Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-3 9781472551764, 9780715639184

Citation preview

Conventions [ ] Square brackets indicate additions to the translation to complete the sense. < > Angle brackets indicate additions to the Latin text. Citations from Aristotle are in italics. Propositions, phrases or words referred to explictly are put in inverted commas. Italics are also used for Latin words and titles of books. Bold type is occasionally employed for emphasis. The references to Aristotle’s text by chapter and page/line are added to aid the reader and do not indicate that Boethius divided his work in this way. All lemmata are those provided by Boethius himself. Divergences from the lemmata in the continuous translation and the first edition of the commentary are noted as are any divergences from the received text of Aristotle.

vii

Textual Emendations 11,24 81,32 88,8 92,3 92,4 113,14 132,3 143,18-19 156,23 158,15 176,8

vocabat for Meiser’s vocabant. Adopting the reading vocem suggested by Meiser. Adopting from the Basil edition (1570) the reading ipsius for ipsarum of the MSS. Reading est for sit. Reading consignificat with T1 rather than Meiser consignificet. Reading tractatu with b. Add . Reading determinationes with FT. Meiser terminationes. Reading determinationem with TE for Meiser’s terminationem. Reading non dixit with T for Meiser’s dixit. The lemma is not given in the text but is taken from the continuous translation.

viii

Introduction Richard Sorabji Boethius’ second and larger commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation was written in Latin in the early sixth century AD in the style of Greek commentaries on Aristotle. Both commentaries were part of his project to bring to the Latin-speaking world knowledge of Plato and Aristotle. His project was for comprehensive translation of them and and for adaptation of the Greek commentaries on them. The project was cruelly interrupted by his execution at the age of about 45 between 524 and 526 AD, leaving the Latin world under-informed about Greek Philosophy for 700 years, although his commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation remained the standard introduction throughout the Latin Middle Ages. Aristotle’s On Interpretation In the first six chapters of his On Interpretation Aristotle defines name, verb, sentence, statement, affirmation and negation. This has standardly been seen as a progression beyond the subject of his Categories, which distinguishes single terms. For On Interpretation already studies the complexity of a statement, and it can be seen as pointing forward to the treatment in his Analytics of syllogistic arguments, which combine three statements, two of them premisses and one a conclusion. But C.W.A. Whitaker has argued that what turns out to interest Aristotle from Chapter 7 onwards is contradictory or contrary pairs of statements, and that these contradictory or contrary pairs relate rather to the practice of dialectical refutation discussed in Aristotle’s other logical works, the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi.1 In Chapters 8 to 10, Aristotle examines exceptions to the rule that in contradictory or contrary pairs one statement will be false and the other true. Chapter 11 addresses some puzzles about complex assertions, Chapters 12 to 13 consider pairs of statements involving possibility and necessity, while the last chapter, 14, discusses beliefs that are contrary.

1

Introduction

2

Boethius’ use of Alexander on the role of thoughts Boethius reveals to us how On Interpretation was understood not only by himself, but also by some of the best Greek interpreters, especially by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias (who flourished around 205 AD) and the Neoplatonist Porphyry (232-309 AD). Alexander, so Boethius tells us (11,13-13,11), defended the authenticity of the work against Andronicus. The latter was already concerned with questions of authenticity in the first century BC and had questioned a cross reference to Aristotle’s On the Soul. But he did so only because he failed to understand that when Aristotle said in Chapter 1 that his book was about the ‘affections’ which he had already discussed in that other work, he was not referring to passions. He was referring to thoughts, which were indeed discussed in On the Soul, as they are here (noêmata, 16a10 and 14). In fact the point made here that truth and falsity have to do with combination (sunthesis, 16a12 and 14) had been made in connexion with thoughts at On the Soul 430a27-7 (sunthesis noêmatôn). Boethius, like the Neoplatonists Dexippus and Ammonius before him, goes a little further and insists that truth and falsity are primarily created at the level of thoughts, not of spoken sounds, but only when the thoughts are combined, not while they remain simple (49,23-32). Aristotle himself had stated at 16a6 that spoken sounds are signs in the first place (prôtôn) of affections of the soul, in other words, of thoughts (noêmata, 16a10). Boethius’ use of Porphyry on written, spoken and mental names and verbs Later in the first chapter at 30,1-14, Boethius quotes Porphyry ascribing a distinction to the Aristotelian school, and making use of it to explain Aristotle’s wording. According to Porphyry, the school recognised three sentences (orationes), evidently types of sentence, one written, one spoken and one composed in the mind, or at 42,1517, one in letters, one in spoken sound and one in thoughts. Porphyry infers that the school would want the sentence in the mind to be analysable into separate components corresponding to name and verb. Thus there would be three types of name and verb, one written, one spoken and one exercised in the quiet of the mind. Porphyry does not raise the further question asked by Augustine in a theological context a little later, when Augustine says (On the Trinity 15.10.1920), ‘The word which is sounded externally is a sign of the word that shines inside, to which the name ‘word’ is more applicable. … [This word] is a prerequisite of any language, but is prior to all the signs by which it is communicated’. In other words, contrary to many

3

Introduction

modern views, soliloquy is causally prior to communication. Of this word in the mind, Augustine claims that it ‘does not belong to any language, at any rate not to any of those which are called the languages of the nations, of which our own Latin is one’. Porphyry does not tell us whether the word in the mind is Greek. But in Aristotle’s text the spoken and written names and verbs are both Greek, and he does not consider whether the thoughts (noêmata) in the soul at 16a9ff. are themselves names and verbs. Nonetheless, Porphyry’s idea that they are names and verbs is repeated by Ammonius in the period between Porphyry and Boethius and ascribed to Aristotle himself in Boethius’ report.2 The idea that thinking is a kind of inner talking goes back to Plato, but it did not at first enter into such details as those raised by Porphyry and Augustine.3 Augustine’s idea that thought is a language different from any natural language was revived in modern times by Jerry Fodor,4 developing the ideas of Noam Chomsky. Fodor was interested in a language of thought that corresponded to whole sentences of any level of complexity, not just to simple sentences consisting of names and verbs. Nonetheless, he and Porphyry and Augustine in their different ways were speaking of a language of thought and Fodor called his language ‘mentalese’. Boethius’ use of propositio for written, spoken, or mental sentences (orationes) Porphyry’s idea helps us to understand Boethius’ definition of a proposition (propositio). Boethius defines a proposition in his De differentiis topicis 1174C as a kind of sentence (oratio), one which signifies what is true or false.5 This is closest to, but not identical with, Aristotle’s definition of logos (sentence) at 16b26. We would not nowadays think of a proposition as a spoken, or as a written sentence. But Boethius thinks of it as a wide term, neutral between any of the three kinds of sentence, written, spoken, or mental. It is wide in other ways as well. Boethius continues his definition of a proposition (1174C-D) by saying that it can be a statement (enuntiatio) or assertion (prolatio), or, if brought into doubt, a question, or, if confirmed by arguments, a conclusion. It can have complexity, if, for example, it is a conditional (1175A-B). In a conditional the ‘if’-clause and the ‘then’-clause can each be called a proposition. A further complication concerns the word oratio, which is sometimes applied to something less than a sentence, a phrase which does not on its own signify what is true or false. Thus one oratio is predicated of another in the sentence ‘Socrates with Plato and the students investigates the essence of philosophy’ (1175D-1176A). Here oratio might be rendered ‘expression’. But as this is the exception and does not fit the definition of a proposition as signifying what

Introduction

4

is true or false, the rendering ‘sentence’ has been maintained in the translation below. Boethius’ use of Porphyry on the differentiation of individuals by unshareable characteristics In Chapter 7 Boethius says that a proposition acquires its character in the first place from thought (intelligentia), and in the second place (136,11-12) from the the things of which the thought (intellectus) consists. As an example of the second, if the sentence is singular, it gets its singularity from the subject that it gets hold of, e.g. Plato, rather than man (136,16). This gives Boethius occasion to introduce an influential idea of Porphyry’s, that individuals are distinguished from each other by each having a composite quality that is actually unshareable (incommunicabilis, 136,17-137,26; 139,4-19). We know that this idea is Porphyry’s, because he puts it in an even stronger form in his Introduction or Isagôgê 7,19-8,3. The individual is there said to be nothing but a bundle (athroisma, sundromê) of characteristics that are (severally or jointly) distinctive. Distinctive characteristics are called idiotêtes (Latin proprietates). I do not believe that Porphyry is here drawing on Aristotle or the Stoics, because he leaves out their idea that the distinctive characteristics would have to inhere in, or be otherwise dependent on, matter, which the Stoics called substance (ousia). I suspect he leaves matter out because he is speaking to beginning students who are about to read Aristotle’s Categories, which does not even mention matter and form, so Porphyry does not want to go into those complications. I believe Porphyry is drawing instead on Plato. Plato Theaetetus 209C speaks of an individual (atomon), such as Socrates, consisting of (ex hôn ei) uniquely distinctive characteristics (the word idios is used earlier at 154A, 166C), such as his distinctive snubness of nose. Snubness of nose is precisely the example used by Boethius when he discusses Porphyry in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagôgê (235,5-236,6, ed. Brandt, CSEL). Plato has the idea that one cannot think of Theaetetus at all without having his distinctive characteristic in mind. In Porphyry what is unique may be a bundle (athroisma, a word used at Plato Theaetetus 157B-C, or sundromê) of characteristics, rather than a single one, and for Porphyry it is unique in the strong sense that it would (ouk an, Isagôgê 7,16-24) not belong to another individual. Hence Boethius’ word, ‘unshareable’ (incommunicabilis). Plato is likely to have been the Stoics’ source of inspiration for their idea that each individual has a distinctive characteristic. Because Porphyry’s work was presented as an introduction to many of Aristotle’s ideas, the notion of the individual as a unique bundle of characteristics was taken by subsequent Neoplatonists, by Proclus ap. Olympiodorum Commentary on Alcibiades 1 Westerink

5

Introduction

204,8-12 and possibly by ‘Philoponus’ in An. Post. 2 437,21-438,2, as representing the Aristotelian view, despite the lack of any reference to matter, or a subject for the characteristics to inhere in. Does truth or falsity depend on the existence of the subject of reference in a singular statement? Aristotle had already anticipated in his Categories the subject of On Interpretation Chapters 8 to 10. In Categories Chapter 10 at 13b12ff., he had supplied an exception to the rule that in contrary pairs of statements, one of the pair must be true and the other false. If Socrates no longer exists, then neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true. The subject arises again when Aristotle resumes in On Interpretation Chapter 11 the discussion of puzzles about compound sentences started in Chapter 8. But here he allows us to say that the deceased Homer is a poet (21a25-8). The existential import of singular statements had already been most brilliantly discussed by Alexander and the Stoics.6 Boethius, and before him Ammonius, overlap in the way they understand Aristotle’s treatment of ‘Homer is a poet’. ‘Is’, according to Aristotle, is predicated ‘accidentally’ of Homer because he is a poet, and not in its own right. Boethius takes Aristotle to mean that ‘is’ applies to Homer only because of his being a poet, and not because of his being Homer. Boethius (374,1427) and Ammonius (Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation 212,24) infer that the ‘is’ would no longer be applicable, if ‘poet’ were not applicable. Presumably that is why the ‘is’ does not imply Homer’s continued existence. The interpretation is repeated at 374.9-376,15, but there Boethius addresses a further remark that Aristotle adds (21a22-3) that the possibility of thinking about what is not does not imply that it is. Boethius explains that the same analysis can be repeated in relation to ‘Homer is thought about’. The ‘is’ there attaches primarily to ‘thought about’, not to Homer, and so does not imply his existence. Mario Mignucci has suggested that Aristotle did not intend to generalise beyond his particular illustrative sentences. ‘Homer is a poet’ obviously does not imply the subject’s present existence, ‘Socrates is well’ obviously does, but not through the verb ‘is’, since On Interpretation 6b19-25 tells us that that is nothing in itself, but merely signifies a combination.7 Determinism: is a singular statement predicting a future contingent event true or false? By far the most famous example of a singular statement that is perhaps neither true nor false was raised by Aristotle in Chapter 9 of On Interpretation. On one interpretation of 18b9-16, 18b33-19a6, Aristotle saw it as a threat that events such as a future sea-battle

Introduction

6

would have been irrevocable 10,000 years ago, if it was true 10,000 years ago that there would be a sea-battle on that day. The idea of inevitability or determinism is therefore a major theme in Boethius’ commentary. But he did not interpret Aristotle’s problem of the future sea-battle in the way just suggested, and he did extend his discussion to many other aspects of determinism as well. Through Porphyry’s records he had access to the defence of indeterminism mounted around 200 AD by the Aristotelian Alexander against the deterministic arguments of Stoics and dialecticians. This led him to discuss a whole range of topics that were then at issue: Is the idea of chance merely a function of our ignorance?8 Is there room for free choice of the will?9 For unactualised possibilities?10 For the idea of things being up to us?11 Is God benevolent, if his actions are inevitable?12 How far down the scale of beings does divine Providence spread?13 How is possibility defined by Stoics and Aristotelians and by the dialecticians Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo?14 Do predictions by oracles imply determinism?15 On the interpretation of Aristotle just mentioned, which is not that of Boethius, Aristotle is worried by the irrevocability of past truth about the future occurrence of a sea-battle. His solution, on this interpretation, is to deny that it was either true or false 10,000 years ago that there would be a sea-battle, although the prediction might eventually start being true after a certain date. What would remain true after the sea-battle would not presumably be a future-tensed prediction. For after the battle it is not true that there will be a sea-battle on that date. What remains true would rather need to be either a past tensed proposition, or, as in modern logic, the tenseless proposition that a sea-battle coincides with such and such a date. If that represents Aristotle’s solution suitably adapted, it would, I believe, be a viable but unnecessary line of thought. For Aristotle need not have worried, if his anxiety was that past truth is irrevocable. Past truth about a future sea-battle really has to do with the future, not the past. We may compare how I can now make my most recent birthday to have been my last by plunging a dagger into my bosom. That is not really a case of my affecting the past, because to describe my most recent birthday as my last is to describe its relation to the future. It is to say that it has no successor. Similarly to make a past prediction to have been true is not really to affect the past. It is to create a relation between a past prediction and a subsequent state of affairs. That is why it is not too late now to make a past prediction to have been true or false. By conducting or not conducting a sea-battle tomorrow, I can make the prediction that I would conduct one true or false. I need not go into too much detail on alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s sea-battle by Boethius and by other ancient commentators on Chapter 9 of Aristotle’s On Interpretation. For another whole

7

Introduction

volume of the present series was devoted to the subject.16 It contained translations by David Blank and Norman Kretzmann of the commentaries of Ammonius and Boethius on this particular chapter, along with four essays: ‘The three deterministic arguments opposed by Ammonius’, ‘Boethius, Ammonius and their different Greek backgrounds’, both by Richard Sorabji, ‘Boethius and the truth about tomorrow’s sea-battle’ by Norman Kretzmann, and ‘Ammonius’ seabattle’ by Mario Mignucci. The present volume puts the subject in the different perspective of Aristotle’s On Interpretation as a whole. What needs to be said is that Boethius explains the idea of the irrevocability of the past. But he takes the threat of determinism to turn not on the irrevocability of past truth, but instead on the principle, which does not seem to be Aristotle’s, that mere predictability implies inevitability.17 He decisively rules out the interpretation, which he calls Stoic, that Aristotle meets the problem by denying that statements about future contingents are true or false.18 Instead he takes an interpretation which may already have been described and attacked by Alexander,19 and which had subsequently been endorsed by Ammonius. This interpretation makes use of the idea of definite truth, although that idea does not occur in Aristotle’s chapter on the sea-battle. According to this interpretation, contradictory predictions about whether there will be a sea-battle tomorrow definitely divide truth and falsity between them. Hence each of the rival predictions is either true or false. All Aristotle is saying is that neither of them taken singly is yet definitely true or false. What does ‘definitely’ mean? It would beg the question if ‘definitely’ simply meant deterministically, because the question at issue is whether determinism holds. Possibly Ammonius was guilty of understanding the word ‘definitely’ in this question-begging way, but Mignucci has suggested a different interpretation of him. Boethius does not beg the question. He focuses on the pair of propositions ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’, ‘there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow’. The pair is treated differently from the members taken singly. It has one member true and one false, and that is how ‘neither true nor false’ is avoided. But the truth and falsity are not yet distributed in one direction rather than the other. Picking up Boethius’ word ‘volubilis’, we can imagine the truth and falsity already contained somewhere in the pair, ready to roll (volubilis) into their respective positions, but not yet having rolled. So far this is a metaphor, and it is not clear how to give it a coherent interpretation. Kretzmann suggests that for Boethius the future-tensed proposition, ‘there will be a sea-battle’ is eithertrue-or-false, but if the battle eventually happens, that will retrospectively make the proposition to have been true, even though we could not predict that outcome. The retrospection already makes this a distinctive interpretation. In addition, if we were to attempt a

Introduction

8

prediction, saying ‘there will be a sea-battle’, the speech act of predicting would have been false, as implying some necessity about the battle, even in the case where subsequent events make the proposition ‘there will be a sea-battle’ to have been true. Whatever Boethius’ interpretation of ‘definitely true’, it was different from that of Ammonius, and this is not the only aspect of the reply to determinism on which they differed. Ammonius, though familiar with Porphyry, made most use of a later source, his teacher Proclus,20 and therefore of Iamblichus, who influenced Proclus. James Shiel has effectively replied to the earlier view of Pierre Courcelle that Boethius was particularly dependent on Ammonius.21 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy In Boethius’ later Consolation of Philosophy, written in prison awaiting execution, he posed the related problem of future events being inevitable because of God’s foreknowledge of them. This is not so far from the question of the sea-battle, given Boethius’ interpretation that the threatened inevitability of the sea-battle turns on its predictability by humans. It is important, however, that in the Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5, Boethius turns to predictability by God. For God’s knowledge, unlike human knowledge, is infallible. If in addition God is aware for ever in advance of what we will do, that awareness will be irrevocable. The combination of infallibility and irrevocability will make it impossible for us to do anything else. One way of avoiding this deterministic conclusion would be to see God’s knowledge not as foreknowledge, but as outside of time altogether. (After all, God is the creator of time). God’s awareness will not then be irrevocable. It is possible, but controversial, whether that timelessness is part of what Boethius means when he makes God’s knowledge eternal. Notes 1. C.W.A. Whitaker, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford 1996. 2. Ammonius On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 23,10-15. 3. I have traced the development onwards from Plato Theaetetus 189E and Sophist 263E in Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Sourcebook, London 2004, vol. 3, Logic and Metaphysics, ch. 7b. 4. Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975, based on the work of Noam Chomsky, and criticised by Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality, Cambridge MA 1988. 5. Boethius, De topicis differentiis, Book 1, Patrologia Latina vol. 64, col. 1174C, translated by Eleonore Stump, with notes and essays, Ithaca NY 1978. 6. Richard Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Sourcebook, vol. 3, Logic and Metaphysics, London 2004, ch. 11a.

