Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-199 9780773568303

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Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968–1990

Postwar Canadian foreign policy has been characterized by two enduring themes: an ongoing commitment to multilateralism, on the one hand, and a substantial commitment to continentalism, on the other. Beginning in the early 1970s, the postwar international system entered a period that would lead to a dramatic transformation. The relative decline of the United States, punctuated by the end of the Cold War, the rise of economic interdependence and the new internationalism, and the emergence of citizen-centred foreign policy are all key features of a significant change. These three factors have had a substantial impact on both Canada’s role in the world and its relationships with its main political and economic partners. The principal argument of this book is that Canada’s foreign policy toward Latin America has been profoundly affected by these three factors, as it evolved in response to both changing domestic demands and shifting international circumstances. On the domestic side, successive Canadian governments have been pressured by nongovernmental organizations to play a bigger role in Latin America. This increased role can be seen in official foreign policy commitments, such as the decision to join the Organization of American States, and in policy decisions on political refugees and the like. On the international side, which includes both a regional and a global dimension, the United States has played a key role in constraining Canadian foreign policy in the region. It is important to note, however, that Canadian foreign policy has been steadied by the long-standing tradition of internationalism. In the end, this book argues that the tradition of internationalism in Canadian foreign policy provides the framework with which to understand and accommodate these changes. brian j.r. stevenson is associate vice-president (International) and associate professor in the Faculty of Business at the University of Alberta.

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f o r e i g n p o l i c y, s e c u r i t y a n d s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s Editors: Alex MacLeod and Charles-Philippe David The Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies Series seeks to promote analysis of the transformation and adaptation of foreign and security policies in the post–Cold War era. The series welcomes manuscripts offering innovative interpretations or new theoretical approaches to these questions, whether dealing with specific strategic or policy issues or with the evolving concept of security itself. monographs Power versus Prudence Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons T.V. Paul Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968–1990 Brian J.R. Stevenson collections The Future of nato Enlargement, Russia, and European Security Edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque

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Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968–1990 brian j.r. stevenson

The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2000 isbn 0-7735-2032-5 Legal deposit third quarter 2000 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for its publishing activities. We also acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Stevenson, Brian J. R. (Brian Joseph Ramon), 1957– Canada, Latin America, and the new internationalism: a foreign policy analysis, 1968–1990 (Foreign policy, security and strategic studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-7735-2032-5 1. Canada – Foreign relations – Latin America. 2. Latin America – Foreign economic relations – Canada. 3. Internationalism. 4. Canada – Foreign relations – 1945– . I. Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. II. Université du Québec à Montréal. Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité. III. Title. IV. Series. fc244.l3s74 2000 c99-901525-7 327.7108 f1029.5.l3s74 2000

This book was typeset by Typo Litho Composition Inc. in 10/12 Baskerville.

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A mi madre que me enseñó la importancia y el placer de escribir A mis hermanas Kiki y Sandy A mi esposa Judy

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Contents

Acknowledgments Preface xi

ix

1 From Puzzle to Policy

3

part one c anadian foreign policy i n a c h a n g i n g w o r l d 25 2 Canada and the Emergence of the New Internationalism 27 3 Foreign Policy Analysis: From the 1950s to the 1980s

59

4 Domestic Pressures, External Constraints, and the New Internationalism 90 part two americas

growing closer to the 109

5 Canadian Foreign Policy towards Latin America: Government Initiatives and Responses, 1968–1990 6 Entering the Inter-American System: Canada and the oas 155 7 Advisors to the Prince? Domestic ngos and Canadian Foreign Policy 184 8 Conclusion 224 Notes 235 Index 283

111

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Acknowledgments

In the long journey from the beginning of this project to the publication of this book many people have been kind enough to offer their time and their expertise. While I cannot possibly thank them all here, I would like to acknowledge the individuals and institutions who were directly involved with the project. For any scholar the principal refuge is always the library. During this project I was welcomed and assisted by various libraries. I would especially like to thank the staff of the National Library of Canada for providing me with space and endless material and for doing so with great efficiency. I would also like to express my appreciation to the staff (and especially to David Milne) of the library of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which at times was a second home to me, for their assistance, kindness, and generosity, even when continuous cutbacks and staff reductions were taking place. My thanks also to the resource centre of the Latin American Working Group not only for the use of its wonderful collection but also for the genuine enthusiasm and support that its members always displayed. But library work is only part of the research process. While doing the research I came in contact with a great many individuals from various organizations whose input was invaluable. From the ngo community the list could be endless; however, I would like to mention a few who were directly involved. Many thanks to Tim Draimin, Joe Gunn, John Foster, and Rick Jackson. From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade my appreciation to John Graham, Gordon Longmuir, Richard Gorham, Jim Lovett, Randolph Mank, Marianne Ruthe-

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x

Acknowledgments

ford, Paul Willox, Peter Boehm, Paul Durand, Christine Pappas, and David Adam. From the House of Commons, my special thanks to Gerry Schmitz for his interest, enthusiasm, and helpful comments. At Queen’s University, I would like to thank David Haglund, who was instrumental in placing me at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as a doctoral intern and who steered me in the direction of the oas before anyone thought it might become a relevant topic in Canada. I would also like to thank Hal Klepak of the Royal Military College for his many helpful comments and for his encouragement and good humour. At the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (itam), my appreciation to Arturo Fernández and Rafael Fernandez de Castro for their unwavering support and friendship and to Juanita Gómez and Rosa Martha Soto for always being there when I needed them. For their support in the publication of this book, I thank the Program for the Study of the United States, Mexico, and Canada (parmec) at itam, as well as the Latin America Branch of dfait, which inspired this work from the outset. I would also like to thank Don Akenson of McGill-Queen’s University Press for boundless patience in the production of this book and Ron Curtis for skilfully copyediting the manuscript. I am grateful, as well, to the Millers for letting me write in one of the most beautiful places on earth. I would especially like to thank Michael K. Hawes who saw this project through from beginning to end and who always gave me his encouragement and insights, all of which made the completion of this project possible. No one could ask for a better friend. Finally, to Judy for always giving me a purpose. The Millers’ Cabin Kananaskis, Alberta

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Preface

As we enter the twenty-first century, Canadians are trying to make sense of their role in the world. For nearly thirty years, Canada has been becoming an increasingly active and effective player on the world stage, active beyond its capabilities as measured by the standards of the more traditional schools of international relations and effective in ways that even Pearsonian diplomats would not have thought possible. At the same time, Canadians have become organized and effective participants in foreign policy matters. Since the late 1960s, there has been a tremendous growth in the activity of nongovernmental organizations (ngos), which have acted with the explicit intent of influencing and changing Canadian foreign policy. This, too, is in stark contrast to the role played by the public during Canada’s “golden age of diplomacy” in the 1950s. These changes in the nature of Canadian foreign policy point not only to the will and determination of the government and of the nongovernmental actors involved but also, and perhaps more importantly, to structural changes in the international system itself, which allow both for more effective participation by a middle power on the world stage and for citizen participation in foreign policy in Canada. During the past thirty years, Canada has also become a more capable and dynamic player in inter-American affairs. Although between Confederation and the end of the 1960s Canada’s involvement in Latin America was modest, beginning with Pierre Trudeau successive Canadian governments have played their part in getting closer to the Americas. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Canada had become a major player in inter-American affairs, hosting major events such as

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xii

Preface

the Pan American Games, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (oas), and the Summit of the Americas, as well as leading the negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ftaa). In a similar and parallel manner, ngos have developed a sophisticated network both in Canada and throughout the hemisphere, opposing and attempting to influence government polices. Whether it be protesting free trade agreements that do not include protection for the environment or labour, pressuring governments on human rights issues, or organizing “people’s summits” that parallel government summits, these groups have become a standard feature of Canadian foreign policy. This book aims to understand the increased activity and effectiveness of both the state and civil society in Canada’s foreigh policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990. The beginning of this period marks an unprecedented commitment by the Canadian government to participate in inter-American affairs with an explicit and welldefined policy designed to create closer linkages to the region at all levels of society. It ends with the culmination of these policies as expressed by Canada’s entry into the oas as a permanent member of that body, marking the beginning of a new level of participation and commitment. The period also begins with the appearance of ngo activity on the foreign policy landscape, activity that attempted to address issues of social justice in Latin America, and it ends with the defeat at the polls in 1989 of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, which many Canadian ngos saw as a beachhead for their political ideals in Latin America. It is this period that best explains the nature of Canada’s contemporary relationship with the region, since there was a structural change in Canada’s role in international relations and the activity of its citizens during this period. The two principal aims of this book, reflected in its two parts, are, first, to understand, through the tools of foreign policy analysis (fpa), the changing nature of the international system itself, of Canada’s increased activity and influence in world affairs, and of the unprecedented citizen participation in foreign policy. Thus the first part of the book is a theoretical analysis of these questions within the methodological perspective of fpa. The second aim of the book, based on the themes developed in the first part, is to provide an empirical study of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America and of the role played by ngos, principally in the Canadian setting. What I suggest throughout is that the changes in Canadian foreign policy are rooted in structural changes in the international system and that they are well reflected in the case study I present. The book is therefore aimed not only at those interested in Canada’s relations with Latin America but

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xiii

Preface

also at those who study international relations and foreign policy. For the former it provides a detailed empirical study of Canada’s relations with Latin America between 1968 to 1990; to the latter it offers an attempt to explain the very nature of that relationship and its root causes.

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Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism

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1 From Puzzle to Policy The actors can be pictured in a matrix of internal and external forces that affect their behavior through pull and pressures or by setting up counter pulls and counter pressures. Arnold Wolfers

1

Here is the paradox of foreign policy: that its aims, the product of interaction between pressures internal and external to the state, have a certain perennial quality about them … and yet the implementation of these aims in the concrete circumstances of the times has to bow to ever-changing realities. F.S. Northedge

2

The 1970s and the 1980s saw profound changes to the postwar order. Challenges to u.s. dominance in world affairs during this time attracted the attention of many students of international affairs. The rapid decline of the United States as the economic master of the world, which began with the downfall of the Bretton Woods system on 15 August 1971, was accelerated by the oil crisis of the 1970s and

exacerbated by the general decline of u.s . industrial capacity. It

encouraged some commentators to proclaim that we were in the “post-hegemonic era” and others to pose the fundamental question for u.s. foreign policy as “primacy or world order?”

3

Even though

these two decades saw a great arms race between the two superpowers, the United States often found itself helpless to overcome various challenges posed to it. Vietnam was a case in point, as was the hostage taking incident in Iran in the late 1970s – demonstrating the constraints facing u.s. military power. Interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989, after the persistent defiance of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, showed that the United States flexed its military muscles only if it was sure that it could win with little resistance. In this context, the case of Nicaragua during the 1980s was indicative of u.s. inability to use force, particularly where East-West issues were concerned. At the same time, the decline of the Soviet Union also attracted attention. The Soviet fear of falling too far behind the United States in military strength, and its contribution to the arms race, had no small influence on the dramatic changes in Soviet policies after Mikhail

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4 Canada and Latin America Gorbachev came to power in 1984. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan, in some respects its own Vietnam, concluded with a complete withdrawal of troops from that country in 1988 and seemed to accentuate the fact that military might could not be measured by the quantity of weapons and military personnel. The rapid changes in Eastern Europe after 1989 also pointed to the decline of the ussr as a world power, which finally came apart in 1991. These changes, along with the disintegration of the ussr as of 1992, led to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of an international system that is no longer strictly bipolar. In addition, universal multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( gatt ) lost much of their postwar importance, in part simply because as more states became members, these institutions became more unwieldy. More importantly, however, their decline occurred with the development of the European Community (ec ) and the establishment of the European Union (eu ) in 1992, which began to spur a new type of regionalism, existing alongside, but challenging the primacy of, universal multilateralism. The new regionalism evolved within the framework of these universal multilateral institutions but constantly challenged their viability as the sole framework for multilateral transactions. The result was that by the late 1980s new regional arrangements were emerging throughout the world, even as universal multilateral institutions went through a renaissance. During the 1970s and 1980s, Canada’s relations with other states changed dramatically. Beginning with the foreign policy review of Pierre Trudeau in 1968 and ending with Canada’s active participation in world affairs by the end of the 1980s, Canada increasingly became a more active participant in international affairs. While the United States became less effective as a world leader, the potential for Canada to be an important international player became more evident. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in Canada’s increased interest in Latin America during the 1970s and in its unprecedented involvement in inter-American affairs in the 1980s. As Canada enters this new era and begins to assess the nature of the New World Order and its role in it, it is more important than ever to examine the two previous decades and attempt to understand the various aspects of Canada’s foreign relations during that period, in order to find, if possible, the clues to a future foreign policy in a changed world. Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America is only a part of the greater story, but it is one that can yield important insights into other aspects of Canada’s past and future foreign relations. In the last few years several excellent works have focused on Canada’s relation with the

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5 From Puzzle to Policy region.4 In this book, I wish to build on the empirical knowledge they provide, in order to ask some important theoretical questions and propose some practical answers.

th e p u z z l e o f c a n a d a ’ s p o l i c y t o wa r d s l at i n a m e r i c a In October of 1989 Magdalena Hernández, a small woman and mother of twelve, arrived at Windsor City Hall after a long voyage from her farming village of Las Vueltas in El Salvador. The purpose of Hernández’s visit which was to request a Windsor city flag, was, in the words of city councillor Sheila Wisdom, “amazing.” The fact that this visit was reported on the front page of the Globe and Mail was also nothing short of amazing.5 This fifty-three-year-old widow, who had been living in refugee camps after her husband and three sons had been killed by the army and who was now president of her village women’s council, did not come to seek refuge in Canada, as so many of her compatriots had done over the previous decade. She came specifically because the flag that had been given to Las Vueltas, Windsor’s twin “city,” had provided the villagers with a sense of protection, but it had been taken down by government soldiers and burnt. Determined not to be intimidated and driven once more to refugee camps, the villagers decided to stay and rebuild their lives. The fact that they had looked to Canada for some form of protection and had sent a representative sponsored by the Canadian nongovernment organization (ngo ) SalvAid would have been unthinkable a decade earlier. That Hernández had made such a request and that the city of Windsor not only gave her a new flag but held a wine and cheese reception in her honour and even urged the Canadian government and the United Nations to ensure that food and medicine got through to Hernández’s village testified to the importance that Latin America had attained for Canadians in the late 1980s. About the same time that Hernández was visiting Windsor, the Department of National Defence was making preparations to send a contingent of armed forces personnel to Central America under a un peacekeeping force that included West Germany, Spain, Ireland, Colombia, and Venezuela.6 The principal task of the peacekeeping force would be to monitor the movement of troops and arms in Central America, under an agreement made by the five Central American presidents in February 1989. This would be the first time that Canada would be engaged in peacekeeping in this hemisphere, but most importantly, this would be the culmination of nearly a decade of increased diplomatic and political contacts with Central America and of over two decades of interest in Latin America in general. That Canada was

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6 Canada and Latin America

initially the only country in the hemisphere to be considered for this peacekeeping force attested to the high profile it had achieved in the region and to its long history and considerable expertise as a peacekeeper. During the same month in 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney attended the summit of Western Hemispheric leaders in San José, Costa Rica, the first time a Canadian prime minister had visited Central America. During the meeting Mulroney announced that Canada would soon join the Organization of American States ( oas ), after almost a century of remaining aloof from the organization. With this policy change, Canada finally made a commitment to an organization it had always seen as troubled and ineffective, thus suggesting a newfound importance for Latin American matters. Indeed, if events such as these are put in the context of the history of Canadian policy towards Latin America since 1968, they suggest a dramatic increase in the interest and the involvement of both the Canadian government and ordinary Canadians. Contact between the Canadian government and the Latin American republics had always been limited since Confederation in 1867. In fact, even shortly before 1968, when Pierre Trudeau launched his major review of Canadian foreign policy, official contact was minimal, and interest by Canadians was limited to a few ngo s and religious orders who worked in the region. During the 1970s, there was, however, a more clearly defined interest by ordinary Canadians in Latin America, particularly respecting Chile after the violent overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende. Canada was forced, by both internal and external factors, to develop a regional policy towards Central America after the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 and the bloody Salvadoran civil war of the early 1980s burst onto the international scene. Canada’s Latin American policy underwent an important evolution, culminating in unprecedented multilateral and bilateral contact throughout the Western Hemisphere. With respect to Central America, this change included the tripling of aid for the 1981–86 period (tripling over the previous five years) to $100 million, and it led to the doubling of this amount for the six-year period from 1988 to 1995. With respect to relations with the larger Latin American republics, Canada increased its contact with the Contadora and Contadora support-group countries. On the diplomatic front, along with nato allies and Latin American states, it increasingly opposed the Reagan administration’s policy in Central America. It recognized the Sandinista government within a few days of its taking power, after overthrowing dictator Anastasio Somoza, and continued to trade with it even after the Reagan administration’s trade embargo against Nicaragua in 1985.

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7 From Puzzle to Policy

During the 1980s Canada accepted large numbers of refugees from the region and contributed substantially to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees ( unhcr ) in its efforts to deal with the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons fleeing conflicts and repression.7 In April 1984 and in November 1988 the Canadian foreign minister visited Central America to meet with government officials, opposition members, and Canadian ngo s working in the region.8 In addition, two parliamentary committees conducted exhaustive studies in 1981–82 and in 1988, respectively, and strongly endorsed greater Canadian involvement in the region, including more diplomatic representation and increased development assistance, as well as a peacekeeping role. 9 On the international front, Canada had consistently supported the Contadora peace process and had repeatedly offered its assistance in security-verification planning and even in peacekeeping “under the right circumstances.” Slowly Canada became involved in multilateral issues and, recognizing important Canadian security interests relating to the Central American conflict, became an increasingly important actor in the promotion of peace and regional security. By 1986 Canadian policy towards Central America was one of the most sensitive foreign policy issues in Canada. 10 In his response of 28 September 1988 to the report of the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, the secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, reacted positively to most of the recommendations issued by the committee, though certainly diluting or ignoring others. Clark’s response included a reassertion of Canada’s support for the peace process in Central America and a continued offer of Canadian technical, and possibly peacekeeping, support. In addition to the $100 million in development assistance mentioned above, Clark announced the establishment of honorary consulates in Tegucigalpa, Managua, and possibly San Salvador that would complement recently opened Canadian International Development Agency ( cida ) offices in those cities. The culmination of Canada’s involvement in the Central American conflict during the 1980s was perhaps Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s attendance at the summit of Western Hemispheric leaders in San José, Costa Rica, when he announced Canada’s entry into the oas . By 1990, with peacekeeping troops in Central America and a seat in the oas , Canada was being drawn into participation, though somewhat reluctantly, in the North American Free Trade (nafta ) negotiations with Mexico and the United States, putting it closer than ever into a trade partnership with a Latin American country and, potentially, into a hemispheric free-trade zone. 11 All of this invites several questions, including, What motivated Canada’s interest in Latin America in the late 1960s? What drew it closer to the region during the 1970s? What encouraged it to become involved

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8 Canada and Latin America in the Central American conflict during the 1980s? and What made it join the oas after almost a century of hesitation? Canada had no traditional relationship with Latin America, and especially the Central American republics, in contrast to its relationship with members of La Francophonie and the Commonwealth states of the Caribbean; it had never exercised a great deal of political influence and had never had substantial trade with the region; and, except for a modest Canadian naval landing in El Salvador in 1932, it had no direct military or strategic interests.12 During the 1970s Canada did not strongly oppose u.s . policy in the Western Hemisphere, nor did it seek to become more involved in the politics of the region. Although it continued to maintain normal diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba, it did not assert itself on other issues, such as the overthrow of the Allende government in 1973. This practice conformed to Canada’s long-standing policy of not becoming involved in inter-American affairs, since Canadian involvement would be an unnecessary irritant to bilateral Canada- u.s. relations. What is most puzzling, perhaps, is that during the 1980s, when the Central American crisis raged on, many of Canada’s policies towards the region put it at odds with the United States, its largest trading partner and closest ally. Even with the improved tone of relations between the government of Brian Mulroney and the Reagan administration, the United States was unable to persuade Canada to support its policy of “stopping communism” in the hemisphere by helping defeat the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Canada consistently argued that the root of the conflict was primarily a North-South issue (that is, primarily social and economic, not ideological). This position was in opposition to the Reagan administration’s claim that the problem was an East-West conflict fostered by the Soviet Union and Cuba. What is curious is that, in effect, while the United States had been funding the Nicaraguan resistance (known as the contras), Canada maintained diplomatic recognition of the Sandinistas and increased its development assistance to Nicaragua, making it the second largest recipient of aid in the region; 13 it attempted, as well, to increase its commercial ties, to try to fill the gap left by the 14 u.s. trade embargo – and during the mid-1980s it was succeeding. Although Canada could not hope to match u.s. financial support to the Nicaraguan resistance – or indeed the support provided to the other Central American republics – there were both symbolic and practical consequences of Canada’s policy toward Nicaragua. Finally, Canada had increasingly opposed the United States during the 1980s in such forums as the un and had supported the ruling of the International Court of Justice against the u.s. mining of Nicaraguan

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9 From Puzzle to Policy harbours, which was, in effect, an international condemnation of the Reagan administration’s policy in the region. From the perspective of realpolitik, Canada’s lack of support for what the Reagan administration claimed as one of the most important foreign policy issues for the United States in the 1980s could not be seen as very advisable: it is hard to understand how such a policy could have been seen to be in the national interest, particularly during Mulroney’s first term in office, which was dominated by one foreign policy issue: the free trade agreement with the United States. Indeed, the Mulroney government had set as one of its main tasks the improvement of u.s.-Canada relations, which had been strained by the Trudeau years. Why could not Canada simply quietly support the Reagan administration’s policy in the region? After all, Canada had no direct strategic or substantial economic interests there and would have had nothing to lose and everything to gain by supporting the Reagan administration.

15

What is also curious is that by the late 1980s

the government of Brian Mulroney had decided quite precipitously, and without public consultation, to join the oas , a body shunned by successive Liberal and Conservative governments. During the 1980s, however, Canada was not particularly vocal in its opposition to u.s. policy towards Central America, nor did it place itself in a leadership role within the hemisphere. It did not make full use of its traditional middle-power position and its important expertise in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Canada’s involvement in the Central American conflict was, in this respect, most often quiet, sometimes hesitant, and always overly cautious. If one can point to many examples of how Canada developed a distinct policy that contradicted u.s. foreign policy, one can also certainly find convincing examples of timidity and, at times, even acquiescence.

16

In this re-

spect, Canada’s policy towards Nicaragua seemed to be at odds with its policies towards Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which appeared to support these regimes who were close allies of the United States, despite serious accusations of human rights violations and questionable electoral processes. If there was divergence between u.s. and Canadian foreign policy towards Nicaragua, there also appeared to

be

convergence

in

policies

towards

the

other

three

republics,

which seemed to many a profound contradiction. When Prime Minister Brian Mulroney supported the u .s . invasion of Panama soon after Mr Clark had signed the charter of the oa s, which explicitly asserted a policy of nonintervention, a profound contradiction emerged in Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America. On the one hand, Canada had peacekeeping troops in Central America and had participated in a long process of conflict resolution to prevent u.s . military

chap_01.fm Page 10 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

10 Canada and Latin America action in Central America, and, on the other, Canada fully supported the u.s. military action in Panama, in contradiction to the position of most Latin American states. During the 1970s Canada was reluctant to confront the United States on important foreign policy issues in the hemisphere, such as the situation in Chile. By the 1980s, however, it was as if two sets of policies were always at work against each other: first, a policy that attempted to demonstrate Canadian independence from the United States and second, a policy that attempted to demonstrate Canada’s support for u.s. policy in the region. In the early 1980s examples of the latter were more plentiful, but even in the late 1980s Canada’s role in the peace process was limited to the design of technical aspects of the Central American peace proposals, and its development assistance program never grew to a level that reflected the political rhetoric coming out of Ottawa. In sum, Canadian foreign policy caused a great deal of confusion and opposition at home and abroad, though of course for different reasons. To some the policy seemed to be a manifestation of Canada’s subservient role to the United States and was the result of extreme timidity towards the United States by successive Canadian governments, both Liberal and Progressive Conservative; to others it seemed to be a sensible and realistic policy that recognized Canada’s limitations in the international arena. The question remains as to what drew Canada increasingly towards involvement in the Americas, from a limited attempt to broaden Canada’s commercial relations in the 1970s to full participation in the inter-American system in the 1990s. The answer lies in an analysis of the

various

factors

that

helped

change

Canada’s

foreign

policy

towards Latin America. The key to this analysis lies in understanding developments, both domestic and international, between 1968 and 1990.

th e d y n a m i c s o f c a n a d a ’ s latin ame ri ca p olicy The puzzle of Canada’s policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990 is that in some respects it seems independent and distinctly Canadian, while in others it appears to bow to u.s. pressures and values. Although the Canadian government increased both bilateral and multilateral contacts during the 1970s, it did not make great efforts to become actively involved in the major problems in the region. While Latin America struggled under military dictatorships and while human rights violations increased, Canada remained curiously on the sidelines. With respect to Central America in the 1980s, part of the

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11 From Puzzle to Policy problem was that Canadian foreign policy was usually seen in bilateral terms. That is, some observers of Canadian foreign policy in Central America denied or failed to recognize that there was a regional policy at work. They also failed to see that although this policy had evolved since the early 1980s, it had been remarkably consistent, even through changes of government, and had allowed Canada to eventually play an important role in the Central American peace process. In addition, Canada’s involvement with the larger Latin American countries of the Contadora and Contadora support group encouraged an ever broader policy towards Latin America that involved unprecedented multilateral activity. This is not to say that the policy had been rationally planned and executed or that Canada’s involvement in the region was in some way foreseen by officials at External Affairs. Rather, a fairly consistent framework had been at work that allowed for evolution but ensured that no revolution in policy would occur. A central reason why Canada’s policy towards Latin America seems to be a puzzle is that most observers do not take into account the internal and external forces at work in the evolution of the policy or the dynamics between these forces. In many ways Canadian foreign policy in Latin America was a product, and even a compromise, between the views of domestic ngo s and u.s. policy interests in the region. ngo s pressured parliamentarians and the government to become more involved and to be more vocal in the condemnation of u.s. policy in the region and human rights abuses by governments in Latin America. In the 1970s the Canadian government was flooded by requests to increase the inflow of Chilean refugees, to overturn its early decision to recognize the Chilean junta, and to vote against any multilateral support for countries in Latin America who were accused of persistent and gross human rights abuses. During the 1980s the Canadian government was asked to increase aid to Nicaragua in recompense for Nicaraguan progressive policies and to increase diplomatic representation in the region in recognition of its domestic and international importance. Our fragile and uneven relationship with the United States, with whom we share cultural, economic, geographic, and military ties, places real constraints, however, on any Canadian government. Within this framework during the 1980s, Canadian policy towards Central America involved maintaining good relations with all five Central American republics. It involved a policy of appearing evenhanded, of not engaging in ideological rhetoric, of opposing any military support in the region by any outside forces (including Cuba, the ussr, and the United States), and of distributing development assistance on the basis of need and not as a reward or punishment for government behaviour. It also meant supporting dialogue for a Latin

chap_01.fm Page 12 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

12 Canada and Latin America American, or better yet, a Central American solution to the conflict. Above all, Canadian foreign policy was promoted by the government as being independent and distinct, as operating always in concert with other states in multilateral forums. However, since Central America was not a vital or important region for Canada by most objective indicators, why had the policy gone as far as it had? Given that Canada traditionally played a minimal role in the hemisphere, why did it increase diplomatic contacts in a generally unstable region? Why did Canada dare to get involved in a region in which the United States had traditionally exerted a great deal of influence and which it considered of vital importance to its own national security? Why did it increase its development assistance when there were areas in the world that, on the simple basis of need, had greater claims?

c a n a d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y th e o r y and the lati n ame rican case Canadian foreign policy theory does not present us with adequate frameworks to answer these questions fully, for analysts of Canadian foreign policy have either rejected or ignored the growing importance of domestic pressure groups over this period and have focused too much on one level of analysis. In order to unravel the puzzle of Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America, we must attempt to bring into our study all the relevant factors that have acted upon that policy, factors that would involve all three levels of analysis (the individual, state, and states-system levels) in a workable theoretical framework. Theoretically rich interpretations of Canadian foreign policy have developed slowly since 1945, to reach a fairly high level of sophistication in recent times. Indeed, it may be said that Canadian foreign policy theory did not begin to reach fruition until the mid-1980s, with the consolidation of three principal schools of thought on the subject. The threefold division of approaches to Canadian foreign policy into principal power, middle power, and satellite approaches, which dominated the discipline in the 1980s, had evolved out of contending views on the nature of the international system and Canada’s role in it. 17 In other words, Canada’s position and role in world affairs was mostly defined in terms of the third level of analysis, the states-system level. This is not to say, however, that analysts do not pay any attention to the domestic setting. But in most cases the analyses of the nature of the domestic setting, and especially of the relationship between the state and the states-system, have been far less developed than they could have been. By defining foreign policy primarily in terms of one level of

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13 From Puzzle to Policy analysis, we limit the scope and depth of our understanding of the foreign policy process. Although concentrating on one level may be helpful in simplifying the analysis when developing general theories, the purpose of which is to present a generalization of trends or to advocate one particular theoretical approach, doing so is not very useful when assessing a particular case. In other words, these theories present us with good ingredients but fall short of introducing good recipes. 18 The dominant approach to the study of Canadian foreign policy has been the internationalist perspective, which has advocated a middle power role for Canada. As Michael Hawes argues, this perspective “emerged in the aftermath of World War II, grew up in the ‘golden age’ of Canadian foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s and persists (albeit now with serious challengers) as the central perspective in the study of Canadian foreign policy.”19 The internationalist perspective replaced the more isolationist tradition in foreign policy in which Canada had engaged before the war. As a principal protagonist in the war and as one of the few countries to emerge relatively unscathed, Canada was propelled into playing a new role in a changed world order. And so the new principles that guided decision makers in Ottawa, as Hawes explains, included “functionalism, middle powermanship, and benevolent internationalism or voluntarism.”20 Canada was no longer to be considered a “small power,” or perhaps more importantly, it did not consider itself a small power, but rather, its involvement in international affairs increased with both its economic and military position in the immediate postwar era. Canada’s influence was to be based on the role played by its diplomats in the new international organizations and alliances created in the new bipolar world. Two other perspectives in Canadian foreign policy literature began to emerge by the late 1960s: that of Canada as a satellite of the United States, best represented by the work of Stephen Clarkson, and the perspective of Canada as a foremost nation, exemplified in the work of James Eayrs.21 For Clarkson, writing at the end of the 1960s, the close alignment that had developed between Canadian and u.s. foreign policy, which was represented by the internationalist tradition, needed to be rejected. Clarkson saw Canada merely as a satellite of the United States, not because the nature of the states-system at the time of the Cold War dictated it but because Canadian foreign policy makers chose to acquiesce to u.s. dominance. For Eayrs, writing during the beginning of an oil boom, which resulted from the oil crisis of the early 1970s, Canada was in fact much more powerful. Indeed, Eayrs believed that Canada’s new role in international politics meant that Canada had more power and influence in international affairs, quite the opposite to Clarkson’s analysis. However, all three perspectives

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14 Canada and Latin America focused on the relation between Canada and the international system, leaving aside the domestic setting, since it had not gained much relevance at the time. By the 1980s these three perspectives began to come together in an important theoretical debate surrounding the nature of Canada’s role in international affairs. On the one hand, the satellite approach, continuing to be represented by authors such as Clarkson, and the principal-power approach, represented by David Dewitt and John Kirton, began to develop much more sophisticated theoretical arguments, supported by better empirical evidence, even if it led to somewhat contradictory conclusions. On the other hand, the middle power approach, represented primarily by Kim Richard Nossal, which had never lost its important position both with practitioners and academics, also developed more sophisticated theoretical arguments and also challenged its major contenders. In all, the 1980s saw the most important consolidation of positions. The fact that the broader debate within international relations theory was more clearly influencing these schools could be taken as a sign of an increased sophistication through the linkage of third-level approaches by students who advocated realism, dependency theory, and the study of interdependence. On the other hand, the 1980s saw few attempts to link the domestic setting and the international system in Canadian foreign policy, since none of the major theorists of Canadian foreign policy attempted to explain the interaction between domestic and external forces as fully as I argue is necessary, largely because in most cases the attempt to explain a theoretical position was influenced by the belief that the determining factors were largely external and, unlike in the United States, domestic pressure groups were not taken seriously. Some authors attempted to explain the role of domestic groups, although in most cases they attempted to disprove their influence. On the left, authors such as Cranford Pratt argued that Canada was a middle power but took an approach compatible with that of Clarkson in his study of Canadian foreign policy towards the Third World from a class perspective. He argued that only those social groups that are part of the dominant class will have influence on the policy process. The belief of statist theorists, such as Nossal, that the bureaucracy has its autonomy is in fact a deception of the capitalist system. For Pratt, therefore, “the dominant class theory provides a more powerful explanation of why some groups are not inside the winning circle in Ottawa than is provided by those who seek the answer in the international behavioral characteristics of these outsiders.” His own preference is, therefore, a dominant class approach, because it seems “the most fruitful overall framework for research on Canadian

chap_01.fm Page 15 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

15 From Puzzle to Policy foreign policy towards the Third World.” 22 What this means is that domestic groups cannot hope to influence foreign policy on issues beyond the scope of the dominant class. From a statist perspective Nossal also rejected the idea that domestic pressure groups could influence foreign policy, but he rejected it for different reasons. Nossal attempted to link domestic and external determinants within an internally cohesive theoretical framework that links a realist analysis of the international system and a statist approach to the domestic setting. In an article that responded to Pratt, Nossal offered his own theoretical framework to analyze the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign policy. 23 The article, as he argued, brought together the “natural companions” of realism and statism. For Nossal the best way to understand the Canadian government’s policy toward the Third World was to assume that “the democratic state is basically autonomous from civil society, and that the policies of the government are a function of its preferences, not the preferences of groups or classes in society.” 24 A fundamental problem with Nossal’s use of statist theory is that it is essentially a static view of the state. This should come as no surprise, because the so-called “natural companion” of statism, realism (in its structuralist interpretations), suffers from the same flaw: both approaches are unable to incorporate the dynamism and change of the system itself.25 In traditional conceptions of the international system, for example, realism is equated with the status quo and reified into an atemporal structure.26 If one views the state as the holder of independent interests that exist and perpetuate themselves no matter what developments occur in civil society, one would be unable to accept or foresee structural changes, one would just deny their existence. Given the framework of statism, Nossal argues that societal influences on the foreign policy process are minimal. His analysis of domestic determinants of foreign policy, therefore, is intended to demonstrate the limitations of domestic groups in influencing foreign policy, while explaining their increased activity. Perhaps the most relevant framework for our purposes is the work of Dewitt and Kirton, which stands out because they do make an important attempt to link the changes in the international system to changes in the domestic setting. Dewitt and Kirton argue that the process of diffusion in the international system has eroded the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics. The result is that “societal organizations acquire a much greater role in international politics.”27 Thus there has been a greater focus on “low issues,” which has increased the importance of the domestic process in formulating foreign policy, especially after Trudeau was elected in 1968.

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16 Canada and Latin America The domestic process, previously dominated by the executive and senior foreign service officers, opened up channels of influence after 1968 on matters of foreign policy and provided increased access to the foreign policy process by Parliament, political parties, associational interest groups, labour, and business. For the principal power perspective, associational interest groups and labour are particularly central, especially because many have international linkages and take advantage of the changes in the power structure of the international system. Consequently, Dewitt and Kirton argue that for complex neorealism these “key societal actors are seen to employ surplus capacity either directly, in the international marketplace, or in efforts to affect government policy in foreign affairs through domestic mobilization, coalition building, and elite influence within parliamentary and governmental structures.”

28

However, greater access to the foreign policy process has

its limits, and the authors seem to make an important qualification concerning the scale of societal influence. While arguing that there has been increased communication between these societal groups and the state, Dewitt and Kirton admit that they lack evidence of real influence by these groups on the foreign policy process. And where evidence does exist, as on issues of immigration and refugee policy, trade barriers, fisheries, human rights, environmental protection, and nuclear proliferation, they add, “the apparent success is related to, among other things, significant sympathy within Cabinet and caucus, the absence of entrenched policy, the role of Quebec and Ontario with political value.”

mp s

29

within the Liberal caucus, or public support

Much the same arguments are applied to the

role and influence of business and of the provinces, which Dewitt and Kirton argue have had a greater role in the foreign policy process, although again they admit that there is no evidence of increased influence. Although Dewitt and Kirton make an important contribution by attempting to link the changes in the international system with the intensification of activity from domestic groups, their theoretical assertions are somewhat disappointing and do not measure up to their third-level analysis. In other words, although they make an important contribution by applying theoretical analyses that derive from contemporary international relations theory, when it comes to extending the effects of the changes in the international system to the domestic setting, their analysis fares rather poorly. How, for example, do societal forces use the changes in the international system to their advantage? What is it about the developments in the changing world order that gives domestic groups greater voice, if not impact, on the foreign policy process? What is the connection between the decline of the

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17 From Puzzle to Policy United States as an international superpower towards the end of the Vietnam War and the rise of domestic social movements protesting issues like nuclear disarmament, u.s. foreign policy in the Third World, the environment, and international development? Furthermore, is it not possible to conclude that if there is greater sympathy for these kinds of issues in Cabinet and caucus or if there is no entrenched policy or if some caucus members are particularly influential, then, in fact, these groups have been successful? Although Dewitt and Kirton are more sympathetic to the role of domestic groups than Cranford Pratt is, yet there seems to be a limit to their ability to disclose the importance of domestic groups and unravel the linkage of the activities of social movements since the late 1960s to the changes in the international system. From my vantage point, the ingredients of Canadian foreign policy involve, principally, the role of the interaction between the domestic political system and the international system. The international system has been changing fundamentally since the late 1960s, and so has the ability of international social movements and international nongovernmental organizations (ing o s) to influence foreign policy. It should be clear that if the nature of the international system has changed in the past two decades and if the changes have allowed a greater role for states and nonstate actors to influence foreign policy makers and the international system itself, then the ingredients of Canadian foreign policy at the second and third levels have altered the way foreign policy is conceived, formulated, and executed in Canada. Drawing from this conclusion, the analysis in this book aims to present a different, and hopefully more complete, perspective on the nature of Canadian foreign policy that takes into account all the relevant factors in the case under study. domestic

pressures,

external

constraints,

and

the

new

i n te rn at i o n al i s m

At least since 1968 there has been a strong movement in Canada to promote an independent foreign policy. This movement has been reflected both in government policy and in academic and public debates. The crucial question has been how Canada could obtain foreign policy independence from its u.s. neighbour. After World War II, when the United States had taken over the role of Canada’s major trading partner and military ally, a role that Britain had always held, Canada’s room for maneuvre in international relations was minimal, strengthened only by its multilateral activities in the un and other

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18 Canada and Latin America international

organizations.

Although

the

constraints

on

Canada’s

foreign policy remain, they went, nonetheless, through an important evolution during the 1970s and 1980s. It became increasingly clear in the early 1980s that Canada was becoming an active participant in international affairs with important roles in such international organizations as the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, a reaffirmed role in the un, and new roles in organizations such as the g-7, albeit as a junior partner and at the insistence of the United States. Throughout the 1980s there was evidence that Canada was shedding the old internationalism, which was based on the rules set forth by a world dominated by the United States as the unchallenged power, and adopting the new internationalism, represented by a world order that was more complex and diffuse in both the kinds of power that were at work and their relative strength. For Canada the opportunities for an increased role and status improved, and its potential as a middle power increased, though its actions did not always conform to its new potential. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it was the Vietnam War that best exemplified how domestic forces could influence, or at least seriously challenge, the external behaviour of a state. It can be argued that in this case the external limitations on state behaviour in an anarchical states-system played only a partial role in determining foreign policy. Mass

social

fluence from

the

movements changing

across u.s.

the

United

States

policy

using

foreign

attempted various

to

in-

methods

peaceful protest to civil disobedience. It was less than coinciden-

tal that the movement against the Vietnam War emerged out of almost a decade of the civil rights movement. The opposition to the war was not merely a transitory mass movement; it was an organized, grass roots movement that left a heritage more than two decades later. Not coincidentally, the cry of “No more Vietnams” arose in the early 1980s in the United States as a response to the Reagan administration’s policy towards Central America. This policy, which, as noted, sought to place the success of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 in the EastWest context, used much of the same rhetoric and tactics towards the Central American isthmus as had been used towards the Indo-Chinese peninsula slightly more than a decade earlier. And so began an important social movement within the United States to actively oppose and defeat Reagan’s Cold War policies in the hemisphere. In Canada the domestic groups that were rooted in opposition to this same policy towards Central America – and that would emerge as important voices opposed to u.s. military incursions abroad – developed

in

much

different

ways.

What

growth of internationally minded ngo

was

s

similar,

however,

was

the

whose members traveled and

chap_01.fm Page 19 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

19 From Puzzle to Policy worked in Third World countries and gained first-hand experience of how foreign policy affects people in other countries. When they returned home, many set out to actively oppose what they saw as regressive measures of foreign policy formulators. “No more Vietnams” also became “No more Chiles,” and hundreds of grass-roots organizations grew across Canada in the early 1980s to defend the Nicaraguan revolution of the Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional ( fsln ) and to give support to other revolutionary movements in Central America, such as the Salvadoran Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (fmln ). If in the United States it can be said that there were important groups influencing foreign policy, in Canada the parallel movement was somewhat different. Since there is little traditional room for organized grass-roots movements to influence foreign policy and since the parliamentary system, with its rigid control of political parties and the dominance of the executive, does not traditionally allow much influence by the public, Canadian foreign policy analysts have always been skeptical about the degree of influence that domestic forces could exert on the foreign policy process. It has always seemed that pressures external to the state were more relevant than internal forces. A foreign policy analyst looking at Canada might find it difficult to see much evidence of an important interaction between domestic pressures emanating from social movements and external constraints. But if successive Canadian governments have until recently been relatively immune to domestic pressures on their foreign policy, the emergence of ngo s in Canada with interest in Latin America may have begun to challenge their monopoly on foreign policy. As mentioned, important changes occurred in Canada after 1968 when the parliamentary system began to open up to issue-oriented pressure groups after parliamentary reforms. The influence of these groups should not be overstated, but neither should they be dismissed. Foreign policy analysis (fpa ) must question the full matrix of forces at work in the development of foreign policy and also include the external constraints on foreign policy formulation. But at the same time, the influence that the emerging constituency has appeared to have on the government’s foreign policy poses important theoretical and practical questions, particularly in the Canadian setting. If the international system is changing, as I have argued above, the question is whether the domestic setting, at least in advanced industrial societies, is also changing and whether social movements are beginning to influence the external behaviour of states, blurring the previously rigid difference between domestic and foreign policy. What is perhaps even more important to ask is whether these social movements develop in common

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20 Canada and Latin America across national borders – thus emphasizing transnational relations, as opposed to international politics – and whether they represent the growth of an international society concerned with common issues of social justice and human rights. The principal thesis of this book is that Canada’s policy towards Latin America has evolved as a result of domestic pressures and external constraints, but that it has been maintained mostly within the tradition of Canadian internationalism. What I will argue throughout is that Canada’s policy has been formed within the framework of two sets of influences: a domestic influence involving groups both in civil society and within Parliament, which has put increasing pressure on the government to become more involved in Latin America, and an external influence with both a regional and global component. The regional influence, which involves our relationship with the United States, has played a powerful role in constraining our policy. But at a broader level I will also argue that the international system is changing in such a manner that regional questions will be of greater importance both at the continental and hemispheric levels. The global influence has developed in the tradition of Canadian internationalism and has consisted of the kinds of support we have received and have been able to dispense within multilateral organizations that have been the primary forum and tool for the articulation and defense of Canada’s policy in the region. The basic assumption is that Canada, as a middle power with a strong tradition in international diplomacy and peacekeeping, played an increasingly important role in Latin America in the 1970s and in the Central American conflict during the 1980s. One of the main questions to explore is whether, domestically, the main locus of this policy arose primarily out of the pressure from civil society that had grown out of a well-organized grass-roots movement and, if so, what exactly was the nature of this movement and the extent of its influence, and did it arise primarily under state leadership? Conversely, it is important to explore the external constraints that have limited the demands of these domestic pressures and to assess the impact of these constraints, particularly relating to Canada’s most important bilateral relationship with the United States. Finally, it is important to explore the global influences that have both encouraged Canada’s involvement – and limited it – by asking how our multilateral activities have allowed Canada to both articulate and implement its policies in order to satisfy domestic pressures and external constraints. If social movements have been growing in Canada and if they may be influencing Canadian foreign policy, a foreign policy analysis approach, which encompasses various levels of analysis, seems the most

chap_01.fm Page 21 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

21 From Puzzle to Policy suitable theoretical framework for looking at them. Since we seek to understand the

relationship between the domestic environment and the

international order, foreign policy analysis provides us with the most useful theoretical framework. Moreover, in focusing on one particular foreign policy question during a twenty-year period in one particular country, it is my intention that this book should begin to answer some of these questions in a concrete fashion. Canadian policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990 provides a good case for the study of foreign policy. I hope to ask important theoretical questions and provide useful empirical evidence and analytical insights, although the narrow focus of this study may yield only preliminary answers to some of the more basic questions.

This book is divided into two parts. The first lays out the principal theoretical questions associated with the study of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990. Chapter 2 explores the fundamental changes to the international system since 1968 and concentrates on the issue of u.s . decline, the rise of international cooperation, interdependence, and multilateralism, and, finally, on the rise of internationally oriented social movements and

s

ngo .

Chapter

3

explores

the

key

methodological

questions

that

emerge from the attempt to study foreign policy in a changing world order. I thus investigate some of the questions posed above by providing an analytical history of the development of fpa . My primary task is to describe the principal theoretical questions that the discipline has asked since the 1950s and to provide a critique that explain, at least in part, the reasons for its decline. I also explore the reasons for the growing relevance of fpa in a world where domestic and external forces interact with greater frequency and relevance, and then provide a suitable framework for guiding my own research. I do not attempt to provide a new “general theory” of foreign policy, however, but rather, explore how the “ingredients” of fpa can be applied to a particular empirical problem. Having presented a theoretical framework that identifies the “ingredients” of foreign policy in general, I attempt in chapter 4 to describe the particular “recipe” of Canadian foreign policy between 1968 and 1990, in order to describe and explain the nature of the principal forces in the foreign policy arena that shaped Canada during an intense period of structural international change. The chapter explores the nature of the Canada-us relationship, Canada’s involvement in the new internationalism, and the growing importance and impact of pressure groups, particularly foreign policy pressure groups, that have

chap_01.fm Page 22 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

22 Canada and Latin America developed in Canada since the late 1960s. I argue that the best assessment of Canadian foreign policy, given the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3, is that Canada can best be described as a middle power whose foreign policy is fully determined neither by state bureaucrats nor by the constraints of the international states-system. Rather, Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990 has resulted from the growing tension between domestic groups on the one hand and regional and global commitments on the other. Following the conclusion in chapter 3, I will argue that the particular domestic configuration in Canada can contribute to a distinctive response to external pressures from the United States and to the constraints and facilities that the international states-system provides. In the case of Canada’s Latin American policy, domestic groups can therefore be seen to have gained a measure of influence unparalleled in the history of Canadian foreign policy. The second part of the book will focus on the case study of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990 (chapters 5 to 7), beginning with an overview of the Canadian government’s initiatives and responses that formed its policy towards Latin America from 1968 to 1990. The main goal in chapter 5 is to explore the development of the Canadian government’s initiatives and responses towards Latin America, from the review of Canadian foreign policy beginning in 1968 to Canada’s entry into the oas . Chapter 6 examines Canada’s role in the oas , particularly after 1968, and explores how events in Latin America encouraged Canada to become increasingly involved in ad hoc multilateralism, especially surrounding the Central American crisis, and eventually led to Canada’s full membership in the oas . I argue that this participation occurred due to global influences on Canada’s foreign policy and was part of Canada’s new internationalism during the 1980s. In chapter 7, I explore the role and importance of domestic ngo s with an interest in Latin America. My principal argument is that the 1960s saw the growth of ngo s with an interest in Latin America as part of a larger growth in social movements interested in foreign policy issues. As a result, a domestic constituency interested in Latin America began to galvanize after the fall of the Allende government in Chile and the influx of government and privately sponsored refugees from that country. By the 1980s, after the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 and the savage civil war in El Salvador, these ngo s had become increasingly involved in scrutinizing Canadian foreign policy towards Central America. After drescribing these two periods, I attempt to explain the implications for Canadian foreign policy.

chap_01.fm Page 23 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:30 PM

23 From Puzzle to Policy With chapter 8 the book concludes with an assessment of Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America that takes into account the role of

ngo s and the importance of the changing external environment. I

also explore the potential for further involvement by Canada in the hemisphere, given the lessons that my analysis has yielded.

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chap_02.fm Page 25 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:32 PM

part one Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World

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2 Canada and the Emergence of the New Internationalism During the 1970s and early 1980s a series of dramatic events signaled that international relations were undergoing a significant upheaval … These developments and many others in the political, economic, and military realms signaled far-reaching shifts in the international distribution of power, an unleashing of new sociopolitical forces and the global realignment of diplomatic relations. Above all, these events and developments revealed that the relatively stable international system that the world had known since the end of World War II was entering a period of uncertain political changes. Robert Gilpin1

Three important new factors interacted in Canadian foreign policy after 1968. First, with events such as the initiation of Richard Nixon’s “new economic policy” of 1971 and the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, signaling the relative decline of that country, Canadian foreign policy makers began to seek greater independence of action and more variety for Canada’s relationships on the world stage. By the late 1960s the international system seemed to be going though an important change that, although not apparently as dramatic as the one created by the end of the World War II, was no less significant for Canadian foreign policy. In this context, any changes to the power base of Canada’s neighbour and most powerful ally or any changes to an alliance supported by the United States would have important effects on Canada. If indeed the United States was a declining power, unable to sustain the international economic system and the global military and ideological hegemony it had created in the postwar period, then, at the very least, the international distribution of power was changing. But one question was open for debate: whether, in the process, the principal superpower was simply being slowly displaced as leader of the Western Alliance or whether the structure of the international system was changing fundamentally. There were also signals that not only was the international system led by the United States loosening but that economic relations were growing in importance over military confrontation. For many

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28

Canadian Foreign Policy

observers this change provided Canada with the incentive to act with greater independence, and, on some issues, even to break ranks with the United States. Thus, in the early 1970s Canada opened up relations with the People’s Republic of China, promoted better relations with the Soviet Union, and attempted to diversify trade and diplomatic contacts, particularly, as we shall see in chapter 4, after the “Nixon Shock,” of 1971, which saw Canada lose its special economic status with the United States. The second factor, one that was very much a part of the loosening international system, was the development of a growing web of interdependence, with the proliferation of international organizations and regimes (rules, norms, and procedures around which actors expectations converge)2 and the emergence of transnational relations, some of which operated outside the purview and control of the state. With the growing complexity of the relations between states and the emergence of nonstate actors in the international milieu, a new international system slowly seemed to be emerging that was soon becoming too dense to be managed by a traditional hegemonic alliance system or indeed by the two leading hegemons of a bipolar international system. In the midst of this new interdependent world, a role emerged for middle power countries like Canada, which had been focusing on utilizing international organizations to increase their role and influence in world politics. For Canada specifically, a founder and staunch supporter of the United Nations, an instigator of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and an active participant in the postwar international economic order, the development of an international system in which low politics appeared to be slowly replacing high politics could only look like a favourable development. The third and final factor that emerged after 1968, one that was intimately related to the other two, was the growing importance and significance of international social movements concerned with global issues and of domestic social movements involved in foreign policy matters. The controversy over the u.s. role in the Vietnam War mobilized millions of u.s. citizens to oppose their government’s foreign policy. Charged with the atmosphere of the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and 1960s, social movements developed that began to question and challenge u.s foreign policy and focus on global matters. These movements eventually found institutional expression in a myriad of international nongovernment organizations (ingo s) and domestic ngo s concerned with international issues. In Canada an important social movement also emerged within the churches and unions opposing u.s. foreign policy and seeking a critical role for Canada in international relations, a movement that challenged the

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Emergence of the New Internationalism

world views shared between the two countries in the postwar period. The development of a foreign policy consciousness among u.s., Canadian, and European citizens and their efforts to influence foreign policy makers in an area usually ceded to “princes” and their advisors were an important new elements in world politics with profound implications for how governments would conduct their foreign relations over the coming decades. The relative decline of the United States, the development of nonstate transnational relations, and the appearance and ascendance of increasingly influential social movements intent on having an impact on foreign policy and world politics, all point to important structural changes to a world order previously based on the principles of realism, with its strict interpretation of interstate relations and high politics as the focal points of world politics. As Michael Hawes argues, structural change occurs when there is a disequilibrium in the international system. For Hawes, the structural changes to the international political economy, for example, are “linked to changes in the international division of labour, the internationalization of production, and changes in the knowledge/information structure, which lead to more general change.”3 For me, in the broader realm of international politics, structural change involves a change to the security structure that gives the state less control over its foreign policy; the state must use the emerging multilateral structures and institutions to attempt to achieve its foreign policy goals. Thus the new internationalist interactions (such as summitry and ad hoc multilateralism) involve a change from the previous structures of the old internationalism, such as the un and other universal international organizations. In the new emerging system, regional organizations, although not completely superseding world organizations, will play a more important role. It is as if the old international organizations based on universal principles are necessary but not sufficient for the needs of states. Thus, regionalism takes on an important role in supplementing universal agreements and regimes. Although the dispute over these developments has created a heated and lively “third great debate” in international relations theory, without any consensus emerging, it has become increasingly difficult to explain the new political phenomena with either strict realist or neorealist theories.4 The complexity of international, transnational, and domestic relations has grown at a rate reminiscent of the great technological revolution of the twentieth century, which it parallels, in which ordinary individuals and even scientists cannot make sense of the impact of the new technology and are uncertain of its unintended consequences. So, too, the dizzying changes in the international arena

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out-pace the individual’s ability to digest world events. The question for debate is whether the decline of the United States is part and parcel of the rules of realpolitik or whether the other two factors mentioned above indicate not only the demise of a hegemonic power but the structural change of the international system itself. The world order after 1968 has involved phenomena not encountered before that do indeed challenge a strict realist or neorealist interpretation but that are not yet sufficient to force us to discard all the precepts of the old school. It is safe to assume that if we are indeed in a period of transition between systems, we should attempt to understand the dynamics and dangers inherent in such a changing atmosphere. Critical judgment is often most needed when old precepts no longer satisfy and new ones do not yet fully convince. The period between 1968 and 1990, a period initiated, as noted, by the growing perception that the United States was declining as a world power and a period ending with the clear indication that the Cold War had been won by the United States (and that in fact the world was transiting through a “unipolar moment”),5 is therefore a period of intense importance that must be looked at closely both theoretically and empirically. For Canadian foreign policy it is potentially a period of fundamental change in which declining u.s. hegemony, an active public interest in foreign policy, and an increasingly interdependent world are changing fundamentally the way foreign policy is formulated and carried out, making important demands in an area of comparative advantage to an internationalist middle power. Nevertheless, these new developments have not meant that Canada could act internationally without regard to the effects its policies might have on its bilateral relations with the United States, which throughout the period still remained the most powerful external influence on Canada. External constraints on Canadian foreign policy deriving from its regional relationship with the United States and Canada’s position in the international system as a middle power may have diminished in certain areas after 1968, but they have not been eliminated and are clearly present in such things as trade and defense. Most importantly, the degree of freedom that Canada has had to act internationally vis-à-vis the United States varies over time and depends on what is at issue; it can be considered to be mostly in the multilateral diplomatic arena. Of fundamental importance in understanding the nature and extent of these external constraints, therefore, is an analysis of the nature of the u.s. decline since 1968 and an assessment of its impact on the international states-system. After dealing with these matters in the first sections of this chapter, I will look at how the international system has been changing since the

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late 1960s and will, in particular, investigate whether increased cooperation between states, interdependence, and the rise of multilateralism can be considered as part of a fundamental structural change to the international system. In the final section of the chapter, I will look at how individuals acting as part of social movements and through more institutionalized ingo s have entered the core of international politics and added another important dimension to the new internationalism. The purpose of this chapter is thus to understand the medium within which Canada’s foreign policy has evolved between 1968 and 1990. By addressing the three important new factors at work since 1968, my purpose is to point both to some old limitations that are still in effect and to the new facilities for Canada’s foreign policy that are not entirely dealt with by the literature and that provide Canada with growing potential as an international actor. An understanding of the impact of these factors on Canada’s foreign policy, will make it easier to picture the development of Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America during this period, and it will provide the context for the empirical study that follows.

ex t er n al c o ns tr a i n ts : th e de c li n e of the united states and changes to th e i nt er n at i o na l o rd e r The debate over whether the United States is indeed in decline has raged on for over two decades with proponents and critics bringing forth contrary evidence and arguments.6 At the level of grand theory the basic assumption is that great empires rise and subsequently fall when they are unable to manage the system they have dominated. The central question in the debate is not whether the United States will eventually enter into decline but whether it has already done so. An equally important question, however, is whether the international system itself has changed and whether the relative decline of the United States is merely part of the normal redistribution of power that the international system has undergone for centuries. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin presents an overall theory of how change occurs in the international system. Two considerations in Gilpin’s analysis are important to highlight: first, the assertion, based on a broad historical analysis, that the United States is a declining hegemon and, second, the affirmation that the decline of the United States does not represent a fundamental change in the nature of the international system. Based on historical evidence, Gilpin develops a model that explains the nature of international political change. Although Gilpin concentrates on the role of war in changing world

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politics, there is little doubt that events after 1968 were at the forefront of his analysis. As he argues at the beginning of his book, events in the 1970s and early 1980s marked important changes to the international system. Central to his contemporary analysis is the recognition of the United States as a declining power. For Gilpin, the erosion of u.s. power in the 1970s fits the overall pattern in his theory of change: he views the decline of the United States as a disequilibrium in the international system. Although he recognizes that the United States remains the dominant state in the system, he argues that “The classic symptoms of a declining power characterize the United States in the early 1980s: rampant inflation, chronic balance-of-payments difficulties, and high taxation.”7 According to Gilpin the United States responded to this disequilibrium by reducing its international commitments through a number of traditional measures, among them the retrenchment of its military forces throughout the world, a rapprochement with China, the recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence, and, most significantly, the announcement in 1971 of a new foreign economic policy that “forced changes in the rules governing international trading and monetary affairs that would benefit the American economy, especially to improve America’s declining trade position.” However, while he accepts the notion of “eroding hegemony” in the early 1980s, Gilpin also argues that there is no clearly emerging power to replace the United States, and thus he concludes that “Progress towards the formulation of new rules and regimes for an international system to follow the Pax Americana has been slow or non-existent.”8 At the heart of Gilpin’s analysis, therefore, is the belief that international relations have not changed significantly for a millennium, for “International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth [and] power among independent actors in a state of anarchy.” Although he recognizes the importance of the economic and technological developments that occurred after the 1960s, and indeed explicitly recognizes that they have altered the relations between states, he declares that “the fundamentals have not been altered.”9 For Gilpin the changes that mark the decline of the United States are the result of a systemic change (that is, a change in the governance of the system) rather than a systems change (that is, a change in the nature of the actors and the very character of the international system itself.)10 Summing up, then, Gilpin, recognizes that the United Statess is in decline but denies that this decline also marks a change in the very nature of the international system that has operated for over a thousand years. The more specific debate on the decline of the United States has not been limited to a debate about the status of the United States; it

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also focuses on the question of the changing nature of the system (in Gilpin’s useful terminology, the question of a systems change). This debate can be most easily summarized by an analysis of the writings of three important authors who argue, to varying degrees, for and against a theory of decline: William Pfaff, Paul Kennedy, and Joseph Nye. What is most important about their works cited here is that all three authors wrote with the realization that the world order was changing quickly and dramatically as the Soviet Union began to unravel after the mid-1980s. All three consider the period of transition between 1968 and the late 1980s. I do not intend a comprehensive overview of the debate over hegemonic stability theory that arises out of the work of these authors. Rather, I propose to analyze their writings on the status of the United States as a world power and recent discussions about the nature of the international system in order to come to terms with the character of the international environment in which Canada has been operating since 1968 and with the status of its most important trading partner and military ally. William Pfaff, an advocate of the notion that the United States is a power in decline and that the international system is undergoing a fundamental shift in kind wrote, even as the demise of the Soviet Union seemed imminent, that “The international prospect today is not so much a world dominated by a single superpower as it is one lacking even great powers that meet the traditional definition of invulnerability. No nation is invulnerable; none are autonomous. No nation dominates in the way individual nations have dominated in the past. Japan; the European states, or ec; the United States – all are economic great powers, but vulnerable ones.” For Pfaff the international system has changed in the last three decades, and the modes of power with it. In this new system the United States is no longer the leader it once was. Although Pfaff concedes that the United States is the most important military power, he also argues that “while the United States remains rich in a form of power relevant to a Soviet military challenge that has faded, it is today weak, relatively speaking, in those forms of power in which its new and relevant rivals, Japan and Western Europe, are strong.”11 What this change suggests to Pfaff is that the world has been moving towards a multipolar system in which military prowess no longer has the importance it once had. In Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends, Pfaff squarely addresses not only the issue of u.s. decline but the parallel transformation of the international system in a manner rejected by Gilpin. At the heart of Pfaff’s critique is a challenge to the ideological fibre of the United States as world power. The decay of the United States, therefore, comes crucially from within the body politic and from ideas that

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are still pronounced and prescribed but that, for Pfaff, are dead: “These are exhausted ideas, like dead stars, in the American political atmosphere, which nonetheless remain central to the way certain subjects are discussed and to the formulation of national policy … Theoretical formulations that are generally conceded to be false but have become conventional, and for which no replacement is evident, continue to be employed by people who certainly know better.”12 Just as there are internal limitations that weaken the United States as a world power, so there are external challengers and challenges: the principal challenger for Pfaff is Europe. From the false thinking in the United States that Europe has been left behind, especially after the experiences of the first and second world wars, Pfaff warns that “Europe still is crucially important, and even dangerous. It can’t be counted out, as Americans have inclined to do since the 1940s. It is more important to the American future than Asia or the Soviet Union or Latin America. It is more important to the civilization in which Americans live because that civilization remains fundamentally a European one.” For Pfaff, Europe represents a sleeping giant with far more potential than Japan or any other industrialized country in Asia. The potential strength of Europe is assumed on the basis of its collective action. But at the heart of the threat is that European states do not have some of the internal contradictions, the false ideas, that Pfaff describes. The resiliency of Europe, particularly after World War II, and the long-term vision of its business and governmental classes, give Europe, as a whole, a definite edge in Pfaff’s view. This is particularly important in light of a changing world order; as Pfaff warns, “Americans should worry about Europe, and consider what the American relationship with Europe may become as the existing alliance weakens and change takes place in the relations of East to West inside Europe.”13 For centuries, according to Pfaff, the United States has been the object of myths, usually invented in Europe, that in many ways reluctantly prepared the United States for its world leadership in the postwar era. During this period the United States was able to redeem this vision and offer the world behaviour that to some extent conformed to the mythology. But Pfaff contends that by the 1960s and 1970s all this began to unravel, and with it, u.s. leadership, in part because of the Vietnam war and economic decline but also simply because the United States was unable to live up to these myths. And so, according to Pfaff, the American century ended: “America has been a brief empire, begun in a war in the 1940s, confidently consolidated in the 1950s. We attained our Augustan age – as Robert Frost had dangerously prayed – in the Kennedy years, a gleam of decadence to be glimpsed behind the brilliance; and afterward terrible and crazy things happened and the empire began rapidly to come apart.”14

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Domestically, the strong tendencies towards isolationism also played a role in accelerating the u.s. decline, during which the internal contradictions of the United States became more apparent. As that country retreats, it begins to withdraw into itself, to a condition it preferred before the World War II. And so Pfaff points out that in this retreat “The solution which arises, without its being articulated, is that the United States revert to its natural condition, which is isolationism.” For Pfaff the United States was a reluctant empire, one never truly comfortable with superpower status, and in this statement he seems to try to console his compatriots with the idea that the end result may not be such a bad thing after all and, more importantly, that it is a logical consequence of the inability of the United States to be an empire: “America’s has been a fleeting empire, forced upon us in emergency, extended with idealism – already being abandoned. Even Poland’s empire, which briefly ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea, lasted longer. America’s has been an unserious empire, of unexamined ideas and uncalculated ambitions, a solipsistic nation’s means for reacting to an external world whose very particularity has seemed threatening.”15 The conviction that the United States has terminated one of the briefest empires in history, while having been in relative, and even absolute, terms the most powerful empire in history, is certainly a difficult proposition to accept. The added dimension that in the postu.s.-empire age no single power dominates is a firm statement by Pfaff on what he believes are the revolutionizing changes to the international system in the past three decades, which imply an important structural change. Pfaff clearly identifies and chronicles the decline of u.s. power because of internal and external reasons. But he fails to recognize that, although the United States has indeed declined since World War II, it has not experienced an absolute decline that has made it a pale shadow of its own past. Moreover, Pfaff also fails to explain adequately just what the changes to the international system have been that rule out the emergence of another great power at this time, in a fashion described by Gilpin. Although it seems true that Japan, Europe, China, and the Russia are not great powers replacing the United States, this, in fact, affirms that the United States is likely to be, by default if nothing else, the Great Power, although perhaps diminished as compared to what it was at the end of World War II. In addition, Pfaff’s emphasis on Europe as the leading challenger of the United States is very difficult to accept. Although recognizing that Europe is a compilation of states and not a state proper, Pfaff’s treatment of this multinational continent as if it were in any way a state of the same kind as the United States is a serious mistake. Europe’s capacity to act politically in a truly united way, particularly against the United States, is far from certain.

