Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia: Multilateralism, Institutions, and Local Perception [1 ed.] 9789819940783, 9789819940790

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Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia Multilateralism, Institutions, and Local Perception JeongWon Bourdais Park Aigul Adibayeva Danial Saari

Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia

JeongWon BOURDAIS PARK · Aigul ADIBAYEVA · Danial SAARI

Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia Multilateralism, Institutions, and Local Perception

JeongWon BOURDAIS PARK Ningbo, China

Aigul ADIBAYEVA Almaty, Kazakhstan

Danial SAARI Almaty, Kazakhstan

ISBN 978-981-99-4078-3 ISBN 978-981-99-4079-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Sasha/AI Midjourney This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For our families

Preface

This book is about how states that happen to be in geographical proximity can cooperate more effectively by building a coherent supranationalism. We, the authors, shared the experience of the political turmoil in Almaty and have been alarmed by the hostilities in the ex-Soviet zone since the beginning of the 2020s. Therefore, we spent quite some time discussing how the Central Asian region could become a more secure, stable, and viable place to live. We agreed that articulating region-specific problems and consolidating a more coherent Central Asia-led regionalization process should be one of the most prominent agendas that all countries in the region would need to put forward. However, the common understanding among insiders and outsiders alike has been that there is a lack of intra-regional initiatives. There have been significant attempts by the governments of Central Asia to nurture solid regionality, but these have often been frustrated by internal and external constraints. As a politically and economically dynamic region with material and strategic values, Central Asia continues to undertake a process of regionalization influenced by external powers’ various patterns of engagement in the region, notably through increasing seemingly softer tool such as multilateral institutions. This process is becoming increasingly difficult for the Central Asian countries to resist, as they are unable to opt out of it. Therefore, it is highly likely that regionalization will continue no matter how the region reacts to it. Considering its enormous potential, Central Asia is a testing bed in world politics for how powerful countries’ rivalries

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PREFACE

shape the politics, economies, and societies of the region. In response to rapid externally-guided regionalization, further efforts to create a robust regional core may co-evolve—with accompanying tensions—with multilevel cleavages at the regional and country levels. We hope that our project will offer helpful insights for readers who are interested in the politics of Central Asia. Ningbo, China May 2023

JeongWon BOURDAIS PARK

Acknowledgments

Many people have provided a great deal of support to help us to finalize this book. First of all, we would like to acknowledge that this project could not have been competed without the direct and indirect institutional support both from the University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC) and KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan. We value enormously our colleagues and students, who have been our main sources of intellectual stimulation and inspiration. Lingzhan Zhou and Zihao Yu, research assistants from the UNNC, were extremely helpful in performing searches for statistical data, compiling information, and producing tables, figures, and graphs over the course of many hours. Special thanks are due to Palgrave Macmillan for accepting our manuscript and the editorial team for their patient assistance. We also appreciate all of the interviewees who were willing to help us with this project. We would like to thank to Villate Brown McKitrick for providing professional support with English editing and preparing the final manuscript for submission. However, any flaws that are found in this book remain the authors’ own responsibility. This project was partially financed by the School of International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC).

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Contents

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1

Introduction: Regionalism for Central Asian Studies

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De-Sovietization, State-Building, and Re-Regionalization

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3

Competing External Multilateralisms and Central Asian Regionalism

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Interactive Evolution and Implementation of Regionalism

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Conclusion: Externally Guided Regionalization

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Index

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List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Changing trade volume between Central Asia and Russia GDP Growth rate of the Soviet Central Asian republics and countries (1986–2021) The number of concluded FTAs by country in Central Asia Trade volume between China and Central Asia (1995–2020) Trade volume between the US and Central Asia (1995–2020) Volume of trade between EU countries and Central Asia (1995–2020) Russia and China-led regional organizations including or focusing on Central Asian Affairs Bilateral Foreign Assistance from the US to Central Asia (2018–2022)

62 68 69 102 103 103 134 141

Note: All tables and figures in the text were adapted and reformulated, based on the indicated sources, by the authors and our research assistants, Lingzhan Zhou and Zihao Yu.

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

Table 1.6 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table Table Table Table

3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2

Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7

Global ranking of trade openness Accession to the WTO Perspectives on regionalism in Central Asia Ranking of electoral democracy in Central Asian countries Ranking of freedom of expression in Central Asian countries Shared interests and risks in Central Asia Inflation (change in consumer price index) 1991–1999 (percent) Intra-regional trade volume (in goods) between CA countries in 2020 (mln. USD) External actors’ multilateralism policy toward CA Reduction of the US financial aid to Central Asia Types of multilateral institutions in Central Asia Multilateral institutionalized cooperation administered by external actors Other inter-regional cooperative initiatives and programs Initiatives of the Central Asian states to strengthen multilateral and regional cooperation Total trade turnover between China and Central Asian countries by 2021 Intra-regional migration in Central Asia (2020) Environmental performance ranking of Central Asian countries (2022)

4 4 15 19 19 24 63 68 85 90 133 135 137 144 148 151 152

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.8 Table 4.9

Parliamentary elections results in Central Asian countries 2019–2021 Presidents of the Central Asian states

157 159

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Regionalism for Central Asian Studies

Central Asia (CA hereafter) is a hybrid region characterized by historical and political complexity. Its heartland comprises vast forests and steppes, geographically bridging East and West and featuring multilayered ethnic, religious, and cultural components. The modernization processes of CA countries have advanced in parallel with foreign invasions, domination, colonization, and decolonization. The region is currently undergoing another phase of modernization since independence, yet it still suffers from low levels of democratization, natural resource curse, uneven development, as well as growing external influence from major powers including Russia. Uncertainties in relation to the war between Russia and Ukraine that began in 2022 suggest a gloomy future in many aspects, with CA countries being caught up in a renewed Cold or Hot War-like international structure (Imamova 2022). Despite the region’s strategic importance and the implications of its complicated political and social dynamics, there is a dearth of updated indepth case studies on CA that consider it as a clustered political entity. This book explores the dynamics of regionalism in contemporary CA amid the changing historical configurations and rising new players in the region. The romanticization of Western values among CA people has been reinforced by the flow of foreign aid and investments into the region that have gradually been replaced by renewed great power

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. BOURDAIS PARK et al., Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0_1

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rivalries and the cultural hegemony of local autarchic neo-patrimonialism (Erdmann and Engel 2006; Izquierdo-Brichs and Serra-Massansalvador 2021; McGlinchey 2011; Shkel 2019). Public discourse reflecting the dynamic changes in the region has evoked heated debates on the concerns, fears, and expectations rising from the changing geopolitical situation, opening a space for repositioning CA in world politics. In this respect, the main focus of this book is the region per se as a spatially, culturally, and politically demarcated space. “Regions do have geographical, cultural, institutional, and economic underpinnings that persist over time, but they are not static and unchanging, or determined only by geography” (Bickerton and Gagnon 2020, p. 268). The conventional approach suggests three elements of regionality (regional features), namely the regional boundary as an organic unity, institutionalization, and identity. The Western view of CA comprises the territories from the Caspian Sea, the Altai Mountains, and the Hindu Kush to the Pamir Mountains. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geographical notion of greater CA embraced Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, northern and central Pakistan, northern India, western China, Mongolia, and the former Soviet republics, in accordance with ethnic and linguistic paradigms. The geographical and cognitive evolution of CA as a region was historically far more organic and expansive before Soviet policy delineated the political demarcations in the vast territories of west CA in the 1920s. It is now commonly understood as the area of the five post-Soviet independent states. “The interaction of the steppe-dwellers with neighboring agrarian states has shaped much of our knowledge of Central Asia” (Golden 2011, p. 4). Our analysis of the region and regionalism takes the approaches of Political Science and International Relations. That is, for our purposes, the region that is commonly called Central Asia in the contemporary world politics refers to the Soviet cultural-territorial-administrative concept and includes five post-Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Apart from the right to native culture and languages granted by the early Soviet decree on the right of native peoples to self-determination in the 1920s, a number of border and territorial units were considered part of the USSR. CA was considered by Russia to be its ‘steppe frontier’ (land inhabited by nomadic tribes in the east) as opposed to its ‘forest frontier’ (Siberia and the Russian Far East; Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 399). During the Stalin era, the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs separately acquired Soviet

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Socialist Republic status in 1936, while the Tajik Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic was part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic under the USSR between 1924 and 1929 but later divided into two separate Republics in 1936. In the Soviet period, external powers did not affect the formation of Soviet nationalities in the CA region, which was called ‘middle Asia’ by the Soviet authorities. The involvement of external powers re-emerged only after 1991, when cultural, historical, and political boundaries were redrawn. Undoubtedly, Soviet leaders had the strongest influence on the processes of nation-building and territorial formation of the national republics in CA until 1991. Therefore, the contemporary national and political tensions in the region originate from the time when the Soviet government laid the foundation of territorial-administrative division for CA Union republics with the presence of eight enclaves, namely Sokh, Vorukh, Karaigach, Sarvak, Barak, Dzhangail, Chon-Gara and Shakhimardan, and an autonomous enclave, Karakalpakstan. The ethnic enclaves formed in the territories of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were seen as the results of ineffective demarcation policies of the USSR that neglected the ethnically diverse contingent of the population and resulted in many people being alienated from their historical homelands after 1991 (Valieva 2021). The dissolution of the USSR resulted in a great deal of hardship for the newly independent states, “which suddenly found themselves confronted with an urgent need to readjust their Soviet-style governance models to the new realities” (Valieva 2021, p. 24) as sovereign states in the international community and the international market. They joined the United Nations (UN) naturally upon their gaining the status of independent states. However, even after three decades of independence and interaction with the outside world, their levels of trade openness remain low (Table 1.1). Nevertheless, they are expected to fully accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO 2020a, b; see Table 1.2) if they have not already done so. Ever since they gained independence, these republics have struggled to build their own nations and states while consolidating state sovereignty and security both domestically and internationally. Today, the region suffers from an array of domestic and regional struggles, including rising rivalries between great powers due to changing interests in the region, the COVID-19 pandemic, the occupation of Afghanistan by the Taliban, serious clashes over border disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in April 2021, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and unprecedented

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Table 1.1 Global ranking of trade openness

Trade openness Country

Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan

Trade openness, 2018

Global rank

98.88 71.53 63.53 55.85 35.16

57 100 116 133 162

Available data 1990–2021 1997–2021 1992–2020 1993–2020 1991–2018

Source The Global Economy (2022)

Table 1.2 Accession to the WTO Accession to the WTO Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

30 November 2015 20 December 1998 2 March 2013 (Observer Governments) Official application made on 24 November 2021 (Observer Governments) Application made on 8 December 1994

Source WTO (2020a; 2020b; 2023)

large-scale citizen protests in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and subsequent military intervention by the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These issues are in addition to other social and welfare problems including widening income disparity, land degradation, environmental pollution, and public health issues. Amid these crises and instability due to historical and economic relations with major great powers and intensifying external power rivalries due to the economic and strategic value of the region, investigating CA as a regional cluster, an epicenter of geopolitics linking Europe and Asia, is meaningful for a number of reasons. First of all, due to their geographical and historical connections, CA countries have common concerns that can be more effectively resolved by responding collectively. In the development field, synergies can be generated if regional cooperation is well-designed, and region-focused research offers analysis of both negative and positive synergies to help clarify under what conditions positive

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synergy may be generated in terms of the paradigm of neoliberal institutionalist accounts on the logic of countries’ pursuing absolute gains (Keohane and Nye 1977; Lukner 2014). Secondly, a regional approach helps in the study of the condition of stable co-existence through building multilateral security measures and trust. Regional security studies, a type of middle-level analysis in the field of international relations, effectively contribute to the stability of the region in question as well as neighboring regions and global security as a building block. Region-focused analysis fills the gap created by statecentered analysis of foreign affairs or the macro-level structural system approach to international affairs. Countries in the developing world show a tendency to bypass their own regional neighbors and often prefer to play a role in global affairs. The absence or creation of region-wide collective bargaining power in relation to external powers reflects the asymmetrical power balance between the regional actors and the external powers, notably China and Russia in the case of CA (see Laruelle et al. 2010). Analysis of regional hegemons, whether internal or external, also adds insights that make the study of actor-system interaction more accurate. Investigating the process of regionalization has comparative advantages to look into the phenomenon of functional spillover beyond the region in resolving prominent and interconnected issues, effectively bridging stateand global-level concerns. Thirdly, understanding regionality, that is, the region-specific features and degree of interaction among CA countries, is an important part of evaluating the possibility of constructing sharable interests and identity. The investigation of the process of regional cooperation provides meaningful case studies and potential to contribute to IR theories at various intra-regional and inter-regional levels with global implications. Against this backdrop, we raise the following research questions: How and by what forces and motivations has regionalism evolved into the current form in the CA region? What are the main features of CA regionalism? And then, what are the significance and implications of the evolving regionalism for the stability and development of the countries in the region? Answering the ‘how’ question with a systematically designed analysis allows us to address part of ‘why’ questions in order to understand essential regional affairs. The concept of integration including cooperation, “verbally defined as forming parts into a whole or creating interdependence, can be broken down into economic integration … social integration … and political integration” (Nye 1968, p. 858). CA

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regionalism entails both material (i.e., geographical and institutional) and ideational (i.e., values, culture, and vision) dimensions. In this book, we go beyond comparative studies of the individual countries to focus on the regional sphere, although comparative analyses of the individual countries are included to the extent necessary in discussing regionalism. In order to address the main research questions adequately, each chapter deals with two sets of interconnected questions about exogenous and indigenous factors, shifting the emphasis to the latter in the penultimate chapter. Firstly, if CA’s inter-state regionalism is important to the major powers which have been engaged in CA affairs, namely the European Union (EU hereafter), the United States (US), Russia, and China, how have they molded CA regionalism through their own agenda of using multilateralism tools in inter-regional (or bilateral or inter-regional hybrid forms) cooperation? Our investigation also addresses related questions such as: In what activities have the major powers been engaged in the CA region, and for what interests? How have these activities been changing, and by what forces? What are the shared and conflicting interests among the players in the region? To address these inter-connected questions, this book investigates the influential countries’ interactions with CA and how they adjust their conflicting interests. Depending on the perspectives on world affairs and political or scholarly intentions, labeling a country as a great power status may vary. For the purposes of this book, the great powers that influence CA are the four major external states or supranational actors mentioned above that are perceived as greatly influential powers among the CA community in comprehensive political, economic, historical, and cultural aspects. A great power must have at least two of three aspects of power, namely military power, economic leverage, and socio-cultural influence. Therefore, the great or major powers in this research refer to the most influential extra-regional actors that have been constantly influencing the shaping and reshaping of the CA region’s security and development (Laruelle et al. 2019, p. 2). The US and the EU are the two most influential aid donors at least during the first decade of CA’s independence. Moreover, the EU is the second-largest trading partner of CA, actively supporting the economic diversification and development of a market economy of CA states, promoting trade and sustainable interaction between the countries of the region. China and Russia are the most influential neighboring countries; they are geographically adjacent and have historical and ethnic ties with the CA countries. China is today the largest trading partner of

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the CA states. In addition, all five Central Asian countries have established close relations with Russia and are cooperating with it in various fields. Secondly, the main research questions inquire about whether and how the CA states have collectively reacted to and managed the major powers’ influential and changing engagements in CA at the intraregional level. In other words, what is CA’s reaction to and the consequences of the fluctuation of interest of the major powers in the region? Our case study intends to contribute to finding regularities in the wider context of the process of regionalization in the field of regional studies in IR. We do not ask why there is no EU-like or ASEAN-like regional integration in CA; instead, our research highlights what is already there, asking what CA regionalism is, how and why it has been formed in such a fashion and by what forces. Different from a rational choice approach which entails more efforts at generalization, our case study methodology focuses on a specific region. At the same time, through this project, we endeavor to resolve the tension between idiographic and nomothetic methodologies that has stemmed from the rise of pluralism and the multidimensionality of contemporary regionalism (See De Lombaerde et al. 2010, p. 732). In 2022, there were a series of disturbances in the ex-Soviet territory as mentioned briefly, including the Kazakhstani president’s decision to invite Russian-led CSTO troops to quell citizen protests in Almaty in January 2022, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and the harsh impacts of sanctions against Russia on the CA economy (Najibullah 2022). This turmoil once again illustrates the volatile and intertwined economic and security dynamics of the region. In this regard, calculating the benefits and risks of regional interaction among CA countries based on immediate reciprocity, (if following the strictly rationalist approach to interstate cooperation) is far more complicated than it appears to be due to, inter alia, shifting national interests, complexity of issue-linkage, and each country’s bilateral and multilateral ties with external players. Although the level of integration is rather low in the absence of intraregional binding horizontal regulatory regimes, there have been growing region-wide collective actions toward further positive interactions, especially during critical periods like the global pandemic. Other examples of region-wide actions come from the environmental field: for the first time in the 26-year history of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the countries of CA acted as a single region representing a consolidated position on climate change (Marteau 2021).

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Patterns of regional cooperation and integration can vary from region to region. CA has its own historical and cultural context, and CA regionalism forms neither the ASEAN type of loose but intra-regionally institutionalized cooperation which is often cited by local intellectuals as a kind of model of regionalism in Asia (Ba 2014, p. 669), nor the EU-type of fully-fledged tight integration. It is meaningful to elucidate whether and what CA countries have built through cooperation and how the leaders and people in the region view the multilateral regionalization process and the collective vision for the future in positioning the region in the international community. In addressing these questions, the neoliberal institutionalist view alone does not sufficiently embrace a comprehensive picture of CA given that hardcore security issues still haunt the region and tensions can be augmented among extra-regional powers. Nor does the classical realism perspective accurately capture regional affairs since there have been clear indications of the cooperative benefit-sharing process over the past three decades, namely, beyond objective shared interests to proactive creation of cooperative agendas and programs for protecting common goods. In the process, some level of spill-over across sectors has occurred beyond just balancing powers among actors or benefit-seeking among states. As seen from the CA countries’ ambiguous response to the changing external powers’ engagement dynamics in the region up until today, region-level politics has been structured in terms of loose intraregionality, internally and externally passively balancing rather than proactively band-wagoning, while at the same time each country makes its own foreign policy choices. Amid the major powers’ incoherent but deeper engagement in the region, hybrid forms of region-wide multilateralism have developed rapidly and CA state elites have been shrewdly wellconnected with the global capitalist market (see, for example, Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). In theory, the possible paths could be as follows: band-wagoning in the neo-classical realist sense, being structured by postcolonialism from the Marxist perspective, or seeing regionalism as the rise of regional hegemonism. A single IR perspective alone cannot accurately portray the CA region and regionalism and can only partially depict the relations between external powers and the region. The fact that CA regionalism has developed no regional hegemon makes the process closer to the notion of “new regionalism” as opposed to a “hegemonic regionalism model” (Hettne 2003, p. 362). Although CA regionalism per se has not yet

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been fully developed, the region has been at the epicenter of a rapidly growing multidimensional, multilateral institutional regionalism. Therefore, one may consider the inclusive forms of institutionalization of CA regionalism as part of the phenomenon of a new and global model of regionalisms. However, what was regarded as new regionalism in the late 1990s was in fact the classical form of norm-based tighter regionalism, which has often been criticized as an anti-pluralistic pre-theory advocated by intergovernmentalism, before international regionalism studies was integrated with the notion of domestic or small-scale regionalism within nations. “Regional hegemonism is the ‘malign’ form of neo-mercantilism. The New Regionalism is the ‘benign’ form. The great task in creating a post-hegemonic future is to promote ‘benign’ rather than ‘malign’ neo-mercantilism” (Hettne 2003, p. 367). One external condition that has supported neo-classical regionalism in this context is the fact that CA regionalization developed in parallel with the countries’ prompt acceptance of economic globalization upon their independence (Aslund 2007). The regionalism in CA developed in response to a wide range of changing external and internal conditions such as rapid economic globalization, consolidating new nationalism, and building a sovereign nation. Regionalism offers another option for a new multilateralism in the rapidly globalizing world, in particular from the relatively weaker countries’ position, as a reaction to or in cooperation with extra regional powers. In terms of a vison for regionalism, the debate over regionalism is broadly divided into two views: the regionalist view that stresses the importance of regional-level cooperation and the skeptical view of regional cooperation that is pessimistic about either the level of analysis (i.e., the region as a major actor in international affairs) or the cooperative approach itself. The discussion on regionalism in CA has not been fully invigorated, and scholars who have touched upon the topic endorse more skeptical views with a few exceptions (Rakhimov 2010, p. 101). Nevertheless, over the past three decades, the CA countries have built a regional structure that consolidates both state sovereignty and intra-regionalization. In addition, Hettne’s (2003) three contrasting models of regionalism provides some insights, namely, trading blocs or ‘megamarkets’ resulting from the possible breaking up of the free trade regime; the geo-political division of the world into sometimes competing, sometimes

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aligned military-political power blocs; and the process of regionalisation from below resulting largely from internal transformations within emerging regions. Hettne paid particular attention to the third model, describing it as “transnational formations which express a regional identity rather similar to nationalism” and calling it the “new” regionalism (p. 360). In his view, while the old model exhibits such features as a creation “from above by the superpower”, “under a bipolar Cold War context”, and “with specific objectives”, the new regionalism is shaped in a more multipolar setting through a “spontaneous” process from within the region with state actors as the main initiators, and for more flexible, comprehensive, and multidimensional directions (p. 362). As time goes by, it seems that the concept of new regionalism has been employed in the opposite direction in combination with neofunctionalism, from a thick to a minimalist definition. In some contexts, such as economic integration, new regionalism refers to an open and inclusive model, a looser form of cooperation as opposed to a conventional proactive closed form of integration. In this regard, what is often regarded as process-focused new regionalism that is mostly based on economic functions and activities in cooperation refers instead to neoclassical regionalism. Clarification can be achieved by asking ‘how new is new?’ and ‘new to which countries or to which regions?’ At the beginning of the rise of regionalism as a theory, ‘new’ meant a stage closer to what we categorize as ‘thick regionalism’. This is similar to the term ‘trust-based qualitative multilateralism’ as opposed to the neoliberal rationalist-institutionalist account of cooperation Rathbun (2011, p. 244) used to describe the US’s institutionalism. Whereas thin regionalism was regarded as rather an earlier stage of regionalism in the stage of the full spectrum of regionalization, what is regarded as new today is in fact the thin model, which is similar with the classical form of early regionalism. Therefore, the question of ‘how new’ is regarded as ‘new’ tends to be undefinable as both ontology and epistemology may dynamically move in different directions in regionalism studies considering the quantity, functionality, legitimization, and spatial expansion of the newly created institutionalized regionalism. The previously dichotomized understanding between a Western model (e.g., the EU) versus an Eastern model (e.g., ASEAN) might be less useful than before. The looser form of integration as opposed to the neo-functionalist integrationist approach including political dimensions (Haas 1958, p. 16) can be understood as neo-classical regionalism. This may explain the multidimensional and

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fast-globalizing features with self-legitimation while creating and consolidating alternative norms to existing global governance found in emerging regionalisms (Zaum 2017, p. 1114). A great deal of research has been emerging discussing the so-called new regionalism embodied in new international and regional organizations, insinuating that their new normmaking function contributes to the plurality of global governance (Ba 2014, pp. 670–671). Some are more critical on the open and loose definitions of regionalism as it embraces and legitimizes conflicts with the existing democratic values, rules, and norms by labeling it under globalization of regionalism (De Lombaerde et al. 2010, p. 734). Regionalism may mean a region-wide political program accompanying various forms of collective actions through which regional agendas, goals and visions are discussed and implemented in view of building a structured cooperative governance. The gaps in the previous studies on how regionalism in CA is formed manifest the following points. Some researchers weigh the role of external powers, consequently depicting the countries and the region as passive victims of rivalries, while others provide insightful anthropological and historical research on the individual countries and the region. The dearth of in-depth research on regionalism itself remains; instead, the focus is on the great powers. This lack of focus overlooks the historical transition toward a different kind of regionalization in CA. Building upon the previous academic endeavors, this book explores ways to position and reposition the region in the wider academic account and provides policy implications for its future stability and prosperity.

Regionality and Regionalization: Affinity Between External and Intra-Regional Multilateralism(s) Not only the presence of different external powers but rivalries among them are important elements in understanding the region and regionalism (Starr 2009, p. 43), although external actors’ influences will explain CA regionalism only partially. US strategies in the CA region have not been as coherent as CA countries initially believed, and the strategies changed dramatically after the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 and again in 2008 when the world experienced a major financial crisis. The series of crises resulted in changes of leadership in the US, partial withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and a revised foreign policy doctrine from Russia.

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During the first stage of independence, the newly emerged CA states received a great deal of aid and investment from the West in order to support their smooth transition, and they were steadily integrated into the world economic community emulating the capitalist marketized development model. During the second stage of interaction between the West and the CA region since 2001, CA experienced fundamental geopolitical changes in the international arena, specifically, the demise of mutual reconsiderations of diplomatic and developmental strategies and the prioritization of state security. Scholars of CA politics tend to believe that this abrupt alteration of foreign policy from the West, particularly the US, generated a vacuum in CA and the countries in the region that were unprepared to face new political, economic, and social challenges. With the vacuum of Western influence in all CA countries, political regimes with their own ethnic and historical particularities have evolved. The governments in CA no longer make efforts to absorb Western political traditions but instead reflect them through their own paradigms which include much stronger inclinations toward autocratic characteristics and oriental paternalism. The latter has played a part in leading to the establishment of rather stable political elite groups in CA throughout the first decade of the new millennium, which triggered different objectives and implementations, in some cases attempting political autarchies. One of the puzzling questions about CA regionalism is why there have been few efforts to create and maintain intra-regional institutionalized cooperation amid the heated competition over supranational structure by external powers. Common answers among local intellectuals include, but are not limited to, the region’s relatively short history of being independent; lack of physical infrastructure to interact due to lack of communication and transportation infrastructure; diversity in terms of values and culture including languages; varying stages of economic development and industrial capacity; competition over natural resources; lack of mutual trust; and fear of the regional spread of terrorism, extremism, and organized crime. However, none of these issues can only be understood as constraints. The listed risks are the very reasons why internally motivated multilateralism can emerge. Diverse economic structures can complement each other rather than permanently conflict. Cultural diversity and lack of mutual trust can also explain why a region cooperates. In the process of regionalization through cooperation, regions often encounter a range of conflicting situations including hegemonic competition, power struggles, harsh negotiations, disputes, and escalation of

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tensions. According to the neo-structural realist IR perspective, in light of the inevitable power disparity among regional actors and the nature of the state, at least one country in the region will invariably aspire to become a regional hegemon. According to Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010), the conditions for the rise of a regional hegemon usually depend on the orientation and disposition of the candidate regional power(s). The conditions include whether the regional power pursues multilateralism or unilateralism; whether the power seeks for revision or a status quo; and whether the impetus for which regional powers play their roles is proactive or reactive (Ibid. p. 743). Although this framework focuses only on one particular aspect of regionalism, that is, the rise of hegemonic power, it is informative when applied to the situation in CA. Although there has not been an explicit hegemonic power internally, external powers have shown strong interest in interacting with the region to various degrees. Therefore, depending on the powers, a wide spectrum of all three aspects co-exists, reflecting conflicting interests and different visions for regional development. For example, Russia has expressed a revisionist ambition toward the CA region when the other three great powers’ influence rises more explicitly, whereas the other parties would prefer political stability with market-friendly policies to maintain their trade relationships. In this regard, knowing the external powers’ strategic positions on the CA region is crucial to understanding the features, functions, and directions of CA regionalism. One of the purposes of this introductory chapter is to present an analytical framework to explain the correlations (co-evolution) of the great power rivalries in CA with the region’s individual and collective reactions to such a fast-changing dynamism. These reactions can be categorized as active accommodation, selective cooperation at various levels, resistance, or hesitation in view of maximizing the region’s or individual states’ interests. Meanwhile, the great powers’ presence in any region can be depicted in the following categories: . Physical conflicts and harsh and chaotic competition with high tension. . Keeping the region as a buffer zone considering the status quo as the best arrangement. . Hierarchical hegemon’s domination for security and economic benefits.

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. Rivalry (historic, strategic, latent, or emergent) with occasional tensions. . Equal competition through soft power tools such as bilateral aid, technical assistance, investment, and institution-building. . Division of labor in tackling CA regional affairs with implicit consensus among the great powers. . Non-hierarchical confluence toward transparent multilateral governances for co-prosperity. There seems to be an implicit division of labor among the major powers when dealing with CA regional affairs through peaceful interestsharing while continuously expanding their interests. From the CA point of view, the absence of an internal non-democratic regional hegemon contributes to regional stability so far. An internal regional hegemon usually leans on one of the four external powers and securitizes the region with shareable agendas, which may evoke and legitimize the temptation for influential parties to divide and rule. The feature of rivalry among the external powers in the region has been a mixture of historical, strategic, latent, and emerging rivalries with potential conflicts. At the operational level, the notion of regionalism entails territorial, economic, political, social, and cultural aspects of connectivity among various actors, which create distinctive physical and ideational boundaries vis-à-vis other regions. It may refer to region-wide shared ideas and interactive actions based on their historical, material, and political conditions. The region’s collective values, similar attitudes, and sharable goals and visions are embedded with and expressed in interactions and actions in view of achieving some level of regional integrity through various forms of region-wide agenda-setting, rule-making, and implementation—what we would call quality development —similarly with qualitative multilateralism (Rathbun 2011, p. 244). In this process of forming a solid regionalism, regional security is the fundamental means and condition for peaceful cooperation for prosperity. However, in practice, regionalism is not understood within the region in question as a unified form under a single perspective. Broadly speaking, our hypothetical typology on regionalism is summarized in Table 1.3. This hypothetical matrix is developed based on our interviews with local intellectuals, researchers, and postgraduate students (see Annex 1: List of interview questions).

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Table 1.3 Perspectives on regionalism in Central Asia

Optimistic proponents

Skeptical outlook

Internal core/relatively static features

Changes subject to external powers

Central Asian shared regional features reinforce (or should reinforce) regionalism. Regional identity strengthens regional cooperation and shapes region-wide agendas for peace and prosperity in Central Asia. Further degree of integration is necessary and possible The region lacks regionality, which is the most important element of regionalization. Consequently, regionalism itself led by external powers will not function as a sustainable and desirable process of regionalization. Without regional shared culture and identity, it is hard to form any regional solidarity, which is essential for regional integration

No matter whether there is regionality or not, external powers created the region and led the regionalization thereafter, which contributes to regional peace and prosperity. The influence of external powers is positive, and competition among them is beneficial for the region Due to great powers’ rivalries, regionalism is dysfunctional in spite of rapid institutionalization and ever-growing multilateralism. Under this circumstance, intra-regional cooperation and integration can hardly be advanced and consolidated. Moreover, Central Asia needs to be cautious about the rising great power rivalries as they affect the region negatively rather than positively

There are subsequent related questions to address, such as whether regionalism in CA has been declining although it is perceived to be necessary or whether it has been reinforced. One clear barometer to assess the degree of regionalization is the institutional development of regional cooperation. Very few regional organizations in CA are exclusively intraregional initiatives, but a growing number of inter-regional multilateral organizations have evolved under the influence of major external powers, notably Russia and China, along with a looser form of connections with so-called middle power countries including Turkey, Japan, India, and South Korea. Chapter 4 details this institutionalization, focusing on its cooperative mechanisms, fora, platforms, regulatory regimes, and so on. Although these functional forms of integration are not the only aspects of regionalization, institutionalization certainly plays a role in reinforcing region-wide cooperation and cultural interaction and contributes to enhancing expectations about states’ behavior.

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Within the institutional approach, another indirect but useful question arises about how to best understand a state’s eligibility for membership in a political community that is regional in scope and supranational in scale. It is useful to address how membership in such a community is created beyond nationhood and statehood, which generates a tangible supranational sphere in the region. It is a puzzling question in the sense that there is no centralized or established system in regional politics. This situation is similar to international politics but very different from domestic politics, with clear territorial demarcation where political principles can be tested and selected by a clear range of population. Hence, what to study in order to understand regionalism is one of the difficulties in analyzing regional-level affairs. Regional politics is highly intangible unless voluntarily constructed, and the border of a region “is not a geographic fact that has sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that takes geographic form” (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002, p. 587). Scholars who are inclined toward institutional liberalism agree that regions are not merely formed by physical and geographical affinity but reinforced by social and cultural construction (Acharya 2011; Ruggie 1992, p. 235; Thomas 2017, p. 2). Acharya (2011) and Kupchan (2010) define regions as groups of states that share a communal or cultural identity. Cultural and political spaces construct identities, creating certain characteristics, meaning, and coherence to their regional self (Thomas 2017, p. 2). Further, the research objectives can vary depending on the purpose of the study and the disciplinary approach. Thomas takes the following as important core aspects to look into: membership norms of a regional community; region-wide internal deliberations; supranational bureaucracies; and documentation of regional deliberation such as interviews with former participants, memoirs, public declarations and press reports. On the other hand, Hameiri (2013) stresses the importance of regional regulatory regimes as the core of functional regionalism. However, as mentioned earlier, the greatest difficulty in conducting region-level research on CA, - not being skeptical about regionalism in CA per se -, is the lack of a tangible process of regionalization that is exclusive to CA states due to their relatively short history of independence, non-cooperative and rigidly top-down centralized political culture, political sensitivities, and outward-looking expansion (as opposed to intra-regional) of institutionalization.