9

Introduction

7. Mario Mignucci, ‘Aristotle on the existential import of propositions’, Phronesis 52, 2007, 121-38. 8. 193,26-195,2, cf. 224,3-9, Meiser. 9. 195,2-197,10. 10. 197,10-198,3. 11. 217,17-219,9. 12. 226,13-22. 13. 231,11-232,13. 14. 234,10-236,4. 15. 224,27-225,9. 16. Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 with Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9, London 1998. 17. 228,3-4; 229,21-230,3. 18. 208,1-18. 19. So Robert W. Sharples, commenting on Alexander Quaestio 1.4, at p. 35n.81 of his Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, London 1992. 20. 1,6-11; cf. 181,30-1. 21. James Shiel, ‘Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, 349-372, revised from a paper of 1958. Pierre Courcelle, Les letters grecques en Occident, Paris 1948, translated Harvard University Press 1969.

Bibliography Ackrill, J.L., Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963. Blank, D. and Kretzmann, N., Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 with Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 9, London 1998. Chiesa, C., Le problème du langage intérieur chez les stoïciens’, Revue internationale de philosophie 45, 1991, 301-21. Gaskin, R., ‘Alexander’s sea battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 10’, Phronesis 38, 1993, 75-94. Gaskin, R., ‘The commentators’ interpretation of de Interpretatione 9’, ch. 12 in his The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future, Berlin 1995. Isaac, J., Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à Saint-Thomas, Paris 1953. Kretzmann, N., ‘Semantics, history of’, in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, NY and London, 1967, vol. 7, 359-406. Kretzmann, N., ‘Medieval logicians on the meaning of the propositio’, Journal of Philosophy 62, 1970, 767-87. Kretzmann, N., ‘Boethius and the truth about tomorrow’s sea battle’, in Blank and Kretzmann 1998, 24-52. Magee, J., Boethius on Signification and Mind, Leiden 1989. Mignucci, M., ‘Ammonius’ sea battle’, in Blank and Kretzmann 1998, 53-86. Mignucci, M., ‘Aristotle on the existential import of propositions’, Phronesis 52, 2007, 121-38. Nuchelmans, G., Theories of the Proposition, Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam 1973. de Rijk, L.M., ‘On the chronology of Boethius’ works on logic’, Vivarium 2, 1964, 1-49; 125-62. de Rijk, L.M., ‘Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa

Introduction

10

métaphysique de l’être’, in L. Obertello, Atti congresso internazionale di studi Boeziani, Rome 1981. de Rijk, L.M., Aristotle, Semantics and Ontology, vol. 1, ch. 3, Leiden 2002. Seel, G. (ed.), Ammonius and the Sea Battle, Berlin 2001. Shiel, J., ‘Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, 349-72, revised from a paper of 1958. Sharples, R.W., commenting on Alexander Quaestio 1.4, at p. 35 n. 81 of his Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, London 1992. Sorabji, R., Necessity, Cause and Blame, London 1980, ch. 5. Sorabji, R., ‘The three deterministic arguments opposed by Ammonius’, in Blank and Kretzmann 1998, 3-15. Sorabji, R., ‘Boethius, Ammonius and their different Greek backgrounds’, in Blank and Kretzmann 1998, 16-23. Sorabji, R., Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, A Sourcebook, vol. 3, Logic and Metaphysics, London 2004. Sorabji, R., ‘Meaning: ancient comments on five lines of Aristotle’, in Christopher Shields (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, forthcoming Oxford 2010. Stump, E., Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, translated with notes and essays on the text, Ithaca NY, 1978. Whitaker, C.W.A., Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford 1996.

Translator’s Note Boethius always takes great care to ensure that his reader knows exactly what part of the text of Aristotle he is commenting on. This sometimes involves him citing repeatedly the Aristotelian text. Although it was tempting to make omissions or relegate such repetitions to a note, I have given Boethius’ text in full to keep faithful to the style of the original even where the effect is somewhat clumsy. The manuscript usually gives the lemma or portion of text which Boethius comments on. It should, however, be noted that this Latin translation of Boethius in the lemmata is not always identical with his separately published translation of the whole text of de Interpretatione. On one occasion where a lemma has been omitted from the manuscript I have reconstructed it from his commentary (22b29-36); otherwise I have left the commentary to speak for itself. The original page and line numbers of the Meiser edition appear in the margins of the text. I have also included the traditional division of the Aristotelian text into chapters. This convention is irrelevant for Boethius, but I have included these chapter numbers since they are sometimes used in modern discussions of the Aristotelian text. From time to time I have also attempted to clarify the arrangement of Boethius’ comments by the inclusion of letters or numbers in the translation. It should be understood that this is not part of Boethius’ text. I have retained the traditional and not very informative translation of interpretatio as ‘interpretation’ in my rendering of the title of the work to avoid confusion. In the body of the text, however, I have ventured to translate interpretatio as ‘communication’. Although this translation, too, is not altogether satisfactory, it is possibly less odd than ‘interpretation’. ‘Communication’ should, however, not be taken in the sense of communication between two people but rather the transfer of signification from thing via thought to verbal expression. Lastly I would like to thank the many readers who have carefully looked through my first attempts at translation of a difficult text. I have had to make many compromises in my response to their always enlightening comments. With their help I hope to have removed at

Translator’s Note

12

least some of the most serious errors from the text and remain fully responsible for any that remain. Thanks also are due to much help and encouragement from Richard Sorabji and for the patience of the editors in the final stages of publication.

BOETHIUS On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-3 Translation

The second edition or larger commentary of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius on Aristotle’s ‘On Interpretation’ in six books BOOK 1 Chapter 1 Alexander, in his own commentary, announces that he felt impelled to have recourse to a very long and painstaking exposition because he disagreed in many respects with the opinions of previous writers. But I have a greater reason for undertaking the task, namely, that hardly anyone has taken on the long process of translating, let alone of commenting, except Vetius Praetextatus2 who provided a Latin version of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, not by translating Aristotle but by translating Themistius,3 as anyone who reads both can easily see. Albinus,4 too, is said to have written on the same themes. I know his published work on geometry. But after long and careful enquiry I have been unable to find those on dialectic. Then if he never uttered a word we will say what he left unsaid, if he did write something, by imitating the devotion of this scholar we too will enjoy the same praise. But although much of Aristotle is obscured because of the subtle science of philosophy, this book above all has been over-compressed through the subtlety of its views and its conciseness of expression. And so far more effort will be required here than in the explanation of the ten categories. We firstly have to give a definition of spoken sound (vox). For this is obviously and clearly the theme (intentio)5 of this whole book. Spoken sound is the striking of the air by the tongue, produced by an animal by means of certain parts of the throat called windpipes. For there are certain other sounds e.g. coughing, produced also by the breath but without being struck by the tongue. For coughing is produced by the emission of breath through the windpipe, but is not formed by the pressure of the tongue. Therefore it does not underlie the sound elements6 for it cannot in any way be written down. Therefore this is not called spoken sound (vox) but simply sound (sonus). We have a second possible definition of spoken sound – it is a sound which appears (imaginatio) to signify. For when a spoken sound is emitted, it is produced in order to signify something. But although a cough is a sound, it is not produced but slips out with no intention of signifying anything. And so since our breath operates to produce spoken sound if it is 1

3,1

4,1 5

10

15

20 25

30 5,1

16

5

10

15

20

25

6,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

struck and formed by the tongue, if the tongue strikes it so that a spoken sound emerges with the sound ended and rounded off, an utterance (locutio) – in Greek lexis – is produced. For an utterance is an articulated spoken sound. We do not translate the word lexis as ‘expression’ (dictio) but as ‘utterance’ and phasis as ‘expression’. The components of utterance are letters, which when joined create one conjoined and combined spoken sound which is called utterance. But whether a particular spoken sound signifies something, e.g. the word ‘man’, or nothing at all, or could signify if applied to something as a name, e.g. ‘blityri’7 (for this spoken sound, though signifying nothing in itself, will signify if accepted by convention to be the name of something), or signifies nothing in itself but does designate [something] when joined with others, e.g. conjunctions, all of these are called utterances. Thus the proper form of an utterance is a combined spoken sound which can be described by means of letters. And so for there to be an utterance, there must be spoken sound, i.e. sound which the tongue strikes, so that the spoken sound itself is formed by the tongue into the sort of sound that can be written down in letters. But for this utterance to have signification there has to be the additional factor that there is some significant mental image by means of which what is in the spoken sound or utterance is brought forward. In other words we have to say that if there is just the striking of the tongue in the breath which we emit through the windpipes we have spoken sound. If the striking is such that it converts the sound into letters we have utterance. But if a certain power of mental imaging is added the spoken sound is made significant. And so when these three occur together – striking of the tongue, articulated spoken sound, a certain mental image [which helps to] bring forth [the utterance] (imaginatio proferendi) – communication (interpretatio) occurs. For communication is an articulated spoken sound significant in itself. Therefore not every spoken sound is a communication. For there are the spoken sounds of the rest of the animals [apart from man], which are not covered by the term ‘communication’. Nor is every utterance a communication because, as explained, there are some utterances which lack signification and some which, though they do not signify in themselves, do however signify when joined with others, e.g. conjunctions.8 But communication is found only in articulated spoken sounds that are significant in themselves. So conversely whatever is a communication signifies; and whatever signifies is called by the term ‘communication’. Hence Aristotle himself too in his book The Art of Poetry9 taught that syllables and conjunctions are components of utterance; syllables taken as syllables signify nothing at all. Conjunctions can signify additionally but designate nothing in themselves. Name and verb, which do signify in themselves, form the components of communication in this book. Nevertheless it is agreed that a sentence (oratio) is

Translation

17

also communication. Since a sentence is both itself spoken sound and a combination of significant components it does not lack signification (significatio). And so since Aristotle is dealing in this book not only with the sentence but also with the name and the verb, and not with utterance simply, but also with significant utterance, i.e. communication, and since the term ‘communication’ is applied to verbs and names and to significant utterances, the book itself takes its name On Communication from the common name of the things dealt with in it, i.e. communication. We have arranged our explication of this work in Latin following Porphyry as far as possible, although we have included material from others too. For Porphyry, our guide, seems pre-eminent in intellectual sharpness and ability to marshal his ideas. And so there will be two primary parts to communication, name and verb. For whatever is in the thoughts of the mind is described by these, since the whole arrangement of a sentence is determined by them. And in so far as spoken sound itself signifies thoughts, it is divided, as I have said, into these two parts, name and verb. But in so far as spoken sound denotes, through the medium of thoughts, things made subject to intellect, Aristotle divided the number of significant spoken sounds into ten categories. And the purpose of this book differs from the plurality of predicates that are categorised into ten groups in that here enquiry is raised about the number of significant spoken sounds only in so far as it relates to the actual spoken sounds by which the thoughts of the mind are described. These are, of course, simple names and verbs; and sentences are composed of these. The purpose of the Categories on the other hand is to deal with spoken sounds which signify things in so far as the mediating thought of the mind signifies them. For name and verb certainly have a certain function in spoken sound; in fact the ten categories themselves signify them. For the ten categories are never expressed without some verbal or name element. Therefore this book will deal with significant spoken sounds in so far as they signify concepts (conceptiones) of the mind and thoughts (intellectus). The purpose of the book on the ten categories has been stated in the commentary on it: that it is about spoken sounds signifying things, into how many parts their signification can be divided in so far as the spoken sounds themselves can designate, through the medium of sense perceptions and thoughts, things underlying thoughts. In his work On the Art of Poetry10 he does not divide utterance in the same way but brings in every component of utterance, confirming that letters, syllables, conjunctions, articles, names, cases, verbs and sentences (orationes) are components of utterance. For utterance does not consist in just significant spoken sounds, but goes beyond the signification of spoken sounds to include articulated sounds as well. For any syllable, any name, or any other spoken sound which

25 7,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 8,1

5

10

15

18

20

25

30 9,1

5

10

15

20

25 10,1

Translation

can be written in letters is included in the term ‘utterance’, in Greek lexis. But it is not the same for communication. For this it is not enough that there is spoken sound of a kind to be expressed in letters, but it must in addition also signify something. The intention (ratio) of the categories is founded on the fact that these two components of communication denote things underlying thoughts. For since the ten things are generally found in the whole of nature there will also be ten thoughts, and since names and verbs signify these thoughts there will be ten categories denoted by names and verbs. There are in fact two, names and verbs, which signify thoughts themselves. And so names and verbs are the elements of communication, although the parts of which communication itself consists are, strictly speaking, sentences. Some sentences are perfect, others imperfect. The perfect are those from which one can understand fully what is meant, the imperfect those in which the mind expects to hear something fuller, e.g. ‘Socrates with Plato’. When nothing further is heard the comprehension of the sentence still hangs in the balance and the listener expects to hear something further. There are five types of perfect sentence:11 1. The prayer type, e.g. ‘Almighty Jupiter, if you are moved by our prayer, then give us your help, Father, and confirm these omens.’ (Virg. Aen. 2.689,691) 2. The imperative type, e.g. ‘Come, my son, call the Zephyrs and glide on thy wings’. (Virg. Aen. 4.223) 3. The interrogative type, e.g. ‘Tell me, Damoetas, whose is the flock? Does it belong to Meliboeus?’ (Virg. Ecl. 3.1) 4. The vocative type, e.g. ‘O Father, eternal power of men and things.’ (Virg. Aen. 10.18) 5. The statement-making type in which truth or falsity is found, e.g. ‘Firstly, nature has various ways for rearing trees.’ (Virg. Georg. 2.9) There are two kinds of sentence like this [last one]; for there is a simple and a combined statement-making sentence – simple: ‘it is day; there is light’; combined: ‘if it is day, there is light’. In this book Aristotle is discussing the simple statement-making sentence and its elements, namely name and verb. Since these are significant, and a spoken sound that is significant and articulated is included in the term ‘communication’, he named the work, as I have explained, On Communication from the common term. And Theophrastus dealt with the statement-making sentence in the book which he composed On Affirmation and Negation. The Stoics too in their books which they call On Axioms deal with the same things as well, but they speculate about both the simple and the non-simple statement-

Translation

19

making sentence. But Aristotle in this book considers solely the simple statement-making sentence. Aspasius and Alexander wrote commentaries on this work as well as on other works of Aristotle, but both of them declare that Aristotle was dealing with the sentence. For, they argue, if to bring something forward in a sentence is to communicate then the book was composed about communication in so far as it was composed about the sentence, as though the sentence alone and not verbs and names also are included in the term ‘communication’. For verbs and names which are elements of communication are called ‘communication’ just as much as the sentence. But Alexander added that the title of the book was imperfect as it does not make clear the kind of sentence Aristotle wrote about. For there are, as already explained, many types of sentence; but he thinks one should add or implicitly understand that Aristotle is writing about the philosophical or dialectical sentence, i.e. the type in which truth or falsity can be determined. But the man who includes only the sentence under ‘communication’ has also misunderstood the meaning of the title itself. For why should he think the title is imperfect because he has added nothing about the sort of sentence he is discussing. It is as if someone were to ask ‘what is a man?’ and when another replied ‘an animal’ he were to criticise him and say that he had inadequately explained what it is because he had not traced all the differences. But even if man has some other common attributes to be attached to the name ‘animal’, there is still no reason why the man who replied ‘animal’ has not given an accurate description. For whether someone adds the differences or not, a man must still be an animal. In the same way too with a sentence, if someone grants to start with that ‘communication’ means just ‘sentence’, there is no reason to criticise Aristotle for calling his work On Communication and for not adding the sort of communication he meant. For it is sufficient that he used an inclusive [term] for the book-title, as we earlier stated he did with respect to names, verbs and sentences when he called the book On Communication since all of these are included in the term ‘communication’. But adding that only a sentence in which truth and falsity can be discerned, i.e. the statement-making sentence, may be called communication is, according to Porphyry, the mark of a man making up the signification of terms rather than one concerned with instruction. Alexander is wrong both in the purpose of the book and its title, but he does not make the same mistake in his assessment of the book’s [genuineness]. For Andronicus thinks this book is not by Aristotle; whereas Alexander rightly and forcefully proves him wrong. Although antiquity has judged Andronicus to be an accurate and painstaking critic and discoverer of Aristotle’s works, it really is amazing why he is wrong in his assessment of this work. For he tries to prove it is not by Aristotle from the fact that Aristotle deals at the

5

10

15

20

25

30 11,1

5

10

15

20

20

25

30

12,1

5 10

15

20

25

30 13,1 5

10

Translation

beginning of the book with the thoughts of the mind, calling them affections of the soul, and that he recalls then that he had discussed this issue more fully in On the Soul. Now because Aristotle normally called12 sadness, joy, desire and other similar dispositions affections of the soul, Andronicus says that the proof of non-Aristotelian authorship is precisely that Aristotle did not deal in On the Soul with dispositions of this kind. But Andronicus does not understand that in the present work Aristotle does not mean by ‘affections of the soul’ dispositions but thoughts. Alexander added to this many other arguments as to why he thought this work was certainly by Aristotle. For example: what is said here agrees with Aristotle’s views elsewhere on the statement-making sentence; the style which is compressed through terseness is not at odds with Aristotle’s [normal] obscurity; Theophrastus, as usual when he deals with topics similar to those already treated by Aristotle, uses also in his work On Affirmation and Negation some of the same terms as Aristotle used in this book. Theophrastus also yields the following indication of Aristotle’s authorship: whenever he deals with a topic after his teacher he touches only lightly upon what he recognised had been previously said by Aristotle, but other matters not treated by Aristotle he pursues more thoroughly. He does the same here too, for he skips lightly over the points raised by Aristotle on statement, but subjects to a more careful kind of examination what his teacher passed over in silence. Alexander also added the following reason: since Aristotle was keen to write on syllogisms he would never have been able to do this properly had he not made some mention of propositions (propositio). I think it is also clear to those who consider the matter carefully, that this book is a preparation for the Analytics. For just as he discusses here the simple proposition, so too in the Analytics he considers only simple syllogisms, so that the very factor of simplicity in syllogisms and propositions seems to point to nothing other than a continuous work by Aristotle. And so we are not to listen to Andronicus who strikes this book from the works of Aristotle because of the word ‘affections’. For Aristotle called thoughts affections of the soul because the thoughts we are accustomed to express in speech and bring forth in sentences have proceeded to some purpose and advantage. For a particular purpose and advantage caused men who lived separately to be gathered together and want to be subject to laws and found cities. And what arises from some advantage must also come of necessity from affection. For since divine things are without any affection, no external advantage can be added to them; but things which can be affected always find some purpose and advantage to support themselves. And so thoughts of the kind to be expressed to someone else in speech are rightly called ‘affections’ of the mind because they appear to have been put together for some purpose and advantage. Enough has now been said about the purpose, title and attribution of the book.