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There is, in short, no evidence of “state-like behavior by the eu.” Therefore, the strengths of even a “United Europe” are in no way the same as those of a United States with a set of national institutions and a well-defined nationalist ideology that places the state above all else. Indeed, Pfaff cannot point to a single power on the horizon to challenge the United States. Since it has not voluntarily ceded its status and since Pfaff himself asserts that no other “great power” exists, particularly since the demise of the former Soviet Union, one cannot conclusively affirm the “end of the American century” – or the end of American hegemony – based on his analysis, evidence, and arguments. One can recognize, however, the growing importance of Europe as an economic and political force in the world without affirming that it will replace the United States as a world power. The recognition that the United States has declined, however, is not necessarily an affirmation of its conclusive and immediate demise. Paul Kennedy, in his much celebrated book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, also addresses the two fundamental issues that I pose – the nature of the u.s. decline and the nature of the international system in the period after 1968. Kennedy’s best-seller touches on these topics as part of a historical analysis that begins with the birth of the modern statessystem around 1500. The central theme in his book, as expressed by its subtitle, is the study of how changes in economic matters affect the hegemonic position of great powers and thus erode them and eventually lead them to be replaced, usually through “hegemonic wars.” For Kennedy, as for Gilpin, the events in the past two decades are part of a common pattern of Great Power decline that has been repeated since 1500. Indeed, it can be argued that although Kennedy’s book is not an explicit analysis of u.s. decline, because it was written at the height of the debate over that country’s status in the world, the effects of his historical analysis can be seen as central to the current debate within hegemonic stability theory. Kennedy’s work, therefore, is an important contribution to the discussion of u.s. decline and of the nature of international system, from the vantage point of an historian. The conclusions drawn by Kennedy about long-term historical patterns can only have a profound relevance to the issue of the current status of the United States in world politics. On the issue of the nature of the international system, Kennedy clearly warns that his historical study in no way should be viewed as a book on theories of empire or on the causes of war or of economic cycles. However, in general terms, Kennedy argues that his analysis can admit of several general conclusions. First, he contends that “there is detectable a causal relationship between the shifts which

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have occurred over time in the general economic and productive balances and the position occupied by individual powers in the international system.” Second, Kennedy maintains that there is a relationship between economic status and rank as a military power, and thus he declares that “the historical record suggests that there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire.)” For Kennedy this occurs because a great power must sustain its military establishment with great economic resources and “so far as the international system is concerned, both wealth and power are always relative and should be seen as such.”16 The period of greatest relevance to us in Kennedy’s study is the postwar period. For him, it marked the ascendance of the United States and the ussr as the two Great Powers and therefore created a bipolar international system. However, and most importantly, Kennedy contends that the ascendance of the United States to superpower status in the immediate postwar period occurred in a rather artificial environment, for all possible challengers were devastated by the war itself, and the United States, its territory untouched by the ravages of war and its economy booming from war production, was experiencing a relative ascendance. Thus he states that “Simply because the rest of the world was either exhausted by the war or in a stage of colonial ‘underdevelopment,’ American power in 1945 was, for want of another term, artificially high, like, say, Britain in 1815.” The United States was thus a military Great Power but became also an economic Great Power, for, because its own industrial base was not only undamaged by war but in fact was strengthened by war production, it was able to create an international economic system, under its control and largely by its rules, along with its rescue packages for war-torn devastated countries, which would further strengthen it: “All of this combined to make the United States committed to the creation of a new world order beneficial to the needs of western capitalism and, of course, to the most flourishing of the western capitalist states … Hence the package of international arrangements hammered out between 1942 and 1946 – the setting-up of the International Monetary Fund, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and then the later General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt).”17 Although the United States emerged as an economic and military Great Power, it was not alone in the international system: the ussr also emerged as a Great Power, to become the other pole of the bipolar system. But the ussr could not compete in the economic arena with the United States, and so Kennedy states that “the Russia of 1945 was a military giant and, at the same time, economically poor, deprived and

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unbalanced.”18 The bipolar system that emerged from World War II, therefore, was not symmetrical; the United States was clearly ahead of its closest rival in almost every respect. It was also a “Euro-Atlantic” system that focused much of its activity on relations between Europe and the United States and Canada. By the 1960s the economies of Europe, Japan, and even China were much improved in comparison to their condition at the end of World War II. The Soviet Union, with its energies pointed towards military parity with the United States, suffered from a long-term decline in the rate of economic growth and from a relatively low economic standing. But from the 1960s onward the United States also began to decline relatively. Kennedy attributes this in part to the artificially high standing of the United States in 1945, when it stood above all the other countries devastated by war. Kennedy thus concludes that “that year [1945] is, of course, the most important fact in understanding the American relative decline … [as] the United States’ favorable economic position at that point in history was both unprecedented and artificial.”19 The question is not, therefore, whether the United States was producing less but, rather, whether the recovered economies of Europe and Asia were producing more than immediately after the war. Kennedy argues that it was the latter rather than the former. But for him this brings up not only the question of whether the United States had to decline relatively but also the question, “Did it have to decline so fast?” Even though the u.s. economy made impressive developments in technologies beginning in the 1960s, the United States began to increase its military expenditures, in Vietnam and elsewhere, and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations also increased domestic expenditures. Paul Kennedy therefore concludes that, “the result was year after year of federal government deficits, soaring prices, and increasing American industrial uncompetitiveness, in turn leading to larger balance-of-payments deficits, the choking back (by the Johnson administration) of foreign investment by u.s. firms and then the latter’s turn toward the new instrument of Eurodollars.”20 Because of the historical trends that Kennedy describes, which portray the fall of the Great Powers as historically inevitable, and because, as Kennedy points out, the United States and the Soviet Union both ran the risk of imperial overstretch, beginning in the 1960s the configuration of the Great Powers began its slow change. However, for Kennedy this does not mean that the international system itself is changing in kind, as Pfaff argues, but rather that “The international system, whether it is dominated for a time by six Great Powers or only two, remains anarchical – that is, there is no greater authority than the sovereign, egotistical nation-state.”21

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Although Kennedy maintains that the United States is declining relatively, and declining fast, he puts the decline into perspective. First, its relative decline is not nearly as profound and fast as that of the ussr, and its absolute strength is unquestionably much larger. Second, the unstructured nature of u.s. society probably gives it a better chance to adapt to the changing international environment. But the United States must also face the fact that historically its decline is inevitable, and so Kennedy argues that it cannot avoid facing the two tests for the longevity of Great Powers: “whether in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation’s perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of ever-shifting patterns of global production.”22 For Kennedy, it is time therefore for u.s. policy-makers to confront the problems of “imperial overstretch,” that is, to face the fact that “the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them simultaneously.” With the relative decline of the industrial sector and the decline of the agricultural sector, the United States cannot maintain, according to Kennedy, the same set of military obligations throughout the world. Added to this are the budgetary policies of successive federal governments and, in particular, the decisions by the Reagan administration to simultaneously increase defence expenditures and decrease taxation “but without significant reduction in federal spending elsewhere – [these decisions] have produced extraordinary rises in the deficit and consequently in the national debt.” And so Kennedy concludes that, viewed in historical terms, the United States is declining rapidly and that without preventive polices the process may accelerate beyond control. He thus maintains that “there is something in the analogy which is made by certain political scientists between the United States’ position today and that of previous ‘declining hegemons.›23 Although Kennedy believes that the United States cannot maintain its current position on the world stage, he does not believe that it is about to decline into obscurity in the very near future. He concludes that the process of decline is well under way and that this process may be slowed down, but not arrested, with better polices that learn from history. Thus Kennedy suggests that political leaders should recognize, understand, and respond to the broad historical trends. They need to ‹manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer term disadvantage.” In the new multipolar world, the United States will continue

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to be a significant power due to its size. To its advantage there is no apparent emerging Great Power to challenge in the immediate future and, overall, its problems are not as acute as they have been for other Great Powers in their final stages of decline. Thus Kennedy suggests some hope for the United States in the midterm: “The tests before the United States as it heads toward the twenty-first century are certainly daunting, perhaps especially in the economic sphere; but the nation’s resources remain considerable, if they can be properly organized, and if there is a judicious recognition of both the limitations and the opportunities of American power.”24 Perhaps Kennedy’s most important contribution to the debate on the u.s. decline is that he places the issue in a broad historical perspective. Doing so makes it more difficult to accept the assertion that the United States has already declined. Kennedy’s study also shows how the rise and fall of Great Powers is not quick and easy to predict. The proposition that the United States is declining relatively is important because it can explain the loss of u.s. power (for example in terms of its share of world production compared with 1945) as a function, as we have seen, of an artificially high initial position, while accepting that the United States was less influential after the 1960s. However, while Kennedy recognizes that the United States has declined quite rapidly, he provides no alternative explanation for the shift to a multipolar world. Furthermore, while he does state that “for all this focus on the American-Russian relationship and its many ups and downs between 1960 and 1980, other trends had been at work to make the international power system much less bipolar than it had appeared to be in the earlier period,” he does not explore the implications of this multilateral world, particularly the various dimensions of interdependence.25 It is crucially important to understand this shift to a more multipolar world, as opposed to the relative decline of the United States. Although Kennedy recognizes the fissures in the system, he does not explore its nature in sufficient detail. What remains to be explained is not so much how the United States grapples with relative decline, but rather, how other states and nonstate actors learn to operate with their relative ascendance and what international instruments are used by them to exercise this new power. Because Kennedy accepts the model of the state-centric international system, he is unable to explain the significance of the rise of multinational institutions and regimes after 1968. While the fact that the decline of the United States is only relative explains in part why the u.s. empire has not ended, as Pfaff suggests, Kennedy does not explore whether the stunning growth of interstate cooperation and interdependence and of multilateral institutions has

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had any effect on the structure of the international system. This is left to Joseph S. Nye. In Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Nye takes a much different position on our two central themes than Pfaff and Kennedy. While Pfaff argues that the United States is in decline and that the international system is changing, and while Kennedy believes that the United States is indeed on the downward slope of power but denies that the international system has changed in any significant way since 1500, Nye takes the intermediate position: he claims that the United States is not as apparently in decline but that the international system is indeed changing, and with it the modes of power that the United States can exercise to remain in the number-one spot. To begin with, Nye rejects out of hand the historical analogies of the United States to other great powers such as Britain, arguing that they “are misleading and the diagnosis wrong. Policies of retrenchment are premature and, ironically, they could produce the very weakening of American power they are supposed to avert.” Nye agrees with Kennedy that the status of the United States was much exaggerated by the “World War II effect,” which therefore cannot be taken as the measure of us power and of the status quo in any long-term calculation. “Much of the relative decline since the 1950s, then, is simply a return to normal after the artificial effect of World War II.” For Nye the proposition that the United States is a declining power only four decades after formally rising to its status is very difficult to accept, and thus he concludes that “it is counterintuitive and ahistorical to believe that the United States should have the dominant share of world product or power forever. American power has clearly declined since 1945, and even if the decline has largely halted, some continued erosion would be natural. The appropriate American response to the changing international environment should not rest on an exaggeration of American power.”26 Nye takes issue, therefore, with what he calls “the myths of u.s. hegemony.” These are exaggerations of the initial superpower status of the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. He argues against those who assert that the decline of the United States is both “continuous and precipitous,” and maintains that “Ironically, the decline of u.s. power was steepest from 1950 to 1973, the period often identified as the ‘period of American hegemony.’ American decline has been much more difficult to discern from 1973 to the present, which is often labeled the period of u.s. decline.” The power resources of the United States, both economic and military, can therefore be seen as declining during the period that many observers argue was the period of greatest u.s. hegemony. With respect to economic trends, Nye argues that by

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most indicators, the United States has merely reverted to its prewar position. u.s. world manufacturing production, among other indicators, rose, logically enough, during the period when Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union were recovering from the war, but, he asserts, “In general, though the indices of economic power at various levels of aggregation are reasonably consistent, they show a relatively sharp decline during the postwar quarter century of supposed u.s. hegemony and relatively moderate change since.”27 For Nye the decline in u.s. military power parallels these economic trends, and he concludes that “Trends in the various measures of American military power resources are quite similar to those shown by the various measures of u.s. share of global economic resources. The American share of global economic and military resources declined for the first postwar quarter century. The pattern of decline produces the semantic irony that American decline was sharpest during the earlier period of alleged hegemony and at best very slight in the period of alleged hegemonic decline.” Nye concludes therefore that in the immediate postwar era, the United States had a disproportionate amount of economic power, which was bound to decline once the other world economies recovered, and he denies that the United States was as powerful a military hegemon as some observers point out. Indeed, Nye disputes the argument that the ending of the gold exchange standard in 1971 was the end of American hegemony. It was the end of the postwar preponderance of the United States, although not the end of its economic hegemony if “hegemonic economic behavior is the ability to change the rules of the international game.”28 Perhaps what is most significant about Nye’s analysis is that in rejecting the notion that the United States is declining (or to put it more accurately, that there is a diminishing significance of a redistribution of overall power capabilities), he also rejects the fact that power and the international system have remained static or will do so in the future. At the heart of Nye’s analysis is the suggestion that not only are the predictions of u.s. decline premature, but they are so because the traditional means of measuring power are obsolete, since they do not measure the importance of the information industries. And thus one of his most important contributions to the debate about u.s. decline and the nature of the international system is that he poses a different dilemma for the United States than the other authors who favour the theory of u.s. decline: for Nye, the central dilemma for the United States is not facing a declining position in world power but rather understanding that the modes of power that brought it to the numberone position in the world are not the same as those that will maintain it there over time.

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This crucial distinction involves three factors. First, it involves accepting that the United States has declined relative to its position in 1945, without accepting its absolute decline or its immediate demise. Second, it involves recognizing that the modes of power in the world have changed in such a way that indicators pointing to a u.s. decline provide an incomplete description of the u.s. status. Finally, it points to new emerging sources of influence in international relations, some of which are social forces while others are multilateral instruments. Thus, Nye argues that the central dilemma for the United States is not one of decline and facing new challengers. Rather, while remaining the leading power, it will have to contend with unprecedented challenges of interdependence that no great power can solve by itself. Nye concludes that “Many of the new issues of international politics – ecology, drugs, aids, terrorism – involve a diffusion of power away from states to private actors and require organizing states for cooperative responses. The classical geopolitical agenda of international security among independent nations will continue alongside these new problems of transnational interdependence.29 According to Nye, the United States will continue to maintain its superpower status not only with respect to the traditional resources but also in a new interdependent world, where, because resources are changing rapidly, the United States, and other powers, will have to adapt. He states that “The problem for the United States will be less the rising challenge of another major power than the general diffusion of power. Whereas nineteenth-century Britain faced new challengers, the twenty-first century United States will face new challenges.” The new interdependent system that began to emerge in the 1970s is crucial, since it brought many new actors onto the international stage, such as corporations and political groups.30 This does not mean that many of the traditional arguments made by realists are invalid; but it does reinforce the arguments of liberals who point to new international actors, processes, and structures. For Nye the acceptance of new power sources in old politics does not necessarily imply the rejection of realism, and the intention is not to “discredit the traditional wisdom of realism and its concern for the military balance of power, but to realize its limitations and to supplement it with insights from the liberal approach.” Thus what emerges in the interdependent world is a series of differing power structures within specific issue areas that produce a much more complex interaction between states.31 States are less able to utilize traditional power resources to further their interests, and although the state continues to be more important, on balance, than private actors, what has occurred is a diffusion of

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power that changes, at the very least, the tactics and strategies of states. Nye argues that at least five trends are involved in this diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues. For him, and others, the traditional use, and utility, of force is much more constrained in the present international system. Great powers are thus restrained in the use of their other power resources to achieve their objectives unless there is a real threat to the state or its vital interests. In this scenario the role of international organizations, where diplomacy is a vital tool, takes a new and added importance: “The solution to many current issues of transnational interdependence will require collective action and cooperation among states … Although force may sometimes play a role, traditional instruments of power are rarely sufficient to deal with the changing issues in world politics. New power resources, such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions, may prove more relevant.”32 Nye’s analysis is helpful for several reasons. First, he does accept that the United States has declined since its paramount position in the immediate postwar period. Like Kennedy, he explains the relative decline of the United States and its loss of power after the 1960s but also the fact that no other power has replaced or is seen as replacing the United States. Nye thus resolves the dilemma of the decline of the United States, and with his description of new modes of power in the international system, he also describes important structural changes to the international system. Thus we find that the international system is not simply going through a change of the leadership of the system, or something that can immediately be described as a systemic change, which is a more long-term change. Nonetheless, the structural changes, I suggest, are profound, since new actors and new modes of power are slowly changing the very structure of the international system, and they perhaps belong to a different category than those described by Gilpin.33 The relative decline of the United States is not significant in the redistribution of power of the international system. Rather, relating to our second topic, the significance of this decline is seen in the fact that the u.s. loss of power is expressed by a change in how power is exercised in a world that has changed its political interactions from competition of states through military conflict to a greater focus on transnational relations in a world of interdependence. If the United States has lost power not vis-à-vis another great power but in relation to a new system, then we must explore how that system operates and what the implications are both for the United States and other states. This is the subject of the next section.

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th e n ew i n te rn at i o n al i s m: i n te r de pe n de nc e , i n te rn at i o n al co o pe r ati on , a n d th e r i s e of m u lti l at er a li s m Since the late 1960s debates in international relations theory have focused on whether the international political order has been going through a fundamental change from a state-centric system where high politics prevail to a new interdependent system where low politics will direct the growing interconnectedness of the world. This emerging new international order, it is argued, will inevitably limit the capacities of states (especially the superpowers) to interact within the logic of realpolitik. This body of thought points to the growth of international communications and multinational corporations, to greater state interaction and cooperation, and to the proliferation of international regimes and institutions, all of which limit the traditional power of states.34 It thus points to the great limitations of military might in this changing world order and to the growing importance of economic and social relations. This movement towards a more interdependent and multilateral world changes the focus of global relations from international to intra-national relations, and consequently the role of the state will shift, if not diminish, but by no means disappear. Although elements of the old internationalism, such as the un system, remain, and are sometimes revitalized, they are often circumvented by new regimes, summitry, ad hoc multilateralism, and regionalism. These new frameworks are signs of structural changes to the international political order. A landmark book on the issue of interdependence is Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane’s Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, which articulates a position somewhere between the “global-village” modernists and traditional realists. Keohane and Nye argue that neither of these two schools has a framework to understand the new politics of global interdependence. They see their task as providing “the means of distilling and blending the wisdom of both positions by developing the coherent framework for the political analysis of interdependence … The secret of understanding lies in knowing which approach or combination of approaches to use in analyzing a situation.” At the centre of their analysis is the creation of an ideal type that they call “complex-interdependence.” They claim that sometimes this analysis comes closer to explaining empirical reality than the realist tradition. Specifically, they challenge the realist assumptions of state centralism, which claims that states act as coherent units, that force is a usable and effective instrument of foreign policy, and that there is a hierarchy of state issues dominated by high politics.

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Keohane and Nye claim that “If we challenge … all [these assumptions] simultaneously, we can imagine a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy.”35 The main characteristics of complex interdependence involve the existence of multiple channels of relations that diminish interstate relations in favour of transnational ones; the absence of hierarchy among issues, which means that “among other things, military security does not consistently dominate the agenda”; and the logic that military force plays a minor role: “Particularly among industrialized, pluralist countries the perceived margin of safety has widened: fears of attack in general have declined and fears of attack by one another are virtually nonexistent.” The general trend is that complex interdependence increasingly weakens the distinction between domestic and international politics. By diffusing power, the political process of complex interdependence changes the distribution of power from a situation in which the military is predominant to one of “issue areas”: a single state will no longer predominate in all issue areas and linkage between issue areas will decrease. Power will no longer be fungible. If issue areas predominate and linkage decreases, then the agenda will no longer be dominated by security matters, and, presumably, other domestic interests that act transnationally will become increasingly important. Thus, “As the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred; as the conditions of complex interdependence are more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formation becomes more subtle and differentiated.”36 This analysis points to a new political phenomena in the international milieu in which the world becomes more complex and interdependent. The room for maneuver, particularly for superpowers, is reduced in the short term, and, consequently, the potential influence of small and middle powers becomes comparatively greater as linkage becomes increasingly difficult to enforce. Second, international institutions also become more important as international politics becomes increasingly managed through multilateral forums; thus, “The existence of multiple channels of contact leads us to expect limits, beyond those normally found in domestic politics, on the ability of statesmen to calculate the manipulation of interdependence or follow a consistent strategy of linkage.”37 Finally, the phenomenon of interdependence involves greater cooperation among states, cooperation that does not quite fit in with traditional realist thought. The proposition that the world has become more interdependent elicited a great deal of criticism from realists.38 The fact that these

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students of interdependence were arguing that the traditional statecentric world, where military conflict was the central driving force of international politics, was diminishing in importance due to increased cooperation was seen as a direct threat to the logic of realist thought, which, having struggled against a cosmopolitan idealism during the interwar period and, most importantly, having blamed World War II on this idealism, was not prepared to accept the propositions of the interdependence school that might lead to a dangerous assessment of the nature of interstate relations. One of the realists most critical of the interdependence school has been Kenneth Waltz, the father of neorealism, who in one article argued that “Today the myth of interdependence both obscures the realities of international politics and asserts a false belief about the conditions that may promote peace.”39 Waltz’s structuralist perspective rejects the proposition that interdependence is increasing, since he views the fundamental logic of international politics as that of an anarchical world where conflict rather than cooperation is the primary driving force of interstate relations. Thus he concludes that “A comparison of the conditions of internal and external interdependence will make it clear that in international relations interdependence is always a marginal affair.”40 More recently, another leading neorealist, Joseph M. Grieco, has also challenged the interdependence school and, specifically, the argument that the existence of international cooperation erodes fundamental realist assumptions. Grieco contends that cooperation can indeed exist in anarchy and thus that the phenomena that “liberal institutionalists” point to can be explained within the basic realist framework. He claims that “realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger.”41 For Grieco, the interdependence school poses a serious threat to a realist world view. Unlike Keohane and Nye, he sees no compatibility between the belief that the world order is fundamentally a state-centric anarchical system and the belief that interdependence and multilateralism are eroding the many aspects of a world order based on this state system: “The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions. This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neoliberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing the intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.”42

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Grieco argues that states see two central obstacles to international cooperation. First, states are concerned about cheating by other states, and second, states are concerned about the achievement of relative gains by other states. At the heart of Grieco’s critique is the belief that although neoliberal institutionalists maintain that they accept some of the basic premises of realism, they in fact have fundamentally different views of these basic principles. Grieco rejects the liberal institutionalists’ central assertion that they can accept fundamental realist assumptions (such as that states are atomistic and that the international system is anarchic) while adhering to principles of interdependence. According to Grieco, neoliberals reject the first premise of realism – that states are the major actors in world affairs – for they “reject realism’s proposition of the centrality of states.” Second, neoliberals reject the realist proposition that states behave as unitary rational agents: “Modern states, according to interdependence theorists, were increasingly characterized by ‘multiple channels of access,’ which, in turn, progressively enfeebled the grip on foreign policy previously held by central decision makers.” Third, neoliberals reject the realist premise that international anarchy is the main force shaping the motives and actions of states, for they argue that “Internationally, nuclear weapons and mobilized national populations were rendering war prohibitively costly.” Neoliberals also reject realism’s fourth proposition, that states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, “finding instead that states increasingly viewed one another not as enemies, but instead as partners needed to secure greater comfort and well-being for their home publics.”43 Finally, Grieco argues that neoliberals reject the fifth realist premise that international institutions hardly affect the prospects for cooperation. Grieco’s concern that the liberal institutionalist school is a fundamental threat to realist thinking and analysis is, however, unfounded. First, his critique of the misinterpretations of various “neoliberals” about what realism is assumes that there is fundamental agreement between realists themselves about the elements of the states-system, which indeed there is not. What is essential to the current debate and what differs from the first “great debate,” that between realists and idealists, is that so-called liberal internationalists and neoliberals differ from previous cosmopolitan and universalist thinkers in that they accept the basic notion that the state is central to world order. Even though high politics plays a lesser role, for a combination of reasons, military conflict is always an underlying possibility, if only in times of crisis. This is perhaps the greatest lesson to learn from realists such as E.H. Carr.44 Moreover, there is no attempt to impose normative views of how the world should be. Students of interdependence, therefore,

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attempt to describe a world order that has been changing and evolving since the 1960s, while neorealists describe an ahistorical world structure not seemingly subject to development or evolution.45 Therefore, the assertion that there is a new evolving order does not necessarily invalidate traditional realist thought, particularly more historicist approaches, it merely attempts to add to it by reflecting the evolution and change of global structures and processes. It may be that high politics and military matters are important, to use an Althuserian phrase, “in the last instance.” However, barring conditions under which a state feels its existence or fundamental interests threatened, it is unlikely that states, particularly Western industrial states, will reject the benefits of cooperation and the advantages of multilateralism. Indeed, one of the objectives of international cooperation is to avoid the conditions that would threaten the fundamental existence of a state and push it towards the use of military force. However, the assertion that the world is more interdependent is no guarantee of a new panacea in which states will no longer be engaged in conflict, disagreement, and even war. It simply means that the rules of the game of international interaction are being rewritten as new, important nonstate players enter the fold of international politics and play an increasingly important part in the international milieu. Ironically, this might make cooperation, for example, a much more elusive goal. For as the actors multiply, as domestic groups increase their presence, the state may find itself increasingly unable to cooperate on crucial matters. It certainly makes cooperation on a global scale much more difficult, while perhaps making regional arrangements easier. Even though an important part of its fundamental logic has remained present throughout the last few centuries, the modern state system has evolved over time, and it has clearly changed since the 1960s. Structures are not necessarily static and historical – least of all in the realm of human interaction. Most students of interdependence and internationalism are attempting to explain and describe the structure of the international system and the new processes that are, in turn, affecting the nature of that structure. It may be that with time, centuries perhaps, the international system will change completely. The period between 1968 and 1990, when new elements and actors appeared, is at any rate very much a period of transformation. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane subsequently underlined the point that although high politics is still important, indeed fundamentally important, we cannot be blind to new kinds of interaction. While reiterating the dangers still present in an anarchic world, they argue that “achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. There is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standard of domestic

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society, international institutions are weak. Cheating and deception are endemic. Yet … cooperation is sometimes achieved. World politics is not a homogeneous state of war: cooperation varies among issues and over time.”46 For Axelrod and Keohane anarchy refers to the lack of government but it does not necessarily involve the denial of an international community. Anarchy may not mean a Hobbesian world in which “states fear for their existence,” especially if there is little evidence of this threat. But for Axelrod and Keohane cooperation is also not idealized as harmony: “Harmony requires complete identity of interests, but cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests.” Indeed, they suggest that it is important to develop a framework of analysis that encompasses the realities of anarchy, the military-security issues, and the economic-political issues. Given the dangers and costs of military conflict, the authors suggest that “governments have often tried to transform the structures within which they operate so as to make it possible for the countries involved to work together productively.”47 Charles Lipson has also attempted to make sense of the evolution of a new international cooperation since the late 1960s. Although it is clear that cooperation is much more prevalent in economic than in security issues, it is nevertheless present in the latter as well. While there are “far more elaborate networks of rules, norms and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable, convergent expectations [on economic matters,] [s]ecurity regimes, on the other hand are very rare indeed.” But why is cooperation prevalent in the former but rare in the latter? Lipson claims that the answer lies in the conditions that can encourage and foster cooperation. He argues for a broader understanding of cooperation in both security and economic affairs and contends that an anarchic system does not by any means prevent international cooperation: “the problems of cooperation are not approached simply as tactical alliances or as limiting cases of international anarchy. Instead, close attention is paid to the possibilities for rule making and institution building, however fragile and circumscribed they may be. By this view, the absence of a Hobbesian ‘common power to keep them all in awe,’ does not preclude the establishment of some effective joint controls over the international environment.”48 What is important about Lipson’s position is that although he sees cooperation as often fragile, even in economic affairs, he also sees it, and multilateral institutions, as part of an historical development beginning in the 1960s. In other words, although he accepts the underlying structure of international relations, he views changes in the past two decades as part of an evolution of the world’s political system. He

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maintains, for example, that after the period of postwar reconstruction was over, there was a transition from “hegemonic unilateralism to multilateral reciprocity.” He denies that multilateral reciprocity is unstable compared with hegemonic systems and maintains, rather, that we must go through a learning period in order to understand how to manage this emerging multilateralism. This period of transition is what he calls a “liminal period,” that is, a period in which the rules of the game change and there is greater ambiguity. This liminal period began in the 1960s when it was clear that the United States was in decline and that hegemonic diplomacy was no longer effective, this at a time when the United States struggled to maintain its hegemony and Europe struggled to obtain a greater role, without allowing the United States to forego its commitment to the continent. And so, he argues, “These positions encapsulate what is so intriguing about moments of liminality – their implicit rediscription of structure, away from a differentiated hierarchical model toward a substantially more equal community.”49 There has been for Lipson, therefore, an important transformation in world politics that we are still trying to sort out. Although he agrees that cooperation is fragile, he contends that “rule-guided and normgoverned arrangements are far more common than the unusual insistence on an international ‘state of nature’ would suggest.” What this indicates to Lipson is that although the anarchical system espoused by realists is indeed an integral part of the world system, of what he calls the “deep structure,” “Theory construction and theoretically principled accounts must incorporate this fundamental notion of deep structure, but they must also move beyond even compelling metaphors to consider the subtle ways that environmental conditions shape interactions in particular issues.”50 Lipson does not deny that the realist view of states as independent actors is a durable truth; rather, he argues that the choices that states make now are governed by the fact that two features work side by side in world politics and that their juxtaposition is the fundamental problem of international relations. Furthermore, he argues that the distinction between an international environment and domestic structure should not be exaggerated for, “the two images are analytically distinct but need not be treated as mutually exclusive, even in ideal type form. The real problem, again, is to integrate choice and structure, not to depreciate or conflate the distinction.”51 The development of interdependence and international cooperation has also been expressed institutionally: in multilateralism. As Keohane argues, the growth of multilateralism has not been even, especially with the increase of bilateralism during the 1980s. He states that “Despite these countervailing tendencies, for the postwar period

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as a whole, states have relied increasingly on multilateral arrangements, and the most important of those arrangements have become institutionalized.” The rise of multilateralism has occurred, first of all, because states see a potential profit in organizing and collaborating, and this is especially true of nonhegemonic states. As Keohane asserts, “Hegemonic states may have incentives to serve as entrepreneurs, but relatively small groups of states can also overcome collective action problems to do so.” Second, with the increase of interdependence states find themselves disadvantaged if they do not coordinate polices with other states and thus become compelled to participate in multilateral arrangements and institutions. Most importantly, domestic political structures, particularly economic structures, are also affected as domestic groups in the international system become more open through trade liberalization: “As interdependence rises, therefore, the opportunity costs of not coordinating policy increase, compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as the consequence of making binding agreements. The result can be expected to be increased demand for multilateral agreements. Second, increased interdependence is likely to affect domestic political institutions and coalitions.”52 Thus, multilateral institutions lessen the uncertainties involved in making transactions and contracts with other states, particularly since issues in a given area increase and become more complex, and if these institutions can create relatively clear rules, uncertainty diminishes. Consequently, “According to this argument we should expect that a combination of increasing interdependence (leading to high levels of issue density) and the success of existing institutions will tend to lead both to an expansion of institutional tasks and an increase in the number of functioning international institutions.” To understand the rise of multilateralism, we therefore have to view a complex web of variables that have combined to shift the structure of world politics. As Keohane concludes, we must first understand the relative importance of power, interdependence, domestic politics, and the contractual environment and then see how they interact: “Both types of study will seek to connect those shifts with changes in distribution of capabilities, patterns of interdependence, domestic political coalitions, and multilateral institutional activity.”53 The rise of interdependence and the growth of multilateralism are, therefore, important effects of a structural change in international politics. Together they comprise the basic elements of the new internationalism. What is significant about this analysis is that it recognizes new activities, new actors, and different avenues of interaction. The new internationalism creates unprecedented kinds of constraints on a superpower like the United States, since it is forced to cooperate and

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sometimes compromise in a way that Great Powers in the past were not required to do. However, because the fundamental structure of high politics is still important, albeit in worst-case scenarios, students of interdependence still recognize the viability of, if not the important threat posed by, high politics. Nevertheless, an important element not properly dealt with by students of the new internationalism is the growing importance of individuals participating through increasingly visible social movements and ingo s. The question is, however, whether they are more influential. I turn now to this topic.

th e h um a n d i m e ns io n of th e n e w i n t er n ati on a li s m : social movements and the emerging international civic culture In Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World, Elise Boulding explores the world civic culture from the vantage point of what she calls the mental maps of the “sociosphere.” She challenges us to view the map of the world in a different way, by presenting a series of layers that comprise the new global order. When we think of the world, she argues, we normally think of it as the collection of states. The first layer, then, is that of the familiar nation-state system, the one we are most used to imagining when we think of the world geographically. We learn this notion from grade school, but it reinforces the vision of a state-centric world. What is missing in our imagination is a view of the world that comprises other actors in world politics – actors that Boulding believes are increasingly important. The second layer is that of the United Nations system, which involves states but has its own international institutions. The multilateral system that this suggests, although based on the state system as the driving force, is one with intergovernmental institutions that create a broader global civic culture. The final layer is the “people’s layer,” which is organizationally comprised of more than eighteen thousand ingo s throughout the world – what she calls the people’s associations. Boulding, like many other analysts of international social movements and ingo s, locates the mushrooming of these groups in the fervent decades of the 1960s. As she argues, “The 1960s were not only the peace movement decade, they were a period of rapid growth and development for several thousand new international nongovernmental organizations concerned with science and human welfare … A concept of the new international order was beginning to emerge among people’s associations.” Against the background of decolonization, the threat of nuclear war, and opposition to the East-West conflict, personified in

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opposition to the Vietnam war, these groups were the beginning of a contemporary and increasingly important civic culture. As she argues, during this decade a concept of a new international order among people’s associations emerged: “As different organizations worked on different world problems within their spheres of competence, they came to see the significance of the interaction among economies, cultures, environments, information and security systems.” What was important about these associations was that, unlike governments, they had long-term goals and commitments to human welfare and began to represent a large number of grass-roots organizations that opened up to local activists wanting to affect global issues. Given these long-term commitments, ingo s began to fulfill important functions in the development of a global civic culture, the most important of which are lobbying for constructive foreign policies of nation states, providing education for world citizenship, expanding conceptual innovations and state-of-the-art expertise, creating opportunities for the North to learn from the South, creating and maintaining information channels, and offering activity as an antidote to despair.54 As a result of these activities, ingo s have become more active, more vocal, and more influential in world politics. What is crucial for Boulding is that, building from local associations, there is a transcendence to the international arena: as activists begin to interact with likeminded individuals and organizations addressing similar concerns, a transnational community is built up. And so the construction of a global civic culture begins in the local community: “The important thing to remember about ingo s is that they are organized by national sections, and national sections are organized by local branches. The networks of international people’s associations thus reach directly from individual households to world forums. No other type of diplomatic activity has this capability.”55 But ingo s are often sustained by broader domestic and global social movements, which gained force in the late 1960s and provided the context for the institutional activism that has created this layer of people’s organizations. As Saul H. Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker believe, these social movements have, unlike their predecessors in the late nineteenth century, “become part of the primary political structures of the modern world.” Their emergence and presence on the world scene cannot therefore be ignored, and the period between the late 1960s and the present has therefore been important for the emergence of a new and powerful factor in international relations. As Mendlovitz and Walker explain, “Over the past two decades, political life has been marked by a renewed resurgence of social movements.

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There are peace movements, human rights movements, environmental movements, urban movements, movements of indigenous peoples and movements for alternate forms of economic life … While it is possible to interpret their character and significance in different ways, it is not possible to ignore them – no analysis of modern political life can leave them out.”56 If the growth of these organizations and movements is not in doubt, their impact and significance is. While they have become a visible and important part of international relations, the question is whether they are effective. The answer is, of course, that sometimes they are and sometimes they are not. But even when not immediately effective, their activism has a long-term impact on national governments, who, even when not ceding to the demands of such groups, are often on the defensive and must at least contend with their demands and criticisms. What is also important is that this constraint was not a prominent part of international relations before the 1960s, but it is an important new element in global politics, especially in advanced industrial states. Certainly, students of international politics do not pretend that social movements or ingo s always have an influence or that they are about to overwhelm the existing structures. Indeed, their effectiveness is predicated on a number of factors, not the least of which is international public opinion. Putting social movements in perspective, Walker and Mendlovitz argue that although social movements respond to the fear of future threats, which often challenges conventional political wisdom, “This is certainly not to suggest that social movements are, or are about to become, the main political force in the modern world. A specter of popular social movements may or may not be haunting the globe. Neither the world economy nor the states-system are likely to succumb to them.”57 The relationship between states and these groups is one of constant tension and posturing. The state, as the central political force in global politics, still has the upper hand, since it not only has enormous resources to draw upon but also is favoured by an international political system that provides it with exclusive coercive powers. Richard Falk argues that in the face of the many challenges to it, “The resilience of the states system … is striking. There is no doubt that the states system has been challenged by modernity, but it has also evolved and responded, and if anything strengthened its hold.”58 This thesis suggests that social movements and ingo s will not overwhelm the states-system and that the relationship is by no means a symmetrical one. As Boulding herself suggests, “State power is always a limitation on what ingo s can do. That is why the average person looking at nongovernmental

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activity tends to think of it as ineffective. However, these organizations are free to act in ways that nation-states are not free to act. It is necessary to understand both their limitations and their capabilities.”59 In his Pressure Groups in the Global System: Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-government Organizations, Peter Willetts argues that many nongovernmental groups have indeed had an important effect upon international politics. He explores the activities and successes of six international “pressure groups”: the anti-apartheid movement, the plo, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, international women’s movements, and ngo activities in the United Nations Commission for Refugees. Willetts argues that they “have been remarkably successful in gaining support in most Western societies and in helping to change the policies of Western governments. This is not to say that the groups have been anywhere near to being as successful as they would wish.” But Willetts also argues that they have not been adequately studied and that their real impact on the global system has been generally disregarded, since most analyses either ignore their impact on the global and domestic political systems they are attempting to influence. Thus he concludes that “The traditional view is that governments are in control of all external relations and that they can, if only they are sufficiently determined, resist any external pressures to change, unless the pressure is backed up by the threat of the use of military force. Therefore, it is typical of the realist approach that intergovernmental organizations are not seen as being of importance.”60 A proper evaluation of these groups must include both their global and their domestic impact, for while governments can resist either domestic or global pressures, “What is highly unlikely is that a government can resist the same demand being made simultaneously by both internal and external actors, unless it too can obtain external support.”61 The interaction of domestic groups with like-minded international ones, drawing of support from international organizations such as the un, or better yet, friendly foreign governments, has a great impact upon national governments who must value not only domestic pressures but international public and governmental opinion. As we have seen, the role and importance of international social movements and ingo s has been largely ignored and dismissed by many students of international politics. But taken together with other important changes to the international system since the late 1960s, they have quickly become an important force in international politics. The dual role they play in attempting to influence the foreign policies of governments, while at the same time fostering certain values of a global civic culture, are important in certain debates at particular times. They are not always effective, but they are also not always irrelevant

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either. If, as I have argued, the United States has declined relatively in power and if the international system has changed so that social and political relations have become more important, then these groups and movements are better able to get politically involved and influence governments, something they could not do when high politics prevailed. The development and proliferation of communications, the increased awareness of international events, and the greater ability to travel, work, and live abroad have created opportunities for awareness, organization, and action that were unimagined even in the 1960s. Internationally oriented social movements, ingo s, and domestic ngo s have grown out of these changes in technology and alterations to the fundamental principles of the international system. In the following pages I will evaluate these groups in both theoretical and empirical terms. It is sufficient to say for now that students of international politics must be more aware of these groups and of their potential and limitations in the evolution of the international system.

conclusion From the outset of this chapter I have suggested that since 1968 three important new factors in the international system have had a great impact on Canada. I have concluded that although the United States cannot be characterized as a spent force in international politics, making its existence as a Great Power one of the briefest in the modern states system and its decline the most dramatic, there is great cogency to the argument supporting the notion that the United States has declined relatively and in important ways since the late 1960s and early 1970s. This decline has been due principally to the artificially high standing the United States had immediately after World War II, as Kennedy and Nye argue, because of the devastation to Europe and Japan. The United States is still, however, the predominant Great Power, since no challenger is on the horizon, but it does not enjoy the same degree of influence and power it had in the immediate postwar era. Second, I have argued that not only has u.s. power declined relatively, but the international system has begun to undergo a fundamental structural change. This change, I suggest, goes beyond a systemic change, that is, a change in the leadership of the international system, and although it is not fully a systems change (a change of the very nature of the international system itself), it includes new actors and modes of power, as Nye suggests. I reject the idea, therefore, that the relative decline of the United States is simply part of the natural redistribution of power that has operated throughout the existence of the modern states system. Rather, I argue that the appearance of interdependence and increased

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multilateralism is a strong indication that the international system is undergoing a fundamental change and that the principles of realism are, by themselves, insufficient to accurately describe and explain the nature of world politics. Finally, I have argued that the appearance of important international social movements and the emergence of issueoriented ingo s add an element to these structural changes that has been ignored and dismissed by realists and inadequately dealt with by students of interdependence. Furthermore, their role in world politics is not insignificant and can, under certain circumstances, be crucial in the interaction between states. What does this mean to Canada? Among other things, the relative decline of the United States means that it can no longer dominate and control the system as it once could. The growing complexity of issues, the difficulty of issue-linkage, and the decreasing importance of military force in the normal relations between states might give Canada more room for maneuver at the systemic level, particularly in multilateral forums, which might enhance its ability to implement an independent foreign policy. The emergence of interdependence and multilateralism also has the potential to enhance Canada’s role as an international actor. If state power is more diffuse and if it is increasingly exercised in multilateral relations, Canada has the potential to utilize its experience and its unique position as an active participant in the new internationalism to formulate policies that contradict u.s. policies and interests, particularly when regionally based international organizations (or regional ad hoc multilateral ones) are more effective in dealing with multilateral issues than universally based international organizations. Finally, with the growth of social movements and ingo s, particularly in advanced Western industrial states, the potential of ingo s based in Canada and issue-oriented Canadian ngo s to influence foreign policy has increased, especially if the systemic constraints on Canada are looser than they were immediately after World War II. Consequently, it would be possible for domestic polices to influence the international system, a situation that was unlikely in the period before 1968. In chapter 4 I will explore the viability of these implications. But first I must attempt to understand how we can study political phenomena at the international, national, and individual levels and develop a model for the study of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America during the critical period between 1968 and 1990. Chapter 3 will explore the literature on foreign policy analysis and explain how, in this changing world, it can provide us with an analytical model that can best allow us to understand Canadian foreign policy during this period.

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3 Foreign Policy Analysis: From the 1950s to the 1980s By reading the debates in Parliament, official records of ministerial press conferences, other official documents, press accounts, and material observable from similar sources overseas; by interviewing relevant people on a non-attribution basis (and the personage who will not reveal a corner of his mind in public is often delighted to get things off his chest in private) – one can get the general picture of what the policy is and how it developed. It only takes patience, time and judgment … There are no immutable or absolute factors in foreign policy. This is what makes writing theoretically about foreign policy so difficult. T.B. Millar1

i n t r o d u c t i o n : t h e g r o w i n g r e l e va n c e o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a ly s i s Few deny that the world is becoming more complex, that international relations today involve patterns and processes unthought of even thirty years ago. Some point to the rise of universal values,2 others to the appearance of international society,3 and still others to the emergence of the international citizen.4 But if the nature of the international state system is changing, one can no longer focus on states as the sole actors in international relations.5 The emergence of transnational institutions and processes have made analysts focus on new sets of variables on the world stage, which traditionally was visualized by some as a global chess board dominated by “high politics.” But high politics have been replaced, or at least complemented, by “low politics” – by the concentration on social and political relations. States, it is argued, have an ever-decreasing capacity to make decisions on the basis of national interest. The study of international relations has been attempting to keep abreast of these developments, to make sense of them and question whether in a world of continuous change the events of the past few decades are old wine in new bottles or a different beverage altogether.6 Immediately after World War II, when the modern discipline of international relations emerged, principally in the United States,

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the preoccupation was to view the constraints that the international states system placed on policymakers.7 It was argued that it was the irresponsible “idealism” of many who believed during the interwar period that the recalcitrant nature of international politics could be changed by attempting to propose a world order based on the domestic model, where the rule of law was supreme, that was responsible for World War II.8 And so an approach to international relations re-emerged that minimized the domestic setting and accentuated the systemic constraints of the system of states. This approach, referred to already in chapters 1 and 2 as “realism,” varied in its analysis and prescriptions. In its most extreme form, it denied that individuals or the domestic configuration of states can ultimately change the choices that must be made to meet the demands of realpolitik.9 Other observers saw a middle point between so-called idealism and realism that explained the states-system as an “anarchical society.”10 But in almost all cases, the focus was on the state as the principal actor on the world stage, and between the 1940s and the 1960s this approach had a great deal of potency. In an age dominated by the Cold War, by the emergence of nuclear weapons, by tensions in Europe, and by military conflicts in the Third World (a concept created by the Cold War itself), the realist approach dominated and flourished. But realism did not go unchallenged. Since the early 1950s at least one other foreign-policy approach has emerged. Ever since foreign policy began to be studied as a distinct discipline in the immediate postwar era, foreign policy analysts have continuously asked fundamental questions about the nature of the international states system and challenged the basic assumptions of realist theory. But more importantly, they have asked questions about the relationship between individuals who make foreign policy, the domestic setting within which these individuals operate, and the external environment in which the states must act. The answers to these questions have been varied, sometimes inconsistent, and often too complex to be operationalized. Foreign policy analysis (fpa) has also entered the debates of the broader discipline. It has, for example, been influenced by the socalled great debates between idealism and realism, between traditional and scientific, or behavioral, methodologies, and more recently, though less explicitly, between neorealism and neo-institutionalism. It has at times been enriched by these debates, but it has also often succumbed to them and descended to utter irrelevance. fpa has also contributed to the broader discipline by posing theoretical questions and presenting supporting empirical evidence, thereby both challenging and often complementing the dominant approach.

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One of the fundamental strengths of fpa, as James N. Rosenau has argued, is that it is a “bridging discipline.”11 It combines the study of sociology and psychology (the behaviour of individuals and social groups), of comparative politics (comparing different domestic governmental systems), and of international politics (behaviour of states in the world arena). These are, in effect, the ingredients of foreign policy. It is, perhaps, because it casts the conceptual net so broadly that fpa has met with a series of major stumbling blocks in explaining particular instances of foreign policy behaviour. The attempt to get away from the case-study approach, which dominated before World War II and lacked a unifying and underlying general theory, led u.s. academics, for example, to an ambitious program of fpa under the rubric of comparative foreign policy (cfp), which eventually declined and went into stasis in the 1970s.12 The attempt by others to develop a theory of foreign policy based primarily on individual decision making also met with poor results, but it has not quite vanished. Their inability to propose useful psychological and sociological analyses of an activity immersed by its very nature in secrecy and deception was hardly a surprise to some observers. And attempts to develop a multidimensional approach that would take into account all, or nearly all, important factors in the foreign policy making process drowned in complexity. Yet basic questions asked by the pioneers of fpa in the early 1950s still intrigue observers today. It is not that they are merely interesting theoretical questions: because foreign policy formulation can have the greatest impact on humanity, they are of vital importance. Understanding how and why a state formulates foreign policy continues to be of fundamental importance for international relations theory. And the practical questions of foreign policy are important as well; in an age when transnational factors are becoming increasingly relevant, understanding the economic and political implications of state actions has never been more necessary. As the world has grown in complexity since World War II, fpa has become an ever more significant guide to decision makers, as well as to those who wish to understand the effects of interstate relations. One common theme in much of the literature on fpa is the interaction between domestic and external forces: Is the external environment, the states-system, so recalcitrant and structured that domestic forces have no real influence? Do foreign policies vary with the domestic composition, with the internal constitution of states? Do states react to external stimuli in much the same way? Or, as it is more commonly asked, just how do the domestic environment, on the one hand, and the external environment, on the other, mix and blend to

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result in particular foreign policies? What are, therefore, the dynamics of the foreign policy of states? What is the relation between individual decision makers, the domestic environment, and the structure of the states-system? These questions became more relevant to advanced industrial states after the late 1960s, oddly enough when foreign policy analysis was in general decline. The constraining structure of high politics was being overtaken by the emerging constraining structures of low politics. That is, realism gave way to “complex interdependence” or “complex neorealism.” Transnational structures could now play the role that military and strategic structures had played before. In the end, little attention was paid to the role of domestic environments and, in particular, of the new social movements in industrialized countries that were attempting to influence foreign policy. This chapter addresses these questions and proposes a theoretical model for the study of Canadian foreign policy that is relevant to the changing world order described in chapter 2. It is particularly important to see how fpa can help us understand the interaction between domestic and international politics.

le ve l s o f a n alys i s a n d f o re i g n p o li cy At the outset it is critical to consider the problem of different levels of analysis. My thesis is that the best way to understand the development of Canada’s foreign policy toward Latin America is to investigate the dynamics between domestic sources of influence and external constraints. Certain basic assumptions are implied in such a thesis, assumptions that must be made explicit, that must be justified, and that must be shown to contribute to the understanding of our case study. fpa, by its very nature, must deal not only with the statesmen and stateswomen and bureaucrats who formulate foreign policy but also with the societies in which they operate and the international system within which both individuals and states function. The image I would like to present of this complex interaction is one of interconnecting and interdependent levels of analysis, none of which is necessarily the only level that best explains the political phenomena under study. It is my task to demonstrate, first theoretically and later empirically, the mutual influence of these levels of analysis. It is my goal to explain how both structure and process operate in this specific instance, resulting in a foreign policy that I have described as somewhat of a puzzle, but that is understandable when we look at the interaction between and within the domestic and international environments. The levels-of-analysis problem was best expressed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Although Waltz is

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preoccupied with “high politics” and concerned to explain how we think about war, his discussion of the levels of analysis will nevertheless assist us in understanding the theoretical dilemma confronted by fpa.13 In effect, for Waltz the study of how we think about war is based on the assumptions we make about what is to be studied. As J. David Singer argues in a review essay on Waltz’s book, “these assumptions lead into, and flow from, the level of social organization which the observer selects as his point of entry into any study of the subject.”14 Waltz, therefore, divides the subject into three levels of analysis (which he refers to as “images”): the individual, the state, and the states-system. While criticizing approaches that emphasize the importance of any single level alone (although he admits that most analysts he examines do not write of one level), he concludes that the best way to understand how we think about war is to view the third level (the states-system) as the “framework” that, if called a cause at all, should be considered a “permissive or underlying cause of war.” He considers the first two levels (the individual and the state) “the immediate or efficient causes of war.” For Waltz, therefore, we must understand the constraints of the third level (as a structure) but not discount the effect of the other two. He can thus conclude that “The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images, there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces of world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”15 By shifting our focus from how we think about war to how we think about foreign policy, this threefold distinction can clarify the theoretical framework I propose. I assume, to begin with, that to study foreign policy it is not fruitful to choose a single level of analysis. Rather, it is necessary to develop a framework that includes all three levels. In the case of Canadian foreign policy toward Latin America, I assume, as well, that the dominant independent variables exist at the second and third levels. This assumption is brought about, in part because of the problems involved in the “decision making model,” which seems now to have lost its way in fpa. How does one accurately study a policy process hidden behind a wall of security and secrecy? Nevertheless, some references can be made to the first, or individual, level of analysis when it becomes relevant and important and when they can be reasonably accurate. Finally, I also assume that the domestic influences on Canadian foreign policy toward Latin America have become more important in the last two decades than they were before, in part because of the changing nature of the states-system and in part because of an activism unprecedented in the domestic politics of foreign policy in Canada.

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My own approach to the level-of-analysis problem in the study of Canadian foreign policy assumes that the interaction between the state and the states-system is not dominated by one or the other level. Consequently, to consider only one level and ignore the other would be to prevent a full understanding of the policy process: one must understand both the force of domestic pressure and the constraints of the external environment. I view this interaction not only as an adaptive process whereby foreign policy is designed and executed within the limits that the international environment places but also as a process that produces different policy outcomes based on specific national attributes. Contrary to Waltz’s more structural formulation of this problem in his Theory of International Politics, where he argues that “despite cultural and other differences, similar structures produce similar effects,”16 I argue that similar structures can produce varying effects, depending on the nature of the domestic environment: the domestic environment plays an important role in changing the international environment during given historical periods.

fo r ei g n p ol i cy a n aly si s : a conceptual history The Nature of Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign policy analysis emerged as a formal and distinct area of study after World War II. It emerged almost simultaneously with, and in some respects in reaction against, the new discipline of international politics, best represented by Hans J. Morganthau.17 At first, influenced by the writings of E.H. Carr,18 theorists like Morganthau attempted to develop a modern theory of international politics that would counter the normative mindset of the interwar period. However, a preoccupation with understanding the nature and mechanisms of world politics that might provide insights into the limits of the behaviour of states precluded a serious analysis of the role of the individual decision maker or the influence and impact that domestic sources might have on state actions abroad. In fact, many members of this early school of international politics (which still maintains a very healthy following today) wished to demonstrate the folly in believing that statesmen and their societies had in fact any significant influence on the anarchical nature of world politics. For them, a study of foreign policy that went beyond a description of the constraints of state action, could only lead to the delusion that the international system could be changed or ignored by statesmen and their societies, a delusion that many realists believed had led to the outbreak of World War II.

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Like the discipline of international politics, fpa emerged primarily, though not exclusively, in the United States. While the United States began to become conscious of its new role as a superpower after the war, the academic community in that country systematically attempted to understand and explain the new world order. It was therefore not merely an academic dispute that helped establish fpa but a very practical need to supply decision makers in Washington with an understanding of how to manage world affairs. Indeed, the u.s. political system easily lent itself to the osmosis between the foreign policy establishment and the universities, not only by hiring academics (while the universities hired retired government officials) but by providing substantial grants to researchers for the investigation of u.s. foreign policy. Finally, fpa emerged during the attempt by many u.s. scholars to found a “science” of politics, influenced by what were perceived as great strides made in sociology and psychology, as well as by the perceived advances in the study of comparative politics. Foreign policy analysts saw their greater goal as injecting rigour into the study of foreign policy. Thus, the study of foreign policy as a scientific endeavour would yield accurate, comparable data that could enhance understanding and increase the predictability of the behaviour of states. Many foreign policy analysts in the United States set as their task the development of a general theory of foreign policy. Among the most prominent of these was James N. Rosenau. What makes fpa theoretically challenging is that it does not fit neatly into a particular level of analysis, as does comparative government (second level) and international politics (third level). Rather, it cuts across these levels: it is the nexus between domestic politics and international politics and has been compared to a discipline that balances between the micro and the macro, or between subsystem and system. Rosenau, for this reason, calls the study of foreign policy a bridging discipline. For a foreign policy analyst, therefore, it should not be enough to understand the nature of the international system, its structure and actors, or merely the “rules of the game.” It is also not sufficient to delve into the decision-making process, the sources of domestic influence, or the culture and history of a particular state, though, to be sure, all these factors must be taken into account. What is important is to understand the dynamics operating between the individual, domestic, and international variables. The analyst must juggle different levels of analysis, each with distinct processes, and somehow explain their rationale. But exactly how this should be done is part of a profound debate among students of foreign policy. If there is general consensus about

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the nature of foreign policy in broad terms, there is profound disagreement as to what is primarily to be studied and in what manner this should be done. In the limited space I have here I cannot hope to properly address the many complex debates within fpa. I will, however, provide a brief sketch of the development of fpa before turning to the chief theoretical issues. My goal is to place my study of the domestic sources of and external constraints on Canada’s foreign policy toward Latin America in the context of the development of the discipline. The Development of Foreign Policy Analysis Following Steve Smith, we can divide the development of the study of foreign policy into three principal periods. The first period began in the 1950s when many analysts were dissatisfied with the realist school; it ended in the mid-1960s.19 The second period began in the mid- to late-1960s and continued to the early 1970s. It was marked by an explosion of research, primarily around the work Rosenau and his “pre-theories” article, which initiated the comparative foreign policy methodology (cfpm).20 The third period, marking the decline of cfpm, began in the mid-1970s and continues today; it contains more diverse and eclectic methodological approaches. As Smith himself argues, this is a rather simplistic summary of over three decades of fpa, but, especially for our purposes, this division lends itself to a broad sketch of the development of the field. Although my aim is to simplify for analytical and conceptual reasons, I should point out that fpa is complex and diverse and has always had within it different academic communities and competing perspectives that have obviously not developed neatly within the framework presented here. My analysis will draw primarily from u.s. sources, but I will also attempt to include German and British sources.21 They have gone through phases similar to those of the u.s. sources, but they are relatively more united, because they are less preoccupied with methodological disputes over general theory. During the third period, the study of foreign economic policy (fep), which is germane to my own analysis, increased in importance, because of the change of emphasis, already discussed, from high politics preoccupied with issues of security to low politics revolving around issues of social and economic relations. As Rosenau himself has argued, the demise of the cfpm approach had as much to do with the rigidity of the theory itself as with the advent of a changing world order subject to what he termed “cascading interdependence.” The new importance of international political economy has therefore changed the way foreign policy is conducted, and, as I argue below, this new emphasis has

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placed greater importance on both domestic sources of foreign policy and on the room for maneuver that small and mid-size states have. fpa, therefore, must also change to allow analysts to better study the new phenomena. Against the Third Image: Richard C. Snyder One of the first analysts to attempt to define the nature of fpa and to focus attention on domestic factors was Richard C. Snyder. Writing in 1952, he was grappling with the significance of u.s. ascendance to world power. This new role urged a redirection of the teaching and discussion of u.s. foreign policy and forced academics like Snyder to address the very practical problems faced by decision makers in Washington. Their concern – almost alarm – can be found in the following statement: “The tidal wave of crises, unfamiliar problems, mounting responsibilities, immediate threats to national security, and instantaneous decisions has tended to sweep away the inclination and opportunity to engage in detached, conceptual thinking about the full implications of the new international situation.”22 The need to understand, and then explain, what the United States should do in the new international environment placed the problem of fpa squarely within the realm of the decision makers, and thus, arguing that “foreign policy encompasses the way in which the society regulates and interprets its foreign relations,” Snyder’s principal concern was to look within us society and ask questions that would assist in understanding how his society could best adapt to its new international role.23 For these reasons, Snyder could not view international politics, and particularly foreign policy, from a third-level perspective – he was more concerned with the first and second levels, but attempted, however, to take into account variables from all three levels. Thus, he argued, the behaviour of a society in its foreign relations “is determined by the interaction of conditions and forces within the society and conditions and forces in the international environment.” But for Snyder, fpa had to deal with the most concrete common denominator, the individual decision-maker: “The complex set of political phenomena called ‘foreign policy’ must be reduced for purposes of analysis to certain kinds of human behaviour in certain kinds of situations.”24 Because foreign relations are ultimately conducted by individuals organized in social groupings, argued Snyder, these groupings must be the focal point of foreign policy, not obscure structures or “systems” of international politics guided by “the rules of the game.” To be sure, in order to understand the individual decision makers, one must explore

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their environment, their social organization, their culture and the pattern of ideas. Diplomatic history and institutional analyses could therefore be complemented by Snyder’s approach. Thus, he called on political scientists to “recognize that their discipline has been held down by a narrow, artificial conception of political behavior and by overwhelming concentration on the unrelated description of political phenomena and moral philosophy at the expense of attempts to establish a coherent theory of causation and control based on what is known about human behavior.”25 Three years after publishing the article in which this statement appears, Snyder published a review essay of five new introductory textbooks on the study of international politics published in 1953 and 1954, including the second edition of Morganthau’s Politics among Nations.26 The essay, though, was not intended to be a review of the individual texts but “a commentary on the literature they represent.” Part of his review emphasizes praise for “the trend toward greater coherence and explicit conceptualization.” Specifically, he agrees with the greater academic rigour of these books, in which ‹science’ and ‘theory’ are now common words. One welcome by-product of greater concern for systematic analysis is more adequate and fruitful definition of terms and attempts at useful typologies.” Though Snyder spent much of his essay identifying conceptual problems posed by terms such as “power,” a problem that still haunts us today, he clearly agreed with the attempts at better definitions and at scientific principles. He was also pleased with the fact that all the authors except Morganthau had dealt with foreign policy. Thus he states that “Not only has ‘foreign policy’ been clarified as a term and as a subsidiary concept, but more space is being devoted to the ingredients of decision, to decisional processes, to the tasks of the policy-maker, to the kinds of considerations which enter into decisions, to means-ends relationships, to limitations on policy choices, and to problems of execution.”27 These works make the common assumption that the concept of power, with all its conceptual difficulties, is central to their analyses. Snyder thus states that for these authors “international politics are deemed to be in fact, and should be interpreted as, primarily concerned with power and conflict and their control.” But because of this focus, the authors concentrate on the state, which Snyder finds limiting. Thus he concludes that “to define the study of international relations as, say, the study of specified interactions among units called ‘states’ does not automatically provide fundamental questions, since only a small number could be derived from that formulation without further specifications.” Already Snyder becomes clear in his opposition to what he considers a simplistic view of international politics, in which

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there is an easy shift from postulating power as an assumption to elevating it to an empirical truth. He argues that, apart from these difficulties, “it is a nice question whether a single factor thesis should be permitted to carry on indefinitely as an assumption. Illustration is not proof, and usage is not necessarily the test of fruitfulness, especially when the concept is not critically re-evaluated.”28 In his earlier article it was clear that Snyder was concerned with understanding very practical problems of how the United States should behave in international politics. When looking at the realist school, he found missing from the analysis many variables that could provide a comprehensive view of, and especially concrete advice on, how to conduct foreign policy. His own critique voiced concern for the weaknesses of viewing international politics merely from the third-level perspective. In his own view all three levels must be included, and his conclusion was a stinging indictment of the books he reviewed: “Despite the unanimous recognition of the interconnections between domestic policy and foreign policy, the importance of public opinion, and the internal sources of national power, one has the feeling that the sociological foundations of state action have been relatively slighted … Leaving aside the analysis of the material bases of national power, only some 130 pages out of the more than four thousand pages represented in these five works are devoted to the possible relationships between the nature of society, on the one hand, and its external behavior, on the other.”29 At the heart of his critique Snyder exposes the inadequacy of what he terms “the force leading to policy” equation. It results, first, in the determinism that takes away choice from policy makers, since “not only is the reification of the state and society invited, but the policy makers may appear as mere puppets swept on by the pressures and movements over which they have no control.” Snyder finds third-level explanations lacking in depth and unable to ask, much less begin to answer, questions he deems important in analyzing social factors and how they connect to policy-making, which can be studied as an interactive process between the three levels of analysis. He therefore finds that a thirdlevel approach makes it “difficult, if not impossible, to show how multiple factors enter into decisions and to provide a method for describing the simultaneous impact of multiple factors.”30 It should be clear, therefore, that for Snyder a sociological, if not a psychological, explanation of policy-making at the domestic level can yield a more sophisticated explanation not only of how but also, more importantly, of why states behave as they do. A power-centred analysis of international politics in which states are the “actors” diminishes our understanding of the system itself, for to argue that the international milieu limits state action is to ignore the question of what maneuverability and adaptability

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states have. Studying the policy-making process in its sociological setting can provide an understanding of this room for movement. Part of the rigidity of the realist school derives from the fact that it was itself reacting against the normative approach of the interwar period. Many authors thought, as we have seen, that the belief in the ability of individuals to change their international environment and create a permanent peace had actually lead to the calamity of World War II. It was in this context that Carr’s work, first published shortly after the outbreak of the war, influenced a whole generation of international politics scholars. But it would be a mistake to assume that Snyder fell into this normative camp. In fact, in his earliest article on the nature of foreign policy, he is explicit about the need for the United States to view the world through realist, not idealist, eyes. The victor of the world contest between the United States and the ussr would therefore be the one “who will be able to make rational decisions based on the world as it really is, not as it thinks it is or would like to be.”31 This is not only a partial explanation of why the authors that Snyder reviews may have been unwilling to view first- and second-level variables; it is also an indication of Snyder’s own “realism,” which also addresses the problems involved with normative thinking in international politics, while attempting to explain the dynamics of world affairs in a multidimensional manner. Snyder concludes his critique by arguing that although “the authors recognize that the external (world environment) and internal (the society) factors exert pressures and constitute limitations on the policy-makers … a third set of factors arising from the immediate organizational setting of policy-making is either ignored or taken for granted.”32 This third set of factors was to become the centre of much of Snyder’s subsequent work. Toward the First Image: Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin If Snyder’s articles can be taken as representative of the fpa critique of third-level accounts of international politics and foreign policy, we can see that, while there was agreement on the need for greater rigour, there was disagreement about what central variable(s) defined the study agenda. The rejection of a single-cause explanation became the centerpiece of an article that Snyder co-authored with H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin in 1954.33 Here the focus shifted from the third level of analysis to the first level – from the states-system to the decisionmaking process. To be sure, the authors envisioned a multilevel analysis. Yet their concentration on the individuals who formulate and execute foreign policy spawned an influential approach in the study of foreign policy that gave central importance to the first level.