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Bearing in mind the methodological challenges, we focus as much as possible on regional organizations and institutions, region-wide cooperation (whether ad hoc or institutionalized), region-level regulatory regimes, and regional reaction to common interests. When region-wide action is too intangible or inconsequential in some areas of regional politics, we investigate significant bilateral or trilateral interactions. Individual state-level analysis is also provided to the extent that it is relevant and necessary. Therefore, the main priority of our analysis is the region-wide supranational-level affairs, but we also include trilateral and individuallevel research. Multilateral Institutionalism in the Authoritarian Context Paradoxically, the de-colonization of CA meant re-entering the Soviet frame of ‘Central Asia’. In the process of de-Sovietization, deregionalization along with globalization and re-regionalization occurred concurrently. CA is still in the process of building and molding its identity through self-identification and vis-à-vis other regions and the global community. CA is often perceived as Russia’s back yard or as a zone that is accidentally independent but preserving, without any resistance, their Soviet heritage (e.g., Ubiria 2016). Previous studies focus on CA countries’ Soviet legacy rather than the new dynamics of the region, which in turn hampers further theorization (see, for example, Fehlings 2022). Academic social science research on CA focuses either on anthropological and archeological approaches to the traits of the nations or macro-level geopolitical analysis of CA’s foreign relations rather than on intra-regionality. This book project intends to contribute to filling this gap. One of the important questions in this context is whether and how far authoritarianism, which is deeply embedded in the political culture of CA nations, may play a cementing role of stimulating a new phase of regionalization. Although the notion of thin or thick depends on where one positions their understanding of regionalism in the wide spectrum of a myriad of interactions, if one endorses thin regionalism, regionality may not be the core variable. By contrast, a thick regionalism approach considers regionality as the important core of a successful full-fledged form of regionalism. In the latter case, discussion about CA authoritarianism is relevant (see Erdmann and Engel 2006; McGlinchey 2011, p. 39). Specifically, the extension of authoritarianism to intra-regional and

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inter-regional levels forms a selective affinity beyond superficial strategic partnership in multilateralism form. For example, China’s multilateralism shows duality (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013), emphasizing equality among states in the international arena but hierarchical influence toward like-minded weaker authoritarian governments. This is in contrast to the expansion of institutionalized multilateralism among liberal democracies (Kastner and Rector 2018; Scott 2013). Multilateralism between states is itself rooted in a liberal cooperative and interdependency approach that respects the counterpart’s sovereignty in theory on an equal basis. The process of multilateralism is normally also democratic, non-hierarchical, and cooperative in decision making for foreign affairs. As the neoliberal view recognizes, designing and maintaining supranational institutions are daunting tasks given the three major common and fundamental difficulties: bargaining, defection, and autonomy (Sterling-Folker 2013). In relation to the shared culture in post-Soviet areas, Oleh Fisun (2003) differentiates between forms of neopatrimonialism: bureaucratic (Belarus), oligarchic (Ukraine and Georgia), and sultanistic (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The main elements of neopatrimonialism include “personalised power, monopolisation of resources at the regime’s centre, the predominance of informal institutions and controlled access to political power” (Hoffmann 2010, p. 90). McGlinchey (2011, p. 39) explains that the roles of ethnic, regional, and clan identities are latently embedded in political culture, especially in CA. Drawing from his analysis of variables such as political reform, economic resources, and the presence of local Islamic influence, McGlinchey provides an informative typology distinguishing three different types of authoritarian political system in three of the CA countries: repressive authoritarianism (Uzbekistan), chaotic authoritarianism (Kyrgyzstan), and stable authoritarianism (Kazakhstan). Although such characteristics of individual countries’ authoritarianism may change over time, the common denominator—a strong affinity between traditional cultural identity and political system—will likely remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. The current degree of openness in the scale of the electoral aspect of democracy in terms of voting rights and freedom of expression are reflected in the world rankings presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. By presenting rankings on some aspects of the states under this research, we do not intend to insist they are rigidly and objectively factual, but they entail some degree of useful

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information with policy implications (for in-depth academic research on rating and ranking the states, see Cooley and Snyder ed. 2015). Authoritarianism rooted in blood-based tribalism and extended nepotism in CA politics is also worth discussing. This is because those traditional features do not remain mere tradition but are deeply ingrained in the political system (autarchy), economic relations (over-concentration and unequal distribution of wealth), and government-society relations (alienation). Loyalty, trust, patronage, and clientelism dominate the political process and policy decision making in CA. Clapham (1985, p. 49) called neopatrimonialism “the most salient type [of rule] in the Third Table 1.4 Ranking of electoral democracy in Central Asian countries Electoral democracy Country Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan

Rank (out of 179)

Electoral democracy—Vote democracy central estimate (2021)

106 140 149 157 165

0.421 0.257 0.216 0.184 0.15

Source Our World in Data (2021) Note The V-Dem index captures to what extent the election was processed under comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections with guaranteed freedom of expression. Scores range from 0 (least democratic) to 1 (most democratic)

Table 1.5 Ranking of freedom of expression in Central Asian countries Electoral democracy—freedom of expression Country Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan

Rank (out of 179)

Freedom of expression—Central estimate (2021)

110 144 152 158 177

0.637 0.408 0.314 0.235 0.071

Source Our World in Data (2021)

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World”. The concept has been well developed in the literature on subSaharan Africa, but very similar concepts with different names have emerged in the research on other regions, such as Latin America (e.g., caudilismo, Sandbrook et al. 2007, p. 46) and Southeast Asia (e.g., bossism, Sidel 2008). However, due to its hybridity, as Erdmann and Engel (2006, p. 17) rightly pointed out, the modern application of patrimonialism involves tackling the “relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other.” How, then, is CA neopatrimonialism linked with regionalization? There are two ways of understanding the interaction. One is cultural diffusion in the political process of regionalization, that is, being linked through the procedural mechanism of functionality. The other has more to do with membership, that is, being linked through the selection of likeminded countries to band together with. These two aspects are closely interconnected in that they feature both inclusion due to like-minded political systems and exclusion by forces that resist authoritarian culture. Recognition of the members’ political culture and system can be an important factor for sustainable long-term relations. The prefix ‘neo’ hints at the fact that networks today are no longer necessarily formed along family, kinship, or traditional lines alone. They may also be formed on a non-blood basis. ‘Neo’ connotes extending beyond the traditional blood/ kin-based expansion of rule and even beyond national boundaries. This combination of old and new network relations is exactly what we find in countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in the networks of clans and families on the one hand and of oligarchs and business networks on the other. Simultaneously, the exclusion mechanism functions in the process of selection, excluding actors both domestically, such as non-state actors and those outside the governing clans, and regionally/internationally, including uncomfortable external powers, potentially the West. In rentier states (Mousseau 2019, p. 175), the phenomenon of neopatrimonialism refers particularly to the allocation of rents through non-transparent networks. In most cases, the services or resources that are offered by a patron to a client are public resources or services (Erdmann and Engel 2006). The ruler’s demands for loyalty are less oriented toward a common good than to the maintenance of personal power.

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Financing CA development has been diversified, notably with the rapid rise of China. Such diversification of the source of development funds and investment naturally results in re-establishing development agendas on their own among CA states. The countries in CA no longer need to try to fit Western values when unconditional aid or investment can be secured from non-Western donors and investors. Due to its growing strategic interest in the region, China has made an effort to soften its overall image through promoting soft power tools (Jakimów 2019; Jiménez-Tovar and Laviˇcka 2019). Nevertheless, the multipolarity China and Russia have been promoting as opposed to US-led unipolarity may generate new risks for weaker countries or the cluster of weaker regions. This is because such diversification of polarity still focuses on the interests of a few polarized states. Ideally, such risks need to be addressed among CA countries in order to interactively shape the regionalization direction for their own individual and regional interests. Unconditional multilateral institutions are based only on consolidated bilateralisms without necessarily sharing interests and/or developmental vision. With the flow of Chinese material resources, individual CA countries have interests that are common to all members while not necessarily sharing the interests collectively. Russia no longer provides immediate material benefits to CA as a region, and the countries and people in CA tend to believe that Russian influence has also relatively waned due to its undemocratic colonial vision. Thus, Russia has limited ability to create any shared vision embracing the former Soviet Republics. Consequently, regional integration of CA states is not necessarily aligned with Russia’s interests. Reflecting this regional dynamic, Europe also re-categorized CA countries by employing either individualized bilateral relations or re-grouping the region under a wider Asian policy or a global strategy recognizing the great political and economic diversity within the region. A series of security issues in the region made the governments of the region cooperate both internally and externally. Conflicting interests are often observable between the regional elites and ordinary citizens. The political elites in the CA region were threatened by the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan as well as political unrest in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and Andijan, Uzbekistan. In those events, the US was considered to be an instigator of political turmoil. Interestingly, CA “elites seem to see the ‘West’ (zapad in Russian) as one entity. It includes Europe and the United States and is regarded as one way of life, not only with a uniform set

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of principles and political philosophy, but also with one set of contemporary geopolitical interests” (Peyrouse 2014, p. 6). The ruling elite in the CA region “prefer to blame potential instabilities on Islamism or political dissidence” instigated by the EU’s belief in a nexus between democratisation and long-term security (Peyrouse 2014, p. 6). Meanwhile, Russia was regarded as a partner, as it did not engage in those high-risk security cases (Matveeva 2013) although this attitude has been changing. A skeptical view holds that whatever methods and efforts the US and the EU undertook at this stage turned out to be incapable of supporting full-scale democratization in CA. The EU’s democratization policy is often criticized as it sets the goal based on their knowledge on the Central Eastern Europe as part of Regimes in Transition which does not fit in any of the CA countries (Hoffmann 2010, pp. 88–89). New security arrangements were established around CA states, based on both Western strategic visions of the region and internal security initiatives in the form of a collective security system. The importance of the CA region as a gateway to the Middle Eastern conflict zone was vividly reflected in the US’s foreign policy doctrine adopted by the Bush administration in 2001. NATO’s expansion to the East was echoed by the intensification of US anti-terrorist operations under the umbrella program of the Partnership for Peace. Consequently, the 2000s were marked by some level of military cooperation, including the establishment of the Karshi-Khanabad airfield (Uzbekistan) and the Manas military base (Kyrgyzstan), followed by active co-trainings of NATO and local troops. The strategy of military cooperation mutually benefited the participants in terms of the potential and actual security challenges, both internally and externally. The area of security cooperation included permanent security monitoring over the emergence of internal unrest such as that which occurred in Fergana, Uzbekistan, or Osh, Kyrgyzstan, which could have challenged Kazakhstan’s stability considering its geographical proximity. Worsening relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan may also negatively affect regional stability although tensions have been attenuated since 2016 under Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s leadership. With the Russian military troop withdrawal from the Tajik-Afghan border, the US replaced Russian security guarantees for drug-trafficking and anti-terrorist protection, thus bringing advantageous gains to Tajikistan. Tajikistan also provided air space for US military flights to reach Afghanistan at the apex of bilateral security cooperation.

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Analytical Framework to Understand Institutionalized Regional Multilateralism Regionality of a governance goes along with “a manifest diversity: beyond the evident diversity in the geographical focus, … a special kind of spatial entity-supranational or transnational ones” (Debarbieux 2012, p. 119). In this context, “regionality refers to different orders of reality (ontology), and regions have a heterogenous status in the production of knowledge (epistemology)” (Debarbieux 2012, p. 119). Scholars of regionalism who stress the core identity of a region naturally maintain that the existence of institutions and organizations is not enough. Certain degrees of intersubjectivity, trust, and legitimacy are required to keep the institutionalized region functioning as a distinctive boundary as a region. Beyond offering a functional and technical network, regionalism as a process requires purposeful grouping of the spatial entities that share geographical proximity and connectivity. Where to end that boundary depends on intentions and purposes of the internal and external actors. CA is formed based on the notion of post-Soviet territory with distinguishable religion and ethnic culture. In this regard, how we build this research for regional interactions in CA entails the following three dimensions: shared concerns over co-prosperity, at the minimum preventing regional insecurity and disturbance; shared will to resolve region-wide issues that are usually not resolved without a certain level of regional cooperation; actual institutionalization (e.g., fora, meetings, treaties, organizations, regimes, governance); and geographical connectivity within which the entities may be affected by any risks without cooperation or the benefits could be multiplied with cooperation. These pre-conditions contribute to the establishment of regionality and regionalization. Therefore, the features and process of regionalization can be articulated based on the following four factors: the positionality and relational power of the member composition in the wider context in International Relations; motivations and purposes built on the degree of generating shared interests, not just common interests (Table 1.6); functional mechanisms such as capacity of designing organizations, sustainable fundings, quality of impartial experts in the secretariats; and a normative vision determining future directions. Regarding the first factor for analysis, positionality of power-status in historical relations among actors, weaker countries have different concerns from more powerful states as a great power’s involvement may result in manipulation and exploitation rather than cooperation. Neorealist and

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Table 1.6 Shared interests and risks in Central Asia Shared interests Security

Economy

Identity/ Culture

Competing areas with risks

Regional stability and Cleavage between pro-Russian, prevention of the spread of pro-Chinese, pro-Western, pro-Islamists terrorism in the region etc.; fear of citizens’ anti-government uprisings; increasing demands for reform; rising or continuous Russian and Chinse hegemonism and military presence; militarisation of the Caspian Sea Economic development Competition over resources; trade through trade, investment, imbalance; rising tensions between and foreign aid government-protected large enterprises and the private sector; corruption and lack of transparency in economic order; concentration of wealth in a small group of political and economic leaders; overreliance on or lack of natural resources; diminishing Official Development Aid; lack of public sector investment Preservation of CA cultural Rising fears of Russian and Chinese heritage; prevention of influence; Western powers’ relative religious extremism; withdrawal; consolidation of nepotism and coherent regional identity autarchic culture in politics; lack of democratic values; political cynicism

Marxist rationalist calculations of inter-governmental cooperation provide insights on this aspect but do not explain how to incorporate and generate further utilitarian benefits through inclusion of weaker parties. The second factor to consider in understanding regionalism is whether the aspiration and motivation for altering the regional status quo is voluntary, based on inner motivation within the region (e.g., EU), involuntary integration (e.g., USSR), or involuntary division (e.g., divided nations such as Germany before unification or the two Koreas). The degree of participation and the way of legitimizing cooperation vary depending upon the various motivations for inter-governmental interactions. In such a process, the issues are selected by participating actors and discourse can be internally constructed. Internally-motivated regionalism is highly likely to continue, although membership may change from time to time. Within the aforementioned two types of involuntary regionalism, the former naturally aspires to remain dis-integrated, whereas the latter may aspire to be re-integrated.

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The third element is functionality in the process of proceeding with economic, social, or political cooperative activities. While these three are the main aspects of cooperation among actors, cultural interaction is the underlying element that may foster the process, either positively or negatively. The rationalist choice institutionalism approach focuses more on quantifiable variables to explain the success or failure of institutions such as durability, the number of partner states, issue-linkage, and micro-level incentives (Lista and Rojas 2018, pp. 312–313). Durability is a consequence of the motivations and purposes and functionality rather than the essential condition of the success or failure. Functionality may focus only on a superficial evaluation of the success of institutionalism. The phenomenon of issue-linkage can be observed in most international organizations, which also produces institutional-level drawbacks such as duplication in activities and misuse of issues as a bargaining leverage against other members. Calculation of micro-level incentives may be essential only for ad hoc, single-issue focused institutions and may overlook the institutional history and longer-term interactions of actors. The fourth point regards integration with clear norms and vision led by internal leadership. If the accumulated history of collective activities has built up norms and vision led by a regional power or a leader, the process can be expedited and mobilize various levels of actors. In this case, institutionalization can be harnessed continuously and supranationalism can be materialized. Depending on the scale of the vision between cooperation and integration, supranationality and confederation may be entangled with unavoidable overlaps (Nye 1968, p. 866). In turn, the process itself justifies the legitimacy of the supranational domain with the creation of shared benefits from cooperation as opposed to choosing not to cooperate. Our analytical framework consisting of these four inter-connected elements is integrated to the empirical analysis in the following chapters. A region generates geographical conditionality and political positionality in world politics. However, the conditions and positions that may seem to be passively confined to geopolitical constraints are not static and continuously interact with non-material elements, primarily regional identity (regionality) and institutions which are continuously evolving through the process of identification and institutionalization. This book project pays particular attention to the mutual interaction between external multilateral forces and intra-regionality as a reaction to those multilateral

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forces. A new regional culture that is based on a CA type of authoritarianism prevails, together with factors such as the West’s gradual retreat and simultaneous new political and developmental dynamism that fill the vacuum. We address not only the commonly explained barriers but the outcomes of cooperation as the region’s dynamic changes have been under-researched in previous studies of regionalization. In particular, we examine the institutions of regionality, motivations of regionalized actions, and the form of regional regulatory frameworks. While doing so, we shed light upon how and to what extent shared circumstantial interests (externally imposed) are transformed into indigenous regionality based on proactively ‘shared’ interests at a supranational level beyond individual countries’ common interests, meaning a collective and synergetic rather than a mathematical aggregation of individual countries’ interests. Intra-regionality and regionalization will be explored through watershed regional affairs and region-wide reactions. In the authoritarian and state-centered political milieu in the region, the supranational sphere can be limited and/or controlled, so inter-governmental authority rather than supranational governance prevails (for a comparative conceptualization, see, for example, Kreuder-Sonnen 2016, pp. 330–332). In order to examine the degree and features of supranationality in CA, formal and informal institutions and organizations are included as main actors. In CA, state actors are still at the center of the creation of supranational domains, therefore our analyses paid balanced attention to both state and interstate organs concerning CA regional affairs. In order to grasp the societal-level perception of regional affairs and vision, we conducted 16 formal in-depth semi-structured interviews faceto-face, online, and via email, mostly between 2020 and 2022. In parallel, we collected responses from 293 local people across the region through a simplified survey questionnaire (Annexes 2, 3). Semi-structured interviews allow for an optimum combination between the deductive approach based on hypotheses in an evaluation matrix and the inductive approach with data emerging bottom up rather than envisaged by hypotheses. The interviews were primarily with broadly categorized experts and intellectuals mostly from civil society in the region. Civil society (grazhdanskoye obshchestvo, in Russian) in CA is different from interest groups and tends to refer to any groups, agencies, institutions, and organizations that are not subject to the central and local governments’ direct control. Some experts recognizes civil

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society in CA more broadly to include those groups “cofinanced by the state and serve as an extension of government structures” (Axyonova and Bossuyt 2016, p. 2). Accordingly, civil society organizations (CSO) include civil and professional associations and organizations, academic and research institutes, community-based self-help groups, and labor unions. Due to the political circumstances, the common understanding of civil society in the region is at times stereotyped as Western-educated antigovernment activism, politically neutral but critical-minded intellectuals, or frustrated political opportunity seekers who have the ability to mobilize a particular segment of population. Market actors are also included, but government-protected or state-owned enterprises are excluded. CSO itself is not the main focus of our analysis on institutionalized regionalism for the following reasons. Our main focus in this book is on the inter-state relations in the process of regionalization through forming regional organizations. Although there is an increasing number of CSOs in CA, they are still weak, underorganized, and short-lived. Some wellfunctioning CSOs are mostly EU-led or local branches of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), thus already embedded in our list and analysis of inter-state cooperation. More importantly, in fulfilling our purpose of investigating regionalism, the alliances and networking of national CSOs are insignificant at present, which itself provides an implication for the features of CA regionalism. Indirect interviews with high-level officials are cited from news media sources due to limited access to them. Our interviews are supplementary data. Rather than providing a systematic summative or directed content analysis using pre-defined theories or keywords, we employed the conventional coding methods during data analysis, based on which, directly relevant contents were selected and contextualized. In addition, factual data were collected from relevant international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, official bureaus of statistics, and local and international newspapers. Most importantly, our first-hand experience of being engaged for many years in the academic community and civil society in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with frequent travels to other parts of the CA region allowed us to combine naturally ethnographic observation and insights through a number of seminars and informal discussions with local people about dynamic regional affairs and changing local perceptions. Regionalism in the CA context entails external multilateralisms (conflicting and common interests) mostly concerning but not limited to security and trade matters, the development of intra-regional dynamics

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from de-regionalization for national identity-building toward building functional regionalization, and moving toward re-regionalization. These aspects generate regional agendas with sharable interests based on neopatrimonialism, a common political culture in the region, which has a close affinity with like-minded authoritarian members’ multilateralism in the region and comfort with renewed Russian power, while reaping benefits from China’s economic investment and Russia’s security guardianship. These conditions have resulted in the current form of CA regionality and regionalism (for discussions on the features of multilateralism and building cultural affinities with CA, refer to Erdmann and Engel 2006; Jakimów 2019; Jiménez-Tovar and Laviˇcka 2019; Kastner and Rector 2018; McGlinchey 2011; Scott 2013; Ubiria 2016). However, regionalism is mutually reinforcing and continuously co-evolving once it reaches the stage of forming functional collectivity.

Structure of the Book The rest of this book proceeds following the broad external and internal forces that contribute to CA regionalization and regionalism. Chapter 2 discusses the origins of externally guided regionalism, born out of the common history of the region. It explains the features of guided regionalism, focusing on Russia’s continuous influence in the region to maintain Soviet dominance. During the era of de-Sovietization, individual countries pursued benefits based on inherited common interests through a certain degree of regionalization, rather than proactively creating these interests. These can therefore be regarded as shared though exogenous interests. Chapter 3 discusses the dynamic interactions between great power rivalries and CA states’ engagement in multilateralism. These interactions molded the features of the externally guided regionalism that reflects the differentiated forms of multilateralism introduced, suggested, and imposed by the major influencing extra-regional powers. The various forms of externally imposed regionalism offer options to the individual states as to which way to develop or resist institutionalized regionalization processes, considering political autonomy, security guarantees, economic benefits, and regime stability. In Chapter 4, the features of externally guided regionalism are discussed in more detail, stressing CA states’ selective acceptance and adoption of external multilateralism in line with major states’ multi-vector

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or non-involvement foreign policy strategies. The chapter highlights the alignments between foreign policy, domestic politics, and political culture for state survival, preserving sovereignty, domestic reforms for stability, and further development. Through mapping the multilateral institutions, regional regulatory regimes, and organizations, the chapter depicts how CA regionalism is reshaped by CA states’ shift in priorities from long-term development to regime stability in the autarchical turn of their political systems. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings. Considering the fast development of inter-governmental institutionalization and global governance, engaging in regional multilateral processes is inevitable as there is little practical way to escape the forces of economic globalization. As Hettne (2003, p. 362) noted, “[t]he process of regionalisation implies a change from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to different dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regime”. Therefore, harnessing intraregional reactions to such forces (i.e., Westernized multilateralism, Sinicized multilateralism, Russified multilateralism) while balancing centralized/guided and decentralized diversified participation in the process may benefit all actors across the nations and the region, further contributing to forming global good governance.

Concluding Remarks This chapter provided a conceptualization of key terms and an analytical framework that explains CA regionalism and regionalization as an outcome of structuration between actors and conditions of the regional institutional structure. CA’s internally led multilateralism is still in the transitory period, exhibiting resistance to generating a supranational regional space even as all actors have been voluntarily or reluctantly engaged in the regionalization process to various degrees. In parallel with the nation-building process, regionalism has also evolved ever since the countries in the region achieved independence. Given the strategic and economic interests of the great powers in the region, it is hard to imagine that CA regionalism can create its own intraregional space without involving these great powers (Muzalevsky 2015). The primary purpose of this book is to investigate the regional space

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beyond the individual countries. Therefore, each chapter prioritizes intraregional affairs for analysis, with discussion on bilateral or mini-lateral external relations within and outside CA (involving CA) when necessary. CA regionalism was formed accidentally by external powers at the beginning of the region’s independence. However, ever since the achieved independence, CA countries have been involved in various cooperative multilateralisms through institutionalization. This engagement in multilateral processes does not merely serve the great powers’ interests; the countries also selectively pursue their own interests. All five of the stillyoung states in CA are struggling to build their nations while dealing with regional geopolitical dynamics and global forces. Depending on the future directions of reform policies in each country, regrouping may happen with other parts of the world. Some level of de-regionalization or regional regrouping may occur simultaneously based on the directions of national identity, changing state agendas, foreign policy strategy, and state survival.

Annex 1: List of Questions for the Semi-Structured Interviews Note: Not all of the questions below were used in all interviews; we selected relevant questions from the list below depending on the interviewees’ nationality and expertise. Most of the formal interviews continued with additional questions and informal discussion. Interviews were conducted in either Russian or English. We anonymized not only the names of the interviewees but also their affiliations and professions as some of the contents might be interpreted as politically sensitive to some parties. In the text, we only indicate interviewees’ broad professional group along with the interview date and method. 1. Do you think Central Asian countries have some level of shared interests? Could you provide examples? 2. Do you feel any kind of solidarity among Central Asian citizens? Please explain under what circumstances this is the case. 3. In your opinion, how developed are the relations between the countries within the Central Asian region? Does the region need external players such as the US, the EU, China, and Russia?

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4. Do you think there would be some benefits (or more disadvantages than benefits) if Central Asian countries cooperate more towards integration? State your view in terms of security, economic ties, and social cooperation. 5. Could you provide any examples (events, programs, projects, policy, civil activities) that have contributed to nurturing Central Asian regionalism? 6. As an expert with extensive experience in the field, how would you assess the degree of presence of Western powers in the Central Asian region? In which areas of activity do you think this presence has been traceable since the early 2000s? 7. How would you assess the degree of China’s presence in the Central Asian region? Do you think this presence has increased over the past 20 years? If so, in what areas and do you find that the presence of the China in the region is a positive trend? 8. How would you assess the degree of Russia’s presence in the Central Asian region? How, in your opinion, has its presence in the region been changing since 2000? In your view, does the region need Russia? 9. If you are skeptical about tighter cooperation among Central Asian countries, which region should your country of origin cooperate more or integrate with (e.g., India, Russia, Mongolia, Turkiye, etc.)? Explain why. 10. Do you have any policy suggestions for the future direction of Central Asia’s region-wide cooperation?

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Annex 2: Data on Interviews and Survey Cited in the Text № Country of origin Profession 1 China (Lived in Almaty for two years) 2 Italy (Living in Almaty)

3 US (Lived in Almaty for seven years)

Professor

Other identification

University professor and researcher in the field of Public Policy and International Relations Professor Director and professor of Political Science and History focusing on Russia and Central Asia Commentator/ Retired professor in Associate International Relations Faculty and Regional Studies

4 Russia

Senior research fellow

5 Uzbekistan

Writer

6 Uzbekistan (Living in UAE) 7 Tajikistan (Living in Sweden)

Assistant Professor Researcher/ PhD candidate

8 Turkmenistan

Associate fellow

Interview Method date Received e-mail response on April 6, 2021 December face-to-face 12, 2021

Received e-mail response on March 16, 2021 University Research Received e-mail Institute focusing on response Spatial Analysis in on International Relations February 9, 2021 Founder of Eurasian civil Received e-mail association and network/ response Commentator/Journalist on March 3, 2021 College of Humanities November face-to-face and Social Sciences 5, 2021 Director of an Received e-mail international research response institute on Central Asian on Studies March 30, 2021 Research institute Received e-mail focusing on security and response development of Central on May Asia 20, 2021 (continued)

1

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(continued) № Country of origin Profession

Other identification

9 Kyrgyzstan

Director of a policy research center focusing on Asia

Policy field practitioner

Interview Method date

Received e-mail response on January 20, 2021 10 Kazakhstan Government Member of the public December face-to-face official council 27, 2020 11 Kazakhstan Researcher Expert in the field of July 25, e-mail international business and 2020 education 12 Kazakhstan Financial Full-time employee in the May 9 face-to-face sector financial sector in 2022 employee/ Almaty/Part-time Postgraduate postgraduate student of student Public Policy 13 Turkmenistan Administrator/ Full-time employee in the May 10, face-to-face Postgraduate public sector/Part-time 2022 student post-graduate student of International Relations 14 Mongolia (Living Postgraduate Full-time postgraduate May 10, face-to-face in Almaty) student student of IR and 2022 Regional Studies 15 China (living in Translator/ Postgraduate student of May 18, face-to-face Almaty) Postgraduate IR and Regional Studies 2022 student 16 Tajikistan Civil society Researcher and May 20, face-to-face worker administrator in a 2022 regional environmental organization in Central Asia

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List of SurveyMonkey Questions: A total of 293 respondents completed the survey below via SurveyMonkey, and 16 experts were selected for in-depth interviews. Q.1 Your gender. Q.2 Your age. Q.3 Your occupation. Q.4 Do you think that the presence of Western powers in the Central Asian region has diminished since the early 2000s? Q.5 Do you think that the change of the West’s presence in Central Asia negatively affects the development of the region? Q.6 Do you think that China’s presence in the Central Asian region has increased since the early 2000s? Q.7 Do you think that the presence of China in Central Asia has had a positive effect on the development of the region? Q.8 Do you think that Russia’s presence in the Central Asian region has diminished since the early 2000s? Q.9 Do you think that the change of Russia’s presence in Central Asia has had a negative impact on the development of the region? Q.10 Do you think the relations between the countries within the Central Asian region are sufficiently developed?

Annex 3: Central Asian Research Survey

Q.9

Q.8

Q.7

Q.6

Q.5

Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4

Male (%)

Your gender 37.46 Your age Your occupation Do you think the presence of Western powers in the Central Asian region has diminished since early 2000s? Do you think the change of West’s presence in Central Asia negatively affects the development of the region? Do you think China’s presence in the Central Asian region has increased since the early 2000s? Do you think the presence of China in Central Asia has a positive effect on the development of the region? Do you think Russia’s presence in the Central Asian region has diminished since the early 2000s? Do you think the change of Russia’s presence in Central Asia has a negative impact on the development of the region?

Questions

62.54 43.60

50.17 6.23

Female 25–40 41–63 64 (%) (%) (%) years and over (%)

17.48

64.69

17.83

Business and Education, Public entrepreneurship science and service (%) culture (%) (%)

No (%)

4.81

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(continued)

45.70 54.30

31.85 68.15

30.00 70.00

95.19

55.59 44.41

51.89 48.11

Yes (%)

1

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Q.10 Do you think the relations between the countries within the Central Asian region are sufficiently developed?

Questions

(continued) Male (%)

Female 25–40 41–63 64 (%) (%) (%) years and over (%) Business and Education, Public entrepreneurship science and service (%) culture (%) (%)

No (%)

17.18 82.82

Yes (%)

36 J. BOURDAIS PARK ET AL.

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CHAPTER 2

De-Sovietization, State-Building, and Re-Regionalization

Introduction The disintegration of the USSR was a controversial and protracted process for all its integral entities. The political liberalization, new ideological platforms, and economic marketization attempted in the early 1990s failed to have an immediate effect on the former states of the Soviet republic. The newly established independent Central Asian states were no exception. Efforts to establish new domestic and foreign political and economic paths were for decades merely an echo of the Soviet legacy. In these new realms, independent Central Asia (CA hereafter) faced an extended phase of moving from Soviet-imposed collectivism to regional coexistence under various atypical hybrid regimes of traditional and modern state characteristics. Even influential external players such as the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) could not prevent the growth of institutionalized paternalism in the region. The economic transition of CA countries was also strongly influenced by the Soviet past as the region attempted to implement a series of economic practices in the 1990s, notably privatization, the introduction of national currency, and nationalized budget planning. Unfortunately, these changes were accompanied by limited access to natural and industrial resources due to poor infrastructure in the region, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular, suffered greatly from resource scarcities. Under this circumstance, CA republics’ © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. BOURDAIS PARK et al., Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0_2

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re-regionalization as post-Soviet countries took a lower priority in the agenda of the state-building process, and the region as a whole naturally faced more obstacles than incentives to implement coordinated intraregional cooperation processes during the de-Sovietization era, at least at the beginning of independence. During the Soviet era, Sovietization in ideological terms rather than assimilation or Russification was commonly employed. Moreover, elements of Russian nationalism were enmeshed with Soviet patriotism. The Soviet system included de-Russification, preferential advancement of underdeveloped peoples based on indigenization policy of 1923 (Liber 1991), and economic and administrative decentralization, although Russification rather than Sovietization was the norm at the cultural level. Therefore, paradoxical as it may sound, de-Sovietization accompanied ethnicization or re-ethnicization as the de-ethnicized Soviet titular nationalities began to assert themselves as distinctive ethnic groups and/or sovereign nationalities (Collins 2002, pp. 143–144; Bourdais Park 2005, pp. 76–78). Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the transition of newly independent CA states from the Soviet Union archetype. De-Sovietization contributed to CA’s regionalization but at the same time re-regionalized the area under Russian influence. Through a discussion of the newly independent state actors as well as newly built inter-governmental institutions, this chapter explores the close linkage between the old Soviet standards and modernized visions of the political, socio-economic, and cultural transformations of the CA region. In addition, the chapter provides an analysis of the discourse concerning the era of de-Sovietization as a challenging period for the nations and governments of the region as they formed the modern CA states’ diverse regimes, economies, and societies.

Brief Historical Background The USSR was the first proletarian state, characterized by a strict unity of ideological, national, cultural, and socio-economic identity through a mono-centred system. Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin launched and forcibly constructed national identity foundations for all Soviet Union entities. Based on the early 1920s Soviet decree on the right of native peoples to self-determination, a number of border/territorial units were created in the USSR that kept the right to maintain their native culture and language. By the time of Stalin’s administration (1936), the Kyrgyz

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and Kazakhs had acquired Soviet Socialist Republic status. At the same time, the breakup of the Tajik and Uzbek Republics was also happening. Thus, the early leaders of the USSR strongly influenced the processes of nation-building and territorial formation of the national republics in CA (Cummings 2013, pp. 38–47). By the time Brezhnev took the leadership in October 1964, the positive signs of social and economic development were gradually fading due to the steady decay of the Soviet planned economy and disillusion caused by ideological degradation. The Kremlin had been capable of successfully controlling all spheres of life in the union of republics, but the Soviet’s Afghan invasion in the late 1970s drove the country to a total deadlock both internally and externally. Stagnation under Brezhnev facilitated anti-Soviet sentiments internally, while complicated external relations between the West and the USSR were marked by the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Ideological friction had intensified by the time of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika, which aimed to reform the country’s governance and was supposed to create the grounds for civic society under the Glasnost agenda. Unlike the previously negative attitudes from the West towards Soviet leaders, the international community welcomed Gorbachev’s reform drives. Starting from the Perestroika period, ideas of self-determination began to awaken in the republics, which further strengthened the Soviet republics’ collective national awareness. Moves to reject Soviet identity provoked the emergence of groups and forces with clear separatistoriented goals among the ethnic and national units. The Jeltoqsan or ‘December’ uprising of 1986 in Kazakhstan, the Fergana massacre of 1989 in Uzbekistan, the Osh riots of 1989 in Kyrgyzstan, and an Islamic revival in Tajikistan signalled the commencement of national movements. In addition, the first wave of migration of the Russian-speaking population flowing out of the CA republics began to rapidly reshape the composition of the local population. Further distance from the Soviet platform fostered a new understanding of the socio-economic realities in the republics of the CA region in the late 1980s. The new political elites saw opportunities for further transformation of the Soviet ideological paradigm. Repeated crises and the impossibility of continuing with Soviet-style policies brought an attempt at a coup d’état on August 19, 1991, pushing the USSR to its destruction. One after another, Soviet republics declared their independence after

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Russia, Ukraine and Belarus had signed the Belovezha Accords to affirm their sovereignty. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic was the last among the participants to endorse the document. Unlike some other post-Soviet republics, the first President of the Kazakh SSR, Nursultan Nazarbayev, hesitated to exit the union, expressing doubts about future economic and political progress after the breakup. From Soviet Republics to Post-Soviet Independent States External powers did not affect the formation of the region during the Soviet period, but a number of modern Greater CA concepts based on cultural historical views appeared after 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CA states urgently needed prompt elaboration of the appropriate political, social, and economic courses to take for their own development. These countries aimed to adopt new values and institutions as quickly as possible in order to build modern and independent political and economic systems that could best accommodate political modernization and full-scale economic and social transitions. These included electoral democracy, civic political culture, a legislative basis, and marketization. The process of political transformation was not homogeneous throughout CA. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan took a rather autocratic approach towards state-building from the very beginning. Kyrgyzstan intended to adopt a Western democratization model and, notwithstanding frequent political turmoil, experienced active political participation and the development of civil society that helped it achieve a positive political reputation in the international community. Strong authoritarian presidential features imitating the Ata-Turk approach in Turkmenistan contrasted with the active civic society built in Kyrgyzstan while distinguishing it from the softer guided democracy in Kazakhstan (Junisbai 2010, pp. 240– 255). Tajikistan faced a prolonged period of civil war at the beginning of its independence that slowed down its post-Soviet transformation at all levels. In general, the CA countries achieved only a very limited degree of democratic advancement due to their persistent inclinations to paternalist political formats, though to a lesser degree in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the new political phenomena featured distinguishable legislative structures that were very different from those of the former Soviet Union which

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had been shaped by Kremlin elites and in which national republics were incapable of autonomous decision-making. These reforms coincided with the dramatic transformation of the shifting world order from a bi-bipolar to a unipolar system with the dominant supremacy of the US (Cameron 2005, pp. 166–167). The US promulgated active foreign policy towards the society of the former Soviet Union. Democratization, marketization, and investment spread throughout the CA region, affecting both its economic and foreign political values, at least in the first decade after the disintegration of the USSR (Catley 1999, pp. 168–174). Sovietologists evaluate the Soviet period and its influences on the CA region in various ways (Kushkumbaev 2017, p. 7). Some (Barnes 2020; Laruelle 2013; Zhussipbek 2017) depart from harsh negativism in their evaluation of ‘Sovietism’ in its former republics, positioning them as victims of the authoritarian Soviet system. From the beginning, the sovereign states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were less negative toward their Soviet past and therefore less hostile toward the Russian Federation thereafter. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan rather hastily tried to distance themselves from Russia and were far less enthusiastic about re-evaluating Russia separately from the USSR. However, citizens in all five countries have been divided and highly fragmented over political and foreign policy issues depending on their own experiences, memories, and perception relating to their Soviet pasts and the Russian Federation. They either held loyal attitudes or used revisionist approaches towards the Soviet past (Kassymbekova 2017, pp. 1–6). Concerning the Soviet legacy, the three interview texts below reflect general view on the CA’s relations with Russia. One of our interviews mentioned: “Russia remains a strong regional player. Although Russia took a back seat for quite some time, in terms of geographical proximity, the prevalent use of Russian language in CA, shared information and media space, and economic ties kept the CA region within Russia’s orbit under Soviet legacy” (Interviewee No. 8). Another interviewee offered an outsider’s view, responding as follows to the local people’s concerns on the question of continuous Russian influence in the region: Russia has recovered enough from the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union to become a significant actor on the world stage, and no doubt feels, with justification, that CA is vital to its security needs. Given the region’s proximity to Russia, and the danger that the Muslim majority

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populations of the CA states may be susceptible to radicalization, its security concerns make sense. But more than that, Russia obviously feels that history, i.e., the long period of integration during the period of the USSR, and Russian domination long before that time, and cultural Russification during the entire Soviet era, provided Russia a special status and privileges in regard to the present and future political and cultural development in the region. Therefore, the question as to whether the region needs Russia is irrelevant. It will have a significant degree of Russian involvement in its political and economic sphere whether it feels it needs Russia or not. (Interviewee, No. 3)

Similarly, taking an external observer’s view, another interviewee noted, “Now, this is a bit more trembling point in the sense that actually CA countries were part of the USSR and they are the part of the PostSoviet system, but it is also true, that actually they [CA countries] are trying to break such kind of labelling and they want to become CA rather than Post-Soviet” [Interview No. 2]. Other interviewees exhibited similar views regarding the Soviet legacy, although their tones and nuances differed. In general, our interviews with local and foreign experts explained the dilemma that CA region has faced, increasingly hoping for further de-Sovietisation while admitting the remaining tie.