Translation

21

The man who knows in what kind of sentence truth and falsity are comprised will understand the usefulness of the book. For they are comprised only in the statement-making sentence. In this work the reflecting person could with care recognise what distinguishes true and false, what things share in truth and falsity in a definite way and what things in different ways and under changing circumstances, what things can be predicated jointly when they can also be predicated separately, what things are predicated separately when they have been predicated jointly, what are the negations with the type of proposition, what their consequences and many other things. Whoever has paid attention to the demands of enquiry will gain great advantage from these. But let us now turn to Aristotle’s own words. 16a1-2 Firstly we must lay down what a name is and what a verb is, and then what a negation, an affirmation, a statement and a sentence are. In beginning his book he first laid down in detailed order the subjects he intended to deal with. For he said that he must first define what he is to discuss. For to lay down is to be understood here as ‘to define’; for what all of these are has to be fixed, i.e. what a name is, a verb etc. – the things we said before are elements of communication. But affirmation and negation come under communication. And so it is clear that name and verb are elements of affirmation and negation. For when these are put together, affirmation and negation are formed. Here arises the question why he promises to define just two, name and verb, when there appear to be more components of a sentence. Our answer is that Aristotle has defined in this book only as much as he needs for what he had planned to deal with. He is dealing in fact with the simple statement-making (enuntiativa) sentence, which is of the kind that is composed of just verbs and names joined together. If someone joins a name and a verb, e.g. ‘Socrates walks’, he forms a simple statement-making sentence. For a statement-making sentence is, as explained above, one which contains in itself the mark of truth and falsehood. In the sentence we used, ‘Socrates walks’, either truth or falsity must be contained. For if this is said when Socrates is walking, it is true; if when not walking, it is false. And so a simple statement-making sentence is formed from names and verbs alone. And so it is superfluous to ask why he did not list whatever else seem to be parts of a sentence when he set out to subdivide the elements of just the simple statement-making sentence and not of the sentence in general. Nevertheless these two, name and verb, are to be regarded as proper parts of a sentence, for they both signify in themselves, whereas conjunctions or prepositions denote nothing at all if not joined with other words. Participles are related to the verb either because they come from the gerund or because they

15

20

25

14,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

22 15,1 5

10

15

20

25 30

16,1

5 10

15 20

Translation

contain the notion of time in their own signification. Interjections, pronouns and adverbs are to be considered as names because they signify something defined where no affection or activity is meant. This is not prevented by the fact that some of them cannot be inflected in cases. For there are some names which are indeclinable. But if anyone thinks these details have been read into the text in front of us, he should, nevertheless, grant what we said just now, that it is not fair to criticise Aristotle for taking into his definition only as much as he thought was necessary for the task he has undertaken, when he intends to deal not with every sentence but only with the simple statement-making sentence. And so we must say that Aristotle does not want to define in this work the parts of every sentence, but only of the simple statement-making sentence, which are the name and the verb. Here is a proof of this. After Aristotle lays down his plan with the words first we must lay down what a name is and what a verb is, he does not immediately say what a sentence is but next adds what a negation and what an affirmation and what a statement (enuntiatio) and lastly what a sentence. But if he were speaking about every kind of sentence, after name and verb he would not have mentioned affirmation and negation and, after this, statement, but would have put sentence next. As it is, since after listing name and verb he puts down affirmation, negation and statement, with sentence at the end, one has to admit, as we said before, that he wanted to make a division of the parts not of the universal sentence but of the simple statement-making sentence which is subdivided into affirmation and negation; and these parts are name and verb. Name and verb of themselves afford a simple meaning and are also termed expressions, but are not the only things to bear this designation. For there are other types of expression, e.g. sentences either imperfect or perfect. I have already explained13 that there are several types of these. Among them statement is a species of the perfect sentence and it may be simple or combined. Philosophers and commentators dispute the kinds of simple statement. For some say that affirmation and negation should be put under statement as species. Porphyry belongs to this group. But others do not agree at all, but maintain that affirmation and negation are equivocal, that they are called by the same name, ‘statement’, and ‘statement’ is predicated of both as an equivocal name, not as a univocal genus. Alexander is the first to belong to this group. It seems useful to append their arguments. And we must firstly say in what ways Alexander thinks that affirmation and negation are not species of statement. Afterwards I will add the argumentation with which Porphyry disproves it. Alexander claims that affirmation and negation are not species of statement because affirmation comes before negation. He then tries to prove that affirmation is prior because all negation destroys and does away with affirmation. But if that is so then affirmation to be

Translation

23

destroyed exists before negation which is to destroy it. When one thing is prior and another comes after, they cannot be placed under the same genus, as is said in the section of the Categories under the heading of what is simultaneous. In more detail – every negation, says Alexander, is a division, every affirmation a combination and connecting. For when I say ‘Socrates lives’ I have joined life to Socrates. When I say ‘Socrates does not live’ I have separated life from Socrates. Negation is then a sort of division, affirmation a connecting; and division is of what is combined and joined together. Therefore connecting, i.e. affirmation, is prior; division, i.e. negation, is posterior. He also adds that every statement made in the form of an affirmation is simpler than one made through negation. For if the negative particle is taken away from a negation the affirmation alone is left. In the sentence ‘Socrates does not live’, if the particle ‘not’ which goes with the verb is removed, there remains ‘Socrates does live’. Therefore an affirmation is simpler than a negation. Then what is simpler must be prior. In quantity too, what is less in quantity is prior to what is more in quantity. Every sentence is a quantity. But when I say ‘Socrates walks’ the sentence is shorter than when I say ‘Socrates does not walk’. And so if an affirmation is quantitatively less it must also be prior. He also added that an affirmation is a state, a negation a privation. But a state is prior to a privation. Therefore an affirmation is prior to a negation. And to avoid the trouble of going through every detail, by showing in these and other ways that affirmation is prior to negation, he has removed them from a common genus. For he thinks that no species can be under the same genus, where one is thought to be prior or posterior. But Porphyry says that in the commentary which he wrote on Theophrastus he had taught that affirmation and negation are species of statement. And here he disproves Alexander’s way of reasoning with the following argument. He says that one should not suppose that whatever in any way is prior to something else cannot be placed under the same genus, but only things that are prior or posterior in their essence or substance are not put under the same genus. And this is right; for if whatever is in any way prior cannot be under the same genus as that which is posterior, substance could not be a common genus for primary and secondary substances. And anyone who maintains that is straying from correct argumentation. But although there are primary and secondary substances, however that may be, neither of them, however, is in any way in a subject and their essence depends on this very fact that they are not in a subject; and so they can be placed under the one genus, ‘substance’. So too although affirmations are prior to negations in the production of the sentence, they nevertheless participate in statement equally with negations in respect of their essence and proper nature. Statement is that in which truth and falsehood can be found. Therefore affirmation

25

30

17,1 5

10 15

20

25

30 18,1

5

10

24 15

20

25

30 19,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 20,1 5

Translation

and negation are equal, for affirmation and negation share equally in truth and falsity. Therefore since affirmation and negation as such have an equal share in statement, they ought not to be separated from the common genus, ‘statement’. I, too, think that we should follow Porphyry’s view that affirmation and negation be put under the common genus of statement. Quite clearly then Alexander’s long and complex arguments have been disproved with Porphyry’s proof that not every mode of a thing’s being prior prevents it from being placed under a common genus, but that only those things which are prior in their own essence and substance cannot be arranged and placed under a common genus. Syrianus, whose surname is Philoxenus, asks at this point why Aristotle has mentioned negation first and affirmation second in the words first we must lay down what a name is and what a verb is, and then what a negation, an affirmation. Firstly he has not said anything to the point since where both affirmation and negation can occur, negation can come first and affirmation afterwards, as in the statement ‘Socrates is well’; the affirmation can be attached to him – ‘Socrates is well’; and a negation of the following kind can also be attached – ‘Socrates is not well’. Since, then, in his case affirmation and negation can each occur, it happens that negation comes before affirmation. For before he was born, he could be said to be not well; for the man who is not born could not be well. Syrianus added that Aristotle, in his actual exposition, maintained the reverse ordering to what he had proposed. For he proposed to deal firstly with negation after name and verb, and then with affirmation followed by statement, and finally sentence. But once he had defined name and verb he dealt firstly with sentence, then statement, thirdly affirmation, and lastly negation which in the opening he had put first after name and verb. Syrianus says that he proposed treating negation first in order to maintain their convertibility. In this he does not differ from Alexander’s exposition either. Syrianus added that it was meaningful14 that statement should be taken as being the genus of affirmation and negation, since although affirmation is, as said above,15 prior with regard to the production of a sentence, with regard to statement, however, that is of true and false, Aristotle put them equally under statement; and that Aristotle approved of this too; for he put negation first and affirmation second, which is no harm if affirmation and negation are placed as equals with regard to statement itself. For things that are naturally equal, possess nothing contrary if they are considered without distinction. There is then an order in which he proposed first the basis of every sentence, i.e. name and verb, and after these negation and affirmation which are species of statement. Their genus, i.e. statement, he called third, whilst placing fourth the sentence which is the genus of statement. He promised to give definitions of all of these. But leaving

Translation

25

them aside and passing them over for the moment and deferring them to a later treatise he now explains what verbs and names are or what they signify. And so before coming to Aristotle’s own words, let us discuss a little in general verbs and names and what they signify. For if there is to be questioning and answering or continuous and coherent speech so that another person hears and understands, if anyone is to teach, another learn, the whole arrangement of speech consists of these three: things, thoughts and spoken sounds. The thing is conceived in a thought. Spoken sound signifies the concepts of the mind and thoughts, whilst the thoughts themselves both conceptualise the things which underlie them and are signified by spoken sounds. Then although there are three things by which all speech and conversation is brought about – the things which act as subject, the thoughts which conceive them and are in turn signified by spoken sounds, and the spoken sounds which indicate the thoughts, there is also a fourth thing, by which the spoken sounds themselves can be indicated, the letters. For written letters signify the actual spoken sounds. So there are these four: letters signifying spoken sounds, spoken sounds signifying thoughts, thoughts conceiving things. The things do not have a confused and accidental order, but are stable by the defined order of their own nature. Things always accompany the thought which is conceived from them; spoken sound follows the thought; the elements, i.e. letters, follow the spoken sounds. For thoughts arise from things which are before them and have been constituted in their own substance. For thoughts are always of things. When the thoughts are constituted there arises signification expressed in spoken sound. For without thought spoken sound designates nothing whatsoever. But since there are spoken sounds, letters, which we call elements, have been invented and by them the quality of spoken sounds is indicated. The situation is in fact reversed when we comprehend something. For those who use the same letters16 and the same elements must also use the same names and verbs (i.e. spoken sounds); and those who use the same spoken sounds have the same thoughts in their mental conception. But those who have the same thoughts clearly have the same things as subjects to their thoughts. But this does not hold conversely. For those who have the same things and the same thoughts do not automatically have the same spoken sounds and letters. For when a Roman, a Greek and a barbarian see a horse at the same time, they also have the same thought that it is a horse; and the same thing is a subject to them and the same thought is conceived from the actual thing; but a Greek calls a horse one thing, whilst a Roman when signifying a horse uses yet a different spoken sound, and the barbarian is different from both in his designation of a horse. And of course they designate the appropriate spoken sounds by different elements too. It is, then, right to say that where the same

10

15

20

25

30 21,1

5 10

15

20

25

26

30 22,1 5

10

15

20

25

23,1 5

10

15

Translation

things and ideas occur, you do not necessarily have the same spoken sounds or elements. Now the thing precedes the thought, the thought the spoken sound, the spoken sound the letters, but the converse is not true. For if there are letters it does not follow that there is any signification to the sound. For no elements of any kind signify a name to men who cannot read simply because they do not know them. Nor if there are spoken sounds must there be thoughts. For you will find many spoken sounds which do not signify anything at all. Nor is there always a thing as subject to a thought; for there are thoughts which have no corresponding thing, e.g. the centaurs or chimaeras invented by poets. Thoughts of these have no underlying substance. But anyone who returns to reality and considers it carefully will know that when there is a thing, there is also a corresponding thought, if not with men then certainly with him [i.e. god] who by the divinity of his own substance knows everything in the proper nature of the thing itself.17 If there is a thought, there is also a spoken sound; and if there is a spoken sound, there are also corresponding letters. Even if they are not understood, that has nothing to do with the actual nature of the spoken sound. For a thought is not a sort of cause of spoken sounds, nor a spoken sound of letters in the sense that when the same letters occur with some people, there must also be the same names. So too when the same things or thoughts occur with some people, it is not then necessary that there are the same terms for the thoughts and things. For although the thing and the thought about a human being are the same, a substance of this kind is given different and varied names amongst different people. And so spoken sounds, too, though identical, can have different letters, e.g. the name ‘man’, though it is one name, can be written in different letters. It can be written in Latin or Greek letters or in some newly invented signs. And so since where things are the same, the thoughts must be the same, and where the thoughts are the same, the spoken sounds are not the same, and where the spoken sounds are the same, they do not have to be composed of the same letters, we must say that things and thoughts are constituted naturally since they are the same for everyone, but that spoken sounds and letters are not naturally constituted but by convention, since they change according to human conventions. The conclusion is that where the same elements occur, the spoken sounds are the same, and where the same spoken sounds occur, the thoughts are the same. And where the same thoughts occur the same things act as subjects. Again where the same things occur, the thoughts are the same, but where the thoughts are the same, the spoken sounds are not [necessarily the same]. Nor are the names and verbs themselves always designated by the same letters where the spoken sounds are the same. But in the ideas we have expressed we have used ‘element’ and ‘letter’ indiscriminately. I will explain briefly the difference between

Translation

27

them. A letter is a written figure of the smallest part of articulated spoken sound, an element the sound of the written form. So when I write the letter ‘a’, the actual shape written with ink or a stilus is called a letter, whereas the sound by which we express the letter is termed an element. Once we realise this we must say that the man who teaches or gives a continuous address or asks questions behaves in the opposite way to those who learn, listen or reply, in three things: spoken sound, thought and thing (We will leave out the letters because some people cannot read). For those who teach, speak and question, proceeding from things to a thought, practise the function and power of their own particular activity through names and verbs. For they derive their thoughts from things which act as subjects and express them through names and verbs. But the man who learns, hears or even the man who answers, goes from names to thoughts and eventually reaches the things. The learner, listener or answerer, in receiving the words of the teacher, speaker or questioner, understands what each of them says and in understanding acquires knowledge of the things too and is confirmed in that knowledge. It has then been rightly said that those who teach, speak and question behave differently with respect to spoken sound, thought and thing from those who learn, listen and answer. Since then there are these four – letters, spoken sounds, thoughts and things – letters most directly and primarily signify verbs and names. And these primarily designate thoughts, but in a secondary way designate things too; thoughts in their turn signify nothing but things. The ancients, including Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus18 and Xenocrates,19 place midway between things and the significations of thoughts sensations in sensible things or certain images (imaginationes) from which thought takes its starting point. We must now omit what the Stoics say about this and must note just this one point, that what is contained in the letters signifies the speech which is constituted in the spoken sound and the speech expressed by the spoken sound designates the speech in the mind and intellect which is made by silent thinking, and that this mental speech conceives and designates the things which are presented to it in the first instance. Aristotle says that two of these four occur naturally, things and mental concepts or the speech that occurs in intellects, for the reason that they are the same and unchangeable in all men; two of them exist not naturally but by convention, namely verbs, names and letters which he says are not naturally fixed because, as we said above, all men do not use the same spoken sounds or the same elements. This is what he says: 16a3-9 Now those things that are in spoken sound are signs20 of affections in the soul, and those things that are written [are signs] of the things that are in spoken sound. And just as letters

20

25

30 24,1

5

10

15 20

25

25,1 5

28

Translation

10

are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work On the Soul21 and do not belong to the present subject.