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In this seminal article the authors first assume that the best way to gain perspective in international politics is to develop an approach that will serve for the understanding of any state. Their aim is to provide a “scheme which will permit the analytical construction of properties of action which will be shared in common by all specific states.” This aim fits well within the attempt to construct a general theory in which state x will stand for any state, although it is recognized that a typology should be developed to facilitate comparison and “to make it possible to take into account certain significant differences among states while at the same time analyzing the behavior of all states in essentially the same way.” This statement is significant because in this manner the authors recognize the importance of variety between states, which may account for differences in their response to the international environment. Although their “scheme” aims at general theory, it attempts to be adaptable to diversity. They present a diagram that includes five major variables: the internal setting of decision making, the social structure and behaviour of the state, the decision makers and the decision-making process, the action of formulating the policy, and the external setting of decision making.34 It is not necessary, for our purposes, to give a detailed account of this scheme; what is important is to recognize the multilevel attempt to explain foreign policy. The authors have included all three levels of analysis as important and interactive variables. Although Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin recognize the role of the domestic realm and accept the importance of the states-system, their main focus is on the decision makers. In fact, their scheme includes factors of the internal and external setting as “interpreted by the decisionmakers.” The authors define the state as “its official decision-makers – those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state.” They conclude that “the key explanation of why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers define the situation.”35 That is, they provide what is fundamentally a psychological explanation of foreign policy. Since Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin define international politics as “processes of state interaction at the governmental level,” their scheme must account for nongovernmental factors in order to account for other variables they deem important. Because decision makers are so important to their framework, there must be an understanding of their milieu if the framework is not to fall into a single-level study of foreign policy. Therefore, the authors refer to “the setting,” which includes “domestic politics, the non-human environment, cross-cultural and social relationships.”36 The setting consists of internal and external aspects, but always with the decision makers as the locus of foreign

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policy, while the domestic environment and the international statessystem are the forces the decision makers must contend with. In this respect – and this is a crucial point – the authors’ concern with the setting is important primarily because of how it can explain the cognitive processes of policymakers and how they define their situation. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s article is important because, as mentioned, it rejects the state-centred analysis of international politics in favour of a three-level approach to fpa, because it attempts to include many potentially important variables that influence foreign policy, and because it focuses on individual decision makers as members of a decision-making unit. As such, it was a pioneering work that both rejected the prevailing view of foreign policy and provided an alternative and sophisticated theoretical framework. The central problem of this framework has to do with its complexities. A difficulty also arises from the psychological focus on individual decision makers and the attempt to understand their perceptions in the foreign policy process as a key to government behaviour in the international realm. Even if the discipline of psychology was advanced enough or had the potential ability to explain the mental processes that Snyder, Buck, and Sapin suggest, it would be nearly impossible to attempt empirically to study officials who count on secrecy, and sometimes deception, in their decision-making activities. Penetrating this particular barrier with a high enough degree of certainty seems almost impossible. Although the state-centred view of international politics says too little of importance with respect to foreign policy, the decision-making approach of Snyder, Brook, and Sapin seems to say too much with respect to variables external to the decision maker and never enough about things that are internal to the mental process of the individuals making policy. The focus on decision makers as the central feature of a theoretical framework for understanding foreign policy seems unworkable. This is not to say that decision makers should not be studied, or more accurately, included in a broader multilevel approach, but they must be assessed within the limits imposed by diplomacy, the secrecy of foreign policy, and the ability of the researcher to assemble the most relevant information. The value of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s work derives from its emphasis on the interaction between the internal and external settings. The authors recognize the importance of the domestic environment, especially in how it can account for different reactions to external pressure that result from the specific attributes of a given state. They argue that “some clues to the way any state behaves toward the world

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must be sought in the way its society is organized and functions, in the character and behaviour of its people, and in its physical habitat.” They offer, as well, an understanding of the way the structure of the international system affects foreign policy, which involves “the modes, rules and nature of reciprocal influence which structure the interaction between states.”37 But again, this structure must be understood from the decisionmaker’s perspective, and because of this Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin argue that “the way these interactions and relationships arise and the particular form or substance they take would seem to be explainable in terms of the way decision-makers in the participating political organisms ‘define their situation.› The limitations of this scheme become even clearer when one understands that the authors see the study of international politics as an either/or endeavour – either third level or first level: “there seem to be only two ways of scientifically studying international politics: (1) the description and measurement of interaction; and (2) decision-making – the formulation and execution of policy. Interaction patterns can be studied by themselves without reference to decision-making except that the ‘why’ of the patterns cannot be answered.”38 Therefore, while authors like Morganthau concentrate on thirdimage issues, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin focus on first-level processes. What is lost in both cases is the dynamics between the state (in its domestic setting) and the states-system. I accept Snyder’s critique of the realpolitik perspective and recognize the many valuable contributions offered by the decision-making model he devised with Bruck and Sapin, especially the implicit importance of the domestic and international environments, but these authors make the same kind of mistake that the realpolitik makes. In both cases too much emphasis is given to one level of analysis and not enough to the interaction between them. While there are limitations involved in studying individual decision makers, the domestic environment, and the international system, the study of foreign policy might gain explanatory power by recognizing that no single level of analysis is always or fundamentally predominant, although in any given case study it might be shown that one level does predominate. The abilities of decision makers or the viability their worldviews might have an important impact on foreign policy in a given instance. On the other hand, the nature of the domestic political environment, the political system, or the degree of interest by the public in a given foreign policy issue, might provide the locus for action under other circumstances. Finally, the nature of the international system, the particular historical

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period within which it operates, and the looseness or restrictiveness of its structure may also greatly influence a particular policy. What is important, however, when analyzing foreign policy, is not to become tied too closely to a single-level study, unless one can demonstrate the value of doing so. As general theory, however, focus on one level can only limit both the questions researchers ask and the answers they are able to extract. The Second Image as Solution? James N. Rosenau and Pre-Theory A pivotal work in the development of fpa was James N. Rosenau’s 1966 article “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.” Reviewing two decades of work on various aspects of foreign policy, Rosenau argues that even “as it seems clear that everything worth saying about the subject has already been said, so does it also seem obvious that the heart of the matter has yet to be explored.” For Rosenau, the challenge to the state-centred approach to the study of international politics provided by the great amount of research done exploring the domestic role in foreign policy was considered a welcome advance, as were the developments in methodological issues. On methodology Rosenau argues that students of foreign policy “know that foreign policy behavior is a reaction to both external and internal stimuli and that one breaks into the chain of causation only for analytical purposes.” Perhaps the major achievement that Rosenau points to, however, is that fpa had by then become a distinct and legitimate field of study; thus he concludes that “the modern student of foreign policy is – or at least has the potential to become – a broad gauged and sophisticated social scientist.”39 Despite all of this, Rosenau seemed displeased over the lack of a general theory in the field. Insofar as the discipline had begun to be defined and important questions were being asked, he believed that positive advances had been made. But Rosenau shared with many students of foreign policy the desire to develop a theory based on scientific principles, a theory that might provide a standard for the comparative analysis of foreign policy. Thus he concluded that “To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. And in this respect progress has been very slow indeed.”40

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What Rosenau saw as rare were works that went beyond description or that asked “if, then” questions. He criticized many of these studies (many were single-country cases) on the grounds that they treated “the internal factor under examination as the only variable in a world of constants.” For Rosenau, many of the elements for the study of foreign policy existed, but there was no theoretical linkage that might produce testable generalizations. Thus he concluded that “the field has an abundance of frameworks and approaches which cut across societies and conceptualize the ends, means, capabilities, or sources of foreign policy, but no schemes which link up these components of external behavior in causal sequences.”41 What the field lacked, in essence, was a Rostow, a Festinger, or an Almond to energize fpa, as these authors had done in the fields of economic development, social psychology, and comparative politics, respectively. If the result of the work of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin can be characterized as an attempt to define the scope and the nature of the field, Rosenau’s article was an attempt to refine its theoretical context and to establish an agenda for the foundation of a theory of foreign policy that would provide comparative data and analysis. Rosenau was particularly concerned with the proliferation of single-country studies that provided few clues for comparative studies. Although the accumulation of data by single-country cases was positive in general terms, the diverse methodological approaches made it impossible to use the results of these studies in order to ask questions of a more general, comparative nature. This problem seemed to Rosenau to be impeding the advancement of the study of foreign policy. Rosenau, therefore, pointed to two basic problems that created this impediment. First, at a philosophical level, for a theory to emerge “empirical materials which have been similarly processed must be available.” Just as buildings cannot be built from fallen trees and unbaked clay, “it is no more possible to construct models of human behavior out of raw data.” Rosenau refers to these basic building materials that must be standardized as “pre-theory.” They “can serve as the basis for all kinds of theories – abstract or empirical, single- or multi-country, pure or applied – but until they have been similarly processed, theorizing is not likely to occur, or, if it does, the results are not likely to be very useful.” At the heart of the matter lies the need to have an “explicit conception of where causation is in international affairs.” This, for us, involves the fundamental questions of the object of study: What are the key elements of fpa? In this respect Rosenau asks some very relevant questions, such as “Should foreign policy researchers proceed on the assumption that identifiable human beings are the causative

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agents? Or should they treat political roles, governmental structures, societal processes, or international systems as the source of external behavior? And if they presume that the causation is located in all these sources, to what extent and under what circumstances is each source more or less causal than the others?”42 Having established the importance of pre-theory, Rosenau proceeds to suggest that “all pre-theories of foreign policy are either five dimensional or translatable into five dimensions.” These five dimensions, or sets of variables, are the individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic sets. While these sets of variables are the ingredients of pretheory, in order to formulate pre-theory itself “one has to assess their relative potentialities. That is, one has to decide what set of variables contributes most to external behavior, which ranks next in influence, and so on through all the sets.” For Rosenau, then, the pre-theory of foreign policy relates only to the domestic level. That is, these five sets of variables are seen from the vantage point of the second level. What he makes clear to us is that the construction of pre-theory is not a matter of dealing only with one set of variables. The behaviour that he wishes to explain consists of the relations within the second level of analysis (the state). He distinguishes this level as the unit whose behaviour we are attempting to explain, and the philosophy of analysis “pertains to how the units are interrelated at a given level.” It is within this framework that Rosenau concludes that in constructing pre-theory, “We are not talking about levels of analysis, but, in effect, about philosophies of analysis with respect to one particular level, that of national societies.”43 The second problem Rosenau points to is conceptual. Returning to his architectural analogy, he argues that it is not only necessary to have building blocks, “it is necessary to be cognizant of the engineering principles.” Theory must be constructed from proper concepts; if it is not, even if the pre-theory is sound, the theory will not endure. Rosenau points to two conceptual problems facing fpa. First, many researchers maintain a rigid distinction between national and international political systems, even though there is “mounting evidence that the distinction is breaking down.” Second, researchers ignore the fact that “the functioning of political systems can vary significantly from one type of issue to another.” The two conceptual problems are interrelated, and so their clarification is also related. Rosenau thus argues that “the interrelationship of the two problems is such that a new kind of [concept of a] political system, the penetrated system, is needed to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue areas.”44

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For us, the concept of the penetrated system is important because it attempts to link the second and third level of analysis, even though the analysis is limited by the second-level vantage point. The penetrated system sets the problem for what Rosenau would later call “linkage politics,” which relates to our theme of the interaction between domestic pressures and external constraints. The concept of the penetrated system, however, makes the very important point that states are at times limited in their actions. He defines the penetrated system as “one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values, or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.” The influence is, however, not always the same, since there are varying degrees of penetration, depending on the issue area or areas through which the penetration occurs. So Rosenau distinguishes “between multi-issue and single-issue penetrated systems, the distinction being based on whether non-members participate in the allocation of a variety of values or of only selected set of values.”45 Like the work of Snyder, Brook, and Sapin, Rosenau’s pre-theories article is important because it includes an attempt to develop a framework that encompasses all three levels of analysis and can include many important variables necessary to understand foreign policy. The reduction of variables to essentially five sets is more useful than that presented by Snyder, Brook, and Sapin. When studying foreign policy, it is indeed important, at the first level, to understand the uniqueness of the individuals and to recognize the constraints created by the role they play in formulating foreign policy. At the second level, Rosenau’s pre-theory correctly emphasizes both governmental and nongovernmental variables that enhance or limit foreign policy. Finally, Rosenau’s inclusion of third-level variables that he calls “systemic” variables and that include “non-human aspects of a society’s external behavior”46 is also an essential part of the analysis. At the pre-theory level, therefore, Rosenau’s analysis points to a dynamic and simplified way to study and understand foreign policy. Insofar as the development of the field is concerned, Rosenau’s article established the starting point of much research, although as Steve Smith argues, “it is difficult to square the undoubted heuristic value of the approach with the deafening silence resulting from its non-application in empirical research.”47 This problem emerged from the difficulty of using both the pretheory and the theory proposed by Rosenau. In some ways, his approach fell into the same trap as that of Snyder, Brook, and Sapin,

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because the rigid scientific standards he proposed made the theory that emerged too complex and unwieldy to generate useful research. Although Rosenau made explicit the arbitrary nature of much of what he proposed, much of it was too contestable to be the basis for a general theory of foreign policy and to be adopted by researchers who, in any case, seemed to prefer their own frameworks. It is no coincidence, as well, that his failed attempt to establish a scientific study of foreign policy came at a time when the behavioral approach was already in decline and was being challenged by many. Of course, it is ironic that, as Smith points out, that since he was “attempting to be so rigorous, so scientific, [Rosenau’s] work had to be judged inter alia by those criteria.”48 For us, however, an even more important shortcoming of Rosenau’s pre-theory is that it focuses on one level of analysis (the second level) and studies foreign policy from that vantage point alone, even though he attempts to take the other levels into account. As with Snyder, Brook, and Sapin, who focus on foreign policy from the decision-maker’s perspective and limit their analysis to the first level, Rosenau simply takes this limiting, one-dimensional approach one level further and thereby has difficulty in explaining the nature of the relationship between state and states-system. It could be argued that because foreign policy is formulated at the domestic level, this is the appropriate level from which to base research. This argument, however, poses the same kinds of reductionist problems that Snyder attributed to the realpolitik school. An understanding and an explicit formulation of the nature and degree of influence of the states-system must, therefore, be included. By doing so we can better understand the degree of freedom of and the limitations on policy-makers and their societies during a debate over a given foreign policy. In a review article written eighteen years later, Rosenau explicitly recognized this shortcoming by arguing that, “Not only did the original formulation focus on the sources of foreign policy behavior without elaborating on the nature of that behavior, but in so doing it also diverted attention from the patterns of world politics to which the external policies of the state contribute.”49 A more useful understanding of foreign policy must include, therefore, an articulation of the nature of world politics, which in this later article Rosenau dubs “cascading interdependence.” There must be, as well, an articulation of how world politics affects the formulation of foreign policy. But it was because Rosenau’s article crystallized both the simplicity and the complexity of understanding foreign policy that it contributed to the development of the discipline. Let us proceed to study its effects.

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domestic pressures, external c o n s t r a i n t s : to w a r d s f r a m e w o r k The First and Second Images: Linkage Politics and Wolfram Hanrieder Rosenau’s pre-theory laid the foundation for the study of linkage between domestic and international politics. This study derives from the attempt to deal with the first conceptual problem of the new relationship between levels two and three, which Rosenau describes as the penetrated system and which spawns the study of political adaptation and linkage politics. One of the earliest writers to apply Rosenau’s concept of the penetrated political system and to deal with the linkage between national and international politics in the study of foreign policy was Wolfram Hanrieder, in West German Foreign Policy, 1949–1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response. For Hanrieder, who argues that the West German state was indeed a penetrated political system, understanding the dynamics of the relationship between levels two and three is crucial in evaluating foreign policy during the period from 1949 to 1963. He is acutely aware, first of all, of the constraints that the international system poses, and he argues that “The relative intractability of the international environment is a problem for the foreign policy makers of all nations. Purpose and power are met by countervailing power, and each country’s foreign policy projects face external restraints that the makers of policy can neglect only at the risk of failure.”50 He warns, however, that to view foreign policy only from this perspective is to imply “a good deal of determinism,” and to ignore domestic political variables. Hanrieder thus opposes a strictly third-level analysis of foreign policy in which “the structures of necessity imposed by the international environment, take analytical precedence over considerations of preference and the possibility of choice.” On the other hand, he points to another analytical perspective in fpa that “focuses on the internal political process of the nation state.” What is important about this perspective is that it “stresses the motivational elements that shape a nation’s foreign policy goals, and highlights the socio-cultural predispositions and institutional processes that lead to their formulation and to the choice of a method for their implementation.”51 But Hanrieder argues that both perspectives impose a teleology. With regard to the first, he says that the issue is whether the state has “internalized” system “rules” and whether it has properly adjusted to the international system. This perspective, he argues, “moves toward a

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preordained historical or analytical telos.” But the second approach also has similar problems, even though it apparently stresses choice rather than necessity, for “the internal conduct of a nation tends to be regarded as either irreversibly determined by its historical past and ‘political culture’ or decisively shaped by the personal idiosyncrasies of its decision-makers.” Although Hanrieder recognizes the legitimacy of choosing one level of analysis (questions about the outcome of foreign policy will stress the operational environment of the third level and questions about motivation will stress the internal political process of the second level) he also stresses the importance of combining both levels, for greater analytical clarity, and concludes that “When both dimensions are covered, a wider range of variables is brought together and more comprehensive analysis becomes possible. Almost by definition, foreign policy goals are circumscribed both by internalmotivational-psychological phenomena and by external operational ones.”52 In an article published the same year as his book, Hanrieder supports this position with a theoretical framework. His principal concern is to include the important factors of both the internal and the external dimensions of foreign policy. The two central concepts he proposes are compatibility and consensus. The first, he argues, is intended to “assess the degrees of feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the opportunities and strictures of the international system.” It includes, therefore, the concern over whether foreign policy goals have “a reasonable chance of realization if implemented by a policy an outside observer would deem appropriate.” The importance of this concept can be seen both in assessing whether foreign policy compatibility can assist in determining the realistic implementation of a given foreign policy and in assessing the resonance between what a state’s policy is intended to achieve and the success it may have. Hanrieder concludes that “the respective degrees of compatibility between individual goals and the international system serve as the base for evaluating the degree of complementarity among goals. The conditions of the international system provide the backdrop for both relationships.”53 The second concept, consensus, “assesses the measure of agreement on ends and means of foreign policy on the domestic political scene.” Hanrieder recognizes that this concept lacks the same “operational background” as the first concept because “the range of political goals that the members of a political system can advocate and agree on is at least hypothetically without limit.” Yet he argues that if consensus is a measure of feasibility and if it is defined as “the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements

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of a national system’s decision-making process, it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation.”54 In this sense, therefore, consensus is also a measure of feasibility that, for him, is particularly relevant in a democratic political system, where the government is concerned with losing popular support. In proposing an analytical framework, Hanrieder draws from Rosenau’s pre-theory article as one of “the most suggestive arguments for establishing linkages between international and domestic systems.” Hanrieder recognizes early on that although Rosenau’s framework included the effects of the international system, on the domestic realm, his definition of the penetrated system, based on authoritative participation of nonmembers, seems increasingly restrictive. This is an important point because it seems to focus on first-level influence from abroad and avoids structural (third-level) limitations of a nonhuman nature, such as the impact of military and strategic considerations, economic agreements and interdependence, and geopolitical considerations. Hanrieder can thus argue that “in short, penetrative processes may take place without a direct, personal, or authoritative participation of non-members of the national system.” For Hanrieder it is important to understand third-level as well as first-level influences on foreign policy. His reformulation of a penetrated political system is premised on two points: “(1) if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events and (2) if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events.”55 If the domestic and international systems are viewed as interpenetrated, the difference between foreign and domestic policy is greatly reduced. The advantage is that questions of whether foreign policy is formulated due to domestic pressures or due to the imposition of international constraints yield to questions of whether the policy is a response to pressures from both levels, or predominantly to pressures from one or the other in a given case study. In addition, Hanrieder argues that the interpenetration allows for the coalescence of the concepts of compatibility and consensus, because both are used as standards of feasibility. While a rigid conceptual distinction between the two levels remains, the analyst can juxtapose “compatibility patterns and the consensus patterns of foreign policy goals irrespective of the degree to which the national system is penetrated.”56 Once the linkage is made, the concepts become isomorphic. A highly penetrated system can thus be more easily studied using the concept of compatibility (which Hanrieder argues is more operational than the

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concept of consensus), because the distinction between the external and the internal is greatly diminished, and compatibility becomes isomorphic and applicable to the domestic realm. Thus, he concludes that “In a highly penetrated system, the external operational environment extends into the internal domain, and the concepts employed for structuring the two environments begin to blend. In other words, it becomes possible to analyze systems of linkage between international systems and national systems by applying concepts that, although they originate from distinct analytical environments, are sufficiently isomorphic to allow cumulative propositions.”57 Handrieder’s approach is helpful to my analysis because his emphasis on the importance of finding a balance between the domestic and international levels provides a better analytical balance than any of the authors discussed so far. That there is interpenetration between the second and third levels of analysis is important, in particular, in an interdependent world. Handrieder’s analysis begins to hint that under the right circumstances the nature of the domestic system can in some ways influence the nature of the states-system. Or perhaps, to put it more pointedly, it begins to hint that domestic influences can alter behaviour, and perhaps patterns of behaviour, at the international level. Compatibility and consensus are two concepts that can allow us to understand the tensions between domestic and international politics in foreign policy. Since I have suggested that Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America has been formulated in such fashion, Handrieder’s analysis implies that we should seek the basis of consensus for such a policy and the compatibility between Canada’s policy and its success in the international arena. Because I have argued that the international system has fundamentally changed, I suggest that the “resonance” – what a state’s policy is intended to achieve and the success it may have – is greater in an interdependent world. Compatibility and consensus are, therefore, much more relevant in the post-1968 world. Unfortunately, Hanrieder wrote before the full impact of interdependence was felt or understood, and his analysis is therefore unable to provide us with a look at how the international system and the domestic environment interact in an interdependent world. This task was taken up subsequently by Peter Katzenstein.

f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c p o l i c y a n a ly s i s : an emerging new framework With the rapidly changing international system in the 1970s, the academic literature on international politics began to focus again on the third level of analysis. Much was written about the new world of

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“interdependence.” Consequently, with the changing focus from high politics to low politics, there was a preoccupation with how the international system was influencing state behaviour. For some analysts, one of whom was Peter Katzenstein, this preoccupation echoed the downplaying of the first and second levels of analysis during the 1940s and 1950s. In an article written in 1976 he puzzled over why this focus on the third level had emerged in the study of foreign economic policy. As he argues, “foreign economic policies result at least as much from constraints on domestic structures as from the functional logic inherent in international effects.” Because he felt too much attention had been placed on how the emerging international system was affecting domestic structures, Katzenstein argued that analysts had to attempt to understand the interaction between the second and third levels: “analysis of foreign economic policies is inadequate as long as it focuses only on the ‘internalization’ of international relations; the ‘externalization’ of domestic structures is also of great importance.”58 Katzenstein also worked with a new interpretation of the international system not found in the foreign policy analysts already studied here. In essence, this new, emerging analysis changed the nature of the relationship between levels two and three, and thus Katzenstein’s focus includes how domestic structures affect the international system, not only on the reverse case. His concern is to demonstrate how, given the same international effects, different domestic political structures respond in different ways. His study of the types of international effects centres on three paradigms in the literature on international politics that are derived from nationalist, realist, and neo-liberal theories. The nationalist paradigm is “concerned with questions of identity. Its primary assumption is the primacy of domestic politics, and it focuses primarily on the analysis of society.” The literature of this paradigm is applied to problems of national and supranational integration, and it is concerned with the degree of interpenetration between societies. The realist paradigm is largely concerned with issues of security; “its basic assumption is the primacy of foreign policy, and it concentrates primarily on the analysis of the state.” The neo-liberal paradigm deals with prosperity; “it assumes as well as argues the case for the intermingling of foreign policy and of society and the state.”59 For Katzenstein, each of these paradigms has made important contributions to the study of international effects on government policy, notwithstanding their shortcomings. The nationalist paradigm has added insight into the mutual penetration of societies; it has also contributed theoretical insights into the problems of policy-making in “the analysis of the availability of relevant information and adequate

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communication capacities of increasingly fragmented government bureaucracies.” The realist paradigm, has contributed insofar as it has explained that the vulnerability of states is always relative, not absolute, and so “in response to an increasing importance of international relations, government is therefore likely to remain geared more to considerations of power than of prosperity.” The realist focus on government action as goal-oriented and based on rational choice has also added the dimension that “governments can fashion effective policies if problems of administrative red tape and duplication can also be solved either by cultural adaptation or by conscious design.” Finally, the neoliberal paradigm’s focus on economic issues has made it successful in perceiving the shift from high to low politics and in focusing on domestic factors. It has also focused on the crosscurrents affecting government policy, for “on the one hand, forces of growing importance subject governments to the impartial and rigorous logic of the international market. On the other hand, these international forces also increase citizens’ aspirations and demands, and with them, government objectives in domestic policies.”60 While the first two paradigms focus only on the second and third levels of analysis, respectively (using our language, of course), Katzenstein argues that the neo-liberal paradigm operates at both the second and third levels. Although concentrating on different kinds of international effects, each of these paradigms assumes that “the functional characteristics inherent in different kinds of international effects will act in a similar manner on the foreign economic policies of advanced industrial states.” But since for Katzenstein government policies are also shaped by domestic structures, these paradigms cannot give a full analysis. He thus proceeds to apply this thesis by comparing what he terms the differences between a state-centred policy in France and a society-centred policy in the United States. Since he argues that France embodies the principal of political concentration and the United States that of social pluralism, he hypothesizes that, given similar international effects, there will be differing domestic responses. “The domestic explanation thus predicts a great dissimilarity between a society-centered American, and a state-centered French response to international relations. Not the functional logic of different types of international effects, but the constraints of domestic structures explain the policy responses of advanced industrial states.”61 Katzenstein’s position was clarified and refined in a book he edited entitled Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States.62 The book contains a theoretical framework presented by Katzenstein and six case studies analyzing the foreign economic policies of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, and

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Japan. In the introductory chapter Katzenstein begins by asserting that “strategies of foreign economic policy of advanced industrial states grow out of the interaction of international and domestic sources,” thus recognizing that the second and third levels of analysis interact. Katzenstein, however, puts this interaction into historical perspective, arguing that it depends on the ascendance or decline in the cycle of a hegemon. Katzenstein argues that in periods of hegemonic ascendancy, which are distinguished by the “politics of plenty,” the hegemonic state and the coalition that surrounds it maintain an open international political economy. “State power is largely invisible, for the nature of the problem in international economic affairs centers on distribution and regulation which occur within established structures. The international political economy thus is orderly; this in turn facilitates the task of political management.” But periods of hegemonic decline are marked by the “politics of scarcity.” The hegemon and the coalition that surrounds it cannot stop the forces toward closure. What occurs then is that “State power becomes visible, for the nature of the political problem in the international economy centers on redistribution and constitutional debates which question established institutions. The lack of order in the international political economy in turn impedes the exercise of effective political leadership by the declining hegemonic state.”63 Katzenstein argues that with the recovery of the economies of Western Europe and Japan after World War II, the United States began a process of hegemonic decline, which was slowed down slightly by the oil crisis of the 1970s. All of this has a special significance for the importance of domestic structures. Since the mid-nineteenth century, both international and domestic factors have influenced the evolution of the international political economy. But for Katzenstein, the changes in the domestic structures of Britain, West Germany, and the United States have had an impact on the foreign economic policy of these countries. He argues, as well, that the international context is also influenced by the domestic structures and by the strategies these countries have adopted. Katzenstein thus recognizes the importance of analyzing the interaction between the second and third levels of analysis. But what is most important for him is to place this relationship in a historical context. That is, instead of trying to give a structural or general theoretical description of the interaction between the domestic and international systems (as Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin and Rosenau have attempted), Katzenstein is concerned with explaining the nature of the relationship with respect to the degree of cohesion a hegemon can generate. Thus he argues that “The relative weight of domestic structures in the shaping of foreign economic policy increased in periods of

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hegemonic decline. As long as the distribution of power in the international political economy was not in question, strategies of foreign economic policy were conditioned primarily by the structure of the international political economy. But when that structure could no longer be taken for granted, as is true today, the relative importance of domestic sources in shaping foreign economic policy increased.”64 It is important to point out that Katzenstein sees the focus on the effect that domestic (second-level) structures have on the foreign economic policy as complementary to international, third-level approaches, such as those of the realist, Marxist, and liberal traditions. These domestic structures are complementary, as well, to the bureaucratic and decision-making (first-level) approaches. In other words, Katzenstein is explicit in recognizing that his approach is eclectic. With respect to third-level approaches, he argues that “these three interpretations highlight different features of the international political economy, their particular strength lies in focusing attention primarily on the different kinds of limitations the world economy imposes.”65 First-level approaches, on the other hand, are “useful in detailing the intra-bureaucratic limitations which the contingency of numerous complex factors imposes on strategies of foreign economic policy.” Both of these approaches, however, are less helpful in explaining the different strategies industrial states pursue – for the reasons he gave his earlier article (i.e., they are unable to account for different responses to similar international stimuli by different states). Katzenstein’s theoretical framework, therefore, attempts to explain foreign economic policy with all three levels of analysis. His own work, however, attempts to explain both the domestic level, which he feels is neglected, and its own particular relevance to this historical period and to a particular kind of international system. His focus on the state and society does not therefore ignore the other two levels of analysis as integral components of fpa. This is why Katzenstein presents us with an innovative thesis and a workable framework for the study of the dynamics between domestic sources of influence on foreign policy and the limitations the international system imposes. In explaining the consensus of the articles contained in Between Power and Plenty, he states that “the common view includes both the problems in foreign economic policy worth explaining (the dependent variables) and the political and economic forces operating at home and abroad which will make these problems intelligible (the independent variables).”66 For Katzenstein, the differences in the domestic structure, which account for differing responses to the international environment, centres on the particular nature of the state and society and their relations. He argues that the manner in which state and society are connected is historically conditioned and that a rigid distinction between the two

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realms does not exist today. How private actors affect foreign economic policy can usually be seen as taking place either through mass preferences expressed in elections (the domestic model) or through the “infusion of private interests into the definition of public preference and the existence of private choice.” Through the interest-group model, though, one can also see how the state itself shapes private preferences (this is the “statist” model of foreign economic policy). This model “discounts mass preferences, political parties, and elections, which are viewed as effects rather than causes of governmental policy.” These two kinds of interrelationships are always mixed, although analysts always recognize the symbiotic relationship between the two, for “they differ only in questions of evaluation.”67 Katzenstein thus argues that the actors who play a role in influencing foreign economic policy (both in society and the state) “consist of the major interest groups and political action groups.” The interest groups represent relations of production (such as industry, finance, commerce, labour, and agriculture), while the political action groups represent political authority (primarily the state bureaucracy and political parties). Thus, Katzenstein argues that “The governing coalitions of social forces in each of the advanced industrial states find their institutional expression in distinct policy networks which link the public and the private sector in the implementation of foreign economic policy.” Because for Katzenstein (and the other authors in Between Power and Plenty) the central concern is to analyze the actors in state and society, he focuses “on the governing coalitions which define policy objectives and the institutional organization which conditions policy instruments.”68 The study of the governing coalitions is in fact the study of the nexus of state and society, and it can yield an understanding of the nature of foreign economic policy and explain why a given policy is formulated. Katzenstein’s analysis points towards a comparative approach. By looking at the relationship between state and society in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, and Japan, the case studies bring together a range of political strategies based on different domestic structures that allow for differing degrees of state power. In countries like France or Japan, state power is greater than in countries like the United States and Britain, with West Germany and Italy being somewhat in the middle. Katzenstein emphasizes the historical nature of this range of state power as well, so that the relation between state and society might vary over time, and thus it is recognized that the domestic structure evolves, as does the international environment. Finally, Katzenstein differentiates strategies of foreign economic policy into policy objectives and policy instruments. The former are defined as “a choice among values which differ from state to state.” This

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definition is used simply as an analytical device to avoid the normative problems of the concept of national interest. It differs as well from this concept in that policy objectives are defined inductively, rather than deductively, and are analyzed as the actions rather than the rhetoric of policymakers. Policy instruments are varied; they include “licenses, tariffs, quotas, exchange controls and export insurance. But they also cover a whole range of monetary and fiscal policies.” For Katzenstein, both the ruling coalitions and the policy networks “condition the forces of foreign economic policy.” Policy objectives, however, are defined by the ruling coalition: “Such coalitions combine elements of the dominant social classes with political power-brokers, finding their institutional expression in the party system and in a variety of institutions a step removed from electoral competition – government ministries, banks, industrial associations and large public or private corporations.”69 But if policy objectives are defined by the ruling coalition, policy instruments are conditioned by the policy network “spanning both the public and the private sector which conditions them.” And so, how many policy instruments there are and what their range is depends on “the differentiation of state and society and the centralization within each.”70 Katzenstein’s contribution to the foreign policy debate can be described as twofold. First, he correctly criticizes single-level analyses of foreign policy, whether they are preoccupied with an international system in which high politics prevail or a looser one in which low politics have become more important. He points out, however, that in an interdependent world the interaction between levels two and three are much more complex and are themselves interdependent. Second, Katzenstein describes an international system in which the composition of domestic forces can itself influence the third level of analysis. He provides an understanding of how individuals have affected the domestic environment to influence, in turn, the international system. Katzenstein thus provides an understanding of the basic ingredients of foreign policy during the period with which I am concerned, and although his particular recipe may not be directly helpful, since I am seeking to understand different phenomena, his methodology is quite enlightening.

c o n c l u s i o n : to w a r d s a r e c i p e for foreign policy This brief study of the development of fpa since the 1950s has allowed us to see how the central theoretical issues inherent in the levelsof-analysis question have evolved in an attempt to define the ingredients (the elements) of foreign policy and to find a recipe (how these

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elements combine) for the study of a state’s behaviour in the international arena. We have seen how the focus on one level of analysis is far too limiting. I conclude, therefore, that the ingredients of foreign policy must involve all three levels of analysis, especially when one is analyzing the post-1968 period – the question is in what relation. We have also seen how the attempt to suggest one recipe for all times and places creates a cumbersome framework that cannot be operationalized. The recipe for the study of foreign policy changes depends on the subject and the period being studied. What I also conclude from the foregoing discussion is that fpa is much more useful as a methodology for the post-1968 period. The loosening of the system described in chapter 2 allowed for greater interaction between the three levels of analysis on any given foreign policy issue. Unlike the immediate postwar period, which consisted of a rigid international structure dominated by high politics and in which states and individuals acting within states had lesser room for action, the world of interdependence has opened up freedom of action for states and domestic groups to influence world politics. My methodological approach, therefore, should attempt, first, to describe the three levels of analysis and explain in what particular proportion they are to be used to analyze the foreign policy issue in question. Second, while outlining the foreign policy issue to be studied, the particular recipe concerning the way in which the three levels of analysis combine in a particular case can be described. For the study of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990, the first step is to explain the nature of the international system during this period. I have done this in the preceding chapter. In chapter 4 I will describe the recipe for Canadian foreign policy during the period. Finally, having clearly described both the ingredients and the recipe, I will proceed with the study of Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990 in part 2.

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4 Domestic Pressures, External Constraints, and the New Internationalism In the postwar period Canadian foreign policy has been effective. However the new foreign policy strategy has been less successful than the old, more ad hoc, version. In the Pearsonian period the emphasis was on giving diplomatic expression to objectives which already mustered support within Canada and were shared with the usa. With the new strategy, not only is domestic support more fragile, but conflict with the usa is almost inevitable. What seems lacking is an appreciation of the limits inherent in Canada’s traditional approach to diplomacy, at a time when the u.s. is a hegemonic power in decline, and Canadian views of the world order increasingly differ from u.s. views. Duncan Cameron1

introduction A central feature of Canadian foreign policy in the postwar period has been the tension between Canada’s bilateral relation with the United States and its commitment to multilateralism – a tension that has grown since 1968. During the postwar period both of these policy issues were intimately intertwined. Canada shared a worldview with the United States, it helped forge the postwar order, and it was an economic and strategic partner of the United States. When u.s. power and influence began to erode and when the postwar system began to change, Canada was forced to seek a more independent foreign policy. A newly interdependent world afforded Canada greater opportunities to act in multilateral fora, and indeed at times Canada sought out these fora to complement or balance its bilateral relation with the United States. The once-convergent policies of u.s. bilateralism and internationalism became more divergent. Forces at times pushed foreign policy formulators in one direction, at times in another. Reflecting on this dilemma, John Holmes argued that “To protect our interest and give us even a minimal influence on grand strategy, must Canada or can Canada act as a formal or tacit partner

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in a North American entity in international institutions? We have done so ad hoc when our interests were coincidental, but must we adopt a more regular pattern?”2 This dilemma was of course foremost in the minds of many Canadians as the Trudeau government suffered the wrath of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s. It was foremost when the Mulroney government began negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States, essentially binding Canada’s economy closely to the United States and increasing Canada’s dependence on that country. But the question is whether this continentalist trend during the 1980s diminished Canada’s ability to formulate an independent foreign policy and whether it eventually forced it to abandon its internationalist principles. I have already suggested that important changes occurred in the international system between 1968 and 1990, changes not only in the distribution of power but in the very structure of the system itself. Part of this structural change has involved the emergence of interdependence, multilateralism, and greater cooperation among states – especially in economic matters and among advanced industrial states. But it has also involved the entry into both foreign policy and world politics of nonstate actors, notably of domestic social movements and international nongovernmental organizations. What I wish to explore next, as a prelude to studying Canadian foreign policy in Latin America, is how this new distribution of power and these important structural changes have affected Canada. The discussion will provide a context for understanding Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s actions towards the hemisphere.

ca n ada - u . s . r el at i o ns : bi lat e ra li s m i n a c h an g i n g i n te rn at i o n al c o nt ex t Throughout its modern history, Canada’s foreign policy has been constrained by its most important bilateral relationship: first with Great Britain and then with the United States of America.3 Until the end of World War II many of the constraints on foreign policy still emerged from Canada’s bilateral relation with Britain. Limited freedom of action in Canada’s foreign relations was integral to its status as a colony, and, after the British North America Act, which founded the modern Canadian state, was passed in 1867 Canada’s ability to act internationally was still minimal. The experiences of Canada during World War I were crucial in creating the momentum for a made-in-Canada foreign policy. But it was not until 1931, with the passage of the Statute of Westminster, that Canada finally obtained the legal ability to formulate

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foreign policy.4 By then, with Britain in decline and attempting to reorganize its relations with the Commonwealth, and with the United States just as quickly in ascendance, the latter increasingly began to take the place of Britain as Canada’s principal trading partner, a role it had begun in World War I. It was not until the close of World War II, however, that the United States finally took over the role of principal partner for Canada. The ascendance of a new hegemon right next door, in an equally new and revolutionary international order, was an important influence on Canada’s foreign policy. The impact on Canada’s freedom of action, however, was muted by the fact that there was a large consensus in Canada over the new world order led by the United States, with its opposition to communism and its policy of containment. Furthermore, as Canada’s strategic position became clear with the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems, which made the Canadian Arctic the pathway to the United States for Soviet bombers and, later, for intercontinental ballistic missiles, Canada became a highly important strategic ally of the United States and began to benefit economically from a series of special arrangements that gave Canada a privileged position and initiated what is called the “special relationship” between the two countries. Participation in and support for nato, commitment to North American Air Defense (norad), and broad support for u.s. foreign policy helped Canada to obtain crucial economic concessions from the United States. Taken all together, these developments lessened the possibilities for tension between the two countries. The combination of Canada’s full backing for the United States, its active participation in the new world order, and the increasingly intimate economic relations between the two countries, all placed Canada in a highly privileged position. If the United States had attained a disproportionate amount of power in the immediate postwar years, Canada had similarly attained a disproportionately beneficial relation with the United States during the same period. Between 1945 and 1968 Canada entered fully into the orbit of u.s. influence, and a postwar strategy was developed around the realistic assessment that Canada’s foreign policy was intimately tied to that of the United States by both geostrategic and economic considerations. To be sure, Canadian officials and politicians shared most of the principles of the new world order that the United States led. Indeed, they had helped forge it: Canada had come out of the war as a strong international actor and had participated in the very creation of the postwar world. But it was clear that Canada’s ability to maneuver was strictly constrained by the geopolitical realities of being next door to

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the United States. Throughout the time that Canada was touted as the internationalist actor par excellence, the country was in fact severely constrained by the overwhelming influence of the United States, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In this sense, while the old internationalism placed Canada at the forefront of international relations, its real influence was nonetheless quite limited, and it did not often stray away from the u.s. orbit, either by preference or real constraint. All this was not apparent, however, so long as the foreign policy elites were in accordance with u.s. foreign policy objectives or Canada benefited from important economic concessions. As soon as the situation began to change, particularly during the Vietnam war, the limitations became more apparent. After 1968 the United States was indeed in relative decline, and it became apparent that the United States might have less influence on Canada’s foreign policy and that the potential for an independent foreign policy had increased. As we saw in chapter 2, by the late 1960s the world order was undergoing structural change, and with it u.s. hegemony diminished in many areas. In the bilateral relationship, therefore, not only were foreign policy elites beginning to diverge, fundamental changes to the international system were beginning to affect the Canada-u.s. relationship. The interests of the two countries were slowly drifting apart: the distribution of power was changing and also the modes of exercising power itself. As Charles Doran and John Siegler contend, “Change originates not so much in how Canada and the United States look at each other, but in how world politics and economics impinge on each of them and, therefore, on their respective foreign policies toward each other.”5 And so, the fundamental shift in the bilateral relationship came from the structural changes to the world order. Viewing Canada from this international relations perspective, Doran claims elsewhere, “proposes that to understand relations between Canada and the United States, one must understand the politics of the international system as a whole. One cannot lift u.s.-Canada relations out of the context of global politics without doing a serious injustice to interpretation.”6 When, by the end of the 1960s, the United States was declining relatively in power and the international system was undergoing profound changes in kind, we would expect to see that Canada would benefit both from the relative u.s. decline and from the loosening of the international system, especially if multilateralism, Canada’s postwar forte, was allowing small and middle powers more freedom of action in the international arena. Viewing the bilateral relationship from this international perspective, as Doran suggests, affords us a more complete vision of Canada’s growing role as a global actor and

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as a multilateral interlocutor. As Doran contends, “This international relations perspective suggests that shifting power relationships and the changing structure of the international system itself may have had something to do with both the timing and direction of changes in the bilateral relationship.”7 Given this vantage point, and in view of the changes to the international system, Canada-u.s. relations between 1968 and 1990 can be seen as a function of this emerging world order. By the time Pierre Trudeau was elected prime minister in 1968, the tendencies that ended the special relationship between the two countries were already underway. As John Kirton maintains, such issues as the emergence of global détente, which lessened Canada’s strategic importance, the unsuccessful u.s. involvement in Vietnam, and Canada’s new self-confidence after its centennial year all helped Canadians to assert a more independent foreign policy. He concludes that Canada’s “1968 decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China, the 1969 reduction of Canadian … nato forces in Europe, the 1970 assertion of Canadian jurisdiction over Arctic waters, and the 1971 declaration of Canadian opposition to United States nuclear tests in the Aleutian Islands all represented a clear Canadian detachment from United States policies on issues regarded by the United States as integral to its global security.”8 Thus, just as the “special relationship” had begun with an affinity between Canada and the United States on military and strategic issues, its dismantlement began with growing disagreements of what was of strategic importance. But if military association brought with it special economic benefits, abandoning it would bring the reversal of Canada’s privileged economic status. Already by 1968 Prime Minister Trudeau had promised a foreign policy review of Canada’s role in a changing world. When the final policy statement came out in 1970 with the publication of Foreign Policy for Canadians, it was evident that the Trudeau government was attempting to broaden its foreign relations to gain greater independence as it moved to diversify its trade and diplomatic links.9 It was attempting, as well, to articulate a very different worldview based on Canadian interests, which now began to diverge from those of the United States. In 1971, with the declaration by Richard Nixon that his administration would implement a new economic policy, including a 10 percent surcharge on imported goods, without the traditional exemption for Canada, it was clear that the special relationship was over and that a new partnership was emerging. After Nixon’s speech to the Canadian parliament in April 1972, Canada-u.s. relations would never be the same. As Kirton and Bothwell argue, “the Nixon Doctrine rendered explicit what the August 1971 crisis had effectively demonstrated – that

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the special relationship, in the forms of special favors or separate bilateral exemptions for Canada from global u.s. policies was dead.”10 The response to these events was Mitchell Sharp’s so-called thirdoption paper of 1972, “Options for the Future,” which reinforced the thrust of Foreign Policy for Canadians but also underlined “a comprehensive strategy to strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life.” Whereas Foreign Policy for Canadians had largely ignored the United States (indeed, of the six pamphlets published under that title, none was dedicated specifically to the United States), the third-option paper put the focus exclusively on the Canada-us relationship. The three possible options were to maintain the status quo, to move closer towards integration with the United States, or to adopt a third option that would “pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.” The paper is careful to underline a positive movement for greater Canadian “distinctiveness,” which, it was argued, should not be viewed as a movement “against” the United States. While recognizing the profound links between the two countries, in which Canada was the junior partner, the paper was geared to enforcing the “judicious use of Canadian sovereignty.” Sharp argued that “More specifically, [the third option] looks to the mutual-reinforcing use of various policy instruments as the proper strategy to achieve greater Canadian distinctness. It inevitably takes account of its own limitations. It does not seek to distort the realities of the Canada–United States relationship or the fundamental community of interest that lies at the root of it.”11 Stemming from Canada’s newfound independence, the paper was a clear change in tactics from those of the immediate postwar era, both psychologically, due to a new sense of national identity, and economically, due to the growing world energy crisis, which was advantageous to Canada. But it was not necessarily an assault on the United States. Rather, it was an attempt to further Canadian independence in a changing world. As Doran claims, “The Third Option was less an arrow aimed at Washington than a shield designed to thwart any further negative consequences of dependence in a period when changing multilateral structures had begun to impinge significantly on the bilateral structure.”12 Although Canada-u.s. relations deteriorated during the rest of Nixon’s stay in office, they improved somewhat during the Ford administration and improved markedly at the outset of the Carter Administration, in part because of greater compatibility between Trudeau and Carter and also because of Carter’s more multilateral approach, which better suited Canada’s foreign policy approach.13 The

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Carter administration saw Canada as an important ally in its foreign policy objectives. As Kirton and Bothwell point out, “It was a strategy which was welcomed by an American Administration waiting for Canadians to help them with their crusade to create a peaceful, prosperous and just world.”14 Canada had become more important to the United States, both as a secure supplier of energy and as an ally in multilateral fora. This change was demonstrated by u.s. insistence, over the objections of France, that Canada join the Western Economic Summit (the g-7). The importance of Canada as a loyal ally was perhaps most dramatically demonstrated by the Canadian rescue of u.s. diplomats in Iran in 1980, which was authorized by the short-lived government of Prime Minister Joe Clark.15 Canadian leverage therefore grew during this period. As Kirton and Bothwell propose, “Canada, it was believed, was so important to the United States that the latter was forced to take seriously secondary issues about which Canada happened to speak strongly (e.g., East Coast fisheries.) Moreover, as a country that ranked ahead of Japan and even Italy in an East-West context, it had a right to greater consultations on these issues.”16 But with the end of the Carter administration in 1980 and the dramatic re-election of Pierre Trudeau on a nationalist platform committed to strengthening national economic policies, relations between the two countries were already beginning to deteriorate. Bilateral relations hit an all-time low after the Reagan administration was sworn into office in 1981. Reagan reacted strongly against Trudeau’s nationalist policies. The relative decline of the United States which had been developing for over a decade, was directly challenged by Reagan, who also attempted to reassert u.s. hegemony in the East-West context through massive rearmament and, in places like Central America, strong opposition to the expansion of communist regimes.17 For Canada a conflict was on the horizon over its new nationalist economic policies, which included strengthening the Foreign Investment Review Agency (fira) and creating the National Energy Program (nep). In the global arena the rise of Ronald Reagan to the u.s. presidency ended Carter’s internationalist foreign policy and marked the beginning of Reagan’s nationalist revival, with strong doses of unilateralism and greater emphasis on a bilateralist foreign policy. The tension between Canada and the United States was exacerbated by the growing influence of domestic groups over the policy agenda. As David Leyton-Brown argues: “Pressures from the international economic environment, differences in political philosophy, and the dissimilarity of policies and procedures all played a role. Adding to the pressures were the increasing political influence of private and regional interests in both countries, as well as changes in their domestic political

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systems.”18 The United States thus began a policy of protecting itself economically from Canada’s growing nationalism, and it began to espouse a policy of free trade. As Adam Bromke and Kim Richard Nossal maintain, the reassertion of Canada’s third option, the strengthening of fira, and the implementation of the nep were contrary to the new ideology of the u.s. administration: “While the Carter Administration greeted the economic measures adopted after Mr Trudeau’s return to power in 1980 with initial protests, these were continued fortissimo, by the Reagan Administration, which immediately set out to protect American interests in Canada by reversing Canadian policy.”19 After the “crisis of the capitals” (which pitted the Reagan administration against the Trudeau government on issues like investment, the National Energy Program, and acid rain), the Trudeau government became much more sensitive to u.s. pressures, as seen particularly in its support for Cruise missile testing in Canada.20 As Bromke and Nossal point out, “At the same time, however, [the Trudeau government] carefully distanced themselves from the positions taken by the Reagan Administration over broader East-West issues.”21 Between 1980 and 1984 the bilateral u.s.-Canada relationship was generally viewed as conflictive, with issues such as acid rain continuing to be irritants. When Brian Mulroney entered office in 1984, his top priority was to recapture the special relationship with the United States. As Michael Hawes argues, “Mr Mulroney managed to establish a good rapport with his like-minded counterpart in Washington early on and worked hard at erasing the image that Canada and the United States were growing apart.”22 By the mid-1980s, however, it was becoming clear that global and regional economic realities were pushing Canada into a more intimate regional economic relation. After over a decade of attempting to make the third option work, even the Trudeau government had begun to explore the possibility of sectorial free trade by establishing the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the MacDonald Commission) in 1983.23 With regional trading blocs emerging in Europe and Asia, it seemed that what was left for Canada was the second option: a deliberate move toward closer integration with the United States. Immediately upon entering office, Mulroney began to remove the major irritants in the bilateral relationship with the United States, for example, by ending the nep and changing fira into Investment Canada, in order to encourage, and not scrutinize, foreign, and especially u.s., investment. Perhaps the most dramatic rapprochement, however, was the negotiation and subsequent implementation of a free trade agreement between the two countries, which, it was hoped, would open the u.s. market to Canadian products and shield the Canadian

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economy from protectionist congressional policies. Mulroney’s central goal of reviving the special relationship between the two countries did not fully succeed, however, because, as I have argued, the changing nature of the international system itself had fundamentally altered the bilateral relationship. According to Hawes, “What all this suggests is that despite Mr Mulroney’s predisposition toward the United States and his specific promises to revive the special relationship, we have not returned to a situation characterized by quiet diplomacy, access based on special status, and exemptionalism. In fact, quite the reverse is true. What happened is that while the relationship was more cooperative and more civil at the one level, it had become both more formal and more structured on another. The very existence of a Free Trade Agreement provides a strong case for the argument that the special relationship had not returned.”24 Although the Mulroney government attempted to improve Canadau.s. relations, this goal did not necessarily mean that Canada would fall completely into line with other u.s. policies around the world. Indeed, at the same time that Mulroney was improving bilateral relations with the United States, there were marked differences on several multilateral issues, differences much more in line with traditional Canadian concerns. In this sense, Mulroney’s promise during the 1984 election campaign to be a “super ally” of the United States did not become entirely true. The search for international peace was an important Canadian foreign policy goal, particularly in the mid-1980s. As Bromke and Nossal suggested in 1987, “Canada’s position on a range of international issues is today no closer to the United States than it was in 1984.” Indeed the differences on policy issues that were important to the United States and on which Canada differed strongly included one important example that, according to Bromke and Nossal, demonstrated a continuity between the Liberal and Conservative governments: “This [continuity] is most clearly seen in regard to Central America. Like many of America’s European allies, Canada had tended to attribute turmoil in the region to indigenous social and economic conditions. The Mulroney government has been openly critical of the Reagan Administration’s encouragement of the Contras and has consistently supported the Contadora peace process. Ottawa has also refused to follow Washington’s lead in imposing sanctions against Nicaragua; instead, development assistance to Managua has continued.”25 What this suggests is that despite the attempt by the Mulroney government to improve bilateral relations, it was, first of all, not successful in turning the tide to a pre-1968 period. Second, the focus on the bilateral relationship also did not involve abandoning Canadian internationalism. Thus Canadian support for the United Nations, for

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example, always remained strong, although for some observers Canada’s internationalist potential was not fully utilized. In attempting to improve the bilateral relationship, the Mulroney government and, more specifically, Foreign Minister Joe Clark also tried to stay on track with traditional Canadian middle-power internationalism. Bromke and Nossal concluded that Mulroney’s approach was simply good domestic politics, for “While elections in Canada are rarely fought over foreign policy issues, it appears that the government’s principal objective is to stay as close as possible to the consensus of international affairs that exists in the country, and thereby pre-empt opposition on foreign policy issues.”26 The Canada-u.s. relationship changed, first, because of the relative decline of the United States and, second, because of the changing international system, in which interdependence and multilateralism were becoming more important. While the loosening international system allowed for Canada’s slow drift away from the u.s. sphere, as demonstrated by Trudeau’s foreign policy initiatives in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, the u.s. backlash against his nationalist economic policies in the early 1980s showed that Canada could not easily formulate policies that it feared would affect what the United States perceived to be its vital interests, whether these fears were justified or not. This does not mean, however, that even during a period when the United States wished to reassert its power and influence, as it did during the Reagan administration, Canada had no room to maneuver and was a complete satellite of the United States. Although there might have been a predisposition by Mulroney to give the United States the benefit of the doubt and hence constrain Canada on certain key issues, this expressed more a policy choice founded on Mulroney’s personal conviction that he could restore the special relationship than the inability of Canada to oppose the United States on these key issues. Indeed, during both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments there was much more room for maneuver than in the immediate postwar era, particularly in multilateral fora, when various u.s. allies similarly opposed u.s. policies and often gathered together to pressure the United States. What this suggests is that although Canada had some understandable constraints in some bilateral issues after 1968, and indeed perhaps also in some multilateral ones, the Canada-u.s. relationship had developed to the degree that Canada was much more able to operate independently than it could just after 1945. The new position Canada found itself in by the 1980s allowed for some opposition to u.s. foreign policies, particularly when there was broad support by other countries in various multilateral fora. On the other hand, the tensions created in the early 1980s and the attempt to

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renew the special relationship also placed some constraints on Canada’s opposition to the United States. The international dimension thus allowed Canada greater freedom of action, as we shall see below, but it did not mean that Canada could act, or indeed wanted to act, in a manner that would unnecessarily create greater friction with the United States.

canada and the new internationalism “The new internationalism,” writes John Kirton, “is alive and well and slowly transforming relations among states and the international system they form.” Indeed, as described in chapter 2, the new internationalism has been evolving since the late 1960s and consists of the new institutions and regimes of an interdependent world. If the old internationalism consisted in institutional arrangements created by the victors in the postwar period, the new internationalism comes out of the emergence of increased interdependence between advanced industrial states since the 1960s. As Kirton suggests, “the new internationalism goes well beyond the establishment of more of the old organizations, even if in new and improved forms. Underlying forces, recurrent responses, and new concepts suggest that basic changes in world politics may be underway.” Even though the old institutions related poorly to these changes in the world system, it became increasingly clear by the 1980s that they were indeed important, if imperfect. But there also came the realization that other international institutions and regimes could develop and flourish alongside the old ones. A new cooperation, according to Kirton, brought with it three important trends: the first was the institutionalization of summitry, which has “embedded internationalism into the highest political levels.” The second trend consisted of what Kirton describes as plurilateral institutions, “which restrict their membership much more exclusively, define their functions more broadly, and demand of their members a more generous investment of their capabilities.” The third trend consisted of the emergence of an embryonic global concert, which is “centered in the Summit Seven, that has joined Europe, America, and the Pacific, and displayed, on subjects from terrorism to macro economic management, the capacity to agree and to lead.”27 Canada responded well to these new developments. Although the thrust of Trudeau’s foreign policy statements in the late 1960s and the content of Foreign Policy for Canadians explicitly rejected Pearsonian internationalism, the Trudeau government soon began to continue and expand its internationalist position. As Margaret Doxey explains, “In spite of the anti-internationalist tone of the 1970 White

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Paper, Canada’s multilateral activities did not diminish. Paradoxically, Trudeau himself became a leading international figure.”28 Although Trudeau was seeking a reduced role for Canada in international activities, this reduction seemed to be directed at the old internationalist institutions created or dominated by the United States rather than the new emergent ones of an interdependent world. In this sense, his continued participation in internationalist activities, particularly in summitry, may have been more a reflection of the recognition of the new multilateralism, which Canada was more apt to be involved with. Given the attempt to seek other forces to balance its declining and deteriorating bilateral relations with the United States, Canada began to take advantage of its multilateral experience in a changing international environment in which it had a comparative advantage. As Kirton argues, “Canada’s position as a rich, mature, secure country had made it conscious of its status and influence in the world. And with this awareness has come a commitment to deploy strategically one of the instruments of that power – the unique international institutional network of the most well-connected country in the world.”29 By the end of Trudeau’s last mandate, with his attempt to play a role in the increasing East-West conflict, it was becoming clear that Canada had been seeking a more active internationalist role and that Trudeau had abandoned his isolationist policies of the late 1960s. As Margaret Doxey points out, “In [Trudeau’s] years as prime minister, Canada continued to participate in un peacekeeping, was an active negotiator in the Law of Sea Conference, the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (ciec) and acquired official observer status in the Organization of American States (oas).”30 With the election of Brian Mulroney, this internationalist trend took full force, although not immediately. While the Mulroney government began by promising to be a “super ally” of the United States, it also ended by promising to build a “constructive internationalism.” Mulroney’s initial foreign policy statement, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations, (the green paper) did not place much importance on multilateral issues (only one small section dealt with the un system and multilateralism).31 Emphasis was placed instead on Canada’s bilateral economic relations with the United States and strengthening the security issues of greatest interest to the Reagan administration. But when the Canadian Senate and House of Commons Committee published its report responding to the green paper, after extensive public consultations, they suggested that “constructive internationalism” should be central to the government’s foreign policy: “The essence of constructive internationalism is that, in

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an interdependent world, international responsibilities should be interwoven with Canada’s basic national aims. In practice it is most instinctive for Canadians to look at the world in this way because geography and history have prepared them to be internationalists.”32 The report was much more internationalist than the green paper had originally proposed, and the government accepted and largely adopted the report. The report, argues Doxey, “clearly behoved the Mulroney government to pay particular attention to its message, which reflected the attentive public’s continuing support for multilateralism as well as perennial fear of relying too heavily on the usa.”33 The 1980s, therefore, saw Canada increase its multilateral activities, particularly in summitry. Canada’s leading role in the Francophone summit and in the Commonwealth clearly cast it as an important ally and leader in the North-South debate. As a bicultural and bilingual country and one of the seven richest countries in the world, Canada was successful in promoting its internationalist ideals. Kirton argues that, “Taken together, the Commonwealth and Francophone summits gave Canada privileged access and a position of leadership at the highest level in groups where the United States was not present and that included a majority of the countries and all the regions of the world.”34 In addition, as a result of its continuing support of the un, through its participation in such things as peacekeeping and mechanisms of disarmament and arms control, and through activities in support human rights, especially in South Africa, Canada became an active internationalist interlocutor. But how to assess the tension created by a continentalist bilateral policy with a global internationalist approach? Margaret Doxey, for example, argues that to cast multilateralism as a counterweight to continental integration with the United States, is too simplistic. For her, Canadian “multilateralism is a necessary compliment to bilateralism – not just an offsetting policy.” And thus she concludes that “Membership of the un and un agencies, the Commonwealth, nato, the oecd and the gatt, and the g-7 have been advantageous and associated costs have been very low.”35 But it is clear that continental bilateralism and global multilateralism create a tension in Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s bilateral relation with the United States does not necessarily, or inevitably, mute Canada’s criticism or opposition to u.s. foreign policy, especially when an issue has built up broad opposition by other u.s. allies in various multilateral fora. Provided that there is also strong opposition to these policies domestically, Canada can express different views without expecting direct retaliation. On the other hand, Canada can choose to differ with the United States in matters of importance to u.s. foreign policy in a quiet and diplomatic

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manner. Depending on Canada’s bilateral agenda with the United States at any given time, it may be more fruitful for Canada to express its opposition, and actively oppose the United States in multilateral organizations, without at the same time publicly and vociferously condemning u.s. actions. The important point, however, is that the new internationalism and Canada’s involvement in it means that Canada is able, and sometimes encouraged, to take differing views on important foreign policy issues with the United States, especially when, to repeat, there is substantial domestic pressure to do so and Canada’s fundamental interests and commitments are not at stake.

t h e n e w p l ay e r s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y : domestic groups At the centre of the growing tension between Canada’s bilateral ties with the United States and its internationalist approach since the late 1960s is the recognition that Canadians want to, and should, play a greater role in the foreign policy making process. Although a feature of Foreign Policy for Canadians was to involve more Canadians in the foreign policy process, this occurred mostly with the “interested” public, such as academics and business people. Thus in formulating the white paper, the Canadian government involved a larger group of Canadians than ever before in an important consultation process, but it did not include public meetings where politicians listened to the opinions of ordinary citizens. Indeed, at the outset of the white paper there is an explicit recognition that Canadians were now much more involved in foreign affairs. Canadians “moved in ever growing numbers into lessdeveloped parts of the world as technicians, teachers and administrators; they encouraged and accepted foreign scholars, students and trainees to enter Canadian institutions of education; Canadians travelled far and wide in search of business, service and pleasure. The emergence of former colonies as free nations offered new challenges to religious groups, private aid societies, universities, humanitarian groups generally.”36 But the interest of domestic groups in international issues was part and parcel of an opening up of the governmental system to pressure groups in general, as a result of which domestic groups interested in foreign policy began to look for and find avenues to influence foreign policy makers. As Hugh Thorburn argues, “by the end of the 1960s, broad social changes and the continued growth of government [led] to a fundamental rebuilding of the policy-making structures at the federal level and in some provinces.” Undoubtedly, Canadians had been influenced by, and had been part of, social movements in the United

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States and Europe that sought to oppose or influence foreign polices. In Canada, this meant an opening up of the previously structured parliamentary system, which had tended to benefit institutional pressure groups over issue-oriented ones. As Thorburn explains, the centralization of cabinet decision making by Trudeau in 1968 had the effect of formalizing the consultative devices that pressure groups required to get their message to decision makers: “All groups and individuals [were] now on a more equal footing, in that greater emphasis [was] placed on the quality of group management, rather than on size or economic resources. This [enhanced] the opportunities for smaller groups and individuals to participate in the policy making process.”37 For Peter Aucoin, these changes to the structure and functioning of government are part of a broader change that began to open up the system to groups and individuals that had not been easily heard before.38 The changes included the establishment of policy advisory units that were separate from the public service and attached to the Prime Ministers Office (pmo) and Cabinet and changes in the pmo and the Privy Council Office (pco) that encouraged ministers to seek advice across departments, so that individual cabinet members balanced broader perspectives on policy issues, depended less on their bureaucracies, and made greater use of task forces. Finally, the 1960s saw a greater use of parliamentarians as the committee system of the House of Commons was reformed. Now, ordinary members of Parliament were able to listen to differing viewpoints of various pressure groups on a number of issues. Although these changes tended to increase the layering between the executive and the pressure groups and to put these groups in closer contact with legislators rather than bureaucrats, they did provide for a more public role for these groups. But the question remains whether the increased access of pressure groups meant increased influence over policy. Thorburn concludes that “Overall, a consequence of the recent changes in the policy-making environment of pressure groups seems to be opening up the process to greater public debate, though this has not necessarily been translated into policy outputs. There is reason to believe that this increased group activity masks the greater autonomy of the state to decide the course of government action.”39 What is more certain is that the changes to the parliamentary system in the late 1960s allowed both more formal and more public participation by pressure groups. But the changes to the parliamentary system benefited the various groups to differing degrees. Paul Pross has developed a typology of pressure groups that puts institutional groups on one end of the scale and issue-oriented groups on the other. His analysis suggests that, on occasion, issue-oriented groups can be effective in

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pressing for a given cause. As he argues, “Despite their usually insignificant size, issue oriented groups frequently serve important functions in the political system. Their chief advantage lies in their flexibility. Because they can develop extremely quickly and are unencumbered by institutional structures, they are excellent vehicles for generating immediate public reaction to specific issues.” What is particularly interesting is that issue-oriented groups can coalesce with institutional groups, which might be less able to press the government publicly and use strategies to embarrass it. Again, as Pross argues, “On occasion, institutional groups avail themselves of the services of issue-oriented organizations, allowing members to work with their more radical counterparts in the hope of winning through publicity what conventional methods have failed to achieve.”40 Although the changes to the Parliamentary system and the proliferation of pressure groups are no guarantee of greater influence for those groups, the changes are certainly not an affirmation of their impotence. Indeed, the struggles of pressure groups do bring results on occasion. One early success for pressure groups involved in the foreign policy process came during the Biafran crisis between 1967 and 1970. As Donald Barry explains, although foreign policy pressure groups had been limited in their activities before that time, “The case of the Nigerian civil war … formed an important exception to this pattern of behavior. The civil war, and especially the plight of the secessionist state of Biafra, became one of the main political issues in Canada during 1968, dominating the attention of the public, Parliament and the media.” Indeed, what is most important about Barry’s analysis is that he argues that the parliamentary changes that were occurring at the time allowed an unprecedented amount of pressure to be exerted on the government. Barry analyses the activities of both institutional pressure groups, such as the Presbyterian Church of Canada, and issue-oriented groups, such as the Committee for the Relief of Biafran Refugees and the Canadian Union for the Rights of Biafra. Because the Biafran crisis required vocal and intense public criticisms and intense lobbying of parliamentarians, Barry concludes that institutional groups, which had previously dominated as pressure groups, were least effective, while issue-oriented pressure groups, taking advantage of the new facilities to use pressure tactics on Parliament, were far more successful: “The Biafran experience suggests that institutional interest groups with established access to a government sometimes have the least effect upon its policy. On the other hand, those groups which used approaches normally regarded as cumbersome and inefficient most effectively embarrassed the government and achieved a temporary modification of policy. This suggests that, in some cases, issue oriented interest groups

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can influence government decisions more effectively than institutional interest groups.”41 But targeting legislators alone was not effective. Barry describes a process in which a division of labour developed: while institutional pressure groups concentrated on influencing decision makers, the issue oriented-groups took a more public stance. Once the issue of Biafra became important to Parliament, it received wide-spread coverage and subsequently became important in the political discourse of the time. This created a cycle where “The interest groups acted through the parliamentarians. Media interest crystallized because the issue was such an important one in the House of Commons. Continued criticism in Parliament, interest group activity, and the media’s coverage of both (as well as its own demands) were, in turn, fed back to the government, which then recognized the issue’s political importance and responded to many of the demands.”42 The pressure groups thus had to maintain and express views generally accepted by the Canadian public. As long as they articulated requests that had broad appeal, they were effective, but when they did not, they were not as effective. The case of Biafra demonstrates that after 1968 there was a new and active role for ngo s to pressure governments on critical foreign policy issues. It also suggests that ngo s can be effective in influencing or altering foreign policy on issues that are highly publicized and enjoy widespread public support. This means that occasionally ngo s can go beyond merely setting the agenda for discussion, as will be seen, in chapter 7, which explores in greater detail the kind of pressure these groups can exercise with respect to Latin America.

conclusion In this chapter I have explored how the changes to the international system described in chapter 2 have affected Canada. To begin with, we have seen that a fundamental element of Canada’s foreign policy is the tension between its bilateral relations with the United States and its internationalist activities and ideology. Since 1968 Canada has more openly sought a greater degree of economic and diplomatic independence. It has achieved this independence most successfully in its multilateral activities, since its attempt to diversify its economy has not propelled it beyond the continentalist sphere. Indeed, while Canada has failed to implement nationalist economic policies and has become more economically linked with the United States, particularly since the Free Trade Agreement was signed, it has not recaptured its special relationship with the United States, nor has it lost its ability to act

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independently in multilateral fora. The very nature of the new internationalism has afforded Canada greater room for maneuver vis-à-vis the United States, compared to the immediate postwar period. This does not mean that Canada can act irresponsibly or that it does not have to carefully measure when, how, and why it will oppose u.s. foreign policy, but it does mean that Canada’s can act independently, particularly in concert with other u.s. allies, and that independent action is sometimes advisable. Indeed, Canadian opposition to u.s. foreign policy is sometimes supported and encouraged by the growing importance of domestic pressure groups interested in global matters. No Canadian government can ignore the rise of public opinion clearly calling for a Canadian foreign policy that promotes traditional internationalist principles such as a Canadian role in peacekeeping, development assistance, and admitting refugees. On occasion Canadian foreign policy becomes, therefore, a function of the tension between domestic pressures and external constraints, influenced by the new internationalism. The following section of this book presents a case study of the dynamics of these three forces acting on Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America between 1968 and 1990.