Emergence and Challenges of Central Asian Regionalism One of the Russia’s primary agendas has been maintaining a wide range of integrity of the former Soviet space. Attempts to lead regional integration through institutionalization by Russia-led regional organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) gradually shifted to the more dominant regional hegemonism. Not only explicitly militarized coercive influence but also so-called soft power tools, very similar to what democratic countries have implemented in their foreign policy, have been implemented in parallel (Paizova et al. 2021, pp. 74–75). An interviewee expressed the view that the decline of Western power in CA is linked with Russia’s increasing so called soft power influence with anti-Western propaganda in content:

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Western powers in Central Asia, I mean organizations and politicians, have noticeably decreased here since the 2000s. Significantly, especially in comparison with the 1990s. I think the following factors played here: the Russian Federation’s turning its interests towards the former republics of the USSR, and an attempt to regain influence. This affected the active promotion of propaganda and the concept of nostalgia for the USSR. It occurred in parallel with active anti-Western propaganda and rhetoric. (Interviewee No. 9)

The CIS consists of the CIS 9 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, known collectively as the CA4, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia) and Turkmenistan as an Associate Member based on its charter adopted in 1993. It was formed as an umbrella organization to deal with a range of political, military, and border security affairs as well as to coordinate trade, finance, and lawmaking. While the Baltic states and Georgia illegalized the Soviet Union’s historical territorial occupation upon its disintegration, CA states as well as Ukraine until 2018 and Belarus participated in the CIS process based on the Belovezh Accords and the Alma-Ata Protocol. Under the umbrella regional organizational framework, the CIS also built two nested organizations: the CSTO for military and security functions and the Eurasian Economic Union for free trade agreements. The CSTO, designed as the military arm of the CIS, consists of Armenia, Russia, and the CA4. The EEU was modeled after the European Union and includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. It also established two sub-institutions: the Eurasian Economic Commission based in Moscow and the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union based in Minsk. Another important regional organization is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), formally established in 2001 with the membership of Iran, India, China, Pakistan, Russia and the CA countries excluding Turkmenistan. The SCO has observer countries such as Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia, and ‘dialogue partners’ including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Turkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Since 2022, the SCO’s agenda has included the development digital economic architecture. The SCO has been recognized by the United Nations (UN) through participating as an observer in the UN General Assembly since 2005, and the SCO Secretariat has established partnerships with various organs of the UN, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Tourism

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Organization (UNWTO), and the International Organization for Migration (UNIOM). The SCO expanded its cooperative network with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and the UN Office on Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT).1 This is one of the SCO’s critical steps toward self-legitimization as a significant actor in the international community. To be recognized, legitimacy needs to be claimed vis-à-vis different audiences by IOs and their members (Zaum 2017, p. 1116). However, the SCO is still be understood as largely political than actually achieving military cooperation, while providing an effective venue for the member states to engage in balancing different external powers in the region (Lohschelder 2017, 101). As chapter four of this volume discusses more in detail about regional organizations, this chapter provides only an overview of the emergence of institutionalized regional cooperation during the early period of de-Sovietization. Given the power asymmetry in Russo-CA and Sino-CA relations, collective security paradoxically increases the deep-seated anxiety and insecurity of individual countries in the region, as can be seen in the violent relationship between Russia and its former-Soviet neighbors. The flip side of this includes the rise of skepticism among local intellectuals who predict that the Russo-Ukraine war in 2022 may further legitimize the consolidation of autocratic CA leaders’ totalitarian regimes. This is particularly the case for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, which are already moving toward more oppressive totalitarian dictatorships similar to that of Taliban-led Afghanistan. Russian media reacted critically to Kazakhstani President Tokayev’s public speech on domestic reform drives on 6 March 2022, interpreting the attempt at democratic transition as an anti-Russian move. On 21 August 2022, Moscow announced extended military drills among CSTO members while making sure that gas lines to Europe will not pass via CA as a means to detouring the Ukrainian territory lest the Russian strategy of restricting export to Europe should be watered down by CA’s providing alternative source to Europe. At the same time, the China-led SCO extended its membership to include Iran in 2023. In turn, this Russo-CA tie will put already unpopular leaders in the predicament of feeling pressure for internal reform to address the domestic public’s concerns,—as in the case of Kazakhstan—, and being 1 From the official UN website: https://dppa.un.org/en/shanghai-cooperation-organi zation.

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externally pressured by Russia, which will continuously limit CA governments’ autonomy. By the same token, the influence of Russia-led regional institutions will be strengthened. As noted by numerous security experts, a decrease of Western military presence in the region has left a power vacuum, deepening security threats in the CA (Daly 2009). Moreover, the economic constituent of Caspian development has been overshadowed by security concerns due to the growing militarization of the Caspian Sea in the last decade. Due to the growing interests in the Caspian region, “there are some more advance talks among the Caspian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus) rather than CA states, and this might be dictated by multiple reasons. One of them is actually because we have multiple intersecting regions inside of CA. The Caspian states have their own relations” (Interviewee No. 2). Russian interests in CA are primarily directed to security, as evidenced by the establishment of the Russian-initiated CIS ATC (Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Centre) in 2000. The CIS ATC was followed by the institutionalization of collective security through the CSTO, which has been permanently based in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, since 2002, and the installation of the second division of the Collective Rapid Deployment force (CRDF) at the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan. In parallel, Putin has contributed to reactivating the SCO under the shared agenda of fighting against the so-called three evils: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Since 2004, Tashkent has hosted the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Conjoint antiterrorist operations, military exercises, and security drills were operated administered and managed by the SCO, while the CSTO has also evolved as the main institution for Russia-CA security cooperation (Lohschelder 2017; Omelicheva 2011). Engaging in the debate on the roles of relatively new regional organizations and their implications for global governance, Zaum (2017) clarifies the issue: “Regional norms that legitimate an organization might conflict with wider international norms and challenge the legitimacy of a regional organization in the light of external audiences;” Zaum takes the SCO as an example, “whose legitimacy amongst some external (especially Western) audiences is compromised by its challenge to liberal norms.” (p. 1114). Competition over institutions and potential ideological clashes became more evident at the beginning of the Biden presidency in the US. There were signs of reviving multilateral security cooperation around the world, but this renewed multilateral regionalized approach had the

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nature of security alliances rather than collective security cooperation. One example was the US’s strengthened approach with the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). “From 2002 to 2021, the United States has provided over $12.1 billion in economic, health, and security assistance to Southeast Asian allies and partners, including the 10 ASEAN member states.” (US Government 2023). Beyond that, the Biden administration reinvigorated existing and emerging institutionalized multilateralism, notably the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and AUKUS (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in the newly-shaping Indo Pacific region. Nonetheless, unlike Obama’s multilateralism, Biden’s approach has been much more exclusive, aggressively regrouping allies versus foes in efforts to restrain China and Russia. These actions have contributed to growing threat perceptions among foes that were already antagonized during the Trump administration. Russia intends to stabilize the situation in the region while maintaining controllable instability there. Russia has generally avoided transnational disputes in CA, such as the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbek clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan during June 2010, in spite of the interim Kyrgyz government’s request for Russian intervention (Górecki 2014). The Moscow-led CSTO made a decision to be involved in Kazakhstan’s internal political turmoil in January 2022, just one month before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. It seemed that any regional disturbance needed to be stopped quickly in the rest of the post-Soviet zone in order to send a strong message to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Ironically, the charter of the CSTO stipulates the following: Acting in strict accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, and guided by the universally recognized principles of international law … The Organization shall promote the formation of a just and democratic world order based on the universally recognized principles of international law.2

2 Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, October 7, 2002, available at https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_ kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti_/#loaded.

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Contrary to the initially agreed function, both the Russian and Kazakhstani governments utilized the multilateral security device to quell democratic movements in Kazakhstan. Concurrently, CA countries have taken the position of not explicitly taking sides in the current war in Ukraine despite Russian claims otherwise (Imamova 2022). Moscow has already put pressure on CA countries, especially Kazakhstan, to send military forces to Ukraine to assist Russia. Some Russian officials have been displeased with Kazakhstan’s tepid reaction and have mentioned the possibility of punishing the northern part of Kazakhstan for its non-involvement. From the very day of independence, Kazakhstan’s deep-seated insecurity due to its Soviet ties is reflected in the decision to move the country’s capital city, Astana (renamed Nur-Sultan). This action was in part designed to raise the cost to Russia of any move to reclaim the resource-rich north that some Russians, including such diverse personalities as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, believed should be Moscow’s (Ordway 2022). Russian Influence in Relation to Other External Powers Russia’s engagement in CA has been driven by geopolitical motives, superseding its immediate concerns with regional security threats. Russia has sought regional domination under the banner of counterterrorist policy in order to counter US hegemony and NATO expansionism. Moscow continues to engage in military exercises and coercive diplomacy. Either pro- or anti-Russian views, the common perception is that Russian influences grow in the region. Russia is now the kind of person who sits in the command room, who has the steering wheel and levers to all systems, but who is busy with completely different things and therefore only touches the levers in rare situations. If desired, Russia can sharply increase its influence. An example of this is Uzbekistan, where Russia has sharply increased its influence over the past three years. There are joint ventures, an increase in trade, and social activities, and, of course, the two most important projects—a nuclear power plant in the Jizzakh region and branches of Russian universities. That is, not only in the economy, but also in the humanitarian sphere, Russia is very quickly returning its positions. Let’s be honest, in all countries of the region, except for Turkmenistan, where China prevails, Russia occupies a dominant role and its influence is slowly growing. And if desired, it can grow very strongly, and here it is only a matter of the

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desires of Russia itself. In my opinion, it is needed because it is a historical center, to which all countries of the region are drawn and ties with which take several centuries. This cannot be changed. (Interviewee No. 10)

Amid the dynamic security situation, the leaders of CA countries have engaged in multi-vector diplomacy in order not to lean on any of the great powers. For example, for the 30 years of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s presidency, Kazakhstan adhered to a balanced foreign policy between Russia and China: “Skillfully maintaining relationships with the US and western Europe, including commercial ties, Nazarbayev used this triangulation to maximize his freedom to maneuver and avoid becoming too dependent on any outside power” (Ordway 2022, p. 15; Baev 2021). “CA needs Russia to counterbalance Chinese and Western powers’ geopolitical influence in the region. In the same way, CA needs other external powers to counterbalance Russian hegemonic geopolitical ambitions in the region” (Interviewee No. 6). Given that Russian ties are strong in CA, regional reaction to Russian aggression is realistically infeasible. The EEU has already been heavily affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. For example, Russia banned the export of grain and sugar to EEU members, which resulted in shortages of imported wheat, rye, barley, and corn from Russia. The exception is Kazakhstan, one of the largest global buyers of Russian grain; transaction data between the two countries are strategically left non-transparent. The Kazakh people are concerned about their future relationship with Russia, asking questions via social media such as whether Kazakhstan might be punished by Western sanctions for allying with the Russia-led EEU. Meanwhile, the Russia-friendly population in Kazakhstan supports Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, but anti-Russian elements have demanded that the Kazakh government distance itself from Moscow, at least by leaving the EEU and CSTO. On the one hand, Russia prevents CA countries from transiting more quickly and proactively to become fuller members of the international market and global community who abide by international norms, rules, and standards. On the other hand, Russian influence in the region at times plays a role of shielding and gatekeeping vis-à-vis Western and international pressure to adopt a neoliberal international order. One interviewee, quoting Alexander Cooley (e.g. 2019; 2012), noted,

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the main actors have their own goals and interests. But sometimes these interests of the allies coincide; sometimes there is mutual assistance to each other, and sometimes there is direct competition. Be that as it may, the interests of the three world powers (Russia, China, and the United States) strongly influence regional politics. It is noticeable that the leaders of CA for almost 30 years have learned to manipulate them for their own benefit, putting forward their own local rules. (Interviewee No. 7)

While Soviet national policy provided an ideological frame for collective identity in the Soviet republics (Blum 2003, pp. 214–216), the monumental event of de-Sovietization provided an impulse to the dynamic spread of tendencies toward nation-building (Fierman 2009, p. 1217). Even though the newly independent CA seemed to welcome integration based on cultural similarities such as language, custom, religion, and history, in reality, what the locals usually believe is that the regionalization scenario is far more complicated. Even with their shared Turkic roots, the republics of CA (with the exception of Tajikistan) turned out to be distant not only from the Russian Federation but from one another. One of our interviewees, responding to a question on regional collective identity as a CA citizen, stated, ven if the CA states are bearers of common socio-cultural values because they were part of the USSR, the long absence of ties directly between the peoples of the region has to some extent erased their sense of commonality. If it is about culture and language, then I do not feel a commonality, as in Tajikistan we speak an Iranian dialect when the whole region speaks Turkic. The same goes for customs and traditions—they are slightly different. I also do not see myself as a holder of a ‘Soviet identity’. I believe it has stayed with the older generation. I classify myself as a generation with new values, receiving education abroad and introducing new techniques to outdated mechanisms which exist in our countries. People of my generation in all the countries of CA are now old enough to hold office and make changes. If this counts as a collective identity, it is definitely a positive one. (Interview No. 16)

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share many common cultural elements (Adams 2010) such as historical cities and ethnic heroes. Turkmenistan turned its policy toward so-called ‘positive neutrality’ status, embracing

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the characteristics of rejecting active multilateral relations and bloc politics in its foreign relations and a rapid shift to authoritarianism under Turkmenbashi (Anceschi 2008). The conceptual basis of national identity formation was based on the Rukhnama: The Book of the Soul, which became a common frame for the system of national values, traditions, and standards of Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan, which had defined itself as ‘the Switzerland of Central Asia’ in the 1990s, adopted a parliamentary republic and tried to be a bastion of democracy in the region, reflected in its early accession to the WTO. In their nation-building process, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sought a platform that could unite the elites and masses manoeuvring between ethnic minorities and titular national interests (Marat 2008, pp. 77–82). Kazakhstan also engaged in the process of nation-building and promoted the idea of multi-ethnic harmony that was stipulated in the Constitutional Law following the decision at the Assembly of the Nation of Kazakhstan in 1995 (Burkhanov 2017, pp. 3–4). The CA states adopted nationalized language policies in the 1990s as a means to strengthen their titular national identities and distinguish themselves from each other. Before 1991, within the system of the Soviet ‘iron hand’ that included all levels of social institutions mediated by the Communist Party, it was possible to create a collective Soviet identity (Laruelle 2011). After the disintegration of the USSR, national identity-building in each CA state was prioritized and promoting regional collectivism was either a secondary concern or regarded as impossible. Post-Soviet countries faced the imminent challenges of economic survival, added to a myriad of new security and political problems (e.g. Luong 2018). For example, Tajikistan was torn apart by a lengthy civil war, while Uzbekistan grappled with Islamic revival groups. In addition, the various foreign policies adopted by some CA countries alienated other CA countries from creating a unified strategy of regionalised actions. In particular, Turkmenistan’s positive neutrality status and isolated closed-door strategy distanced it from regional alliances. Intra-Regional Regionalism The political and socio-economic transformations of the CA region during the first decade of independence were marked by a number of de-Sovietization events. The regionalization process was disorganised and sporadic. In the early 1990s, the CA states idealized regionalization.

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Collectively distancing themselves from the Russian Federation, CA countries held out hopeful agendas to enhance collaboration and new political, economic, and cultural ties among themselves. While a skeptical view is more prevalent, it is worth noting the generally supportive view on intra-regional regional cooperation, as a vision: If CA states will cooperate more in terms of security, environment, economy, and social cooperation, definitely, I think it is good and will bring more benefits than disadvantages. Integration could be a strong support for CA region against terrorism (Afghanistan as a threat), separatism (Russia or China as a threat), poverty, and environmental issues (Aral Sea, Bukhtarma, Issyk-Kul Lake, trees’ and animals’ degradation, etc.). Great examples are the EU and ASEAN. As what we see today, Uzbekistan is more willing to compete with Kazakhstan than to cooperate, Turkmenistan is a closed state, not even open for CA neighbours with similar history, this all is not good, in my opinion. (Interviewee No. 12)

The Central Asian Union (CAU) was launched to facilitate the process of CA’s intra regional cooperation. Envisioned as a geopolitical platform for the five countries of the region, the CAU was initiated by the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and involved the creation of a free trade zone with a visa-free regime, common currency, and cultural and educational interaction. It was also positioned as a possible alternative to the CSTO and the SCO (Panfilova 2008). However, the effort was curtailed mainly due to rejection by thenpresident Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. The CAU was renamed as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) and was rejuvenated in 2008 by internally motivated initiatives (e.g. Zhambekov 2015; Tolipov 2014, p. 109) However, it was again short-lived; it was incorporated into an externally-initiated regionalization mechanism, in particular the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-supported Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC Program). The need to seek regional cooperation was partially a reaction to Russian foreign policy under Kozyrev, who prioritized the West as a foreign strategic partner for Russia and developed a foreign policy that ignored the CA region for the time being (Sherr 2013). Domestic political and social problems also hampered further regionalization. The prolonged civil war in Tajikistan demonstrated the consequences of the abrupt departure from Sovietized political culture and values. Due

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to the iron curtain, the external borders of the newly independent states had to be determined by the CA states themselves. Using the full power of its coercive instruments, the USSR was able to isolate itself and its union republics alike from any external contact with Western and other non-communist countries. After the disintegration of the USSR, the independent Russia promptly re-oriented itself to the Western world and successfully secured support while the newly independent states in the Soviet’s Middle Asia were left disconnected from the world as well as from the USSR and later the Russian Federation. Tajikistan was rather weak in self-defence and lacking resources, allowing religious groups from the Afghan border to penetrate and spread their influence over the Tajik population. The local government of Tajikistan alone could not resist them, and consequently the country experienced a lengthy and bloody civil war (Malashenko 2012, pp. 83–84) that ended in 1997 with the help of CSTO troops. A compromise with the official government allowed the united Tajik opposition to participate in a national reconciliation commission that put an end to the civil war. However, the war left the country in socio-economic despair, precipitating migration, unemployment, and poverty that greatly affected the economic slowdown of the Tajik state (Epkenhans 2017, pp. 99–145). Since independence, border disputes have remained unresolved. In 2002, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan adopted a demarcation treaty to solve the questions of the territorial borders. Kazakhstan occupied the Bagys village and Arnassay water reservoir in return for yielding 1700 hectares of the border areas to Uzbekistan. These areas included Turkestanets village, part of South Kazakhstan and the Kyzyl-Orda oblasts (Pannier 2020). In 2010, ethnic clashes killed hundreds of ethnic Uzbeks in South Kyrgyzstan, resulting in thousands of Uzbek refugees. Violent clashes continued between 2020 and 2022 at the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with casualties on both sides (Baisalov 2021). Uzbekistan often uses military force including mines at disputed borders against Kyrgyzstan, resulting in military and civilian casualties (Baisalov 2021). Tensions also occurred between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, especially during Islam Karimov’s rule. However, with Shavkat Merziyoyev as president, the tensions over territorial border areas were somewhat mitigated (Baisalov 2021). Domestic political systems began to take various shapes. Kazakhstan adopted new amendments to its constitution through referendums to strengthen executive power and presidential authority in 1995. The reform substantially modified the initial idea of democratic transition and

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determined the direction of social-political institutions thereafter. The number of political parties decreased, and presidential authority overshadowed parliamentarism (Olcott 2010, pp. 87–106). Simultaneously, disproportional resource distribution by dint of the privatization process in the early 1990s caused stratification of the social classes (Peck 2002, pp. 53–55). In Uzbekistan, terrorist acts targeting key governmental objects and top officials, including President Islam Karimov, made the entire country shaky in 1999. The Organisation for Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was blamed for these events (Polat and Butkevich 2000, pp. 543–547). Although the interpretations of the origins of the acts were rather controversial, the event eventually served to strengthen presidential power, followed by steady intensification of law enforcement for further centralization. The government used the terrorism as a reason to consolidate presidential power and expand law enforcement. In the 1990s, the personification of power in Turkmenistan through the cult of personality of Saparmurat Niyazov isolated the country from the CA region and the international community alike. In light of Turkmenistan’s massive reserves of oil and gas, the government claimed an ambitious strategy for socio-economic development. Comparing the hydrocarbon reserves of Turkmenistan with the Middle East experience, leadership claimed the state was a ‘second Kuwait’ (Pomfret 1995a, pp. 28–56). Turkmenistan gradually moved away from the regionalism plans in the 1990s, counting on strong executive power, a foreign policy based on the ‘positive neutrality strategy’, distancing itself from the Russian Federation, and more importantly, its abundant gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan’s transformation in the 1990s is an example of attempting democratic transition through economic reforms. Although Askar Akayev’s presidency lasted for fifteen years and was regularly criticized for its authoritarian rule, Kyrgyzstan developed democratic elements far more actively compared with other CA states. These elements included encouraging civic, multi-party, and parliamentary systems. However, in spite of the country’s accession to the WTO in 1998 and rapid marketization, its goal to become a ‘second Switzerland’ eventually failed economically (Pomfret 1995b, pp. 18–29). Its minimal natural resources, which the Soviets had compensated for through the Kremlin’s donations, could not adequately sustain the national economy. The beginning of the 2000s featured major changes in various actors’ presence in the region. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent rise of

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international terrorism made CA’s region-wide collective security system visible. The proximity of Afghanistan, with its shared borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, affected US security strategies in the region. Based on mutual interest framed by the war against terror, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan allowed the US to establish military and air bases in Karshi-Khanabad and Manas, respectively (Oliker and Shlapak 2005, pp. 39–45). Both opened in 2001 and operated under similar directives, installing military objects to serve US aircraft involved in the Afghanistan operation. The Uzbek Karshi-Khanabad military base was closed in 2005 after a critical assessment of the Andijan massacre in the US media. The Andijan massacre was the killing of a conservative Islamic opposition to Karimov’s government (Bukharbayeva 2019, p. 126). It gained wide international coverage followed by embargo and sanctions against Uzbekistan from the EU and the US up until 2009. In the summer of 2005, new legislation was adopted in Uzbekistan in favour of the withdrawal of the US contingent from their territory. The Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan was in operation until 2009. Despite the economic profitability of leasing facilities to the US, a political agenda prevailed in the decision to close the air base. Although the Tulip Revolution and the first coup d’état in 2005 did not affect the US’s continued use of the Manas air base, the second coup d’état in 2010 ended it for good. In 2009, the Russian Federation was ready to pay 150 million USD to complete the US military mission in Manas, although it had its own Kant Air Base 30 km away (Kossenov 2009). The Kyrgyz parliament was inclined to close the Manas base (Reed 2009, pp. 5–6), but it was transformed into the US Air Force Transit Center and operated until 2014 under the US control. Meanwhile, the Russian-controlled Kant Air Base continues its operations as of this writing (Lymar 2020). The first generation of CA political leaders assessed the influence of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation somewhat differently. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became the subjects of long-term, singlestrongman regimes under Islam Karimov and Saparmurad Niyazov, respectively. Both held antagonistic attitudes toward the Soviets and the Russian Federation, similar to leaders in other former USSR states such as the four Baltic countries and the GUAM member-states, namely Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Meanwhile, the leaders of Tajikistan

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and Kyrgyzstan have changed their strategies in this regard depending on who is in power. For example, within 30 years of independence, the presidency has changed five times in Kyrgyzstan and twice in Tajikistan. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan experienced power transitions due to the natural deaths of their first presidents, although this did not bring about any political transformations afterwards. In contrast, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the long-time president of Kazakhstan, was rather clear-eyed in his reflections on the Soviet past and maintained a friendly attitude toward Russia from the time Kazakhstan achieved independence. The current (as of 2023) president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev, has followed the same strategy. Notwithstanding the diversity within the region, a neo-patrimonial political culture has been formed that closely interacts with each country’s own way of building a modern state (e.g., Clapham 1985, pp. 61–113; Shkel 2019, pp. 169–172) both separately and interactively.

De-Sovietization of the CA Economy and Integration into the International Market At the dawn of independence, there was a deep disparity in the economic capacity of each of the CA countries. Such differences were not merely the consequences of available human or hydrocarbon resources but were rooted in the Soviet economic model that was designed to serve each republic’s specific function for the union. The roles of CA republics varied from active suppliers to minor segments to fulfil Soviet-scale production needs. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan belonged to the former (active suppliers), whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were among the latter (production needs). To minimize this gap, a typical economic policy followed a financial levelling approach that allowed budget support from the central government for underdeveloped segments of all fifteen Soviet Socialist Union Republics. Even in 1991, Soviet subsidies were still being distributed to the newly independent CA states. In 1991, the USSR’s transferred budget made up a significant amount of each government’s revenue: 27% in Tajikistan, 25% in Kazakhstan, 21% in Kyrgyzstan, 14% in Uzbekistan, and 13% in Turkmenistan (Rubin 1998, p. 141). However, with the sudden cut of annual subsidies in 1992, the independent CA countries faced harsh financial hardship while the remaining Soviet economic specialization and infrastructure left in some CA states

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barely functioned as a foundation for further development. The mountainous and landlocked countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan suffered due to their insignificant industries and poor natural resources and energy reserves, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan enjoyed more favourable conditions for economic development. Kazakhstan in particular remained a significant trade partner of the Russian Federation compared with the other CA countries (see Fig. 2.1). Nevertheless, each underwent different scenarios of development and eventually took different positions in the global market. The abrupt process of exit from the ruble zone in the 1990s and the introduction of national currencies for CA countries was partially relieved by the flow of world currency to their markets, largely in the form of various types of financial aid. In the process of transition, all CA states endured harsh economic hardship in the 1990s, as indicated by the inflation rate (Table 2.1). Tajikistan experienced the highest inflation rate in the first decade of independence. The inflation rate was stabilized in the early 2000s except for Tajikistan due to the civil war. Direct and indirect foreign investments played a significant role in such stabilization, especially from the US. In particular, Kazakhstan secured substantial economic support in return for non-proliferation positioning through the Nunn-Lugar pact (Abzhaparova 2010, pp. 1542–1549), which offered

Fig. 2.1 Changing trade volume between Central Asia and Russia (Source World Integrated Trade Solution 2022)

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opportunities for the country to establish cooperative business activities with partners in the US and Europe. The Nunn-Lugar program, named for US senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, was approved by the US Congress and launched as a response to Kazakhstan’s nuclear disarmament in 1991–1992. It proposed the full-scale conversion of military industries to peaceful ends and the expansion of economic cooperation in exchange for nuclear-free practices including demilitarization, military cooperation with the US, and close consultation. This was a gateway for Kazakhstan to enter the market by fostering cooperation with the US and EU. The program was not considered to be economic in nature, but it presupposed that a Kazakhstan-led CA would be recognized as a nuclear-free zone and guaranteed an impulse for economic development by cooperating with world powers. In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan’s economic policy and the doctrine of multi-vector foreign affairs were able to attract overseas investments, satisfying the country’s main goal to achieve economic success and the scope of national interests. The national interest was inevitably linked with the domestic energy market that structured the future of the national economy. Following this economic strategy in the gas and oil industry, Kazakhstan had a highly advantageous position in the early 1990s with the appearance of a cluster of US and European petroleum giants such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Texaco, Agip, BP, Shell, and Total. In turn, the Kazakh government provided political stability and favourable legislative conditions for prompt and efficient operations by foreign investors, obliging them not only to invest financially but also to facilitate job opportunities and fulfil other social responsibilities at the local micro-level (Buldybayeva 2012). Apart from the money boosted into the economy, Table 2.1 Inflation (change in consumer price index) 1991–1999 (percent)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

79 85 112 103 82

1381 855 1157 493 645

1662 772 2195 3102 534

1892 229 350 1748 1568

176 41 609 1005 305

39 31 418 992 54

17 26 88 84 59

8 36 28 24 29

7 12 43 17 18

Source EBRD Transition Report Update, April 2001, p. 16

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the strategy facilitated a quick and effective market rise that Kazakhstan urgently needed in order to enter the global market. It is noteworthy that the initial economic rise of Kazakhstan was accompanied by a strong and well-designed banking system (Pomfret 2006, pp. 40–42). Turkmenistan, another state with extensive gas and oil reserves, undertook a different approach to its economic development. With its large hydrocarbon potential and relatively small population, Turkmenistan has carefully chosen partners for cooperation since independence. Combined with a large national (state) industrial sector, its economic policy featured a key role of the government in managing resources. In the context of its specific political milieu, Turkmenistan prefers a less open cooperative regime with external markets. Since Turkmenistan enjoys neutrality and an associative membership within the CIS, it tends to engage in political and economic manoeuvring only with very select partners such as Russia, China, Türkiye, and Iran. However, Turkmenistan’s relationship with Russia became increasingly difficult as a result of a gas transportation accident that occurred in the CA-Center (CAC-4) pipeline on April 9, 2009 (Durdiyeva 2010). The conflict led to a cessation of gas supply by Turkmenistan, but export to Russia was restored on January 9, 2010. In the meantime, however, China gained a much bigger portion of gas imports from Turkmenistan, with projected dynamic acceleration of imports for the future up to 100 billion cubic meters (Abdurassulov 2014). Despite a rather sceptical attitude to opening and establishing a market economy, Uzbekistan has exported a substantial amount of agricultural goods and energy resources (Pomfret 2009). Compared with other CA leaders, Islam Karimov was cautious about becoming a recipient of extensive Western financial aid while the country was more open to foreign interference in the beginning of the 1990s. He repeatedly sounded the alarm to other CA countries about the danger of overdependence on foreign capital. This view resulted in a low level of development of Uzbekistan’s economy, and gradual rather than rapid economic reform projects resulted in poor economic performance. In the first years of its independence, Tajikistan was dragged into a deep socio-economic crisis that was intensified by a civil war that lasted almost five years and directly diminished the country’s economic sustainability, which was already vulnerable during the pre-war period. Having a common border with Afghanistan made it strategically important for the US and Russia, and Tajikistan was open to cooperation with Western countries, although limited to political and security (rather than

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economic) scopes. Accordingly, both Russia and the US supported Tajikistan, with the US government investing over 1 billion USD and taking financial responsibility for the construction of the Panj River bridge that linked Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan was the weakest economic link among the CA states and had the least potential in the 1990s. Poor natural resources and a disadvantageous geographical location, combined with internal political unrest followed by the Tulip Revolution in which President Askar Akaev was overthrown and replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, resulted in economic stagnation. In the absence of its own production, Kyrgyzstan received substantial financial aid from the leasing of two American and Russian military bases in Manas. From one political regime to another, the lease underwent dramatic price increases for the US, from 17 million USD to 60 million USD. Political scientists regarded this situation as a time bomb that could detonate corrupt political elites (Michel 2014). Into the 2020s, the economies of CA states remain vulnerable and unable to cope with new challenges. One significant reason for this is the mismanagement of their abundant natural resources and failure to back industrial development with efficient and equitable governance. The cotton industries in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the hydrocarbonlinked industries in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan still operate with outdated methods. This creates a huge gap in the global market compared to fast-developing Western innovation in oil production, which is based on new technologies such as fracking, deep-water drilling, and seismic mapping. Therefore, CA countries have lagged behind in creating updated revenue sources out of crude oil. They are also far behind in adopting new technologies in agriculture; agrarian modernization in the West dramatically contrasts with the old-fashioned traditional agricultural methods used in CA, which are still based on manual labour mobilization. Political Culture: Common Features and Shared Interests CA countries can be categorized as new types of authoritarian regimes that have adopted strictly state-controlled capitalism with few or nominal

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democratic institutions in their political process. The countries’ selfdefined official regime types represent a ‘democratic secular state’3 in the case of Kazakhstan, ‘a sovereign, unitary, democratic Republic’ in Kyrgyzstan,4 ‘a sovereign, democratic, law-governed, secular, and unitary State’5 in the Republic of Tajikistan, ‘a democratic, legal and secular state’6 in Turkmenistan, and ‘a sovereign democratic republic’7 in Uzbekistan. Scholars typify the features of authoritarian states with leadership categories of a single individual (as in personalist regimes), a hegemonic party (as in single party regimes), the military as an institution (as in military regimes), and a royal family (as in monarchies). A hybrid regime entails some level of democratic institutions. None of these categories neatly accommodates the five CA states. However, judging from their degrees of adapting democratic systems and their own political traditions, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan can be understood as quasi-democracies, Tajikistan as an autocratic democracy, Turkmenistan as having features of a personalist regime, and Kazakhstan as a relaxed soft authoritarian system (e.g., Schatz 2009) or a new democracy if a minimalist definition of democracy is accepted. Except for Kyrgyzstan, the CA countries are resource-rich. Nevertheless, within the broad spectrum of authoritarian state-led capitalist systems, they are considered unsuccessful. Some scholars (e.g., Franke et al. 2009) apply the ‘resource curse’ theory to explain this situation. A vicious cycle of political economy is often related to the abundant natural resources. Ruling elites share such resources within their own closed circle, monopolising resources. The country’s taxing and welfare system for wider society are also criticised for being unfair and dysfunctional, as is the case in Kazakhstan. In the process of mono-sectoral industrialization relying overly on resource extraction sectors, these societies often face severe corruption, lack of investment for long-term economic

3 ‘The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself as a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are a person, his life, rights, and freedoms’ (The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Section I. Article 1). 4 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (Chapter 1, Section 1 Article 1). 5 Tajikistan’s Constitution (1994) with Amendments in 2016 (Article 1). 6 Constitution of Turkmenistan (2008) with Amendments in 2016 (Article 1). 7 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Article 1).