15

Though22 he had proposed dealing firstly with the name and verb, and had promised to define later whatever he put next, he leaves this for the time being and makes a few introductory remarks about the affections of the soul and their signs, i.e. spoken sounds. Most commentators have failed to give reasons for his insertion of these points. But the reason for their inclusion has been explained by just three commentators as far as I know. Of these Herminus’ explanation is furthest from the truth. He says that Aristotle included a discussion of the signs of the soul’s affections to give added impact to the usefulness of the book he was composing. For since he intended to discuss spoken sounds, which are signs of the soul’s affections, he was right to give a few prefatory words on these. For since no one is unaware of the affections of his own soul, it is most useful to know also about the signs as well as the affections of the soul. For the affections cannot be recognised except by the spoken sounds which are their signs. But Alexander gives another reason for this insertion – because, he says, names and verbs are included in simple communication. Now a sentence is composed of verbs and names; and truth and falsity are found in the sentence. Whether any expression is simple or is already a conjoint and combined sentence, they take their importance from what they signify. For their order and content are first in the things signified and only afterwards flow into spoken sounds. Since then the import of what signifies takes its start in the things signified, he proposes firstly to tell us about what the actual spoken sounds signify. But Herminus’ interpretation is to be criticised, for he gave no explanation at all of the reasons for the idea he proposed. Alexander just touched on the reason, coming very close to understanding it, but did not properly disentangle the main reason for Aristotle’s treatment. But Porphyry clarified in detail the exact reason and origin of this statement and revealed the entire dispute amongst the older philosophers about the power of signification. For he says that the opinions of the ancient philosophers were uncertain as to what it is exactly that is signified by spoken sounds. Some thought it meant things and that their names are what is given in spoken sound. Others thought of certain incorporeal natures23 whose significations are designated by spoken sounds, adopting in a way the incorporeal species of Plato’s doctrine when he says that the word ‘man’ and ‘horse’ signify not the underlying substance of anything but the species man himself and horse itself. Thinking of this as an

20

25

30 26,1 5

10

15

20

25 30

Translation

29

incorporeal universal they posited certain incorporeal realities which they thought were the primary signifiers and which could be joined in signifying with other things24 in order to constitute a statement or sentence. Others think that sensations, others images are signified by the spoken sounds. Since this was a controversial subject for the older philosophers and continued so up to Aristotle’s time, anyone who was going to define significant names and verbs had to say firstly what they were signifying. For Aristotle does not think that the underlying things or sensations or images are signified by names and verbs. That names and verbs are not spoken sounds signifying sensations he makes clear in his work On Justice when he says: physei gar euthus diêrêtai ta te noêmata kai ta aisthêmata which you can translate as follows into Latin: ‘thoughts and sensations are differentiated by nature.’25 So he thinks that sensation and thought are different in some way. But the man who says that affections of the soul are signified by spoken sounds is not talking here about sensations; for sensations are affections of the body. If he had said that affections of the body are signified by spoken sounds, then we would be right to understand sensations here. But because he pointed out that names and verbs signify affections of the soul, we must think that he means here not sensations but thoughts. But since imagination is also something pertaining to the soul, one might wonder whether by affections of the soul he means images which the Greeks call phantasiai. But he distinguishes these very carefully and correctly in On the Soul26 where he says: estin de phantasia heteron phaseôs kai apophaseôs. symplokê gar noêmatôn estin to alêthes kai to pseudos. ta de prôta noêmata ti dioisei tou mê phantasmata einai? ê oude tauta phantasmata, all’ ouk aneu phantasmatôn which we translate as follows: ‘imagination is different from affirmation and negation, for truth and falsity involve combination of thoughts. How then will first thoughts differ from images? But certainly neither these nor any thoughts are images, but they cannot exist without images.’ This argument proves that images and thoughts are different and that affirmations and negations arise from a combination of thoughts. He therefore also doubted whether first thoughts could be images of any kind. Now we call first thoughts those which conceive a simple thing, e.g. when someone says just ‘Socrates’ and wonders whether this sort of thought which in itself in no way involves truth or falsity is a thought or an image of Socrates himself. But he clearly shows what he thinks about this problem too, for he says, ‘But certainly neither these nor any thoughts are images, but they cannot exist without images’. In other words what the word ‘Socrates’ or any other simple word signifies is not an image but a thought, which cannot arise without an image. For sensation and imagination are, as it were, primary forms on which the mind, when it comes upon them, leans as on a foundation. For just as painters are accustomed

27,1 5

10

15

20

25 28,1 5 10

15

20

25 29,1

30 5

10

15

20

25 30 30,1 5

10

15

20

25

Translation

to outline a body and sketch in where they intend to express someone’s face in colours, in the same way a sensation and image act naturally as foundations in the perception of the soul. For when something comes to the notice of sensation or thought27, firstly an image of it must be born, then a thought which is fuller comes along and distinguishes all its parts which in the image had been previously represented in a confused way. Imagination is then something imperfect, whereas names and verbs signify the perfect and not what is curtailed in any way. Therefore Aristotle’s doctrine is right: whatever is involved in names and verbs signifies neither sensations nor images but just the quality of the thoughts. And so the Peripatetics28 who draw from Aristotle were right to posit three forms of speech (oratio): one which can be written in letters, a second which can be vocally expressed and a third which can be connected by thought; one contained in thoughts, the second by spoken sound, the third by letters. And so because Aristotle considered that it is thought that is signified by spoken sounds and was intending to lay down in their definitions that names and verbs signify, he was right to say in advance what they signified, and by declaring his own ideas restrain the reader from making a mistake derived from the complex argument between the ancients. And in this way nothing in this paragraph can be considered superfluous or disconnected from the flow of thought. Porphyry29 asks why Aristotle said those things that are in spoken sound rather than ‘spoken sounds’, and those things that are written instead of ‘letters’. His solution is as follows. It is said that for the Peripatetics there are three [kinds of] speech, one written in letters, a second expressed vocally, the third composed in the mind. If there are three forms of speech the parts of speech are without doubt also threefold. Then since the verb and name are primarily parts of speech, there will be some names and names that are written, some spoken, some exercised in the quiet of the mind. Then since he proposed first we must settle what a name is and what a verb is, and the nature of names and verbs is threefold, he showed exactly what he intended to discuss and what he wanted to define. And because he is speaking about the names and verbs that are expressed vocally he explains this too more fully in the words the things that are in spoken sound are signs of affections in the soul, and the things that are written [are signs] of the things that are in spoken sounds as if he were saying ‘the names and verbs expressed vocally indicate affections in the soul and written names and verbs in turn bear the responsibility for indicating the significance of vocally expressed names and verbs.’ For just as vocally expressed verbs and names signify mental concepts and thoughts, so too the verbs and names which exist only in the forms of the letters signify the verbs and names which we speak, i.e. which we sound with our voice. For in the phrase the things that

Translation

31

are in spoken sound are . . one must understand ‘verbs and names’. And when he says the things that are written one must equally understand ‘verbs and names’. And to the second mention of things that are in spoken sound must be added the names and verbs which spoken speech expresses and explicates. If nothing were left out the complete idea would be as follows: the names and verbs that are in spoken sound are signs of affections in the soul, and the verbs and names that are written [are signs] of the verbs and names that are in spoken sound. That is the obvious understanding of the passage, although our additions seem to be lacking. Therefore the idea is not divorced, but follows on from the first proposition. For when he decided to define the nature of verb and name since their nature is multiple, he made exactly clear his meaning as to what verb and name he wanted to deal with. And so beginning with the names and verbs of spoken sound, he discussed what they signified. For he said that they designate the affections of the soul. He also added that the spoken verbs and names are designated by what is expressed by the shapes of the letters. But since not every spoken sound has signification, whereas verbs or names never lack significations, and because not every significant spoken sound designates something by convention but some things by nature like tears, groans and lamentation – some spoken sounds also of other animals point to something by nature, e.g. anger is indicated from the barking of dogs, and what pleases them by some other sound – whereas verbs and names signify by convention, and verbs and names are not just spoken sounds, but significant spoken sounds, and not just significant, but also designate something by convention rather than by nature, he did not say ‘spoken sounds are signs of affections in the soul’. For not every spoken sound is significant and there are some spoken sounds that signify naturally rather than by convention. But if he had expressed himself in that way none of it would be pertinent to the specific nature of verbs and names. And so he refused to say spoken sounds in a general sense, but mentioned only ‘the things that are in spoken sound’. For spoken sound is something universal and names and verbs are parts of it. But every part is in the whole. Therefore, since verbs and names are within spoken sound, they are rightly called ‘the things that are in spoken sound’ as if he were saying: what is included within spoken sound signifies thoughts. But this is as if he had said: spoken sound in a certain state signifies thoughts, for names and verbs are, as said above, not just spoken sounds. Just as a coin is bronze not only struck with a particular stamp so that it can be called a coin but also so that it can be the price of some thing, in the same way verbs and names are not only spoken sounds, but spoken sounds used in such a way as to signify thought.30 For a spoken sound like ‘garalus’ signifies nothing, though grammarians looking at its form argue that it is a name; but philosophy will not think it a name unless

30 31,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 32,1

5

10

15

20

32

25

30 33,1 5

10

15

20

25

30

34,1

5

Translation

it is so used that it can designate some concept in the mind and in this way some thing.31 And indeed a name will have to be the name of something. But if a spoken sound designates nothing, it is the name of nothing; and so, if it is the name of nothing, it cannot even be called a name. And so a spoken sound of this kind – that is a significant spoken sound – is not just a spoken sound but is called a verb or name, just as a coin is called not just bronze but by its own name, ‘coin’, by which it is distinguished from other bronze. And so Aristotle’s phrase ‘the things that are in spoken sound’ designates nothing other than the spoken sound that is not only spoken sound but the spoken sound that has impressed on it some specific character and some sort of form expressing a conventional signification. Of these, i.e. verbs and names which are in spoken sound which is in a certain state are signified by those which are written, so that the words those that are written is to be understood as applying to verbs and names which are in letters. The following could also be a reason why he said and those that are written: since we call letters both the inscribed figures and the spoken sounds which are signified by the same formulae – e.g. in the case of ‘a’ both the sound itself and the form signifying the spoken sound that is written in the medium of the wax take the name of the letter – and since he wanted to make clear to what verbs and names the things which are in spoken sound correspond, he did not say letters, because this could even refer to the sounds of letters, but ‘the things that are written’, to show that he was talking about the letters which exist in writing, i.e. whose shape can be created in the wax by the stilus or on parchment by the pen. Otherwise what is contained in the sounds refers to the names that are in spoken sound because names and verbs are made up of those sounds. But Porphyry decided as follows on the two interpretations. The words and the things that are written must not be referred to letters so much as to the verbs and names which have been located in the written letters. It remains to add why he didn’t say ‘the things that are in spoken sound are the signs of thoughts’ but rather ‘signs of the affections in the soul’. For since the things that are in spoken sound signify things and thoughts, thoughts in a primary way and the things which intelligence itself comprehends, by a secondary signification through the medium of thoughts, the thoughts themselves are not without some affections which enter the soul from the underlying things. For a person is affected by the specific character of the thing which he comprehends in the intellect and then proceeds to give it expression and to signify it. For when someone thinks of some thing he must first receive through an image the form and specific character of the thing thought and there must occur an affection or a mental perception (intellectus perceptio) accompanied by some affection. When this is placed and fixed in the recesses of the mind, there occurs a will

Translation

33

(voluntas) to convey the affection to another person. A certain forceful drive (actus) to continue the thinking comes next from the power of deepest reason. Speech explicates this and expresses it, relying on the affection which was first established in the mind or, more precisely, on the signification that has developed along with the developing speech which adapts itself to the movements of the signifying (inner) speech.32 This affection occurs like the impression of a form, but in the way this normally happens in the mind. For the way in which a characteristic form is naturally in a thing is quite different from the way its form is when transferred to the mind, just as letters, i.e. the signs of spoken sound, are committed in different ways to wax, marble or paper. The Stoics say that an image is transferred from things into the soul, but they always qualify this with ‘in the manner of soul’. And so, since every affection in the soul seems to be the specific character of a thing and, furthermore, spoken sounds signify primarily thoughts but rely after this on the signification of the things from which thoughts arise, any spoken sound which is significant indicates an affection of the soul. But these affections in souls are produced from the similarity of the things [to the affections]. For when someone sees a sphere, square or some other figure in things, he grasps it by some power and likeness in the intelligence of his mind. For the man who has seen a sphere, weighs up its likeness in his mind and thinks; and when his soul has been affected by the image, he knows the thing by whose image he has been affected. Every image carries a likeness of the thing whose image it is. When the mind understands, it comprehends the likeness of the things. Hence it happens that when we see one body to be larger than another, another to be smaller, afterwards when thinking of those very bodies when they have been taken away from our sight we know and understand, because memory has saved it, that we saw there was a smaller and a larger body. This would not happen unless what the mind suffers it possesses as likenesses of the things. And so, since the affections of the soul which he called thoughts are in some way likenesses of things, and even though Aristotle speaks just after about affections, he made the transition to likenesses in close proximity, because it makes no difference whether he says affections or likenesses. For the likeness of a thing is exactly the same as an affection in the soul. And Alexander tries to explain the passage in this way. He meant, he says, that things that are in spoken sound signify thoughts of the mind and proves this with another example. For what is in spoken sound signifies affections of the soul in the same way as what is written signifies spoken sounds. We therefore understand the phrase and those things that are written as if he said ‘just as those things that are written are [signs] of the things that are in spoken sound’. That what is written, Alexander said, is a sign of spoken sounds, i.e.

10

15

20

25 35,1

5

10

15

20 25

36,1

34 5

10

15

20

25

30

37,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

names and verbs, he showed from his words ‘and just as letters are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds’. For it is an indication that the signification of the spoken sounds themselves is contained in the letters that when the letters vary and what is written is not the same, the spoken sounds must also differ. This is Alexander’s interpretation. Porphyry, since he proposed three types of speech: one contained in the letters, a second expressed in sound with names and verbs, and a third which the thought of the mind works out, declares that the signification of Aristotle’s words now those things that are in spoken sound are signs of affections in the soul would be clear if he had said ‘now those things that are in spoken sound, both names and verbs, are signs of affections in the soul.’ And because Aristotle showed what spoken signs signified he indicated also by what signs names and verbs are revealed and so added the phrase and those things that are written [are signs] of those things that are in spoken sound as if he were saying ‘the verbs and names that are written are signs of the verbs and names that are in spoken sound’. This sentence is not opposed nor is the phrase and those things that are written to be understood with Alexander as if he were saying ‘just as those things that are written, i.e. letters, signify the things that are in spoken sound, so what is in spoken sound is a sign of the affections of the soul’, for the following reasons: 1. You should not add anything to the simple meaning. 2. When the arrangement is so terse and the division of the sentence so fixed it should not be disrupted. 3. If the signification of letters and spoken sounds is similar to that of spoken sounds and affections of the soul, then just as the spoken sounds change according to the changes in the letters, so also the affections of the soul will alter when the spoken sounds differ. But that is not the case, for the same thought can be signified by changing spoken sounds. But Alexander tries with the following argument to prove his interpretation which I referred to above. For he says that the signification of letters and spoken sounds is similar in that just as letters do not signify spoken sounds naturally but by convention, so too spoken sounds do not designate thoughts of the mind naturally but by a particular convention. But whatever the man who above claimed Aristotle’s words and those things that are written as being the equivalent of ‘just as those things that are written’ seems to add to his interpretation, there is no doubt that he is equally making a mistake. And so according to our judgement those who want to keep on the right course will attach themselves to Porphyry’s interpretation. Aspasius too is strongly in agreement with Alexander’s second interpretation which we noted above, and we reprehend him for the same mistake as Alexander. Aristotle in fact thinks that these signs of letters, spoken sounds and affections of the soul occur in two ways,

Translation

35

one by convention, the other naturally. And these are his very words and just as letters are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds the same. For if letters naturally designate spoken sounds and the spoken sounds in turn naturally designate thoughts of the mind, all men will use the same letters and the same spoken sounds. But because the same letters and the same spoken sounds are not found among all men it is agreed that they are not natural. But33 in this passage there are two readings. For Alexander thinks it ought to read as follows: ‘Now what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all men and what the same affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same’. Aristotle included this since he wanted to separate what signifies by convention from what signifies something naturally. What signifies by convention is variable, but what signifies naturally signifies the same to all men. He begins by going from spoken sounds to letters and firstly shows them to be not naturally significant as follows: and just as letters are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds the same. For if letters are proved not to signify naturally because different people use different letters, in the same way it will be likely that spoken sounds too do not signify naturally since separate (singulae) nations do not converse with the same spoken sounds. Since he wants to hold the view that the likeness of thoughts to the underlying things exists naturally he says what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all men. He means ‘what spoken sounds, which are different in different nations, possess the signification of’ – and he means ‘of the affections of the soul’ – ‘these affections are the same for all’. For it is impossible that what Romans think of as man is conceived as a stone by barbarians. And similarly with the rest of things. What he means when he says that what spoken sounds signify in all nations is unchangeable is that the spoken sounds themselves, as he showed with the words just as letters are not the same for all men, neither are the spoken sounds, are different to many men but what the spoken sounds signify is the same for all men and cannot be altered in any way. They are of course thoughts of things and cannot be altered because they exist naturally. And this is what he means when he says what these, i.e. spoken sounds, are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all men – to show that spoken sounds are diverse but what the spoken sounds signify, i.e. affections of the soul, are the same for all men and can in no way be changed since they are naturally formed. And he is not content here to speak of spoken sounds and thoughts, but by the fact that he asserted that spoken sounds and letters are not the same for all men he showed that they are not naturally formed; and again he showed that thoughts, which he calls affections of the soul, are natural because they are the same for all men; from thoughts he then made the transition to things when he

25

30 38,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 39,1

5 10

15

36

20

25

30 40,1 5

10

15

20

25

41,1

5

Translation

says ‘what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same’, meaning: things too are naturally the same for all men. Just as the affections of the soul which are taken from things are the same for all men, so too the actual things of which the affections of the soul are likenesses are the same for all men. They are therefore also natural just as the likenesses of things, i.e. affections of the soul, are natural. But Herminus goes against this interpretation. For he says it is not true that thoughts which spoken sounds signify are the same for all men; for what, he says, is expressed in equivocation, when one and the same type of spoken sound signifies more than one thing? He thinks the following is a more truthful reading: ‘Now what these are in the first place signs of these are affections of the soul for all and what these affections are likenesses of these too are things’ so that here is apparently demonstrated what spoken signs signify or what affections of the soul are likenesses of. According to Herminus all we must take from this is that affections of the soul are what spoken sounds signify as though he said ‘affections of the soul are what spoken sounds signify’ and ‘what those that are contained in thoughts are likenesses of are things’ which is the equivalent of saying ‘things are what thoughts signify’. But Porphyry assesses both views subtly and with precision and approves more of Alexander’s view which declares that one need not neglect the fact that equivocation involves multiple signification. For both the man who speaks fixes his mind on one particular thing, which he thinks and declares in a spoken sound, and the listener too expects one thought. But if, when each understands something different from the one name, the person who said the name equivocally designates more clearly what he meant to signify by the name, the listener then receives it and both agree on the one thought which in turn becomes one for those who at first had had different affections of the soul because of the equivocation of the name. For it cannot be the case, given that Aristotle distinguished conventional from natural spoken sounds on the grounds that the former are not the same for all men, he would have to maintain that what he thought was natural was natural because it was the same for all men.34 And so Alexander is to be accepted either on his own account or on the authority of Porphyry. But since Aristotle said but what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all, Alexander asks, if they are the names of things, why has Aristotle said that spoken sounds are in the first place signs of thoughts. For a name is assigned to a thing, e.g. when we say ‘man’, we signify a thought, but the name belongs to the thing – i.e. animal, rational, mortal. Then why are spoken sounds not signs primarily of things to which they are applied rather than of thoughts. But perhaps, he says, he puts it this way

