India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy 9781138243538, 9781315272139

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INDIA’S SOFT POWER A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

PATRYK KUGIEL

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Patryk Kugiel and KW Publishers Pvt Ltd The right of Patryk Kugiel to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 9781138243538 (hbk) ISBN: 9781315272139 (ebk) Typeset in Minion Pro by KW Publications

CONTENTS Abbreviations  Introduction  1. Soft Power in International Relations: A Conceptual Framework 

v vii 1

2. Evolution of Power in Indian Foreign Policy 

33

3. Sources of India’s Soft Power 

65

4. Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy 

93

5. Effectiveness of Indian Soft Power Strategy 

125

6. Augmenting India’s Soft Power: Modi and Beyond 

159



References 

203

ABBREVIATIONS AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa CII Confederation of Indian Industry CNN Cable News Network DPA Development Partnership Administration FDI Foreign Direct Investment FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry FTA Free Trade Agreement GDP Gross Domestic Product IBEF India Brand Equity Foundation IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa ICCR Indian Council of Cultural Relations IFC India Future of Change Initiative IGO Inter-Governmental Organisations IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International Non-Governmental Organisations IT Information Technology ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation MDG Millennium Development Goals MC Ministry of Culture MEA Ministry of External Affairs

vi • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

MOIA MT NGO NRI OCI PDD PIO PPP SAARC SSC UN UNDEF WTO

Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Ministry of Tourism Non-Governmental Organisations Non-Resident Indian Overseas Citizen of India Public Diplomacy Division Person of Indian Origin Purchasing Power Parity South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation South-South Cooperation United Nations United Nations Democracy Fund World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

O

n 21 June 2015 the world stood still. Hundreds and thousands of people around the globe, parks and streets, shopping malls and airports, practiced asanas to celebrate first International Yoga Day established by the United Nations a few months earlier. As the “Indian gift to the world” – yoga – basked in its universal acclaim, India’s global image got a boost. Although much attention has been focused on India’s economic progress and military achievements in recent years, its soft power is no less important. The growing popularity of yoga and the more vibrant diplomacy of the new Indian government under Prime Minister Modi suggest that India is on the right track to make the optimum use of its many strength. As this case shows, it is not only the number of rockets and tanks which can decide India’s global position but, increasingly, there are other less tangible elements that can create its credibility and attractiveness. Soft power describes the ability to influence the actions of others by virtue of one’s culture, values and policies rather than by force. Unlike hard military or economic power, it works through attraction and cooptation rather than coercion and payoffs. India is familiar with this field and offers an interesting case for comparative studies of soft powers. It proves that the concept is not confined to the Western world, and that the United States faces a strong competitor in India. Yet soft power is not an alternative to hard power but rather, its supplement. An effective amalgamation of both in a comprehensive external strategy is what can

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make a country a smart power. As yoga cultivates harmony of the body and mind, smart power assumes mindful balance of hard and soft power assets. If India can translate this rule in its foreign policy it is set to emerge even more as a major global player. Though less celebrated, soft power became especially important in the changed realities of the post-Cold War international scenario. Globalisation and increasing interdependence among nations limited the acceptance of use of military force or other coercive measures in foreign relations. A strong army or vibrant economy is often not enough for countries to maintain their objectives. In this information age, with free movement of people, capital and ideas, perceptions matter more than ever. It is claimed that, “communication strategies become more important, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins” (Nye, 2011b:p.18). Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea may have suggested that the use of military force in international relations is not over. In practice, this example proves that the “use of force is more costly today than was the case in the past” (Gray, 2011: p.21). Russia has already paid the price for its actions: it now suffers from international condemnation, political isolation, economic sanctions, and unified anti-Russian sentiments in many nations. These factors dealt a severe blow to Russia’s image, which had just been propped up by its massive investment in the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi— planned as a showcase of national power. Russia, despite its muscle flexing, chose not to send regular troops to Ukraine, but engaged in “hybrid warfare” and “creeping invasion”. This choice clarified that incredibility of the soft power theory— that, there is no acceptance for using 19th century means in the 21st century. Since the term “soft power” was coined in the early 1990s it has enjoyed a spectacular international career. Although originally designed for the United States, as the sole superpower, soft power has been, gradually “de-Americanised” and incorporated into the foreign policy strategies of many countries. In India, this subject has been insufficiently studied and unfortunately, has been marginalised in the discourse on

INTRODUCTION • ix

international relations. For a country with civilisational richness and positive record in international affairs, this marginalisation of soft power is intriguing. One possible explanation of this puzzle is that, “Indians take their soft power for granted” and thus, there is no need for further scrutiny of the subject (Interview with Indian diplomat, Warsaw, 2013). Another reason may be the fact that, when the term “soft power” was created, India was looking ahead to the next stage, which focused on hard power. For the last few decades,discourse on foreign and security policy in India has been dominated by realist analysts focusing solely on the material attributes of power. For them, soft power is a confession of state weakness, and many confuse “soft power” with a “soft state” (Hymans 2010). Another possibility is that soft power is resented and rejected simply as a Western concept that does not fit into the Indian context. Such an interpretation would be a mistake, as India is no stranger to the soft power concept; disregarding it would dispose of decades of progress in this alternative model. In fact, India is sometimes labelled a “soft power by default” (Wagner, 2010), and is believed to have substantial potential in this field. It was one of first countries to pursue a soft power strategy, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, long before the term was coined. However, after the defeat in the 1962 war with China, India gradually shifted towards a hard power approach, and its foreign policy became more pragmatic and driven by realpolitik. Until recently, soft power played a negligible role in strategic and security discourse in India, and there was no single declaration or strategy to announce its greater infusion into the country’s foreign policy. Only after 1998 did India rediscover the utility of its soft power in external relations. Historically, the roots of Indian soft power can be traced back to the philosophical concepts of ahimsa, the pacifism of the Buddhist Emperor Asoka, the universalism of Hinduism and the non-violent independence struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi. From classical dance and music, old traditions of yoga and Ayurveda, to cuisine, fashion and Bollywood movies—Indian culture is a great resource of the country’s power of

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attraction. The Indian diaspora – over 20 million strong and spread across the globe – is a powerful asset for disseminating a positive image of the country. India’s fast economic growth – witnessed over the last decade – is a source of great attraction for foreign investors. A positive record of SouthSouth cooperation and a long-held solidarity with developing countries is another source of Indian soft power in many parts of the world. But though international literature on soft power has grown considerably over the last two decades, India has remained a glaring exception. Unlike in the case of America, analysis of soft power has played only a nominal role in Indian academia, drawing limited attention from scholars and policymakers. It is no coincidence that a hallmark publication on Indian foreign policy prepared by the Foreign Service Institute (2007) did not include a single article specifically addressing soft power, and only three out of 58 chapters dealt with any aspect of it—(role of the diaspora, culture and media). Similarly, a special 2010 issue on Indian foreign policy, brought out by International Studies – a leading academic journal on international relations, published by the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi – completely disregarded the subject of soft power in its many articles (International Studies, 2010). A recent document, Non-Alignment 2.0, A strategy for India’s new foreign policy, prepared by leading Indian experts and intellectuals, did not lend a single chapter to soft power (Khilnani, et al., 2012), despite acknowledging the value of ideas and perceptions in external relations. In contrast to China,where dozens of books and reports have been published on soft power, India had no major monograph on this phenomenon until 2013. The book by Daya Kishan Thussu,Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood, is the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of India’s potential in this area, but it is limited to the perspective of a media and communication specialist rather than international relations, and focuses principally on India’s assets—not on its foreign policy. In recent years, several authors have written articles on this aspect of Indian foreign policy (Wagner, 2005, 2010; Tharoor, 2008; Purushothaman, 2010; Lee, 2010c; Malone, 2011; Mukherjee, 2013). Some

INTRODUCTION • xi

experts have also underlined the importance of soft power in their books on India’s foreign policy (Nayar and Paul, 2003; Tharoor, 2012). There are several publications that focus only on specific aspects of soft power. For instance, Varma (2007) and Bashar (2009) underline the importance of culture and civilization values as special assets. Others consider the Indian diaspora as the most useful tool of Indian soft power (Mohan, 2003; Kapur 2003; Gupta, 2008). Observers have also focused on recent changes in public diplomacy (Hall, 2012, 2013) and foreign assistance (Chaturvedi, 2012; Mawdsley, 2011, 2012; Ganguly and Mullen, 2012; Chanana, 2008) as a sign of India’s shift towards soft power in its foreign relations. Unfortunately, this litany of authors and their accompanying work represents shards of a shattered mirror rather than a whole and comprehensive approach properly reflecting India’s soft power. Moreover, the existing literature on India’s soft power is ambiguous and inconclusive. One can distinguish two groups of opinions about India’s potential in this area. The first group comprises those who already recognise India as a major soft power and point at its potential in the field. The bestknown representative of this group is Shashi Tharoor, a diplomat and writer who has long claimed that soft power is India’s single most important asset in foreign relations. Another analyst, Purushothaman (2010), argues, “India has a substantial amount of soft power and has the potential to augment it.”Also, Joseph Nye, the author of the soft power concept, recognised potential of India in this regard and saw it as a future “smart power” (Nye, 2006b). The second group of scholars, even if they do note certain aspects of India’s power of attraction, points to a number of obstacles that hamper the effective use of India’s soft power strategy. Wagner (2010), who was one of the first to recognize a shift from hard to soft power in India’s foreign policy strategy, claims that India does not use its potential effectively and is a “defensive soft power”. Malone (2011b) opines that the Indian government is somewhat defensive and selective in projecting its soft power. Hymans (2009) argues that many of India’s soft power strengths also constitute its own “soft vulnerabilities.” Others complain that though India was a soft power in the past, it has lost its attractiveness in recent

xii • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

years. For example, Abraham (2007) claims that India has denied itself much of its soft power since it turned “to a foreign policy built around the projection of hard power.” Gupta (2008) regrets that India “has not adequately utilized soft power resources” – pointing to Indian spirituality. There is a general feeling that India’s soft power is weak and consistently falls short of expectations (Lee 2010c; Mukherjee 2013). This summary suggests that analysis of India’s soft power has just started, and there is need for further scrutiny of Indian foreign policy in this context. Therefore, the book aims to fill the remaining gaps in the literature on India’s soft power and shed more light on this neglected aspect of contemporary foreign policy. This study is not about the potential of India’s soft power alone; rather, it discusses how such a capacity is being transformed into capabilities and observes its practical implementation in Indian foreign policy. It is located in the context of Indian strategic thinking and presented in the framework of Indian policy making. It would be interesting for all students of international relations, soft power theory, Indian foreign policy and an evolving international system. More specifically, this work has been undertaken in pursuit of the following objectives: to comprehend the evolution of power in Indian foreign policy and explain subsequent shifts from soft power to hard power and smart power approaches; to critically analyse the resources and potential of India’s soft power in all its dimensions; to analyse the implementation of the soft power approach by successive governments in India; to evaluate the effectiveness of new strategies in foreign policy; and to examine limitations and suggest ways of wielding of soft power. The author seeks to answer several research questions: What are the main strengths and weaknesses of India’s soft power? How is India incorporating a soft power approach into its foreign policy? What are the main tools India uses for projecting its soft power abroad? What kind of power is India likely to become? Two working hypotheses were also tested during the course of this study: First, that India has great soft power potential that can be useful in realisation of the country’s foreign policy objectives. Second, that India

INTRODUCTION • xiii

deliberately employs a soft power approach in its external relations to supplement, rather than replace, its hard power in an integrated smart power strategy. The book is divided into six chapters. The opening chapter introduces the concept of “soft power” and summarises the international debate on the idea of power in international relations. It starts with detailed characteristics of the term as seen by the “father” of soft power, Joseph Nye, to describe the subsequent evolution of the concept. It tries to provide answers to questions raised in the debates over soft power: What constitutes soft power? Who can have it? How can it be measured? How does it work? In the second chapter, there is a general discussion about how soft power is transferred to the context of India and evaluated from a historical perspective. By analysing different approaches to national power in postindependence India, this chapter underlines the tension between idealists and realists in Indian strategic thinking. It provides argument that soft power is back in mainstream foreign policy in India, and a more strategic method to combine soft and hard power approach is emerging since the turn of the millennium. The third chapter deals with the question of India’s soft power resources. It expands Nye’s categorisation of assets to examine five elements that decide India’s power of attraction— along with culture, political values and foreign policy, the author also introduces the importance of the Indian diaspora and the country’s economic growth. The fourth chapter analyses the use of soft power resources in the state’s foreign policy. It focuses on such instruments of the country’s external relations as: public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, foreign assistance and relations with its diaspora. The fifth chapter tries to assess results and effectiveness of the soft power strategy by using a number of quantitative and qualitative data. It analyses India’s position on different rankings and soft power indices and summarises international perceptions of the country as given in public opinion polls. The attractiveness of India is calculated against the

xiv • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

data of the flow of capital, tourists, students and migrants. Two different case studies, Afghanistan and Poland, are then evaluated to give a more detailed picture of the effectiveness of certain soft power tools. The final chapter examines major limitations in Indian soft power and suggests ideas on how these can be overcome. It begins with a summary of major reforms and new initiatives of the new government, since mid2014, that appear to give a major boost to Indian soft power. It shows that the success of Indian soft power will, to a large extent, be dependent on progress in its hard power dimension. The concluding part summarises major findings of the study and suggests some recommendations for future research and policy making. It is argued here that the BJP-led Indian government may open a new chapter for further expansion of India’s soft power. It seems, therefore, that India may emerge as major global smart power in the future. The study argues that, India again discovers the utility of its soft power in advancement of foreign policy goals. Following India’s soft power use after gaining independence, the country turned to hard power after 1962. Yet during the last two decades, India has been again turning away from this hard power and choosing to develop and implement its soft power potential in foreign policy to realise its national objectives. As India undergoes a transformative period in its foreign policy and continues to struggle to develop a new grand strategy for its foreign and security policy, the concept of smart power may come to its rescue. While developing its hard power capabilities, India can more vigorously use its soft power assets to expand its influences abroad. Stronger soft power could assist India in being accepted as a leader among South Asian countries, attracting more foreign capital and visitors, and garnering increased support to strengthen its position in the international forum, including in the UN Security Council. A smart combination of soft and hard power best uses India’s capabilities, assets and resources, to advance India’s global rise and to put it in a stable, yet dynamic position.

1 SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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ower is a central concept in international relations. Yet for such a fundamental idea, it has various definitions bestowed by different schools, and its definition is still regarded as “contested” (Nye, 2011b), “troublesome” (Gilpin, 1981) and “controversial” (Waltz, 1979). Not surprisingly, the idea of soft power shares the same weakness and is even more difficult to define. Over two decades after American scholar Joseph Nye coined the term, soft power is still not fully explained and is often misunderstood. There are ongoing heated debates about its theoretical rigidity and practical applicability. According to some critics, “treatments of soft power have developed little beyond ‘soft theory’” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.25). A fluid concept, its identity often takes on varying interpretations imparted by different people and states. Its vagueness leaves many questions unanswered. This chapter examines the basic features of soft power and addresses the most important controversies surrounding the term: What constitutes soft power resources? Where does soft power start and hard power end? What is the relationship between the two? How does soft power work and how can it be implemented effectively as a state policy? How can soft power be measured and how can it be made more efficient? In unravelling these questions, the chapter arrives at a broader definition of soft power that includes not only intangible resources but also tangible assets and behaviour that makes countries attractive and legitimate. In doing so it adjusts the concept to better accommodate it in India’s context.

2 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

Concept of Power in International Relations The idea of soft power has evolved in opposition to the dominant discourse of realism in the theory of international relations, which emphasises the roll of a state’[s hard attributes in its pursuit of foreign policy aims. In this school of thought, which can be traced back to thinkers such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes, the international system is seen as anarchic, and the principal actors are unitary, self-interested rational states that compete with each other for survival and influence. In order to defend their security and attain other national interests, these self-help-system states tend to accumulate power. Therefore, power becomes a central notion in realism, regarded both as an objective of state policies and a means through which they can influence other actors to act in a desired way. Power is seen as a capability to coerce others to do what one wants, or to do what, in other circumstances, they would not (Dahl, 1961). According to realist scholars, power is understood in terms of material resources. Kenneth Waltz (1979: p.131) lists these resources as consisting of the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” According to Robert Gilpin (1981: p.13), power is “the military, economic and technological capabilities of states.” For John Mearsheimer (2001: p.55), “power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses,” of which the most crucial are military assets. Although over the years more emphasis was put on economy or technology(rather than just military strength)— in determining a nation’s power, realists tend to focus on tangible and measurable resources. This is not to say, however, that realists have completely ignored the importance of ideas and perceptions in international affairs. Leading scholars, from E.H. Carr – one of the main representatives of classical realism, to Kenneth Waltz – the founder of the neorealist theory, recognise the role of morals and believe in foreign policy. They are aware of the material power’s limitations and agree it is not the best way to exercise power in all situations, pointing at the power of opinion. Hans

SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS • 3

Morgenthau, a renowned American foreign policy realist, writes about “the significance of a policy of prestige in an anarchic world” and claims that states should “be alert to international morality and world public opinion in order to maintain their international status” (Lee, 2010c: p.13). This interest in other, “softer”, forms of power has only grown with the changes in the international system and the emergence of new international relation theories such as liberalism or constructivism. For liberal thinkers who underline the importance of economic interdependence and international laws and institutions for making a more peaceful, stable international system, national power is equated mostly with a strong economy. Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasises the power of ideas and perceptions in describing relations between states, as opposed to security and institutional concerns. Both schools of thought yield evaluation of other dimensions of power rather than focusing singularly on military and economic might. As against a power based on coercive measures, thinkers like Bachrach and Baratz (1963) suggest a “second face of power” linked to agenda setting and control (Nye, 2011b: p.14). Lukes (1974) and Isaac (1987) then propose a “third face of power” based on the process of cooptation in which “one actor is able to mould preferences and interests of other actors so as to converge closer to its own preferences and interests” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.29). Such consideration over different aspects of power eventually paved the way for soft power, which incorporated the second and third faces of power – agenda setting and co-optation. The emergence of the soft power theory was preceded by important changes in the international system by the end of the Cold War. According to Nye (1990b: p.160), there were five trends that contributed to the diffusion of power: growing economic interdependence, the rise of transnational actors, strengthened nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues. For Gallarotti (2011: pp.37–39), these enabling factors were: mounting interdependence and globalisation; acquisition of nuclear weapons and modern military

4 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

technologies by more states; the growth of democracy in the world system; more prosperous and modern populations that were “far less enamoured of a ‘warrior ethic’”; and the growth of international organisations and regimes, making cooperation easier and more natural. By the end of the 20th century, it was becoming apparent that the traditional ways of exerting influence were less acceptable. States required other instruments and policies to realise national objectives as “the use of military force became simply more costly for modern great powers than it had been in earlier centuries” (Nye, 2004: p.15). In fact, the majority of contemporary wars have been internal conflicts, and there is less tolerance for solving international disputes through military force. In a new, more interdependent world, hard power policies are less legitimate – and thereby less effective – in attaining national objectives. In Nye’s (2004b: p.69) words: “Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength in war. Today, however, the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important.” Moreover, fast technological development in the 20th century caused power to pass from the “capital-rich” to the “informationrich”. Consequently, more attention now is granted to instruments based on cooperation, attractiveness and persuasion. Soft Power and its Criticism Soft power, along with military and economic power, determines the ability of states to exert influence in foreign relations and realise their national interests. According to the most common definition, soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004a: X). In the narrowest sense, it is seen as equal to the cultural attractiveness of a country. In a broader perspective, it encompasses everything except military capabilities. In practice, a country’s soft power or “power of attraction”, “co-optive power” stands for its legitimacy, reputation, international credibility, etc.

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The term soft power was first coined and popularised by Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr. in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and an article in Foreign Policy, “Soft power”. He subsequently elaborated upon the concept in several books and articles. Nye (1990a: p.154) criticised the traditional understanding of power “as ability to control others” and “associated with the possession of certain re-sources: population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability”. Instead, he claimed, “power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible” (ibid: 167). Such resources like “communication, multilateralism, national cohesion, universalistic culture, and international institutions and culture” (Nye, 2004b: p.14)became more important. Initially, Nye described soft power as “co-optive power” as opposed to hard power, understood as “command power”. Whereas the first is “the ability to shape what others want”, the latter is “the ability to change what others do” (Nye, 1990a: p.267). Soft power rests on “the attractiveness of one’s culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic”; hard power, on the other hand, works through “coercion or inducement” (ibid). Soft power co-opts, rather than coerces, people. In other words, whereas “soft power is pull, hard power is push” (Nye, 2011a: p.19). Going beyond the neoliberal school of thought, Nye prioritises ideas and perceptions over economic or military power. The popularity of soft power did not prevent it from falling under severe criticism. Its critics argue that the soft power concept brings little explanatory and predictive value (Kearn Jr., 2011); that it is too vague and elusive; and that it is practically impossible to measure (Rothman, 2011). Niall Ferguson (2003) writes that “the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft” dismissing its ability to influence behaviour of other states. Scholars point out problems with the applicability of a soft power approach stemming from its relational and contextual character (Nye, 2004; Kearn Jr., 2011; Gallarotti, 2011). Others argue that it brings a false promise of country exceptionalism while also threatening to relegate a

6 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

military strength’s relevance as a foreign policy tool (Gray, 2011). The debate is far from over, but its multifaceted nature provides an opportunity to clarify four fundamental questions. What Constitutes Soft Power? While the cause of a country’s military or economic power is widely understood, the ingredients of soft power are not as self-evident. If soft power is about shaping preferences of other countries, what are the currencies that countries can use to influence choice? What are the resources that make the country a soft power? How is soft power different from hard power? Since there is no single precise and universally accepted definition of soft power, there are several misperceptions regarding its scope and character. For instance, it is a frequent mistake to reduce soft power to culture, or any other of its elements. Here, Nye leaves no doubt— explicitly stating, “soft power is not simply equal to popular cultural power” (Nye, 2004: p.11). Not to be dumbed-down, soft power is a much more complex phenomenon encompassing many other resources. Another mistake is to identify soft power with one of the tools through which soft power works – be it public diplomacy or cultural promotion. While soft power can manifest itself in certain policies or activities, it is not confined to these elements. Moreover, soft power is sometimes seen as a moral or idealistic policy, whereas, in reality, soft power does not necessitate morality. Like any resource, soft power can be used for good reasons, such as building trust and confidence, and for bad, such as rationalisation of an unjust invasion. “But soft power is a description, not an ethical prescription. Like any form of power, it can be wielded for good or ill” (Nye, 2006a). This presents an identity crisis: If soft power is not defined by the above characteristics, then what is it actually? Nye claimed, originally, that soft power is associated with “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and international institutions” (Nye, 1990b: p.167). He has since changed the scope of a country’s soft power to include three slightly different elements: “its culture (in places

SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS • 7

where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004a: p.11). In this classical sense, soft power is differentiated from military power and economic power according to the criteria of tangibility. Thus, soft power would not include any material resources, such as money transferred abroad in the form of foreign assistance. Most soft power researchers followed Nye’s definition to the letter, and they tended to see soft power resources as intangible – as opposed to concrete assets of hard military and economic power. For instance, Hymans (2009: p.235) claims that “soft power is based on intangibles: less emphasis on what you own, and more on what you represent. In other words, soft power is the ability to make others do what you want on the basis of how they see you.” But this simple juxtaposition of soft and hard power resources as tangible and intangible assets is confusing and does not properly convey the whole picture. In fact, neither good institutions nor attractive culture can function properly when separated from a secure material base and financial support. Culture not only comprises intangible ideas and values, but also, or mostly, material artefacts and products. For instance, a good Bollywood movie cannot be produced without access to a budget. Similarly, technological progress would stall without certain economic investments. Undeniably, a country’s economic wealth and prosperity is what makes it attractive to others. Hence, economic strength may itself be a powerful source of soft power. It is not by coincidence that countries regarded as strong soft power holders are usually the most affluent and developed nations, while the poorest and underdeveloped rank lowest on the scale. Not many Americans or Norwegians would like to settle down in Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas most Afghans and DRC citizens would probably jump at the opportunity to immigrate to the US or Europe. Some initiatives, like the Gross Happiness Index, promoted by countries like Bhutan, may be interesting propositions, but in today’s

8 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

materialistic world, such indices are seen as a curiosity rather than a real assessment of national prowess; in this globalised era, a high position on the Human Development Index matters much more than a position on the Gross Happiness Index. Nye himself is rather muddled when explaining the differences between soft and hard power resources. He writes that “soft power does not depend on hard power” (Nye, 2004a: p.9), but at the same time, he hails American technological achievements and economic progress as important sources of US attractiveness. In one place, he regards all economic tools, such as foreign aid or economic sanctions, as hard power tools, only to admit in other texts that soft power instruments include “public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts” (Nye, 2011b: p.228). It seems that Gulio Gallarotti (2011: p.34) is correct when he claims: “although there is a tendency to equate hard power with tangible resources and soft power with intangible resources, their principal distinction does not depend on tangibility.” Contrary to Nye’s initial claim, soft power cannot exist in a void, but is precluded by strong foundations of hard power. The attractiveness of a country is closely connected with its economic strength, and to a large extent, soft power stems from a country’s hard power. As Kearn (2011: p.74) rightly argues: “without a certain amount of hard power resources, it is exceedingly difficult to envision a state possessing a significant degree of soft power.” In practice, there is no single example of a country that can exert significant influence on the global arena by being strong exclusively in soft power while lacking hard power resources (economic or military). Even Nye is guilty of such oversight: he uses Norway as an example, which plays a disproportionately large role in the international arena due to its soft power assets, but he forgets that Norway is one of the wealthiest and most developed countries in the world. Similarly, for many realists, “unless a nation is equipped with sufficient military capabilities and material resources, the exercise of its soft power only creates a hollow voice in real world situations” (Lee, 2010c; p.14).

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It seems this is actually well understood in India. As Indian author and proponent of the soft power concept Shashi Tharoor explains (2008: p.43) about mistakes in past Indian policy: “the great flaw in Nehruji’s approach was that his soft power was unrelated to any acquisition of hard power; and as the humiliation of 1962 demonstrated, soft power becomes credible when there is hard power behind it.” Simply put, no one wants to emulate an example of a weak or poor state. Rothman (2011: pp.56–7) is absolutely right when he says that a critical category for any country’s soft power is “success”. Other countries are prone to embrace certain norms, ideals and policies of another state when they see such qualities are the source of prosperity and strength. As Rothman observes in the case of America, “countries emulate the US culture of policy practices abroad because of an innate attraction based on success” (ibid: 57). In this sense, Nye’s narrow definition – according to which soft power entails only culture, political values and foreign policies – is incomplete. Consequently, it is necessary to expand the definition to include more elements. Even if the core soft power resources are intangible, material assets also form the country’s power of attraction. Soft power legitimises states and increases their attractiveness in the eyes of others. In the absence of economic or technological achievements, the state can promote its success in culture or political organisation, but a country’s soft power comes from myriad sources. If the difference between soft and hard power is not tangibility, then what is that allows us to distinguish between the two? Nye claims (2011b: p.19) we need to differentiate between “power resources” and “power behaviour”, as “misunderstanding and much of the criticism of [his] theory comes from confusion between these two.” This means that soft power derives not only from specific resources but also from the certain behaviour of states that is seen as legitimate and attractive by others. It is a matter of possession balanced with use. Hard power works through coercion, command, and threats to realise its aims; soft power works through persuasion, attraction and seduction. In this sense, hard power resources, including military assets, can be a source of soft power if they

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are used properly. In other words, “the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.35). In behavioural terms, Nye explains, (2011b: p.19) “resources often associated with hard power behaviour can also produce soft power behaviour depending on the context and how they are used. Command power can create resources that create soft power at a later stage, for example, institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid.” For instance, military tools can produce soft power for a country when they are used in a humanitarian mission (e.g., in 2004, the US and India used their naval forces during the rescue operation after the tsunami in Asia), dispatched for the UN peacekeeping missions or holding joint exercises with friendly armies. Some scholars propose a certain category of “soft military power” to describe military behaviour that generates soft power (Ladwig III, 2010). On the other hand, “misuse of military resources can undercut soft power” (Nye, 2006: p.11). Likewise, economic resources can create soft power when offered as development assistance or foreign direct investments, but the same such assets would undermine soft power when used as a threat of economic sanctions or withdrawal of capital. Nye observes (2006a) that “Economic strength can be converted into hard or soft power: You can coerce countries with sanctions or woo them with wealth.” In the same vein, misuse of soft power resources does not enhance national power. On the contrary, it can create tensions and undermine hard power. Aggressive promotion of one’s culture can be seen as cultural imperialism, endangering traditions and values of other countries. Imposition of liberal cultural norms on a traditional society may be seen as coercive and threatening and can be resented and rejected. In fact, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) theory of the “clash of civilizations” attributed major conflicts along cultural and religious lines. The offensive promotion of one’s ideology, be it communism, democracy or capitalism, could become a serious source of tension between states with different

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political and economic systems. One recent analysis of public diplomacy of East Asian countries found “the struggle for soft power in Asia may deepen mistrust and increase the potential for hard-power conflict in the region” (Hall and Smith, 2013: p.2). Even if “there is far less conflict of interests in the process of soft power” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.28), such rivalry and tensions in soft power domain cannot be totally excluded. It can be claimed that soft power behaviour is, in fact, more important than soft power resources. Some scholars have actually made it a core of their soft power definition. Mingjiang Li (2009: p.3) suggests understanding soft power in behavioural terms as “soft use of power”. As he explains, convincingly: “Analysing the drawbacks but adhering to the core propositions in Nye’s theoretical framework, soft power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power.” In other words, the major source of soft power is not what a country possesses, but how it uses such attributes. According to the Chinese scholar, “if culture, ideology and values can be used for coercion and military and economic strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better approach to soft power is how resources are used rather than associating resources of power as soft or hard. In essence – he suggests – soft power lies in the soft use of power to increase a state’s attraction, persuasiveness, and appeal” (Li, 2009: p.7) This idea is correct when it is understood that soft power resources can be used in a hard power manner; conversely, hard power resources can be used in soft manner. This “soft use of power” approach does not mean a soft state; rather, it implies one reluctant to use force and coercive measures extensively and without a legitimate reason. In behavioural terms, a country’s soft power comes from certain actions and policies seen as legitimate and in line with dominating rules and expectations. Therefore, soft power is what makes a state attractive in the eyes of others. Who Has Soft Power? There are many actors that can accumulate and project soft power. At the state level, agents of soft power can be either public institutions or

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private actors: business communities, non-government organisations, cultural association, universities, the media, or intellectual or cultural elites. At the basic, non-state, level, every citizen is a primary agent of soft power, as each individual’s actions can influence the country’s image abroad. It is argued that non-state actors actually have more influence on the country’s soft power, as they have more channels of communication and often possess greater credibility to act. Although the government is the most powerful player in the soft power domain, it may not be in full control of all soft power resources. Private actors can reinforce a country’s soft power and support government efforts – or undermine them. Pakistani nationals organising heinous terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 severely damaged the image of Pakistan abroad; the vile gang rape in Delhi in December 2012 broadcasted a disturbing message about India to the world and sabotaged the officially promoted image of the country. However, an Indian composer winning an Oscar for his movie score, or writers winning the prestigious Man Booker Prize, enhance India’s attractiveness. Although many of these activities take place without government involvement, states can use the success of their citizens for nation branding. At a minimum, the government should not undermine the soft power created by private actors (Nye, 2004: p.17). At the international level, soft power is an attribute of state and international organisations, private actors, international non-government organisations, and multinational corporations. From an international relations perspective, the most interesting and important actors are the states, percolating through the different ministries, agencies and representatives. Here, the question arises as to why, if all states can have soft power, some have more of it than others and how those with less can improve their positions. Is soft power only a privilege of major powers, or can it be equally accessible to all states? And is it restricted only to countries adhering to certain ideologies, cultural ethos, and political and economic systems? Because soft power is an American proposition, originally devised as a strategy for the sole superpower operating in unilateral world order, it is

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sometimes claimed that the concept will not work well for other countries functioning in a different context and circumstances. It is argued that the concept serves best to the hegemonic state and “soft power seems to be most relevant when considering the strategy and behaviour of the leading power (or perhaps powers) in a relatively hierarchical international system” (Kearne Jr., 2011: p.76). Soft power works here as a “transmission belt between the leading state and its followers” and new states entering such a system “are likely to construct their domestic and foreign policies to harmonise with the prevailing norms and values” (ibid). This observation is valid in many ways. A hegemonic power has the best access to multiple channels of communication, and the greatest voice in international institutions, so it can influence global public opinion and promote norms and values aligned with its interests. This, however, does not mean that other countries cannot accumulate significant soft power. The superpower is privileged naturally in every domain, including soft power, but other countries can aspire to a similar position. Recent experience shows that, in fact, many emerging and middle powers have embraced soft power strategies, often challenging the dominance of the sole hegemon. In the last two decades, soft power has become a fashionable concept not only in the EU and European states, but also in Japan, China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea, Venezuela and others (Thussu, 2013; Kearn Jr., 2011). This shows that soft power is neither the exclusive privilege of major powers nor of Western countries; rather, it can be utilised by all actors aspiring to play a larger international role. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have eagerly embraced soft power in their international strategy. As a rising power, China has found it to be a helpful tool in mitigating the fears of other countries regarding its fast development. As a result, in China, “soft power has become one of the most frequently used phrases among political leaders, leading academics, and journalists” (Li, 2009: p.1). As Joshua Kurlatnzick (2007) enthusiastically claimed in his famous book, Charm Offensive, China’s soft power made remarkable success, outpacing even the US in favourability among many

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Asian countries. This activism has pushed other Asian states to invest more in their soft power. One can even observe a new soft power rivalry in some regions. As argued by Hall and Smith (2013: p.1): “There are two arms races happening in Asia today: one for military capabilities and another for weapons of ‘soft power’.” The rising interest in the soft power concept means that it is no longer an American idea confined exclusively to the Western world. As many countries try to adopt the concept to local conditions and implement their own version of soft power, its definition and scope has changed to accommodate diverse perspectives. In the Chinese interpretation, for instance, soft power “means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (Kurlantzick,2007: p.6). The discourse on soft power has been de-Americanised and enriched by the particular “national” character of many countries (Thussu, 2013: 24). Indeed, it should not be seen as unexpected, as many have pursed similar policies long before the contemporary concept of soft power was developed. Interestingly, many found the new terminology helpful to better explain their behaviour and policies. The pertinent question, however, remains: Why do some countries have greater soft power than others, and what decides their actual position? Nye gives three conditions for countries willing to accumulate soft power. These are: “those whose dominant cultures and ideals are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism, autonomy); those with best access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance” (Nye, 2004: pp.31–32). While the second and third conditions seem quite understandable, as credibility is widely appreciated and access to communication channels is an obvious technical requirement, the first element is more controversial and subjective. It may be argued that the selection of “prevailing global norms” of liberalism, pluralism,

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and autonomy are derived from Western liberal countries and are not necessarily widely embraced in the world, especially in many Asian or Arab countries, which emphasise a collective ethos. Another proposition of elements that decide soft power comprises a longer and more detailed listing of a country’s characteristics in the domestic and international domain. In external relations these include: respect for international laws, norms and institutions; fundamental reliance on multilateralism and disposition against excessive unilateralism; respect for international treaties and alliance commitments; willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good; and liberal foreign economic policies. Internally, countries must demonstrate pronounced social cohesion, an elevated quality of life, freedom, sufficient opportunities, tolerance, an alluring lifestyle, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism and pluralism, as well as a functioning government and bureaucracy (Gallarotti, 2011: p.30). It is apparent that the list of domestic prerequisites clearly prefers Western democratic countries, and as such, the standards can be contested in many developing nations. Still, as long as the definition of “global norms” is shaped by the West, it will retain an edge in terms of soft power. It appears that there is less controversy when deciding the elements generating soft power in a state’s foreign relations. This stems from a minimal common understanding of shared values and norms of international relations that is based on the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Human Rights Declaration. Policies help protect and promote these internationally agreed laws and foster multilateral solutions and cooperation reinforcing a state’s soft power. Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, which oversees the largest comparative survey of public perception of different countries – the BBC World Service Poll – noticed in 2006: “It appears that world public opinion does not look kindly on governments engaging in suspicious nuclear activities as is the case of Iran, becoming more authoritarian as in the case of China and Russia, frustrating the needs of their immigrants as in the case of France, or occupying another country

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without international approval as in the case of the US. On the other hand countries and regions that engage the world primarily through soft forms of power such as the case of Japan and Europe tend to get good marks” (BBC, 2006). It seems that India fulfils many requirements to be a soft power. Nye himself did not devote much attention to India in his analysis, as he initially did not see it as an important power. He observed, however: “Asian countries have impressive potential resources for soft power” but still “lags behind that of the U.S., Europe and Japan, but it is likely to increase” (Nye, 2005). Moreover, Nye recognised Mahatma Gandhi as the “greatest example of soft power” and pointed to the superiority of his peaceful struggle over the violent and less successful hard power strategy adopted by Yaser Arafat (Nye, 2004: p.123). He expressly underlined the importance of the Indian democratic system as one area in which India has a powerful edge over China, despite lagging behind in terms of economic development and lifting millions from poverty. According to him, the “democratic constitution and political structure” mean that India “has passed a test that China still faces” (Nye, 2006b). He observes, however, that even though “India benefits from democratic politics, it suffers from overly bureaucratised government” and its reputation is burdened with the problems of the long standing dispute over Kashmir” (Nye, 2005). How Does Soft Power WEork? Soft power is not a mere theoretical concept but a practical tool bringing tangible benefits. Still, the accumulation of soft power is not enough to influence the behaviour of other states. Possession of relevant resources constitutes only soft power potential, which would need to be translated into actual power through concrete actions and policies. This requires an effective “power conversion” of resources into strategies that produce outcomes the states seek (Nye, 2011b: p.20). It is not always easy to convincingly prove how soft power translates into concrete benefits. What is the link, if any, between cultural

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attractiveness of one country and the decision about it by other countries? How can respect for another country’s political values influence policy affecting that country? If one country supports the legitimate policy of another country, is it because the latter is a soft power or because it agrees with the policy outright? Why is it so difficult to show clear correlation or causation between one country’s soft power and other country’s decisions? In contrast to hard power, which can directly change the behaviour of another state through force, threats, or inducement, soft power rests on non-physical, non-threatening and non-forceful means and mechanisms to influence the preferences and decisions of other international actors. Moreover, “soft power works indirectly and its influence is most likely to have visible effects primarily over the long term, and it will have limited relevance in discrete attempts to alter behaviour in the short term” (Kearn Jr., 2011: p.70). Soft power is more subtle and invisible, and unlike coercion and threats, aims to change the preferences and interest of other states, which cannot happen overnight. It needs more time to show progress but, at the same time, its effects are more durable. Because soft power works indirectly, it is also more difficult to prove that it is the sole cause of influence and change in the behaviour of a foreign actor. That also explains why “benefits of such soft power are much more difficult to ascertain and evaluate” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.40). According to Nye (2011b: p.16), there are three major co-optive means through which soft power works: “agenda setting, persuasion and attraction”. Rothman (2011: p.56) suggests two mechanisms through which the power of attraction influences others’ behaviour: norm diffusion and discourse dominance. Rather than commanding or coercing others to do what one wants, a country can use its “power of attraction” to co-opt or persuade others to want the same. In other words, a country with strong soft power will find other countries more willing to accept its leadership role regionally or globally, open up to cooperation and support its objectives in the international arena.

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As Nye (1990b: pp.166–7) explains: If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will follow it more willingly. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power.

