … are we small or insignificant’ (Evans, 1993c). Evans was a crucial figure in shaping the image of Australia as a middle power that, by virtue of its resources and accumulated goodwill, and through coalition building with ‘like-​minded’ countries, would be able to influence specific issues in international affairs. Particularly with Evans at the helm of Australian diplomacy, the late 1980s and early 1990s were the ‘golden years’ of the country’s middle power identity and activism (Ravenhill, 1998, p 322). In a book written by Evans and former diplomat Bruce Grant on Australia’s foreign relations in the 1990s, they argued that the number of middle powers across the world would be ‘a dozen to twenty at most’, based on ‘balancing out GDP and population size, and perhaps military capacity and physical size as well, then having regard to the perceptions of others’ (Evans and Grant, 1995, p 344). In the few years preceding the APEC proposal, Australia had been around the fifth to sixth biggest economy in the Asia Pacific, and the 14th largest in the world (The World Bank, 2021a). Beyond material capabilities, Australia’s middle power status during this time was also associated strongly with the notion of ‘good international citizenship’. Stressing that good international citizenship is ‘not the foreign policy equivalent of boy scout good deeds’, Evans explains that this concept is ‘best described … as an exercise in enlightened self-​interest: an expression of idealistic pragmatism’ and reflects recognition that global problems require global solutions (Evans, 1989a, pp 12–​13). In the pursuit of good international citizenship, Australia sought to build on its active and creative diplomacy, international credibility, liberal democratic principles, as well as strong commitment to multilateralism and institutions (Evans, 1993a; Evans and Grant, 1995, p 37). There was also awareness that the middle power status brought with it a set of advantages and disadvantages for Australian foreign policy. Unlike the major powers, Australia would not have unilateral influence on important global issues, but it could, on the other hand, rely on its non-​threatening profile to build like-​minded coalitions that would help to advance its interests (Hawke, 1987, p 13; Evans, 1993b). In this sense, multilateralism and institution building were crucial elements of Australia’s middle power diplomacy. As Evans explained in a speech to promote then Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s APEC initiative: Each [regional country] can have influence. Each [regional country] can have leverage. But as small or medium sized nations we are in constant competition for attention and influence in the capitals of the great powers and major economies. Collectively, however, we can exert 70

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more influence than if the ASEAN nations, or Australia, or even Japan were to act alone. (Evans, 1989b) More importantly, Australia saw a window of opportunity for non-​ major powers to take the lead in regional multilateral initiatives amid the ‘extraordinarily fluid international environment’ in the late 1980s (Evans, 1989a, p 6). During a speech to Korean business associations in Seoul on 31 January 1989, Hawke called for ‘a more formal intergovernmental vehicle of regional co-​operation’ in economics and trade (Hawke, 1989a, p 4). As an ‘econom[y]‌of medium size’, Australia was vulnerable to the fluctuations in the international trading system and was without the ability to unilaterally shape events to its own advantage (Hawke, 1987, p 16). From Australia’s perspective, it was thus imperative to strengthen the multilateral trading system that prioritized rules rather than material strength. Given that about half of Australia’s trade was with the countries on the western Pacific rim by 1988, the success of the newly industrialized or industrializing economies in the region was interlinked with Australia’s prosperity. Yet, as observed by several analysts and government officials, Australia was not a natural member of the Asian bloc (Ravenhill, 2001, pp 82–​3; Goldsworthy, 2003, p 7). As such, it was important for Canberra to seize the opportunity in setting up an Asia Pacific (as opposed to an East Asian or Asian) platform, to ensure that it had a voice in regional economic affairs that would affect its own interests. Australia’s initiative on APEC was also made possible by the fact that it was not considered a major power by other regional countries. Throughout 1987 and 1988, both Japan and the US had been considering, separately, the convening of government-​level forums to strengthen economic and trade cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Funabashi, 1995, pp 58–​9). However, fears of having ‘these two economic giants … dominate any transpacific regional organisation’ meant that neither of them could take the lead on the APEC initiative (Dent, 2016, p 120). As Evans surmised, ‘each side may have feared the worse of the other, and the smaller powers may well have felt that their own interests were at risk’ (Evans, 1993c). The Japanese government was moreover aware that the memories of its ‘Greater East Asia Co-​Prosperity Sphere’ (the official name for Japan’s occupation of regional countries during World War II) still lingered, with some in the region remaining distrustful and suspicious of Japan’s political ambitions. It was thus considered diplomatically practical for Australia, which had also been considering similar ideas for regionalism, to be the public face of the initiative if it were to succeed (Deng, 1997, p 361; Dalrymple, 2003, p 85; Dent, 2016, p 120). As a non-​major power, Australia did not appear threatening to its regional neighbours (Funabashi, 1995, p 60). Yet, as a middle power, Australia had sufficient material resources and political weight to garner 71

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support from other countries and get the initiative off the ground (Evans, 1993c; Evans and Grant, 1995, p 354; Ravenhill, 2001, pp 88–​9). Given this context, Australia was better placed than Japan or the US to take the lead in forming APEC. To be sure, Australia’s proposal was still, initially, received with some doubts particularly from the ASEAN countries. In addition to concerns that APEC might relegate ASEAN to the sidelines in regional multilateral cooperation, some member states were also apprehensive that the new platform might reinforce the influence of Japan and the US in the Asia Pacific to the detriment of smaller countries (Cooper et al, 1993, p 92; Bowles and MacLean, 1996, p 340). Following a meeting of its economic ministers in September 1989, ASEAN expressed support for the principles behind APEC but added the caveat that ASEAN should be at the centre of any regional economic cooperation initiatives (Sargent, 1989b). Australia’s desire to improve relations with ASEAN countries and be an ‘insider’ of the region meant ‘a willingness to make concessions’ (Beeson, 2009, pp 40, 43). Moreover, realizing that support from Indonesia was key to obtaining ASEAN’s backing for APEC, Canberra was careful to accommodate Jakarta’s sensitivities (Young, 1990; Elek, 2005, p 72; Frost, 2016, p 82). Australian officials were also quick to reassure that the country had been ‘a steadfast supporter of ASEAN from its earliest days’, and committed to having ASEAN at the core of the APEC process (Evans, 1989b; see also Hawke, 1989b, p 4). This allowed ASEAN ‘to have a considerable impact on the APEC agenda’ in its formative days, including having an ASEAN member state chair every other APEC meeting (Cooper et al, 1993, p 104; see also Pitty, 2003, p 27). Following several rounds of negotiations among the regional countries –​spearheaded by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Secretary Richard Woolcott –​the inaugural APEC ministerial meeting was convened on 6 November 1989 in Canberra, with the participation of economic and foreign ministers from the six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US. Australia continued to be invested in APEC’s success through the early 1990s, and when Paul Keating took over the prime ministership from Hawke in 1991, he proposed the addition of a leaders’ summit to ‘add political weight and status’ to the process (Keating, 1992b, p 4). By this time, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan had also become members of APEC. To Keating, it was the perfect opportunity for APEC to bring together in one organization the leaders of China, Japan and the US and help to facilitate the ‘triangular economic, political and security relationship that will determine Asia’s future’; this would be the first multilateral platform in the post-​Cold War Asia Pacific to do so (Keating, 2001). Keating’s proposal of holding a leaders’ summit alongside the APEC ministerial meeting drew ‘a non-​committal 72

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response’ from then US President George H.W. Bush (Keating, 2000, p 82). Fortunately for Keating, Bill Clinton, who took over the presidency from Bush in January 1993, was more welcoming of an APEC leaders’ summit (Funabashi, 1995, p 80). Clinton’s interest played a part in advancing the timeline for the inaugural summit, which was eventually held a year earlier than originally planned (Hartcher, 1993). Certainly, Keating also obtained sufficient support from Indonesia, Japan and China to follow up on the initiative with other APEC members (Keating, 2000, pp 87–​8; Pitty, 2003, p 32). The responses from the three countries were particularly important for the success of the leaders’ summit. Indonesia’s de facto leadership of ASEAN would determine the association’s attitude towards the proposal. Japan had worked closely with Australia on the establishment of the APEC process and remained an economic powerhouse, and China was emerging as a regional power in post-​Cold War Asia. All three countries appeared supportive of the leaders’ summit –​although Beijing opposed the participation of Hong Kong and Taiwan –​and others subsequently came on board as well (Keating, 2000, p 87). Having obtained support from the other APEC members, Keating successfully convinced Clinton to host the first APEC leaders’ summit in Seattle in November 1993. The only objection came from Mahathir, who had initially countered Hawke’s APEC proposal with the EAEG that excluded western countries such as Australia and the US, and now perceived the launch of the APEC leaders’ summit in Seattle as a US attempt at neo-​ colonialism (Dosch, 2015, p 117; see also Mohamad and Ishihara, 1995, pp 47–​8). Consequently, Mahathir declined to attend the Seattle summit. The addition of the leaders’ meeting to the APEC process, nevertheless, suggested that the forum’s agenda would go beyond economic and trade liberalization issues to include political and strategic discussions. Keating was thus of the view that, with APEC, Australia ‘for the first time … would have a seat at a very big and powerful table … and one which is entirely within our region and suits our own economic purposes’ (as cited in Callick, 2001). Interestingly, Hawke’s initial proposal in January 1989 had apparently excluded the US (along with Canada). The exact reasons for this are unclear, although some analysts have attributed the exclusion to Australia’s intention of dispelling fears about possible US domination, as well as the view that US protectionist measures were part of the problem that APEC was meant to address (Crone, 1992, p 76; Cooper et al, 1993, p 92). Evans himself had reportedly suggested that US participation in APEC would not have been welcomed by regional countries if it had been pre-​emptively foisted upon them by Australia, while Woolcott explained that Australia’s delayed inclusion of the US was to avoid having the superpower take on the leadership role in APEC as it would likely hamper the forum’s prospects for success (Funabashi, 1995, pp 62–​3). In his memoirs, Hawke debunks claims that 73

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he had intended to exclude the US –​‘the major economic power’ –​from APEC (Hawke, 1994, p 431). Regardless, most of the regional countries expressed their preference for US participation in APEC, and by May 1989 Canberra was unequivocally committed to having both the US and Canada in the economic cooperation forum (Evans, 1989b). With the introduction of APEC in the regional multilateral architecture, Australia thus successfully institutionalized an ‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization of the region that gave it a seat at the most important table in the Asia Pacific during that time. This occurred against the backdrop of active Australian middle power diplomacy, the rising importance of the economic agenda, as well as the rapid economic growth of Asia. While acknowledging that Australia would never be able to match up to the major powers in terms of material strength and strategic influence, Australian leaders and officials were also aware that being a middle power meant that the country could achieve certain things that the rest of the non-​major powers could not, for example, taking the leading role to initiate and launch APEC. As Evans and Grant point out, for a country like Australia that is ‘of a size and weight of less than major power proportions’, the ideal regional and global architecture would be one based on institutions and principles of equality (Evans and Grant, 1995, p 354). This would be, in principle, achieved by the multilateral nature of APEC, which would offer ‘educative and constraining influences’ against major power dominance in the regional architecture (Cooper et al, 1993, p 115). Let us now move on to discuss Indonesia’s response to and subsequent leadership of APEC.

Indonesia and ASEAN centrality While Indonesia had initially responded cautiously to Australia’s proposal to convene APEC, the Southeast Asian country later became one of APEC’s strongest proponents. Jakarta had shared the concerns of its fellow ASEAN member states that APEC would entrench the dominance of major powers over the emerging economies and sideline ASEAN in regional multilateralism. Despite these fears, Indonesia objected strongly to Malaysia’s counter proposal of the EAEG. Indonesia regarded such an exclusionary platform as antithetical to the interests of both itself and ASEAN, and subsequently succeeded in persuading Malaysia to modify the EAEG into a ‘caucus’ within the APEC framework, albeit an independent one led by ASEAN. Given its recognized status as ASEAN’s de facto leader, Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994 and its hosting of the second APEC Summit further reinforced the organization’s place in regional multilateralism in the early post-​Cold War days. Unlike Australia and South Korea, views of Indonesia as a middle power had yet to fully emerge from Jakarta in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To 74

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be sure, Indonesia’s GDP hovered between the 22nd and 30th largest in the world during this time and it was Southeast Asia’s largest economy (The World Bank, 2021a). Its growing economy also prompted observers to highlight the likelihood that Indonesia could become one of the next ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, following in the footsteps of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan (Mihaly, 1990, p 162; Emmerson, 1991, p 187). Nevertheless, Indonesia’s trailing infrastructure and socioeconomic development –​especially when compared to other regional countries –​ corresponded with its policymakers’ views of it as a developing country (Sumarlin, 1986; Ali, 1991; Jacob, 1991). As late as April 1994 –​just a few months prior to Indonesia’s hosting of the second APEC Summit –​Alatas acknowledged that Indonesia was ‘the most sizable economy in Southeast Asia’ but continued to refer to it as a ‘developing country’ (Alatas, 2001, p 529). Interestingly, however, external sources were starting to regard Indonesia as a ‘middle power’ –​a label associated with its considerable economic size and population, as well as its political maturity (‘Our media’, 1989; Mehta and Morais, 1990). This was certainly aligned with statements from Jakarta that it was ‘time for Indonesia to play a more active and assertive role’ in international issues and that Indonesia’s progression towards an advanced country would ‘have an impact on world politics’ (Kassim, 1989; as cited in Suryadinata, 1996, p 177). To a large extent, perceptions of Indonesia as a significant actor –​and indeed, as a middle power –​in regional and global affairs were bolstered by its roles in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and NAM. The latter had its origins in the seminal Bandung Conference of 1955, with then Indonesian President Sukarno among the founding leaders of the movement comprising newly independent states of Asia and Africa, which sought non-​alignment between the Soviet Union and the US. As NAM chair from 1992 to 1995, Indonesia led the grouping in charting a new purpose and role in the aftermath of the Cold War. Indonesia also assumed a leadership role in ASEAN. In fact, as a reflection of how influential Indonesia was in shaping developments in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s establishment in 1967 was in part ‘an effort to constrain Indonesian hegemony in Southeast Asia’ in the wake of Sukarno’s hostile Konfrontasi policy from 1963 to 1966 towards the newly formed Malaysia (Roberts and Widyaningsih, 2015, p 264). Subsequently, Indonesia has had an outsized role in influencing ASEAN’s mode of operations and processes. It chaired the first ASEAN summit in 1976, from which emerged foundational documents such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The extent of Indonesia’s diplomatic clout in Southeast Asia was also on display in the decade-​long conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, as Indonesia led ASEAN’s response and was the co-​chair of the Paris peace conferences that resulted in the official end of the war (Alagappa, 1993). In this sense, even as 75

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Indonesia lagged Australia and South Korea in some material capabilities, it nevertheless pursued a role in international politics comparable to the other middle powers or even as a ‘major state in Southeast Asia’ (Suryadinata, 1996, p 8). Notwithstanding challenges to its big power aspirations, Indonesia was able to leverage its profile as one of the more influential countries of the Global South to advocate its own interests –​a strategy that was similarly illustrated in its contributions to APEC in the platform’s formative years. Initial Indonesian responses towards Hawke’s proposal were not particularly enthusiastic. Among Jakarta’s primary concerns were the possibility that APEC might take the form of a closed trading bloc that would deepen fragmentation in the global economy, as well as the likelihood that APEC would consign ASEAN to the backbenches of regional economic cooperation and exacerbate the North–​South divide (Sargent, 1989a; Soesastro, 1996, p 25). Suharto reportedly expressed apprehension that the different levels of national development among regional countries would ‘[make] formation of a single regional forum extremely difficult’, while Trade Minister Arifin Siregar cautioned that the formation of a trade bloc would lead to a trade war (‘Japan, Indonesia’, 1989; see also Jacob, 1989a). In an interview with journalist Yoichi Funabashi, Woolcott recalls that in securing regional support for APEC’s establishment, ‘the most important country was Indonesia’ (as cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 56). This was because ‘Indonesia was the major influence in ASEAN’ and the association ‘[did] not react to any particular proposal or policy without ascertaining Indonesia’s view’ (Funabashi, 1995, p 56; Woolcott, 2003, p 235). Consequently, Jakarta was Woolcott’s first stop in Southeast Asia –​second after Wellington –​as he embarked on a tour of regional capitals to discuss Hawke’s proposal. Following Woolcott’s visit, Alatas voiced his agreement with the underlying economic principles of the Australian initiative and pledged support for the first APEC meeting, but noted that Indonesia’s preference was to utilize existing arrangements such as the ASEAN Secretariat and the annual Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) involving ASEAN and its dialogue partners (‘Reps to’, 1989). From the perspectives of Indonesia and its fellow ASEAN member states, this approach would ensure ASEAN’s continuing relevance and role in regional multilateralism. In contrast, APEC was expected to be led by non-​ASEAN countries that were much more powerful and influential than the ASEAN member states, a scenario that did not bode well for the prospects of ASEAN. While Australia and other non-​ASEAN powers were willing to accord ASEAN a central place in the APEC process, the concerns remained. Subsequently, at APEC’s inaugural ministerial meeting in November 1989, Alatas set out six principles encapsulating ASEAN’s position on the development of the new forum. First, ‘ASEAN’s identity and cohesion should be preserved’ in APEC, and ‘its cooperative relations with its dialogue partners and with other third countries should not be diluted’. Second, 76

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APEC cooperation should be based on ‘equality, equity and mutual benefit’, taking into account the disparities in levels of economic development and socio-​political systems among regional countries. Third, APEC should not seek to establish ‘an inward-​looking economic or trading bloc’. Fourth, APEC cooperation should be based on consultations rather than ‘mandatory directives’. Fifth, APEC should contribute towards capacity building and the promotion of common interests. Sixth, APEC should ‘proceed gradually and pragmatically’, and not be too hasty in its institutionalization (Alatas, 2001, pp 343–​4). Meant as a way to protect the interests of the emerging economies such as Indonesia against the larger developed economies in APEC, these principles were formalized as the ‘Kuching Consensus’ at an ASEAN ministerial meeting in February 1990. Indonesia was certainly not the only ASEAN member state to voice its uneasiness about the potential impact of APEC on the Southeast Asian countries. Viewing APEC as a platform that enforced western hegemony and allowed western countries to benefit at the expense of the weaker economies in the region, Mahathir counter proposed the EAEG in December 1990. Comprising the six ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea, the EAEG was meant to provide these ‘East Asian’ countries with ‘the leverage and a platform to act in concert and speak with one voice’ vis-​à-​vis the protectionist measures of the richer European and North American countries (Mohamad, 2004a, p 127; see also Mohamad, 2004b, p 163; Dhillon, 2009, p 224). Countries such as Australia and New Zealand –​which Mahathir described as ‘always favour[ing] the European viewpoint’ –​were excluded from the EAEG (Mohamad, 2011, p 612). Despite Malaysia’s affirmation that the EAEG would ‘revolve around ASEAN’, not all the ASEAN countries supported Mahathir’s proposal (Lai, 1991). Indonesia, in particular, was reluctant to back the EAEG (Crone, 1992, p 77; Higgott and Stubbs, 1995, p 522). Reports noted Jakarta’s annoyance that it had not been consulted beforehand, given that it considered itself the leader of the Malay world and ASEAN –​ both of which Malaysia was a part (Chuensuksawadi, 1991; Suryadinata, 1996, p 73). Suharto and Alatas also warned against the formation of an inward-​looking trade bloc and conveyed support for APEC’s open regionalism (‘Cool response’, 1990; Kagda, 1991). Indonesia’s wariness of the EAEG additionally arose from its reliance on US assistance and investment, and its hope that the US could counterbalance Japan’s economic influence in Southeast Asia (Kassim, 1992b; Suryadinata, 1996, p 73). Although Alatas denied sharing ‘the misgivings of other countries’ about the EAEG, its exclusion of the US arguably did not align with Indonesia’s preference (‘Jakarta has’, 1992). At an ASEAN economic ministers’ meeting in October 1991, Indonesia succeeded in persuading Malaysia to change the name of the EAEG to a consultative East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) (Milne and Mauzy, 77

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1999, p 130). The ASEAN economic ministers, moreover, agreed that the EAEC would ‘not be an institutionalized entity and would not be a trading bloc’, and would only convene ‘as and when the need arises’ (‘Joint press statement’, 1991). This was arguably a significant downgrade from Malaysia’s original initiative. Nevertheless, despite this name change, Indonesia remained hesitant to concretize the EAEC given the group’s exclusion of the non-​East Asian countries (Pura, 1992). The differences between Indonesia and Malaysia were also illustrated in their respective visions of the EAEC’s role. Malaysia preferred for the EAEC to be linked to the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, but Indonesia favoured the incorporation of the caucus within APEC. From Indonesia’s view, it was necessary for the EAEC to be incorporated within or adjusted in line with the APEC framework to be acceptable to Japan –​which had been reluctant to endorse the EAEC despite being deemed by Malaysia as the key player to lead the grouping –​and the US (Kassim, 1992a; Pura, 1992). A compromise was eventually made and in July 1993 –​more than two years after the idea was first mooted –​ASEAN foreign ministers agreed that the EAEC would be an independent caucus within APEC, and have its agenda supported and directed by the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting (Chalermpalanupap, 2005, pp 58–​9 ). Even with ASEAN’s official endorsement, however, the EAEC continued to falter in the face of differing views about its functions and modalities (Thaitawat and Thapanachai, 1993). Although Indonesia had become more openly supportive of the APEC process by the early 1990s, it was nonetheless wary of Keating’s proposal for a summit and Clinton’s offer to host the inaugural meeting. In his memoirs, Keating recalls his initial assumption that the first summit would be held during Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994 (Keating, 2000, p 84). While the timeline was eventually brought forward to the year when the US was chair, Keating was mindful that Indonesia’s response to the proposal would be ‘critical’ and ‘decisive within ASEAN’ (Keating, 2000, p 88). Jakarta did not explicitly object to the idea to convene the leaders’ meetings, but urged caution against a hasty institutionalization of the grouping (Ali, 1992; Kitney, 1992). Jakarta’s response could be attributed to two main reasons. First, a formal summit involving the leaders of major powers such as China, Japan and the US would add even more significance to the APEC process, and likely overshadow ASEAN’s significance in the region. Second, Indonesia was aware of the political sensitivities surrounding Keating’s initiative especially where Malaysia was concerned (Ali, 1992; Kitney, 1992). These reasons also explained Indonesia’s reluctance to endorse the APEC Eminent Persons Group’s recommendation for APEC to transition from a loose and consultative forum to an ‘economic community’ (Chan, 1993; ‘Indonesia, others’, 1993). 78

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Jakarta’s support for Australia’s initiative, nevertheless, also translated into its hosting of the second leaders’ meeting in Bogor in 1994 despite its initial concerns about APEC’s institutionalization. This was something that Keating had broached with Suharto in seeking his support for the establishment of the summit (Keating, 2000, p 88). Describing the invitation to Suharto to host the second APEC summit as ‘particularly astute’, John Ravenhill explains that this ‘appeared to pay tribute to Soeharto’s role as the elder statesman of ASEAN, and to Indonesia’s long-​standing claim to be the most important of the ASEAN countries’ (Ravenhill, 2001, pp 106–​7). In line with Indonesia’s interest in narrowing the North–​South gap, the Bogor summit focused on bridging differences between the advanced and emerging economies in APEC. Officials noted that given its membership, APEC represented a microcosm of North–​South relations in the global economy (Alatas, 2001, pp 357–​8). From Jakarta’s viewpoint, it was critical to help emerging economies catch up to their developed counterparts before APEC proceeded to discuss trade liberalization arrangements, so that the benefits would be equally shared (Jacob, 1994; Nainggolan, 1994, p 64; Soesastro, 1995, p 484). To be sure, Indonesia’s chairing of APEC was not completely smooth sailing as some ASEAN member states disagreed with Indonesia’s agenda. In a significant change of its attitude, Indonesia went from having one of the more cautious responses towards the APEC Eminent Persons Group’s recommendation of establishing a timetable for free trade, to fixing target dates for the process (Baker, 1994a; Suryadinata, 1996, pp 180–​1). Jakarta’s initial draft of what would come to be known as the Bogor Declaration for trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific, however, was strongly resisted by others such as Malaysia and China. As several observers noted, Suharto played a proactive role in ensuring that an agreement would be reached on APEC’s free trade goals (Suryadinata, 1996, pp 181–​2; Frost, 2016, pp 86–​7). Ahead of the summit in Bogor, Suharto held bilateral meetings with other APEC leaders to ‘reconcile outstanding differences’ over the free trade timetable and ‘seek a consensus’ (Lee, 1994). In an attempt to propose a possible solution that would be acceptable to all, he suggested that the advanced economies would implement free trade by 2010, while the emerging economies would do so by 2020 (Suryadinata, 1996, p 181). Suharto also introduced the notion of ‘flexible consensus’, which allowed member economies to join the trade liberalization process at their own pace (Baker, 1994b). This idea of ‘flexible consensus’ was reflected in his management of Malaysia’s dissent. In response to the 2020 deadline for emerging economies to achieve free and open trade and investment, Mahathir argued that they would be unlikely to catch up with the developed economies and that it would be unfair to expect countries such as Malaysia to stick to a specific timeline in opening up their economies (Tan, 1994). At Suharto’s suggestion, Malaysia submitted an annex to the Bogor Declaration conveying 79

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its interpretations of the trade liberalization timeline as ‘indicative’ and ‘non-​ binding’, and noting that the process would be undertaken by member economies ‘on a best-​endeavour basis’ (as cited in Soesastro, 1995, p 489). Although there continued to be disagreements over whether the annex was an official part of the Bogor Declaration, Suharto’s suggestion ensured that Malaysia was able to express its reservations without disrupting the overall Indonesian agenda for APEC (Funabashi, 1995, pp 92, 146). Indonesia had also rejected calls by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines to hold an informal ASEAN summit prior to the APEC Summit in Bogor. According to Hadi Soesastro, a member of the Indonesian National Committee for PECC, Suharto as the host of the APEC Summit ‘did not want to give the impression that ASEAN leaders are ganging up against the others’ (Soesastro, 1995, p 476). Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994 has been credited with substantively advancing the platform’s progress, with the Bogor summit ‘produc[ing] an ambitious and concrete goal for the hitherto deliberately vague programme of economic cooperation’ (Bisley, 2012, p 354; see also Garnaut, 2012, p 19). APEC’s subsequent struggle to achieve the Bogor goals does not negate Indonesia’s key role in shaping the formative days of APEC. As then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong observed, the proposal for trade liberalization ‘can only be done in Jakarta with President Suharto’ given Indonesia’s ability to bring together diverse regional states (as cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 90). Likewise, Indonesia played a significant role in determining the outcomes of the various proposals set forth by Australia and Malaysia. As an emerging economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia had initially been wary of APEC as an institutionalized platform that would work to the detriment of the weaker regional economies and sideline ASEAN. It thus sought to safeguard ASEAN’s central role in the APEC process as a way to ensure its own interests. The success of its chairing of APEC in 1994 and hosting of the second APEC Summit was also built upon its combined attributes of being both an emerging economy and ASEAN’s de facto leader. In this sense, Indonesia’s efforts regarding APEC demonstrated its distinct role in the region and ensured that the ASEAN member states had a say in the first intergovernmental multilateral forum in the post-​Cold War Asia Pacific.