Translation

37

because although spoken sounds are the names of things we do not use spoken sounds to signify things, but [to signify] affections of the soul that are produced in us from the things. Then in view of what spoken sounds themselves are used to signify he was right to say they are primarily signs of them. Aspasius finds himself in great difficulties on this point. How, he wonders, is it possible that the affections of the soul are the same for all men when there is such a diverse opinion on the just and the good? For Aspasius thinks that Aristotle meant the affections of the soul have nothing to do with incorporeal things but only with things which can be perceived by the senses. But he is wrong, for the man who errs is never said to have understood, and the man who thinks of what is good but not in the same way as it is but differently, will perhaps be said to have had an affection of the mind but will certainly not be said to have understood.35 Now when Aristotle talks about likeness he is making statements about thought. For it is impossible that a man who thinks what is good is bad has conceived in his mind the likeness of the good. For he has not understood the thing which underlies, but since what is just and good may be so by convention or nature and if he is talking about what is just and good in terms of civil law or injustice, the affections of the soul are certainly not the same, because civil law and civil good are by convention rather than by nature. But natural good and justice is the same for all nations. And in the case of god too, though his worship may be diverse, there is an identical thought of a certain pre-eminent nature. And so we must briefly recapitulate; Aristotle comes to the sentence by the parts. For his decision to define what a verb and a name is, mean that these are the smallest parts of a sentence; [and in deciding to discuss] affirmation and negation, he is by that very fact talking about the sentence composed of verbs and names, which are in turn parts of statement. And after statement he proposed to speak about the sentence, of which statement is itself a part. And since, as we have said, speech is threefold – in letters, in spoken sound, in thoughts – whoever would define verb and name and lay down that they are significant, first says what the verbs and names signify and in fact begins from the names and verbs in spoken sound saying there are those which are in spoken sound. And he shows what they signify, adding that they are signs of the affections that are in the soul. In turn he declares that the verbs and names that are formed in letters signify the names and verbs which are in spoken sound, saying: and those things that are written [are signs] of the things in spoken sound. And since they amount to four – letters, spoken sounds, things and thoughts – of which letters and spoken sounds are by convention, thoughts and things by nature, he proved that spoken sounds exist not naturally but by convention with the argument that they are not the same for all men but differ, i.e. spoken sounds are not the same

10

15

20

25

30 42,1 5

10

15 20

25

30

38 43,1 5

10

15

20 25

30 44,1 5

10

15

20 25

Translation

just as letters are not the same for all. To prove that thoughts and things exist naturally he said that the thoughts which spoken sounds signify are the same for all men, and that things of which the affections of the soul are likenesses are in turn the same for all men, i.e. what these, the things that are in spoken sound, are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all men and what these are likenesses of – things – are also the same. Now he calls them affections of the soul because it has been made clear with great care elsewhere that every spoken sound from a living being is produced either from or because of the affection of a soul. And he called an affection of the soul a likeness because, according to Aristotle, understanding is nothing other than taking up in the cognising of the soul itself the specific character (proprietas) and image of an underlying thing. He notes that he had carefully discussed affections of the soul in his book On the Soul. But since it has been shown how verbs, names and the sentence primarily signify thoughts, whatever signification there is in spoken sound comes from thoughts. And so whoever intends to discuss spoken sound properly has to look first a little further at thoughts. And so what above he called affections of the soul and likenesses, he now more openly terms thought when he says: 16a9-18 Just as in the soul a thought is sometimes neither true nor false, at other times it is necessarily one of these, so also with spoken sound. For falsity and truth have to do with combination (conpositio) and division (divisio). And so names and verbs by themselves are like thought without combination and division (e.g. ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing further is added); for so far they are neither true nor false. The following is an indication of this: ‘goatstag’ signifies something, but it is not something true or false until ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added either simply or with reference to time. Since name, verb and every sentence (oratio) signify affections of the soul, it is doubtless from the things that they designate that the specific signification comes to be in the same spoken sounds. The complete and continuous sequence of Aristotle’s thought is as follows: since the things we turn over in our mind and thought are directly signified in spoken sounds we consider some thoughts to be simple and without any statement of truth or falsity, e.g. when the specific character of man arises in the quiet of our imagination; for no recognition of truth or falsity arises from this simple kind of thinking. But there are combined and conjoined thoughts in which there is already a certain vision of truth or falsity, e.g. when to any simple mental perception is added something else which makes it be or not be something, e.g. if ‘is’ or ‘is not’, ‘is white’ or ‘is not white’ are added to the thought ‘man’. The following may be deemed sentences which

Translation

39

share in truth or falsity: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’, ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’. Of these ‘man is’ or ‘man is white’ are expressed in combination, for the first joins ‘is’ and ‘man’, the second ‘man’ to ‘white’ through the combined predication of the thought. If I add something to the thought ‘man’ so that it becomes ‘man is’, ‘man is not’, ‘man is white’ or something similar, truth and falsity arise in the thought itself. Therefore Aristotle claims that just as there sometimes are simple thoughts lacking in falsity and truth and others in which one of these may be found, it is the same in spoken sound too. For the spoken sounds that indicate simple thoughts are also themselves divorced from falsity and truth, whereas in those that signify the sort of ideas in which falsity and truth already exist one of these will necessarily be found. For if one says merely ‘man’, ‘white’ or even ‘goatstag’, although signifying something, they clearly lack any mark of truth or falsity since they signify a simple thought. Aristotle’s entire view is of this sort. We must, nevertheless, look more carefully at his meaning when he says for falsity and truth have to do with combination and division and and so names and verbs by themselves are like thought without combination and division. We should note too why he used a compound name, in fact an example of something nonexistent, in the words for a goatstag signifies something. Nor should we neglect the words either simply or with reference to time. First of all we must comment on the phrase for falsity and truth have to do with combination and division. The question arises whether all truth36 has to do with combination and division or some does and some not at all; and whether truth and falsity are constituted in all combination37 or division, or are not found generally but in a particular type of combination or division. For truth occurs in opinions whenever an image is taken from an underlying thing or a thought gets an image of the thing as it is; falsity occurs when the image is not supplied to the mind from an underlying thing or not of the thing as it is. But so far as regards truth and falsity nothing more is found than a certain relationship of opinion to an underlying thing. For the only thing to do with truth seen here is the relationship and mode of the relationship of the image to the underlying thing. But no one would call this relationship combination. In this case, then, not even an imaginary form of division can be conceived. We also have to consider whether there is any combination or division where things are said to be true in their own substance, so that the pleasure of living well is true and the pleasure of making war false. We must also note that whatever is understood in god (greatest of all) is not understood to be in him accidentally but substantially. Moreover we believe that the goods which derive from him are so substantially and not accidentally. But if we believe in god’s substantial existence (and no one would say god is false and nothing in him could turn out to be accidental) god must be declared to be truth

30 45,1

5 10

15 20

25

30 46,1 5

10

15

20

40

25

30 47,1 5

10

15

20 25

30 48,1 5 10

15

Translation

itself. Therefore, where is there combination or division in things that are naturally simple and are not joined by combining anything? Therefore not all truth and falsity arises in the context of combination and division, but only that which occurs in a plurality of thoughts and in the utterance of speech. For there is clearly no combination in the relation itself (habitudo) of image and thing. Combination occurs in joining thoughts. For when I say ‘Socrates walks’ the concept itself that he ‘walks’ is not a combination. But when in developing my thought I join walking to Socrates a combination is created. If I utter this in a sentence (oratio) the same combination occurs again and the dimension of truth and falsity makes its appearance along with it. Therefore truth and falsity are found only in those combinations which are now under exclusive consideration, i.e. name and verb, negation and affirmation, statement and sentence. These combinations take their nature of truth and falsity from thoughts and preserve it in the [verbal] expression of their signification. I will speak a little later more plainly about division which has to do with negation and combination which has to do with affirmation. Now we have to see whether it is true that truth or falsity are produced in all cases of combination and division. In fact it is completely false. For who would say that a combination of names such as ‘Socrates and Plato’ or a division of these names, ‘neither Socrates nor Plato’, contained any indication of truth or falsity? Then it must be admitted that truth and falsity do not occur in all cases of division and combination, i.e. when expressed in a sentence (oratio). But it is certainly true that all truth and falsity expressed in a sentence arises in combination and division, but not all combination and division in a sentence contains truth or falsity. Then he would be wrong if he had said that there is truth and falsity in all combination or division. But since he simply said that truth and falsity have to do with combination and division he must be regarded as having expressed himself correctly and most accurately. For those names that are said to be simple, but which can somehow designate truth or falsity, are the sort that have a kind of combination within themselves and within their signification, e.g. if someone says ‘(I) read’. This is to say ‘(I) read’ as if saying ‘I read’.38 This is combination. Or whenever someone replies in just a simple word to a question, in this case too the simple word seems to establish truth or falsity. But this is wrong since the listener’s reply is joined to the whole complex of the questioner’s statement. For example, if someone replies ‘(it) is’39 to the question ‘is the world an animal (living being)?’ this one word seems to contain truth or falsity. But that is wrong, for it is not one; but if you look at the real force of the reply it is as if he had said ‘the world is an animal’. His words names and verbs by themselves are like thoughts without

Translation

41

combination and division designate, as he has already explained above,40 that the things which are in spoken sound are signs of the soul’s affections. If they are signs, spoken sounds carry within them the likeness of thoughts just as letters the likeness of spoken sounds.41 And since it has been explained why he spoke of the similarity between names and verbs and affections of soul and why he posited that truth and falsity have to do with combination and division, we must say what exactly is the combination or division in which truth and falsity are found. For since he is considering the simple statement-making sentence (as he later declares himself in the section on division, the first single42 statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation.43) he now wants to indicate the type of combination which either establishes the existence (substantia) of something or joins something with the verb ‘to be’. For when I say ‘Socrates is’, I attach the ‘is’ to Socrates and establish that his substance is, whereas if I say ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ I put together philosophy and Socrates with the verb ‘to be’ or if I say ‘Socrates walks’ it is the same as if I were to say ‘Socrates is walking’. And so when combination of this kind occurs that uses the verb ‘to be’ either to establish existence (substantia) or join something, it is called affirmation; and the nature of truth and falsity is found in it. And all negation is constituted in respect of predication (for the negation of the affirmation ‘Socrates is’ is not ‘not-Socrates is’ but ‘Socrates is not’. A negation is added to what Socrates was said to be so that we say he is not that which he was formerly said to be); it is then called division since the addition of a negative divides what in affirmation has been established or joined using the verb ‘to be’, i.e. either the establishing of a thing’s existence (substantia) or also the creation of a combination through the phrase ‘is something’. For when I say ‘Socrates is not’ I have divorced ‘to be’ from ‘Socrates’. And when I say ‘Socrates is not a philosopher’ I have separated ‘Socrates’ from ‘to be a philosopher’. This separation which involves negation he called division. It is then clear that if there is a simple thought in the affections of the soul, since the thought itself so far does not possess the nature of truth and falsity, its expression too will be divorced from both. But when there occurs a combination made in the thoughts using ‘to be’ or even a separation made in thoughts – and truth and falsity are primarily created in thoughts44 – then since spoken sounds take their signification from thoughts, the spoken sounds too must be true or false to correspond with the quality of the thoughts. The novelty and great subtlety of Aristotle’s example is very effective. To prove that just a single name is neither true nor false he suggests a name which is in fact combined but of something which has no real existence. If a single name could possess truth or falsity, a name of the kind ‘goatstag’ surely designates something false since there exists in reality nothing of that kind. But in fact it

20

25

30

49,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 50,1 5

42

10 15

20

25

30 51,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 52,1

Translation

does not designate any falsity. Unless the goatstag is said to be or not to be, even though it does not itself actually exist, when said in isolation nothing false or true is conveyed in the word. And so he suggested the kind of name for which there is no underlying thing to show the force of a simple name that lacks all truth or falsity. But if a single name could designate any truth or falsity, the name which designates a thing which does not in reality exist, would be totally false. But that is not the case. Therefore truth and falsity can never be found in a simple name. He was also extremely careful to avoid suggesting a name which would signify nothing but one which, though it did signify something, could not however be true or false, so that it would not lack truth and falsity by not signifying anything, but by its being expressed simply. However he also managed in the same passage to prove that not only a simple name is far removed from truth and falsity, but that combined names, so long as they have no composition involving ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ (as said above), cannot signify truth or falsity. It is as if he were to say ‘not only a simple name except when there is some combination does not signify true or false, but combined names too lack both (as he himself said) unless ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is added to them either simply or with reference to time. He added this because in some cases the sort of statements occur that what is said of them is put forward with reference to existence, whereas in others the ‘to be’ which is added signifies not existence but a sort of presence. When we say ‘god is’ we are not saying that he is now but only that he exists in his substance (in substantia esse) so that this refers to the unchangeability of his existence rather than to any time. But if we should say ‘it is day’ this does not refer at all to the existence of day but only to the state of time. This is what ‘is’ means, as if we were to say ‘it is now’. So when we say ‘is’ to designate existence, we add ‘is’ simply, but when to indicate something present, we add ‘is’ with reference to time. What we have said is one explanation. There is another as follows. Something can be said to be in two ways, either simply or with reference to time. Simply [means] with reference to the present time as when someone says ‘a goatstag is’. But the present which is indicated is not a time, but the boundary of times, for it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. So whoever uses the phrase ‘to be’ with reference to the present, uses it simply, but whoever adds the past or future does not use it simply but is already running into time itself. For, as explained, there are two times, past and future. But if when someone refers to the present he is speaking simply, then when he mentions either past or future he is using a statement with reference to time. There is also a third explanation. Whenever we use time in an indeterminate sense, e.g. if someone says ‘there is a goatstag’, ‘there was a goatstag’, ‘there will be a goatstag’, this is said indeterminately

Translation

43

and simply. But if someone adds ‘now is’ or ‘yesterday was’ or ‘tomorrow will be’ he is adding time to the simple ‘to be’. Aristotle’s words until ‘is’ or ‘is not’ are added, either simply or with reference to time must be understood in one of these three ways. Now his earlier statement just as in the soul a thought is sometimes neither true nor false he afterwards explained saying that names and verbs by themselves are like simple thoughts, e.g. man or white. But to the words it is necessarily one of these he gave no corresponding explanation. The sense will have to be completed from the words but it is not something true nor false until ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added. For it is a sort of combination of thoughts which is necessarily either true or false and to whose expression either ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added. Then since he has been dealing with the name and verb and has in deep reflection shown as briefly as possible the implications of spoken sounds, letters, thoughts and things, he now returns to define what he had promised in his earlier proposal.45 For in defining name he carries on:

5 10 15

20 25

Chapter 2 16a19-21 A name then is a spoken sound significant by convention without time, none of whose parts is significant when separated. Every definition is formed by the establishment of the genus and completed by combining the differentiae with it. If we collect the differentiae in the case of a proposed genus and fit them to the one species we want to define until the collection fits only the one species, there is nothing further required to make the definition; e.g. if you want to define man, to the genus ‘animal’ you must join two differentiae, rational and mortal, and make the following order (ordo): rational mortal animal. If this definition is referred to man, it is a complete description of his concept (ratio) and substance. Since Aristotle wanted to define what a name is, he first took its genus, saying that a name is a spoken sound, thereby distinguishing what we call a name from what are not spoken sounds but just sounds. For sound is different from spoken sound. Sound is a perceptible striking of the air, whereas spoken sound is a breath emitted by means of certain parts of the throat called windpipes and which is formed by a particular pressing of the tongue. In addition spoken sound belongs only to living things, whilst sound is sometimes produced by the collision of inanimate bodies. Therefore since he showed name to be a spoken sound, he divided and separated this part of speech from others which are not spoken sounds but simply sounds. And he took spoken sound as the genus of name. For spoken sound has something else as a sort of species, verb which differs from name. It also embraces

30 53,1 5

10

15

20

25

44

30 54,1

5

10

15

20

25 30 55,1

5

10

15

Translation

certain utterances which signify nothing meaningful, e.g. articulated spoken sounds whose signification cannot be discovered in themselves, e.g. scindapsos.46 And so he attached yet further differentiae to this genus, which divide and separate name from the other species placed under spoken sound just as spoken sound separated name from other sounds. For adding that a name is a significant spoken sound distinguishes name from those spoken sounds that signify nothing at all, such as syllables. For syllables, though the whole name is made up of them, signify nothing at all by themselves. There are also some spoken sounds made up of letters and syllables which have no signification, e.g. blityri. And so since there seemed to be some spoken sounds which lack signification, a name which is a spoken sound and is always produced to designate something could not be otherwise defined than by distinguishing it from spoken sounds without signification. Therefore he said that a name is a significant spoken sound so that by ‘spoken sound’ it could be distinguished from other sounds and by the addition of ‘significant’ from what comes under spoken sound but designates nothing. But this is not yet enough for the whole definition and a name is not only a significant spoken sound. There are some spoken sounds which signify but are not names such as those produced by us in certain emotions, e.g. when someone lets out a groan or stirred by distress emits a shout. One is a sign of mental, the other of bodily distress. Although they are spoken sounds and signify a certain affection of the soul or body, no one would call a groan and shout names. Dumb animals, too, utter some spoken sounds which signify. The barking of dogs signifies their anger, another softer sound indicates pleasure. And so a name must, by adding the differentiae, be distinguished from everything which is spoken sound and signifies but is not included in the term ‘name’. What did he add? That a name is not a significant spoken sound simply, but by convention. It is by convention because it is fitted out in accordance with the particular establishing (positio) and decision (placitum) of the man putting the word forward. For no name has been naturally established nor is a thing called by a specific term coming from nature in the same way as the underlying thing exists naturally; but the human race, which has power of thought and speech, gave things names and making them up of whatever letters and syllables it pleased assigned them to the particular substances of underlying things. This is proved by the argument that the same names would exist in all nations if names were natural, as sense perceptions, since they exist naturally, are the same for all. For all nations look with just their eyes, hear with their ears, smell with their noses, perceive tastes with their mouth and judge heat or cold, smooth or rough with touch. These are the sort of things which seem to be all the same amongst peoples. The actual things that are perceived do not change, since they have been