This was well demonstrated in the case of Poland’s support for the US intervention in Iraq, in 2003. Polish society’s enthusiasm for America helped Poland’s government make a decision to unanimously back the US invasion in Iraq, a counter to most of its European partners. There was no serious political opposition, no massive anti-war protests and anti-US movements, unlike in other European countries, which only made it easier for Polish authorities to send one of the largest military contingents to Iraq. Certainly, there were other interests and elements at play, but without strong US soft power, Poland’s support would have lacked such resolve. Soft power can be helpful in preparing the ground for certain foreign policy decisions and gathering required international support to ultimately legitimise one’s foreign policy. As there is diminished tolerance for the use of force in the 21st century, soft power is a less-costly means to exercise power in external affairs, both in economic and political terms. As Nye (2011b: p.16) argues, “If a state can co-opt other states to comply with its objectives through persuasion, it can save on sticks (use of force) and carrots (use of economic assets)”. It stands to reason that “almost all military and economically superior states use soft power resources to further their global influence and legitimize their position” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.32). For instance, when the US did not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003, or any links between the Saddam Hussien regime and Al-Qaida, the Bush administration tried to

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legitimise the intervention in terms of bringing freedom and democracy. This strategy, however, was not well received, as soft power clearly cannot justify all actions. As perceptions matter today more than ever, soft power is important not only for realising political aims but also for gaining economic benefits. That explains why countries started to invest heavily in nation-branding exercises. Each wants to be seen as a stable, credible partner and attractive market. A positive image is important to draw more foreign capital and attract more tourists and students. For instance, one Ernst and Young study found out that “countries with strong ‘soft power’ brands attract significantly more foreign direct investment” (EY, 2012a). Along with attraction and persuasion, which can shape preferences of other states, the second means to influence the behaviour of others is through agenda setting. Agenda setting, called the “second face of power”, is not forceful manipulation of others’ preference, but of their acts through more subtle and invisible control of available options within a given system. By framing the agenda, soft power can limit the number of alternative options available and exclude those that are the least preferable. As Nye writes, “a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases” (Nye, 1990b: p.168). Although agenda setting is confined to traditional diplomacy, soft power is important to directly reach the foreign public in order to explain and justify one’s own position on crucial issues. The initial decision of George W. Bush to frame the intervention in Iraq in 2003, in the context of “the war on terrorism”, helped him to gather a strong “coalition of the willing”, even though it was organised without the consent of the United Nations and many countries remained doubtful about the soundness of the presented arguments to justify the invasion. Similarly, Western domination, in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and its leading role in international

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climate change negotiations, trade talks and development cooperation, makes it difficult for developing countries to secure or legitimise their interests. Influence over agenda setting would be extremely important for countries such as India, seeking a greater role global financial and political architecture. This explains, for instance, why BRICS countries challenge the existing international system, in which they are under-represented, and form their own coalitions to oppose Western supremacy. Establishment of the BRICS financial body, the New Development Bank, in 2014, is a case in point. India joined other emerging powers to form the BASIC forum (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) to oppose imposition of the Kyoto Protocol on developing countries at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. This also explains their preference to work through new financial forums, like the G-20, when discussing reforms in the financial system. For the same reasons, agenda setting is an important means to defend against US dominance in the world. As correctly underlined by Nye (1990b: p.155): “Proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behaviour of states. Thus, the critical question for the United States is not whether it will start the next century as the superpower with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants.” Agenda setting is closely linked to manipulation of discourse in international relations. In the information era, states can influence public opinion by controlling dialogue. The established agenda influences opinion on what is just and what is no,t in regard to pressing issues like climate change, that involve multilateral negotiations and talks. This allows governments to appeal directly to foreign public opinion, hoping that civil society can exert internal pressure on its own governments to change certain decisions along the wishes of the prevailing soft power nation. Competition to dominate discourse is well illustrated in the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Since the very beginning of the conflict the primary Russian

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news TV station in the English language –Russia Today – presented a vastly different image of the developments than was available in Western media sources, attempting to influence the conflict narrative. Indeed, the information war has become almost as important as the military conflict it seeks to describe; it is a strategic stand-off, fraught with diplomatic tension. Russia understood well the power of perceptions and attached great importance to this soft power tool with designs to challenge the Western domination over global public opinion. Naturally, soft power has a number of limitations. It is important to remember that soft power is relational, and like any kind of power, “it always depends on the context in which the relationship exists” (Nye, 2004: 2). This means its effectiveness is highly influenced, not only by objective circumstances, but also by subjective evaluation of its interpreters and receivers. Certainly, the message content is as important as is the nature and character of the target of soft power policies: what is attractive to one country may not be equally appealing to others. For instance, the so-called “Beijing Consensus”, which allows China to combine a closed political system with an open market economy, may be an attractive model for other authoritarian regimes to follow, but it is seen with suspicion by democratic states. Similarly, India’s reluctance to embrace the Western idea of democracy promotion seems disappointing to many in the West (Wagner, 2010; Malone, 2011a), but may be appreciated by other developing states, which oppose political interference from abroad. The fact that certain political and economic reforms preclude economic assistance granted by the European Union may be seen as a comprehensive support by some and as neo-colonial policy by others. Promotion of certain cultural or social norms can be received differently among different countries but also by different constituencies at home. In fact, there are very few universal values and standards that are highly regarded by all political actors and that would serve as a source of soft power in all circumstances. To further complicate matters, one needs to distinguish between elites, who take part in the decision-making process, and the general

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public, whose control over the decision-making process is limited and indirect. In this way, soft power inevitably operates at different levels. Some soft power policies, like exchange programs, sending experts in the framework of technical assistance, or Track II dialogues, are directed at country elites. And still, nurturing a positive attitude towards another country’s culture or values via decision makers does not guarantee that such elites will adopt a decision favourable to that country. As Nye (2004: p.12) admits, “the fact that Kim Jong Il is alleged to like pizza and American videos does not mean he will abandon a nuclear program,”— as expected by the US government. Most soft power activities – from cultural promotion to media broadcasting to development assistance – are, however, targeted at foreign societies at large. And yet, generating goodwill amongst the public, through different soft power instruments, does not assure their governments will make decisions expected by the nation exerting soft power. The fact that Bollywood movies are popular among Pakistanis does not necessarily mean that the Pakistani Army will renounce its idea of India as an “existential threat”. The ruling elites of countries may simply have different interests to those of the general public and go against the preferences of its citizens, at least for some time. It is more difficult in democratic countries, as Richard Nixon learned over the Vietnam War or, more recently, George W. Bush over the invasion of Iraq. In both cases, public opposition and criticism of official government foreign policies made each respective president’s approval ratings decline and helped end foreign interventions. The positive thing is that, with the strengthening of democratic systems around the world, and the growth of social media and ongoing empowerment of the citizens, this gap between elites and citizens is narrowing. This suggests that the effectiveness of soft power will further increase in the future, if current global trends continue. Public diplomacy and direct work with foreign public opinion will become ever more important. The many reasons discussed above explain the challenge to wielding soft power. Changing long-held perceptions and old stereotypes of

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other countries requires continuous effort and a diverse toolbox. And the results are often disappointing. As one recent analysis found, despite the heavy investment of the Asian states in public diplomacy to augment their soft power, this strategy has “had little or no positive effect on foreign public opinion to date” (Hall and Smith, 2013: 1). To have better results, countries need to first improve their soft power potential at home and then expand to strengthen soft power tools in external relations. It would require resolution of persisting problems and internal conflicts that produce a negative perception of the country abroad. Providing wealth, prosperity and security to its own citizens is the first condition for a state to be seen as more attractive to outside observers. The more successful a country is in its overall policies, the stronger soft power it has. In this sense, soft power cannot simply replace hard power: it can complement it and sometimes compensate for some deficiencies in its hard power domain. In practice, states employ a wide variety of tools and policies to project soft power, influence the perceptions and preferences in other states and sway the agenda of international forums. The most common are economic diplomacy, public diplomacy, cultural promotion, foreign development assistance, scholarships and academic exchanges, promotional campaigns, TV broadcasting, and the use of diaspora. Moreover, it is crucial, when nurturing soft power, to lead a coherent and firm foreign policy in which soft and hard power reinforce, rather than contradict, each other. There is nothing more dangerous to a state’s credibility than hypocrisy and double standards in international affairs. If a state promotes a benign image abroad that is contradicted by its confrontationist policies, its soft power will be undermined. Actions speak louder than words and, as Nye warns (2004: p.110), “public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for the projection of hard power is unlikely to succeed.” As observed correctly by Hall and Smith (2013: p.12): “When there is a gap between how a government describes itself through public diplomacy and how foreign audiences perceive its foreign policy, this disconnect between words and deeds can create a backlash.”

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This was precisely a case, for instance, with the US policy of promoting democracy in the Arab world, which, at the end of the day, led to a steady rise of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and most of the world in the post-2003 period. How Can Soft Power be Measured? Due to its very nature (subjective, relational, intangible, etc.), soft power is difficult to measure. It is far easier to count the number of tanks and other weapons a state has at its disposal than to assess the attractiveness of one’s culture or the legitimacy of its foreign policy. Measuring GDP and other economic indicators is less complicated than the quantification of ideational objects like values. As Nye explains, soft power is more like love – no one can clearly define it but all experience it in our everyday life (2011b: p.9). Still, scholars who reject soft power on the grounds that it is unquantifiable overlook the fact that even hard power provides many theoretical and practical difficulties and cannot be measured precisely. What constitutes greater might: one nuclear weapon or one thousand tanks? Billions spent on defence or on technological research? Thus, hard power, too, is contextual and not easy to measure. Soft power is the same, only more nuanced. Despite these objective difficulties, there are some methods scholars employ to evaluate soft power. Nye, reassures, “it’s quite possible to quantify sources of soft power” and, as an example, suggests to “measure and compare the cultural, communication, and diplomatic resources that might produce soft power for a country” (Nye, 2006a). In this way, one would tally the number of diplomats on service in different countries, additionally assessing how many are engaged in soft power policies. Also, the budgets of ministries of foreign affairs should be compared and the spending on cultural promotion or development assistance specifically calculated. Although this approach would be helpful in assessing commitment of countries and resources invested in soft power projection, it would reveal little about the results of this policy, or about soft power itself.

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An appropriate tool to assess a country’s overall soft power is public opinion polls, which show how other nations perceive the given country in various dimensions. If soft power is the “power of attraction”, then “polls are first good approximation of how attractive a country appears” (Nye 2004: p.16). This method, however, is not without serious flaws. First, these surveys are frequently conducted by Western institutions, and thus can be biased towards the liberal Western perspective through specific framing of the questions. Secondly, these surveys concentrate mostly on Western countries and major powers and thereby neglect the views of many developing states. Therefore, while it is quite easy to compare what people think about the US in different corners of the world, it is hard to find reliable data on perceptions of Tanzania, Vietnam or Bhutan in a similar spectrum. This creates obstacles in comparisons of the attractiveness of countries, especially those less developed. Another practical problem is that many surveys are not held at regular intervals; thus, they provide only sporadic insights and not a cohesive, uninterrupted trend in views about a given country. Finally, although polls can tell something about a country’s attractiveness, they are useless in assessing that same country’s influence on other aspects of soft power – agenda setting. To conclude, public opinion polls are certainly not a perfect measure, but so far, there is no better alternative. For instance, since 2005, the BBC World Service has conducted one of the most useful and reliable global public surveys. It assesses the perception of 16 countries and the European Union in over 20 states from all continents. Therefore, it shows not only the attractiveness of given states among a large pool of respondents but also trends of their perceptions abroad. The survey asks respondents whether they see a given country’s influences as “rather positive” or “rather negative” in international relations. The poll in 2013 included a total of 26,299 citizens across 25 countries who were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone, and the margin of error per country ranged from +/- 3.0 to 4.9 per cent (BBC, 2013). This overarching survey can be complemented by countryspecific surveys (for instance, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes

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Project, measuring perceptions of the US worldwide) the occasional regional poll (like the Chicago Council public opinion survey of five East Asian states in 2006), or more regular national public opinion pools. Newer, but even less perfect, tools to measure and compare the soft power of countries are specific rankings recently developed by several institutions. One of the most important is the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, which measures the global image or a brand of 50 countries. First developed in 2005, it measures state perceptions in six dimensions: culture, governance, people, exports, tourism, investment and immigration. It presents a commercial approach to a country that, like any product, needs proper marketing to maximise profits. It is based on the assumption that “the way a country is perceived by international public opinion makes a critical difference to the success of its business, trade and tourism efforts, as well as its diplomatic and cultural relations with other countries” (Simon Anholt website, 2014). Another interesting option is the IfG Monocle Soft Power Index, developed in 2010 by the British Institute for Government and Monocle magazine, which evaluates the soft power of countries according to 43 different parameters, derived from existing rankings and indices, grouped within five categories: government, culture, diplomacy, education, and business/innovation, supplemented by seven subjective elements evaluated by panel of experts. Its third edition, in 2012, evaluated 40 countries. One recent variation of the soft power index is the  Rapid Growth Markets Soft Power Index. This measures a country’s soft power according to 13 soft power variables, divided into three major categories: global image, global integrity and global integration.  The variables all impact a sovereign state’s soft power on the global stage. Due to limited data availability of a few of the variables, the index only covers six years, from 2005 to 2010 Other, less direct, but relevant, soft power indices include, among others: the Global Peace Index, and the Good Country Index. The Global Peace Index (GPI)ranks nations according to their level of peace. Is seems

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hardly imaginable that states at war with others or with themselves can be seen as a source of attraction. The index is composed of 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators from other respected sources and ranks 162 independent states, covering 99.6 per cent of the world’s population. It gauges global peace using three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict, and the degree of militarisation (GPI website, 2014). In 2014, Simon Anholt, author of the nation-branding concept, suggested another innovative ranking – the Good Country Index, which measures how much each country on earth contributes to the planet and to the human race. It uses 35 reliable datasets that track the way most countries on earth behave, five in each of the seven categories: science and technology, culture, international peace and security, world order, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and health and wellbeing. Its first edition, in 2014, evaluated 125 countries. Most of the datasets used are produced by the United Nations and other international agencies, with a few contributions from NGOs and other organisations. According to Anholt, this ranking gives “each country a balance-sheet to show at a glance whether it’s a net creditor to mankind, a burden on the planet, or something in between.” It is, hence, not a moral judgment of a country, and “good” is not seen in opposite to bad, but to “selfish” (Good Country Index website, 2014). If soft power is about the relative attractiveness of a country, another indication of soft power may be the number of tourists visiting every year or the number of foreign students attending that country’s universities. Migration flow is still considered auxiliary information about how a country is seen by its own citizens and foreigners. Naturally, there are many more additional ways to calculate country’s power attraction, adjusted to its specificity. For instance, other measures of evaluation that Nye used in his assessment of US soft power are data such as the number of patents, Nobel Prize winners, number of Internet users, expenditure on research and development, and many more (Nye, 2004). The list of specific attributes of soft power is not precisely defined and, therefore,

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specific research may try to draw its own set of variables according to which soft power can be measured. Towards Smart Power As was mentioned before, soft power does not exclude or replace hard power. The two should not be seen as contradictory but rather as two extremes on the continuum of power “from the softest forms of attraction to the hardest forms of physical control over another” (Rothman, 2011: 60). In fact, hard and soft powers are inherently interlinked, and the relationship is both complex and interactive. As Nye claims: “Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other” (2004: 25). As shown above, soft power can both enhance hard power and weaken it and hard power can undercut soft power, or, be a source of its enhancement. To better escape the inherent contradictions of the soft power concept, in 2003, Nye introduced a new term, “smart power”, which combines two dimensions. As he explains, the “smart power” term was developed “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye, 2011:20). Instead, he warns, “it is a mistake to rely on hard power or soft power alone.” And he calls the situation when the two are effectively combined “smart power” (Nye, 2006a). The new term soon became popular in policymaking and academic circles in the US, drawing a number of analyses and commentaries. A special US bipartisan Commission on Smart Power, established in 2006, warned that overreliance on military power is not a wise strategy to guide America’s global engagement. The authors called for the United States to become a smarter power by “complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in its soft power” (CSIS, 2007: p.5). Smart power was defined as “neither hard nor soft” but “the skillful combination of both” (ibid: 7). In 2009, US Secretary of State Secretary Hilary Clinton officially introduced smart power as a US foreign policy strategy, composed of the three “D’s”: diplomacy, development and defence (Clinton, 2010).

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Smart power is sometimes described as “soft power 2.0”, as it encompasses a larger role for soft power in a country’s external relations. It is based on the assumption that soft power is often a better tool to realise certain aims rather than operating only by coercive measures. It is not advocated to replace hard with soft power, but to obtain optimal diversification between both dimensions of power to wield maximum influence in international affairs (Gallarotti, 2011: p.42). In this sense, soft power can be used to supplement hard power resources or achieve different national objectives (Lee, 2010c: p.12). A country that wants to be effective in international relations must have both kinds of power. As one Indian commentator rightly observed: “Hard power without soft power stirs up resentments and enmities: soft power without hard power is a confession of weakness” (Tharoor, 2012: p.287). Thus, it is important to choose the right policy tools and correct mix of soft and hard power policies to a specific situation and objective. Nye observes, “soft power got nowhere in attracting the Taliban government away from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990s. It took hard military power to remove them. That said, other goals, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power. Coercive democratisation has its limits, as the Bush Administration found out in Iraq” (Nye, 2006b: p.106). Military power continues to be indispensable for providing security and stability to a country. “Economic power is bedrock of a country’s international influence, which expands its capacities to act also in other areas. Soft power is essential to win hearts and minds and make realisation of one’s aims less contested and resisted. Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas” (CSIS, 2007: 6). It can be said that, whereas military power is crucial to winning wars, soft power is essential to winning peace. Therefore, both are necessary. Finally, it is also important to mention some limitations of the smart power strategy. Despite its rising popularity in academia and policy-making circles in many countries, implementation of smart

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power strategy is facing stiff resistance and a number of institutional, intellectual and practical barriers. First, the old paradigm and tradition to look at foreign policy through a hard power lens is pervasive and not easy to change; old habits die hard. Moreover, “the institutions of hard power are vastly, disproportionately larger, better funded and more influential than the institutions of soft power” (Wilson III, 2008: p.116). Despite the fact that many countries have happily avoided an open conflict or war, governments often prefer to spend a large share of their budgets on defence rather than investing in soft power instruments. For instance, in 2008, the budget of the US Department of Defense was around US$ 260 billion, with 3 million people under its authority, whereas the main body responsible for civilian actions in foreign policy – the US Department of State – had a budget of US$ 10 billion, out of which only US$ 1.5 billion was precisely accounted for public diplomacy (ibid: 117). The defence lobby, military-industrial complex and security experts try to ridicule soft power as an inappropriate response meddling in serious state affairs. It is not only in the US that hard power has more numerous and powerful allies than soft power proponents. Hard power’s easily quantifiable nature and straightforward rules make it more real to many politicians and experts. As correctly observed by one American scholar: “Given the complexity of these problems – conceptual, institutional, political and cultural – smart power will not be easy to achieve, especially in the short term” (Wilson III, 2008: p.122). Similar to soft power, smart power is not restricted to any one country or group of countries. Nye asserts that smart power “is available to all states (and non-state actors), not just to the United States” (2011b: p.20). He specifically writes about India as potential smart power saying: “it is a safe bet that India’s hard and soft power are likely to rise in the coming times. If India can combine the two successfully, it will be a ‘smart power’” (Nye, 2006a).

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Conclusion The idea of soft power is still evolving, and more research is required to better understand and operationalise the concept. This chapter examined the basic tenets of soft power to present an updated definition. Having found that although soft power is associated naturally with intangible assets (ideas, values, culture, etc.), material resources are also a source of soft power. Therefore, the distinction between hard and soft power rests not so much in the character of resources but in the method of power use. In a very broad sense, soft power means “soft use of power”. It works indirectly through agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction, in contrast to hard power, which works by coercive means. Soft power resources must not necessarily be limited only to the three elements enumerated by Joseph Nye (culture, political values, foreign policy), and should include other assets, depending on the specific context and a country’s unique potential. It can be argued that soft power encompasses both resources and behaviour, which together help to build a positive image of a country, making it more attractive and legitimate in the perception of other states. Many countries, while adopting soft power, have actually enunciated a broader idea of soft power than Nye did (Thussu, 2013: p.38). It seems that in India’s case, soft power resources would include, along with culture, political values, foreign policy, its diaspora, and growing economic potential. Today, soft power functions mainly as an element of smart power. It envisages states that use all their resources – both soft and hard – to realise their interests in external relations. A skillful combination of these two elements in a comprehensive foreign strategy is the most appropriate way to wield more influence in the interconnected world of the information era. Thus, not is just military and economic power important, but also the ability to influence other states and set the agenda of international institutions. Even though the US is the most powerful smart power today, other countries have recognised the importance of investing in both hard and soft power. India is set to emerge as next important smart power.

2 EVOLUTION OF POWER IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

I

ndia is a country with a long history. Over the centuries its cultural, economic and political influence has stretched far beyond the nominal boundaries of contemporary political entities present on the Indian subcontinent. In the post-independence period, India’s longstanding foreign policy goal has been to achieve major power status in the international system (Nayar and Paul, 2003; Zajaczkowski, 2008). Over the years, Indian leaders have employed different strategies and used diverse resources in their search for this global role. This chapter sets the foundation for an in-depth analysis of soft power in modern India by providing a historical context and summarising ways the interpretation and role of power has changed in Indian foreign policy since 1947. It proposes to look at this evolution in three periods. The first period is characterised by the prevalence of a soft power approach, which began with India’s independence in 1947 and ended with the death of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1964. The second period ranges between 1964 and 1998, when India relied mostly on hard power in external relations. The third period depicts contemporary India, and is characterized by the emergence of a smart power strategy. This chronology differs slightly from the more popular description of Indian foreign policy, seen as shifting from idealism to realism and then to pragmatism. For instance, David Malone (2011: p.47) writes: “India’s journey from 1947 till the present day, both in terms of foreign policy and domestic politics, can be seen as transition from idealism under

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Nehru, through a period of ‘hard realism’ (or realpolitik) lasting roughly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (coinciding with the dominance of the Indian political scene by Indira Gandhi) to the economically driven pragmatism of today.” The second period is extended by several years to year 1998 because India’s nuclear tests had fundamental value for its hard power status and repercussions for its foreign policy. It is argued here that since then, India again has employed more soft power resources for realisation of national objectives in international relations. Revival of soft power thinking – together with continuing development of its hard power potential – means that India is pursuing a smart power strategy. Power in Indian Strategic Thought Soft power is definitively not a new phenomenon in India, although its understanding and application in the Indian political context have had different phases over the decades. If the term had already been used during the Cold War era, India would have been considered among the greatest soft powers in the world. The long and successful non-violent fight against the British “under Gandhi’s leadership was perhaps the most spectacular historical example of the potential effectiveness of political strategies based on soft power” (Hymans, 2009: p.241). This positive legacy imprinted a dose of idealism on the foreign policy of independent India and remains an important element of its external relations today. In a popular, though not always correct, view, India was a pacifist state following a moral-based foreign policy that did not use force in foreign affairs. In reality, however, there were several instances when India did resort to the use of arms, consequently lessening its idealism over the years. Indeed, relations between idealists and realists were far more complicated, and discussion around the kind of power that India ought to be continues to this day. Should India act on the premises of its civilization and use the example of its high moral standards to transform world order? Or should it concentrate on accumulation of economic wealth for more effective influence in foreign affairs? Should India have a strong army if it wants its voice to be heard and its interests respected?

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Should it coerce others – or attract them – in order to achieve its aims in foreign relations? And, what resources constitute India’s assets and source of power in international relations? Over the years, answers to these questions have varied, depending on international context and the capacities of contemporary India. In general, the sources of India’s power have been its geography, demography, economy, military and civilizational heritage. Today, India is one of the largest and second-most populous countries in the world. After two decades of rapid growth, it is the world’s ninth largest economy, with significant achievements in technology— especially in the nuclear and space sectors. In military terms, it has the third largest army in the world and is one of few countries with nuclear weapons. Finally, as an old civilization, it presents a distinct cultural and philosophical model with considerable appeal to people in other countries. This variety of significant resources gives India numerous options in pursuing foreign policy. Indeed, Indian strategists and politicians have often presented competing views about what constitutes India’s greatest international strengths and what kind of power India should use to attain its foreign policy interests. The debate between soft and hard power proponents has a long tradition in India. On the one hand, Kautliya, an advisor to Emperor Chandragupta, is seen as a precursor of realism in external affairs in India. His main work, Arthashastra, and the concepts of mandalas, are seen as a classic work in international relations on realism, even though he well understood the importance of perceptions in foreign affairs. His heritage lends a strong foundation to a vibrant community of contemporary Indian realists and pragmatist security analysts. On the other hand, the philosophical concepts of Buddhism and Hinduism, based on principles of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, formed an indigenous basis for principle-based foreign relations. The concept of Saam – “convincing in a mutual and conciliatory way” as one of several policies recommended for successful state craft in the Hindu epic the Mahabharata (along with Dand, Daam, Bhed) – can be seen as a precursor of today’s soft power approach (Das, A. K., 2006: p.6).

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Immediately before India’s independence, soft power thinking was revived due to the renaissance of Hinduism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and offered strong moral justification of the independence movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. For instance, Swami Vivekananda – a Hindu spiritual leader in the latter half of the 19thcentury, foresaw India’s future role in the world as that of a “messenger of peace, that of a catalyst for creating a just and moral world order” (Dixit, 2003: p.17). Mahatma Gandhi, who practiced the philosophical notion of nonviolence, also saw soft power as a legitimate and effective tool for India to use in international affairs. “I am not pleading for India to practice non-violence because it is weak” – he said – “I want her to practice nonviolence being fully conscious of its power. No training in or collection of arms is required for realization of this strength”. (Quoted in Dixit, 2003: pp.17–18). Likewise, people like Sri Ramana Maharishi, Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore also influenced thoughts along these lines about India’s role in the world. In contemporary India, there are three or four major streams of thinking about strategy security and foreign policy issues. Each of them has a distinct perspective about the greatest strengths of India and the best use of force in external relations. According to Rahul Sagar (2009: p.801), the four competing visions of India’s place in the international system include: “Moralists, who wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action; Hindu nationalists who want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilization; Strategists who advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities; and Liberals who seek prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence.” For another Indian scholar, Kanti Bajpai, there are three major strategic paradigms: Nehruvianism— espoused by idealists influenced by the thinking of India’s first Prime Minister, who wanted to pursue a policy based on moral principles; Neoliberalism—promoting economic interdependence as a means to stabilise and secure the world; and Hyperrealism—advocating military power as the most significant element

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of statecraft. Finally, an American author, Stephen Cohen (2003: p.56), suggests another categorisation of the Indian thinking on foreign and security relations: Nehruvian tradition— representing idealism, (with its variation as Gandhian – more idealistic, or Nehruvian – more militant); Realists— who concentrate on the country’s material resources; and Revitalists— who believe in the great Indian civilization as a major strength of the modern India. These different groups propose three major visions of India in the international order: “Firm India”—pursuing a forceful policy; “Conciliatory India”— willing to compromise and cooperate, and “Didactic India”— advancing policy to change perceptions of friends and foes alike (ibid). Referring to these traditional schools in the more recent terminology of soft power is neither easy nor perfect. But in general, it is proposed here to identify proponents of soft power with Nehruvianists, Moralists and Idealists— whereas, hard power thinkers would include Hindu nationalists, Hyperrealists and Realists. The closest to today’s notion of smart power would possibly be neoliberals and pragmatists (see Table 1). In this sense, one could assume that the idea of smart power – entailing a pragmatic combination of soft and hard power strategists – could find many supporters in India.

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Table 2.1: Select Views on Indian Power Soft power

Hard power

Smart power

Rahul Sagar

Moralists

Hindu nationalists Neoliberals

Strategists Neoliberals

Kanti Bajpai

Nehruvianists

Hyperrealism Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism

Stephen Cohen

Nehruvianists (Didactic India)

Realists (Firm India)

Revivalists (Conciliatory India)

Moral-based foreign policy. Use of force as the last resort. Civilization, culture and spirituality as assets of India.

War is inevitable in international relations and military power is a precondition for success and survival. Trade and economic interdependence can lead to prosperity and peace. India should develop material power – both military and economic.

Mixing soft and hard power resources into an effective strategy.

Major characteristic

Source: Author’s own compilation

Stephen Cohen (2003: p.53) may actually be right in claiming that “Pragmatism, realism and idealism exist side by side” in Indian strategic thinking. Others would rather claim that after the Cold War, the neoliberal thinking about foreign relations became the most popular school in India (Bajpai, 2003; Sagar, 2009). Still, analysis of newspapers and articles over recent years suggests that the foreign relations discourse was heavily influenced by hard security and defense specialists. However, there is also an observable revival of soft power thinking in India. To better comprehend the recent trends, an evolution of the role of power in Indian foreign policy over the last decades is summarised below.

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India as a Soft Power: 1947–1964 India gained independence from the British on 15 August 1947. From the beginning, it embraced a foreign policy platform characterised by idealism and moralism. It sought to play an active international role grounded in certain norms and values rather than power politics. This soft power approach, as we could say in today’s terms, was a result of several elements coming from India’s limited material capabilities, strong civilisational base, historical experiences, role of personalities and geopolitical situation. Therefore, this was not a result of naïve idealisation of international relations, but in fact a practical adjustment to reality (Sikri, 2009; Nayar and Paul, 2003). First of all, India joined the community of nations as an underdeveloped and poor country. Not surprisingly, it tried to realise its global ambitions by highlighting the richness of its culture and virtue of its values instead of the misery of its economy. It accordingly pursued a foreign policy agenda backed by the power of moral arguments rather than arguments of power. Being relatively stronger in terms of intangible assets, but weak in terms of material resources, India used soft power to compensate for its hard power deficiencies. As correctly observed by Nayar and Paul (2003: p.17) “despite the handicap of the lack of material capabilities, the Indian elites attempted to play a leadership role on the basis of soft power, defined in terms of diplomacy and ideological appeal, rather than hard power, defined in terms of economic and military capabilities.” India’s sense of self-importance was based on its geographic and demographic size, as well as the heritage of its ancient civilization. It was one of the largest and most populous countries in the world and one of the first to regain independence after World War II. Indian leaders thought of their country not as a normal state but rather as a civilization that could usher in moral values and ethical standards into international relations. The pacifism of Buddhism and the tolerance and assimilating capacities of Hinduism formed the basis of India’s idealistic outlook towards world affairs. Indian leaders saw this unique ethical value as

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entitlement to a major power status and invitation to play a leading role in world affairs. Self-confident India expected the world to acknowledge this special moral position and follow its lead. Secondly, India’s post-independence views on external relations were shaped by the non-violent struggle with British colonial rule. Peaceful victory over one of the major world powers substantiated the claims that neither a strong army nor economic potential were indispensable to be effective in world politics. In fact, the day the British left “was Indian soft power’s finest hour” (Hymans, 2009: p.244). At the same time, the colonial experience made India’s worldview anti-colonial and anti-imperial; it imprinted a deep mistrust towards European powers, which in 1947 were still holding most of their Asian and African colonies. The experience of colonisation caused India to embark on the self-imposed crusade again colonialism and imperialism. Hence, India’s claimed objectives included assistance to other nations to gain independence and end oppression. Thirdly, the human factor played an exceptionally important role in shaping India’s external relations. The foreign policy of independent India was largely designed and implemented by one man – Jawaharlal Nehru – the first Prime Minister of India (1947–1964) and the first Minister of External Affairs. In fact, he was responsible for preparing India’s policy much earlier, as Gandhi entrusted him with the foreign policy formulation for the Indian National Congress in 1927 (Dixit, 2003: p.10). He was one of the main leaders of the non-violent struggle and a close disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, sharing many aspects of his idealism. Nehru sincerely believed in the special role for India in international order. According to him, India was a country that could spread peace to create an international system based on justice and moral values, and help eradicate imperialism, colonialism and discrimination. Finally, it is important to be cognizant of the practical geopolitical context of 1947. The world was recovering from the most devastating war in history, which manifested the brutal consequences of politics based on hatred, racism and militarism. A new international order, with the nascent United Nations, was emerging, and gave many people hope that a different

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international system was possible: one that would be more peaceful and cooperative. At the same time, however, the alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was over, and bipolar confrontation seemed inevitable. Indian leaders were concerned that opting for any side in this new division would further constrain the country’s freedom in international affairs and would not best serve its interests. In this sense, Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was not only driven by idealism but was also a pragmatic adaptation to the global situation. Nehru “had faith in his strategy, because he felt it was in tune with fundamental trends in world history” (Hymans, 2009: p.248). Moreover, he managed to attract other countries to follow suit and carved out a significant sphere in the bipolar world. As Dixit observed (2003: p. 19): Nehru’s assessment was that India should keep away from the Cold War power politics, should remain committed to its own democratic terms of reference for national consolidation in order to maintain international peace and stability and to meet India’s own national interests. This approach evolved into ‘non-alignment’ becoming the guiding principle of India’s foreign policy, and, ultimately, found manifestation in the creation of Non-aligned Movement.

During the first few years after independence, India focused on consolidation of its territory, defining relations with its neighbours, especially Pakistan and China, establishing close ties with developing countries and keeping the right distance from the evolving confrontation between the West and the USSR. The basic principle of Nehru’s strategy was non-alignment, according to which India had to pursue an independent and autonomous foreign policy. Concurrently, he sought to influence world affairs by proffering ideas of peace, equality and cooperation. His explanation of foreign strategy in the Constituent Assembly of India on 8 March 1949 can be also read as a declaration of a soft power approach:

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India is a country with tremendous vitality which it has shown through its history. It has often enough imposed its own cultural patterns on other countries, not by force of arms, but by the strength of its vitality, culture and civilization. […]What are we interested in world affairs for? We seek no domination over any country, domestic or other. Our main stake in world affairs is peace, to see that there is racial equality, and that people who are still subjugated should be free. For the rest we do not desire to interfere in world affairs and we do not desire that others should interfere in our affairs (Quoted in Dixit, 2003: pp.32–33).

Hence, India pursued a soft power approach in which it tried to develop friendly relations with all countries, or at least with as many as possible. It presented itself as a force for peace, an opponent of war, and a spokesperson for other post-colonial countries. It supported decolonisation politically and materially, criticised Western imperialism and was among the first to condemn the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa at the UN forum. Despite being a poor country, it provided aid to other developing countries and established institutions to promote Indian culture. At first, when other major powers followed the U.S. acquisition of nuclear weapons, India insisted on denuclearisation and universal disarmament – a policy that later changed. It was a firm believer in multilateral negotiations and a staunch supporter of the United Nations as a prime global body to make international affairs just. The principle of non-alignment was consequently endorsed and built up a Non-Aligned Movement – a coalition of countries forging a third way in the international order, between the U.S. and the USSR. In 1954, the India–China Agreement formulated five principles of peaceful co-existence of countries. These then became the basis for discussion at the 1955 international conference of Asian and African countries in Bandung; and, in 1961, the principles were endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement at the Summit in Belgrade. Along with Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslavian Leader

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Joseph Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the spiritus movens of the new organization and the one who gave it a specific character. The formation of NAM was an important personal success for Prime Minister Nehru and probably the finest hour of Indian diplomacy at the global level. Yet, adherence to Asian solidarity and idealism were not always easy and did not always work in India’s interests. For instance, India declined, in the name of Indo–Chinese friendship, the historic American offer to replace China in the Security Council in the early 1950s (Dixit, 2003: p.56), and the Indo–China agreement on Tibet only benefited China (Mohan, 2011). India’s position alienated Western powers and facilitated the U.S. alliance with Pakistan. Its soft power strategy eventually led to a defeat in war with China in 1962, when Nehru underestimated the realpolitik thinking of its northern neighbour and ignored increasing signals of an arriving military confrontation. Even before that, Indian leaders realised that unconditional loyalty towards firm moral principles in foreign policy was increasingly difficult, and, on many occasions, it involved risking national interests and security. As a result, despite its calls for peaceful solutions to international problems, India reverted to a hard power approach when other strategies failed. This shift in approach was reflected in the case of the first war with Pakistan in 1947, the annexation of the Princely state of Hyderabad in 1951, and of the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961. In the context of growing political and economic ties with the Soviet Union, Nehru did not condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, even though he was very critical about the intervention of France and Britain in Egypt over the Suez crisis around the same time. This sent mixed signals about Indian policy and exposed its double standards. As Dixit (2003: p.67) admitted to theWestern governments’ criticism, India’s stance on the Hungarian and Suez crises “negated New Delhi’s claims that its foreign policy was based on moral principles”. As he explains further (ibid):

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This criticism was (and is) valid at the apparent and normative levels, but it was the first major manifestation of India acting firmly to safeguard its perceived national interests. It also reflected the fact that India was realizing that international politics is essentially an amoral phenomenon governed by power equations and vested interest. India could not become an exception to this general predicament in international relations if it had to safeguard its interests.