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part two Growing Closer to the Americas

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5 Canadian Foreign Policy towards Latin America: Government Initiatives and Responses

introduction A coherent Canadian policy towards Latin America has developed only relatively recently: a true interest in the region began to emerge only in the late 1960s. But from then on, Canada’s relations with the region erupted onto the Canadian political scene with increasing frequency, and Canadians’ interest in the region continued to surprise many observers of foreign policy. Latin America became more important to Canada because of domestic interests, as well as external pressures. Canada’s century-long isolation from the hemisphere began to dissolve in 1968 with the beginning of Pierre Trudeau’s foreign policy review and ended with Canada’s entry into the oas in 1990 and with the beginning of the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta). Within twenty-two years Canada had become a country of the Americas. After putting Canada’s relations with Latin America in historical perspective, this chapter traces the development of government policy towards Latin America during that time, with an analysis of two broad periods, the first from 1968 to 1979 and the second from 1980 to 1990.

ca n ada an d l at i n a m er i c a: an historical framework Canada’s relations with Latin America can be divided into four distinct periods:1 the first spans a century from immediately before Confederation, in 1867, to 1967, Canada’s first centenary.2 The second

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period begins with Pierre Trudeau’s foreign policy review in 1968 and ends in 1979 with the defeat of the Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark. The third period coincides with the beginning of the last Trudeau government in 1980 and ends with the end of the first mandate of Brian Mulroney in 1988. The fourth period begins with Mulroney’s second term in office after November 1988, and ends with Canada’s entry into the oas in January 1990. The first period (1867–1967) was marked by little or no interest by Canadians and successive governments in hemispheric affairs. There was neither public pressure nor state leadership in Canada–Latin America relations, in many ways because Canada saw itself both as a European and, later, more as a North American nation, in a sense that did not include Mexico. Latin America was largely distant and, in any case, it was a region dominated by the United States. On the multilateral side, the dominant issue before 1948 was Canada’s entry into the PanAmerican Union and, after that time, into its successor, the oas, an issue that was never resolved during the period. On the bilateral side, relations with Latin American countries were dominated by trade; two-way diplomatic representation did not begin until 1941. This period is best described as one of isolation from the hemisphere, minimal bilateral contacts, and little interest in inter-American multilateral responsibilities. The second period (1968–79), by contrast, was principally “stateled,” in reaction to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s interest in the region and Canada’s attempt to cope with a changing world environment – particularly its attempt to lessen the influence of the United States. Canada’s policy towards the region emanated principally from the political leadership in the executive, in Parliament, and, to a lesser extent, in the bureaucracy. There was, during this period, little influence and input from civil society. On the domestic side, the 1970s saw the building of the ngo infrastructure that eventually erupted in the early 1980s into a powerful lobby urging the government to increase its involvement in hemispheric affairs and its opposition to u.s. policy towards Latin America. In this respect, the 1970s witnessed a silent revolution from within civil society, in some important ways stimulated and financially supported by the state (which funded ngo aid projects in the region through the Canadian International Development Agency (cida)), but based on a grass-roots movement inspired by development assistance work in Latin America and politically radicalized by the downfall of Salvador Allende in Chile and the influx of political refugees from that country after 1973. The third period (1980–88), by contrast, was distinguished in its early phase by general disinterest by Trudeau and Secretary of State for

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External Affairs (ssea) Mark MacGuigan in the region. This was not a period of state leadership, and the emergence of a well-organized movement in civil society surrounding the issue of Central America pushed first parliamentarians and then the government to focus greater attention on the emerging crisis, thereby having some impact on the state’s foreign policy. By contrast with the 1970s, when the ngo community was unable to have great impact on Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America, particularly its policy towards Chile, the 1980s saw a diverse and well-organized opposition to the government whose influence grew as the decade progressed, leading the government to play a larger role in the region. As a result, with the appointment of Allan MacEachen to the post of ssea in 1982, Canada began a closer relationship with Latin America throughout the Central American crisis. Canadian involvement increased during the first Mulroney government, culminating in Canada’s role in peacekeeping operations in the region by the end of the decade. The fourth period (1988 to 1990) begins with the reelection of Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives in November 1988 and their review of Canada’s long-standing reluctance to join the oas, and it ends with formal membership in the oas in January 1990. This period involved both state leadership (in the decision to join the oas in the absence of any public demands) and growing pressures within Canada to develop a more independent policy towards the region. Although short, it is a pivotal period because it sets the stage for a broader policy towards the region in the 1990s, which included the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) between Canada, Mexico, and the u.s., participation in the reform of the oas and the hemispheric summit process, and a leadership role in the negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ftaa).3

fr om s tat e l ea de r s h i p to p ub l i c pa r t i c i p a t i o n : 1 9 6 8 – 1 9 7 9 A New Era in Relations between Canada and Latin America: Trudeau’s Initiative In his first major foreign policy statement as prime minister, Pierre Trudeau promised a reassessment of Canada’s foreign policy.4 At the beginning of Canada’s second century, it seemed time to review both the nature of the changing world and of Canada’s approach to it. And so, while recognizing the importance of Canada’s internationalist policies of the previous two decades, Trudeau argued that “there has been a tendency to play upon failures and to be patronizing about successes;

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to pull down institutions and ideas with nothing very concrete to offer in their place; to over-simplify the possibilities for solving international issues which, even today, are as complex as they are enduring, and to forget that an anxious world was not plunged into either military catastrophe or economic chaos.” What Trudeau concluded was that Canada’s foreign policy must be reassessed, “not because of the inadequacies of the past but because of the changing nature of Canada and the world around us.”5 Central to this reassessment was Trudeau’s belief that Canada should be aware of its limited capabilities, since it was no longer the important and influential power of the immediate postwar era. For Trudeau, this meant primarily a realistic approach to foreign policy that would reevaluate the new international milieu and Canada’s role in it. Pearsonian internationalism, he felt, had lost its potency. True to his rationalism, Trudeau proposed a Cartesian exercise: breaking down all preconceptions and reconstructing Canada’s foreign policy agenda on sound principles of realism and pragmatism. Thus he argued that “we wish to take a fresh look at the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy to see whether there are ways in which we can serve more effectively Canada’s current interests, objectives and priorities.” And he concluded that “Our approach will be … above all … to see that our policies in the future accord with our national needs and resources, with our ability to discharge Canada’s legitimate responsibilities in world affairs.”6 As part of the review Trudeau saw it as necessary for Canada to diversify its international ties: it was very much a part of his view that Canada’s close relationship with the United States had to be counterbalanced. Thus he argued that “We have to sort out the dilemmas which that complex relationship [with the United States] poses for us so as to widen the area of mutual benefit without diminishing our Canadian identity and sovereign independence.”7 There was, therefore, an attempt to define Canada’s new foreign policy as one that would increase ties with Western Europe, China, Africa, and Latin America and to design a foreign policy that, while not ignoring Canada’s tie to the United States, would nonetheless affirm Canada as an independent state with diverse ties to the rest of the world.8 The reference to Latin America, however, was more than a passing comment. It seemed clear that the region was important in his view: “We have to take greater account of the ties which bind us to other nations in this hemisphere – in the Caribbean, Latin America – and of their economic needs. We have to explore new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with Latin America, where more than 400 million people will live by the turn of the century and where

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we have substantial interests.”9 Given that there was no great public demand for a deeper relationship, that Canada’s economic ties with the region during the 1960s were minimal (exports to Latin America hovered around 3 to 4 percent of Canada’s total exports),10 that the region was dominated by dictatorships,11 and that there were as yet no clearly defined strategic interests, it can be assumed that a focus on the region had a good deal to do with Trudeau’s own concerns and those of his immediate advisors.12 Three important points emerge from Trudeau’s statement. First, in his attempt to reevaluate Canada’s foreign policy, Trudeau’s highly rationalist framework later imposed a distinctly personal flavour upon the final review.13 We see evidence, in other words, of the importance that Trudeau as an individual would have in the foreign policy review process. Since there had been no public debate or pressure to make Latin America a priority and since there had been no significant changes in trade or immigration, Trudeau’s own interest in the region was an important and major influence in spawning interest about Latin America in Canada. Even during the election campaign, shortly after he was elected leader of the Liberal party, he displayed a surprisingly clear vision of where he wanted to see Canada’s foreign policy go. Second, his emphasis on Latin America would have a profound effect on later policy, because the region was defined as a high priority for Canada, even though many critics argued that it should not be. The third aspect, and perhaps the most significant, was Trudeau’s announcement that he would send a ministerial mission to Latin America before the end of 1968 and that “This mission will be designed to demonstrate the importance the Government attaches to strengthening our bilateral relations with leading Latin American countries.”14 Indeed, it would be a significant demonstration, for it would be the highest-level and most comprehensive ministerial mission Canada had ever sent to the region. Finally, one other policy announcement would later have an impact on relations between Canada and Latin America. Trudeau committed himself in the statement to review Canada’s development assistance program. Although this aspect received only small mention, the change in direction would have a profound effect on the ngo community in Canada, which would grow during the 1970s, largely due to funding provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (cida). In a symbolic gesture in the statement, Trudeau announced the change of the External Aid Office to the Canadian International Development Agency,15 but he also announced the creation of an international development centre, later called the International Development Research Centre (idrc). Thus, in sum, Trudeau announced a policy that would

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bind Canada much closer with developing states and would later assist in creating greater ties between Canadian ngo s and Latin America. It is within the context of this statement in 1968 that we can find the genesis of a new Canadian policy towards Latin America. Even though the policy initiatives toward the region were at the inception stage, there is remarkable consistency between the goals outlined in this speech and a later foreign policy review in 1970. A Voyage of Exploration to Latin America and the 1970 Foreign Policy Review The priority of Latin America within the foreign policy review of the summer of 1968 was first reiterated during the Speech from the Throne on 12 September 1968, which opened the first session of the 28th Parliament, and during Trudeau’s opening remarks during the throne speech debate, when he repeated the promise to send a ministerial mission to Latin America before the end of the year. The announcement detailing the trip came shortly afterward, on October 24. Trudeau referred to the trip as a “voyage of exploration” during which the ministers would make Canada better known and would lay the groundwork for Canadians to better understand the region. He also made it perfectly clear that he wanted this mission to be seen as an important signal to Latin American nations: “I have said many times, and I repeat now, that the government considers our relations with the countries in this hemisphere as being of high priority. The mission which will visit nine of the Latin American countries shortly is to be considered not only as our indication of our anxiety to strengthen our bilateral relations with these countries, but also as a clear demonstration of the importance we attach to our relations with all our neighbors, and especially with those in our hemisphere.”16 The mission would include five ministers: the ssea, Mitchell Sharp; the minister of Industry Trade and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pépin; the minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources, J.J. Greene; the Secretary of State, Gérard Pelletier; and Otto Lang, minister without portfolio. In addition, Jean-Pierre Goyer, the parliamentary secretary to the ssea also travelled to the region. There were, as well, a host of senior officials from various ministries and representatives from the media.17 The itinerary was to take the task force to nine Latin American countries in Central, South, and North America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. The trip lasted from 27 October to 27 November, and because of time constraints on the ministers, it was designed so that at least three ministers would be visiting one of the countries at any given time, while the

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others could attend to business in Canada. This arrangement created what Trudeau described as “a kind of shuttle service.”18 On his return from Latin America, Mitchell Sharp made a brief statement in the House of Commons and declared that the mission “marks the turning point in our relations with Latin America.” Indeed, by all accounts, it had been quite a success and included the establishment of a Canada-Mexico committee to deal with political, economic, and commercial matters. Since it was a mission of exploration, however, the trip did not bring about any major policy statements, to the disappointment of some opposition members, although Sharp did promise to table a preliminary report of the mission as soon as it was available. He did, however, make one important comment concerning ngo s. Although the ministerial visits had involved mostly government-to-government contacts, ministers also met with nongovernmental groups, and particularly with Canadians in the region. As Sharp stated, “While we worked mainly with governments, we paid special attention to private institutions which, both in Latin America and in Canada, have an important role to play in our relations … In all these meetings we were greatly impressed by the importance of the part which private individuals and groups can play in the pursuit of goals shared by the peoples of Canada and Latin America.”19 This feature of the trip should not be overemphasized, but the fact that the ssea was impressed by the ngo s during his trip is a sign that the role of the ngo community in the region was substantial and growing. What had not emerged yet was the kind of role these ngo s could play to further the government’s objectives in the region, one of which was, in the minister’s own words, “to establish a basis for better understanding of Latin America on the part of Canadians.”20 The government was, therefore, directly encouraging closer ties between Canadians and Latin Americans, and the minister’s praise of private institutions and individuals demonstrated his approval of participation by ngo s. The preliminary report of the ministerial mission was tabled on 24 January 1969 by J.P. Goyer, Sharp’s parliamentary secretary. It gave a fairly detailed analysis of the nature of the mission, of the current state of relations with the region, of the impressions of the ministers, and of the future direction that Canada’s foreign policy should take. But the report itself was only a working document of the task force composed of officials who went on the trip and who would consider the findings. The report made two important points of special concern to us. First, the ministers recognized that development assistance was an essential factor in Canadian–Latin American relations. It stated that “Economic and social development is the principal task facing all

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the countries the mission visited. Development issues were given high priority on the agenda of discussion with each of the governments concerned.”21 Most of the projects mentioned in the report involved monies for research and feasibility studies for the countries’ infrastructures, but some, such as a loan to the government of El Salvador to help construct a new port, were more substantial. (Ironically, the Canadian navy had landed in the same port in 1932 to protect British lives after a peasant insurrection.) Other Central American projects were a loan to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration to finance infrastructure projects in that region, including highways, industrial parks, agricultural storage installations, and telecommunications. The report stated that the task force would study the question whether development assistance should increase and whether the method of extending aid should be changed. In this latter respect, a second important point emerged. The report made special mention of the role of ngo s. Under the heading “Canadian Government Assistance to Private Bodies,” the report stated that “An important element of Canada’s assistance to Latin America is support of development projects carried out by private Canadian organizations. The mission was greatly impressed by the outstanding work being done by the more than two thousand Canadian missionaries and lay volunteers throughout Latin America, particularly in the fields of education, public health and community development. The mission had discussed with a large number of these people and looked into several specific projects for which support is being extended or considered under cida’s Non-Governmental Agencies programme.”22 The kinds of projects that the ngo community was engaged in differed qualitatively from the projects the government was sponsoring. While government-sponsored projects were designed for industrial, commercial, and agricultural infrastructure, the ngo projects related directly to individuals and small cooperatives. Some of the examples given in the report were a community-development project in the suburbs of Lima, Peru, (for which cida had allocated $125 thousand) and an agricultural cooperative in Brazil to improve the production, marketing, and pricing of coffee produced by small farmers. In Central America, the report mentioned a project in Honduras to establish a radio school for elementary education and instruction in basic hygiene and farming methods, and in Guatemala, assistance to coffee cooperatives, schools for primary education, and public health centres. Special mention was given to two Canadian ngo s: Canadian Executive Services Overseas (ceso) and Canadian University Services Overseas (cuso). The report concluded that funding to ngo s for development assistance in Latin America should be explored, it stated

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that “cida’s Non-Government Agencies programme for aid to private institutions is applicable in Latin America, and that cuso and ceso are already active in the area and that there is scope for expansion of their activities.”23 On 25 June 1970, the government released its long-awaited foreign policy review in a white paper entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians.24 It appeared only one day before the parliamentary session was to adjourn for the summer, which gave Parliament no time for debate until it reconvened in the fall. The white paper, which bore a remarkable resemblance to Trudeau’s foreign policy statement in 1968, consisted of six pamphlets, one of which focused exclusively on Latin America, reaffirming the government’s contention that the region was of great importance to its future foreign policy.25 Only seven months earlier, however, on 3 November 1969 the government had announced that it was closing three diplomatic missions in Latin America. After the much-announced ministerial mission to the region, this decision had seemed like a profound contradiction. A few days before the closures were officially announced, a leak had tipped off the opposition in the House of Commons. Conservative mp Heath Macquarrie seemed to have taken delight in asking the acting ssea if he could “advise if the announced closures of three more Canadian missions in Latin America is an implementation of the Throne Speech forecast of ‘intensification of Canadian contact with the government and people of Latin America,’ or is it an exception of this proclaimed goal?” Former prime minister John Diefenbaker, relishing the contradiction, asked Mr Sharp in the House on the day of the announcement if the “visitation by the five ministers had its climax in the closing of those two missions in South America? Was that a consequence of the visit?”26 As a result, by the time the foreign policy review was to be released, the government needed to regain some credibility. The Latin America portion of Foreign Policy for Canadians reflected the concerns and direction of the preliminary report of the mission to Latin America. The mere existence of the separate pamphlet on Latin America attested to the fact that the region was important to the government. The principal thrust of the review was that Canada would pursue a two-tier policy, one immediate and the other long-term. The immediate goal was to solidify and expand Canada’s bilateral relations with key Latin American countries; the long-term goal was to begin to increase involvement in the multilateral institutions of the interAmerican system. The government sought both to clearly define a Canadian foreign policy toward the region and to make it a distinctly Canadian one. The principal objective was therefore “to develop and

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strengthen in a coherent and clear-cut way Canada’s distinctive position in hemispheric affairs, in terms both of Canadian national interests and of Canada’s relationships with Latin American countries, individually and collectively.”27 The bilateral road would consist, in essence, of increased development assistance and the promotion of Canadian business interests. (Given the closing of the missions a few months earlier, no mention was made of increasing diplomatic representation.) The white paper called for increased involvement in the Inter-American Development Bank (iadb) to help with capital assistance, but it turned down membership, a decision that would be reversed when Canada joined the iadb in 1972. The principal focus of development assistance, however, would involve creating a bilateral technical assistance programme, although the white paper states that “a bilateral Canadian programme will be carried out in consultation with multilateral institutions already operating in Latin America and with those private organizations which have special knowledge of the region.” The government committed itself to more than doubling its allocation for development assistance for Latin America, while increasing the proportion of Canada’s overall development assistance funds. The report also made the commitment that “Support for Canadian private agencies providing development assistance to Latin America will be increased.”28 In the field of trade and investment, the government committed itself to developing a more systematic approach towards Latin America and to fitting it into its overall foreign policy, in order to assist the private sector. The multilateral road involved obtaining full membership in several inter-American agencies, such as the Pan-American Health Organization (paho), the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (iica) and, as mentioned, the Inter-American Development Bank. But the central question was whether Canada would join the oas. Given the choice of joining or not, the Canadian government created another option: to seek membership as a “permanent observer,” which would not entail full commitment to multilateralism in the hemisphere, but which could be interpreted as a positive sign. In this fashion the Canadian government initiated a policy that would eventually lead to membership in the oas but that would maintain a bilateral policy for the years to come: “This will permit Canada’s relations with the countries of Latin America to develop rapidly, and by improving Canadian knowledge and understanding of those countries and their regional institutions, prepare for a better-informed and more useful Canadian participation as a full member of the oas, should Canada, at some future date, opt for such a participation.”29

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The multilateral road would therefore be longer-term than the bilateral one. What was needed in 1970, according to the government, was to build the infrastructure of ties; that had not been done during the previous one hundred years. This would be a slow process that would not be helped by the low level of trade between Canada and Latin America or by the ever important presence of the United States in the region. If Canada had traditionally gained presence and applied influence through multilateral forums, Canada’s rejection of the multilateral road would also mean that it was not seeking an important political role in the region. But it was one thing to increase development assistance and foster trade; it was quite another to get involved in the serious disputes between the United States and Latin American countries. And so Canada took the quiet road, not only the bilateral road, towards greater ties with Latin America. Nonetheless, by the early 1970s Canada had ended its isolationism from Latin America.30 The impact of the white paper on Latin America would be profound.31 With its emphasis on bilateral relations, sustained principally by an increased development assistance program, the Canadian government provided important leadership to foster greater ties not only between governments but especially between individuals and ngo s. Indeed, the government was explicit about this aspect of its foreign policy toward Latin America when it stated that “The mainspring of the government’s policy is the proposition that, between Canada and Latin American countries as neighbors in one hemisphere, between Canada and regional groupings of such countries and between Canadians and Latin Americans on a people-to-people basis, there are expanding possibilities for mutual benefits, especially in terms of economic growth, enhancement of the quality of life and promotion of social justice between different parts of the hemisphere.”32 When the House resumed after the summer break on 5 October 1970, the ssea announced that during that very morning the senior British trade commissioner in Montreal, James Richard Cross, had been kidnapped by armed men. And so began the October Crisis, which was to rock the Trudeau government for the months to come. Not surprisingly, the foreign policy review, to say nothing of the Latin America portion of it, did not receive much attention. Nevertheless, while Parliament did not focus on the foreign policy review, the wheels of government began to implement the various policies that would later have a profound impact on the development of an ngo community in Canada with special interest in Latin America and, later, in Central America. Foreign Policy for Canadians, and the state leadership in this early period, would stimulate an already-growing movement in Canada that began to fight against social injustices in many of the

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Latin American countries to which Trudeau had just attached such importance and extended much development assistance. This is perhaps what makes Foreign Policy for Canadians so important, for the policies enunciated in it and later implemented by the government would set the stage for important contradictions and increasing confrontation between ngo s and the government’s foreign policy towards the region. The responsibilities of a government behaving as a state actor in the international milieu and the conscience of the ngo community in its role to struggle for social justice would lead to conflict time and time again. The foreign policy review was a remarkable exercise insofar as it supported both perspectives. Canada and the Fall of Salvador Allende: ngo s and Refugees On the morning of Tuesday, 11 September 1973 David Adam, first secretary of the commercial section at the Canadian Embassy in Chile, was walking to work near the Palacio de la Moneda, the presidential palace in downtown Santiago. As he reached the embassy he was stunned to find tanks and soldiers rushing towards the palace, followed by small arms fire and movement by military personnel. A coup had begun. A few hours later, Chilean air force planes began to bomb the palace, and by the early afternoon President Salvador Allende was dead. The first democratic Marxist experiment in Latin America was over. For months the politically charged atmosphere of Chile had been rife with rumours of coups by the military and “autocoups” by supporters of Allende. In a confidential telex sent by the Canadian ambassador, Andrew Ross, only five days earlier, the escalation of violence was described as a continuing crisis, but manageable overall: Temperature certainly has risen again but what we are witnessing now seems rather like first few eruptions in porridge pot which Allende probably can still stop if he wished to turn the heat down. Even if he eventually intends to do so, I doubt Allende and responsible opposition yet ready to abandon constitutionality. However because of activities of both extremes turmoil and terrorism probably will continue at present level or even escalate in weeks ahead.33

The ambassador and his staff, therefore, did not feel that a coup was imminent. And so, a few days before it took place, David Adam and Mark Dolgin, the first secretary (political), convinced Ross to travel to Buenos Aires on Monday, the day before the coup, to pick up his new car, which he had ordered in June from General Motors Canada. Because of the difficulty of delivering it to a Chilean port, due to the embargo on the Chilean regime, the car was delivered in Argentina and

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put in storage. Ross and his wife were to fly on Monday and take the two-day drive back to Chile, arriving in Santiago on Wednesday or Thursday. On the day of the coup the embassy was in the care of the two junior officers, Adam (aged thirty-two) and Dolgin (thirty-four). Until later in the day, Adam, Dolgin, the locally engaged embassy staff, and some Chileans who were at the embassy doing routine business when the coup started were stuck at the embassy while opponents and supporters of Allende battled away just outside the building. At one point when Adam looked out, a soldier shot at him, narrowly missing him. By the end of the day, the staff was escorted by the military to their residences, where they stayed under curfew until Friday. When individual Chileans began coming out of hiding, many started to seek refuge in foreign embassies and the residences of diplomats they knew. Some took refuge at the homes of Adam and Dolgin, about fourteen people in all. But because Canada was not a signatory to any bilateral or multilateral treaty providing for diplomatic asylum and because the houses that Adam and Dolgin were living in were not Crown-owned, the situation of the refugees was quite precarious.34 Therefore, as soon as the office opened on Friday morning, many Chileans went to the embassy to seek asylum. Virtually all other work was suspended in order to interview them. However, by the end of the next week, the embassy received direct instructions from Ed Ritchie, the under secretary of state for External Affairs (ussea) in Ottawa not to give asylum unless individuals were followed in “hot pursuit.” Adam and Dolgin adopted a liberal interpretation of this rule. Knowing that lives were in danger, they were certainly not going to expel those people already in their homes. The others who went to the embassy immediately after it opened were not given asylum, although hundreds were interviewed. The ussea instructed Adam to lock the door to the embassy before the situation became unmanageable.35 On Monday, 17 September, Adam and Dolgin decided to transfer surreptitiously those who had obtained asylum in their homes to the ambassador’s residence, which was Crown land and provided for a safer refuge. At this point a total of twenty-eight people were gathered together at the ambassador’s residence. The ambassador returned to Santiago on Tuesday, 18 September, immediately following the opening of the Chilean frontier, unaware of the reception waiting for him in his residence or the furor that was brewing in Canada. Back in Canada two problems had arisen for the Canadian government: the question of recognition of the new military junta and the question of refugees. These two problems would plague the Trudeau government for months to come. The initiatives by Pierre Trudeau

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towards Latin America, and especially the policies implemented after Foreign Policy for Canadians, began to reveal the tensions they had helped to shape. Trudeau’s initiatives had helped to focus attention on Latin America and had encouraged Canadians to become more active in international issues. Part of the dilemma for his government was that there were few democratic countries in the region: most were ruled by military dictators or juntas, and to get closer to them would create problems at home and abroad. Democratic Chile had been one of the few exceptions. But the turmoil brought about by the election of the first Marxist president in the hemisphere, the adamant United States opposition to this regime, the underlying sympathy for Allende’s government from the left in Canada, the nationalization of u.s.-owned Anaconda and Kennecott Copper by the Allende government, and the existence of a minority government in Canada were all ingredients for a confrontation that seemed unavoidable – a confrontation that was a turning point for Canadian foreign policy. Relations with Chile were not particularly important to Canada. Exports to that country had dropped by half between 1970 and 1972: in 1970 Canadian exports were valued at $22.8 million, while in 1971 this figure had dropped to $13.3 million and reached a low point in 1972 of $10.4 million. They did pick up in 1973, however, rising to $22.4 million.36 There was no development assistance program in Chile during this time, and there was a feeling in Ottawa that this was just another South American political crisis. Although Canada had showed itself tolerant towards the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro and had opposed u.s. policy towards that country for over a decade, the Canadian government did not have great sympathy towards Allende. Minister Sharp believed that there was a great deal of incompetence in Allende’s government and, since he considered it a minority government, that “Allende was the cause of his own problems. We did not have anything against him, but this is what we felt at the time, right or wrong.”37 Indeed, the cool reception of the news of the coup by the government in Parliament the day after Allende was overthrown was also due in part to the fact that it was considered just another coup in Latin America, like hundreds before it. Canada had always waited until someone was in charge, when relations would continue as usual. A motion in Parliament was presented by New Democratic Party (ndp) Member of Parliament David Lewis the day after the coup calling on the House of Commons to “extend its sympathy to the people of Chile in the tragic death of their President and express the hope that democratic institutions will be restored without delay.” This motion did not receive the unanimous consent required for it to be adopted,

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although later that day Sharp did say that he would be extending his “sympathy to the people of Chile on the death of their President and, of course, my condolences to the family. All of us, I am sure, express the hope that democratic institutions will be restored in Chile without delay.” The day after Sharp’s statement another ndp mp, John Rodrigues, proposed a motion stating that “the Canadian government refuse recognition of the Chilean military junta and forthwith withdraw any financial or other support which this government presently provides.”38 Again, the motion did not receive the required unanimity, and it failed. Indeed, for the next two weeks the question of the recognition of the junta was being considered by the government. Although considerable pressure was put on the government by the ndp in Parliament and by ngo s outside Parliament not to recognize the Chilean junta, there were several important considerations for the government. First, the Trudeau government had just reversed Canada’s foreign policy with the decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China. A fundamental tenet of this decision was that Canada should not withhold recognition of a government because of its ideological stripe. Second, the Canadian government argued that it was established policy, especially in light of the Chinese case, to recognize governments that were in control of a territory, without this recognition implying acceptance or approval of the type of regime. Third, the Canadian government had quite routinely recognized other Latin American military regimes and saw no reason why it should not do so in this case. As noted, there was not great sympathy for Allende’s government in Ottawa, and there was hope that the Christian Democrats would soon take control of the country again. Finally, the Canadian government had to consider the implications for Canadians trapped in the coup. Five Canadians were being held at the time in the infamous stadium where the military regime had collected most of the dissidents. Failure to recognize the regime, it was believed, would have jeopardized their lives. For two and a half weeks, the Canadian government pondered the question of recognition. Canada’s relations with Chile were described by External Affairs as “in a state of suspended animation.” In a confidential telex from Ottawa to the embassy in Santiago the position was that “We are not/not inclined to rush into recognition of a new regime. Prefer to wait until several countries particularly in latam not/ not necessarily in agreement with coup or ideology have acted.”39 Indeed a spokesperson for the department stated that Canada recognized the “state of Chile,” but the question of recognition of the new Chilean military government was still rather obscure.40 Pressure both for and against recognition mounted, however. A Toronto Sun editorial,

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for example, argued that “We can understand the Soviet Union’s distress at Allende’s overthrow, he being an ideological comrade and all that. But that’s no concern of Canada. Gracious, we don’t bat an eyelid at coups in other parts of the world and live comfortably with places like Egypt, Burma, Thailand, Turkey, Greece, Indonesia etc., where the military took over to save the country from chaos … so be a brave chap, Mr Sharp, and recognize the new Chilean regime. It looks as if it’ll be around for a while.”41 However, ndp mp Andrew Brewin pressured the government to accept the recommendation of the moderator of the United Church, the primate of the Anglican Church, and Bishop Power of the Canadian Catholic Conference and withhold recognition of the Chilean military regime “until it is clear that the new government is prepared to respect fundamental international principles and the recognition of human rights.” The minister replied by confirming what would consistently become the Canadian government’s policy on the issue of recognition of the Chilean regime: Sharp stated that “Our policy is not one of approval if and when we give recognition, but we want to make sure only that there is a government we can deal with confidently and that is in effective control.”42 Once the government recognized the military junta on 29 September 1973, the first battle for domestic groups in Canada was over – and lost. Some newspapers like the Toronto Star applauded the action and stated that Ottawa is “legally proper in its cold-eyed realism,”43 although it also underlined that the government should make clear that recognition does not mean approval. However, Glen Allen of the Montreal Gazette called the government’s action “a weak move at best.” He stated that “there are many good reasons not to recognize the new government, not the least being the value of the example: If Canada and all the Canada-size countries in the world withheld recognition, the generals might have hung up their machine guns for a few days and thought things over.”44 In response to another question by Andrew Brewin in the House, Sharp, of course, defended the government’s recognition of the Chilean junta and made this definitive statement: “I do not think it is necessary to make a statement in the House as to the reasons for recognizing the government of Chile. We were following practice which we have followed, generally speaking, in the past. Indeed, far from giving early recognition to the government of Chile, we were very late in the process; we followed the Vatican, Denmark, Sweden, and other close friends who have just as strong a respect and liking for democratic institutions as we have.”45 Indeed, by the time Canada recognized the junta, over thirty countries had already extended recognition.46 However, if

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those who were fighting to make the Chilean coup a more important matter for Canadians were disappointed at losing the battle over recognition, a more important one was beginning to be fought: the battle to bring Chilean refugees to Canada. If they had lost the former battle, the latter would be won, but not without great effort. By the time the Canadian government decided to recognize the Chilean Junta, the situation at the embassy had become quite difficult. The ambassador had accepted Chileans at the embassy, offering them “shelter,” and he had also had to contend with securing safe passage for the Canadians held by Chilean authorities. On 20 September, Ed Ritchie (the ussea) had sent a confidential telex to Ambassador Ross instructing him that “Except where Canadians are concerned cases of visible imminent danger to life or situations evidently tantamount to hot pursuit, you should discourage further requests before situation becomes unmanageable.”47 Besides the concern that the embassy might be flooded by refugees, there was the belief that in the end not many Chileans would actually want to leave the country. In a confidential memo classified “for Canadian eyes only,” the Canadian embassy in Chile, reflecting the views of an unnamed person in Santiago interviewed by Ross, stated that [19 (1) exempt] Did not/not think that so many Chileans would want to go abroad once things have settled down, therefore, he was rather anxious that our immig svc should not/not rush things as people currently motivated by fear might make decision they would regret later. He estimated number of Allende supporters or sympathizers to be but 25 per 100 of population (higher figures being attributable in good part to control of electoral apparatus). Apart from some hundreds of activists, great majority were good and sincere Chileans.48

While the Canadian embassy in Santiago was suggesting slowing down the processing of refugees to Canada, the Chilean refugee question was becoming a hot political issue at home. By November the situation was complicated by the leak of several classified telexes by Ambassador Ross that demonstrated to many in Canada a lack of sensitivity to the situation in Chile. Ross was clearly appalled by the violence of the coup, but he seemed willing to give it the benefit of the doubt and ultimately believed that it would soon give control to the Christian Democrats. In one confidential telex he stated that “Hopefully brutalities and witchhunting perpetrated by ultras and all too reminiscent of Nazi methods will soon be curbed by junta.”49 In another telex he stated that deaths during the coup fell into three categories: “(a) those killed in original operation lasting few days (b) violators of

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subsequent edict against carrying firearms or curfew (c) political murders. First two categories are abhorrent but understandable however revenge killings morally indefensible and proffer horrifying evidence of depth of hatred created by politicians and pre-coup excesses of both extremes.”50 Although the ambassador had some defenders in Canada, the leaks proved extremely embarrassing to the government, since they did not paint a very sympathetic view of Allende and his followers, who were now martyrs. The fact that negative comments regarding the military junta were not well received by those in power in Chile, seems to have caused less concern in Canada. However, these developments did not seem to impede the processing of refugees. Indeed, the Chilean government allowed for the stay and safe passage of those seeking asylum at the Canadian embassy, although the Chilean policy allowing safe conduct in these embassies was rescinded after 11 December.51 The Chilean government did not know that the Canadian Embassy was harbouring the refugees in the ambassador’s residence. They were all moved to the embassy by 10 December, one day before the deadline. Under pressure in Parliament and from ngo s the government decided to send Geoffrey Pearson to Santiago to take a look at the situation and assess what could be done. Pearson, chairperson of the Policy Analysis Group at External Affairs, was sent because he did not have a prejudiced view on the issue and was only marginally aware of the situation at the embassy.52 He arrived on 20 November, and meetings were arranged between him and various groups, including officials of other embassies who could give their views on the situation. In a confidential telex sent by Pearson from Santiago to Ottawa expressing the same views as Manpower and Immigration official Gary Schroh, Pearson proposed a much more generous policy in accepting refugees. He estimated that about 10,000 Chileans wanted to leave and argued that Chileans classified as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (unhcr) seemed discouraged from applying to the Canadian Embassy: “Only 17 have submitted applications to this office. More might have done so if they had been led to expect quick results. Possibility remains that more will seek refuge in centres but for now hcr expects to close centres by end of year. Recommend we take lenient view of outstanding applications, so inform unhcr, and prepare to assist his office further if he so requests.”53 There were of course other categories, such as immigrants (who could go to Canada only if they met normal immigration criteria) and asylees (who had fled to the embassy and the official residence fearing for their lives), the latter posing the most difficult problems, not only for the Canadian embassy but for other embassies as well. For Pearson,

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the category of asylee should receive special attention, especially because Canadians were concerned about asylees. Pearson had consulted with various European embassies on the question: Europeans and I expect some cdns will continue to ask questions about our asylum policy especially in light of our record on refugees and public commitment to humanitarian approach. Thus believe it desirable to reconsider strict interpretation of asylum rule. Consequences of more liberal interpretation could include of course major inconvenience to emb and ambassador, risk of bringing to cda political extremists, possible risks of having to keep some persons indefinitely and some strain in relations with Chile. If we liberalize rules discreetly, few requests may be made in time available. Selection of asylees in some cases could be made easier.54

Pearson’s recommendations were not all well received by the ambassador. In an eight-page confidential memo entitled “Pearson Report” and sent by Ross to headquarters in Ottawa, Ross agreed with Pearson on the policy of asylees and stated, “With exception of suggestions in para eight with respect to liberalization of asylum quote rules unquote I have few reservations regarding report sent by Pearson with Schrohs general concurrence.”55 Ross reasserted that he had stretched the asylum rules immediately after the coup and that “in new wave of repression by junta involving relatively quote innocent unquote people I should not/not hesitate to stretch it again.”56 But overall the ambassador indeed had many reservations about Pearson’s report, especially that a speedy acceptance of refugees would be unwise without proper security checks and before the political situation in Chile was settled. However, he recognized that great pressure was building up in Canada, and so Ross was hesitant to disagree with Pearson’s recommendations: “Attempt to achieve equal rep would produce donnybrooks and if I disagreed with recommendations there is risk of exacerbating criticism already apparently troublesome enough in cda. Acceptance of briefs or reps by pressure groups is always useful which is in effect what we have already done here, but policy determination in Ott and interpretive discretion here must remain with govt and embassy respectively. Ross.”57 Indeed, Ross was waging a losing battle for a more cautious and conservative refugee policy. At home, pressure to bring Chilean refugees and speed up the processes had mounted. Ross’s embarrassing telexes, particularly his use of the term “riffraff” to describe Latin American leftists who sought refuge in Chile during Allende’s government, had eliminated his credibility with many Canadians. One example is James Eayrs’ critique of Ross, in which, after commenting that

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Ross was probably in Argentina buying an Edsel while the coup was occurring (in fact he was buying a Pontiac) and after commenting on the leaked telex from Buenos Aires, Eayrs argued that “Certainly his cable from Buenos Aires to Ottawa rates as the Edsel of dispatches. It is at most a disturbing document, combining bias and wishful thinking in what is sure to become a classic example of how not to engage in diplomatic reporting.”58 Ross also had defenders, however. Charles Lynch wrote that he had known Ross since 1939 and that he had “always had reason to admire his grasp of things – never more than in the hot seat he has occupied in Santiago before, during, and after the overthrow and tragic death of President Salvador Allende.”59 Nevertheless, the fact that the government did not come to Ross’s defence after the leak and that Pearson was sent as “an outsider” were clear indications that his credibility was low. Indeed, Pearson’s report was crucial in forging a new program to bring Chileans to Canada. In a secret telex announcing the implementation of a special operation to do so, Ed Ritchie explained the difficult political situation in Canada: “We realize highly delicate nature of this operation and can only emphasize govt’s conviction that it is required to meet genuine feelings and deep humanitarian concern which continue to be conveyed to them, almost three months after the military coup, by many Canadians and in particular church leaders.”60 And so, Special Movement Chile had begun, with cabinet authorization to accept between 300 and 1,000 refugees under reduced criteria. Indeed, under domestic pressure it was agreed to accept up to 7,000. Consequently, the experience with Chile had brought mixed success for the ngo s in the short run. Although they had failed to convince the government to withhold recognition of the Chilean junta or to rescind its decision, they were able to bring a large number of refugees to Canada. Many were sponsored by local church groups, which began an important politicization of Canadians interested in human rights questions in Latin America. Ironically, the fact that the Canadian government recognized the new Pinochet regime allowed Canada to accept more refugees with greater ease. If the government had listened to the opposition, the ngo s would have won the first battle but perhaps lost the second. Beyond the immediate ability to bring Chilean refugees to Canada, there was a more fundamental shift in the way civil society and the government would interact on crucial foreign policy issues. As historian George Hanff concludes, “[The Canadian government] took this decision, not because its stability was threatened, but rather, because the high profile of the activists and the visibility of the pressure threatened an image that Canadians and non-Canadians seem to have about

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Canada. At its narrowest, this image could be defined in terms of Canada’s so-called refugee-thinking tradition. In its broadest context, it is defined in terms of Canada’s internationally responsible attitude … The Canadian government probably deemed the acceptance of approximately 7,000 refugees from Chile not an unreasonable price to keep it alive.”61 The Latin America constituency had engaged in its first political battle and had achieved some measure of success. It would not be the last time either would occur. But success can also be attributed to those officials in Chile, such as Adam and Dolgin, who took the initiative to safeguard lives, even at the risk of being reprimanded. Geoffrey Pearson’s pivotal intervention in the whole affair was crucial and doubtless saved many lives. What is interesting about this episode is how government officials and ngo representatives were able to work both sides of the issue to convince the government to accept refugees. Assessing the Trudeau Decade J.C.M. Oglesby, in his review of Canada-Latin American relations from 1968 to 1978, dubbed the period the “Trudeau Decade.”62 There is no question that this decade was pivotal in Canadian foreign policy towards the region. Trudeau’s initiative between 1968 and 1970 highlighted the importance that the Canadian government gave to the region. Even though Canada’s trade was negligible and there were few strategic interests in Latin America, the government’s initiative had an impact on Canadian society. Canadian business people began to look at Latin America with growing interest, bilateral government contacts began to increase, development assistance grew steadily, and Canadian ngo s began receiving funds from cida through its ngo program.63 On the multilateral side, Canada began to draw closer to the Americas by becoming a permanent observer at the oas and joining the Inter-American Development Bank, among other inter-American agencies. But while the Canadian government initiated a new era in Canada– Latin America relations, as the decade wore on elements within civil society (particularly the churches, labour, solidarity organizations, and private aid agencies) began to show a deepening interest in the region. The highest levels of government focused much attention on Canada– Latin America relations between 1968 and 1970 and in 1976, when Trudeau made his much-publicized Latin American tour. The high profile of the Chilean crisis in 1973 fell unexpectedly into the government’s lap, and it was doubtless surprised and unprepared to handle the political debate that ensued after the death of Dr Allende and the influx of refugees during the rest of the decade.

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The crisis in Chile was an important test of the Liberal government’s policy towards Latin America, one that was usually characterized as slow and not fully committed. Foreign Policy for Canadians had called for greater bilateral involvement by the government of Canada with Latin American countries, but the Canadian government was unwilling to become overinvolved in the politics of a country with which it had little contact, no matter what the implications of Allende’s overthrow for the future of democracy in the region. It was John Harbron who, in an article written soon after the coup, argued that “it has been a revelation to Canadian officials and Canadians generally that a refugee crisis originating in this hemisphere would be just as heart-rendering for the victims, just as demanding on our hospitality, and consciences, and need the same understanding from government and the public, as those earlier ones in Europe and Africa which had brought Hungarians, Czechs and East Indian Ugandans to our shores.”64 But Trudeau cannot be accused of inconsistency. It is true that he had begun a bold initiative towards the Americas and had placed relations with the region towards the top of his agenda during his foreign policy review. If Trudeau promised greater ties with Latin America, he also promised, in a more fundamental way, that his government would subscribe to a “realistic and pragmatic” foreign policy. It should have been no surprise to anyone that when that foreign policy was implemented, principles of realpolitik would ultimately govern. Gone were the days of the active internationalism of Lester B. Pearson, at least for a while. What emerged in the Trudeau decade, however, was a growing tension between elements in civil society and the state’s formulation of Canadian foreign policy in Latin America. Against the government’s realpolitik, there emerged a mélange of alternative worldviews that gathered together to oppose government policy and gained strength despite substantial differences in philosophical and political views. The rallying point was a humanist internationalism concerned with social justice. This is why the Chilean situation can be viewed as pivotal not only for Canadian foreign policy towards the region but also for the dynamics between state and civil society in the formulation of foreign policy in Canada. It is significant not only that the Canadian government was faced with a substantial domestic opposition that critically assessed its policy towards Chile and the subsequent influx of refugees with an unusual energy and commitment but, more importantly, that these refugees had a profound impact on interested Canadians. If the first century of Canada-Latin America relations had been characterized by isolationism, with little state initiative and public interest, the 1970s began to

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change all that. Not many Canadians travelled to Chile and other Latin American countries during this period, although the numbers were steadily increasing. But when Chilean refugees began to arrive in Canadian cities, many sponsored by individuals or community groups, there was increased exposure to a culture that had been distant and mysterious. If Canadians could not go to Latin America, then Latin America would come to Canada. Their arrival had a profound effect on Canadians who had showed some interest in the region and in issues of social justice and international development. Between 1970 and 1973 there were few voices calling for moral and financial support for Allende’s Chile. After Allende’s death, interested Canadians galvanized and joined organizations to assist refugees and to show solidarity with the people of that country. Much of the public interest was waning by the late 1970s, but it took other important events in Latin America to again bring together many Canadians in support of a Canadian foreign policy that would support revolutionary forces in the late 1970s: those events were the Nicaraguan revolution, the civil war in El Salvador, and the subsequent Central American crisis of the 1980s. The Nicaraguan Revolution and the Government of Joe Clark With the defeat of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the ascendance to power of Joe Clark on 4 June 1979, the Trudeau decade was over. But Canada’s increasing closeness to Latin America was not. Indeed, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, came to the position with a commitment to improve both the government’s stand on human rights and development assistance, and to rely more closely on groups outside Parliament and the Department of External Affairs for advice, perhaps because as an opposition mp, MacDonald had had the opportunity to interact with various pressure groups that had developed during the 1970s. MacDonald wanted, first of all, to improve the low priority of development assistance in the hemisphere; there was, in her words, “not much trade and not much aid, and there was much we could do to improve the latter.”65 Indeed, the minister recognized that Canada had a growing interest in the hemisphere. In a speech to a meeting of the Inter-American Press Association in Toronto, she stated that although relations with the United States were obviously of great significance, since they are “our closest neighbour, our preponderant trading partner, our closest friend … I do want you to know, however, that it is my own personal and very strong view that our relations with the other countries of the Americas are also of vital importance to Canada.” Furthermore, she argued that given the difficult times in the rest

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of the world, Canada should look closer to home to improve and foster relations. She thus stated that “we shall be paying particular attention to the countries represented in your Association’s membership.” Indeed, the minister concluded with the announcement that in her government’s review of foreign policy, she had asked that the Western Hemisphere be given particular attention.66 Her twin interests in human rights and development assistance made the Western Hemisphere a perfect area to concentrate on, particularly with the development of a strong domestic constituency interested in the region. The second important commitment for the new ssea was the attempt to pay more attention to groups outside the bureaucracy. As David Cox argues, MacDonald “was entirely committed … to making policy rather than allowing herself to be carried along by the flow and weight of bureaucratic opinion. In this determination she evoked, at least for a time, a strongly sympathetic response from certain groups outside government, and from some inside already dissatisfied with the increasingly mundane tendencies of current foreign policy directions.”67 Indeed, the minister recognized the importance of some of these outside groups in her speech to the Inter-American Press Association, particularly groups interested in human rights. Thus she argued that “Canadian Church groups, labour organizations, intellectuals and the media, as well as the public at large, are asking more and more often for the Canadian government to intervene on the human rights front … all these arouse a natural concern among Canadians, and they quite properly urge their government to express these concerns through official representations to the governments involved.” In the end, her goal was to increase ties with the region while simultaneously improving relations with the United States, and so she concluded that “It is my intent to reinforce our relations with the United States and that we do all we can to increase ties we have with Latin America and the Caribbean.”68 Indeed, the minister had already had an occasion to deal with the implications of these policy orientations. Within a few weeks of coming to power she had to begin to deal with the deteriorating situation in Nicaragua, which had presented her first opportunity to change the approach of Canadian foreign policy. On 19 June 1979, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs received a ten-page confidential memorandum from the chargé d’affaires in San José, Costa Rica. The memorandum was in stark contrast with the telexes of Andrew Ross, since it gave a comprehensive and well-rounded account of the situation in Nicaragua, an account that underlined the uncertainties and analyzed the implications for Canada: “We look to the unfolding tragedy in Nicaragua and wonder what will happen. It is not easy to make

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predictions. Reliable information is rare and often limited, and objectivity, especially, is almost impossible to find.” The memorandum looked at the military situation, the political outlook, the international dimension, the economic prospects, and what it all meant to Canada. In the assessment of the coalition that was to take over Nicaragua, the memorandum recognized that the junta was not going to establish democracy soon. However, there seemed to be a sympathetic tone to this analysis: “The establishment of democracy, although an important element in the junta’s rhetoric, is not an immediate prospect. The junta claims that since Nicaragua has never known democracy, the people must be educated and, in particular, the level of literacy must be raised considerably. (This is not an entirely specious argument, since Nicaragua does have a fairly high rate of illiteracy.)”69 However, in the confidential talking points prepared for the minister the next day, it was clear that the Department of External Affairs recommended support for what it considered moderates in the emerging regime: “Canada has no special views to express on the ultimate political settlement, particularly in Nicaragua, but certainly we would favour the emergence of a moderate centrist regime composed of liberal elements and other Christian Democratic groups.”70 The memorandum from San José also made it clear both that from the outset the Nicaraguan revolution was being received with sympathy by many Latin American countries and that there was a great desire to exclude the United States from the conflict. The Canadian chargé d’affaires saw this as a significant development and wrote, “With Venezuela’s offer of mediation which, according to reports received here, Somoza seems inclined to accept, we may be seeing the beginning of a new independent attitude on the part of Latin America – ‘we can look after our own problems.› Indeed, the memorandum also mentioned that the Andean Pact had recognized the Sandinistas as belligerents in the conflict, which “under international law carries more than diplomatic significance. It acknowledges what no sensible observer would have predicted three weeks ago: that the Sandinista guerillas have been a match for the better armed and intensively trained Guardia Nacional.” The question now was, how should Ottawa react? The memorandum suggested that Canada should stay out of the attempt to resolve the crisis but that “Consideration should be given now, however, to the extent to which we would be willing and able to participate in recovery and reconstruction activities should the government of Somoza be replaced.”71 There was, therefore, not only a recognition that Canada could play a role in the reconstruction process but a clear indication that Latin American countries wanted no outside interference and that Canada,

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which was still clearly an outsider, should stay out of the resolution of the conflict. This conclusion was made more important by the fact that Canada’s interests in Nicaragua were minimal, although those in the region were more substantive: “There is little prospect that private Canadian investment would be forthcoming with a new government of pronounced leftist tendencies, since even Costa Rica attracts little Canadian investment, especially in view of the Provisional Government’s declared intention to nationalize resource industries.”72 Given the analysis that came from the Canadian Embassy in Costa Rica and the recognition of the state of belligerence that was adopted by several Latin American countries with respect to Nicaragua and that gave the Sandinistas certain prerogatives under international law, the Canadian government had now to face two issues: first, whether it would recognize the Sandinistas as belligerents and, later – when, as was expected, they ousted Somoza – whether it would recognize them as the new government of Nicaragua; and, second, whether Canada would play a role in the reconstruction of the country. For the next weeks, the government considered the various options. In a confidential memorandum on 20 June 1979 the director of the Latin America section at External Affairs, Roger Gilbert, explored the possibility that the government might recognize the “state of belligerency” in Nicaragua: “If the Canadian government decided to devise a Canadian political act calculated to censure Somoza’s regime [it] might fit into either recognition of the ‘state of belligerency’ or recognition of the Sandinistas’ provisional government, as the case may be. These are some hypotheses that we would like to look at with your counsel.”73 There is no evidence that this possibility was passed on to the minister, and it seems highly unlikely, given that only a few small Latin American and Caribbean countries had recognized the provisional Nicaraguan government, that Canada would do so. In addition, the belief that Canada should stay out of Latin American affairs unless invited probably ruled out early recognition. An analysis of Canadian interests and Canada’s possible role was explored at headquarters the next day. In an internal confidential memorandum Gilbert suggested that sixty Canadians had been successfully evacuated to Panama by a u.s. operation and asserted that “Canadian interests in this country are very limited. Trade is almost non existent. In addition, Nicaragua does not benefit from any cida program and Canada’s embassy maintains very little contact with it. Elsewhere in Latin America, Canadian interests are considerable.”74 Gilbert went on to explain the importance of Canadian investments (the specifics of which are exempt under section 19(1), see note 60), the cida programs, and the presence

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of a thousand Canadians in the region, all of which were enough to suggest that Canada should keep a close eye on the situation. Most important, perhaps, was the fact that the United States was seeking a role for Canada through diplomatic channels. This was important because a foreign policy priority for the Clark government was improving relations with the United States. And so Gilbert concludes that “The fact that the government of the United States is consulting closely with us to find a solution may be interpreted as a veiled invitation to Canada to become directly involved in the affairs of the continent.”75 Indeed, the next day, in a note for the minister on the situation in Nicaragua, Allan E. Gotlieb, under secretary of state for External Affairs, after an interview with u.s. ambassador Thomas O. Enders, explained that “The Americans asked whether they could count on Canada to help with the reconstruction in Nicaragua. I answered that Canada would look at any proposal but that budget constraints could be an impediment to an early decision.”76 Three important elements in the mounting Nicaraguan civil war would, therefore, encourage Canadian involvement. First, the crisis in Nicaragua embodied two key issues that ssea MacDonald felt were central to her policy outlook: human rights and development assistance. Denouncing the Somoza regime would satisfy the former, and the plan for reconstruction would sustain the latter. Second, the United States was actively seeking and encouraging a role for Canada, particularly in providing emergency aid and development assistance. Finally, both the minister and some of her officials recognized that Central America, if not Nicaragua itself, was of some importance to Canada. By the beginning of July the Canadian government was thus preparing some sort of response to the situation. It had apparently not seriously considered recognizing a state of belligerence, which would have tacitly meant recognizing the Sandinistas as the government in waiting, yet it also clearly did not want to give any support to the Somoza regime. However, it was soon obliged to take a stand. The situation was again assessed in a confidential memorandum to the minister from Gotlieb on July 4. Given events in Nicaragua that continued to support a Sandinista victory, given the demand from the United States for a cease-fire, as well as attempts by the oas to mediate the conflict, and given that the minister was beginning to receive a flood of letters and representations by ngo s, Gotlieb presented the options for the government: The time has perhaps come for a statement by Canada deploring the violation of human rights in Nicaragua and lending at least moral support to the oas

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resolution … the Canadian statement would carry a great deal of moral weight and, to some extent, would respond to the representations you have received. It would reflect not only Canada’s concern for human rights but also a more direct role for Canada, which is just an observer in the oas, but, like Spain, will have made its position on the Nicaragua crisis known.77

Gotlieb added that if the minister wished to demonstrate her displeasure to the Somoza regime, the new Canadian ambassador to Costa Rica (also accredited to Nicaragua) could withhold his letters of accreditation: “we can instruct him not to present his credentials to Nicaragua until such time as the present situation has been clarified. In a way, this would constitute a tacit repudiation of the Somoza regime.”78 Two days later the Department of External Affairs released a communiqué on the situation in Nicaragua. In it the Canadian government deplored the violations of human rights in Nicaragua, called on the government of President Somoza to respect them, and stated that “The Canadian government joins the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in their condemnation of the inhumane conduct of the régime of President Somoza and in their call for a guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception.”79 By the time the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza, there was, therefore, no question whether the Canadian government would recognize and assist the new government. The Clark government had clearly rejected the Somoza regime, and, having had several representations from the United States, from Latin American countries, and from internal departmental memos suggesting that Canada should be active in the reconstruction of Nicaragua, when the Sandinistas finally entered Managua on 19 July 1979, the Canadian government was ready to recognize and assist the new government. Although recognition came five days later, there is no evidence to suggest that Canada waited until the United States recognized the new regime, as Peter McFarlane suggests (without providing any evidence) in Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America.80 Indeed, in a memorandum to the minister sent only two days before the Sandinistas arrived in Managua, Allan Gotlieb explained that the u.s. State Department had informed him President Somoza was about to leave the country to go to Florida and that the issue of recognition of the new regime should now be considered and decided upon. Gotlieb suggested that Canada would be wise to put off recognizing the new government of Nicaragua at least until it is known whether the new government is fully in control of the territory after the end of fighting, which is deemed imminent, and can demonstrate stability and continuity. The time will be particularly ripe for a

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political act of sympathy, and it would behoove Canada to align itself with the countries that wish to avoid a dominant Castroist influence in this country.81

Indeed, just as had happened a few year earlier with Chile, the Canadian government was to withhold recognition of the new government until it was in control of the territory, following what had become a fundamental principle of the Department of External Affairs. Moreover, on 23 July, R.P. Gilbert of the Latin America branch sent a confidential telex to a number of posts on the subject of recognition of the Government of Reconstruction in Managua. He suggested that “We would like to recommend to the ssea that cda confirm its relations as soon as a majority of countries, particularly from this hemisphere, and some European countries, have done so.”82 Official recognition came the following day, only five days after the Sandinistas entered Managua, when it seemed to be sure that they were in control of the territory.83 The Canadian government immediately began a number of emergency assistance programs, not only through ingo s but also through Canadian ngo s who were being flooded with donations for Nicaragua. Indeed, if one compares the Canadian government’s reaction to the crisis in Nicaragua with the reaction to Chile, it seems that both officials and politicians had learned some lessons. Although the process of recognition was overly cautious, yet considering that the Clark government was quite new and inexperienced and in a minority position in the House of Commons, it seemed to handle the situation without any major criticisms or political crises. But within less than a year there would be a new government in Ottawa, and within eighteen months Ronald Reagan would come to power, making Central America a focal point for both East-West conflict and the attempted revival of u.s. hegemony.

f r om bi lat e ra l i n d i f f er en c e to multilateral activity 1980–1988 The period from 1980 to 1984 was pivotal for Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America: it was the period when a regional policy towards Central America was born, and it is best characterized as a period of transition between indifference and limited involvement in the region.84 With the reelection of Pierre Trudeau in February 1980, when he won his largest majority, his attention turned inward to deal with the two issues that went to the heart of his political career: the Quebec referendum on sovereignty association and, later, the patriation of the constitution. One other domestic policy issue soon became important to Canada’s relationship with the United States when the Trudeau

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government implemented the National Energy Program (nep) and strengthened the Foreign Investment Review Agency (fira); the new Reagan Administration soon reacted swiftly to oppose it, creating what was later called the “crisis of the capitals.” The first two years of Trudeau’s last term in office thus revolved around issues that went to the core of Canadian interests: the survival of the federation and the bilateral relationship with the United States. It should be of little surprise, therefore, when reviewing this period to see everywhere the signs of official indifference to and detachment from the events unfolding in Central America – and specifically detachment from the Reagan administration’s policies towards the isthmus. If Latin America had declined in the foreign policy priority of Canadian governments during the late 1970s, Central America could not even be seen on the horizon. But the forces that were to bring Central America slowly to the forefront of the Canadian foreign policy agenda were brewing both within and outside Canada. Outside Canada, the most important player was former California governor and candidate for the Republican presidential nomination Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s success in obtaining the presidential nomination and later the presidency in 1980 had much to do with the emergence of the New Right in the United States and with a rebellion against the perceived loss of u.s. power in international affairs. The taking of u.s. hostages in Iran played a continuing role in both the Republican primaries and the presidential election. The sense of impotence felt by many in the United States fueled a new nationalism that railed against the liberal attitude that had arisen during the 1960s, particularly the opposition to the Vietnam War. Many in the New Right felt that liberal attitudes had played a fundamental role in the u.s. withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the triumph of North Vietnam. More important, however, was the fact that in 1979 what many in the New Right considered to be a “totalitarian” regime had been established in Nicaragua, in the backyard of u.s. influence, bringing memories of the Cuban revolution and reaffirming the validity of the domino theory, which forsaw country after country in Latin America falling to Communism. The Nicaraguan revolution became, then, the rallying point for many in the United States against the decline in u.s. hegemony. It was simultaneously the symbol of what had been wrong with u.s. foreign policy under Jimmy Carter, and the key to overcoming it. With Reagan’s election in 1980, Central America was therefore assured a prominent role in u.s. foreign policy. The focus became to stop the tide that had begun in Nicaragua by opposing Communism, particularly in El Salvador, which was on the verge of following in Nicaragua’s footsteps.