South Korea and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s first expansion Unlike Indonesia and Australia, South Korea was neither a leader nor an initiator as far as visions of regional multilateralism were concerned in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Rather, South Korea facilitated APEC’s first expansion, which saw China, Hong Kong and Taiwan joining the APEC process in 1991. The induction of these three member economies at the APEC ministerial meeting in Seoul in November 1991 ‘strengthen[ed] 80

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APEC’s stature as the single largest forum speaking on the subject of trade liberalisation’ and reinforced its importance in the regional multilateral architecture (Shim, 1991, p 27). Reaching an agreement acceptable to all three members on issues such as political status and protocol procedures was certainly a complicated task. South Korea’s shuttle diplomacy was given a boost by its relatively neutral and non-​threatening image, as well as the fact that it was the only APEC member to still have diplomatic ties with the ROC by the end of 1991 and that its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were also improving. Similar to the preceding sub-​sections, we begin by examining South Korea’s middle power status during this time. The first official description of South Korea as a ‘middle power’ came from President Roh Tae-​woo in June 1991, while he was on a visit to the US. In a speech on South Korea’s role in a ‘[n]‌ew Pacific [o]rder’, Roh said that the country ‘may have become a “middle” power’ given its economic size, trade volume and per capita wealth (Roh, 1992, pp 243, 249). This was actually a rare pronouncement of South Korea’s middle power identity under the Roh administration. Instead, Roh preferred to promote the narrative that South Korea was emerging from the ‘peripher[y]’ to ‘propel itself into the ranks of the industrialized nations’ and assume ‘a central position in the international community’ (Roh, 1992, pp 208, 298). Regardless, Roh certainly acknowledged that South Korea was ‘neither a superpower nor an affluent advanced country’ (Roh, 1992, p 248). South Korea’s rise to middle power or industrialized country status was initially driven by its rapid economic growth from the 1960s through the early 1990s. While it had emerged from the Korean War as one of the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of US$67 in 1953, by 1989 this figure had increased to US$5,817 (Chung, 2007, p 12; The World Bank, 2021c). As a result of its post-​war economic growth, by the late 1980s South Korea’s GDP size had risen to be the sixth or seventh biggest among the Asia Pacific countries, and it ranked between 15th and 19th in the world (The World Bank, 2021a). South Korea’s rapid socioeconomic growth –​dubbed by its leaders as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’ –​enabled the country to become one of the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, along with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. South Korea’s economic rise was additionally closely linked to its democratization process in the late 1980s. In 1987, the country held its first direct presidential election in 16 years, from which Roh emerged as the victor. A ‘successful showcase of market economics and democracy’, South Korea was regarded as a developmental model for the emerging economies (Roh, 1992, p 131; see also Wood, 1993, p 188). Its unique ‘midway’ position between the advanced and emerging economies during this time also enabled it to promote itself as a bridge between these two groups (Roh, 1992, p 147; see also ‘ESCAP session’, 1991). South Korea’s 81

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economic and political achievements were certainly on full display when it hosted the Summer Olympics in September 1988, and Seoul saw this event as signalling its ‘arriv[al] at the threshold of the developed world’ (Roh, 1992, p 309; see also Han, 1989, p 34). Then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen concurred that Seoul’s successful staging of the Olympics boosted South Korea’s international influence (Qian, 2005, p 110). As will be discussed later, the Seoul Olympics were also a watershed for relations between South Korea and the communist world. Despite acknowledgement that South Korea’s status and material power were certainly not on par with countries such as Japan and the US, Roh declared that the country was nevertheless now ‘ready and willing to fulfill its international obligations … commensurate with its new status and capabilities’ (Roh, 1992, p 211; see also Roh, 1992, pp 248–​9). Amid these developments, the establishment of APEC and the membership dilemma over China, Hong Kong and Taiwan provided an opportunity for South Korea to assume a mediatory role in the regional multilateral architecture. During negotiations to launch APEC, Australia, Japan and the US had expressed interest to include China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in the grouping (Elsner, 1989; Woolcott, 2003, pp 239–​40). Prior to the first ministerial meeting in November 1989, Woolcott had broached the idea of Chinese participation in conversations with Premier Li Peng, but these plans were derailed by Beijing’s opposition to the inclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan in APEC (Woolcott, 2003, pp 239–​40). At the same time, ASEAN countries were reportedly concerned that the heavyweight Chinese economy might result in their interests being sidelined. Another concern was that China’s participation might put pressure on ASEAN member states that had yet to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing (Steketee et al, 1989). The Tiananmen incident in June 1989 subsequently put the issue of Chinese membership on hold, and without China’s participation in APEC, Taiwan and Hong Kong’s memberships were also out of the question. By the second ministerial meeting in July 1990, however, APEC ministers were in agreement that the three economies should be invited to participate in the forum, given their significance for the Asia Pacific ‘both in terms of present economic activity and their importance for the region’s future prosperity’ (‘1990 APEC’, 1990). As such, consultations should commence towards a mutually acceptable formula that would allow all three economies to participate, ideally at the next ministerial meeting to be held in 1991. South Korea, which was to host this third ministerial meeting, subsequently began negotiations with China, Taiwan and Hong Kong on their admission to APEC. South Korea’s mediating role in the issue was complemented by the Roh administration’s nordpolitik at the time. With calmer superpower relations and a more positive strategic climate, Roh saw a chance to improve the 82

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situation on the Korean peninsula. The main goal of nordpolitik was to ‘secure stability and peace’ in inter-​Korean relations by maintaining good relations with Pyongyang’s friends, such as China and the Soviet Union (Roh, 1992, p 155; see also Park, 1993, p 219). Establishing diplomatic ties with countries in the communist bloc would also help to enhance South Korea’s trade networks and economic prosperity (Kim, 1993, p 258). South Korea’s approach dovetailed nicely with the economic development aims of China and the Soviet Union, which required an expansion of economic cooperation with more countries. The Seoul Olympics, held just seven months after Roh’s inauguration, catalysed the progress of nordpolitik. The Soviet Union, China and eastern European countries sent large contingents of athletes, as well as trade and cultural delegations (Han, 1989, pp 34–​5). Consequently, dialogue on trade, investment and people-​to-​people exchanges blossomed. In particular, government-​level contact between China and South Korea went from being almost non-​existent, to the beginning of indirect trade in the late 1970s, to a trade volume of US$3.2 billion in 1989 (Chung, 1988, p 1033; Kim, 1993, p 262). In working towards formal diplomatic ties, South Korea and China agreed in October 1990 to set up trade offices, with some consular functions, in each other’s capitals. Significantly, amid normalizing relations with China, South Korea was the only APEC country to still have relations with the ROC through 1991. All the others had established official relations with the PRC and in accordance with the ‘One China’ policy, could not simultaneously have diplomatic ties with the ROC. With the existence of official ROC–​South Korean relations on the one hand and improving PRC–​South Korean ties on the other, South Korea had the diplomatic pull it needed to conduct shuttle diplomacy with the disagreeing parties. Political representation was the key point of conflict, particularly between Taiwan and China. Seeking to participate in APEC ‘on an equal footing to Beijing’s representation’, Taipei wanted to be officially designated as the ‘ROC’ and send its foreign minister to the meetings (Chu, 2016, p 177). This was unacceptable to China, who asserted that, based on the ‘One China’ principle, only it could join APEC as a sovereign country, while Taiwan and Hong Kong should participate as regional economies that were not independent of the PRC (Qian, 2005, p 108). In this regard, China said that Taiwan should be represented under the name ‘Taipei-​China’ or ‘Taiwan-​China’ –​a formulation that was rejected by Taiwan (Chu, 2016, p 177). China additionally insisted that Taiwan should be represented by only its economic minister and not its foreign minister (Qian, 2005, p 109). The impasse was eventually resolved following ‘[p]‌ersistent Korean diplomacy’ that was largely credited to Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See-​young, who was also the chair of the APEC senior officials’ meeting (Funabashi, 1995, p 73). Lee proposed that Taiwan be represented as ‘Chinese Taipei’ –​adopting Taiwan’s designation in the Olympics –​which both the ROC and PRC 83

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were amenable to (Chu, 2016, p 177). Taiwan was also persuaded to only send ‘ministers in charge of APEC-​related economic affairs’ to the meetings (Chu, 2016, p 177; see also He, 2009, p 32). With a consensus reached and the negotiations concluded, APEC welcomed China, Taiwan and Hong Kong as the platform’s newest members at the third ministerial meeting in Seoul in November 1991. According to academic and former Taipei Times reporter Ming-​chin Monique Chu, in total South Korea conducted nine rounds of negotiations –​ separately with Taiwan and China –​from October 1990 to October 1991. Officials from Beijing and Taipei never actually met throughout this process; South Korea was effectively the go-​between (Chu, 2016, pp 175–​6). While Lee has emphasized that his talks with Beijing and Taipei were conducted in his capacity as chair of the APEC senior officials’ meeting, rather than as a South Korean official, Funabashi points out that Lee’s efforts benefitted from Seoul’s improving relations with China (Funabashi, 1995, p 74). In addition to its unique relations with China and Taiwan at the time, Seoul was also perceived as having certain qualities that made it suitable to be a mediator in the issue. Based on interviews conducted with US officials, both Chu and Funabashi conclude that Washington viewed South Korea as a ‘less confrontational’ and ‘nonthreatening’ mediator for China, than if the US or Japan had attempted to assume that facilitating role (as cited in Funabashi, 1995, p 74; Chu, 2016, p 184). Indeed, Foreign Minister Qian, who represented China at its first APEC meeting in Seoul, recalls that South Korea ‘did all it could to help China become a member’, with Lee working tirelessly to develop a compromise that was acceptable to all parties (Qian, 2005, pp 108–​9). The perception of South Korea as a benign and neutral intermediary was likely reinforced by its relatively weaker power status –​ particularly when compared against the US and Japan –​and its enthusiasm towards improving ties with China as part of nordpolitik. Moreover, any kind of high-​profile US role in this issue would have been complicated by Washington’s policy towards Taiwan (Chu, 2016, p 175). As such, it was more appropriate and suitable for South Korea to take a central role in the negotiations. Described by a senior South Korean foreign ministry official as ‘a coming-​ out party for [Seoul’s] foreign relations’, the country’s hosting of the first APEC meeting that included China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1991 undoubtedly helped to enhance its regional and international profile (as cited in Shim, 1991, p 27). Thanks to its distinctive qualities and unique foreign relations at the time, South Korea was able to assume a role in this issue that other, greater, powers would unlikely be effective in. At the same time, by utilizing its diplomatic resources and taking on a leadership role in the negotiations, South Korea set itself apart from the rest of the non-​major powers. The reduction in military and ideological tensions in the late 1980s, 84

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as well as Seoul’s hosting of the Summer Olympics in 1988, also offered opportunities for South Korea to diversify its foreign policy and expand its engagement with communist countries, including China. With the inclusion of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in APEC, South Korea helped to widen APEC’s membership composition. As South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang-​ock declared at the Seoul meeting, ‘APEC has now come to embrace all of the major economic players of the region’ (as cited in Starr, 1991). Australia’s efforts in launching the APEC process, Indonesia’s pursuit of ASEAN centrality in the new organization, as well as South Korea’s facilitation of the memberships of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, all contributed towards the shape and form of APEC. Material resources played a part, but the social and ideational dimensions of each country’s approach were important as well. The success of their strategies illustrated that power politics was not simply about which countries had the largest economies in the world, but crucially, about how certain countries were able to leverage their relevant strengths within this instance of multilateral institution building to serve their own interests. To be sure, material power still mattered. Without Japan and the US supporting Australia’s various APEC initiatives, for instance, it is unclear if its efforts would have found success. Likewise, without the larger (non-​ASEAN) powers backing Indonesia’s efforts to maintain ASEAN centrality, it is unclear that ASEAN would have gained a central place in the APEC process. It is evident, nevertheless, that all three middle powers enjoyed certain profile attributes that bolstered their persuasiveness and credibility among their regional counterparts. This accounted for their ability to navigate the power politics characterizing APEC dynamics to their benefit.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the circumstances and conditions that shaped APEC’s evolution through the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the first region-​wide multilateral platform in the post-​Cold War era that brought together foreign ministers, as well as economic and trade ministers –​and later leaders –​of China, Japan, the US and the rest of the regional countries to the same table, the inauguration of APEC was a notable moment in the regional multilateral architecture. Amid declining Cold War tensions and the collapse of global bipolarity, Asia’s economic rise, as well as the anxieties over extra-​regional trade blocs, APEC’s value was not merely economic, but also strategic and political. A quick comparison of the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the formative days of APEC highlights that all three middle powers were quite successful in diluting major-​power stratificatory forces and assuming functionally differentiated roles that neither major nor smaller powers would be able to perform as effectively. Indeed, 85

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when activated by the process of power politics, the differentiated structure helped to generate the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards APEC. To a large extent, all three countries were driven by the need to weaken the extensive influence of major powers in regional economic affairs, by ensuring that other smaller and medium-​sized countries had a voice in decision making alongside the larger economies. The launch of the multilateral APEC as well as the insistence on ASEAN centrality in it were attempts by the respective middle powers to safeguard their own interests. Australia’s focus was on entrenching an Asia Pacific conceptualization of the region that would validate its place in the region. This was important for Australia, which often had its place in the Asian region questioned. As Asian economies grew in importance to Australia’s own prosperity in the late 1980s, however, Canberra sought to institutionalize a multilateral economic cooperation platform that would secure its place, and consequently economic interests, in the region. In contrast, Indonesia’s place in the region was rarely in doubt. As ASEAN’s de facto leader, it was often regarded as an important actor in the broader region too. Nevertheless, Jakarta’s concern about being dominated by the more developed economies and the potential sidelining of ASEAN in the region –​both of which would portend adverse consequences for its interests –​pushed it to strengthen APEC over Malaysia’s inward-​ looking EAEG, and ensure that the advanced economies accommodated their emerging counterparts in the APEC process. Meanwhile, South Korea relied on its distinctive diplomatic relations at the time to open APEC’s door to Chinese participation in APEC, along with Taiwan and Hong Kong. The inclusion of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in APEC meant a greater level of power diffusion as more voices were added to the APEC agenda. Such efforts contributed towards ensuring a more inclusive and equal decision making in the region, which was to the advantage of middle powers as they now had seats at the multilateral table. The functions of middle powers as initiators of or mediators within multilateralism were also reflected in the approaches and responses of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards APEC. Building on their ideational and social attributes, all three countries managed to persuade others to support their efforts. Whereas the major powers had the capacity to impose their preferences on others relatively easily, middle powers such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea had to rely on other, more diplomatic, tools to garner support for their agendas. This meant some form of compromise, as evident in Australia’s accommodation of ASEAN in APEC and Indonesia’s negotiations with Malaysia over the EAEG/​EAEC. In Australia’s case, its profile as a non-​threatening middle power also put it in a better position than Japan or the US to take the lead on this new cooperative grouping, given that it was meant to offer stability amid the behaviour of the world’s top two 86

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economic powers. Similarly, South Korea’s role in facilitating the entry of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong into APEC in 1991 was made possible thanks to its non-​threatening and non-​antagonistic image, particularly from the perspectives of China and the US. Admittedly, Seoul’s role here was in large part a matter of circumstance, given that it was the only APEC member to retain diplomatic ties with the ROC through 1991, which put its officials in a good position to conduct shuttle diplomacy and mediate the disagreements between Beijing and Taipei on the latter’s status in APEC. Nevertheless, the behaviour of South Korea, Australia and Indonesia in shaping APEC illustrated their ability to utilize both their material and ideational strengths to their advantage. In terms of social, relative and relational power politics, all three countries were able to leverage their resources and profiles to ensure support for their roles from both the major and smaller powers. As a consequence of the power politics surrounding the formation of APEC, the behaviour of the three middle powers were activated within the differentiated structure in the Asia Pacific. This analysis will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 6, following a similar discussion of the EAS in the next chapter.

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5

Shaping the East Asia Summit Introduction This chapter examines the conditions and circumstances surrounding the formative days of the EAS that was launched in 2005, focusing on the structural forces and processes that generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The time period for this case study stretches over a relatively long period of time, from the late 1990s to 2011. This is due not only to how the EAS and its membership evolved, but also to the fact that the platform’s establishment was linked to the East Asian community debate that occurred particularly robustly through the late 1990s and 2000s. Strictly speaking, however, the analysis narrows down to three specific points within this time period. The first is the late 1990s, when South Korean President Kim Dae-​jung convened the EAVG following the Asian financial crisis, for regional policymakers to provide recommendations on strengthening regional cooperation and community building. It was in the EAVG report that the creation of an EAS was first mentioned. The second point in time is the inauguration of the EAS itself, in 2005. In the period leading up to the platform’s launch, a debate emerged over its membership composition. Some countries expressed the preference for the new forum to only include the APT members, while others sought to also bring in Australia, India and New Zealand. It was in large part due to Indonesia’s efforts, supported by others, that the EAS launched as a 16-​member forum. The third and final point in time under study for this case is the late 2000s to early 2010s, when both Indonesia and Australia attempted to secure US participation in the changing regional multilateral architecture. This vision was ultimately realized in 2011, when Indonesia chaired the first 18-​member EAS that included Russia and the US. The establishment of the EAS was an important moment because it institutionalized the annual gathering of leaders representing the key countries that would shape the regional strategic environment going forward. While the summit initially started off as a cooperative platform for non-​traditional 88

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security issues such as finance, energy, education, avian flu prevention and disaster management, Indonesia took the initiative to add issues such as the South China Sea disputes when it was chair in 2011. This expansion of the EAS’ agenda, coupled with its ability to annually gather regional leaders, has raised its profile to a strategic forum crucial for regional cooperation and stability. The introduction of the EAS to the alphabet soup of regional multilateral organizations reflected the evolving power dynamics in the Asia Pacific –​with China and India being included as founding members, and the US absent from the first six years of the process. This was in contrast to APEC, which had the US as a founding member, with China only joining two years after its launch and India yet to be included. Moreover, whereas APEC comprised economies (rather than states) and its later inclusion of geostrategically further-​flung members such as Mexico and Chile meant a certain difficulty for the forum to deal collectively with regional concerns, the EAS consisted only of sovereign states and its membership composition reflected a clear regional context. Much of the literature on the formative days of the EAS has focused on its surprise emergence amid the Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership, the central role that ASEAN played in deciding its form, as well as the changing interests and approaches of the US in the region during this time (see, for example, Malik, 2006; Cook, 2008; Teh, 2011). The analysis in this chapter builds on these works by examining the contributions of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia towards shaping the form and function of the EAS, as well as the drivers that resulted in those behavioural outcomes. While the EAS was ultimately an ASEAN-​centred process targeted at managing major power dynamics, the behaviour of the three middle powers –​two of which were not ASEAN members –​contributed significantly towards the final shape and form of the platform. To a large extent, their behaviour and the consequent outcomes were generated from the presence of differentiation in the Asia Pacific. Trends and developments leading up to the EAS, such as the Asian financial crisis, US policy towards the region after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (thereafter the 9/​11 attacks), the Sino-​Japanese rivalry, as well as the growth of ASEAN-​centred multilateralism, reflected both the stratificatory and functional differentiation in the region during this time. China’s political and economic growth, in particular, resulted in it challenging not only Japan, but also the US, for regional leadership. Through negotiations of social, relational and relative power politics, South Korea, Indonesia and Australia diffused power away from the major players and assumed distinct functions in regional multilateralism to varying extents. South Korea’s establishment of the EAVG, Indonesia’s pursuit of a broader East Asia Summit, and Australia’s efforts in ensuring US participation in regional multilateralism contributed towards shaping the eventual form and agenda of the new institution. 89

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The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the regional circumstances and structural conditions from the late 1990s to the mid-​2000s that contextualized the establishment of the EAS. Understanding the context in which the EAS was formed is important as it offers an explanatory basis for the subsequent developments that occurred. The views of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea regarding the ongoing trends will also be highlighted. The third section then proceeds to examine the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in shaping the EAS. The focus is specifically on South Korea’s EAVG initiative, Indonesia’s leadership in determining membership of the EAS, and Australia’s APC proposal. While this chapter is focused mainly on empirically laying out the case study, the concluding section will briefly raise the theoretical implications of the discussion here.

Regional dynamics and structure from the late 1990s to mid-​2000s From the late 1990s to mid-​2000s, several important regional and global developments shaped the approaches of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia towards multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. Major events included the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997, the 9/​11 attacks on the US, the rivalry between Japan and China for regional leadership, as well as intensifying regionalism that was largely driven by ASEAN through the late 1990s and 2000s. From the perspectives of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea, these developments underscored the need for an effective platform that could secure the interests of non-​major powers like themselves, integrate and socialize a rising China into the region, and at the same time manage the destabilizing effects of major power dynamics. Indeed, these trends initially contributed towards closer cooperation and regionalism among ‘East Asian’ countries –​in essence, the ten ASEAN member states, as well as China, Japan and South Korea –​but subsequently the preference for including states such as Australia and the US became more prominent.

Asian financial crisis 1997–​98 The origins of the Asian financial crisis are often traced to early 1997, when several banks and companies in the region encountered economic difficulties and closures (Desai, 2003, pp 120–​1). In July, the Thai government decided to float the baht following the aggressive selling of the currency by speculative investors. This led to the baht’s devaluation and resulted in a financial meltdown across the Asia Pacific. Other than Thailand, countries that were hardest hit by the crisis included Indonesia and South Korea (Djiwandono, 1999, p 115; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, p 135). The financial crisis 90

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came as a shock because prior to 1997, most regional economies had been enjoying strong growth, moderate inflation, as well as high savings and investment rates (Glick, 1999, p 33; Desai, 2003, p 86). The effects of the Asian financial crisis reverberated beyond economics, with domestic political changes in Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. At the regional level, the crisis was also the catalyst for several crucial developments. First, the speed at which the financial turmoil spread from country to country demonstrated the interdependent nature of regional and global economies. In particular, the crisis illustrated the ‘negative aspect of closer interdependence, where domestic problems in one country could –​if left unchecked –​spread to affect other regional states’ (Curley and Thomas, 2007, p 9). The currency crisis began in Thailand, spread to the rest of Asia, and by 1998 had also affected countries as far as Brazil. The crisis moreover revealed the close economic links between ASEAN and the Northeast Asian countries. These considerations would come to shape discussions on the need for better financial and economic coordination not just among the ten ASEAN states, but also involving China, Japan and South Korea (Terada, 2003, p 255). To be sure, when the crisis hit, regional and global arrangements such as APEC and ASEAN processes, as well as the IMF and World Bank, were already in place. The IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) intervened and provided bailout packages (Desai, 2003, pp 213–​14). Critics have charged, however, that the IMF had mismanaged the crisis, and worsened the situation instead (Katz, 1999; Desai, 2003, pp 212–​40; Curran, 2017). The IMF and the US also rejected Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund. Consequently, questions were raised about whether supposedly international organizations were simply aimed at protecting US or ‘Western’ interests at Asia’s expense (Higgott, 1998, pp 346–​50; ‘IMF criticism’, 1998). The deteriorating state of affairs gave rise to regional frustration and resentment over the ‘heavy-​handed’ and ‘unsympathetic’ approach of western countries and organizations (Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, p 139; Curran, 2017). In contrast, China, whose economy remained largely intact, emerged as a ‘responsible international economic player’ by refraining from devaluing the renminbi and offering assistance to Southeast Asian countries (Tanaka, 2007, p 62). Meanwhile, existing regional arrangements also failed to deal effectively with the crisis. Assessing the responses of APEC and ASEAN, Michael Wesley writes that these institutions lacked ‘a solidarity, a resolution, and a commitment to the recovery of afflicted economies’ (Wesley, 1999, p 64). ASEAN was ‘powerless’ against the economic predicament of its member states, while APEC was perceived as a US-​led organization that aligned its responses with Washington (Emmers and Teo, 2018, p 162; see also Higgott, 1998, pp 341–​2). The failure of APEC to come up with concrete solutions to the crisis deepened the divide between its western (mainly Australia and the US) and Asian members (Higgott, 1998, 91

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pp 341–​2; Emmers and Ravenhill, 2011, pp 136–​8). These circumstances accentuated the need for new or enhanced ‘self-​help’ platforms that would better protect the interests of regional countries vis-​à-​vis the US and other western powers (Higgott, 1998, p 353; see also Yahuda, 2014, pp 88–​9). In South Korea, the financial crisis put a halt to three decades of high economic growth rates –​over 8 per cent annually –​and resulted in a depreciating won, falling stock prices and a fourfold increase in unemployment (Kwon, 1998, p 331; Reddy, 2010, p 38). Initially, the South Korean government was reluctant to approach the IMF for help. Officials held the view that the IMF would impose harsh conditions on Seoul that ‘would carry a high political cost and deprive it of its economic sovereignty’ (Garran, 1997). By November 1997, however, the worsening situation prompted South Korea to seek out IMF assistance and a few weeks later both sides agreed on a record US$57 billion bailout package in exchange for Seoul’s implementation of tough reforms such as limiting economic growth and increasing taxes (Choe, 1997). Jaewoo Choo and Sophie Boisseau du Rocher point out that, for Seoul, the crisis also ‘exposed [Washington’s] incapability and sheer unwillingness’ to act, and resulted in the emergence of ‘a general sense of untrustworthiness and disloyalty toward the United States’ (Choo and du Rocher, 2007, p 100). Notably, China also did not offer South Korea any form of direct assistance –​a contrast to its provision of aid to Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand (du Rocher and Nicolas, 2007, p 3; Chung, 2008, p 164). The financial crisis certainly had political consequences for the South Korean government. President Kim Young-​sam fired his top two economic advisers, and Kim Dae-​jung subsequently won the first-​ever election victory for an opposition party presidential candidate in December 1997 (Choe, 1997). As explained later, the new president would go on to make a significant contribution to the EAS through the EAVG, which was aimed at addressing the gap in regional economic cooperation (Kim, 2006, p 11). These correspond to what Anthony Milner observes as the two opposing narratives characterizing South Korean perception of the crisis –​that the country was simultaneously a ‘shrimp between whales’ and ‘a nation that … will show the rest of the world the way’ (Milner, 2003, p 290). Indonesia also struggled to manage the repercussions of the economic meltdown. Amid the free-​falling rupiah and soaring inflation, Indonesia requested assistance from the IMF, World Bank and ADB in October 1997 (Gopalakrishnan, 1997; Bird, 1998, p 175). In response, the three institutions pledged to provide more than US$30 billion to Indonesia, on the condition that the latter implemented sweeping economic reforms (Gopalakrishnan, 1997; ‘Govt shuts’, 1997). Despite this agreement, Indonesia’s annual budget announced in January 1998 led some analysts and IMF officials to question the country’s commitment to the reforms (Gopalakrishnan, 1998; Walters, 92

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1998a). During a subsequent visit by IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus to Jakarta, President Suharto agreed to more reforms, ‘including an end to special arrangements associated with his family and close business associates’ (Walters, 1998b). The outcome of these negotiations was most famously captured in a photo that showed Suharto hunched over a table signing the agreement as Camdessus looked on with his arms folded. Several observers noted that Indonesians would have regarded the imagery of their country ‘surrendering’ or ‘bow[ing]’ to the IMF as humiliating and reflective of the organization’s ‘imperial arrogance’ (Kassim, 1998; Bird, 1999, p 28; see also Mydans, 1998). The improvements in Sino-​Indonesian relations during this time have been attributed both to Indonesia’s unhappiness with the US and western institutions during the financial crisis, as well as China’s economic assistance (Sukma, 2009, p 601; Shekhar, 2018, pp 201, 204). As the economic situation continued to deteriorate amid ongoing political tensions, violent riots that targeted mostly the ethnic Chinese for their perceived wealth erupted in parts of Indonesia. Protestors also called for Suharto to step down. Concluding his 30-​year-​long presidency, Suharto resigned in May 1998 and handed over the reins to his vice president, B.J. Habibie. This marked the start of Indonesia’s turn inwards for the next several years, although it would emerge to resume its leading role in ASEAN from the early 2000s. Australia was not as badly affected by the financial crisis as some of its regional counterparts, and it offered assistance to struggling economies. Australia and Japan were the only two countries that contributed to all three IMF rescue packages for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, and Canberra additionally lobbied the IMF on Jakarta’s behalf (Wesley, 2001, pp 305–​6). The economic crisis had come on the heels of the rhetoric of Independent Member of Parliament Pauline Hanson, who warned in 1996 that Australia was ‘in danger of being swamped by Asians’ (‘Pauline Hanson’s’, 2016). Hanson’s anti-​Asian sentiments certainly unsettled Australia’s neighbours (see, for example, Anggraeni, 1996; Ho, 1996). In this sense, the economic crisis provided the John Howard government with an opportunity to counter Hanson’s comments and bolster its credentials in the region (Scott, 1998, pp 230–​1; Milner, 2003, p 300). Prime Minister Howard made the observation in 1998 that Australia was ‘more respected in Asia now than it was five years ago because we’ve done well and we’ve been able to help’, while his foreign minister, Alexander Downer, declared that it was the differences between Australia and other regional economies that made it possible for the former to ‘contribute strongly in seeing our region through these difficult times’ (as cited in Dodson and Grattan, 1998; as cited in Ngoo, 1999). Interestingly, Australia’s ability to withstand the Asian financial crisis ‘encouraged Australians to identify less rather than more with “Asia” ’, and prompted Australians ‘to think on a global rather than regional scale’ (Milner, 2003, p 300). This was 93

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a turnaround from its policy of the early 1990s, with Australia’s regret over its past ‘fawning approach to Asia’ illustrated in the Howard administration’s initial disinterest towards the EAS (Milner, 2003, p 300). The Asian financial crisis and responses to the crisis reflected differentiation within the region. Amid arguments about whether ‘Asian values’ or ‘western values’ were superior, the failure of Asian economies to overcome the crisis on their own skewed the debate in favour of western models of political and economic development. To be sure, the conditions attached to the IMF bailout packages, as well as the rejection of Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund proposal by the IMF and Washington, also led some in the region to see the need for an ‘East Asian’ modality of economic cooperation and integration. The speed at which the financial crisis spread through the region ‘galvanized [ASEAN] into deepening its integration and projecting its socialization and managerial processes into Northeast Asia’ (Jones and Smith, 2007, p 148). The extension of ASEAN-​centric cooperation to include China, Japan and South Korea had been in the works for some time, following the ‘acclimation’ of ASEAN member states to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s EAEC/​EAEG concept (Terada, 2003, p 256). In 1997, the three Northeast Asian countries were invited to participate in an ASEAN meeting, kicking off the APT process. It was clear, nevertheless, that for all the talk of a multipolar world, the international system remained one that was stratified, with the US at the top (He, 2008, p 507). The US was not only the biggest economy in the world in the late 1990s; it maintained a GDP that was about twice as big as the second largest economy –​Japan –​during that period (The World Bank, 2021a). Subsequently, it was the US and other western economic actors that drove regional responses to the crisis. Kai He notes, moreover, that US indifference towards the economic woes of the ASEAN member states made the latter ‘aware of the danger of a unipolar world’ and they began looking for ways to ‘reduce economic dependency towards the outside powers, especially the US’ (He, 2008, p 507). The crisis also highlighted China’s increasing economic power. Its economic growth had caught up to Japan’s over the 1990s and 2000s, and its decision not to devalue its currency during the financial turmoil contributed to the portrayal of it as a responsible power in the international economic sector. In this sense, the Asian financial crisis revealed and reinforced differentiation in regional politics in both stratificatory and functional terms. Such differentiation was deepened following the 9/​11 attacks on the US.