Although Nehruvian India failed to achieve its grand objective of using soft power to change the dynamics of global politics, it came closer to success in this effort than many would have imagined (Hymans, 2009: p.259). In its pursuit, India amassed goodwill and legitimacy among many developing countries and made its voice heard in multilateral forums, which far exceeded its material potential. For instance, India was chosen as a Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the Korean conflict in 1953; it successfully mediated behind the scenes to bring about the Indochina Peace Agreement in Geneva in 1954; and it was selected as the Chairman of the UN Control Commission for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. As Dixit (2003: p.47) concluded, “India’s acceptability as a reconciliatory and mediator was both remarkable and illogical because this credibility and diplomatic success of India had nothing to do with its economic resources or military power.” Clearly, India credited its high international standing to its soft power. It had yet to learn, however, that soft power without hard power does not yield lasting success. China’s aggression was a final blow for Nehru, and a lesson of realism for Indian foreign policy makers. Nehru confessed his mistake in the Indian parliament in 1962, saying: “I want you all to realize the shock we suffered during the last week or so. We were getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it” (quoted in Muni, 2009: p.19). This event was, as some experts call it, “a revenge of realism” to Nehru’s pacifist and idealist foreign policy, which forced India to

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“modify its foreign policy in important ways in the direction of realism” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.151). The lost war with China was not the only problem for the Indian foreign policy’s mixed legacy during this period. India’s soft power approach enabled it to punch above its weight in international relations, and it amassed a number of friends among developing countries, but neither yielded substantial tangible benefits. The developing world played a marginal role in major international issues and could not provide India what it wanted most – elevation to global power status, or capital and technology necessary for economic development. Trade with the developing world was limited and it could not replace the Western market for Indian products. Its principled and idealistic foreign policy had irritated and alienated Western powers, which in turn ignored India’s larger aspirations and instead pursued a policy, as Nayar and Paul (2003) call it, of “regional containment”, in the form of supporting India’s regional rival, Pakistan. Initial enthusiasm for international law and the United Nations led to disillusionment when the UN Security Council acted in favour of Pakistan during the first war over Kashmir in 1948. India’s pursuit of the autarkic model of development made little progress in terms of economic growth. Instead of changing international order, India had to change its own foreign strategy. Soft power was to be replaced by hard power. India as a Hard Power: 1964–1998 The humiliating defeat in war with China was a bitter lesson for India. It marked the beginning of a new era in Indian foreign policy. Following the death of Nehru, more pragmatic politicians took charge of India’s foreign policy: Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–1966) and Indira Gandhi (1966–1977; 1979–1984). The limited success of the previous soft power approach, aggression by China in 1962, aggression by Pakistan in 1965, and China’s nuclear tests in 1964 all proved to Indian leaders that military strength could play a more important role in statecraft than moral arguments. India took a novel course on realism and militarism. In this new period,

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“India retreated from its global ambitions to a concerted effort to build its material power and focused on regional autonomy” (Basrur, 2010: p.268). It also meant that from the late 1970s to 1990, the idea that India should project itself as a firm, powerful state and be able to use force freely was the dominant strategic theme in Indian policy (Cohen, 2004: p.58). When Pakistan’s army dictator Ayub Khan tried to resolve the dispute of Kashmir by dispatching the paramilitary and regular army to Indianheld Kashmir (Operation Gibraltar) in 1965, India responded with full force and opened another front in the Pakistani province of Punjab. The second war with Pakistan ended a few weeks later with the victory of the Indian army. In response to China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, India embarked on an indigenous nuclear weapons programme, shrugging off the pacifist policy of Nehru who shared – along with Mahatma Gandhi – the ethical aversion to weapons of mass destruction. India stepped up its military buildup, its acquisition of armaments abroad, mainly in the USSR and its allies, and developed a more ambitious missile and space programme to sustain its superiority in South Asia. A major manifestation of India’s hard power approach came in 1971 with the military intervention in East Pakistan, which led to its breakaway from the newly formed state of Pakistan—and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Although India’s engagement in the crisis had a clear strategic and security basis to exploit any opportunity to fundamentally weaken its regional rival, such actions were justified to the world as a humanitarian intervention to stop genocide by the Pakistani army and massive exodus of Bangladeshis to India. Indira Gandhi strategically used the accumulated soft power image precedent of the past to realise hard power interests. India was ahead of its times with the precedents of humanitarian intervention; as such its move was largely seen as suspicious by fellow developing countries that adhered to a non-interventionist principle and by the U.S. and the West, which supported Pakistan. Even Indira Gandhi was well aware of the dilemma of whether India should be a soft or a hard power—as she complained once: “We are accused of being soft but when

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we become hard we are accused of being hard” (quoted in Hymans, 2009: p.247). India did not fully exploit the military victory over Pakistan: it signed the Shimla Agreement, which changed the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir into the Line of Control and compelled both rivals to settle the issue in “bilateral negotiations”. In yet another example of India’s hard power approach, it annexed Sikkim in 1975. Several years later, India’s muscle flexing peaked during the 1980s (Basrur, 2010: p.269). This included sending Indian Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka (1987–1990) and a brief intervention in the Maldives in 1986. Another example of coercive diplomacy was the imposition of an economic blockade on Nepal in 1990. Although there was no further war with Pakistan, relations between the two countries remained extremely tense, and both came close to a conflict in 1986 and 1990. In 1979, Indira Gandhi declared a new doctrine, according to which South Asia was seen as an area of exclusively Indian influences. Certainly, in this period, India didn’t try to get a leadership role in South Asia by persuasion and attraction, but through direct imposition of its will on smaller neighbours. At the global level, India’s Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, signed in July 1971, in preparation of a confrontation with Pakistan, marked the departure from the principle of non-alignment. By openly siding with the communist bloc in a global confrontation, India undermined its position as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. Intervention in Pakistan in 1971 was by itself a violation of the fundamental principle of NAM and its own foreign policy – that of non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs. Further undermining its image as principle-based country, India did not condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, which resembled the situation surrounding the 1956 crisis in Hungary—proving India’s preference to strategic relations over South Asian solidarity. But this was not the end: two more decisions dealt a final blow to India’s international image. From a soft power perspective, Indira Gandhi made two “colossally bad decisions”: in May 1974, when her government conducted a so-

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called peaceful nuclear explosion and a year later, when she declared a state of emergency. “Neither of these acts” – claims Hymans (2009: p.251) – “did anything positive for India, or even for Mrs. Gandhi’s personal, power; instead, this one-two punch of militarism and authoritarianism ruined the Indian state’s credibility in the eyes of its natural Western constituencies. A bitter feeling of betrayal further heightened their negative reaction. India’s long and patiently constructed diplomacy of soft power lay in ruins.” The end of the Cold War forced India to make crucial readjustments in its external outlook. According to Raja Mohan, India had to rethink non-alignment as a central principle of its foreign and security policy and find another organizing element for its external relations (Mohan, 2003: p.29). This new policy became more “modest and pragmatic”. (Mohan, 2003: p.262). It opened a new direction for Indian foreign policy. The disintegration of the USSR quickened the process of India’s rapprochement with the U.S., which already had started in the 1980s under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. India shed off its traditional antiAmericanism and became more willing to engage with Western powers. Still, their relations could not make much progress due to controversies over India’s nuclear programme and the worsening crisis in Kashmir. India’s new pragmatism meant normalization of ties with Israel, even though rhetorically India remained a strong supporter of the Palestinian aspiration for statehood. To some, it looked like “India’s embrace of the American world order during the 1990s set the stage for the recent resurgence of the country’s soft power, but also represented the ultimate abdication of its former great soft power ambitions” (Hymans, 2009: pp.259–60). In 1991, India launched its Look East Policy to capitalise on the rapid growth of the South East Asian nations and reassert its strong position in post-Cold War Asia. By the mid-1990s, it initiated a more cooperative policy towards its neighbours, termed, after then-Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, as the Gujral Doctrine. In order to repair strained relations with its smaller neighbours, India resigned from the principle of reciprocity

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and was better prepared to offer unilateral concessions to smaller SAARC members. At the same time, despite its conciliatory steps, India did not step away from pursuing hard power. Post-Cold War India, however, emphasised economic power as a major platform to strengthen its international role. The economic liberalization started in 1991, and rising economic interdependence made India discover the strategic importance of a strong economy. It became evident that basic precondition for realisation of India’s global ambitions was accumulation of material wealth. Hence, foreign policy was framed with the interest and intention of creating conducive regional and global conditions for the Indian economy to flourish. Prioritisation of economic cooperation did not mean that India neglected its military power. On the contrary, rising militancy in Kashmir in the 1990s, persisting tensions with Pakistan, and China’s growing threat made India invest heavily in strengthening its military capabilities. It prioritised army modernization and its military acquisitions abroad. Waning idealism and rising realism in India’s foreign policy was wellillustrated in a remarkable shift on its policy towards Myanmar/ Burma. From the time of its harsh criticism of the Burmese junta’s cruel suppression of the student’s movement in 1988, India, by the early 1990shad turned to a policy of “constructive engagement” with the military regime in Rangoon. Again, hard military and security interests and strategic considerations won over more idealistic and soft power motivations. The pinnacle of the hard power approach came in May 1998, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government conducted five nuclear tests in the desert of Rajasthan (Pokharan II). It showed India’s strength as a major power and was a culmination of “India’s defiance of a major power system” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.19). Pakistan followed India in a few days’ time, and both countries were harshly criticised by the international community. New sanctions were imposed on them by the Western states, led by the U.S. Such action called into question India’s own

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credibility and its policy based on the principles of non-discrimination and nuclear disarmament. A country that had for years been calling for denuclearisation had just declared itself as a nuclear power and seemed to take final departure from its principle-based foreign policy. Its international image was hardly undermined, but others had to treat it more seriously. As a result, India reaffirmed its image as a hard power. It is important to note, that even though India pursued a more hardpower driven policy in this period, complete rejection of soft power of the earlier era was not feasible. As observed by Cohen, “Both Indira and Rajiv made many changes in Indian foreign policy, but they and the Congress party establishment insisted that a national consensus on foreign policy based on Nehruvian principles was in place, even when they departed from them” (Cohen, 2004: p.37). This was evident from the humanitarian justification of the intervention in Pakistan in 1971, self-imposition of nuclear tests, and constant opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the grounds of its discriminatory character. The real change in Indian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic realism came only after the Cold War. With the end of bipolarity and crucial changes in domestic politics, the loss of dominance of the Indian National Congress and rising role of regional parties, “the Nehruvian consensus in foreign policy has long since broken down” (Cohen, 2004: p. 37). Assessment of the effectiveness of the hard power approach in external relations over this period is not unambiguous. India has not yet been recognized as a global power, and many have started questioning whether it is even a regional power. Although its relations with the West touched its nadir point following its nuclear tests, there was strong conviction in India that this was a price worth paying to join the nuclear powers’ club and acquire an indispensable feature of global power. Economic reforms and the opening of the economy since the early 1990s had already started bearing fruitin the form of faster internal growth and heightened international interest in the emerging market. However, the end of the Cold War and increasing irrelevance of the Non-Aligned Movement made India’s global position as a speaker of developing countries less

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significant. In addition, India’s more pragmatic foreign policy left many partners in the developing world disappointed, and India’s role as a leader of the developing world was subsequently contested. Yet, world powers were equally disinterested in accommodating some of India’s global aspirations as they were in the previous era. India’s position in South Asia was even more disputed. Simmering conflict with Pakistan intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, and Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities to ease India’s dominance in conventional arms. Relations with smaller neighbours remained troublesome, and India’s dominance in South Asia was resented. Its policy as a regional hegemon gave India “an important lesson to be learnt: that power projection both had its limits and could be counterproductive” (Basrur, 2010: p.270). This proved the ineffectiveness of India’s hard power and explained why India had already changed its policy towards its neighbours in the 1990s (Wagner, 2005). The new approach based on economic interdependence and shared destiny revealed the first signs of a more soft power policy.

Change was required to further improve India’s international image, which suffered due to a number of domestic problems. A popular uprising in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s, supported by Pakistan and crushed by brutal pacification and militarisation of the region, went against the peaceful mindset in the post-Cold War liberal order. India’s nuclear tests were perceived by other nuclear powers as a threat to the global status quo. Domestically, the 1992–1993 communal clashes, in Ayodhya and Mumbai, called into question India’s democratic system and inter-religious tolerance. There was little left of a perception of a spiritual and peaceful India that could contribute to the international order. India as Smart Power: Post-1998 Most scholars agree that the revival of soft power in Indian foreign policy took place only in the late 1990s or early 2000s (Lee, 2010c; Mukherjee,

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2013; Hall, 2012). Although Christian Wagner (2005) is partly right when he locates the shift from a hard to soft power approach in the early 1990s, as some softer policies can be traced back to that period, the main institutional mechanism and instruments developed for projecting soft power are found a decade later. According to Malone (2011: p.252), “finally, in the 1990s, the Nehruvian framework was definitively retired. Since then, India’s foreign policy strategy has been, essentially, to rise in the world through full and unembarrassed participation in the American world order. As such, it closely follows Nye’s prescription for soft power in today’s world.” Several authors cite 1998 as a turning point in Indian foreign policy (Nayar and Paul, 2003; Muni, 2009). After testing nuclear weapons, India achieved its maximum hard power, while its soft power reached a new low. For realist thinkers, this development had a fundamental significance for gaining more confidence and respect in the world. As one former diplomat writes: “More than anything else, it was India’s status as a nuclear weapons power that compelled both the U.S. and China to take India more seriously, and brought it welcome attention and grudging respect from other countries” (Sikri, 2009: p.280). Interestingly, S.D. Muni observes that India’s shift in its policy on democracy promotion and rapprochement with the U.S. came from “ the need to cultivate the USA in the aftermath of uneasiness developed on the question of India’s nuclear explosion and decision to acquire nuclear weapons” (Muni, 2009: p.12). In some opinions, this development meant a final departure from previous principle-based and soft power approach in Indian foreign policy and total endorsement of hard realism based on national interest. Hymans (2009: p.237) summarises that “India pursued such a revolutionary soft power strategy under Gandhi and Nehru, until turning away from it under Indira Gandhi, and then definitively abandoning it under Atal Behari Vajpayee.” This opinion is incorrect. On the contrary, this development can be seen as another turning point and the beginning of a more deliberate use of soft power in Indian policy.

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The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister had, in fact, started using soft power not for ideological or idealistic reasons, but from the perspective of pragmatic necessity. Among several reasons explaining the possible shift, the most pressing was the need to rebuild the reputation of India as a responsible, status quo power and attractive economic partner – the reputation undermined by its nuclear tests. This was important not only to face the wrath of the international community and ease the sanctions but also to address India’s image problem resulting from foreign and domestic policies in previous years. There was growing recognition that the previous strategy – based mainly on hard power – had failed (Wagner, 2005, 2010). By the late 1990s India’s leadership role in South Asia was contested as never before: the image of regional bully was stronger and tensions with Pakistan and other neighbours were rising (Mitra, 2003; Gateway House, 2012). On the global stage, India’s nuclear tests and simmering conflict in Kashmir were not enhancing India’s image as status quo power. Moreover, India must have realized that China’s offensive in South Asia were a direct challenge to India’s interest in its neighbourhood (Palit, 2010, 2011). To compete with China on soft power terms, India had to develop its own adequate toolbox. The evolving international context, including globalisation and the arrival of new technologies, made the soft power theory quite appealing to many countries. It became common for many of them to develop soft power policies, and India had to follow suit in adjusting to the new reality. It was not only economic liberalisation and globalisation that worked in favour of India but also two geopolitical processes – democratisation and the war on terrorism – that supported rise of soft power in India. A different international context in the post-Cold War world, marked by replacement of the confrontation between capitalism and communism by the struggle for democracy, put a special weight on India as the most populous democratic country and contra-positioned it against another Asian giant – China. Moreover, declaration of the Global War

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on Terrorism by American President George W. Bush, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, allowed for re-framing of the conflict in Kashmir to India’s advantage. What had been seen in the West in the 1990s as a problem of human rights violations and brutal repression of a freedom movement now emerged as part of the global fight against the international menace of terrorism. India changed its label from oppressor of the Kashmiri people to a credible ally in the war against terrorists. The problem of Kashmir had been successfully muted in international affairs and played a lesser role in shaping India’s global image in following years. Even though there was no single strategic document and doctrine, the shift towards soft power could be seen in several crucial foreign policy decisions, the development of new instruments and mechanisms devoted to soft power projection, and speeches of Indian leaders and politicians. A new “softer use of power” is illustrated on several pivotal decisions taken directly after 1998. To alleviate the negative fallout of the nuclear tests, the BJP government quickly announced a unilateral moratorium on further testing and engaged in intensive diplomatic dialogue with the U.S. In the coming months, to build its image as a responsible nuclear power, India vowed to adhere to a strict non-proliferation regime while being outside the NPT and in 1999 adopted a nuclear doctrine of “no first use”. This helped India to “salvage some soft power” (Purushotaman, 2010) and reassure the international community that it would not contribute to a nuclear disaster in South Asia. Secondly, India changed its position on democratic promotion at the global level, discovering the possible utility of this issue in relations with Western powers. Although India originally supported democracy in South Asia, at the global level, it kept away from any policies that could have been seen as an export of ideology and a violation of the principles of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs. Now, the Indian government skillfully employed the label of the world’s largest democracy to rebuild relations with the U.S. and successfully promoted the idea of a “natural partnership” between the “two largest democracies”(Muni,

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2009). In June 2000, India became a founding member of the Community of Democracies at the conference in Poland. In 2005, India co-funded the UN Democracy Fund and became the second largest contributor to the UNDEF budget (with US$10 million). Indian leaders referred more openly to the old Nehruvian image of India as a normative power and employed newly available tools and instruments of diplomacy to get its message through. In a more active approach, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Sinh said in 2005: “For us, the democratic idea lies in the common heritage of mankind. Those fortunate to enjoy its fruits have a responsibility to share the benefits with others” (Singh, 2005). The new soft power approach was further manifested in relations with Pakistan. India showed a restrained response to the Pakistani military intrusion in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir in spring 1999, which could have led to nuclear war and forced the Western powers to intervene diplomatically to diffuse the tension. India’s calm reaction to Pakistani provocations convinced the U.S. that India was a responsible partner, and U.S. President Bill Clinton exerted pressure on Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to draw back Pakistani troops (Mohan, 2003). This was a turning point in U.S.–India relations and subsequently paved the way for Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, which opened the way for strategic engagement between the two countries. Moreover, despite the Kargil war, Indian leaders pushed for peace talks with Pakistan, one initiated in Lahore in 1998 (the Lahore process), and another with a meeting with the new Pakistani military dictator, Pervez Musharaff, in Agra in 2001. Following the next serious crisis in 2001–2003, India entered into a “composite dialogue” with Pakistan in January 2004. The same restrained reaction to Pakistani provocations was followed by India after the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 and again after attacks on multiple targets in Mumbai on 26 November 2008. Despite strong evidence of Pakistani-trained terrorist involvement and strong pressure on the government for retaliatory strikes, India did not resort to military power and, instead, increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to curb terrorism

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on its soil. Although these reactions looked too “soft” for many hawkish commentators in India, they rather illustrated a deliberate soft power approach. The scaled-back responses were partly designed to reinforce the image of India as a responsible nuclear power and a benign military power committed to peace and stability in South Asia. Finally, since 2000, India has relied less on the hard power of military strength and more on economic interdependence and attractiveness of its own example in relations with South Asian countries. It was supportive of greater integration and trade among the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and increased funding for economic assistance and cultural promotion in the region, including Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It became less prone to use military power in foreign policy but relied more on building up a positive image of the country. Together with these foreign policy decisions, which showed the softer character of India’s approach, since 1998, different Indian governments have created and strengthened new instruments and institutional structures to augment soft power and use its resources effectively in foreign policy (for details, see chapter 4). In 2004, it established a new Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs to tap the potential of the diaspora for India’s interests; the new Public Diplomacy Division within the MEA was created in 2006 to manage India’s image abroad and explain the country’s foreign policies to both domestic and foreign audiences; a separate Development Partnership Administration in the MEA was set up in 2012 to coordinate increasingly ambitious and comprehensive foreign assistance programmes. Since 2000, India has pursued a more active cultural diplomacy, establishing new cultural centers abroad and expanding scholarship programmes, as well as stepping up its development assistance both in South Asia and in Africa. Although India began to pay more attention to its soft power in the last period, it does not mean that it has neglected its hard power. On the contrary, economic growth and national security have remained prime preoccupations for policymakers and IR pundits in New Delhi. Following

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the end of the Cold War, and even after the nuclear tests, India has not stopped investing in its hard power capabilities. It has considerably expanded its military and economic power over the last two decades. India has been growing even more rapidly: it quadrupled its economy between 1991 and 2012 and emerged as one of the most attractive global markets. The country increased its defense budget and stepped up modernisation of its army. In 2011, it emerged as the world’s largest arms importer, responsible for nine percent of the volume of international arms imports (SIPRI, 2011). It is also technologically advanced, being one of few countries that has sent a space mission to the Moon and Mars. It is also preparing a manned mission to the Moon in the coming years. Unlike in the past, India has not sacrificed one dimension of power for another, but is in the midst of building up a comprehensive smart power strategy. Even though soft power has never been officially proclaimed as India’s formal doctrine, its increasing role has been seen more often in speeches of important politicians and policy makers. In 2004, the External Affairs Minister in the BJP-led NDA government – Yashwant Sinha – explained the soft power approach of India quite openly. His words, in fact, closely resembled Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech in 1947 while saying (Sinha, 2004): India distances itself from the conventional idea of power as the ability of a nation to bend other nations to its will through coercive use of force. It is also essential to make clear at the very outset that India approaches the notion of power with an alternative vision. Our pursuit of power is firmly anchored in a mission aimed at eliminating war, protecting international law, strengthening the UN and striving for a new deal for developing countries. […] India’s influence has spread on the strength of our culture, religion and philosophy. As the land of Gandhi, India has an international image that few others can claim. India’s track record as a democracy, our diverse society, independent judiciary and vibrant press also stand out. Needless to say, the success of our IITs and the IT industry has spawned a novel stereotype of an Indian as a workaholic computer whizkid. Similar views were presented by representatives of the next Indian Government of the United Progressive Alliance led by the Indian National

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Congress party, which came into power in mid-2004. For instance, in 2007, while talking to the students of Jammu University, former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh claimed that the “huge potential of young women and men”is “this soft power, not just military strength, which will be the real maker of India’s greatness” (Singh, 2007). A year later, he talked at length about the importance of soft power to young Indian diplomats: The soft power of India in some ways can be a very important instrument of foreign policy. Cultural relations, India’s film industry – Bollywood I find wherever I go in Middle East, in Africa – people talk about Indian films. So that is a new way of influencing the world about the growing importance of India. Soft power is equally important in the new world of diplomacy” (Singh, 2008).

The former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also acknowledged the importance of culture in foreign policy. At the meeting with the Indian diaspora in Delhi in 2011, he said that “India’s soft power is an increasingly important element in our expanding global footprint […] The richness of India’s classical traditions and the colour and vibrancy of contemporary Indian culture are making waves around the world” (Singh, 2011). During the same meeting, he acknowledged a special role for overseas Indians in building a positive image of India abroad. He asserted that “India has a message for the world. It is a message of pluralism, of tolerance, of the balance between individual rights and collective responsibilities. It is this message that every daughter and son of this great Mother Land of ours symbolizes. Each one of you – living in different countries, different faiths, different languages, and different beliefs – is a symbol of that great idea of ‘unity in diversity’ that India represents” (Singh, 2011). At one point, Singh even gave the exact recipe for making India a smart power, when he declared in a speech to Commanders of the Army in 2006: “We are today in a situation where the pursuit of national interest requires the use of an integrated approach combining political,

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economic, military and other levels of both soft and hard power” (Singh, 2006). Interestingly, Singh pushed the enevelope for the new smart power strategy first, much before U.S. President Barack Obama’s endorsed it in 2009. The notion of soft power has been more often recognized by Indian politicians, diplomats and journalists. One of the most vocal supporters of the idea of soft power is Congress politician and former UN diplomat, Shashi Tharoor, who in numerous speeches and articles popularised the soft power concept in India. According to him, “Today’s India truly enjoys soft power, and that may well be the most valuable way in which it can offer leadership to the twenty-first-century-world” (Tharoor, 2012: p.312). The Joint Secretary in India’s Public Diplomacy Division of MEA, Navdeep Suri, wrote in 2011: “The idea of India – an ancient civilization that nurtures a vibrant democracy, a secular ethos and a rapidly growing economy – is a powerful one. Cinema, dance, music, literature, yoga, Ayurveda, Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore and even the IT industry constitute a formidable array of soft power assets; each of these contributes in its own way to the attractiveness of India to global audiences” (Suri, 2011: 299). This discussion was even more vibrant in Indian newspapers with the rising number of articles suggesting the strengths of India’s soft power and its better use in foreign policy. In 2003, an Indian strategist, Raja Mohan, designated the Indian diaspora as the greatest asset of the country’s soft power. Some have criticised the “unfortunate outgrowth of ‘hard power’ fundamentalism”, according to which “India’s economic growth and military might be all that is needed to be admitted as a legitimate member of the club of great powers” (Chaulia, 2007). Others have called for a clear positive image or “zeitgeist of New India” to be more alluring in international affairs (Khanna, 2012). There were more voices that “the time is ripe to revisit the value of soft power resources as tools of a grand strategy and foreign policy for this emerging power” (The Hindu, 2011). Naturally, discussion on soft power in the Indian media has not been as vibrant and dominant as security and

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economic topics, but it has shed some light on the rising interest in soft power theory. Although it was the NDA government of Atal Vajpayee that had laid the foundation for stronger soft power from 1998, the policy was furthered and strengthened by the next UPA government of Manmohan Singh from 2004. After 10 years later and considerable investments in soft power, this approach is likely to be continued under the new government of the BJP. It seems that soft power has become a bipartisan idea, regardless of who is at the helm of affairs in New Delhi. In fact, in 2014, the BJP manifesto made an explicit reference to India’s soft power for the first time. It said: India has long failed to duly appreciate the full extent and gamut of its soft power potential. There is a need to integrate our soft power avenues into our external interchange, particularly, harnessing and focusing on the spiritual, cultural and philosophical dimensions of it. India has always played a major role in world affairs, offering a lot to the World. This has been its tradition since time immemorial. The magnetic power of India has always been in its ancient wisdom and heritage, elucidating principles like harmony and equity. This continues to be equally relevant to the world today in today’s times of soft power. We will adopt Proactive Diplomacy to spread the same. India was reckoned not only as Vishwaguru but also a vibrant trading society. Our ancestors used to trade with foreign nations through the routes of sea, centuries ago. This was based on the strength of our business acumen and integrity, our products and crafts. The symbols of our ancient civilizations stand as a testimony to our architectural and urban planning excellence. We will revive Brand India with the help of our strengths of 5 T’s: Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology (BJP, 2014).

A resounding victory for the BJP in 2014 elections has also given a new impetus for celebrating India’s soft power. In a wave of commentaries in Indian press, there is a rising understanding of importance of this

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dimension of power. The new advent of smart power in Indian foreign policy is well elaborated by Amitabh Mattoo (2014): All those who had expected the Modi foreign policy doctrine to be defined by a new muscularity or even machtpolitik – the wielding of the conventional stick – will probably be disappointed. Instead, there will be a renewed emphasis on using the carrots of economic levers and soft power. This suggests a thoughtful understanding of the importance of what Nye terms “smart power”: a clever combination of the tools of conventional hard, or military and economic, power and soft power. It is this integrated approach that will best serve India in a complex, interdependent world, which is defined as much by conflict and competition as it is by cooperation and the need for greater coordination in confronting common global threats.

The birth of a more articulated Indian version of “smart power” was revealed in the address of Indian President Pranab Mukherjee to Parliament on 9 June 2014, when he presented the new government’s aims in foreign policy. He said: “India’s foreign policy, with its civilizational roots and heritage, is based on the principles of developing peaceful and friendly relations with all countries. We will pursue our international engagement based on enlightened national interest, combining the strength of our values with pragmatism, leading to a doctrine of mutually beneficial relationships” (Mukherjee, 2014). This “enlightened self-interest” may soon emerge an as Indian version and response to the Western smart power strategy. As the concept refers to the ancient Greece philosopher Aristotle, who claimed that the more you benefit others the more you are benefited yourself, one can expect India to promote situations based on “win-win” solutions. Similar to the old doctrine of “principled pragmatism” the new foreign strategy will try to combine high moral ideas with political pragmatism, or in other words, soft and hard power.

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Conclusions This chapter discussed how the idea of power and its practical use in foreign policy of India has evolved over the last six decades. It argues that India initially embraced a soft power approach in its foreign policy, believing that it could transform the nature of international relations and help construct a more peaceful and just international order. The soft power approach was not purely idealistic, as it evolved from a realistic assessment of India’s power resources and international context in the first years after gaining independence. Despite some success in promoting its image as a credible state, at least among other developing countries, India confronted serious practical challenges with pursuing principle-based foreign policy and has become increasingly pragmatic. Defeat in the war with China in 1962 “showed up the basic unrealism of a policy based on soft power and forced India to come to terms with the proposition that the pursuit of a major power role in the absence of hard power, or military capabilities, was a chimera” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.19). The death of Nehru in 1964 and advent of the leaders who followed in the country drove India to shift to a hard power approach and invest mostly in military and economic power. The end of the Cold War forced India to rethink its foreign policy strategy again and opened an opportunity to emerge as one of the new poles in the multi-polar world system. Recently, India has mixed soft and hard power resources to develop a smart power strategy. In other words, India, like other states, “deploys a blend of coercive, persuasive and commercial instruments” in its foreign policy (Bajpai and Pant, 2014: p.9). The transition to smart power is far from over, and the term itself is still rarely used in India. As India is still in search of its new grand strategy, it sends mixed signals to the world and tries to accommodate different approaches to international relations. As observed by Cohen (2003: p.63), “The Indian thought is both idealist and realist, Gandhian and Machiavellan, and individuals who hold such views can be found across the spectrum.” What might

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be construed as mismanagement and chaos by India may be in fact a deliberate strategy of employing various effective resources – including both military and non-military – that the country has at its disposal. Whereas India’s hard power resources are well known, measurable and thoroughly described, there is an impending need to assess what in the 21st Century will constitute India’s soft power potential that the country can use in its foreign policy.

3 SOURCES OF INDIA’S SOFT POWER

A

s detailed in the previous chapter, soft power has played an increasingly important role in Indian foreign policy in recent years, and there is a growing interest in exploring factors that contribute to this dimension of the country’s potential. However, there is no agreement among scholars when assessing the real strength of India’s soft power. While some consider India as one of the few major soft powers (Tharoor, 2008, 2012; Wagner, 2010; Purushothaman, 2010) others point at serious flaws in this outlook (Lee, 2010c; Mukherjee, 2013). There is also controversy over what constitutes India’s largest asset in this domain. In order to engage the debate this chapter examines the capacity of India’s soft power to point out the country’s greatest strengths in this area. Discussion of India’s soft power potential follows Nye’s three categories of resources: culture, values, and policies. However, to draw from this concept with specific reference to India, the analysis includes two more elements that appear particularly relevant in this regard. The first is diaspora – a factor that plays a less important role in the case of the US, but which comes to the fore in the case of India. The second is economic potential, which Nye considered a hard power element, but which heavily influences a country’s image and forms the basis for many soft power activities. Combined, these five factors will give a more complete picture of India’s attractiveness.

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Cultural Power Culture seems an obvious asset of India’s soft power – one could argue the most important. Indeed, it has fascinated outsiders since the time of Alexander the Great, bringing invading armies, travelers, merchants, migrants and religious refugees fleeing persecution, explorers, entrepreneurs and, eventually, colonial powers. Indian culture has left a visible mark on many Asian nations and, to a large extent, shaped the Western romantic vision of the Orient as an exotic land of spirituality, wisdom and wealth. India is not only a land of antiquity – home to one of the world’s oldest living civilizations and the birthplace of Hinduism and Buddhism – but also a place of modern advancements, a country equipped with attractive pop culture, from cinema to music, food, and arts, with much to offer the world. The attractiveness of Indian culture spurs from its longevity and diversity of racial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups. From the first indigenous civilization of the Indus Valley, over centuries, India has assimilated various influences – Greek, Arabic, Persian and European. Along with several local religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, India has become home to significant minorities of Muslims, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. Buddhism is a sizable soft power asset that has expanded India’s influences to the distant parts of Asia in the past. From the plains of the Ganges, where Buddha lived in the 5th century BCE, Buddhism spread in subsequent centuries to nearby countries such as Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and continued on to Afghanistan, Tibet, and China, eventually reaching Korea and Japan. Instrumental in this rapid expansion was Emperor Asoka (of the Mauryan dynasty), who, it is believed, converted to Buddhism after his victory in the bloody battle against the kingdom of Kalinga in the 3rd century BCE. The death and cruelty of war convinced him to turn to non-violence. Instead of sending armies to project his power, he started sending monks to the neighbouring kingdoms with Buddhism’s message of peace. He followed a policy termed “conquest by dharma” (i.e., by the principles of a right life). This transformation may be regarded as one

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of first examples of a shift from hard to soft power in external relations. Although Emperor Asoka’s kingdom crumbled soon after his death, the Buddhist influence outlived its royal propagator. During the peak of Buddhism in India (around the 6th–8th centuries) India was the center of teaching and philosophical thought. The famous Buddhist University in Nalanda (located in today’s state of Bihar) was one of greatest in the ancient world, and land attracted students and scholars from all across Asia. Therefore, it is rightly argued, “Buddhism was the biggest project of dissemination of Indian ideas” (Thussu, 2013: p.10). Along with Buddhism, Hinduism also spread to other places in Southeast Asia, primarily by Indian merchants and travellers. As a proof of its far cultural reach, the most beautiful Hindu temples are found in Cambodia (Angkor Wat) and Indonesia (Prambanan Temple). The Hindu epic, the Ramayana, is still popular and incorporated into traditions in several other Asian nations such as Thailand and Indonesia. These cultural links are strongest in India’s immediate neighbours, with “whom India shares not only borders but also ethnic groups, religions and languages. After all,” – claims the Indian author – “it is we in India who share Urdu with Pakistan, Nepali with Nepal, Bangla with Bangladesh, Tamil with Sri Lanka and English with the rest of the world” (Varma, 2007: p.1136). Although India today is a Hindu majority country, it is a multicultural society with a universalist appeal. The universalism and the tolerant image of Hinduism became popular in the world thanks to the manner it was propagated in the19th century by one of India’s leading spiritual teachers, Swami Vivekananda, who between 1893 and 1984 toured the U.S. and Europe to deliver a series of lectures. Subsequent the popularity of Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, a writer and philosopher, Sri Aurobindo, a spiritual and political thinker, and eventually Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of the freedom movement— all helped strengthen the image of India as a peaceful and spiritual land. It is rightly argued that Indian culture, “based largely on universalist and assimilationist Hindu principles, is a potent source of soft power” (Mukhrejee, 2013: 10).

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Several elements of traditional Indian culture – such as music, dance, theatre, yoga or Ayurveda – are still vibrant in India and have become increasingly appealing to many foreigners. Ayurveda, an ancient system of medicine, is still practiced by millions, and it is also taught at many Indian universities. Yoga attracts many tourists to India and even finds a greater following in the West, either as a path for spiritual realisation or, more often, as a physical exercise that helps to keep the body in good health. From the Theosophical Society in the 19th century— to the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (popularly known as the Hare Krishna Movement) — to the Art of Living Foundation, several organizations have become progressively active outside India in popularising Indian thought and traditions and familiarsing foreign audiences with Indian values. Old Indian fairy tales from the Panchatantra – were diffused in the West through Arabic intermediaries, while the ancient treatise of love – the Kamasutra – became a part of the world’s cultural heritage. Indian classical music was popularised in the world by India’s leading luminaries in classical music such as the Sarod virtuoso Akbar Ali Khan, Sitarist Pandit Ravi Shankar or Tabla player Zakir Husain. Bharatanatyam, Kathak, and Kathakali are major dance forms from India’s classical traditions that are becoming increasingly popular in the West, powered by the many international performances of Indian artists. The varied styles of sculpture to be found in India’s numerous temples, the range of its art heritage—from the ancient frescoes discovered in the caves of Ajanta and Ellora— to the magnificent Mughal miniature paintings— to the paintings of the modern artists, such as M.F. Husain, S.H. Raza and F. N. Souza—all have found deep admiration outside India. It is worth noting, for instance, that “Mughal miniature paintings reached London as early as 1619 and were copied in Amsterdam between 1654–56 by Rembrandt, who was enchanted with the delicate details or garments and jewellery”. (Chakraverty, 2005: p8). The long and complex history of India is envisioned in its amazing and diverse architecture, full of foreign influences and indigenous styles, ranging from region to region. This has

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been well recognized by UNESCO, which listed 24 cultural sites (along with six natural sites) on its World Heritage List by the end of 2013. This was the seventh best position in the world: only Italy, China, Spain, France, Germany and Mexico have bigger representation. Although most cultural assets refer to ancient Indian traditions, there are also modern cultural products to catch the world’s attention, with Bollywood probably being the best-known brand from India. The first full-length motion picture, Raja Harishchandra, based on the story from the Hindu epic the Ramayana, was produced in 1913 by Dadasaheb Phalke. With over a hundred years of history, Bollywood is not only one of the oldest film industries in the world but also the largest. For instance, in 2011, the total number of all films produced in India was 1,255 – more than in Nigeria (997), the U.S. (819), and China (584) (UNESCO, 2014). In 2013, the industry earned $1.5 billion – making it the sixth-largest box office market in the world, after the U.S. and Canada, China, Japan, Germany, and France (MPAA, 2013). Bollywood movies are “watched by audiences in more than 70 countries […] and every year a billion more people buy tickets for Indian movies than for Hollywood films” (Thussu, 2014: p.9). Although Bollywood became a brand name for Indian cinema, it actually only represents movies made in Hindi in Bombay (Mumbai). Besides this, there are many more film making centres in India with movies being made in many Indian languages. In 2012, the majority of movies were produced in the Tamil language (Kollywood) based in Chennai – 262, and then in the Telugu language (Tollywood) in Andhra Pradesh – 256. The Hindi movie industry (Bollywood) in Mumbai, took third place with 221 releases, followed by other movies produced in many regional languages. (FFI, 2012). Bollywood movies are deeply rooted in India’s cultural ethos; thus, they are prime agents to educate and familiarise foreign audiences with its distinctive traditions, values system and aesthetics. This specific genre of movies, which includes a lot of dancing and singing, accounts for the growing popularity of Hindi songs and music abroad. Moreover,

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the success of the Bollywood film industry around the world paved the way for the positive and wide reception of Indian soap operas and TV series. Tharoor, for instance, states that one such Indian TV soap opera, Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi, dubbed into Dari and telecast on the privately-run Tolo TV, was reportedly the most popular television show in Afghan history up to 2009. He recalls from his visit to Kabul that when the show was aired, the streets would be deserted (Tharoor, 2012: p.285). Even the US government acknowledged the popularity of Bollywood in Afghanistan and considered using it for political aims. As one Wikileaks cable disclosed, “Bollywood movies are wildly popular in Afghanistan, so willing Indian celebrities could be asked to travel to Afghanistan to help bring attention to social issues there” (Burke, 2010). Bollywood stars such as Amitabh Bachchan and Shah Rukh Khan are among the most recognizable Indians in the world, and Indian cinema is highly popular not only in neighbouring countries but also in the Middle East and many countries in Africa. It is said that: “beyond the Western world, and from a cultural diplomacy perspective, Bollywood is perhaps more effective than other countries of the global South. The promotion of family and community- oriented values, in contrast to Western individualism, has made audiences more receptive to Indian films in many other developing countries. Their religiosity and gender representation make Indian films culturally accessible to Muslim audiences, for example in Arab countries and in south and Southeast Asia. Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria has a long-established interest in Hindi cinema. (Thussu 2014:10). Bollywood cinemacontinues to steadily acquire an increasing fan base in the West, largely due to the growing Indian diaspora. Indian industry reports estimate that 20 per cent of the overseas theatrical market for Bollywood is in the United States (Thussu, 2013: p.137). Britain accounts for one-fifth of the global revenue for Bollywood’s international releases. Western audiences may also enjoy India’s art cinema, whose footprint is steadily advancing in the global market. Also after the international success of Monsoon Wedding, directed by Mira Nair (winner of the Golden

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Lion  at the  Venice Film Festival), it was Danny Boyle’s Oscar-winning Slumdog Millionaire followed by Ang Lee’s Life of Pi, that put Indian cinema on the map of internationally-acclaimed cinema. Although these projects were frequently undertaken by non-Indian directors, they told Indian stories and employed Indian staff and Indian actors. Most recently, a romantic movie from Mumbai, The Lunchbox, by Ritesh Batra, has established new fans in the West, particularly in the US, where it was widely praised and appreciated. India has also emerged as a fecund ground for world literature. Several Indian or Indian-origin writers living abroad have been internationally acclaimed for their contribution; many were acknowledged by crowning awards such as the Nobel Prize in Literature, the Man Booker Prize, and the Pulitzer Prize, to name a few. Along with the first Nobel Prize for Literature winner in 1913, Rabindranath Tagore, there is another Nobel Prize winner of Indian origin: V.S. Naipal, who won the Nobel Prize in 1981. Another prestigious international literature award – the Man Booker Prize – was conferred on five Indian or Indian-origin authors: V.S. Naipal (1971), Salman Rushdie (1981), Arundhati Roy (1996), Anita Desai (2006), and Arvind Adiga (2009); and there are five winners of the Pulitzer Prize, who are all persons of Indian origin: Gobind Behari Lal (1937), Jhumpa Lahiri (2000), Geeta Anand (2003), Siddhartha Mukherjee (2011) and Vijay Seshadri, who won it in 2014. The latest testimony to this growing role of India in the world of literature is the Jaipur Literature Festival, which has emerged as one of the most important events of its kind in the world since its inauguration in 2006. The popularity of literature should not be surprising in a country with a large English-speaking population and huge market for books and print media. India is home to 8,700 privately-owned newspapers, which enjoy a combined daily circulation of 370 million readers – more than any other country. The Times of India is the most widely circulated Englishlanguage daily in the world, reaching more people than The New York Times or Guardian. Nine of the world’s top twenty newspapers ranked by 2011 circulation are from India (Seth, 2013: p.312).