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development and public services, concentration of wealth among a small ruling group, and unfair distribution of the ruling group’s income from foreign rent seekers, inevitably resulting in social discontent. Evidently not all of natural resource-rich countries enter the vicious cycle of rentier state with authoritarian nature although there is a strong co-relationship between the two (Haber and Menaldo 2011). Meanwhile, for rentier states, foreign partners (e.g., governments and business actors) are the most important stakeholders as trading partners sustaining the national economy. One of the main challenges to the social and economic development of the entire CA region is the continuing trend of income inequality and social stratification (UNDP 2010). Economic stagnation (see Fig. 2.2 for the GDP growth rate) is not merely linked to the level of wages and national income. In general, there is a decrease in the overall standard of living compared to the Soviet era, which at times instigates nostalgia among the older generations in CA countries. Employment was guaranteed, which stabilized the labor market, the national economy, and individuals’ lives. It was rare to be dismissed from a job because trade unions systematically protected the interests of ordinary workers. There were social benefits as well, such as annual vouchers for summer health resorts and free medical care. Today, only officials of state or quasi-state organs can afford these in CA. Both Russia and Kazakhstan have explored the concept of so-called ‘social lifts’, whereby ordinary citizens can enjoy welfare state benefits (Cook 2015, pp. 2336–2347). All CA countries more or less share this problem. Speaking of the economic aspect of regional cooperation, the limitations and challenges of regionalization in CA partly stem from this particular feature of rentier states. Their heavy reliance on external markets hinders them from looking inside to seek opportunities for coprosperity. As a result, intra-regional trade volume has been insignificant (see Table 2.2). According to data released in 2021, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the lowest shares of the total volume of intra-regional trade, amounting to 5.5% and 4.5%, respectively. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have the highest shares, amounting to 28.3% and 21%, respectively, and Uzbekistan takes in-between position with 13.3% (Table 2.2). The foreign trade of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is less focused on the regional market due to the predominance of oil and gas in their exports. These resources are mainly supplied to the EU countries, China, and Russia, and most

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Fig. 2.2 GDP Growth rate of the Soviet Central Asian republics and countries (1986–2021)

Table 2.2 Intra-regional trade volume (in goods) between CA countries in 2020 (mln. USD) CA states

KazakhstanKyrgyzstan TajikistanTurkmenistan Uzbekistan Total

Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan 794.1 Tajikistan 909.7 Turkmenistan 145.9 Uzbekistan 2856.3 Total 4706.0

796.2 – 36.8 8.0 878.6 1719.6

791.4 37.3 – 12.2 360.6 1201.5

128.0 11.8 7.8 – 342.4 490.0

2916.5 341.3 333.8 440.3 – 4031.9

4632.1 1184.5 1288.1 606.4 4437.9 12,149.0

Share of trade in total turnover (in %) 5.5 21.0 28.3 4.5 13.3

Source The Center for Economic Studies and Reforms (2021)

of the imports also come from the above-mentioned countries. Externally led regional organizations such as SCO have established mechanisms to circumvent trade barriers. While the CA countries have concluded a number of free trade agreements bilaterally and multilaterally (Fig. 2.3), the counterparts are concentrated among the CIS member countries. Kazakhstan (since 2015), Kyrgyzstan (since 1998), and Tajikistan (since

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Fig. 2.3 The number of concluded FTAs by country in Central Asia

2013) have acquired member status at the World Trade Organization (WTO), but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have been in observer status, awaiting the results of their accession applications. Intra-regional trade between the countries of CA is an important component of the region’s economy considering several factors, such as geographic proximity, complementarity in natural resources, diversity in industrial structure,—from traditional agrarian to modern industrial— facilitating cooperation with neighbouring states, and infrastructural connectivity. CA’s geographical location allows the establishment of trade relations, both internationally and regionally. CA has borders with China, Russia and Iran, and is located at the crossroads of transcontinental trade routes. This situation offers great potential for developing trade relations with both neighbouring and far-abroad countries. As a result, the region can offer a wide range of goods and services for export, which can attract demand from other countries beyond the region. Initiating intra-regional cooperation entails state-centered features since leaders and state officials need first of all to agree with the degree of interactions between the states in question. Common material interests are not a sufficient condition to sustain continuous cooperation. During the first decade of CA’s independence, Western powers also rapidly influenced the region to adapt to the neoliberal world order by establishing open market policies and privatization as well as implementing political democratisation. At the same time, due to post-Soviet

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ties between Moscow and most of the political leaders and high-ranking officials in CA, de-Sovietization did not end and revolved with Russification process. Therefore, the phenomena of CA’s de-Sovietization and Russia’s re-regionalization as Eurasia with Russification of the post-Soviet zone co-exist.

Environmental Issues as a Soviet Legacy The low priority given to environmentally sustainable development is an imminent threat to development across CA. A number of serious ecological problems are believed to be rooted in the colonial relations between the USSR and the region. One prominent issue is associated with the atomic bomb testing sites and nuclear plants in Kazakhstan, notably the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site that was built in 1947. Abundant scientific, engineering, financial, and human resources were mobilized to implement the Soviet Union’s nuclearization project, and the site was deemed a suitable location for testing at the beginning of the Cold War period. In August 1949, the first on-land nuclear bomb test was held in the steppes of the Abay district near Semipalatinsk, followed by the first hydrogen bomb testing in 1953. Although on-land practice was eventually replaced by underground testing technology, more than 40 years of operation generated harmful radioactive materials, fatally affecting soil erosion and water contamination in the region. Experts estimate that approximately 1.5 million people living in the area have suffered from the consequences of the testing, including increased rates of cancer, leukaemia, nervous disorders, skin diseases, immune system disorders, heart disease, and early aging syndrome (Tashkinbayev 2019). More radioactive remnants were discovered in 1989 throughout the entire Semipalatinsk region. Local environmental protests of the Perestroika period transformed into an international social movement called ‘Nevada-Semipalatinsk’ (Loretz 2015, pp. 21–22). The movement contributed to halting the tests and affected the governmental decision in 1991 to close down the site permanently. Nevertheless, environmental degradation continues to affect the land and its residents. The region requires continuous restoration efforts for both ecological systems and human health. Apart from the Kazakh government’s financial support, there have been a number of international rehabilitation initiatives. For example, Japan has provided hospitals and diagnostic centres (Astana Times 2014).

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Another problem rooted in the Soviet past is the catastrophic situation in the lakes of the Aral Sea. Reduced water quantity and soil salinization affect Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which receive water supplies through the Amu Darya and Syrdarya Rivers that flow into the sea (Gullette and Féaux De la Croix 2017, pp. 5–7). The problem stems from the exploitative agricultural irrigation practices starting from the Soviet period in the 1960s, mainly for cotton production. These practices utilized artificial landscape design, with arbitrary adjustments to the river flow and excessive water intake used as indicators of a successful planned economy. In addition, some parts of the Uzbek coastal area of the Aral Sea were ruined by oil and gas reserve exploitation by Russian, Chinese, and Swiss oil and gas companies (Issayev 2018). By 2000, the water level in the sea had decreased by 20 meters, and its total volume was 210 km3 , down from 1060 km3 in 1960 (Rosenberg 2021). Consequently, coastal areas in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan suffer tremendously from the degradation of the ecosystem, which negatively affected the fishery industry and the domestic market supply. When the shrinkage of the sea reached a catastrophic scale, the UN declared it a world environmental disaster (Micklin 2007, pp. 48–51), but the problems persist in spite of numerous initiatives. One important issue related to the Aral Sea environmental catastrophe is the development of bacteriological weapons on the island of Vozrozhdeniye, which is situated on the border of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Aralsk-7 was a top-secret Soviet project of the Cold War period that included laboratories and testing sites exploring anthrax, plague, typhus, and smallpox bacteria. The scientists running the project were housed in a large laboratory complex in Kantubek with the sea banks as natural isolation barriers. With the Aral Sea drying, the island was abandoned and the hazardous vapor seeped back into the soil or spread to the atmosphere. The atmospheric pollution led to an increase in the number of deadly diseases among the local population. Moreover, it is believed that there could be more hidden reserves of unspecified toxic remnants from previous experiments. Even though they have been untouched for decades, some of these remnants are potentially hazardous threats (Gorvett 2017). In Uzbekistan, both pro-government and opposition environmental NGOs, such as the Birlik platform of the first major opposition movement that emerged in the 1990s, raised environmental issues as citizens’ main concern. Also, the Navruz experiment in 2000, involving several

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CA governments, discovered high levels of metals and radionuclides in the Aral Sea river basin (Barber et al. 2005). Data collected within the first two phases of the Navruz Project (2000–2006) demonstrated high radioactive contamination levels in the region mainly because of the Soviet-era legacy of waste processing and uranium mining. These contaminants threatened both human health and regional security since heavy rainfall and flooding could result in the movement of radioactive substances into public water supply systems. Inconsistent economic and environmental planning, fragile legislation, and corruption are often significant obstacles to solving the problems surrounding the Aral Sea and the adjacent Amu Darya and Syrdarya Rivers. Kazakhstan has attempted to solve the problem by attracting international investors such as the World Bank to revive the sea. A project to regulate the Syrdarya riverbed and preserve the northern part of the Aral Sea was successfully launched by Kazakhstan to ensure that the river water would not be used for cotton and rice to the same extent as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do with the Amu Darya River. The project includes cleaning the Syrdarya riverbed to reduce moisture loss as well as dam construction and fishery restoration. However, the Uzbek part of the sea continues to dry up due to Uzbekistan’s reluctance to negotiate on this matter. Uzbekistan justifies its position by pointing out that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not interested in the project since both countries will keep extracting water for their cotton fields. The construction of the Kokaral Dam on the southern shore of the northern lake has helped preserve some of the fishing in the Aral Sea. With the support of the World Bank, the dam helped to provide a 20% increase in water resources in the northern lake since 2005. In addition, a fish hatchery constructed with the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel (Umarov 2003) was built on the northern lake, where various types of fish are grown and released into the North Aral Sea. Other measures include revival programs for the Aral Sea Basin launched by the Kazakhstani government and the International Foundation of the Aral Sea. An international conference was held in 2018 in Tashkent on the topic of ‘Joint Actions to Mitigate the Consequences of the Aral Sea Disaster: New Approaches, Innovative Solutions, and Investments’. These transboundary ecological challenges can only be addressed through region-wide policy actions (for further discussion on the increasing engagement by international and regional non-governmental organizations and emerging regional governance in dealing with water-related

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issues in CA, see Bourdais Park et al. (2020). Therefore, they are challenges that also offer a window of cooperation as well noted in a few interviews. If CA countries cooperate more towards integration, it will be beneficial to solve regional problems, in particular the environment. CA countries need to conduct more cooperation on regional environmental protection and jointly solve environmental problems. For example, combating desertification, rationally utilizing water resources and other energy sources, and protecting the environment and ecology. The Aral Sea ecological disaster affects all CA countries, so it is necessary for CA countries to strengthen cooperation and make joint efforts to solve the existing environmental problems in CA. (Interviewee No. 15)

The CA states and people alike have showed elevated awareness of environmental matters. Region-wide environmental cooperation has been developing through various bilateral and multilateral mechanisms such as the Climate and Environment (CLIENT) Program, the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC), bilateral cooperation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the environmental issues associated with the Rogun reservoir, and tri-lateral cooperation between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan over the water resource issues in the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan.

Conclusion Opinions and assessments of the long period after the disintegration of the USSR are reflected in controversial scenarios. The expert community has split into several groups that differ in their views on the coexistence of the former Soviet socialist republics incorporated into an oppressive ideological and command-administrative mechanism. The degrees of rejection or adoption of the Soviet collective model varied drastically in the CA states, from the revival of religious and national identities to cautious and passive attempts to construct regionalism. Eventually, each state took different routes to de-Sovietization as domestic processes influenced the unique pattern that the states followed. Kyrgyzstan is the only CA nation to take a democratic course, while the other CA states show clear paternalist

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trends. An institutionalized shift to a free market economy was accompanied by the CA states’ withdrawal from Moscow’s central budgeting and the creation of independent economic and financial systems through privatization, natural and human capital, and foreign investments. While addressing the question of how the countries in the CA region struggled to become stable sovereign states and why they need more cooperation, at this stage we could partly answer the question of why CA’s intra-regional cooperation has not been successfully launched albeit attempted. As discussed so far, sudden de-Sovietization brought increasing interaction with other influential countries outside CA, including the Russian Federation. In this regard, the first of the four major factors in our analytical framework to understand regional multilateralism—positionality and historical relations between member states—explains how CA’s historical ties with Russia substantially affected its basis of regionalism and the process of regionalization. As this chapter mainly focused on de-Sovietization in the process of regionalization, fuller explanations of the absence of stronger intra-regional cooperation and institutions are yet to be explicated in the following chapters. Regionalization processes among the CA countries can also be understood as a response to the forces of external multilateralism and globalization. CA engaged in a dual-track learning process after independence that involved building a firm and stable sovereign state while adjusting to outside forces and quickly learning the mechanisms of multilateralism after their abrupt exposure to the international market under the strong wave of neoliberalism. This dual process materialized through trade, aid, security cooperation, and social and cultural interactions with countries within and outside the region. The features and quality of collective discourse and institutional arrangements determine the success of institutionalized regional cooperation and how nations deal with external multilateralism. At present, regionalism in CA is still being directed by external guides or forces rather than intra-regionally motivated. This chapter mainly outlined the common historical background of the countries in the region. While delineating the difficulties that each country has faced due to its abrupt independence as a sovereign state, we have identified the pre-existing and emerging region-wide issues, embracing a wide range of security, economic development, and political and social stability. Seemingly, there are more barriers than hopes for regional cooperation among the CA countries; however, the very obstacles may and should establish the grounds for further cooperation.

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In a nutshell, CA’s regionalization during the early period of independence and de-Sovietization in relation to the major powers can be described as an accidental regionalism arising from the common Soviet legacy,—including language, geographical proximity, culture, religion, and customs—, as opposed to a proactive CA-led and CA-focused multilateralism process through interest-sharing and regional identitybuilding. Identifying common interests across members is the first stage of multilateral cooperation. Beyond that, constructing ‘shared’ interests to generate supranational-level mutual benefits may sustain the continuity of regionalization.

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CHAPTER 3

Competing External Multilateralisms and Central Asian Regionalism

Introduction Within the Cold War framework, the Central Asian region as part of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) represented an ideological and political opponent of the West. From the 1970s through the 1980s, Central Asia (CA) underwent a transitional period during the SovietAfghan War and became a significant base of military operations against Western threats to the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean. Despite the historically antagonistic USSR-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) relationship, the geopolitical emergence of the CA region gained significance worldwide. The end of the 1980s brought the termination of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the end of the Cold War. Concurrently, strong interest in CA emerged among the major powers in the NATO bloc. To enter the international community as independent entities, the CA states had to undergo an array of political transformations aimed at democratization. Western allies immediately supported their new courses to democratization. Yet, the presence of the West and its influence on the political, social, and economic processes of CA as a region differed between the first decade of CA independence and into the 2000s, primarily due to growing and fluctuating external influence and interactions with the region.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. BOURDAIS PARK et al., Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0_3

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There are contrasting views on the patterns of great powers’ engagement in the region depending on whether the emphasis is on the role of regional actors at the intra-regional level (Azizov 2017; Stein 2013) or on the disposition and strategy of the great powers (e.g., Bohr 2004; Scott 2013). The former takes a liberal constructive view in line with the new regionalism approach, whereas the latter takes a conservative (neo-)realist view on regional integration. Stein (2013) argues that unlike in Europe, “the return of the colonial powers in Asia delayed the rise of states with independent autonomous decision-making capability and therefore also delayed steps toward regional integration”, ending up with zombie-like institutions (p. 169). Meanwhile, Scott (2013, pp. 31–35) juxtaposes the EU’s multilateralism and China’s multipolarity in building relationships with Asia. Many other scholars and commentators have examined CA regionalism and regionalization and provided various insights (e.g. Cooley 2019; Buranelli 2021; Koch 2014) from a variety of different perspectives. Building upon those previous findings and debates, this book project explores both external and internal grounds that have shaped CA regionalism. This chapter focuses more on external actors’ influence and its interaction with the CA countries, whereas the next chapter discusses more in detail the internal factors. Although it is still in a transitional stage, CA’s regionalization has been more externally imposed so far, based apart from geographical proximity on the states’ common Soviet legacy, linguistic identity, and urgency of building an independent state. The process of de-Sovietization itself is an important basis of regionality and regionalization in CA. In this chapter, we explore the question of how external powers interact with the CA countries as a step toward understanding CA regional identity and regionalism better. As clarified in Chapter 1, the four external powers (i.e., the US, the EU, Russia, and China) are highlighted because they are the four major influencing actors and perceived great powers in the region. Their strategies and the CA countries’ interpretations of these strategies are summarized in Table 3.1.

Engagement of the West in the 1990s The newborn countries of CA in the early 1990s plunged into an abyss of drastic change and had to seek reliable partners in order to survive among their strong neighbors in the north and the south. The EU

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Table 3.1 External actors’ multilateralism policy toward CA External power

Official foreign policy toward CA

Perceived interpretations of the influence

Russia

Promoting explicitly Russian-led multilateralism; combining coercive and soft power tools; Soviet zone; supporting multilateralism in a wider Commonwealth of Independent States with strong Russian leadership Promoting intra-regional multilateralism; emphasis on the formation of regional identity based on values; no hegemon strategy; spreading democracy; strengthening selective bilateralism

Backyard of Soviet zone; security buffer zone against Western power; backyard of Soviet zone; growing antagonism with most fearful but others positivizing the consequences Pivoting as security buffer zone; balancing against Russia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB); bilateralizing CA multilateralism; inconsistent policy; incomplete mission for democratization Economic interests; functionality-focused; softening influence; embedded liberalism; high expectations as reliable partner; more consistent than the US Economic interests with further ambition of comprehensive influence including military, security, and culture; polarized opinion on the role with concerns about the future

US

EU

Promoting EU-funded and monitored intra-regional multilateralism; nurturing civil society-focused development

China

Grouping with like-minded countries; intensifying institutions and enlarging inclusive cooperation at all levels; comprehensive long-term partnership; strategic partnership with other extra-regional powers

and the US participated in designing political and economic structures, lobbying Western-friendly regimes and supporting political institutional renovations in the region during the transition period. Numerous overseas NGOs, other international organizations (IO) and foreign embassies significantly affected both domestic and foreign political processes, especially in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The political intentions of the US went as far as the promotion of the landmark Greater Central Asia project, viewing the region as a long-standing security buffer zone and trading opportunity. The CA states experienced different processes of political transformation. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan had rather different political prospects than the other three for developing their statehood from the very beginning. Strong totalitarian features in Turkmenistan and a long-lasting civil

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war in Tajikistan throughout the 1990s drove their political evolution into different scenarios in combination with other domestic political objectives. They resisted externally imposed democratic advances from which the other three countries have more or less reaped benefits in the process of being part of the international community. In this regard, the first stage of political transition for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent Uzbekistan led to full-fledged support of their sense of sovereignty and political regimes based on newly created constitutions, legitimate election systems, legislative bodies, party systems and civic societies. One aspect of US influence in the CA region in the 1990s was the Nunn-Lugar program, which was funded with US$8.79 billion in exchange for the nuclear non-proliferation of nuclear postSoviet republics (Lugar 2009), from which Kazakhstan gained a large sum of solid foreign investments in the hydrocarbon industry. However, due to the US’ priority shift in dealing with global security problems, the governments and people in CA tend to consider US foreign policy toward CA to be incoherent in spite of continuous engagement in the social and education fields. One interviewee explained such changing strategies: Taking into account the war in Afghanistan as a starting point, the US presence in Central Asia has grown rapidly. The most visible was the military presence. The US and NATO countries established military bases in Central Asia, where military contingents and military aircraft were deployed. The US has played a decisive role in the war in Afghanistan, and its regional security influence exceeds that of other major powers. During the final phase of the war in Afghanistan, Central Asia became the Northern Passage through which the US supported its fighting. With the withdrawal of US military bases and the end of the war in Afghanistan, the US military presence in Central Asia has been significantly reduced. However, this means a return of the situation to its usual state, since the period of the war in Afghanistan was atypical for the US in the region. During the initial period after Trump took office, the US lacked a coherent foreign policy and neglected Central Asia. Since the early 2020s, Washington has begun to pay more attention to Central Asia, and the presence of the US in Central Asia has gradually increased. (Interviewee No. 1)

The US soft power strategies touched upon the education field as well. Since 1993, young people in the region have been trained under the framework of various educational programs. In particular, the Bolashak program is considered one of the most prestigious opportunities for

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college students. Thanks to this and similar programs, Western countries contribute to the education of the future local elite, making it easier to integrate the newly independent states more naturally and effectively into the learning process of Western values and international norms (for a useful analysis of the process of diffusing a country’s norms and policies including the learning process, see Simmons et al. 2006, pp. 795–801). The US also sought to gain a foothold in the educational market of CA countries through the creation of a number of universities such as Kazakh-American University in Almaty and the American University of CA located in Bishkek. In addition to universities, there are numerous US foundations in the region. The US distributes grants through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in order to work with non-governmental structures. USAID issues grants among American NGOs and provides financial assistance, including to the government of the republic, while the NED’s activities are focused on supporting the non-state sector in Tajikistan, primarily local pro-Western public associations and mass media. With two universities and a number of public foundations operating in the region, the US has made significant efforts to build good governance and spread democratic values. However, the US’s attempt to promote their own vision of civil and political processes created difficulties in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the interaction took place mainly at the official level rather than societal level. US funding has the biggest influence in Kyrgyzstan since the political forces there are more multifaceted than in other CA countries with diversification in domestic actors and institutions. The US’s value-driven engagement in capacity building was more in the form of bilateral than multilateral cooperation. Active participation of the West in the CA region in the 1990s fostered pro-Western liberal values in its citizens thanks to the educational and employment opportunities derived from political and economic cooperation and accessibility to the global community, including Western media. Those citizens and civil society groups who are under Western influence still represent an important platform of social networking in monitoring anti-democratic regional affairs in CA and support the main institutions that promote Western liberal values and standards.

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The US’s Changing Strategies and Local Perception of the Decline of Western Power In the 1990s the US presence was idealized and mainly associated with the democratic and marketized development in CA. However, the scope and perceptions of the US presence in the region were dramatically transformed after 2001. The 9/11 attack marked a new vector for the changing US strategies towards the development of the CA region. Afghanistan’s proximity to CA territories led to a wider US presence and deeper engagement in the military, security, and geopolitical aspects of the region. Starting with the 2003 operation in Iraq, the US, with NATO military assistance, operated in the region until NATO troops gradually withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014 during the Obama administration. Many experts have commented that this change in US foreign and military policy made the region more vulnerable, at least in terms of security and military cooperation. CA has received far less attention under Trump. The Taliban’s capturing of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 illustrate that the region is vulnerable to unexpected destabilizing factors. During the first stage of Western influence before 2001, numerous investments in the region were made in view of steadily integrating CA into the world economic community and enthusiastically promoting values compatible with the neoliberal economic order. By contrast, the second stage from 2001 to 2014 featured dramatic reorientations of the CA states due to the fundamental geopolitical changes in world politics including mutual reconsiderations of the strategies and priorities of both CA and the West. Between 2001 and 2014, the major Western powers in the region took new approaches and strategies in CA. In addition, a series of global events affected the CA region directly and indirectly, including the global financial crisis, dramatic shifts in US domestic politics, Russia’s revised foreign policy doctrines, and the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. One of the consequences of the US’s retreat was the Islamic renaissance among the CA countries. There has been moderate sympathy in CA nations for Islam. The confrontation between the US and some Islamic state regimes was revealed during the Arab Spring, when one local regime after another were overthrown. Islamic extremism is a growing factor of insecurity in CA that has the potential to influence the political situation in general, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In this regard, the latent anti-American mood among marginalized groups is likely to spread. Nevertheless, the CA regimes are less religiously orthodox compared to

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the Middle Eastern regimes, therefore their brand of Islam is not as restrictive or dogmatic as in the Middle East. Thus, it has not led to explicit confrontation with the Western values. Despite great efforts by the US and the EU, full-scale democratization in CA has been a total failure. The regimes of the four other countries in the region except Kyrgyzstan have become more totalitarian and are now more sensitive towards unintentional political changes. Regional experts expressed concerns that the gradual withdrawal of Western powers from CA may lead to fairly serious challenges in political, economic, and security spheres for the region. One of our interviews confirmed: I would say that US involvement in the region has definitely declined. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and especially given the emphasis on combatting the spread of Islamic radicalism and the invasion of Afghanistan, the US’s involvement in Central Asia, more specifically Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, was seen as vital to US interests. The urgency of that sort of presence has waned over time … The US alongside the EU maintain some level of interest in promoting the stability of Central Asia for geopolitical reasons, primarily via promoting democratization responding to the demands of citizens including implementation of the rule of law and all other necessary democratic practices. However, Western political influence has declined, in part related to push-back from the region’s autocratic regimes. What remains is a Western desire to create an environment conducive to business investment and the security and the continued development of the energy sector. (Interviewee No. 3)

In the late 2010s, the Trump administration planned to significantly cut US financial aid that used to flow via USAID (Table 3.2), although the situation has gradually returned to the previous level of support since Biden has been in power. Most local experts cite financial cuts as evidence of the decrease of US or EU presence in each country. A Kyrgyz political analyst, Chinara Essengul, noted that social segments such as civic society, democratization, and parliamentary reform in Kyrgyzstan would tremendously suffer from the US’s diminishing role in the country (Begaliyeva 2015). Kazakhstan has tried to overcome the transitional status and the effects of the reduction of external financial supports by a number of initiatives. One of them was KazAID, which targeted financial assistance

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Table 3.2 Reduction of the US financial aid to Central Asia

Country

2017

2018

Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan

44 mil. USD 33 mil. USD 5.88 mil. USD 3.9 mil. USD 6.1 mil. USD

18 mil. USD 17.3 mil. USD 9.8 mil. USD – –

Source USAID (2023)

to least-developed countries such as Afghanistan in an effort to transform Kazakhstan from aid recipient to donor status. In addition, Kazakhstan committed to educate Afghani citizens in technical and vocational education organizations and universities until 2021 (Kosenov 2012). Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Omirtai Bitimov, supported the extension of the 50 million USD Kazakhstan-Afghanistan educational program worth, which was initiated in 2010 to help 1000 Afghan students attend Kazakhstani universities within ten years (Ekimov 2014). Kazakhstan also became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. These initiatives not only further diminish the opportunities for Kazakhstan to receive foreign grants in many needed areas but also increase expectations that Kazakhstan will demonstrate higher levels of political and economic advancement (Mazorenko 2016). Nonetheless, many local intellectuals see this ambition only as a diplomatic bluff as it will only justify further disengagement of the US and Europe in CA, in turn resulting in further deterioration of political accountability with democratic principles. Afterall, the governments of CA reinforced elite-centered mechanisms in development under highly personalized autocracies. US-CA relations enter a new phase. Particularly since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukraine War in 2022, the US under Biden has reinvigorated bilateral and multilateral diplomatic interactions in an effort to strengthen relationships with the region. Toward the end of 2022, the Regional Development Cooperation Strategy (RDCS 2020–2025) by which the US, Afghanistan, and the five CA countries participate in USAID was reviewed and reactivated. The initiative explicitly promulgates its main purposes as accelerating development for the region and supporting key objectives in the U.S. Strategy for the CA region. The five priority areas are energy, trade, transboundary water and environmental management,

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countering violent extremism, and combating human trafficking (USAID 2023). The official US stance on the principle of engagement in the region can be understood from the citation below: The US is developing a timely and far-reaching strategy in Central Asia. As a distant partner, that strategy can play a powerful complimentary role to the initiatives of other regional states such as the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt and possibly others. But it is ultimately the Central Asian states themselves, not any external third party that must make the policy choices that will shape their future. The United States should gently nudge them in the right direction—that is, towards each other. (Kuchins and Kourmanova 2015, pp. 3–5)

The very principle of a partner country’s development of ownership may result in nurturing local perception of a US retreat from the region. The passage below further explains US strategy in the region, supporting stable transition with CA’s own regionalism: [A] new Central Asia strategy to replace the one that was approved in 2015 … includes the very important transition we’ve seen in Uzbekistan where President Mirziyoyev has brought some visionary leadership both to his domestic reforms as well as to his stance towards Uzbekistan’s neighbors. It was driven by what has been the very stable political transition underway in Kazakhstan. And the strategy obviously builds on the opportunities of advancing a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan. … We’ve simply seen a change in attitude towards a regional identity. The Central Asian heads of state convened without the presence of any major powers for the first time in at least a decade in 2018, and then they repeated that session last year. A very important step. So the C5+1 platform, which the United States has long championed, has really emerged I think as a critical, valuable diplomatic tool and an organizing principle for us in the region. (Wells 2020, pp. 5–7 and 30–32)

The above-quoted text reflects the emerging public discourse in the CA region, stressing more on the possibility of moving toward a path of departing from overreliance on external influence.

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The EU’s Influence and Local Perception in Central Asia The EU has evaluated the importance of CA as a strategic gateway to the Asian subcontinent since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the independence of CA countries, the European Commission has been deeply engaged in development assistance along with technical, financial, and institutional aid, opening its first delegation office in CA in 1994 in Almaty, then the capital of Kazakhstan. European partners rapidly developed a presence in the economic, political, security, social, cultural, and legal spheres in CA. Some CA states, especially in the 1990s, looked forward to learning from the construction of political institutions such as Bologna education standards, democratization, human rights, civic society, investments, and trade. From 2014 to 2019, the EU prioritized a number of projects on human rights, social inclusion, gender equality, sustainable development, business leadership, entrepreneurship, and technology in cooperative agendas for CA (European Commission 2020). Funding from various EU organizations has poured into CA, including 1028 million EUR for 2014–2020 (up from 750 million EUR for 2007– 2013) from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which includes both bilateral assistance and regional programs (Paramonov et al. 2017, p. 22). The assistance focused on education, regional security, sustainable management of natural resources, and socio-economic development. The EU has paid special attention to issues such as observing elections and promoting democracy in CA. For instance, the parliamentary elections in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2015 and the presidential election in Kyrgyzstan in 2017 were observed by the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The ODIHR reported election rule violations in Kazakhstan in 2022 (Akhmetkali 2023), but they were unable to proceed with observations in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan because both countries are not only politically closed but also explicitly resistant to any democratic institutions. Thus, authoritarianism, broadly defined, is institutionally embedded in the system, countering the diffusion of liberalism-based multilateralism. The region has suffered from the lack of objective internal evaluations on political processes for a significant period of time. The EU made an effort to implement the rule of law through legal harmonization between the EU and CA countries as “stipulated by the EU as a core tool for the

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promotion of its norms and principles” (Voloshin 2014, p. 31). However, the inter-regional legal convergence has been successful only in some limited domains such as environmental regulations, financial institutions, and cultural exchange. It has not been successful in the political process. Only in December 2019 did Uzbekistan allow the process of observation by the OSCE/ODIHR (Soutullo and Rinaldi 2022, p. 8). Turkmenistan still does not allow such a monitoring process. The CA region’s relations with the EU are closely linked with organizations such as the OSCE and NATO, “which are also seen as representing European interests. After the 2005 Andijan events, relations with these two organisations decreased in importance; the status of the OSCE Centre in Tashkent was reduced to the OSCE Project Coordinator” (Peyrouse 2014, p. 9). In June 2019, the EU endorsed the EU Central Asian Strategy. The scope of the EU’s relations is linked to the readiness of individual CA countries to undertake reforms and strengthen democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary, as well as to modernize and diversify the economy, such as by supporting the private sector and SMEs in particular, in a free market economy. In this context, the EU also welcomed and supported the accession of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, one of the most important EU policy agendas in developing countries which is also most relevant to our theme is its emphasis and support for enhancing multilateral cooperation through institutionalization. Examples characterized by various types of multilateralism include initiatives, projects, programs, platforms, fora, conferences, and organizations. The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program focused on the development of the transport corridor from Europe to CA through the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. Promoting Dialogue to Avoid Disagreements on Issues Related to Water Resources Management in Central Asia was implemented by the Regional Environmental Center for CA. In terms of education, CA receives about 4% of the EU’s international mobility budget, with more than 1000 projects for about 8000 students, researchers, and staff. In addition, the Jean Monet scheme provides projects for partner institutions in CA states (European Commission 2020). Economically, in cooperation with the EU, Kazakhstan provides 8% of European oil imports, and the Trans-Caspian pipeline is planned to eventually supply EU countries with Turkmen gas (Statistical Office of the EU 2020).

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CA states also made attempts to collaborate with the EU proactively in the early 2000s. For example, Kazakhstan developed the state program Path to Europe, which led to Kazakhstan’s holding the 2010 chairmanship in the OSCE, represented by Kanat Saudabayev. Kazakhstan was the first post-Soviet CA country to preside in the European regional organization (Baizakova and Yergesh 2013). The Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA), which covers cooperation in the trade and economic development spheres, was signed by all CA countries except Turkmenistan (Soutullo and Rinaldi 2022, p. 9). With its renewed global strategy, the EU has extended the scope of its engagement in Asia, including CA. In July 2020, the EU, along with the World Health Organisation (WHO), announced the Central Asia COVID-19 Crisis Response Program (CACCR) to supply three million Euros to support building the long-term resilience of the national health systems of the CA region (Soutullo and Rinaldi 2022, p. 1). The main areas of EU assistance and cooperation have been long-term stability, development, and democratization through supporting the rule of law, integrated rural development, education, good governance, and environmental protection (EU 2022). The EU has actively engaged together with various NGOs to address human rights issues in the region. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) identifies significant challenges in Turkmenistan, as the country is rigidly authoritarian, and its cooperation with the EU is limited to bilateral relations in light of the EU’s critical comments on violations of human rights and the lack of democracy (International Partnership for Human Rights 2022). The EU’s multilateral approach toward CA has played its own role in the society of the region. In general, the vicissitudes of the EU’s approach to Asia reflect a norm-based humanitarian approach, economic/ material interests, and an integrated security approach with comprehensive coverage (e.g., human and societal security). Since the 2010s, the EU has pursued a larger global role in a wider context covering broader regions and themes along with geographical expansion (Bourdais Park et al. 2020). In the process of CA regionalisation, the EU has great potential for coherent regional cooperation with CA. However, in face-to-face interviews, local experts describe signs and perceptions of declining EU presence in the region. Nevertheless, CA countries’ expectations of the EU remain high, particularly in terms of the development of civil society

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and social transformation, and the EU’s constant and active involvement is beneficial for the region. These observations are reflected in the following interview excerpts: While the US and the EU maintain an interest in promoting stability in CA for geopolitical reasons, primarily via the promotion of democratic regimes responsive to the demands of citizens, the primacy of rule of law and other such practices, Western political influence has declined, in part related to push-back from the region’s autocratic regimes. What remains is a Western desire to create an environment conducive to business investment and the security and the continued development of the energy sector. (Interviewee No. 2) Europe paid a great deal of attention to CA as a potential region, where actually they could spread the principles of individuals’ rights and freedoms and shape a new democratic system. Again, I am not convinced that this is anymore a priority of the EU due to many other aspects and political events happening in Europe. So, right now, actually the European interest in CA since is more focused on business and specific partnerships defined time by time by specific projects. (Interviewee No. 2) In four countries of the region, the economic and political presence of the EU has reached its maximum and will not increase yet. Against this background, only Uzbekistan looks promising, where, after the opening of the economy, the presence of European countries began to increase. But I would like to point out that the vagueness and lack of intelligible goals were originally laid down in the EU’s strategies, so this result should not be surprising. (Interviewee No. 10)

Another interviewee gave a different interpretation of the EU’s presence in the region: I do not believe that the withdrawal of the Western powers took place. The presence of the West has been preserved, on the horizon of my vision it has moved to another level. If in the cheerful times of the ‘sunset’ the West was clearly manifested in public and public life, now its presence is more and more hidden from public eyes. But nevertheless, it is enshrined in deep documents and agreements, in the dictate of policymakers and design makers, in control over property. Therefore, it became uninteresting for them to focus on interacting with ordinary people, and in the public sphere it seems that there are fewer of them. (Interviewee No. 11)

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The EU certainly paved the way to open CA countries with institutions and infrastructure for long-term development, paying particular attention to assistance in building the private sector and developing civil society, such as education, training, poverty alleviation, trade infrastructure, market mechanisms, and the rule of law. Several factors explain the EU’s relative and perceived disengagement and invisibility in the recent past. First, although the EU’s common external approach is to promote multilateralism through regional cooperation (Scott 2013, pp. 32–43), the fact that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are no longer official development aid recipients has contributed to altering the EU’s regionalized approach in CA, and consequently bilateral relations with individual CA states emerged. Private-sector investments rely much less on the governments’ direction and economic policy. European private corporations are reluctant to continue their business or to increase investment in a country where transparency, security, and stability are in question. Second, the focus of the EU’s engagement in CA has been the areas related to long-term development such as good governance, institutional support, sustainable development, democratization, civil society, and education. Tangible impacts are not immediate, which may lead to the public’s perception of the EU’s relative invisibility. Third, the EU’s value-driven influence has been already embedded in CA society, albeit insufficiently according to the interviews. Due to internal resistance, these value-driven inter-regional relations are limited. An interview confirms this point: Fourth, the EU’s invisibility is linked with the widening roles of China and Russia in CA (Bossuyt 2018, p. 7). These two powers’ visibility has been steadily growing in the region. Some experts argue that Russia explicitly acts a regional hegemon (Gayoso Descalzi 2011). A new geopolitical situation in CA has been established as the new (or renewed) major actors (i.e., Russia and China) are not interested in influencing the region with political or cultural values. Instead, motivated by security and economic affairs, Russia and China became active in certain regional affairs, notably, cooperation in defense areas, energy, infrastructure, and so on. Local intellectuals in CA tend to believe that China and Russia are interested only in reaping material benefits in the region for their own national interests.