9/​11 attacks and US-​led war on terror On the morning of 11 September 2001, four commercial aircraft bound for the US were hijacked. Two of the planes were intentionally flown into 94

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the north and south towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, leading to their collapse. The third plane hit the Pentagon, while the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania. The death toll numbered almost 3,000, making it the deadliest terrorist attack on US soil. The attacks on the World Trade Center (a symbol of US economic power) and the Pentagon (the base of US military strength) were viewed as ‘an assault on institutions that represented core US values’ (Murata, 2009, p 221). In the weeks that followed, US investigation and intelligence agencies uncovered links between the hijackers and al-​Qaeda, an Islamist organization led by Osama bin Laden that was based in Afghanistan. The fight against terrorism was thus framed, from the US perspective, as the defence of ‘American nationhood’ and western values against Islamic extremism and fundamentalism (Murata, 2009, p 221). During a speech to Congress a week after the tragedy, US President George W. Bush declared that every country across the world would have to decide where their allegiances lay: ‘[e]‌ither you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001). Subsequently, failing to secure the arrest of Osama from the Taliban government, the US and a coalition of its allies invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. The 9/​11 attacks had a profound impact on the US approach to its foreign relations, including towards the Asia Pacific. At the first two APEC summits following the attacks, for instance, Bush made terrorism a key agenda item at the expense of the forum’s original economic and trade focus, reportedly exasperating some regional leaders (Camroux and Okfen, 2004, p 165). While the 9/​11 attacks had suddenly catapulted counterterrorism to the highest of US security interests, not all Asia Pacific countries shared this concern. On the one hand, many Southeast Asian countries had been combatting terrorism long before the attacks (Vicziany et al, 2004, p 19). On the other hand, regional countries found themselves facing urgent economic recovery, political stability and social development challenges following the Asian financial crisis, leaving them little scope to intensify counterterrorism cooperation (Lee, 2003, p 111). The complexity of US counterterrorism strategy in the Asia Pacific was compounded for Muslim-​majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, whose governments faced pressure from domestic Islamist constituents to condemn what was perceived to be western-​ led aggression on the Muslim world (Capie, 2004, pp 227–​33). Certainly, then Indonesian President Megawati had condemned the ‘brutal and indiscriminate attack’ on the US and committed to international counterterrorism cooperation in the immediate aftermath of 9/​1 1 (‘Indonesia’s Megawati’, 2001). Hardline Islamic groups in the country, however, warned that US retaliation on Afghanistan would be ‘tantamount to a crusade against Islam’ and threatened to attack the US embassy in response (‘Indonesian Muslim’, 2001; Soetjipto, 2001). Anti-​US protests subsequently erupted. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 95

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2002 found that 64 per cent of Indonesians polled opposed the US-​led war on terrorism while 49 per cent felt that US foreign policy did not take the interests of others into account (Pew Research Center, 2002, p 60). Such sentiments from Indonesian voters meant that Indonesia was constrained in its counterterrorism cooperation with the US, even as it remained reliant on US financial assistance for its post-​crisis economic recovery. During negotiations for a joint statement condemning the 9/​11 attacks at the October 2001 APEC Summit, Indonesia (along with fellow Muslim-​majority countries Malaysia and Brunei) sought to omit references to Osama and US military strikes on Afghanistan (Knox, 2001; ‘RI, post-​Shanghai’, 2001). In this sense, while 9/​11 had elevated Indonesia’s importance to the US in the context of the latter’s counterterrorism strategy, Indonesia was hesitant in demonstrating full support for US attacks on Afghanistan (Smith, 2003, pp 455–​6). Nevertheless, as a leading Indonesian expert in foreign policy pointed out, it was also clear that although the US ‘alone could not solve all these new challenges’ including terrorism, it was ‘still the “primus inter pares” among the big powers … because her participation and leadership in many instances are requisites to finding the solution’ (Wanandi, 2008, p 312). From this perspective, Washington remained the foremost actor in global affairs. In contrast to Indonesia’s wariness, Australia strongly backed US anti-​terror efforts and followed its major power ally into Afghanistan in October 2001. The 9/​11 attacks also shifted the focus of Australia’s security concerns, from traditional interstate conflicts to transnational or stateless actors based in areas with weak state governance (Wesley, 2007a, p 62). From Canberra’s perspective, the global war on terrorism had implications for its near region, which it started to regard as an ‘arc of instability’ (Dobell, 2007, p 86; Wesley, 2007a, p 62). This was due not just to terrorism, but also the socioeconomic and political turmoil wreaked by the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia and the violence surrounding East Timor’s fight for independence in the late 1990s (Dobell, 2007, p 86). Additionally, Canberra’s intervention in Jakarta’s policymaking on East Timor and the Australian leadership of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security in the country was perceived by Indonesia as distasteful and ‘arrogan[t]‌’ (Cotton, 2001, p 228; Goldsworthy, 2001, p 18). The 9/​11 attacks deepened the differences between Australia –​as a member of the western world and a US ally –​and its Muslim neighbours. Following raids by Australian security agencies on some Muslim homes in 2002, Mahathir said that Australia was ‘unsafe for Muslims’ and Megawati called on Australia to ‘not go overboard’ in their anti-​terror campaign (‘Indonesian president’, 2002). Although counterterrorism cooperation between Australia and some Southeast Asian countries was strengthened in the wake of 9/​11, Australia’s regional relations remained troubled. Howard’s declaration of Australia’s right to take 96

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pre-​emptive action against terrorist threats in other countries, as well as his agreement with an interviewer that Australia was the US’ ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Asia Pacific, drew consternation from regional leaders (‘The reluctant’, 2005; Wesley, 2007a, pp 58–​9). These developments and attitudes shaped Australia’s dismissive approach towards the emerging regionalism of the time, although Canberra was ultimately a founding member of the EAS in 2005. Like Australia, South Korea pledged ‘unreserved support and cooperation’ for the US-​led counterterrorism campaign, which materialized in Seoul’s provision of a medical unit and transport to Washington’s war in Afghanistan (‘President pledges’, 2001). South Korea’s attitude towards the global war on terror, however, remained relatively ambivalent, similar to most other East Asian countries that prioritized economic recovery and political stability in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. As Lee Shin-​wha further notes, Islam was not a major element in Northeast Asia’s dynamics, except in the western provinces of China (Lee, 2003, p 107). Instead, South Korea’s foremost concern arising from the 9/​11 attacks and subsequent US counterterror campaign was the impact on the inter-​Korean peace process. This was particularly so after Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002, in which he described North Korea, Iran and Iraq as forming an ‘axis of evil’ that ‘threaten[ed] the peace of the world’ (Bush, 2002). Observers pointed out that Washington had diverged from President Kim’s reconciliatory ‘Sunshine policy’ towards North Korea, with Seoul wary that Bush might be ‘bringing his crusade on terror to the Korean peninsula’ (‘Is Bush’, 2002; see also Romei and Lunn, 2002). Such sentiments fanned anti-​US attitudes in South Korea, which were further inflamed when a US military vehicle accidentally crushed two South Korean schoolgirls to death in June 2002 and the soldiers in the vehicle were acquitted later that year. Subsequently, the presidential election at the end of 2002 saw the victory of Roh Moo-​hyun, who said that he would not ‘kowtow to the Americans’ (as cited in Choe, 2002). US supremacy and penchant for unilateralism were evident. Bush’s statement that ‘the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others’, backed up by US actions in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq, were reflective of such unilateralism (Bush, 2003). In quantitative terms, the gap in defence spending between the US and the rest of the countries was sizable. In 2001, for instance, US military expenditure exceeded the collective spending of the next 15 countries (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2021). US ability to project military power beyond its shores also continued to be something that not many states could match. Charles Krauthammer argues that the 9/​11 attacks deepened this asymmetry of power by demonstrating ‘heretofore latent American military power’ and the US ability to recover quickly from the attacks, as well as ‘accelerate[d]‌ the realignment of the current great powers’ –​ including China and 97

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Russia –​behind the US (Krauthammer, 2002/​03, pp 7–​8). To be sure, US soft power and liberal democratic values were not accepted unquestioningly across the globe. However, even though some Asian countries differed from the US in values and priorities, the broad consensus was that the US was the most powerful country in the world and its constructive engagement with the region was important for stability. Even Malaysian leaders, who were often wary of ‘unrivalled US hegemony, and the purposes to which its preponderant power is put (or not)’, had ‘long recognised that the US military presence was indispensable for regional stability’ (Nesadurai, 2004, p 24; Heng, 2015, p 406). Similarly, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen in 2002 described both China and the US as ‘great powers with world influence’ and highlighted their ‘common responsibility … in preserving regional and world peace’ (‘Chinese Vice-​Premier’, 2002). Notwithstanding continued US dominance in the region, responses to the US-​led counterterror campaign clearly underscored the differing priorities and approaches between the US and Australia on the one hand, and several Asia Pacific countries –​such as Indonesia and South Korea –​on the other. While Australia demonstrated its staunch support of the US strategy, others were ‘rankled’ by US threats of ‘“regime change” and “pre-​emption” on sovereign states where it deemed necessary’ (Pablo-​Baviera, 2007, p 235). The inclination of the US towards unilateralism and its apparent disregard of the domestic sensitivities in some regional countries deepened the divide surrounding its counterterror strategy. Along with the disappointing western responses to the Asian financial crisis, the US approach to counterterrorism in the Asia Pacific thus contributed to a rising call for the establishment of a high-​level regional multilateral platform that would focus on the concerns of ‘Asian’ countries.

Rise of China and Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership The emergence of the Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership could be attributed to the economic, military and political rise of China alongside Japan’s stagnating growth (Calder, 2006, p 129; Yahuda, 2014, pp 82–​3). In the post-​World War II period, Japan’s economy underwent a period of rapid growth, and by the 1980s it had become the second biggest economy in the world. This allowed it to establish a strong economic and political presence in Southeast Asia. Japan became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1977, and its trade, investments and aid were crucial for Southeast Asia’s socioeconomic development (Singh et al, 2017, p 107). In addition to being the only Asian country in the G7, Japan had also made important contributions to early attempts at regional cooperation including in the PECC and APEC. Japan’s status as a regional economic leader was affirmed by Prime Minister Mahathir’s designation of it as the ‘first among equals’ 98

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in the EAEC (Mohamad, 1995, p 37). Japan’s leadership role in Southeast Asia, however, became increasingly challenged by domestic economic and political problems, as well as a rising China. In the 1990s, Japan experienced a prolonged recession. Its year-​on-​year GDP growth fell from 6.8 per cent in 1988, to a low of −1.3 per cent in 1998 (The World Bank, 2021b). Subsequently for the next decade, Japan’s annual economic growth ranged from −0.3 to 2.8 per cent; in contrast, China’s annual GDP growth rate over the same time period ranged from 7.7 to 14.2 per cent (The World Bank, 2021b). Predictions at the turn of the century highlighted expectations that China could overtake Japan as the world’s second largest economy by 2020 –​this ultimately occurred much earlier, in 2010 (Richardson, 2001; The World Bank, 2021a). Such developments marked a transition period where China rose to supplant Japan’s position as the dominant Asian power. While Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi’s (2001–​06) shifts in defence policy enhanced Japan’s role in international security post-​9/​11, its pacifist constitution limited reforms (Tang, 2007, p 25; Singh, 2013, pp 89–​93). Meanwhile, China began spending more on defence, and its military expenditure was estimated to have exceeded Japan’s from the mid-​2000s (SIPRI, 2021). Beijing also embarked on a naval expansion programme that included the purchase and refurbishment of what would eventually become its first aircraft carrier (Myers, 2018). In October 2003, China became the third country in the world –​after the US and the former Soviet Union –​to launch a manned space mission, which a Japanese media outlet described as ‘a major step toward realizing its national goal of becoming a great power both economically and militarily’ (Saeki, 2003). The instability in bilateral ties was fuelled by historical and political disagreements between the two countries, arising mainly from past Japanese invasion and occupation of Chinese territories, as well as the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/​Senkaku Islands. Such tensions were reflected prominently in President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, during which the two countries –​despite initially positive expectations –​failed to agree on matters relating to their wartime history and both leaders subsequently declined to sign the joint statement. From the early 2000s, Chinese scholars and officials also started promoting the idea of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ premised on the country’s economic development alongside participation in economic globalization, institutional innovation, as well as the formation of mutually beneficial relationships with other countries (Zheng, 2002, pp 5–​6). While the phrase was later modified to ‘peaceful development’ to dial down its confrontational tone, the concept’s substantive elements and vision of China as a future major power endured. The dynamics between a rising power vis-​à-​vis a stagnating power contributed towards the Sino-​Japanese strategic competition for regional leadership. One aspect of this rivalry manifested in the engagement of China and Japan with regional multilateral institutions. Amid deepening economic ties 99

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with ASEAN member states, China became the first country to propose an FTA with ASEAN in 2000, and two years later both sides concluded a framework agreement that called for the FTA’s establishment within 10 years. The announcement of an ASEAN-​China FTA ‘came as a major shock to Japan’ and Tokyo proposed its own ASEAN-​Japan FTA in 2002 (Chung, 2011, p 414). In 2003, China reached another milestone in its regional relations by becoming the first dialogue partner of ASEAN to sign the TAC. Subsequently, Japan –​which had thus far refrained from signing the TAC due to concerns about its ability to promote human rights and democracy in the region –​acceded to the treaty in 2004 (Terada, 2006, pp 12–​13). Beyond investing in ASEAN-​led processes, China and Japan also attempted to institutionalize their preferred composition of the region. China worked actively to strengthen ‘East Asian’ cooperation within the APT framework. On the other hand, Japan was more inclined towards an ‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization of the region that included the US, so as to balance China’s expanding influence in the region. Being sandwiched between China and Japan was certainly not an unfamiliar situation for South Korea, given its history and geography. The growth of China’s economy and its integration into the global economy was accompanied by a rise in bilateral trade with South Korea. By 2000, South Korea’s trade with China accounted for 9.4 per cent of its total trade volume –​an increase from 2.1 per cent in 1990. Over the same period, South Korea’s trade with the US and Japan dropped from 26.9 per cent to 20.1 per cent, and 23.1 per cent to 15.7 per cent respectively (ASEAN-​Korea Centre, 2011, p 46). Analysts highlight that the South Korean public had tended to view China favourably since the normalization of diplomatic ties, although there were some concerns –​especially from the policy elite –​about the potentially destabilizing effects of China’s rise (Chung, 2001, pp 783, 785–​6; Han, 2007, p 12). Meanwhile, despite the landmark accord in October 1998 in which President Kim and Japan’s Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi pledged to ‘squarely face the past’ and ‘build solid, good-​neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-​first century’, historical disagreements continued to frustrate bilateral relations (‘Japan-​Republic of Korea’, 1998). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, South Korea’s attitude towards China, Japan and the Sino-​Japanese rivalry was also linked to Kim’s Sunshine policy on North Korea. Compared to Tokyo and Washington, Beijing was more supportive of the engagement-​ oriented Sunshine policy (Rozman, 2007, pp 203–​4; Chung, 2008, p 165). As Gilbert Rozman observes, the Japan–​South Korea–​US ‘alliance triangle … reced[ed]’ in favour of a closer Sino-​South Korea relationship regarding North Korea (Rozman, 2008, p 191). Ultimately, this had the effect of reinforcing China’s role as a major player on the Korean peninsula, dovetailing with its rise on the global stage. 100

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Australia similarly began to recognize the growing strength and influence of China in the region, even as Japan remained one of its closest economic and security partners –​the latter particularly after Tokyo’s defence reforms post-​9/​11. ‘From an Australian perspective’, David Walton writes, ‘the emergence of adversarial camps in Asia based on rising tensions between Japan and China ha[d]‌the potential to polarize the region and disrupt trade flows’ (Walton, 2008, p 81). Australia’s economic relations with China had grown rapidly since the early 2000s and by 2005 China was Australia’s second largest trade partner after Japan (Zhang, 2007, p 101). Canberra also began to regard Beijing as a constructive actor in international affairs (Zhang, 2007, p 104). In its 2003 White Paper on foreign and trade policy, the Howard administration acknowledged that China’s rise would be ‘the most important factor shaping Asia’s future’ and was thus eager to strengthen the relationship (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, 2003, p 79). In this context, Canberra was understandably not keen to get caught in the middle of Sino-​Japanese rivalry even if China’s ‘shadow … loom[ed] over the bilateral relationship’ between Australia and Japan (Walton, 2007, p 78). Despite establishing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and the US in 2002, Australia’s motivations at the time were thus more to socialize Tokyo and Washington into constructive roles in regional security and address transnational challenges, rather than solely to balance China (Medcalf, 2008, p 27). This positivity towards China shifted visibly in the late 2000s under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s administration. Among other incidents, Australia’s flagging of China’s military modernization as a ‘cause for concern’ as well as Beijing’s arrest of four executives from Australian mining company Rio Tinto on bribery and espionage charges sparked a downturn in bilateral relations (Department of Defence, Australia, 2009, p 34). As the chapter will later discuss, it was in the context of these evolving circumstances that the Australian government sought to (re)shape the regional institutional architecture. As a beneficiary of China’s economic assistance during the Asian financial crisis and given the disappointment over Japan’s failure to follow through on its Asian Monetary Fund proposal, Jakarta was conscious of the evolving Sino-​Japanese dynamics in the region (Shekhar, 2018, pp 209–​10). It was evident, for instance, that although Japan remained the biggest economy in the region (the US notwithstanding), this standing was increasingly challenged by China’s rise (Subianto, 2003, p 7). Consequently, while Indonesia–​Japan relations remained consistently strong and anchored in economics, the post-​Suharto period also saw active Indonesian engagement with China, as bilateral trade, political exchanges and military interactions grew (Smith, 2000, p 513; Sukma, 2009, p 596; Shekhar, 2018, pp 208–​9). Rizal Sukma observes that since 1998, ‘[m]‌ost Indonesians no longer see China as a threat to national security’ –​a reference to past fears of 101

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communism –​and instead regard the Northeast Asian power ‘more as both an economic opportunity and a challenge’ (Sukma, 2009, p 603). Nevertheless, even as Indonesia became ‘more comfortable and confident toward China’ at the bilateral level, there remained ‘a degree of wariness’ in terms of China’s regional ambitions (Sukma, 2009, p 607). Jusuf Wanandi observed in 2000 that China’s journey towards ‘great power’ status had ‘become a regional (and even a global) problem’, and urged Beijing to exercise responsibility in its foreign policy (Wanandi, 2000, p 373). From Jakarta’s perspective, the Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership was a matter of concern for the potential instability that it could bring about (Wanandi, 2000, pp 373–​4). Some Indonesian intellectuals also noted the importance of US regional presence –​as the ‘existing single superpower’ –​in reining in the ambitions of other regional powers (Wanandi, 2006, p 347; see also Rezasyah, 2004, pp 101–​2; Wanandi, 2004b, p 110). Indonesia ultimately sought to enmesh major powers in ASEAN-​led institutional arrangements and norms, in order to commit them to Southeast Asia’s stability. If the US was the undisputed major power in the region during this time, Japan and China followed closely behind as second-​tier powers of the region. This was evident not just based on economic and military indicators, but also in their respective approaches towards their Asia Pacific neighbours and regional multilateralism. While Japan’s leadership status in the region was comparatively long established and it would continue to retain its role as a significant actor, the Bush administration’s labelling of China as a ‘strategic competitor’ had the effect of designating the latter as an equal to the US (Storey, 2000). Moreover, China’s economic and political rise and the perceptions of it emerging as a responsible and constructive major power gradually became recognized by regional actors. In response, countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea sought to expand and deepen engagement with China. In this sense, even as the US remained stratificatorily and functionally distinct as the global hegemon, China and Japan were also regarded as regional leaders that provided public goods and came close behind Washington in terms of capabilities and influence. One of the consequences of the Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership was that ASEAN –​as a neutral organization between the two major powers –​ became firmly entrenched in the driver’s seat of regional community building and, specifically, the EAS. ASEAN’s central role in the regional architecture during this time was complemented by the trend of rising ASEAN-​led multilateralism –​a topic that the next sub-​section focuses on.