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One can assume that India’s cultural outreach can only expand in the future with globalisation and growth of modern social media and technology—especially the Internet. The fact that global communication is taking place chiefly through the English language gives a powerful edge to Indians. In the competitive global market of ideas, the numbers favour India. Although only 12 per cent of India’s population has mastered English, this already makes India the second largest English-speaking country in the world, just after the US and ahead of the UK, South Africa and Nigeria. Moreover, in 2012, only 12 per cent of the population had access to the Internet, which made India second to the US in usage of English in the net— and the number of Internet users is being projected to rise to 600 million by 2020 – three time more than the US (Thussu, 2013: p.192). Today, India has the second largest number of Facebook users (62 million in a 2012 survey), and it will continue to rise in the coming years, with India’s use leapfrogging that of the US. During this era of Web 2.0, when there is an open platform for creation of information content, the Indian perspective on major issues will be more visible and dominant (ibid). India’s attractiveness is evident through a growing interest in Indian cuisine and fashion. Spices, already highly traded goods since ancient times and through the Middle Ages, is gaining popularity alongside its primary product— India’s contemporary cuisine. The spread of Indian restaurants throughout the world not only promotes Indian cuisine, it also develops a whole new market to explore. Interestingly, Tharoor observes (2012: p.283), “in England today, Indian curry houses employ more people than the iron and steel, coal and ship building industries combined.” In an ironic role reversal of the cultural influence between its former colony and England’s great metropolis, the national British meal is reputed to be chicken curry. One specific form of culture that plays a pivotal role in augmenting the image of countries is sport. Physical fitness, accompanied by a country’s success at major international sport events, can substantially increase its attractiveness and soft power. For instance, a 2013 BBC survey found that, after hosting the 2012 Summer Olympics in London,

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the UK’s image improved the most among tracked countries, attributed to the “Olympics effect”. As this correlation was acknowledged by other dominating powers, major sporting events were subsequently planned in Beijing(2008), Sochi(2014) and Brazil(2014 and 2016). India is the new kid on the block – albeit the scrawny one – eager to play, but relatively weak in sports, as illustrated by its unimpressive performance in Olympics Games. In the 2012 Summer Olympics Games, in London, Indian athletes won a mere six medals: the best result in India’s sporting history, but one which put India in 55th position at the medal table. As a bystander to major international sport tournaments, India has had to mobilise brain over brawn, carving out a niche in specific sport disciplines. One opportune example is cricket. In this, India’s strength is especially important in countries such as Australia, Pakistan or South Africa where cricket is popular. The inauguration of a professional cricket league, the Indian Premiere League, in 2008, gave it a leading position among cricket fans in the world. The special appeal of this sport in South Asia gave “cricket diplomacy” an important role in the political history of the region. Championed by the success of cricket, India has set out to conquer the world’sstage of sports in new directions. The 2010 organization of Commonwealth Games in Delhi and the 2011 inauguration of Indian Grand Prix in Formula 1 races in Noida, near New Delhi, are examples of how sports are becoming an excellent outlet for India and its soft power. As summarised by Shashi Tharoor (2008): So when India’s cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an Oscar nomination, when Indian writers win the Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India’s soft power is enhanced.

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Historically, India’s soft power was directed mostly at Asia (Thusssu, 2013: p.10). India’s ideas were disseminated through the medium of the sacred languages of Hinduism (Sanskrit) and Buddhism (Pali). With the advent of the globalised era and quickened flow of people and information, India’s influences reached the furthest corners of the world. Western curiosity in India’s culture and history started only with the arrival of colonial administrators to India, and it gained momentum in the 19th century with the establishment of Indian studies at major European universities in the UK, Germany, France, Russia, and Central Europe. This stimulated research on Indian religions and philosophy and led to the popularisation of the image of a spiritual India. Indian nationalist leaders who dared to challenge the world’s empire with nonviolent means – those such as Mahatma Gandhi – spurred additional attention in India. The next wave of curiosity about India came after the Second World War. Indian culture and spirituality had a great effect on counter culture in the West in the 1960s – inspiring hippies and “flower power” movements. Pacifism and idealism preached by India’s leaders and spirituality of religious gurus confronted the materialistic and violent policies in the West and corrupt leadership in the Vietnam War. Cultural personalities, such as British singer George Harrison and his fellow Beatles, were among the many Westerners who came to India in search of the traditions of wisdom and eternal truth propagated by Eastern spirituality and thought. Their interactions with Maharishi Mahesh Yogi at his ashram by the holy Ganga, triggered further Western fascination with India. It is argued that, “by the 1970s, India had accumulated a sizeable amount of attractive soft power with the rising youthful forces in American culture” (Hymans, 2010: p.250). A concrete example of how this soft power could serve India’s foreign policy goals was “Harrison’s explosively successful ‘Concert for Bangladesh’, held at Madison Square Garden in August 1971, which was the first pop concert explicitly dedicated to raising consciousness about a human rights issue” (Hymans, 2009: p.250). Moreover, Hymans

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(ibid: p.251) may be right in arguing the practical implementations of using culture as a tool when he asserts that “Harrison ended up providing significant moral cover for Mrs. Gandhi’s December 1971 humanitarian invasion, which of course was also – and, in truth, in her eyes more importantly – a smashing strategic victory over India’s enduring rival.” There is growing recognition in India that culture may be a powerful instrument of wielding India’s influences abroad. Pavan Varma, former head of the Indian Council on Cultural Relations (ICCR) claimed, “in the field of culture, however, we have always been a superpower, given our civilizational depth and antiquity. […] India stands today at the threshold of being accepted as a new global cultural ambassador, a perception no doubt modulated by the fact that we are emerging as a significant global power in other arenas as well” (Varma, 2007: p.1137–8). In some views, India “offers one of the more dynamic alternatives to the Western cultural ethos” (Paul and Nayar, 2003: p.59). And, “Indian assets of soft power, such as its ethnic, religious, linguistic diversity, have not been discussed enough to make others aware about India richness in this area” (Chenoy, 2012). Political Values The Indian state is based on values that are fundamental to a country’s soft power: democracy, pluralism, secularism and federalism. Following the peaceful struggle against British colonialists, independent India adopted a political system resembling that of its past occupiers – a parliamentary democracy. The constitution, which came into force on 26 January 1950, gave universal suffrage to all citizens 18 years of age and above, abolished untouchability and guaranteed fundamental rights of equality and freedom, against exploitation etc. It was one of the first democratic constitutions adopted in the developing and post-colonial world, and it undoubtedly laid the founding base for empowerment, entitlement and enfranchisement of ordinary people. The decision of the founding leaders to base the new system on universal suffrage, secularism and federalism is often regarded as a prime

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reason for the success of Indian democracy (Kohli, 2001; Oldenburg, 2010). It is rightly cherished that “democracy has taken roots in India against considerable odds: a low-income economy, widespread poverty and illiteracy and immense ethnic diversity – defying prevailing theories that stipulate preconditions for democracy” (Kohli, 2001: 1). It undermined common beliefs and scientific theories, according to which democracy cannot develop in post-colonial states with low levels of GDP per capita (such as a modernization theory). And, despite numerous challenges, this democratic experiment continues to this day (with a short interruption during the Emergency clamped down in India between 1975 and 1977). The regular elections, a strong Election Commission, an independent judiciary, a free press and a burgeoning civil society are seen as intrinsic pillars of the Indian system. Over the decades, India has evolved from a dominant-party to a multi-party system, with many strong regional parties and coalition governments. Today, there are several national parties and over 1,600 state parties in India. The democratic selection of representatives at three distinct levels – local (panchayat), state, and national – keeps India in the election process almost constantly. Mammoth general elections, which take place every fifth year, attract the attention of foreign media and tourists who come to India to witness the “largest democratic exercise on earth” and is now a phenomenon which has given birth to a new branch in the tourism industry: its called “election tourism”. The rise in turnout from 45.7 per cent in the ever first elections in the country, which were held in 1947— to a record 66.38 per cent in the 15th voting election, in 2014, is relatively high and suggests the general trust of the populace in India’s democratic process. Indian democracy has been positively evaluated by many international rankings. The Economist Intelligence Unit gives India a “free democracy” label in its overview of countries’ political systems (EIU, 2012). Freedom House (2013) labels India as “free”. The significance of this value ascribed to India becomes even clearer when seen through the prism of the

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regional context. One major study, done by Oxford in 2008, confirms that India is the strongest democracy in South Asia and that democratic values are rooted deepest in India compared to other countries in the region (Sethi, 2008). Democracy worked effectively to assimilate and protect against extreme pluralism of Indian society. This highly diverse group – in terms of religion, race, ethnicity, language and caste – is brought together under the umbrella of one nation by the idea of “unity in diversity” and democratic safeguards (Khilnani, 1997). The concept, developed and promoted by Nehru, was seen as the only way to guarantee tolerance and social peace in a multi-religious society. Despite having a clear majority of Hindus, India is a secular country with no single privileged religion. Its Muslim minority, representing 14 per cent of India’s population, makes Indian Muslims the third largest in the world (behind Indonesia and Pakistan). It also has a considerable number of Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists along with many local religions of the tribal population. The Indian model of multiculturalism is one of the most successful in tackling large internal diversity and can be of interest to other developing countries. Another important political value is federalism. Officially, India is a federal state (union of states), with a strong central government, but a significant level of prerogative is conferred on state authorities. After several phases of state reorganization— along linguistic lines, India now has 29 states and seven Union Territories. This solution allowed for accommodation of ethnic and linguistic diversity within one political structure. Regions are thus governed by local political forces, which play an active role in national politics and foreign policy. To acknowledge distinct local identities, the Indian constitution recognizes 22 official languages, with Hindi as the national language. This recognition of regional differences explains, partly, why India has not shared the experience of secession, as many of its multi-ethnic peer states in Asia or Africa have. Apart from Kashmir and North East states, most of India is free from major secessionist movements.

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Even if democratic India lacked Western appreciation in the first decades following its independence, the end of the Cold War, and subsequent replacement of ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism by competition between authoritarianism and democracy, has put India in the limelight and raised the value of India’s example. Democracy became an important source of India’s selfconfidence and recognition in the West. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998), former security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, pointed out that the Indian example shows democracy is not an exclusively Western concept, restricted only to developed countries. Certainly, the political system gives India an edge over China, or other authoritarian states, in soft power terms (Lee, 2010b). Joseph Nye (2006) also admitted, “democratic India has passed the test which China has not yet taken.” In other words, India has successfully embraced Enlightenment values. As an Indian author, Raja Mohan (2003: p.270) argues: That India remains the single most important adherent of the Enlightenment in the non-Western world has begun to acquire an unprecedented importance in international politics. In a world where the ideas of individual freedom, democracy and rational inquiry are being challenged by both post-modernists and pre-modernists wearing the garb of religion, India, warts and all, is the living demonstration that enlightenment values are universal.

Not surprisingly, Indian leaders are continuously projecting India as a potential inspiration for other countries and using this asset in furthering external relations. As Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister observed in 2005, India is an example “of democracy functioning in a low-income environment” (Singh, 2005). “Success of Indian democracy,” according to Dr. Manmohan Singh (2011), “is perhaps relevant to others who are still facing these challenges.” He stressed the value of the Indian example saying: “a democratic, plural and secular India can contribute to tolerance and peaceful co-existence among nations” (Singh, 2011).

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Indeed, as a democratic, pluralistic, secular, and federal state, India may appear attractive to internally divided countries around the globe. Some even claim that India “could be an institutional alternative to Western political system” (Blarel, 2012). Foreign Policy According to Nye, foreign policies need to be seen as “legitimate and having moral authority” in order to be a country’s soft power source. It seems that in this arena as well, India has amassed significant potential over the last 60 years. There are, indeed, only a few countries that have attached so much importance to morality and legitimacy in international relations as India has. There are several elements that have contributed to India’s soft power, including principle-based policy, support for multilateral diplomacy and international law, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, and enthusiasm for economic cooperation. Independent India emerged as a result of the moral and legal struggle with a colonial Empire. As observed by Tharoor (2012: p.286), “after all Mahatma Gandhi won India its independence through the use of soft power – because non-violence and satyagraha were indeed classic uses of soft power before the term was even coined.” This heritage formed the founding stone of the young state’s foreign policy. The architect of Indian foreign policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, shared this belief in India’s exceptionalism and special mission that (“tryst with destiny”) the country should manifest in the world. He saw India as a unique country based on its civilisational background, ethics and values – a country that extolls not only a softer kind of power, but also one that can transform the international system into a more peaceful environment. India presented itself to the world as a “moral power” that pursues a principle-based foreign policy, not only in its own interest but also for the larger good. The rejection of power politics based on narrow national interests and spheres of influence made Nehru declare war against colonialism, poverty, racism, xenophobia and militarism rather than join one bloc against the other in the style of Cold War confrontation. India stood

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for a more just, fair and peaceful international system, fighting against all forms of discrimination and injustice. It was a vocal supporter of decolonisation and de-nuclearisation— and a staunch critic of imperialism, apartheid and the arms race. India soon emerged as a leader of the developing world, leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and a proponent of rule-based international order. According to Tharoor (2012: p.286), “Jawaharlal Nehru was also a skilled exponent of soft power: he developed a role for India in the world based entirely on its civilisational history and its moral standing, making India the voice of the oppressed and the marginalized against the big power hegemons of the day.” Although Nehru’s policy hardly withstood the stress test when confronted with the military might of China in the 1962 war, some of its legacy survived. The legitimacy and credibility gathered in India’s first years of independence positively influenced the perception of India in other countries. Although it became more pragmatic and opportunistic after the Cold War, the panchsheel principles still form an ideological base for India’s external strategy. As stated by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the UNGA in September 2011, in the aftermath of the Western intervention in Libya: “The observance of the rule of law is as important in international affairs as it is within countries. Societies cannot be reordered from outside through military force. People in all countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future” (Singh, 2011). India’s unique perspective on foreign relations was also evident in the country’s support for multilateral diplomacy and negotiated solutions rather than unilaterally imposed decisions by stronger countries. From the first Asian Conference, organized even before its independence in 1947, India has called on Asian and developing nations for solidarity and common standing on important issues in international affairs. Its activism on multilateral forums gave India a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), group of G-77 countries in the UN, and trade negotiations, where it emerged as a speaker for developing countries.

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Its preference for multilateralism continued after the Cold War, when India became a founder and member of several new groups. As its influence on existing structures of global governance (e.g., the UN Security Council, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) remained limited, India joined hands with other emerging powers to form BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) to work together for a multipolar world order. India was also admitted to several regional and global forums, such as the G-20 (bringing together the 20 largest economies in the world), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); it also became an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others. India has also played an active role in forming several multilateral forums in its neighbourhood. India’s multilateral engagements have become more active than ever and its global place better felt. Another element in India’s traditional strategy of building a positive image and acquiring international credibility has been the active participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In fact, India used to be one of the largest contributors of personnel to UN missions. In 2012, it was the third largest troop contributor, with 8,093 people located in 10 peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Golan Heights on the Syria-Israel Border (UNDOF), Liberia (UNMIL), Cote d’Ivore (UNOCI), Cyprus (UNFICYP), East Timor (UNMIT), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Abyei (UNISFA) and South Sudan (UNMISS) (MEA, 2013: p.96). India regards the UN as the only international body eligible to authorise peacekeeping missions and regularly declines to participate in missions undertaken without a UN mandate, such as Iraq in 2003. This reinforces the country’s image as one of defending the major role of the UN and observance of international law. In the past, India’s contribution to peace efforts included active participation as a peace broker and mediator between

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warring parties in several conflicts, from the first involvement as chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the Korean peninsula, after the Korean war of 1950–1953, and one of three member states in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICSC) since 1954. After the Cold War, India promoted its image of being a statusquo power. It is one of the few countries that managed to build friendly relations with many countries, despite conflicting interests. While putting itself closer to the West in recent years, India has continued cooperation with internationally isolated regimes, such as those in Iran or Myanmar; it has remained a supporter of an independent Palestine and yet has built up strong security and intelligence links with Israel— and it has expanded its interests in Africa without alarming the international community as China did. Despite exercising its nuclear option in 1998 and staying outside the NPT regime, India has managed to project itself as a “responsible nuclear power” and gained de facto recognition as a member of the atomic club by signing a nuclear deal with the US, in 2008. Following the debacle during its intervention in Sri Lanka, India has not sent troops abroad unilaterally and has refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. It has largely succeeded in changing its perception in the neighborhood from a “regional bully” to a “benign regional power” and the “prospect of an Indian hegemonic threat to South Asia has receded considerably” (Basrur, 2010: p.280). Notwithstanding its military build-up, it is not seen as a threatening force beyond South Asia. Indeed, the country’s stance, in many ways, resembles the Chinese strategy of a “peaceful rise”. But India appears more successful in mitigating the fears of others. As observed in a recent report: India’s great advantage is that, barring certain perceptions in our immediate neighbourhood, it is not seen as a threatening power. The overseas projection of Indian power has been very limited; in its external face, India’s nationalism does not appear belligerently to any country, nor, as expansionist or threatening in any way. This has, in some respects, been

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a great asset to India. Its power has often been the power of its example. The world recognises that it needs India to succeed. This is an asset that we have rather taken for granted, and it behooves us now to leverage that global consensus as effectively as we can (Khilnani, et. al, 2012: p10) Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset It is said that, “in a globalised and interconnected world, diasporic communities have become increasingly important actors in international relations and therefore an added dimension to the soft power of a country. Depending on their economic and political influence within the centres of global power, diaspora can be a vital strategic instrument and channel of communication to further foreign policy goals and gains” (Thussu, 2013: 73). In this context, India has one of the strongest assets at hand. After China, the Indian diaspora is the second largest in the world. Recent statistics of the Indian government show that about 21.909 million Indians or people of Indian origin live in almost 200 countries around the world (MOIA, 2013). This includes members of three categories: Persons of Indian Origin (PIO), Non-Resident Indians (NRI) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) (MOIA, 2013: p.8). The first group – PIO – constitutes people who were (or whose  ancestors were) born in India or countries where Indian ancestors lived and who, at present, hold another country’s citizenship or nationality. Some of the PIO are, for example, former citizens of India who recently had to renounce their Indian citizenship while going through the procedure of naturalisation. An NRI, on the other hand, is an Indian citizen who is ordinarily residing outside India and holds an Indian passport. According to the World Bank (2011), this group of emigrant Indians is estimated to be above 11 million. Finally, an OCI is a person of Indian origin who holds other country’s citizenship but qualifies for certain privileges given to Indian nationals. The OCI scheme started in 2005 and allows for a limited form of dual citizenship, which is generally prohibited in India. Holders of OCI cards get, for instance, a life-long visa to India and have numerous economic and social rights,

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but not political rights. In addition, there is also a lesser-known category, called Stateless Persons of Indian Origin, which includes people with no official documents to demonstrate their Indian origin. Most of this group is based in South Asia, in countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar (Thussu, 2013: p.76). The Indian diaspora is spread unevenly across the world. There are states where ethnic Indians form a majority (e.g., Mauritius – 60 per cent, Guyana – 51 per cent), a significant minority (e.g., Fiji – 41 per cent, United Arab Emirates – 32 per cent, Qatar – 24 per cent), as well as places where they symbolically are present (Hungary, Slovenia, see Table 3.1). The largest Indian communities live in the United States – 2.245 million, Malaysia – 2.020 million and Saudi Arabia – 1.789 million. There are 28 countries with over 100,000 and 8 countries with over 1 million Indians. Table 3.1. Countries with the Largest Indian Communities No

Country name

Population (NRI+PIO)

No Country name

Share in total population

1.

US

2.245.239

1.

Mauritius

60.1%

2.

Malaysia

2.050.000

2.

Guyana

52%

3.

Saudi Arabia

1.789.000

3.

Fiji

41%

4.

UAE

1.750.000

4.

Trinidad & Tobago

38%

5.

Sri Lanka

1.601.600

5.

Suriname

36%

6.

UK

1.500.000

6.

UAE

32%

7.

South Africa

1.218.000

7.

Reunion

31%

8.

Canada

1.000.000

8.

Nepal

27%

Qatar

9.

Mauritius

882.220

9.

10.

Oman

718.642

10. Bahrain

20%

24%

11.

Singapore

670.000

11. Oman

15%

12.

Nepal

600.000

12. Kuwait

13%

13.

Kuwait

579.390

13. Malaysia

7%

14.

Trinidad & Tobago

551.500

14. Saudi Arabia

7%

15.

Qatar

500.000

15. Sri Lanka

6%

SOURCES OF INDIA’S SOFT POWER • 85

16.

Australia

448.430

16. Singapore

5%

17.

Myanmar

356.560

17. Myanmar

5%

18.

Bahrain

350.000

18. Canada

3.5%

19.

Guyana

320.000

19. UK

2.3%

20.

Fiji

313.798

20. South Africa

2.2%

Source: MOIA website, 2014

The overseas Indian community is highly heterogeneous, and thus it reflects the ethnic, linguistic, religious and racial diversity of India. The community composition in a given country depends on the time of their arrival, migration patterns and many legal, economic and social circumstances. It can be said that the Indian diaspora is mainly of economic origin. As was discovered by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (Government of India) in 2002, “the majority had left because of economic reasons or in search of better employment prospects and not because of political, social or ethnic factors” (Government of India, 2002: XII). The value of the diaspora as a soft power instrument lies not only in their numbers and distribution but more so in the positions, roles and prestige they acquired in their respective countries. The Indian overseas community appears to be one of the most successful in the world. Indians in developed countries, from the US and Europe to Australia, have emerged as an economically secure and politically vibrant group. For instance, such Indians form the most affluent ethnic community in the US, with a higher average household income than Caucasian Americans. They are also relatively better-educated and highly represented in prestigious positions in business, medicine, law and academia. This is manifested in the “growing presence of members of the Indian diaspora in top universities, international media, and multilateral organizations, as well as in transnational corporations” (Thussu, 2013: p.73). In fact, many people of Indian origin emerge as the elite in their new motherlands. Those of Indian origin are influential in American Ivy League universities and have even become Nobel Prize winners in various academic fields. It is enough to say that one can find among them

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the richest people in the world (e.g., Lakshmi Mittal, the fourth richest in the world, is a British-Indian steel magnate), CEOs of some of the largest multinationals (the nomination of Satya Nadella as CEO in Microsoft in 2014 is the best example), influential journalists (e.g., CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria) and Nobel Prize winners (Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate in economics,who now lives in the UK). As prosperous entrepreneurs, doctors, scientists or artists, they present a new face of India in the world. They build an image of a more vibrant, inspirational and successful India. Apart from their economic and intellectual success, people of Indian origin play an increasingly active role in politics in several countries. Here, one may point out examples of Cheddi Jagan – prime minister of Guyana (1957–1961), Mahendra Pal Chaudhary – prime minister of Fiji (1999 –2000), and Anerood Jugnauth – twice prime minister and president of Mauritius (2003–2012), and Kamla Persad-Bissessar – an incumbent prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. In America, for instance, Indo-American Rajiv Shah was nominated in 2009 as the head of US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Obama administration appointed over two dozen Indo-Americans to senior positions in the administration, judiciary and White House (Thussu, 2013: p.84). Bobby Jindal, the US-born child of immigrants from Punjab, is the governor of Louisiana, and was one of the possible nominees of the Republican Party in the 2012 presidential election. Apart from the US, people of Indian origin serve in several parliaments, including in Canada, the UK, and Germany, where they work to strengthening cooperation with India. Also, in non-political circles, journalists, entrepreneurs and academicians exert some influence on the policy of the host country on issues significant to India. Economic Potential Undeniably, economic success has played an important role in India’s rise in the emerging world market, and it has refashioned its image for the better in attracting the attention of the business sector, media and scholars interested in international relations. During the decades of the

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Cold War, an impoverished, underdeveloped India grew at a sluggish pace (the Hindu rate of growth) and was not an attractive destination for the capital-oriented West. Only the liberal and pro-market reforms, initiated in 1991, by then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh of India, triggered the process that led to a new image of India as a modern, vivacious and technology-savvy country. Over the last two decades, India has made impressive economic progress: Its GDP grew, on an average of nearly 5 per cent a year over 1990–2012 (UNDP, 2013: 3) and, during the last decade, it has grown around 8 per cent annually, although it has slowed down a bit to 4–5 per cent in last two years. The size of the India’s economy multiplied four times between 1991 and 2011. Today it is the tenth largest economy in nominal terms and third when calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP). Although India’s per capita income is still low— around US$ 3,400 in 2012, it has dramatically reduced the proportion of people who are income-poor (the percentage of the population living on less than 2005 PPP US$ 1.25 a day) — from 49.4 per cent in 1990 to 32.7 per cent in 2010 (UNDP, 2013: p.13). The average life expectancy has risen from 58 to 68 years, and the infant mortality rate has dropped from 80 to 47 deaths per thousand births (Thussu, 2013: p.7). According to a well-known prognosis by Goldman Sachs (2003), India is set to emerge as the third largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan by 2032. Although numerous economic and social indicators are still relatively low, India’s impressive progress has made it one of the most attractive emerging markets and investment destinations in the world. Its large population – a liability when India was poor – is now transforming into a valuable asset as people are becoming richer. According to some estimates, the size of the Indian middle class, now between 50–200 million people, will reach 600 million by 2025. The large and increasingly rich society makes a perfect consumer market for foreign companies. Not surprisingly, stocks of FDI to India soared from just US$ 1.6 billion, in 1990 to nearly US$ 202 billion, in 2011 (Thussu, 2013: p.7).

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A large pool of skilled workers has led to the emergence of a strong service sector in the country. India has become one of the leading countries for outsourcing and the IT industry. According to the UN agency for trade, UNCTAD, during the past 20 years, production of software and BPO (business process outsourcing) services in India surged from US$ 200 million, in 1991, to US$ 75 billion, in 2011, and export sales rose from US$ 110 million to nearly US$ 58 billion in the same period (Thussu, 2013: p.8). While China has managed to emerge as the “world’s factory”, India has become the world’s service hub. Highly successful IT companies, such as Infosys and Wipro, have largely reshaped old stereotypes of India as a poor country of mystics and elephants. Bangalore, the city where most IT companies are based, has been labelled as ‘India’s Silicon Valley’. As summarised by Tharoor (2008: p.40): “The old stereotype of Indians as snake charmers and sadhus lying on beds of nails has now been replaced by one of Indians as software gurus and computer geeks.” In fact, it seems that both the stereotypes of “IT India” and “spiritual India” coexist and can work hand in hand to enhance the country’s soft power. Similar progress has been made in the pharmaceutical, automobile and chemical industries. In 2014, eight of the world’s biggest corporations, in terms of revenues, on the “Fortune 500” list were Indian. Albeit it was a much worse result than other major powers (US 128 companies, China - 95, Japan – 57), India had still made a visible progress in comparison to previous years (in 2004 there were only 4 Indian companies, mostly in last hundred). From an import substitution economy, India is gaining more from active engagement in the globalisation process and trade and investments with other countries. In 2010, India’s trade to output ratio was 46.3 per cent— up from only 15.7 per cent, in 1990. India’s FDI also reached a peak of 3.6 per cent of GDP, in 2008— up from the 1990 figure of less than 0.1 per cent  (UNDP, 2013: p.76). The Indian economy has shown strong resistance against the global economic crisis following the 2008 financial crisis, with its GDP growing

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almost 10 per cent in 2010; and it has done its part in helping the global economy pick up speed. As observed by the UNDP, “without the robust growth in these economies, led by China and India, the global economic recession would have been deeper” (UNDP, 2013: p.21). Moreover, India’s economic success has had a positive spillover effect on other developing countries, illustrated in the production of cheap generic drugs. As appreciated by the UNDP, “Indian firms, for example, are supplying affordable medicines, medical equipment, information and communications technology products and services to countries in Africa” (UNDP, 2013: p.3). In recent years, India has not only emerged as an attractive FDI destination, its business community has also gone shopping abroad. The outward stock of the FDI rose from just US$ 124 million, in 1990, to over US$ 111 billion, in 2011 (Thussu, 2013: p.7). The acquisition of the British luxury brand, Jaguar Land Rover, in 2008 by India’s Tata Group for US$ 2.6 billion, shocked many in the West—but it also apprised it ofthe newfound prowess of the Indian economy. Indian companies have made sizable investments in Africa, Latin America and Europe – for instance, the Aditya Birla Group bought over the U.S. aluminum firm Novelis, in 2007, and Columbian Chemicals, in 2011; and Mahindra and Mahindra acquired Sangyong, a Korean carmaker. Overall, Indian companies have proven themselves capable of competition with Western partners in a wide spectrum of markets. Another element of India’s new image is its achievements in technology and science. India is now a member of the elitist club of countries with indigenous nuclear programmes and space rocket launch capability. It runs an ambitious programme of peaceful atomic energy, and has also developed strategic capabilities, manifested by its nuclear weapons test in 1998. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), one of the biggest government space agencies in the world, placed its first satellite (Rohini) in orbit in 1980 —put there by an Indian launch vehicle. The ISRO offers a commercial programme for launching satellites and, in 2008, successfully sent its first mission —Chandrayan -1, to the moon. It plans to land on

90 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

the moon by 2016 and is preparing for a manned mission to by 2020. On 5 November 2013, ISRO launched its Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM), Mangalyaan, which entered the orbit of Mars successfully in 2014. This was not only the first Asian nation to enter the orbit of Mars (after USSR, USA and EU), but also the least-expensive Mars mission to date and first nation to have in so doing succeeded, in its first attempt. The country’s Indian Institutes of Technology are held in high regard; India is also a leader in biotechnology, nanotechnology and IT industries, and it plans to increase funding for research and development in the coming years to emerge as a strong high-tech leader. From India’s transition from a state-controlled socialist economy to a market-oriented system emerged a unique model, one which stresses the importance of “sustainable and inclusive” growth. This growth is based on domestic consumption and services that compel observers to talk about the people-centric “Mumbai consensus” as opposed to the pro-market “Washington consensus” and state-centric, export-driven and manufacture-based “Beijing consensus”. As was observed by an Indian economist, that from as early as 2006, the uniqueness of India’s “consumption-driven model” meant that: “rather than adopting the classic Asian strategy – exporting labour-intensive, low-priced manufactured goods to the West – India has relied on its domestic market more than exports, consumption more than investment, services more than industry, and high-tech more than low-skilled manufacturing. The consumptiondriven model is also more people-friendly than other development strategies.” (Das, 2006: p.6). As another Indian author claims, “as a poor and diverse developing country that has made impressive strides in all fields after its independence, India offers an alternative model of governance and development to the one being advocated by the West as so-called ‘universal’ one. Without India’s support and leadership, there is little hope of bringing about a new world order that gives due importance to the imperatives of social justice and inclusive growth” (Sikri, 2009: p.235).

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Conclusion This overview of India’s major soft power assets shows its substantial potential in this area. If Nye (2004: p.17) claims that much of the US soft power “has been produced by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft and Michel Jordan,” then it can be said that India’s soft powers comes from Bollywood, Bangalore, Infosys and Shah Rukh Khan. With a rich and increasingly popular culture, functioning democratic system and many positive records in foreign policy, India seems well equipped to shape opinions and preferences of others in a desired way. Its recent economic success and an increasingly influential diaspora supplementing India’s power of attraction make the country more appealing to the outside world than ever before. It seems, moreover, that these assets will only grow in the future, owing to a young and aspirational population as well as good economic prospects. India may be, in fact, one of the few countries that can offer an alternative cultural, political and economic model to the West. When seen in congruence with the rise of China and crisis of the neoliberal model of capitalism in the West, India’s influence has the ability to expand. As observed by Thussy (2014: p.10): “The combined economic and cultural impact of China and India, aided by their extensive global diasporas, may create a different form of globalization, one with an Asian accent and flavor.” To a large extent, India’s global image will depend on how it will continue to manage to combine the tradition of an old civilisation with modernity and globalisation. Its history suggests it will be able to resist the influence of Americanisation and assimilate the best elements into a novel and more attractive power. As correctly observed by Indian experts: The fundamental source of India’s power in the world is going to be the power of its example. If India can maintain high growth rates, leverage that growth to enhance the capabilities of all its citizens, and maintain robust democratic traditions and institutions, there are few limits to India’s global role and influence. The foundations of India’s success will, therefore, depend on its developmental model (Khilnani, et al., 2012: p.8).

92 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

India’s “power of example” is going to be even more carefully scrutinised and questioned as the country ascends in the global arena. It will be confronted with numerous challenges that will decide its future status. According to Tharoor (2012: p.284), India “has an extraordinary ability to tell stories that are more persuasive and attractive than those of its rivals.” What this chapter aims to shed light on is that India has an attractive message, but whether it will be capable of harnessing its potential effectively with others will depend on developing its special toolbox of soft power instruments.

4 SOFT POWER IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

I

ndia has considerable soft power assets. Yet, it is rightly argued that “mere possession of soft power resources does not make a country attractive on the world stage; these assets need to be translated into influencing the behaviour of other states and stakeholders, requiring a concerted effort by policy makers” (Thussu, 2013: p.12). Conversion of soft power resources into soft power strategies, or specific capacities into capabilities, is what can determine the success of India’s foreign policy. Moreover, due to the nature of soft power, the state is not the only actor involved in its projection and augmentation, although it is undoubtedly the most powerful. This holds true in the case of India as, Shashi Tharoor reminds us (2012: p.279) that soft power, “is created partly by governments and partly despite governments; partly by deliberate action, partly by accident.” This chapter focuses on the government’s deliberate actions undertaken to utilise India’s soft power for advancement of its national interests. Although “softer use of power” is discernible across traditional Indian diplomacy in the post-Cold War period (such as restraint in the use of force, insistence on multilateralism and abstention from interfering in the affairs of other countries), this chapter examines five specific soft power tools, policies and activities of state authorities, developed in the last two decades, in pursuit of foreign policy. These include public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, development cooperation policy and relations with its diaspora.

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Public Diplomacy A major tool of soft power,which aims to engage, inform and influence foreign public in order to gain support, sympathy and goodwill for a country’s foreign policy, is public diplomacy. It can be defined “as an instrument of statecraft that aims to shape foreign public opinion and, through it, influence the policy decisions made by other states. Given this understanding, public diplomacy consists of various forms of media management, public relations, information campaigns, and academic exchange that include, among others, a subset of activities associated with cultural diplomacy” (Hall and Smith, 2013: p.7). Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in one basic distinction: it targets directly “the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals” rather than “representatives of states, or other international actors” (Melissen 2007: p.5). It is also not the same as old propaganda, as it is more interactive, open, and transparent, and it seeks to actively engage people to build a relationship of trust and credibility. As stressed by Nye, “public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking” (2004: p.111). In the era of round- the-clock TV broadcasting, social media, and Internet 2.0— when information travels at galactic speed and everyone can be an author of information reaching millions in all corners of the globe— successful management of country’s image becomes more difficult, and public diplomacy, more important. It entails also other related concepts such as nation-branding or foreign cultural relations. Reputation has always mattered in international relations, and states have always had tools at their disposal to interact with and influence the foreign public. Most countries maintain special agencies, departments or even whole ministries responsible for projecting the desired image of its country abroad and disseminating favourable information. India itself “has a long history of trying to use public diplomacy and other instruments of soft power to secure its foreign policy objectives. After Independence, India invested considerable resources in highlevel dialogues, intellectual and cultural exchange, and conferences of

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concerned parties, seeking to influence peoples as well as governments by using open diplomacy and moral persuasion” (Hall, 2012: p.1090). Using international forums, especially the UN platform, to convey India’s message to an international platform, India “sought to leverage its democratic credentials, its extraordinary history and cultural heritage, and its contributions to anti-imperialism and non-violence” (ibid: p.1099). As long as India remained outside major globalisation trends, associated with the group of socialist states and Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War period, it, along with some other Asian countries, “used public diplomacy and propaganda to pursue anticolonial agendas, spreading ideas aimed at undermining European influence in the region and throughout the ‘Third World’” (Hall and Smith, 2013: p.3). As the world has changed after the Cold War, so did Indian public diplomacy. The emergence of India on the international arena, liberalisation of its economy(which opened it to foreign investments) and growth of modern media and communication technologies,all made the issue of perception ever more important. Active use of public diplomacy by other great powers, especially China’s “charm offensive”, drove India to up its ante in this area. India wanted to spread its new image and needed new tools to achieve its aims. Since the beginning of the new millennium, India has looked beyond these well-established traditional instruments of public diplomacy and employed a number of new initiatives to enhance its global influence. According to Hall (2012: p.1090), the novelty of the new approach entails three elements: actively seeking new audiences within India, the West and the developing world; engaging the wider public on foreign relations issues in an increasingly interactive and democratic manner; and seeking to utilise new media rather than traditional methods. The responsibility to influence perceptions of India abroad has been, traditionally, shared by several institutions: the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and ICCR, among others. A special department within the MEA – the External Publicity Division – has maintained the central role

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in handling India’s international image. It was tasked to “engage with the media, articulate the views and positions of the Government of India on various national and international issues, disseminate information on India’s relations with its immediate and extended neighbours and publicize the achievements and successes in meeting our foreign policy objectives, to both Indian and international media” (MEA, 2013: p.153). In practice, the External Publicity Division facilitates: press coverage of Indian VVIP visits abroad and incoming VVIP visits to India; organisation of regular and special briefings and background interactions for the media, both Indian and foreign-based in Delhi; issuing press releases and statements; and conducting familiarisation visits of foreign journalists. For instance, during 2012–13, the division, apart from securing media coverage of high level visits that year, organised 189 visits of foreign journalists and editors from 50 countries to India, and facilitated the work of 201 foreign media representatives based in India (MEA, 2013: p.154). The division manages the ministry’s website and active presence on social media. In September 2012, the ministry revamped its web portal; today it is more attractive, interactive and user -friendly. It has also launched its YouTube channel, Facebook page, Flickr, and Google+ pages (MEA website, 2014). As these activities were not deemed satisfactory enough, in 2006, a new Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) was created within the Ministry of External Affairs, to manage and promote a positive image of India to the outside world and domestic audiences. Whereas the External Diplomacy Division tackled traditional media and journalists at a formal level, the new division was tasked with reaching out to new audiences by implementing new interactive and communicative tools. This decision stemmed from recognition that, in the information era, India needs “a coherent public diplomacy strategy that functions as a vital part of foreign policy and effective nation branding approach that goes beyond the highly successful ‘Incredible India’ tourism campaign” (Suri, 2011: p.297). The new institution was seen clearly through a soft power lens. As admitted by Joint Secretary Navdeep Suri (2011: p.297),the “PD Division,

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given the limitations of both its resources and its influence, is only one of a host of players engaged in deliberate or incidental projection of soft power. Nevertheless, some of our activities in this area are aimed at a conscious amplification of our soft power potential.” In 2013, PDD employed four diplomats, along with the joint secretary, and around 40 supporting staff (Interview with PDD official, New Delhi, April 2013). Major tasks of the new division included hosting foreign visitors; supporting promotion of Indian culture and disseminating knowledge about it; promoting a positive image of India’s support for developing countries; reaching domestic audiences to explain and discuss Indian foreign policy; managing India’s image and branding; and developing digital tools of diplomacy. It is involved in production of material about India’s richness and diversity: for example India Perspective, a publication which is distributed in 17 languages in 160 countries through diplomatic missions, as well as documentary films; organisation of seminars and conferences with domestic and international universities, think tanks, and research organisations; supporting Track 1.5 and Track 2.0 dialogues between Indian and foreign experts and decisionmakers; organisation of lectures explaining Indian foreign policy to domestic audiences; and development of effective Web 2.0 strategies and utilisation of a full range of social media tools to increase its outreach in the modern world . Social media was used by default to disseminate information about activities undertaken by PPD. It started its account on Twitter, @Indiandiplomacy, in July 2010, followed in quick succession by a Facebook page, a YouTube channel, and a blogspot page under the same moniker. Its public diplomacy website went live in October 2010 and became the first Indian government site to utilise the full range of Web 2.0 tools. On its Facebook page, the division posted articles and relevant links “projecting India’s soft power including stories on culture, literature, economy, science, defense and social achievements”. (MEA, 2013: p.156). On its YouTube channel, it uploaded almost all of the documentary films produced by MEA since 1981, and the collection today boasts nearly