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The development of a u.s. policy that opposed the Sandinista regime in the hemisphere, however, was not enough by itself to elicit Canadian attention, much less the beginning of increased involvement in the region. Within Canada, other forces were at work, focusing on both Central America and u.s. involvement there. In instances like Cuba, Canadian foreign policy had showed some independence, but by and large, Canada had steered away from becoming too involved in hemispheric affairs, especially in cases of conflict between a Latin American country and the United States. Typically, Canada defended its bilateral relations with other countries, for example, by reaffirming its trade and regular diplomatic relations with Cuba, but it was extremely hesitant about getting involved in u.s.–Latin American conflicts, as was the case in the Chilean crisis. This policy was at the heart of Canada’s aloofness from full membership in the oas for most of the century. One important new emerging element was the consolidation of ngo s, which had been growing during the 1970s. They came together in the early 1980s around the issue of supporting the Nicaraguan revolution and opposing u.s. policy towards El Salvador and Guatemala, where insurgent groups were very active. At first this movement, which had its roots in opposition to u.s. foreign policy in Vietnam in the 1960s and in Chile during the 1970s, focused on providing basic assistance to Nicaragua and lobbying the government to increase bilateral aid to that country. But later, when it began to become clear that the new Reagan administration, inaugurated in January 1981, was going to provide massive military aid to El Salvador to help stop the rebellion led by the Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación Nacional (fmln), lobbying efforts increased and demanded that the Canadian government should condemn the militarization of Central America and oppose what some expected might be direct intervention in Nicaragua by u.s. armed forces. From Indifference to Limited Involvement: 1980–1984 It was against this emerging background that Mark MacGuigan was appointed ssea in March 1980, and it is interesting to note that his first speech as foreign minister was dedicated to Latin America, even though it did not indicate the launching of a new policy towards the region.85 The speech focused entirely on the larger countries of Latin America and made no mention of the conflict brewing in the Central American isthmus, a revealing indication, perhaps, of how little attention was paid to the Central American conflict by the Department of External Affairs and the minister, but an indication also that the

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conflict had emerged because of a fundamental shift in u.s. foreign policy. Once the conflict became apparent, the Trudeau government was just as struck by the groundswell of support by ngo s for an active Canadian role in defending the Nicaraguan revolution and opposing the u.s. administration’s policy in Central America as it had been in 1973 when domestic church groups had vehemently opposed recognition of the Pinochet regime in Chile and pressed the government to condemn the military junta, while asking for a generous refugee policy.86 As mentioned, at the outset of the Trudeau government of the early 1980s the issue of economic independence was a high priority. The importance of affirming an independent foreign policy for Canada and diversifying trade was evident in policies like the nep, which must be understood as part of the attempt by the Trudeau government to ensure a sense of national identity at a time when the future of the federation was in question. In a speech by Mark MacGuigan at the Eleventh Leadership Conference of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a speech made just before Ronald Reagan was elected president, the minister focused his attention on the differences and similarities between Canadian and u.s. foreign policy, as if attempting to explain Canada’s new assertiveness in the energy field. He argued that the differences did not mean conflict, and he mourned the fact that the u.s. president seemed to be losing his ability to formulate foreign policy to the Congress. By emphasizing the differences between Canadian and u.s. foreign policy over such things as the bombing of North Vietnam and the extraterritorial application by the u.s. of its antitrust laws and by referring to the dispute between the United States and Canada over tuna fishing, MacGuigan attempted to explain what he believed were the “profound differences between the u.s. and Canadian moulds.” He explicitly rejected the notion that Canada’s foreign policy was made in the United States and disagreed with those who believed it should be of the same mould.87 Given this official position, therefore, it seems difficult to argue that Canadian acquiescence towards the Central American region was due to a broader policy that sought convergence with u.s. objectives in the region. It was not that Canada wanted to quietly support u.s. policy in Central America; it was simply that the government did not see why it should get involved in an area of little vital interest. In fact, the government’s complete ignorance during 1980–81 of the conflict brewing in Central America and its limited involvement during 1982 can be attributed to three interrelated factors. First, Canada had no bilateral interests in the region. Trade was small, official contacts were limited, and Canadians themselves had traditionally showed no interest in the

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region. Second, Canadian opposition to u.s. foreign policy generally occurred primarily in two instances: when direct Canadian interests were at stake and when Canada was in good multilateral company. Finally, Canada had traditionally stayed out of the u.s. path in the hemisphere, and this was particularly the case in Central America, where the Canadian government believed that the United States had legitimate strategic interests. During the crisis of the capitals, the government seemed a bit gun-shy. Indeed, in MacGuigan’s words the government “wanted to avoid any unnecessary exacerbation of relations.”88 In addition, MacGuigan was generally not sympathetic to the leftist rebel groups in Central America and to the domestic ngo s who supported them in Canada. Although he felt that Canada was not actively supporting the United States in its policy in the region, he did not wish to actively oppose it either. And so when a reporter asked him about Canada’s views regarding u.s. support for the Salvadoran government against the fmln, he stated, “I would certainly not condemn any decision the u.s. takes to send offensive arms to [El Salvador] … The United States can at least count on our quiet acquiescence.”89 Although the minister meant to say “quiescence,”90 the controversy that ensued created a great deal of criticism for the Trudeau government and pitted it against all those who had opposed Trudeau’s policy on Chile, and against many more who were actively opposing the government’s lack of policy towards Central America and its “acquiescence” to u.s. foreign policy there. There are strong parallels between the initial slowness of the Trudeau government to react to the demands of domestic groups in 1973 and its slowness to react to their demands between 1980 and 1982. About a month after the minister’s statement that the United States could count on Canada’s acquiescence, the government established a subcommittee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on Canada’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. It was chaired by Maurice Dupras, who had convinced Trudeau that he should establish it. The subcommittee’s work was pivotal in changing the direction of Canada’s foreign policy towards the hemisphere, and especially towards Central America. According to Dupras, the role of ngo s in this process had “an important impact on the subcommittee.” Members of the subcommittee who worked on the issue for a year and a half not only received representations from domestic groups but also travelled to the region to assess the situation for themselves. While travelling in Latin America, Dupras found that many in countries such as Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, and Venezuela believed that “Canada was the only country that could play eye to eye with the u.s. and Trudeau was the only person who could do it.”91

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Indeed, the subcommittee was greatly impressed by their travels to the region, which had a great influence on their recommendations. When the Final Report was finally made public on 30 November 1982, it contained two important recommendations that would make fundamental changes to Canada’s policy towards Central America.92 First was the call for the Canadian government to give a much higher priority to Latin America and the Caribbean and the recommendation that “The central objective of Canadian policy should be the promotion of stability.”93 In promoting stability, the Canadian government should pay special attention to social and economic matters and promote respect for human rights and development assistance. Second, the subcommittee recommended that the Canadian government should make “Central America a region of concentration in Canada’s foreign policy.” At the heart of this recommendation was the view that Canada “should seek to promote stability by directly addressing security concerns.”94 The committee’s role in bringing to the fore the issue of Central America was important for three reasons. First, given MacGuigan’s personal reluctance to make the Central American issue important and given his reluctance to listen to ngo s, the subcommittee’s meetings provided a forum for public discussion. Second, in travelling to the region, parliamentarians got a first-hand impression of the situation there that allowed them to make up their own minds on the nature and importance of the conflict, and this gave their views much more credibility. Finally, the subcommittee’s reports provided the government with the basis for future policy, particularly after MacGuigan was replaced in the fall of 1982. Just as during the early crisis in Chile the government had ignored the public’s cry for Canadian action, so the Trudeau government was indifferent for nearly two years after the crisis in Central America began brewing. It is interesting to note that on both occasions Canada was coming out of a serious conflict with the United States, in the first instance with the end of the “special relationship” and in the second with the crisis of the capitals. On both occasions, as well, substantive policy changes occurred when a new minister was appointed. Ironically, on both occasions that minister was Allan MacEachen. What struck MacEachen most about the Central American crisis when he was appointed ssea in the fall of 1982 was that “the interest by Canadians in Central America was disproportional to Canada’s interests there.”95 He had experienced that interest in the intensity of debate in the House of Commons, where questions about Central America were regularly asked by the opposition during question period. Upon becoming ssea, MacEachen had two conflicting sets of issues to balance; on the one hand, it was a priority for the Canadian government to manage its bilateral relations with

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the United States with minimal conflict; on the other, there was pressure from domestic groups and Parliamentarians (of both the government and opposition parties) who demanded a greater role for Canada in the region; added to this was the growing contact with countries in Latin America concerning this regional crisis. The tension between the external constraints and the domestic pressures brought about a foreign policy towards Central America that could not possibly fully satisfy either the u.s. administration or domestic critics. But it was a solution that sought a multilateral escape from both pressures. And so, at its inception and throughout the decade, Canada’s policy towards the region was a balance between domestic pressures, external constraints, and the new internationalism. The fundamental tenets of Canada’s foreign policy were threefold. First, given that the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States was quite fragile and given that the United States was attempting to impose a policy in a region that Canada had previously conceded was in the realm of u.s. influence, Canada had to accept the legitimate security concerns of the United States in the region. This, in effect, was the basis for the external constraints. Thus MacEachen could say, “we fully appreciate the dilemma that is facing the United States government as it seeks to respond to these explosive events in a region of strategic importance to u.s. interests.” Second, although recognizing u.s. interests in the region, the Canadian government could not accept that the Central American crisis was the product of an East-West conflict and that it was ideologically fueled. The subcommittee on Latin America and the Caribbean and many representatives of Canadian ngo s, as well as the opinions of Latin American countries, had made it clear that the fundamental issues at stake were social and economic, and so were the solutions. The minister thus concluded that “The fundamental problems of Central America are the result of a long history of political, economic, and social repression. Stability and change cannot be accommodated until social and economic progress remove the explosive pressures of popular frustration. Interference by outside ideologies and political forces holds great danger for this process.”96 Because it agreed that the United States had “legitimate interests” and because it disagreed with the United States on the nature of the conflict, the government was caught in a difficult balancing act between the u.s. administration and domestic groups. It found a solution in giving support for ad hoc multilateral activities by Latin American countries. Consequently, support for the Contadora Group, an ad hoc group formed in 1983 to attempt to resolve the conflict, became the fundamental linchpin of Canada’s Central America policy.

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The minister thus concluded that “Canada, therefore, fully endorses the regional peace initiative sponsored by the Contadora Group of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. This attempt to find regional solutions to regional problems deserves the support of all concerned.”97 Indeed, MacEachen made it clear to the u.s. administration that Canada disagreed with its policy, thus giving in to domestic groups. In a television interview MacEachen stated that in recent discussions with Secretary of State Shultz, “We had a very protracted, or shall we say, we had a full discussion of the situation in Central America and we agreed to disagree … I think in public statements I’ve made these views known that we don’t attach the same, we don’t give the same validity to the military approach that the United States is giving at the present time.”98 The difficulties between the Trudeau government and the ngo s were exacerbated in part by the fact that the government had decided to cut off aid to El Salvador and Guatemala. The Minister argued that although aid was important in the region, it could not be delivered in this case because “where there are consistent and massive abuses of human rights, a line is drawn. In the case of El Salvador and Guatemala, our bilateral aid relations have been suspended as a result of the international security situation and its effect on human rights and the difficulty of delivering aid programs in these countries.” In addition, there was little doubt that the minister was aware of and sensitive to the domestic pressures on his policies. He stated that “There is a growing Canadian public interest in Central America. There is every reason for Canadians to be interested and to be concerned. Geography alone is a reason. It is the area closest to us of serious instability and East/West confrontation.”99 Indeed, MacEachen was flooded by demands from domestic groups who, he stated, “certainly did have influence on government policy.”100 The minister thus increased aid to the region, began admitting refugees from Central America, and began to hint that, if it was asked and if the Central American countries agreed, Canada could play some role in the verification of a peace accord. All of this activity culminated in a visit by MacEachen to Central America between 3 and 13 April 1984. The trip was to take him to Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. Significantly, he did not visit El Salvador; his failure to go there was considered a sign of disapproval of the Salvadoran regime, as well as good domestic politics. Although the u.s. administration had attempted to convince MacEachen to go to El Salvador on the eve of his trip, MacEachen declined, stating only that “The itinerary which I am following, was drawn up some considerable time ago … the non-inclusion of El Salvador on my itinerary

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does not have any political connotation to it at all.”101 However, when Maurice Dupras had previously convinced MacEachen to go to Central America, he had urged him to avoid going to El Salvador, and given the deteriorating conditions there and the strong domestic opposition, the decision certainly was good domestic politics.102 In addition, since El Salvador was in the midst of an election, MacEachen believed that a visit to that country was not prudent. Upon his return from Central America, the minister presented a report to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. MacEachen reiterated his policy towards the region, especially his policy of support for the Contadora Group. He was clear to reiterate his differences with the u.s. administration, and on the subject of the mining of Nicaraguan harbours, he stated that “I made it very clear that Canada regards the mining as a dangerous escalation of tension and a serious violation of international law.” MacEachen recognized that the Contadora Group might not be able to solve the problems of the conflict but said, “Although the obstacles are enormous and the basis for pessimism about its future only too real, I continue to believe that Contadora represents the only international instrument with the potential for reconciliation in Central America.”103 He also spoke about his meetings with many ngo s before leaving Canada and during his visit to the region. What was apparent in his speech, however, was that the Canadian government was relying more and more on support from the larger Latin American countries. This contact would prove crucial in the next few years as the Mulroney government wrestled with the central dilemma of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America: the tension between domestic pressures and external constraints. The Multilateral Road: 1984–1988 When the Mulroney government was elected on 17 September 1984 with the express policy of improving Canada-u.s. bilateral relations, it seemed that Canada’s policy towards Central America might change and take a more pro-u.s. posture. On 25 September of that year, the ssea, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, stated that Canada applauded “the initiative, skill and tenacity of the Contadora countries in their efforts to build a framework of reconciliation in the spirit of the un charter. We also welcome the opening of a direct dialogue between the usa and Nicaragua.”104 This statement was fully supportive of the policies of the Liberal government, which Mulroney’s new Conservative government seemed to be continuing. However, the new government’s decision not to send an official observer group to the Nicaraguan elections to be held in November and its renewal of aid

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to El Salvador, announced on 5 December 1984, seemed to indicate a change in policy. Nevertheless, the Mulroney government maintained the fundamental tenets of the Liberal’s policy towards the region, and, most importantly, in continuing and expanding these policies, it became more and more involved with the most influential countries in Latin America through the Contadora Group. Between 1984 and 1987, when the Arias Peace Plan (the Esquipulas II agreement) was finally signed, the Canadian government continued to support, and be active in, the peace process through Contadora. Soon after becoming ssea, Joe Clark met with ambassadors of the Contadora countries in Ottawa. At this time the Contadora countries were attempting to draw up a draft proposal for a peace in Central America, and the Canadian government had been asked to comment on the security and control aspects, specifically on the design of the Control and Verification Commission (cvc). Clark later reaffirmed its commitment to the peace process when appearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on 5 December 1984. Early in 1985 Clark travelled to Mexico, where he discussed the Central America crisis with President Miguel de la Madrid. Thus, soon after Clark became ssea, he had begun to become active in this multilateral attempt at peace in Central America. During 1985, therefore, attempts to assist the Contadora Group continued while the government was preparing its foreign policy review. When the government released the green paper, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations, Clark stated that “Central America and the Caribbean have been the troubled regions close to home. It is generally agreed that the sources of unrest there are socio-economic. Are our aid programs in Central America an adequate Canadian contribution to stability? Are Canadian political and security interests sufficient to involve ourselves more? Would a more active Canadian security presence in the Caribbean region have a stabilizing influence and help to diminish superpower rivalry in the region?”105 Response to these questions came in the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations entitled Interdependence and Internationalism. The joint committee was important because it conducted the public review of Canadian foreign policy and requested submissions from various groups. To its surprise, the most prominent topic brought before the committee was the issue of Central America, which prompted the comment in the report that “The intense interest of many Canadians in Central America, for example, transcends any direct role that Canada plays in the region.” Indeed,

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the report stated that many Canadians wanted a more independent policy from the United States on Central America and more active Canadian participation in that region’s problems: “Most submissions on Central America … had common characteristics: criticism of u.s. policy in the region and advocacy of a larger role by the Canadian government including, frequently, opening an embassy in Nicaragua.” Nonetheless, the report offered only a continuation of the policy that was in place. The committee asserted that Canada should oppose third-party intervention in the region. To the disappointment of many ngo s, it opposed the establishment of an embassy in Nicaragua; it suggested that Canada help refugees in the area and that the Canadian government strengthen its ability to monitor human rights in the region. In this respect, the committee recommended that the government continue its policies: “Many Canadians believe that Canada can and should be very active in Central America. In addition to supporting the Contadora peace process and dialogue within and between individual countries, Canada should promote human rights in Central America by maintaining a generous refugee policy for those who are the victims of human rights violations.”106 Overall, the importance of the committee, as I argued in the previous chapter, is that it recommended an internationalist approach for Canada, and in responding to the questions of the green paper, reiterated both broad public and parliamentary support for an internationalist policy in Latin America. In this respect, the committee’s concerns over the Latin American debt crisis, and Canada’s role in it, were important in broadening Canada’s Latin America policy and utilizing the contacts being made with the Contadora Group and the Lima Group (also known as the Contadora Support Group), most members of which were going through deep economic crises. Latin American countries had large and substantial debts with Canadian banks; the committee “estimated that they hold some $20 billion of the problem indebtedness, concentrated in about 20 countries, with the major debtor being Latin American countries.”107 Latin America was indeed becoming more important for Canada, and not just for security concerns. In his response to the committee report, Clark stated that, first of all, “In Latin America and the Caribbean we have important economic and political interests which can be furthered through helping to fortify democratic government, developing relations with key states, playing a full role in resolving the debt situation, and working to resolve the regional conflicts in Central America.” The government’s response to the recommendations on Central America reiterated the attempt to find a Latin American solution to the regional problem.

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The government, first of all, reiterated its opposition to third-party intervention and its support for Contadora. Second, it vowed that it would continue to monitor human rights in the region. Finally, although it supported the work of the unhcr and stated that the monitoring of human rights was improving, especially though contacts with ngo s, it was cautious about using ngo s for programs of democratic and human rights development.108 Overall, the whole process of review of Canada’s foreign policy, through the three documents mentioned, did not alter the policy of the Canadian government towards Central America, although it made parliamentarians more aware of the deep interest by the Canadian public in the region and of the greater financial ties that Canada had with Latin America as a whole. Because the Central American peace process was proceeding at a snail’s pace, and perhaps because many did not believe that the process would conclude in any dramatic agreement, there was little incentive to change policy. Many Canadian parliamentarians seemed content with a policy of aid, refugee assistance, and support for Contadora. Because the Contadora countries were helping to maintain only a technical contribution for Canada, there was not much Canada could do short of vocal opposition to the United States, which, with the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement taking place, was an unadvisable and unlikely policy. Consequently, when the five Central American republics agreed on a peace proposal put forward by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sánchez on 7 August 1987, Canadian foreign policy, based on the attempt to find a solution to the conflict through the Contadora Group, was now facing a whole new set of problems. On 5 August 1987, Joe Clark released a communiqué reaffirming support for the Central American peace process and stating that “We have no illusions that an agreement will be easily reached.”109 Most observers at the Department of External Affairs were therefore quite surprised when an agreement was reached, and it prompted a flurry of activity. The ssea immediately came out in support of it and stated that “Canada remains ready to provide technical advice based on its long peacekeeping experience, to promote the peace process.”110 Clark immediately dispatched two senior officials to the region to assess the situation and provide advice to the minister.111 The following month, in a speech to the un General Assembly, Clark reiterated his support for the peace process and made a commitment to assist the Central American peace plan: “Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms, which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is

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prepared to contribute to the process in any direct and practical way open to us.”112 In Canada the following month, Clark received the vice-president of Nicaragua, Dr Sergio Ramirez Mercado.113 But perhaps the most important event was the trip of the ssea to Central America from 21 to 29 November, a trip that would take him to all five Central American republics. Clark’s purpose was to familiarize himself with the region and “to see for himself what more Canada can do to meet that challenge.”114 Indeed, the trip was preceded by the resumption of aid to Guatemala, since, as Clark indicated, “resuming a bilateral program at this time is a concrete measure of Canada’s support for the Central American peace process.”115 While in Central America Clark received much criticism at home after he suggested that Canada might accept Nicaraguan contras as part of a Central American peace proposal, and he was loudly criticized by aid workers in Nicaragua.116 Indeed, Dave Todd of Southam News called Clark’s visit “one of the least satisfactory exercises in his three years as external affairs minister.”117 However, Clark’s trip had several advantages. First, it provided him with a first-hand look at the Central American situation. In his seven-day tour he met with various officials and was generally well treated by Central Americans. Second, the trip seemed to have convinced Clark that Canada could and should play a more important role in the region. After meeting with Salvadoran president José Napoleón Duarte, Clark began hinting that Canada could play a peacekeeping role, deploying Canadian troops in the region.118 One of the by-products of the adoption of the Arias Peace Plan and the minister’s trip was the establishment by the Mulroney government, on 29 January 1988, of the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America. The committee held meetings from 2 March to 3 May 1988 and travelled to Central America from 8 to 18 May. Upon their return, committee members presented a report entitled Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process, which was published in Spanish as well as in Canada’s two official languages. The committee’s efforts were focused on assessing the transition in Canada’s foreign policy from supporting the Contadora peace process to providing support for the Esquipulas II agreement. The committee recommended very strong support for the peace process in Central America and concluded that “Our country should do everything in its power to encourage dialogue within and between the countries of Central America and, in particular, assist their efforts to find regionwide solutions to their problems. We believe that Canada has a special leadership role to play in striving to mobilize international support for the peace process. In this way, we can be the truest and most useful allies of Esquipulas II.”119

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Among the most important policy recommendations were that Canada participate in the design of the verification and control mechanism and in the peacekeeping force (on 7 April 1988 Canada had been approached unofficially by the five Central American countries, through the United Nations, to develop a verification and control mechanism).120 It was also suggested that Canada play a greater role in human rights and democratic development through the national reconciliation committees of the Esquipulas II agreement. There were other suggestions, such as that Canada should play a more regular role in election monitoring, that Canada should create an Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Development, and that Canada should assist in military and police force training in the region. There was the strong suggestion that Canada should provide $100 million to a special Esquipulas II fund for a five-year period to assist in economic development and reconstruction. The committee also suggested that Canada enhance its representation in the region and possibly, as a minimum, appoint a chargé d’affaires. In all, the committee envisaged a greater role for Canada in the region and support for the establishment of peace. In his response to the committee’s report on 23 September 1988, Joe Clark accepted most of the recommendations, rejected some, and diluted others. He suggested that Canada was ready to participate in the Auxiliary Technical Group (atg) “for the design of appropriate peacekeeping mechanisms.” The government agreed that Canada would provide technical assistance to help the development of democratic institutions, if asked. On the issues of economic assistance and diplomatic representations, the government agreed to establish a $100 million fund, but suggested that it would be done over six years (1988– 94), rather than five (that period was later extended to more than seven years). The government also announced the establishment of aid offices in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and it announced that honorary consulates would be established in Honduras and Nicaragua. But the government rejected the notion of opening up mini posts in the region. In conclusion, the minister summarized his response by stating that “The Special Committee’s Report shows what Canada has done and what we can still do.”121

co n cl u s i o n : th e be g i n ni n g of a new policy The efforts of the standing committee as well as the new commitments by the government were being made in an atmosphere that can best be described as the winding down of a ten-year East-West crisis. To begin

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with, Ronald Reagan was about to be replaced by George Bush, who did not have the same desire or opportunity to pursue a military conflict in Central America. With the entrance of Reagan into international affairs in 1981, the crisis in Central America had heated up. By the same token, with his retirement the crisis cooled down, although conflict and suffering in the region did not. The crisis cooled not only because of Reagan’s impending retirement. The world order that Reagan was leaving behind was substantially different from the one that had existed when he took office. With the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the profound changes to Soviet foreign and domestic policies, Central America was disengaged from Soviet policy, and with it support for the Sandinistas and even for Cuba. The Sandinistas were no longer an ideological threat to the United States, since it now seemed quite clear that the United States was winning the Cold War. By 1990 Canada was asked to participate fully in onuca (the un/oas peacekeeping mission in Central America). But perhaps the event that was the strongest symbol of the end of the Central American crisis was the defeat of the Sandinistas at the polls on 25 February 1990. With this defeat, it seemed, the Central American decade was over. For Canada, however, it was the beginning of a new relationship with Latin America, with its entry into the oas on 6 January 1990 and the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, announced towards the end of that year. The end of the Central American crisis in 1990 marked the beginning of a new policy for Canada in Latin America. The central policy issues were now broader. They were now to revolve, first of all, around the oas. But more broadly speaking, Canada was working closely with the former Contadora Group and the Lima Support Group, now called the Rio Group. The issues that emerged now for the 1990s were support for democratization and development, and problems of the environment, the Latin American debt, drug trafficking, and economic integration. But most importantly, the thrust of Canada’s policy toward Latin America at the beginning of the 1990s was to recognize how all these issues revolved around the North-South dialogue, particularly now that the East-West Cold War was over. In an important foreign policy speech on Latin America given in December 1990 in Calgary, Alberta, Joe Clark identified what could possibly be the basis for Canada’s future relations with the region. He called on Canada to begin a new dialogue with developing countries and, in particular, to begin to seek a closer relationship with the hemisphere. He stated that “For Canada the hemisphere is a good place to start this new partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally. The

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opportunities are great. So too are the challenges. And so is our responsibility. Mikhail Gorbachev has called for a ‘Common European Home.’ I think it is time that we in North America begin to think – and act – in terms of a ‘common hemispheric home.’ For too long, Canada has seen this hemisphere as our house; it is now time to make it our home. That is the challenge now before us. That is the purpose of our policy.”122

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6 Entering the Inter-American System: Canada and the oas Our decision to join the oas symbolizes our determination to be full and constructive citizens of the Americas. Canada has over many decades tried to play a useful role in the Councils of the world. From the un to the Commonwealth, the Francophonie to the g-7, we have defended the principles of freedom and fairness, of equality and social justice. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney1

introduction On 7 September 1988, Ambassador Richard V. Gorham, Canada’s permanent observer to the Organization of American States and firstever roving ambassador for Latin America gave a speech to the Permanent Council of the oas in which he outlined the difficulties surrounding Canada’s entry into the oas as a permanent member and the reasons why Canada had not joined. He stated that “These reasons reflect at times financial and budgetary priorities, at times concerns about undertaking additional security responsibilities by adhering to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), at times concerns that full membership might subject us to pressures from one side or another or restrict our ability for independent action and at times concerns that our bilateral relations with individual Latin American or Caribbean countries, or with the United States, might suffer … The simple fact is that there has never been a national consensus in Canada in favour of joining. For all these reasons, successive governments in Canada have concluded we should not seek membership.”2 Ambassador Gorham was describing the core debate that had existed in Canada for most of this century. But he added an important, though diplomatic, critique of the oas that had also been at the heart of Canada’s reluctance to join. He noted that although Canada was anxious to play a constructive role in the hemisphere as permanent observer, a greater role in the organization as a member was precluded

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by the many important problems plaguing it. He pointed out that the Protocol of Cartagena, which was to make several amendments to the charter of the oas, had not been ratified and that only Dominica and Trinidad and Tobago had met all their financial obligations to the organization while it was in desperate financial trouble. It is understandable that he would conclude that this analysis “clearly indicates a very low priority being given to the Organization by its own members. We cannot but wonder to what extent the member nations fully believe in and support the Organization which they so often urge us to join.” Gorham added, however, a very important qualification to this reaffirmation of Canada’s reluctance to become a full member of the oas and to his critique of the organization itself: in his personal view, if the organization was to be revitalized, it “would have a highly positive impact on public opinion in Canada, with important implications for the question of eventual Canadian membership.”3 This, in essence, had been Canada’s policy towards the oas, and it seemed it would continue to be so for some time to come. Throughout the first Mulroney government of 1984–88, no debate had occurred in Canada about joining the oas. The comprehensive foreign policy review undertaken by the Mulroney government during its first term in office, which included a review of defence and development assistance, made no mention of the oas, except for one oblique reference in the green paper of 1985, Competitiveness and Security, the government’s first foreign policy review document.4 In all, there was no hint, as Ambassador Gorham’s speech attests, that the government was ready to consider joining the oas. In fact, the one foreign policy issue that dominated during this period was the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, on which the Mulroney government staked its political future in the general election of November 1988. Almost one a year after Gorham’s reaffirmation of Canada’s policy of hesitation towards the oas – and interestingly enough, during a summit meeting in Maine with President Bush – Prime Minister Mulroney announced that the Canadian government was seriously considering joining the oas. Within thirteen months of Gorham’s speech, Mulroney stood in front of the leaders of Latin America at the hemispheric meeting in San José, Costa Rica, and stated that “Interdependence is making us all partners in each other’s burdens, participants in each other’s prosperity, and architects in each other’s dreams. Democracy, debts, sustainable development, drugs – these issues are the agendas of all the governments of this region. The Organization of American States is the only regional organization that can bring all the governments of the hemisphere together to deal with them … Canada

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is encouraged by the efforts made to revitalize and restructure the oas. And we are prepared to contribute to that process, in whatever useful way we can.5 In a little over a year, the Canadian government had made a complete turnaround in its policy towards the oas, and it had done so, significantly, with virtually no public debate and certainly with no public support for the idea of joining the organization.6 Mulroney’s announcement was a complete surprise to almost all observers. On the surface, therefore, it seemed that there were no underlying reasons for Canada’s full entry into the inter-American system.7 I subscribe to the view, however, that Canada’s entry into the oas was the culmination of a process started by Prime Minister Trudeau in his review of Canadian foreign policy in 1970, a process designed to focus on bilateral ties with Latin American countries in the short term, in order to develop the potential for multilateralism in the long term. That process was strengthened by Canada’s growing involvement in multilateralism over the previous ten years, that is, by what has been dubbed Canada’s New Internationalism – to distinguish it from the golden age of middlepowermanship during the Pearson era.8 During the 1980s Canada’s important contributions to La Francophonie, to the Commonwealth, and to peacekeeping through the un, and Canada’s entry into the g-7 all pointed to the possibility of a new role for Canada in world affairs. Canada’s entry into the inter-American system can be viewed, therefore, as part of Canada’s widening role in international affairs through multilateralism. Given Canada’s traditional middle-power position and the emergence of this New Internationalism, it is important to assess the implications of this new policy initiative and see Canada’s entry into the inter-American system from an historical perspective, as part of a long-term movement towards integration with the hemisphere.

The principal purpose of this chapter is to explain Canada’s increasing interest in hemispheric affairs as a function of changes to the international order that culminated with the end of the Cold War and as an expression of a new regionalism that the new order entails. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides a brief overview of how the oas developed over the 1970s and 1980s, from an organization that had descended to irrelevance but that, by the late 1980s, was increasingly in need of fundamental reform in order to fulfill an important new role in the hemisphere, a role that was connected to profound changes and challenges to the international

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political system. The second section provides an analysis of “the oas question” in Canadian foreign policy. The third section assesses the process of Canada’s entry into the oas and identifies some of the reasons behind the decision.

th e oas , f o r go t te n bu t n ot de ad ? f r o m i r r e l e va n c e t o t h e n e w internationalism For over two decades the oas had been moribund. It had few friends or advocates, and many critics delighted in pointing to the organization’s shortcomings and inadequacies, as well as its growing irrelevance and possible demise.9 In 1969 Jerome Slater wrote that “it seems clear that the Organization of American States … has entered a period of disarray and political decline. The signs are everywhere present.”10 For Slater, this decline was marked, in part, by us unilateralism, beginning with the Guatemalan crisis in 1954, then with the Bay of Pigs, and culminating with the intervention in the Dominican Republic.11 But it also occurred because the few convergences between Latin America and the United States that had existed during the 1940s and 1950s were breaking down. That period, considered by many to be the golden age of the oas,12 had been built on a consensus based on the good neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,13 on the consolidation of the United States after World War II, and on the threat from an extra-hemispheric power during the Cold War. This consensus allowed for the growth of an inter-American dialogue, as well as for the consolidation of the world’s oldest general-purpose regional international organization.14 By the late 1960s Latin America had declined as a priority for u.s. foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress, initiated with great fanfare by President John F. Kennedy, had been a great disappointment,15 and u.s. anti-communist policies in the hemisphere diminished the relevance of multilateralism and, hence, the importance of the oas. Added to this was the rise of nationalism in many Latin American states, which diminished the usefulness of the organization, since it was increasingly seen as a tool of the United States, while at the same time, the United States felt its policies consistently opposed, and often simply ignored the organization. The rapid bureaucratization of the oas also contributed to its decline, and many, particularly successive u.s. administrations, saw it as ineffectual and wasteful. In the end, the oas was abandoned by both the United States and the Latin American countries. Although no one declared the organization dead, all

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seemed to walk away in disgust while it remained with just enough attention and support for mere survival. In the 1980s disenchantment with the oas had been augmented by the u.s. intervention in Grenada and by the inability of the organization to deal with the Falklands/Malvinas war.16 Ronald Reagan’s unilateralist policies in the hemisphere, together with his ardent anticommunism, did much to alienate the new emerging democratic governments in the hemisphere. When the United States sided with Britain after General Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina invaded the Falklands/Malvinas (and in the view of many Latin Americans clearly chose nato over the oas), it was the final blow for many Latin Americans. The Rio Treaty (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) was shown to be ineffectual, and the will of the oas was perceived by many to have been slighted. By 1984, not only was the decline of the organization a given, but its relevance and even its survival were in question. Thus in 1984 Francis X. Gannon, consultant to the oas secretary general between 1976 and 1984, posed a most relevant question, in the form of a title: “Will the oas live to be 100? Does it deserve to?”17 For Gannon, the prestige of the organization had hit rock bottom and a serious questioning of its raison d’être was in order. But just as no one was willing to revive the organization, no one wanted to put it out of its misery. And so it lay, forgotten but not dead. To compound matters, the oas was unable to deal with the two most crucial problems of the 1980s: the conflict in Central America and the debt crisis. When Central America seemed on a collision course, it was not the oas that helped to manage the crisis but the Contadora Group, the ad hoc group created outside the organization.18 Composed of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, it had met for the first time in 1983 off the coast of Panama on Contadora Island, from which it took its name. Its primary goal was to find an alternative regional plan to halt the escalation of the conflict in Central America. What was most important was that it sought to find a Latin American solution to the regional conflict. That is, by working outside the oas, it effectively cut out the United States and created a diplomatic buffer that thwarted the Reagan administration’s policy toward the region. This strategy was in marked contrast, for example, to u.s. policy against Castro’s Cuba in the early 1960s, which received strong support from most oas members and included a diplomatic and economic quarantine approved by the organization itself.19 The momentum of the Contadora Group increased when the Lima Group (as mentioned in chapter 5, also known as the Contadora Support Group) was formed in July of 1985. Composed of Argentina,

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Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, the support group added to the credibility of the Contadora process, but also reaffirmed the inability of the oas to cope with the critical situation in Central America. Even though one of the three pillars of the oas, the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement (also known as the Pact of Bogotá), was specifically designed to mediate conflicts between American states, the five Central American republics and the eight countries composing the Contadora and Lima Group worked outside the institutional framework of the oas – hardly a show of support for the organization.20 One other significant event occurred during this period when eleven Latin American debtor countries met in Cartagena, Colombia, on 21–22 June 1984, in order to obtain international recognition for their economic problems and find the means to secure some relief from their creditors.21 Significantly, this meeting followed soon after a special conference organized by the oas in Caracas, Venezuela, in September of 1983, to discuss the increasing indebtedness of countries in the hemisphere. It was an important signal of the malaise of the oas that the countries attending the Cartagena conference (composing a third of the oas members) found it necessary to create a new ad hoc forum to cope with a problem already dealt with by the institutional framework of the organization. The presence of foreign ministers at this meeting, moreover, attested to the fact that this new forum was to deal with a political dimension of the debt problem. Predictably, the group and its activities were opposed by the United States and other industrial nations who were afraid that a “debtor cartel” was being formed. Nonetheless, the conference, which resulted in the Consensus of Cartagena, began a series of meetings outside the oas.22 Between 1983 and 1986 the Cartagena Group was able to highlight the principal problems of debtor countries in Latin America and to attempt to propose some solutions. The emergence of the Contadora and Cartagena Groups in the early to mid-1980s was significant because it gave a strong signal that highlighted the declining relevance of the oas in addressing the most pressing problems in the hemisphere. These groups were a symbol, as well, of the alienating effect of the Reagan administration’s policies in Latin America. u.s. abandonment of the oas increasingly isolated the United States from the rest of the hemisphere. If other hemispheric countries found the United States uncooperative in this multilateral forum, they soon found ways of creating an oas without the usa by establishing ad hoc, independent groupings. In addition, many of the countries involved in these groups were emerging into a new era of democratic rule after difficult military dictatorships that had been, at

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the very least, implicitly supported by the United States or originally established with u.s. assistance. The oas was often seen as a vehicle of u.s. hegemony or as the abandoned tool of an era in which the United States could control the direction of the organization with the support of military allies in many of the countries in the region. For this reason, these ad hoc organizations were an important vehicle for Latin American solidarity, and, hence, they functioned not only to deal with specific issues but to demonstrate the need for an effective system of communication among hemispheric states. Both the Contadora and Cartagena Groups allowed for the consolidation of ties among the most powerful regional players in the hemisphere and contributed to a sense of the solidarity that the oas espoused but had long lacked. A made-in-Latin America response to the crises of Central America and the debt was, therefore, a sign both of the failure of the Reagan administration (and, indeed, of its predecessors) in its approach to the hemisphere and of the oas as a potential intermediary between North and South. Paradoxically, this failure may very well have helped to create a new revitalized inter-American system – one that seemed to be isolating the United States, but one that ultimately lacked an institutional medium to implement hemispheric policies. By 1986 the Contadora and Cartagena Groups had begun to converge into a more unified and coherent movement. More precisely, perhaps, the Contadora Group began to separate itself from the Cartagena Group by creating a new forum for consultation, which included the larger Latin American countries representing most of the region’s population.23 With the emergence of a new regional plan for peace in Central America proposed by Costa Rica’s president Oscar Arias Sánchez, the Contadora Group found itself drifting from the conflict. For some, this signalled the success of Contadora (that is, by avoiding a military confrontation and creating political space for a regional solution):24 for others, it signalled the failure of diplomacy.25 What is important is that by late 1986 the foreign ministers of the Contadora and Contadora support groups, meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, agreed to establish the Permanent Mechanism for Political Consultation and Agreement – the so-called Rio Group (also known as the Group of Eight).26 The purpose of the Rio Group was to “strengthen Latin America’s political agreement, to explore alternatives to the region’s most pressing economic and social issues and to exchange points of view on these nations’ role in the international community.” Some of the central issues that the group dealt with included strengthening democracy in Latin America, finding ways to strengthen economic

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integration, dealing with the Central American crisis, and completing “the consolidation of the Rio Group and the further institutionalization of the Presidential Summit Meetings.”27 It seemed from the declaration made at the first presidential meeting of the Rio Group in Acapulco, Mexico, on 27–28 November 1987, and entitled Acapulco Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy28 that the forum for dialogue and action had become a permanent one. But the spectrum of issues to be dealt with had also broadened from the limited issues of the Cartagena and Contadora Groups to issues ranging from the East-West conflict, the eradication of poverty, and the battle against drug trafficking, all of which were dealt with officially by the oas. There was, though, a consensus to “struggle for the total integration of Cuba into the inter-American system” expressed by Brazilian president Jose Sarney, on behalf of the group, with only Venezuela expressing “some reservations.”29 By the second presidential meeting of the Rio Group in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 27–29 October 1988, the group had agreed on the Uruguay Declaration,30 which dealt in greater detail with issues such as regional integration (economic, cultural, and scientific) and the environment. In addition, the group dealt with issues of peace in the region, debt, and commerce. In all, this meeting resulted in a more detailed and comprehensive declaration, including a host of issues comprising the most important problems that the hemisphere was confronting. Members also advocated greater ties with socialist countries and with Canada, Japan, and regional organizations such as the Council of Nordic Countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Countries, and the Organization of African Unity. The declaration included a call for better understanding between the Rio Group countries and the United States and, interestingly enough, a call to deal with the problems with the oas itself. For the previous two decades, therefore, the oas had suffered from deepening irrelevance in dealing with the issues most important to the hemisphere and from a growing abandonment by all the major actors. The emergence of important summits outside the oas and meetings dealing with issues for which there was an institutional framework within the oas attested to the fact that there was a desperate need for an effective hemispheric multilateral organization and that the oas certainly had not fulfilled that role. The rift that had been created between the United States and many Latin American countries had left the organization impotent; even important internal reforms aimed at greater efficiency within the oas bureaucracy, such as occurred between 1975 and 1983, could not have had an important impact on

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the region without the political will of the major players to use the available institutional framework.31 Between u.s. unilateralism and Latin American ad hoc multilateralism, the major losers were the oas and many of its smaller members (many of which were new members from the Caribbean), for whom the organization had a great deal of potential. By the time of its hundredth anniversary (the oas began as the Pan American Union in 1898) the relevance and very existence of the oas was threatened by paralysis. What is amazing is that, given all this, the oas not only lived to see its centenary but began to show some signs of recovery, and perhaps even of a healthier life. Beginning with the implementation of the Arias Peace Plan in 1987, the oas became an active interlocutor in the Central American crisis. Since then, the secretary general of the organization, João Clemente Baena Soares, played a role in the process for resolution of the conflict; the oas played a role in such functions as overseeing the Sapoá negotiations between the Sandinistas and the contras, overseeing the release of Nicaraguan National Guardsmen from prison (under the amnesty that is part of the Esquipulas II Peace Accord), and acting as official observer in the Nicaraguan elections of 1990. The Contadora peace initiatives and the Arias Peace Plan both operated largely outside the oas, yet when their role as crisis managers subsided and effective measures were envisaged to enforce the peace plan, some existing institutional framework was needed and sought. The oas (along with the un) began to play increasingly important roles in the Central American conflict in the late 1980s. The need for an institutional framework was becoming apparent. This was, perhaps, one of the first signs of the growing relevance of multilateral organizations. But for the oas ever to begin to recover, what it needed, as a minimum requirement, as should be clear from the analysis here, was the political will of the major players: the United States and the Rio Group. But where were signs of this political will, and was there evidence of increased relevance of the oas? A significant event indicating some measure of relevance for the organization was the ratification of the Protocol of Cartagena at the eighteenth General Assembly of the oas at San Salvador on 14–19 November 1988.32 With the deposit of the ratification by El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Panama, the charter of the oas was amended as of 16 November 1988.33 The protocol had first been put forward at a special session held in Cartagena, Colombia, in December 1985. Some of the major changes included an increased role for the permanent council in the settlement of disputes, increased powers for the

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secretary general, allowing Guyana and Belize to become full members after December 1990,34 and allowing for greater involvement by the organization in economic policy matters, especially the debt crisis. Finally, the charter amendments included significant statements about the importance of representative democracy, “with due respect for the principle of non-intervention.” This is noteworthy if we keep in mind that many of the countries that spearheaded the changes to the charter, such as Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, were part of the new democratization movement in Latin America.35 (However, it was the English-speaking Caribbean states that had all ratified the Protocol of Cartagena by 1988, while the Latin American countries lagged behind). The overall importance of this reform is that it points to increased support for an effective hemispheric organization, since at least two-thirds support was required to ratify the protocol. So while the Contadora and Cartagena Groups were actively creating and participating in new ad hoc groups, they were also attempting to introduce important changes that would make the oas more relevant and useful. By the Eighteenth General Assembly, the United States had not ratified the Protocol of Cartagena, and thus charter amendments were largely supported by Latin American and Caribbean countries, including influential regional players who had seemed on the surface to have abandoned the oas. Support for the oas can also be seen in the October 1988 Uruguay Declaration of the Rio Group, mentioned earlier. In its Outline for Action, the declaration identified its first goal as increased support for the oas. Three points were made: first, that the Protocol of Cartagena should be ratified; second, that there should be active support for the secretary general in his endeavour to solve the organization’s financial problems; and finally, that there should be support at the next General Assembly for the Rio Group’s own plan for the future of the organization.36 This kind of support, coming as it did one month before the General Assembly meeting, seemed to indicate the growing interest in the oas by these countries. In fact, under the title “Political Agreement,” the declaration stated that “we have also agreed to continue the efforts destined to strengthen the role of the Organization of American States as a political forum and an instrument for inter-American cooperation and understanding.”37 In sum, by late 1988, support for the oas by Latin American countries seemed to be gaining momentum, in marked contrast to the previous two decades. But if the Declaration of Uruguay and the ratification of the Protocol of Cartagena are partial indications of genuine support given to the organization by Latin American countries, we can also point to the resolution proposed by Costa Rica in Guatemala City during the Eighteenth

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General Assembly, which ratified the protocol.38 The General Assembly passed the resolution, which called for the formation of a ministerial task force representing all oas members “to conduct an in-depth review of the role of the oas.” The resolution was important in the breadth of its mandate, which included strengthening the organization as a political forum and as an instrument for understanding in the hemisphere, “in the exercise of multilateral diplomacy,” and asserted that “priority attention during 1989 [should be given] to an in-depth analysis of the topics that would make up the agenda for oas action.”39 Other issues to be covered in the review of the oas were the strengthening of its role in human rights, drug problems, the debt problem, trade, integration and the development of inter-American law, the increase of technical cooperation, and other issues that the permanent council might choose to deal with. Finally, in a declaration made by the Rio Group to the oas General Assembly, there was an unmistakable desire for the enhancement of the organization.40 It recognized that the oas was going through a crisis of “identity and objectives,” and it was made clear that the major problems the organization faced were not the bipolar and strategic ones that had dominated the first twenty-five years of its existence. The Rio Group saw the oas as incapable of dealing with the needs and objectives of the current members, since it “has not evolved at the same rhythm that hemispheric relations have done and it has slowly and increasingly seen itself separated from the principal problems that are produced in America.” This crisis was demonstrated by the increasing financial problems that plagued the organization, even though it had seen a large increase in membership, and although the bureaucratic structure of the Alliance for Progress continued to exist, support for it was long gone.41 Finally, the statement pointed to the fact that Latin American and Caribbean countries were major players in the world scene, proof of which could be seen in the emergence of the Contadora and support group movements, as well as in the existence of the Rio Group and the Commonwealth meetings of the Caribbean countries. In sum, the world had changed in the previous twenty-five years, but the oas had not. It was within this framework that the Rio Group called for a “new conception of security, of political solidarity and cooperation among the American States.” Echoing the call of the Declaration of Uruguay, the Rio Group stated that “The strengthening of the organization demands, then, a new political commitment among the countries of the hemisphere through the formulation of an Agenda for Action of the oas that will look after the continental problems, facilitating dialogue and cooperation between the industrial countries and the developing

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nations of the hemisphere, all of this at the center of a regional organization that is characterized by the principle of universality.”42 In concrete terms, the position of the Rio Group was, therefore, that the oas should be strengthened to make it a more relevant organization. But any analysis of the potential and relevance of the oas must include an assessment of the u.s. position. As was argued above, during the years of the Reagan administration, u.s.–Latin American relations became progressively strained, particularly on the issue of Central America. The predisposition of the United States had been to act bilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary, and multilaterally only if it could get its own way. Certainly, much of the disappointment in the oas occurred because the United States did not utilize the organization and continuously withheld funds from it. Without u.s. financial and political support, the oas simply could not be effectively revived. Recognizing this, the Rio Group had called for a renewed dialogue with the United States. Although during the first months of the Bush administration no official mention was made of increased support for the organization, there were influential conservative voices calling for a new u.s. policy toward the oas. Two reports released just before and after the election of Bush indicated some support within the United States for a greater role in the oas.43 In a document released by a committee of the Republican Party entitled Santa Fe II: A Strategy for Latin America in the Nineties, there was a concrete proposal for “renovating the oas.” The document was quite critical of the Reagan administration’s policies in the region and of its ignorance of the oas: “the Reagan Administration’s de facto lack of interest in this body has been a serious mistake. Its promises to meet fully its financial commitment to the Organization and its subsequent refusal to do so have badly damaged American credibility.” The document went on to argue that the oas was a much friendlier body than the un and that the oas therefore deserved greater attention. The committee argued as well that the oas was an important forum for the United States to discuss and attempt to resolve such issues as military security, drug trafficking, immigration, and the debt. Moreover, it suggested more concretely that the oas ambassador should coordinate u.s. initiatives in the region and that the United States should pay its assessments, “to show that it takes its responsibilities seriously.” The conclusion of the committee was not so different from that of the Rio Group; it stated that “The next Administration needs to get its priorities straight. Our agenda and that of Latin Americans are not necessarily incompatible. The oas, properly financed and aimed in the right direction, can serve our mutual interests.”44

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A report by the Heritage Foundation that was designed for the State Department as a “blueprint for action” for the new Administration also referred specifically to the oas. Pointing to the diminished influence of the United States in “South America,” as a result of the new multilateral institutions, the report stated that “The new president should strengthen u.s. participation in the oas and seek to make the oas an effective instrument of democracy and capitalism in the Western hemisphere.” The report also called for the pursuit of actions requiring multilateral cooperation and, like the Santa Fe II report, targeted issues such as drug trafficking, immigration, terrorism, the debt, the elimination of non-trade barriers, and increased funding for the oas. The Heritage Foundation report also called for u.s. ambassadors to meet more frequently with “South American” foreign ministers and for greater involvement of senior u.s. officials in “attending and addressing oas meetings.” Finally, it encouraged the u.s. government to “make available to the oas information and technical resources on such issues as drug control and antiterrorism warfare.”45 In all, the report described u.s. policy toward the hemisphere as desperately in need of a multilateral forum. However, it also went so far as to suggest that aid should be given to countries “supporting u.s. positions in the oas,” which was intended to “increase u.s. clout” within the organization.

An early indication of the Bush administration’s attitude toward the oas came immediately after the annulled election results in Panama in May 1989, which occurred amid accusations by the opposition of electoral fraud and of “foreign interference” by the Noriega government. The u.s. diplomatic assault on the regime of President Noriega began with a request to Latin American countries to withdraw their ambassadors. During a scheduled meeting of the oas Permanent Council on 12 May, the United States supported a Venezuelan resolution requesting a meeting of consultation of foreign ministers on 17 May, “to consider the serious crisis in Panama in its international context.” This was the first such meeting convened since the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, and it came at a time when the United States and Panama had reached a high level of rhetorical confrontation. For both the United States and Panama, convening the meeting allowed for breathing space during a difficult and tense period, but for the United States especially, it demonstrated the willingness to use the oas, if only to test its effectiveness. The resolution that resulted and was accepted by consensus used strong language to criticize Noriega and the violence against opposition candidates. The resolution also set up a mission of foreign ministers (from

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Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago) and the secretary general of the oas to search for “conciliation formulas for arriving at a national accord that can bring about, through the democratic mechanisms, a transfer of power in the shortest possible time, and with full respect for the sovereign will of the Panamanian people.”46 On the other hand, the resolution had a message for the United States, since it also stated that the meeting of consultation exhorts all states to refrain from any action that may infringe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states.47 The failure of the diplomatic initiatives of the oas in their attempt to resolve the conflict between Panama and the United States peacefully may be considered by some as another failure of that organization. However, the mere fact that the United States accepted this kind of mediation by the organization may be regarded as a triumph in itself. The eventual use of force by the United States against Panama was perhaps inevitable, but the subsequent vote by the oas to condemn the u.s. action (the vote was 20 to 1, with 8 abstentions), clearly underlined the fundamental importance of such a multilateral forum and reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in the Americas. Clearly, Latin American and Caribbean countries took the role of the oas seriously, both in attempting to mediate to avoid conflict and in condemning the use of force after it occurred. And while the new u.s. administration did not send any signals in support of the oas, the use of the organization to deal with the situation in Panama was, briefly, a positive sign. Not only did the Bush administration have to confront the growing hemispheric isolation created by the Reagan administration, it also had to confront the increasing ad hoc multilateralism in which the Latin American countries had been engaged. If the United States wanted to avoid the creation of an “oas without the usa,” it had to begin, as the reports cited above argue, to focus much greater attention on the oas. But the United States might have had to accept somewhat diminished influence over the organization and its members, while still paying the lion’s share of the cost of running it. In an era of greater interdependence, the United States might have had to adjust to the increased use of multilateral diplomacy, although it was doubtful, if push came to shove, that the United States would have avoided unilateral actions anywhere in the hemisphere, as was made clear by the u.s. invasion of Panama. The announcement by Bush in June of 1990 that he was launching the Enterprise for the Americas, which dealt with trade, investment, and debt, and his subsequent trip to South America in early December 1990 gave no indication, either, that his administration saw an important role for the oas in the 1990s.

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During the 1970s and 1980s the oas was, perhaps, at its the lowest ebb. But some solutions had also begun to emerge. We have seen during this period the abandonment of the principal inter-American multilateral institution, but, particularly for Latin American states, not the abandonment of inter-American multilateralism. The United States had been unwilling to play the game and Latin American States, in particular, had begun to create their own games with different rules – and without the United States. Nevertheless, the inter-American system could not work indefinitely without active u.s. participation, and the need for the institutional framework of the oas became more apparent in late 1980s, as so many Latin American and Caribbean leaders argued. Ad hoc multilateralism could produce the process for dialogue and creative diplomacy, but once some consensus was reached a proper framework was needed. The oas is, for better or worse, that framework. It may be that – to transpose the old saying – when it comes to the oas, the hemisphere “cannot live with it and can not live without it.” This might be the central paradox of the inter-American system today. In assessing the oas, we must not fall into the trap of confusing the rhetoric behind it with the real difficulties involved in a regional multilateral organization. As L. Ronald Scheman argues, we seem to expect too much from international organizations; we are used to the more concrete and relatively efficient method of national governments. International organizations have different goals and methods. For Scheman, “The real benefits of these organizations are their influence in fomenting a world environment that modifies the behavior of states, especially the most aggressive of them.”48 But also important is the functional role they can play in providing technical assistance, especially to small states. For those who are waiting for the oas to achieve an efficiency and effectiveness comparable to domestic governments, there will be a long wait indeed. The oas, it must always be remembered, is composed of thirty-five member states, all of whom have diverging interests and opinions. There are limits, therefore, to its performance. This is not to say that there is no room for great improvement (and a desperate need for it), but this improvement should be directed at concrete and realizable projects, as Scheman argues. The oas has proven itself capable of inefficiency and irrelevance, but it should also be clear that it is a necessary, if not an indispensable, organization in the long term. To have limited expectations about the oas is not however to diminish in any way its ideals, which can be, at times, the driving force for change. But it does mean that, to use Scheman’s phrase, we must find a balance between “rhetoric and reality.” We must also remember that if the oas had been forgotten, it was not dead.

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The unfolding of events in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s confirms the rise of the new internationalism. The growth of ad hoc multilateralism and multiple channels of interstate relations, the growing importance of summit meetings among Latin American heads of state, and the recognition that many important issues could not be dealt with outside of multilateral institutions concluded in the genuine attempts by Latin American countries to somehow make the oas more relevant, though perhaps there was not always the desire to make it truly effective. It is also important to recognize that the relative decline of the United States after 1968 also signalled the decline of the oas and a general movement by Latin American countries away from blindly supporting u.s. policy in the region, or in the world for that matter. This change gave Latin American countries freedom to act in opposition to u.s. foreign policy during the Central American crisis, and, indeed, it allowed Central American states themselves to pursue a peace plan not sanctioned by the Reagan administration. The question remains how Canada responded to these hemispheric trends, which is the subject of the next section.

d e f i n i t e m ay b e : canada’s commitment to the oas The question of joining the oas has been perhaps the longest unresolved issue in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian response, as Jean Chrétien put it, had always been a “definite maybe.”49 Although Canada was ineligible to join the Pan-American Union (pau),50 since it was not a republic, not completely independent, and not integrated into the inter-American system in any significant way,51 the question of membership in the predecessor organizations of the oas can be dated to before World War I. Indeed, in 1910 Elihu Root, the u.s. secretary of state, ordered a chair with Canada’s name inscribed on it in anticipation of Canadian membership in the union.52 The event later become a cliché describing Canada’s aloofness toward membership in the oas.53 In 1933, though, during the Inter-American Conference at Montevideo, Mexico, Chile, and Ecuador expressed their desire for Canada to join the pau. By this time Canadian membership had become less problematic, due to the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which, among other things, allowed Canada to develop its own diplomatic relations and thus eliminated one of the principal barriers. But Canada still declined to join. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, bringing the United States into the war, Canada was prepared, for the

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first time, to join the pau.54 Prime Minister MacKenzie King had by this time decided to have a “diplomatic exchange” with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The decision to hold an emergency meeting of the pau in Rio de Janeiro in early 1942, to discuss “hemispheric defence,” prompted the prime minister to express Canada’s interest, through diplomatic channels, in joining the union. Jean Desy, Canada’s minister to Brazil, was asked to “tell the Brazilian authorities for their confidential information that Canada would be prepared to accept an invitation to join the Pan American Union.”55 The United States, however, was worried that Canadian membership in the union would foster British “involvement in hemispheric affairs,” and so opposed Canada’s attendance at the meeting, which only the American republics were supposed to attend. This prompted MacKenzie King to say, rather cryptically, that “there have been times quite recently when we might have expected invitations, but were given reasons why it should not be advisable to have an invitation extended, for reasons which I cannot explain publicly.”56 From the time the Organization of American States was founded in 1948 and through the 1950s, Canada’s involvement in the United Nations made Canadian membership in the oas a difficult prospect. During this period of Canadian internationalism it was felt that support for a regional organization would work against the universality of the un and might serve to undermine it.57 It is easy to understand that secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, one of the un’s greatest advocates, would not want to join a regional organization, which, in any case, was seen as dominated by the United States. As John Holmes put it so incisively, “On Canada’s part, the persistent difficulty lay in our weariness of neutralism before the war and of regionalism after the war.”58 For the period considered as the golden age of the oas, therefore, Canada was not involved in the inter-American system to any significant degree.59 The overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954, however, did much to solidify Canada’s opposition to the oas. With the u.s. policy of “try the oas first,” in order to achieve its objectives multilaterally if it could, it became clear that the organization’s principles of nonintervention, not to say the role of the un as peacekeeper and mediator, were the victims of us unilateralism.60 During the Diefenbaker government (1957–62) a slightly renewed interest in the oas emerged. After undertaking the first visit of a Canadian foreign minister to Latin America, Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith (who travelled to Brazil, Peru, and Mexico) returned with some degree of interest in Canadian membership in the oas. His successor, Howard Green, an advocate of Canada’s membership in the pau in 1941, took over the issue, and between 1960 and

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1961 there was a great debate over oas membership.61 During this period Canada began participating in the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (1960) and joined the un’s Economic Commission for Latin America (1961). By then, the United States wanted to share the financial burden of the oas, and began to encourage Canada, as the only other major industrial power, to join. Considering the antagonism between the Diefenbaker government and the u.s. administration, the invitation was probably a mistake and certainly contributed to cooling the debate about joining the organization. It was, however, the expulsion of Cuba from the oas in 1962 and u.s. involvement in the Bay of Pigs that most likely caused the freezing of the oas question in Canada. Canada’s relations with Cuba were quite warm, since there was, in general, some sympathy for the Cuban revolution in some quarters in Canada. Opposing the United States on this foreign policy issue, allowed the Diefenbaker government, as J.C.M. Oglesby argues, to increase trade with Cuba and to demonstrate an independent policy.62 The principal loser in all this, as the principal vehicle of the United States, was the oas.63 The final blow was, of course, the Dominican Republic intervention, which put the question of Canada joining the oas into a deep freeze.64 So after 1963, the Pearson government, with Paul Martin Sr as the ssea, made no move toward membership,65 although Martin was known to be sympathetic to the idea.66 In 1967, in an address delivered in Ottawa, Martin stated that “For my part, I have no doubt whatsoever that membership in the oas is part of the ultimate destiny of Canada as a country of the Western hemisphere.”67 During the Liberal leadership campaign in 1968, Pierre Trudeau argued that Canada should join the oas, but only when it became more independent from the United States, which would allow Canada greater room for independent decision making.68 In the same year, after Trudeau had been elected leader of the Liberal Party and had won a general election as prime minister, five cabinet ministers visited Latin America to study closer ties with the region. Two years later, the Department of External Affairs released the white paper Foreign Policy for Canadians. As was explained in chapter 5, an entire booklet of this document is dedicated to Latin America (partially a result of the ministerial visit in 1968), with a specific chapter on the oas. The analysis of the white paper affirmed that Canada already wanted to get closer to Latin American countries, but it asked if the oas would be the best route. The choices were reduced to two: join the oas or draw “closer to the inter-American system, without actually becoming a member of the oas.”69

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Although the white paper was somewhat optimistic about the future of the oas (in part because of the new Caribbean memberships), it expressed traditional Canadian concerns, such as the implications of signing the Rio Treaty and the difficult position Canada would be in if a case like the Cuban embargo and quarantine should occur. Although it was recognized that Canada had real interests in the hemisphere, it was stated that they were still “somewhat limited.” Thus it was argued that the government’s role was to develop closer ties with Latin American states. Yet membership in the oas was still postponed: “It may be that, at a certain point in time, a Canadian government will conclude that Canada could best foster this purpose by joining the oas. In the meantime, Canada should draw closer to individual Latin American countries and to selected inter-American institutions, thus preparing for whatever role it may in future be called upon to play in the Western hemisphere and gaining the experience which is indispensable in a complex milieu which few Canadians yet know very intimately.”70 In traditional Canadian fashion, given the opportunity to join or not to join the oas, the government did neither, and yet it did both. Applying good old Canadian diplomatic skills, Canada created a third choice out of only two. The government’s decision was to apply to become a permanent observer to the organization and to become a member of various inter-American organizations. This decision was seen as a first step toward full Canadian membership. It fell to J.P. Goyer, the parliamentary secretary to the ssea, to address the General Assembly of the oas in Washington on 30 June 1970 and state that “the Canadian government would be interested in establishing a formal link between Canada and the oas at a suitable level. We would envisage a Canadian representative as having the status of Permanent Observer.”71 Canada was formally granted the status of permanent observer on 2 February 1972, as were Guyana, Israel, and Spain. In 1972 Canada also joined the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences and the Inter-American Bank. It had already become a member of the Inter-American Institute of Geography and History in 1968 and of the Pan American Health Organization in 1972. It was of course ironic that Canada became involved to this extent with the oas in its period of decline. Given the state of the organization and of u.s.–Latin American relations, the decision to become a permanent observer was certainly a sound one. It allowed Canada to have the best of both worlds. It could increase relations with Latin American countries (and with English-speaking Caribbean countries that joined mostly during the 1970s), while avoiding the major controversies of the time. Indeed, there must have been a collective sigh of

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relief among senior officials of the Department of External Affairs when Canada could sit quietly and anonymously in the background during the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. Nevertheless, if the objective of the 1970 white paper and the application for permanent observer status was to increase ties with Latin America, they were largely successful. The subsequent two decades saw much greater interaction between Canada and the hemisphere. Domestic interest and “awareness” also increased dramatically (the lack of interest by Canadians in Latin America was always cited as a reason not to join). With the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, Canada received scores of refugees, many sponsored by individuals and church groups. With the rise to power of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979, interest and awareness in Latin America increased markedly. Although this had not translated into any substantial interest in the oas, it may be interpreted as a first step toward public awareness of inter-American affairs. During the 1970s, there were several calls for Canada’s full membership in the oas, which ranged from a call by u.s. president Jimmy Carter to one by Grenada’s prime minister Eric Gairy.72 But Trudeau’s attitude was that if the Latin Americans were not agreed on the usefulness of the organization, there was not much sense in joining. Canada continued to wait and see. Dr Arthur Blanchette, Canada’s permanent observer to the oas between 1976 and 1980, argued that Canada was benefiting from permanent observer status and that the oas discussions were more constructive than those in the un.73 But perhaps Senator Eugene Forsey put Canada’s position best when he said that membership in the oas “would be the perfect way to lose friends and influence people the wrong way.”74 This period of aloofness certainly coincided with the rest of the hemispheric trends, and so Canada remained in a fairly comfortable position as an “active observer.” Speculation about Canada’s membership in the OAS was renewed by the recommendation of the Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence that resulted in the report Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.75 The subcommittee voted seven in favour and four against, with one abstention. On the standing committee nineteen voted in favour of the entire report and six against (with one abstention), but nine members specifically opposed oas membership. It is difficult to understand, however, why the subcommittee voted in favour of oas membership, given that during the open proceedings virtually every witness opposed oas membership. The general opinion of the committee seemed to be that the oas had a solid reputation in the field of human rights, as indeed it did, and in its “small but modest” development assistance program.

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Canada was not a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the committee felt that a Canadian contribution to this commission would be substantial. Except for some rather stretched arguments about commercial benefits derived from Canada’s involvement in development assistance through the oas, however, little that was positive could be said about the organization. The subcommittee argued that, in general, “the Organization of American states is not now a particularly effective instrument for the promotion of Canadian foreign policy purposes.”76 Nonetheless, the subcommittee felt that Canada might be more effective if it was entirely within the oas than it would if it was only partly involved in it. For one thing, it argued that Canada could serve as a bridge between North and South in our own hemisphere, and it speculated that since it was unlikely that the oas would be replaced, Canada’s contribution might strengthen the organization. In addition, it felt that Canada, as a full member, could promote the return of Cuba to the oas, and, finally, it rejected the idea that membership in the oas would create serious rifts between Canada and the United States, since there were anyway always occasional differences in other international fora. The subcommittee recommendation can be attributed to one very important viewpoint: although Canada’s membership in the oas had been opposed by some because of the organization’s ineffectiveness (they argued that Canada should wait until the current members had “fixed it”), the Subcommittee took the opposite view and argued that “the question to answer is whether Canada wished to participate with the other nations of the Americas in trying to build a more effective oas. The Sub-Committee’s answer to this question was yes.”77 It was recommended, however, that Canada should not sign the Rio Treaty until further review. Reaction to the subcommittee’s decision was fairly flat. No major debate ensued. A Vancouver Sun editorial opposed the recommendation and called it the “wrong choice.”78 But the question of membership caused some difficulties. Not only was the Falklands/Malvinas crisis fresh in the minds of many, but, as the Vancouver Sun editorial pointed out, some observers felt that oas membership would bring Canada into greater contact with the dictatorships of Latin America. On the other hand, the Council On Hemispheric Affairs, based in Washington, dc, called on Canada to join and argued that “full membership in the oas would enable Canada to play a more active regional role in human rights issues and become a strong voice for reason and peaceful solutions in areas of conflict, particularly in Central America.”79 In 1983, Allan MacEachen, who had recently replaced Mark MacGuigan as ssea and who had therefore inherited the oas question,

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turned down the subcommittee recommendation, perhaps in the end because, as he stated in February of that year, “I need to be convinced that it is a real plus and that we are going to help Canada’s interest by joining.”80 This opinion was based, it seems, on the fact that, although there was no overwhelming reason to abstain from joining, neither was there any great inducement to join. On balance, given that the oas seemed to have been abandoned by the United States and the major Latin American states, given that unilateral u.s. actions were probably envisaged in Central America, and given the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, oas membership must not have looked very exciting. So, once again, Canada, with its policy of hesitation, would patiently wait until next time. With the election of the Mulroney government in 1984 and the major review of Canadian foreign policy, little attention was given to the oas membership question, in sharp contrast with the previous white paper of 1970. In his own review of Canada’s foreign policy in Competitiveness and Security, the green paper mentioned in chapter 5, ssea Joe Clark described Canada as a unique state, since it was an Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic state, as well as a member of the un, nato, the Commonwealth, and La Francophonie (and, one might add, of the g-7), but he also argued that “We are a nation of the Americas, with an interest and an investment in the hemisphere’s future.” However, unlike in 1970, only two sentences were dedicated to the oas, at the very end of the green paper, under the heading “Regional Conflicts.” The paper stated that “the debate has long been underway whether to join the Organization of American States (oas), with strongly held arguments for and against. Where do Canadians stand on the issue?”81 Although under the same heading separate reference was made to the Caribbean and Central America and questions were raised about whether our current involvement was enough or whether more was warranted, no explicit connection was made between these two issues. No mention was made, either, of the oas and Canadian membership in the 1986 report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations (the Hockin-Simard Report) titled Interdependence and Internationalism. Interestingly enough, however, the Contadora and Cartagena Groups were clearly mentioned in the sections dealing with the Central American conflict and the mounting debt crisis in Latin America, indicating that the committee had quite clearly seen these groups as effective interlocutors dealing with their respective issues.82 These sections did therefore demonstrate a greater sensitivity to the hemisphere. While Central America remained an important foreign policy issue during the Mulroney government’s first term in office (1984–88),

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Latin America as a whole, and the oas specifically, remained the lowest of priorities. The government’s energy was overwhelmingly reserved for the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and toward its own overhaul of foreign, defence, and development assistance policies. The oas sank almost into oblivion. With the appointment of Richard V. Gorham as permanent observer to the oas in 1987, the ambassador and his alternate observer began to administer their duties based in Ottawa, although the permanent observer mission remained in Washington. As if to try to balance this obvious diplomatic signal to the oas, Gorham was appointed roving ambassador to Latin America in late 1987, a position that had no precedent in Canada (and one that was not filled again when Mr Gorham stepped down in 1990).83 The 1987–88 Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs justified this action by stating that “These changes were designed to facilitate stronger ties between oas agencies and interested public and private sector organizations in Canada and, at the same time, to heighten awareness of Canada’s interest in the region.”84 But the clearest and most important statement of the Mulroney government’s attitude toward the oas came when, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Gorham addressed the Permanent Council of the oas in September 1988, the first time since Canada had become a permanent observer that a Canadian Ambassador had addressed that body. In his speech, Gorham stressed the importance of the themes that influenced Canada’s bilateral relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. At the top of the list of priorities were trade and investment “which continue to be of prime importance to us.”85 But Gorham also pointed to Canada’s interest in the growth of democratization in the region and the importance of stability, with specific reference to Central America. Other issues of importance outlined by the ambassador were Canada’s interest in promoting social justice and human rights, as well as in connecting these issues to the problem of debt in Latin America and the Caribbean. In this respect, he cited Canada’s efforts at the g-7 summit in Toronto in 1988 to pay special attention to the concerns of middle-income countries and Canada’s development assistance program in the region. Finally, he mentioned the growing problem of drug trafficking and the need for Canada to address this problem through multilateral cooperation. If indeed these issues had led to the increasing importance of Canada’s relations with Latin America, some members of the Permanent Council must have been disappointed at Gorham’s critique of the organization, discussed earlier, and, particularly, of member states’ lack of support for it.