Proliferation of ASEAN-​centred multilateralism While ASEAN had been formed in 1967, its institutional development was relatively slow-​going in its early years. ASEAN’s first summit was held a decade 102

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after its founding, in 1976, with the then five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) acceding to the TAC that outlined the ‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperation. Although ASEAN ‘bolstered its international credibility for its role in opposing Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia’ in the 1980s, it was only from the 1990s that ASEAN’s institutional structures began to take shape into today’s familiar form (Acharya, 2017, p 275). The Singapore Declaration of 1992 marked a turning point for ASEAN –​then comprising six members with Brunei as the latest addition. With the end of Cold War tensions, ASEAN declared ‘a new will to move to a higher plane of cooperation’ and ‘to place [itself] at the center of the region’s post-​Cold War strategic architecture’ (Beeson, 2009, p 32; Weatherbee, 2009, p 102). The ASEAN FTA agreement was signed in 1992, and the ARF met for the first time in 1994 to ‘foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues’ (ASEAN, n.d.). Subsequently between 1995 and 1999, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia joined ASEAN, making it a ten-​member organization. In 1997, ASEAN issued the ASEAN Vision 2020, which called for ‘a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies’ by 2020 (ASEAN, 1997). The Hanoi Plan of Action for realizing the vision was put into place the following year. Despite these milestones, developments in the late 1990s also posed challenges for ASEAN. A prominent example was the Asian financial crisis, which resulted in the turn inwards of several ASEAN member states that were struggling to cope with the effects. This included Indonesia –​traditionally regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN –​which had to focus its attention more on the socioeconomic and political problems within the country. Jakarta would only resume its leadership of ASEAN in the early 2000s, and particularly during its chairing of ASEAN in 2003. The expansion of ASEAN to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam also raised some important questions for the organization’s future. While the gaps between the newer and older ASEAN member states have been played down by former ASEAN Secretary-​General Rodolfo C. Severino, he nevertheless acknowledges that the enlargement led to concerns about the creation of a ‘two-​tier ASEAN’ split between the six older and more developed members, versus the four newer and less developed members (Severino, 2006, p 67). Several observers further highlighted that ASEAN cooperation and cohesion could run into problems given that the newer member states did not necessarily share similar political goals, threat perceptions or norms with the older ASEAN members (Gates and Mya, 2001; Acharya, 2014, pp 111–​14). In the early 2000s, ASEAN-​led initiatives to enhance regional integration and community building among the ten member states were put 103

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forward –​first by Singapore for the economic sector, followed by Indonesia for the security sector and the Philippines for the sociocultural sector. Subsequently, a key development in ASEAN’s regional integration efforts was the adoption of the ASEAN Concord II (also known as the Bali Concord II) in 2003, which, for the first time, detailed a framework for an ASEAN Community. The ASEAN Community would be built upon three pillars, namely, ASEAN Security Community (later renamed ASEAN Political-​ Security Community), ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-​ Cultural Community. The ASEAN Concord II reaffirmed the ‘fundamental importance’ of ASEAN principles, including non-​interference in another state’s domestic affairs and consensus in decision making (ASEAN, 2003). These initiatives went some way in rejuvenating ASEAN’s role as the central organization in the regional multilateral architecture. The notion of ASEAN centrality in the Asia Pacific was also strengthened, as the association grew to become the hub of overlapping and multi-​layered networks and arrangements that facilitated regional cooperation. In addition to forums that were exclusively for the ten member states, ASEAN also established a series of dialogue and cooperative platforms that involved other Asia Pacific countries, including the aforementioned ARF and APT, as well as the various ‘ASEAN Plus One’ meetings with its dialogue partners. The APT arrangement, especially, was targeted at ‘a bigger vision of building an East Asian community’ based on economic, sociocultural and non-​traditional security cooperation (Lee, 2015, p 175). Between 2003 and 2005, several of ASEAN’s dialogue partners also acceded to its TAC –​a condition for participating in the EAS. ASEAN-​centric platforms and processes operate according to principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ –​which prioritizes process over results, non-​interference in domestic affairs and consensus building –​not all of which have sat well with some of its extra-​regional partners, although they have generally indicated their commitment. Moreover, given that ASEAN comprises ten of the smallest or weakest countries in the region, it is surprising that bigger and more powerful countries have been happy to support –​at the very least in rhetorical terms –​ASEAN’s approach towards multilateral cooperation. Some observers, however, have argued that it is precisely ASEAN’s weaknesses that have made the other powers comfortable with the notion of ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture (Kausikan, 2017; McCarthy, 2017). Regardless, through the 1990s and mid-​2000s, ASEAN evolved to become a central aspect of Asia Pacific multilateralism. From Indonesia’s vantage point, a strong ASEAN serving as the hub of regional multilateralism was certainly in its interest. Then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda proclaimed on several occasions that ASEAN was the cornerstone of Jakarta’s foreign policy (‘New ministers’, 2001; ‘President Megawati’, 2001). As Indonesia emerged from the depths of its socioeconomic and political problems and sought to bolster its international 104

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stature, ASEAN was a natural platform for the Southeast Asian country to amplify its influence and reassert its traditional leadership role in the region. This was evident during its tenure as ASEAN chair in 2003. As chair, Jakarta garnered agreement for the Bali Concord II which called for the establishment of an ASEAN Community. Indonesia was instrumental in putting forth the concept of an ASEAN Security Community, which it envisioned would deepen non-​traditional security cooperation and ensure that Indonesia would not be the only democracy in a neighbourhood of mostly non-​democratic governments (Unidjaja, 2003b; Natalegawa, 2018, p 206). In the wake of the Asian financial turmoil, the East Timor crisis, and what officials perceived as a divided ASEAN response to the US-​led global war on terror, the Indonesian government was keen to (re)claim its primus inter pares status in ASEAN and Southeast Asia by leading the way to greater regional stability (Timberlake, 2003; Unidjaja, 2003a; Weatherbee, 2005, pp 150–​1). Indonesia was strongly supportive of ASEAN ‘being in the “driving seat” in shaping the region’s political, diplomatic and economic architecture’ beyond Southeast Asia, although there were some concerns on whether ASEAN could hold its own against bigger powers (Natalegawa, 2018, p 70; see also Subianto, 2003, p 9). Describing the APT as ‘one of the most significant of the ASEAN-​led processes’, former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa underscored ASEAN’s role in ‘plant[ing] the habit of cooperation … where none had existed before’ –​a reference to the sensitive relations among China, Japan and South Korea (Natalegawa, 2018, pp 78–​9). In many aspects, the elevation of ASEAN and its associated processes in the regional architecture was thus embraced by Indonesia. South Korea has been a generally passive actor in broad Asia Pacific multilateralism, although there have been instances of proactivity –​the EAVG being one example. Seoul’s passivity could be attributed to two main reasons. First, South Korea is not an ASEAN member state, and by default is often regarded as an external partner in ASEAN-​centred multilateralism. Second, South Korea is compelled by geostrategic considerations in its foreign policy. Given the fragile relations among China, Japan and South Korea, as well as the periodic flare-​up of tensions on the Korean peninsula, Seoul’s priorities had been unsurprisingly focused on Northeast Asia rather than the wider Asia Pacific where ASEAN played a more central role. Several scholars observe that compared to ASEAN-​Japan and ASEAN-​China relations, ASEAN-​South Korea ties have appeared ‘relatively neglected’ on both sides (Ho, 2007, p 1; see also Hernandez, 2007, pp 41–​3). To be sure, South Korea’s relations with ASEAN and its member states became more substantial post-​Asian financial crisis (Lee, 2015, pp 181–​2). The gathering of the APT leaders which started informally from 1997, for instance, provided a sideline opportunity for ASEAN and South Korea to hold annual summits –​something that Lee Jaehyon argues ‘would not have been easy’ to 105

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do otherwise (Lee, 2015, p 182). As a dialogue partner, Seoul was supportive of ASEAN-​centred multilateralism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. South Korea launched discussions for an FTA with ASEAN in 2003, and a year later established a ‘comprehensive cooperation partnership’ with ASEAN and acceded to the TAC. The entry of North Korea into the ARF in 2000 was also welcomed by South Korea given its Sunshine policy at the time (Pandey, 2000). Seoul’s interest in broader regional multilateralism, however, waned after the Kim Dae-​jung administration as its foreign policy returned to focus on what it regarded as the ‘big four’ –​China, Japan, Russia and the US –​and North Korea. Australia was arguably even more institutionally distant to ASEAN than South Korea was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although Australia was ASEAN’s oldest dialogue partner, it was not a participant in the nascent APT and its role in the East Asian community-​building process was less prominent. The Howard administration’s ‘Asia first but not Asia only’ rhetoric –​coupled with its ‘uncritical embrace of the American alliance’ and scepticism of regional multilateralism –​further deepened its divisions with its regional neighbours (Sheridan, 2002; Bell, 2007, p 47; see also Cotton and Ravenhill, 2007, pp 8, 10). ‘[B]‌y 2001’, Michael Wesley writes, ‘Australia faced probably its highest ever level of resistance from ASEAN states determined to block it from membership of broader regional institutions’ (Wesley, 2007a, p 66). Canberra’s efforts to strengthen economic integration with ASEAN and through APEC also hit temporary roadblocks (Wesley, 2007a, pp 55–​7). Amid this downturn in relations, Foreign Minister Downer advanced a distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘cultural’ regionalism, and argued that Australia’s relations with Asia were rooted more in the former than the latter (as cited in Kelly, 2000). In what Wesley aptly describes as the ‘the Howard paradox’, however, the then prime minister ‘ma[de] Australia a member of every regional grouping it has sought to join’ and attained ‘a level of Asian engagement his great rival [Paul] Keating never achieved’ (Wesley, 2007b, p 23). Under Howard’s successor, Kevin Rudd, Canberra returned to explicitly advocating for a greater role for Australia to shape regional multilateralism. Rudd’s proposal for an APC is discussed later in this chapter. Nevertheless, in stark contrast to Indonesia and South Korea, Australia’s relations with ASEAN-​centred multilateralism continued to be dogged by identity issues and its unequivocal followership of its ‘great and powerful friend’, the US (Hartcher, 2003). As reflected in the discussion here, another form of differentiation that became increasingly evident from the late 1990s to mid-​2000s involved regional organizations in the Asia Pacific. ASEAN’s attempts to place itself as the central organization in the regional architecture and the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality from other actors elevated it to a superordinate position in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Developments such 106

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as the Asian financial crisis, 9/​11 attacks and the Sino-​Japanese rivalry also had an impact on the rising ASEAN-​centred multilateralism. These events stressed the necessity for an ASEAN-​led response towards sources of regional instability. If ASEAN was considered the premier multilateral organization in the region during the time period under study, then Indonesia –​as the first among equals in the organization –​was logically the leader of ASEAN-​ centred multilateralism. Non-​ASEAN countries, such as Australia and South Korea, were regarded more as external partners to the association. Nevertheless, with the push for East Asian community building, Seoul was arguably viewed as a more engaging partner than Canberra. For the time period covered by this chapter, ASEAN was thus a core element of regional multilateralism, and the institutions and practices it put into place were crucial to the formation of the EAS. Taking collectively the trends and developments in this section, it is clear that stratificatory and functional differentiation were present in the Asia Pacific through the late 1990s and mid-​2000s. The focus was, on the one hand, on delineating the major powers and their obligations, vis-​à-​vis the rest of the regional states, and on the other, highlighting the prominent role of ASEAN in the regional multilateral architecture. The US continued to be the foremost major power and public goods provider in the region, with several of its regional allies –​most conspicuously Australia –​supporting its continued primacy. Alongside its economic and political rise, China’s profile as an emerging power in East Asia gradually became recognized by regional actors. Its regional leadership role also came to the fore when it went head-​to-​head with Japan in engaging with ASEAN institutions. At this point, then, an Asia Pacific stratification of states would have the US as the number one power, followed by China and Japan (on relatively equal terms), and then the rest of the regional countries. This section has discussed four key developments in the Asia Pacific from the late 1990s to mid-​2000s that set the context for the formative days of the EAS. The Asian financial crisis, along with the frustrating responses from western countries and international institutions towards the crisis, highlighted the need to strengthen cooperation between Southeast and Northeast Asia. Likewise, the evolution of US strategy towards the Asia Pacific following the 9/​11 attacks also drew attention to the differences in interests and priorities between western countries –​such as the US and Australia –​and East Asian ones. Together with China’s rise and the consequent Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership, as well as intensifying ASEAN-​centred multilateralism, these developments spurred regional countries towards establishing a regional platform that would be to the benefit of ‘East Asian’ countries. Against this background, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea took the opportunity to accentuate their necessity and relevance in the region through the EAS and its associated initiatives. 107

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Shaping the East Asia Summit This section examines the behaviour of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia which contributed towards the emergence of the EAS as well as shaped its subsequent form and membership composition. Amid the growing sentiment towards ‘East Asian’ regionalism and community building, China’s rise and its increasingly prominent regional role, as well as the rapid institutional development of ASEAN, all three middle powers sought to ensure the formation of an EAS that would accord them a seat at the regional table. This was not just in comparison to the major powers. For Australia and South Korea, it was also about elevating their roles vis-​ à-​vis ASEAN. In addition, Australia was also concerned about its regional (or ‘East Asian’) belonging. The process of establishing the EAS, and the platform itself, offered Canberra, Jakarta and Seoul the opportunity to diffuse power and influence towards themselves. In leveraging the conducive regional dynamics of the time, their efforts were also facilitated by distinctive attributes associated with their ‘middlepowerness’. While the specific qualities (and behaviour) of each middle power varied, in general these included their non-​threatening profiles, reputation for institution building, and credibility as committed supporters of regional multilateralism. The following discussion is primarily descriptive, with most of the theoretical analysis taking place in Chapter 6. Let us begin with South Korea’s EAVG initiative.

South Korea and the East Asia Vision Group South Korea’s formative role in the EAS is typically traced to its convening of the EAVG that was proposed in 1998, and the follow-​up East Asia Study Group (EASG) that was established in 2001. Seoul’s activism in Asia Pacific multilateralism during this time was due to the visionary leadership of President Kim Dae-​jung, as well as conducive circumstances in the region for promoting closer economic integration and community building (Han, 2018, pp 161–​2). Following the presentation of the EAVG and EASG reports at the respective APT meetings, however, South Korea’s activism in Asia Pacific multilateralism diminished. This could be attributed, domestically, to a change in its government in 2003 and, externally, to the intensification of rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo. Nevertheless, South Korea’s behaviour regarding the EAVG and EASG offered ‘an intellectual launch pad for the EAS’ (Cho and Park, 2014, p 584). This sub-​section examines the factors that motivated South Korea’s EAVG proposal, as well as the circumstances that surrounded the convening of the EAVG and subsequent EASG. Before proceeding, however, the section first explores South Korea’s middle power status during this time. 108

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In the late 1990s, South Korea was ranked fairly high up in terms of economic resources among regional countries. Other than in 1998 when its GDP was overtaken by India and Australia –​presumably due to the Asian financial crisis –​South Korea had consistently ranked fourth in the Asia Pacific for GDP from 1997 to 2001, coming in just below the US, Japan and China (The World Bank, 2021a). At the global level, South Korea’s economy ranged from being the 11th to 15th largest (The World Bank, 2021a). Within two years of the start of the Asian financial crisis, South Korea was on the road to recovery (Lee, 1999, p 361). Building on its economic capabilities, South Korea also adopted and projected a middle power identity. As an article in The Korea Times pointed out in 2002: Korea is a middle power country in the world. It has the 13th largest economy in the world, with a per-​capita GDP approaching $10,000 again. It is a member of the well-​to-​do countries club, the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development]. At the UN General Assembly last year, Korea’s Foreign Affairs-​Trade Minister Han Seung-​soo was named the president. This means the international community acknowledges Korea’s status and economic power. (‘Is Korea’, 2002) Unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s when explicit mentions of South Korea’s middle power status by its government officials on the international stage were rare, under the Kim administration (1998–​2003) the country’s diplomats, officials and media were much more open about South Korea’s capacity and role as a middle power in regional and international affairs (‘Cabinet endorses’, 1999; Kim, 1999). This narrative was accompanied by the notion that given South Korea’s rise to global prominence, the US ally should now pursue a more independent foreign policy (Choi, 1999; ‘South Korea to’, 1999). The decision to dispatch peacekeeping troops to East Timor in 1999 as part of a UN contingent, for instance, was partly rationalized in terms of South Korea’s profile as a middle power that could contribute towards regional and global security (‘Cabinet endorses’, 1999). South Korea’s middle power status was also affirmed by other actors, including then UN Secretary-​General Kofi Annan (‘Kim attends’, 2000). Nevertheless, Seoul acknowledged the limitations of being ‘a middle power situated between the world’s most powerful nations’ (Hong, 1998). Foreign Minister Hong Soon-​young cautioned that South Korea ‘must not presume to be a main player in the global theatre’ and should ‘seek a “life-​size” diplomacy befitting [its] national resources and strength’ (Hong, 1998; Choi, 1999). As a ‘trusted’ middle power, South Korea could build a ‘wide range of multifaceted diplomatic relations with countries across the world’, project a ‘responsible voice … to actively take part in the cooperative projects to 109

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nurture the abilities of the developing countries’, and contribute towards ‘establishing international rules and norms’ (‘History repeats’, 2000; Lee, 2000; Han, 2001). These expectations that South Korea had of its foreign policy behaviour were in part premised on the idea that having received aid and assistance from others in the past, the country was now able to ‘repay the debt’ to the international community (‘Is Korea’, 2002). Considering the constraints facing South Korea’s foreign policy, multilateralism was viewed as an opportunity for Seoul ‘to have greater leverage in the international arena’ (Han, 2001). Within the Asia Pacific, Kim’s EAVG proposal was associated with South Korea’s middle power diplomacy as well (‘ROK welcomes’, 2000). The idea to form an EAVG was raised by Kim during an APT meeting in December 1998. In Kim’s words, the EAVG was meant to ‘study concrete ways to nurture East Asia into a single community of cooperation, serving as the basis for the countries of the region to start the discussion on the related issues in earnest’ (as cited in Severino, 2006, p 267). The group would comprise only private citizens, including economic experts, from China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN member states (‘Kim suggests’, 1998). A confluence of various factors had prompted this suggestion. The first was the coming to power of Kim himself. Kim had assumed the presidency in February 1998, and the December meeting where he made his EAVG proposal was his first ASEAN meeting. South Korea’s regional activism during his term was ‘very much linked to [his] own personal leadership and his vision for East Asia’ (Vio, 2015, p 139). Shin-​wha Lee, the EAVG chair’s advisor, also observed that ‘[a]‌mong regional leaders, [Kim] was the one to express his perceptions of the region in the most systematic manner’ (Lee, 2008, p 238). In fact, Kim had already conceptualized such a vision for an East Asian regionalism since the 1960s (Lee, 2008, p 238). The timing was also opportune. Following the Asian financial crisis, Kim saw a chance to boost South Korea’s regional status by assuming a leadership role in East Asian regionalism (Han, 2018, p 161). The formation of the EAVG was to address the region’s inability ‘to mount an effective collective response’ to the economic meltdown, and in proposing the EAVG, Kim stressed the necessity of establishing a forum in which the APT states could ‘seek ways of injecting vitality’ into the region (as cited in ‘Kim suggests’, 1998; Kim, 2006, p 11). For South Korea, the financial crisis underlined the importance of its relations with its neighbouring countries, and the EAVG was meant to offer recommendations on enhancing the resilience of relations among regional countries, as well as strengthening economic linkages between Southeast and Northeast Asia. Due to chronic mutual distrust, neither China nor Japan would accept the other taking a leadership role in the regionalism process (Cheong, 2008, p 64). Similarly, as Inkyo Cheong notes, it would also have been ‘difficult for the ASEAN countries 110

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that were affected by the financial crisis to play any role in the international arena’ (Cheong, 2008, p 65). The proactive approach of South Korea, and of Kim in particular, in ‘set[ting] the future direction of East Asia cooperation’, was thus accepted by other regional countries (‘ASEAN praises’, 2001; see also Severino, 2006, p 309). Kim admits, however, that Southeast Asian countries had initially been ‘apprehensive’ that the EAVG was ‘aimed at expanding the influence of Northeast Asian countries in Southeast Asia’ (Kim, 2006, p 11; see also Chalermpalanupap, 2005, p 71). It was an unsurprising assessment, given that the APT process itself would not be formally institutionalized until 1999, and that China, Japan and South Korea together had a GDP that was around ten times larger than all of ASEAN combined (The World Bank, 2021a). Even the group’s name –​formulated as ‘East Asia’ rather than ‘ASEAN Plus’ –​suggested a distancing from the ASEAN-​centric multilateralism that characterized most Asia Pacific-​wide platforms at the time. Subsequently, former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-​joo travelled to regional capitals to seek their cooperation in convening the EAVG as soon as possible (Tanaka, 2017, p 205). The EAVG met for the first time in October 1999 in Seoul, with ‘two knowledgeable private citizens’ as members from each of the APT countries (Tanaka, 2017, pp 377–​8). Members agreed to select Han as the chair of the group (Tanaka, 2017, p 378). The South Korean chair assumed an agenda-​shaping role, and was able to effectively ‘harmonis[e]‌different policy opinions’ and ‘coordinate … policy recommendations’ (Choo, 2009, p 99). The EAVG report, issued in 2001, listed 22 key recommendations to realize the East Asian community (EAVG, 2001). At the APT Summit that same year, Kim took the lead in presenting the EAVG report and ‘Korea proposed six cooperation projects in three sectors, including the conversion of the ASEAN+​3 Summit Meeting into the “East Asia Summit Meeting” and the establishment of an “East Asian Forum” to be composed of East Asian governments and civilians’ (Cheong, 2008, p 76). Most significant for our purpose was the call for the ‘evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+​3 into the East Asian Summit’ (EAVG, 2001, p 17). To examine the EAVG’s proposals, Kim convened the EASG in 2001. Unlike the former, the EASG was an inter-​governmental platform. It comprised one senior official from each of the APT countries, as well as the Secretary-​General of ASEAN. Its objectives, as stated in its Terms of Reference, were specifically to ‘assess the recommendations of the EAVG’ and ‘explore the idea and implications of an East Asian Summit’ (EASG, 2002, p 64). The co-​chairing of EASG meetings was rotated among the ASEAN member states, on one side, and either China, Japan or South Korea, on the other. Meanwhile, a working group set up to support the EASG was co-​chaired by an official from South Korea and an official from the ASEAN 111

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Secretariat. The EASG presented its report to the APT Summit in November 2002. The report noted that while there was a need ‘for East Asia to continue to build a durable institutional framework for region-​wide dialogue and cooperation’, the time was not yet ripe for an EAS (EASG, 2002, p 5). This was attributed to concerns that ‘ASEAN may be marginalized if the transition … moves too fast’, as well as whether the addition of another summit process would burden regional countries with ‘too many meetings’ (EASG, 2002, p 5). Consequently, the EASG concluded that the formation of the EAS should be a ‘part of an evolutionary and step-​by-​step process’ for the medium to long term, with the APT framework ‘remain[ing] the only credible and realistic vehicle to advance the form and substance of regional cooperation in East Asia’ (EASG, 2002, p 5). From the late 1990s, South Korea embraced its middle power status and sought to reflect that status in its foreign policy, especially in terms of expanding its diplomatic relations and contributing towards global and regional challenges. As a middle power, South Korea was aware that it was not a major strategic player in the same sense as China, Japan or the US; yet, it could still play a useful role in the regional multilateral architecture. Kim’s EAVG initiative, emerging after the Asian financial crisis had exposed the weaknesses of regional economies, was built on these principles. In both the EAVG and the subsequent EASG, South Korea created for itself ‘an equal place at the table with larger powers and an opportunity to influence regional discussions that otherwise would minimize its role’ (Snyder, 2008, p 92). South Korea’s proactive approach in this instance of regional multilateralism was demonstrated in its chairing of the EAVG, as well as the co-​chairing of the EASG working group. Interestingly, while the EAVG recommended that the EAS would take shape based on the APT process, and the EASG recommended for this evolution to be a long-​term development, the first EAS was held in 2005 –​a mere three years after the EASG report was released –​and it was not linked to the APT. This surprising turn of events is discussed in the next sub-​section.

Indonesia’s push for an expanded East Asia Summit While Indonesia had mostly retreated from its regional and global roles following the Asian financial crisis, by the early 2000s it was on the path to re-​establishing its traditional leadership profile in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Under the presidencies of Megawati (2001–​04) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–​14), in particular, Indonesia aspired to be a key player that was proactive in multilateralism and international organizations (Fitriani, 2015, p 73; Thies and Sari, 2018, p 413). These attributes were evident in Indonesia’s contributions in setting up the EAS. Along with a few other countries –​and in contrast to the inclination of some others for 112

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a more restrictive membership –​Indonesia pursued an EAS that would include Australia, India and New Zealand in addition to the APT countries. Beyond the launch of the EAS in 2005, Jakarta continued to facilitate further expansion of the platform’s membership to include Russia and the US. It was also under Indonesia’s tenure as chair that the EAS agenda expanded to include discussions on the South China Sea. Before examining in more detail Indonesia’s approach towards this new multilateral arrangement, however, let us first consider the country’s view of its place in the region through the late 1990s and 2000s. Indonesia recovered gradually from the economic fallout of the Asian financial crisis, and it took about five years before its GDP figure bounced back to pre-​crisis levels (The World Bank, 2021a). Although it was still the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the only Southeast Asian country at the inaugural meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999, it continued to struggle with domestic socioeconomic challenges that prevented it from maximizing its influence on the world stage (Emmers and Teo, 2018, pp 50–​2). Observers point out, nevertheless, that Indonesia made steady economic and political progress under President Yudhoyono’s administration (Anwar, 2015, p 27; Karim, 2018, p 352). In stark contrast to its experience during the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia was able to weather the global financial crisis of 2008–​09 and even recorded positive economic growth during that time (Anwar, 2010, p 127; Anwar, 2015, p 27). By 2010, Indonesia’s GDP was the 18th largest in the world, a move up from the 28th spot at the beginning of the decade (The World Bank, 2021a). In addition to economic indicators, Indonesian media and political elites in the early 2000s also took pride in the country’s standing as the world’s largest Muslim-​majority democracy and largest archipelagic state (‘Free and’, 2001; UNGA, 2001, p 4; UNGA, 2003, p 16). These attributes were used to justify Indonesia’s significance in regional and international affairs, and especially at the time when Jakarta assumed the ASEAN chair in 2003. With its ‘robust economic growth, a stable domestic environment, and the resilience of its newly established democratic political system’ from the mid-​2000s, Indonesian officials and academics began promoting the country’s middle power status in global affairs during the later years of the Yudhoyono administration (Emmers and Teo, 2015, p 195; see also Darmosumarto, 2009; Wihardja, 2011). The middle power image was also associated with Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ approach that reflected its foreign policy autonomy (‘Indonesia fits’, 2011). Admittedly, Indonesia’s middle power profile during this time was arguably not as coherent or persistent as those of Australia and South Korea. This could be in part attributed to the preference of some Indonesians to describe their country as a potential ‘negara besar’ (big power), rather than ‘negara menengah’ (middle power) (Sukma, 2013). 113

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Regardless, it was clear that under Megawati and later Yudhoyono, Indonesia aimed to regain its standing in ASEAN and Southeast Asia –​something that would be ‘commensurate with its size and with the expectations of the region’ (Wanandi, 2004a). From Jakarta’s perspective, the fall of Suharto had created a leadership vacuum in ASEAN, and Indonesia sought to demonstrate that it still retained its ‘natural leadership qualities’ vis-​à-​vis Southeast Asia (Suryodiningrat, 2003; see also ‘The relevance’, 2002). Such expectations of Jakarta’s regional leadership were affirmed by political elites and observers in other countries, with then ASEAN Secretary-​General Surin Pitsuwan noting that ‘Indonesia has a weight, an international legitimacy and a global appeal’ to garner support for its ASEAN initiatives (‘Indonesia can’, 2010; see also ‘RI moving’, 2003). It was in this context that Indonesia took a proactive role in shaping the EAS. As mentioned earlier, the EAS had been meant as an initiative for the longer term that should evolve from the APT framework (EASG, 2002, p 5). Rodolfo C. Severino, former Secretary-​General of ASEAN, recalls that until 2004 there had been a lack of regional momentum to launch the EAS (Severino, 2006, p 269). From 2004, however, Malaysian officials started lobbying for the EAS to be held the following year. Malaysia’s plan caught the rest of the regional countries by surprise and even ‘prompt[ed] several countries to begin to form a coalition to oppose the EAS proposal’ (Soesastro, 2006, p 51). According to a Jakarta Post report, Indonesia had ‘voiced the strongest objections’ to Malaysia’s proposal (‘ASEAN affirms’, 2004). Natalegawa, who was then director general for ASEAN cooperation in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the vague distinction between the existing APT and the new platform, and expressed reservations that the latter might erode ASEAN centrality (Natalegawa, 2005). Indonesia was especially concerned over talk that the EAS would be the main foundation of East Asian community building, as this would potentially undermine ongoing ASEAN community-​building efforts that it had initiated when it was ASEAN chair in 2003 (‘Formidable challenges’, 2005). This apprehension arguably deepened when the idea of an East Asian Community secretariat based in Kuala Lumpur, separate from the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, was mooted (Natalegawa, 2018, p 87). Indonesia was thus more in favour of retaining the APT arrangement –​as a clearly ASEAN-​led process that would augment its profile in the region, in contrast to the unclear form and scope of a potential EAS that may sideline its role –​as the building block of any emerging regional community (‘ASEAN has’, 2004; Rahil, 2004). It was, eventually, the newly installed President Yudhoyono who reportedly ‘capitulated to peer pressure at his first ASEAN gathering’ and agreed to an EAS despite the foreign ministry’s reluctance to endorse the proposal (Suryodiningrat, 2010; see also Suryodiningrat, 2005). Amid Sino-​Japanese rivalry to dominate the EAS, ASEAN’s driving 114