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1,000 movies in various languages. In 2013, PDD had nearly 100k likes on Facebook, around 60k followers on Twitter and thousands of viewers on YouTube (ibid). For its digital activities, PDD has merited several awards: in 2012 it received the “Platinum Icon” from Webratna Awards for innovative use of technology in the sphere of digital diplomacy from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology; it was also presented with the Gov2.inaward, from Governance Now magazine, for being the first central ministry to propagate and extensively use social media as a communication tool to connect with ordinary citizens. New social tools have substantially improved the outreach to Indian and foreign societies and reduced the distance between authorities and citizens. Tharoor, an active user of social media himself, has advocated further strengthening of the MEA’s presence on different social media sites, not only to considerably expand its reach and message but also to get feedback and encourage interaction, thus learning more about their audience. He notes, “the Government of India should understand that using social media brings into government’s ambit a large number of people who would otherwise be indifferent to India’s diplomacy (Tharoor, 2012: p.308). Greater use of the Internet by the Ministry of External Affairs and other government institutions will continue in the future with even renewed vigour under the new BJP government. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has an active presence on social networking sites, drawing a large following from people who are equally active, especially on Facebook and Twitter. Not surprisingly, one of his first decisions after taking office was to advise the new ministers in his cabinet “to use the microblogging sites and the social media platform extensively for public outreach” (Shukla, 2014). After a period of increased activism and expansion, PDD was, however, dissolved as a separate unit and merged with the External Publicity Division in 2014. In the BJP government the Ministry of External Affairs has now one joint External and Public Diplomacy Division. This appears to have been a positive change that can lead to

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better coordination of activities by different departments and enhanced effectiveness in their work. Apart from the government, there are also other public bodies that play an increasingly important role in public diplomacy. One such institution is the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). Established in 1943 as an independent think-tank, it was reformed by the Act of Parliament, in 2001, and reinforced as a semiautonomous agency of MEA. ICWA is involved in research on foreign relations and promotion of knowledge about Indian foreign policy through its publications, including the major journal, India Quarterly. It organizes conferences and seminars on international relations, facilitates Track 2 dialogues and serves as a prestigious platform for visiting leaders and diplomats. Over the years, it has reached out to foreign experts and opinion leaders and globally expanded its network of partners. By 2012, it had signed MoUs with similar think tanks from 19 countries. Although it appears to be an old-fashioned and overly bureaucratic institution, it has gradually improved the quality of its research and expanded its number of researchers, emerging as one of the important tools of Indian public diplomacy. The Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) – another semi-autonomous think-tank – plays a similar auxiliary role for the MEA in external relations. It provides inputs for the government of India on international economic issues and development cooperation but focuses its effort on relations with other developing countries. RIS is engaged in several Track 2 processes; it organises workshops, seminars, conferences and trainings for experts from the Global South countries; and is engaged in networks of cooperation with numerous partners. Its research and conference activity gives India another channel to circulate its perspective on crucial topics in South-South and South-North negotiations and discussions. An important area of public diplomacy, present in every country, is promotion of national perspective through state owned media. Here, however, compared to other major powers, India is significantly weaker. The major media outlet, established by the government with a mission

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to spread Indian worldview in other countries, is the External Services of All India Radio (AIR). Created in 1939, today AIR broadcasts in 27 languages to more than one hundred countries. Its primary service is in English, with eight hours of daily broadcast on shortwave radio to 79 countries. (Hall, 2012: p.1101). Services in other languages are limited to a few hours. With its limited operations and the general decrease of radio popularity in the contemporary world, dominated by TV and Internet, this tool has a minimal impact on global perceptions of India. More worryingly, India does not have an international TV news channel to influence discourse on international relations and bring Indian perspectives to a global audience. The rise over the last decade of Qatar– based Al-Jazeera TV as a global broadcaster challenged the traditional media market dominance of American (CNN) or British channels (BBC). Also other countries have launched their own professional round-theclock news channels: China – CCTV; Russia – Russia Today; France – France 24; Saudi Arabia – Al Arabiya; and Iran – Press TV. Although there are plenty of private news channels in India, there is no major TV with global outreach, while the public service broadcaster Doordarshan is theoretically available to members of the Indian diaspora and other viewers in 67 countries. There is growing recognition of this problem and, there have even been some attempts to “position Doordarshan as a major global infotainment player” (Suri 2011: p.301). Thus far, however, this attempt has not brought any tangible result. Economic Diplomacy Another important instrument of foreign policy, closely related to public diplomacy and crucial for a country’s soft power, is economic diplomacy – “that is activities by foreign ministries and embassies in support of their country business and finance sectors (Melissen 2007:XVIII). As long as India was stuck as a state-controlled economy, economic diplomacy played a limited role and was focused on export promotion and earning hard currencies to bridge the foreign exchange gap. This changed with the end of the Cold War and liberalisation of the Indian economy, from

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1991. Promotion of economic interests abroad, to fuel India’s growth, has become a priority for each successive government. Nowadays, India’s image has gained tangible value in a highly competitive global market. One Indian author observes, “the success or otherwise of economic diplomacy depends not merely on objectives realities; perceptions are equally important in ‘selling India’” (Sikri, 2009: p.222). Economic diplomacy is now vital to secure India’s interests in new areas such as energy security, intellectual property rights, environmental issues and climate change negotiations. It includes numerous and varied tasks: attracting inflow of foreign direct investments and promoting crucial investments abroad; promotion of national interests in multilateral trade negotiations; and influencing other countries’ regulation to create more favourable business conditions for national companies active in foreign markets. Major objectives of India’s economic diplomacy are the facilitation of exports, acquisition of new technologies and energy resources, promotion of India as attractive investment destination, and promotion of Indian investments abroad, especially in energy sectors. In order to attain these aims, India pursues information and promotional campaigns, uses foreign aid as a lever for export facilitation, and negotiates favourable regulation to access other markets. Even though the Ministry of External Affairs plays a crucial role in foreign policy, there are several institutions engaged in economic diplomacy (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Finance, etc.), but the lack of sufficient coordination among them hinders improvement of policy efficiency. Since liberalisation of the economy led to the emergence of a vibrant and active private sector interested in global expansion, the government has eagerly engaged business to promote its economic interests abroad. Organisations, such as the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI), the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASOCHAM), have become important instruments in facilitating contacts with foreign partners and presenting the attractiveness of the economic opportunities that India

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offers. They regularly organise conferences on the Indian economy and business forums with foreign partners, receive trade missions and promote India as land of opportunities for business. The Indian government also seeks innovative tools to present India as an attractive economic power. For instance, in 2006, the Department of Commerce in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, together with the CII, created a private-public partnership titled the “India Brand and Equity Foundation” (IBEF), “to promote and create international awareness of the Made in India label in markets overseas and to facilitate dissemination of knowledge of Indian products and services” (IBEF website, 2014). IBEF became a premier institution engaged in promotion of an attractive ‘Brand India’ through its reports, data, surveys, active use of Internet and social media, and organisation of promotional and investments campaigns abroad. Most of these “nation branding” campaigns were targeted at the West, which remains a major source of capital, technologies and tourism for India. Some prominent examples include the “India Everywhere” campaign at the Davos Summit in 2006, and the “India@60” program, involving events in India, the US and Europe. Another famous case of a more active nation branding campaign exercise is the “Incredible India” campaign launched in 2002, by the Ministry of Tourism, in cooperation with private partners, to promote India as an attractive tourist destination. Indian delegations are more active participants in world trade fairs (including a large presence at the last EXPO, in Shanghai, in 2010); India continues to emerge as a new important host of trade fairs in many sectors. Another important area of economic diplomacy is multilateral trade negotiations. While India has presented defensive interests at global talks at the WTO, it has become more willing to enter regional trade agreements. The first free trade agreement, signed with Sri Lanka, in 1998, turned out to be a great success, leading to manifold increase in bilateral trade and strengthening bilateral ties. Since then, India has signed several bilateral and regional deals: Preferential Trade Agreements

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(PTA), Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECA). These included, among others, a PTA with Afghanistan, Israel, Chile and MERCOSUR; an FTA with SAARC and ASEAN; and a CECA with Singapore and South Korea. Moreover, it is negotiating a few more FTAs with several partners, including the European Union and Canada. Although many of these FTAs are limited in scope and often do not really succeed in helping remove persisting obstacles to trade, such as non-tariff barriers, they do point to a gradual opening of the Indian economy. The economic dimension of foreign policy has become especially apparent in relations with India’s neighbours in South Asia. Beginning in the mid-1990s, and with the announcement of the Gujral Doctrine, India pushed for closer economic cooperation among the SAARC members. It offered more preferential regulations towards smaller partners (such as the MFN status to Pakistan, awarded unilaterally in 1996, or FTA with Sri Lanka, in 1998) and presented a vision of deeper economic interdependence. As Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon (2006) declared, at a lecture in Delhi in 2006, “we must give our neighbours a stake in our own economic prosperity” to promote the idea of ‘dense interdependence’.” Although this strategy has genuine economic and security objectives, it discloses that India wants to change its image as a “big brother” and present itself as a more benign and attractive partner. As Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said, in February 2005: “The challenge of our diplomacy lies in convincing our neighbors that India is an opportunity not a threat, that far from being besieged by India, they have vast, productive hinterland that would give their economies far greater opportunities for growth than if they were to rely on their domestic markets alone” (quoted in Mohan, 2007: p.114). As India’s economic growth increases, further disparities in relation to its smaller neighbours, positioning India as an “opportunity” and not a “threat”, become important an element of soft power strategy in the region.

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Cultural Diplomacy Culture has been natural tool of diplomacy for centuries, as is well illustrated in a custom of gifts and cultural artefacts exchange by emissaries of ancient kingdoms across continents. As culture is a prime source of a country’s soft power, cultural diplomacy is a crucial instrument to enhance the attractiveness of states and influence the preferences of others. It entails establishing and nurturing cooperation with other countries through use of culture, art and education. In India, international cultural cooperation lies in competence of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. Whereas the former sets up general directions and priorities for cooperation, the latter gives the legal framework for cultural exchange with different countries. In 2012, the Ministry of Culture had bilateral cultural agreements with 126 states and cultural exchange programmes with 58 states (MC, 2013: p.36). Furthermore, the ministry supports international collaboration and promotion of Indian culture abroad, provides grants to India Friendship societies in foreign countries (45 in 2012), facilitates the Indian Literature Abroad project, which aims to translate and popularise literature in Indian languages into five UNESCO languages and, finally, participates in regional and multilateral cultural forums. The primary public institution responsible for implementation of cultural cooperation programmes and promotion of Indian culture abroad is the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). The Council was founded in 1950 by Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, independent India’s first education minister, with the primary objective of establishing, reviving, and strengthening cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries (MEA, 2000). Its aims are to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes pertaining to India’s external cultural relations; to foster and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries; to promote cultural exchange with other countries and people; and to develop relations with national and international

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organisations in the field of culture (ICCR website, 2014). Although this is a semi-autonomous public agency, it works under the supervision of the Ministry of External Affairs. The activities of the Council include (ICCR, 2013): yy Operation of Indian Cultural Centres abroad and Regional Offices within India. yy Establishment and operation of Chairs for Indian Studies in foreign universities. yy Administration and granting of scholarship schemes for overseas students, and supervision of the international student welfare. yy Exchange of exhibitions; exchange of groups of performing artists. yy Organisation of and participation in international seminars and symposia. yy Participation in major cultural festivals abroad; Organisation of “Festivals of India” abroad; organisation of lecture-demonstrations by performing artists abroad. yy Organisation of the Distinguished Visitors Programme, under which eminent guests from abroad are invited to India. yy Presentation of books, audio-visual material, art objects and musical instruments to institutions abroad. yy Providing the Secretariat for the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding. yy Organisation of the Annual Maulana Azad Memorial Lecture and the commemoration of Maulana Azad’s Birth and Death Anniversaries; Maintenance of a well-stocked library and the manuscripts of Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad. yy Publication of journals for distribution in India and abroad. yy Digitalization of rare manuscripts. yy Awarding of Library Fellowships. yy Supporting Hindi-related activities, including publication of a Hindi magazine, Gagananchal. yy Undertaking projects on behalf of the Ministry of External Affairs.

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As India hasbeen paying more attention to its soft power over the last 10–15 years, ICCR has substantially expanded its global outreach and reinvigorated its activities. To this end, it was allotted additional funding to promote India’s culture abroad, and all major programs of the Council have been strengthened, including Indian Cultural Centres abroad, chairs of Indian studies at foreign universities, scholarship programmes, and organisation of festivals of Indian culture, seminars, conferences and cultural programmes. Back in 1999, ICCR had run only 14 Indian Cultural Centres abroad, offered around 1,000 scholarships to foreign nationals from around 80 countries, and sent 19 professors on deputation abroad, teaching Hindi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Malayalam, modern Indian history, and Indian civilization as chairs of Indian studies. Its budget from a grant of the Ministry of External Affairs at that time stood at Rs. 36 crore. In the financial year 2012–13, the Council received a sum of Rs. 1572.9 crore, as grant-in-aid from the Ministry of External Affairs. The actual expenditure during this period was Rs. 2426.8 crore (ICCR, Annual Report 2012– 2013, 2013). In a period of about 15 years, the support for the ICCR from the Ministry increased about 46 times, which allowed for more active cultural diplomacy. The network of Indian Cultural Centres in different parts of the world has been expanded from 14, in 1999, to 22, in 2007, and to 35, in 2013. Moreover, the ICCR had planned to open 15 new centres within the next two years “in order to expand its reach and promote India’s soft power abroad” (ICCR website, 2014). The new centres will be located in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, in P-5 capitals, in Africa, and in Latin America. The Cultural Centres function under the administrative control of the Council and the respective Indian Missions abroad with the main task of promoting India’s composite cultural heritage. (ICCR website, 2014c ). The activities of these Indian Cultural Centres can broadly be classified under two categories. First, they cater to local needs by keeping in touch with overseas Indians in countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Guyana, Suriname, etc.; second, they

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work like promotional centres, exposing Indian culture to the population of the host country. As the number of centres has increased in the last decade, so has the number of chairs of Indian studies. From only 19 scholars, sent abroad in 1999, the number increased to 93, in 2012, and to 108, in 2014. Out of these 108 chairs, 35 teach Indian languages such as Hindi (25 chairs, of which 11 are manned by school level teachers instead of professors), Sanskrit (7 chairs), Tamil (2 chairs) and Bengali (1 chair). The remaining 73 chairs are for teaching various humanities and social science subjects across the spectrum of socio-cultural, political, academic studies such as history, economics, international relations, philosophy, Buddhist studies, literature, Tagore studies and cinema, etc. (ICCR, 2013: p.8). The purpose of these chairs, apart from educating foreign students about India, is to become a nucleus around which Indian studies can develop in academic institutions abroad. (ICCR website, 2014d). They are established mostly at foreign universities by the ICCR, in consultation with Indian missions abroad. Another important activity of the ICCR is administration of scholarship programmes tfor foreigners studying in India. The number of scholarships has risen over three times compared to the early 2000s. The Council administered 3,334 scholarships during 2012–13 under various schemes for foreign students to pursue undergraduate, post-graduate and doctoral programmes as well as professional courses (ICCR, 2013: p.7). In 2013–2014, the ICCR offered 3,365 scholarships, in total, under 24 scholarship schemes, to people from about 135 countries. Most of the scholarship holders come from developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South and Central America. The largest groups are from Afghanistan (over 1000) and Africa (900). In total, in 2014, around 4,750 foreign students were studying in India under the various scholarship schemes. (ICCR website, 2014e). Not only were they studying about Indian history, dance, music, painting, sculpture, etc.,they were also taking professional and technical courses such as engineering, pharmacy, accountancy, business administration and management. Students are offered a modest

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stipend and welfare, and orientation programmes run by the ICCR. Management of scholarships is the second largest ICCR expenditure (after Indian Centres Abroad), which in 2010–2011amounted to Rs. 2857.30 lakhs.. Although the scale of support for foreign students is less impressive when compared to other powers such as China, the US or the UK, it shows considerable effort by India to leverage its soft power. The ICCR has become more active in other cultural activities as well. For instance, during 2012–13, the Council sponsored 153 groups to present varied forms of Indian dance, music and other performing artsin markets abroad; sponsored visits by 62 eminent Indian scholars, intellectuals, academicians and artists to foreign countries under the Outgoing Visitors Programme; invited seven eminent foreign academicians under the Academic Visitors Programme; organized several festivals and events performing Indian culture abroad and cultural events of other countries/ regions in India (ICCR 2013). The council also publishes six journals in five different languages, namely, Indian Horizons and Africa Quarterly (both in English), Gagananchal (Hindi, bi-monthly), Papeles de la India (Spanish, bi-annual), RencontreAvec L’ Inde (French, bi-annual) and Thaqafat-ul- 14 Hind (Arabic, Quarterly). Despite this remarkable progress and expansion of ICCR activities, it still has a long way to go to reach a level comparable to other major powers, including China. Tharoor (2012: p.291) rightly observed that “The ICCR has done good work, but at a modest level of ambition, and it has appeared to its well-wishers to be in serious need of additional resources, both financial and creative, if it is to make a serious global impact.” The Council concentrates on promotion of traditional Indian culture (music, dance, theater) which, in a sense, strengthens the image of India abroad as an exotic Oriental country. Foreign Assistance Foreign aid is another example of India’s rising soft power capabilities. Although the country had already started helping less developed countries,

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from thethe1940s, it is only recently that this has been recognized as an important element of its foreign policy. Just after independence, despite massive internal development needs, India started limited aid for Nepal and Bhutan, and in 1949, launched a cultural fellowship programme. In 1964, its flagship Indian Technical Cooperation Program was initiated to share its expertise with fellow developing countries. From the very beginning, the foundation principle of India’s development cooperation policy became an approach for friendship and cooperation, and the aim of peaceful co-existence (Chaturvedi, 2012: p.558). While being, traditionally, one of the largest recipients of development assistance from other developed countries, India has cultivated the development cooperation described in the spirit of solidarity and SouthSouth Cooperation (SSC), stemming from the philosophy of Gandhi and Nehru, already exposed in the 1947 Asian Nations Conference, in New Delhi. Chaturvedi points out that “development cooperation policy of India underwent dramatic policy changes in the early 2000’s” when it terminated aid from many smaller donors and, stepped up its support to other developing countries. (2012: p.559). This marked a major shift from “India as beneficiary” of foreign aid to “India as important provider of aid.” The change was brought about mostly by the newly found economic strength after the first decade of liberalisation reforms in the 1990s and its rising self-confidence. India also wanted to promote its image as a rising power— one that does not need assistance from abroad. In an expert’s words: “the new economic strength of India is providing the material base for elevating SSC beyond rhetoric to more substantive operations” (Chaturvedi, 2012: p.558). It is only in the last ten yearsthat India’s external aid programme has undergone significant expansion in terms of geographical reach, modes of support and financial scale. It is not easy to precisely assess how much India spends in the area of development assistance. India is not part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and does not comply with its definition of aid and standards on evaluation and reporting of aid. Unlike China, India

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has not presented any comprehensive report in which it has made an official self-evaluation of its aid. Delivery of assistance is dispersed among many ministries, agencies and institutions, which further complicates formulating a clear picture. The Ministry of External Affairs annually produces data regarding aid only in the form of technical and economic assistance, and this does not include some elements of Indian aid, such as scholarships or foreign loans. According to some estimates, “India disbursed over $1.5 billion in traditional foreign aid in 2011 – second only to China among developing country donors” (Mullen and Ganguly, 2012). One of the best experts on Indian aid points at much higher number – even US$ 3 billion, including the spending on peacekeeping, loans and technical assistance (Chaturvedi, 2013). Even when one looks only at the aid administered by the MEA, it seems clear that India’s foreign assistance has risen substantially over the last decade. Indeed, the budget of the Ministry of External Affairs assigned to Technical and Economic Cooperation has grown from Rs. 1025.64 crore in 2003–04 (MEA, 2004: p.166) to Rs. 3233.93 crore in 2012–13 (MEA, 2013: p.173). In 2012–13, it accounted for one third of the whole budget of the Ministry of External Affairs. In terms of geographic distribution of aid, the major beneficiaries are still India’s neighbours in South Asia— accounting for 78 per cent of MEA spending for technical and economic cooperation. The single largest recipients of Indian aid are traditionally Nepal and Bhutan and, more recently, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. The total aid to Afghanistan since 2001 is estimated at US$ 2 billion, which is spent on diverse projects, ranging from construction of roads and transmission lines to vocational training for women and numerous scholarships for Afghan students. In the last few years, more aid was directed also to other countries in Asia and Africa. India has, for instance, given credit lines worth US$ 200 million to the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), US$ 500 million for the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa, the India Movement (TEAM-9) group of countries in West Africa, as well as several bilateral credits to African countries.

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India channels most of its aid in three forms: grants, loans, and technical assistance. The role of first two forms has risen considerably in recent years. As India’s economic interests grew, management over loans was given to Export-Import Bank, a major body that can lend money to foreign countries. As a part of the comprehensive approach of Aid to Africa, India waived many debts owed by African countries under the World Bank’s Heavy Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Relief Initiative. It has also decided to give phased duty-free market access to 50 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from Africa and Asia. Still, the crucial part of Indian aid is technical assistance managed by the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme. It is based on the belief that “it was necessary to establish relations of mutual concern and inter-dependence based not only on commonly held ideals and aspirations, but also on solid economic foundations. Technical and economic cooperation was considered to be one of the essential functions of an integrated and imaginative foreign policy” (ITEC website, 2014). In 2012, ITEC provided almost 8,500 civilian training slots for foreign nationals and over 1,000 slots for military trainings. Proof of the growing importance of foreign aid is the emergence of new institutions. In January 2012. the government established a new structure within the MEA – the Development Partnership Administration, to effectively handle India’s aid projects through the stages of concept, launch, execution and completion. (MEA website, 2014). Although it is not yet a separate development agency, like USAID, as suggested by some, its creation clearly shows that India wants to be seen as an important international donor or “partner”, as it prefers to be called. DPA has three divisions. Currently, DPA I deals with project appraisal and lines of credit; DPA II deals with capacity-building schemes, disaster relief, and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme; and DPA III deals with project implementation. Importantly, India presents its foreign assistance coherently with the moral and ideological principles of its foreign policy and, by emphasising differences with traditional Western donors; it aims at generating a more

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positive image among peer-developing countries. India stresses the fact that it’s “development partnership is based on the needs identified by the partner countries” (MEA website, 2014). It is argued that India’s aid is fundamentally different from traditional patterns in North-South development cooperation. The Indian model follows the South-South cooperation, which is based on the notion of mutual growth, and not on philanthropy characteristic of Northern donors. As argued by one author: “The concept of North-South flows derives its strength from the Western social commitment of altruism. In the case of South-South cooperation, the underlying principle is to support each other for win-win partnership on all sides” (Chaturvedi, 2010: p.23). Other differences include the lack of conditionalities in South-South cooperation, lower transaction costs and concentration on infrastructure and productive sectors, rather than on social sectors, as it is in the North-South model. Due to a different perspective, India does not want to accept the rules and standards of international development cooperation set up by the Western donors and promoted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. India has become more assertive and active in negotiation of the new post-2015 development agenda and rules of development cooperation, known as the Busan process. These differences were clearly summarised by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai at the South-South conference, in Delhi, on 15 April 2013: Our engagement is demand-driven and responds to the developmental priorities of our partner countries. We do not attach conditionalities, we do not prescribe policies and we do not challenge national sovereignty. We promote a mutually beneficial exchange of development experiences and resources (Mathai, 2013).

India’s foreign aid may help to create goodwill towards the country but, at the same time, it is pragmatic and closely aligned with national objectives. As some observers put it: “India’s assistance effort is clearly enmeshed into a larger set of foreign-policy goals: ensuring secure

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sources of energy for an expanding economy, opening markets for India’s increasingly export-oriented industrial and service sectors, and bolstering geostrategic ties with key neighbours” (Mulen and Ganguly, 2012). Another Indian author admits, “India’s foreign assistance programme is a strategic tool to showcase India’s technical strengths and achievements and to harness and promote India’s political and economic interests in the world” (Sikri, 2009: p.239). India tries to align foreign aid with promotion of its image as an IT hub, through establishing IT centers in developing countries and initiating regional IT projects like e-Pan Africa Network. This collaborative enterprise – worth US$ 115 million and established by India and the African Union, in 2009 – aims to build the telecommunication infrastructure for tele-education and tele-medicine to connect African students with Indian universities and African doctors with Indian doctors for consultations. However, by exposing the principle of mutual benefit and “win-win partnership”, India justifies realising national interests in development cooperation. It openly says that development cooperation is not an altruistic aim but one that should bring mutual benefits and create strong and long term partnership. Possibly, the major difference with the Western approach is less hypocrisy in India’s policy. Despite this foreign aid program expansion, India’s role in development cooperation is still less visible and recognized by the outside world. A joint secretary in the MEA complained, in an article in 2011, “Our concessional lines of credit provide billions of dollars for development projects in Africa and elsewhere but little is known about them in the public domain”. (Suri, 2011: p.298). He asserted, “From a public diplomacy perspective, there is a pressing need for us to start speaking about all the positive work that India does through its development partnerships in Africa, South East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed in our own neighbourhood.” This was echoed by certain sections of the Indian media. Opinion in the The Hindu, in 2012, gives several examples of the need to better publicise India’s activity in this domain:

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India was the first to help Bangladesh after the 1997 cyclone that claimed 150,000 lives, but so poor was the projection of its aid that western and U.N aid captured the world headlines. India’s contribution to the posttsunami rescue in Sri Lanka and Indonesia got a little more notice, but only a little. […] In Sierra Leone in 1999, an undermanned Indian contingent of troops did the initial peacekeeping under constraints imposed for reasons of political correctness that no army commander would, or should, have accepted. But all it received were jeers, while the credit for subjugating the rebels went to a British contingent dispatched in May 2000 that made its own rules of combat (Jha, 2012).

One specific area of foreign assistance is support for democratic institutions and processes in other countries. India is sometimes criticised for its passive approach in promotion of democracy abroad. There are some expectations in the West, that India, as the world’s largest democracy, should do more to support democratic transformations in other countries. Reluctance to engage actively in the Western notion of democracy promotion is sometimes understood as a proof that India is a “defensive soft power” (Wagner, 2010). For many, India’s engagement with the military Junta in Myanmar, or dictatorial state in Iran, undermines the credibility of its own democracy and is highly disappointing. This leads to a certain misunderstanding of India’s position on this issue. First of all, here it is important to recall that “soft power” is, indeed, a relational concept. What can appear as an opportunistic relationship with dictators for some in the West, is proof of India’s principled policy of non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs. Even if Raja Mohan (2011) is right that this policy is driven by very pragmatic concerns and not ideological differences with the West, it is seen differently by people from democratic and authoritarian countries. Secondly, there are important ideological and strategic differences between India and Western countries when it comes to democracy promotion (Kugiel, 2012). It is not that India refuses to support democratic governments abroad; it expresses such support differently.

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Even though more democratic countries in its region would better-serve India’s security and economic interests, it is rather reluctant in directly influencing neighbouring countries’ political situations. As explained lucidly by the former Indian diplomat: “India does not use democracy as an ideological stick with which to beat its neighbours. It is not in the business of exporting democracy and has been perfectly willing to deal with all kinds of regimes in its neighbourhood and around the world” (Sikri, 2009: p.34). Instead of exporting its “model” of democracy or trying to change the system in other countries, India prefers a more passive approach of showing the “example” of functioning democracy. As said observed by Dr. Manmohan Singh, the former Indian Prime Minister, “India has a responsibility to show that democracy works” (Singh, 2006). There are many examples, indeed, when India supports democracy abroad, although it has never been a crucial area for Indian foreign policy. For instance, India trains officials and diplomats of other developing countries through various country-based sources and sends its own experts on deputation to other countries to share their expertise in different aspects the functioning of the Indian system. In recent years, the Election Commission of India gained a special position in this area, and now engages other electoral bodies in different states to share its expertise in organisation of fair and just elections. It even established a special department to organize training and seminars on electoral process questions. Construction of the building of the new Afghan Parliament is another contribution to democracy in Afghanistan. In 2006, it played a positive role in Nepal’s transition to democracy. Still, the Indian approach to democracy differs from the Western approach. Most importantly, India is willing to support democratic institutions and mechanisms in other countries only when it is asked for help by the other governments and in the form agreed by both sides. As underlined by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his speech in the UN Democratic Fund in 2005: “India has been sharing its rich experience, institutional capabilities and training infrastructure with

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nations that share our values and beliefs and request our assistance” (Singh, 2005, emphasis added). Stressing the “request for assistance”, Singh has clearly differentiated India’s position with that of the West, which is often seen as imposing its values on other countries. If soft power is about “soft use of power”, then it is right to conclude that the Indian approach to the question of democracy is more accurate for generating soft power. It must be added here, that India’s position on the question of democracy is also very practical and linked to India’s strategic interests. According to S.D. Muni (2009), India extends support to democracy when it has its important national interests, like in Nepal in 2006, or in Afghanistan after 2001. It can also pragmatically use democracy in foreign policy when dealing with democratic countries and referring to shared values. At the same time, it is worth mentioning here, conditional engagement does not stop India from having a close partnership with countries with which it does not share the same political affinity. Leveraging Diaspora in Foreign Policy The Indian government has, for long time, remained indifferent to the potential of its diaspora. It discovered its utility only by the end of the 20th century and developed special mechanisms, initiatives and institutions to employ this asset for the pursuit of national objectives. Today, the Indian government recognizes that “these ‘Global Indians’ can serve as bridges by providing access to markets, sources of investment, expertise, knowledge and technology; they can shape, by their informed participation, the discourse on migration and development, and help articulate the need for policy coherence in the countries of destination and origin” (MOIA, 2013: p.34). In the last 15 years, it has created several mechanisms and instruments to reach out to its diaspora and use its potential. By the end of 1999, the government started offering special schemes for Indians not residing in India and created the category of Persons of Indian Origin (PIO). These people, who had Indian roots but now hold citizenship of other states, were allowed to apply for PIO cards,

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which provides certain privileges, especially regarding issuing of Indian visas. In April 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs set up a special Non-Resident Indian/Person of Indian Origin Division in response to long standing demand of overseas Indians for a separate ministry or division to serve as a single focal point or contact point on NRI/PIO matters (MEA, 2001: p.135). In August 2000, the government formed the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora to do a comprehensive study of “characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of Indian Diaspora and their expectations from India” (Government of India, 2002: p.7). It has analysed the situation of overseas Indians in most of the countries and drew some lessons from other states’ policies to their respective diasporas (including Jewish, Polish, Lebanese, Italian, Filipino, Japanese, Chinese and Irish). In the end, it presented a detailed report in which several reforms to strengthen India’s relations with the Indian diaspora and improve its usefulness for the country were suggested. The document, released officially in January 2002, formed a base for further reforms in relationship between India and its diaspora, paving the way for a number of new initiatives. Since 2002, the government has eased the conditions and lowered the fees for issuing PIO Cards, which entail several privileges available to Indian citizens (no visa requirement to travel to India, right to buy immovable properties in India, etc.) but give no political rights (including voting rights). In 2006, the government introduced the “Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)” scheme, which replaced the PIO Card scheme. In May 2004, an independent Ministry of Non-Resident Indians Affairs was established to oversee all issues concerning relations with Indian nationals settled abroad. The ministry was renamed as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), in September 2004, with a mission to “connect the Indian diaspora community with its motherland.” The Ministry focuses on developing networks with and amongst overseas Indians with the intent of building partnership with the diaspora. Besides dealing with all matters relating to overseas Indians, the ministry is

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engaged in several initiatives for the promotion of trade and investment, emigration, education, culture, health, and science and technology (MOIA website, 2014). It runs several programmes and schemes directed to groups of overseas Indians serving different needs. Among other events, it organises the annual conference of Overseas Indians (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, PBD), confers the highest national award on Overseas Indians (Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award, PBSA), organises short courses and studies in India for overseas Indian youth (“Study India Programme”, “Know India Programme”)and also facilitates study visits for those PIOs interested in their Indian origins (“Tracing the Roots” scheme). It also deals with many problems of Indian emigrants in foreign countries and looks after their interests in relations with hosting authorities. In recent years, India signed Social Protection Agreements with other countries (including Canada, Hungary and the Czech Republic) to regulate the status of Indian migrant workers. The MOIA is also responsible for issuance and management of the Overseas Indian Card scheme. The most important event in forging lasting links and connecting with the Indian diaspora is the annually held Day of Overseas Indians, or Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD). This convention of Overseas Indians has been held since 2003, with attendance from the highest representatives of the Indian state (including the president, prime minister, and minister of external affairs) and serves as a platform for discussing key issues concerning members of the global Indian diaspora and their links with India. PBD is celebrated on 9th January, each year, to commemorate Mahatma Gandhi, “the greatest Pravasi” who, on that day, in 1915, returned to India from South Africa to lead India’s freedom struggle. The Indian government uses this opportunity to encourage its diaspora to contribute to the internal transformation of India into a highly developed country and a major power. It seeks to transform the old pattern of “brain drain” into “brain exchange” with the reverse use of the potential of overseas Indians. At PDB in January 2014, Minister of Industry Anand Sharma encouraged the NRI community to invest in India, and he announced that the government had relaxed foreign direct

4.322

5.626

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$ million)

Source: WDI, 2014

20.999

15.735

Personal remittances, received (current US$ million)

2003

2002

Indicator Name

5.771

18.750

2004

7.269

22.125

2005

20.029

28.333

2006

25.227

37.216

2007

43.406

49.977

2008

35.581

49.203

2009

27.396

53.479

2010

Tab 3.1. Remittances and FDI inflow to India, 2002–2012

36.498

62.499

2011

23.995

68.820

2012

235.120

427.136

Total

SOFT POWER IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY • 119

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investment norms in several important sectors such as retail and civil aviation (The Hindu, 9 January 2014). Today, the Indian diaspora plays an increasingly important role in India’s domestic growth and realisation of its aspirations in international affairs. The effects of migration on India are manifold. Devesh Kapur (2011) convincingly shows that it has strengthened Indian democracy, facilitated flow of expertise to India and helped in integrating the country into the world economy. Generally speaking, the diaspora’s value lies in three fundamental aspects: economic, political and image-building. First of all, it is an important source of capital for India’s development, in a form of both remittances and foreign direct investments (FDI). India is the largest recipient of private money transfers in the world; it most likely will retain this position in the future. According to the World Bank, in 2013, US$ 71 billion was transferred to India by Indian migrants (World Bank, 2013). The remittances India receives have increased steadily from US$ 15.8 billion, in 2002, to US$ 69 billion, in 2012. Total remittances received during the decade of 2002–12 amounted to US$ 427 billion, which is actually more than the total inflow of foreign direct investments to India in those years (US$ 237 billion) and earnings from export of IT services. Money transfers from the diaspora are important sources of foreign exchange reserves for the Indian government. It played a particularly crucial role after the 2008 global financial crisis, when FDI inflow decreased considerably (see Figure 3.1). Importantly, remittances are a major or additional source of income for many families in India. Although countrywide information on remittances is not available, it is estimated that a significant proportion of financial resources from the diaspora is sent by an increasing number of unskilled and semi-skilled Indian workers employed in the Persian Gulf countries and Malaysia (MOIA, 2013: p.36). According to the World Bank, in 2011, remittances contributed to almost 3.9 per cent of India’s GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2011: p.32).

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Figure 3.1. Remittances and FDI Inflow to India 2002–2012

Source: World Development Indicators, 2014

Moreover, overseas Indians also contribute to the hike in the recent inflow of foreign investments to India. For instance, it was estimated that the Indian diaspora contributed 9 per cent, or US$ 4 billion, to the country’s foreign direct investment in 2002 (Kadekar, 2012: p.7). Importantly, migrants from India often occupy managerial positions in some of the biggest transnational corporations (e.g., the CEO of Microsoft) and can influence investment decisions of their companies. Interestingly, the small country of Mauritius, which is home to a considerable Indian community, is the largest source of FDI to India in recent years. On the other hand, India has emerged as one of the largest investors in Britain, where it has a very strong Indian community. The second important value of overseas Indians for the country is the increasing political and economic influence they have accumulated, especially in developed Western countries. The Indian community comprises one of the most affluent groups in the US, Canada and the UK and they merit influential positions in academia, business and media. Along with their growing numbers and prestige, overseas Indians have become increasingly influential political groups in several countries, including the US. Some Indian-American lobbying groups (i.e., USIndia Political Action Committee, USINPAC) in Washington have played a supportive role in Indo-US rapprochement over the last decade, including successful support for the US-India nuclear deal of 2006. It is

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even regarded by some as the “next most influential lobby group in the US” after the Jewish lobby (Kamar, 2007). In countries like the UK or Germany, people of Indian origin have become members of parliament and thus created important links between India and their new homeland. They act as intermediaries between the two states and explain Indian concerns and interests to foreign audiences. People of Indian origin become a natural bridge between India and many Western countries, narrowing the natural geographic and cultural distance. In general, it can be said that India has close and intense relations with countries that became a new home to significant Indian communities. It is no coincidence that India’s recent engagement with the US, Canada and Australia happened only after the emergence of strong Indian communities there. As observed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): “One of the strongest assets of the US relationship with India is the expanding connection between Indian and American people” (CSIS, 2007: p.23). In this sense, they have become a strong asset for the Indian government and a vital soft power tool. Finally, the significance of the Indian diaspora is its contribution in building a positive image of India abroad. They frequently bring their tradition and culture to new places and become a natural bridge between Indian and foreign societies. Quite often, overseas Indians are the first contact points for foreigners with Indian civilisation, and they can create a positive image of India. These Indian expats act as natural brokers and interpreters between different societies and make foreigners more familiar with the Indian system of values, norms and aesthetics. In many Western societies, robust Indian communities contribute to the emergence of a new image of India as a modern, aspirational, inspirational and fastgrowing country. In fact, they are Brand India Ambassadors abroad. In practice, these groups become, usually, default partners for Indian diplomatic missions and government bodies in organising cultural events, promoting campaigns and lobbying for India’s interests. As their prosperity and influences grow in many countries, their value for India’s foreign policy will only grow.

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Conclusion This chapter analysed major soft power tools employed by the Indian government to increase its global attractiveness and shape opinions and preferences in other countries. Several general comments seem appropriate here. First, each of these tools underwent a phase of expansions and development in the last 15 years. Along with the strengthened use of cultural diplomacy, India also discovered the utility of its diaspora for domestic and foreign interests and directed more resources to be used for foreign assistance and public diplomacy. The Indian government has simultaneously developed new or strengthened existing institutions whose major task is to project a positive image of India and increase the country’s attractiveness to others. This confirms the shift towards greater reliance on soft power in Indian foreign policy that took place since the early 2000s. In the last years, India changed its approach from a “passive soft power” to an “active soft power”, and more deliberately and vigorously, it uses this capital through special policy tools and mechanisms to realise its interests in its foreign policy (Thussu, 2013: p.4). Second, India does not simply follow or replicate the Western approach to soft power; on the contrary, it assertively stresses its different and unique model based on “mutual benefit” and partnerships with other countries. It does not pursue aggressive cultural promotion or development assistance based on conditionality. Instead, India tries to act in consonance with foreign partners and take its cues from others’ requests. It presents “soft use” of soft power. In this way, it can better escape controversies and concerns customarily associated with the use of soft power by the great powers. Its benign approach to soft power decreases resentment and criticism from foreign partners. This augurs well for the policy’s success. Finally, India is still at the early stages of developing its soft power toolbox. It is evolving new institutional solutions and needs more time to streamline the process to act in more effective and productive way. The new government’s aligning of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs with the Ministry of External Affairs or merging of the Public Diplomacy

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Division with the External Publicity Division, though justified and probably positive, reveals the institutional flux in the Indian system. Moreover, India still lacks a major TV news channel to reach global audiences and promote the desired Indian perspective. Development cooperation needs more transparency and predictability to better serve image-building purposes. The network of Indian Cultural Centres abroad, though expanded substantially, lags behind similar networks of China, the UK or France. If India wants to emerge as a major soft power, it needs more resources, constant decision-maker attention and better coordination actions.