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Renewed and Emerging External Powers Russia’s Changing Strategies Russian foreign policy towards CA has developed through several stages. After a long history of Russian presence in the region starting in the mid-eighteenth century and through the Soviet period, the collapse of the USSR brought new tendencies. Mostly, the strategies of the Russian Federation have been dependent on the views and visions of Russian ministers of foreign affairs. During Yeltsin’s presidency (1991–1999), the minister of foreign affairs was Andrei Kozyrev, who held pro-Western views about foreign policy for which he was often criticized. Kozyrev welcomed the principles of alliance in cooperation with Western powers. The foundations of his Western orientation were laid during Gorbachev’s perestroika, with its characteristics of glasnost, liberalism, new thinking, and democratization. Transplanting the Western models of economic, political, and social development based on liberal values, Kozyrev was reluctant to cooperate with the East and paid little attention to the postSoviet CA states. Kozyrev (as well as Gorbachev) eventually left Russia to reside abroad, while rapid and often thoughtless economic liberalization brought oligarchic economic malignancies. The appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as foreign affairs minister in 1996 was welcomed by ruling elites for his clear focus on paying attention to near abroad. For the first time since 1991, Russia expressed its own position on global political issues, such as NATO expansion to the East, the bombing of Yugoslavia, and the US invasion of Iraq. These positions were not recognized by the West, which worsened the relations between the Russian Federation and the West. However, there were positive outcomes of Primakov’s leadership. Among these were new initiatives to strengthen cooperation with the Asian subcontinent, including CA and China. A number of agreements were signed between Russia and the CA3 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Primakov formulated key principles of Russian foreign policy, including improved security cooperation, prevention of multiple ethnic conflicts and monitoring the post-Soviet space. After 2001, Russian foreign policy became multidimensional, broadly focusing on the CIS states for cooperation and partnerships with the EU and other Asian countries. When Russia took an unambiguously disapproving position on the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, no one could have known that the confrontation between the US and Iraq would become

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so severe and long-lasting (Ambrosio 2005, pp. 1189–1190). Both Russia and China were against the invasion, but Putin expressed strong disagreement with the US position at the 2007 Munich Security Conference (Watson 2007). However, starting with Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov, the Foreign Minister during Putin’s presidency, Russia lacked the capacity to conduct and formulate an independent foreign policy path. Russian foreign policy was no longer based on political ideology, but national interests. As of 2023, the minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov represents Russia’s new image in the world as a great power with a leading role in many fields of global politics. Both domestic and foreign policies are administered by Putin, which has affected Russo-CA relations. The effects of these new policies can be characterized as a fraternity-like approach that is rooted in personal friendship between Putin and political leaders in CA. CA’s Russian ties entered a new era with the advent of the RussoUkraine war. The consequences of the war on CA confirmed the undiminished close connection between Russia and CA states in all aspects, namely military, finance, migration, finance, commodities, oil/ gas markets, sports, healthcare, and environmental protection (Satubaldina 2021). Putin’s pressure on the confirming renewed alliance has been not only through reinforcing bilateral ties between Russia and individual countries (Xinhua News Agency 2022)1 but also through reinvigorating Russo-CA (region-to-state) hybrid linkage (BBC News 2022; Walker and Bisenov 2022). Russian expectations of CA’s individual and collective support grow while fear and concerns vis-à-vis Russia increase among the CA states and people. The general public in Kazakhstan felt threatened and the economic impact was immediate with the abrupt depreciation of the Kazak currency (tinge) followed by prompt government measures to minimize the effects (Kumenov 2022). On social media, Russians, Kazakhs, and Ukrainians engaged in discussion and exchanged confrontational messages. Pro-Putin Russian journalists and experts made provocative remarks about Northern Kazakhstan and instigated populist claims that Russia should punish

1 ‘Kazakhstan, Russia seek to strengthen cooperation’ (Xinhua, November 29, 2022). It reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kazakh counterpart, KassymJomart Tokayev, signed a cooperation document strengthening their diplomatic ties. The document contains 37 articles that stipulates efforts to deepen bilateral cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, defense, culture, education, health care, youth and sports.

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Kazakhstan for its ‘betrayal’ in showing intentionally lukewarm attitudes toward the Ukrainian question. Local intellectuals commented that ordinary citizens’ fearful concerns were not groundless considering Russia’s past military interventions in the post-Soviet zone. These concerns related to the annexation of Crimea after pro-democracy protests known as Maidan Uprising in 2014 were not limited only to Ukraine. The Kremlin offered support to the Belarusian dictator, Aleksandr G. Lukashenko, as he violently crushed peaceful protests against his autocratic rule in 2020. Russian troops are stationed in Transnistria and the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh as “peacekeeping forces,” but in practice the Russian military supported Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russian troops are present in parts of Georgia and Abkhazia for so-called special strategic operations which are ongoing in Ukraine (Hopkins and Nechepurkenko 2022). Responding to the question of the feasibility of intra-regional cooperation under the renewed and increasing great power rivalries in the region, one interviewee notes that: External players are always needed because development in isolation from the world is impossible. The stronger the position of strategic competitors in the region, the more the external powers will be interested in maintaining their value in the region and in investing in the region. As for intraregional (meso-regional) integration, there is still a lot of room for development, the peoples of CA remain more disunited today than most of their history. (Interviewee No. 4)

Another interviewee’s view from Tajikistan is worth noting regarding Russia’s position in CA in relation to intra-regional integration. Most of the interviewees use the terms, regional cooperation and regional integration interchangeably. They usually mean the EU and the ASEAN as examples of regional integration in their minds: I am not entirely skeptical about CA integration, but at the moment, Tajikistan is more inclined to cooperate with Russia than with neighboring states. The fact is that Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia, and for a long time after the collapse of the USSR, the country had problems with its neighbors Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Russia has for years provided military equipment, soldiers, and training to the military in Tajikistan to protect the border with Afghanistan. Despite the fact that not only Russia but also China is helping militarily, the people are more prone to

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trust and choose Russia. Russia is also the main destination for labor migration, which also strengthens relations between the countries. This relationship provides many opportunities for Tajik citizens, such as dual citizenship and accelerated acquisition of this citizenship. (Interviewee No. 13)

Multilateralism between authoritarian countries may function differently from neoliberal institutionalist or conventional functionalist models, implicitly accepting a hierarchical hegemonism (e.g., Kazakhstan and China) or distancing from the club (e.g., Turkmenistan). From a liberal point of view, multilateralism and authoritarianism are inherently conflicting as multilateralism loses its core connotation of a cooperative win–win approach among states if the members’ domestic hierarchical political culture is extended to foreign affairs.

China’s Growing Interest in Central Asia In the 1990s, China was in the process of achieving the strategic goal of gradually moving from the position of a regional power to the status of global power. In this process, China began to consider CA as a vital bridgehead for expanding its westward influence. “China recognized the Central Asian states in December 1991 and as early as January 1992, China and the Central Asian states began to exchange communiques of full diplomatic exchanges” (Swanstrom 2005, p. 575). Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, China’s interaction with CA was rather scattered and fragmented, starting with the attempt to delimit the adjacent territorial borders and provision of security guarantees to CA states. Since the early 2000s, Chinese interests in CA have diversified and transformed into well-established regional strategic directions in the domains of energy resources and the effective use of the region as a transit corridor. These interests highlight legitimate engagement in regional affairs, notably antiextremism and anti-separatism to prevent radical Islamic movements in CA. One Belt One Road (OBOR), renamed the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), reflects the complex economic and security issues in shaping the direction of Sino-CA relations and China’s economic and financial engagement to deepen its partnerships as a strategically giant partner (Popov 2016; Ayelbayev et al. 2015). In the process of China’s entry as a new player in the region, competition between Russian investors and Chinese companies in the CA market is especially conspicuous in the energy sector (Dadabayeva and Kuzmina 2014, pp. 32–47). Partly due

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to the rise of competition, some Russian experts have re-emphasized the necessity of Russia’s constant presence in CA, embracing this agenda as part of the regionalization process under their idea of a ‘Greater Eurasia’ (Paltsev 2018, p. 136). China’s influence has been steadily strengthened via its own multilateralism strategy, which includes the development of infrastructure to increase opportunities to develop transport corridors and general logistics capacity for trade in all CA countries. As China’s ambition for institutionalizing multilateralism goes global (Johnson 2021), its instrumental core has been rapidly expanding issue-wise and inclusive member-wise. CA is only part of China’s ambition to expand multilateralism although the region serves (or has the potential to serve) various aspects of China’s instrumental purposes including border security, transportation, trade, and energy. The other strength of China’s presence in CA is linked with the growing influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organizatio (SCO) (Lohschelder 2017, pp. 104–112; Semyonova 2017). Originally established in 1992 to deal with border security-related issues, the SCO currently operates in multi-level economic, security, and political spheres with a large budget pool, permanent secretariats, and ambitious projects. Other similar institutions that reflect China’s multilateralism in the CA context include the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWEC). In spite of growing concerns about China’s rapid and powerful presence in CA, infrastructural development projects by China in CA have not interfered with other regional projects such as ‘New Silk Road’ or ‘Eurasian Integration’ (Ayelbayev et al. 2015). The infrastructural development plan also correlates to Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol program, which launched a number of projects related to infrastructure, logistics, knowledge-intensive industries, high-tech sectors, industry, and agriculture (Zhou 2017). According to a report from the office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2020), the implementation of Nurly Zhol contributed to building new highways and creating new jobs in local markets, which is estimated as a main contributing factor to the 16% economic growth in Kazakhstan. The program offers local businesses new opportunities to operate effectively via various logistical benefits, meanwhile contributing to the social development, including 108 high schools and 19 kindergartens. Sea access has been actively explored as

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well for opening new terminals and increasing the transportation export of local goods, for example, several terminals with the load power of more than 1.5 million tons. By 2021, Nurly Zhol had also assisted in renovating local airports, improving logistical and transportation activities. As observed in Figs. (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3), compared with the US and Europe, since the mid-2010s, the trade volume has increased between China and CA, in particular Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, although some fluctuation is also noticeable. The figures also show the disparities among CA countries in trade activities with the three counterparts and overall stagnation of the countries except Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan although the statistical data on Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are often inaccurate and unreported. It may still be premature to define the nature and consequences of China’s multilateralism in CA in a comprehensive and accurate way as it is still evolving and represents a mixture of many approaches, including selective multilateralism, an Asia-first approach and the globalism school (see Scott 2013, pp. 39–40). A growing stream of literature examines China’s institutionalized multilateralism to understand and theorize its nature, final vision, and impacts on partner countries’ long-term prosperity. There is a skeptical or more cautious view of China’s so-called Angolan model of loan schemes in the extractive and mining sectors Trade Volumes of the Five Central Asian Countries with China from 1995 to 2020 30000000.00

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0.00 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

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Fig. 3.1 Trade volume between China and Central Asia (1995–2020) (Sources World Integrated Trade Solution 2022)

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Fig. 3.2 Trade volume between the US and Central Asia (1995–2020) (Source World Integrated Trade Solution 2022)

Fig. 3.3 Volume of trade between EU countries and Central Asia (1995–2020) (Source World Integrated Trade Solution 2022)

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in CA. Under this scheme, loans are provided on the condition that they are repaid in the form of natural resources (Adibayeva and Saari 2017; Bossuyt 2019). “The Chinese approach to the region is very different from its rivals. For example, the Chinese will give loans in exchange for shares in local companies or build large and small infrastructure networks in poorer countries of the region, such as Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” (Interview No. 7). On the other hand, optimistic or pragmatic views argue that the recipient areas are not passively accepting this kind of arrangement without interactive negotiations with China (Bitabarova 2018; Qoraboyev 2018; see also China’s reaction to the criticism of the Angolan model in the case of Sri Lanka published in Global Times ).2 Together with the wide variations in the standard of living and levels of economic development among the CA countries, China has been an increasingly unpredictable variable in the future development of CA. Public attitudes oscillate between Sinophilia and Sinophobia among decision-makers and the general public alike (Zhou 2017). “The fact [is] that there are probable mutual advantages, from both China and the CA perspectives, of tightening their connections, but at the same time there is not such a level of trust to develop deeper in their relations which the governments would like to establish (Interviewee No. 2). A major issue has been the structural relations between China and CA countries that have gradually resulted in the reduction of domestic production in CA and the creation of various unequal partnerships (e.g., Dave and Kobayashi 2018). This consolidation of structural arrangements provides China with easier access to the enormous natural resources in the region while the countries in CA continue importing manufactured goods from China at high prices (Miller 2017). More and more CA experts express concerns about the rapid rise of Chinese capital in the regional economies that may pull local markets into constant debt and political dependence on Beijing. Some of them are as extreme as forecasting the yuan to perform as an active currency, pressing the dollar and Euro in the region (“Expert: The Euro and the Yuan” 2021). In our survey, the absolute majority of

2 For China’s explanations on the criticism of debt traps via BRI, see ‘Chinese FM denounces ‘debt trap’ accusation’ (Global Times, 28 March 2023) https://www.global times.cn/page/202303/1288132.shtml; ‘Sri Lanka crisis shows risk of US sanctions to developing nations’ (Global Times, 13 April 2023) https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202 204/1259247.shtml.

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the respondents (95%) believe that China’s presence in CA is gradually increasing year by year since the 2000s. A skeptical view is predominant: 70% believe that China’s presence is unlikely to have positive effects on the long-term development of CA. In addition, increasing Sinophobic expressions can also be seen in various CA social groups, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Activists organize occasional protests and engage in heated debates in social networks such as Facebook and Instagram (Musabayeva 2019). In 2016, a series of civil protests took place in several Kazakhstani cities. Among the various agendas, the amended regulations on renting lands to foreigner’s inflamed local populations where Chinese migrant communities had settled, evoking anti-Chinese sentiments among the protesters. Intense anti-Chinese protests also occurred in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2019. These were related to numerous issues, such as citizenship for Chinese immigrants, questioning the rationale of taking on large debts to China, deporting illegal Chinese immigrants from Kyrgyzstan, stopping issuance of labor permission for Chinese potential immigrants, scrutinizing local enterprises that invite Chinese business actors, and forbidding marriage registrations with Chinese spouses (Panfilova 2019). Meanwhile, from the Chinese perspective, reducing its energy dependence on the Middle East would allow Beijing to complete yet another task in its CA axis of priorities, since all the branches of the CAChinese pipeline go through the territory of two or more countries in the region. The pipelines operated by companies such as KazTransOil, CNODC, Atasu-Alashankou, and Kenkiyak-Kumkol are at present effectively controlled by the governments of Kazakhstan and China (Kazakhstan-China Pipeline 2023). Within the frameworks of CA-China hydrocarbon projects, the gas pipeline between Turkmenistan (bordering Uzbekistan) and China’s XUAR (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) was built in 2007 and is operating at present (Hydrocarbons Technology 2020). It is still a matter for speculation whether the ambitious comprehensive package of inter-state development agendas will be fully materialized (Chow 2020, pp. 10–11). At the same time, China’s strategy towards CA is often expressed through the prism of Pax Sinica (Umarov 2020), although the local perceptions and evaluations on China’s increasing presence demonstrate a mixture of hopes and concerns. The two interview excerpts below are self-explanatory:

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In the process of CA regional cooperation and regionalization, China has been the leading external power. China is the leader in regional cooperation with CA, largely outpacing investments of Russia and other engaged players. Turkmenistan is no exception. Until 2019, China was the country’s only customer and given the economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID19 outbreak, Ashgabat becomes dependent on foreign financing more than ever. Over 90% of its total gas export goes to China only partially for cash with the rest in lieu of earlier Chinese loans. Over the last two decades, Chinese involvement became more vibrant, structured, and acknowledged by others; it is engaged in infrastructure projects, economic cooperation, and increasingly the security sphere, including selling military equipment. (Interviewee No. 8) The presence of China is very clear: we are its neighbors, so China will continue interacting with us. The world powers and its close neighbors are the top priorities in Chinese foreign policy, so we will receive good attention. We directly influence the security of the XUAR [Xinxiang Uygur Autonomous Region], therefore China is interested in the stability of our region. China’s influence has increased dramatically, however, and transformed into political influence among the elite and a large increase in China-phobia among the general public. This is due to the fact that China provides tied loans, which are used to purchase the services of Chinese companies and goods, as well as imposing loans on non-priority projects from Central Asia’s point of view. But at the same time, investment and purchase of goods in the region improves the overall economic situation in our countries. It is especially good that the problem of gas transit has been resolved, which has made it possible to solve the gas supply to South Kazakhstan and partly to Kyrgyzstan. Since China is only interested in gas and uranium but nothing else. But it supports the region’s economy. Access to its market is an advantage as access to the US market used to be. (Interviewee No. 10)

A noteworthy change since the Biden administration took office in the US is the rising competition of multilateral institutionalization across the globe. China consolidates its multilateral diplomatic tools beyond a mercantilist expansionist approach. In dealing with the relations among the great powers in CA, Saul (2013), for example, described China’s enthusiasm for implementing multilateralism through institutionbuilding. “The striking feature of contemporary Chinese foreign policy is not how comparatively aloof China remains from international legal norms, but how quickly it has integrated itself into them” (p. 84).

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Since February 2022, the world media has highlighted China’s reaction to Russia’s invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine. Beijing has taken a neutral stance or a self-claimed mediator’s role without explicitly supporting either side (i.e., US/Ukraine or Russia/Belarus). Nonetheless, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a China-led multilateral institution (26% of whose shares are held by the government of China), agreed to stop providing financial support or development loans destined for Russia and Belarus in early March 2022, immediately after the West established US/UN-led sanctions on Russia on February 27, 2022 (Bermingham 2022; “U.S. Pressures China” 2022). By contrast, in bilateral Russo-Chinese relations, Beijing has confirmed that China would maintain normal trade and diplomatic relations with Russia, emphasizing sovereignty and warning against internationally mobilized populist discourse against one side. Any revisions to these two countries’ bilateral security and economic relations will directly and indirectly affect the CA region. At the beginning of his third presidential term, President Xi emphasized the quality of national modernization, referring to a new phase of modernization for national rejuvenation focusing on the people and human rights, new patterns of development, industrial transformation, and reducing gaps between cities and between cities and countryside. In line with Beijing’s global vision for developing countries, Xi’s New Year speech on SinoAfrican relations clearly articulated China’s ambition and its view of multilateralism, stating that “Africa needs to borrow this lesson from China on promoting ease of doing business and reducing the exorbitant taxes currently burdening the investors to foster regional reintegration and ensure the success of the African Continental Free Trade Area” (Zhang and Chen 2023, para. 4). Likewise, Xi’s first foreign visit since the pandemic travel restrictions were lifted was to attend the 22nd annual meeting of the Council of Heads of State held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on 16 September 2022. In a speech entitled “Ride on the Trend of the Times and Enhance Solidarity and Cooperation to Embrace a Better Future,” Xi stressed the SCO as a new path for the development of international organizations that would embody “the Shanghai Spirit, namely

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mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations and pursuit of common development”.3 Accordingly, human, social, and environmental matters are incorporated, if not yet implemented, in the official functions and activities of all major China-led inter-governmental organizations.

Region’s Shared Problems and Perceptions of the Involvement of External Powers Participation in the institutionalized process of regionalization is not involuntary, although it may be impractical for the CA states not to be engaged in the multilateral cooperative institutions led by powerful states. Not all CA countries are keen to participate in the external power-led regional cooperation in CA. In diplomatic interactions with external and internal partner states within the CA region, Turkmenistan traditionally adheres to neutrality, refusing to actively participate in any regional integration blocs. Nevertheless, there were changes in foreign policy leading to the improvement of certain bilateral and multilateral relations with its neighbors when Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov came to power. For example, the New Caspian Sea Agreement signed on August 12, 2018, demonstrates that cooperation in the region is still achievable (“Convention on Caspian Sea’s Legal Status” 2018). Tajikistan, due to a number of problems and difficulties, is open for cooperation with all major powers and ready to accept economic support from Beijing, Washington, and Moscow. After the Andijan events in Uzbekistan in 2005 and the second revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, both countries’ attitudes to the US changed from very friendly to cool (Kendzior 2007, pp. 317–332; Nichol 2010, p. 11). This change led to a rapprochement between Tashkent and Bishkek with Moscow, which further accelerated the shrinking of the US’s role in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan adheres as much as possible to a multi-vector strategy in foreign policy and endeavors not to take sides in any conflicts (Mukanov 2014). Some local experts expressed their vision on regional cooperation which is in line with the integrationist views in regionalism studies. 3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (16 September 2022) https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220 916_10767162.html.

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It seems that we need to seriously think about the project about the possibility of the Central Asian countries joining the global trend of regionalization and their unification under a single political body. (Interviewee No. 7) There is a need for more social cooperation between countries, which will greatly benefit the region. Water management, pollution, migration, and ethnic disputes are likely to be solved if social cooperation between countries is more developed, because these are the main cross-border problems that affect all CA countries. In terms of security, after the Afghan crisis and the revolutions of the Arab Spring, the region has already taken a step toward integration to secure itself and protect itself from terrorism, and I think they are doing a good job. But the future cannot be foretold, nor can I say that these actions are stable. (Interviewee No. 14)

Security-wise, the reduced presence of Western countries after the closure of the mission in Afghanistan may increase the risks in the field of security (Villasenor et al. 2013, pp. 26–30), as seen in the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent political turmoil which is highly likely to raise security alerts in CA. While hardcore security issues are re-emerging in CA due to the Taliban’s seizure of the Afghan government, the security-related discourse is more about the Taliban’s negative impacts on the CA countries rather than any security risks between CA countries. This demonstrates that among CA countries, there is some level of consensus and trust-building on security issues although individual countries’ diplomatic positions toward the Taliban vary. While the necessity of more coherent intra-regional cooperation has been much discussed, experts admit that the presence of external power in CA is unavoidable for all aspects of regional issues, security, economic growth, and social welfare. “External players are needed, because they create markets, investments, employment, humanitarian cooperation, and so on. You can’t do without them at all” (Interview No. 10). However, speculations on the feasibility of institutionalized cooperation vary: In my opinion, the main obstacle to integration is not the continuation of disputes over borders, shared resources in the region, or other problems, but most likely the lack of desire of the leaders of the countries of the region to work through a supranational body. Without regional cooperation, the potential border disputes will remain a long and painful process for all countries in the region. Unfortunately, despite the official discourse

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on the development of regional cooperation, little has been done to resolve problems in our region. Latent hostility, mistrust and divergence of interests between the elites and even between the peoples of CA continue. (Interviewee No. 7)

The presence of radicalized, fundamentalist, and extremist religious groups creates a wide array of risks and challenges for the internal and border security of CA countries (Biard 2016). Internally, there has been an obvious trend of more autocratic forms of government that fosters a certain social stability on the one hand (except in Kyrgyzstan, where some political freedoms are still preserved), but on the other hand leads to further distance from democratic values and standards, decreases the pluralism of thinking, exterminates healthy competent opposition, and so forth (McGlinchey 2015). In the social sector, educators are concerned about the lack of state support for education, and experts believe that education is one of those issue areas where regional cooperation can be accelerated: CA countries can deepen cooperation in higher education. Mutual recognition of higher education qualifications, certification of scientific education personnel in the region, and accelerated exchanges between teachers and students in the region. This is conducive to the cultivation of talents in Central Asian countries. (Interviewee No. 15)

During the Soviet era, for example, preschool programs such as nurseries, kindergartens, and school education were subsidized by the state, including vocational and higher education. Abrupt decreases in educational support from Western donors and the rise of non-democratic powers in the region have redirected the development path in all CA countries, leaving the younger generation on their own for their educational development, also due to the national governments’ lack of investment in education. At the civil society level, local intellectuals emphasize regional cooperation in the education sector, specifically increasing the literacy level of their citizens. Since independence, several regional educational institutions have been established, such as Bilim-CA (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), the University of Central Asia under the Aga-Khan Foundation (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan), and American University of Central Asia, whose mission is to promote democratic transformation in the region. Kazakhstani institutions such as KIMEP

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University, AlmaU, Nazarbayev University, and others took the exceptional opportunity to enter the US-funded system and have tried to meet internationalization requirements so that students can benefit from scholarships. Education is one of the fields where the outcome of foreign assistance in CA is tangible and seen as a positive outcome of external donors’ competitions in the region: We can see that a new generation of young people are slowly but surely joining political echelons at least in some states of the region. Thus, competition over offering more education opportunities might eventually affect the political composition and direction of the region. At different points, education exchange and scholarship programs of one or another player prevailed in the region, with Russia maintaining its positions due to language and historical bounds, the EU and the US programs appealing but requiring English language proficiency besides high admission scores, and lately China offering language courses all over the region and stipends to study in China, which both is good for further economic ties and building better understanding of the country within CA. Turkey was among the first outsider to come to the region after the USSR’s break up but lost its position to other players and eventually was able to keep schools only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Interviewee No. 8)

The EU has developed a new strategy for cooperation in the educational sector with the countries of CA (European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019), making education a priority of its new program for the region (Peyrouse 2019). This could be done by providing students from CA countries with grants to study in European universities, implementing joint educational programs, or creating a European University in CA. In the developing world, investment in human capital plays a significant role in the economic development of the region by enhancing the quality of human resources to contribute to higher production and economic growth in the long run. Well-planned intra-regional cooperation certainly helps to address common social issues such as education and employment along with other citizens’ welfare issues. Scholars on CA regionalism often use the ASEAN as a relatively successful model of achieving coherent cooperation in the Asian context (e.g., Paramonov 2019). The EU plays a large role in supporting intra-regional cooperation among ASEAN countries,

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consistently influencing them with its clear position of promoting multilateralism. Since independence, CA state leaders, especially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have made efforts to lead the region, but some experts criticize the EU’s overemphasis on trade and seeking business opportunities for private sector interests of their member countries rather than seeking a concerted regional cooperation strategy (Muminov 2018). A general tendency is that depending on the policy and strategy of the influencing external powers, the countries’ demands and expectations for the interactions also vary as admittedly those external powers have their own interests to fulfil: The external powers engage in closer cooperation only if they see it fit their strategic objectives. Limited regional cooperation driven by pragmatic objectives, in my mind, is better than the shaky idea of Central Asian integration. Whether CA states want it or not, external powers such as Russia, China, or the US will be present in the region. The question is whether CA authorities can turn the interference of those actors to their own advantage. (Interviewee No. 6)

Escalating tensions among the major great powers have affected their bilateral relations with CA. Not only the bilateral relations but also the external powers’ relations among themselves are important variables to explain the dynamics of the region in terms of security, economic development, and social interactions. Strengthening rivalries may accompany potential conflicts but on the surface, strategic partnership or division of labor among the major extra-regional powers outside CA would be better descriptions of the structure of power relations. In addition, the fact that the individual CA states have developed different attitudes towards Russia and the US makes regional security more complicated and unpredictable. From the neoliberal point of view, responses to the growing external hegemonic influence in the region may result in one of two paths: enhanced intra-regional cooperation toward tighter economic integration led by an internal leader or individual states’ expansion of outwardlooking globalization with acceleration of market integration. These paths form a sprawl of various types of inter-regional and global institutions and organizations connecting with the outside world. Both paths are observable with the rising tension and deeper engagement of external powers in the region. In fact, regional governance and international or global governance may be mutually reinforcing (Kacowicz 2018) depending on

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the issue area. By contrast, from the realist point of view, the phenomenon of band-wagoning may emerge in the process of regionalization, possibly along with the rise of a regional hegemon. This path can further divide the region, which already has multilayered political and social cleavages within it. Neither of the two phenomena, clear band-wagoning or a rise of regional hegemon, has been clearly observable in CA. This is partly due to the US policy toward the region which, unlike US policy in other regions, did not support the rise of a regional hegemon. The rivalry of powerful partners in CA reflects the current feature of multipolarity in international relations and also provides options for multilateralism rather than pushing CA countries to choose and follow only one of the powers. “The situation in Central Asia seems to be developing into a new version of the Great Game that was played out between Great Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century in Central Asia” (Swanstrom 2005, p. 581; See Cooley 2012, p. 5 for discussions on the Great Game metaphor.). This situation may be comparable to that of other regions the US and China have influenced with a clear and exclusive bipolarity, notably in other parts of Asia, including Northeast, South, and Southeast Asia. Russia and the EU still play a role of preventing bipolarized external hegemonism in the region through constantly cross-balancing one another.

Conclusion The main purposes of this chapter were to explore the dynamic changes in external powers’ engagement in the region and to analyze by what forces and in what forms such changes contribute to the multilateral regionalization process among the five CA countries by shaping and reshaping regionality. Each main chapter of this volume is structured in the way main factors or variables that contribute to regionalization process can be explored and discussed. While exploring how and to what extent regionalism has been processed in interaction with external actors, the necessity and motivations for regional cooperation, constraints on maintaining well-functioning intra-regional institutions, and features of CA regionalism are explained and analyzed. Employing our analytical framework explained in Chapter 1 to recap the main discussions in this chapter, in terms of the countries’ positionality stemming from historical political and economic power-relations, relatively weaker countries such as CA visà-vis the four great powers have faced concerns over manipulation and

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exploitation rather than over how to consolidate cooperation. Lacking financial and technical know-how on the process of systematic and cohesive long term institutionalized cooperation, the region has heavily relied on externally imposed multilateralism (s). Therefore, linking with the second element, CA regionalism demonstrates passive re-regionalization although this does not mean that such regionalism is forced. The third element, functionality in the process of economic, social, or political cooperative activities, and the fourth element, setting a norm or vision led by a regional power or a leader will be discussed in the following chapter. Based on the Soviet Union’s loose geographical and administrative categorization of the region, the Western powers’ multilateralism influenced the building of regionality in CA before the 9/11 attack and the securitization of the terrorism-altered zone. While the core nature of Western multilateralism waned, a new external regional leader or hegemonic power, China, together with renewed strong influence from Russia have become deeply reshaped the region, resulting in competition over external and conflicting multilateralisms. The reaction from the CA states to these dynamics so far has been to exhibit diverse forms of regionality and intra-regional regionalism that are still fluid and unfixed; nevertheless, some level of cooperation has been going on in a selective and cautious manner. As there is no regional hegemonic power as such within the CA region, leaving those countries in a loose cluster rather than ‘divide and rule’ has been more effective for all players. In the absence of power struggles among CA states despite the great disparities in economic development and political culture, the direction and strategies of the great powers are not pronounced. Likewise, the CA countries’ policy reactions to pressing institutionalized multilateral engagements by the external powers are not yet clearly pronounced in terms of establishing a shared vision for regional development. In this regard, all aspects of regionalization in CA are under construction, revealing the hybrid and fluid nature of regionality in the course of forming a regional governance structured by various types of inter-governmental interactions.

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CHAPTER 4

Interactive Evolution and Implementation of Regionalism

Introduction Prominent problems in the Central Asian (CA) region that require multilateral cooperation include an array of issues from security to social and cultural domains. Some of these are potential territorial disputes, ecological degradation, preventing terrorism, economic cooperation, and social development. Although most of the interviewees agreed with the necessity of further cooperation, barriers to enhancing cohesive regionalism are numerous. Experts on the region have provided explanations of the barriers such as the tendency of CA states to over-rely on major external powers in their foreign policy orientations and bypass their CA neighbors (Malysheva 2020), the region’s volatile and conflict-prone features evidenced in a number of border conflicts, the lack of commonly agreedupon principles and the notable ethnic and national components in the controversial territorial border demarcation, such as in the Fergana valley (De Haas 2016), and the historically groundless demarcation of the current territories that makes sovereignty of the countries in the region unstable. Politically, regime security is the fundamental common concern as the leaders of the CA countries are still apprehensive about legitimately maintaining their power and sovereignty domestically. Therefore, experts, commentators, and local people alike tend to believe that it is premature to discuss transnational cooperation within the region seriously. Meanwhile, there is also an emerging consensus on the benefits of regional © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. BOURDAIS PARK et al., Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0_4

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cooperation in some areas that are directly linked to enhancing ordinary people’s quality of life in the region. In particular, transboundary environmental issues have arisen for a decade now. Tensions and conflicts are also reflected in contention over hydro energy as another form of confrontation reflecting territorial disputes between CA states. Today, the independent states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are unable to solve problems related to disputed enclave territories that are of strategic importance for each of them to manage the water resources they need for local agriculture, farming, and pastures (Valieva 2021). Protests in Karakalpakstan demonstrate the resistance of the Karakalpak population to constitutional amendments that prevent them from emigrating from Uzbekistan (Venkina 2022). These territorial and water disputes are among many prominent regionspecific issues that can be resolved only through enhanced region-wide cooperation. Addressing the main research questions of how and by what forces or motivations regionalism in CA has evolved as external power-led passive multilateralism, we primarily discuss the spread of institutionalized cooperation in the region, focusing on evidence of inter-governmental interactions and the fundamental limitations of regionalism. We divide this discussion into three parts, namely, the security, economic, and social arenas. Next, we explore the source of the emerging shared interests among CA states and the alienation of civil society in the process of regional cooperation. In addition to de-Sovietization and the patterns of interaction with external powers, the third main contributor to CA regionalization is the growing number of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in the region. These organizations are the focus of this chapter, which also highlights the interactive-ness among actors and institutions. The motivation of state leaders to cooperate with external powers’ rapid building of multilateralism in or including CA is closely linked with the desires to consolidate their authoritarian power and nurture solidarity among themselves. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the features and meaning of regionalism in CA.

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Regional Cooperation and the Limits of Institutionalized Regionalism The newly independent countries of CA had to adapt to completely different political, economic, and security realities and be acknowledged by the major world powers and international organizations. To be accepted, the new states had to meet the special conditions. For example, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus had to remove the nuclear arsenals that were installed in their territories during the Soviet era. One of the major reasons for Kazakhstan to disarm its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s was to acquire worldwide recognition of its sovereignty and quickly build a peace-loving image in the international arena. By paying the high price of denuclearization and joining nonproliferation agreements, Kazakhstan received significant development funds together with security guarantees from the main players in the international scene. In the context of a rather sensitive nuclear situation in South Asia (China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan as nuclear powers) and Eurasia in general (Russia and Iran as nuclear powers), the idea of making CA a nuclear-free space perfectly matched the strategic plans of Western countries. Previous research on nuclear politics tends to describe this process of denuclearization as a passive acceptance of external pressure. Bourdais Park and Chung (2022) offered a different angle, highlighting the willingness of Kazakh leadership to proactively denuclearize by exploring the internal struggles of decision-making in the context of domestic and regional politics. In this process, the seed of CA regional security cooperation came to fruition in the declaration of CA as a nuclear-free zone. The first attempt to institutionalize intra-regional CA cooperation was discussed as early as 1991 and materialized in the form of the Central Asian Union (CAU) in 1994. The CAU started with the CA3 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) and was primarily concerned with matters related to security and the economy. Tajikistan could join only as an observer in 1996 as the country was in the middle of chaos due to its civil war (1992–1997) while Turkmenistan opted for isolation. As a security body, the CAU established a Council of Defence Ministers, and actual training exercises were held under the UN aegis in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1997. This cooperation process through the CAU was attempted in parallel with Russia’s re-regionalization of Soviet Middle Asia under another broader integration process via the Commonwealth

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Independent States (CIS). The CAU was renamed the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) and thereafter several attempts made by CA leaders to revive the CAU/CACO but in vain till the early 2000s. In the following sections, we explore the architecture of competition among state actors through institutionalizing multilateralism. Intra-regional Security Dynamics and Cooperation Within a few years of independence, a seemingly effective security structure was established that was not financially costly for the newly independent countries in the CA region. This structure addressed existing regional security concerns by means of collective security agreements with neighboring Russia through institutional membership in the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This dual alliance served as a sort of security arch for the whole region. In the beginning of the 1990s, geopolitical rivalry between major powers in the region and beyond over the Caspian Sea was considered by some experts as a campaign for new resources’ trophy. In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski (1997) made a useful comparison between the contemporary CA and the Balkans, in many ways due to the competition for its extensive hydrocarbon reserves. Brzezinski called CA the ‘Eurasian Balkans’ because of the similarities between these regions in the context of geopolitical historical processes. For example, both regions are at the crossroads of different cultures and have a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population. In addition, both regions were and remain areas of strategic importance, important for international trade and energy. These factors influenced the political processes and foreign policy of the countries of both regions. By 2009, a gradual exodus of US troops from the region began, dictated by the new world and regional geopolitical situation in which Russia and China competed to displace the Western powers’ interests in CA. While the US and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) had well established their security strategy concerning CA within the Greater CA Project, Russia lacked a coherent approach in fighting the ‘three evils’ of extremism, terrorism, and separatism in the region although the agenda was jointly adopted and signed by the heads of all member states of the SCO (SCO Charter 2002; Wang and Kong 2019).