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role in the new platform, by default, was ‘the least unacceptable alternative’ (Camroux, 2012, p 376). The question of membership was more complex. Malaysia and China, supported by Cambodia, Laos and Brunei, wanted to restrict membership to the APT countries, while Indonesia, along with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam, preferred the EAS to include Australia, India and New Zealand (Wain, 2005). From Indonesia’s perspective, an EAS comprising only the APT countries could sideline ASEAN centrality, given the combined economic weight of China, Japan and South Korea vis-​à-​vis the ten ASEAN countries (Natalegawa, 2018, pp 88–​9). By this time, Jakarta’s relations with Canberra had improved, helped in part by the latter’s aid to Indonesia in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh (Teh, 2011, p 349). As an indication that both countries had repaired their tenuous relationship in the late 1990s and early 2000s, then Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda was described as Australia’s ‘most dedicated backer’ for admission into the EAS (Kelly, 2005). Jakarta’s advocacy for a wider membership was based on geographical and geopolitical factors. In terms of the former, an EAS that included Australia, India and New Zealand ‘would have the ASEAN region as the undoubted “centre” ’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 89). Geopolitically, wider membership would help to ‘dilute’ –​Natalegawa was careful to reject the term ‘contain’ or ‘balance’ –​the ‘increasing influence of any particular state’ and ‘safeguard ASEAN’s centrality’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 90). Yudhoyono also underscored that a 16-​member EAS would reflect ASEAN’s ability to respond to the ‘emergence of China and India as new big powers in this region’ (‘ASEAN must’, 2005). The stance of Indonesia and other like-​minded actors such as Singapore and Japan eventually prevailed, as ASEAN foreign ministers arrived at a consensus in April 2005 that non-​APT members could join the EAS if they met three criteria: substantive relations with ASEAN, full dialogue partner status with ASEAN, and accession to ASEAN’s TAC (Severino, 2006, p 271). The first EAS in December 2005 thus saw the participation of the ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand. Later, Indonesia also became a key actor in expanding the EAS to include Russia and the US, shifting away from its original policy of not admitting new members to prevent the forum from becoming ‘a miniature version of the United Nations’ (Wirajuda as cited in Khalik, 2007). Russia had been present at the inaugural meeting as an observer, at the invitation of the Malaysian chair. Having acquired full ASEAN dialogue partner status in 1996 and signed the TAC in 2004, Moscow had expressed interest in joining the EAS. ‘[F]‌or Indonesia’, Natalegawa rationalizes, admitting Russia into the EAS without the concurrent entry of the US ‘ran the risk of unsettling the calibrated “equilibrium” in the region’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 93). This was in reference to the concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’, which 115

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Natalegawa conceptualized as an alternative to a ‘destabilizing “balance of power” ’ for the region (Natalegawa, 2018, p 99). A dynamic equilibrium focused on the interactions among and intent of countries, the multifaceted dimensions of power, as well as the surrounding context framing interstate relations (Natalegawa, 2018, p 101). The concept called for the absence of a preponderant power –​and by association, the ‘dilut[ion]’ of any rising power –​and the ‘promotion of predictability of interstate behaviour based on commonly agreed principles and norms’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 101). In a bid to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in the region and in light of rising Chinese influence, by early 2010 Jakarta had raised with its ASEAN counterparts the issue of expanding the EAS to include Russia and the US. Around the same time, several other countries had also put forward their visions for the regional architecture. Australia promoted its APC (discussed in the next sub-​section), Japan proposed an ‘East Asian Community’, and Singapore suggested a new ASEAN+​8 platform to engage Russia and the US. Indonesia was not particularly enthusiastic about any of these proposals, and expressed the view that ASEAN’s existing arrangements already served the purposes that these new initiatives claimed to fulfil (‘Indonesian foreign’, 2009). Jakarta’s consideration remained ASEAN centrality in any regional community-​building efforts. The APC and East Asian Community had been proposed by non-​ASEAN countries, and even in the case of Singapore’s ASEAN+​8 formulation, Indonesia was concerned that the ‘+​8’ countries may end up playing the leading role in regional multilateralism (Yoshimatsu, 2012, p 405). Both Yudhoyono and Natalegawa stated that regional countries should focus on strengthening the current ASEAN-​led forums rather than establishing new ones (‘Indonesian foreign’, 2009; Frost, 2016, p 156). Natalegawa added that Indonesia ‘[would] lead ASEAN in responding’ to the various community-​building and regional architecture initiatives (Budianto, 2010). He warned that if Indonesia did not step up, ‘there [would] be a vacuum of leadership’ in ASEAN (Budianto, 2010). Hence, Indonesia sought to (re)assert ASEAN’s central role and leadership in the broader regional architecture by inviting Russia and the US to join the EAS. It was fortuitous that by mid-​2010, the US approach towards engaging Asia had changed from dismissive to interested. Under the new Barack Obama administration, the US declared its intention to join the EAS and signed ASEAN’s TAC in July 2009. Two years later, Indonesia, as the prevailing ASEAN chair, formally welcomed Russia and the US to the EAS. At the 2011 EAS that it hosted in Bali, Indonesia put forward a 12-​ point ‘Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations’ (also known as the Bali Principles), which all 18 participating countries adopted. This was ‘a conscious and deliberate attempt to project and extrapolate the ASEAN experience to the wider EAS setting’ that included major powers such as China, Japan and the US (Natalegawa, 2018, 116

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p 105). In line with the concept of dynamic equilibrium, the Bali Principles aimed to ‘regulate’ the behaviour of regional countries via the promotion of norms and mutually agreeable principles (‘ASEAN summit’, 2011). It was also Indonesia that drove efforts to expand the EAS agenda beyond the original focus on functional and non-​traditional security issues, to include more strategic issues so that it would remain relevant. Yudhoyono made the case that the entry of Russia and the US would alter the atmosphere of the EAS meetings, while Natalegawa expressed the view that regional leaders should be able to discuss strategic issues at the forum (‘President: EAS’, 2010; ‘Indonesia takes’, 2011). Subsequently, the 2011 EAS chaired by Indonesia had ‘robust discussions’ on South China Sea developments despite resistance from China, which contested the appropriateness of raising the issue at the EAS (Natalegawa, 2018, p 129; see also Thayer, 2011). Observers have credited Yudhoyono’s ‘firm hand’ in overcoming Beijing’s opposition and persisting with efforts to facilitate discussions of the contentious issue at the meeting (Weatherbee, 2013, p 77; see also Thayer, 2011). Having emerged from a period of domestic turmoil and foreign policy challenges through the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia (re)claimed its status as first among equals in ASEAN. This started to become evident when it took over as ASEAN chair in 2003, as well as in negotiations to establish the EAS from late 2004. Despite fellow ASEAN member Malaysia attempting to seize the first-​mover advantage in initiating the EAS, Indonesia leveraged its persuasive skills and regional profile to ensure that its preferences prevailed. For the middle power, multilateralism in the form of ASEAN was a vital element of Jakarta’s strategy to rein in the ambitions of other regional powers. Not only did Jakarta introduce an alternative concept to maintain regional ‘equilibrium’, it also took practical steps to get other regional countries to buy into its vision for the regional architecture. Consequently, Indonesia’s efforts were effective in diluting the influence of the major powers and strengthening its own place and role among Asia Pacific states. Certainly, Indonesia’s success with securing US participation was not a solo effort. As we will see in the next sub-​section, Australia also played a key role facilitating US participation in the EAS.

Australia and the Asia Pacific Community Australia’s role in helping to facilitate US membership in the EAS should be seen in association with its APC initiative. Proposed in 2008 by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the APC aimed to create an overarching regional institution that included all the key players in the Asia Pacific, to encourage dialogue and cooperation amid China’s rise and uncertain major power dynamics. While the APC as originally envisioned by Rudd never materialized, it was one of the developments –​along with Indonesia’s 117

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intervention as discussed earlier –​that catalysed the expanded EAS in 2011. Given the similarity in form between the APC and expanded EAS, and the fact that several regional leaders highlighted the links between the two initiatives, Australian leaders and diplomats were quick to point out that the launch of the expanded EAS represented the fulfilment of Australia’s APC objectives. From Australia’s perspective, its middle power profile and characteristics meant that it was among the best placed to seize the initiative on such a multilateral, institutional platform. Certainly, the first Rudd administration (2007–​10) explicitly promoted Australia as a middle power that was committed to ‘creative middle power diplomacy’ in its foreign policy (Rudd, 2010d). When the Rudd administration came into office in December 2007, its leaders and diplomats sought to emphasize the importance of Australia in regional and global affairs. Australian officials defined the country’s middle power status based on its standing as one of the top 15 economies in the world and one of the top 20 countries in terms of income per capita, as well as its relatively high living standards (Rudd, 2010c; Smith, 2008a). From Australia’s perspective, its ‘robust parliamentary democracy’, as well as its status as a ‘founding member’ of key multilateral groupings –​including the G20 and APEC –​and active participant in ‘practically all of the major councils in the world’ appeared to be essential elements that bolstered Canberra’s middle power profile on the international stage (Christie, 2008; Rudd, 2010b). Based on these characteristics, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith described Australia as ‘a significant and a considerable nation’ (Smith, 2008a). That said, there was a clear sense of the limits regarding what Canberra could achieve in its foreign policy. Australia did not belong to the club of ‘major powers’ –​which Rudd identified to be China, India, Japan, Russia and the US (Rudd, 2009). Rather, Rudd drew parallels between the middle power status of Australia and countries such as Indonesia and South Korea (Rudd, 2011a). Given Australia’s ‘not insubstantial’ national assets –​certainly more than those held by a majority of the states in the international system –​and taking into consideration that it did not possess major power capabilities and influence, Rudd ‘sought institutional responses to the world’s problems’ (Rudd, 2008a; Gyngell, 2017, p 302). While unilaterally Australia ‘may not be decisive in the way that the great powers might be’, Rudd noted that if it cooperated with other like-​minded powers, as a group they could ‘be more agile than the great powers’ (Rudd, 2011a). Under the Rudd government, Australia sought an activist foreign policy that would continue ensuring that it had a seat at various tables of global decision making. Canberra was of the view that it possessed distinctive skills, including good offices, persuasiveness and nimbleness, that it could leverage when initiating ideas and building coalitions (Rudd, 2011b). Rudd described his vision for Australia’s foreign policy as a ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, which would involve ‘nudging 118

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international agendas forward’ where possible and ‘mak[ing] a difference for the good’ (Rudd, 2010d; Uhlmann, 2008). This was certainly not pure altruism at work; Australia, as a non-​major power, would be better placed to secure its own core interests if it had a respected and credible voice in international affairs (Rudd, 2008a). The Rudd government’s foreign policy was based on three pillars, namely, strengthening Australia’s alliance with the US, enhancing its engagement with the UN, as well as deepening its ties with the Asia Pacific (Rudd, 2008b). Most of these considerations were reflected in the APC proposal. Rudd announced the initiative during a speech at the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre in Sydney in June 2008. Noting the changing demographics, as well as economic and strategic relationships across Asia, Rudd emphasized the need for ‘strong and effective regional institutions’ to reinforce the region’s capacity to manage challenges and strengthen interstate ties (Rudd, 2008c). Given that Australia’s engagement with Asia was the ‘coincidence of several imperatives –​geographic, economic and strategic’, it was in the former’s interests to shape a regional architecture that would sustain stability and prosperity in the region (Rudd, 2008c; see also Woolcott, 2009). Rudd administration officials often pointed out that while there were several multilateral institutions –​including APEC, ASEAN and the EAS –​that underpinned the regional architecture, there were gaps that needed to be addressed. India was not a part of APEC, and the EAS did not include the US (Smith, 2008b; Official Committee Hansard, Australia, 2010, p 105). For Australia, however, the inclusion of these two powers in any regional institution was essential to counter rising Chinese influence. As mentioned earlier, since the early 2000s China had become increasingly proactive in the region, including with ASEAN and its member states, fanning perceptions that it was competing with Japan for regional leadership. Leaked diplomatic cables cited Australian officials explaining that Australia wanted to avoid having Chinese dominance and US absence in the regional architecture (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Secretary of State, 2009). Given that China’s vision for the regional architecture remained confined to an APT formulation, Australia knew that it could –​despite being a founding member of the EAS –​still end up as an outsider to the region. Similar to the developments during APEC’s formation, Canberra thus sought to pursue an ‘Asia Pacific’ conceptualization of the region that would include the US –​and this time, India –​in order to reinforce its own place in the region. As a vision for the regional architecture that was targeted for the year 2020, the APC would encompass: • A regional institution which spans the entire Asia-​Pacific region –​ including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region. 119

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• A regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security. (Rudd, 2008c) Being a middle power, Australia was ‘well placed to begin this process of discussion’ on the issue (Rudd, 2008d). Canberra believed that it could add value to the regional architecture given its propensity for new and innovative ideas, as well as its past accomplishments in regional multilateralism such as the establishment of APEC (Frost, 2009, p 16; Rudd, 2011c). Canberra was moreover of the view that such a proposal coming from Australia would draw less suspicion about its intentions from other regional countries, than if it had been initiated by China, Japan or the US (Australia Canberra, 2008; Frost, 2009, p 17). Following Rudd’s announcement of the initiative, Richard Woolcott –​appointed as special envoy to promote the APC –​visited 21 countries and held discussions with more than 300 people (Weller, 2014, p 179). Kim Beazley, then Australia’s ambassador to the US, also had the task of persuading the White House to back the proposal (Beazley, 2016a). Despite Australia’s initial assessment that its middle power status offered it an advantage over the bigger powers in such an initiative, regional reception towards the APC was relatively lukewarm. In fact, following Woolcott’s consultations, Australia from May 2009 started referring to the APC with a small ‘c’ (that is, APc), meant to reflect a more informal and less institutionalized process (Frost, 2016, p 154). While countries agreed on the importance of strengthening the regional architecture and expressed interest in learning more about Rudd’s proposal, few explicitly pledged support for the APC (Frost, 2009, pp 11–​13; Woolcott, 2009). South Korea was reportedly ‘the most important backer of the APC idea’ in its early days, but following the reactions of others, Seoul’s enthusiasm apparently diminished (Sheridan, 2009; see also Callick, 2010). Singapore diplomats, in particular, were vocal critics of Australia’s initiative. Ambassador Barry Desker described the idea as ‘dead in the water right from the very beginning’, while Ambassador Tommy Koh accused Australia of trying to impose a predetermined outcome on regional countries (Koh, 2009; as cited in Nicholson, 2008). In general, ASEAN member states were concerned that the APC would threaten ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture, despite Australian reassurances to the contrary (Australia Canberra, 2009a). This was for two reasons. First, given the lack of appetite for creating new institutions, Rudd reportedly said that the APC could emerge through an evolution of APEC or the EAS (Secretary of State, 2009). This nevertheless did not obtain unanimous support from other regional countries, as some still saw the APT as the basis of regional architecture building. Moreover, while Rudd declared publicly that ASEAN should remain at the ‘core’ of the APC, leaked diplomatic cables indicated that Australia was ‘less inclined’ towards using 120

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ASEAN-​centric platforms (Australia Canberra, 2009b; Rudd, 2008e; see also Japan Tokyo, 2009). Second, during a Sydney conference in December 2009 involving representatives from around the region to discuss the APC idea, co-​chair Michael Wesley suggested forming a concert of powers. This would presumably involve Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US (Acharya, 2010). This idea was quickly shot down by Singapore given that such an arrangement would risk the marginalization of smaller states like itself (Acharya, 2010). Nevertheless, Australia’s plan to ensure US participation in the evolving regional architecture subsequently coincided with Indonesia’s attempt to bring Washington into the EAS. Admittedly, as Beazley notes, such efforts ‘were pushing against an open door’ given that the new Obama administration had also started to shift US attention towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN (Beazley, 2019, p 135). Following ASEAN’s decision to invite Russia and the US to join the EAS, Australian leaders were quick to declare the objectives of the APC fulfilled. Rudd’s successor, Julia Gillard, said in 2010 that the expanded EAS was something that Australia very much supported and indeed fought for. We wanted there to be a place where the US, China, the major countries of our region, would sit around a table and talk about strategic questions, defence questions and economic questions. So this East Asia Summit has authorised the US and Russia joining as parts of the East Asia Summit from next year on and that does equip that vision of having a table that brings together these major players in our region, with the rest of the region. (as cited in Middleton, 2010; see also Rudd, 2010a) While direct links between Australia’s APC proposal and the expanded EAS may appear tenuous, it is not too farfetched to say that Rudd’s proposal had fostered discussions about regional institutions that eventually formed a part of the efforts to expand the EAS (Carr, 2015, p 139; Tan, 2016, p 47). Former Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo noted that Rudd and Australia had ‘contributed much to the discussion in ASEAN about how that original architecture can be improved and strengthened’, while Natalegawa acknowledged that ASEAN’s hastiness to consider US and Russian entry into the EAS was ‘reinforced’ by the APC proposal (Natalegawa, 2018, p 98; ‘Joint press conference with Singapore’s’, 2010). Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also acknowledged Canberra’s role in Washington’s decision to join the EAS, stating that she was: influenced by Kevin Rudd’s very strong argument on behalf of an Asian-​Pacific Community. … We certainly believed it was in America’s 121

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interests but we were very encouraged by Australia’s understanding of the dynamics in the region and encouragement for us to become more involved in helping to create the architecture of the 21st century. (‘Joint press conference between’, 2010) Beazley also recalls his conversation with Jeff Bader, the National Security Council’s Senior Director for East Asia, in which the latter pointed out Australia’s input in the US decision to join the EAS (Beazley, 2016b). Viewed in this way, Rudd’s initiation of the APC evidently had some role –​alongside changing ASEAN and US interests –​in the evolution of the EAS. With its APC initiative, Australia thus helped to catalyse US entry into the EAS. Admittedly, the success of Australia’s objectives here depended to a large extent on other factors beyond its control, such as the fortuitous change in administration in Washington and subsequently a shift in US policy towards the Asia Pacific, as well as ASEAN’s own preferences towards expanding EAS membership. Nevertheless, Canberra’s proactive diplomacy in regional architecture building, as illustrated by its ideas and initiative to begin negotiations with regional countries, contributed towards the advancement of the EAS as well. As a middle power, Australia was clear about the opportunities and limits of what it could do in regional and global affairs. Branding its foreign policy as ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, the first Rudd administration sought to draw upon Canberra’s diplomatic strengths and capabilities in pursuing the APC initiative. The formal participation of the US –​along with Russia –​in the EAS starting from 2011, in this sense, could be attributed partly to Australia’s efforts. As evident from the discussion thus far, all three middle powers contributed towards shaping the EAS into its present form. South Korea took on a central role in the EAVG and kickstarted the discussions that led to the establishment of the EAS, Indonesia played a key role in deciding the new forum’s membership in 2005 and subsequently in its expansion, and Australia helped to catalyse US entry into the EAS in 2011. As with their roles in the formation of APEC, both material and ideational/​social dimensions were important in determining the success of their respective approaches. All three countries were cognizant that the best way to amplify their voice and influence would be through multilateral platforms, and were also able to leverage their diplomatic capabilities and clout to navigate the power politics surrounding the EAS. Perhaps more clearly than in the APEC case, this chapter on the EAS has also highlighted the importance of domestic developments –​such as a change in government or the coming to power of certain individuals –​as well as external circumstances in contributing towards the effectiveness or sustainability of the respective middle power initiatives.

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Conclusion This chapter has examined the circumstances and conditions that led to the EAS in 2005, including the establishment of the EAVG in 1999 –​ from which emerged the recommendation to form an EAS –​the debate over its initial membership, and the summit’s expansion in 2011. The platform was created against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis, US counterterrorism strategy post-​9/​11, Sino-​Japanese rivalry and proliferation of ASEAN-​centred multilateralism. These developments led to the interest in ‘East Asian’ community-​building and regional integration initiatives that not necessarily included western countries such as Australia and the US, as well as imperatives from the ASEAN member states to keep the organization at the core of regional multilateralism amid major power dynamics. The EAS’ provision of an avenue for the leaders of 18 regional countries to meet annually has made it an important pillar for the regional multilateral architecture. Indeed, by 2011, the membership of the EAS was arguably an appropriate reflection of the evolving power dynamics in the region that would continue for the foreseeable future, with the participation of key powers such as the US, China and India. To varying extents, the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in shaping the EAS were relatively successful in diluting major-​power stratificatory forces and in pursuing functionally differentiated roles for themselves in regional multilateralism that neither major nor smaller powers would be able to perform as effectively. The behaviour of the three middle powers and their outcomes were also a result of the differentiated structure in the region being activated by the process of power politics. It was clear that through the EAS and its associated processes, all three countries sought to moderate the overwhelming influence of major powers in the region. South Korea’s EAVG focused on strengthening regional economic cooperation among the 13 APT countries, Indonesia’s efforts to expand EAS membership was targeted at maintaining a dynamic equilibrium and avoiding the preponderant exercise of power, and Australia’s attempt to facilitate US entry into regional multilateralism was meant as a counterbalance to rising Chinese influence. To a large extent, their respective approaches were similar to those during the formation of APEC. Seoul’s behaviour helped to enhance relations between Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, Jakarta aimed to maintain ASEAN centrality in regional multilateralism, and Canberra pursued an Asia Pacific conceptualization of the region that would include the US. Despite the different approaches, all three countries were essentially seeking to navigate power dynamics in order to keep and reinforce their own place in the region. It was through ASEAN, for example, that Indonesia would be best able to assert its first-​among-​equals position

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in the region. Similarly, US participation in the regional architecture would help to solidify Australia’s own place in the region. The functions of middle powers as initiators of or facilitators within multilateralism were also reflected in the approaches and responses of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards the EAS. The roles played by these three middle powers in shaping the new forum ultimately relied on both their material and ideational/​social attributes. Indonesia, perhaps reflecting more its social and ideational sources of strength than material ones, was able to leverage its de facto leadership of ASEAN to consolidate the organization’s strategy towards the EAS. This meant, for instance, that along with some other regional countries, Indonesia successfully opposed Malaysia’s preference for a more exclusive EAS that would only include the APT countries. Later, Indonesia also led ASEAN efforts to maintain centrality amid alternative visions of the regional architecture, by inviting the US and Russia to join the EAS. Likewise, Seoul was effective as the EAVG chair and convenor in part because neither Chinese nor Japanese leadership during that time would be collectively accepted by all in the region. Meanwhile for Australia, the APC initiative demonstrated the Rudd administration’s capacity to advocate for and invest in the strengthening of the multilateral architecture. While the APC did not ultimately materialize in its originally envisioned form, Canberra’s diplomacy played a part in facilitating US entry into the EAS –​a point acknowledged by its counterparts, including Washington. In terms of social, relative and relational power politics, all three countries were able to leverage their resources and profiles to ensure support for their roles from both the major powers and smaller states. As a consequence of the power politics surrounding the formation of the EAS, the behaviour of the three middle powers were activated within the differentiated structure in the Asia Pacific. The following Chapter 6 combines and compares the findings from the two empirical chapters, and analyses them in the context of the book’s theoretical framework.

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6

The Differentiation of Middle Power Behaviour in Asia Pacific Multilateralism Introduction This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the middle power behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the formation of APEC and the EAS, and traces the empirical developments back to the differentiated structure of regional politics. Building on the works of Albert et al and Donnelly, the understanding of structure here focuses on stratificatory and functional differentiation (Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert et al, 2013; Donnelly, 2013). This structure forms the basis for middle power behaviour in multilateralism, although the eventual effects would be activated through negotiations of social, relative and relational power politics (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–​20). The key argument is that as a way to ensure their own place and relevance in the region, middle powers have sought to dilute major-​power stratification and undertake functionally differentiated roles in regional multilateralism. These are broad objectives across all three middle powers, although, as we will discuss later, the specific details and considerations for each middle power initiative vary. The discussion will also reinforce the importance of context for middle power behaviour, by highlighting briefly two other scenarios of Asia Pacific multilateralism in which middle power initiative was apparently absent. The behaviour of middle powers in regional multilateralism is thus conditioned, but not determined, by the structure of differentiation. This chapter is organized as follows.1 It starts off with a section that looks at each middle power’s behaviour across both APEC and the EAS. The analysis here will draw out similarities and differences for each middle power in their approaches towards the two instances of regional multilateralism. The objective is to find out if there are consistencies or discrepancies in the strategies of each middle power in regional multilateralism at different 125

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times, and what drives such considerations. This is followed by a section that recalls the book’s theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3. It will discuss how the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea could be understood through the lens of differentiation, as well as explain how all three countries tried to shape power politics to their advantage in the formation of APEC and the EAS. Before concluding, the chapter will also briefly explore middle power behaviour in the ARF and the ADMM-​Plus as cases where the context and power politics did not appear as conducive for middle power initiative as a whole.

Examining middle power behaviour in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and East Asia Summit Based on the preceding two empirical chapters, this section examines the differentiation and power considerations surrounding the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS. It will seek to draw out the similarities and differences of each country’s strategy and considerations in the two instances of regional multilateralism. This will offer some insight into how each middle power has positioned itself in the post-​ Cold War Asia Pacific, its drivers for behaviour, as well as the capabilities and skills associated with its middle power profile that it has been able to leverage. The following sub-​sections will be organized by country.