5 EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIAN SOFT POWER STRATEGY

A

ssessing a country’s soft power and the effectiveness of its use in foreign policy is never easy. As the first chapter shows, due to its very nature, soft power is less tangible and measurable than hard power. To what extent has India’s reputation and credibility influenced or changed other countries’ policies towards it? Has India’s power of attraction brought any tangible benefits thus far? Have India’s soft power tools been well designed and implemented in conducting foreign policy? Has this “softer use of power” been any more effective than previous hard power approaches? What are shortcomings of the new strategy? How can we tell whether if this approach is working? This chapter tries to find the answers to the above questions using several methods and tools. First, it presents existing indices and rankings measuring soft power of chosen countries that put India’s strengths in a comparative perspective. Second, it analyses international public opinion polls to see the international image of India and current attractiveness to foreign audiences. To complement this picture with more tangible results, this chapter will then consider the attractiveness of India for tourists, students, migrants and investors. This is followed by an analysis of the role of soft power for realisation of Indian interests in the international arena. Finally, two different case studies – Afghanistan and Poland – are analysed to give a detailed picture on the effectiveness of specific soft power tools and policies.

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Soft Power Ranking Probably the easiest, but also the least accurate, way to measure India’s soft power is through rankings that assess this element of state standing. There are several direct and indirect indices that can be of help in this regard. Interestingly, India does not perform well in any of these rankings. First of all, “Brand India” is still not well known abroad: the result is that it is evaluated rather poorly. In 2009, the composite nation branding survey – Anholt-GfKRoper Nation Brand Index, ranked India in 26th place, between Egypt and Poland, among the 50 top countries (Lee, 2010c: 11). In the more recent edition, in 2013, India was placed even lower: in 31st place out of the top 50. The most attractive states in the index were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. All of India’s BRIC partners were classified higher: Brazil – 20th, Russia – 22nd, China – 23rd (Simon Anholt website, 2013). A similar ranking done by a private company, Future Brand, Country Brand Index 2012–13, did not even include India among its top 25 countries (it was 42nd). India performs below expectations in other relevant rankings. In the third edition of the complex IfG-Monocole Soft Power Index, in2012, India was ranked 36th among 40 countries classified, better only than Malaysia, the UAE, Egypt and Indonesia (McClory, 2013). The index was topped by the UK, the US, and Germany, and other emerging powers were far ahead of India: Brazil – 17th, China – 22nd, Russia – 28th, South Africa – 34th. India’s position has not changed substantially from previous editions of this ranking, as it was ranked 23rd out of 26 classified countries in 2010 and 27th out of 30 countries in the ranking’s second edition, in 2011 (McClory, 2010, 2011). Another similar index, developed by Ernst and Young, exclusively for emerging markets— its Rapid-growth markets soft power index, ranked India at second position in 2010, after China but ahead of Russia, Brazil or South Africa. This high position is thanks to knowledge of English, presence of Indians on the TIME 100 list, and relatively high scores in the rule of law, freedom index and immigration categories. It was less positively assessed in other categories: voter turnout, university rankings,

EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIAN SOFT POWER STRATEGY • 127

tourist inflow, weak performance in the world Olympics and little international popularity of Hindi language. (Ernst and Young, 2012). In the Good Country Index, measuring a country’s overall contribution to global goods, presented for the first time in 2014, India was ranked 81st out of 125 countries assessed, between Kazakhstan and Belarus. The ranking was topped by Ireland, Finland and Switzerland; other P-5 countries were ranked at: the UK – 7th, France – 11th, the US – 21st; Russia – 95th, and China – 107th. This makes India’s position quite distant but better than other emerging powers such as China and Russia, but well behind regional powers like Japan (25th), South Africa (44th) or Brazil (49th). India is especially well evaluated when it comes to its contribution to health and wellbeing – 37th – thanks to its substantial food aid, pharmaceutical export and voluntary excess donation to the WHO; for international peace and security it is rated – 44th – due to its contribution to peacekeeping troops and dues in arrears to UN peace keeping budgets; and culture – 53rd – mainly due to export of creative goods and creative services. It scores particularly poorly in other categories: prosperity and equality (117th), and planet and climate (107th) (GCI Website, 2014). Another index that seems relevant for assessing country’s soft power is the Global Peace Index (GPI), prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an independent think tank. In the seventh edition of the ranking, released on 17 June 2014, India was ranked at 143 out of 162 countries classified; situated between Egypt and Guinea-Bissau. The top three most peaceful countries were Iceland, Denmark and Austria; New Zealand, Canada and Japan were the only non-European countries in the top 10. The three least peaceful countries in 2013 were South Sudan, Afghanistan and Syria. All major powers and members of the UN Security Council were classified relatively low: France – 47th, the UK – 48th, the US – 101st, China – 108th, and Russia – 152nd, which suggests that a larger global role corresponds to a greater use of military power. South Asia remained at the bottom of the overall regional ranking (GPI, 2014). India scored the worst in the following categories: conflicts, nuclear and

128 • INDIA’S SOFT POWER: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

heavy weapons, terrorist activity, political terror, access to weapons, and perceived criminality in the society; its best scores were in GPI indicators like weapons import, jailed population, security officers and police, armed services personnel, and displaced population. The authors see little hope of improving India’s situation in the short-term. According to the report “the nature of both the external and internal conflicts in India precludes a quick resolution. The greatest threat to peace are all a result of longstanding issues and their roots are so well entrenched that it will take years of strong policymaking to resolve them” (GPI, 2014: p.30). Mixed Image of India Abroad If a country’s soft power is its attractiveness and credibility, then one of most natural measures of assessing its strength is its international image and perceptions of it abroad. There are several regular, regional, and global surveys comparing such opinions across countries. For India, results of these opinion polls are mixed and inconclusive. One of the most comprehensive and reliable global polls tracking countries’ perceptions is the BBC World Service Poll. The survey, released on June 2014, presents the perception of 16 countries and the European Union in 23 surveyed nations on all continents. India was ranked in 12th position (only better than Russia, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran) with 38 per cent respondents, on average, having a “mainly positive” view of India’s influences, and 36 per cent holding a “mostly negative” opinion (BBC, 2014). The most favourable views about India are found among African countries, and the least favourable are countries in Western Europe (see Figure 5.1). The top three countries with the best opinion of India were Russia (net rating +44 per cent), Nigeria (+42 per cent) and Japan (+25 per cent); and the three with worst opinions were Germany (-52 per cent), Pakistan (-37 per cent) and Spain (-30 per cent). Other regional surveys confirm the opinion about India being divided. In 2006, the Chicago Council on World Affairs conducted a poll in Australia, China, South Korea and the US. It found that these nations were divided on the opinion of whether India’s rise was a good

EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIAN SOFT POWER STRATEGY • 129

Figure 5.1. Views of India’s influence. By Country 2014

Source: BBC 2014

development for the world or not (Hall, 2012: 1108). The respondents in these four countries held different views when assessing India as an expanding economic and military power. Modest majorities in all countries saw the expansion of Indian economic power as a mainly positive

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development (in China – 56 per cent mainly positive, in the United States and South Korea – 53 per cent mainly positive). Some worries about an economically more powerful India were expressed in China (26 per cent mainly negative), followed by the United States (39 percent mainly negative), and South Korea (44 per cent mainly negative). Opinions were more negative about the prospect of growing Indian military power. Here, only in China were people quite comfortable with a significantly more militarily powerful India (56 per cent believed it was mainly positive and 26 per cent mainly negative). This contrasts with the 69 per cent and 71 per cent in the United States and South Korea, respectively, who regard India’s military build-up negatively (Chicago Council, 2006: 46). The survey also showed, generally, a low level of trust toward India in the region. When asked whether they trust India to act responsibly in the world, only Australian respondents gave an overall positive response (68 per cent). In the United States and South Korea, fewer than 50 per cent trust India either somewhat or a great deal; and in China, 68 per cent say they do not trust India either at all or very much. The silver lining was that, despite such ratings, India slightly outperformed China (ibid). Respondents were divided, but leaning toward the negative, on questions regarding desirability of India’s influence in the world and judging trust that India will keep its commitments. Interestingly, however, India was seen as playing a positive role in resolution of key problems facing Asia across the region. Pluralities of Americans (50 per cent), South Koreans (50 per cent), and Chinese (48 per cent) say India’s role is either somewhat or very positive. Intriguing results can be gauged from public opinion polls in India’s closest neighbourhood. Here, India has been seen rather positively in most neighbours, except Pakistan. Surveys conducted a few years ago show a positive attitude towards India in Afghanistan – 59 per cent positive, 1 per cent per cent negative (BBC, 2006), Sri Lanka – 49 per cent positive, 4 per cent negative (BBC 2006), Bangladesh – 81 per cent positive, 16 per cent negative (Gallup/SADP 2011) and Nepal – 84 per cent positive (Gallup/SADP 2012).

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Of note is the trajectory of results seen across a wider period. The BBC has tracked perceptions of India in its global survey since 2006. Analysis of the longer trend reveals, surprisingly, that India’s favourability ratings have slightly declined over the last several years, despite extra efforts put on soft power projection (see Graph 5.1). The net rating of positive assessments among all countries surveyed in 2006 stood at +10 per cent and has decreased to -2 per cent, in 2013, to recover to +2 per cent points, in 2014. Whereas, in 2006, on average, 35 per cent gave India positive rating and 25 per cent gave it a negative one (41 per cent did not give any answer), in 2014, on average, 38 per cent viewed India positively and 36 per cent viewed it negatively. Whereas, in 2006, India was seen positively by a majority of citizens in 22 out of 33 surveyed countries and negatively in only six of them, eight years later, the picture is more divided, with 10 out of 23 surveyed countries leaning positive, 10 negative, and three divided (BBC, 2006, 2014). The highest drop was recorded in 2009 (by 7 net per cent points down) and in 2013 (by 15 net per cent points down). It appears that, in the first case, the downward trend could have been caused by the negative fallout of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which signalled India to be an insecure, unstable and conflict-prone country with ineffective police and special forces. Significant deterioration of the perception of India in 2013 was more complex. Apparently, it coincided with the decline of the Indian economy, resulting in doubt concerning its further development. A series of scandals led to the growing international spotlight of corruption in India and the ineffective bureaucracy, as these received special attention from the anti-corruption campaign of Anna Hazare. In addition, a brutal gang rape of an Indian student, in Delhi, on 16 December 2012, topped headlines in the global media and highlighted problems and dangers facing women, a sense of insecurity, the ineffectiveness of police, and social and gender tensions in Indian society. This story had a hugely negative impact on the image of India, especially in liberal Western societies, far more sensitive to the issues of gender equality and those that pay special attention to the safety

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and position of women. This series of unfortunate events could explain the deterioration of India’s image in European countries like Germany, France or Spain. The negative impact of this crime was also visible in the initial decrease in tourist arrivals, especially women tourists. This assessment is shared by Steven Kull, Director of PIPA, which conducted the survey for BBC, who commented, in 2013: “While China and India’s prestige was enhanced by defying the gravity of the economic downturn, they seem to be falling back to earth with slowing growth rates and a perception of widespread corruption. The scandals surrounding the treatment of women in India may also have had an impact on this year’s findings” (BBC, 2013). Figure 5.2. Views of India’s influence 2006-2014

Source: BBC 2006-2014

Perceived inequality and marginalization of various fringe groups is a cause of concern for various foreigners; India’s diversity and varied cultural experience constitutes its biggest asset. According to a BBC poll in 2012, which included questions about five factors that influence people’s attitudes towards certain countries to the biggest extent, those who perceived India’s role positively attributed this to India’s traditions and culture (48 per cent), followed by 19 per cent who mentioned its economy, products and services. On the other hand, major factors

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responsible for negative opinions were: the way India treats its people (29 per cent), followed by Indian traditions and culture (25 per cent) (BBC, 2012). All these surveys show that, despite new promotional campaigns and investments in its soft power, India still has a serious image problem. The global survey results and international rankings measuring the perception of India abroad can be quite surprising. Before drawing conclusions, it is important to make a caveat: most of the surveys and rankings are prepared from a Western, liberal perspective, and certain indicators can be biased against developing countries. It may be argued, for instance, that public opinion polls about India’s favorability would be more positive if there were more developing countries included. Actually, existing polls confirm this assumption, as they show that India has a better image in African and Asian countries than in Europe. Nevertheless, India’s low position, in comparison to other countries, is still worrisome. As admitted by MEA Joint Secretary Navdeep Suri, in 2011: “Although the efficacy of nation branding exercises can evoke valid skepticism, it is also a fact that India tends to fare rather poorly in terms of several leading global indices. Brand India, moreover, is seen to have taken a serious knock out on account of the spate of negative stories in the run-up to the Commonwealth Games in October and we are looking at several initiatives which, in the short term, can help in restoring India’s image” (Suri, 2011: 300). Tourism, Education, Migration and Capital: India as Source or Destination Country The number of individuals who want to visit India for tourism, education, or work is clearly another method to assess its attractiveness. Regarding tourism, data shows India has become a far more popular tourist destination in recent years. The number of foreign tourist arrivals has more than doubled between 1997 and 2012, from 2.37 million to 6.58 million. As shown in Figure 5.2 below, this upsurge in the number of foreign visitors coincided with the start of the flagship tourism

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promotion campaign, “Incredible India”, initiated by the Ministry of Tourism in 2002, which may indicate its effectiveness. Moreover, India’s position improved not only in absolute numbers but also in the share of international tourists arrivals in the world, from 0.40 per cent, in 1997, to 0.64 per cent, in 2012 (Ministry of Tourism, 2013). In 2012, most foreign tourists to India came from Western Europe (28.17 per cent), North America (19.70 per cent), and South Asia (17.81 per cent), and the top three sources of tourists were the US (1.04 million), the UK (788,000), and Bangladesh (487,000). The growing popularity of India as tourist destination means concrete economic benefits for the country. Foreign exchange earnings from tourism have grown from US$ 2.8 billion, in 1997, to US$ 17.87 billion, in 2012 (ibid). This constituted approximately 20 per cent of India’s current account deficit that year, according to official figures. This is especially important for India, as the tourism industry overall accounts for 6 per cent of India’s gross domestic product, and it is responsible for about 10 per cent of organised employment in the country (Bargi and Timmons 2013). Figure 5.3. Foreign Tourist Arrivals in India 1997-2012 (in millions)

Source: Ministry of Tourism (2013b)

Explaining this success, one can recall such increases were possible due to a general upward trend in international tourist flows in the last decade and the improved tourist infrastructure in India, but India’s

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rising popularity and soft power influence cannot simply be disregarded. The Incredible India is often seen, indeed, as the first ever “branding campaign” of India and can be viewed as one of the most successful initiatives of this kind in the world (Nandan, 2014; Kant, 2008). There is even more evidence of a clear correlation between tourist flows to India and the image of the country abroad. The only years when there was a decrease in foreign tourist visits to India were — 1998, the year of India’s nuclear tests and imposition of international sanctions; 2001 and 2002, after the terrorists’ attacks on 13 December 2001 and military standoff with Pakistan lasting throughout 2002; and in 2009, after the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Although there were some initial media reports pointing at a 25 per cent drop in foreign tourist arrivals in the first three months of 2013, resulting from growing concern about women’s safety in India following the fatal Delhi gang rape in December 2012 (Rahman 2013; Bargi and Timmons, 2013), this is not confirmed in official statistics. According to government estimates, foreign tourists arrivals in 2013 were 6.848 million, a growth of 4.1 per cent, as compared to FTAs of 6.578 million in 2012 (Ministry of Tourism, 2014). The positive trend in tourism arrivals to India also indicates India’s growing soft power, which plays an important role in attracting more foreigners. Still, there is a lot that needs to be improved. The current size of the group of foreign tourists in India – a huge country with a rich culture and numerous tourist attractions of prime value – is not just not satisfactory. In 2012, India was ranked at the distant 41st position in World Tourist arrivals, far behind top contenders France (ranked 1st in 2012 with 83 million tourists), the US (67 million tourists), and China (57 million tourists), but also Malaysia (25 million), Thailand (22.4 million), and Vietnam (6.8 million). This suggests a largely untapped tourist potential of India. Action should be taken to create a more attractive image of India abroad and improve the quality offered at home. As underwhelming as the performance of the tourism industry may be, India’s performance in the international education market is far more

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troublesome. India is still not perceived as an attractive destination for international students, and it is, rather, a source of student mobility. More Indians prefer to study abroad than foreigners prefer in to come to India for studies. In 2010, there were only 12,374 international students studying in India, compared to over 170,000 Indians studying abroad (UNESCO, 2010). Most foreign students in India come from South and West Asia (3,767), the Arab States (3,453), or Sub-Saharan Africa (1,898). However, it is important to note that there has been a strong rising trend in international students coming to India in recent years. According to UNESCO data, the number of foreign students in India rose to 27,000, in 2012, and to over 31,000, in 2013 (UNESCO website, 2014). India was ranked as the 15th most popular higher education destination in the world, behind the US, Australia, and the UK, but also far behind China and South Korea. Apart from several world-level Indian Institutes of Technologies and top private institutions, Indian universities remain poorly funded, produce little research, and seem unattractive to international students (Ernst and Young, 2012). The weak position of Indian higher education is evident in its international rankings. On the 2014 Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) (so-called “Shanghai List”) India had only one university – the Indian Institute of Science – ranked globally (between 301–400). That same year, China had 32 universities, the US – 146, Germany – 39, the UK – 38, Brazil – 6, Russia – 2 and Poland – 2. Moreover, there were only two universities ( both in distant places) among the top 200 World Universities in Engineering/Technology and Computer Sciences for 2014 – these were the Indian Institute of Science, ranked between 101–150, and the Indian Institute of Technology Madras, ranked between 151–200. Only one university – the same Indian Institute of Science – was ranked in the 151–200 range in the 2014 Academic Ranking of World Universities in Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Not a single academic institution from India was placed among the top 200 World Universities in categories such as Life and Agriculture Sciences, Clinical Medicine and Pharmacy, or Social Science.

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Similarly, India is not seen as an attractive migration destination, except for neighbouring countries in South Asia. In general, more Indians emigrate from the country than foreigners settling in India. According to the World Bank’s estimates, in 2010, the stock of emigration from India was 11.36 million, while the stock of immigration was 5.43 million. Most immigrants in India come from Bangladesh (63 per cent), Pakistan (21 per cent), Nepal (11 per cent), or Sri Lanka (3 per cent), and other countries constitute around 3 per cent of immigrants. Hence, migration flows out of the country reveal another flaw in India’s power of attraction. Until it improves the standard of living, it will continue to be a country from where people migrate in search of better life. International capital flow is yet another tangible measure that shows a country’s attractiveness, in this case: the economic dimension. India has become an increasingly popular investment destination only in the last decade. The amount of foreign direct investments (FDI) inflow to India, which stagnated for over a decade around US$ 5 billion, skyrocketed in 2006 to over US$ 20 billion from little more than US$ 7 billion a year earlier. It picked up to US$ 43.4 billion, in 2008, but then decreased to US$ 25.3 billion, in 2012, following the international economic crisis and mounting problems at home. Despite the overall remarkable progress, India has been a less popular destination for foreign direct investments than other emerging economies and attracted the least FDIs among all BRIC countries. In comparison, in 2012, FDI inflows to China were 10 times higher (US$ 252 billion), while Brazil attracted US$ 65.3 billion, and Russia US$ 31.3 billion (OECD, 2013). FDI stock in India, by the end of 2011, was US$ 206.2 billion, whereas the number in China was US$ 1804.2 billion, US$ 669.7 billion in Brazil and US$ 457.5 billion in Russia. Moreover, when one includes net flow of FDI, it turns out that there was more money leaving India than coming in to the country over the last two decades.

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Figure 5.4. Foreign Direct Investments to India 1990-2013 (BoP, current US$)

The recent “Make in India” campaign, launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to make India a global manufacturing hub, offers a chance to reverse negative trends and attract more foreign capital. This will, however, require further economic reforms that will help transform the country into more a favourable place for doing business. As Indian government data for early 2015 shows, there is already a positive change in capital flow. According to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, the total FDI inflow to India between April 2014 and January 2015 was US$ 25.5 billion, 36 per cent more than in the corresponding period in the previous year (US$ 18.7 billion). Cumulative FDI in India from April 2000 to January 2015 stood at US$ 361 billion, including US$ 243 billion equity inflows (DPPI, 2015). Already, for the last couple of years, India has been regarded as one of the most attractive FDI destinations by UNCTAD. Now, the second round of economy liberalisation may further boost its global economic appeal. Advancing Foreign Policy Goals Probably the most fundamental question in assessing the effectiveness of India’s soft power is how this approach has helped in realising its

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foreign policy goals. The answer is difficult, not only due to the imminent constraints of this concept but also because there is no one official foreign policy strategy of India that can be used as a reference point for analysis. Yet, one can assume that,the two core aims for India in external relations is, to secure an international environment conducive to fast economic growth— and to advance its global position as a major power. To attain these goals, India needs security from external threats, a stable neighbourhood, and a favourable international economic and political system that would accommodate India’s concerns and aspirations. The country would like to play a bigger role in global institutions, from UNSC to IMF, and move from being a “rule-taker” to “rule-setter”. From climate change negotiations to trade talks, and from antiterrorism cooperation to reform of the United Nations, India’s effectiveness will depend on its perceived credibility and attractiveness. The country’s image is also fundamental in attracting foreign investments, technologies or tourists that can fuel economic development. Shashi Tharoor (2012: 277) claims, “India’s potential leadership role in the world lies in its soft power.” Yet it is hard to point out the moments when India’s soft power played a decisive role in attaining its foreign policy interests. As shown above, despite the more active use of soft power tools in last decade, there has been no major shift in international perceptions of India. Therefore, some scholars tend to criticise the effectiveness of this approach (Muhkerjee, 2014; Hall, 2012). However, it is argued here that the new strategy is likely to bring major benefits in the long term; indeed, it is already showing positive outcomes. Some of India’s success in the last several years can be attributed, if not completely, then at least partly, to its soft power. First, India has managed to rebuild its positive image in South Asia, even though some contentious issues in relations with many neighbours remain. In refraining from the use of force and interfering in internal affairs as well as promoting the idea of deep interdependence, India has mitigated its perception as a regional hegemon and is now a more acceptable leader. This was caused not only by a change of diplomatic

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style but also by a more active soft power projection through expansion of cultural centres, development assistance and people-to-people links (Kugiel, 2014b). One convincing example of the effectiveness of these efforts is the policy towards Afghanistan (see below). The invitation of all leaders from SAARC to the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in May 2014, was a wise public diplomacy move that established India’s role as a stabilising force. Modi’s subsequent visits to Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka further promoted India’s image as an attractive partner. Even if relations with Pakistan remain a negative exception, a new stage for SAARC may be at hand. Second, India has managed to regain legitimacy it had lost somehow after the nuclear tests in 1998. Thanks to its follow-up policy and new initiatives of recent years, India is now seen as a peaceful, non-revisionist state and responsible nuclear power. One of the most striking examples is the nuclear deal with the US, signed in 2008, which would not have been possible without the important role of the Indian diaspora in the US (Kamdar, 2007b; Kirk 2008) and public diplomacy efforts of the world’s largest democracy. This was a remarkable shift in US policy, whose strategy towards India in the 1990s was based essentially on one single mantra: to “cap,  roll back, and eventually eliminate”  India’s nuclear  weapons. Ultimately, the United States has become the first to recognize, de facto, India’s nuclear power status. Although there were more strategic and economic factors behind this decision than are apparent on the surface, one wonders whether this would have been possible had India not been soft power. The counter example of neighbouring Pakistan, which is not known for its soft power, is an informative case. Now India, unlike Pakistan, has the chance for another successful campaign for membership in nuclear non-proliferation regimes, like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Moreover, despite significant military buildup, India, unlike China, is not seen with suspicion as a threat to stability in Asia. This allows it, for instance, a more active security presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Third, India has gathered more friends and allies to support its multilateral initiatives. One example of this is the vote, in 2011, for India

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as non-permanent member of Security Council. With the exception of China, India extracted support for its permanent membership in the UNSC from all permanent members – the largest support ever. Although there is little hope for imminent reform of the UN, India’s popularity is undeniable. Interestingly, during his 2010 trip to Delhi, US President Barack Obama vocalised that India is not an emerging power, but “already emerged”; yet another recognition of its global aspirations. At the same time, India still has the capacity to play a larger role among developing countries. Its development assistance to Africa and direct investments in many parts of the world has created sizable goodwill for the country. India’s role in Africa is not fuelling tensions and suspicion as China’s engagement there does. Even though India now is less recognised for idealistic policy, as it was renowned for during the Cold War period, its newfound pragmatism and realpolitik is what calls the day in the 21st century, and is thus well understood in many states. Especially outside the Western block, India’s adherence to NAM principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs of other countries. is better appreciated than the more patronising attitude of Western powers. This can pay off in oncoming battles regarding climate change, the new development agenda or trade negotiations. Also, financial benefits from a rising number of tourists, remittances and foreign direct investments are other tangible benefits from soft power. More detailed analysis of the effectiveness of certain soft power tools and policies is given below in two very different case studies. Success Story of Indian Soft Power: Afghanistan Afghanistan is often presented as the best proof of Indian soft power effectiveness or “civilian” strategy in the post-2001 period. Instead of contributing troops to the international mission, India chose a low profile strategy based on strong diplomatic support for the new government of Hamid Karzai, civilian engagement in reconstruction, and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. As observed by Hymans (2009: 249) Afghanistan “became the first case study of complex soft power strategy

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in Indian foreign policy.” Major elements of this approach were the significant development assistance, education and cultural cooperation, focus on trade and investments, diplomatic support, and stronger peopleto-people contacts. Since 2002, India has committed over US$ 2 billion for reconstruction, and has established the largest scholarship program for Afghan students ever. Afghanistan is an important security and strategic partner for India. Both countries share a long history of civilisation, cultural and societal ties. Common interest in combating terrorism and building a “prosperous, democratic and stable” Afghanistan became a backbone of official dialogue just after the US–led invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban regime. Since 2002, President Karzai has paid 12 visits to India (the last one in May 2014, for the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi), while former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kabul twice: in August 2005 and May 2011. This dialogue at the highest level has been complemented by regular interactions between ministers of external affairs and other ministries, parliamentarians, military officials and civil society representatives. The climax of India’s decade-long, low-profile engagement in Afghanistan came on 4 October 2011, when both states signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership, the first of its kind to be endorsed by the Afghan government with any foreign country. This comprehensive deal envisaged strengthening cooperation in four key areas: politics and security; trade and economy; capacity development and education; and social, cultural, civil society and people-to-people relations. It foresaw more coordination in regional and international forums, including Afghan support for a permanent seat for India in the reformed UN Security Council; it established a regular Security Dialogue to coordinate the fight against international terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering; and it called for more trade, investments and promotion of regional economic cooperation. Moreover, the deal stipulated joint efforts to develop the Afghan economy and civil service, and improve women’s rights among other things (Kugiel, 2011).

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The core of the soft power approach was significant Indian development assistance. This concentrated on areas such as humanitarian aid, infrastructure, electricity, agriculture, telecommunications and media, education, health, and capacity building. Among the most significant contributions were the Salma Dam power plant in the Herat Province (worth US$ 184 million), construction of the Afghan Parliament building, in Kabul (US$ 180 million), the Pul-e-Khumri electricity transmission line to the Afghan capital (US$ 120 million) and the 218 km-long Delaram–Zaranj road, which opened additional land access to Afghanistan through Iran (MEA, 2009). It also ran almost 100 small development and community projects in remote and rural areas. Importantly, Indian projects were developed and implemented in cooperation with Afghan partners and followed priorities set by the Afghan government in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. They were focused on local ownership of assets and, usually through completion, used hired Afghan contractors and local staff. Within its technical assistance program, India offered a wide range of human resource schemes for the Afghan administration and sent its experts and officials to Kabul. One crucial element of aid became educational support, routed mostly through a scholarship program for Afghan students. The ICCR provides about 1,500 scholarships annually (for long- and short-term training), thus making Afghans the largest beneficiary group. The example of Hamid Karzai, himself a graduate of an Indian University, in Simla, who emerged as a pro-India politician, is a vivid example of benefits of such a long term investment. In total, India has committed some US$ 2 billion to Afghanistan, becoming the sixth largest donor and by far the biggest contributor from its region. Building on strong cultural and historic links, India has opened to the Afghan people and facilitated contacts and cooperation in education, culture, tourism and business. In 2007, India officially inaugurated the Culture Centre in Kabul to further promote its culture and project soft power. Bollywood movies, TV soap operas and Hindi songs were already among the most popular entertainment options in Afghanistan.

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Besides the number of students coming to India for higher education, India has also emerged as an important destination for Afghans seeking medical treatment, ever since India introduced, in 2005, special medical visas, which are free and do not require applicants to provide financial statements or proof of medical insurance. “India is famous in Afghanistan for its modern hospitals and availability of medicines,” quoted one Afghan undergoing treatment in Delhi an article in the New York Times blog, in November 2013 (Bearak, 2013). Thousands of Afghans have availed this opportunity, constituting almost half of all traveling to India. According to the Indian Embassy in Kabul, over 100,000 medical visas have been issued between 2010 and 2013 alone. Several direct flights between Kabul and Indian cities cater to the needs of the growing number of Afghans coming to India for medical, tourist, business, or education reasons. In total, the number of arrivals from Afghanistan to India increased from a mere 6,000, in 2002, to over 111,000, in 2013 (Ministry of Tourism, 2003, 2014). Intensification of civilian cooperation also meant stronger trade and investment links, facilitated partly by India’s unilateral concessions. India had in March 2003already signed its Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan, which opened up tradepossibilities: India allowed substantial duty concessions, ranging from 50 per cent to 100 per cent, to a certain category of Afghan dry fruits (38 items). In November 2011, India removed basic customs duties for all products of Afghanistan (except alcohol and tobacco), giving them duty free access to the Indian market (MEA, 2014). It supported the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement,  signed in 2010, that allows access to a land route through Pakistan to export goods to India, even though the same trucks cannot bring goods back from India. As a result, India emerged as the third biggest trade partner for Afghanistan and the largest market for Afghan products, absorbing some 30 per cent of Afghan exports in 2013. Indian companies have explored investment opportunities in Afghanistan, and one of the largest FDI projects in the country, the Hajigak iron ore reserves, was assigned to an Indian consortium, in 2011. In June 2012,

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India hosted the Investment Summit on Afghanistan, with participation of several hundred businessmen from Afghanistan, India and other countries from the region. Even though results of these initiatives are far from satisfactory, due to instability in Afghanistan, India has continued to encourage deeper integration of Afghanistan’s trade and investments network. India has also extended diplomatic support for Afghanistan at regional and multilateral levels. It was at India’s request that Afghanistan was admitted as the eighth member of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation, at the 2007 Delhi Summit. India has been an active promoter of Afghanistan, as a regional hub, to use its geostrategic position for trade, transit, transport and to attract regional and transregional investments. Despite opposition from Pakistan, India has become an active participant in the Istanbul process (or Heart of Asia process). It has been assigned the role of the leading country in one of its confidence building measures (CBM) dedicated to trade, commerce and investment opportunities, and it hosted the senior officials meeting of the Heart of Asia process on 17 January 2014. Also, India has been engaged in trilateral dialogues with the US and Afghanistan, and Iran and Afghanistan, to talk about regional solutions to Afghan instability. Recently, it stepped up efforts to connect Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean, through the Iranian port of Chabahar, as an alternative to Pakistani ports of trade. Moreover, it has been supporting Afghanistan at the UN forum and international donors meetings (Bonn, London, and Tokyo) to secure long-term commitment to the country’s security and development. This combination of strong political support and comprehensive civilian engagement, based on India’s soft power potential, has made India one of the closest partners for Afghanistan and generated goodwill among many Afghans. Public opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan in recent years suggest that India has emerged as one of the most positively perceived countries there. According to a joint survey, done in 2010 by the BBC, ABC and ARD, India was seen favourably by 71 per cent of the Afghans questioned, which was the best result of any nation. In

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comparison, the favourable view of Afghans toward the US was 51 per cent, the UK – 39 per cent, Iran – 51 per cent and Pakistan – 15 per cent. The Strategic Partnership, signed in 2011, underpinned by close personal contacts between leaders from both countries, had to be tested on the way towards Afghanistan’s transition period, beginning in 2014. Although India offered limited military assistance (mostly training and equipment), the core of its policy remained focused on civilian cooperation, as the tenure of pro-India president Hamid Karzai were nearing its end. The change of government in Kabul, in 2014, and withdrawal of most of the international troops from the country seemed to risk India’s recent strategic gains in Afghanistan. Indian experts observed, with caution, new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s tilt towards Pakistan and China. After all, President Ghani, unlike his predecessor, made his first trip to Delhi in April 2015, only after seven months in office, and already having visited Beijing, Islamabad, Washington and Riyadh, along many other capitals. Even if Afghanistan allowed stronger Pakistani influences in the country, India still has considerable assets that make it an indispensable partner for the Afghans. As recommended by Raja Mohan (2015), “if Ghani had no choice but to focus on a ‘Pakistan-first’ strategy, Delhi has no option but to patiently wait for Kabul’s new engagement with Rawalpindi to play out.” Indeed, generated soft power and multi-faceted ties give India a certain edge that no other regional players can count on in their relations with Afghanistan. This can be used in the future for stronger cooperation when domestic and regional circumstances improve. Despite these recent uncertainties, the case of Afghanistan shows that a soft power strategy can bring tangible and strategic benefits. Shortcomings of Indian Soft Power: Poland The second case study testing the effects of Indian soft power is a less obvious country: Poland. Indo-Polish relations have always been cordial, but not especially important. This can be seen as exemplary for distant countries, where India used to have a minor interest and less intensive

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cooperation. In the absence of vibrant economic or political cooperation, the relevance of soft power gains importance. However, it can be assumed that, in this situation, cultural cooperation, mutual perceptions and people-to-people links play more vital roles in shaping official dialogue. India and Poland maintained close and friendly relations during the Cold War, by virtue of their respective relationships to the USSR. Following geopolitical changes, post-1989 cooperation between the two lost momentum. India, focused on its neighbourhood and global ascendance, saw no interest in Poland, which, in turn, concentrated on its relations with the European Union and the United States. Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited Warsaw in 1979, for the last time, and thereafter no external affairs minister paid a visit to Poland during the post-Cold War period. Indian President Pratibha Patil was the highest Indian guest to Poland, in 2009. Polish trips to India included that of Polish Presidents Lech Walesa, in 1994, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, in 1999; there were visits also by Prime Ministers Leszek Miller, in 2003, and Donald Tusk, in 2010. In general, Polish representatives were much more active in keeping in contact than were their Indian counterparts. Poland has also, without much success, promoted the idea of a strategic partnership with India in last few years. A modest level of economic cooperation and limited number of converging interests has meant a lack of Indian reciprocation thus far. With trade turnover at US$ 2 billion in 2014, Poland is still not among India’s 50 top trading partners, and India ranks as Poland’s 26th commercial partner. Despite recent attempts at reinvigorating relations, there is still limited interest and a huge knowledge deficit between the two. This leaves a lot of space for Indian soft power to operate. In this regard, India’s major tools implemented in Poland include public diplomacy, cultural and educational cooperation, tourism and promotional campaigns, and strengthened links with the nascent Indian diaspora. Indian diplomats in Warsaw are the prime actors responsible for promotion of Indian interests, including through public diplomacy. In recent years, one can observe the growing activity of the Indian Embassy.

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Especially during the 2011–2014 tenure of Monika Kapil Mohta, former head of the Nehru Centre in London, as Indian Ambassador in Warsaw. Her presence gave a special boost to raising India’s visibility in Poland. Indian diplomats became keen to interact with the Polish public, giving lectures at universities, participating in cultural and economic events, and addressing students or business forums. Still, providing the precise number of these interactions is impossible, as repeated requests for relevant data from the Indian Embassy were left unanswered, which can point at shortcomings in terms of communication skills and hints at the defensiveness of Indian diplomacy. Events organised by Indian representatives rarely attracted wider media coverage and were rarely used to reach out to new audiences. Annual celebrations of Republic Day and Independence Day, as well as Holi and Diwali, drew the regular crowds of diplomatic corps, the Embassy’s cooperates and India lovers. So far, the Embassy has not engaged enough on a major scale with Polish journalists to encourage them to present a more accurate and updated picture of India. In the end, the general impact of diplomats on Polish perceptions of India has been rather limited, except for the occasional businessman who becomes more interested in Indian economy by individual initiative. Partially, the reason behind this is are the limited capacities of the Indian Embassy in Poland, which has been usually staffed by 2-4 career diplomats and several supporting personnel, which can be seen as unsatisfactory for the potential scale of engagement with Poland. Unlike other Western capitals, the Embassy of India in Warsaw has no Indian cultural centre that could lead cultural and promotional activities. One can assume that a limited budget for cultural and promotional activities leads to a dearth of Embassy-led concerts, art shows or other performances. However, with the Indian Embassy’s prestigious new home in Warsaw, to be opened in mid-2015, there is a hope of strengthening the scale and spectrum of public diplomacy activities. Organisation of a huge event on International Yoga Day, on 21 June 2015, is the first example of a more robust and effective promotional campaign.

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Although Poland is not a partner country of India’s development assistance, there are several slots within the ITEC program and an ICCR scholarship which is offered to Polish nationals annually. The latter plays a particularly important role in fostering educational cooperation and promotion of India. Over the last few years, Polish students have been given 10–12 scholarships each year to pursue studies in India. As empirical research confirms, “international soft power can result from success in the area of education” (Wójcicka, et al., 2015) so it is convenient to evaluate what results India sees from its scholarship program. To understand the effectiveness of this Indian soft power tool, an on-line survey was conducted, in January 2014, among Polish beneficiaries of the ICCR scholarships in recent years. According to the Indian Embassy, in Poland there were 57 Polish students who availed stipends for studies in India between 2005 and 2013. Out of this group, 18 people agreed to fill in a questionnaire to assess their experiences and attitude towards India after completing the programme. This accounts for one-third of all participants of the Indian government program, and is a remarkable sample to draw some conclusions. These were mostly students of Indology studies, and they focused on one of the Indian languages while in India, although other programmes were also pursued (such as classical music, dance, or international relations). This explains why those who utilised the scholarship were already interested in India and assessed their knowledge and understanding of India as high (5 per cent) or very high (61 per cent) before their departure to India. Yet, most of them admitted that studying in India better exposed them to Indian culture and helped them to understand the country to a larger extent (44 per cent). Some students acknowledged the huge complexity of India while saying: “During my studies in Poland, I had learned a lot about customs, religions and culture of India, however in practice, India turned out to be much more complicated.” The majority of students assessed the utility and relevance of acquired experiences and knowledge about India for their future carriers and work as “very high” (39 per cent) or “rather high” (16 per cent). It was, however, often observed that the

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“quality of education” was poor, and the overall high assessment was a result of many elements (friends, trips, etc.) that constituted their final experience. Importantly, for most of students (39 per cent), studies in India had a positive effect on their attitude towards India; yet for 22 per cent, this experience worsened their feelings towards the country. Some people pointed at the “inescapable” cultural shock, and others at the “unexpected amount of discrimination and hypocrisy” in Indian society. In the words of another person: “India is a fastened learning of life – for a much longer time in Poland I have not gained so much experience as for this short time I spent on the Indian subcontinent.” The scholarship was also helpful in developing long-lasting personal contacts – 61 per cent of students maintain links and relationships with people met during their stay in India after returning to Poland, and 22 per cent have maintained these contacts rarely. The survey confirms, also, that granting scholarship is a long-term investment, which makes scholars brand ambassadors of India. Almost all of them (88 per cent) have stayed engaged in work or activities that deal with India. They, for instance, participate and organise Indian events in Poland, follow the news on India and promote knowledge about the country. As a result, the majority of ICCR scholars have a favourable view on India’s role in international affairs (71 per cent), although some observed that India “performs below its potential” in international relations. At the same time, a large group of students (44 per cent) raised the problem of insufficient stipends as a major challenge of the ICCR program. Especially those who studied in major cities, like Delhi or Mumbai, who faced difficulties living on US$ 100–150 per month — and without private savings or help of their families, they could not have had an enjoyable stay. It was also observed that the ICCR does not provide any assistance in finding accommodation, access to health care or bureaucratic work, which tends to have a negative effect on their final impressions. Especially when compared to the scale and quality of support offered by other countries (the US and the EU but also China or Taiwan), the level of support from the ICCR is highly unsatisfactory.