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These security dynamics may offer a chance for the West to diversify their oil and gas resource suppliers and be less dependent on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Such engagement of Western countries in the Caspian Sea region in the beginning of independence was supported by multiple investments and pipeline project proposals from the US and EU, especially in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan since they were particularly willing to cooperate. Since the 2000s, however, the economic constituent of Caspian Sea development has been shadowed by security complications that contributed to the growing militarization of the Caspian Sea in the last decade. The increased Russian naval presence in the Caspian Sea area of Russia and Iran has caused Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to militarize even more for the sake of power balance. Such a balance, however, is a rather fragile peace-guarantor for the Caspian basin. The escalation of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, with Caspian Azerbaijan demanding the return of disputed territories by force, illustrates the point. Again, the relevant question is whether the existing security structures of the new regional actors are able to guarantee the security of the region and moderate the existing military risks. Amid the enduring tensions in the region, a series of watershed security issues emerging in or near the region in the beginning of the 2020s have exacerbated the fundamental concerns about the already complicated security dynamics in CA. These include the Taliban’s seizure of Afghanistan, an unprecedented internal uprising in Kazakhstan in January 2022, and Russo-Ukraine warfare since February 2022. As the issues of Afghanistan and the unrest in Kazakhstan had more direct and immediate consequences for CA regional security, the following section details these two events to explain the region-wide collective reaction to regional affairs. Commentators and scholars have paid more attention to reactions from the external powers (notably the US) when analyzing the reasons for the tensions as the power vacuum of Western powers/guidance evoked the necessity of reviewing Western powers’ foreign policy toward Islamic zones such as in CA (VOA Kazakhstan 2022). This chapter will focus on intra-regional reactions, analyzing what actions CA countries have taken individually or collectively and what the constraints are in establishing more effective collective actions.

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The Taliban in Afghanistan On August 15, 2021, Afghanistan experienced major political turmoil as the Taliban quickly took over and proclaimed sharia law throughout the country. The population that had previously supported pro-Western values and liberal ideas and been unwilling to follow the Taliban’s beliefs was threatened and oppressed by the new leadership. Despair and fears about survival were the main emotions. Restrictions on education, employment, and female socialization, as well as limitations for using the bank accounts were put in place soon after the Taliban took power. The initial pacifist and peaceful statements made by the Taliban to the world media were untrustworthy and suspect because they had changed their tactics but not their belief system. One of our interviews with a researcher from Tajikistan brought up Afghanistan in relation to CA regional cooperation: Central Asian states have played a key role in stabilizing Afghanistan and have developed a coordinated regional response, supporting the Afghan people by opening doors and providing aid. Furthermore, the current situation in Afghanistan poses a threat to the entire region, which is another call for a joint response. (Interviewee No. 13)

Among the five CA states, Uzbekistan has showed the most support in cooperation with the Taliban. A number of fallen regimes were replaced by more radical ones during the Arab Spring, and ordinary people suffered significantly from the failed strategy. During the 17th Eurasian Media Forum, many analysts predicted a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan since they assumed that there would be a significant difference between fighting in the mountains and ruling an entire country (Mir 2021). Such challenges as drug trafficking, the spread of extremist ideology, and the rise of terrorism may become serious threats to the security and stability of CA, which adds another reason to develop a modality of regional multilateral security cooperation. Although the Afghan refugees to CA were not seriously seeking to settle in CA and considered it only as a transitory zone (Satpayev 2021), Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were approached by the US to accept about 9000 Afghans who had worked with and for the US operations in their home country (Martin et al. 2021). Kazakhstan, for example, accepted 100 UN employees from Kabul who were concerned about the escalation of the situation in Afghanistan (Khabar News 24

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2021). Since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not border Afghanistan, their official positions were less intense than those of other CA states adjacent to the Afghan territory. Historically, Turkmenistan has maintained friendly relations with the Taliban at the official level. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov, expressed zero tolerance for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate, although he saw no reason for continuing military operations to resolve the Afghan crisis. Moreover, the Uzbek side welcomed Afghanistan as an integral part of CA (Khrolenko 2021). Tajikistan feared the penetration of Afghan refugees, terrorists, and drugs into its territory and therefore was less neutral towards the Taliban than the other CA states. Most intellectuals in CA tend to believe that with the power vacuum left by the diminishing Western influence in the CA, local governments lack a clear vision and are unable to develop a long-term foreign policy strategy to deal with a sudden security crisis. The positions of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in the international arena are unclear and depend to a great extent on changing political and economic circumstances. The foreign policy efforts of the CA countries are aimed at avoiding troublesome confrontations with both China and Russia. Although the region is under the collective security regime of the CSTO and the SCO, the fundamental insecurity stems from the fact that these organizations are not based on the principle of inclusive ‘diffusive reciprocity’, borrowing Rathbun’s concept, across the influential extraregional powers based on long-term generalized trust (Rathbun 2011, pp. 244–247). The prolonged warfare between Ukraine and Russia confirms their fears. With all their sympathy for Ukraine and its people, none of the countries in CA would like to imagine themselves in a similar position. Moreover, at the beginning of the outbreak of war, the countries of CA have serious doubts about assistance from the West when thinking of a hypothetical conflict with Russia, believing that unlike Ukraine, Western countries will not be so ready to assist them against Russia. This lack of attention to the region is well demonstrated in the example of the conflict in Uzbekistan in June 2022, when the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan experienced a wave of protests against possible constitutional amendments that could deprive it of its autonomous status.

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Russia-Led CSTO Involvement in Kazakhstan On January 2, 2022, a protest broke out in Zhanaozen (Mangistau region), Kazakhstan, due to an abrupt increase in price of liquefied gas (LPG). The authorities explained the decision to raise gas price as based on market rules. On January 3, the protest spread to other cities in the country, notably Almaty. Though they were initially socio-economic in character, the protests eventually took the form of a political confrontation between the masses and the authorities. At this stage, a kind of hodgepodge of various interests of existing internal and external political and power groups formed, and as a result, state integrity and security were threatened. The strikers demanded a change of leadership and the resignation of the president and seized strategically important objects, sometimes turning to aggressive looting. Arson and destruction of public and private facilities took place. All means of communication including internet and radio were quickly disabled for a week, creating an information void. The government imposed a state of emergency and a curfew, officially announcing the presence of terrorist groups and the need to eliminate them. For several days, foreign states took a position of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Kazakhstan, though Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his support for the decisions made by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev amid the Kazakh government’s deadly shooting of civilians (Hindustan Times 2022). Eventually, Tokayev called for the attention of the leaders of the CSTO member countries. The CSTO defined the situation in Kazakhstan as an invasion of foreign-trained terrorists (“Kazakhstan: Why Are There Riots” 2022), but CSTO military units only stayed from January 6 to 15. In the end, Tokayev took into account the sentiments of citizens, including serious dissatisfaction with the presence of the CSTO troops in the country. The Secretary General of the CSTO, Stanislav Zas, and President Tokayev announced that the number of the CSTO ‘peacekeeping contingent’ would be approximately 2030 soldiers and 250 military vehicles. Kazakhstan is also a member of this organization, thus some observers commented that the mobilization of the CSTO force in Kazakhstan was totally controllable when Tokayev agreed to invite the CSTO to send in peacekeepers on 5 January 2022. Casualties could have been minimized. Therefore, the event of the CSTO’s intervention should not be exaggerated as an indicator of Kazakhstan’s overreliance on Russia. Critical commentators believed that Kazakhstan

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should have promptly mobilized internal forces to cope with the situation. However, President Tokayev, who was himself involved in an internal power struggle among elites, thought that relying on internal forces might be unwise in stopping the aggression. Moreover, in the course of personnel decisions, the head of the National Security Committee was dismissed. It is notable that the CSTO, with the active participation of the Kazakh military, provided assistance to Tajikistan when a civil war was going on during the internal military-political conflict in the period between 1992 and 1993. However, the Tulip Revolution in 2005, the Osh riots in 2010, and the Third Revolution in 2020 did not involve CSTO. The political conflicts in Uzbekistan during the Andijan events of 2005 and in Karakalpakstan of 2022 were also resolved without the involvement of the CSTO. This suggests that the CSTO is definitely functional but not used in a consistent manner based on any clear rules shared across its members. One of the main functions of a multilateral security organization is to make any actions against security risks predictable so that the situation can be controlled, leading to longer-term commitments and reciprocity among participants. Ironically, the Kazakh government considered the CSTO’s military intervention in the internal political turmoil to be a prompt and effective operation, even though soldiers were shooting lethal live ammunition at the crowd attacking the President’s Almaty Residence. Among ordinary citizens, however, the Kazak government’s actions generated mistrust of their own government, stoking fear and fury. In addition, Tokayev sometimes reveals a desire to distance Kazakhstan from Russia, such as in his failure to recognize the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. This inconsistency occasionally causes concern in the Russian expert community as there is a fear that Kazakhstan will leave Russian dominance. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 has not had a direct impact on military-political security in the CA region. However, an equally important issue is food security. The main transportation routes of the CA countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan, run through the territory of the Russian Federation. Other difficulties resulting from the prolonged Russian-Ukrainian conflict include economic insecurity and internal political destabilization. For example, Alisher Ilkhamov notes the non-recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) by the countries of CA as evidence of their

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obvious unwillingness to be drawn into a direct conflict as well as their desire to avoid falling under harsh sanctions from Western countries (Turgaev 2022). It is clear that CA will be forced to share some level of economic hardship caused by the military conflicts, and yet its governments and people alike are in favor of promoting a peaceful settlement. These cases show the necessity of regionalized security cooperation and demonstrate the external constraints on further intra-regional actions. Adding to these structural and circumstantial constraints, an analysis of their linkage with domestic political dynamics provides a mixed message on the barriers to and opportunities for rebuilding cooperative regionalism.

The Institutional Sprawl of Multilateralism Involving Central Asia Although there is more skepticism than hope for the possibility of moving towards more effective and inclusive regional cooperation in CA, institutionalized multilateralism has been growing rather than diminishing. Political and international institutions govern and structure the behavior and attitudes of state and non-state actors through establishing and exercising laws, regulations, customs, and norms. Depending on the discipline, research inquiry, and methodological orientation, scholars and experts in this field tend to categorize studies of institutionalism under three approaches: rational choice, historical, and sociological. However, the three approaches are not mutually exclusive and are often combined in empirical research to explicate the phenomenon of institutional expansion in the contemporary international affairs. The legitimacy and longevity of an institution depend not only on the historically accumulated collective rationale of institutionalization led by historical membership but also on effective responses to world affairs and calculations of the cost and benefits of participation. In analyzing regional institutions, the various focus of the different approaches, whether history, functions, identity, or national interests, are equally useful. Region-wide institutionalism establishes rules for actors’ behaviors and reforms and reshapes those rules with new visions to alter the direction of regional affairs. In the process of institutionalization, an organization may be established in a physical form such as bureaucratic bodies, permanent

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secretariats, and mechanisms for the durable interaction of participants (see for example, Rothstein 1998). Therefore, institutionalization at the level of regional politics certainly contributes to forming regionalism that includes regional regulatory regimes, binding and non-binding soft laws such as regional multilateral agreements, and at times historically accumulated norms. However, the forms of the regional institutions may vary depending on the organizational or institutional cohesion in terms of the binding nature of their protocols and durability.1 Based on our examination of the established institutions and organizations in CA that focus exclusively or inclusively on CA affairs, there are broadly four different types of multilateral institutions. These are presented in Table 4.1. The institutions with stronger (or potential) cohesion are presented in Fig. 4.1. In addition to our explanations of the regional organizations for CA affairs in the previous chapters, Table 4.2 summarizes the major organizations categorized by their leading extra-regional powers. Whereas the organizations are the physical form of region-wide multilateralism, the substance of their cooperation is embodied in regional regulatory regimes that bind (loosely, voluntarily, or legally) the participating parties to comply with agreed-upon rules and principles in order to share benefits collectively and equitably. A full list of organizations is presented in Table 4.3. Table 4.1 Types of multilateral institutions in Central Asia

Regional Institutions (CA-centered)

International/Inter-regional institutions (Broad CA affairs with extra-regional actors)

Institutions with strong cohesion

Institutions with weak cohesion

Binding regional regulatory regimes with at least two CA countries (e.g. FTAs and specific regional treaties) Dealing with comprehensive regional security and economic issues (e.g. CIS, CSTO, SCO)

Usually ad hoc based regional initiatives, platforms, fora, programs, cooperative projects Loose form of inter-regional cooperative programs

1 For a useful typological theory of institutions see, for example Kreuder-Sonnen (2016, 330–332).

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Fig. 4.1 Russia and China-led regional organizations including or focusing on Central Asian Affairs

The primary difference between the EU-led cooperative institutions and those led by China and Russia is that the EU designs and initiates cooperative programs and provides funding and technical assistance for launching multilateral institutions but is not involved as a leading actor in the process of operating the institution(s) and implementing regional agendas. The EU supports programs and project focusing on the public welfare such as energy, water, drug, and education issues. The EU’s institutional support is intended to lead to tangible or measurable outcomes while letting the CA5 be the main actors, encouraging local ownership aimed toward gradually adopting EU and international (good) practice and policy influence. This pattern is in line with the internationally agreed-upon principles of official development assistance (ODA), especially those related to supporting the development capacity of the region and guaranteeing local communities’ ownership for their own development. Consequently, general publics in the region usually consider the institutions and organizations as indigenously grown civil society organizations (CSOs) rather than externally guided regional organizations. This also leads to the perception that the EU’s role is diminishing in the region.

EU-funded

EU-funded since 2003 Established in 2008

CA 5 EU and CIS 9 (A project to monitor the implementation of the EU Strategy for CA)

The Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN) The Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) The European Union—Central Asia Monitor (EUCAM)

EU, Switzerland, UK, World Bank, CA 5 and Afghanistan EU, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, CA 5 (Observer: Russia) Funded and technical secretariat assisted by the Tacis Regional Cooperation Programme, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) under the ENPI-East Regional Indicative Programme, and EuropeAid CA 5

The Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE)

(continued)

‘Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the development of transport initiatives’ signed in 1993 World Bank and EU funded and engaged since 2009 1996–2016

EU 27, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine, and CA 5 (Observer: Mongolia, Lithuania, Greece)

The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program

EU

Active year

Inter-governmental institutionalized cooperation (programs and organizations)

Leading external parties

Participants (members and observer countries)

Multilateral institutionalized cooperation administered by external actors

Table 4.2

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

China

Russia

Inter-governmental institutionalized cooperation (programs and organizations)

Leading external parties

China, Turkey, Iran, and CA 5

China, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and CA4 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) (Observer: Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia; Dialogue partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) China, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Mongolia, Pakistan, and CA 5

Participants (members and observer countries)

CIS 9 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and CA4), and Turkmenistan (associate member) The Collective Security Treaty Russia, Armenia, and CA 4 (Kazakhstan, Organization (CSTO) Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) The Eurasian Economic Russia, Belarus, Armenia and CA 2 (Kazakhstan Union (EEU) and Kyrgyzstan)

The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC Program) The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic corridor (CCAWEC) The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

(continued)

Table 4.2

Declaration of the Eurasian Economic Integration signed in 2011

Charter adopted in 2002

Charter adopted in 1993

One of the six land corridors in the BRI in 2015

ADB-supported since 1997

Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the SCO in 2001

Active year

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European Union-Central Asia Water, Environment and Climate Change Cooperation (CAWECOOP) Strengthening disaster resilience and accelerating implementation of Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in Central Asia (CESDRR) Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

2015

New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB) under the BRI Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program

Ensuring water and energy security Promoting civil society and human rights development in the region

2009 2017

2019–2022

2015

1993

2002

Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA)

Participants

(continued)

EU, CA states, Afghanistan EU, CA states

US, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus EU, CA states (Headquarters in Vienna) Economic corridor connecting Western China, Russia, China to Western Russia CA countries International transport corridor between the EU 27 + Azerbaijan, EU and partner states in Central Europe, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Caucasus and Central Asia (EU-led) Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine + CA 5 (Observers: Mongolia, Lithuania, Greece) Promoting dialogue to avoid disagreements EU, on issues related to water resources CA states management in Central Asia Promoting regional disaster risk reduction EU, CA states strategy and establishing regional data loss database

1991

Nunn-Lugar

Denuclearization, demilitarization of military industry conversion Border management and security

Effective dates Purposes

Other inter-regional cooperative initiatives and programs

Name of regional program

Table 4.3

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2019–2022

OECD policy component of the Central Asia Invest program

2019 1996

2020–2024

USAID-funded Central Asia Media Program

INOGATE

Central Asia Rule of Law Programme

Strengthening Financial Resilience and 2019–2022 Accelerating Risk Reduction in Central Asia Program Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2020–2025 (RDCS)—Central Asia

2007

SWITCH Asia 2020 Grants Projects in Central Asia

Protecting human rights, combatting economic crimes and promoting the efficient functioning of public institutions

Regional energy cooperation program between the EU and the countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia

Introducing sustainable technologies and more eco-friendly production methods (textiles and leather, agri-food products) Supporting investments, competitiveness and sustainable economic development in Central Asia Providing financial sustainability, investment for disaster and climate resilience in the region Transiting to self-sufficiency in energy, trade and water management and combating extremism and human trafficking in the region Promoting media literacy

Effective dates Purposes

(continued)

Name of regional program

Table 4.3

US, CA states, Afghanistan EU, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, CA 5 EU, CA states

US, CA states, Afghanistan

EU, CA states

EU, CA states

EU, CA states

Participants

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2009 2009

2015–2019

Erasmus Mundus program

Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN)

Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)

1992

1992

UNESCO programs for Central Asia

2008

European Union—Central Asia Monitor (EUCAM) OSCE programs for Central Asia

1991–2006

1993

Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Studies (TEMPUS)

Assisting CIS countries in the implementation of economic and political reforms, free market reforms, the rule of law and democratization Monitoring EU Strategy implementation for Central Asia Assisting CA countries in the implementation of media diversity, youth leadership, justice, security, labor migration, gender equality, water management and environmental issue programs Assisting CA countries in the implementation of educational, scientific and cultural programs

Promoting research and education, information exchange and collaboration between higher education institutions in Central Asia Combating drug trafficking operations

Promoting student exchange programs

Promoting cooperation at the level of higher education institutions

Effective dates Purposes

Name of regional program

CA countries

CA countries

CIS countries

CIS countries

CA countries

EU, Central Europe, CIS, Georgia, Ukraine, Asia, Central Asia, Africa EU, Central Europe, CIS, Georgia, Ukraine CA countries

Participants

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The EU has initiated, funded, and supported numerous initiatives, programs, projects, and platforms, but many of them are in loose forms of cooperation for a fixed period of time. As not all of the CA countries belong to the official recipients’ group, the EU also bilaterally establishes partnerships with individual countries, focusing on economic and social issues rather than political or security matters. EU-supported fixedterm institutions may evolve into longer-term institutions. For example, CADAP 7 reflects the EU’s long-term engagement with CA partners to strengthen their national policies in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. The US’s strategic agenda toward CA also supports region-specific development agendas with financial aid (Fig. 4.2) and encourages intraregional cooperation in general multilateral efforts related to social affairs such as energy, trade, transboundary water and environmental management, countering violent extremism, and combating human trafficking. However, the US-initiated institutions are insignificant and aid and cooperation are unilaterally organized via established institutions such as USAID’ RDCS (the Regional Development Cooperation Strategy) and soft power tools rather than creating new regional institutions in the region. Compared with the EU, the US’s institutionalized engagement is more on an ad hoc basis with a political agenda depending on the security situation in the region rather than looking for long-term general engagement at the governmental level through establishing permanent organizations. Overall, the government of the US and the central authority of the EU consider the countries in the CA region as aid partners and thus more or less follow internationally agreed-upon aid rules for providing financial and technical assistance rather than engaging in hardcore security matters through multilateral institutions. According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s official categorization for the purpose of ODA flow, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are upper middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI 4096–12,695 USD in 2020) and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are lower middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI 1046–4095 USD in 2020). The two relatively wealthier countries are already excluded from the list of toppriority countries for ODA distribution. This is one of the important reasons why local people in CA may feel that the EU and US presence in societal developmental sectors has been diminished, which, in their view, (re)invites China and Russia to fill the vacuum. One interviewee pointed out that:

4

$9,00,00,000

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US-Central Asia: Foreign Assistance -Total (2018-2022)

$8,00,00,000 $7,00,00,000 $6,00,00,000 $5,00,00,000 $4,00,00,000 $3,00,00,000 $2,00,00,000 $1,00,00,000 $0

2018 Kazakhstan

2019 Kyrgyzstan

2020 Tajikistan

2021 Turkmenistan

2022 Uzbekistan

Fig. 4.2 Bilateral Foreign Assistance from the US to Central Asia (2018–2022) (Source https://www.foreignassistance.gov)

Now that the period of existential crisis in Central Asia has passed, the need for outside assistance has decreased,2 how receptive the Central Asian countries are to that assistance, and to the strings that come attached to such aid, is variable. And that variability, dependent on the nature of the particular regimes in power and the peculiarities of the autocratic rulers, makes for difficulties in terms of regional integration. (Interviewee No. 3)

Beijing’s multilateral approach is based on the notion of equal membership among all developing countries. Newly developed China-led institutions in the region began with a looser form of diplomatic forum touching upon non-political functional issues (especially trade and business relationships) but gradually expanded their scope of engagement and membership while tightening bilateral relationships and consolidating institutional formality. Chinese engagement in CA is strategically well planned with clear direction. The quote below clarifies this approach: In the first half of the 1990s, Beijing’s concern was to sign demarcation treaties, demilitarize the borders, and prevent the strengthening of Uyghur 2 See Fig. 4.2 for the decrease in aid volume, which supports the interviewee’s statement.

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separatism. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, it aimed to create a platform for discussion and mutual discovery, and to build a collective security framework through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the first half of the 2000s, China moved to establish itself vigorously on the Central Asian market, mainly in hydrocarbons, extractive industries, infrastructures, and communications. Finally, since 2005, Beijing has been trying to establish ways to promote its language and culture and to train Central Asian elites according to the Chinese model. (Peyrouse 2016, p. 14)

The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic corridor (CCAWEC) within the BRI program has considerable economic, transport, and logistics importance for the countries of the region since the participant states may greatly benefit from transit and supporting projects (Çınar 2021). Meanwhile, the Russian approach to multilateralism with its former Soviet zone has usually been explicitly binding, focusing on territorial and security issues, establishing multilateral relations with legally binding treaties inclusively with the former Soviet zone (e.g., the Landmark Caspian Sea Agreement in 2018). Therefore, the regional organizations led by Russia and China are characterized by stronger organizational cohesion than those led by the US and the EU. At the societal level, there have been quite a few achievements in institutionalized cooperation and implementation of various development agendas. For example, the Erasmus Mundus Plus program actively cooperates with CA countries on four projects for universities and youth. The popularity of its projects in CA has greatly increased: more than 1100 projects between European partners and universities in CA included 7395 students, researchers and staff in mobility programs (European Commission for EU-Central Asia Academic Cooperation through Erasmus Plus 2020). Despite challenges, most of the programs have functioned well and been beneficial for the stakeholders. Another successful project is the Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA). Launched to facilitate operations for border security and management in the region, the project included multiple initiatives such as drug control, terrorism monitoring, COVID-19 response, and border and customs services. Considering the highly challenging circumstances on the borders of the CA region, the project has proven to be relatively efficient (BOMCA 2021). The USAID-funded Central Asia Media Program (2022) focuses on strengthening advocacy and improving self-regulation measures in the

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media community and has trained more than 2000 journalists and media professionals from CA countries. Non-state news agencies and civil society institutions have received support to be engaged in the media. Several thousand people were included in the program of media literacy activities. Intra-regional Economic Cooperation Since 2000 In the 1990s, a number of intra-regional projects and programs were developed that took liberal functionalist directions. Nevertheless, the region’s liberal market-friendly evolution has altered since the mid-2000s, when internal political turmoil in some CA states, notably Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, occurred in parallel with the transformation of regimes that had adopted more explicit and rigid paternalistic political ideologies. The process of distancing from the West has been reflected in a deeper level of cooperation of the CA countries with China and Russia. However, the changing trends have not prevented the CA states from attempting to develop multilateralism and regionalization. Table 4.4 shows some of these initiatives. The state actors in CA have gradually become more open to interregional cooperation. Kazakhstan has proposed most of the global initiatives for CA, including EXPO, OSCE, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, status as a non-permanent member in UN Security Council, and the Astana summits on the Syrian crisis. In contrast, Uzbekistan has increasingly focused on regional processes such as in its initiatives related to CAR (Investment Forum of CA countries in Tashkent, Regional council for transport communications). Although not all initiatives are fully-fledged, some have been successfully implemented, such as the Aral projects. In terms of regional economic and social infrastructure, the Western economic presence in the region in the 1990s structured the societies in CA but they were reshaped in the 2000s. The processes of regionalization began to acquire a new configuration due to both internal and external dynamics. The reappearance of Russia and active engagement from China in the region were driven by the goal of restoring the Great Silk Road for long-term interaction in Eurasia. Reflecting this, CA multilateralism leans toward Russian- and Chinese-led institutions, reflecting a newly emerged economic structure. Through the Eurasian concept and regional structures, Russia intends to transform CA into an economic and political satellite rooted in a historical background of more than three centuries.

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Table 4.4 Initiatives of the Central Asian states to strengthen multilateral and regional cooperation Countries

Active initiatives

Uzbekistan

“Barrier-free” Central Asia

Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan

Proposed initiatives

Investment Forum of Central Asian countries in Tashkent Security coordination working Regional council for transport group communications Council of Heads of Border Cooperation in the energy Regions sector, taking into account the long-term interests of the Central Asian region UN Special Resolution Formation of a single, “Strengthening regional and recognizable tourism brand in international cooperation to ensure Central Asia with attractive peace, stability and sustainable regional tourism products development in the Central Asian region” Creation of the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Human Security for the Aral Sea region Joint strategy of the Central Asian Establishment of a five-party countries for the development of business council of Central economic cooperation Asian countries Regional Council for Transport Cooperation on the use of Communications water and energy resources of the Naryn-Syrdarya River between 4 Central Asian countries Manifesto “Peace. 21st Century” Provide scholarships for to create a nuclear-weapon-free students from each Central zone Asian country to study at the best universities in Kazakhstan 2017–2019 Astana international Provide an efficient platform meetings on the Syrian conflict for a constructive dialogue resolution between representatives of the authorities and the opposition Astana Summit of the Bring together heads of Organization for Security and governments and high-ranking Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in officials from the 56 OSCE December 2010 countries and 12 partner states and regional organizations for cooperation

(continued)

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Table 4.4 (continued) Countries

Tajikistan

Central Asian countries

Active initiatives

Proposed initiatives

“On peacekeeping activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan” law

Regulate public relations related to Kazakhstan’s national contingent participation in operations for maintaining peace and security according to international obligations Support the economies of Central Asian states to increase their benefits and lower the risks of the BRI

Implementation of regional investment projects, including holding an investment forum of Central Asian countries and China in 2022 December 15, 1995: the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a document on the organization and formation of the collective peacekeeping battalion “Centrazbat” under the auspices of the UN April 4, 2000: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on joint action to combat terrorism and political and religious extremism

Form a multinational coalition to build cooperation with the military structures of the USA, Canada, Great Britain and EU countries

Combat terrorism, religious extremism (e.g., Taliban’s destabilizing role), transnational organized crime, and other security threats

Sources Panfilova, Victoria. 2021. ‘Tashkent proposed a new agenda for Central Asia.’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Retrieved from https://www.ng.ru/cis/2021-08-04/100_190004082021.html; ‘The President of Turkmenistan invited the heads of Central Asian countries to think about creating a fivesided Business Council.’ 2019. https://turkmenportal.com/blog/23440/prezident-turkmenistana-pre dlozhil-sozdat-pyatistoronnii-delovoi-sovet; ‘Tashkent hosted the second consultative meeting of the heads of state of Central Asia.’ 2019. Retrieved from https://cis.minsk.by/news/12592/v-taskentesostoalas-vtoraa-konsultativnaa-vstreca-glav-gosudarstv-centralnoj-azii; Nurbay, Rabiga. 2021. ‘Top 30 Global Initiatives of Kazakhstan: Contribution to Global Security.’ https://strategy2050.kz/ru/news/ top-30-globalnykh-initsiativ-kazakhstana-vklad-v-mezhdunarodnuyu-bezopasnost/; ‘Rahmon said that the summits of the heads of state of Central Asia and China should be regular.’ 2022 https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13519921?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=org anic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com

In regard to the CA-initiated intra-regional security and economic cooperation process, internally motivated attempts to revive the CAU/ CACO began in the 2000s but stalled for some time. In 2018, Kazakhstan’s president Nazarbayev initiated the attempt once again. There

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are several reasons Nazarbayev was keen to re-activate the CAU. Kazakhstan, as one of the largest economies in the region, wanted to expand its economic ties with other CA countries via the CAU. Nazarbayev was also seeking to strengthen the country to take advantage of its location in the center of the region where it serves as an important bridge between Russia and China. He also saw the CAU as an instrument for strengthening stability and security in the region. However, the then president of Uzbekistan, Karimov, refused to participate, mainly because Uzbekistan had expanded its cooperation with Russia by signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement. At the same time, Karimov regarded Nazarbayev’s intention to consolidate the CAU toward a permanent regional institution as a potential threat to Uzbek sovereignty. Later in 2018, the new President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, put the agenda back on the table. He had several reasons for re-considering the initiative. Firstly, Mirziyoyev was seeking to create a stable political, economic, and security regime in CA. He saw that the integration of countries can strengthen security and make the region’s economy more efficient. Secondly, Uzbekistan was becoming more open to the world community, and Mirziyoyev was inclined to cooperate with other countries at the regional level in order to establish closer economic relations and increase his international prestige among other countries. Third, Uzbekistan may see the creation of the CAU as a way to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. Other members shared this view. Nevertheless, after a few meetings among the member countries, the meetings to advance the CAU initiative have been held since 2019 under the broader inter-regional cooperation structure of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC Program) led by China and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Confusingly, the CAREC Program shares the same acronym with the EU-initiated Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, an intra-regional environmental institution established in 2001. Deviating from the CAU’s comprehensive agenda to deal with broad region-specific security and economic matters, the CAREC Program shifted the agenda to energy, investment, trade, and transportation along with other inter- rather than intra-regional economic cooperation matters. Thereafter, the meetings since 2019 have been attended by the presidents of the CA4 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and representatives from the SCO.

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At Putin’s urging, the first version of the CAU merged with the Russialed regional integration structure of the CIS in 2005. By contrast, the disappearance of the CAU/CACO in the late 2010s was, as explained, related to its integration into the broader structure of the CAREC Program, which somehow diluted the core regionality of CA in the regional cooperation process. CAU/CACO has technically ceased to operate, and its annual meeting is now held under the CAREC Program. One interviewee remarked on an externally led organization which is relevant to this context: Except for Turkmenistan and occasionally Uzbekistan, CA states take the side of Russia on many geopolitical issues by joining Russia-led organizations and alliances and turn to Russian ‘big brother’ at times of economic or political disturbances. While Russia might be unable to pay for its regional dominance and increasingly understand and accept China’s taking over in the economic sphere, Russia still struggles to preserve its political influence. (Interviewee No. 8)

There has been a plethora of studies on the rise of China in CA. These studies have addressed a wide range of topics including security implications (Jardine and Lemon 2020), economic benefits and impact on longer-term developmental vision (Kerr 2010; Wong 2011; Xing 2001), Chinese multilateralism (Ying 2021), the influence of Chinese soft power (Yellinek et al. 2021), ethnic minorities such as Uyghurs (Syroezhkin 2011), environmental issues (Sorokina 2020), and the digitalization of integration policy (Nowak et al. 2022; Ambalov and Heim 2020). The sheer number of academic and policy studies on Sino-CA relations demonstrates China’s rising influence in the region and some degree of fearful response from the region. For example, Kerr (2010) refers to the long-term planning of Chinese cooperation with CA as a complementary agent to its economy. The presence of the US in the region was not welcome by Chinese policy-makers due to the US policy of containment towards China’s fast rising economic influence. The US’ interest in new trade areas in CA can be explained by increased Chinese investments (Wong 2011). The renewed US interest in new trade zones in Central Asia can be linked with increased Chinese investments, since this region is located at the crossroads of important trade routes and is of geostrategic importance. Central Asia has significant reserves of natural resources such as oil, gas, rare

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earths, and many others. The US may also consider the region a potential source of raw materials and economic opportunities. The increase in Chinese investment in CA may well be of certain concern to the US. This can contribute to the US’ interest in strengthening its presence in the region in order to limit China’s growing influence. The energy sector is an attracting factor for China’s economic policy. Starting in 1997, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other oil companies were actively exploring the oil fields of CA (Xing 2001). By 2018, the trade turnover between China and CA states exceeded 41.7 billion USD annually (Umarov 2020). The latest trade turnover estimations are conducted semiannually or annually and indicate a clear tendency to a fast-growing increase of data indicators (see Table 4.5). Although the trade turnover between the CA countries and China decreased from 46.4 billion USD in 2019 to 38.6 billion USD in 2020 due to the pandemic, enormous regional trade and economic recovery in the region can be expected with the normalization of economic flows with China (Shaukenova 2022). Local experts view that cooperation between CA and China could be understood around the idea of sustained development of the Xinxiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR; e.g., Syroezhkin 2011). Economic development of XUAR is predominantly based on mineral resource extraction from CA states which benefit from importing already finished end-products from China (Melnikovova 2020). In 2004, the XUAR “bordering with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan accounted for 73 percent and 77 percent, respectively, of China’s trade Table 4.5 Total trade turnover between China and Central Asian countries by 2021

Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan

Total imports from China in US$

Total exports to China in US$

6.35 billion 4.88 billion 438.39 million 1.46 billion 445 million

9 billion 1.74 billion 34.41 million 64.09 million 5.32 billion

Rank China as a trading partner 2 1 3 1 3

Note The above data are extracted from each country’s trade information and reformulated by the authors based on world trade data provided by Trading Economics (2022; https://tradingeconomics. com)

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with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2004” (World Bank Report 2009). Uzbekistan’s second leader, Mirziyoyev, signed 100 economic cooperation agreements with China worth approximately USD 20 billion (Azizov 2017). At the official level, most of the economic decisions about cooperation with China are concluded on the basis of the bilateral framework which the concerned parties agreed upon. As for public opinion, Sino-phobic sentiments have been expressed in the region. Reasons for these feelings may include the non-transparent trade cooperation between Kazakhstan and China kept out of public access, discrimination against Turkic ethnic groups in XUAR, and the foreign debts of CA states (Satpayev 2019). Beijing continues to implement larger regional projects and reinforce its positioning as a key partner in CA as a region, considering the region to be a crucial crossroad between China and the European markets. The implementation of the strategy of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road (EBSR), for which Beijing was ready to allocate 40 billion USD, facilitates the inclusion of the CA region as a co-player and transit zone. Russian interests are added as the project is in line with the Federation’s expansion of its Eurasian space. Similar to the security aspect, the economic aspect of expansion also demonstrates the region’s inevitable connectivity with the external powers’ own vision of developing the region through further cooperation (Smale and Perlez 2017). The first segment of cooperation to be influenced is infrastructural development, for which China has deployed considerable funds to construct land routes through the CA region. For example, in 2016, a high-speed freight train finally linked China with Iran via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, serving all parties both financially and logistically. CA is also actively involved in hydrocarbon trade and transportation to China. From CA’s point of view, further cooperation with China is also part of their strategy to diminish the region’s over-dependency on Russia.