Translation

45

established naturally. Sweetness and bitterness, white and black and all the other things we perceive with our five senses are the same for all. For what is sweet in perception to Italians does not seem bitter to Persians, nor does what appears white to our eyes appear black to Indians, unless the senses happen to be disturbed by some illness, something which has nothing to do with nature. Since these things exist naturally then, they are the same for all nations. Then if names should appear to be natural, they would be the same for all nations and would not undergo any change. But as it is Latin speakers call man by one term, Greeks by another, and the barbarian nations by different terms too. This lack of agreement in assigning names is an indication that names have been composed for things not naturally but according to the decision (placitum) and will of those assigning the names. The same thing is also indicated by the frequent changes in individuals’ names. For the man we now call Plato was previously called Aristocles and the man now called Theophrastus was, before [he met] Aristotle,47 named Tyrtamus by his own parents. And when in the same language many terms are applied to one thing, it is demonstrated that the thing in question is not named naturally but by applying names; for if each thing were called by a natural name, we would signify one thing by just one name. Then if words are natural what is the relevance of there being for one thing several spoken names intended to coincide in one designation and description? For we say sword, blade, steel and these three apply to the same underlying substance. And so it has been proved that names are by convention, i.e. in accordance with the decision of those who apply them as if Aristotle said that a name is a spoken sound that is significant not naturally but ‘according to the decision and will of the man applying’ the name. In this way he distinguishes them from spoken sounds which designate naturally as do those we utter in our affections and emotions or which dumb animals attempt to emit. But the differentia mentioned above has not yet constituted the full form and definition of a name; for a verb has in common with a name that it is a significant spoken sound by convention. But the addition of the differentia ‘without time’ distinguishes a name from a verb. For no name includes the signification of time. It is the mark of a verb, when either passivity or action is signified, to bring along with it some time dimension to express time when something is said to act or suffer. When I say ‘Socrates’, it has nothing to do with time. But when I say ‘I read, did read or will read’, it does involve time. Then when one adds to name that it is said to be without time, it is distinguished from verb. Of course no one should imagine that we think that no name signifies time. There are names which in their signification designate time, e.g. when I say ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’, these are names of time. But we maintain that time is not signified with the same name. For signifying and signifying additionally (con-

20

25

30 56,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 57,1 5

46

10

15 20

25

30 58,1

5 10

15

20

25

Translation

signare) are different. A verb signifies time along with its own particular mode, e.g. when it designates the mode of agent or patient the passivity or action is not expressed without time. Hence we do not say that a name does not signify time, but that the signification of times does not accompany a name. There remains just one differentia which if added to the above will complete the definition of name. By this name is distinguished from sentence. Certain sentences are certainly found which though they are significant spoken sounds and by convention since they are composed of names, are however without time, e.g. ‘Socrates and Plato.’ This sentence, though composed of names, is not a name but is a significant spoken sound by convention and lacks time. To distinguish a name from this kind of sentence he added the differentia ‘none of whose parts is significant when separated’. For since a sentence is composed of verbs and names and it is obvious that the verbs or names signify, there can be no doubt that the parts of the sentence too signify something. But the part of a name, since it is simple, signifies nothing at all. But since every sentence and every name and every verb take their power of signifying from the underlying thoughts, it is often the case that one name signifies many thoughts. Therefore it will also be the case that a non simple name does not designate just one affection of the mind or thought. For when I say ‘suburban’ an apparent signification (imaginatio significandi), but such that when cut off from the whole name, it signifies nothing in reference to that name. So when we say ‘wildhorse’48 ‘wild’ signifies something. But if it is separated from the whole combination it does not have the same signification it had when, along with the part ‘horse’, it joined together in denoting ‘wildhorse’. For this whole combination designates one idea. So in a sentence ‘wild’ has a signification (the sentence ‘wild horse’ contains two ideas), but in a name it has none since the word ‘wildhorse’ designates one idea. But perhaps ‘wild’ signifies in addition when taken with the part with which it is joined, but when separated has no signification. This is then what Aristotle means when he says 16a22-6 But it is not the same in combined names as in simple ones. In the latter the part is in no way significant, whereas in the former it wants to be, but not of anything separated, e.g. ‘wild’ in ‘wildhorse’. For the parts of a simple name do not even have an apparent signification, whilst what is combined has the sort of parts that try somehow to signify something but which signify in addition rather than just signify something apart. So adding to [the definition of] name that its parts when separated signify nothing distinguishes it from a sentence. After explaining the relevance to the definition of name of the

Translation

47

addition none of whose parts is significant when separated (that it distinguishes name from sentence), he discusses why ‘by convention’ (secundum placitum) was added. Since the signification of names is never natural but every name designates by [having a signification] applied to it (positione) it was said to be ‘by convention’. For words designate whatever the man who first gave things names intended (placuit). Who maintains that names are natural when there is such an extensive variety of them amongst all nations? It is not meant that no spoken sound designates naturally but that names do not signify naturally but by convention. Some sounds of wild creatures and dumb animals have this quality. Their spoken sound signifies something, e.g. the neighing of a horse reveals a searching for a companion horse, the barking of dogs the irascibility of those barking etc. But although the spoken sounds of dumb animals signify by their own nature, they cannot be written down in any form of letters. But a name, although it underlies letters, designates nothing in itself until it is applied to the signification of an underlying thing, e.g. the words ‘scindapsos’ or ‘hereceddy’ signify nothing in themselves, but if they are applied to signify some underlying thing – e.g. when a man is called ‘scindapsos’ or a stone ‘hereceddy’ – then what signifies nothing in itself will designate by being applied (positione) and in accordance with the particular intention (placitum) of the one who applies them. Therefore a name is significant when, in Aristotle’s words, it becomes a sign.49 And it becomes a sign when a word which naturally designated nothing is allowed to signify an underlying thing by the intention of the man applying the word. This is what he means by becomes. For if names signified naturally, Aristotle would not say of them becomes a sign. For it would not become, but be a sign. Therefore since names are significant by convention and the sounds of wild creatures which cannot be expressed in letters are by nature, their spoken sounds are not said to be names. In general we say that of all spoken sounds some can be written in letters, others cannot; and again of those that can or cannot be written, some signify [something], others nothing. Furthermore of all spoken sounds some signify by convention, others naturally. A name is then by convention, for it is made a sign of an underlying thing by being applied (positione). For there is no name which naturally signifies. For it is not signification which defines a name, but signification by convention. For even50 sounds which cannot be written (like those of wild animals) signify. He called them sounds since there are some dumb animals which do not possess spoken sound at all, but make a noise by a sort of sounding. Certain fish make a noise not through a voice (vox) but by their gills and, as Porphyry affirms, the cicada transmits a sound through its chest. ‘Yet none of these is a name.’51 He says this not because there is no name for the spoken sounds produced by animals, but because they do not use them as names. For although

59,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 60,1 5

10

15

20 25

48

30 61,1

5

10

15 20 25

30 62,1 5

10 15

Translation

the barking of dogs is a spoken sound that cannot be written down and signifies naturally, it is still called barking – and roaring of a lion, bellowing of a bull. These are names for the relevant spoken sounds which are produced by dumb animals. But we do not say that none of them is a name because there is no name for these spoken sounds [ – there is in fact – ], but because none of these sounds is such as to be a name, i.e. such that wild animals could converse with each other employing them as though using names. For they possess signification, but, as explained, naturally; a name, however, is by convention. 16a30-2 ‘Not man’ is not a name, nor is there any correct name for it. It is neither a sentence nor a negation. Let us call it an infinite name. In the previous section by the addition [to the definition] which we have mentioned he distinguished from name everything which is outside name. But now, since there are some things which fall under the definition of a name but which seem to differ from name, he discusses them to explain what precisely a name seems to be. The phrase ‘not man’ or ‘not horse’ is not a sentence, for every sentence consists either of names and verbs or of just two or more verbs or of just names. But there is just one name in ‘not man’, i.e. ‘man’; ‘not’ is neither a name nor a verb. So it consists neither of two verbs nor of a verb and a name, for there is no verb in it. Therefore ‘not man’ is not a sentence. It is superfluous to prove that it is not a verb since time is always found in verbs. Here you cannot find time at all. It is not a negation either, for every negation is a sentence; since ‘not man’ is not a sentence, it cannot be a negation. There is also the fact that every negation is either true or false, whereas ‘not man’ is neither true nor false, for its meaning is not complete; for this reason, too, it is not said to be a negation. Who would say it is a name, when every name, whether it be a proper or common name, signifies in a definite way? When I say ‘Cicero’, I name one person and substance. And when I say ‘man’, which is a common name, I have signified a definite substance. But when I say ‘not man’ I signify something, that which is not a man, but this is infinite; for it could signify a dog, horse, stone or whatever is not a man. And it could equally be said of what is or what is not; for if someone says ‘not man’ of Scylla who52 does not exist, it signifies something which does not persist in substance and in the nature of things, whereas if someone says ‘not man’ of a stone, wood or anything else which exists, it will signify something constant; and the signification of this kind of phrase is everything except what it actually names; for since man is excluded, ‘not man’ signifies anything but man. This is very different from a name since every name (as has been said) signifies definitely what is named and is not said in the same way both of what exists and what does not exist. Yet

Translation

49

a spoken sound of this kind is significant by convention without time and its parts (as said) designate nothing of their own. For this reason the ancients were in doubt whether they should not call this a name or add it as a kind of appendix to the definition of a name. Those who distinguished it from name delimited name with the following definition: a name is a spoken sound designating a circumscribed signification by convention and without time and none of its parts designate anything separately. Then since ‘not man’ does not signify a circumscribed thing, it is to be distinguished from name. But others quite differently claimed that it is a name, but not simply. They thought it can be put under name as an addition in the way in which a dead man is not said simply to be a man but a dead man; so too the name which designates nothing definite is not said simply to be a name but an infinite name. Aristotle is the originator of this idea and claims to have invented the term for it where he says nor is there any correct name for it meaning: older generations did not have a name for ‘not man’ by which it could be properly called. And up to the time of Aristotle no one knew what ‘not man’ was. It was Aristotle who attached a term to this expression with the words let us call it an infinite name, not just a name, since it designates without particular reference, but an infinite name since it designates several and an infinite number of things. But the impossibility of being placed simply under name applies not just to spoken sounds of this kind; there are some others that have all the [qualities] of a name and signify in a definite way but cannot be said simply to be names because of another difference, e.g. the oblique cases ‘Cato’s’, ‘to Cato’ etc.53 There is a difference here from the name in that the name when joined, in the direct case,54 with ‘is’ or ‘is not’ forms an affirmation .55 If someone says ‘Socrates is’, this is true or false. If it is said when Socrates is alive, it would be true, if when dead, false. Therefore it is an affirmation. If someone says ‘Socrates is not’ he would now be making a negation, in which truth or falsity is found. Then every direct name when joined with ‘is’ or ‘is not’ forms a statement. But the oblique cases joined to ‘is’ or ‘is not’ never make a statement; for a statement is a complete thought consisting of a sentence to which truth or falsity apply. If anyone says ‘is Cato’s’ the sense is incomplete; for what is Cato’s is not mentioned. It is the same with ‘is to Cato’. Since a statement is not created by joining these to ‘is’ or ‘is not’ there is a certain difference from name, although they are identical to name in general definition. It is a big difference that a direct name joined to ‘is’ makes a complete, the oblique cases, an incomplete sentence. When we say the oblique cases when joined to the verb ‘is’ do not make a complete sentence we do not mean that the oblique cases are never joined to a verb so as to make a complete sentence. For when I say ‘(it)56 grieves Socrates’ it is a statement. It is not with every verb but only when the oblique cases are joined with

20

25

30 63,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 64,1 5 10

50 15

20 25

30 65,1

5

10

15 20

25

Translation

‘is’ or ‘is not’ that they never form a complete sentence. This is what Aristotle means when he says ‘Cato’s’ or ‘to Cato’ and the like are not names, but cases of a name.57 Hence they seem to differ since they are not called names. For what were applied first, i.e. which point something out, are more rightly called names. The genitive does not point something out, but someone’s, and the dative to someone etc. The direct case, which is first, points something out, e.g. when someone says ‘Socrates’, and therefore this [case] is called nominative, since it alone somehow has the power of a name and is a name. It is very likely that the man who first applied names to things said something like ‘let this be called a man and this a stone’. By subsequent usage it came about that the name in its original form developed into the other cases. A stronger argument is that every case is the case of some name. Unless there was a name whose case it is it could not properly be said to be the case of a name. But every case is an inflexion. The genitive and dative etc. are inflexions of the nominative. Therefore they will be cases of the nominative. But every case which is derived from a name is the case of a name. Nominative is a name. The case of something is different from that of which it is the case; therefore the case of a name is not a name. Aristotle makes this very point – the same account holds for this58 as for names59 which means: the account and definition of the oblique case and of the name are the same in everything else (for they are spoken sounds, significant by convention without time and designate something definite), but, as he himself says, differ because when combined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’ it is neither true nor false,60 a condition certainly fulfilled by a direct name which when combined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’ makes a true or false [statement]. This is what he meant by a name always is61 which has to be understood as meaning: makes a true and a false [statement] when combined with ‘is’, ‘was’ or ‘will be’. He then gives examples: ‘Cato’s is or is not’.62 In these, as he says, nothing true or false is said. Then the complete definition of a name is as follows: a name is a significant spoken sound by convention without time, signifying in a definite way, none of whose parts separately signifies anything and which when combined with ‘is’, ‘was’ or ‘will be’ completes a thought which can be expressed in a sentence and forms a statement. Since we have finished with name let us turn to the definition of a verb. Chapter 3

30 66,1

16b6-7 A verb is what additionally signifies time, no part of which signifies separately and is always63 a sign of things said of something else. The complete definition of a verb is as follows: a verb is a significant

Translation

51

spoken sound by convention, which additionally signifies time, no part of which signifies anything separately. But since it shares with name in being spoken sound and significant by convention, he passed these over in silence and began with what is particular to verb. Particular to verb is that it additionally signifies time and it is separated from the definition of name by this. Every verb has not the signification but the additional signification of time. For names signify time but a verb, since it primarily signifies actions and sufferings, draws in also the dimension of time together with the actions and sufferings, as when I say ‘I read’; this verb primarily indicates a certain action, but along with the signifying of activity introduces also present time. And so he says not that a verb signifies, but that it additionally signifies, time; for a verb does not primarily designate time (this belongs to name), but along with what it primarily signifies it introduces and involves also the dimension of time. And so since name and verb are significant spoken sounds by convention, the addition of what additionally signifies time to [the definition of] verb distinguishes it from name. As we have often said, name can signify time, but verb additionally signifies time. And just as in the definition of name he added that the parts of a name when taken separately from the whole combined name designate nothing (to distinguish it from sentences like ‘Plato and Socrates’ which are composed of names64), so too in the case of verb he added that the parts of a verb have no separate signification, thus distinguishing it from sentences which are made up of verbs, e.g. ‘to walk and to run’. This sentence is composed of verbs; and the single verbs signify both in the sentence and outside it by themselves. But this does not apply at all within a verb. Just as in a name the part of a name has no separate signification, so in a verb part of the verb has no signification separately. He says that a verb is a sign of things said of something else, which is tantamount to saying that verbs signify just accidents; for every verb signifies something accidental. The word ‘(a) run’ is in itself an accident, but is never said in the sense of being or not being in something. But if I say ‘(he) runs’, by asserting it as an accident in someone’s activity I signify that it is in someone. And since ‘runs’ cannot exist without a subject (for it cannot be said without the one who runs), it is for this reason said that every verb signifies what is said of something else. Then ‘runs’ signifies what is said of something else, i.e. the man who runs. Once he has explained this he clarifies with examples what he means by a verb additionally signifying time. He says I mean that it additionally signifies time as ‘run’ is a name and ‘runs’ a verb, for it additionally signifies that it is now.65 He has very clearly shown the difference between name and verb by comparing a name and a verb. For since ‘run’ is an accident and formed so as to be a name, it does not