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Despite these concerns, the overall overview of Indian government scholarship program can be evaluated as very high. The case of Polish scholars confirms that this is one of the major tools for building stronger ties and goodwill for India. Apart from the few individual negative experiences, the majority of those who studied in India return as promoters and friends of the country. Despite the poor quality of education and modest level of support, this programme gives the opportunity and incentive for studies in India, that would otherwise not take place. This can be seen as an important tool for Indian foreign policy, but further improvements in the programme can make much larger and more positive impact. The Indian diasporais becoming an increasingly important asset of Indian soft power in Poland. This once irrelevant group, a few dozen people before 1989, has expanded considerably to some 4,000 people by 2014. Although this is still a small number compared to global standards, they constitute the eighth largest immigrant group in a largely homogeneous Polish society (Pędziwiatr, et al, 2014). More importantly, this new emerging minority shares positive characteristics with those successful Indians settled in other developed states,such as the US or Australia, rather than Indian migrants to the Middle East or some other Western states (like Italy) attracting mostly semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Research done in 2014 shows people of Indian origin in Poland are relatively better-educated and more prosperous than average in Polish society (ibid). The group consists of the three largest elements: entrepreneurs, professionals working in international companies and students. Along with its growing prosperity, the Indian community has become better-organized and more active in the cultural and economic life of Poland. There were at least six main Indian associations in different cities, serving the needs of the community while also contributing to better Poland-India relations. For instance, the Indo-Polish Cultural Committee (IPCC) has been the main organizer of Indian festivals Holi and Diwali – promoting Indian traditions and culture across Poland; and the Indo-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) is a

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premiere organisation engaged in promotion of India as an economic partner and facilitating contacts between business people from both countries. As truly brand ambassadors of India, they play a significant role in promoting a positive image of their country in Poland. Serving as guides and partners for Indian diplomats, they become an important element of India’s public and cultural diplomacy. They can be seen as a strong human bond between two states and increasingly positive element in relations, which is also eagerly engaged by Polish diplomats. Advancement of Indian interests in relations with Poland is supported by other public and private organisations from India. One remarkable example is the cooperation between the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Polish Institute of International Affairs, which serves as a major Track II diplomacy mechanism, ever since both institutions signed an MoU in 2006. Since then, there have been four rounds of talks on political and economic cooperation, held in Warsaw and Delhi, alternatively, to test new avenues for cooperation. Thanks to close ties to their respective ministries of foreign affairs and involvement of diplomats and experts, this dialogue helped to increase mutual understanding of both countries and informed official relations. One of the tangible effects of this cooperation is the first-ever book on bilateral relations, India-Poland: Vistas for future Partnership in the 21st Century, published in India in 2014. There have been a few more mechanisms established in recent years that have fostered stronger economic and educational cooperation between the two states. For instance, in 2010, the University of Warsaw established the Centre of Contemporary India Studies, which offered an MA program on modern India and signed MoUs on cooperation with over a dozen Indian universities and research institutions. It was also instrumental in launching Poland and Central Europe Centres at universities in Kolkata and Manipal, in 2012. Institutional networks and the exchange of researchers and students helped a great deal in developing expertise and disseminating knowledge about modern India among the young generation of Polish scholars. Although the initiative was on the Polish side, and funded by a grant from the European Union, Indian

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diplomats and official partners in India eagerly assisted the project. One can add here that the Indian government encouraged institutional links between other major Indian and Polish institutions, including the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Polish National Chamber of Commerce (KIG), academies of sciences, and others. This led to more frequent contacts between entrepreneurs from Poland and India and exchange of larger business delegations, as for instance, over 100 Indian delegates for the Poznań Trade Fairs in Poland, in June 2014. It is hard to state, conclusively, the role of the recent soft power strategy in generating more interest in India and reshaping its image in Poland. This perception has always been rather positive and cordial, partly due to a long tradition of Indology studies in Poland and positive experiences of cooperation during the Second World War (including the story of some 4,000 Polish refugees who found shelter in India) and during the Cold War. Jagiellonian University, in Kraków, was one among the first in this part of Europe to a start special department focused on India studies, set in place way back in the late 19th century, followed by the University of Warsaw, in the 1920s, and more recently, the ones opened in Wrocław and Poznań. These institutions fostered a professional interest in Indian traditions, literature, languages and trained “Indologists” who influenced Polish perceptions of India for decades. The Indian Council of Cultural Relations supported these activities, providing chairs of India studies in Kraków and Warsaw. With the end of the Cold War and advent of globalisation, interest in India has somehow diminished, and public perception has been, to a large extent, influenced by images provided by popular media houses, which usually concentrate more on negative news. An old stereotype of “spiritual” and “exotic” India has been complemented by an image of a “poor” and “underdeveloped” country. This is well illustrated by the popular book, issued in 2011, Lalki w ogniu (“Dolls in the fire”), written by Polish journalist Paulina Wilk, who depicts India as a country of poverty, malnourishment of children, and social and gender injustice.

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Analysis of major Polish newspaper media content during the period from 2012–2013 shows there is little general interest in India, and most existing articles concentrate on curiosities and negative news – from terrorist attacks, to corruption scandals, to violence against minorities and women. For instance, the largest outburst of articles about India in recent years was in the aftermath of the Delhi gang rape, in late 2012. The image of a modern, developing economy and emerging power is somehow lost and does not reach the general public, yet. As a result, Polish awareness of India is still based on old stereotypes and clichés, and largely misses the complexity and richness of the country. On a positive note, however, it can be added, that in last 10 years, there have been more scientific books in Polish presenting a comprehensive overview of India as an emerging power and rising economy (Zajączkowski 2008; Iwanek and Burakowski, 2014). Despite these constraints, there is still significant goodwill for India in Poland. Although there are no Polish official surveys evaluating attitude of the Polish populace towards India, existing international polls present Poland as having one of the most positive opinions about India. The global opinion survey, done by BBC World Service, in 2013, shows that the majority of Poles are more positive about India’s influence in the world (17 per cent net positive). This was one of the best results among those of the 25 assessed countries, and only 6 countries rated India higher. In Europe, only Russia had accrued a more positive view (33 per cent net positive), but the Poles saw India as more friendly than the Germans, or the British – nations with more intense contacts and interests. These findings were somewhat confirmed by smaller on-line surveys on perceptions of India, which were conducted by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, in 2014 (Kugiel, 2014). A simple questionnaire was sent to a few thousand people interested in international relations (experts, diplomats, academicians, students, etc.); a total of 338 complete answers were returned. Although it cannot be seen as representative for a whole society, it gives some insight into what Polish elites probably think about India. The outcomes indicate that 50 per cent of respondents

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evaluate India’s influences on world affairs positively, 44 per cent claimed India has no particular influences and only 6 per cent saw India’s role negatively. Moreover, 72 per cent of respondents regarded their personal attitude toward India as positive (54 per cent) or very positive (18 per cent); only 6 per cent harbours negative feelings; whereas 22 per cent were neutral. Conclusively, 49 per cent of respondents regarded India as an important partner for Poland, and more than half (51 per cent) claimed that the Polish government is not doing enough to build stronger relations with this country. These views of Polish experts may be an encouraging sign for India as it points to the large, probably untapped potential of its soft power in Poland. It is not an easy task to measure the impact of Indian soft power in realisation of Indian interests. One can argue, however, that several tools and mechanisms, especially more active public diplomacy, scholarship programmes and use of the Indian diaspora, have had a positive effect on growing cooperation and promotion of the new image of modern India. It can be noted that bilateral trade rose fourfold from 2004, from little more than US$ 400 million to US$ 2 billion in 2014. Polish businessmen have become more frequent visitors to numerous fairs and exhibitions in India, as have investors. According to the Indian government, the Polish FDI in India has exceeded $US 600 million, making Poland the 25th largest foreign investor in the country. India also has become a more popular tourist destination, despite the largely negative image the country has in major Polish media. The number of visitors from Poland to India has risen from 6,000, in 2003, to almost 24,000, in 2013 (Ministry of Tourism, 2003, 2014). There is also a growing intensity of political dialogue and official visits. Indian soft power works through more than 30 Indian restaurants, dozens of Ayurveda spas, several hundred schools of yoga, the memory of Mahatma Gandhi, and rising popularity of Bollywood movies and Indian classical culture. The general success of the Indian economy in last decade has also strengthened interest in India as an emerging market. The case of Poland shows that soft power instruments can bear positive results; however, they need further strengthening and more

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investments. The absence of a cultural centre, limited diplomatic staff, and a modest promotional budget are among the major challenges for a more effective policy. Winding down the scholarship program can risk widening the gap between the two societies. Also, the defensive and reactive style of communication with Polish opinion leaders requires a major turnabout. Today, the information deficit and misunderstanding of India forms major impediments for closer political and economic cooperation. There are still old stereotypes and clichés of mystical and poor India dominant in Polish society, and the media still pays little attention to new developments in this country. This can be altered with the help of soft power. The recent “Make in India”, campaign, launched in Poland in March 2015, offers a good chance to change this and update the image of India in the eyes of the Polish public. India enjoys natural goodwill in Poland, but it will need more activism and resources to uphold this attitude in a fast changing and increasingly competitive global system. Nurturing soft power can lead to more robust trade and tourism as well as open support for India at multilateral forums. Conclusion Analysis of effectiveness of India’s soft power brings rather mixed results. There are numerous examples where this strategy worked well for India – from upward trends in the flow of tourists and investments to the nuclear deal with the US to drawing support for its multilateral initiatives. As the case of Afghanistan demonstrates, soft power tools can be effective for building not only strong political partnerships but also massive goodwill among the public. At the same time, the example of Poland suggests that modest levels of engagement yield modest results. Raja Mohan (2014) is not completely right when he claims that “[w]hether it is yoga or Bollywood, Indian soft power has steadily grown over the decades precisely because the government had nothing do with it.” The Indian government has a role to play in wielding soft power and has started to better integrate it in foreign policy in recent years.

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Yet, India ranks rather poorly in numerous international indices of soft power and its “nation brand” is not as well regarded as it might initially appear (Hall, 2012: 1109). Moreover this image problem continues despite the country’s rise on the global stage and increasing investments in its soft power capabilities. How is it possible that the home to Mahatma Gandhi, source of rich civilization and increasingly popular mass culture, a country that presents itself as a promoter of the ruledbased international system and peaceful coexistence of nations, does not draw popular support and favourable views abroad? There is no simple explanation of this complex problem and no single reason behind India’s relatively low position in soft power measurement. Possibly it is yet too early to assess conclusively the impact of soft power on realisation of the country’s interests as soft power works in the long perspective. Nevertheless, there must be also some important factors that undermine India’s global perception. As argued by Ian Hall (2012: 1109), “Clearly, public diplomacy alone cannot address this poor image which is the result of matters far beyond the control of the ICCR or the MEA.” The rule in economy that apparently applies to politics also says that marketing alone will not be sufficient if the product is not good enough. It appears evident that India’s assets (such as democracy, Bollywood, yoga, and the diaspora) are countered by its considerable liabilities (such as poverty and underdevelopment, social and religious tensions, and the Kashmir conflict). Better understanding of the limitations of its soft power is essential for a more effective approach in the future. Several ideas about impediments to India’s soft power— and on how India can wield its strengths in this domain are given in the next chapter.

6 AUGMENTING INDIA’S SOFT POWER: MODI AND BEYOND

T

he landmark electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in 2014, opened a new era for India’s soft power. Contrary to some concerns that the new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi will revert to a hard power approach, he has, rather, become a main promoter of India’s power of attraction. During the first 12 months in office, he has shown strong leadership, more active diplomacy, and greater use of culture and digital media in foreign policy. Soft power has become, for the first time, an oft-repeated term in the Indian media, and it has drawn more attention from the experts. Although Modi already has contributed greatly to India’s image, there are still many challenges ahead. As shown in Chapter V, India’s relatively low rankings in soft power terms points at a potential yet unleashed. According to Rohan Mukherjee, India’s inability to capitalise on its soft power resources is the result of three factors: the overestimation of these resources by analysts; lack of sufficient hard power to under gird India’s soft power ambitions; and unresolved elements of India’s identity that tend to undermine its efforts at soft power projection through public diplomacy (Mukherjee, 2013: 1). For John Lee, the main factors contributing to India’s perception problem include: lack of social progress, lack of control over the media, unproven record of structural reform, belated entry into the global economy and poor use of cultural diplomacy in Indian statecraft (Lee, 2010c). For some authors, it is rather an outcome of abandonment of great soft power ambitions of its first

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generation of leaders, especially Gandhi’s and Nehru’s idealism (Hymans, 2009; Abraham, 2007). Still others claim that India’s reluctance to use its democracy credentials in foreign policy substantially weakens its soft power (Wagner, 2010; Tharoor, 2012). In the words of Shashi Tharoor (2012: 292), “India’s failure to leverage its soft power lies in its inability to exploit its own democratic tradition of freedom.” Kanti Bajpai (2014: 12) gives a longer list of the limitations of soft power resources by adding India’s increased domestic weakness: “lack of leadership, rudderless political parties, incoherent coalition governments, incapacitating federalism, rampant corruption, ramshackle bureaucracy, unrestrained judicial activism, irresponsible media coverage, undernourished civil society, increasing left and right wing radicalism, unchecked identity politics and human development levels that are often worse than that of the smaller South Asia countries and Sub-Saharan Africa.” This chapter offers comprehensive explanation of the weakness of India’s soft power and characterise major liabilities. It focuses on several major challenges for India’s attractiveness: the deficiencies of hard power, flaws of democracy and inefficient bureaucracy, underdeveloped software of diplomacy, and the need for a coherent foreign strategy. It offers some suggestions as to how can India’s government address these shortcomings and make a better use of soft power strengths. Modi as Soft Power Asset? India’s relatively respectable position on the international arena in the first years after gaining independence is commonly attributed to the personal skills, vision and charisma of its first leader – Jawaharlal Nehru. It is argued that, in the following decades, the leaders of the next generation were far less effective and respectable abroad. Certainly, the presence or lack of inspiring personalities impacts the country’s position: those who can inspire foreign audiences while dealing successfully in direct contacts with other world leaders naturally promote the standing of their country. The previous Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, who served from 2004 to 2014, was initially highly regarded as a prominent economist

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and author of Indian economic reform in the 1990s. Along with his professionalism, Mr. Singh’s practice of the Sikh religion strengthened the image of India as a diverse, secular and tolerant country, where members of all religious communities have equal access to the highest state office. However, his standing decreased during the second term within the governing Congress Party, and so declined his reputation in the international media; his negotiating position on international forums quickly followed. Singh’s low profile and reported reluctance to travel internationally further impaired India’s global interests. The rising weakness of the prime minister, as exposed in Sanjaya Baru’s book, The Accidental Prime Minister, underlined the impression of the leadership deficit in recent years. Hence, the successful election campaign, solid democratic mandate and personal charisma of new Prime Minster Narendra Modi revived confidence in the political system. Despite some dissenting criticism from sections of the domestic and international media, brought about by Modi’s close association with the right-wing Hindu nationalist movements and accusations of his murky role in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, Modi nevertheless won respect and support from many sides. In external affairs, he continues the course charted by his predecessors, but a number of initiatives and new style of diplomacy gave the impression of a more self-assured and assertive India. Narendra Modi placed economy at the centre of foreign policy and keenly increased India´s soft power through better utilisation of digital, cultural, and traditional diplomacy. Modi has emerged as one of the most active Indian prime ministers in the foreign relations domain. Within his first year in office, he undertook 19 state visits abroad, for both multilateral and bilateral meetings, and received a number of foreign leaders. He attended the BRICS Summit in Brazil, in July 2014; UNGA in the US, in September 2014; the East Asia Summit in Myanmar; the G20 Summit in Australia; and the SAARC Summit in Nepal, in November 2014. He also made trips to Japan, Germany, France and China. Delhi hosted, amongst others, leaders from China, Russia and the United States. From his inauguration ceremony, in

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May 2014, to which all SAARC leaders were invited, and first foreign trips to Bhutan and Nepal, Modi prioritised a neighbourhood policy. In the larger expansion to Asia, he transformed the “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy, promising more vibrant cooperation with South-East Asian nations. Even though he hardened India’s stance towards Pakistan, he generally pursued a pragmatic foreign policy focused on rebuilding the country’s credibility as a responsible power, stable democracy and business-friendly place. India managed to strengthen relations with all major powers, despite the increasingly divided international community. Modi upheld a strong partnership with Russia and did not join the West in imposing sanctions, and yet managed to rebuild strained relations with the US: American President Barack Obama was even a special guest for the 2015 Republic Day. But Modi’s interpersonal relations went deeper than just the surface: he secured the promise of multibillion-dollar investments in Indian infrastructure from Japan, China and the US, and he encouraged transfer of technology and supply of nuclear fuel from others. A new, remarkable element in foreign policy was the extensive use of social media as a key public diplomacy tool. Still, as chief minister of Gujarat, Modi had already been very active on Twitter, and one of the first decisions he made after taking office was to recommend his ministers to open Twitter accounts. The list of his followers quickly expanded to a record high. By mid-2015, with more than 12 million Twitter followers and 28 million Facebook page likes, Modi was the second-most followed political leader on social media, after US President Barack Obama (58 million Twitter followers and 43 million Facebook page likes). He has regularly used Twitter to connect with the public but also to send condolences and political messages to other countries. Moreover, in November 2014, he joined Instagram, and within hours of posting his first picture, the account had nearly 38,000 followers, and after the first five months, the number rose to more than 443,000 followers (Mallapur, 2015). Ahead of his visit to China – in May 2015 – Modi joined the Chinese social media platform Weibo to connect with Chinese citizens.

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Modi presents an open and dynamic style of diplomacy to reach the maximum number of people and communicate directly with the public. For instance, during his visit to New York, in September 2014, he found time, not only for official meetings with VVIPs, but also to interact with ordinary Americans at a concert in New York’s Central Park, to talk with the Indian diaspora during a rally in Madison Square Garden, to have breakfast with the CEOs of multinational corporations, and to give a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. He even made time to pen an op-ed in The Washington Post promoting his “Make in India” project. His omnipotent nature is not limited to the United States: Modi also became the first Indian prime minister to address the Australian Parliament while visiting the country in November 2014. Modi has walked the extra mile in using India’s cultural soft power in foreign policy. He has missed no opportunity to promote Indian traditions and heritage, boosting the pride of Indian’s in their country. In contrast to previous Indian prime ministers, Modi chose Hindi as the official language for public speeches and official contacts, stressing some kind of Indian linguistic sovereignty. Most of the new initiatives and campaigns were given Hindi names or acronyms as another sign of growing cultural self-assurance. To underline the importance of the past achievements in natural medicine made by Indian civilization, the new government has, for the first time, called into being a separate Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, cleverly abbreviated as AYUSH, which, in Sanskrit, means “long-life”. Naturally, Delhi has not been hesitant in projecting its rich cultural inheritance from the past or celebrate Indian values, languages and traditions, but it has also not shied away from promoting its modern culture. Modi supported traditional promotion through the ICCR Indian culture centres, additionally offering more innovative ways to promote Indian heritage. Buddha, Bollywood, Ayurveda, Yoga, curry or cricket became standard tools of public diplomacy. As India’s prime minister, Modi has been picking out certain artefacts based on the needs and expectations of his interlocutors, to warm up the atmosphere for

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bilateral visits and infuse more trust into cooperation. Symbolic visits to Buddhist temples in Japan or Sri Lanka, or supporting the Indo-Chinese film co-production on the life of a Chinese monk – Xuan Zang (Hieun Tsang), who, in the 7th century, spent 17 years in India, or visiting a cricket stadium in Australia – such symbolic gestures have become a trademark of his diplomacy (Aneja, 2015). Buddhism has been at the heart of India’s efforts in the region of South-East Asia to build stronger ties, promote tourism and reassure India’s spiritual leadership in the region. Reviving Indian heritage as a birthplace of Buddha, Modi aims at projecting India as a “soft power” using the Buddha connect in political and economic diplomacy, in what Indian media recognises as “Buddhist diplomacy” (Aurora, 2015). As democracy has been used as an ideational bond with Western developed states, Buddhism has been recognised as a common ground with many Asian nations. This fits well into the idea of promoting Asian values, as opposed to universality of the Western liberal model. Even though Modi’s political roots are far from revering Mahatma Gandhi, he does not shy away from using this best known Indian icon for promotional gains. During his visit to China, in May 2015, Modi called Gandhi a “global citizen” and apostle of peace who can offer inspiration for finding a way out of contemporary crises. While launching the Centre for Gandhian and Indian Studies at Fudan University, he emphasised: “The world today is going through two major crises — global warming and terrorism. Solutions to both lie in Gandhi’s teachings. Gandhi is still relevant” (The Hindu, 2015b). The most spectacular example of using cultural heritage in foreign relations came with the establishment of International Yoga Day by the UN. During his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, on 27 September 2014, Modi called members to support the promotion of yoga around the world calling it “an invaluable gift of our ancient tradition.” With special mobilisation of the Foreign Office, the proposal soon won the support of 175 sponsors at the UNGA for the resolution establishing 21 June as the International Day of Yoga. The resolution was adopted

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with haste through an acclamation on 11 December 2014 – less than 100 days since the proposition was first tabled. This way, India reclaimed its special links with yoga and made it an international platform for the promotion of Indian values. Together with International Non-Violence Day, established by the UN in 2007, and celebrated on 2 October – the day of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth – this was the second recent important recognition of India’s contribution to humanity. Another crucial element in this new soft power strategy has become a bid for a stronger engagement with the Indian diaspora. Wherever Modi went, meetings with the Indian community were an important part of the program and spectacular public diplomacy undertakings. An event, organized in Madison Square Garden in the US, was a special occasion to celebrate the success of Indians abroad. At the 13th Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, held in Gandhinagar on 9 January 2015, Modi inaugurated an annual event and called the Indian diaspora the “great capital” for the country. He appealed to them to help transform the nation and especially to join the Clean Ganga campaign. He informed some 4,000 delegates from 57 countries about reforms to ease travelling and visa restrictions for overseas Indians and tried convince them that India is now the land of opportunities they were once seeking abroad (Gaikwad, 2015). He made promises to overseas Indians regarding lifelong visas and other incentives and encouraged them to take part in India’s development. It is very important for India’s soft power reforms to be undertaken at home. By launching several national campaigns and projects addressing the pressing needs of the country, like sanitation, water pollution, treatment of women, etc., Modi sent a clear signal that India is going to address and overcome its major challenges and no longer deny or ignore its shortcomings. The most important element of the new approach was the inauguration of the “Make in India” programme to present India as attractive economic partner and next manufacturing hub for the world. As part of this flagship campaign, Modi promised major reforms in bureaucracy, elimination of unnecessary rules and regulations, more

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transparency and accountability of the government and a more favourable environment for entrepreneurs. These moves have already changed the international perception of India and helped to build more confidence in the Indian economy, bringing more investments and trade. However, though he has already done much to better India’s image and attract new FDIs, the hardest part is yet to come: delivering on promises. As observed by the media, “substantive policy changes and not speeches alone would determine the success of Narendra Modi’s desire to bolster investment and encourage tourism and manufacturing” (Pande, 2014). Hence, although there is a lot of room for optimism after his first year in office, the coming years will show whether Modi’s imprint on India’s soft power will be a lasting one or end in another disappointment at home and abroad. Re-branding India Promoting a new narrative about India is not an easy task, as it must begin from a relatively low starting point. It is important to remember that India has been, for decades, depicted and understood as huge and interesting but at the same time as a highly impoverished and underdeveloped country, with rich spiritual traditions but also a highly unequal society. India needs to challenge age-old stereotypes and racial prejudices still prevalent in some countries. As explained by Nayar and Paul (2003: p.93), “India has been a victim of pervasive cultural biases and racism prevalent in the global system. India’s inability to obtain a leadership position would thus be regarded as the result of the widely held stereotypical and negative images of India, especially in the West.” It is not only a problem of India’s underdevelopment,it may also refer to the heritage of colonial rule and the general attitude of superiority of the West towards post-colonial states, which Edward Said exposed in his famous 1978 book, Orientalism. Although there is a growing interest in the “rising India” in the West, still many people continue to look at it through the prism of old clichés of a socialist, non-aligned or mystical state.

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One important example of this patronising attitude is the West’s discriminatory policy on nuclear weapons, in which “India has been portrayed as the part of the ‘other’ who cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.97). John Hymans may be right when he observes (2009: pp.238–9), that Western perceptions of India have oscillated between two dominant negative images: that of “Feminine India” – soft and tempting – and “Savage India” – violent and irrational. These images are present today and form “India’s soft vulnerability.” Challenging this perception in the modern globalised era is even more complicated, as Western media coverage concentrates usually on bad news and individual accidents, reaffirming the negative image of a country. Hence, it would require extra effort to construct a new narrative about India. And this cannot happen without the Indian state’s active participation. The “Incredible India” campaign, a more active cultural promotion or stronger engagement with the diaspora, are some examples proving that the administration can effectively shape the country’s image in the world. But still, much is needed to rework old assumptions and myths. The “Make in India” campaign, launched in 2014, focuses on economic potential of the country and is a much-needed successor to the previous “Incredible India” project. It supplements an exotic image of India as a land of adventure with a new one of India as a land of business opportunities and an emerging economy. Regardless of its effects on the investment flows to India, it can be instrumental in spreading a new message of India as a modern country and promising partner. In the modern days of globalisation and with the rise of non-state actors, nation branding exercises should not be confined to activities of the administration alone. India needs to better use the large potential of its media, civil society and business community to this end. They need to be engaged and encouraged to get involved in projecting India’s image abroad. There is a lot to be changed still. There are over 2 million non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in India, the largest number in the world, but they are almost exclusively

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focused on domestic issues. As a result, India has no influential NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or Greenpeace, which have become valuable tools of soft influence from Western countries. Conferring the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 to Kailash Sathyarthi has been a historic recognition for the work done by Indian civil society, and it will no doubt improve its voice on the global arena. As Indian NGOs concentrate on massive challenges at home, they have rich experiences in areas that are in high demand in many developing countries. The example of vocational training programmes, run since 2008, in Afghanistan by the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), shows the model that could be replicated in other places (Timmons, 2012). Instead of curbing their freedom of operations, the government should consider opportunities to strengthen their capabilities for external activities. Indian research institutions are already enthusiastic to play a more active role in this regard and are significantly natural allies of the government in informing global debates on international affairs. India is a country with one of the largest number of think tanks. According to the one of the most influential University of Pennsylvania rankings— which compares the world’s think tanks— in 2014 there were 191influential institutions from India (2015). Those with more think tanks than India were only: the United States – 1,830, China – 429, the United Kingdom – 287, and Germany – 194. India is ahead of countries such as France (177), Argentina (137), Russia (122), Japan (108), and Canada (99). Still, the quality of these organisations is not always fully recognised. In the top 100 Think Tanks Worldwide list (Non-US), there were four Indian institutions listed: the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (31), the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) (51), the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (81) and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (82). When the list includes all think tanks, taking into account American ones, which traditionally have a numerous presence, then among 150 institutions, there were six from India: the Centre for Civil Society (50), the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (100), the Indian Council for Research on International Economic

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Relations (ICRIER) (105), the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (107), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (114), and Development Alternatives (DA) (129). On the list of the top think tanks from China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, only India has 15 institutions mentioned. When ranked by area of research, two categories are interesting, especially in terms of soft power. Among the 85 top Defense and National Security Think Tanks, India has three representatives, as compared to 22 from the US, five from the UK, four from Germany and only two from China. These Indian institutions were: the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (40), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (54), and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (72). In the listing of the top 85 Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks, India had two institutions (the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS, 72; and ORF, 81) in comparison to 16 from the US, four from the UK and three from China. These organisations are important actors in Track-II diplomacy and can make India’s perspective better heard globally. Other areas for nation branding, which have not been fully explored so far, are sport events and international awards. India is the only country amongst the nations of BRICS that has not organised a major global sport competition in recent years, and it does not plan any in the foreseeable future. Despite having the largest cinema industry in the world, India has no awards comparable to those assigned by the Western world. The American Oscars or French Palme d’Or (“Golden Palm”) not only set trends in the entertainment industry but also can be seen as soft power tools that promote certain values and decide important contemporary issues. Similarly, the Nobel Peace Prize, conferred by Norway or the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, awarded by the European Parliament, are means to promote European values on the global stage. One major Indian political prize, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding, administered by the ICCR, is hardly known beyond South Asia, and its influences are limited. In

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the global competition of ideas and values, these symbolic actions and political prizes can legitimise certain policies and behaviours. That explains China’s establishment of its own peace prize – the Confucius Peace Prize – in 2010. India, with its democratic credentials, is much better positioned to strengthen prestige and international appeal of its Nehru Prize or create a new award that can more effectively challenge the Western-driven international agenda. Finally, India should better use its media for foreign policy goals. Today, although journalists can play an imperative role in influencing short-term policy decisions, the Indian media, in general, remains Indocentric and focuses mostly on local and national issues. Major Indian newspapers and TV channels have few foreign correspondents, who are based mostly in Washington and London, which hampers international reporting (Markey, 2009: p.195). Despite their large circulation in India, Indian newspapers are hardly available abroad, and India is the only country among the major powers lacking a round-the-clock TV news channel to disseminate Indian perspectives on global affairs. The most popular private news channels (such as News 18 India, part of the TV18 group, as well as NDTV 24x7) can hardly compete with major news stations such as BBC or Al Jazeera. Interestingly, as Thussu observes (2014), “the Indian state broadcaster, Doordarshan, remains one of the few major state news networks not available in important global markets at a time when global television news in English has expanded to include inputs from countries where English is not widely used, including Japan and Iran.” Thussu ascribes this fact to “bureaucratic apathy and inefficiency” in India. The media can be also helpful in educating domestic society about increasingly complex international relations, India’s foreign policy, and building bridges with other nations. One respectable example, which can be replicated in other countries, is the Aman Ki Asha campaign (Hope for Peace), run jointly by the Times of India and Pakistani Jang media house. The programme contributes to a better understanding between people in two rival countries. Providing special programmes and

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financial incentives, the government could encourage more activism by private media in external relations. Indian public diplomacy must be more proactive in countering the negative presentation of India abroad. Reaching out to foreign audiences with its own positive message is an uphill battle, as good news does not attract attention of the media as easily as negative news. Still, public institutions appear to be rather passive. Surprisingly, the PDD had no strategy to swiftly counteract the negative fallout on India’s international image following the Delhi gang rape in 2012. As one PDD official explained, this needs no official mitigation strategy as “time itself would heal the image and set the record right” (Interview with PDD official, New Delhi, April 2013). Without a more proactive approach, the negative stereotype of India as a land of oppression, sex violence and discrimination against women and other minorities will be only strengthened. This passivity is a mistake, as India has many good stories to tell about women, empowerment, gender equality and the fight against poverty. It is important for the government to go beyond spreading the message about its achievements and successes,by also better explaining India’s domestic challenges to foreign audiences. Although poverty will remain a major hindrance in the projecting of India’s international reputation, the government should be more vocal about efforts undertaken to tackle the problem. Shying away from debate on its internal difficulties or going into denial about its major shortcomings is not a reasonable option in the current globalised era, in which there is easy access to information and growing international scrutiny of every country. In fact, it must be openly explained to the world that the underdevelopment is not the result of indifference of the independent India to the plight of its citizens, but rather, a result of centuries of colonial exploitation and an unfair postWorld War II global system. There is no shortage of initiatives that the Indian government has implemented to eradicate poverty and unleash the potential of its citizens. But international public opinion knows very little about them and has

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limited occasion to hear about them from official sources. Although many people in the world have heard about Brazil’s social programme, BolsaFamilia, far fewer have heard about India’s many schemes, such as the massive Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which provides 100 days of work to rural households. India runs several affirmative action endeavours and social programs. According to the UNDP, India has increased central government spending on social services and rural development from 13.4 per cent in, 2006–2007, to 18.5 per cent, in 2011–2012. And social services as a proportion of total expenditure rose from 21.6 per cent, in 2006–2007, to 24.1 per cent, in 2009–2010, and 25 per cent, in 2011–2012 (HDR, 2013: 3). In order to the change the perspective that the international community has about India, it needs to devise a better communication strategy to promote knowledge about the efforts undertaken to eliminate poverty, ease domestic tensions, and to realise the potential of its young and vibrant population. As a country that has made enormous progress in eradicating poverty and has slowly turned, from being a recipient of foreign aid, into a donor of assistance to other countries, India is in a position to play a leading role in contributing to international discussions about development cooperation, the global fight against poverty and new development goals in the post-2015 period. Soft power instruments— from information campaigns to international conferences and track-II dialogues, are useful not only to project a positive image of India abroad but also to discuss and explain the complex reasons behind the persisting negative elements in its functioning. It is important to remember, “If a country fails to tell its own story, its image will be shaped exclusively by the perceptions of others” (Byers, 2009: p.1). Addressing the Hard Power Deficit India’s case seems to confirm the opinion that significant soft power is possible only if based on solid hard power foundation. It is argued, rightly, that a country tells a better story when it has strong hard power

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credentials and achievements as “no state or population seeks to emulate or follow a weak or poor state” (Lee, 2010c: 7). The Indian government’s efforts to promote a new image of modern and developing India will not be successful as long as there will be easily visible malnourished children aplenty on the streets along with images of poor infrastructure. Without solving its most persisting economic problems and providing more opportunities to its society, India’s image abroad will continue to remain flawed. The major challenge is thus to deal effectively with its problem of poverty. As convincingly summarised by Tharoor: “India can’t be a superpower and super poor at the same time” (The Hindu, 31 October 2011). Although India managed to reduce its poverty levels from 49.4 per cent, in 1990, to 32.7 per cent, in 2012, it continues to be home to the largest population of impoverished people on the planet (HDR, 2013). Despite almost 5 per cent income growth annually, on average between 1990 and 2012, India’s per capita income is still low, around US$ 3,400 in 2012; and its position on a number of socio-economic indicators remains below the global average. In 2012, India was ranked at 136th place out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index. Its infant mortality rate is still relatively high (48 deaths per 1,000 live births), and one in three malnourished children in the world is Indian, which former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recognized as the “national shame” (BBC, 2012b). At the same time, there are a growing number of billionaires in India, with 36 people listed on the Forbes list of the world’s super-rich. Economic disparity is not confined to differences between the rich and poor, but also between different states and regions, numerous social castes and ethnic groups. What is even more worrying, as shownby one recent study, is that this rapid economic growth has widened economic inequality, limiting “the impact of growth on poverty alleviation” (Kohli, 2012: XI). The stunning contrasts of India’s economic and social strata, aired on the international media, does little to build up a good reputation of the country.