Regional Social Issues and Loose Intra-regional Cooperation Intra-regional Cross-Border Movement of People The governments of the CA countries have adopted regulatory documents as strategies for migration policy. In particular, the monitoring of legal and illegal, skilled and unskilled migrants is carried out within the

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framework of the documented Action Plan for the Implementation of the Concept of Migration Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2022– 2026, adopted in 2011. Turkmenistan developed and adopted similar legal frameworks and policy guidelines on migration in 2007, and the other three countries did so in the 2010s. Within CA, the main flow of labor migrants to Kazakhstan originated from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, among which there are both legal and illegal labor personnel since the economic situation in Kazakhstan is more stable than in other CA states (Najibullah 2021). Hanks and Tatibekov (2018) found that about 1,020,000 migrant workers from CA have legally arrived in Kazakhstan, accounting for 15% of the country’s total labor force. A similar number of illegal guest workers is predicted as well. Table 4.6 presents a snapshot of intra-region movement as of 2020. Migration for educational purposes is also significant. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are the three most popular destinations for students in CA, but Kazakhstan is the only country that regularly hosts students from all five countries. However, the data on the number of students from CA in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are missing (United Nations International Organisation for Migration 2019). Despite the incomplete statistics on educational migration between the CA countries, this cooperative process certainly facilitates mutual cultural enrichment, cross-cultural exchange, and an increase in regional interactions at the civilian level. Similarly, tourism is an area of intra-regional cooperation. CA’s shared historical legacy related to the importance of the Silk Road has evolved into an appealing tourism concept. In particular, Uzbekistan has actively promoted attractive historical sites and consequently successfully accommodates a significant number of intra-regional tourists. For example, the Bukhara Declaration was signed within the UNWTO meetings in 2002, which promulgated CA’s macro-directions for tourism (Oriental Express Caucasus and Asia 2023) and has been continuously implemented thereafter. Intra-regional Environmental Efforts Despite the prevalent skepticism about the overall regionalization processes in CA, there are still positive shifts in solving some regional problems. Sharing a common agenda of environmental problems such as water security, energy and land use, climate change, and protection of

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Intra-regional migration in Central Asia (2020) Turkmenistan

Source Our World Data 2023

Immigrants: Where foreign-born population in the selected country moved from (2020) Kazakhstan – 7085 16,644 1104 Kyrgyzstan 12,599 – 2146 973 Tajikistan 840 11,351 – 446 Turkmenistan 19,994 (No data) 1465 – Uzbekistan 13,092 4856 11,408 756 Emigrants: Where people born in the selected country moved to (2020) Kazakhstan – 12,599 840 19,994 Kyrgyzstan 7085 – 11,351 (No data) Tajikistan 16,644 2146 – 1465 Turkmenistan 1104 973 446 – Uzbekistan 296,511 8940 7563 67,003

Table 4.6

3.73 million 199,011 276,031 194,920 1.16 million 4.2 million 774,377 586,851 242,554 2.03 million

13,092 4856 11,408 756 –

Total

296,511 8940 7563 67,003 –

Uzbekistan

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biodiversity, the CA countries are seriously considering joint solutions. Table 4.7 presents the changes in the rankings of CA countries in overall environmental performance that implies positive trend. Over 26 years of holding Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the governments of CA could not be heard effectively when acting individually, since each of them spoke for itself (Podolskaya 2021). Now all the states of CA are ready to act as a single bloc in addressing environmental and climate issues. This move can be explained by a few key factors in the context of CA: firstly, there has been a continuous rise in awareness of transboundary environmental problems within the region; secondly, environmental cooperation is one of the soft fields in diplomatic negotiations without directly dealing with any thorny political issues; thirdly, since the Paris Accord in 2015, the global climate scene has become far more complicated in terms of the negotiating groups, beyond the previous simple bipolarized division between global north and global south. With the rising awareness of environmental issues, CA countries understand the region-wide interest in protecting international climate negotiation; and last but not least, the region’s interaction with environmental IOs and Regional Organizations, notably the EU and the OSCE, has substantially helped the region to be engaged in the global climate and other environmental governance. The issues of hydro resources, security, and economy were discussed at the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of States of Central Table 4.7 Environmental performance ranking of Central Asian countries (2022)

2022 EPI results Country

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Rank (out of 180)

EPI score

10Year change

93 126 117 118 107

40.90 35.70 37.10 37.00 38.20

11.80 1.20 −1.60 8.90 1.90

Source Environmental Performance Index (Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy; Center for International Earth Science Information Network Earth Institute, Columbia University 2023) 2022 EPI Results. Available at: https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/ 2022/component/epi

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Asia. In particular, the Green Agenda for Central Asia (signed on July 21, 2022) and the roadmap for expanding regional cooperation for 2022– 2024 were approved. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the two leading countries. In a 2020 speech, President Tokayev stressed that “environmental protection and ecological development are at the forefront of Kazakhstan’s agenda. The whole civilized world is dealing with this issue, and we should not remain aloof from the main trend” (Tokayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2020). The CA countries proposed an agreement on friendship, good neighborhood policy, and cooperation for the development of the region. As of 2022, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have signed the agreement, and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are expected to sign once it is approved at the national level (Zhekshe and Beishenbek 2022). The ongoing cooperation in the environmental sector provides some positive direction for the future of intra-regional collective efforts if it is accompanied by properly designed regional regulatory regimes and functioning governance tools and institutions. Considering the rapid rise of environmental awareness in the region, especially at the civil society level, the environmental field may well establish a non-political but practical way of enhancing interactions between the five states. As environmental issues are inevitably transboundary and environmental externalities affect all countries in the region, the process of environmental cooperation may further generate a CA-led regionalism. As multilateral cooperation is a reciprocal process, the currently prevalent perception on the influence of external powers in the regionalization process is caused not only by extraregional involvement but also by proactive or inactive reactions from the CA states. Civil Society Organizations in Central Asia Detailed analysis on the activities and functions of the civil society organizations (CSOs) in CA is out of the scope of this project, but this section provides a brief description of the increasing presence of CSOs in CA. Many of the CSOs operating in CA, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), work relatively independently for the benefit of their societies which are often seen as competing with governmental affairs. About 11,000 NGOs from various fields of activity are officially registered in Kazakhstan (Assanova 2021). In Kyrgyzstan, approximately 4000 NGOs are registered in the government system, but the actual number of

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CSOs may reach 8000–12,000 (Mussabayeva 2021) depending on their definitions and scopes, which are broader than those of NGOs. About 2000 NGOs were registered in Uzbekistan at the end of 2019 (Asian Development Bank 2021), although there are a large number of unofficial organizations. In Tajikistan, official statistics have not been updated since 2011, when about 1700 NGOs were registered; however, it was estimated in 2018 that more than 3000 CSOs exist in the country (Kurbonov 2020). In Turkmenistan, there are 120 registered CSOs (Aronsky 2021). These official or estimated figures do not reflect the number of all informal organized groups that have played some roles in CA. Axyonova and Bossuyt (2016)’s research is informative, especially their categorization of various kinds of CSOs in the region, dividing them into four types: public associations inherited from the Soviet times; local communitybased initiatives and self-help groups based on informal mechanisms; socalled neo-liberal NGOs financed by foreign donor programs; and crossborder civil society initiatives. Among those relatively well-functioning CSOs include the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, which has been engaged in the protection of human rights and freedoms and democracy. The Kyrgyz NGO Hand in Hand aims to improve educational opportunities for children with disabilities (Derstine 2019). A branch of the Enactus Global NGO called Enactus Kazakhstan invests in various programs and projects for young people aimed at developing their professional skills, raising the level of education, and supporting entrepreneurship and other social goals (Moskovchuk 2023). CSOs in CS are growing in number but are still rather weak and underorganized, primarily due to a number of socio-economic, political, and cultural constraints. The authoritarian political culture, high level of corruption in politics, business, and society, and the low level of legal literacy of the population hinder the development of a homegrown non-governmental sphere. The political milieu in CA does not allow foreign-sponsored non-state actors to engage proactively and collectively in public affairs. For example, organizations affiliated with George Soros were forced to leave the CA countries in 2015 after the governments accused the organizations of violating legislation and international law, as well as interfering in the internal affairs of the country, supporting political opponents and organizing color revolutions that pose a threat to state security. Some critics said these organizations were driven out democratically (Beacháin and Polese 2010), while others argue that they were driven out because their values were opposed to the authoritarian

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regimes (Laumullin 2020). In any case, many organizations funded by Soros continue to operate in the region, although they face trouble from local authorities. They mainly focus on the areas of democracy and the rule of law, human rights, and developing civil society. Notably, most CSOs in CA are led by local people who have been trained and equipped with organizational skills and experience in various fields as part of major donors’ ODA process. These organizations are usually financially and technically supported and funded by international organizations and other donors but managed by local experts. The EU in particular has been a prominent player in nurturing CSOs in line with its interests in promoting democracy and human rights (Velichkov 2021), providing substantial financial and technical assistance to implement projects that contribute to the strengthening of public participation and the development of civil society in CA.

Political Systems and Regionalism in Central Asia The underlying significance of the internal political culture and characteristics of the political system in CA countries is twofold in relation to the purpose of this book project. The first is linked with the autarchic political system and the other with the patrimonial political culture. The former affects the fundamental limitations in multi-stakeholder-led full-scale regionalization at all levels including not only the central governments but also private economic and societal actors. The latter aspect is the negative synergy generated by the authoritarian political culture that can hamper a deeper level of cooperation on an equal basis—horizontally between government and their own citizens. This culture fosters a preference for non-interventionism in domestic affairs that makes them exclusive and non-transparent, which in turn makes cooperation with partners superficial. Autarchic Systems and Regional Politics Competitive party systems are not common in countries non-democratic regimes, reflecting the fact that party competition is central to te development of liberal democracy. Despite their centrality to competitive democratic systems, multi-party political system is often subject to criticism and accused of representing only particular groups of people as opposed to the welfare of general public. The USSR typically represented

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an authoritarian single-party system, with the Communist Party as the embodiment of the interests of the revolutionary class. Under such totalitarian political pressure, any opposition was considered to be harmful anti-revolutionary or revisionist elements. Nevertheless, the single-party system was gradually tainted by the rise of personal networks which eventually became far more important than political ideology in maintaining the stability of the regime (Akela 2017). This cycle of the changing nature of the political system results from the powerful ruling elites’ rejection of fair and public-minded governing. In turn, totalitarian governments can be easily corrupted and begin to lose legitimacy. Implementing oppressive control then becomes the only tool to maintain stability and political power. Contrarily, in Russia, in 1995, 43 political parties ran candidates for parliamentary elections, with the largest party, the Communist Party, garnering 22% of the vote. In the election in 2021, 49.82% of the vote went to United Russia, while the Communists came in second with 18.93%, and the other 12 parties combined received 32.25% (Sharafutdinov 2021). Table 4.8 shows that CA states have been following the similar pattern of multi-party system, although each country displays differences in the details of its operation. Notably, however, there have been very few leadership changes in real terms except in Kyrgyzstan (Table 4.9). Starting with multiparty systems in the early 1990s, some CA countries had evolved by the 2000s into single- or dominant-party systems. Singleparty systems enjoy all the privileges of monopolizing state power and controlling candidates during elections while legally excluding any other parties from entering the political scene (Duverger 1954). The exception in the region is Kyrgyzstan, but its transformation from a parliamentary system to a centralized presidential system in 2021 became the subject of harsh criticism as a retreat from democratization. As Cooley (2019) implicitly pointed out, many foreign or domestic experts on CA and people in the region alike use the terms, democracy and democratization, rather vaguely in the regional context (See pp. 589–590). What is clear is that any vigorous public debates on alternatives to western liberal democracy that fit post-communist society have not yet fully emerged in the region. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, initially adopted the Russian model of limited pluralism and later a dominant party system in which one party holds a hegemonic position in the political process and the minor

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Table 4.8 Parliamentary elections results in Central Asian countries 2019–2021 Countries

Number of parties

Name of leading parties with gained votes in %

Source

Kazakhstan

5

Demidov (2021)

Uzbekistan

5

Kyrgyzstan

16 out of over 220 political parties officially registered

Tajikistan

8

Political party “NurOtan” —71.09% Democratic Party “Ak Zhol”—10.95% People’s Party of Kazakhstan—9.10% People’s Democratic Patriotic Party “Auyl”—5.29% Political Party “Adal”—3.57% Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan—35% Democratic Party of Uzbekistan “Milliy Tiklanish”—24% People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan—18% Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan “Adolat”—15% Ecological Party of Uzbekistan—10% Birimdik—24.90% Mekenim Kyrgyzstan—24.27% Kyrgyzstan—7.25% Butun Kyrgyzstan—7.27% The other 12 parties did not enter parliament gaining from 0.18 to 6.96% of the vote People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan—50.4% Party of Economic Reform—16.6% Agrarian Party of Tajikistan—16.5% The other four parties received 16.5% in total

Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2021)

Pannier (2020)

RFE/RL’s Tajik Service (2020)

(continued)

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Table 4.8 (continued) Countries

Number of parties

Name of leading parties with gained votes in %

Source

Turkmenistan

4

Democratic Party of Turkmenistan—44% Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan—8.8% Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan—8.8% The other parliament fractions received 38.4% in total

Central Commission for Holding Elections and Referendums in Turkmenistan (2018)

parties do not constitute a challenge to the dominant position. Amanat, previously NurOtan Party, has incorporated the Asar political party, the Civic Party, the Agrarian Party and a number of other smaller parties, clearly transforming Kazakhstan from a somewhat political pluralist system to a one-party system (Marat 2007, pp. 19–20). During his presidency, NurOtan leader Nursultan Nazarbayev spoke about ‘guided democracy’ as a foundation of the regime, indicating it as a temporary but necessary stage in Kazakhstan’s political development (Olcott 2005, pp. 143, 208). Thus, the party system could hardly nurture any competitive parties by which the ruling party could be challenged, and opposition is valued by the society as a key mechanism for balancing. In addition, there is a lack of political agencies in Kazakhstan that could offer any alternatives to the highly centralized system of power (Linke and Naumkin 2009). The history of the single party in Turkmenistan is a direct reflection of the legacy of the USSR party system experience. The party apparatus of the Communists was used as a skeleton for the creation of the new Democratic Party, which remains the official and dominant political party in Turkmenistan. For example, the Majlis elections of 2018 demonstrate that the political system of Turkmenistan is far from democratic in nature since the power is concentrated in the hands of president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. However, this situation is often legitimized as the country’s tradition of oriental paternalism. A single dominant party system in the absence of any counterbalancing mechanism hampers democratic interaction among the actors in each country. In order to advance the level of regional cooperation on matters

Turkmenistan

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow Serdar Berumuhamedow

Emomali Rahmon Saparmurat Niyazov

Rahmon Nabiyevich Nabiyev Akbarsho Iskandrov Rahmon Nabiyevich Nabiyev Akbarsho Iskandrov Emomali Rahmon

Kassym-Jomart Kemeluly Tokayev Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev Qahhor Mahkamov

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan

Name

November 1990–August 1991 September 1991–October 1991 October 1991–December 1991 December 1991–September 1992 September 1992–November 1992 November 1992–November 1994 November 1994–Present November 1990–December 2006 December 2006–March 2022 March 2022–Present

1991–2019

March 2019–Present

Period

Presidents of the Central Asian states

Country

Table 4.9

Democratic Party of Turkmenistan

Democratic Party of Turkmenistan

People’s Democratic Party Democratic Party of Turkmenistan

Communist Party of Tajikistan (until 1994)

Communist Party of Tajikistan

Communist Party of Tajikistan

Communist Party of Tajikistan

Communist Party of Tajikistan

(continued)

Non-Political Amanat (Amanat) (Nur Otan) (before 22 April 2022) Party Amanat (Amanat) Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Nur Otan) (CPSU) (before 1991) Communist Party of Tajikistan

Political Party

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Islam Karimov

Shavkat Mirziyoyev Sadyr Zhaparov

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Sooronbay Sharip uulu Jeenbekov Almazbek Sharshen uluu Atambayev Roza Isakovna Otunbayeva Kurmanbek Saliyevich Bakiyev Askar Akayev

Name

(continued)

Country

Table 4.9

October 1990–March 2005

November 2017–October 2020 December 2011–November 2017 April 2010–December 2011 August 2005–April 2010

September 1991–September 2016 December 2016–Present October 2020–Present

Period

Independent

Ak Jol People’s Party

Social Democratic Party

Social Democratic Party

Liberal Democratic Party Meke chil (“Patriotic” Political Party) Social Democratic Party

People’s Democratic Party

Political Party

160 J. BOURDAIS PARK ET AL.

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that enhance the public welfare and overall prosperity of the region, institutionalization may not be sufficient. Interactions between diverse actors, both horizontal (intra-regional) and vertical (at a domestic state level), are essential to generate agendas for shared interests and solutions. In this process, regionalization is reinforced beyond technical functionality in pursuit of short-term national interests, and regional identity can be nurtured at the societal level, what we call thick regionalization. Well-functioning multilateralism requires democratic communication at all levels, and states’ search for binding transnational rules is embodied in a regional regulatory regime for upward harmonization. In this regard, the domestic political system is closely linked with the patterns of various types of multilateralism. Although in theory, multilateralism for business and trade relations is more universal in nature than political relations, as interaction between private sectors are based on the principle of competition than coercion, the degree of decentralization in economic activities differs across among participating actors. According to competition theory, “investors and buyers in the global marketplace have preferences for certain political systems, sometimes for liberal democracy and sometimes for benevolent authoritarianism” (Simmons et al. 2006, p. 792). Foreign Policy Option and Development of Intra-regionalism In March 2022, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev gave a public speech on the path of renewal and the country’s modernization. In this speech, he announced a radical democratization through shifting the current so-called super-presidential form of government to a presidential republic with a strong parliament. Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev had announced political reform programs such as economic liberalization during his visit to Kazakhstan in December 2021 to discuss enhanced cooperation between the two countries for further intra-regional cooperation. In an interview, he emphasized the importance of reliable partners, mentioning an Uzbek proverb: “Uzoq karindoshdan yakin kushni afzal” (“A close neighbor is better than a distant relative”) and a Kazakh proverb: “Tuysy zhakyn zhakyn emes, konysy zhakyn zhakyn” (“A good neighborhood is stronger than family ties”). He went on to say the following:

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We have developed the Development Strategy for New Uzbekistan. The central place in it is occupied by the tasks of building a people’s and humane state that ensures the legitimate interests and well-being of each of its citizens, regardless of their nationality, language, and religion, on the basis of the further development of a free civil society, in a word, the full implementation of our priority principle, “In the name of human honor and dignity.” From now on, we organize our activities within the framework of the new paradigm man – society – state. (Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Uzbekistan 2021)

President Mirziyoyev goes on to inter-connect and extend his vision for domestic reform with/to the CA region: As part of the implementation of the idea “From the Action Strategy to the Development Strategy,” we intend to continue the course towards strengthening the atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect, good neighborliness, and strategic partnership in the Central Asian region. Undoubtedly, the achievement of these goals is impossible without cooperation with our closest neighbors - the states of Central Asia. … In conversations and negotiations with my colleague, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Kemelevich Tokayev, I always feel the desire to work actively and creatively for the benefit of not only my people, but our entire region as a whole. Kazakhstan was the first to support the holding of Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, put forward an initiative to sign a five-sided Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of Central Asia in the 21st century, and actively contributed to the implementation of initiatives aimed at this. Undoubtedly, the future of our region, the prospects for deepening regional security are also connected with the strengthening of Uzbek-Kazakh relations, on which development, prosperity and stability throughout Central Asia also depend. (Satubaldina quoted from Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Uzbekistan 2021)

The fundamental conditions that motivate and buttress external cooperation beyond national boundaries include readiness to create and recognition of an autonomous supranational sphere through efforts of regulatory harmonization, long-term commitment to mutual benefit sharing, the government’s will to increase public welfare at the regional level beyond their own national boundaries, and confidence in supporting societal-level functional interactions (openness). These conditions are hard to satisfy in the rigid authoritarian context because rigid sovereignty,

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non-interventionism, loose and least-binding regional commitment, and absolute top-down political decision-making mechanisms govern state behaviors in regional affairs. While external powers-led institutionalized cooperation is helpful for the CA region, a CA-wide autonomous supranational sphere to deal with shared interests within CA becomes equally important given the increasing risks and crises in the region. Having discussed regionality in the process of regionalization in CA, its particular feature of regionalism and pattern of institutionalized regionalization can be described as externally guided regionalism. This term is not meant to imply that intra-regionalism or regionalization do not exist. On the contrary, intraregionalism has great potential to develop but has been frustrated, while externally-initiated regional cooperative processes have been invigorated and gradually expanded with abundant material and administrative supports. In this process, the common denominator among participating members have been only the vaguely defined agenda to address the so-called three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the region, which in the eyes of the public in the region is a deal between authoritarian external partners’ pivoted regionalism and domestic regime security. Our surveys and interviews confirmed that non-state civil society actors’ aspiration and expectation of greater degrees of regional cooperation are closer to a norm based-regionalism (linked with the sociological institutionalism approach) that is influenced and supported by Western actors in the hope of achieving some level of democratization. Both state and non-state actors made some efforts to, at the minimum, introduce democratic institutions at the beginning of the independence with CA regionalization up until 2000. Meanwhile, there is a growing gap created by new partners and selective affinity as the internal regimes move toward rigid totalitarian autarchy. In this regard, the region has become a stage for competing East versus West multilateralisms and a testing bed for authoritarian state actor-centered multilateralism as opposed to or as an alternative to the traditional neo-liberal sense of market-oriented democratic institutionalism. Although CA was an important base of operations against Western powers during the Cold War, after independence it had to go through democratic reforms in order to become a full member of the world community. This meant that in the 1990s, the countries of the region initiated Western political models and adopted their values through the

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activities of Western NGOs. The countries of CA were looking for external partners for economic development. Most of these partners came from Western countries and considered the region part of the Greater Central Asia project. However, not all CA countries went through this process in the same way; for example, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan retained paternalistic features. Local intellectuals strongly believe that the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan greatly influenced CA, leading to the transformation of political regimes influenced by the local autocratic administrative traditions of Eastern paternalism. Therefore, such trends as clans and political patronage in the region began to manifest themselves clearly (Shkel 2019). For example, under Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a clan-related network was created in Kyrgyzstan to maintain their power (Shkel 2019). Moreover, local elites, to some extent, began to pull back from the Western political model, fearing the “Arab Spring” syndrome. The growing Islamic influence also played a role influencing the political situation in the region, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, causing high levels of anti-American sentiments among marginalized groups. Most of the CA territories are potential transit zones. Understandably, the people of the North Caucasus and other Muslim subjects of the Russian Federation, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, are also at risk from the rise of radical extreme Islamists. China is not immune to this issue due to its Uighur and Dungan populations. It is questionable whether Russia and China will be able to counter this threat. Despite the existence of both anti-Russian and anti-Chinese sentiments, CA countries are actively interacting with Russia and China, which, in turn, consider the region to be a strategic component of their foreign policy. The younger generation, especially those educated in Western universities, challenge the current autocratic regimes, being oriented towards Western liberal values, the rule of law, human rights, and freedom. Local intellectuals often express concerns that the diminishing of US and European interests in the region may bring increasing deterioration of democratic accountability, possible reinforcement of elitist approaches, and radically personalized autocracies. These fears grow with the possibility that without the Western presence, both China and Russia are well placed to play larger roles in the region due to their selective affinity with the political culture, which will in turn drive CA to a worsening autocratic abyss. One interview reflects this concern:

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Winning the hearts and minds of regional leaders with its non-interference policy focusing on economic cooperation, China gradually became a convenient partner for Central Asian regimes despite anti-Chinese incentives among local populations. The mere presence of China (or any other player) in the region cannot be viewed as either positive or negative. It is what and how political regimes in Central Asia need to tackle and given the opportunistic, highly personalized, and corruption-prone nature of Central Asian regimes as well as obvious asymmetrical interests, there are of course grounds for concerns. Nevertheless, infrastructure development and investment open prospects of better communications, education and jobs for local populations. (Interviewee No. 8)

Although there is not an overarching form of intra-regional integration, the implicit principle of region-wide cooperation through various venues of multilateralism is gaining influence. Unlike the EU or ASEAN, however, more solid forms of organizations are presently led by external actors, notably Russia and China, especially for the purpose of developing individual countries in the region but facilitating collective resources and security guarantees from Western donors. Collectivity of CA countries served efficient administration at a lower cost from multilateral and bilateral donors that contributed to regional development and stability during the critical period of state-building with their own national identity while keeping a safe distance from Russian dominance. Actors were heavily state-led, but economic and civil society actors were also active. With the rise of China and its growing presence in the region, the architecture of competitive multilateralisms by the great powers in CA shows very similar patterns with the phenomenon in ASEAN in terms of the great powers’ rivalry over weak multilateral institutions in weaker regions. Among scholars of international cooperation, there has been no unified answer to the question of whether weaker countries’ institutionalized intra-regional integration would be more beneficial for those weaker countries or for the stronger external influential actors. However, numerous studies have clarified that under certain conditions, such as institutional design, duration, participants, and issue linkages, regional collective actions effectively and efficiently address transboundary problems in many areas. More coherent intraregional cooperation may help not only to address actual regional problems but also to alleviate citizens’ perceived insecurity about being under-protected both externally and internally.

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The benefits of intra-regional cooperation may outweigh noncooperation or inaction in regard to extra-regional institutionalization, whether it is calculated between CA members as rationalist (strategic trust) or moralist (based on longer-term generalized trusts). As our interviews with people in the civil society reveal, citizens of the region strongly feel that the current way of regional integration may not be desirable, although not all respondents can articulate what is missing in the rapid process regionalism. In fact, officially agreed-upon collective interests include the necessity of international cooperation, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, no first use of armed force, no enemymaking, no territorial claims, and the inviolability of borders (De Hass 2016, p. 208). This explains why CA state actors’ preference for the status quo is implicitly kept as a common political agenda. Abundant natural resources themselves do not necessarily lead to authoritarian political systems, but the status quo provides a comfort zone where political leaders can preserve their current autarchic regimes with rentier state characteristics that support the governments’ common interests (Haber and Menaldo 2011, p. 25). Nevertheless, the struggle of the political leaders in the CA over the dilemma arising from the fast-changing global security dynamics and the growing great powers’ rivalries in the region cannot be underestimated. These rivalries can be portrayed as, at present, the co-existence of Russia’s geopolitically ambitious extension through Eurasian regionalization, China’s expansion through its New Silk Road regionalization, the EU’s re-regionalizing of CA under global strategy, and the US’s strengthening unipolar multilateralism. As the great powers re-draw their imaginary regional maps, the dilemma CA political leaders are increasingly facing is that as long as they keep regime stability as their top priority, their countries’ over-reliance and dependency on Russia and China inevitably become stronger as the two are strong shields against citizen-motivated democratizing forces that may reshape the current way of regionalization.

Conclusion This chapter focused on which directions the CA countries have taken in the process of developing regionalism, the main features of regionalism as reflected in institutionalized cooperation, and whether and to what extent there has been intra-regional cooperation. We provided analysis

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and insights on the theoretical and practical implications of the features of CA regionalism by discussing its achievements and barriers. In theory and practice elsewhere, externally-led and intra-regional cooperation do not conflict with each other but are complementary and mutually reinforce the whole process of harnessing and thickening multilateralism, contributing to larger regional and international organizations as a solid core. CA differs from other regions in that its borders were drawn by political leaders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and not on the basis of linguistic, ethnic, or religious differences. This means that ethnic and cultural differences rather than political ones are at the center of regionalism. Therefore, a strong national or ethnic identity was not firmly formed or constructed within CA, and this weaker territorialized nationalism could potentially be a significant basis for regionalism. Due to their relatively short history of being independent, the CA countries’ political, economic, and social structures are still under construction. In the current political ambience in CA, coherent IGOs promote opportunities for dialogue and cooperation at all levels including non-state actors and fulfill trust-building functions. Applying the analytical framework suggested in Chapter 1, the focus of this chapter was on the last two elements, the actual functionality of regional organizations and a vision for future directions. Some divisive roles are exhibited in the rivalries of multilateralism, albeit overlapping in their activities and functionality. Russian-led organizations have tended to focus on security whereas China-led ones are more active in trade so far. Some degree of intra-regional level leadership emerges to tackle regional affairs but there are limited due to political constraints home and abroad. The very fact that the intra-regional space is weak and blurry indicates that the sovereignty of CA countries is still conditional, developing, and intertwined with external powers. It is a daunting task to highlight CAspecific regionality and regionalism, decoupling it from external powers. As demonstrated, numerous organizations, regional regulatory regimes, initiatives, and programs for regional cooperation have dealt with various issues including security, development, and societal welfare. Nevertheless, the overall collective reaction to urgent regional issues has not sufficiently and proactively addressed these issues due to stronger leadership from outside the region and lukewarm attitudes of CA government actors. Returning to the main research questions, in connection with the previous chapters of this volume, Central Asian regionalism can be described as externally guided regionalism, based on common national

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interests rather than shared interests in transnational problems at the intra-regional level. This process has been reinforced by the external powers’ rivalries over generating their own type of multilateralism with re-regionalization agendas. The feature of selective affinity was also added to the governments’ principles of opting for external partners in fulfilling their state agendas of regime stability. In this process, some aspects benefit the region but not all of the cooperation mechanisms are effective.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion: Externally Guided Regionalization

As the title Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia: Multilateralism, Institutions, and Local Perception indicates, we have offered explanations, analyses, and insights on contemporary Central Asia (CA hereafter) both as a region and as a historical and territorial boundary of five independent political entities. The volume employed a conceptual prism of regionalism focusing on the evolution of external competitive multilateralism, CA countries’ selective engagement in the process of institutionalized regionalization, and citizens’ perception of the phenomenon of fluctuating and increasingly influential extra-regional political powers, namely the US, the European Union (EU), China, and Russia. As an academic area in-between Area Studies in Comparative Politics and International Relations, Regionalism Studies has been advancing around issues mostly related to European integration. The study of regionalism and regional institutions developed along with the firm establishment of the EU and drew much academic attention during the period of rapid economic globalization in the 1990s. With the rise of China leading a new wave of multilateralism since the mid-2000s, regional organization and governance have once again drawn renewed attention from scholars and experts. The collective institutionalization of weak countries can be seen as facilitating economic exploitation by great powers or security dominance, but exploitation, interdependency,

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and cooperation describe identical functions of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) albeit from different perspectives. Regional clustering has many advantages, especially in the era of rapid globalization and the consequent strengths of IOs with strong multipolarity. Multipolarity-led multilateralism is different from liberal bottom-up institutionalization. High-functioning regionalization is a strategy to be more competitive in the global market and to survive in an insecure world. There are various academic approaches to and common understandings of regionalism, and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Due to its interdisciplinary nature in terms of the unit of analysis, rather than taking one particular approach to studying regionalism, this study followed an effective way to address our main research inquiries: “How and by what forces and motivations has the current form of regionalism been shaped in Central Asia” To answer this question, this book also addressed the question: What are the main features of CA regionalism? And then, what are the significance and implications of the evolving regionalism for the stability and development of the countries in the region? The questions require descriptions and analyses of CA regionalism as well as the constraints of forming regionalism, the reasons regionalism has evolved to its current state in CA, and prescriptive discussions on the direction of regionalism for CA’s stability and prosperity. Making the concept of regionalism operational and researchable, this project explored the influence of external powers, institutions and institutionalization, and CA governments’ and non-state actors’ reactions and perception toward growing multilateralism forces in and on the region. This research did not intend to test existing theories as such. However, the characterization of regionalism as cooperative as opposed to skeptical or exploitative organizations and institutions is inspired by the neoliberal approach in International Relations. Relatively weaker countries’ clustering in the international arena cannot be fully understood by market-oriented liberalist accounts alone. The analysis of the constraints and limitations of CA-centered regionalization at the national level is in line with neoclassical realists’ approach in the sense that domestic politics, society and leadership matter in shaping regional governance. The project also looked into the perceptions, motivations, and social interactions as well as common historical background of the members as an important element of forming regionalism that significantly affects regional affairs. This perspective is associated with a constructivist

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methodology. The reason for choosing an interdisciplinary and metatheoretical approach is that regionalism entails all aspects of power relations, activities, and functionality of interactions (i.e., competition and cooperation) between actors and institutions, the degree of sociocultural ties, and geopolitical conditionality due to the graphical proximity in the case of CA. Then, what is the main rationale for studying and engaging in the regional affairs using the regionalism perspective? There are both normative and practical reasons. If it is functioning well, regionalism can resolve regional problems more effectively as regional actors can prioritize regionspecific issues better for the stability and development of the region. In the process, tensions between countries in the region can be mitigated through exchanging information and data, monitoring implementation, collaborative investigation, and peer pressure. All five CA countries are still categorized as less developed or developing in spite of their high potential, showing lower-level performance in terms of transparency, electoral democracy, income disparity, social inequality, pollution and emission levels, economic stagnation, and trade imbalance. Many of these issues are regionally interconnected. Nevertheless, CA regionalism cannot be studied only within the CA territory due to the heavy influence from external actors. An observable fact over the past three decades is the increase in externally-led competitively institutionalized multilateralism. Within CA, some appreciate it, while others fear its expansion. These diversified views stem from the complicated division inside the society over regional (within a country), personal, and family roots and are often divided into pro-West versus pro-East. One may wonder whether discussing regional cooperation in this region would have any significance in the contemporary world in the middle of the war waged by Putin’s Russia in Ukraine. In fact, many have been worrying that Kazakhstan may be the next Ukraine. However, as the findings of this study demonstrate, regionalism through institutionalized multilateralism is increasing rather than decreasing. Whatever the motivations and patterns are, the rapid rise of regional institutions and organizations itself provides sufficient rationale for examining regionalism in CA. Looking at CA through the prism of regionalism brings new insights to understand the countries and the region more clearly.

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Summary of the Volume The chapters evolved following the broad external and internal forces that contribute to CA regionalization and regionalism. Chapter 2 discussed the first stage of the evolution of externally guided regionalism in CA. It contoured the features of guided regionalism that is initiated, financed, controlled, and monitored by external powers, focusing on Russia’s continuous influence in the region in order to maintain dominance. Meanwhile, individual CA states were preoccupied with their own survival and adaptation to the process of nation- and state-building. During the era of de-Sovietization, the individual CA countries pursued benefits based on inherited as opposed to proactively created common interests through a certain degree of regionalization which can be regarded as constructing shared though exogenously developed interests. They had certain national interests and strategies in common, namely sovereignty/ independence, economic integration with the world market, and security guarantees. Drawing clearer psychological national borders was the top priority and required not only internal consolidation but external clarification of boundaries, therefore, regionalization without intra-regionality was necessary for the CA countries to consolidate their own national identities and sovereignty. Chapter 3 addressed the dynamic interactions between the growing great power rivalries and CA states’ engagement in various types of multilateralism. These interactions molded the features of guided regionalism, reflecting the diverse forms of multilateralism that had been controlled and monitored by the major influencing extra-regional powers. The various forms of externally imposed regionalism gave the individual CA states options for which way to choose to develop (or resist) the institutionalized regionalization process in consideration of their political autonomy, security guarantees, economic benefits, and regime stability. The chapter focused on the process by which the CA states constructed benefit-sharing and power balancing, distancing themselves from Soviet influence by inviting different extra-regional powers and letting them compete with one another or cooperate through their own approaches to multilateralism (s). In this process, the external powers created their own space in CA by promulgating a shared but loose common goal, namely fighting terrorism, extremism, and separatism. This goal is more in line with the domestic regime stability of CA states than with more inclusive societal prosperity.