Australia Australia’s middle power profile was arguably the strongest among the three countries examined in this book. It had embraced a middle power identity since the end of World War II and possessed the requisite material capabilities to back up such a status, and had also been proactive in multilateralism and institution building at both the global and regional levels. In the lead-​up to its proposals of APEC and the APC, Australia positioned itself as a country that nestled comfortably in the gap between the major powers and the smaller countries in the ranking of states in the international system. Foreign policy officials and political elites repeatedly described their country as a middle power or medium-​ sized economy. Alongside this self-​conception was the acknowledgement that Canberra possessed limited capacity compared to the major powers, and consequently lacked extensive influence over global affairs. Yet, Australia was not insignificant. It had a greater amount of economic and diplomatic resources at its disposal than a majority of the rest of the states. Its status as a founding member of and the leading role it played in several multilateral groupings, such as the UN, G20 and APEC, were also treated as the basis for its middle power status. At this level of limited but still considerable material capacity, Australian officials viewed multilateralism, institutions and coalition building 126

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as among the best options for the country to secure its interests amid changes in the international political structure. These considerations drove Australia’s approach towards establishing a regional economic and trade forum in the form of APEC, as well as towards institutionalizing an APC that would help to deal with the impact of a rising China. To a large extent, Australia’s decision making was also shaped by fears of major power unilateralism. Its APEC proposal, for instance, arose out of concerns about Washington’s protectionist approach towards trade, as well as the disagreement between the European Community and the US resulting in the Uruguay Round deadlock at the expense of small and medium-​sized economies like itself. Similarly, its suggestion to create an APC emerged out of its recognition that China was gaining in strength and influence in the region, but there were no suitable regional platforms that could effectively manage the changing power dynamics. It was thus important for Australia to both engage constructively with China as a rising power, as well as to guard against any exclusionary tendencies –​especially against itself –​that a Chinese vision of the regional architecture might involve. Multilateral platforms such as APEC and the APC would potentially constrain the unilateral tendencies and overwhelming influence of the major powers in international politics; more importantly, they would also allow their initiators to exert some influence, to their own benefit, in terms of agenda setting or membership composition. For a middle power like Australia, multilateral and institutional approaches have thus been viewed as the most valuable ways to ensure that it gets a say in regional decision making vis-​à-​vis the major powers, and, more fundamentally, that it is acknowledged as a rightful member of the region. As a country regarded to be culturally and geographically distinct from many of its East Asian neighbours, Australia’s fear of regional exclusion was consistently present. Its bid to establish APEC as a regional forum for economic and trade cooperation was a response to regional integration and trade liberalization initiatives in Europe and North America that it was excluded from. Canberra was moreover aware that it was not naturally viewed as a member of the Asian region, which meant that the likelihood of it being left out of regional initiatives proposed by another country was relatively high. As Asian economies grew in importance to Australia’s own prosperity in the late 1980s, Canberra worked towards having a multilateral economic cooperation platform that would secure its place, and consequently economic interests, in the region. This was likewise also the case for its APC proposal. The push for East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s to mid-​2000s reinforced debates about Australia’s regional belonging. Despite being ASEAN’s oldest dialogue partner, Australia’s followership of the US in the latter’s post-​9/​11 counterterrorism strategy, its role in the East Timor crisis, as well as the John Howard administration’s dismissive rhetoric towards regional multilateralism deepened the chasm between Canberra and its 127

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regional counterparts. While Australia was eventually included as a founding member of the EAS, its role in the East Asian community-​building process hung in the balance. The APC proposal sought to address this problem, by trying to replicate the success of APEC in outlining an Asia Pacific (rather than East Asian) formulation of the region. An Asia Pacific region would, more naturally, include Australia in terms of geography. From Canberra’s perspective, strategic considerations also weighed in favour of an Asia Pacific region. In contrast to some of the voices advocating an East Asian region without US presence, the geographical boundaries of an Asia Pacific region would be expected to encompass the US. In the post-​Cold War period, Australia regarded US presence and engagement in the region as being in its own interests. For one, Washington’s participation in regional multilateralism and the acceptance of it as part of the region would help to secure Canberra’s own place in the region. After all, if the US, which is located all the way on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, was considered part of the Asia Pacific, then Australia should –​based on both geography and its status as a US ally –​also be similarly treated as an Asia Pacific country that rightly belonged in regional forums. US presence in the region also served as a counterbalance to rising powers such as China, which may behave in a way inimical to Australia’s interests. For example, China’s vision for the regional multilateral architecture had been rooted in an East Asian formulation, which meant that should this Chinese vision take shape and become dominant, Australia would be excluded from the region. Having its major power ally present in the region as a benign hegemon would thus be a key element of Australia’s vision for the regional order. It is not necessarily contradictory that Australia was seeking to maintain US regional primacy on the one hand, while seeking to reduce major power influence on the other. The point is that the middle power aimed to diffuse power away from major powers, as a whole, to enhance its own relative influence. Given its concerns about regional belonging, an effective way to enhance Australia’s influence in the region was if the US continued to be dominant. In this sense, Australia still wanted a stake in regional decision making; it was simply that it was easier to achieve this goal with the US also at the same table. As a non-​ASEAN member state, Australia also sought to promote non-​ ASEAN-​centric multilateralism through APEC and the APC. This made sense, as in attempting to gain a seat for itself at the regional multilateral table –​at which ASEAN had been the central actor –​Australia, as a non-​ ASEAN member, would need to emphasize its own role in the multilateral architecture vis-​à-​vis ASEAN centrality. In both APEC and the APC, however, Australia’s efforts did not completely succeed in overcoming ASEAN centrality. Due to Australia’s desire to improve relations with Southeast Asian countries, for instance, it subsequently conceded to ASEAN’s 128

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request that the association be at the core of APEC. This commitment was not merely rhetorical; it was agreed that every other APEC meeting would be chaired by an ASEAN member state, allowing ASEAN to exert agenda-​ setting influence in APEC. Meanwhile, Australia’s APC did not garner sufficient regional support to materialize, although the APC’s key elements of having a regional institution that would include the US and discuss strategic matters was realized in the expanded EAS in 2011. Australia’s diplomatic clout and persuasive skills as a middle power were also demonstrated in negotiations over APEC and the APC. Its profile as a non-​threatening middle power put it in a better position than Japan or the US to take the lead on APEC, given that the platform was meant to offer stability amid the behaviour of the world’s top two economic powers at the time. Japan and the US were then engaged in a trade dispute, and Australia’s concern about an increasingly unilateral US were shared by others across the region. Lingering memories of Japan’s aggression in World War II, moreover, were a hindrance to Tokyo’s leadership in this case. Thus, having the US or Japan take the lead in convening APEC would not have been as effective given that the smaller regional countries feared that these economic powerhouses would attempt to benefit at their expense. Consequently, although Tokyo and Washington were also considering similar proposals to promote regional economic cooperation in the late 1980s, it was agreed that the initiative would have a better chance of success if spearheaded by Australia, given that it was perceived to not harbour aspirations of regional dominance. Australia’s success with APEC certainly required some form of give-​and-​ take on its part, and its acquiescing to at least some demands of others. An example would be Australia allowing ASEAN to take a central role in APEC despite it being an Australian initiative. Canberra was cognizant of the fact that if it wanted to achieve its goals regarding APEC, it would be necessary to get ASEAN on its side. On ASEAN’s part, its member states were also more open to Australia’s initiative given the latter’s non-​threatening profile. Certainly in the early stages of negotiations, ASEAN did express some doubts over the APEC proposal; these were, however, directed more towards the likelihood that Japanese and US dominance could be strengthened by their participation in APEC, rather than towards Australia’s role as an initiator. In launching APEC, Australia’s middle power status thus gave it an advantage over major powers such as Japan and the US. Interestingly, Australia was less successful in its attempts to gain regional support for the APC. Like with APEC, Australia’s efforts with the APC stemmed from its self-​perception that it was neither a major power nor small state. On the one hand, Australia had considerable economic and diplomatic resources that allowed it to commit to institution building in the Asia Pacific. On the other hand, Australia perceived its non-​major power status as being 129

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to its advantage, because, as Rudd administration officials underscored, such a proposal coming from China, Japan or the US would have been met with suspicion from other regional countries. It was then ironic that this was precisely the reaction that greeted Australia’s APC initiative in its early days. More so than during APEC’s formation, the fissures in regional identity and ASEAN centrality emerged as strong counterforces to Australia’s efforts to initiate a new regional multilateral platform. The former was due to the increasing prominence of an East Asian region (given the rise of China) vis-​ à-​vis the Asia Pacific, while the latter was because of ASEAN’s institutional growth in the 1990s. As a result, the APC, which was seen as both a risk to an ‘East Asian’ region and ASEAN centrality, was met with suspicion. While the APC did not ultimately materialize in its originally envisioned form, Canberra’s diplomacy nevertheless played a part in facilitating the debate over US participation in the EAS. The outcomes that emerged regarding Australia’s efforts with APEC and the APC also implied that support –​ or at the very least, tacit acceptance –​from the major powers remained instrumental in such initiatives. Australia’s proposals of APEC and the APC were attempts to maximize its power advantage –​not necessarily just in terms of material resources, but more importantly, in terms of how power politics could be negotiated. For example, while Australia –​supported by others –​may have succeeded in putting in place an Asia Pacific conceptualization of the region that would ensure US engagement, it could not overcome the forces of ASEAN centrality. To a large extent, Australia’s behaviour with regards to the launch of APEC and the suggestion of the APC was a response to what it saw as the differentiated politics of the region, which shaped its approach towards regional multilateralism, as well as the perception and acceptance of its approach by its regional counterparts.

Indonesia Compared to Australia and South Korea, Indonesia’s middle power status tended to be premised much less on indicators of material strength, and more on its normative and ideational underpinnings. Certainly, Indonesia had since the end of the Cold War maintained its place as the largest economy in Southeast Asia, with its global economic weight acknowledged by its G20 membership. This, coupled with its comparably large territorial and population size, as well as its historical relations with its neighbours, shaped its portrayal as a regional power and leader in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Notwithstanding these credentials, Indonesia’s other indicators –​such as infrastructure and socioeconomic development –​continued to lag that of the other more established middle powers, as well as some Southeast Asian countries. Perhaps it was not surprising that descriptions of Indonesia as a 130

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middle power emerged initially from external sources, with Jakarta explicitly embracing the label –​which was contested by the narrative of Indonesia as a ‘big power’ –​only after a period of domestic stability and sustained economic growth following the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, it was clear that even if it did not explicitly describe itself as a middle power, Indonesia pursued a proactive role in regional and global affairs on par with those sought after by other middle powers. When it came to Southeast Asia and ASEAN, Indonesia regarded itself and was likewise regarded by others as the first among equals. Consequently, as ASEAN came to occupy a central position in Asia Pacific multilateralism, Indonesia’s role in the wider region also became amplified. In projecting its middle power influence in regional multilateralism, Indonesia relied largely on normative sources of leadership such as its reputation, foreign policy autonomy and longstanding diplomatic clout in the Asia Pacific. Indonesia’s approach towards regional multilateralism and other foreign policy matters was in part driven by its concern over asymmetric interstate relations. This concern corresponded with Indonesia’s ‘Third World’ status and its contributions towards the founding of the NAM. In the late 1980s, Jakarta’s apprehension to the unfolding trends of rising economic interdependence and protectionism by some developed economies was focused on the deepening global inequality that these developments would bring about. This was to the extent that Indonesian officials designated the North–​South gap as one of the biggest problems in the post-​Cold War period. Similarly, Indonesia’s response to Australia’s APEC proposal in 1989 included questions about whether and how the forum would promote more equitable economic cooperation and narrow the North–​South divide. This issue also took priority under Indonesia’s chairing of APEC in 1994, when it worked to bridge differences between the advanced and emerging economies in the organization. As a member of the Global South and a former colony, Indonesia had experienced the marginalization and exploitation by countries considered as part of the Global North. These experiences arguably pushed Indonesia to pursue more equality in interstate relations, especially in terms of North–​South interactions. Debates about such inequality again reared their head in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when western-​ led international institutions were perceived to be arrogant and indifferent towards Indonesia’s plight. Throughout the post-​Cold War period, Indonesia acknowledged the power differentials between itself and the major powers, and sought to make it more balanced. One manifestation of this pursuit was in the concept of dynamic equilibrium, formulated by then Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa as an alternative to the balance of power. In promoting a dynamic equilibrium for the region through the EAS, Indonesia aimed to temper the rising or predominant power of any country and establish predictability in 131

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interstate relations through setting principles and norms. These deliberations led Indonesia to support a broader membership for the EAS amid China’s rise –​first advocating for Australia, India and New Zealand to join the new forum, and subsequently embracing US and Russian membership. The Bali Principles that it put forward during its tenure as EAS chair in 2011 were also meant to set out behavioural norms and standards for all 18 member countries, regardless of whether they were major powers or small states. Earlier, during negotiations to form APEC, Jakarta’s role in formulating the Kuching Consensus –​as an encapsulation of ASEAN’s position on the new forum –​was similarly directed at ensuring that the concerns of ASEAN member states were not sidelined vis-​à-​vis the bigger economies. To a large extent, Indonesia’s efforts to narrow the power differential gap was pursued through the maintenance of ASEAN centrality in broader regional arrangements. Given that Indonesia was regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN, having the organization assume a central role in regional multilateralism would, logically, reinforce Indonesia’s central role in the region as well. In discussions about the respective forms of APEC and the EAS, Indonesia attempted to highlight the utility of ASEAN and existing ASEAN-​led networks. For instance, even as Jakarta became receptive to Australia’s APEC proposal, it continued to express preference for utilizing ASEAN arrangements including the PMC. The Kuching Consensus had also emerged out of discussions among ASEAN member states and was reflected as the ASEAN position on APEC. Jakarta moreover urged against a hasty institutionalization of APEC, presumably to ensure that it did not overshadow ASEAN’s slow pace of institutional development. These reflected attempts to keep ASEAN’s place at the centre of a non-​ASEAN-​ led initiative. Indonesia’s priority on ASEAN centrality was likewise demonstrated during negotiations over the membership composition of the EAS. Amid the initial confusion over how the EAS would fit with ASEAN-​led arrangements, Indonesia was understandably concerned that the new platform may sideline ASEAN’s role –​and potentially its own importance –​in regional community building. A couple of years earlier, Indonesia as the ASEAN chair had launched ASEAN community-​building efforts and advocated a role for the organization beyond Southeast Asia. Indonesia thus worked to ensure that ASEAN would be in the driver’s seat of the EAS. Later, in response to the APC and East Asian Community proposals from Australia and Japan respectively, Indonesia stressed that ASEAN and its current suite of platforms were already sufficient for the region. It was additionally mindful that ASEAN should be the main driver of engaging the US and Russia in the regional architecture, via the EAS. As EAS chair in 2011, Indonesia also expanded the forum’s agenda to include the strategically pertinent South China Sea disputes. Certainly, an ASEAN that was able to project its centrality 132

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and relevance in the wider region would help to amplify Indonesia’s own influence and bolster perceptions about its regional significance. Indonesia’s status as the first among equals in Southeast Asia and ASEAN was acknowledged by its regional counterparts. Australia, for example, knew that it had to obtain Indonesia’s backing for the APEC initiative –​in terms of both its initial launch in 1989 as well as the proposal for a summit in 1993 –​in the first instance before the rest of the ASEAN member states would commit their support. Indonesia’s ASEAN counterparts also displayed recognition and acceptance of its status in the organization, as evident in the fact that without its support, Malaysia’s EAEG proposal and its inclination for a more exclusive EAS did not take off. With regard to the EAEG, Indonesian officials cautioned against its inward-​looking nature, while in the case of an exclusive EAS membership, Jakarta was apprehensive about the sidelining of ASEAN and the potential for China to dominate the multilateral platform. To be fair, Indonesia was not the only one resisting Malaysia’s initiatives; without a significant number of others concurring with Indonesia’s view, its preferences would arguably be unlikely to prevail. For instance, the US had also opposed the EAEG, with Japan and South Korea likewise reluctant to endorse it (Chalermpalanupap, 2005, p 59). Similarly, countries such as Japan and Singapore supported Indonesia’s more inclusive approach towards EAS membership. Nevertheless, based on the rhetoric and behaviour of regional actors in discussions over APEC and the EAS, it would not be implausible to say that Indonesia’s diplomatic stature as the longstanding leader of Southeast Asia and ASEAN had been regionally accepted. In backing up its regional leader status, Indonesia demonstrated its possession of certain soft power capabilities. The fact that it was able to gather support from all the other ASEAN member states for the Kuching Consensus as initially set out by then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, succeed in persuading Malaysia to accept a reduced posture for the EAEG and manage the differences among APEC members over the trade liberalization timeline in the Bogor Declaration testified to the sway and persuasive skills of Indonesia’s diplomats and officials in APEC discussions. This is not to say that Indonesia’s efforts did not meet with resistance. Rather, the key point here is that Indonesia was able to overcome pockets of disagreement and arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. For instance, Indonesia had been hesitant to fully support the EAEG –​despite Malaysia framing it as an ASEAN-​centric platform –​in part due to its exclusionary nature and the reluctance of some regional countries to participate. Between its own preference for incorporating the renamed EAEC within APEC and Malaysia’s insistence on linking it to the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, both sides reached a compromise which resulted in an EAEC directed by the ASEAN economic ministers within the APEC framework. By the same token, observers also highlighted Jakarta’s unique standing, which allowed 133

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it to facilitate discussions on the South China Sea –​amid opposition from Beijing –​during its term as EAS chair. Indonesia further displayed particular intellectual creativity in its approaches to and visions for regional multilateralism. During its chairing of APEC in 1994, its proposed free trade timetable had come up against resistance from Malaysia and China, among others. In response, then President Suharto advanced the notion of ‘flexible consensus’, to accommodate reservations by some countries that they would not be able to fulfil the trade liberalization timeline set out in the Bogor Declaration. Years later, Natalegawa would put forward his concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as an argument for the EAS to expand its membership. These examples encapsulated Indonesia’s normative and ideational power. It may not have completely matched up to the other middle powers or its regional counterparts in material assets, but its diplomatic ability, intellectual innovation and recognition of its regional leadership have certainly backed up its primus inter pares position in the region. Indonesia’s approaches towards shaping APEC and the EAS illustrated attempts to ensure that it would continue to have a seat at the regional table. For Indonesia, this meant working through ASEAN, an organization in which it had de facto leadership. Consequently, Jakarta sought to maintain ASEAN centrality in APEC and the EAS. This would, in turn, reinforce Indonesia’s central role in the region even with the major powers. Similar to Australia, Indonesia’s behaviour in the two multilateral processes was a response to what it regarded as the differentiated politics of the region. Jakarta was aware that it had to deal with countries more influential and powerful than itself, but at the same time conscious that it occupied a distinct stature in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and by association the broader Asia Pacific. Taken together, these considerations then shaped Indonesia’s approach towards regional multilateralism and the reception of its efforts.

South Korea For the time periods under study, South Korea’s self-​association with the middle power profile fell somewhere between Australia’s relatively enthusiastic promotion of its middle power identity and Indonesia’s tentative embrace of the label starting from the late 2000s. To be sure, the size of the South Korean economy was comparable to that of Australia, with the former’s GDP figures even overtaking the latter’s in some years. While South Korea first described itself as a middle power in 1991, subsequent mentions of the term in foreign policy pronouncements were few and far between. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, South Korea’s leaders displayed more inclination to portray the country as joining the industrialized world and moving towards a central role in world affairs. It was not until the Kim Dae-​jung administration that Seoul started to more frequently describe itself as a middle power on 134

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the international stage. These conceptualizations built not only upon South Korea’s economic wealth but also on its contributions to regional security, as well as soft power attributes such as its credible reputation. It was evident that South Korea, much like Australia and Indonesia, viewed itself as belonging to a different category of states as the major powers and smaller states. Even as it faced limitations in its foreign policy, Seoul acknowledged that there were certain international obligations that the country should take on given its level of material capabilities and what it regarded as its increasing diplomatic clout. There was a distinct sense that South Korea, while not a major power, could nonetheless achieve certain tasks –​such as bridging the gap between the advanced and emerging countries –​that smaller countries would find difficult to do. Given these considerations, Seoul viewed multilateralism as a suitable way through which it could advocate shared interests and enhance its influence in regional and global agendas. Unlike Australia, South Korea’s efforts at power diffusion in the region have predominantly involved East Asian actors. To some extent, this was because South Korea’s ‘East Asian’ status had not been disputed –​a stark contrast to what Australia had to deal with. Consequently, it was arguably easier and less controversial for South Korea to spearhead East Asian multilateral initiatives. Yet, one could also point out that this was partly a matter of the context that South Korea found itself in at the time. In APEC, for example, South Korea’s role was in bringing China, Hong Kong and Taiwan into what was already an established platform. Rather than having an influence on APEC’s founding membership –​as Australia did –​South Korea facilitated the entry of new members. Moreover, the admission of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan was an issue that countries such as Australia, Japan and the US had already expressed interest in even before APEC was formally inaugurated in 1989. Following agreement among all participants at the second APEC ministerial meeting in 1990, South Korea –​as the host of the third APEC ministerial meeting –​had the task of working out the details of admission. In this sense, Seoul’s contributions were necessarily focused on the Northeast Asian economies with the outcome being that power within APEC was diffused as the forum expanded. The EAVG’s membership composition was similarly predetermined since it was convened within the APT framework. While South Korea could certainly have established a forum independent of the APT and consequently have more autonomy to shape its membership, its considerations –​arising from the Asian financial crisis –​meant that the APT seemed the most suitable vehicle for the EAVG. China had emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis and had improved its image as a responsible stakeholder in global affairs. Meanwhile, the US as well as international organizations such as the IMF had been criticized for mismanaging their responses towards the crisis, which were detrimental for regional economies. Hence, there was a push 135

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for an ‘East Asian’ platform that could cater better to the needs of regional countries in the event of a similar crisis in the future. South Korea’s EAVG reflected an attempt to ensure that the region’s future was not concentrated solely in the hands of the biggest economies –​US, Japan and China –​and that smaller and medium-​sized countries would have a say in collective decision making. In this instance, as it was with APEC, Seoul’s efforts consequently involved adding more East Asian voices to the respective agendas. As a non-​ASEAN member state, South Korea’s approach towards regional multilateralism was also expected to be premised on diffusing power away from ASEAN as the core multilateral organization in the Asia Pacific. This preference, however, was not visible in the APEC case study given that APEC had been formed two years prior to Seoul taking on a more prominent role. South Korea was essentially working within the contours of an already-​defined platform, that is, an APEC with ASEAN occupying a central place. In this sense, it was unclear if South Korea would have wanted to shape APEC as a non-​ASEAN-​centric organization. In contrast, the EAVG came across –​at least initially –​as having the effect of weakening ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. While it may have been based on the APT process, the EAVG aimed to promote not an ‘ASEAN-​ plus-​three’ community, but rather, an ‘East Asian’ community with relatively equal ownership across the ASEAN and non-​ASEAN countries of the regional community-​building process. Indeed, both ASEAN and South Korean officials have acknowledged the apprehension of Southeast Asian countries that the EAVG and its proposals would relegate ASEAN to the sidelines of the regional multilateral architecture. Given that South Korea was not a member of ASEAN, it thus sought other avenues that would help to elevate its place in the region and allow it to exert its influence over regional agendas. To be fair, South Korea had demonstrated relatively consistent –​if mostly low profile or passive –​support for ASEAN-​centred multilateralism through the years, even as Seoul’s main priority understandably remained on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia where ASEAN tended not to play a paramount role. South Korea’s leading role in the EAVG, in this regard, could be viewed as an aberration in its foreign policy focus. In both APEC and the EAVG, Seoul was able to leverage its middle power profile as well as diplomatic credibility to achieve its objectives. South Korea’s role in facilitating the entry of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong into APEC in 1991 was made possible thanks to its non-​threatening and non-​antagonistic image. These characteristics were recognized by the other actors, including the major powers. US officials acknowledged that having Washington or Tokyo as the mediator in this instance would have made the process more difficult and challenging. Admittedly, Seoul’s role here was in large part a matter of circumstance. It was the only APEC member to retain diplomatic ties with the ROC through 1991, which put its officials in a 136

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good position to conduct shuttle diplomacy and mediate the disagreements between Beijing and Taipei on the latter’s status in APEC. From China’s vantage point, working with South Korea was also in its interest. Other than the obvious benefit of securing APEC membership, Beijing also had the opportunity to reciprocate South Korea’s nordpolitik strategy of seeking to improve relations with communist countries amid declining Cold War tensions. It would have been challenging otherwise for China to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, or even for their officials to meet, without raising questions from its North Korean ally (Hao and Zhuang, 1992, pp 1146–​7). The issue of Chinese entry at the third APEC meeting, which Seoul was scheduled to host, thus provided a pretext for South Korean officials to hold bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts from 1990 to 1991, which hastened the normalization of relations (Cha, 1999, p 80). South Korea’s success was moreover attributable to its ability to conduct separate negotiations with China and Taiwan on sensitive and divisive topics, such as Taiwan’s political status in APEC, and subsequently arrive at a consensus acceptable to all parties. South Korea’s non-​threatening profile and diplomatic skills likewise stood it in good stead when it came to the EAVG. While the EAVG was not strictly speaking an inter-​governmental grouping, the fact that the proposal came from South Korea, rather than China or Japan, contributed towards its success. The Sino-​Japanese rivalry for regional leadership at the time –​ prompted by a rising China vis-​à-​vis an economically stagnating Japan –​ meant that any proposal made by either Beijing or Tokyo to form and chair a regional grouping would have drawn suspicion and opposition from the other side. On the other hand, the smaller Southeast Asian economies that were affected by the financial crisis would also have found it challenging to play a proactive role at the regional level. As such, South Korea was among the best placed to initiate and coordinate the EAVG. Former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-​joo was given the task of travelling around the region to canvass support so that the EAVG could convene at the earliest date. Once the meetings began, South Korean representatives –​as the chair of the EAVG and subsequent EASG working group –​worked to coordinate the various interests of regional countries towards the advancement of the multilateral architecture. To some extent, the acceptance of Kim’s EAVG proposal by regional actors and the appointment of a former South Korean foreign minister as the EAVG chair was an affirmation of South Korea’s credentials as a credible facilitator in the region. Much like with Australia and Indonesia’s efforts in regional multilateralism, the success of South Korea’s initiatives also depended in part on either support or the absence of opposition from the major powers, such as China, Japan and the US. Without China agreeing to South Korea’s proposal for Taiwan to be referred to as ‘Chinese Taipei’ in APEC, or without China and Japan 137

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being amenable to South Korea’s EAVG initiative, it would have been more challenging for Seoul’s initiatives to take off. In these forums, South Korea was thus able to leverage its non-​threatening profile and persuasive skills to take the lead without raising suspicion from other states about its regional ambitions. The EAVG case further stressed the importance of the domestic political leadership in South Korea, as Seoul’s activism in regional multilateralism during that time was credited very much to the vision and initiative of then President Kim Dae-​jung. When his presidential tenure concluded, South Korea returned to a backseat role in broader Asia Pacific multilateralism as Kim’s successor, President Roo Moo-​hyun, preferred to focus on the country’s role in Northeast Asia. South Korea’s contributions towards expanding APEC’s membership and the advancement of East Asian community building via the EAVG built upon its soft power attributes as well as material capabilities. In doing so, South Korea’s behaviour maximized its middle power status and helped to ensure that it could effectively assume distinct roles in regional multilateralism that no other actors were expected to do as effectively. Alongside South Korea’s post-​Cold War economic rise in particular, its leaders and diplomats saw that the country was well placed to contribute towards certain segments of regional and global affairs. These factors, combined with opportune circumstances such as the decline of Cold War tensions or the Asian financial crisis, influenced not just the shape and form of South Korea’s regional multilateral initiatives but also how they were received by other regional actors. This section has sought to present the considerations and approaches of each of the three middle powers –​South Korea, Indonesia and Australia –​ in APEC and the EAS. It is evident that all three countries were mindful of the differentiated politics in the region, with a clear recognition of who the major powers and smaller states were. Given this regional hierarchy, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea regarded themselves as occupying the ‘middle’ stratum, with the respective power and influence to carry out certain kinds of initiatives but not others. These deliberations informed their strategies towards regional multilateralism, as they gravitated towards multilateral platforms that they felt would protect their interests best. In their strategies, each of the three middle powers attempted to shape regional multilateralism to their own advantage. For Australia, this meant platforms with an Asia Pacific membership that included the US; for Indonesia, this meant platforms that were premised on ASEAN centrality; and for South Korea, this meant platforms that enabled the Northeast Asian countries to be regarded as equal partners in multilateralism vis-​à-​vis ASEAN. Certainly, the success of these strategies depended very much on the context and circumstances of the specific time period. What worked in the formative days of APEC, for instance, did not necessarily work for East Asian community-​building 138

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efforts in the late 1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, the objective of all three middle powers was to create or maintain for themselves a seat at the regional multilateral table. Attempts to achieve this aimed to dilute the stratificatory forces of the major powers and highlight the functional differentiation of middle powers in the region. The next section re-​examines the book’s theoretical framework in light of the empirical discussions, and analyses how the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in regional multilateralism support or contradict the theoretical expectations.