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Ambassador Gorham’s statement, which was made at the very end of the Mulroney government’s first mandate, certainly encapsulated Canadian policy and the Canadian attitude toward the oas during the previous four years. Canada had done everything short of withdrawing its permanent observer status to demonstrate its displeasure with the oas. But the next few months would see events that would pave the way for Canadian membership in the organization, a completely unimaginable event in September 1988. Within a month of Gorham’s speech, the Rio Group had urged Latin American states to ratify the Protocol of Cartagena and had called for a significant reform of the organization. Within two months the oas General Assembly, meeting in San Salvador, had ratified the protocol and set up a ministerial taskforce to reform the oas. At the same time, Canadians had returned the Mulroney government to power and thus assured the passage of the fta with the United States. With this agreement behind them, the Mulroney Tories could begin to look at other regions of the world.

entering the inter-american system: th e f o u rt h pi l la r o f ca n ad i a n foreign policy? Why did the Canadian government make such a dramatic change within such a short period of time, particularly since the decision to join the oas came without warning and in the absence of any public debate? Until this time successive Canadian governments had all avoided the issue of oas membership without much domestic controversy or international pressure. Moreover, Latin America had traditionally been a low priority for Canada, preoccupied, as we were, with the United States and Europe and the Asia Pacific region as the three pillars of our foreign policy. Relations with the English-speaking Caribbean states, where Canada historically had strong ties and interests, were best handled through Canada’s involvement in the Commonwealth and the francophone summit, so joining the oas had to involve primarily a change of policy towards Latin America. To begin to unravel this seemingly abrupt and sudden decision to join the oas, we must first understand that Canada’s entry into the inter-American system had been a slow and gradual process for over two decades. One of the main conclusions of chapter 5 was that Pierre Trudeau’s foreign policy review in 1970 and his policy of greater bilateral and multilateral contact with the hemisphere was pivotal. The strategy laid out by Foreign Policy for Canadians was simple but powerful: in the short term, Canada was to consolidate and increase its bilateral relations with Latin American countries, and in the long term

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Canada was to nurture its multilateral relations through its observer status at the oas, with a sight on eventual membership. Much of the impetus for this policy thrust was Pierre Trudeau’s own personal belief that Canada could no longer ignore Latin America.86 But it was the 1980s that brought Canada closest to Latin America. The Central American crisis allowed Canada to enter into the most volatile issue in the hemisphere – which it did in a delicate balance between u.s. pressure to overthrow the Sandinistas and Latin American resistance to the escalation of the conflict. During the 1984–88 period, contact between Canada and Latin American countries did increase, but it was the nature of this contact that was significant. Before the Contadora peace process began, Canada’s multilateral contacts in the hemisphere were limited to the oas (although Canada was involved with un agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean). As a permanent observer, for example, Canada was not required to send its foreign minister to the General Assembly, which limited diplomatic contacts considerably. Because the oas was seen as ineffectual by Canadian diplomats and politicians, Canada’s multilateral role was limited to the technical aspects dictated by permanent observer status. But during Mulroney’s first term in office, Canada began to participate in the emerging ad hoc multilateralism of the Contadora peace process and, later, with the five Central American presidents in their efforts to seek a peace agreement. In this respect, contact between Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sánchez and ssea Joe Clark was particularly important, especially after the former was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Supporting the Contadora peace process until 1987 provided senior Canadian government officials and the ssea himself with unprecedented multilateral diplomatic communication with the most powerful Latin American countries. But the strong and enthusiastic Canadian support for the Arias Peace Plan also involved a predisposition to accept Costa Rica’s diplomatic initiatives, which were in accord with Canada’s internationalist ideology. Awarding the peace prize to Oscar Arias greatly solidified support for Costa Rica’s approach to the conflict, in part because the award was in the same vein as the Nobel Peace Prize awarded former Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson. Here was the opportunity to link Canada’s old internationalist ideals to a peace process carved from the same tree as Canada’s, to those of the new internationalism. Although the Central American crisis was perhaps the principal catalyst for the decision to join the oas, because it brought Canada closer to Latin American ad hoc multilateralism and defined an unprecedented role for peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the hemisphere, other important issues increased Canadian awareness of

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Latin America and led to eventual participation in the inter-American system. First, there was the debt crisis in the region. By 1988 Latin American and Caribbean countries (principally Mexico and Brazil) owed over $19 billion to Canadian banks.87 The possibility of a major default by some of these countries increased Canada’s stake in Latin America. There was also an attempt by Canada to play a constructive role as an intermediary between North and South. This became evident when ssea Joe Clark asked several Latin American foreign ministers to meet with him on the eve of the Toronto summit of the g-7 in l988 and when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney attempted to deal with the debt problem at the summit. Another issue that increased the relevance of Latin America for Canada was the drug problem. In 1988 the rcmp released its publication National Drug Intelligence Estimate for 1987/88, in which the importance of drug trafficking from Latin America, especially trafficking in cocaine, was made evident.88 As the drug problem grew in Canada during the 1980s and extended from mere trafficking and sale of drugs to money-laundering techniques that involved Canadian banks and financial institutions, the importance of greater multilateral coordination between Canada and drug-producing countries in Latin America became more evident. A Canada/oas-sponsored training program in the summers of 1989 and 1990 in which middle level Latin American drug enforcement officers were invited to a special two-week course sponsored by the rcmp was an indication of the importance of greater multilateral coordination in the hemisphere. In October 1989 Prime Minster Mulroney explicitly acknowledged these two problems in his speech in San José, Costa Rica, in which he announced Canada’s intention to join the oas and argued that the two problems demonstrated the interdependent nature of the hemisphere. Canada’s decision to join was also influenced by developments in the inter-American system itself. As Ambassador Gorham’s speech before the Permanent Council of the oas attested, developments towards reform could influence Canada’s decision to review membership. Consequently, the calls for reform of the oas by the Rio Group,89 the ratification of the Protocol of Cartagena, and signs that member states in Latin America were beginning to pay their dues in 1989, all influenced the Canadian government in a positive way. Although these developments in no way signified that the oas had dramatically changed, they did point to positive developments that, when added to the other factors mentioned above, had a significant influence on Canada’s decision to join. Finally, it is also important to note that Canada joined the oas when its role in Europe was diminishing with the end of the Cold War, the

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increasing solidification of a European economic community, and the demise of the Soviet empire, all of which seemed to be isolating Canada from its traditional multilateral role in European and East-West affairs. For generations politicians and diplomats had fostered Canada’s multilateral role in order to counterbalance Canada’s relations with the United States. Now they seemed to be losing one important element in this counterbalance. Added to these changes was Canada’s continental integration with the United States, which pushed it even further into the u.s. sphere. The decision to join the oas, like the subsequent decision to enter into the North American free trade talks only a year later (in 1994 Mexico was added to the fta in a trilateral, and later on, it was hoped, in a multilateral trade regime), only underscored Canada’s search for new counterbalances with the United States. Whether it was conscious or not, joining the oas was part of a visceral reflex to attain greater independence in foreign policy and to fully apply an internationalist ideology in a new region. In sum, the growing interconnections in North-South relations in the hemisphere and the increasing importance of multilateral relations in dealing with issues such as peace in Central America, the debt crisis, the drug problem, and, more recently, the environment, as well as the increasing importance of regionalism in a post–Cold War world, all had a profound influence on Canada’s decision to enter the inter-American system. The interest and commitment of groups within civil society have partially justified the government’s decision to join the oas. It is true that domestic groups had at best an ambivalent position concerning the oas, though many opposed it because they believed it was a u.s.dominated organization. Yet the high priority that many Canadians had given to Latin America in the previous twenty years pushed many ngo’s to look at the oas as another important tool with which to pressure their government to promote human rights, democracy, and development. For example, only a year after Canada became a member, many Canadian ngo s began to focus on the oas to press the government on issues such as human rights now that Canada was a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.90 Finally, another important objection to joining the oas was that Canada had long been reluctant to sign the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) and had reservations about security aspects of the oas charter, in particular chapter 5. Although the security zone included Canada, it was unlikely that Canada would ever consider signing the Rio Treaty, since the Canadian government would find little domestic support for joining another military alliance – especially one that might draw Canada into an unwanted conflict.

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The Falklands/Malvinas conflict was a continuous reminder to the Canadian government of the potential entanglements that the Rio Treaty could produce. However, the fact that Canada could be accepted into the oas without signing the Rio Treaty was perhaps the last stumbling block to overcome. There is little question that Canada’s reluctance to adhere to the Rio Treaty defused opposition to oas membership at home. But all this did not mean that Canada was not interested in matters of security in the hemisphere.91 Since joining the oas Canada has been responsible for promoting the creation of the Unit for Democratic Development and the Working Group on Cooperation for Hemispheric Security, which later became the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security. These initiatives fall within a new conception of security called “cooperative security,” which includes nonmilitary issues such as democratization, drug trafficking, migration, and human rights.92 The end result of all these developments was that Canadian internationalism seemed directed towards a new region.

conclusion As this chapter makes clear, Canada’s entry into the inter-American system must be seen as a gradual development that began with the release of Pierre Trudeau’s foreign policy review in 1970 and culminated with the announcement by Brian Mulroney in San José, Costa Rica, in 1989 that Canada intended to join the oas. In the nearly twenty-year interval between these two events, bilateral and multilateral contacts increased steadily, as did contacts by ordinary Canadians. This process became more evident during the 1980s, when Canada became involved with the Central American conflict as a potential mediator and peacekeeper. As contacts between Canadian and Latin American officials increased through ad hoc multilateral fora, Canada was drawn into the inter-American system. With the renewal of Canada’s internationalism during the 1980s, multilateral fora became increasingly important, both to promote Canadian interests and to cope with issues of transnational importance that bilateral relations could not deal with. Canadian multilateralism in the hemisphere grew steadily and incrementally, and in this sense, it did not represent a new direction, only the culmination of an old one. But in another sense, Canada’s full entry into the oas represented a qualitative change in its responsibilities in inter-American affairs. Once Canada had become a full member of the oas, its multilateral policies would have to be more responsive to the hemisphere.

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The growing importance of Canada as a multilateral protagonist in the hemisphere depends, however, not only on the high quality of its diplomats, but also, and especially, on its political will to take a leading role in inter-American affairs. Unfortunately, although joining the oas was an important step in placing higher priority on Latin America, yet the announcement of the decision to become a permanent member was devoid of a coherent or comprehensive policy outlining the government’s intentions. Did Latin America deserve a higher standing in the government’s foreign policy agenda? Would there be a greater allocation of resources for bilateral and ngo development assistance programs? Would there be increased diplomatic representation in the region? In short, how would Canada define its role in the hemisphere? The absence of such a comprehensive policy that might serve as a guide to Canadian foreign policy sent mixed messages. On the one hand, the government took an important initiative in entering the inter-American system, but, on the other, that new relationship was nowhere defined or supported by greater resources, other than voluntary and assessed oas fees. Indeed, it is difficult to understand, in the absence, at the political level, of an articulated policy toward the region, just what the government intended by joining the oas. The lack of such a policy might well have signified a reluctance to elevate Latin America to a more important position on the foreign policy agenda. It might also have signified a reluctance to take hold of the responsibilities, both symbolic and material, that joining the oas demands. It might have meant, finally, an unwillingness to make Canada an important leader in inter-American affairs. Nevertheless, the Mulroney government (and especially Joe Clark) was responsible for the deepening of relations between Canada and Latin America, not only by joining the oas but also by increasing bilateral and ad hoc multilateral relations throughout the hemisphere. This strategy, of course, was part and parcel of a broadening of Canada’s foreign policy due to the new internationalism. In seeking deeper ties and an increased presence in Latin America, Mulroney’s government also reflected a greater awareness of the region on the part of the Canadian public and their call for activism by Canada in the region. This development is the topic of the next chapter.

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7 Advisors to the Prince? Domestic ngo s and Canadian Foreign Policy Nobody had ever seen any Canadian, except a soldier, who had been in Vietnam. But you’ve got thousands who’ve been to Nicaragua for the crop [as volunteer coffee-pickers], or as missionaries. It’s a different lobby, or presence. Nothing in our experience has prepared us for that. External Affairs Official1

introduction Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America after 1968 cannot be understood without an investigation into the role that nongovernment organizations have played in attempting to shape that policy. Whether through representations to government officials to admit Chilean refugees after the overthrow of Allende, through grass roots letter-writing campaigns urging the Canadian government to denounce the government of El Salvador, through press conferences accentuating a contradiction in Canada’s foreign policy in Central America, through presentations before parliamentary committees, or, finally, through consultative sessions with parliamentarians and government officials, ngo s became increasingly active in Latin American issues throughout the 1970s, and highly visible during the 1980s when the Central American crisis became one of the most sensitive foreign policy issues in Canada. This intense activity and increasing organization was not solely the product of the Central American crisis. By the time the Nicaraguan revolution had succeeded on 21 July 1979, by the time Archbishop Arnulfo Romero of El Salvador was brutally assassinated on 24 March 1980, highlighting the savage civil war in that country, and by the time Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States in November of 1980, a Latin America constituency had been establishing itself for more than a decade, through a cross-country network that would blossom into one of the most sophisticated and enduring foreign policy advocacy networks in Canadian history. Whatever these

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ngo s were able to accomplish in the 1980s, when they became most visible, was due in large part, therefore, to how they had evolved in the 1970s. Although many students of Canadian foreign policy have recognized the increased activity of these groups over the past two decades, they deny that this increased activity has meant increased influence on government policy.2 I do not claim that all social movements dealing with foreign policy have been able or are able to influence government in the way these groups did in the 1970s and 1980s, nor do I claim that this influence produced radical changes and results hitherto unknown to Canadian foreign policy. But I do argue that the Latin America constituency was pivotal in the establishment of a Canadian foreign policy towards Central America and, indeed, was the locus of that policy in the 1980s. The Latin American constituency, viewed as a social movement with a specific set of political and policy goals, succeeded in making the politics in Central America one of the most sensitive Canadian foreign policy issues in the 1980s, an issue that might otherwise have been largely ignored by successive Canadian governments. This is not to say that these groups were able to press successfully for all their demands and were able to control Canada’s foreign policy agenda in the region. Indeed, this kind of influence (so-called agenda-setting)3 should not be the measure of their success or failure, since it would signify their takeover of the foreign policy apparatus itself. Instead, the success of these groups can be measured by the manner in which they were able to place the issue of Latin America on the foreign policy agenda, by the number of policies that the government adopted in response to their explicit requests or under the political pressure that they created, and by the role they played in mobilizing ordinary Canadians through a variety of groups all across the country to support an issue clearly out of the bounds of Canada’s state interests. In other words, one good measure of the success of ngo s interested in Central America during the 1980s is the proposition that if it had not been for them, Canada might have largely ignored the conflict in Central America, as Britain did throughout the 1980s.

th e nat u re a n d b ac kg ro u nd of canada’s latin american constituency The Latin American constituency in Canada has evolved into a broad-based coalition of ngo s, often operating at the local level and with national organizations to coordinate activities and disseminate

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information. ngo s with an interest in Latin America can be divided into five groups: • • • • •

church organizations labour organizations solidarity support organizations research organizations voluntary development aid organizations

Such a division is, of course, not clear-cut in practice. For example, the Latin American Working Group (lawg) was both a solidarity support organization, since it engaged in many activities in support of peoples in the region, and a research organization that had the best collection of resources on Latin America in Canada and that published articles, books, and a newsletter. A more clearly defined research organization like the Canada–Caribbean–Central America Policy Alternatives (capa) produces academic work but is also an advocate organization. In general, individuals active in Latin American affairs may be involved in one or more of these kinds of organizations, or they may perform functions outside their strict purview. It should therefore not be surprising to find a church organization doing solidarity work, acting as an advocate before the government on specific foreign policy matters, managing development projects in the region, and sponsoring research. The complexity of these ngo s defies strict definition by function, but this is part of what makes them both interesting and effective. Because there are so many of them, for simplicity I will focus, where possible, on the umbrella organizations that represent each grouping at the national level, and I will concentrate on their role as public policy advocates in Canada. While the 1970s saw the emergence of ngo s with an interest in Latin America and the 1980s saw an explosion of their activities, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of quiet revolution for these groups. The two principle organizations participating in this quiet revolution were the churches and the Canadian labour movement. Later – and through the advances of these organizations – development agencies, solidarity networks, and research organizations began to evolve on their own. The increased involvement of the mainline churches in Latin America beginning in the late 1960s was part of a broader politicization of the churches in that decade. During the previous decades, the churches seldom involved themselves in foreign policy issues, and when they did, in the words of Bob Matthews, they would “whisper into the ear of the King,” as the church and state would work together to address common goals.4 But the 1960s were, as John Webster Grant explains them, “the

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decade of ferment.”5 Several events contributed to this change: the Protestant churches underwent programs of modernization, such as the new curriculum of the United Church and changes to the Catholic Church brought about by Vatican II, that opened the church structure and spurred a new ecumenical movement. The meeting in 1966 of the World Council of Churches’ Conference on the subject of church and society was pivotal. As Cranford Pratt and Roger Hutchinson argue, the conference “marked a dramatic shift in emphasis from the task of developing less developed countries and classes to being in solidarity with oppressed peoples in their struggles for liberation.”6 Three basic changes had occurred by the late 1960s and early 1970s that would fundamentally change the relation between the state and the churches on matters of foreign policy. According to Matthews, there was, first, a new agenda facing states that included economic, environmental, and the social questions. Second, there was a disjunction between the government’s foreign policy goals and ideals and the goals and ideals of the churches. And finally, there was a profound change within the churches themselves. Thus, Matthews concludes, it was “the more general activism of the church in the Third World and in the World Council of Churches that had a profound impact on the way Canadian churches viewed international development and world politics. The net result is that since the early 1970s the advocacy role of the churches in Canada has grown.”7 The 1970s, therefore, bore the fruit of this ferment. A number of important interchurch organizations were established that marked a new activism in foreign policy. The two issues that first distressed church members were Canada’s policies toward Vietnam and toward South Africa.8 They helped to further politicize some elements in the churches, and as a result, several interchurch coalitions concerned with NorthSouth issues developed in the 1970s.9 This broader church movement, particularly in its connection with Third World issues, found particular resonance with young Christians and their discovery of the struggles occurring in Latin America. They later became activists and leaders in the ngo movement. Labour, represented by the Canadian Labour Congress (clc), began its ties with Latin America in 1956, when it joined the InterAmerican Regional Organization of Workers (known by its Spanish acronym of orit), which is the regional organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ictfu). Unlike the predecessor organizations that joined to form the clc (the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada and the Canadian Congress of Labour), the clc was more active in international issues and, in 1957, even set up an office for international affairs.10 A fundamental foreign policy

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principle of the clc and orit was opposition to Communism and right-wing dictatorships in Latin America.11 Labour’s increased involvement in Latin America during the 1960s was gradual, but its contacts with the region were at least as well developed as the churches’. What emerged for labour from this decade was a clear policy of opposition to repressive regimes, whether from the left or right, a belief that Canada had an important role to play in the region, and the promotion of greater involvement by Canadians in foreign policy issues. However, the clc did not pave the way for participation by its members in issues relating to Latin America, and at any rate by the late 1960s and early 1970s, little attention was being placed on the region: the Vietnam War, the Middle East, South Africa, and Rhodesia were taking centre stage.12 Throughout the 1960s contact was made through labour officials, but the groundwork had been laid for union member activism in Latin American affairs, and perhaps all that was required was an important event to rally the members themselves. During the 1950s and 1960s Canadian ngo s became involved in Latin American affairs, therefore, primarily through the churches and through labour officials. The issues were tackled at the institutional level, with little involvement of members. These institutions provided the leadership and created the context for involvement by individuals through other more direct ways of participation. By the late 1960s, with the general politicization of society due to opposition to the Vietnam War and the struggle for civil rights, ngo s began to provide individuals interested in Latin America with more direct means of participation than the church or labour could provide at the time. Nonetheless, these latter institutions provided the leadership and the legitimacy for opposition to dictatorships and for support for development in Latin America. As the churches and labour began to criticize u.s. involvement in Latin America and as they began to take the government of Pierre Trudeau up on its challenge to allow Canadians to become more involved in foreign policy issues, the emergence of a Latin American constituency was the inevitable result. By the early 1970s all the elements for this constituency were present and only waiting for a catalyst to bring them together.

a c al l f o r a c ti o n : th e ch i le an co u p and the canadian reaction The overthrow of Salvador Allende in September 1973 was the catalyst that brought the first concerted response by Canadians from all walks of life to a crisis in Latin America. It was the rallying cry for those who

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had slowly been learning about the region during the previous decade and an awakening for many others who had no previous knowledge of Latin America. For years interested Canadians had read about military coups in Latin America and had done nothing to pressure their government to condemn them. The Canadian government therefore understandably was astonished by the strong reaction from the Canadian public, even though it had been promoting greater involvement by Canadians in the foreign policy process. Although Canadians had not actively followed the rise of Salvador Allende and were generally apathetic towards events in Chile, the brutal military coup and Allende’s subsequent death became the focus of nation-wide condemnation, which was particularly evident at the grass-roots level. Petitions signed by academics, labour unions, church leaders, student organizations, and ordinary Canadians grew quite unexpectedly.13 But the ire of the public was focused not only on the Chilean military junta or the United States; it was also directed at the Canadian government for its recognition of the Chilean military regime, its slow and reluctant response to the plight of Chilean refugees, and its financial support for the junta through the Export Development Corporation (edc) and through international financial institutions (ifi s). Another set of criticisms was leveled against Canadian corporations and their investments in Chile, and pressure mounted for Canadian institutions and individuals to divest themselves from these corporations. In all, the strength and the swift organization of the domestic movement opposing Canada’s foreign policy towards Chile was a surprise, and it put the government on notice that Canadians would scrutinize Canada’s foreign policy in a way they had never done before. The churches (headed by the Canadian Council of Churches) took a leading role in urging the Canadian government to condemn the Chilean coup, and they opposed Canadian recognition of the Pinochet regime. Beginning in September 1973 the churches took unprecedented measures to oppose Canada’s foreign policy. The first few months after the coup were a period of organization and intense lobbying by the churches. Only two days after the coup, church leaders sent a telegram to ssea Mitchell Sharp urging him to assist refugees leaving Chile, an issue that would be at the centre of church-state relations for years to come. On 18 September, the Canadian Council of Churches also sent a telegram quoting a cable sent to the un by the World Council of Churches urging the Security Council to ensure that the new regime in Chile would respect human rights. In response to this crisis and in opposition to Canadian recognition of the Pinochet regime, the Inter-Church Ad-Hoc Committee on Chile (icahcc) was founded in September and October of 1973. It had its

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first meeting with Sharp on 3 October 1973, when it criticized the government for being too weak in its stand against the junta, for its quick recognition of the Pinochet regime, and for its treatment of human rights and refugee questions.14 The government responded to pressure from the churches and others by sending a special envoy to Chile, Geoffrey Pearson, and an official of Manpower and Immigration to get a first-hand look at the situation and report back to the minister.15 In December the icahcc met with Sharp again; by then much more pressure was being placed on the government for its slow reaction to the refugee crisis. One important new factor was that the churches had begun to send fact-finding missions to the region, and they returned with first-hand information about the brutality of the coup and the deplorable conditions of those arrested. Rev. Richard Roche, sj, recently returned from Chile, met with Sharp on 3 December and urged the government to help the refugees. In December two other Canadian church leaders were sent to Chile, Rev. William Smith of the Canadian Catholic Conference and Father Robert Smith of the Scarborough Foreign Mission. By the end of December the Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Catholic Conference, with Father William Smith attending, had met with Sharp to explain the grave situation. In a statement made on 28 December, Father William Smith said that “The Canadian Churches have a moral responsibility to speak out against this abhorrent violation of human rights and to extend a warm hand to their brothers and sisters who suffer.”16 By January 1974 the government began to respond. On 12 January Canadian forces planes went to Chile and brought back more than 170 refugees, including a group who had been in the Canadian embassy since 10 December. The churches nevertheless began to barrage the government with criticism and pleas for quicker and more efficient processing of refugees, and these pleas became the centre of lobbying for them.17 Many church people also began to accuse the government of supporting the Pinochet regime, and others asked that Canada “be cooler” towards Chile.18 The icahcc began to consolidate and coordinate the activities of many of the churches, as well as to act in concert with solidarity organizations and labour unions who were also mobilizing on this issue. On 9 October 1974 “a group of concerned citizens” consisting mostly of church people, academics, aid organization representatives, and student leaders submitted a brief to Allan MacEachen, the new ssea, and to Robert R. Andras, the minister of Manpower and Immigration, that pointed out what the group believed was the distance between the rhetoric and the reality of government actions towards Chile.19 Three main points of criticism emerged from the first year’s analysis by the group

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of Canadian foreign policy towards Chile: the brief criticized the government for remaining virtually silent regarding the suppression of democratic institutions in Chile and the many human rights abuses; it criticized the government for recognizing the Chilean junta and accused it of assisting multinational corporations to extend economic assistance to Chile and promote Canadian investment there; and finally, the brief criticized the slow processing of refugees. It urged the government to take a stronger stand on human rights issues, including clearly and publicly denouncing the Pinochet regime; it also urged the government to continue its policy of embargo and do all it could to discourage public and private investment; and it recommended that Canada allow ten thousand persons to enter Canada under relaxed criteria. By 1976 the icahcc was expanding its interest beyond Chile, and it sent a delegation of church members and mp s to the Southern Cone. Although they were not permitted to enter Chile, they reported on the human rights abuses in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay and began to broaden somewhat the debate about human rights in Latin America.20 One of the most important events following the overthrow of Allende was the establishment of solidarity organizations throughout Canada.21 Many sprang up spontaneously to help Chilean refugees enter Canada, but they also concentrated on condemning u.s. policy in Chile and putting pressure on the Canadian government to be more critical of both the United States and Chile. These groups, which were comprised of a coalition of church members, students, unionized workers, and academics, were important because they allowed interested individuals at the local level to get personally involved. Many of these solidarity organizations held church-basement meetings, lobbied their local mp s, and published newsletters providing alternative interpretations of events in Chile. In Toronto, for example, a group called the Toronto Welcome Committee for Refugees from Chile was formed in late 1973. The group provided services such as reception for refugees upon arrival in Canada, including translation and settlement services, counseling, assistance with immigration officials, and collection and distribution of clothes and money for needy cases.22 At the national level the Chile-Canada Solidarity Committee was formed. It had three main purposes: providing alternative information to the press, pressuring the Canadian government not to recognize the Pinochet regime and to accept large numbers of refugees, and organizing forums to inform the public of the causes of the coup. The committee began publishing the Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter, with the assistance of lawg, in September 1973. The newsletter chronicled demonstrations held across the country and publicized the establishment of

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other solidarity organizations.23 It also published responses by the Canadian government to questions about the treatment of refugees (these responses usually demonstrated little sensitivity to their plight),24 and it reported on the many meetings of such groups with government officials.25 When the secret memos of Ambassador Andrew Ross were leaked, lawg and the Chile-Canada Network claimed that they clearly demonstrated a bias in favour of the military junta and published excerpts to make their point, while making the complete set available to anyone upon request.26

In the 1950s, among those who answered the call of Pope John XXIII to do missionary work in Latin America were many Quebec missionaries. They began a special relationship between Quebec and Latin America that was to grow during the following decades. With the radicalization of Quebec society during the 1960s a connection was forged between the search for justice in Latin America and for a new role for the Québécois within Canada. As L’Entraide missionnaire, a leading church organization that began in the late 1950s, described it after a reorganization between 1970 and 1973, given “the combined influence of the Latin America situation and the radicalization of Quebec society, L’Entraide will be focussing particularly on social justice and the preferred option for the poor in the second half of the ’70s.”27 There was, then, a special connection between the dramatic social changes in Quebec in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the attention placed by the Québécois on events in Latin America, a connection that found new meaning with the overthrow of Allende. Soon after the military coup in Chile, the Comité de solidarité Québec-Chili, which published the newsletter Chili-Québec informations, was established. Branches were formed throughout Quebec and on university and cegep campuses.28 The Comité de solidarité espoused a variety of methods for protest, including public demonstrations, petitions, and telegrams. Support also emerged for bringing Chilean refugees to Quebec and ensuring speedy approval by Canadian officials. Interestingly, the Comité de solidarité immediately made the connection between the struggle of the Chilean people and that of the Québécois, perhaps because the coup had come only three years after the October crisis of 1970. It stated that “In Quebec, we had the War Measures Act and Bill 19, followed by the imprisonment of union leaders. Our ‘democracy’ cites national security and essential services as its justification; the military junta invokes security and national reconstruction.”29 Together with the interest gained through missionary work and the cultural, religious, and linguistic parallels, this connection that

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many Québécois felt with Chile accounts for the quick mobilization in Quebec. Chili-Québec informations continued to publish, but as the decade progressed, it began to feature articles about other Latin American countries30 and also criticized Canada’s business connections with the region.31 In 1976 a group of Latin American journalists established the Agence latino-Americaine d’information (alai) in Montreal. It subsequently published newsletters relating to the same issues in English and Spanish, and there were occasional publications in Spanish and French.32 In January 1973, nine months before the military coup in Chile, lawg and the Development Education Center published a booklet entitled Chile versus the Corporations: A Call for Canadian Support, in which they outlined many concerns about the survival of the democratically elected government of Chile, in view of the economic blockade it was going through and the strong opposition from multinational corporations.33 The connection to the churches is quite evident in the booklet; it was printed at the United Church House and contained a radical Christian critique of the world capitalist system (it began with a quote from Isa. 3:14–15 and ended with Prov. 31:8–9).34 It was intended to communicate “the message of Canadian and American missionaries in Chile that many of their efforts towards socially responsible Christian witnesses are frustrated by governments and corporate actions at home. Specifically, it calls for action in Canada and the u.s. to end the attacks on the democratically elected government of Chile.”35 The booklet included a letter from u.s. missionaries to Christian churches presenting not only their opposition to u.s. foreign policy in Chile and Latin America but a fundamental disagreement with the very power base of the United States. They concluded, for example, that the international capitalist system contradicts the teachings of Christ and argued that “The present international economic system is a situation of sin, and as such it must be rejected.”36 In another section, reprinted from Le Soleil, Québécois missionaries in Chile appealed to Prime Minister Trudeau, and various Catholic religious leaders appealed to the Canadian government to support the government of Allende. lawg concluded by reaffirming its views that Chileans were poor because of the international capitalist system in which multinational corporations played a vast role. Making an explicit connection between the struggle in Chile and the struggle in Canada, lawg thus concluded that “Canadians who ignore or tolerate this warfare on the hope and future of a people by private corporate empires based in the United States (or any other country) simply invite upon themselves a similar threatened future. Chilean copper may become a

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metaphor for Canadian iron ore, petroleum, wood, or water. If and when Canadians act in solidarity with the Chilean people, they may learn something about the road to their own liberation.”37 As the most established solidarity network and research organization on Latin America in Canada, lawg worked on Chilean issues while maintaining a broad interest in other Latin American issues. The group, which had an established network and knowledgeable volunteers, had chronicled the events leading up to the coup and thus was the best informed organization. During the 1970s lawg published widely on the situation in Chile and was often sharply critical of the Canadian government. The task for lawg throughout the 1970s became to criticize Canadian foreign policy towards Chile, to press the government on the issues of Chilean refugees, to provide information on the evolving events in Chile and the international solidarity network that developed, and to provide analysis and information about Canadian involvement in Chile (particularly about Canadian corporations), thereby presenting its own anticapitalist worldview. By the spring of 1974 lawg was putting together information on the refugee situation, noting that Canada had accepted only 234 refugees by February 1974, whereas France had accepted over 1,000, West Germany 750, and Sweden 580. However, lawg also reported that although the Canadian government had ignored the refugee situation for the first three months after the coup, in response to repeated representations by ngo s the government was beginning to react positively: “About the end of November, there was a shift in rhetoric, and the December 10 admission of more than fifty people into the embassy was a material expression that Ottawa at last was conscious that there was a problem in Chile. This consciousness was won, inch by inch, by repeated representations, factual reporting, church pressure, demonstrations and the visit of Madame Allende.”38 lawg representatives had no way of knowing that Canadian officials in Chile had taken in many refugees immediately after the coup, but were quite accurate, as we saw in chapter 5, about the influence that ngo s had wielded in pressuring the government to move quickly to accept Chileans into Canada. Indeed, by January 1974, the government had established a new program for Chilean refugees, the Special Movement Chile. As George Hanff argues, “With the decision to initiate [this] programme … and with the subsequent decisions to enlarge the programme’s quota, the Canadian government appears to have been responding largely to the pressures emanating from various domestic sources and the unhcr.”39 In September 1974, a year after the coup, lawg was continuing to pressure the government, but this time to improve the processing of refugees, since the battle over accepting them had already been largely

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won. For example, lawg argued that only 695 Chileans had actually arrived in Canada, even though the Canadian churches had asked for between 5,000 and 10,000. It also pointed out that “Canadian immigration statistics show that for the first quarter of this year there was a higher immigration from Ecuador (452) than from Chile (395).”40 However, by 1977 the quota of the Special Movement Chile, the government program to bring Chilean refugees to Canada, had slowly risen to 7,000, and by 1978 approximately 6,000 Chilean refugees had been admitted.41 With some ground gained on admitting Chilean refugees to Canada and with that battle being waged by the churches and solidarity organizations, lawg provided a sympathetic analysis of the Allende government in a series of articles on Chile, criticized the international capitalist economic order for helping to overthrow that government, condemned u.s. imperialism, and claimed to expose the duplicity of capitalist countries, especially Canada, in supporting the Pinochet regime.42 One year after the coup, in a scathing review of Canada’s foreign policy toward Chile, lawg argued that “Fuel feeds fire. When it’s a human holocaust, savagery burning all in its path, it needs a lot of fuel. And Canada is feeding the fire in Chile.”43 In support of this statement lawg argued that Canada’s recognition of the Pinochet regime, its granting of a $5 million export credit for the sale of De Haviland airplanes (approved during the Allende government but announced after the coup), and its endorsement of a $95 million stand-by facility grant by the imf all pointed to Canadian complicity. In addition lawg pointed to cases in which Canada had supported the Pinochet regime in multilateral forums, such as the renegotiation of the Chilean debt held by the Paris Club, the approval by the Inter-American Development Bank of a $22 million loan, and the participation by Chile in a cida-sponsored investment seminar. In addition, lawg pointed to increased purchases of Chilean copper by Canadian companies and to the sale by Canadian companies of mining equipment to Chile. What was especially criticized was that Canada’s policy towards Chile was publicly declared to be “apolitical,” deriving from economic, not political, criteria. As lawg argued, this meant that the policymaker’s concern was to “put the government structures at the service of an export-oriented and foreign-dominated sector of the Canadian economy for the realization of increased profit.” For lawg, therefore, there was a direct connection between foreign policy and the business sector, but there was also the belief that the public could change these policies. As lawg concluded, “The countervailing power is that of the Canadian people to insist that no fuel be added to the Chilean holocaust from Canadian taxpayer’s

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monies; that Canadian banks and private enterprises be constrained from trading and investing in Chile; that the loans and aid programmes to Chile be stopped, so that one more obstacle can be removed from the struggle of the Chilean people to resist and overthrow the dictatorship.”44 lawg continued to do solidarity work with other groups. For example, two years after the coup lawg helped organize Chile solidarity week and (along with the Sudbury Committee for a Democratic Chile and the Chile Documentation Centre in Regina) published Chile Report: Two Years of Struggle, Two Years of Solidarity. The report featured a photograph of a uniformed General Pinochet sitting with his arms crossed, looking defiant, and surrounded by senior Chilean military officials. The caption read, “How our government keeps these men in business.” The report outlined Canadian government and business support for the junta and provided a brief analysis of Canadian companies doing business in Chile. It also included a section entitled “What You Can Do in Solidarity with Chile,” in which Canadians were asked to publicize the events in Chile, write letters to corporations urging them not to invest in Chile, and pressure the Canadian government to halt credit to the Chilean regime, and it called for individuals to join local solidarity committees.45 lawg also participated in a solidarity group called Project Chile, a coalition that included the Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility and the Canadian Labour Congress and that opposed Canadian support for the Chilean junta in the form of investment, loans, or credits.46 The assault on Canada’s foreign policy towards Chile continued throughout the 1970s, as did the attack on corporations. One issue of the lawg Letter was devoted entirely to Noranda Mines and its investments in Chile, another to economic relations between Canada and Chile and human rights, and yet another to Canadian trade with Chile between 1973 and 1978.47 In this manner, lawg was able not only to highlight the crisis in Chile but also to further its own “anti-imperialist” analysis. Before the Chilean coup the clc had not been in close contact with Chilean unions, but it subsequently rallied with other ngo s to condemn the coup and opposed Canadian recognition of the Pinochet junta.48 In October 1973, clc executive vice-president Joseph Morris wrote to ssea Mitchell Sharp criticizing Canadian recognition of the Chilean junta and urging the Canadian government “to assure the safety of the 13,000 refuges who had made Chile a haven from militarism in other Latin American countries.”49 At its 1974 constitutional convention, the clc reiterated these two critiques of the government and, in a statement adopted by the convention in May, stated that,

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“On both of these points, our government proved to be lax with their rather rapid recognition and the plodding manner in which it responded to the cruel fate of the many Chilean refugees.”50 The clc was particularly concerned with the suppression of trade union rights, but it joined the broader movement opposing the Canadian government’s actions towards Chile in a way it had not done before, thereby helping to demonstrate a great deal of solidarity between various social groups in Canada. It was clearly also much more critical of the Canadian government than it had been in the past, and it continued to criticize the Canadian government at subsequent conventions. In all, the Chilean crisis galvanized a number of individuals, institutional ngo s and social movements; it also created issue-oriented ngo s at the local and national levels. But what was to come would be even more impressive. One of the most important features of the “Chilean constituency” was that by the late 1970s it began to expand and spawn an interest of the whole of Latin America. By 1977, in order to reflect this growing concern, the Inter-Church Ad-Hoc Committee on Chile changed its name to the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (icchrla). In the first editorial in the new icchrla Newsletter, the connection between Chile and the rest of Latin America became explicit, especially because of requests from Christians in Canada: “We, as Canadian Christians, are being called to respond to these needs of the churches and people in Latin America who speak out prophetically against injustice and human rights violations. The Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America hopes to carry out an active role in Canada in defense of human rights and refugees from oppression in Latin America.”51 And so, with the establishment of icchrla, a broader commitment to the region began, but what followed was also the institutionalization of this commitment and the establishment of a regular newsletter that provided a steady source of information. In the first icchrla Newsletter, for example, in addition to the editorial just mentioned and coverage of events in Chile, there was analysis of situations in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay. Interest in Central America was also beginning to increase. The two principal countries targeted for analysis in Central America were Guatemala and El Salvador, with some mention of Nicaragua. Although during this period, the icchrla concentrated on various human rights problems in the region, it also concerned itself with the larger Latin American countries and with Canadian immigration laws.52 With the entrenchment of the Chilean regime, the issue of Chile seemed to be losing steam, although it continued to be prominent for the icchrla. Once most

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of the refugees had arrived in Canada from Chile and once it was obvious that Pinochet was not going to be toppled or pressured out of power, the work of icchrla became more diffuse. By the late 1970s, lawg’s attention was beginning to focus on the Nicaraguan revolution. In an issue of the lawg Letter dealing with Canada-Chile trade, published in June 1979, lawg’s editorial made a direct link between the struggle in Chile and the Nicaraguan revolution, which was nearing an end: “As this Newsletter goes to press, the news from Nicaragua is more and more compelling. The Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan people are engaged in a desperate and determined battle to free themselves from the brutal and inhumane fortyyear-old dictatorship of the Somozas. Once more we are witnesses to the possibility that a Latin American people will free themselves from a government which has enslaved them to enrich a few, and in its place create a society based on justice and equality.”53 For its part, the clc continued to reiterate its policy calling for the Canadian government to rescind recognition of the Pinochet regime and stop bilateral and multilateral aid and financial support for Chile. By 1976, however, the clc was also mentioning the suppression of human rights in Argentina.54 During the Twelfth Constitutional Convention in 1978, the clc was particularly preoccupied with the erosion of democracy in Latin America, and it argued that “The destruction of democracy means the disappearance of fundamental human rights and is immediately accompanied by the suppression of trade union rights.”55 The clc continued its campaign and concentrated on opposing the sale of candu nuclear reactors to Argentina and denouncing the repression of organized labour in that country.56 With the creation after 1975 of a new publication entitled Labour’s Views on International Affairs, the clc was able to give more coverage to Latin American affairs. By 1978 the clc was also beginning to pay attention to events in Central America. As the Nicaraguan revolution was heating up, the clc published two articles on the situation there by Luis Medrano Flores, the general secretary of the Confederation for Trade Union Unification of Nicaragua (cus), explaining the grave situation in his country and requesting financial support for the struggle against Somoza. The clc responded by providing funds to assist the cus. When Medrano Flores was assassinated on 11 January 1979, clc president Dennis McDermott expressed his “horror and dismay” and condemned the murder.57 By 1979 the trade unions were also linking events in Chile and Nicaragua. At a meeting of thirty union leaders from Europe, Latin America, and Canada with members of the ictfu Committee for the Defence of Human and Trade Union Rights in Latin America, which was held in Toronto on 1–2 February, McDermott

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stated that “The human and trade union rights situation in this part of the world cannot be allowed to deteriorate any further … Chile and Nicaragua are the tip of an international political iceberg which, allowed to continue on its bloody jaunt, could rapidly develop into another powder keg. Our Action, therefore, transcends the boundaries of the trade union world and must reach out to the international community as a whole.”58

The immediate response by Canadians to the Chilean coup was truly an amazing event, but one which can be understood in the context of the evolution of interest in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s and the general belief that the public should have a greater say in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian public certainly had mixed success with its response to the coup. On the issue of refugees, it seemed quite successful. However, even though there seemed to be a great deal more work done by domestic groups than during previous refugee crises, recognition of the Chilean junta was never reversed and successive Liberal governments continued to deal with Chile both multilaterally and bilaterally. Perhaps the greatest success was the development of the Latin America constituency itself, which would be the basis for opposition to Canadian foreign policy in the 1980s. Once the network was born it would be here to stay, and it would certainly continue to surprise Canadian governments in the future. Perhaps most importantly, the response by Canadians to the overthrow of Allende created difficult domestic problems for the Trudeau government, which was unaccustomed to such public displays of opposition regarding events in Latin America, an area that, as mentioned, had not previously elicited such passionate interest by Canadians. The scale of the reaction and the depth of feeling involved, however, can be attributed to several important factors that would play themselves out in the coming decade, but with even greater force. First, Canadians had become increasingly interested in North-South issues for over a decade and interest in Latin America was well established among the churches, unions, and some development agencies. There was a sense among many Canadians that the world was becoming smaller, that it was in fact “a global village,” and that events in faraway places had an impact at home. For many Canadians, these events were no longer someone else’s problems. As the Vietnam War had taught Canadians, a moral argument needed to be raised against the injustices of the world, whether they took the form of war, famine, or human rights abuses. Second, Foreign Policy for Canadians had established as government policy the importance of involvement by Canadians in the

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foreign policy process; it had called for an independent foreign policy for Canada; and it had emphasized the importance of Latin America to Canada. Third, although there was little interest demonstrated by Canadians in the Chilean situation between 1970 and 1973, the murder and overthrow of Allende, a democratically elected president, was viewed as an injustice that could not be ignored, as had been the case with the Dominican Republic intervention only eight years before. Finally, there was a growing willingness to accept that the Chilean coup was a result of u.s. intervention and, with time, this suspicion bore fruit. In sum, conditions existed in 1973 in civil society that had not existed before but had been ripening for some time. The fruit of this movement would continue to ripen.

th e c en tr a l a me r i c a n d e c a de As already discussed, beginning in the 1960s and continuing in the 1970s, Canadians became increasingly interested in Latin America. The Dominican Republic intervention disturbed a few, but the overthrow of Salvador Allende mobilized thousands and surprised the Canadian government by the intensity of the domestic critique of government policy and the pressure to bring refugees Canada. But the Central American crisis was to bring together public forces that had been building for nearly two decades, in a massive campaign focused on a region little known to most Canadians, where there had been virtually no traditional Canadian interests. The immediate focus of attention was a coalition led by a littleknown revolutionary group called the Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (fsln), which overthrew Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and brought forth the promise of a new kind of political system in Latin America. With the hope that the example of the Sandinista revolution, which promised to support principles espoused by the Latin America constituency in Canada during the 1970s, would spread in Central America, many in Canada began to focus attention on the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. When the Reagan administration began its policy towards Central America by opposing the Sandinistas and providing military aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, Canadians mobilized to buttress the Nicaraguan revolution and to oppose Reagan’s policy by pressuring the Canadian government to condemn Washington’s actions. Between 1980 and 1983, then, mobilization by ngo s revolved largely around securing a foothold in the region for a new kind of regime and, later, around opposing any threat by the United States to the Nicaraguan revolution, on the one hand, and around continuing to oppose the regimes in El Salvador and Honduras, on the other.

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At first, most of the demands directed at the Canadian government by the Latin American constituency were for bilateral actions: increased aid to the region, opposition to the u.s. embargo on Nicaragua, condemnation of the mining of Nicaraguan harbours by the United States, public disagreement with the United States on the funding of the Nicaraguan resistance, and denunciation of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for their human rights violations. Once the Canadian government had acted on some of these demands, the focus of ngo s began to shift in the direction of a multilateral role for Canada by promoting a peacekeeping – if not a peacemaking – role, a role that was very much a part of Canada’s traditional internationalist ideology. Soon after the Contadora Group was founded in 1983 by four Latin American countries (its purpose, as noted in chapter 6, was to reduce tensions in the region and promote a peaceful and negotiated settlement), the demands on the Canadian government by domestic groups changed considerably. Although ngo s continued to press for the demands they had made in the early 1980s, including even more aid to Nicaragua and no renewal of aid to Guatemala and El Salvador, it was clear that the Canadian government was now being pressed to fulfill its traditional role as peacekeeper. This domestic pressure resulted in unprecedented Canadian multilateral activity in Latin America and, as argued in the chapter 6, was to have an important impact on Canada’s future relations in the hemisphere. Revolutions to the South: Focus on Central America By 1979 it was becoming apparent that Central America was the new hot spot in the region. Two icchrla fact-finding delegations went to the region in 1978 and 1979.59 In June 1979, one month before the Sandinistas took power, the icchrla published a special issue of its newsletter that pointed to the growing importance of Central America: “The almost complete failure of the electoral process in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the entrenchment of military governments, the failure of aid and development programs in the region, and the worsening economic situation of the people have led to the development of strong popular movements. Because of their demands for justice, it is these movements which are being struck most severely by the present repression and political violence.”60 More importantly, the analysis of the Central American situation also included a critique of Canada’s foreign and economic policy in the region, even though Canadian business interests were modest, to say the least, and the Canadian government had not focused any attention on Central America. The icchrla nonetheless pointed to the

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involvement of Canadian corporations and the federal government itself in such schemes as the $200 million eximbal project in Guatemala (which was funded by edc loans for $20.75 million), as well as the Cerro Colorado Copper project in Panama, the Olancho forestry project in Honduras (with $19 million in cida credits and grants), and hydro and geothermal projects in El Salvador ($10.2 million in cida loans), all quite modest, but symbolic, involvements.61 With the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution and with the intensification of the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, the icchrla went through a new period of consolidation, focusing more closely on the Central American crisis.62 It hired a new staff member, Bill Fairburn, to concentrate on South America, allowing another staff member, Francis Arbour, to dedicate herself to Central America.63 While maintaining its broader mandate to deal with human rights issues in Latin America, the icchrla began to intensify its energies directed toward Central America and, in particular, to analyze critically Canadian foreign policy towards the region. Although at the base of the critique of the Canadian government there were the issues of admittance of refugees and private investment in Central America, as there had been in Chile in the early and mid-1970s, the icchrla now took a broader and deeper role in Canada’s foreign relations. It was clear to many in the churches who supported the Nicaraguan revolution that Canadian aid should be forthcoming as a reward for a new enlightened government there. In a brief to the Canadian ambassador attending the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1980, the icchrla expressed quite clearly the rationale for its concern in Latin America and its vision of Canada’s role in the world. It stated that the “icchrla sees its work as an element in the global struggle for a ‘just, participatory and sustainable society,’ envisioned by the World Council of Churches.” This being the case, the icchrla would spread its net widely in its pursuit of human rights, since “the struggle is not only for political rights but for social, economic and cultural rights as well.”64 These statements represented a politicized church that was adhering to socialist and Marxist ideals.65 The icchrla also made an important statement when it acknowledged that Canada had begun to take a greater role in human rights: “Last year, Canadian officials spoke more frequently and with greater clarity on human rights problems, both at home and in international forums like the un. At last year’s commission, Canada took a leadership role in the discussion of the very serious international problem of disappeared persons.”66 These comments point at once to the ideals underlying the icchrla and to the fact that the committee felt that some advances were being

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made in influencing the Canadian government to become more vocal on human rights issues. But more importantly, perhaps, the icchrla explicitly expressed its conviction that a Canadian foreign policy in Latin America had to involve a fundamental challenge to the existing domestic and international systems, when it argued that it opposed the “problems inherent in the international economic order. The existing economic and political structures between nations and within nations have given rise to a distorted world system of development that promotes gross disparities, both between developed and underdeveloped countries, and between small national elites and the majority of populations.”67 By August 1980 in just one year, the icchrla had published a second newsletter focusing on Central America.68 Having now to assess the Nicaraguan revolution, the worsening civil war in El Salvador, the alarming acts of violence committed by the armed forces in Guatemala, and the brutal murder of Archbishop Arnulfo Romero, the icchrla was confronted with a deepening crisis that encapsulated the problems it had identified as critical in Latin America: on the one hand, u.s. intervention, social and economic inequity, the persecution of the clergy, massive human rights violations, and the existence of military control, and on the other hand, the “rays of hope” from a revolution that was just emerging in Nicaragua and that fully exemplified the values pursued by the icchrla itself. Following reports in each of these countries, the committee asked readers to write letters to the ministers of External Affairs and Employment and Immigration asking them to protest the actions by the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments. On 3 December 1980, the icchrla presented a brief to ssea Mark MacGuigan on Canadian relations with El Salvador in which it recommended that the Canadian government publicly condemn the civilianmilitary junta for its responsibility in unjust actions, that the Canadian government publicly oppose foreign military intervention in El Salvador, that it assure the safety and well-being of refugees outside El Salvador, and that it open communications with the opposition Frente Democrático Revolucionario (fdr). In addition, icchrla suggested that Canada act in concert with sympathetic countries in Latin America, such as Mexico and Ecuador, in pursuit of these recommendations and that the Canadian government make direct representations with the u.s. government. Finally, icchrla also suggested that these actions might lead to the “rupture of diplomatic relations,” with the current Salvadoran regime.69 If icchrla concentrated on the worsening aspects of El Salvador, it also focused on the positive aspects of the Nicaraguan revolution,

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especially since it was seen as an example of what other countries in Latin America should emulate. In a report on Nicaragua entitled “A Country Blessed with the ‘Sunshine of Hope,›70 the icchrla pointed out that although ngo s had been quick to respond to Nicaraguan needs, governments had been slow to respond and the National Nicaragua Network had decided to launch “a national effort to encourage the Canadian government to initiate a bilateral aid campaign for Nicaragua.” This followed a request by thirteen Canadian agencies on 31 October 1979 for a bilateral aid program for Nicaragua. Participants were encouraged to visit members of parliament personally and to point out to the government the role that ngo s were already playing. The report suggested to its readers that “Wherever possible, personal visits to local Members of Parliament should be made. Use the summer and fall to show Canadian legislators that the costly victory against dictatorship in Nicaragua was not in vain, and that Canadians support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to rebuild their society on a new basis. Resolutions from church groups, union locals, teachers associations, letters from school classes and church school classes could also be helpful.” It suggested that “In letters, or conversations, it is important to emphasize that while the Canadian government has made some positive moves, they are not in any way appropriate to the need.”71 A pivotal point came when the icchrla made a presentation before the subcommittee on Canada’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean on 9 July 1981. The icchrla clearly welcomed the opportunity to present its case on Latin America. Since the Trudeau government had been under extreme pressure to expand its role in Central America, the opening up of the parliamentary system to the icchrla’s concerns was particularly important. It had already clearly established a vision for Canada on Latin America, especially on Central America, and it was now attempting to articulate that vision through the political process. The icchrla clearly welcomed the work of the committee when it stated that “Canadians have been provided with a unique opportunity for input into the discussion and formation of Canadian policies toward Latin America with the creation of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Canada’s relations with Latin American and the Caribbean” and added that it “provides an important focal point for the widespread concern many thousands of Canadians feel for the people in the Southern part of our hemisphere. Concerned Canadians can use the Sub-Committee both as an educational tool and as a point of pressure on the Canadian government.”72 Although the icchrla by no means lost interest in or lost track of the rest of the hemisphere, there is little doubt that its focus began to

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be placed on Central America. This is reflected in the submission to the subcommittee as well as in the increased attention to Central American countries in the newsletters and annual reports.73 For the next eight years the committee would become increasingly involved in pressing for a Canadian foreign policy in Central America that would better reflect these underlying values. As the Canadian government grappled with what to do in Central America while the crisis began to heat up in 1981 and 1982, the churches took an active role in criticizing the government for its inaction and in suggesting ways that Canada could get involved. In an open letter to Pierre Trudeau, three people representing the United Church of Canada called on him to withdraw support for the Duarte government in El Salvador, to take an independent position in foreign policy, to play a role in peacekeeping in Central America, and to provide refugee assistance to those fleeing El Salvador. These policy proposals became the essence of the church’s pressure on the government and, to varying degrees, the Canadian government eventually heeded them.74 During the 1980s, voluntary development agencies began a more politicized approach, especially through the Canadian Centre for International Cooperation (ccic). In the case of Latin America, the Nicaraguan revolution provided a cause for Canadian voluntary agencies and a perfect channel for aid organizations to become involved in the foreign policy process. Most importantly, the Nicaraguan government invited international private assistance, and consequently Canadians were able to travel to Nicaragua and gain direct experience of the profound needs of the people in developing countries. Although Canadians had been involved in development projects in Latin America for over two decades, the experience of participating in a revolution led many individuals to become politicized upon their return to Canada. Volunteers now demanded that their agencies participate in the foreign policy process and influence their government to increase aid to Nicaragua and cut it from countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, who were in the throes of revolution. The response by many development agencies to the Nicaraguan revolution was immediate, and in a coalition with church groups and solidarity organizations, private Canadian aid began to pour into Nicaragua.75 Many organizations that had development programs also began to express a concern for the situation in El Salvador. The ymca, for example, organized a conference with the Democratic Revolutionary Front (fdr) in January and February of 1981.76 El Salvador also became the focus for ccic and, under ccic president Tim Broadhead, it carried out an intense lobbying campaign of solidarity with the people of El Salvador. When the ccic board met with ssea Mark MacGuigan

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to discuss development issues, board member Helen Forsey pressed the minister on the issue of El Salvador, stating that “We ask fervently that Canada continue its opposition to any intervention in the area and provide assistance to refugees.”77 In September 1981 Tim Broadhead was among a group of church delegates and mp s who visited the ambassador of Honduras in Ottawa to ask for the release of twelve refugees incarcerated in his country.78 Because ccic members continued to express grave concern about the situation in El Salvador, in November 1981 ccic released a statement directed at prime minister Trudeau on the situation in that country. ccic asked the Canadian government to mediate between the Salvadoran government and the rebels, to request that the United States comply with the December 1980 un resolution on El Salvador, to condemn the Salvadoran junta for its violations of human rights, and to assist Salvadoran refugees inside and outside El Salvador.79 The voluntary agencies pressed individually and through the ccic to assist refugees, sought support from mp s, and sent delegations to the region to report back in Canada.80 In 1981 the ccic helped start an inter-agency working group on Latin America with agencies such as the Mennonite Central Committee, Canadian University Services Overseas (cuso), care Canada, Canadian Save the Children Fund, and Oxfam.81 Although there would still be some tensions within the development community about how critical they should be of government, ccic, as an umbrella organization, became much more involved in Latin American affairs than it had ever been before. With ngo s like Oxfam leading the way, the voluntary aid community was no longer on the periphery of the Latin America constituency. As soon as the revolution had succeeded, the Latin American Working Group began to publish a special newsletter on the Nicaraguan situation entitled Nicaragua Update.82 By October of 1979 lawg, along with the Jesuit Center for Social Faith and Justice and the Community Information Research Group, began to publish Central America Update, which was to cover news for the entire isthmus. (lawg had responded in a similar way when it began to publish the Canada-Chile Bulletin after the overthrow of Allende in 1973.) The Central America Update gave full reports on the events in Central America, provided information not usually available through the mainstream media, and also published information concerning solidarity activities in Canada. In this manner, lawg continued its approach of facilitating the work of solidarity organizations while maintaining its own broader analysis of Latin America in general. lawg continued to provide in-depth analysis, as it had done for over two decades, criticizing what it considered to be u.s. imperialism

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in Latin America, analyzing Canada’s corporate and business connections, and promoting a more involved policy for the Canadian government. As it had done with the Chilean refugee crisis in 1973, lawg concentrated first on the plight of refugees. In a special issue on refugees, a lawg editorial pointed out that the refugee crisis was a result of social inequality and “In this context, the Central American refugee can be understood as a person who has opted for life, and beyond that, for the continuing struggle for self-determination and justice.”83 For lawg the issue was not just about accepting refugees but rather about preventing the circumstances that had caused the problem in the first place. lawg therefore urged the Canadian government to oppose u.s. military intervention in the region, to support a negotiated settlement, and, especially, to use the bad human rights records of countries like El Salvador and Guatemala to vote against funds provided by international financial institutions. As occurred in 1973, solidarity organizations sprang up across the country, both in support of the Nicaraguan revolution and in support of the revolutionary struggles in Guatemala and El Salvador. One of the most successful solidarity groups at the national level was Tools for Peace, which collected and shipped millions of dollars of goods to Nicaragua. As in 1973, solidarity organizations worked at the local level and sponsored events such as demonstrations, film presentations, benefit concerts, and letter writing campaigns. In Quebec L’Entraide missionnaire also began concentrating on Central America. In 1981 it published studies on the situation in El Salvador and Honduras. alai also published various studies on the emerging crisis, and Solidarité Québec-Amérique Latin began to publish a regular newsletter in 1985 called Ici l’Amérique latine.84 An important addition to the established ngo s was the founding of the Canada–Caribbean–Central America–Policy Alternatives (capa) in 1982. capa developed out of the growing academic interest in Central America and was made up of individuals doing research on education in support of Central America and the Caribbean. It was, however, not merely a research organization; it also did advocacy work to promote alternate polices for the region. In many ways a solidarity organization for academic research, capa played a very important role in Canada as the Central American crisis developed, because it brought together academics who wanted to do research and advocacy work. The five-fold purpose of capa was to encourage and help coordinate Canadian research on the region while increasing ties, to disseminate to wider audiences, with an eye on influencing public policy, to formulate both broad and specific alternatives for Canadian policy towards the region, to cooperate with other organizations interested in Caribbean and

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Central American affairs, and to support activities of researchers in that region who were working to develop social, economic, political, and cultural alternatives.85 capa operated from the offices of the Jesuit Center for Social Faith and Justice in Toronto, with Tim Draimin coordinating the research. capa’s research interests included Canada’s political relations and Canadian investment and trade in the region, Canada-u.s. relations as they affected the region, conjunctural analysis of Canadian economics and politics, and community economic and political power in the Caribbean and Central America.86 As soon as capa became established, it launched a research agenda that included Canadian aid to the region, Canadian aid and trade relations with Nicaragua, Canada’s links to the militarization of the Caribbean and Central America, and Canada’s foreign policy in Central America.87 On the labour front, the response of the Canadian Labour Congress to the Nicaraguan revolution was immediate, partly because of the relationship that already existed between the clc and the Nicaraguan cus. This situation was in contrast to the events following the Chilean coup in 1973, when the clc had little contact with the labour movement there. After an ictfu fact-finding mission to Nicaragua in which John Simonds (clc executive director) participated, the clc launched a relief fund for Nicaragua.88 Within a month of the Sandinista triumph the clc sent a dc-8 cargo plane, paid for by cida, loaded with 75,000 pounds of food and medicine that was followed by five other Canadian armed forces Hercules aircraft provided by the Canadian government. The goods were donated by clc affiliates and were personally delivered by Simonds.89 The clc confronted other issues in Central America in the early 1980s. For example, it paid special attention to Guatemala, where trade unions had suffered a great deal and where a strike against CocaCola had received world-wide attention.90 On 7 July 1980, Dennis McDermott announced a boycott of Coca-Cola products in Canada in order to end the repression and murders of union leaders that followed a strike at a Guatemalan Coca-Cola franchise, the Embotelladora Guatemalteca, s.a. (egsa). This was part of a world-wide boycott and was vigorously pursued by the clc. It requested that the Canadian government cease all foreign aid to Guatemala and “divert such money to a fund for direct assistance to the families of the victims of the repression.”91 By September the clc had funds to help workers in Guatemala, and the boycott was suspended after Coca-Cola took over the franchise.92 The conflict resurfaced in 1984 when the Guatemalan bottling plant went bankrupt after unsuccessful negotiations with the union. The clc supported the occupation of the plant by workers and

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continued to pressure the Coca-Cola corporation, which owned the building and the equipment and was egsa’s largest creditor.93 In May 1984 Coca-Cola agreed to locate new owners, respect the collective agreement, and pay workers to maintain the plant until it reopened.94 After a few conflicts with the new owners, the bottling plant finally reopened in 1985.95 Other activities of the clc included calling on the labour movement and governments in the hemisphere to convene a conference on the future of El Salvador and criticizing the United States for shipping arms to El Salvador.96

As Canadian foreign policy began to change after MacEachen became ssea in 1982, the icchrla continued to request more aid and support for Nicaragua and withdrawal of support from, as well as clear condemnation of, the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, the icchrla requested that the Canadian government reconsider its “core country” status for Honduras and express Canada’s concern over the militarization of Honduras by the u.s. administration.97 The icchrla continued to submit proposals to the Canadian Ambassador for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and, year after year, highlighted the human rights situations in Central America. On 11 October 1983, shortly after a fact-finding mission had returned from Guatemala and Mexico,98 representatives of the icchrla met with MacEachen and presented a brief intended to set out new policy initiatives. The brief icchrla recognized that the Canadian government had begun to make positive strides with respect to Central America, and it recognized that “The Canadian government considers the Central American region with a much greater degree of priority and urgency than two or three years ago. In doing so it has responded not only to the growing international crisis but to the concern expressed by Canadian citizens.”99 The committee made four concrete recommendations regarding political initiatives. First, highlighting the importance of regional peace initiatives, it requested that the Canadian government oppose the u.s. militarization of the region and encourage and support the Contadora Group’s initiatives for regional development.100 Second, it recommended that the Canadian government condemn the funding and training of the contras and that it establish an embassy in Nicaragua. Third, it recommended that the Canadian government oppose the renewal and enlargement of u.s. military aid to El Salvador, that the ssea hold high-level conversations with the opposition in El Salvador, and that the Canadian government support the dialogue leading to