5

10

15 20

25

30 67,1

5

10 15

20 25

52 30 68,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 69,1 5

10

15

Translation

signify time, whereas ‘runs’ also is an accident located in a verb and designates present time. Verbs seem to differ from names in that the former additionally signify time, the latter are predicated with no additional signification of time. After showing that a verb additionally signifies time, he now shows in a memorable way how it is predicated. He had previously mentioned that it is always said of something else. These are his words: it is always a sign of things said of something else either of things said of a subject or in a subject.66 He means by this that a verb signifies something in the sense that what it signifies is said of something else, but as an accident; for every accident both is in a subject and is said of the substance which is its subject. For when I say ‘runs’ I say this of a man (if it is the case), i.e. of a subject, and ‘run’ itself is in the man; from this the verb ‘runs’ has been inflected. And so the statement that a verb is always a sign of what is said of something else means this: a verb always signifies accidents because he means that those things are shown by a verb’s significance which either are in a subject or are said of a subject. There is another interpretation. Because he is in the habit of using the phrase ‘to be predicated of a subject’ casually as if saying ‘to be in a subject’ and often when he says something is predicated of a subject he means it is in a subject, when he wanted to show that the significance of accidents is contained in verbs he said that verbs always designate what is of a subject. But because this seemed rather obscure he clarified it by the addition of ‘or in a subject’ to explain with the addition of ‘in a subject’ what he meant exactly by the phrase ‘of a subject’ which he had used. It is as if he had said: a verb is always a sign of what is predicated of something else as of a subject, but lest this might appear obscure to anyone, I mean that ‘to be of a subject’ is the same as ‘to be in a subject’. An even better interpretation67 is to think that he meant something like: every verb signifies an accident, but in such a way that what it signifies is either particular or universal, that what he says is of a subject we refer to the universal, what in a subject only to the particular. For when I say ‘(it) is moved’, this is a verb and an accident, but universal; for there are several species of movement, e.g. running is put under movement. Then if running is to be defined, we predicate motion of it. Therefore motion is the genus of running and thus motion is predicated of running as of a subject, whereas running itself, since it does not have other species, is only in a subject, i.e. in the one who runs. But although motion is also itself in a subject, it is predicated of a subject. And so he says that a verb is a sign of what is predicated of something else and added ‘i.e. of a subject or in a subject’. This means: verbs signify the dimension of accidents, but such as are either universal or particular, e.g. ‘(I) am moved’ is something universal and is said of a subject as of ‘running’,

Translation

53

but ‘(I) run’ is a particular and, since it is not said of a subject, is only in a subject. 16b11-15 ‘Does not run’ and ‘does not work’68 I do not call verbs. They additionally signify time and are always of something else, but what makes them different has no name. Let it be an infinite verb, since it applies in the same way to what exists and what does not exist. Just as he said in the case of the name ‘not man’ that it is not a name because it can fit many other things which are not men and because it denies the thing it names and leaves nothing definite in its predication (for what is not man can be a centaur, a horse or anything else that either is or is not; and so it is called an infinite name.), similarly a verb like ‘does not run’ or ‘does not work’ is also itself infinite since it is true not only of that which is but also can be predicated of that which is not. For I can say ‘a man does not run’ when ‘does not run’ is predicated of a thing that is, a man. I can also say ‘Scylla does not run’; but Scylla does not exist. Therefore ‘does not run’ can be predicated both of what is and of what in no way is. But someone might argue that the same applies to definite verbs; for I can say ‘a horse runs’, ‘a centaur runs’ about what is and what is not * * *69 70 and past in that the future is time in front of the present, but the past is left behind. He used a novel and surprising phrase, ‘what embraces’. After a great deal of effort this is the only translation I could find that the Latin language permitted for the more vibrant Greek expression ta de ton perix.71 Anyone who knows Greek realises how much better it sounds in that language. 16b19-25 Verbs uttered by themselves are names and signify something; for the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to be at rest. But it does not yet signify whether it is or is not; for not even72 ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply ‘[it] is’); for by itself it is nothing, but it additionally signifies some combination which cannot be thought of without the components. In this passage Porphyry73 throws in a great deal about Stoic logic and that of other schools. He does the same in his explanations in other parts of this book. We sometimes have to overlook this, for greater obscurity is often caused by superfluous explanation. Now Aristotle’s idea is as follows: verbs uttered by themselves are names, not in the sense that every part of a sentence is called a common name as we say names are of things, but in the sense that every verb when uttered by itself without adding that of which it is predicated in some way resembles a name. If I say ‘Socrates walks’, ‘walks’

20

25

30 70,1 5 10 15 20 71,1

5

10

15 20

54 25

30 72,1 5 10

15

20

25

30 73,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

relates entirely to Socrates and there is no separate understanding (intellegentia) of it. But when I say just ‘walks’ I have said it as though it was in something, i.e. as if someone walks, whereas in fact it exists on its own, keeps its own meaning (sententia) and is the signification of this verb. This is why the Greeks use verbs expressed on their own with the article in front, e.g. to peripatein, tou peripatein, tôi peripatein. But if verbs are joined with names, in Greek the article cannot be added in front of them, but only when they are said alone. They are names because they signify a thing in such a way that although they signify a thing that is in something, they are uttered by themselves and with their own meaning (sententia). Aristotle’s words verbs uttered by themselves are names is the equivalent of ‘verbs when alone and not joined with anything else are names’. He gives the following argument for this: for the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest. This means: in listening to every name, since the spoken sound as it proceeds through the syllables uses up a little interval of time, in the actual procession of the time in which the name is heard the mind of the listener too proceeds, e.g. when I say ‘unafraid’ just as the name proceeds through the syllables ‘un’, ‘af’ etc., so too the listener’s mind goes through the same syllables. But when someone has completed a name and said ‘unafraid’, just as the finished name halts from its progression through the syllables, so too the mind of the listener takes rest. For when he hears the whole word, he gets the whole signification; and the mind of the listener which was following the syllables as they were spoken wanting to understand what he was saying, halts when he gets the signification and his mind is settled as the word is completed. This is what he means by the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest. Moreover often the speaker after uttering his whole sentence halts the listener’s mind; for there is nowhere for the understanding to go and with the completion of the name itself the listener’s mind which was moving forward is halted by the unfolding of the name, rests and does not proceed to further thinking since the signification of the name has been made clear. This is common to verb and name, but only if a verb is uttered on its own; for if it is joined with a name, the listener’s understanding is not yet halted since there is still somewhere to which his mind can proceed, e.g. when I say ‘Socrates walks’ ‘walks’ is not understood by itself but is referred to ‘Socrates’ and the understanding involves the whole sentence, not a word on its own. But if it is said on its own it has the sort of signification a name has. It was then right to say that verbs uttered by themselves are names since the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest. Alternatively, the explanation will clearly be better if we say: verbs uttered by themselves are names since they signify a certain thing; for if a verb does not keep the signification of the sort of thing

Translation

55

that either always is in something else or is predicated of something else it does not signify anything at all. And if it signifies something which cannot exist apart from the subject, it does not also have to signify the thing which is the subject, e.g. when I say ‘tastes’ it does not signify nothing because the word ‘tastes’ cannot exist without that which tastes. Nor again when I say ‘tastes’ do I signify the person who tastes; but the word ‘tastes’ is the name of a certain thing which is always in another and said of another. And that is how it comes about that there is also understanding; whoever hears ‘tastes’, although he does not hear a thing that exists per se (for it is always in something else and that in which it is has not been said), he does however understand something, relies on the signification of the verb itself, arrests his thought in that signification and comes to rest, so that he does not seek any further understanding at all, just as is the case with a name. For just as a name is the proper signification of a thing existing in itself, so also a verb is the signification of a thing which does not exist in itself but of some other thing that relies on a subject and a certain sort of foundation. There is a question here. His words for the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest cannot apparently be true. The speaker does not arrest his thought nor does the listener come to rest, for there is something lacking in a word (sermo) or name, e.g. if someone says ‘Socrates’ the listener’s mind next asks ‘Socrates what?’ Is he doing or suffering anything? The listener’s mind has not yet come to rest when he asks any of these. It is the same with a verb. When I say ‘reads’ the listener’s mind asks who reads. Then the speaker has not yet arrested his thought nor the listener become silent. One should imagine that Aristotle replied to this that whenever any listener grasps in his mind a significant spoken sound, he relies on his understanding of it, e.g. when someone hears ‘man’ he understands mentally the word he has grasped and agrees in his mind that he has heard rational, mortal animal. But if someone perceives the sort of spoken sound that designates nothing at all, his mind, not strengthened by any signification or understanding, wanders, strays and is not stilled by any constraints of designation. And so Aristotle’s notion is right that verbs uttered by themselves are names, that the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest. This sort of problem was raised and solved by Aspasius. What does Aristotle say after he has established that verbs uttered by themselves are names? But it does not yet signify whether it is or is not which is the equivalent of saying that something is signified by verbs as by names, but that does not imply that a negation or affirmation is made. When I say ‘tastes’ there is a certain signification, but it does not signify that anything is or is not, i.e. it is not something affirmative or negative. For if affirmation and negation are found in the combination of thoughts, as he explained above,

25

30 74,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 75,1 5

56 10 15

20

25

30 76,1 5

10

15 20

25

30 77,1

Translation

neither names nor verbs uttered by themselves will form an affirmation or negation. Aristotle has explained elsewhere in various ways that truth and falsity consist in thoughts rather than things. If truth or falsity were in things one uttered thing would be either an affirmation or its contrary, a negation. But since truth and falsity are located in thoughts joined together, and the sentence communicates opinions, thoughts and affections of the soul, truth and falsity do not apparently exist without the combination of thoughts and words (verba). Therefore there is no affirmation or negation without some combination. Then verbs uttered by themselves do signify something and are names of a thing, but do not signify to the extent of confirming that something is or is not, i.e. making an affirmation or negation. For just as in the parts of a name or a verb the parts signify nothing in themselves but designate when all together, so too in affirmations or negations the parts do signify, but when joined as wholes they designate truth or falsity. So when I say ‘Socrates is a philosopher’, ‘Socrates is not a philosopher’ when taken singly the parts rely on their own signification but do not signify anything true or false, yet when joined together as in ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ they form truth or its contrary falsity. So though verbs uttered by themselves are names, signify something and are parts of the combination which creates truth or falsity, they do not themselves by their own signification designate existence (esse) which belongs to affirmation or non-existence (non esse) which belongs to negation. Unless the subject to which the verb applies is added there is no statement, e.g. when I say ‘tastes’ it is not a proposition unless I say what tastes. The following words for not even ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is a sign of the actual thing mean: ‘to be’, which is a verb, or ‘not to be’, which is an infinite verb is not74 a sign of the actual thing, i.e. signifies nothing in itself. For ‘to be’ is used only in combination. Of course every verb uttered on its own signifies something, but it does not yet75 signify whether it76 is or is not. For something just said on its own77 does not signify that a thing is nor is not. 78 This is what he means79 by not even ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is a sign of the actual thing80. For with respect to the actual thing that a verb designates, the verb on its own (which is applied to that thing) is not a sign that it is or is not. In other words, the verb which is applied is not a sign that the actual thing – the thing the verb is describing – is or is not. This is tantamount to saying that the words of the actual thing that it is or is not is more or less the same as saying that [the verb does not] signify that the actual thing is or is not. The meaning is clearer if we say that the verb is not a sign of the thing to which it is applied that it is or is not, i.e. of its existence or non-existence (this is in fact a matter of affirmation or negation). The meaning then is: a verb is not a sign of a thing’s existence or non-existence. As to the addition nor if you say simply ‘this is’ or the alternative reading nor if you simply say ‘being’ (ens),

Translation

57

Alexander says ‘is’ or ‘being’ are equivocal. For all predicates which do not come under a common genus are equivocal and being is predicated of everything; for substance is, quality is, and quantity etc. Therefore he now seems to be saying: ‘being’ or ‘is’, from which is derived ‘to be’ (esse), signifies nothing in itself; for every equivocation signifies nothing when on its own.81 Unless it is applied to specific things at the instigation of the one who signifies in itself it signifies none just because it signifies many. Porphyry82 put forward another explanation as follows: The word ‘is’ in itself reveals no substance, but is always a connective, either of things which are if it is simply placed alongside or of something else by participation. For ‘Socrates is’ means Socrates is one of the things that are and I join Socrates to the things that are. But ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ means: Socrates participates in philosophy. Here too I join Socrates and philosophy. This is what is meant by it having the power of connecting rather than of a thing. But if it suggests some combination and joining it signifies nothing at all when uttered by itself. This is what Aristotle means by nor if you say simply ‘[it] is’, i.e. on its own. Not only does it not designate truth and falsity, but is nothing at all. He makes this clear with the following remark, but it additionally signifies some combination which cannot be thought of without the components. For if the word ‘is’ has the power of a certain combining and joining and the appropriate place, it signifies nothing when alone and unqualified by any joining; but it can signify that very combination which it designates when the component parts are joined together, whilst without such combining it is not possible to understand what it signifies. In fact we are to understand the phrase by itself it is nothing not as meaning that it signifies nothing at all, but that it reveals nothing true or false when uttered on its own. When it is combined, a statement is formed, but when the verb is uttered on its own, no signification of truth or falsity occurs. The whole meaning is: verbs when uttered by themselves are names (for the speaker arrests his thought and the listener comes to rest); but although they signify something, they do not as yet signify affirmation or negation. For although they designate a thing, the verb is not a sign of the thing’s existence nor can anything true or false be discerned from ‘is’ or ‘being’, whichever we use. For although on their own they signify something, they do not as yet signify true or false. A statement arises in combination and it is there that truth and falsity originate. Truth and falsity cannot be understood without what is combined and joined. Enough has been said about verb and name. In our second book we must consider the sentence (oratio).

5

10 15 20

25

30 78,1 5

10

15

20

25

BOOK 2 If as much attention were paid to mental exercise as to physical toil which develops the human race and fills it with the rich fruits of

79,1

58

5

10

15 20 80,1

5

10

15

Translation

ingenuity, we would not experience so little human virtue. But when laziness depresses the spirits the fruitfulness of the mind straightaway bristles with deadly growths. Nor would I agree that this happens because of our awareness of the task but rather from our ignorance. For whoever ceased from labour who was experienced in it? Therefore we must apply the power of the mind. It is true that the mind is lost if once it becomes slack. But it is my fixed purpose, if the favour of the godhead should approve more firmly, to translate into the Roman style and write commentaries on the whole Aristotelian corpus that has come into my hands, although there have been brilliant minds whose labour and study have introduced to the Latin language many of the things that I am now dealing with but without displaying any kind of order, thread and progression in the organisation of the various disciplines. And so anything written by Aristotle which results from his subtlety in logic, seriousmindedness in moral experience and sharp-wittedness in natural truth, all of this I will translate in proper order and illuminate, too, with what light a commentary affords. And by translating all the dialogues of Plato and also commentating on them I will bring them into a Latin form. When this is achieved I would not shrink from somehow bringing the ideas of Plato and Aristotle into a single harmony and proving that they do not disagree in everything as most think but that they agree in most things and in the most important philosophical issues. If life and leisure suffice I would strive for this with much profit in the work and with much toil. And those who are not seething with envy ought to support me in this task. But let us now return to what we set out to do. For Aristotle at the beginning of his book proposed that name should firstly be defined; after this verb, then negation and after this affirmation, next statement and lastly sentence. But now after he has spoken about name and verb he reverses the order and explains firstly what he proposed to do last; for he discusses sentence which he put last in the plan of the work. This is what he says: Chapter 4

20

25

16b26-33 A sentence is a significant spoken sound, any of whose parts is when separated significant – as an expression, not as an affirmation. I mean that ‘homo’ (man) signifies something but not that it is or is not, though it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added. But a single83 syllable of ‘homo’ does not signify anything. Nor in the word ‘sorex’ does ‘rex’ signify anything, but is simply a spoken sound. In double words, as we have said, a part does signify something but not in itself.

Translation

59

Aristotle seems to regard as a sentence also those spoken sounds which consist of names or verbs but which do not form a complete idea, such as ‘Socrates and Plato’ and ‘to walk and say’. For although these are not complete ideas they are composed of names and verbs. For he says that a sentence is a significant spoken sound whose parts signify something separately. Note that he says signify and not signify additionally as [the parts] in the case of name and verb. And the following consideration too shows that he also calls imperfect spoken sounds sentences so long as they are composed of names and verbs, when he says, when speaking of name, that in the word ‘wildhorse’ ‘wild’ does not signify anything as it does in the sentence ‘wild horse’.84 Now ‘wild horse’ is a spoken sound composed of names but does not have a completed sense and yet he says as in the sentence wild horse. For if according to Aristotle ‘wild horse’ is a sentence, why should not other phrases too which are composed of names and verbs, though incomplete, be deemed sentences especially given his definition of a sentence (A sentence is a significant spoken sound, any of whose parts is when separated significant.)? Then in spoken sounds which consist of names and of verbs the parts signify separately but do not signify additionally. For if a name and a verb is significant when apart, and in spoken sounds which are composed of names and verbs the parts signify when apart but do not signify additionally, then even imperfect spoken sounds when composed of names and of verbs are sentences. For if every name and verb is significant, and these spoken sounds, i.e. sentences, are composed of names and of verbs, there is no doubt that in the spoken sounds composed of names and of verbs the parts are significant in themselves. But if this is the case even the spoken sound85 of which some part has significance when separate and by itself, though it belongs to an imperfect idea, is clearly a sentence. But the additional remark that the parts of the sentence signify as expression, not as affirmation, Alexander interprets as follows: some are simple sentences which are composed of just names and verbs, others are really combined and made up of sentences already joined together. The simple sentences have names and verbs as the parts from which they are composed, e.g. ‘Socrates walks’. The composite sentences are sometimes just sentences and sometimes even affirmations, e.g. when I say ‘Socrates walks and Plato speaks’ both are affirmations, whereas when I say ‘I say that you, descendant of Aeacus, can defeat the Romans’ the sentence is of a kind made up of sentences and not of affirmations. Now simplicity is prior and composition later. Wherever there is a prior and a posterior there is no doubt that what comes first by nature must be defined in the first place. And so since the simple sentence is prior and the compound sentence posterior he defined the simple sentence first with the words of which the parts signify as expression, not as affirmation, where he means by expres-