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Moreover, the poverty of its citizens constrains state actions in other spheres and complicates realisation of a more ambitious foreign policy. For instance, many people in India and abroad object to the country’s foreign assistance in situations where aid is required at home, as many parts of the country and numerous Indians are striving for limited resources in the first place. Why should India provide scholarships to foreign students when it cannot accommodate the rising educational needs of its own citizens? Similarly, some technologically advanced and ambitious achievements are seen not as reason for pride and soft power, but, on the contrary, are points for questioning and annoyance. One example is the remarkable success, from 2013, when India sent a mission to Mars, joining the elite club of space powers. The space program, in a country where children are dying from hunger and curable diseases, was, for many, an absurd notion. As pointed out in an article in the New York Times: “The inescapable question is why does primary health care in India not have the sort of scientist-hero founder, the dedicated researchers and the extraordinary government support that its space program has enjoyed?” (Manu, 2013). Poverty and underdevelopment are, therefore, not only a crucial limitation of India’s hard power but also of its soft power. Tharoor is right when he writes (2012: p.312) that India will not be a good brand and will not appeal to others, unless it becomes “a healthy and prosperous place for all Indians.” Luckily, this has been well recognised by the Indian government, which, consequently, regards sustained, fast and inclusive economic development as its most important strategic goal. Achievement of this goal will determine the fate of India’s future and further shape its soft power aspirations. Along with economic underdevelopment, the other hard power deficit – security threats – severely undermines India’s power of attraction. A country with the strong Maoist insurgency (Naxalism) affecting a sizable chunk of territory; violent separatism in Kashmir and the North-East states; over 30 officially recognized, and over 40 active terrorist organizations; and the unresolved conflict and border dispute

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with Pakistan, India comes with many flaws affecting its attractiveness to others. Indeed, India is one of five countries most affected by terrorism, and terrorist attacks, and those incidents, such as the one in Mumbai in 2008, painfully expose the country’s vulnerability. The internal instability draws domestic resources, increases political risk for investors and undermines India’s international legitimacy. One special case is the Kashmir dispute. This has been one of the longest conflicts in contemporary times and is regarded as a potentially major flashpoint on the planet, with the possibility of escalating events that could even lead to nuclear war. Border skirmishes, terrorist attacks and anti-India protests in the Jammu and Kashmir states provide many opportunities to portray the country in a negative light. The Kashmiri diaspora and international human rights groups regularly criticise India for the militarisation of the area, human rights violations and failure to pay attention to the demands of the local population. Although the situation in the region has improved considerably, in comparison to that of the 1990s, with India largely managing to fend off any international involvement in this dispute, the Kashmir issue constrains the country’s leadership in South Asia and its global rise. The fact that it is Pakistan helping to keep this issue boiling is of little help to India. Finding a sustainable and peaceful solution to this problem is crucial for India to considerably improve its international image and free itself from important constraints in foreign policy. As this appears to be nowhere in sight, for the moment, Indian diplomacy will have to try harder to better communicate its stance on the issue, minimise the risk of civilian casualties and improve its human rights record in order to mitigate the negative fallout from the crisis. Improving internal security and stability will remain a daunting task for some time to come and will limit the country’s soft power. Reforming Bureaucracy The Indian bureaucracy may be credited for its professionalism and contribution to the endurance of the Indian state, but it contributes, just

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as often, to the country’s bad name. Rampant corruption, ineffective public institutions and outdated regulations not only undermine India’s global image but also bear weighty economic costs. According to the Corruption Perception Index, prepared by the international think tank —Transparency International, in 2013, India was ranked in the distant 94th position out of 177 countries, behind United States (19th), Brazil and South Africa (72nd), China (80th) and Sri Lanka (91st) , but performing better than Pakistan and Russia (127th) (TI, 2013). India is ranked 134th in the World Bank’s 2013 Doing Business Report, between Yemen and Ecuador. The ease of doing business in India is assessed worse than that in all developed countries but also worse than other emerging powers: South Africa (41st), Russia (91st), China (96th), Brazil (116th); and even worse than most of India’s neighbours in South Asia: Sri Lanka (85th), Nepal (105th), Pakistan (110th), and Bangladesh (130th) (World Bank, 2014). Numerous, lengthy and costly procedures to start a business, complex tax regulations, difficulties with obtaining construction permits and disappointing protection for enforcing contracts are major obstacles for entrepreneurs in India. The weak and ineffective state is a target of criticism of many liberal-minded scholars and journalists in India. Unlike in China, where the economy grows, thanks to the government’s strong role, in India, the economy grows despite the state. As Indian economist Gurcharan Das illustratively writes, “India grows at night, while the government sleeps” (Das, 2012: 1). Severe public outrage at the government’s perceived corruption led to massive anti-government protests led by Anne Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal, and eventually, the public fury manifested itself in the historic defeat of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition in the 2014 elections. Clearing public life from corruption and improving the quality of public services remain two of the major challenges for the new BJP government. Prime Minister Modi recognises this as one of his major priorities and has made bold commitments to reform bureaucracy and regulations to return to fast economic growth. He has promised to rid the burden of redundant laws, reminiscent of colonial times or of socialist-

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and state-controlled economy, to free the potential of entrepreneurial Indians and attract more foreign capital. He has vowed to move India to the top 50 countries in the ranking of ease of doing business of the World Bank in two years’ time. The success or failure will significantly influence India’s power of attraction, as the country’s economic progress in the last two decades has been a major factor behind the rising global recognition of India’s role. Another specific bureaucratic liability, important for the country’s image abroad, is the hardship of its visa policies. As correctly observed by Tharoor, “If soft power is about making your country attractive to others, the Indian bureaucracy seems determined to do anything in its (not inconsiderable) power to achieve the opposite effect, in the way in which it treats foreigners wishing to travel to or reside in India” (2012: p.292). Time-consuming, expensive and often complicated, the visa process is what drives many people to opt for other destinations for tourism or business. One especially irritating rule was introduced due to security concerns, after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 (happily withdrawn by late 2012), which prohibited return to India before a twomonth break. The most discriminatory rules are those towards Pakistani nationals, which not only contribute to low favourability of India in Pakistan but which also do not go unnoticed by global public opinion. This case elucidates how hard security considerations were given precedence in Indian statecraft, which, in a way, proved detrimental to its soft power in the end. As Tharoor exposed the harshness of this procedure, “journalists and even academics deemed to be insufficiently friendly to India are often denied visas or required to produce so much documentation, or fulfill so many conditions, that they give up the effort. Some who have expressed criticisms of India in the past, whether or not these criticisms are well founded, are placed on a negative list and denied visas when they apply. Such practices are disgraceful in principle in a democracy; worse, since they are intended to avoid negative views about India appearing abroad, they ensure precisely what they are trying to prevent” (Tharoor, 2012:

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p.294). Moreover, those who need to stay in India for longer periods must undergo additional verification for registration at the Foreign Registration Regional Offices – testing the good feelings and patience of even the most ardent India supporters. Treatment of foreign visitors evidences a lack of transparency, openness and willingness to interact with foreign audiences. As Tharoor further states, “India’s ability to promote and leverage its soft power in the world will receive a major boost only if and when the country’s visa policy is thoroughly re-examined and, ideally, revised” (2012: p.294). Happily, this is anticipated to happen, as India is implementing the reform of its visa policy that many have urged for. Since 2011, it has offered issuance of visa-on-arrival for tourists of several countries. In early 2014, the government announced that, by the year’s end, the scheme will be dramatically expanded and will encompass all but eight countries (The Indian Express, 14 February 2014). In November, the Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) facility became operational for citizens of over 40 eligible countries. This was available for up to 30 days visit for tourism, medical treatment or business, and it encompassed those who arrive at one of eight selected airports. The scheme was renamed e-Tourist Visa (eTV) on 15 April 2015 and expanded to include over 70 countries. Soon, it will include most countries. This reform could be another right step to significantly relieve visa application bureaucracy and contribute to a rise in tourist trips to India and a better perception of India abroad. Nurturing Democracy One of the greatest strengths of India’s soft power is its open, pluralistic and democratic political system. Despite its many flaws, Indian democracy is commonly credited for the relative stability and resilience of internally diverse India as one country (Oldenburg, 2012). This value must be protected and democracy deepened to guarantee an inclusive and peaceful society. As rightly argued by Tharoor (2012: 289), “to wield soft power, India must defend, assert and promote its culture of openness

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against the forces of intolerance and bigotry inside and outside the country.” Responding to rising expectations of its increasingly aspiring society and international scrutiny, India needs to improve the quality of political life as well as the effectiveness and transparency of the current system. The 2014 general elections were celebrated in India and made headlines in international media with images of the energetic, colourful and largest-ever democratic exercise on earth. While this success must be cherished, emphasised and promoted, at the same time, the government cannot ignore difficult questions being raised about democratic deficiencies. There is an urgent need to invite reforms to remove persisting flaws, find answers to existing problems and improve the dismal human rights records. International human rights organisations have often criticised India for excessive use of force by security personnel, the death penalty, arbitrary arrests and detentions, tortures and reoccurring communal violence (AI, 2012; HRW, 2014). In the 2014 report of Human Rights Watch, India was criticised for, “restrictions on Internet freedom; continued marginalization of Dalits, tribal groups, religious minorities, sexual and gender minorities, and people with disabilities; instances of remained marginalized and often without redress; and  persistent impunity for abuses linked to insurgencies, particularly in Maoist areas, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, and Assam” (HRW, 2014: p.334). The Armed Forces Special Power Act of 1958 remains a matter of special concern: it gives extra impunity for armed personnel in Kashmir and other specified areas from any abuses and human rights violations. Human rights groups complain that, despite civil society pressure, authorities remain unwilling to repeal the law (AI, 2012: p.173). Although India has a right to protect its security and integrity by available means, it must calculate whether these measures incur more costs than benefits, domestically and internationally. Even if criticism from foreign sources is seen with suspicion in India, there are, more importantly, numerous domestic voices monitoring the

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state of democracy and reporting its deficit on daily basis. The National Human Rights Commission, an independent and public body, has been regularly tracking human rights violations since its establishment, in 1993. Local NGOs and human rights activists, experts, and journalists, such as Arundhati Roy, expose failures of the Indian state in different spheres and the perils of environmental degradation, political criminality or marginalisation of minorities. The Indian media exposes disturbing trends in rising sex ratio imbalances, violence against women (rape, acid attacks, dowry death, sexual exploitation), and communal strife. Although it is not possible to change India’s situation overnight, as development and education needs time, better formulation and implementation of laws and policies is a daunting task. Tharoor is right when he says, “every time there are reports of sectarian violence or a pogrom like the savagery in Gujarat in 2002, or nativist attack like those by a fringe group in 2010 on women drinking at a pub in Mangalore, India suffers a huge setback to its soft powers” (Tharoor, 2012: p.288). Unfortunately, the vicious gang rape on a student in Delhi by five men on December 2012, or another instance of communal riots, like the one in Muzaffanagar in UP in autumn 2013, in which around 50 people died, deals further blows to India’s reputation abroad. It is not to say that the Indian state has been a passive observer of these internal challenges; on the contrary, the government has been proactive in some spheres by making the democratic system more responsive and efficient. For the first time in many years, high ranking officials were sent to jail for corruption, and new laws were introduced to provide women better security. Massive civil movements and protests against corruption, in 2011, or against violence towards women in, 2012 and 2013, reflect a more active and assertive nation, striving for a better life. This capital that cannot be wasted. A recent report by Human Rights Watch (2014) observed more positive steps: “strengthening laws protecting women and children, and, in several important cases, prosecuting state security force personnel for extrajudicial killings. The impact of these developments will depend in large part on effective follow-up by central government authorities.”

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The historic victory of the BJP, in 2014 national elections, and the growing popularity of “Hindutva ideology” posed new questions about India’s democracy. In the light of recurring attacks on religious minorities, in the latter half of 2014 and early 2015, many people in India and abroad questioned the ability of the Indian state to control intercommunal relations and temper radicalisation of certain groups. Human rights groups and international media have criticised mounting religious intolerance and forced conversions, calling on Prime Minister Modi to “rein in the divisive agenda of his militant Hindu-nationalist supporters”  (The New York Times, 2014). Also, President Obama observed in a speech, during his successful visit to New Delhi, in January 2015: “India will succeed so long as it is not splintered along the lines of religious faith.” Another editorial in the New York Times, in February 2015, titled “Modi’s Dangerous Silence”, called on the Indian prime minister to take a stance against religious violence. The crisis was eventually put to an end, after Modi, on 17 February, strongly condemned religious intolerance and vowed to crackdown on communal violence (The Wall Street Journal, 2015). Nevertheless, this is a warning for India. Communal harmony and internal stability are not as important for international public opinion as it is for India itself. Indian strategist Raja Mohan (2014) warned in December 2014, “If unchecked, the extremist forces of the Hindutva will not only undercut India’s soft power but also overturn Modi’s hopes to rapidly enhance Delhi’s hard power through a vigorous engagement with friends and partners” (Mohan, 2014). Any changes in the status of Indian Muslims, the attempted reform of Article 370 or the rising intolerance, could worsen the already burgeoning internal instability and harm India’s global reputation. One important area to measure the quality of the political system is freedom of speech and the media. In the 2014 World Press Freedom Index, an annual ranking of countries compiled and published by  Reporters Without Borders, India was classified in a distant 140th place, between Chad and Jordan, and worse than even Afghanistan

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or Nepal. This abysmally low ranking is not acceptable for the world’s biggest democracy. Restrictions imposed on media harm not only India’s international reputation but are counterproductive for its domestic functioning. As argued by Tharoor, “Free speech keeps our government accountable and helps political leaders know what people are thinking” (2012: p.302). India should avoid going the Chinese way, as democracy is one crucial area in which India has an obvious edge over its regional rival (Lee, 2010b). Government decisions that infringe on the independence of the media and freedom of expression send a negative signal. It is certainly not a smart policy to limit criticism of the government by limiting freedom of speech (Tharoor, 2012: p.302). Government attempts to control and censor Facebook or Twitter, over a controversy with Union Minister Kapil Sibal, or the arrest of anti-corruption cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, on sedition charges, in 2012 (BBC, 2012c), or two young women, over comments posted on Facebook (BBC 2012d), did not serve India’s reputation well. It stirs concerns about the state of India’s democracy and brings India dangerously close to dictatorial regimes, which seek tools to limit Internet access for their own populations. National security benefits from such actions are also questionable. The government’s decision, in January 2013, to make it compulsory for the police to seek clearance from high-ranking officials before making an arrest, under the 66A section of the Information Technology Act— previously much abused, was a step in the right direction to protect basic rights (HRW, 2013), but threats to freedom of speech are still pervasive. In this sense, the verdict of the Supreme Court, in March 2015, to strike down Section 66A  of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), was hailed by civil society, media and external observers as a “victory of free speech” (The Hindu, 2015a). This signaled the endurance of India’s system and the resilience of its democracy.

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Perfecting a Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy One fundamental element of soft power is the legitimacy of foreign policy. If the country’s decisions in external relations do not match its projected image, its soft power is undermined. In this sense, the problem for India is that its foreign policy objective and execution have been unclear, and it has been seen in recent decades as reactionary, defensive, ambiguous and lacking a long-term vision or grand strategy. As observed by David Malone (2011: p.72): “Indian foreign policy following the Cold War has been pragmatic, but it has also been devoid of the kind of strategic vision required for India to achieve great power status.” Pragmatism, although often more efficient than principled foreign policy, also causes inconsistency in India’s position on international issues. India often behaves differently on similar matters, depending how it perceived its interests as being better secured. For instance, it can sign a declaration on strategic partnership with Iran in 2003, yet vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency resolution in 2005 and 2006; vote against Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Commission in 2012 and 2013, and abstain from voting on the same issue in 2014; stand for the principle of non-intervention and territorial integrity and national sovereignty when criticising the Western intervention in Libya, in 2011, and refrain from criticising Russia, its important ally, when it breached the sovereignty of Ukraine in Crimea, in 2014. India’s abstention from voting in many crucial conflicts (e.g., Syria 2012, Ukraine 2014) creates misunderstanding in the assessment of its intentions. It struggles to reconcile its calls to nuclear disarmament with the buildup of national nuclear capabilities and its traditional criticism of the discriminatory character of the current nonproliferation regime with its rejection of the same rights for Iran. As one former Indian diplomat admits, “it is of course illogical that India should be asking other States to observe their obligations under an international treaty that India itself has not signed” (Sikri, 2009: p.143). These confusing decisions open India to criticism and questioning, by some, of its ability to be a “responsible power” that can share the burden of providing security and stability throughout the world.

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Moreover, in the realm of global governance, “India has been accused of being a spoiler on issues as diverse as trade, nuclear non-proliferation and humanitarian intervention” (Mukherjee, 2013: 11). Malone (2011: p.249) claims that even though “India’s stature has grown, its stake in some forms of multilateralism has diminished”. Its position in the WTO, the CTBT, and the NPT or climate change negotiations is seen as “obstructionist”, “arrogant”, “moralistic”, or “confrontational” (Malone, 2011: pp.300–302). Moreover, human rights groups and certain Western governments claim, “India did not live up to expectations in promoting respect for democracy and human rights in its foreign policy. Although the country aspires to a growing role in world affairs and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it did little to address some of most pressing problems confronting the world in 2013, such as the crises in Syria and Egypt” (HRW, 2014: p.341). It is criticised for its reluctance to share more burdens as a “responsible stake holder” to match its major power aspirations. In a sense, this means India rejects the notion of its special role in international relations, which it claimed during the Cold War. According to Raja Mohan (2003: p.268), “the critics of the new foreign policy have accused India of giving up its unique moral standing and political exceptionalism in the world. In becoming less ideological and intensifying the quest for the traditional attributes of national strength, India has become a normal power that is no longer focused on transforming the world.” Also, as Malone confirms,“post-1990 India was no longer as convinced of its moral uniqueness and began to think of itself as a nation like several others in the quest of great power” (Malone, 2011: p.236). This “normalcy” and abdication of larger international aims may bring more short-term gains and be perceived positively in the West, but it was highly disappointing for many in India and the developing world. As stated by one scholar, India lost its “once distinctive diplomatic voice”, ethically informed uniqueness and, now, “it increasingly behaves like the countries it once criticized”. (Abraham, 2007: 4,210). It does not use

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the asset of its spirituality in foreign policy enough, which could form its largest source of soft power (ibid). Others argue that India does not properly use Nehru’s heritage of India acting as legitimate “peacemaker” and “honest broker” in world conflicts, and the potential of participation in UN peacekeeping missions is woefully unexplored. Overall, India’s lack of involvement creates a perception that it has stepped back from global politics and left the space it had occupied in the past as leader of the developing world. It risks missing some opportunities to make its voice heard at the global level. Unlike in the past, India is not actively engaged in diplomatic negotiations over many critical international issues, such as nuclear talks with North Korea or Iran, or the peace process in the Middle East or the African countries. Having enjoyed cordial relations with most of the conflicted parties, India could play a more active and positive role as an honest facilitator and earn more prestige in international affairs. As bitterly commented by one author, “Simply dispatching warm bodies for peace keeping missions is not quite what Nehru had envisaged as a proper role for India on the world stage. If contributions to UN peacekeeping are measures of soft power, then Bangladesh is ahead of India” (Chaulia, 2007). As a response to this gaping opportunity, the new government would be advised to come up with diplomatic initiatives that would put India as the main mediator and peace broker in important international crises to show its attractiveness as a “peace provider”. Finally, there is still a challenge linked to growing political fragmentation and influence of regional parties and regional governments on major external relation decisions. For instance, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee became a hindrance; putting herself in the way of strengthening cooperation with Bangladesh, as India has blocked major bilateral treaties with it since 2011, and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalita complicated the Centre’s relations with Sri Lanka, pressuring for a harder stance on the question of Sri Lankan Tamils in recent years. Although this has been temporarily resolved with the strong democratic mandate of the BJP in the last elections, roles of the centre and regions in

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foreign policy must be better defined to avoid confusion and stymieing solution=providing decisions. Moreover, the number of actors involved in India’s external relations – ranging from the Ministry of External Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister, to other ministries (Overseas Indian Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Trade, Tourism, Culture, Energy, Oil and Gas, etc.) to state agencies (like the ICCR) to private and non-state actors – have additionally amplified the sense of discord and lack of a cohesive external strategy agenda. By sending mixed signals to the international community, India undermines its own credibility. It seems that India is still trapped between its idealist principles and pragmatic national interest in pursuing foreign policy. Bridging these two elements is a daunting task, and internal divisions scar India’s international reputation. As India’s role in international affairs grows, the government will need to pay special attention to present a more coherent, predictable and legitimate foreign policy. It should make sure that it practices what it preaches, and insure its foreign policy choices are based on strong foundations. It does not necessarily mean that India needs to revert to an idealist and moral policy. It needs a policy that is based on clear, solid and convincing arguments. It would be advisable for India to describe these principles and directions in some grand foreign strategy. It should help to better coordinate foreign policy among different stakeholders and improve complementarity of efforts. It would also contribute to creation of an international image depicting India as more predictable and consistent. It is important that the new strategy envision the most effective combination of hard and soft power resources and develop the Indian image of smart power. India must go back to its tradition of diplomacy and not see things as a sum-zero game. As recalled by one Indian diplomat, Jawaharlal Nehru said: “no government can adopt a policy which is demonstrably to the disadvantage of the country. But, at the same time, he pointed out, we must strive to harmonise the national interests of various countries

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while advancing our own” (Dutt, 2007: p.247). This principle, as recalled by Indian President Pranab Mukerjee, as “enlightened self-interest”, can be a good base for India’s grand foreign policy strategy. Boosting Foreign Policy “Software” The under performance of India’s soft power has also been a victim of the same deficiencies that have hampered the effectiveness of its traditional diplomacy. Several authors have already underlined the problem of the modest capacities of the Indian Foreign Service, especially in relation to the growing scope and ambitions of Indian external policy (Markey, 2009; Rana, 2010; Sirkar, 2009; Tharoor, 2012). Indian expert Kishan Rana’s comparison of the Indian Foreign Service with several Asian countries reveals serious limitations and several bottlenecks in the functioning of Indian diplomacy. Daniel Markey (2009: p.189) called it a problem of the “software” of India’s foreign policy, understood as “the intellectual and constitutional infrastructure needed to exercise power on the international arena.” It consists of five types of institutions: a nation’s bureaucracy, which is involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation, think tanks, universities, the media, and private business, which also plays a role in this domain. According to Markey, these institutions “charged with researching, formulating, debating, and implementing foreign policy are too often underdeveloped, in decay or chronically short of resources” (ibid). Firstly, the Indian Foreign Service is remarkably small, underpaid, and hobbled by its selection process, which “remains firmly rooted in the old civil service traditions” and rarely relies on outside expertise (ibid, pp.189–192). Although the quality of Indian diplomats is highly regarded and appreciated for its professionalism, the problem is in the quantity. With fewer than 800 professional diplomats in 2006, the service was stretched thinly across 119 resident missions and 49 consulates around the world. India’s diplomatic corps is not greater in numbers than other middle-size Asian states,such as Thailand or Indonesia (Rana, 2008), and the number of personnel in their their ranks too are far fewer than

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other major powers. As Markey pointed out in 2009, other developing states, like Brazil and China, have at least 50 per cent more professional diplomats than India; Germany and the United Kingdom have roughly four times more personnel; and the US has nearly 20,000 diplomats – far beyond the reach of any other country (Markey, 2009: p.196). In fact, this leads to a bizarre situation in which there are more American diplomats based at the US Embassy in Delhi than there are Indian diplomats in the MEA Headquarters of their home country. Being a country with over 1.2 billion people, India has only slightly more diplomats than city-state Singapore, with just over 5 million citizens. Although Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon advocated a doubling of MEA personnel back in 2007, this aim is hard to achieve with an average of 20 people admitted to the service every year (Markey, 2009: p.196). This imposes very practical and logistical problems for countries willing to strengthen cooperation with India. The problem is not only with a shortage of staff but also with financial allocation for diplomacy in India. The budget of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from 2006–2007, US$ 563.2 million, was virtually equal to that of Brazil, but roughly half of that of China, significantly below nations such as the UK (US$ 3.75 billion in FY 2006), Germany (US$ 3.02 billion in FY 2006), France (US$ 3.33 billion in FY 2007) and Japan (US$ 2.92 billion in FY 2007) and almost 20 times less than that of the US (around US$ 10 billion in FY 2006) (Markey, 2009: p.197). With such limited human capital and financial resources, not only is traditional diplomacy but also the newer soft power is being severely compromised. Secondly, Indian diplomacy suffers from limited cooperation and the intellectual support it receives from its universities and think tank communities. Even if India’s public institutions of higher education are, in general, highly regulated, poorly funded and rated below average on quality parameters, the science of International Relations (IR) is particularly underdeveloped and neglected (Markey, 2009: p.194). There are only a few academic institutions with comparable achievements and status in IR, such as the oldest School of International Studies at

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Jawaharlal Nehru University, in Delhi; although, even this institution does not play as influential a role as it did in the past. Moreover, there have only been a limited number of institutional links and cooperation between the MEA and other agencies involved in foreign relations on one hand and researchers and academicians on the other. The creation of the National Security Advisory Board – consisting of 20 non-governmental experts from various fields – as a consultative body to the National Security Council (established in 1998) stands as a positive, but rather isolated, example. The quality and relevance of research on IR is further constrained by limited access to information and archives on recent history of Indian foreign policy. Hence, Indian foreign policy is more influenced by sensational reports drafted by the vibrant Indian press and TV journalists, rather than by in-depth analysis and research of a growing number of scholars and experts on IR. Finally, experts point at the need for better use of private sector and media potential in Indian diplomacy. There are several important business organizations, (e.g., the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and ASOCHAM) and private corporations (e.g., Reliance, Infosys, TATA) that play an increasingly active role in international cooperation and promotion of India. There are also successful examples of privatepublic partnerships, like the Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) and “India Everywhere” campaign of 2007, which show the usefulness of combining private actors in building the positive image of India abroad. These initiatives should be further expanded and supported to broaden outreach and improve the effectiveness of official policies. Over the years, several propositions have been labeled in order to improve Indian diplomacy. Most crucially, the Indian government should step up the MEA budget, expand, reform, pay and train Indian Foreign Service officers, and consider ways to “bring non-career officers into the MEA and other parts of the foreign policy establishment as term-limited fellows” (Markey, 2009: p.205). The American expert further argues that the government should encourage growth of world-class social

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science research and teaching; dedicate extra resources to think tanks and universities dealing with international affairs; open wider access to government information, both historical and contemporary; and boost debates on foreign policy (Markey, 2009). Tharoor (2012) suggests that the IFS should make greater use of its NRI community, which is often well-exposed to the global arena and could significantly improve the quality of the Foreign Service. Still, after years of debate and modest reform, not much has changed in the organisation and strength of the IFS. Most recommendations made in recent years are still relevant and wait to be fulfilled. Until 2012, the Indian diplomatic cadre expanded only slightly, to 845 career diplomats and 3,962 total personnel (MEA, 2013). By December 2012, there were still over 500 vacancies in the diplomatic corps. On the positive side, however, there was a significant increase in the MEA budget, which doubled between 2007 and 2008 and again between 2012 and 2013, from Rs. 4572.39 crore to Rs. 9662.00 crore. There is also growing awareness about the need to strengthen the link between the MEA and the IR community in India (Suri, 2011: p.302). Several initiatives undertaken by the Public Diplomacy Division – including public lectures, an annual International Relations Congress, and development of a comprehensive database of experts – were launched to better utilise the expertise of Indian specialists and connect with society. The emergence of private think tanks, tasked primarily with international relations, and strengthening of public ones, as well as the growing popularity of IR science in public and private universities, all offer hope for stronger non-governmental input to foreign policy formulation from outside the government. Also, the promise of reform and expansion of the Foreign Services, included in the BJP manifesto in 2014, and the personal commitment of the new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, to strengthen Indian diplomacy, may push for real and substantial changes in India’s foreign policy software. As many previous promises brought little change, it is to be seen whether India will prepare itself better to play a larger international role this time.

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Strengthening Soft Power Capabilities Having invested considerably in soft power in the recent years, the Indian government needs to make another push for reinforcing specific soft power policies, instruments and institutions. Soft power should be recognized as a legitimate, real and important element in the country’s external relations, long dominated by hard security considerations. As argued by Tharoor, “India will not need to try as hard, but it will need to do more than it currently does to leverage its natural soft power into a valuable instrument of its global strategy” (2012: p.290). The scale of Indian development assistance, cultural diplomacy, and economic promotion all fall short of the actions of other major powers in this area. For instance, educational assistance offered by the ICCR, with over 3,000 scholarships to foreign students annually, must be appreciated, but it is still much less than what is made available by other major powers. Moreover, the attractiveness of these scholarships, in terms of financial conditions and quality of education, lags far behind many other available options. Similarly, cultural promotion is often old fashioned and under resourced. While the expanded network of Indian cultural centers abroad numbers 35 institutes, China aims at establishing 500 Confucius Institutes around the globe; the network of Alliance Francaise spans over 1,000 locations in 135 countries; and the British Council is present in several hundred cities in over 100 countries. With this level of engagement, India will fail in competition with China and other developed countries. More worryingly, even this modest scale of ambition has been at risk in recent years, as India’s main instrument for cultural diplomacy continues to wallow in a crippling fund crunch. Even as Modi’s government talks big about projecting India’s soft power, the dire financial situation has forced the ICCR to constrain its ambitions and look for new modes of operation. It is reported that, instead of further expanding the network of cultural centres, chairs abroad, the ICCR closed down centres in Toronto, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and a sub-centre in Fiji’s Lautoka (Mitra, 2015). According to the parliamentary standing

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committee report on the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), tabled in Parliament in early 2015, the ICCR was allocated just Rs 192 crore for its activities in 2015–16, instead of requested Rs 250.48 crore. This poses a risk that, unlike China, Indian cultural outreach may be limited in the coming years, unless new ways of operation are found. One idea is to open new centres in cooperation with either the foreign government or with private organisations. After the first such PPP  (private-public partnership) model, a cultural centre was opened in Spain, and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) since has drawn up the rules for opening more such centres. The next Indian cultural centre on the PPP model will be in Busan, South Korea (Mitra, 2015). Although this can be a temporary solution for hard times, India will need to find more resources for cultural promotion if it wants to be more active in projecting its vision. It would also need to improve coordination among many different public and private actors of different soft power initiatives and present a more proactive approach. Rana, a distinguished expert on India’s diplomacy, pointed out in 2010: “No effort has been made to reach out to the other actors that contribute to India’s overseas image; they deal with specific attributes of the country’s soft power, be it tourism authorities, or those dealing with the media, education and economic management and the like” (2010: 367). The problem was already acknowledged by Navdeep Suri (2011: 302), who commented: “In our context in India, several of these activities remain in independent silos and there is a need for us to evolve better coordination mechanisms and also take a longer term view on the entire issue of messaging and strategic communications”. One possible solution to this problem would be establishing a “public diplomacy board” like in some western countries, to coordinate and harmonise actions in a manner that reinforces the country’s image (Rana, 2010: p.367). Greater centralization of different soft power policies under the Ministry of External Affairs, as observed recently (with the merging of the MOIA with the MEA and the merging of the Public and External Public Diplomacy Divisions) seems to be a step in the right direction, but still, much more needs to be done.

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Conclusion Narendra Modi has attempted to reassure his audiences about India’s position as a major global soft power and strengthened its public diplomacy tools. Culture, the diaspora and social media have been given a larger role in the country’s external relations. Yet, important constraints remain, and India will need stalwart determination to overcome existing limitations. Overcoming some shortcomings, such as addressing development and security concerns, will take more time. Others, such as the reforms in the bureaucracy or improving diplomacy software, can be dealt with in the foreseeable future. Much will depend on the success of economic reforms and growth of its economy, both of which will give the government more room to manoeuvre. India will need to protect its assets (such as a democratic, open and secular society) and improve its hard power capabilities (such as tackling poverty, solving security threats, etc.) to wield its soft power. But it can already actively use its existing soft power instruments and invest more in this dimension of its external policy. Currently, there is no reason why India should be a defensive soft power. It is one of few countries that can offer cultural, political and economic models, alternative to the West or China. As the world is increasingly interested in India, the country should return this curiosity and adequately respond to this rising attention. It requires a willingness to engage in meaningful debates on different aspects of India’s perspective on crucial international topics and its internal issues. Although India’s development constraints are well known, this level of support will not make India a global power at par with other P5 members. In order to have more impact on international perceptions of India, there is need for further investment in soft power resources and strengthening soft power tools. Conclusion: Emerging Smart Power In the post-Cold War period, extensive writing has depicted India as a “rising power”. The bulk of attention has been paid to the huge potential

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of its growing economy and significant military build-up. Somehow, the less tangible dimension of India’s strength has been overlooked in the mainstream discourse. Opinions like that of Shashi Tharoor – India as a “land of better story” and its major global status lies in soft rather than hard power – have been largely ignored by the strategic community. This has changed only recently. As more countries heavily invest in increasing their soft power, India is pushing itself to catch up with this global trend. Without official declarations and much fanfare, India has emerged as major global soft power. This book has brought forward many examples of its tremendous potential, that make India one of the few countries capable of providing an alternative cultural, political and economic model from that promoted in the West or the East. A functioning democracy in a highly diverse and underdeveloped country, the “Mumbai consensus”, which tries to combine economic growth with equality and inclusiveness, or a multicultural society based on ideas of tolerance and pluralism, are features that can make India attractive to many other countries, if not in the whole world then at least in the developing South. The rising and increasingly influential Indian diaspora and economic potential will increase India’s opportunities to shape perceptions of other states and strengthen its impact on international discourse. Though India has had significant soft power potential at its disposal for some time now, it only started utilising it as a foreign policy tool after 1998. A number of political decisions and official speeches evidence soft power’s strategic and deliberate integration into India’s foreign policy. In recent years, the country’s policy towards its neighbours in South Asia has turned benign, as it has promoted deeper economic interdependence, offered more unilateral concessions, refrained from interfering in their domestic affairs, and showed restraint in using force in response to Pakistani provocations. At the global level, India has worked to build friendly relations with all states and promoted its image as a responsible power. Greater reliance on soft power is evident in the development of new institutions and instruments. This includes the separate Ministry

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for Overseas Indian Affairs, established in 2004, the Public Diplomacy Division in the MEA, created in 2006, and the Development Partnership Administration in the MEA, set up in 2012, along with several public bodies and private-public partnerships. India has significantly increased its financial allocation for public, cultural and economic diplomacy, development assistance and strengthened links with its large diaspora. The network of Indian cultural centers abroad has expanded greatly, as has the number of scholarships available to foreign students. These steps show how India’s soft power capacity has been translated into capabilities and used in foreign policy. This means that India is a “passive” soft power no longer. It not only has substantial soft power resources; it uses them actively for realization of foreign policy aims. Yet, India has emerged as a soft power of different kind. Even though it borrows from Joseph Nye’s idea, it has assimilated it creatively to adjust to a different context. India’s soft power seems more benign and less offensive and it works through inspiration rather than projection. India wants to be seen as a “power of example” that does not seek to impose its values, or political or economic systems on other countries. It understands soft power in behavioural terms as “soft use of power”. Its strategy is not to mask revisionist intentions and mitigate fears of Asian partners, as is the case with China’s charm offensive. Unlike the West, India does not export its democracy, does not condition economic assistance, and does not promote its culture aggressively. To borrow Robert Kagan’s famous statement: whereas Europeans are from Venus, because of their reliance on soft power, and Americans are from Mars, due to extensive use of hard power, Indians would be coming from the planet Earth, as they are in the midway between the US and Europe in their approach to power (Kagan, 2003). India’s approach is grounded in the idea of “enlightened self-interest”, based on the partnership of equals and mutual benefits. India’s example proves also that soft power is highly contextual. India’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in other countries internal affairs may be attractive to many developing countries but is looked at with suspicion by Western governments and societies that would like

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India to be more actively promoting democracy. Bollywood movies can be very effective in spreading Indian values in South Asia and parts of Africa but is less appealing to audiences in the West. It can be very difficult for each country, India included, to be a friend with everyone, and has the potential to put India’s image in jeopardy. At the same time one needs to remember that soft power is not equal to a “soft state”. As the example of the United States demonstrates, clearly, soft power countries can find it even easier to use their hard power capabilities when necessary. Moreover, a strong army and legitimate use of force can even enhance a country’s attractiveness. Thus embracement of soft power does not require renouncement of hard power. This seems to be well recognised by Indian leaders, as they draw an accurate lesson from their past, when over reliance on one of the two facets of power proved unsuccessful. Bitter experiences encountered in the 1950s and 60s show that soft power alone cannot make India a global power. At the same time , when in the following decades India focused heavily on its hard power and underestimated its soft power, it was not a much more successful approach. Relying solely on soft power is naive; depending exclusively on hard power is myopic. Only a seamless combination of the two can assure the country’s ascent on the global stage and realise its goals in the interconnected world and globalised times. A revival of a soft power strategy in India does not mean a return to the idealistic foreign policy characteristic of the first two decades of the independent country. On the contrary, it is a sign of a highly pragmatic policy, that has adjusted well to contemporary realities. Unlike in the Nehru period, when soft power was a substitute for its hard power brethren, today, India can use the two “faces of power” to complement each other in an integrated and effective smart power strategy. In this sense, Indian foreign policy has evolved, moving from the spectrum of greater soft power under Nehru, to hard power until the mid-1990s, to smart power in the 21st century. This book has focused on India’s soft assets, but it is not to say that the Indian government has neglected its hard power capabilities in recent

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years. On the contrary, military build-up and economic growth remain at the centre of India’s present development efforts. Following multibilliondollar investments in its army, technology and development, India has emerged as a nuclear power – with ballistic missiles and blue sea navy, a member of a narrow group of countries capable of sending spacecraft to Mars, in addition to being a new engine driving the global economy. As one scholar rightly writes, “since the late 1990s, India has enjoyed the happy situation of seeing its hard and soft power rise remarkably fast and in tandem” (Hymans, 2010). India’s case confirms, rather, that soft power cannot work effectively when separated from hard power. Contrary to Nye’s initial suggestion, soft power needs strong hard power behind it and successful policies at home and abroad. Soft power does not come only from intangible resources but draws heavily from its material wellbeing and military strength. Limits on India’s hard power are an obstacle also for the country’s soft power. Tense relations with neighbours, the simmering conflict in Kashmir and the North East, the Naxal insurgency, persisting poverty and unequal growth, communal clashes and sexual violence —all pose challenges to India’s internal stability and growth; such detractors also weaken “Brand India” abroad. Stronger soft power requires deepening of its democracy, improving bureaucratic efficiency, boosting its “diplomacy software” and forging a more coherent foreign policy strategy. It is true that the “soft power” concept, 20 years after its introduction in the science of international relations, remains elusive and contested, and needs further theoretical analysis to be better defined and understood. It does not, however, make it less real, as many countries include soft power elements in their foreign policies. In the current globalisation era, where brawn and coercive measures are less acceptable, and the more costly tools of realising state interests, where success in the international arena depends more on a country’s reputation, image, attractiveness and ability to co-opt others and influence their preferences. Perception matters in international relations, with diffused power and empowered citizens, as never before. More often, today, it is beneficial for a state to be admired

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by others, rather than be feared. A country’s success today, is defined not by the number of enemies it can kill but by the number of allies it can earn. It is important to remember that, “when you can get others to admire your ideals and want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them your direction” (Nye 2004a: X). While measuring soft power is difficult, there are already several achievements that would not have been possible for India to reach if it had not used its soft power tools. Thanks to the attractiveness of its culture, appeal of its values and more active economic diplomacy, India has managed to draw more tourists and foreign direct investments, despite persistent development challenges. The soft power approach made India more popular amongst the populace in South Asia and advanced the Look East Policy, minimalising the contest to India’s role of leadership in Asia. The image of India as a non-threatening power gives it an advantage over other major powers,such as China, Russia or the US. Moreover, it has wisely used its image as “the world’s largest democracy” and “natural ally” of the West to engage the US and the EU in strategic partnerships. The perception of India as a responsible and democratic country helped its de facto nuclear status recognition. To see how the soft power of India has played a role in this case, one needs only to note the radically different situation of Pakistan, which holds inadequate soft power sway. Yet, soft power will be even more important in the future as India strives for stronger role in global politics. Today, as in the past, India has far superior hard power capacities than its neighbours, except China, but it cannot match the muscle of current major powers. This will likely continue for the next few decades, although the gap will narrow considerably if India maintains the current pace of its economic stride. In the 21st century, India will neither fight its ascendance on the global stage neither will it force its smaller neighbours to accept its dominance in South Asia. The use of force in an era of globalisation and nuclear weapons is not a feasible option for India to pursue, and the South Asian states have more alternative friends, such as China or the US, to fend off

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India’s pressure. Instead, India should persuade its neighbours to accept its leadership in the region by improving credibility and giving them a stake in its success. Still, India waits to be recognized as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in a reformed UN, and to have more influence over the agenda setting by global governance institutions. Certainly, India will need to convince more countries and garner their support in crucial international negotiations, from climate change to non-proliferation. Soft power will be crucial to India to successfully realise all these aims. With its young, English-speaking, increasingly well-educated, tech-savvy and inspirational population, India is positioned to succeed in this global competition of soft powers. As one of the world’s oldest civilisations, with popular modern culture and a positive record in international affairs, India has accumulated a great deal of natural goodwill. Yet, it is evident from the analysis of global public opinion surveys that India’s image abroad is not as good as expected. It means that India’s immense soft power potential remains largely untappedstill and that much more can be done to further improve perceptions of the country and legitimacy of its foreign policies. India will need to attach even more importance to soft power and dedicate more resources to cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, foreign aid and relations with its diaspora. Also more effective communication is necessary to rebrand India as a modern country and global power. While India needs the world to fuel its growth, the world also needs India. Its transition from a relatively poor country to a major emerging market, management of multiculturalism and vibrant democracy, makes it a depository of knowledge and experience , all of which is much needed in other parts of the globe. Many countries in the Global South would welcome India’s leadership if it only could go beyond its individual interests and present a larger case for all those underprivileged in trade, climate change or migration negotiations. As a country that successfully has lifted millions of its citizens out of poverty, India should be more active in international development cooperation and a post-2015

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development agenda. Europe may be interested in learning from India’s model of tackling diversity and functioning multiculturalism. Friendly relations with most states give India a special edge to lend its diplomatic skills for solving international conflicts and crisis, from Iran and Syria to the South China Sea. Many would see India as a force for a moral international order. Its cultural, spiritual and ideological heritage may be a valuable source of inspiration for a more just, equitable and peaceful world. The UN declaration on World Non-Violence Day on 2 October, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, or International Yoga Day on 21 June, are two examples of how this potential can enrich humanity. But India’s aspiration may go beyond that. As one Indian author claims: In its foreign policy, India can and must play its role as a conscience keeper of the world. […] Half a century ago, a comparatively weak India had a stronger voice in the world because there was a certain morality and therefore a welcome boldness in India’s foreign policy. India was seen as a leader. Mahatma Gandhi, because of his moral and ethical view of life, has probably done more for the cause of peace and the image of India than any Indian. Today, regrettably India is being seen as a cap follower. Perceptions do matter, perhaps more than reality. As a junior partner, India will not make it to the high table. Leadership implies not just economic and military strength, but also ideas that inspire and motivate (Sikri, 2009: p.298). In the post-Cold War period, Indian foreign policy has been in transition. A policy whose identity is rooted in two interpretations: while some see it to be more pragmatic; for others, it appears as “reactive”, “defensive” and “ad-hoc”. Its international position has been described often in contradictory ways, as a “nuclear power” and “moral power”; “status quo power” or “revisionist power”; an “emerging power” or “hegemonic power”. Many of these labels actually refer to the question of whether India is “hard” or “soft” power. Here, it is argued that India is both: it is a smart power. India deliberately employs the soft power approach in its external relations to supplement, rather than replace, its hard power potential in an integrated smart power strategy.

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The electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which squarely emphasises the development of soft power, and the policy pursued by the new Prime Minister Narenda Modi, suggests that soft power will play an even larger role in the country’s external relations. The proposition of the idea of five “T’s” – Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology – and announcement of greater use of India’s comprehensive power, mark the beginning of a better-articulated smart power approach. Contrary to the popular perception and fear that the new BJP-led foreign policy would be more militaristic and based on material hard power, the present government is equally eager to rely on its soft power. India’s approach is grounded in the idea of “enlightened self-interest”, based on the partnership of equals and mutual benefits. There are still potential pitfalls round every corner which can endanger India’s internal stability and international position. For instance, the rising tensions with Pakistan, or the growing alienation of Indian minorities, which can be detrimental to the country’s growth and attractiveness. The new government needs to protect the soft assets of India while enhancing its hard power potential. By simultaneously rooting itself in culture and tradition, and also moving forward to meet the challenge of new situations, India can, from this vantage point project itself as an anchor for both its region and the world— as a rising smart power.

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