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negotiations between all representative political forces in El Salvador. Finally, the icchrla recommended that the ssea visit the countries of the region. The icchrla made other important recommendations in the areas of human rights, aid, and refugees. It recommended that the Canadian government should strongly condemn the increased human rights violations in El Salvador and Guatemala at the un. It suggested that aid to El Salvador and Guatemala should continue to be suspended, that Canada should reconsider aid to Honduras, that it should designate Nicaragua as a core country, giving it priority for increased Canadian aid, and that ngo s should be provided with greater resources to deliver aid in the region. With respect to refugees, it recommended that the Canadian government should increase its budget for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (unhcr) and increase its acceptance of Salvadoran refugees to Canada. By 1983 Nicaragua was suffering from political, military, and economic pressure from the United States, which created tensions between the Sandinistas and the labour movement. The clc, however, continued to support the Sandinistas. In September 1983, the clc Executive Council, meeting to discuss the Nicaraguan situation, noted the growing tensions between the labour movement and the Sandinistas, acknowledging, however, that it was “due largely to the outside military, political and economic attack against the 4-year-old Sandinista government.” The clc also began a policy that included criticizing the u.s. government, supporting the Contadora peace process, and becoming more involved in solidarity initiatives. It stated that “As a credible voice for both trade unionism and the democratic left, the clc can and must play a role in the solution-seeking process in the region by ensuring the Contadora initiative receives trade union input, by working with the trade unions in the region in conjunction with the Socialist International affiliates on Central American questions, and by undertaking other bilateral solidarity initiatives in the region.”101 In 1983, in an important statement responding to u.s. intervention in Nicaragua, Dennis McDermott stated that, “on behalf of its 2 million members, the Canadian Labour Congress demands that the u.s. government cease and desist its intervention against the sovereign state of Nicaragua by immediately withdrawing its military and economic support from those who would violently overthrow the Sandinista government, and by ceasing its economic isolationist policy against Nicaragua.”102 Although the clc fully supported the Government of Reconstruction in Managua, its principal loyalty was to the labour movement in Nicaragua, represented by the ictfu affiliate cus, which the clc felt

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was independent from any government. The cus had made it clear that it supported the Sandinistas so long as they protected workers’ rights. During a cus convention at which Canadian clc officials were present, cus general secretary Alvin Guthrie said that “we shall support a system of government which effectively defends the workers’ interests, whatever that government might call itself, be it Marxist, communist, Christian, liberal etc.”103 But some participants in the ngo movement in Canada were not happy with any clc policy that might be critical of the Sandinistas, since they feared that such criticism might be used by their opponents. When the clc released a report citing infractions by the Sandinistas, Central America Update called it “a slight shift on Central America” by the clc, even though it was at the same time highly critical of the United States.104 It was, of course, no shift at all, since it conformed with clc and orit policy and was part of a long-standing tradition of criticizing governments of all stripes if they did not protect workers’ rights. The fact that the clc had become so critical of the United States and had called on the Canadian government to participate actively in the solution of the Central American crisis was more significant, however, because it demonstrated a greater willingness to be vocal on Latin American affairs. The Peace Process in Central America and a New Canadian Role By the mid-1980s, the Canadian government had begun to accede to many of the demands of domestic ngo s, such as increasing aid to Central America, but not to others, such as the establishment of an embassy in Managua. Central America had indeed become an important foreign policy issue in Canada, one that often dominated question period in the House of Commons and elicited a great deal of interest by the media. When the threat to Nicaragua heated up due to u.s. warnings that it would use military force and to its imposition of a trade embargo and its support for the Nicaraguan contras; when the civil war in El Salvador continued to smolder and human rights abuses were escalating; when news of human rights abuses against Guatemalan Indians by government forces and death squads became well known; and when the militarization of Honduras was clearly pointing to a major East-West confrontation in our own hemisphere, many Canadians began to pressure the government to use its skill and reputation in conflict resolution and peacekeeping and to become actively involved in the region. Indeed, in 1984 a Gallup poll reported that 50.7 percent of Canadians opposed u.s. policy in Central America, while 23.1 percent supported it and 26 percent did not have an opinion.105 In 1985, in a

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Decima poll 80 percent of Canadians said that Canada should take an interest in the crisis in Central America (26 percent said it was very important, while 54 percent said it was important). When asked, 56 percent of Canadians said that the causes of the unrest were poverty and injustice, 28 percent blamed Cuba or the Soviet Union, and 12 percent blamed the United States.106 These polls indicated a great deal of interest by Canadians in the region and, more importantly, a belief that Canada had a role to play in resolving the conflict. The Central American peace process, more than any other issue, dominated the agenda of the Latin American constituency in Canada during the last half of the decade. From the mid-1980s on, the domestic ngo s concentrated on an active peacemaking and peacekeeping role for Canada, although they continued to press the government for greater aid for Nicaragua, more vocal condemnation of u.s. policy, and criticism of human rights violations in the region. For its part the icchrla fully endorsed the development of the Contadora peace process and dubbed it the “homegrown initiative” and the “only alternative.”107 The concrete proposals for Canada’s support of Contadora included speaking out more in support of Contadora initiatives, continued expression of the Canadian position on Central America to the u.s. administration, and the offer of moral support to u.s. citizens in government and civil society who were speaking out in opposition to their country’s policy in Central America.108 In addition, the icchrla urged the Canadian government to encourage the United States to negotiate with Cuba with regard to Central America and to work with European and Latin American countries “to ease the current economic isolation of Nicaragua.”109 The committee also asked Canada to take a leadership role in promoting a multination show of confidence in the Contadora Group, to provide site facilities and technical support for some of the Contadora consultations, and to use its good offices (and facilities), without preconditions, for negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the fdr/fmln. In June of 1984, the icchrla presented a second brief to Allan MacEachen in which it commended the government for actions taken since it had last met with the minister in October 1983, including welcoming the trip that MacEachen took to the region in April 1984. However, it also pressed the minister to open an embassy in Nicaragua and to publicly condemn u.s. policy in Nicaragua.110 When the government of Brian Mulroney was elected in the fall of 1984, the icchrla immediately put out an appeal to “all concerned Christians” to write or phone their mp s, the new ssea Joe Clark, and the prime minster to urge them to refrain from renewing bilateral aid to El Salvador and Guatemala, to have the ssea meet with high-level

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fdr/fmln representatives, and to request that the Canadian government condemn the government of El Salvador at the forty-first session of the un Commission on Human Rights.111 In October and November 1984, the icchrla cosponsored, with La Ligue de Droits et Libertés and the ccic, a six-person delegation to observe the national elections. The delegation returned and met with Joe Clark on 27 November and presented him with a report entitled Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections and War, which endorsed the elections and pointed to the need to assist Nicaragua. The report expressed regret that the Mulroney government had not decided to send observers to the election and called on the government, among other things, to open an embassy in Managua, to continue to increase all forms of aid, and to encourage the Reagan Administration to “negotiate in good faith with Nicaragua.”112 One important event was the presentation of a brief by the icchrla before the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations on 29 November 1985. This was, perhaps, the most important opportunity for the icchrla to express its views respecting Central America to the new government. The brief was quite opposed to the government’s green paper Competitiveness and Security (discussed in chapter 5). The icchrla reiterated an independent foreign policy for Canada in Latin America and, with regard to Central America, had strong praise for the government’s support of the Contadora peace process, for Canada’s criticism of u.s. action against Nicaragua and its opposition to the u.s. mining of Nicaraguan harbours, and for Canada’s refusal to join the economic boycott of Nicaragua.113 In particular, the icchrla praised “Canadian criticism of United States action against Nicaragua in international, multilateral, [and] financial bodies.”114 The committee suggested that the Canadian government should maintain a sustained political and diplomatic presence in the region in order to “safeguard the gains of the Nicaraguan revolution, to bring peace to El Salvador, and to reverse the militarization which is distorting the national development objectives in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.”115 Most importantly, perhaps, the icchrla emphasized that Canada should view its interests in this hemisphere in terms of its long-term interests, which support the “quest for more social structures.” It concluded that “Self-interest in narrow terms, short-term profit, unjust and, in the long run untenable, conditions maintained by force – these can never form the basis of a true security for Canada. Respect and passion for justice constitute the real guidelines to common security and human emancipation in an interdependent world.”116 For the rest of the 1980s two issues dominated the icchrla’s agenda: opposition to the Reagan administration’s policies in Central

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America and the promotion of a meaningful role for Canada in the peace process in the region. Canadian church leaders, for example, urged Brian Mulroney to influence President Reagan during summit meetings.117 But a positive role for Canada in peacekeeping became a more important goal, since, as noted, it conformed to Canada’s internationalist traditions. When the government set up the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, the icchrla pointed out that Canada had a unique position in attempting to resolve the conflict. It argued that Canada could play a role in monitoring and supervision and suggested that the government show strong support for the Esquipulas II accord. It also consistently followed the situation in Chile and most of Latin America and by the end of the decade began to pay close attention to the effects of the Latin American debt and the problems of drug trafficking and militarization in the Andean region.118 As for lawg, in 1985 it published a special issue of its newsletter on Central America entitled An Anti-Intervention Handbook: Canadians and the Crisis in Central America, which was intended for individuals interested in Canada’s position in the Central American crisis. The issue asked why Canadians should care about Central America and set forth an “anti-intervention agenda.” lawg argued that Canadian interests were at stake in Central America because the conflict rested on a bipolar view of the world, divided between superpowers. lawg asked the question that was on the mind of many Canadians: “What room is there, in such a world, for countries like Canada?”119 In response to this question lawg reiterated its view that u.s. foreign policy in the region should be rejected for the harm it was causing, but this view was based as much on Canadian internationalism as on lawg’s own anti-u.s. position: “When Canadians stand up for principles like ‘respect for international law,’ ‘self-determination,’ and ‘non-intervention,’ it is our interest that we are defending. When any state flaunts international law and rejects the jurisdiction of the World Court (to which Canada-u.s. disputes are sometimes referred), aren’t Canadian interests at stake? When a superpower denies other peoples the right to work out their own solutions to the problems facing them – aren’t our rights threatened too? … When it is the United States that behaves in these ways, shouldn’t Canadians be doubly concerned? After all, we too live in the u.s. backyard.” In the view of lawg, therefore, Canada was already involved in the Central American crisis because of its close alliance with the u.s. and, as lawg put it, Canada was “part of the Western Hemisphere and it is hemispheric security – our security – that Ronald Reagan claims to be defending in Central America.”120

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Having established that Canada had interests in the region, lawg set out a strategy for Canada and for Canadians. It argued that public pressure must clearly be put on the government to get more involved, since “It was public pressure that forced External Affairs Ministers MacGuigan and MacEachen to devote more and more attention to the crisis.” lawg was critical of the Mulroney government’s policy in the region, calling it “hesitant and ambiguous.” It criticized the Conservative government for renewing aid to El Salvador and argued that its close ties to the Reagan administration were a barrier to an independent policy. Yet it recognized that “Public knowledge about Central America, the links of solidarity and effective public mobilization of opinion and pressure have already encouraged initiatives on the side of the Conservatives.” lawg therefore urged Canadians to ask for strong action to stop the momentum of militarism in Central America, including clear opposition to u.s. policy there, and to guarantee that no Canadian components or material would be exported to support the Salvadoran government or the contras. lawg set out a clear strategy for Canadians wishing to organize in their communities, as it had been done in the early 1970s in response to the Chilean crisis. The strategy included lobbying mp s and the government in organized church and ngo groups, responding immediately to government statements requiring an urgent response, and seeking out information from church and human rights groups on the region. Most importantly, lawg suggested that Canadians should visit the region and see the situation for themselves, because “Successful tours have provided important building blocks for a strong anti-interventionist policy in Canada.” lawg also suggested that Canadians could provide assistance by donating to aid organizations, use alternative trading companies (companies that sold Nicaraguan coffee, for example), and use the media to get the message across.121 The Anti-Intervention Handbook is an indication of the sophistication of the solidarity movement in Canada. After almost two decades of experience, lawg was able to help inform, organize, and mobilize Canadians to influence their government. For the rest of the decade lawg continued its study of Central America, publishing an issue in 1986 on Canadian aid to Central America since 1980, an issue opposing Canadian aid to El Salvador, and a critique of Canadian aid to Honduras.122 By the mid- to late 1980s, capa was also fully pursuing its research agenda and promoting a role for Canada in the peace process. In 1984 capa published its first brief presenting an alternative for Canadian foreign policy in the region. Although the brief acknowledged that

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Canada’s foreign policy towards Central America had begun to move in the right direction, it argued that there was a need to go from “acquiescence to action.” capa recognized that the Canadian government appreciated that the roots of the crisis in Central America were based on issues of poverty and social injustice, rather than on ideological ones, and that Canada adhered to an anti-interventionist policy. It recognized the importance of Canada’s involvement in the dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua, as well as with the regional actors of the Contadora group, and the importance of Canada’s recognition that the framework for a solution to the conflict must be drawn up by Latin Americans themselves. capa also pointed out that Canada had a unique role in helping resolve the crisis, since it had considerable political capital, including the fact that it was not an imperialist power, that it had demonstrated its independence by maintaining good relations with Cuba, and that it was working out complicated bilateral relations with the United States.123 Moreover, capa saw a special role for Canada because of its position as a “continental middle power” and because of the nature of the international environment. As a middle power, and the second richest country in the hemisphere, Canada maintained a high credibility with Latin America and had good relations with Western Europe and the United States. “These factors enable Canada to help resolve conflicts, to bridge political and even ideological gaps between hostile countries or forces, to unravel complex and highly charged issues, and thus to fulfill a significant positive role as a middle power in the Americas.” In addition, during the previous decade the hemisphere had witnessed “the steady erosion of the hegemonic military, political and economic power of the United States,” which was being replaced by the rising middle powers in the hemisphere: “The emergence of major Latin American industrial countries, coupled with the impact of ‘oil power,’ is creating a multi-polar region.”124 The model for Canada espoused by capa was that of Mexico, which had been more active in the regional conflict in Central America. capa also argued that the principal foreign interlocutor in the region was not the Soviet Union or Cuba, but the United States. capa thus rejected the idea that there was a significant role for Cuba or the Soviet Union in this crisis. Given the urgency of the Central American crisis, capa recommended that Canada should not follow a policy of “quiet diplomacy” and that it should support actions to1 complement the Contadora peace process. Finally, capa suggested that contrary to statements made by ssea MacGuigan and MacEachen, Canada had considerable interests in the region that included the Canadian world view (that is, the promotion of social justice, development, and multilateralism), its

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middle-power role, the region’s proximity and potential as a threat to hemispheric and global peace, the promotion of human rights, economic relations (present and future), regional immigration to Canada, and the value of an independent foreign policy reaffirming Canadian sovereignty. In sum, capa concluded that Canada had the potential to play a greater, more important, and more vocal role in the peace process in Central America, and it added that “Canada has much to gain by becoming actively involved in laying the foundations for social justice, authentic development and lasting peace.”125 Besides fostering research and presenting policy alternatives, capa was also engaged in organizing seminars and workshops on various aspects of the Central American crisis; the most prominent were three international round-tables on the peace process in Central America funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Department of External Affairs. These sessions brought together Canadian academics, politicians, diplomats, and representatives of ngo s with experts from the United States, Europe, and Latin America to discuss the peace prospects. The round-tables were held in camera in order to encourage frank discussion, but reports of the proceedings were published on the basis of nonattribution.126 The significance of the round-tables was perhaps more psychological than substantive, since the important effect of the meetings was to inform Canadian politicians about the events in the region and discuss possible Canadian participation. capa’s most important contribution was perhaps the publication of Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada. This comprehensive overview of Canadian foreign policy towards Central America is particularly interesting because it is an academic study that provides concrete policy recommendations suggested by capa itself. The book was intended to examine the roots of the problems in the region and to describe the role that Canada had played in the crisis. But capa also believed that there was a still greater role for Canada. As Liisa North, an editor of the volume, argued, “We are convinced that the Canadian government can and should do more to assist Central Americans to construct more just and peaceful societies. Through such assistance Canada would in turn contribute to the creation of a more equitable and peaceful international system.”127 At the broadest level, capa recommended that all diplomatic efforts of the Canadian government should be predicated on respect for human rights. There was a need for social transformation, and Canada should renew public advocacy of the principles of nonintervention and self-determination. With respect to Canada’s regional policies, capa recommended that Canada should have closer relations with the

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autonomous Latin American institutions and that the Canadian government should have ministerial meetings with the Rio Group (the Group of Eight) and with Central American countries and support groups of Latin American countries seeking Washington’s support for peaceful resolutions to the Central American conflict. capa also recommended that the Canadian government should further Cuba’s integration into the regional dialogue and assist in relaxing the tensions between Cuba and the United States. It wanted the Canadian government to encourage the u.s. administration to fully support the Esquipulas II agreement and comply with decisions of the International Court of Justice, to press for the dismantling of Contra bases, and to oppose further military aid to El Salvador, while promoting instead a negotiated solution to the civil war. Although capa was a latecomer to the Latin America constituency, its contribution during the 1980s was considerable, in part, of course, because many who were active in capa had been active in other ngo s with an interest in Latin America. However, the publication of Between War and Peace in Central America in fact marked the end of the Central America decade. The book summarized ten years of Canadian involvement in the region, but by the time it was published, Central America was no longer prominent on the foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless, Latin America would not drop from the agenda completely, since new issues and challenges emerged for Canada in the 1990s. The signing of nafta, the uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, the emergence of summit diplomacy and “people’s summits,” all meant a continued activism. Indeed, John Foster seemed to foresee Canada’s greater involvement in the 1990s when he concluded that “As Latin American expectations of Canadian involvement in hemispheric affairs grow, so too will diplomatic and domestic pressures on Ottawa to commit more resources and increase the size of its diplomatic representation in the region and the profile of Latin America at the Department of External Affairs and International Trade.”128 For its part, by the mid-1980s, the Canadian Labour Congress continued to criticize the United States for its policies in Latin America while supporting the Contadora peace process and urging the government to become involved in promoting peace.129 At the Fifteenth Constitutional Convention, the International Affairs Committee put forward a resolution condemning the u.s. policy in the region and called on the Canadian government to “oppose usa policies in Central America; to withhold bilateral aid from any country serving as a base for military intervention and actively support the Contadora initiatives for a negotiated settlement in Central America.”130 Another motion condemned the United States for its intervention in Grenada,

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and there were two motions supporting respect for human rights in Argentina and Brazil. The clc continued its interest in Chile and began to show concern for the major difficulties Latin America was facing with the debt crisis.131 But the clc did not reserve its criticism for the United States; it also criticized the Sandinista government when, in August 1984, the conflict between the cus and the Sandinista police came to a head and the police occupied the offices of the cus, following a demonstration of cus members. The clc Executive Council stated that “The police intervention was both overly harsh and unwarranted, and the clc has communicated its concerns to the Nicaraguan authorities.”132 In its presentation to the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, the clc reiterated its view that Canada should support the negotiated settlement through Contadora but did not publicly criticize the Nicaraguan government.133 It continued its support of the Sandinistas, arguing that criticism of some of the actions of the Nicaraguan government was not a wholesale criticism of the regime. Both Dennis McDermott and Dick Martin, executive vice president, wrote to the ssea and to the external relations minister to express clc concerns.134 Indeed, in 1986 the clc sent Rick Jackson, director of the International Affairs Department, to Central America to continue to monitor the situation.135 In June the clc expressed its “grave disappointment” with the decision of the u.s. Congress to approve a $100-million aid package to the Nicaraguan Resistance.136 In both the 1986 and 1988 constitutional conventions, the clc continued to support a peaceful settlement of the Central American crisis. In 1986, for example, it reiterated its policy towards Central America and urged the Canadian government to work against intervention; it also fully supported the Nicaraguan people in their struggle against u.s. destabilization. In addition, it called on its members to “intensify its campaign to lobby the Canadian government towards a more distinctive policy towards Nicaragua.”137 By 1988 the clc had decided that it would expand its relations with Central American unions. The most important result of this decision was that the clc would now deal with unions in Nicaragua not affiliated with the ictfu. This change reflected recent practice, but not a change in clc policy.138 At the Seventeenth Constitutional convention of the clc, the International Affairs Committee received over thirty resolutions respecting Central America. In response, it put forward the most comprehensive resolution on Central America so far and called on the Canadian government to condemn the u.s. funding of the contras and support the Arias Peace Plan, which, it reiterated, would end military assistance from both the United States and Cuba and the Soviet Union. It called

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for the Canadian government to give greater aid to Nicaragua, while suspending bilateral aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. And it called for clc support for ngo projects in these countries and for greater ties with unions. With respect to Panama, the clc condemned the actions of the Noriega regime and opposed u.s. intervention in that country.139

In the latter half of the 1980s, then, ngo s moved quickly to pressure the government not only on traditional issues such as development assistance, human rights, and refugee policy but, most importantly, on issues of peacekeeping and diplomacy that pushed Canada closer to the Latin American fold. The search for a meaningful peacekeeping role for Canada in the Central American crisis provided a further point of convergence between the more radical ngo s and the more cautious and conservative actions of Liberal and Conservative governments. The call for Canada to play its traditional honest-broker role was something that successive Canadian governments found difficult to reject, particularly when this role not only satisfied domestic demands but also government goals. Particularly for the Mulroney government, but also for the Trudeau government, opposition to u.s. policy in the region became a symbolic expression of Canadian internationalism and an independent foreign policy. This policy convergence between ngo s and the government, which also included development assistance, the promotion of human rights, and a liberal refugee policy, allowed both parties to achieve common goals while still maintaining their profound differences. In the end, both got something out of the struggle, and Canada-Latin American relations were the greatest beneficiary.

co n cl u s i o n : as s e s s i ng th e l at i n america constituency For over two decades a Latin America constituency had been developing in Canada. This constituency has grown not only in size and sophistication but also, I suggest, in influence. Why Canadians have developed such interest and passion in a region with which Canada itself has had so little contact and interest is difficult to explain precisely. Proximity is clearly an important reason. It should be clear from the analysis here that initial contact with Latin America began with the institutional connections of the Canadian churches and the clc, which began to bring the political and social issues of the region to Canadians in general. But it is also important to note that interest in Latin American is part of a growing concern with international issues

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and North-South relations that many Canadians have found crucially important. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that ngo s have grown in a way that makes it difficult to ignore them. ngo s have been influenced at the international level by a dramatic increase in communications and knowledge of the world that did not exist before the 1960s. In addition, their increased ability to travel and live abroad, whether on holidays or on development projects, and their powerful first-hand experience of the region has shaped the views of many Canadians. But while Canadians have become increasingly aware of the problems of the Third World in general, and of Latin America in particular, they have also become more effective in trying to help change the poverty and injustice they have confronted. At the international level, individuals, usually working through ingo s, have been able to take an active part in development and political issues, and they have also been able to become more involved in attempting to influence their government, in part because the domestic political system is in many ways more receptive and sensitive to organized pressure groups. There are limitations, to be sure, but compared with the period before 1968, there is more activity and more influence. As we have also seen, the development of the Latin America constituency has been shaped by dramatic and politically charged events in the region. Canadian governments have been persuaded to play greater roles in the politics of Latin America than they would otherwise have played. The slow reactions to ngo demands immediately after the Chilean crisis and the reluctance of the government of Pierre Trudeau in 1981–82 to become entangled in Central America were soon reversed, ironically, on both occasions by Allan MacEachen, who became ssea as both issues were heating up. Although the short-lived government of Joe Clark responded quickly in 1979 to assist the Nicaraguan people, it did so with the encouragement and support of an already large and well-organized community in Canada interested and committed to Latin America. The fact that the Mulroney government continued the policies of its predecessor, even though it was doing everything to appease the Reagan administration, also testifies to the growing political clout of the Latin America constituency. What the preceding short history of this constituency has demonstrated, to reiterate, is that a well-organized and committed coalition of ngo s has played an important role, and on occasion a crucial one, in changing and directing Canadian foreign policy. It also demonstrates the importance that individuals like Allan MacEachen, Flora MacDonald, and Joe Clark can have in promoting important initiatives that respond to domestic groups and international demands.

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This is not to say, by any means, that the Latin America constituency has been able to obtain all its demands, or even its most fundamental ones. It is to say, however, that it has been effective not only in placing Latin America on the policy agenda and restricting government action but also in promoting a policy that almost certainly would not have been developed and implemented without its political activities. To be sure, the Trudeau government did not break relations with the Pinochet regime, and the Mulroney government did not establish an embassy in Managua or rescind its renewal of aid to Guatemala or El Salvador. Furthermore, neither government loudly and vociferously condemned successive u.s. administrations for their interventionist polices in the region. And finally, neither government demonstrated great enthusiasm for regimes like the Allende regime in Chile or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. But, on the other hand, the Trudeau government did respond, although belatedly, to demands to bring refugees from Chile and, in the early 1980s, from Central America, particularly from El Salvador. It did, as well, begin to support the Contadora peace process. Indeed, this support became the cornerstone of the Mulroney government’s policy towards Central America. It also supported the indigenous Arias Peace Plan, which was formulated without the explicit support of the Reagan administration. It is, therefore, important to put the effectiveness of the Latin America constituency into perspective. Without strong domestic pressures, there was little reason for Canadian governments to become as involved as they did in the politics of Latin America. Consequently, the Latin America constituency can be seen as the locus of Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America for over two decades. Of course there were external factors influencing Canada’s foreign policy. European and Latin American acceptance of Chilean refugees put pressure on Canada to do its bit. European and Latin American opposition to the Reagan administration’s policies in Central America allowed Canada to band together with other countries without feeling isolated in its opposition to u.s. foreign policies. Indeed, this international atmosphere allowed for what I have called resonance, the synchronization of external and domestic interests, as described in chapter 3. The impact of ngo s should not be overstated, however. It is clear that in rejecting many of the more radical demands of ngo s, Canadian governments demonstrated their limitations and preferences quite clearly. When the demands of ngo s did not fundamentally contradict Canadian interests and when they conformed to Canadian internationalist ideology – with its commitment to such things as development assistance, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution – they were heeded. But more radical demands, such as demands for severing relations

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with Chile or for full support for Nicaragua while lessening or cutting off relations with other Central American nations, were clearly unacceptable to Canadian governments, perhaps because demands of the first kind fit well within the dominant liberal internationalist ideology while those of the second kind were more in keeping with leftist ideals. It is also more than likely that Canadian governments heeded many demands because, as I have suggested throughout, the international system allowed Canada to oppose u.s. foreign policy to a larger extent than before and permitted multilateral activities and institutions to have more influence. It is indeed possible to debate the extent of the influence of the Latin American constituency on government, but the analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that it is much more difficult to argue that it has been insignificant. For the influence of the Latin American constituency has been felt not only in the formulation of specific policies but also in making government sensitive to the demands of both institutional and issue-oriented pressure groups with an interest in Latin America. It may be that governments will temporarily ignore an important issue in the region, as occurred with Chile and Central America for a short period of time, but it is less likely that governments will be willing to ignore demands that come simultaneously from ingo s, multilateral institutions, friendly governments, and members of the governing party. This is perhaps the success not only of the domestic groups but also of the new interdependent world. If we are entering a period of growing importance for regionalism, as I argue, if Canada will become increasingly tied economically, diplomatically, and strategically to Latin America, then in 1990 the voice of the Latin America constituency and its struggle to influence government policy had only just begun as part of Canada’s foreign policy history.

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8 Conclusion To be sure, [joining the oas] would mean an added responsibility, but yours is not a nation that shrinks from responsibility. The hemisphere is a family into which we were born, and we cannot turn our backs to it in time of trouble. Nor can we stand aside from its great adventure and development. I believe that all the free members of the Organization of American States would be both heartened and strengthened by any increase in your hemispheric role. Your skills, your resources, your judicious perception at the council table – even when it differs from our own views – are all needed throughout the inter-American community. Your country and mine are partners in North American affairs; can we not become partners in inter-American affairs? President John F. Kennedy, Address to a Joint Session of the Canadian Parliament, 17 May 19611

pa r t o f t h e a m e r i c a s On Saturday, 8 March 1947, the Canadian under-secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, gave a rather unimportant speech before the Herald Tribune forum in New York City. It was unimportant for two reasons: the topic, “Canada in the Americas,” was low on the Canadian foreign policy agenda and in the first paragraph of his speech Pearson indicated that he was speaking merely as a Canadian citizen and not as a government official. The short speech, given a little over a year before the Pan-American Union (pau) was transformed into the Organization of American States (oas), dealt much less with the Americas than with Canada. After ten minutes of explaining Canada to the audience, Pearson finally asked the question that was most likely on their minds: “Why doesn’t Canada join the Pan American Union?” To this Pearson replied, certainly to the surprise of many in the audience, “because we have never been asked.” He did not say that Canada had indeed been encouraged to join in the past by several Latin American countries, albeit in a quiet and diplomatic manner, and Canada itself had wanted to join only six years earlier.2 Pearson argued that not having been asked to join did not in fact cause any distress to Canada, for it was member of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations and thus could have mutual and

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beneficial relations with American countries. In an attempt to explain why Canada had not become a member of the pau, Pearson compared Canada’s position towards the pau to that of a maiden who when asked why she had not married her swain, replied that she had not been asked but added that she would “always feel deep sisterly affection for him and, perhaps, this might eventually develop into love and even marriage.”3 As we have seen, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney finally popped the question, on 27 October 1989 and announced Canada’s intention to join the oas during the hemispheric summit of heads of government in San José, Costa Rica. The prime minister stated that “In an age of interdependence, the well-being of the peoples of this Hemisphere is indivisible … Canada’s presence here today signals a new departure in our relations with Latin America. We recognize that our interests are directly engaged here. We will no longer stand apart.”4 That Canada had finally built up the nerve to make such a commitment came as a surprise to most Canadians, even to those who had high degree of knowledge about and interest in Latin America. Profound changes had occurred in relations between Canada and Latin America between the time when Lester Pearson flirted with the pau and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney finally announced Canada’s full entry into the inter-American system. The changes had occurred both at the level of state relations (bilateral and multilateral) and at the level of civil society, with an explosion of interest and unprecedented contact between Canadian activists interested in improving the human condition in Latin America and Latin Americans coming to Canada to escape repression in their own countries. This book has attempted to explain the various forces that brought Canada closer to Latin America between 1968 and 1990 and have subsequently created an increasingly important and intimate relation.

ca n ada an d l at i n a m er i c a: from courtship to marriage? I have argued throughout this book that the international system has undergone important structural changes since 1968. The relative decline of the United States is, in this sense, not so much a sign of the redistribution of international power, a process that has been going on since the inception of the international states-system as it is a sign of a fundamental change in how that system now operates. This change would explain why the United States has declined “so fast,” as Paul Kennedy argues, but also why it will remain a country that is “bound to lead,” as Joseph S. Nye maintains. There are clearly no challengers to replace the United States as world hegemon, so its decline is not

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marked by the ascendance of another world power. The “fast decline” of the United States is due to the diffusion of power created by a new interdependent world. Loss of power by the United States has not meant an absolute gain by another, but by the system itself. This is why Nye argues that u.s. foreign policy makers should realize that there are no new challengers but rather new challenges. For Canada-u.s. relations this change has meant that the over-dependence that emerged after World War II and was made all too clear in the early 1970s could be reduced in an interdependent world. The 1970s and 1980s were a period of readjustment to the loss of the special relationship between Canada and the United States, just as they were a period of readjustment for the United States as a declining superpower. Canada’s nationalist policies during the 1970s and early 1980s were attempts to readjust to the new bilateral relation. By the mid-1980s, however, Canada was again drawing closer to the United States (and perhaps to new regional hemispheric arrangements), but now without the guarantees provided by a similar world outlook and by goodwill on the part of the United States, which had been evident in the immediate postwar era. Canada’s attempts to forge a Third Option may have failed, but further attempts to forge a closer bilateral economic relation have not yet resulted in smoother bilateral relations with the United States, which would hearken back to the golden age of Canada-u.s. relations between 1945 and 1968.5 The economic, continentalist trend, which draws Canada ever closer to the United States, poses traditional dilemmas for Canada: how can Canada balance its relations with the United States to assure both its independence and its sovereignty? Part of the answer to this question may lie in the new regional arrangements that nafta provides and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ftaa) promises the allowing Canada to pursue its multilateralist policies, which are needed partially to counterbalance the bilateral relation and partially to continue Canada’s internationalist traditions. The period between 1968 and 1990 saw not only the relative decline of the United States but also changing modes of power in the international system. Interdependence and multilateralism meant that power was more diffuse, less easy to characterize, and, at times, less easy to manage. Although interdependence, it must be remembered, also means restraints on a country’s multilateral relations, this new international order, I have argued, afforded Canada greater opportunities to become an important player in world affairs and follow an independent foreign policy than were available before 1968. Though by no means a principal power, Canada became, potentially, a more influential middle power than it had been in the immediate postwar era. In

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the western hemisphere, Canada had an opportunity to become an important and active player. Added to Canada’s role in postwar multilateral institutions such as the un, nato, and norad, there were important contributions through such organizations as the Economic Summit, the Commonwealth, the francophone summit, and the oas. Although Canada was not able to escape the orbit of planet usa, to use the metaphor of the satellite school of Canadian foreign policy, and although it was by no means clear that it could have done so or that it would have wanted to, nonetheless, forces were at work in the planetary system, and in the galaxy, that could counterbalance undue u.s. influence. The question that remains is, can Canada become more effective in ensuring its independence as it draws into a closer economic relation with the United States? Part of the answer may lie in a continental and then a hemispheric free trade area, but more broadly speaking, it may mean that we must focus our trading attention on switching from an Atlantic-centred economy to a Pacific one, which would include the United States and Latin America as part of what we normally think of as the Pacific Basin in Asia. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I have attempted to explain that one product of the relative decline of the United States and of the important structural changes to the international system has been the growth of peoples’ movements and organizations that have become increasingly involved in foreign policy and world affairs. These movements have been ignored by realist thinkers and not fully dealt with by students of interdependence. This book is intended as a contribution to and extension of the latter’s attempt to explain a changing world order. The growth of ingo s and their increasing influence has been one of the most interesting developments in world politics over the last three decades. In Canada, I have examined the nature of these movements in general. I have suggested that the greater role of parliamentarians has also increased the opportunities for ngo s to play an important public role in foreign policy. This brief history of peoples’ movements interested in Canadian foreign policy has shown that there has been a revolutionary change in how Canadians view the world and how they attempt to change it. The emergence of ngo s has meant not only the development of important new transnational actors but the emergence as well of new and influential domestic pressure groups. Foreign policy in Canada is no longer solely within the purview of princes; the advisors have grown in size and sophistication. The role and importance of these ngo s should not be overstated, as I have said, but it should also not be dismissed. ngo s may not be able to pressure governments under

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all circumstances, but their presence and influence as new elements of the changing international system may well be here to stay.

From the outset I have argued that two sets of forces have been at work to push Canada closer to Latin America since 1968. On the one hand, important changes in the international system have made Canada seek more diversified economic and diplomatic contacts through both bilateral and multilateral channels. The attempt at closer relations with Latin America emerged, first, from the recognition that it was a region with economic and diplomatic potential for Canada that would supplement, and counterbalance, the relationship with the United States. The logic of this argument is still sound, and even more so as we reach the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the growth in size and sophistication of the Latin American constituency has meant that policymakers can no longer ignore the implications of public opinion when they decide on crucial and controversial issues relating to Latin America. Canadians are interested in the region, and greater economic and political ties would be welcomed by them. Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America since 1968 has thus been a compromise between external constraints, on the one hand – constraints dictated not only by Canada’s bilateral relations with the United States but also by Canada’s traditional aloofness and ignorance of the region – and domestic pressures, on the other hand, pressures coming from a large and eclectic group of Canadians who have responded to fundamentally important issues of development, social justice, human rights, democratization, and the promotion of peace and security, all basic Canadian internationalist values. This compromise is the key to resolving the puzzle of Canadian foreign policy towards the region, and it explains why there are at times seemingly contradictory policies at work. The tensions between the two forces acting on the Canadian government have been profound. This is not to suggest that the Canadian government is a passive player but that it must balance these forces when making policy. What should be clear from the evidence presented in this book is that Canadian governments can no longer be careless about their polices towards Latin America. The government must now carefully weigh its policy choices towards the region, especially now that Canada has an important and visible role in the oas, where it must vote publicly on controversial issues under the scrutiny of an interested public, a watchful United States, and expectant allies in the hemisphere, and now that it is a member of nafta with the potential to become more closely tied commercially to Latin America.

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I have also attempted to show that just as Canadian governments must be more aware of and sensitive to the opinions and demands of the Latin American constituency, so too must Canadian ngo s be aware of and sensitive to the real limitations, the constraints, that Canadian foreign policy makers face when they formulate policy towards Latin America. By understanding these limitations, ngo s can be much more effective in pressing the government on issues it can do something about, and they can reduce the tendency to be dismissed and ignored if their demands are too far-fetched. But perhaps more importantly, I have argued that even when u.s. polices in the region are rejected by the Canadian government as incompatible with Canadian interests and values, Canada is not free to risk its most important bilateral relation unless the issue is of vital importance to the Canadian state and, in all likelihood, an issue that would involve a bilateral economic question. Canadian opposition to u.s. policies in the area is better achieved when Canada responds independently, as it did when it decided not to join the u.s. embargo of Nicaragua and continued to provide Nicaragua with aid. Furthermore, Canada can act in concert with like-minded Latin American states to oppose u.s. foreign policy, as it did when it supported the Contadora Group during the 1980s. Canada is by no means helpless in international and inter-American affairs. It is not, therefore, a satellite of the United States, but it should also not be reckless in conducting its foreign policy; it cannot afford to do so. The emergence of interdependence has meant greater freedom for Canada in multilateral forums, but it has not meant a loss of sensitivity in bilateral issues, especially with the United States. There are many important and effective channels for Canada to exercise its independence other than direct diplomatic confrontation with the United States on a given policy issue. Confrontation, in any case, would likely have little positive impact and might well create a negative impression on u.s. foreign policy makers and have a harmful and counterproductive impact instead.

In summary, since 1968 Canada has been growing closer to the Americas; it has established important credentials as a North-South interlocutor in this hemisphere. With the development of relations with Latin American countries, Canada has attained an important hemispheric role and extended its net to encompass relations with the entire hemisphere that have taken a concrete form with Canada’s entry into the oas. With its willingness to use its position in forums like the g-8 to bring forth concerns of Latin American and Caribbean countries, Canada has demonstrated to developing nations that it is an important

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ally. Thus not only has the new internationalism afforded Canada a more influential position in hemispheric affairs, it also points to the growing importance of regional multilateral organizations (as opposed to universal multilateral organizations such as the un), the more frequent and effective use of summitry and ad hoc multilateralism, and a more active role for domestic groups in foreign policy. The question is, how best can the Canadian government channel these advantages? I have suggested that it should continue its internationalist middle-power policy in this hemisphere and that it should help build a national consensus through regular consultation with Canadian ngo s.

ne w i s s ue s f o r c an a di an – lat i n am e ri c a n r el at i o ns i n t he tw e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y As Canada faces the twenty-first century, it confronts an international system potentially as different as the systems it adapted to after 1945 and after 1968. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both of which signaled the end of the Cold War era; the emergence of a new multilateral system that this entails; the slow and steady retreat of Canada, both strategically and commercially, from Europe; the creation of a North American Free Trade Area (nafta), and the rise of regionalism will all entail new challenges for Canada in the decades to come, challenges that will have strong continental and hemispheric implications. The changes in Europe will mean not only a reduced role for Canada in European affairs but a search for new alliances and trading partners. Without the threat of military confrontation in Europe and with a reduced Canadian role in European security, Canada may well be pushed further away from that continent and towards the Americas and Asia. The consolidation of the European Union, which brings together over thirty years of European integration, further shuts Canada off and eliminates the kind of privileged role Canada had in the postwar period. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also has incalculable repercussions for an international system previously founded on bipolarity, and on a world-wide ideological struggle, however uneven that bipolarity was. The emergence of a “unipolar moment,” to use Charles Krauthammer’s phrase, means a relative increase in u.s. military power and, since it is the only superpower left, it may also mean a relative increase in u.s. influence in the world; both changes have potentially important repercussions for Canada. Finally, the creation nafta means that strong and seemingly irresistible continentalist forces are pulling

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Canada into an ever narrower economic relation with the United States and Mexico. The same trends may also be pushing the United States to return to “fortress America.” Although this change may not mean a return to the isolationism of the prewar era, it may indicate a greater awareness and importance of the hemisphere and a greater necessity to consolidate its economic and security interests there. Indeed, the relative decline of the United States may be “more relative” with respect to the rest of the world than with respect to the hemisphere, where the United States continues to wield great power and influence, particularly in the absence of a Soviet threat. Furthermore, with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean wanting to take advantage of nafta and to pursue the idea behind of the Initiative of the Americas, the potential for a hemispheric economic free trade zone will bring Canada into new economic contacts with the countries of the region, which may become a necessity if the other trading blocks manage to reduce imports of Canadian products and services and if inter-block, rather than inter-state, trading becomes the norm. All these trends are early indications that centrifugal forces may well make the Western Hemisphere much more important to Canada than ever before. If they do then we would expect that the trends described throughout this book – greater contact and integration with the countries in the Western Hemisphere and greater contact and concern by the Canadian public – will continue and accelerate. The difference, however, in the post-1990 period is that besides ngo s, business groups will now have an increasing interest and stake in Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America, which will bring these groups into a level of conflict that did not exist before 1990, when business interests were quite modest. I do not suggest that for the moment Latin America will become more important than the United States, Europe, and Asia, the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy, although it certainly may move up the ladder. What I do suggest is that developments since 1968 have made Latin America the solid fourth pillar of Canadian foreign policy. As a result, important new policy issues are emerging that must be taken into account when addressing the place that Latin America will have for Canada in the coming decade and certainly in the coming century. But what are the further implications of the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the New World order in the hemisphere for Canada’s relations with Latin America? What is the new agenda in Latin America and what is Canada’s role in this agenda? To begin with, the inter-American system that was recast in 1948 with the creation of the oas was essentially a Cold War tool for the United States. But with the

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end of the Cold War, an important instrument of the oas, the Rio Treaty, has become useless. The fundamental East-West problems that the oas was targeted to address in 1948 have become irrelevant at the end of the 1990s and for the foreseeable future. Regional security issues have thus changed fundamentally. The only Cold War issue left in the hemisphere is that of Cuba, which is struggling to adjust to the new order. Emerging security concerns, although outside the area traditionally considered to be strategic or military, are problems with drug trafficking, migration, human rights, democratization, the environment, and “cooperative security,” which will become trouble spots for u.s.–Latin America relations.6 Second, with the “lost decade” behind them, Latin American countries are struggling, through trade liberalization and a search for markets in the United States and elsewhere, to recover their position in world trade. Third, since the early 1980s, Latin American countries have begun a slow and fragile move towards democratization. Many Latin American countries can best be described as “electoral democracies,” and the potential for further development of democratic institutions has never been greater in the region. But as the cases of Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru have demonstrated, democratization is by no means easy or assured. Fourth, and intimately related to the previous three points, with the elimination of the East-West conflict, problems of social and economic development may become ever more important. A new regional security system, a changing economic system, and the demands for greater democratization will all converge on the battle against poverty and the furtherance of social justice. Finally, the problem of the environment in Latin America will focus attention on the importance of ecological policies that can be balanced with the economic needs of developing nations in the hemisphere. The establishment of nafta and the possibility of the ftaa poses one of the most serious challenges. As has been proven by the difficulties that Chile faced in attempting to become a member of nafta, the United States can certainly block attempts to develop free trade in the hemisphere, and as Gerstrin and Rugman have argued, the creation of an ftaa may be distant, at best.7 For Canada, locked into a nafta that increases its dependence on one market, the sense of vulnerability is profound. Developing alternative regional markets and integrating into them must be a priority of Canadian trade policy. Latin America, with all the barriers it presents, must be at the top of the list, perhaps as part of a Pacific-centred strategy. But most important of all, if Canadian business can tap into the Latin American market, with or without an ftaa on the horizon, Canada can expand its trading relationship

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independently of the United States. For this reason, support for universal multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization (wto), which promote a rules-based international system, are important in areas where regional arrangements have not yet been developed. For Canada the best-case scenario would be a fully multilateral free trade area in the hemisphere, with a rules-based system that would protect Canadian interests. But it is more important to promote trade first, to get firms to do business in the region and become integrated into it, before the ideal is realized. For this goal Canadian firms must be educated and supported by the various governments and business associations about the potential of doing business in Latin America. Another issue of great importance in this new era of Canadian-Latin American relations is the development of close bilateral ties with Mexico, a country that can be a spring-board to Latin America for Canadian business. The Canadian-Mexican relation has grown in leaps and bounds since 1990, even through the difficulties Mexico experienced in the mid-1990s. But more importantly, Mexico can be a strategic ally for Canada in nafta. After all, Canada and Mexico may not be in the same boat together, but they are in the same ocean, and when the seas get rough, they will surely count on each other for support. Developing a distinct bilateral relation nurtured outside the trilateral demands of nafta is profoundly important, lest we lose sight of each other in high seas. Although this is not an exhaustive list of the important issues in Canadian–Latin American relations for the next few decades, it does indicate the depth of the problems and the urgency of finding responses and solutions. With Canada’s marriage to Latin America, these problems have become part of the Canadian foreign policy realm. If the trends discussed in this book continue, it should be clear that these issues will also continue to dominate not only Canada’s foreign policy, but its domestic politics as well. On the one hand, external pressures will come from two sources. First, the United States will seek Canada’s participation and support in helping the development of the region. Support will be sought, as well, in issues of regional security, such as pressuring Cuba and helping the United States with its war on drugs. On the other hand, external pressures will come from Latin American and Caribbean countries who see Canada as an interlocutor in NorthSouth issues. Pressure might also mount for Canada to become more economically involved with them, especially through nafta or other multilateral trading arrangements. At another level, because the issues outlined here fall well within Canada’s internationalist ideology and range from assuring regional peace and security to assisting in poverty alleviation and development, Canadian ngo s will likely become more

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active on such issues as development assistance, the environment, and the promotion of democratization and human rights in the region. In this sense, the business community in Canada can be expected to become a more active player in the effort to influence Canada’s foreign policy towards Latin America. Canada’s new internationalism will therefore likely be stretched to capacity as regional, hemispheric, and domestic pressures increase on Canadian governments to play a significant role in hemispheric affairs. Taking advantage of this new hemispheric role and of the oas as an important forum, however, will require the will of Canadian governments to improve and utilize the oas while seeking other more informal multilateral channels. If there is a lesson to be learnt from the events in Central America during the 1980s, it is that ad hoc multilateralism is far more important and effective than the formal structure of the oas. In this respect, a new agenda in Latin America will also mean a new agenda for Canada in the region, and it is therefore likely that the tension between domestic pressures, external constraints, and the new internationalism will continue into the next century.

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Notes

chapter one 1 2 3 4

5 6

7 8 9

Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, 37. Northedge, “Foreign Policy,” 10. Keohane, After Hegemony; Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas; Klepak, Natural Allies Canada’s Relationship with Latin America; Canada and Latin American Security; Daudelin and Dosman, Beyond Mexico; Dosman, “Canada and Latin America”; Haar and Dosman, Canada’s Changing Role in the Americas; McKenna, Canada and the oas. Charlotte Montgomery, “City of Windsor Flag Set to Flutter as Protection for Village in El Salvador,” Globe and Mail, 6 October 1989, 1–2. “Canadian Soldiers Join un Peacekeeping Force,” Globe and Mail 1 December 1989, a9. Ironically, the day after this announcement it became clear that the un force would not go to El Salvador, due to the increasing unrest caused by the civil war there. See Craig McInnes, “El Salvador Off Limits to un Force for Now,” Globe and Mail, 2 December 1989, a4. Simmons, “Latin American Migration to Canada; Basok, “Latin American Refugee Movements.” The first ssea to visit was Allan MacEachen (3–13 April 1984); the second was Joe Clark, from 27 October to 27 November 1987. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Final Report; Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Supporting the Five.

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236 Notes to pages 7–15 10 This can be seen by the comments of the Special Joint Committee of Canada’s International Relations, which received the greatest number of briefs on the issue of Central America. Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, Interdependence and Internationalism, 7. 11 See Randall, Konrad, and Silverman, North America without Borders? and Randall and Konrad, nafta in Transition. 12 Zamosc, “The Landing that Never Was,” 131–46; McFarlane, Northern Shadows, chap. 4. 13 North and capa, Between War and Peace, 100–1. 14 Rochlin, “Canadian Relations with Central America,” 45–70. 15 During the 1980s Canada’s strategic interests in the region grew, however, and by the end of the 1980s, they were quite important. See Klepak and Vachon, Canadian National Interest in Latin America; Dosman, Latin America and the Caribbean; Haglund, “Canada’s Security Interests.” 16 Huard, “Quiet Diplomacy?” 17 This division can be found in Hawes, Principal Power, 3. I will follow Hawes’ division of the three approaches, which he refers to as the complex neo-realist perspective (principal power), the internationalist perspective (middle power), and the economic nationalist perspective (satellite). For other analyses that follow a similar division, see Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, chap. 1; Nossal, Canadian Foreign Policy, chap. 3. 18 In this respect, the “second-string” perspectives outlined by Michael Hawes are important because most of them focus on the domestic setting and individual decision makers, although they seem to present us with the same problem: they focus on one level of analysis without much regard to the others. See Hawes, Principal Power. These approaches include the federalist perspective (chap. 3), the parliamentary-influence perspective (chap. 4) and the policy-process perspective. 19 Ibid., 3. 20 Ibid. 21 Clarkson, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Eayrs, “Defining a New Place for Canada,” 15–24. 22 Pratt, “Canadian Foreign Policy,” 12; ibid., 10. 23 Nossal, “Statism, Realism and Canadian Foreign Policy.” See also Nossal, Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. For a statist approach with respect to Latin America, see McKenna, “Canada’s Policy towards Latin America.” 24 Nossal, “Statism, Realism and Canadian Foreign Policy,” 2 (original emphasis). 25 Perhaps the most influential structuralist realist is Kenneth Waltz; see especially Theory of International Politics. See also Krasner, Defending the National Interest, especially chap. 1. 26 See Walker, “International Political Theory.” 27 Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, 167.

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237 Notes to pages 16–44 28 Ibid., 178. 29 Ibid., 180. chapter two 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Gilpin, World Politics, 1. See Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.” See Hawes, “Hegemonic Decline,” 219. See Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics. Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.” See also Frye and Leyton-Brown, “The Unipolar Moment?” Besides the works cited below see the following: Gilpin, Political Economy of International Relations; Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony; Russett, “Vanishing American Hegemony”; Strange, “Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony”; Garten, “Is American Decline Inevitable?” Strange, “Future of the American Empire”; Gowa, “Rational Hegemons”; Corden, “American Decline.” Gilpin, World Politics, 232 (emphasis added). Ibid., 234. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 39 ff. Pfaff, “Redefining World Power,” 46; ibid., 37. Pfaff, Barbarian Sentiments, 5. Ibid., 16, 23. Ibid., 183. Ibid., 186, 188. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, xxiii, xxiv–xxv (original emphasis). Ibid., 460, 463. Ibid., 467. Ibid., 557–8. Ibid., 559, 560–1. Ibid., 567. Ibid., 665. Ibid., 666, 681, 684. Ibid., 690, 691. Ibid., 512. Nye, Bound To Lead, 5, 6, 12. Ibid., 73, 78. Ibid., 87, 94. Ibid., 20–1. Ibid., 175. Ibid., 178–80. Ibid., 182, 187. See Hawes, “nafta and the New Structural Realities.”

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238 Notes to pages 45–59 34 Of the texts not discussed specifically below, see Keohane Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics; and especially Keohane, After Hegemony. 35 Nye and Keohane, Power and Interdependence, 4, 22–3, 24. 36 Ibid., 25, 27, 32 (original emphasis). 37 Ibid., 34. 38 See, inter alia, Rosencrance and Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality?” Holsti, “A New International Politics?” Holsti, “Change in the International System”; Rosenau, “Before Cooperation.” 39 Waltz, “The Myth of National Interdependence.” See, as well, his Theory of International Politics. For an excellent exposition of the statist perspective, see Krasner, Defending the National Interest, chaps. 1, 9. 40 Ibid., 206. 41 Grieco, “Anarchy,” 487. For another critique, see Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power.” 42 Grieco, “Anarchy,” 486–7. 43 Ibid., 488–90. 44 See Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis; See as well, Bull, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On.” 45 See Walker, “Realism, Change and International Political Theory.” 46 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 226. 47 Ibid., 226, 253. 48 Lipson, “International Cooperation,” 12, 1. 49 Ibid., 20, 21. 50 Ibid., 22. 51 Ibid., 23 (original emphasis). 52 Keohane, “Multilateralism,” 740, 741, 742. 53 Ibid., 744–5, 747–8. 54 Boulding, Building a Global Civic Culture, 42; ibid., 37–41. 55 Ibid., 49. 56 Mendlovitz and Walker, Towards a Just World Peace, 9. 57 Ibid., 10. 58 Falk, “Contemporary Social Movements,” 17. See also Falk, “The Global Promise of Social Movements.” 59 Boulding, Building a Global Civic Culture, 37. 60 Willetts, Pressure Groups in the Global System, 192, 193. 61 Ibid., 194. chapter three 1 Millar, “On Writing about Foreign Policy,” 61. 2 This view is best represented by the World Order Project Model (womp); see, for example, Falk, “Contending Approaches to World Order”; Mendlovitz, “Institute of World Order”; Walker, One World, Many Worlds.

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239 Notes to pages 59–66 3 Bull and Watson, The Expansion of International Society. 4 Linklater, Men and Citizens. 5 This approach, which began in the 1970s, is perhaps best represented by Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 6 The staunchest defender of the thesis that nothing is really changing is Kenneth Waltz, who argues strongly against advocates of the thesis of interdependence. For an early critique, see Waltz, “The Myth of National Interdependence.” More recently, Waltz has been at the centre of what has been termed the “third great debate” in international relations theory. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and responses to this book in Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics. 7 Hoffmann, “An American Social Science.” For a more recent analysis, see Krippendorf, “The Dominance of American Approaches.” 8 The most important initial critique was Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis, originally published in 1939; see also Morganthau, Politics among Nations, and Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. 9 Waltz is the prime figure in this debate. He argues quite consistently that individuals have little effect on the conduct of government in international politics, due to the constraints of the structure of the international statessystem. See, for example, Man, the State and War, especially chapter 7; for a specific reference to foreign policy, see Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics and Theory of International Politics, especially chap. 5. 10 Bull, The Anarchical Society. 11 Rosenau, “New Directions,” 1. 12 Kegley, Comparative Study of Foreign Policy; Hermann and Peacock, “Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”; Rosenau, “Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?” Rosenau, “Comparative Foreign Policy”; Munton, “Comparative Foreign Policy”; Faurby, “Premises, Promises and Problems.” 13 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 2. 14 Singer, “International Conflict,” 453. 15 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 230, 238. 16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 88. 17 Politics among Nations. 18 See, for example, Twenty Years’ Crisis. 19 Smith, “Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations,” 345–8. See also Smith, “Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm.” 20 Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories.” 21 The British approach is more historical and throughout its development has not tended to get bogged down in scientific and methodological conundrums. A leading British scholar on foreign policy is F.S. Northedge. See his British Foreign Policy; “The Nature of Foreign Policy”; and The International Political System. The debate between British and u.s. students of foreign policy is particularly interesting: see Smith “Foreign Policy

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240 Notes to pages 67–81

22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Analysis”; Rosenau, “International Studies in a Transnational World”; and Northedge, “Transnationalism: The American Illusion.” Snyder, “The Nature of Foreign Policy,” 61. Ibid. Ibid., 64, 68. Ibid., 69. Snyder, “Toward Greater Order.” The other works reviewed were Schleicher, Introduction to International Relations; Padelford and Lincon, International Politics; Palmer and Perkins, International Relations; and Strausz-Hupe and Possony, International Relations. Snyder, “Toward Greater Order,” 461, 464–5. Ibid., 463, 466, 472. Ibid., 473, emphasis added. Ibid., 473–4. Snyder, “Nature of Foreign Policy,” 66. Snyder, “Toward Greater Order,” 474. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Decision-Making; later reprinted by the same authors in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. References below are to this later edition. The decision-making approach continued in fpa: see Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” and Allison, Essence of Decision. This is, perhaps, the best example of the effectiveness of the decision-making approach. Snyder, Brook, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 63, 72. Ibid., 65. Ibid., 66. Ibid., 68, 73. Ibid. Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 95, 98. Ibid., 98–9. Ibid., 99. Ibid., 106, 107. Ibid., 108, 109 (original emphasis). Ibid., 116–17. Ibid., 128–9, 132 (original emphasis). Ibid., 109. Smith, Foreign Policy Adaptation, 22. Ibid., 16. Rosenau, “A Pre-Theory Revisited,” 252. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1. Ibid., 1, 2 (original emphasis). Ibid., 2–3. Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus,” 977 (original emphasis). Ibid. Ibid., 978, 979.

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241 Notes to pages 81–95 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Ibid., 980. Ibid., 981. Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” 2. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 7, 9, 11. Ibid., 12, 13, 14–15. See the introductory chapter by Katzenstein, entitled “Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” as well as his concluding chapter, “Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy.” Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty, 7, 9. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 14–15. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 19. Ibid., 297, 303, 306–7. Ibid., 308. chapter four

1 Cameron, “Beyond Quiet Diplomacy,” 20. 2 Holmes, “The New Agenda of Canadian Internationalism,” 16. 3 For a good collection of historical writings on Canada-u.s. relations, see Hillmer, Partners Nevertheless. For a concise literature review, see LeytonBrown, “Perspectives on Canadian-American Relations.” See, as well, Holmes, Life with Uncle. 4 See the O.D. Skelton memorial lecture, for the sixtieth anniversary of the Statute of Westminster, on Canada-u.s. relations: Gotlieb, The United States in Canadian Foreign Policy. 5 Doran and Siegler, eds. Canada and the United States, 244–5. See also Fox, A Continent Apart. 6 Doran, Forgotten Partnership, 1, 2. 7 Ibid., 2. 8 Kirton, “Canada and the United States,” 118. 9 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians. 10 Kirton and Bothwell, “A Proud and Powerful Country,” 118. 11 Sharp, “Canada-u.s. Relations,” 21, 1. The six pamphlets were Foreign Policy for Canadians, which provided the framework, Asia, Africa, Latin America, United Nations, and International Development. 12 Doran, “The United States and Canada,” 135. 13 For an account of the relations between Canada and the United States towards the end of the Nixon administration and during the Ford administration, see Kirton and Bothwell, “A Proud and Powerful Country,” 115 ff.

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242 Notes to pages 96–111 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Kirton and Bothwell, “A Very Necessary Country,” 300. Cox, “Leadership, Change and Innovation in Canadian Foreign Policy.” Kirton and Bothwell, “A Very Necessary Country,” 305. Kirton, “America’s Hegemonic Decline.” Leyton-Brown, Weathering the Storm, 71. Bromke and Nossal, “Tensions in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” 347–8. See also Beigie and Stewart, “New Pressures, Old Constraints,” and Flaherty and McKercher, Southern Exposure. Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge. Bromke and Nossal, “Tensions in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” 350. Hawes, “Mulroney and the Americans,” 11. See, as well, Cohen, “Canada and the u.s.” Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Report. Hawes, “Mulroney and the Americans,” 11. Bromke and Nossal, “u.s.-Canadian Relations,” 165, 166–7. Ibid., 167. Kirton, “Final Challenges,” 138, 140–1. Doxey, “Constructive Internationalism,” 291. Kirton, “Final Challenges,” 141. Doxey, “Constructive Internationalism,” 291. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security; for an analysis and critique see Nossal, “Canadian Foreign Policy.” Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, Interdependence and Internationalism, 137 (original emphasis). Doxey, “Constructive Internationalism,” 293. Kirton, “Canada’s New Internationalism,” 104. Doxey, “Constructive Internationalism,” 300. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians, 6. Thorburn, Interest Groups, 11, 13. Aucoin, “Pressure Groups,” 175–9. Thorburn, Interest Groups, 15. Pross, “Pressure Groups,” 9–12. Barry, “Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process,” 117, 133. Ibid., 134. chapter five

1 For a brief account of the first two periods, see “Canada and Latin America,” External Affairs 23 (no. 2): 492–5. For a different periodization, see Rochlin, “Evolution of Canada.” For an excellent comprehensive overview of Canada’s relations with Latin America, see also Rochlin, Discovering the Americas.

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243 Notes to pages 111–15 2 For the most comprehensive account of this first period, see Oglesby, Gringos from the Far North. See, as well, by the same author, “Canada and Latin America.” 3 Several important works have recently been published on this topic. See Klepak, ed. Natural Allies? Klepak, What’s in It for Us; Daudelin and Dosman, Beyond Mexico; Dosman, “Canada and Latin America.” For an account on the unlikelihood of an expansion of nafta into Latin America, see Gerstrin and Rugman, “Economic Regionalism in Latin America.” 4 Canada, Department of External Affairs, “Canada and the World.” See also Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy. This volume includes a reprint of this speech together with a number of other speeches related to the foreign policy review between 1968 and 1970. 5 Canada, Department of External Affairs, “Canada and the World,” 278. 6 Ibid., 281. 7 Ibid., 281–2. 8 This point was reaffirmed more clearly in a speech by the prime minister to the Alberta Liberal Association nearly a year after his foreign policy statement. The speech was significant because it was a major statement that reaffirmed an independent defence policy delineated outside the realm of Canada’s nato commitment. See Trudeau, “Defence Policy and Foreign Policy.” 9 Canada, Department of External Affairs, “Canada and the World,” 283. 10 It is interesting to note that although virtually the entire 2 March 1968 issue of Foreign Trade, the bimonthly magazine of the Department of Trade and Commerce, was dedicated to development and trade in South America and much was made of the trebling of trade since World War II, no mention was made of the fact that Canadian exports had remained at the level of 3 to 4 percent during the 1960s (see Thomas, “Latin America: Trade and Development,” 2–7). Indeed, during 1967 Canadian exports to Latin America fell to 2.8 percent of total Canadian exports from 3.6 percent the previous year. In 1968 and 1969, this figure remained at 2.9 percent and increased only slightly in 1970 to 3.4 percent. For an excellent account of Canada’s trade with the region during this period, see Bradford and Pestieau, Canada and Latin America, especially part 2. The figures cited can be found on page 87. 11 Several years later, Robert Fulford criticized Trudeau’s Latin America policy because it showed too much closeness to the Latin American dictatorships. See Fulford “Canada, Friend of All Dictatorships,” Saturday Night, 88, 7 December 1973; see the rejoinder by Donald Cameron in Saturday Night, 89, 10 March 1974. 12 It must also be pointed out that Gérard Pelletier, one of Trudeau’s closest confidants, had made a tour of Latin America in September of 1967, towards the end of the Pearson government, in his position as parliamentary

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244 Notes to pages 115–22

13 14 15

16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33

secretary to the secretary of state for External Affairs, Paul Martin. Pelletier’s extensive visit included the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico. See “Mr. Pelletier Visits Costa Rica,” External Affairs, 19, no. 12 (1967), 529–31. See, for example, Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, especially chaps. 6 and 7. Trudeau, “Canada and the World,” 284. Indeed, in September 1968 the agency’s name was changed, and the agency was restructured. See “Canadian International Development Agency,” External Affairs 20, no. 11 (1968), 469–74. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, First Session, 28th Parliament, 12 September 1968, 8; 16 September 1968, 66; 24 October 1968, 1966. The list of ministries represented by senior officials is astounding. Besides officials representing the departments of the ministers attending the trip, there were also officials from the Canadian International Development Agency, the Export Credits Insurance Corporation, the Canada Council, the National Gallery, the National Film Board, and the cbc. Media representatives included the cbc (French Network, International Service), the Toronto Telegram, the Southam Press, and cbc tv. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 25 October 1968, 2033. Ibid., 29 November 1968, 3293–4. Ibid., 3293. Canada, House of Commons, Ministerial Mission to Latin America, Preliminary Report, 19. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 35. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians. For an assessment of Trudeau’s impact on the foreign policy review and his general impact on foreign policy, see Lyon “The Trudeau Doctrine”; Story, “Reflecting on the Conceptual Framework”; and Dobell, Canada’s Search for New Roles. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 3 November 1969, 391; 31 October 1969, 355; 3 November 1969, 403. Foreign Policy for Canadians, “Latin America,” 25. Ibid., 28, 29. Ibid., 32. See Harbron, “Canada and Latin America”; and Oglesby, “Latin America.” For an overall assessment of the foreign policy review, see “Foreign Policy for Canadians: Comments on the White Paper,” Behind the Headlines 19, nos. 7–8 (August 1970). Harbron, “Canada and Latin America,” 25. Confidential telex from Andrew Ross to External Affairs in Ottawa, number 475, 6 September 1973, in Latin American Working Group and

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245 Notes to pages 123–8

34 35

36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48

49

50 51

Chile-Canada Solidarity, The Confidential Cables from Ambassador Andrew Ross in Santiago, Chile to External Affairs in Ottawa (Toronto: lawg 1973), mimeo), 3. Interview with David Adam, Mexico City, 15 January 1992. The situation of those seeking asylum was widely reported in the press. See Guy Demarino, “Canadian Embassy Shelters Refugees after Chilean Coup,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 September 1973, 1; “19 Refugees Seeking Asylum Complicated Diplomatic Talks,” Globe and Mail, 2 October 1973. Statistics Canada, Exports by Countries (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970 to 1973). Interview with the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 25 April 1991. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 12 September 1973, 6460, 6471; 13 September 1973, 6495. Confidential telex from External Affairs headquarters in Ottawa to embassy in Santiago, gwl 305, 17 September 1973, in Latin American Working Group and Chile-Canada Solidarity, Confidential Cables. Guy Demarino, “Chile-Canada Relations in State of Limbo,” Spectator, 19 September 1973, 74. Editorial, Toronto Star, 28 September 1973. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 18 September 1973, 6667. “Make Our Position on Chile Clear,” editorial, Toronto Star, 2 October 1973. Glen Allen, “Canada’s Recognition of Chile a Weak Move, at Best,” Montreal Gazette, 2 October 1973. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 15 October 1973, 6858. “Canada Recognizes Junta as Government in Chile,” Globe and Mail, 1 October 1973. Except for the material published by lawg, all other classified material quoted below was obtained pursuant the Access to Information Act, request a-1367, obtained 20 March 1990. Declassified confidential telex from A.E. Ritchie to Andrew Ross, gwl-314, 20 September 1973. Declassified confidential (Canadian eyes only) telex from Santiago to the Department of External Affairs headquarters (gwg), telex 660, 11 October 1973. The code 19 (1) denotes that in declassifying the material the names of persons consulted and information still deemed to be classified has been deleted from the declassified copies provided to me. Material still deemed sensitive is not declassified under section 15 (1). Confidential telex from Andrew Ross to the Department of External Affairs headquarters in Ottawa (gwl), telex 563, 24 September 1973, in lawg and Chile-Canada Solidarity, Confidential Cables, 4. Confidential telex from Andrew Ross to the Department of External Affairs headquarters in Ottawa (gwl), telex 540, 20 September 1973, ibid. See declassified secret telex from Santiago to headquarters in Ottawa, telex 901, 5 December 1973, advising Ottawa that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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246 Notes to pages 128–36

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63

64 65 66

67 68 69

70 71

72 73

would no longer be adhering to conventions on diplomatic asylum in countries not adhering to the respective conventions. The cut-off date would be as of 11 December 1973. Interview with Geoffrey Pearson, Ottawa, 24 June 1991. Declassified confidential telex from Santiago to Department of External Affairs, telex 841, 24 November 1973, 2. Ibid., 5. Declassified confidential telex from Andrew Ross to Department of External Affairs, telex 343, 28 November 1973, 1. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 8. James Eayrs, “Envoy Missed the Action: Bad Advice from Santiago?” Ottawa Citizen, 1 October 1973. Charles Lynch, “Andrew Ross Being Subjected to Leaks and Attacks,” Montreal Gazette, 13 November 1973, 9; see as well Charles Lynch, “Support for Ross in Chile, At Last,” Spectator, 21 November 1973, 13. Declassified secret telex from Ottawa (gwl) to the embassy in Santiago, telex gwg-460, 4 December 1973, 5. Hanff, “Decision-Making under Pressure.” Oglesby, “A Trudeau Decade.” In 1969, for example, the Canadian Association for Latin America was created by Canadian businesses to foster trade with Latin America. The association, in conjunction with the Economic Policy Committee and the Private Planning Association of Canada, published a comprehensive book on Canada–Latin America trade relations. See note 10 above. On the issue of Canada’s bilateralism with Latin America, see Murray, “The Bilateral Road.” Harbron, “Growing Pressures on Canada,” 32. Interview with Flora MacDonald, 3 July 1991. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement. Notes for a speech by the secretary of state for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, to the Inter-American Press Association, Toronto, 17 October 1979, 4. Cox, “Leadership, Change and Innovation.” Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement, 6, 7. Declassified confidential memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in San José, Costa Rica, to the under secretary of state for External Affairs in Ottawa, number 649, 19 June 1979. “Nicaragua: What Lies Ahead?” 1, 6. Declassified confidential “Talking Points,” 20 June 1979. Declassified confidential memorandum from the Canadian Embassy in San José, Costa Rica, to the under secretary of state for External Affairs in Ottawa, no. 649, 19 June 1979, 7–8, 2, 10. Ibid. Declassified confidential memorandum from Roger Gilbert (gsl), 20 June 1979 (translation).