Revisiting the argument: differentiation, power politics and middle power behaviour This book’s objective has been to explore the structural forces and processes that drive middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The proposed argument is that differentiation serves as a mechanism that, through power politics characterizing a specific context, conditions middle power behaviour and shapes outcomes of regional multilateralism. These behaviour and outcomes involve diluting major-​power stratification and highlighting the functional differentiation of middle powers. This process is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In both APEC and the EAS, the behaviour of all three middle powers indeed helped to dilute stratification of the major powers and highlight the functional differentiation of middle powers in the region, to varying extents. Broadly, their efforts diffused power away from individual major powers by bringing more actors into multilateral decision making. This was the case even for Australia, which –​despite displaying a preference for US dominance in regional multilateralism –​had also sought to diffuse power away from the US to some degree, as evident in its initial approach towards APEC and its inclusion of countries such as China and India in the APC. This would have the effect of reducing the collective influence of the major powers. Australia, Indonesia and South Korea also took on initiator, facilitator or mediator roles in regional multilateralism that built upon their material and ideational attributes. Certainly, specific details played out differently Figure 6.1: How middle power behaviour is generated in multilateralism Mechanism:

Action + Context:

Outcomes:

International political structure as constituted by differentiation

Power politics at a particular time and place

• Dilution of major-power stratificatory forces • Pursuit of functionally differentiated roles for middle powers

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depending on the negotiations of relative, relational and social power politics within the respective contexts. The social aspect of power means ascribing state power to social institutions, such as the government, ministries or diplomatic corps of a particular country. Relative power refers to the notion that power is meaningful only when compared against another actor, while relational power reflects the idea that the type of power required depends on the particular situation (Barkin, 2010, pp 18–​20). During the time periods under study, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea held certain views of their respective power status and influence in the world, and based on those understandings formed an idea of what the best strategies for their foreign policies were, including towards regional multilateralism. This reflected social power politics, where each country understood that even though –​or precisely because –​they were not considered powerful in the conventional sense, their level of material resources and associated status would help to accentuate their suitability for certain strategies. The behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS, as well as the consequences on regional multilateralism could also be attributed to relative power politics. Material capabilities, such as economic or diplomatic resources, placed the middle powers at a stronger position as compared to the other non-​major powers. Their access to economic resources in their outreach efforts would have contributed towards the success of their respective initiatives. In the case of Australia’s efforts with APEC and South Korea’s efforts with the EAVG, for example, both countries were able to send special envoys around the region to canvass support. Beyond material assets, relative power politics in terms of ideational narratives and normative influence also played out in the middle powers’ favour to some extent. Indonesia’s diplomatic clout as the traditional leader of ASEAN, for instance, bolstered its efforts to ensure that the organization remained largely cohesive and retained its central place in regional multilateralism. This was particularly apparent in Indonesia’s success –​admittedly, with the support of other like-​minded states –​in overriding preferences for a more exclusionary form of regional multilateralism. Jakarta’s standing in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and consequently in the wider region, was arguably the main buttress for its success. Meanwhile, views of South Korea and Australia as non-​threatening middle powers vis-​à-​vis the major powers meant that regional countries were more open towards supporting their proposals. The US may be the world’s hegemon, with Japan or China rising as its challenger (depending on the time period), but these countries’ major power status ironically limited their roles in the formation of APEC and the EAS. At the same time, when compared to the smaller states, South Korea and Australia had comparably more resources and credibility that they could leverage to demonstrate their commitment. This was especially evident in Australia’s establishment of APEC, as well as 140

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South Korea’s attempt to mediate between China and Taiwan joining APEC in the early 1990s and its initiative to convene the EAVG in the late 1990s. Another illustration of relative power politics playing out, this time involving the interaction of the three middle powers’ behaviour, would be in terms of the ideational force posed by ASEAN centrality in the region. Although the ten ASEAN member states were, individually, materially weaker than Australia and South Korea, the latter two countries found themselves having to acquiesce to ASEAN’s preferences in issues of regional multilateralism. All three middle powers also attempted to (re)shape the broader characteristics of the multilateral context, to ensure that power politics would be to their advantage. Australia, most clearly, repeatedly sought to put in place the contours of an Asia Pacific region. This would accord Canberra a rightful seat at the regional table, in contrast to its likely exclusion from an ‘East Asian’ region. Indonesia’s insistence on ASEAN centrality in APEC and the EAS could also be read in a similar way. Having ASEAN assume a central role in regional organizations would enable Indonesia, as the de facto leader of ASEAN, to amplify its own influence and importance in the wider region. The diffusion of power that middle powers promote is thus not in an unconstrained manner, but guided by their own considerations of how they could still retain an advantage over the rest of the non-​major powers. In terms of relational power politics, for middle powers in the multilateral context the ability to persuade is arguably most essential (see, for example, Kim, 2015; Gyngell, 2019; Teo, 2022). This relates to the notion that middle powers lack sufficient coercive capabilities –​or lack the political will to use them –​to get other countries to do what they want, and their most valuable diplomatic tool would lie in forging like-​minded coalitions to put forward a collective voice on regional and global matters. To be sure, possessing a sufficient level of material capabilities also contributes towards the success of persuasive strategies, in terms of shaping perceptions about the middle power’s credibility and reputation. Both in the APEC and EAS case studies, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea relied on their persuasive and negotiating skills, backed up by their material sources of influence, to gather support for their efforts. This was certainly so when it came to convincing the major powers which –​given their greater capabilities and strategic weight in the world –​could easily turn away from multilateral cooperation, and also true of the middle powers’ approach towards countries perceived to be materially weaker than themselves, such as the ASEAN member states. For Australia and South Korea especially, it was precisely because they were neither major economic nor military powers that they came across as less aggressive and less likely to sideline the smaller countries’ interests in collective decision making. As middle powers that were perceived not to possess regional hegemonic ambitions, it was more acceptable for them to take the lead on multilateral initiatives in the Asia Pacific. The ideational 141

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qualities associated with being a ‘middle power’ were thus very much shaped by the material attributes of these countries. South Korea’s facilitation of the entry of China and Taiwan into APEC offers another case in point. As the only APEC member to still have official ties with the ROC at the time, South Korea was in the unique position of having the ability to mediate between Beijing and Taipei. In this situation, South Korea was the country with the most appropriate ‘power’ to carry out this specific task. These characteristics were not only promoted by the countries themselves but also acknowledged by other actors, including the major powers. This is significant as it suggests that even countries with the highest-​ranked economic or military power were aware that to achieve certain outcomes, others –​with less material capabilities –​were better placed to take the lead. Relational power politics also involves an understanding that, while major powers may not be as well-​suited for certain tasks as the middle powers, the former’s support for middle power initiatives is nevertheless important to an extent. The success of APEC vis-​à-​vis the EAEG, as well as the expansion process of the EAS demonstrated the salience of major power backing, or at the very least, an absence of major power opposition. Moreover, Australia’s initiatives tended to aim at or result in stronger US engagement in regional multilateralism. Australia had been among the US’ closest allies and Canberra generally regarded Washington’s presence in the region as beneficial to its own interests. Bolstering the US role in regional multilateralism would serve to reinforce Australia’s own place in an Asia Pacific region, and would also help to counter any hostile or exclusionary intentions that regional countries may potentially display towards Australia. It was therefore no surprise that Australia’s attempts at diluting major-​power stratification collectively in the region involved strengthening US influence at the expense of other rising powers that may be hostile to its own interests. Meanwhile, although South Korea was also a US ally and had a vested interest in strengthening its relations with Washington, ensuring the latter’s presence in the region appeared to have been less of a concern in Seoul’s multilateral initiatives. Given the surrounding contexts of the time, South Korea’s role in the enlargement of APEC and its EAVG initiative focused more on enhancing the influence of Northeast Asian actors in regional multilateralism. In both instances, support from major powers such as Japan and China for South Korea’s role were certainly vital to its success. It is useful to note, nevertheless, South Korea’s dismissal of concerns about its EAVG being similar to Malaysia’s EAEG which –​as a South Korean media article described –​had ‘an anti-​American overtone with political intentions’ (‘Kim suggests’, 1998). Lee Shin-​wha notes that President Kim’s vision of East Asian cooperation had also been premised on South Korea’s strong alliance relations with the US (Lee, 2008, pp 237–​8). Last but not least, Indonesia had embraced a non-​aligned foreign policy and had traditionally 142

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been wary of the dominance of any one major power in the region. Yet, even as Jakarta demonstrated a clear preference for a balance of major power influence, its efforts to bring the US into the EAS and in issuing the APEC Bogor Declaration for trade liberalization in the region would arguably not have succeeded without the major powers and major economies agreeing with its approaches. The behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in APEC and the EAS processes also reflected the extent to which the performance and effectiveness of middle power roles are very much dependent on context and the opportunities it offered. Without declining military and ideological tensions and a corresponding rise of the economic agenda, Australia’s APEC initiative might not have materialized in 1989. Canberra’s attempt to replicate this success with the APC in the late 2000s faced more obstacles as a result of changing regional dynamics. Without the other APEC members switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC before 1991, the task of facilitating the entry of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong might not have fallen to South Korea. Without the ascendancy to power of President Kim –​who had a strong vision for regional integration –​amid the Asian financial crisis and intensifying Sino-​Japanese rivalry, South Korea might not have been able to assume the key role it did in the EAVG. Without the new President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agreeing to inaugurate the EAS in 2005 despite hesitancy from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the platform’s development may have turned out differently. Later, without a change in US government and Washington’s subsequent change in its Asia policy, Indonesia might not have succeeded in bringing the US into the EAS. All these statements may be counterfactual, but they do not negate the point about conducive circumstances. For both the APEC and EAS case studies, the context played an important role in determining, first, whether middle powers attempted to take action regarding regional multilateralism, and second, whether these attempts were received positively by other regional actors. These helped to create the possibility for middle power behaviour and their outcomes. The negotiations and contestations occurring in the power politics surrounding the respective middle power initiatives consequently shaped the eventual form of APEC and the EAS. In this sense, the middle powers were able to establish the terms for multilateral cooperation in ways that enhanced their own ‘power’ within the region. The approaches of all three countries in the two case studies also revealed the differentiated politics that constituted the regional structure. This was evident both in the circumstances leading up to the middle power initiatives, as well as the altered context following the outcomes of those initiatives. Prior to the APEC proposal, as well as the processes related to the EAS, there was a clear sense of which countries were the major powers and the roles that were associated with their status. The fact that US hegemony and its 143

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associated obligations were acknowledged by other actors, or that China was deemed a rising power, are examples of this. Such structural conditions of stratificatory and functional differentiation, as well as the interactions between the various forms of differentiation, generated the possibilities for Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to pursue their respective strategies towards regional multilateralism. The three countries viewed themselves in certain ways and through these narratives formed an idea of which other countries they were most similar to, and which countries they were different from. Such views were moreover used to justify certain elements in their foreign policy; in this instance, their approaches towards regional multilateralism. All three countries exhibited awareness that while they were not as powerful in the same way that the major powers were, they nevertheless could still extend their influence in specific areas given their resources and profiles. Their behaviour and subsequent outcomes could be ascribed not just to the attributes of the countries under study but also to the social relations that they were embedded in. This means that the ability of middle powers to dilute major-​power stratification and assume functionally differentiated roles were, in part, derived from their place in the regional structure, including their ‘interdependent relations’ with other countries, regional organizations and so on (Sayer, 2010, p 105). To be sure, the possession of economic or diplomatic resources, or the projection of a middle power identity, would be important in the conduct of middle power behaviour. Equally crucial for the concept of middle powers, however, would also be the notion that these states were located within social networks that (re)affirmed their middle power roles or status as a distinct category from the other states. In contrast to accounts that regard middle powers as having to overcome structural constraints, this study has thus pointed out the possibility that structure could also be enabling for middle power behaviour. By itself, however, the effects of the differentiated structure would not be activated. It was through the process of power politics that differentiation generated middle power behaviour and outcomes. At this point, it would be useful to underscore the interdependence of structure and agency in international political outcomes. ‘Structure without agency’, Donald Emmerson writes in the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy, ‘is mere potential’ (Emmerson, 2012, pp 49–​50). He adds that ‘[a]‌ctual outcomes will depend on what both local and foreign decision makers see, say and do –​and do not see, say or do’ (Emmerson, 2012, p 50). Moreover, as Berth Danermark, Mats Ekström, Liselotte Jakobsen and Jan Ch. Karlsson observe, ‘actions are never determined by a certain structure; they are merely conditioned’ (Danermark et al, 2002, p 56). Likewise, middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism were conditioned, but not determined, by differentiation. Within the options made possible by the structural relations of differentiation, Australia, Indonesia and South 144

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Korea, depending on various considerations, adopted certain strategies that they thought would best achieve their respective interests in regional multilateralism. This suggests that while structure may have primacy, agency also plays an important role in accounting for outcomes. Consequently, there is nothing ‘fixed’ or ‘eternal’ about middle powers (Sayer, 2010, p 105). Robert W. Cox’s paraphrasing of John Holmes in 1989 that ‘the middle-​ power role is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’ certainly continues to ring true (Cox, 1989, p 825). The motivations and outcomes of middle power behaviour change depending on the context. Thus far, the theoretical and empirical analyses have focused heavily on the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea towards APEC and the EAS. The study of those two instances of regional multilateralism has illustrated the book’s core argument about how structural differentiation and power politics shape middle power behaviour. It may be worth taking a brief look at how this argument holds up in the strategies of the same three countries beyond APEC and the EAS. This would indicate if the framework and findings about middle power behaviour in regional multilateralism have broader applicability across other organizations in the Asia Pacific.

Middle power behaviour in the ARF and ADMM-​Plus Within the Asia Pacific, other multilateral forums that incorporate all three middle powers would be the ARF and the ADMM-​Plus. Applying the book’s argument to the formation of the ARF and ADMM-​Plus, we see that developments played out slightly differently from the APEC and EAS case studies. The ARF’s inauguration in 1994 occurred in much the same circumstances that had characterized the early days of APEC. Anxieties over US withdrawal from the region and the potential for instability, uncertainty over China’s rise, as well as the emergence of new ways of thinking about security post-​ Cold War, drove some regional countries to see the value in multilateral security cooperation. While the APEC process had already acquired political significance as the first intergovernmental meeting in the post-​Cold War Asia Pacific –​and even more so with a leaders’ meeting added in 1993 –​there was a gap in the regional architecture for an arrangement that would focus more obviously on security issues. Around the same time of APEC’s establishment, Australia was also advocating for a multilateral security dialogue for the region. On separate occasions throughout 1990, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans highlighted the usefulness of a process akin to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for Asia –​a ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia’ (CSCA), as it were (as cited in Frost, 2016, pp 92–​3). The reasoning behind Evans’ CSCA proposal was similar 145

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to the case that Australia had made for APEC. ‘[A]‌t a time of rapid and fundamental change in the international and regional environment’, Evans stated in parliament, Australia should embrace a ‘multidimensional policy … to help shape a security environment which is favourable to Australia’s interests’ (Evans, 1989d). He added that it was ‘very much in [Australia’s] interests to be seen as a significant partner to the region, an accepted and natural participant in regional affairs’ (Evans, 1989d). Australia was certainly not the only one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to push for a regional security dialogue. Canada also floated its own suggestion for such an arrangement. These ideas, however, found little affirmation with ASEAN and the US. ASEAN was wary of what it regarded as ‘Western-​style legalistic institution-​building’ and the challenge that a second Australian regional initiative –​after APEC –​might pose to its relevance in the region, while Washington feared that regional security multilateralism would undermine its bilateral security alliances (Evans, 2017, pp 162–​3; see also Lim, 1998, p 121). Acknowledging that the most effective way forward would be to ‘accommodate ASEAN’s concerns’ and ‘accept … ASEAN centrality’, Evans dropped references to a ‘CSCA’ but continued to call for ‘a multilateral dialogue and confidence-​building process’ for the region (Evans, 2017, p 163). In this respect, Australia’s approach here was similar to what it did with the APC and EAS. To be sure, the need for a framework for multilateral security dialogue was something that ASEAN member states, including Indonesia, agreed on. However, rather than establishing new arrangements –​and the aversion was presumably reserved especially for those proposed by non-​ASEAN members –​ASEAN preferred to rely on its existing platforms (Severino, 2009, p 8). Alatas stressed that the ASEAN approach remained ‘of central validity and relevance’ (as cited in Katsumata, 2009, p 62). Later, building on a suggestion by Japan to utilize the ASEAN PMC that brought together ASEAN member states and the dialogue partners, ASEAN decided in 1992 to add security issues to the PMC agenda that had thus far been limited to economic matters (Leifer, 1996, p 21). The importance of opportunity is once again highlighted here, as by this time, the US had become much more open to the idea of regional security multilateralism (Leifer, 1996, pp 27–​8). In this sense, the circumstances were conducive for the establishment of ‘a new forum for security discussions, based on the ASEAN PMC but with a wider membership’ that would include countries such as China, Russia and Vietnam (Frost, 2016, p 95). Indonesia’s approach to regional autonomy also evolved. Shifting away from its previous policy preference to exclude the major powers from Southeast Asia, Jakarta accepted the notion that ‘regional security would be best ensured … through “equilibrium among them and between them and Southeast Asia” ’ (Acharya, 2014, p 169). Still, as some scholars observe, Indonesia was ‘less than comfortable within the 146

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ARF’ given that it was now ‘locked into a security institution [with] major non-​Southeast Asian powers’ such as China, Japan and the US (Leifer, 1996, p 50; Suryadinata, 1996, p 84). Arguably in light of the power asymmetries, Jakarta emphasized that the ARF should be focused on facilitating norms building and consultations rather than problem solving –​essentially what was described as the ‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperation (Suryadinata, 1996, p 84; Acharya, 2015, p 64). Indeed, even though the ARF was launched as a forum to discuss regional security issues beyond Southeast Asia or ASEAN, Natalegawa notes that the use of the term ‘ASEAN’, rather than ‘Asian’, in its name was deliberate ‘to underscore the ASEAN-​centred and ASEAN-​led nature of the forum’ (Natalegawa, 2018, p 79). This allowed Indonesia, as the leader of ASEAN, to assume a more significant role in the wider Asia Pacific region. It was perhaps not surprising that despite ASEAN’s insistence on its centrality in the ARF, some non-​ASEAN countries attempted to carve out a more equal role for themselves. South Korea, for instance, was reportedly among the countries ‘which felt their own regional agendas were being neglected’ and ‘resented ASEAN’s diplomatic assertiveness and proprietary role within the ARF’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41). Seoul was particularly ‘irritated by its inability to promote formally its own priority of a North-​east Asian dialogue’, and Foreign Minister Gong Ro-​myung emphasized that both ASEAN and non-​ASEAN members should ‘make common efforts to develop the ARF on an equal footing’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41; as cited in Soh, 1996). Michael Leifer reveals that both Japan and the US also privately believed that ASEAN centrality should be ‘transitional’ (Leifer, 1996, p 41). Ultimately, however, the major powers were ‘not sufficiently troubled’ by ASEAN’s central role in the ARF to derail the process (Leifer, 1996, p 41). Nonetheless, and in response to appeals from non-​ASEAN participants in the ARF to share the chairpersonship, ASEAN implemented a co-​chairing system in the ARF inter-​sessional meetings and support groups (Morada, 2010, p 19). While the analysis of the ARF here remains at a very superficial level, it is clear that the differentiated structure was similar to what had characterized the circumstances surrounding APEC’s launch –​given the similar time period and context –​and this resulted in similar motivations driving Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in regional multilateralism. To varying extents, the three middle powers aimed to dilute major-​power stratification and undertake functionally differentiated roles to serve their respective interests, but the outcomes played out differently from the APEC case study. This was a consequence of the specific power politics that surrounded the ARF’s formation. More than in APEC, ASEAN centrality was arguably a greater force in the establishment of the ARF. Neither Australia nor South Korea had the opportunity to assume significant roles in this instance, although 147

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Canberra –​much like its involvement with the expanded EAS –​contributed intellectually to the forum’s creation. While the ARF as a multilateral platform certainly helped to dilute the collective stratificatory forces of the major powers, it is hard to attribute this dilution to the efforts of Australia and South Korea. In contrast, Indonesia’s efforts in shaping the ARF was more apparent and enabled the Southeast Asian middle power to ensure its relevance in the wider region. Turning now to the ADMM-​Plus, the regional circumstances for its launch in 2010 were arguably similar to those leading to the EAS’ inauguration in 2005 and expansion in 2011. The proliferation of ASEAN-​centric multilateralism, as well as what some regional countries saw as the need for a security forum led by ASEAN (in contrast to the Shangri-​la Dialogue that was organized by the UK-​based International Institute for Strategic Studies) and the defence sector (in contrast to the foreign-​ministry-​led ARF), provided the basis for the ADMM-​Plus (Capie, 2013, pp 17–​18; Kuik, 2016, p 93). A brief investigation of the ADMM-​Plus’ beginnings, however, suggests that the three middle powers did not play particularly instrumental roles as compared to the EAS. This was due to how the ADMM-​Plus originated. The platform was a natural offshoot of the ADMM, which had been inaugurated in 2006, and the convening of the ADMM itself was an objective laid out in the 2004 Plan of Action for the ASEAN Security Community. While the ASEAN Security Community had been an Indonesian initiative, the ADMM-​Plus appeared to be driven by several other ASEAN member states. During the first ADMM hosted by Malaysia, then Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak had already shared his vision for an ADMM-​Plus process that would include ASEAN’s partners (Teo, 2008). The subsequent ASEAN/​ ADMM chairs, such as the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, led efforts to establish the membership criteria and modalities for the ADMM-​ Plus (Teo, 2008; Chiang, 2014). Chiang Chie Foo, who was former senior adviser to Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, recalls the importance for the ADMM-​Plus to ‘start right and be inaugurated with the right configuration and composition of countries’ (Chiang, 2014). Following discussions among the ASEAN defence ministers, it was agreed that the ADMM would invite Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the US to form the ADMM-​Plus in 2010. Unlike in APEC and the EAS, the establishment of the ADMM-​Plus was very much an ASEAN-​driven process. The roles of non-​ASEAN countries such as Australia and South Korea were more passive, with little space for them to take the initiative. In the case of Indonesia, it also did not appear as active as some of the other ASEAN member states in shaping the ADMM-​Plus. This was arguably for two reasons. First, the ADMM-​Plus was already envisioned at the time of the ADMM’s establishment. Second, negotiations over the ADMM-​Plus were led by the respective ASEAN/​ADMM chairs of the time, which did not 148

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include Indonesia. At the broad level, the argument could thus be made that the context in this instance of regional multilateralism was not particularly conducive for middle power behaviour and their effects to emerge. Depending on the context and power politics involved, the success of middle power strategies in regional multilateralism may thus vary even if they maintain certain capabilities and attributes. What remains clear, nevertheless, is that all three middle powers, being conscious of their non-​major power status, have sought to ensure their own relevance and place in the region through multilateral platforms.

Conclusion Building primarily on the empirical data in the APEC and EAS case studies, this chapter has weaved together an account of how the differentiated structure of regional politics generated middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism, with the outcomes depending on the process of power politics that surrounded the particular initiatives. In this analysis, differentiation theory has served as a heuristic to enrich explanations of middle power behaviour in multilateralism. The options available to middle powers in the context of regional multilateralism, as they sought to carve for themselves a seat at the various tables, were made possible by the presence of differentiation in the regional structure. The specific strategies and outcomes of middle power behaviour, however, were shaped by their respective considerations, resources and attributes, as well as the social relations they were embedded in. The effects of the differentiated structure are thus activated by the social, relational and relative power politics that surround middle power behaviour in a particular instance of multilateralism. The specifics of such negotiations of power politics would vary across the three middle powers not just due to their differences in material capabilities but also considering the different ways that they perceive regional developments and actors, as well as the different ways that they are perceived by others in the region. The attributes and strategies of middle powers thus have to be understood in light of the context and shared meanings that surround their deployment of power. Moreover, both structural and agential factors play a part in driving middle power behavioural outcomes. As we have seen, structure conditions middle power behaviour, but agency and the ability to seize opportunities are equally crucial to determine the final form and success of middle power initiatives. The brief exploration of middle power behaviour (or lack thereof) in the ARF and the ADMM-​Plus emphasize this point. Overall, nevertheless, middle power initiatives aim to dilute major-​power stratification and highlight functional differentiation to the middle power’s benefit. This is a way for middle powers to maintain their relevance in international politics. 149

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This would also demonstrate the ability of middle powers to shape the multilateral environment within which participating states operate. Bearing in mind the oft-​cited claim that middle powers prefer and are better able to leverage multilateralism, the analysis here thus adds to such accounts by outlining the ways that middle powers –​as a distinct category of states vis-​ à-​vis the major powers and smaller states –​utilize multilateral platforms to their advantage.

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Conclusion Contributing towards the study of middle powers This study has made the case for a new approach to explain middle power behaviour in multilateral platforms, focusing in particular on the Asia Pacific. In contrast to views that non-​major powers do not matter in international politics, the book has aimed to demonstrate the value of an alternative structural perspective –​specifically one based on differentiation –​in the study of middle power behaviour, and highlighted how the differentiated structure may interact with power politics to generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism. In turn, such middle power behaviour shapes the environment within which other states operate. Through negotiations of power politics, the outcomes of middle power behaviour are manifested in the dilution of major-​power stratificatory forces and the middle powers taking on functionally differentiated roles. This process contributes towards maintaining the relevance and standing of middle powers in regional multilateralism. The book has illustrated this argument by examining the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the creation of APEC from the late 1980s to early 1990s, as well as in the formative days of the EAS from the late 1990s to early 2010s. The findings of the book contribute towards two bodies of literature, first, on middle power theory more broadly, and second, on middle powers in Asia Pacific multilateralism. The introduction of differentiation theory to the study of middle powers has enabled the incorporation of a concept which, although implied in many analyses of middle powers, has not appeared to feature prominently in the literature. Indeed, the current position, identity and behaviour approaches to middle powers reflect the notion of differentiation, but do not explicitly theorize it. This gap in the middle power literature is puzzling, given the extent to which the middle power concept is premised on the notion of how such states are differentiated from the major powers and smaller states. By putting differentiation at the centre of the analysis, the book’s framework takes a fundamental aspect of 151

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the middle power concept and demonstrates how middle powers could be a distinct category with material and ideational/​social characteristics rarely possessed by other types of states, upon which their behavioural strategies are built. Reframing middle power behaviour through the analytical lens of differentiation has facilitated an understanding not simply of what middle powers seek to achieve in international politics, but also of the contextual circumstances and structural conditions that make those outcomes possible. The combination of differentiation theory with power politics has additionally shed light on the multidimensional aspects of middle power behaviour and their outcomes. Whether middle powers are effective in their initiatives depend not only on the differentiated structure but also how the negotiations of social, relative and relational power politics play out in specific contexts. This reinforces extant arguments that the study of middle powers should be approached from the combined perspectives of various IR paradigms. As highlighted in the case studies, negotiations of power politics have been crucial in explaining middle power behaviour and whether they achieved their desired outcomes in Asia Pacific multilateralism. Questions such as what kind of power is suited for a particular context and whether such power is accepted by the other stakeholders would matter for middle powers seeking to exercise their influence in multilateral platforms. This book has also highlighted the relations between the material and ideational aspects of middle power status. On the one hand, middle powers are viewed by the smaller states as less threatening than the major powers, due to their perceived lack of hegemonic ambitions and major-​power-​level resources. Yet, middle powers still have sufficient capabilities and diplomatic clout to carry through their initiatives, enhancing their profiles as credible and reliable initiators, facilitators or mediators. This sets them apart from many of the smaller countries. The case studies also indicate the close relations between stratificatory and functional differentiation. For example, the position of middle powers in terms of stratification contribute towards their functions in international politics. In turn, the kinds of functions they assume in international politics feeds back into whether they occupy a higher or lower position in the stratification of states. The book’s analysis further supplements existing literature that makes the claim that middle powers are more inclined towards multilateral diplomacy, by taking a deep dive into middle power contributions towards Asia Pacific multilateralism. While the behaviour approach towards middle powers has frequently argued for the importance of multilateral channels for middle powers to secure their interests, it is not so clear how middle powers interact with multilateralism. By constructing and applying a theoretical framework oriented around differentiation to middle power behaviour in Asia Pacific multilateralism, the findings here have illustrated that the behaviour of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea has had an impact in terms of 152

Conclusion

diluting major-​power stratificatory forces and middle powers performing particular roles that other types of states could not do as effectively. Amid the instrumental roles played by ASEAN and major powers such as China, Japan and the US, these middle powers have also demonstrated their ability to significantly contribute towards the formation of specific multilateral initiatives in the region. Their agency and attributes are certainly an important factor, as the preceding chapters have shown. Equally important, however, are the structural forces of differentiation that have conditioned the multilateral diplomacy of the three middle powers. Here, we see how the middle powers fundamentally interact with multilateralism and the conditions under which middle power behaviour can hence influence regional dynamics. The argument here thus contributes to the existing middle power literature in terms of offering a novel conceptual language to capture what it is, exactly, that middle powers do when it comes to multilateralism, and the kinds of outcomes their behaviour could achieve. Policy-​wise, the findings of this book also offer several implications. For one, while middle powers may not be as influential or strategically important as the major powers, it is unhelpful to simply dismiss the notion that middle powers could make significant contributions in international politics. Certainly, the influence of middle powers should not be overstated. The lack of hard power capabilities and diplomatic clout vis-​à-​vis the major powers may logically limit the effectiveness of middle power strategies to some extent. But even as we acknowledge that middle powers may not be as influential or strategically important in the same way that major powers are, the book has demonstrated that middle powers could under certain circumstances be better suited than the major powers for particular tasks. In some cases, the lack of hard power capabilities has also worked in the middle powers’ favour and bolstered their non-​threatening profiles. As we have seen in the APEC and EAS case studies, middle powers do have the ability to shape the environment within which major powers operate. Through efforts to dilute major-​power stratificatory forces and seek out functionally differentiated roles, middle powers were able to reinforce or alter specific aspects of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific. To be sure, the book’s findings also suggest that any middle power initiatives in the Asia Pacific environment would need to obtain the support of the major powers, as well as ASEAN. Particularly regarding the former, it is not that middle powers were simply being used by the major powers to fulfil tasks that the latter did not want to take on. This suggests that middle powers lacked agency, which was not the case. Rather, going back to the point about power politics, it reflects the idea that middle powers have to take into account the geopolitical context they are located in, and navigate those circumstances by using their material and ideational/​social traits. Moreover, for Australia and South Korea –​neither of which are an 153

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ASEAN member state –​getting the association’s support would be essential for multilateral initiatives that seek to encompass the whole Asia Pacific region. By effectively deploying their material resources, as well as making use of the narratives surrounding their status and strategies, there is thus potential for middle powers to make a difference in international politics. In this sense, international politics are not necessarily defined only in terms of the major powers. The value of multilateralism for middle power diplomacy, moreover, goes beyond forming like-​minded coalitions or the amplification of non-​ major power voices in collective decision making. How these objectives are achieved should also be part of policy-​making considerations. In this regard, the dilution of major-​power stratification and allocation of functionally differentiated roles contribute towards the understanding of what middle powers could do in multilateral platforms and how they could pursue their objectives. For middle powers seeking to illuminate their relevance in international and regional affairs, the availability of opportunities and visionary leaders are also important. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the growth of ASEAN-​led multilateralism amid Sino-​ Japanese rivalry in the early 2000s, all provided opportunities for Australia, Indonesia and South Korea to put in place initiatives that enhanced their own roles and standing in regional multilateralism. These circumstances were complemented by the visions of particular leaders and diplomats, such as Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa as well as South Korean President Kim Dae-​ jung, who understood the ways in which their respective countries could contribute towards shaping Asia Pacific multilateralism and pursued the corresponding strategies. Overall, the book has sought to advance a new way of thinking about middle powers and their behaviour in multilateralism. The differential framework presented here builds on and adds to the existing works by middle power theorists. The empirical findings regarding middle powers in the Asia Pacific also contribute towards the current body of knowledge on what explains the behaviour of countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in regional multilateralism.