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This period witnessed an explosion and expansion of institutionalized multilateralisms that shaped the current form of CA regionalism. Continuous balancing between major actors dominates and stabilizes the regional security dynamics, but this explanation only helps to understand why countries seek nationalized strategies and individual states’ own interests. In order to maintain regional organizations, more effort is needed to articulate substantive common interests in the supranational sphere beyond national boundaries. On the surface, there was a rise of supranational regionalism through which countries explicitly tried to align their interests. For example, aligning with China’s domestic and foreign agenda of fighting against the abovementioned three evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism did not conflict with Western powers’ preferred interventionist agendas such as protecting human rights and promoting democracy. The war between Russia and Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation between the West and authoritarian powers, notably Russia and China, further complicated the brinksmanship diplomacy of CA states. As in other regions, great power rivalries are observable in their benefit-sharing while avoiding explicit tensions and conflicts. In this chapter, the authors articulated the conflicting and cooperative dimensions of the interactions between external multilateralism and region-wide reactions, which in turn determine the characteristics of the supranational sphere of CA regionalism. This regionalization process has continued while generating loosely agreed-upon common interests as a common denominator for institutionalizing multilateralism. However, we argued that this process has been promulgated by external powers rather than sufficiently and widely engaging intra-regional actors across the region. In Chapter 4, the explanations of the features of externally guided regionalism are further deepened, highlighting CA states’ selective acceptance and adoption of external multilateralism in line with each country’s own foreign policy strategies. The chapter highlighted the alignments between foreign policy, domestic politics, and political culture for state survival. In addition, through mapping multilateral institutions, regional regulatory regimes, and regional organizations, the chapter presented how CA regionalism is reshaped by CA states’ priority shift from longterm development to regime stability reflecting the autarchical turn of the political system in CA. The authors argued that although authoritarianism in theory conflicts with the notion of non-hierarchical horizontal multilateral cooperation process, consensus among authoritarian governments

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has paradoxically implicitly strengthened the process of institutionalized cooperation. Furthermore, the main features of the political culture stemming from neopatrimonialism affect the formation of regionality, which in turn contributes to the patterns of regional cooperation. The core features of neopatrimonialism in CA include the extension of traditional blood-based kinship to small-group coalitions in the political system, naturally forming an exclusive, elite-centered regime. Influenced by this political culture, the state’s governing tools are often opaque, hierarchical, and oppressive. In the regional space, in order to secure a regime unaffected by external forces, participating countries naturally communicate and cooperate more comfortably under the safe principle of politically neutral non-interference or with those countries sharing a similar political culture. This has created a dilemma for the CA governments. If they strengthen ties with authoritarian partners, regime stability can be guaranteed because unlike the US and the EU, China and Russia do not attempt to nurture civil society, the potential opponent of the power groups in the governments. On the other hand, the governments of CA have growing fears of losing external autonomy in relation to China and Russia. This struggle is well reflected in the complicated architecture of institutional sprawl. CA became part of the testing bed to see how authoritarian countries’ pattern of inter-governmental multilateral cooperation would function and contribute to reshaping global cooperative governance. In parallel, there has been a CA-focused intra-regional cooperative process in spite of many barriers. The authors argued that guided regionalism has not only been harnessed by the external powers but also actively chosen and implemented by the CA states. In addition, it is found that the evolving regionalism in CA has been so far further alienating the civil society and the general public, thus the current supranational sphere inadequately addresses citizens’ security, welfare, and social equity, which have been dominant issues across CA society. The regionalization of CA is still developing, but the process has contributed to organically reshuffling the regional dynamics. Returning to the main research question, our answer is, in a nutshell, that CA regionalism in its current form has evolved not only through external guidance but also through voluntarily, strategically, and selectively (not) opting in. Regionalism is not a static concept, thus regionalization continues. CA’s regionalism has formed through externally guided regionalization not merely because of the rising great power rivalries in

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the geopolitical structure of CA as a region and/or external powers’ competition over the economic utilities and political hegemonism of multilateralism. To the contrary, the four major external actors have shown diffusion of power as opposed to explicit hegemonism concentrating on the region. Their wider scoping of regionalization created a structure in which CA-focused interests are diluted while implicit division of labor among the actors is guaranteed, particularly in their economic activities in the region. At the intra-regional level, political and sociological elements such as domestic political culture, regional identity, and collective solidarity are added to the externally guided regionalization. Those elements formed around de-Sovietized new state building, adopting some level of democratic values and norms in the first decade of their independence but later returning to a more authoritarian political culture. The contributing elements of the process do not impact sequentially on regionalization but are continuously and interactively co-evolving and co-existing. The contributing factors that I identified include great power engagement in the wake of the abrupt independence after the dissolution of the USSR, the neoliberal world order and opening to the international market and culture through Western aid mechanisms, the after-effects of 9/11 and the rise of Islamophobia, the rapid rise of China, and competition over multilateral institutionalization for strategic geopolitical reasons. Internal forces include the diversification among CA countries since independence due to different paths of development, delayed democratic reform across the region resulting in alienation of non-state actors and restrictions on regional alliances among non-state actors in the decisionmaking process including regional affairs, and autarchic governments’ affinity with Russia and China due to historical and personal ties and perceived economic benefits for regime stability. The project focused on the region’s reaction to external power-led multilateralism together with in-depth analysis of the current and future challenges. The vision of CA regionalism moves from a norm-seeking model by dint of the Western model of multilateralism that promotes thick regionalism to a neo-functional institutionalist notion of new thin regionalism, stressing the process per se as in other Asian regional governances. That is, thin regionalism of the ASEAN type influenced by China rather than the EU model of integration as local intellectuals increasingly mention to emulate. Thickening regionality motivates further creation

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of intra-regional supranationalism for exclusive intra-regional institutions and cooperation. However, due to materially low incentives and some perceived risks, CA states will maintain their thin level of regional integration. Nevertheless, as seen in contemporary world politics, the dichotomized frame of functional regionalism versus a neo-functional process of regionalization seems obsolete as the major powers’ institutionalized competition to generate supranational multilateralism commonly accompanies value-driven ideological conditionality. Only the order of the process, that is, whether political conditionality comes before or after functionality, and the specific tools, such as various soft powers with traditional characteristics, differ while the principles of the implementing institutions are very much alike. One can argue that, contrary to the prevalent epistemic discourses on the skeptical explanations and interpretations of the failure and infeasibility of regional cooperation in CA, the current stage of CA regionalism is the interactive outcome of unipolarized or bipolarized multilateralism. It has been initiated and led by one predominant member country, one of the region’s perceived external great powers, that unilaterally imposes hegemonic clout or bilateral relationships with each member country within the multilateral institutional setting. Equally importantly, the intra-regional dynamics of interest are shifting from sustained development to regime stability. CA countries’ seemingly passive reaction to externally guided institutionalized multilateralism reflects the state elites’ interests in regime stability and the alienation of civil society’s aspiration for multiple actors’ participatory regionalization. In this process, the division of labor among the great powers becomes clearer. CA countries’ multi-vector diplomacy interacts with the growing strategic competition, which represents the external powers’ various ranges of interests in the region as a comprehensive security buffer zone, a source of material interests, and a target of cultural and ideological influence.

Significance of Regionalism and the Region To recap, the main findings are fourfold. First, competitive multilateral engagement by various actors generates not only gains and benefits but also tensions and fears for the region. The perceived fears and actual gains are two sides of the same coin, as the external powers’ deeper engagement in security, economy and society will inevitably produce an unprecedented

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supranational space where the interaction between members tightens, possibly resulting in both expected and unexpected relations such as interdependent cooperation, dependency with loss of autonomy, intervention, or exploitation. Second, the current structure of externally guided regionalism has been formed not only by the external powers but also by how the local governments and citizens in the region react, whether with active participation, passive acceptance, or strategic management or isolation, to the growing interests of external actors in the region. Among governments and intellectuals in the CA region, there is an emerging discourse on the necessity of tightening intra-regional cooperation in spite of numerous general and region-specific barriers. Third, a number of regional institutions and organizations have been set up ever since the region became independent from the Soviet Union. The externally led institutional sprawl entered a new phase of reactivating and consolidating functions of the existing regional organizations, notably Russia- and China-led organizations. Fourth, there is a comfort zone created by the government actors of CA, including state-owned and/or supported economic actors and political elites with family and regional ties to China and Russia. Meanwhile, CA’s civil society (i.e., the rest of the non-state actor groups) have hoped for more consistent and stronger interactions with the West. With the growing discontent against their own governments, society’s fears about guided regional multilateralism come from their concerns that under the current political system in the region, the economic or security benefits of the Russo-CA and Sino-CA relationships will only be shared among those state actor circles who are upholding the status quo as opposed to democratic reforms. This creates a complicated internal division between pro-East versus pro-West donors and traders. Adding to the complexity is the rise of Russophobia and Sinophobia, which are the results of the mixture of reality and image and the mis- or lack of communication on the strategy and policy between external actors and local communities. This tension stems from the quality of multilateralism in CA in which the needs of various actors, interest groups, and individuals in the region are insufficiently reflected in the regionalization process due to the vertical rather than horizontal mode of regional integration. There is a widespread cynicism among citizens who are very skeptical about government reforms, Western influences, and intra-regional cooperation. If the CA states are not enthusiastic and their citizens are

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cynical and skeptical, why should researchers still make an effort to discuss the qualities of regionalism in CA? Multilateralism, especially in the form of regional organizations, has become increasingly influential in the known or unknown supranational sphere. With continuous globalization, new regional organizations will certainly play a larger role in reshaping rules and norms whereby various actors’ attitudes and relationship are restructured. As evidenced in this research, institutional sprawl is real. In-depth research on regionalism enhances understandings of and strategies for how to increase diplomatic leverage, create mutually beneficial economic gains, share region-wide welfare outcomes through regionalism, and preserve cultural autonomy. Theoretical Implications for Regional Studies Several levels of directly and indirectly applicable theoretical accounts were mentioned in the text. Some theoretical implications can be drawn. As this research is a case study focusing on a specific region, it is not my intention to generalize the findings about CA regionalism to explain other regions. However, given that academic research on regionalism and institutionalism has advanced based on the EU and the ASEAN cases and recently emerging regional organizations, using applicable concepts or middle-level theories naturally implies some degree of implicit comparisons between established regionalism and CA.1 In addition, an understanding of regionalism itself inevitably entails broader and more diverse perspectives in terms of the scope of aspects (political, economic, or socio-cultural), forms (open or closed, binding or loose), and purposes (process-focused or outcome focused) of regionalisms. There are more convergences and overlaps than clear-cut exclusivity across theories of regionalism depending on the researcher’s purpose when explaining real-world regional affairs. As regional studies are in the domain between domestic politics and international relations, this book contains some elements of the neo-classical realism approach in the sense that states are still at the center of the scene and domestic politics closely interact with foreign policy decision-making and accordingly determine power relations among states; in the CA context, this is in relation to external powers’ influences. However, the application of this approach is 1 See, for example, Berg-Schlosser 2018, for a methodological discussion on comparative area studies.

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confined to the purpose of studying CA considering the critical point that civil society led by non-state associations in the region is underdeveloped. Rather than depicting weaker states as passive actors in the international system, this research examined the interactive outcome between external powers’ influence and the reactions from the region. At the same time, it considered institutions and organizations as potentially important actors shaping regional affairs. This approach is in line with the widely categorized neo-liberal institutionalist tradition. Within institutionalism studies, this work followed historical and sociological rather than strictly rationalist approaches (see for example, Lista and Rojas 2018 and Thelen 1999), as this study paid more attention to the process of regionalism-building through institutions. There is an emerging debate on whether and how new organizations may reshape the existing world order against the established liberal multilateralism (e.g., Scott 2013; Stephen 2017). This question was only partially relevant to the purpose of this research since it refers to Chinaled organizations and their activities in CA. There are clear differences between Western-led multilateralism (which emphasizes democracy and marketization) and China-led multilateralism (which is based on the idea of multi-polarity; Gu 2017), but the latter is also very different from Russian-led multilateralism (which is a controlled bilateralized multilateralism). Likewise, there are certain differences between US-led multilateralism (unilateral aid relations) and the EU-led multilateralism (civil society-focused hybrid multilateralism). The main conceptual prism of this research was regionalism, which can be understood in the CA context as a reaction to externally imposed multilateralism (what I described as a guided regionalism) through institutionalization ever since its independence, and the outcome of the interaction between such an external force and domestic needs in the current political and geopolitical circumstances. Nevertheless, all of the above-mentioned theoretical and methodological framing is not necessarily applicable to the real political scene of the region. Another complication in theorizing CA stems from the geopolitical situation of the region, which lies in-between Asia and Europe. Its Soviet heritage has influenced its collective identity as hybrid rather than Asian. Therefore, the debate on Asian-type regionalism versus Western/universal models of integration or a general inquiry on the absence of IR theories for Asia (Buzan 2014; Qin 2007; Park 2020) has only very limited implication for CA.

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Moreover, the dichotomized understanding of regionalism versus neoregionalism seems to be outdated, as China-led institutions do not merely mimic old international organizations in form,—“an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions” (Zhao 2011)—, but create and construct substantive alternative values in expanding membership, functions, and influence. Functional supranationalism naturally pursues both sharing material profits and value-driven/embedded co-influence while not openly intervening in state sovereignty-related issues. All in all, the discrepancy between imaginative theories and reality invites a fundamental metatheoretical inquiry on the roles of theories per se: do they exist to bridge normative ideas and praxis or to remind the gap between the two, preserving theories as a tool to guide the changing realities toward the idealizable normative aspect of theories (e.g., Jahn 2016). In an effort to avoid methodologically discursive eclecticism, based on our research on the region and the relevant literature on intergovernmental institutions, I delineated an analytical framework with implications for theorization to enhance the understanding of regionalism in the CA context. The four suggested elements in the analytical tool are value-neutral as they have the potential to act as both constraints and catalysts of regional interaction, that is, reasons to (or not to) cooperate. The raison d’être of regional cooperative institutions is their supranational value in dealing with issues that cannot be dealt with or are less effectively dealt with at national or global levels. Such supranational values can be recognized and continuously generated when the mutual benefits are beyond the mere sum of individual countries’ quantifiable national material interests, absolute gains within the region and relative gains vis-à-vis extra-regional cooperation. Nonetheless, the reason why the institutional approach is not enough to understand the patterns of actors in regional politics is that international institutions are not adequate to govern and shape actors’ behavior, motivation, and decision-making. By their nature, entry into these institutions is voluntary and entailing the risk of defection while the participating actors’ deception can still be analyzed within the institutional setting. The four analytical elements that this research applied to articulate the features and processes of inter-state regional institutionalization in general are: the positionality and relational power of the member composition in the wider IR context; the motivations and purposes built on the degree of generating shared interests; functional mechanisms such as the capacity for

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designing organizations, funding, and the quality of impartial experts in the secretariats; and a normative supranational vision guiding and shaping the future direction of the region through implementing regionalism. When applying these factors to the CA case, the features of externally guided regionalism become quite clear. Regarding the region’s positionality and power-status in the historical relations, relatively weaker countries have different concerns as the involvement of great powers may result in undesirable outcomes such as manipulation and exploitation rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. In addition to the region’s former Soviet influence, the importance of the CA region as a gateway to the Middle East conflict zone was vividly reflected in the US’s renewed foreign policy doctrine compiled by President George W. Bush in 2001. NATO’s expansion to the East mirrored the intensification of US antiterrorist operations under the umbrella agenda of the Partnership for Peace program. Consequently, the 2000s were marked by the establishment of the Karshi-Khanabad airfield (Uzbekistan) and the Manas military base (Kyrgyzstan) followed by active co-trainings of NATO and local troops. This strategy mutually benefited the participants in terms of the potential and actual security challenges, both internally and externally. By 2009, however, a gradual exodus of the US troops from the region had begun, largely dictated by the new world and regional geopolitical situation in which Russia and China competed to displace the existing powers’ interests from CA. Russia seized the opportunity to reinforce its economic, military, and political presence in the second half of the 2000s. In addition, the Western countries’ interests in the Caspian Sea region at the beginning of independence were supported by multiple investments and pipeline project proposals from the US and the EU. In the later period, however, the economic constituent of the Caspian development was shadowed by security complications due to the growing militarization of the Caspian Sea. The roles of the Russian and Iranian navies became more prominent, acting as a blast wave for Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s positions to militarize for the sake of power balance. Such a balance, however, is inevitably a fragile peace-guarantor for the Caspian basin, and the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2019 with Caspian Azerbaijan aggressively intending to return to the disputed territories illustrates the point. CA has been a buffer zone for Russia and China as well as the Western powers. For Russia, it is a group of former republics of the

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Soviet Union and the southern edge of its border. China sees the region as a transit corridor to both Europe and Russia, or in a more global sense, as a bridge between the East and the West. The West has traditionally seen CA as an outpost to access the Middle East. Due to the volatile security tensions in the territorial borders adjacent to the region (e.g., the Afghan-Tajik border), external powers’ military presence and intervention in the region have been taken as usual practice. Amid the US-Russian confrontation, an effective security structure was established, which was not financially costly for the CA region and enforced the existing regional security concerns framed by collective security agreements with neighboring Russia through the Russian-led Collective Security Treaties Organization (CSTO) and the China-initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While all external players more or less provide the region with security guarantees, relying on external influence has demonstrated limitations to deal with domestic and intra-regional security problems. These regional dynamics are further explained by the second factor, whether the cooperation and integration are developed based on the participants ’ inner motivation within the region. Internally-motivated regionalism is highly likely to continue although membership may change. Most of the regional organizations dealing with CA affairs are hybrid and inclusive in the nature of membership. Regionalism is embodied in regional organizations and implemented in their various functions and activities to produce regional public goods. It is questionable whether the existing regional governance structures initiated and controlled by the current external regional actors can guarantee CA’s regional economic interests and security needs. Building regionality and collective solidarity is a bottom-up process which also interacts with institutionalization. The current architecture of the CA reginal governance does not clearly reflect the multi-dimensional process only exhibiting competition of externally imposed multilateralism. This explains the pattern of externally guided regionalism. The third element is functionality in proceeding with economic, social, or political cooperative activities. The previous chapters explained in detail the process of institutionalizing regionalism, imposing different types of multilateralism. There has been a rapid sprawl of externally financed and monitored cooperative projects, initiatives, programs, and fora. These are categorized as four different types out of the combination of the two elements, institutional cohesion (strong or weak) and institutional

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scope (regional or inter-regional/international), and explained how the different multilateral forces have been interactively functioning in cooperation with internal actors and organizations in shaping and reshaping the direction of regionalism. The primary difference between the EU-led cooperative institutions and those led by China and Russia is that the EU designs and initiates cooperative programs and provides funding and technical assistance for launching multilateral institutions but is not involved as a leading actor in the process of operating the institutions and implementing regional agendas. The EU has initiated, funded, and supported numerous initiatives, programs, projects, and platforms, however, many of them are in the loose forms of cooperation for a fixed period of time. Similarly, the US’ strategic agenda toward CA also supports region-specific development agendas with financial aid and encourages intra-regional cooperation, in general multilateralism in social affairs while keeping hardcore security negotiations bilateral than multilateral. Overall, the US government and the EU central authority consider the countries in the CA region as aid partners, thus following the internationally agreed-upon aid rules for providing financial and technical assistance rather than engaging in hardcore security matters in the multilateral regionalization process. Beijing’s multilateralism approach is based on the notion of equal membership among all developing countries. China-led institutions in the region initially took on a looser form, touching upon non-political functional issues such as trade and business relationships, but gradually expanded in their scope of engagement and membership while tightening bilateral relationships and consolidating institutional formality. Meanwhile, the Russian approach to multilateralism with its former Soviet zone has usually been explicitly binding from the beginning, focusing on territorial and security issues and establishing multilateral relations with legally binding treaties inclusively with the former Soviet zone. Therefore, stronger organizational cohesion is revealed in the regional organizations led by Russia and China. Non-state societal actors in CA tend to believe that the engagement of the US and the EU is more functional in guaranteeing long-term development of the region whereas the engagement of Russia and China benefits powerful groups in the CA states for their own wealth and regime stability. In this context, proactive intraregional cooperation will react more effectively to increasing and consolidating regional governance, not

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to reduce external multilateralism but to maximize the benefits of a solid and proactive process of regionalism building. The fourth point regards cooperation and integration with clear norms and vision led by regional leadership. If the accumulated history of collective activities builds up norms and visions led by a regional power or a government leader, the process of regionalization can be expedited and various levels of actors can be mobilized. In such a process, the issues are selected and discourse can be internally constructed. In turn, the process itself justifies the legitimacy of the supranational domain by creating shared benefits of cooperation as opposed to choosing not to cooperate. In this case, institutionalization can be harnessed continuously and supranationalism can materialize. As political leadership or regime change in a real democratic sense is very rare in current practice, political will to change the status quo of how regional affairs are dealt with is also rather weak and path-dependent. This has also contributed to the current form of externally guided regionalism. Regional dynamism stems from the tension between external powers’ growing influence and the internal power groups’ struggle to preserve their domestic regimes for stability, sovereignty, and identity. In addition, the growing tension between the ruling elites and civil society in the CA states may contribute to changing the direction of CA regionalization. In this context, local intellectuals note that for the CA dictators, the war in Ukraine is another chance to reconsolidate their domestic regimes, justifying the necessity of oppression in response to external security threats. The Ukrainian case will signal to CA society that democratization and division are politically risky due to Russian influence. This is in fact the common dilemma that is faced by all five countries in the region. In the contexts of multilateral cooperation, rational calculation, and historically accumulated experience, the image and illusion of regionalism are much more complicated than they appear to be. The discussion on regionalism in CA has not been fully invigorated, and scholars who have touched upon the topic endorse more skeptical views. Nevertheless, since they achieved independence from the USSR, the CA countries have built a regional security structure that consolidates both state sovereignty and intra-regionalization. Regionalism offers another option for a new multilateralism in the rapidly globalizing world, especially for the relatively weaker countries, as a reaction to or in cooperation with extra regional powers.

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Methodological Significance The gaps in the previous studies on regionalism in CA manifest the following points. There is an epistemological tendency to overweigh the role of external powers, consequently depicting the region as a passive victim of great power rivalries structured in geopolitical conditions. However, there is not a single country or a region that is not confined to geopolitics; only the degree varies. Therefore, the geopolitical limitation per se does not establish any idiosyncrasy in analyzing the region. Some scholars overestimate culture and identity and look at the individual countries of the region from anthropological and historical structuralism perspectives. There is a dearth of in-depth regional-level analysis. Building upon the previous academic endeavors, this book explored ways to zoom in on the region per se while positioning it in the wider academic explanations of regionalism and regionalization and providing policy implications for its future stability and prosperity. Therefore, the book pays sufficient attention to the mutual interactions between external multilateral forces and intra-regionality as a reaction (or inaction) to those multilateral forces. Our research on the dynamic changes shed light upon the fact that regionalization has been continuously co-evolving. In terms of empirical contributions, the book addresses not only the commonly explained barriers but the outcomes of cooperation as the region’s dynamic changes have been under-researched. In particular, this research examined the institutions of regionality, regional events, motivations of regionalized actions, and the form of regional regulatory frameworks. While doing so, this book focused on how externally imposed shared circumstantial interests are transformed into indigenous regionality based on proactively shared collective and synergetic interests beyond individual countries’ accidentally common interests. It explored intra-regionality and regionalization through watershed regional affairs and region-wide reactions. Future Scenarios At least three realistic future scenarios can be outlined. Firstly, and ideally, intra-regional cooperation mechanisms based on previously existing bodies can be rejuvenated and strengthened. In particular, the Central Asian Union (CAU) could be resurrected to closely communicate and

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cooperate with pan-CA civil society-led non-governmental public organizations and networks such as the Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN), the Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP), and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC). This would integrate the regionalization process both horizontally and vertically, ensuring that the agendas focus on urgent regional matters. Such a process may both balance against and contribute to the externally influenced institutional sprawl. The second possible scenario represents the opposite direction. Existing intra-regional institutions may further be weakened while external powers such as Russia and China keep increasing their clout in the region through their own types of multilateralism. The four major actors could keep the status quo in the region by an implicit consensus of not evoking any tensions in doing their own business in the region. As their involvement in the region develops, there might be some new arrangements in strategic partnership among the main actors, for example, enhancing EU-China cooperation in CA matters. While this path may provide surface stability and short-term economic development, the supranational structure within the CA region will be diminished, region-specific interests will not be sufficiently addressed, and institutional utility will not be shared within the region. The third scenario is further globalizing of the current regional governance, ideally keeping a CAU/CACO-like intraregional institution at its core, through consolidating more bilateral and multilateral relationships with middle power countries such as Turkey, India, Japan, and South Korea. At the same time, inter-regional cooperation between CA and regional organizations in other parts of the world could increase while the region remains open to athe ctivities of international organizations.

Concluding Remarks Central Asia as a region has developed a complex mixed collective identity based on continuous tension since independence: between Russophilia and Russophobia, between Sinophilia and Sinophobia, between Westernized modernity versus a Central Asian way of development, and between a dual identity as Asia and Europe. The architecture of the current regional governance demonstrates that external power-led established regional organizations have been reactivated and the number of regional institutions has grown. Amid these dynamics, intra-regionalism embodied in

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regional organizations is relatively weak and much less present than in external actor-led regional organizations. The rising institutionalized rivalries continue to attempt to reorient the CA countries to the external actors’ ambitions of reshaping the region in alignment with their own practices, values, and norms through institutional tools. Vigorous interactions are ongoing through various means including cooperation, learning processes, and sometimes coercion. Only carefully designed CA-focused regional organizations can safely play roles as supranational actors who can effectively tackle region-specific matters. Given the shared geopolitical conditions and the historically and newly constructed power relations between the five countries and the great powers surrounding them, no matter whether the tradition and practice of CA regional interaction and cooperation is externally imposed or internally generated, there are no benefits for these countries in antagonizing one another rather than increasing interaction and cooperation. No matter how the geopolitics change in CA, the people and the region will remain where they are currently. The physical proximity between them will not change although identity can be reconstructed in accordance with political regrouping of the cluster. Therefore, opportunity costs will be higher if tensions rather than well-functioning cooperation escalate. The benefits outweigh the risks of regional cooperation in many areas. The key is identifying how to design cooperative tools and what to select as areas of cooperation. Facing globalizing forces and the need to integrate into the international market, regional-level cooperation is inevitable in CA. Smaller and/ or weaker countries will not be able to sustain development through selfisolation with a few bilateralisms alone. The authors argue that the regionalism in CA has been shaped through reciprocal interactions between the regional actors and great powers rather than unilaterally influenced by a dominant power over the region. A guided regionalism that is initiated, financed, controlled, and monitored by extra-regional actors has been the outcome. There have been some fluctuations depending on the rise and demise of certain great powers, but there is also a continuity that simultaneously explains the core of CA regionalism: the hybrid of socialist modernization; western capitalist re-modernization; and preservation of tradition as the core of the CA states, authoritarian neopatrimonialism. There remain a number of additional questions to explore, including whether or not the disparities in economic development may create a regional hegemon in the future. It is debatable whether it is inevitable in a

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dynamic region that a rising regional hegemon will evolve from inside the region due to the countries’ heavy security reliance on external powers, notably Russia. The quality and robustness of intra-regional cooperation will also depend on how well the CA countries will succeed in domestic reforms, which will in turn determine how they approach regional and international cooperation.

References Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. 2018. “Comparative Area Studies: The Golden Mean between Area Studies and Universalist Approaches?” In Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications, eds. Ariel I. Ahram, Patrick Köllner, and Rudra Sil, 29–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry. 2014. “The International Society Approach and Asia.” In Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, eds. Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 100–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0006. Gu, Bin. 2017. “Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB.” Journal of International Economic Law (20): 137–158. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgx006. Jahn, Beate. 2016. “Theorizing the Political Relevance of International Relations Theory.” International Studies Quarterly 61 (1): 64–77. https://doi.org/10. 1093/isq/sqw035. Lista, Peter, and Fabio Rojas. 2018. “Institutions.” In The SAGE Handbook of Sociology, eds. William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner, 312–326. Los Angeles: Sage. Park, Saeyoung. 2020. “The Death of Eastphalia”. In 1874 In East Asia in the World Twelve Events that Shaped the Modern International Order, eds. Stephan Haggard and David C. Kang, 239–262. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Qin, Yaqing. 2007. “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7: 313–340. https://doi.org/10. 1093/irap/lcm013. Scott, David A. 2013. “Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Beyond …? EU-China Understandings of the International System.” International Relations 27 (1): 30–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117812463153. Stephen, Matthew D. 2017. “Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance.” Global Governance 23: 483–502. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 19426720-02303009.

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Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Reviews of Political Science 2: 369–404. https://doi.org/10.1146/ annurev.polisci.2.1.369. Zhao, Suisheng. 2011. “China’s Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and Calculations.” 20 (68): 53–67. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10670564.2011.520846.

Index

A Afghanistan, 2, 3, 11, 22, 45, 49, 50, 60, 64, 65, 86, 88, 90, 91, 109, 127–129, 135–138, 164 Autarchic/Autarchy/autarchical turn, 2, 19, 24, 29, 155, 163, 166, 179, 181

B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 85, 100, 104, 136, 137, 142, 145

C Caspian development, 51, 187 Central Asian regionalism (CA regionalism/regionalism in CA), 6–9, 11–13, 15, 27, 29–31, 74, 111, 113, 114, 124, 167, 176, 177, 179–182, 184, 190, 191, 193 Central Asian Union (CAU), 57, 125, 126, 146, 147, 191

Civil society, 26, 27, 33, 46, 87, 94, 96, 110, 124, 137, 143, 153–155, 163, 165, 166, 180, 182, 183, 185, 190 Collective action, 7, 11, 127, 165 Collective identity, 55, 185, 192 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 4, 7, 48–52, 54, 57, 58, 126, 129–131, 133, 136, 188 Collective vision, 8 Color revolutions, 154 Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), 48, 49, 51, 64, 68, 97, 126, 133, 135, 136, 139, 147 Corruption, 24, 66, 72, 154, 165 D Democracy/Democratic, 11, 18, 19, 24, 46, 48, 50, 53, 56, 58, 59, 66, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92–95, 110, 154, 155, 158, 161, 163, 164, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185, 190

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. BOURDAIS PARK et al., Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4079-0

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INDEX

Democratization, 1, 22, 46, 47, 83, 85, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 139, 156, 161, 163, 190 Denuclearization, 125, 137 De-Sovietization, 17, 28, 44, 55, 56, 70, 73, 74, 84, 124, 178 Development aid/assistance, 14, 24, 96, 111, 129, 131, 134, 140, 141, 155, 189 E Economic development, 12, 24, 45, 62–64, 67, 74, 94, 104, 11, 112, 114, 138, 148, 164, 192, 193 Environment/Environmental, 4, 7, 33, 70–73, 90, 93–95, 98, 108, 139, 140, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153 Ethnic minority, 56, 149 The European Union (EU), 6, 10, 22, 24, 30, 43, 49, 60, 63, 67, 84, 89, 92–97, 99, 111–113, 127, 134, 135, 137–140, 142, 145, 155, 165, 166, 175, 180, 181, 184, 187, 189 Externally guided regionalism, 28, 163, 167, 178, 179, 183, 187, 188, 190 External powers, 3–5, 8, 11–15, 20, 30, 46, 50, 84, 99, 109, 112–114, 123, 124, 127, 149, 153, 167, 168, 176, 178–185, 188, 190–192, 194 Extremism, 12, 24, 51, 88, 91, 126, 138, 140, 145, 163, 178, 179 F Foreign aid, 1, 24 Functionalism, 100, 143 Functionality, 10, 20, 25, 85, 114, 161, 167, 177, 182

I Institutionalized cooperation, 8, 12, 109, 114, 124, 142, 163, 166, 180 Institutional sprawl, 180, 183, 184, 192 Integrationist, 10, 108 International cooperation, 144, 165, 166, 194 International organization (IO), 25, 85, 107, 125, 155, 167, 186, 192 Intra-regional cooperation, 15, 44, 69, 74, 99, 109, 111, 112, 140, 143, 146, 150, 161, 166, 167, 183, 189, 191, 194 Intra-regionality, 8, 17, 25, 26, 178, 191 K Kazakhstan, 2, 4, 18, 20, 22, 27, 33, 45–47, 49, 50, 52–54, 56–58, 61–68, 70–73, 85, 86, 89–94, 96–102, 105, 106, 108, 110–112, 125, 127–131, 136, 137, 140, 143–146, 148–151, 153, 154, 156–159, 161, 177, 187 Kyrgyzstan, 2, 3, 18, 21, 22, 33, 45–47, 49, 51, 52, 56, 58–62, 65–68, 72, 73, 85–87, 89, 92, 93, 97, 105, 106, 108, 110, 111, 124, 125, 129, 136, 140, 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 187 M Military intervention, 4, 99, 131 Motivation, 23–26, 113, 124, 176, 177, 186, 191 Multilateral engagement, 114, 182

INDEX

Multilateralism(s), 6, 8, 9, 12–15, 18, 27–30, 52, 74, 75, 84, 85, 92, 93, 96, 100–102, 106, 107, 112–114, 124, 126, 132, 133, 142, 143, 147, 161, 163, 165–168, 175–179, 181–185, 188–190, 192 Multi vector diplomacy, 182 N Neo-patrimonialism, 2 New Silk Road, 101, 166 O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 134 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 92–94, 143, 144, 152 P Participatory regionalization, 182 Positionality, 23, 25, 74, 113, 186 R Regime stability, 28, 29, 166, 168, 178–182, 189 Regional cooperation, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 23, 57, 67, 74, 94, 96, 99, 108, 110, 112, 113, 124, 132, 147, 153, 158, 163, 167, 177, 180, 182, 193 Regional governance, 72, 112, 114, 176, 181, 188, 189, 192 Regional identity, 10, 15, 24, 25, 84, 85, 91, 161, 181 Regional institutions, 51, 132, 133, 140, 146, 175, 177, 183, 192 Regionalization, 5, 7–12, 15–17, 20, 21, 23, 26–30, 44, 55–57, 67,

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74, 75, 84, 101, 108, 109, 113, 114, 124, 143, 150, 153, 155, 161, 163, 166, 175, 176, 178–183, 189–192 Regional organizations (RO), 11, 15, 17, 27, 48, 49, 51, 68, 94, 133, 134, 142, 144, 167, 175, 179, 183, 184, 188, 189, 192, 193 Regional security, 5, 14, 53, 72, 86, 92, 112, 125–127, 133, 179, 188, 190 Russia, 1, 2, 5–7, 11, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 28, 30–32, 34, 47–54, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74, 84, 85, 88, 96–99, 101, 107, 111–114, 125–127, 129–131, 134–137, 140, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149, 156, 164–166, 178–181, 183, 187–189, 192, 194

S Separatism, 51, 142, 163, 178, 179 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 49–51, 57, 68, 101, 107, 126, 129, 136, 142, 146, 188 Shared interests, 8, 23, 30, 124, 161, 163, 168, 186 Soviet Union/USSR, 2, 3, 24, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 70, 73, 83, 89, 97, 99, 111, 114, 155, 158, 159, 181, 183, 188, 190 State-building, 44, 46, 165, 178 Supranationalism, 25, 182, 186, 190 Supranational sphere, 16, 26, 162, 163, 179, 180, 184

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T Tajikistan, 2, 3, 22, 32, 33, 45–47, 49–51, 55–58, 60–62, 64–68, 71–73, 85–88, 92, 93, 97, 99, 102, 108, 110, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 136, 140, 145, 146, 150, 151, 153, 154, 159, 164 Territorial border, 58, 100, 123, 188 Terrorism, 12, 24, 51, 59, 60, 109, 123, 126, 128, 142, 145, 163, 178, 179 Trade, 3, 6, 9, 13, 24, 27, 49, 53, 57, 62, 67–69, 74, 90, 92, 94, 96, 101, 102, 107, 112, 126, 138, 140, 141, 146–149, 161, 167, 177, 189 Turkmenistan, 2, 18, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 59–62, 64–67, 69, 71, 72, 85, 87, 92–94, 96, 100, 102, 104, 105, 108, 110, 125, 127, 129, 131, 136, 140, 147, 149–151, 153, 154, 158, 159, 164, 187

U The United States (US), 6, 11, 21, 22, 32, 43, 47, 52–54, 60, 63–65, 85–91, 95, 97, 98, 102, 106, 108, 111–113, 126–128, 140, 142, 147, 164, 180, 187, 189 Uzbekistan, 2, 3, 18, 21, 22, 32, 45–47, 49, 53, 55–62, 64–67, 69, 71–73, 85–88, 91–93, 102, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 136, 140, 143, 145–147, 149–151, 153, 154, 160, 161, 164, 187

W Water, 58, 70–73, 90, 109, 124, 134, 137–140, 144, 150 War, 1, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 86, 90, 98, 107, 129, 177, 179, 190