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247 Notes to pages 136–43 74 Declassified memorandum from gsl-969, from gsl (Roger Gilbert) to jgg (via gsp), 21 June 1979 (translation). See also note 48, above. 75 Ibid. (translation). 76 Declassified “Note pour le ministre.” Subject: “Situation au Nicaragua,” 22 June 1979 (translation). 77 Declassified confidential “Mémoire pour le ministre,” from Allan Gotlieb. Subject: “Projet de déclaration au sujet du Nicaragua,” 4 July 1979, 1–2 (translation). 78 Ibid., 2 (translation). 79 Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Situation in Nicaragua,” 6 July 1979. 80 McFarlane, Northern Shadows, 160–1. 81 Declassified “Mémoire pour le ministre.” Subject: “La situation au Nicaragua,” 17 July 1979 (translation). 82 Declassified telex gsl-1120 from gsl in Ottawa to various posts around the world. Subject: “Nicaragua: reconnaissance du govt provisoire de reconstruction nationale,” 23 July 1979 (translation). 83 Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Recognition of the Government of Nicaragua,” 24 July 1979. 84 Some of the principal writings on the subject are Baranyi, “Canadian Foreign Policy towards Central America”; Martel, “Le point sur les relations du Canada avec l’Amérique centrale”; Lemco, “Canadian Foreign Policy Interests in Central America,” also published as “Canada and Central America”; Haglund, “How is Canada Doing in Central America?” Rochlin, “Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy towards Central America”; Baranyi, Peace in Central America? Schmitz, Canadian Foreign Policy in Central America; North and capa, Between War and Peace in Central America; Lemco, Crisis in Central America. 85 Department of External Affairs, Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, to the Ontario Co-operative Programme in Latin America and Caribbean Studies Conference on Health and Welfare Development, “Canada and Latin America – Past, Present and Future,” Statements and Speeches, Windsor, 29 March 1980. 86 Interviews with the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, 25 April 1991, and the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, 4 July 1991. 87 Department of External Affairs, Notes for an Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, to the Eleventh Leadership Conference of the Centre for the Presidency, “Approaches to Foreign Policy – Differences and Similarities,” Statements and Speeches, Ottawa, 18 October 1980. 88 Interview with the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Ottawa, 4 July 1991. 89 Quoted in Huard, “Quiet Diplomacy or Quiet Acquiescence?” 90 Interview with the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Ottawa, 4 July 1991.

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248 Notes to pages 143–50 91 Interview with Maurice Dupras, Ottawa, 22 April 1991. 92 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Final Report. Indeed, the subcommittee released three reports; the second one was Canada, House of Commons, Subcommittee on Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada’s Relations with the Caribbean and Central America. 93 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Final Report, 78:7. 94 Ibid., 78:11. 95 Interview with Alan MacEachen, Ottawa, 28 June 1991. 96 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Notes for a speech by Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a seminar on Latin America sponsored by the United Nations Association of Canada and the Institute for International Development and Cooperation,” University of Ottawa, 3 June 1983, 12, 6. 97 Ibid., 11. 98 Interview with the Honourable Allan MacEachen on The Journal, cbc, 30 August 1983. 99 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Notes for a Toast Offered by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the Visit to Ottawa of the Foreign Minister of Colombia, H.E. Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo,” 3, 2. 100 Interview with Alan MacEachen, Ottawa, 28 June 1991. 101 Press conference by Allan J. MacEachen, Washington dc, 2 April 1984. 102 Interview with Maurice Dupras, Ottawa, 22 April 1991. 103 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, on his trip to Central America, 3 to 13 April 1984,” 10 May 1984, 2. 104 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Notes for a speech to the 35th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” New York, 25 September 1984, 9. 105 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security. 106 Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, Interdependence and Internationalism, 7, 15, 114. 107 Ibid., 84. 108 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada’s International Relations, 8, 79.

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249 Notes to pages 150–2 109 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Joe Clark Reaffirms Canadian Support for Peace Process in Central America,” no. 153, 5 August 1987. 110 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Joe Clark Supports the Tentative Peace Agreement Announced by the Central America Presidents,” no. 154, 10 August 1987. 111 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Joe Clark Sends Officials of the Department of External Affairs to Central America to Reiterate Canada’s Support for the Central American Peace Plan,” no. 163, 16 August 1987. 112 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Statement by the Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs to the 42d Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” New York, September 22, 1987. 113 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Official Visit to Canada of Dr Sergio Ramirez Mercado, Vice President of Nicaragua,” no. 197, 9 October 1987; Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Toast by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the dinner given in honour of Mr Sergio Ramirez Macedo, Vice-President of Nicaragua,” Ottawa, 21 October 1987. 114 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Secretary of State for External Affairs to Visit Central America,” no. 219, 20 November 1987. 115 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, “Resumption of Canadian Bilateral Humanitarian and Economic Aid to Guatemala,” no. 211, 13 November 1987. 116 See, for example, Robert Fife “Joe’s Tour Beset by Booboos,” Toronto Sun, 29 November 1987; “Canadian Aid Workers Criticize Joe Clark,” Toronto Star, 29 November 1987; Gordon Barthos, “Joe Clark Hit on Latin Trip: Reviews at Home Are Less Glowing,” Toronto Star, 29 November 1987; Robert Stone, “Blunders Mar Tour,” Winnipeg Free Press, 12 December 1987. 117 Dave Todd, “Central America Trip a Low Point for Clark,” Ottawa Citizen, 5 December 1987. 118 “Clark Indicates Canada Willing to Act as Latin Peacekeepers,” Victoria Times-Colonist, 29 November 1987. 119 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Supporting the Five, 37. 120 Klepak, Verification of a Central America Peace Accord; Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Regime. 121 Letter by ssea Joe Clark to Thomas Bosley, chairman of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 23 September 1988.

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250 Notes to pages 154–7 122 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the University of Calgary, on Canadian policy towards Latin America.” Calgary, Alberta, 1 February 1990. chapter six 1 Canada, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “Prime Minister Announces Canada’s Intent to Join the Organization of American States, San José, Costa Rica, 27 October 1989, 5. 2 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Speech to the Organization of American States by Richard V. Gorham,” Washington, dc, 7 September 1988, 17. 3 Ibid, 19. 4 To put the oas question in perspective, it must be kept in mind that between 1984 and 1988 there were a number of reviews of foreign, defence, and development assistance policy, and only one dealt slightly with the oas. The most important references regarding the Mulroney government foreign policy review include the following: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security (the reference to the oas can be found on page 42); Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations (the Simard-Hockin Report), Independence and Internationalism; followed by Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada’s International Relations; the review of defence policy, Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment; the review of international development assistance, Canada, Canadian International Development Assistance, Sharing Our Future; Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, For Whose Benefit? and finally, Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development Assistance. 5 Canada, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “Prime Minister Announces Canada’s Intent to Join the Organization of American States.” 6 Indeed, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade did not even look at the issue of the oas until the decision had been taken, and it reported on its views after membership was acquired. See, Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Canada and the Organization of American States: Toward an Active and Independent Role, Minutes and Proceedings, issue no. 35, 6 February 1990. 7 For a comprehensive analysis of Canada’s relation to the oas, see McKenna, Canada and the oas. 8 Kirton and Holmes, Canada and the New Internationalism.

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251 Notes to pages 158–60 9 For an excellent recent study of the opinions for and against the organization, see Han, Problems and Prospects of the Organization of American States. 10 Slater, “The Decline of the oas,” 497. 11 See also, two other articles by Slater, “The United States, the oas,” and “The Limits of Legitimation.” 12 Another interpretation is that this was the period in which the United States dominated the hemisphere and the oas. For one such interpretation, see Nikolayeu, “The Evolution of the oas.” 13 It was in 1933 at the Montevideo Conference that the United States accepted the principle of nonintervention and adhered to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. This was a significant step for many Latin American states who wanted to curb the growing power of the United States. See Wilson, “Multilateral Policy and the Organization of American States.” 14 As Han argues (Problems and Prospects), the oas is not the oldest international organization per se; having been founded in l889, it was preceded by the International Telegraphic Union, founded in l865. It may be argued that as a political and commercial forum, the oas certainly is the oldest international organization. 15 The Alliance for Progress was launched after Kennedy called for a special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. Representatives of the organization met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and signed the Charter of Punta del Este. For an early analysis of the alliance see Dreier, Alliance for Progress; and for a very recent study see Scheman, Alliance for Progress. 16 See Rubin, “The Falklands”; Moore, “The Inter-American System Snarls in Falklands War”; Connell-Smith, “The oas and the Falklands Conflict.” 17 Gannon, “Will the oas live to be 100?” 18 See Bagley, Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace; Purcell, “Demystifying Contadora.” 19 For an analysis of this, see Wainhouse, “The Role of the oas”; Tondel, The Inter-American Security System. 20 For an assessment of peaceful settlement under the Pact of Bogota, see Reid Martz, “Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”; “oas Reforms and the Future of Pacific Settlement”; and Paz Barnica, “Peacekeeping within the Inter-American System.” 21 The countries represented by foreign and finance ministers were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay. 22 Consenso de Cartagena, Endeudamiento Externo de America Latina: Lineamientos generales de políticas de reestructuración y financiamiento, Cartagena, Colombia, 22 June 1984.

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252 Notes to pages 161–4 23 All the Contadora and Contadora Support Group countries except Panama were involved in the Cartagena Group. 24 For example, this was the position of the Canadian government, expressed by John Graham, director general of the Caribbean and Central America bureau of the Department of External Affairs between 1985 and 1987; see Graham, “Shaping Stability in Central America.” 25 Bagley, “Contadora: The Failure of Diplomacy.” 26 Although initially they were commonly known as the Group of Eight, this term was not quite accurate after the members decided to temporarily exclude Panama in 1988, after Manuel Antonio Noriega overthrew Eric Arturo del Valle as president in February of that year. The Canadian government, however, refers to the Permanent Mechanism for Political Consultation and Agreement as the Rio Group. For simplicity, I will follow common practice and refer to it as the Rio Group. 27 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, dc, Press Release. “The Presidents of the Group of Eight Latin American Countries Will Hold a Summit Meeting in Acapulco, Mexico,” 4 November 1987. 28 Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación Política, “Acapulco Commitment to Peace: Development and Democracy.” Acapulco, Mexico, 1987, mimeo. Official English translation. 29 Larry Rohter, “8 Latin Chiefs Urge Cuba Role in Their Region,” New York Times, 29 November 1987. 30 Mecanismo Permanente de Consult y Concertación Política, “Declaración de Uruguay,” Punta del Este, Uruguay (Spanish version); translation is by the author and is not official. 31 See Scheman, “Institutional Reform of the Organization of American States, 1975–1983.” 32 For literature on Charter reform involving the Protocol of Cartagena, see three articles by Scheman, “oas Charter Reform”; “oas and Technical Cooperation”; and “oas and Political Action.” See, as well, Durand, “Modernizing the oas.” 33 The Charter was amended once before, by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, and came into effect in 1970. See Manger, “Reform of the oas”; Robertson, “Revision of the Charter of the oas.” 34 Under article 8 of the Charter, Guyana and Belize were ineligible for membership because they had a dispute with Guatemala and Venezuela, respectively. Under the new Charter, article 8 was changed so that they were eligible, regardless of disputes, after 10 December 1990. 35 These changes, however, have sharpened the tension in the Charter between the principles of nonintervention and representative democracy, two principles that are not always compatible. The references to the importance of democracy were added to the preamble, under the headings of “Essential Purposes” and “Principles.” Already, with the crisis in Panama

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253 Notes to pages 164–70

36 37 38

39 40

41 42 43

44 45 46

47 48 49

50

after the annulled elections of May 1989, the oas permanent council, and later the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, had to balance their critique of the Noriega regime with the fundamental belief in nonintervention. Even the statement of the Twenty-first Meeting of Consultation on 17 May 1989 makes clear references to condemnation of Noriega, while asserting nonintervention. Predictably, Panama (and Nicaragua) argued that the oas was interfering in domestic affairs during this period. The oas condemnation of the u.s. action, however, leaves little room for doubt that nonintervention is a more fundamental principle for the organization. Declaración de Uruguay, (note 30) “Lineamientos Para La Acción,” 1. Ibid., II, “Concertación Política,” 3. Organization of American States, General Assembly, Eighteenth Regular Session, San Salvador, El Salvador, 14–18 November 1989, Proceedings, vol. 1 oea/Ser/XVIII, 0.2.10 March, 1989, vol. I. The resolution is titled “Strengthening of the oas,” ag/res, 939 (XVIII-1/881), 64–5. Ibid., 65. Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación Política, “Declaración de las Delegaciones de Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, México, Peru, Uruguay y Venezuela.” Presented to the eighteenth regular session of the General Assembly of the oas, 14–18 November 1988. Mimeo. The original document is in Spanish; the translation is by the author and is not official. Ibid., 2, 3. Ibid., 3, 4. It must be pointed out, however, that this support is certainly not widespread. For example, the Aspen Institute report on the Americas hardly mentions the oas, although it deals with many of the same concerns as the two reports dealt with below. See Aspen Institute, The Americas in 1989. Jordan, Santa Fe II, 24, 25. Heatherly and Pines, Mandate for Leadership III. Organization of American States, Twenty-First Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Draft Resolution. Presented by the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. oea/Ser. F/11.21; Doc. 8/89 rev. 1; 17 May 1989, 3. Ibid. Scheman, Inter-American Dilemma, xvi. The phrase was prompted by the exchange between Chrétien and Dr Marcel Roussin of the University of Ottawa, during the proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Canada’s International Relations: Proceedings. 29 January 1986, 37, 62. Over the years the oas has had several institutional names. It began in l889 with the establishment of the International Union of American Republics. The administrative name, however, was the Pan American Union, which is

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254 Notes to pages 170–4

51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61

62 63

64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72

still the name of the secretariat. In 1948 the organization’s name was changed to the present one. Anglin, “United States Opposition to Canadian Membership,” 2. See also Miller, “Canada and the Pan-American Union.” Jackson, “Canadian Foreign Policy,” 125. Macquarrie quite correctly puzzles over this gesture, as Canada’s form of government was somewhat of a disqualification. See Macquarrie, “Canada and the oas,” 40–1. Ogelsby, “Canada and Latin America,” 166 ff. Ibid., 170–1. Cited in Macquarrie, “Canada and the oas,” 41. See Miller, “Canada and Pan America,” 179. Holmes, “Canada and Pan America,” 179. Canada was, however, a founding member of the Inter-American Statistical Institute, in 1940, and attended other specialized conferences in the hemisphere. See Holmes, “Canada and Pan America,” 177–8. It was Green who established the Latin America Section at the Department of External Affairs, and in late 1961 Canada established diplomatic relations with all Latin American countries. See Oglesby, “Canada and Latin America,” 177–8. In August of 1963 a very complete and cautious report emerged, published by the Canadian-American Committee, which gave a good overview of the pros and cons of Canada’s membership in the oas. See Harbron, Canada and the Organization of American States. For a good analysis of this period, see Oglesby, “Canada and the PanAmerican Union,” 578 ff. Although there were some public indications in 1966 that Canada was seriously considering the membership question, it was believed that privately Pearson and senior officials of the Department of External Affairs were against membership. See Knowlton Nash, “Canada Thumbs Down on u.s. Latin Pleading,” Financial Post, 16 April 1966, 36. See Knowlton Nash, “Is Canada Ready to Fill Chair at oas?” Financial Post, 25 September 1965, 265. Honourable Paul Martin, “Canada and Latin America,” External Affairs, 19, no. 7 (July 1967), 265. See Oglesby, “Canada and the Pan-American Union,” 587. Canada, Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians, 20. Ibid., 24. Jean-Pierre Goyer, Address to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, External Affairs, 22, no. 8 (August 1970), 268. “Canada Won’t Join Alliance but We Are Moving Closer,” Toronto Star, 10 September 1977, a1; “Become a Full Member of oas Canada Urged by Grenada pm,” Globe and Mail, 15 June 1977, 10.

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255 Notes to pages 174–84 73 “oas Aiming at Canada as Member?” Winnipeg Free Press, 12 July 1978, 42. 74 “Canada Cold to oas Membership,” Montreal Star, 10 February 1977, a8. 75 See Canada, House of Commons, Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, on Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Proceedings and Report. See also Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Final Report, on Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. 76 Canada, House of Commons, Sub-Committee on Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Report, 78:19. 77 Ibid., 78:19–21, 22. 78 “Wrong Choice,” Vancouver Sun, 25 November 1982, a4. 79 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Press Release, “Canada Urged to Join oas, Washington, dc, 1 September 1982. 80 “Canada Will Not Join oas,” Chronicle Herald, 23 February 1983, 2. 81 “Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security, 1, 42. 82 Canada, Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, Interdependence and Internationalism, 86–7, 111. 83 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, 15 September 1987, “Appointment of a New Roving Ambassador for Latin America.” 84 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1987/88, 61. 85 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, “Speech to the Organization of American States by Ambassador Richard V. Gorham,” 7 September 1988, 5. 86 See Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, chaps. 6, 7. 87 Culppeper, “Restructuring Sovereign Debt.” 88 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Drug Intelligence Estimate. 89 Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación Política, “Declaración de Uruguay,” Punta del Este, Uruguay, 29 October 1988. 90 An assessment of Canada’s first year in the oas was made by the Canada– Caribbean–Central America Policy Alternatives (capa), which gave a detailed analysis and critique of Canada’s involvement in the oas during its first year. See capa, Report Card on Canada’s First Year. This has since become a yearly event. 91 Klepak, Canada and Latin American Security. 92 Stevenson, “Cooperative Security.” 93 For an evaluation of Canada’s performance in the oas, see McKenna, Canada and the oas, particularly 171–81. chapter seven 1 Paul Knox, “Seeing Not Necessarily Believing,” Globe and Mail, 19 December 1984, cited in lawg Letter, vol. 9, no. 1/2, 35.

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256 Notes to pages 185–7 2 Most observers of ngo activities have concluded that ngo s have not had much success in influencing government, for a variety of reasons. See Baranyi, “Canadian Foreign Policy”; Rochlin, “Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy”; Mace and Roussel, “Les groupes d’intérêt”; for an analysis that accepts a greater role and impact for these ngo s, see Lemco, Canada and the Crisis in Central America, chap. 7. 3 See Stairs, “Public Opinion and External Affairs”; Stairs directly attributes the basis of his framework to Best on page 130n4: Best, Public Opinion, 224–55. 4 Matthews and Pratt, Church and State, 3. 5 Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era. See chap. 8 for a description of the decade of ferment and chaps. 9 and 10 for Grant’s analysis. See also Handy, History of the Churches, especially chap. 12. 6 Pratt and Hutchinson, Christian Faith and Economic Justice, 4. For an excellent overview of the role of churches in Canadian foreign policy, see Greene, Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy; see especially, Ross, “All God’s People,” 70–100. 7 Matthews and Pratt, Church and State, 3. A brief critique of Foreign Policy for Canadians by the Canadian Council of Churches can be found in Monthly Digest (Canadian Council for International Cooperation), vol. 2, no. 7, 2. 8 Matthews, “The Christian Churches and Human Rights,” 7. As Matthews argues, one important document taken up by the churches, although not produced by them, was “The Black Paper,” which was a critique of the government’s policy towards Southern Africa. See Garth Legge, et al., “The Black Paper: An Alternate Policy for Canada towards South Africa,” Behind the Headlines, 30, September 1970. 9 They were Ten Days for World Development, created as an annual campaign and with the central goal of narrowing the gap between the rich and poor and giving full support to the New International Economic Order (this was coordinated by the Anglican Church House in Toronto, but was supported by the Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and United Churches in Canada); the gatt-Fly, created in 1973 to bring structural changes to the world economic system (it emerged after observers returned from the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Chile in 1972); the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, established in 1973 out of concern for corporate investment in southern Africa and Latin America and with an eye to questioning the churches’ own investments; the inter-church Project on Population, established in 1974 in preparation for the World Conference on Population; and Project Ploughshares, established in 1976 to focus on the threat of nuclear war, the arms race, and disarmament. For a brief overview of Ten Days for World Development, see Gardiner, “Building a Counter-Consensus in Canada,” in Greene, Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy.

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257 Notes to pages 187–90 10 For an excellent overview of the Canadian Labour Congress between 1956 and 1968, see Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics. The book, unfortunately, does not deal with clc involvement in international issues during this period. 11 For example, in 1958 Kalmen Kaplansky, the newly appointed director for the international affairs department of the clc, wrote that “Although Communist influence is on the decline, it still remains a formidable threat to the free trade union movement. In spite of all these obstacles, orit has made a tremendous contribution to the welfare of the workers in Central and South America.” See Kalmen Kaplansky, “Report on International Affairs to the Second Convention,” Canadian Labour, 3, no. 4, (1958): 87. 12 For example, the clc policy statements on international affairs between 1968 and 1970 did not even mention Latin America and the Caribbean; see clc Policy Statement: International Affairs, (adopted by the seventh Constitutional Convention of the clc, held in Toronto, 6–10 May 1968); clc Policy Statement on International Affairs (approved by the eighth Constitutional Convention, 1970); Policy Statement on International Affairs (approved by the ninth Constitutional Convention, 1972). 13 See, for example, “Bullets Replace Ballots in Chile: Petition,” Hamilton Spectator, 10 November 1973, c5; “Canada Act Now to Save Lives,” Globe and Mail, 1 December 1973. 14 Terrence Belford: “Churches Criticize Canada’s Policy on Chile,” Globe and Mail, 4 October 1973; “Religious Leaders Lobby for Chileans,” Ottawa Citizen, 26 December 1973, 1. 15 Pearson was sent as an individual who had not been involved in the whole issue in Chile and whose views would be considered more detached than those of other members of the foreign service who had been dealing with the crisis in Chile. Pearson spoke primarily to other diplomats in Santiago and to Canadian officials in the embassy. He returned to Ottawa and recommended that more refugees should be accepted into Canada. Interview with Geoffrey Pearson, Ottawa, 24 June 1991. 16 Father William Smith, “Statement of Father William Smith, Canadian Catholic Conference, 28 December 1973, to Hon. Mitchell Sharp and the Press,” mimeo., 3. 17 Marilyn Emerson, “Chilean Refugees Policy Attacked by Foster,” The Varsity, 1 February 1974; Norman Hartley, “Churches Seek More Federal Aid for Chileans in Refugee Camps,” Globe and Mail, 17 January 1991; “Church Researcher Attacks Canada’s Work with Chileans,” The Ontarian, 15 January 1991. 18 “Be Cooler to Chile Brief Urges Ottawa,” Toronto Star, 9 October 1974, a8; “Ottawa Charged with Complacency toward Chilean Refugee Plight,” Globe and Mail, 5 March 1974, 29; “Ottawa Support for Junta in Chile Irks Churchman,” Montreal Gazette, 13 September 1974; “Churchman Criticizes

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258 Notes to pages 190–3

19

20 21

22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30

31

Support of Chile Junta,” Globe and Mail, 12 September 1974, 2; Terrence Belford, “Churches Criticize Canada Policy on Chile,” Globe and Mail, 4 October 1973. “Canadian Policy towards Chile: A Brief to the Honourable Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Honourable R. Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 9 October 1974,” mimeo. The brief was presented by twenty-four individuals, mostly church people but also representatives of aid organizations and labour and solidarity organizations. Inter Church Committee on Chile, One Gigantic Prison, 1976. The following are some of the organizations: Saskatchewan Committee for a Free Chile, Canadian Chilean Working Group of Manitoba, Canadian Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile, Chilean Association Kitchener-Waterloo, Vancouver Chilean Association, Toronto Chilean Association, Ottawa Chilean Association, Comité Québec-Chili, Hamilton Chilean Committee, Thunder Bay Committee for Solidarity with Chile, Sudbury Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile, Toronto Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile, and Solidarité Québec-Chili. At the national level there was the Canadian Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile and, of course, lawg. For a detailed analysis of the activities of the Toronto Welcome Committee for Refugees from Chile, see their Report, 1974–1975, mimeo, available at lawg resource centre. Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter, 27 September 1973, 13. Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter, 9 October 1973. Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter, 18 November 1973, 3 ff. Tim Draimin, on behalf of lawg, sent a letter to members that included excerpts from the leaked memos and called for the withdrawal of Ross. See “Letter for Friends of the Latin American Working Group,” dated 15 November 1973. For a news report on the issue, see Michael Lavoie, “Envoy’s Secret Cables Leaked,” Toronto Star, 6 November 1973. L’Entraide missionnaire, Une histoire d’avenirs (Montreal: L’Entraide missionnaire, 1987), 5 (translation). Chili-Québec informations, December 1973, no. 2, 3. “Suites du ‘Septembre Noir’ Chilien: quelques leçons à retenir au Québec,” Chili-Québec informations, January 1974, no. 3, 8 (translation). See for example Chili-Québec informations, 15 April-15 May, 1974, no. 6, 20–1; see as well, Chili-Québec informations, 10 December 1974, no. 11, “Le syndicalisme en Argentine,” 10–11, and “Brésil: main dans la main avec les gorilles,” 12–13. A whole issue of the newsletter was dedicated to this issue in 1977; see “Le Canada profite-t-il des coups d’État?” Chili-Québec informations, nos. 23–4, March-April 1977. The newsletter published a special issue on the labour

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259 Notes to pages 193–7

32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

movement in Latin America; see “Résistance ouvrière en Amérique latine,” Chili-Québec informations, no. 25, May 1977. alai published Latin Perspective in English, Servicio Informativo in Spanish, and a series entitled Documentación Política. Latin America Working Group, Chile versus the Corporations. Isa. 3: 14–15 reads, “The Lord enters into judgement with the elders and princes of his people: ‘It is you who have devoured the vineyard, the spoil of the poor is in your house. What do you mean by crushing my people, by grinding the face of the poor?› Proverbs 31: 8–9 reads as follows: “Open your mouth in behalf of the voiceless for the rights of all who are less desolate. Open your mouth, decree what is just, maintain the rights of the poor and the needy!” lawg, Chile versus the Corporations, 2. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 58. lawg Letter, 2, nos. 1–2, 1974, 9 (my emphasis). Hanff, “Decision-Making under Pressure,” 129. lawg Letter, 2, no. 4, September 1974, 6; see, as well, an interview with a Canadian social worker who helped Chilean refugees in Chile that chronicles the many imperfections of the refugee claimant process in Chile: “Chile: Immigration to Canada,” 6 ff. See Hanff, “Decision Making under Pressure”; Dirks, “The Plight of the Homeless,” 19. See, for example, “Chile: A Return to ‘Free’ Enterprise,” lawg Letter, 2, nos. 1–2, March-April 1974. lawg, “Canadian Aid to the Junta,” lawg Letter, 2, no. 4, September 1974, 16. Ibid., 17. lawg, Chile Report: Two years of Struggle, Two years of Solidarity, September 1975, 4. See Project Chile, leaflet, “The Junta and its Friends,” 1977. lawg Letter, 4, no. 5; vol. 5, nos. 4–5, 1977; vol. 6, no. 1, 1978. Interview with Rick Jackson, director, International Affairs Department, Canadian Labour Congress, 21 May 1991. Quoted in Mary Kehoe, “Chile: Death of a Democracy,” Canadian Labour 19, no. 1, March 1974, 33. clc International Affairs Policy Statement, document no. 13, May 1974, 2; reprinted in Canadian Labour, 19, no. 6, June 1974, 23. icchrla Newsletter, May 1977, 1. For example, on 1 June 1977, the icchrla made a presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration, “Respecting Bill c-24, An Act Respecting Immigration to Canada.” Besides a story on El Salvador in the icchrla Newsletter, in the first and

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260 Notes to pages 198–202

53 54

55

56

57 58 59

60 61 62

63 64 65

second editions (May and August of 1977), stories appeared on Guatemala and Nicaragua in the June/July 1978 edition. The other two editions during this period concentrated on the Southern Cone (September/October 1977), with a special issue on Argentina (March/April 1978). Ibid., 2. See clc, Policy Statement on International Affairs, approved by the eleventh clc Constitutional Convention, 1976, and clc, Policy Statement on International Affairs, document 15, twelfth Constitutional Convention, 1978. Canadian Labour Congress, “Text of the Statement on International Affairs,” approved by the Twelfth Constitutional Convention of the clc, held in Quebec City, 3–7 April 1978, Canadian Labour, June 1978, 20. “Argentina … the Vigil Goes On,” Canadian Labour, 24, no. 7, 29 June 1979, 5; “Picket-Line Delays Heavy Water Shipment to Argentina,” Canadian Labour, 24, no. 9, 27 July 1979, 5. See Labour’s Views on International Affairs, no. 17, December 1978/January 1979. Cited in “Canada, Europe and Latin America,” Labour’s Views on International Affairs, no. 18, April-May, 1979, 3. The first icchrla fact-finding mission in November 1978 was part of a North American delegation to Nicaragua that examined the deteriorating situation there; the second group consisted of two icchrla members who visited Guatemala and El Salvador in February 1979. In 1980 the icchrla sent two more fact-finding missions to Central America. During this time, three of the fact-finding missions occurred, one to the Southern Cone in October 1976 and two to Chile in February and November 1979. icchrla, Newsletter, June 1979, 3. Ibid., 4. Besides the fact-finding missions mentioned above, only two issues after the first special issue on Central America, the icchrla had another special double issue on Central America, in July-August 1980, concentrating on Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Interview with Bill Fairburn, Toronto, Ontario, 8 May 1991. Reprinted in the icchrla, Newsletter, April 1980, 3. Canadian Dimension magazine published a special issue entitled “The Left Hand of God” in 1979. It explored this trend within the mainline churches. See Canadian Dimension, 13, no. 5, January-February 1979: Gregory Baum, “Christianity and Socialism,” 30–4; Benjamin G. Smillie, “The Social Gospel,” 35–7; Bonnie Greene, “The Christian Left in English Canada,” 38–42; Jose Cesar Jungueira, “The Re-emergence of the Christian Left in Canada,” 46–9; Paul Marshall and Mike Welton, “A Guide to Christian-Marxist Dialogue,” 50–2. Interestingly enough, immediately preceding this series there is an article entitled “Nicaragua: The People on the Offensive,” written by the Latin American Working Group (25–7).

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261 Notes to pages 202–6 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., 5. 68 icchrla, Newsletter, special double issue on Central America, July-August 1980. 69 icchrla, Brief to the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Subject of Canadian Relations with the Republic of El Salvador, 3 December 1980. 70 Ibid., 48–55. 71 Ibid., 49. 72 icchrla, Newsletter, fall/winter 1981, 20. 73 The importance of Central America to the icchrla is indicated by the fact that between 1980 and 1988 many special issues on the isthmus comprised the bulk of icchrla publications during this period. See the following icchrla newsletters: summer 1982, on native rights in Nicaragua; spring 1983, on Guatemala; fall 1983, on Honduras; spring 1984, on Central America; fall 1984, on El Salvador; in addition there were Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections, and War (the report of the six-member Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation that spent ten days in Nicaragua from 28 October to 8 November 1984); Canadian Policy and Central America (a brief presented to the Hon. Allan MacEachen, ssea, 12 June 1984); Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Mexico and Guatemala 22 Aug.-8 Sept. 1983; Trabil-Nani: Historical Background and Current Situation on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, 1984; special issue on El Salvador, Newsletter, 1987 no. 4; special issue on Central America, “Time to Tackle the Real War against Intervention, Exploitation, Poverty,” Newsletter 1987, no. 5. 74 The United Church of Canada, Committee on the Church and International Affairs, “An Open Letter to the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau,” 18 March, 1981. Signed by Donald G. Gray, secretary of the General Council, W. Clarke MacDonald, deputy secretary, Office of the Church in Society, and Garth W. Legge, secretary, Division of World Outreach. A copy can be found in Matthews and Pratt, Church and State, appendix a. 75 To give one of many examples, soon after the Nicaraguan revolution the Canadian Save the Children Fund announced a new wide-scale program and asked for volunteers. See ccic, Newsletter 3, no. 5, January 1980, 1. 76 ccic, “El Salvador Solidarity,” Newsletter vol. 4, no. 6, 1. 77 ccic, “ccic Board Meets with MacGuigan,” Newsletter 4, no. 7, March 1981, 1. 78 ccic “Delegation Demands Release of Salvadoran prisoners: ccic President Meets Honduran Ambassador,” Newsletter 5, no. 1, September 1981. 79 ccic, “ccic Statement on El Salvador,” Newsletter 5, no. 3, November 1981, 1.

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262 Notes to pages 206–8 80 See, for example, ccic, “mp s Support ngo Stand,” Newsletter 5, no. 6, February 1982, 1; ccic, “Refugees in Central America,” Newsletter 5, no. 8, April 1982, 2. 81 ccic, “Working Group on Latin America,” Newsletter 5, no. 2, October 1981, 1. 82 The Nicaragua Update began publication in late June 1979 with the help of volunteers and was published until October 1979. The first-year publications were published by lawg as Nicaragua Update: Support International Solidarity with Nicaragua (Toronto: lawg, 1980). 83 lawg, “Central American Refugees: The Crisis and Context,” lawg Letter, vol. 8, no. 1, September-December 1982, 1. 84 L’Entraide missionnaire, Salvador, resterons-nous muets donc complices? (Montreal: L’Entraide missionnaire, 1981); Philip Weaton, Le Honduras: démocratie, ou base régionale pour la contre-révolution (Montréal: L’Entraide missionnaire, 1983). In addition, see a special issue on liberation theology in Latin America that consists of translated articles by Latin American clergy: L’Entraide missionnaire, La spiritualité de la libération, (Montreal: L’Entraide missionnaire, 1981). See alai, Trois moments du processus salvadorien (Montreal: alai, 1981); Guatemala, Honduras: les organisations populaires (Montreal: alai, 1981); Amérique centrale: géopolitique et révolution, (Montreal: alai, 1982). 85 Canada–Caribbean–Central America Policy Alternatives, From Acquiescence to Action: Brief on Canada and Central America, 29 March 1984, i. 86 Canada–Caribbean–Central America Policy Alternatives, explanatory pamphlet. 87 capa began to publish this research after 1984. Some of their publications include Julie Leonard and Tim Draimin, “Canada’s Links to the Militarization of the Caribbean and Central America,” capa, May 1985; Xavier Gorrostiaga, “Towards Alternative Policies in the Region,” capa, May 1985; Fr. Leonard Altilia, S.J., “Education in the New Nicaragua: A Preliminary Report,” capa, March 1985; Michael Czerny and Tim Draimin, “A Secret Foreign Policy: Canada and Central America,” capa, winter 1985; Tim Draimin, “Canadian Aid to Central America,” capa, December 1984. 88 “clc Launches Relief Fund for Nicaragua,” Canadian Labour 24, no. 10, 10 August 1979. 89 “Operation Solidarity Results in Tremendous Success,” Canadian Labour 24, no. 12, 7 September 1979, 3; Pierre D’Amour, “Nicaragua: A Working Hand from Canadians,” Canadian Labour 24, no. 13, 28 September 1979. 90 “Terror in Guatemala,” Labour’s Views on International Affairs, no. 20, February 1980. 91 “Stop Repression of Workers, clc Tells Guatemala,” Canadian Labour 25, no. 10, 11 July 1980.

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263 Notes to pages 208–13 92 “Guatemala,” Labour’s Views on International Affairs, no. 22, November 1980. 93 “In Guatemala – ‘Things Go Better with Union Busting,› Canadian Labour 29, no. 4, April 1984, 6. 94 “Executive Council Decisions,” Canadian Labour 29, no. 9, October 1984, 7. 95 “Coke Guatemala Deal in Trouble,” Canadian Labour 30, no. 2, February 1985, 11; “Guatemala Coca-Cola Dispute,” Canadian Labour 30, no. 3, March 1985, 10; “Coca-Cola Guatemala: One Year Later,” Canadian Labour 31, no. 7, September 1986, 9. 96 “clc Urges Co-ordinated Action to Aid People of El Salvador,” Canadian Labour 26, no. 4, 9. 97 icchrla, Newsletter, fall 1983, 11. 98 icchrla and the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees, Why Don’t They Hear Us? Canadian Inter Church Fact-Finding Mission to Guatemala and Mexico, August 22, 1983 to September 8, 1983. 99 icchrla, Canadian Policy on Central America: A Brief Presented to The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 October 1983. 100 Ibid., 10–12. 101 “clc Contacts with Trade Unions in Nicaragua,” Canadian Labour 28, no. 10, November-December 1983, 7. 102 Dennis McDermott, “clc Statement on usa Intervention in Nicaragua,” Information, clc Public Relations Department, 22 November 1983. 103 “clc Contacts with Trade Union in Nicaragua,” 7. 104 “clc: A Slight Change in Central America,” Central America Update 5, no. 2, October 1983, 15. 105 “Une majorité au Canada (mais une minorité au Québec) s’oppose à la politique américaine en Amérique Centrale,” Ici L’Amérique Latine, December 1984, 1. 106 Decima Research Limited, the Canadian Public and Foreign Policy Issues, August 1985, no. 1299, 50. 107 icchrla, “Contadora: A Homegrown Initiative,” Newsletter, spring 1984, 2; no. 4, 1985, 1. 108 icchrla, Newsletter, spring 1984, 4. 109 Ibid. 110 icchrla, Canadian Policy and Central America: Renewing the Dialogue. A Brief to the Honourable Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 June 1984. 111 icchrla, “Recommendations for Action,” Newsletter, fall 1984, 7. 112 Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation (which observed the 1984 Nicaraguan election), Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections and War (Toronto: icchrla 1984), 50. 113 icchrla, Newsletter, no. 3, 1986, 8.

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264 Notes to pages 213–19 114 icchrla, Canada in the Americas: Advocate of Peace. A Brief to the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, excerpts reprinted in icchrla, Newsletter, no. 3, 1986, 6. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 “Press Reagan to Change u.s. Policy in Central America,” 11 March 1987, reprinted in icchrla Newsletter, no. 3, 1987, 4–5. 118 For example, see icchrla, “Chile: The Struggle to ‘Defend Life’ Intensifies,” Newsletter, summer 1984, 6; Special issue on Chile, Newsletter, no. 3, 1985; Special issue on Chile, Newsletter, nos. 5–6, 1986; “The Testimony of Carmen Gloria Quintana,” Newsletter, no. 3, 1987, 2; Special issue on the debt, Newsletter, no. 4, 1990; Special issue on drugs and militarization in the Andean region, Newsletter, no. 6, 1990. 119 lawg, “An Anti-Intervention Handbook: Canadians and the Crisis in Central America, lawg Letter 9, no. 1/2, 1985, 1. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid., 30, 35. 122 Latin American Working Group, “Overview of Canadian Aid to Central America, 1980–1985,” lawg Letter 9, no. 3, February 1986; “Taking Sides: Canadian Aid to El Salvador,” lawg Letter 10, no. 1, August 1987; “Paved with Good Intentions: Canadian Aid to Honduras,” lawg Letter, no. 44, February 1989. 123 Canada–Caribbean–Central America Policy Alternatives, From Acquiescence to Action, 1–4. 124 Ibid., 4. 125 Ibid., 7, 9. 126 North, Negotiations for Peace; North, Measures for Peace. 127 North and capa, Between War and Peace, 17. 128 Ibid., 225. 129 See, for example, “Military Dangers in Central America,” Canadian Labour 29, no. 2, February 1984, 7. 130 Canadian Labour Congress, Report of the International Affairs Committee. Document no. 10, fifteenth constitutional convention, 2. 131 See, for example, the report on a visit to Chile by an ictfu delegation that included Rick Jackson (director of the International Affairs Department of the clc), “ictfu Mission Meets Chilean Dissidents,” Canadian Labour 28, no. 8, September 1983, 9; and support by Canadian workers for a national strike held in Chile in October 1984, “Canadian Workers Picket Chilean Legations in Canada,” Canadian Labour 29, no. 9, November-December 1983, 7; “clc Calls for Stronger Action in Chile,” Canadian Labour 31, no. 6, July-August 1986, 10. See also “Union Conference on the Debt Crisis in Latin America,” Canadian Labour 29, no. 8, September 1984, 9.

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265 Notes to pages 219–32 132 “Executive Council Decisions,” Canadian Labour 29, no. 9, October 1984, 7. 133 Canadian Labour Congress, Submission to the Parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations, 28 November 1985, 72–3. 134 In a letter to ssea Joe Clark dated 30 May 1985, Dennis McDermott expressed his concern about the u.s. embargo on Nicaragua and praised Clark for public assurances that Canada would continue to trade with Nicaragua. Dick Martin’s letter, which came after he visited the region, criticized the government’s “quiet diplomacy” in the region and called on to become more active there. See “clc Lobbies Government on Central American Policies,” Canadian Labour 30, no. 7, July-August 1985, 9. 135 “clc Visit to Central America,” Canadian Labour 31, no. 3, March 1986, 9. 136 Canadian Labour Congress, “clc ‘Gravely Disappointed,’ by u.s. Aid to Contras,” Information, Public Relations Department, 27 June 1986. 137 Canadian Labour Congress, Report of the International Affairs Committee. Document no. 8, Sixteenth Constitutional Convention, 1986, 2. 138 “Broadening Relations with Central American Unions,” Central America Update, May/June 1988. 139 Canadian Labour Congress, Report of the International Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Constitutional Convention, May 1988, document no. 8, 1–3. chapter eight 1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 May 1961, 4964. 2 See J.C.M. Ogelsby, “Canada and Latin America”, 166–7; Macquarrie, “Canada and the oas.” 3 Pearson, “Canada and the Americas,” 3. 4 Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, “Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney: Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San José, Costa Rica, October 27, 1989,” 5 (my emphasis). 5 Leycegui, Robson, and Stein, Trading Punches. 6 Stevenson, “Cooperative Security.” 7 Gerstrin and Rugman, “Economic Regionalism in Latin America.”

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index.fm Page 283 Wednesday, August 23, 2000 1:37 PM

Index

Adam, David: Chilean crisis, 122–3, 131 Agence latino-Americaine d’information (alai), 193, 207 Allen, Glen: on the Chilean crisis, 126 Allende, Salvador, 6, 188–9 American Treaty of Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá), 160 Amnesty International, 56 Anaconda, nationalization of, 124 Andras, Robert R.: and Chilean crisis, 190 Anglican Church: and Chilean crisis, 126 Anti-Intervention Handbook: Canadians and the Crisis in Central America, An, 214 Arbour, Francis: role in icchrla, 202 Argentina: human rights, 198; invasion of Falklands/Malvinas, 159; member of Lima Group, 159–60; and oas, 164 Arias Peace Plan (the Esquipulas II agreement), 148, 151–2, 163, 179 Association of Southeast Asian Countries, 162 Aucoin, Peter: on Canadian foreign policy, 104 Auxiliary Technical Group (atg), 152 Axelrod, Robert: on internationalism, 49–50 Baena Soares, João Clemente, 163 Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends (Pfaff), 33

Barry, Donald: on Biafra and pressure groups, 105–6 Belize: membership in oas, 164 Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Katzenstein), 84–5, 86 Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada, 217–18 Biafran crisis, 105 Blanchette, Dr Arthur: on Canada’s role in the oas, 174 Bolivia: and ratification of Protocol of Cartagena, 163 Boulding, Elise: on social movements, 53, 55–6 Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Nye), 41 Bothwell, Robert, 94–5, 96 Brazil, 188: and changes in the oas, 164; debt, 180; member of Lima Group, 160 Brewin, Andrew: response to Chilean crisis, 126 Broadhead, Tim: response to crisis in El Salvador, 205–6 Bromke, Adam: on Canada-u.s. relations, 97, 98; on foreign policy, 99 Bruck, H.W.: foreign policy analysis, 70–3 Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World (Boulding), 53 Bush, George: attitude toward oas, 166–8

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284

Index

Cameron, Duncan, 90 Canada: aid to Central America, 6, 7, 12, 152, 195, 202; domestic pressure on foreign policy, 14–21, 103–7, 184–223 (see also nongovernmental organizations); oas, 155–83; peacekeeping, 5–6, 9–10, 152, 153; policy towards Central America, 139–54; promotion of an independent foreign policy, 17–21, 57–8; refugees from Central America, 7, 11, 123–4, 127–31, 174, 189–200; relations with United Kingdom, 91–2; relations with United States, 6, 8–11, 28–32, 90–100, 139–42, 145–6 Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (capa) 186, 207–8, 215–18 Canada-Chile Bulletin, 206 Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, 174 Canadian Catholic Conference, 126, 190 Canadian Centre for International Cooperation (ccic), 205–6 Canadian Congress of Labour, 187 Canadian Council of Churches, 189–90 Canadian Executive Services Overseas (ceso), 118–19 Canadian International Development Agency (cida), 7, 112, 115–16, 118–19, 202 Canadian Labour Congress (clc), 187–8, 196–7, 198; support of trade unions, 208–9; criticism of u.s. policies, 210–11, 218–20 Canadian Save the Children Fund, 206 Canadian Union for the Rights of Biafra, 105 Canadian University Services Overseas (cuso), 118–19, 206 care Canada, 206 Carr, E.H., 48, 64, 70 Cartagena Group, 160–1, 164, 176 Carter, Jimmy: and Canada-u.s. relations, 95–6, 174 Central America Bank for Economic Integration, 118 Central America Update, 206, 211 Chile: fall of Allende, 122–31; relations with Canada, 6, 10, 170, 188–92, 215 Chile-Canada Network, 192 Chile-Canada Solidarity Committee, 191–2 Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter, 191–2 Chile-Québec informations, 192–3

Chile Documentation Centre, 196 Chile Report: Two Years of Struggle, Two Years of Solidarity, 196 Chile versus the Corporations: A Call for Canadian Support, 193 China. See People’s Republic of China Clark, Joe: and Canada-u.s. relations, 96, 99; Contadora peace process, 148, 150–2, 179; and Latin America, 153–4, 176, 180, 183, 213, 221; response to the report of the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 7; signing of oas charter, 9 Clarkson, Stephen: Canadian foreign policy, 13–14 Coca-Cola: Guatemala strike, 208–9 Colombia: and changes in the oas, 164; peacekeeping in Central America, 5 Comité de solidarité Québec-Chili: and Chilean crisis, 192–3 Committee for the Relief of Biafran Refugees, 105 Commonwealth: benefits for Canada, 18, 102 Community Information Research Group, 206 Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations, 101, 148, 156, 176, 213 Confederation for Trade Union Unification of Nicaragua (cus), 198, 210–11, 219 Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce), 101 Conference on International Economic Cooperation (ciec), 101 Contadora Group, 7, 11, 145–50, 153, 159–162, 164, 176, 201 Control and Verification Commission (cvc), 148 Costa Rica: in the oas, 164–5; peace plan, 161, 179 Council of Nordic Countries, 162 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 175 Cox, David: on Flora MacDonald, 134 Cross, James Richard, 121 Cuba, 11, 141: and membership in the oas, 162, 172, 175; Rio Group, 162 Desy, Jean: and Canada’s membership in the pau, 171 Development Education Centre, 193

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285

Index

Dewitt, David: Canadian foreign policy, 14, 15–17 Diefenbaker, John: closure of diplomatic missions in Latin America, 119; interest in the oas, 171–2 Dolgin, Mark: role in the Chilean crisis, 122–3, 131 Dominican Republic: intervention in, 172, 200 Doran, Charles: on Canadian foreign policy, 93, 95 Doxey, Margaret: Canadian foreign policy, 100–1, 102 Draimin, Tim, 208 Duarte, José Napoleón, 151 Dupras, Maurice, 147; Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 143–4 Eayrs, James, 13; criticism of Andrew Ross, 129–30 Ecuador, 170, 195; and Panama, 168 El Salvador, 9, 118, 146–7, 148, 200–6; American policy towards, 140, 200; Protocol of Cartagena, 163 Enders, Thomas O.: seeking Canadian help in Nicaragua, 137 Esquipulas II agreement. See Arias Peace Plan Esquipulas II Peace Accord, 163 Europe: Pfaff on, 34–6 European Community (ec), 4 European Union, 4 Export Development Corporation (edc): Chile, 189; Guatemala, 202 Fairburn, Bill: role in icchrla, 202 Farabundo Martí para la Liberación (fmln), 19 Ford, Gerald: and Canada-u.s. relations, 95 Foreign Investment Review Agency (fira), 96, 97, 140 Foreign Policy Analysis (fpa), xii, 59–89; comparative foreign policy methodology (cfpm), 66; development of, 66–7; and foreign economic policy (fep), 66, 82–8; history of, 64–6 Foreign Policy for Canadians, 94, 95, 100, 103; Latin America, 119–23, 132, 172–3, 178–9, 199–200 Forsey, Eugene: on membership in the oas, 174

Forsey, Helen: and Canada’s policy toward El Salvador, 206 Foster, John, 218 France: foreign policy, 84 Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ftaa), xii, 113, 226 Frente Democrático Revolucionario (fdr), 203, 205 Frente Farabundo Martí Para la Liberación Nacional (fmln), 141 Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (fsln), 19, 200. See also Nicaragua Friends of the Earth, 56 g-7, 18, 96, 102, 177, 180 Gairy, Eric, 174 Galtieri, General Leopoldo, 159 Gannon, Francis X.: on the relevance of the oas, 159 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt), 4, 37, 102 Gilbert, Roger: and Canada’s policy toward Nicaragua, 136–7, 139 Gilpin, Robert, 27, 31–3 Globe and Mail, 4 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 3–4, 153 Gorham, Richard V.: and the oas, 155–6, 177–8, 180 Gotlieb, Allan E.: and the crisis in Nicaragua, 137–40 Goyer, Jean-Pierre: and membership in the oas, 173; ministerial mission to Latin America, 116, 117 Grant, John Webster: church activism, 186–7 Green, Howard: and oas membership, 171–2 Greene, J.J.: ministerial mission to Latin America, 116 Grieco, Joseph M.: on internationalism, 47–9 Group of Eight, 161. See also Rio Group Guatemala, 9, 118, 146, 151, 171, 200–2; Coca-Cola strike, 208–9; and the crisis in Panama, 168 Guthrie, Alvin: cus and Nicaragua, 211 Guyana: membership in the oas, 164, 173 Hanff, George: on Chilean refugees, 130–1, 194 Hanrieder, Wolfram: foreign policy analysis, 79–82

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Harbron, John: on the Chilean crisis, 132 Hawes, Michael, 29; Canada-u.s. relations, 97, 98; Canadian foreign policy, 13 Herald Tribune forum: speech of Lester Pearson, 224 Heritage Foundation: on u.s. participation in the oas, 167 Hernández, Magdalena, 4 Holmes, John, 90–1; on the pau, 171 Honduras, 9, 118, 200–2 human rights, 10, 11, 146, 201–11; in Chile, 184–223; in Nicaragua, 134, 137–8 Hutchinson, Roger: church activism, 187 icchrla Newsletter, 197 Ici l’Amérique latine, 207 Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 152 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 175, 181 Inter-American Development Bank (iasb), 120, 173, 195 Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (iica), 120, 173 Inter-American Institute of Geography and History, 173 Inter-American Press Association: speech of Flora MacDonald, 133–4 Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (orit), 187–8 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 155, 181–2. See also Rio Treaty Inter-Church Ad-Hoc Committee on Chile (icahcc), 189–91, 197–8 Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (icchrla), 197–8, 201–5, 209–11, 212–14 Interdependence and Internationalism, 148–9, 176 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 37 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ictfu), 187, 198–9, 208 International Court of Justice: ruling on u.s. mining of Nicaraguan harbours, 8–9 International Development Research Centre (idrc), 115 International Monetary Fund, 37 international nongovernmental agencies (ingo s), 53–8

internationalism, 45–58, 90–107, 157, 170, 229–30 Investment Canada, 97 Ireland: peacekeeping in Central America, 5 Israel: permanent observer in the oas, 173 Jackson, Rick: clc observer, 219 Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice, 206, 208 Katzenstein, Peter: foreign policy analysis, 82–8 Kennecott Copper: nationalization of, 124 Kennedy, John F.: Alliance for Progress, 158; oas, 224 Kennedy, Paul: on u.s. decline, 33, 36–41, 225 Keohane, Robert O.: on internationalism, 45–6, 49–50; on multilateralism, 51–2 King, MacKenzie: on membership in the pau, 171 Kirton, John: on Canadian foreign policy, 14, 15–17, 94–5, 96; on internationalism, 100, 101, 102 La Francophonie, 18 Labour’s Views on International Affairs, 198 Lang, Otto: ministerial mission to Latin America, 116 Latin America: debt crisis, 159–60, 180; drug trafficking, 180; Quebec, 192–4 Latin America Working Group (lawg), 186, 191–2, 193–6, 206–7, 214–15 Law of the Sea Conference, 101 lawg Letter, 196, 198 L’Entraide missionaire, 192, 207 Le Soleil: on Chilean crisis, 193 Lewis, David: parliamentary motion on the Chilean crisis, 124–5 Leyton-Brown, David, 96–7 Lima Group (Contadora Support Group), 149, 153, 159–60 Lipson, Charles: on internationalism, 50–2 Lynch, Charles: defense of Andrew Ross, 130 MacDonald, Flora: Canadian foreign policy, 133–4, 137, 221 MacEachen, Allan: and the Central American crisis, 144–5, 209, 215, 221; and the

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Chilean crisis, 190; on membership in the oas, 175–6 MacGuigan, Mark, 113; and Canadian policy towards the Central American crisis, 141–4, 203, 215 Macquarrie, Heath: closure of diplomatic missions in Latin America, 119 Madrid, Miguel de la, 148 Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Waltz), 62 Martin, Dick: on clc policy towards Nicaragua, 219 Martin, Paul Sr: and oas membership, 172 Matthews, Bob: church activism, 186, 187 McDermott, Dennis: response to Chilean crisis, 198–9; response to u.s. intervention in Nicaragua, 210, 219 McFarlane, Peter: on Nicaragua, 138 Medrano Flores, Luis: articles on Nicaragua, 198–9 Mendlovitz, Saul H.: on social movements, 54–5 Mennonite Central Committee, 206 Mexico, 233; debt, 180; fta, 181 Millar, T.B.: foreign policy analysis, 59 Montreal Gazette: on Chilean crisis, 126 Morganthau, Hans J.: foreign policy analysis, 64, 68 Morris, Joseph: Chilean crisis, 196 Mulroney, Brian, 6, 147, 155, 156–7; attendance at Western Hemispheric summit, 7; and Canada-u.s. relations, 97–100, 101; multilateralism, 101–2; oas, 176–8, 179, 180, 225; support of American invasion of Panama, 9–10. See also Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement multilateralism, 51–3, 101–3, 157 National Energy Program (nep), 96, 97, 140 nato, 92, 94 Nicaragua, 8–9, 11, 133–9, 147–8, 151, 153, 163, 200–1, 203–4, 205, 206, 208; human rights, 198–9; Protocol of Cartagena, 163 Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections and War, 213 Nicaragua Update, 206 Nixon, Richard: and Canada-u.s. relations, 94–5

nongovernmental agencies (ngo s), 11, 18–20, 22, 28–9, 58, 121–2, 184–223; activism, 103–6, 112–13, 141, 143, 149, 181; Canadian government support for, 115–19, 139; and Chile, 130–1; and Nicaragua, 19, 142 Noranda Mines, 196 Noriega, Manuel, 167 North, Liisa: and capa’s role, 217 North American Air Defence (norad), 92 North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta), 232; Canada, 7, 98, 113, 153, 156, 178, 225 Northedge, F.S., 3 Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America (McFarlane), 138 Nossal, Kim Richard: on Canada-u.s. relations, 97, 98; on Canadian foreign policy, 14–15, 99 Nye, Joseph S.: on internationalism, 45–6; on u.s. decline, 33, 41–4, 225 October Crisis: effect on foreign policy, 121 oecd, 102 Oglesby, J.M.C.: Canada–Latin American relations, 131; Cuba, 172 onuca (the un/oas peacekeeping mission in Central America), 153 Organization of African Unity, 162 Organization of American States (oas), xii; analysis of role in Canadian foreign policy, 170–8; and Canada, 6, 7, 9, 22, 101, 112, 141, 153, 155–83; history of, 158–70, 231–2; and Nicaragua, 138; process of Canadian membership, 178–83 Oxfam, 56, 206 Palestine Liberation Organization (plo), 56 Pan American Games, xii Pan-American Health Organization (paho), 120 Pan American Institute of Geography and History, 172 Pan-American Union (pau), 112, 163, 170–1, 224–5. See also Organization of American States Panama, 167–8, 202; Protocol of Cartagena, 163 Pearson, Geoffrey: and Chilean crisis, 128–9, 130, 131, 190

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288

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Pearson, Lester B., 224–5; Nobel Peace Prize, 179; pau, 171 Pelletier, Gérard: ministerial mission to Latin America, 116 People’s Republic of China: Canada’s relations with, 28, 94, 125 Pépin, Jean-Luc: ministerial mission to Latin America, 116 Permanent Mechanism for Political Consultation and Agreement, 161–2. See also Rio Group Peru, 118 Pfaff, William: u.s. decline, 33–6 Pinochet, Augusto, 189–91, 196 Politics among Nations (Morganthau), 68 Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Nye and Keohane), 45 Pratt, Cranford: Canadian foreign policy, 14–15, 17; church activism, 187 Presbyterian Church of Canada, 105 Pressure Groups in the Global System: Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-government Organizations (Willetts), 56 Pross, Paul: on pressure groups, 104–5 Protocol of Cartagena, 163–4, 178 Ramirez Mercado, Dr Sergio, 151 Reagan, Ronald, 140, 159; and Canadau.s. relations, 96–7, 139–42 Rio Group, 153, 161–2, 164–6 Rio Treaty, 159, 181–2 Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1400 to 2000, The (Kennedy), 36 Ritchie, Ed: policy toward Chilean refugees, 123, 127, 130 Roche, Rev. Richard: response to Chilean crisis, 190 Rodrigues, John: response to Chilean crisis, 125 Romero, Archbishop Arnulfo, 184 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 158 Root, Elihu, 170 Rosenau, James N., 25; foreign policy analysis, 61, 65, 66, 74–9, 81 Ross, Andrew: Chilean crisis, 122–3, 127–30, 192 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the MacDonald Commission), 97

SalvAid, 5 Sánchez, Oscar Arias, 150, 161, 179 Santa Fe II: A Strategy for Latin America in the Nineties, 166 Sapin, Burton: foreign policy analysis, 70–3 Sarney, Jose, 162 Scheman, L. Ronald, 169 Schroh, Gary: Chilean crisis, 128, 129 Sharp, Mitchell: Canadian foreign policy, 95; ministerial mission to Latin America, 116–18; response to Chilean crisis, 124–5, 126, 189, 190, 196 Siegler, John, 93 Simonds, John: clc and Nicaragua, 208 Singer, J. David, 63 Slater, Jerome: on the decline of the oas, 158 Smith, Father Robert: response to the Chilean crisis, 190 Smith, Sidney: and Canadian membership in the oas, 171 Smith, Steven, 66 Smith, Rev. William: response to the Chilean crisis, 190 Snyder, Richard C.: foreign policy analysis, 67–73 Solidarité Québec-Amérique Latine, 207 Somoza, Anastasio, 6, 135–9. See also Nicaragua Soviet Union: Canada’s relations with, 11, 28; decline, 37–9; foreign policy, 3–4, 153 Spain: peacekeeping in Central America, 5; permanent observer in oas, 173 Special Movement Chile, 130 Sudbury Committee for a Democratic Chile, 196 Summit of the Americas, xii Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process, 151–2 Theory of International Politics (Waltz), 64 Thorburn, Hugh: on Canadian foreign policy, 103–4 Todd, Dave: criticism of Joe Clark, 151 Tools for Peace, 207 Toronto Star: on Chilean crisis, 126 Toronto Sun: on Chilean crisis, 125–6 Toronto Welcome Committee for Refuees from Chile, 191 Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, 187

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Trinidad and Tobago: financial obligations to the oas, 156; mission to Panama, 168 Trudeau, Pierre, 139–40, 142–3; and Canada-u.s. relations, 94, 96–7; foreign policy, 15–16, 95, 99, 100–1, 112, 116–22, 131–3; foreign policy review, 4, 6, 94, 113–22, 157, 178–9; and membership in the oas, 172, 174 United Church of Canada, 205; response to Chilean crisis, 126 United Nations, 4; Commission on Human Rights, 209; Economic Commission for Latin America, 172 United Nations High Commission on Refugees (unhcr), 7, 56, 210; and Chilean refugees, 128, 194 United States: decline of, 30–44, 57–8, 85, 93–4, 225–6; and El Salvador, 140–1; foreign policy, 3–4, 153, 158–9, 160–1, 166–9, 200; foreign policy analysis, 65, 67, 84; and Nicaragua, 6, 8–10, 18, 140–1, 147, 200–1; and Panama, 9–10, 167–8 Uruguay: Lima Group, 160; oas, 164 Uruguay Declaration, 162, 164 ussr. See Soviet Union

Vancouver Sun: on the oas, 175 Venezuela: role in the oas and Panama, 167–8; peacekeeping in Central America, 5 Vietnam War: effect on foreign policy, 18–19, 27, 28, 54 Walker, R.B.J.: on social movements, 54–5 Waltz, Kenneth: foreign policy analysis, 62–3, 64; internationalism, 47 War and Change in World Politics (Gilpin), 31–2 West German Foreign Policy, 1949–1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response (Hanreider), 79 West Germany: peacekeeping in Central America, 5 Western Economic Summit. See g-7 Willetts, Peter: social movements, 56 Wisdom, Sheila, 5 Wolfers, Arnold, 3 World Council of Churches, 187, 189 World Trade Organization (wto), 233 ymca: in El Salvador, 205

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