Areas for further research To strengthen the explanatory value of a differential framework for middle power behaviour in multilateralism and international politics, there are several areas of further research that should be undertaken. Such research would build on the book’s findings and analysis, and reinforce the importance of differentiation in the study of middle powers. 154

Conclusion

The first area stems from the research design in this book, which determined Australia, Indonesia and South Korea as the quintessential middle powers for study. Considering the claims of middle power distinctiveness, it would be necessary to also examine the approaches of major powers and smaller states towards Asia Pacific multilateralism. The objective would be to find out if, for example, a country that possesses less material resources compared to the three middle powers and perceives itself to be a smaller or less influential state, adopts behavioural strategies akin to that of the middle powers when it comes to multilateralism. And if so, would the outcomes be similar? The same parameters could also be applied to study a country that has greater material resources and has been regarded as a major power. A thorough study of the major powers and smaller states’ approaches towards regional multilateralism would reveal if seeking to dilute major-​power stratification and pursuing functionally differentiated roles are unique to middle powers. It would also trace how processes of power politics play out in the initiatives of the major powers and smaller states. Such an investigation would highlight the differences between middle powers and other types of states in multilateralism. Should the findings reveal that the major powers and smaller states are unlikely to achieve the same outcomes as the middle powers, this would help to reinforce the notion that middle powers indeed occupy a distinctive place in regional multilateralism. On the contrary, if the major powers and smaller states are successful in achieving those same outcomes, it would then be necessary to relook the framework and argument that has been proposed in this book. The second area for further research would be to look more deeply at middle power behaviour in other instances of Asia Pacific multilateralism. This has been done briefly in Chapter 6, where the approaches of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in the ARF and ADMM-​Plus were outlined. The purpose here has been to compare middle power behaviour in the ARF and ADMM-​Plus with APEC and the EAS, but a more comprehensive study of middle power behaviour in other regional multilateral platforms would be valuable in terms of establishing a broad argument about how and why such countries behave the way they do in Asia Pacific forums. It would certainly facilitate a better understanding of how consistent middle powers are in their multilateral strategies. This would then add to the knowledge on how the differentiated structure interacts with potentially different circumstances of power politics to generate middle power behaviour in multilateralism. A third avenue for research, which overlaps with the elements in the preceding two research directions but could remain a separate study, is to examine the multilateral behaviour of Canberra, Jakarta and Seoul in their near neighbourhoods. Australia’s approach towards multilateralism in Oceania, or South Korea’s approach towards multilateralism in Northeast Asia, or Indonesia’s approach towards multilateralism in Southeast Asia alone, 155

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may be different from their strategies towards broader Asia Pacific forums. For example, South Korea’s behaviour in the Northeast Asia Trilateral Summit (involving also China and Japan), or the Six Party Talks (involving also China, Japan, North Korea, Russia and the US) may not necessarily be similar to its contributions in shaping APEC and the EAS. After all, within those membership compositions, South Korea is a comparatively smaller power compared to the other countries involved. Similarly, Australia’s behaviour in the Pacific Islands Forum –​where it possesses the largest economy among the grouping’s member states –​is likely to also be different from its strategies towards Asia Pacific multilateralism. In Indonesia’s case, restricting the study to its near Southeast Asian neighbourhood, where it is more clearly regarded as negara besar (big power), may also evoke a different set of power dynamics as compared to in the wider Asia Pacific. Consequently, the behavioural outcomes affecting regional multilateralism should also be different as these countries may not even be regarded as ‘middle powers’ within their near regions. This would reinforce the importance of context –​particularly in terms of how it frames and facilitates power politics –​for the differential framework outlined in this book. Last but not least, such a study could also be extended to middle powers in other regions, or at the international level. This could include, for instance, looking at how European middle powers have acted in the EU or NATO, or even how middle powers have acted in the UN and other similar bodies. The findings would be instructive of whether the book’s argument and framework could be applicable beyond the Asia Pacific. Certainly, it would be expected that, broadly, notions of differentiation and power politics would still remain a core part of the explanation of middle power behaviour. The focus of these other investigations would be to highlight how the differentiation mechanism and other processes emerge and take shape under different contextual circumstances. This book began with the account of how countries such as Australia and Canada attempted to carve a place for middle powers in the newly established UN in the mid-​1940s. They did not achieve their desired aims, but the middle power concept has endured and undergone modifications to keep up with the changing geopolitical dynamics. The findings here have demonstrated the importance and value of the middle power concept in international politics, focusing particularly on Asia Pacific multilateralism. Moving forward, there remains much to be done to further comprehend the complexities of the middle power concept and the types of behavioural strategies that middle powers could carry out in international politics. An appreciation of the contributions of middle powers towards global and regional agendas, as well as of the opportunities for middle power initiatives, would undoubtedly be useful in understanding the dynamics of international relations at the broader level. 156

Notes Chapter 1 1

2

Australian diplomats at the San Francisco conference appeared to prefer the term ‘security powers’, although they used it interchangeably with ‘middle powers’. The author is grateful to the reviewers who suggested this approach.

Chapter 3 1

The author would like to express appreciation to the reviewer who highlighted this point.

Chapter 6 1

The content in this chapter’s first two sections incorporates very few citations as it heavily references the empirical data already cited in Chapters 4 and 5. Given considerations of space as well as the analytical nature of this chapter, specific citations of the empirical information are thus not repeated here.

157

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197

Index 9/​11 attacks  89, 90, 99, 101, 107, 123, 127 and the war on terror  94–​8 A abduction  10–​11 activism  10, 18, 19, 69, 70, 108, 110, 138 Afghanistan  59, 95, 96, 97 agricultural reforms  64 aid flows  68 Alatas, Ali  60, 65, 68 and APEC  76–​7 Albert, Mathias  3, 5, 32, 38, 41, 125 anarchy  34 cultures of  35, 38 Annan, Kofi  109 Argentina  67 arms control  59, 60 Asia, economic rise of  58, 61, 62–​5 Asian Development Bank (ADB)  91 Asian financial crisis  88, 89–​94, 103, 110, 112, 135 criticism of Western support  91 political changes caused by  91 ‘Asian Tiger’ economies  62, 81 Asia Pacific Community (APC)  10, 117–​22, 124 ASEAN response to  120–​1 and Australia  69–​74, 116 and Indonesia  74–​80 and South Korea  80–​5 Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  8, 127, 141 APEC’s first expansion  80–​5 and Australia  69–​74 concerns of ASEAN  72 and the economic rise of Asia  62–​5 and the financial crisis  91 formation of  9, 56–​62, 85–​7 and Indonesia  74–​80 middle power behaviour in  126 and other trade blocs  66–​9 political elites at  56 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  4, 9, 62, 153–​4 and APC proposal  120–​1

and ARF/​ADMM-​Plus  147, 148 ASEAN centrality  74–​80, 132 ASEAN-​China FTA  100 ASEAN Community  104 ASEAN multilateralism  102–​8, 104 Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus (ADMM-​Plus)  8, 145–​9 and EAS  114, 124 and EAVG  136 and the formation of APEC  72 Plus Three (APT)  9 as a power in the region  49–​50 Regional Forum (ARF)  8, 145–​9 Australia  4, 8, 64, 113, 123–​4, 151 anti-​Asian sentiment  93 and the APC and EAS  117–​22 and ASEAN  106, 128–​9 concern about regional role  108, 127 concern about trade blocs  66–​7 and the EAS  89, 108, 115 and East Timor  96 and the financial crisis  93 formation of APEC  9, 56–​7, 69–​74, 85, 129–​30 and identity  17–​18, 26–​7 and leadership  19–​20 as a middle power  118 middle power behaviour  125–​30, 139–​45 and multilateralism  106 and a security issues forum  146–​7 and Sino-​Japanese rivalry  101 UN status argument  1–​2 and US relations  96, 122, 128 view of regional architecture  119–​20 B bailouts  91, 92, 94 balance of power  44, 50, 51, 116, 131 Bali Concord  104, 105 Bali Principles  116–​17, 132 Ban Ki-​moon  27 banking  90 Barkin, J. Samuel  6, 45, 46, 47 Barnett, Michael  44 Beazley, Kim  121, 122

198

Index

Beckley, Michael  44 Beeson, Mark  19, 31 Behringer, Ronald M.  19, 20 Bin Laden, Osama  95 Bogor Declaration  79, 133 bridging  18, 62, 79 Brunei  8, 26, 103 and the EAS  115 Bull, Hedley  42 Burges, Sean  22 Bush, George H.W.  73 Bush, George W.  95, 102 State of the Union address  97 Buzan, Barry  3, 5, 32 C Cambodia  8, 26, 59, 75, 103 and the EAS  115 Cam Ranh Bay  59 Canada  17 foreign policy behaviour  18 and leadership  19–​20 and NAFTA  66 and security issues forum  146 UN status argument  1–​2 Carr, Andrew  22 Carr, E.H.  45, 47, 48 Chiang Chie Foo  148 Chile  10, 89 China  8, 9, 26, 56, 57, 81, 153 and the EAS  89, 115 joining APEC  72 military expansion  99 relations with Soviet Union  59 rise of  98–​102, 107, 135 Sino-​Japanese rivalry  98–​102 citizenship, good international  20, 70 classical realism  45, 47 Clinton, Bill  support of APEC  73 Clinton, Hillary  121 cluster analysis  15 coalition-​building capabilities  19, 20, 46, 126, 141 Cold War  and the context of Asia Pacific  8 declining tensions of the  2, 49, 58–​62, 103 collective decision making  32 common interests  50, 77 communism  59, 61, 102 diplomacy and communist countries  82–​3 and market reforms  63 community building  88, 103, 132 constructivism  13, 16, 49 Cooper, Andrew F.  19 Cooper, David A.  24, 31 cooperation  3, 49, 54, 62, 76, 88, 95, 103, 114 economic cooperation  56

counterterrorism  95, 96, 97, 98, 123 credibility and trust  54, 70 D Dahl, Robert A.  44 democracy  113 protests in China  59 in South Korea  81 Denmark  2 de Swielande, Tanguy Struye  23 devaluations  90 differentiation  13–​14, 22, 28–​9, 151–​2 and the Asian financial crisis  94 in Asia Pacific structure  57 concept of  5–​6 differential framework  4, 31–​3 differentiation mechanism  51–​4 dimensions of  38 in international politics  37–​43 and middle power behaviour  51–​4, 149 and middle powers  5–​7 see also functional differentiation diplomacy  2, 18–​23, 46, 126, 152 Australia’s diplomatic role  70, 74, 130 Indonesia’s diplomatic role  75–​6, 131, 133–​4, 140 niche diplomacy  18–​19, 21 South Korea’s diplomatic role  81–​4, 110, 135, 137–​8 Donnelly, Jack  3, 5, 32, 36, 38, 125 Dumbarton Oaks proposals  1 Duvall, Robert  44 dynamic equilibrium  115–​16, 117, 123, 131, 134 E East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC)  77 East Asia Economic Group (EAEG)  9, 57, 74, 77 East Asia Study Group (EASG)  108, 111–​12 East Asia Summit (EAS)  8, 88–​90 and ASEAN  89, 132 and Australia/​APC  117–​22 concept and membership  9–​10, 115, 123–​4 context of  89–​90, 107 EAS expansion and Australia  118 EAS expansion and Indonesia  112–​17 middle power behaviour in  126 East Asia Vision Group (EAVG)  9, 88, 108, 110–​12, 135, 137, 141 Eastern Europe  68 EU connections with  66 East Timor  96, 105, 109, 127 Eaton, Sarah  49 economic cooperation  58, 62, 65 the formation of APEC  56–​8 Emmers, Ralf  50 Emmerson, Donald  144 equitable economic development  131

199

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

ethics and morality  48 European Community  64, 66 European Union (EU)  40 Evans, Gareth  19, 59–​60, 64, 66–​7, 70, 146–​7, 154 F Finnemore, Martha  51 foreign policy behaviour  5, 13, 18–​23 and identity  17–​18 ideology of  16 ‘fortress Europe’  66–​7 free movement  66 free trade  64, 68, 79, 100, 103, 106, 134 in North America  66 functional differentiation  5–​6, 32, 37–​8, 125, 144, 149, 151 and the formation of EAS/​APEC  56–​7, 123, 139 role differentiation  41–​3, 51–​4, 85 functionalism  18 functional leadership  19 G Gecelovsky, Paul  17, 18 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  63, 64 Gillard, Julia  121 Gilley, Bruce  15, 20, 21, 41 global affairs, relevance in  19 global financial crisis (2008)  39, 113 global problems  70 Goh Chok Tong  80 Gong Ro-​myung  147 Gorbachev, Mikhail  58–​9, 61 gross domestic product (GDP)  14, 24–​5 Indonesia  75, 113 Japan  99 South Korea  81, 109 gross national product (GNP)  15 Group of 7 (G7)  62, 98 Group of 20 (G20)  20, 41, 113, 118, 126, 130 Guzzini, Stefano  48 H Han Seung-​soo  64 Hanson, Pauline  93 Han Sung-​joo  137 Hawke, Bob  9, 57, 70, 73 hierarchy of states  40 Higgott, Richard  19, 31 Holbraad, Carsten  15 Holloway, Stephen  21 Hong Kong  9, 10, 57 economy of  62 joining APEC  72 Howard, John  93, 106 Hurrell, Andrew  16

I ideational component  6, 23, 36, 64, 85, 139, 152, 153 identity  5, 13, 16–​18, 25–​8 India  8, 10, 24, 26, 88, 89, 113, 119 and the EAS  115 Indonesia  4, 8, 10, 26, 56, 60–​1, 62, 123–​4 APEC formation  9, 57, 85 and ARF/​ADMM-​Plus  148 and ASEAN centrality  74–​80, 103, 104–​5, 131 concern about the EU and NAFTA  68 EAS expansion  112–​17 EAS formation  88, 89, 108, 115, 116, 133 and equitable economic development  65, 68 financial crisis  90, 92–​3 and identity  27–​8 Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy  75 as a middle power  74 middle power behaviour  125, 130–​4, 139–​45 and a security issues forum  146 and Sino-​Japanese rivalry  101–​2 and US counterterrorism  96 inequality  131 inference, modes of  10–​11 institutions  45 and authority from states  40 institutional liberalism  3 institution building  108, 126 interdependence  41, 49, 58, 65, 68, 91, 131, 144 Intermediate-​Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987  59 International Monetary Fund (IMF)  41, 91, 92, 93 investment  68, 91 Iraq  97 Islamic extremism  95 J Japan  8, 26, 53, 58, 153 ASEAN-​Japan FTA  100 distrust of  71, 99, 129 and the EAS  115 economy and role of  62, 98–​9 formation of APEC  56–​7 Sino-​Japanese rivalry  89, 98–​102 Jones, Catherine  46 Jones, David Martin  50 Jordaan, Eduard  22 K Keating, Paul  8, 57, 60, 72, 78–​9 Keohane, Robert O.  21, 22, 50 Kim Dae-​jung  9, 88, 106, 134, 154 and EAVG  110

200

Index

and the financial crisis  92 visionary leader  108, 138 Kim Young-​sam  92 Korean War  81 Kuching Consensus  77, 132, 133 L Laos  8, 26, 103 and the EAS  115 leadership  3, 19, 154 by Australia  126 by Indonesia  112, 114, 116, 117 by South Korea  110 Lee Myung-​bak  27 Lee Sang-​ock  84–​5 liberalism  41 liberal institutionalism  40, 49 Li Peng  82–​4 Luhmann, Niklas  37 Luxembourg  24 M major-​powers  dilution of stratification  3, 6, 10, 53, 56, 125, 139, 148 and multilateralism  20 responsibility and hierarchy  37 Malaysia  8, 124 and the EAS  114, 115 economy of  62 and formation of APEC  9, 57, 77–​8 and identity  28 Manicom, James  18, 23 market economy  64 in the Soviet Union  58 material capabilities  5, 14–​16, 24, 44, 126, 135, 140 McRae, Dave  28 Megawati  95, 112 Mexico  2, 66, 89 middle powers  5–​8, 23–​9, 149 argument for status at UN  1–​2 in Asia Pacific  23–​9 Australia as a middle power  69–​70, 74, 118 behaviour and structure  42–​3 definition of  13–​14 and the EAS  108 foreign policy behaviour  18–​23 and the formation of APEC  56–​8 and formation of EAS  122, 124 identity of  16–​18 Indonesia as a middle power  75, 113 material capabilities  14–​16 middle power behaviour  3, 10, 51–​4, 139–​48, 151–​2 middlepowermanship  19, 20, 28 middle power theory  151 and multilateralism  2–​4, 49–​51, 85 South Korea as a middle power  81–​2, 108–​9, 112

MIKTA grouping  2, 27 military expenditure/​power  14, 15 troop numbers  15 US presence in Asia ​Pacific  61 Mohamad, Mahathir  57, 61, 73, 98 Morgenthau, Hans J.  45, 46, 48 multilateralism  2–​4, 20, 31, 53, 89, 125, 126, 152 ASEAN multilateralism  102–​8 and Australia  106 and institution building  70 and middle powers  51–​4, 149 multilateral diplomacy  3, 4, 28 multilateral institutions  18, 41 multilateral platforms  8, 49–​51 and power politics  50–​1 regional multilateralism  129, 131, 134, 136, 138, 144 regional security multilateralism  146 Muslims  95, 96, 113 in Australia  96 Myanmar  8, 26, 103 N Natalegawa, Marty  105, 131, 147, 154 Neack, Laura  21 neoliberalism  13, 18 neorealism  3, 13, 31 neorealist view of structure  35–​6 Netherlands  2 New Zealand  8, 26, 88, 113 and the EAS  115 niche diplomacy  18–​19, 21 Non-​Aligned Movement (NAM)  60, 75, 131 non-​threatening powers  140 non-​threatening profiles  153 nordpolitik  82–​3, 84, 137 norms  3, 20, 38, 40, 49, 51, 53, 102, 116, 132 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  66, 67 North Korea  8, 26, 65, 100, 106, 137 North-​South divide  68, 131 Norway  2 Nossal, Kim Richard  31 nuclear arms treaty  59 O Obama, Barack  121 and the EAS  116 Olympics  60, 82, 83 Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988  63, 64 One China  83, 115 O’Neil, Andrew  15, 20, 21, 41 P Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)  56, 62

201

MIDDLE POWERS IN ASIA PACIFIC MULTILATERALISM

Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)  56, 62, 63 Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD)  56, 62 Parsons, Talcott  37, 44 Patience, Allan  17 Paul, T.V.  43 peace, maintaining  1, 42, 60, 96, 97, 99, 109 Paris peace conference  75 persuasive/​soft power  5, 13, 18, 47–​8, 133–​4, 138, 141 Peru  10 Philippines  8, 26, 104 position approach, the  14–​16 power politics  10, 33, 43–​51, 45, 139, 149, 151, 152 and multilateral platforms  49–​51 and realism  45 relational power politics  47–​8, 141, 142 relative power politics  140 social aspects of  46 social power politics  140 see also persuasive/​soft power protectionism  63, 68, 131 R Razak, Najib  28, 148 Reagan, Ronald  59 Reeves, Jeffrey  18, 23 regional cooperation  see cooperation relational politics  47–​8 research  design  7–​11 further  154–​6 retroduction  10–​11 Rha Woong-​bae  65 Roh Moo-​hyun  97, 138 Roh Tae-​woo  27, 60, 81, 82–​3 Rudd, Kevin  17, 101, 106, 117–​18, 119 rules-​based order  3, 20, 21, 40, 51, 53, 63, 110 Russia  8, 26 membership of EAS  10, 88, 115, 116 S Sayer, Andrew  10–​11 Schroeder, Paul  42 Scott, David  17 Seattle summit  73 security issues  89, 99, 104, 109, 135, 146–​7 segmentation  5–​6, 32, 37, 39 self-​identification  16, 17 Seoul Olympics  60, 82, 83 Severino, Rodolfo C.  103, 114 Sewell, William H.  33 shared understandings  35, 46, 50 shuttle diplomacy  81–​4 Singapore  8, 26, 104, 121 and the EAS  115 economy of  62

Singapore Declaration 1992  103 single market  66, 67 Sino-​Japanese rivalry  89, 98–​102 smart power  48 social structure of international politics  35 social systems and power  44 South China Sea  89, 113, 117, 132, 134 South Korea  2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 26, 151 APEC expansion  80–​5, 136, 141 APEC formation  57, 85, 135 and ARF/​ADMM-​Plus  148 and ASEAN role  105–​6 concern about EU and NAFTA  67 and democracy  60 and EAS  89, 108–​12, 115, 122 economy of  62, 81 financial crisis  90, 92 and identity  27 as a middle power  81–​2, 108–​9, 112 middle power behaviour  123–​5, 134–​9, 139–​45 relations with China/​Taiwan  137, 142 and Sino-​Japanese rivalry  100 ties with ROC and PRC  83–​4 and trade with N. Korea  65 as US ally  142 and US counterterrorism  97 and US protectionism  64 Soviet Union  1 decline of the  58–​9 specialized interests  19, 42 specific initiatives  153 stability  98, 102, 107 and ASEAN centrality  105 and the EAS  89 standard of living  24, 118 stratification  5–​6, 32, 37, 40, 125, 140, 144 structure in international politics  33–​43, 45 Stubbs, Richard  50 Suharto  76, 79–​80, 93, 134 Sukarno  75 Sunshine policy  100, 106 Sussex, Matthew  20, 23 Sweden  2 T Taiwan  9, 10, 57, 137 economy of  62 joining APEC  72 technical skills  19 territorial size  14 terrorism  95, 96, 97, 98, 123, 127 global war on terror  39, 94–​8 Thailand  8, 26 economy of  62 financial crisis  90 Tiananmen Square  59 Timor-​Leste  8, 26 trade blocs, rise of  66–​9, 127

202

Index

trade liberalization process  79–​80 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)  75, 103 tsunami 2004  115 Turkey  2 U unemployment  92 Ungerer, Carl  17 unilateralism  3, 21, 53, 63, 65, 68, 97, 98, 127 unipolarity, emerging  58–​62 United Kingdom (UK)  1 United Nations (UN)  109 General Assembly (UNGA)  1 inception of  1, 6 Security Council (UNSC)  1, 2, 40, 51 United States (US)  1, 56, 121, 153 9/​11 and the war on terror  94–​8 and the Asian financial crisis  91, 92, 94 counterterrorism strategy  127 GDP  94 joining APEC  73–​4 joining the EAS  10, 88, 115, 116, 117 and NAFTA  66 relations with Soviet Union and China  58–​9 role in Asia ​Pacific  60–​2, 97, 107, 142 and South Korea  64 trade tensions with Japan/​Asia  63 withdrawal from Asia Pacific  8 Uruguay Round  58, 63–​4, 127 V values  53, 61, 94, 95, 98

Vietnam  8, 26, 75, 103 and the EAS  115 withdrawal from Cambodia  59 W Waltz, Kenneth N.  34, 36–​7, 38, 42 war on terror  94–​8 Asian opinion on  98 wealth  24 Wendt, Alexander  35, 38 Wesley, Michael  91, 106, 121 Western reaction to financial crisis  91, 93, 131, 135–​6 White, Hugh  24 Widodo Joko  27 Wight, Martin  43 Wirajuda, Hassan  115 Wivel, Anders  43 Wood, Bernard  15 Woolcott, Richard  72, 73, 76, 82, 119, 120 World Bank  62, 91 World Trade Center  95 World Trade Organization (WTO)  41 World War II  1, 17, 20, 21, 26, 98, 126, 129 Japan’s occupations during  71 post-​war global order  49 Y Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang  27, 112, 113, 117 Z Zürn, Michael  3, 5, 32, 37, 39

203

“Can middle powers in the Asia-Pacific pursue multilateralism in the face of increasing great power rivalry? This book employs differentiation theory for an innovative approach to this timely question.” Mathias Albert, Bielefeld University “Combining realist concerns for power politics and sociological concerns for how things come to be, this book’s examination of Australia, Indonesia and South Korea illuminates the connection between middle powers and multilateralism. Worth reading for anyone interested in the mix of powers that constitute international politics.” Alice Ba, University of Delaware

Sarah Teo is Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Regional Security Architecture Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University.

Drawing on insights from differentiation theory, this book examines the participation of middle powers in multilateralism. Taking Australia, Indonesia and South Korea as examples, the book examines these countries’ roles in regional organizations, and particularly during the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and East Asia Summit. Through its analysis, the book argues that middle powers pursue dilution of major power stratificatory forces, as well as functionally differentiated roles for themselves in multilateral diplomacy. The book sets out a valuable new framework to explain and understand the behaviour of middle powers in multilateralism.

SERIES EDITORS Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations combines Yongjin Zhang original research and theoretical Shogo Suzuki innovation to give fresh insight into Peter Marcus Kristensen the changing politics of the region.

ISBN 978-1-5292-1647-9

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