30 81,1 5

10 15

20

25

30

82,1 5

10

15

20

60 25 83,1

5

10

15

20

25

84,1 5

10

15 20

Translation

sion the simple name or verb. For there are parts in simple sentences of this kind. In compound sentences there are sometimes just sentences, sometimes affirmations as we proved above. Alexander also added that every definition must be either more concise than the defined species or ought not to exceed it. But if Aristotle had framed his definition to say that the parts of a sentence signify as sentences and not as expressions, he would exclude simple sentences from this definition, for the parts of simple sentences signify not as sentences but as simple names and verbs. For if every sentence shall have sentences in its parts, those parts in turn which are sentences will be made up of other sentences. And again the parts of the parts, which in turn are also sentences, will contain other sentences in their parts. Once the mind has grasped this it proceeds to infinity and there will not be any primary sentence such as to have simple parts. For it cannot be possible for a sentence to be termed primary when it has other sentences in its parts. For the parts are prior to their composition. But if no primary sentence can be found when the mind is led into infinity, since there is no primary sentence, neither is there a final sentence. And so since primary and final sentences have been done away with, all sentences are done away with and there will be no sentence at all. And so the definition would not have been correct if it had meant ‘a sentence is a significant spoken sound, whose parts signify something separately as sentences.’ But, says Alexander, not even if some sentences have sentences in their parts is it necessary that the parts of the sentences themselves are affirmations. For example when I say ‘cease inflaming me and you with your complaints’86 the parts of this sentence are: (1) ‘cease inflaming me with your complaints’, and (2) ‘cease inflaming yourself with your complaints’. Neither of these is an affirmation although the whole appears to be a sentence. Therefore his definition would not have been correct if it meant ‘a sentence is a significant spoken sound whose parts signify something separately as an affirmation’. For though the parts of this kind of sentence are composed of sentences, the whole body of the sentence is not made of affirmations. But since in every sentence there are verbs and names, which are simple expressions, but the parts in every sentence are not either sentences or affirmations, he put what is common in the definition as though saying ‘a sentence is a significant spoken sound by convention, whose parts signify something separately, of necessity as expression but not always as an affirmation or a sentence’. For it is impossible to find a sentence whose parts do not signify something separately of necessity as name or verb, whereas a sentence can be found whose parts signify but not as sentences or affirmations. And so if he had said that a sentence is a significant spoken sound, whose parts signify something separately as affirmation he would not have included in this definition those sentences whose parts are sentences but not affirma-

Translation

61

tions like the verse which I cited above. But if he had said that a sentence is a significant spoken sound whose parts signify something separately as a sentence he would have omitted in the definition those sentences whose parts are simple such as ‘Socrates walks’. But when he says that the parts of a sentence signify as expressions but not all as affirmations he includes simple and compound sentences in this definition; simple because every simple and very short sentence is composed of name and verb which are simple expressions, compounds because having sentences in their parts the parts themselves have simple expressions and these simple expressions are parts of the whole body. For example when I say ‘if it is day there is light’ ‘it is day’ and ‘there is light’ are parts of the whole sentence, but ‘day’ and ‘is’ and ‘light’ and ‘is’ are in turn parts of these parts. And these are parts of the whole sentence ‘if it is day there is light’. But ‘day’ and ‘is’ and ‘light’ and ‘is’ are simple expressions. And so the parts even of compound sentences undoubtedly always signify as expressions but not as affirmations or particular sentences. And so Aristotle made a correct definition. Alexander explains the passage in this sense and adds that Aristotle often calls affirmations expressions but wishing to make a distinction when he said that the parts of a sentence signify as expression he added the words as expression not as affirmation in case anyone would take expression and affirmation together. It is as if he were to say: expression is double, one simple, the other affirmation, but the parts of a sentence signify something separately as the expression that is simple not as the expression that is affirmation. The whole of Alexander’s interpretation contains this kind of understanding. Porphyry is also of the same opinion but disagrees in one point. His explanation is as follows. An expression, he says, is a simple name, a simple verb or a compound of two, e.g. ‘Socrates’ or ‘walks’ or ‘wildhorse’. The term expression also goes on to include sentences, but sentences composed of simple verbs and names, e.g. ‘Socrates and Plato’ and ones including a composite name such as ‘wildhorse and man’. Although these sentences are composed and imperfect they are still given the name expression. The term expression is even applied to perfect sentences which, it has to be said, are later called statements. There is a simple statement when someone says ‘Socrates walks’. And this is called an affirmation. Its negation is ‘Socrates does not walk’. Simple statements are then affirmations or negations which are composed of single names and verbs. And so when I say ‘if it is day there is light’, an entire sentence of this kind is not said to be an expression. For it is compound and composed of sentences, namely ‘it is day’ and ‘there is light’. These are affirmations and are called expressions. And the affirmations which are expressions contain in turn other simple expressions – ‘day’ and ‘is’, ‘light’ and ‘is’. And so when I say ‘Socrates walks’, this sentence contains expres-

25 30 85,1 5

10 15

20

25 30 86,1 5

10

15

62

20

25 30 87,1 5

10

15 20

25

30 88,1

5

10

Translation

sions as parts, namely a name and a verb, and these are expressions but not affirmations. But if I say ‘Socrates disputed in the Lyceum with Plato and the rest of his pupils’ the part of the sentence ‘Socrates in the Lyceum with Plato’ is itself an expression but not as a simple name or verb nor as an affirmation but only as an imperfect sentence though one composed of verbs and names. But if I were to say ‘if (it) is a man, (it) is an animal’, this sentence again contains expressions in its parts, but neither as simple expressions nor as imperfect sentences but as perfect and simple affirmations. One affirmation is ‘it is an animal’, the other ‘(it) is a man’, whilst the whole sentence is not an expression. But if I were to say ‘if it is not an animal, it is not a man’ this sentence again appears to be composed of two simple negative expressions, whilst the whole sentence is not an expression at all. So then expression beginning from simple names and verbs proceeds right up to sentences, though imperfect, and does not even stop there but goes on further even to simple affirmations and negations and there makes an end of its progress. And so since not every sentence has as parts affirmations and negations which are perfect statements consisting of simple expressions and since not every sentence contains imperfect sentences in its parts, nevertheless every sentence contains simple expressions since every sentence is composed of verbs and names. This means that the parts of a sentence always signify something as expressions but not always as affirmations, in agreement with Alexander whose interpretation I have already explained above. At this point Aspasius makes an unnecessary fuss. For he said that Aristotle did not want to establish a definition for all sentences but only for simple sentences, which consist of two [parts], a verb and name. But he is completely wrong. For if a simple sentence consists of simple verbs and names, then there is no reason why a compound sentence does not also in the same way have verbs and names in its parts. But if it is common to simple and combined sentences to have simple expressions but not affirmations as parts so that even sentences which contain affirmations nevertheless have simple expressions in their parts, it escapes our understanding why he throws this question at Aristotle. Syrianus, who is called Philoxenus, does not think that such are sentences whose sense is imperfect, and consequently thinks these do not have any parts. For when he says ‘Plato disputing in the Academy’, because this is not perfect he says it does not have parts on the understanding that everything that is imperfect is not composed of parts. And so when Aristotle says ‘a sentence is a spoken sound, whose parts signify something separately’, he thinks that he means the sort of sentence that has a completed sense, for its87 parts are verbs and names. But this is ridiculous. For something cannot become composite except from its own parts; but if anything to be

Translation

63

composite should have ten parts, they must nevertheless be added one by one before we come to the tenth part; but what we superimpose, one by one, on each other to make the sum of the whole body will still be parts even if we never arrive at the thing that was to be composed. Therefore if before arriving at the final part the prior parts are parts of what has been achieved and composed there is no reason why one cannot speak of parts of an uncompleted thing. For it is not being maintained that what are parts of an incomplete composite are parts of a whole composite. E.g. suppose there is to be a complete name and it is to have four parts, i.e. syllables, e.g. ‘Mezentius’.88 If I remove one syllable and say ‘Mezenti’ or if I write down one and then two syllables, ‘Mezen’, each syllable of this, ‘Me’ and ‘zen’, are parts and though the composition itself is void of meaning and incomplete it is still comprised of parts. One should then pay no attention to Syrianus but to Porphyry who followed Aristotle’s meaning and doctrine in such a way as not to make his definition, which is in fact true, waver and show contradictions in its application. But that is enough on this subject. This is what Porphyry says:89 ‘Aristotle, wanting to demonstrate that every sentence has just simple or composite parts, took an example from simple sentences to say that the parts of a sentence signify as expression not as affirmation. E.g. in the sentence “Plato disputes”, the parts are expressions but not affirmations. If the sentence were as follows: “If Plato disputes, he tells the truth”, although “Plato disputes” and “tells the truth” are expressions they are not however simple [expressions] but affirmations. For a simple expression is neither an affirmation nor a negation, but becomes one when something is added that has the force of an affirmation or negation. This is what Aristotle says: I mean that “homo” (man) signifies something but not that it is or is not, though it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added.’ This is as if he said ‘a simple name does not make an affirmation or a negation unless the verb ‘is’ is added, which is an affirmation, or ‘is not’ which is a negation.’ The following sentences – But a single syllable of ‘homo’ does not signify anything. Nor in the word ‘sorex’ does ‘rex’ signify anything, but is simply a spoken sound. In double words, as we have said, a part does signify something but not in itself. – have a twofold interpretation. For his first statement that it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added to the expression which he earlier declared to be simple when he was speaking about the significant part of a sentence, this he now fills out and explains saying that it does not immediately become an affirmation or negation or even a sentence by adding anything at all to the simple expression. For if something which is not in itself significant is joined to the simple expression, a sentence or affirmation or even a negation will not be created. For if a single syllable of homo (a syllable which would have

15

20

25

30 89,1 5 10

15 20

25

30 90,1

64 5

10

15

20

25

30 91,1 5

10

15 20

25 92,1

Translation

no signification in itself) were added to the very same expression, no sentence is produced from it. But if a sentence is not produced, then neither is an affirmation or a negation. For these are types of sentence. So if someone removes a single syllable from the word homo and attaches it to the whole simple expression and says homo mo or in any other way cuts off a part and adds it to a whole and entire expression, he will not make a sentence. And if this is so, neither will he make an affirmation or a negation, which are types of sentence. And so it has to be understood as though he had spoken as follows: I mean that homo signifies something but not that it is or is not, though it will be an affirmation or a negation if something is added, but not if something is added in the sense of a single syllable of homo or of any other expression, if it has no signification in itself as, for example, rex in sorex has no signification but is simply a spoken sound. And so if someone removes the apparent part rex and adds it to the word sorex to give sorex rex, as though rex were a part of the word sorex, it is not a sentence and so neither an affirmation nor a negation. For these consist of spoken sounds significant in themselves. Rex in the word sorex signifies nothing itself because it is a part of a name. It makes better sense if we apply the phrase but not a single syllable of homo, not to the perfect sentence but rather to what is meant by expression to show clearly what expression is, since he said earlier that the parts of a sentence signify as expression not as affirmation. For he defined expression as a spoken sound significant in itself. So when he says but not a single syllable of ‘homo’ it is as if he said ‘a part of a sentence signifies as expression, but these very expressions are complete names and verbs, not parts of names and verbs. For in the words ‘a wildhorse runs’, ‘wildhorse’ is an expression belonging to the whole sentence and signifying as part of the sentence, whereas ‘wild’ signifies when added as part of a name and so ‘wild’ is not an expression. And so neither is any other syllable in a part of a sentence, i.e. in a name or verb, since it signifies nothing in itself. Although it is part of a name and the name is part of a sentence, it nevertheless will itself have no signification in the whole sentence. And so it will not be an expression. It is then to be understood as if he said: ‘a sentence is a significant spoken sound, any of whose parts is, when separated, significant – as an expression, not as an affirmation. I mean that homo (man) signifies something’ and is a particular simple expression. For it is not a sentence, since it is simple, nor an affirmation nor a negation because it does not signify that it is nor that it is not. But it will be an affirmation when something is added which makes it an affirmation or a negation. But the word homo which I claim is an expression is an expression precisely because it signifies in itself. But a syllable of the word homo since it signifies nothing is not an expression (this is what he means by but not a single syllable of ‘homo’). Even if it does seem to signify,

Translation

65

it is,90 however, part of a name and signifies when added91 in a name but signifies nothing in the whole sentence, for it is not a part of a sentence. This is what he means by nor in the word ‘sorex’ does ‘rex’ signify anything, but is simply a spoken sound signifying nothing. Hence it is proved that parts of this kind are not expressions, for an expression is not simply spoken sound but spoken sound which signifies in itself. Any names that are composed of other [names], e.g. wildhorse, do give an apparent signification, but in themselves signify nothing but only when joined. In simple names like Cicero there is no apparent signification (imaginatio significandi). When I sound out the simple parts they are without any apparent image at all even for the mind. In double words the part wants to signify, but taken separately does not have a signification. And so because it only signifies conjointly what the total compound name designates, taken separately it signifies nothing as has often been said.

5

10

15 20

16b33-17a2 Every sentence is significant not as a tool, but (as has already been said) by convention. The fact that the parts of a sentence, verbs and names, are by convention proves that sentences are by convention. But if every composite derives its nature from that from which it is composed, a spoken sound which is composed of spoken sounds constituted by convention is itself formed by convention and by position. Therefore it is clear that a sentence is by convention. But Plato in the Cratylus thinks it to be otherwise and says that a sentence is a kind of instrument and tool92 for signifying the things which are naturally conceived in ideas and of sharing them in words. But if every tool is according to nature because it is a tool of natural things, e.g. the eye for seeing, he thinks that names too are by nature. Aristotle denies this and Alexander relies on many arguments in Aristotle in proving that a sentence is not a natural tool. When Aristotle says ‘every sentence is significant not as a tool’ he means every sentence is significant but not naturally, for the word ‘tool’ proves this. For it is the equivalent of saying ‘naturally’ since if you say that a sentence is not a tool you are saying that it signifies by convention rather than by nature. Natural tools belong to natural things. He put ‘tool’ instead of ‘nature’ because Plato, as I have said, posited that the tools of every craft are according to the nature of the crafts themselves. And Alexander undertakes to show that a sentence is not a tool as follows: every means to natural acts is itself also natural, e.g. because vision is given by nature, the means to vision – the eyes – is also natural. In the same way since hearing is natural we know that our ears, which are the tools of hearing, have been given to us naturally. Therefore, since a sentence is by convention, not by nature (for it is clear that the parts of a sentence, verbs and names, are established

25

30 93,1 5

10 15 20

25 94,1 5

66

10

15

20

25

30 95,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

by convention as the difference of vocabulary with all nations proves and so by this every sentence is shown to be by convention) and what is by convention is not by nature, a sentence is not a tool. For the condition and capacity to signify are natural. But if a sentence is not natural it is not a tool. With these and other arguments he shows that a sentence is not a tool. And so we must say that we are naturally able to speak and by nature have the powers to attach words to things, but we do not signify by nature but by convention. Just as we are by nature able to acquire the individual crafts, but do not possess them by nature but learn them by teaching, so too a spoken sound occurs by nature but signification by means of a spoken sound is not by nature, for a spoken sound on its own is not a name or verb but only when a signification has been added. And just as it is natural to be moved, whereas to jump requires skill and application, and as a piece of bronze is natural but a statue requires application or skill, so too the actual possibility of signifying and spoken sound are natural, but signifying through a spoken sound belongs to convention not nature. So far he has spoken about the common sentence. He now passes to its species when he says: 17a3-7 Not every sentence is statement-making but only that in which there is truth or falsity. They are not in all, e.g. a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false. Let us leave aside the other types. Their consideration is more appropriate to rhetoric or poetics but the statement-making sentence belongs to the present enquiry. There are many types of sentence but people divide them differently. The Peripatetics divide all types and kinds of sentence into five parts. But we are talking about the kinds of the sentence that is perfect not imperfect. I call perfect those which fulfill and complete the sense. Let us suppose a division as follows: sentence is the genus. One kind of sentence is imperfect, the one which does not complete the sense, e.g. ‘Plato in the Lyceum’. The other is perfect. Of perfect sentences we have the following types: 1. The prayer type, e.g. ‘May Bacchus be present to give you joy’93 2. The imperative type, e.g. ‘Receive and pledge’94 3. The interrogative type, e.g. ‘Where, Moeris, do your feet take you, where does the road lead you?’95 4. The vocative type, e.g. ‘O you who rule the world of men and gods with your eternal commands’96 5. The statement-making type, e.g. ‘it is day’, ‘it is not day’ Only in the statement-making sentence is truth and falsity seen. In the rest truth or falsity is not found. Many say there are more kinds of perfect sentence and others produce countless distinctions

Translation

67

amongst them. But this is not relevant to us. All the types of sentence are useful for orators or poets but only the statement-making sentence is appropriate for philosophers. That is why he says not every sentence is statement-making, for there are numerous that are not statement-making, as the ones I have mentioned. But this is the only one in which truth and falsity can be found. And so since logicians and philosophers enquire only about the one in which truth and falsity are found and the rest are appropriate to poets and orators, it will be right to deal only with the statement-making sentence. So far then he has spoken about the elements (parts) of communication and about the common sentence. Now he narrows the scope of his discussion to the species and deals with one type of sentence and one type of communication – the statement-making sentence; for statement is a species of communication, negation and affirmation are species of statement. And so this is the most suitable point to begin, along with Aristotle himself, to enquire into the statement-making sentence.

96,1

5

10

15

Chapter 5 17a8-15 The first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation. The rest are single through conjunction. Every statement-making sentence must have a verb or an inflexion of a verb. For the definition of man is not a statementmaking sentence unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ or something of this kind is added. And the reason why ‘two-footed land animal’ is one thing and not many and cannot be one simply by being said together belongs to another enquiry. The single sentence is dealt with in two forms: as single in itself or when joined in conjunction of some kind. In fact one ought to say that some sentences are single by nature, others by convention. Naturally single are those sentences which cannot be subdivided into other sentences, e.g. ‘the sun rises’. But those that are single by convention are subdivided into other sentences, e.g. ‘if (it) is a man, (it) is an animal.’ For this is divided into other sentences. And just as wood or stone exist separately in their own nature and are single, but a ship or house made from them consists of a plurality, and they are one by art but not by nature, so too in sentences we say that there are those that are simple and naturally single in themselves – those composed of just a verb and name – and combined sentences which, as we have said, can be divided into other sentences. For in this kind of sentence conjunction has joined several sentences, e.g. ‘both Plato and Socrates is’. For conjunction has joined each of them and so what was in itself and by nature not single appears single by convention. But the single sentence has two types naturally – affirmation and negation. Now the fact that he did not say ‘the first single statement-

20

25

97,1

5

10

15

20

68

25

30 98,1 5

10 15

20

25

30 99,1 5

10

15

Translation

making sentence is affirmation or negation, the next by conjunction’ but the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation raises the question whether first refers to affirmation so that negation comes after or whether first referred to the simple sentence in the sense that the sentence compounded of other sentences is second. Now Aristotle himself solves this ambiguity for he says the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation and to make clear what he means as second he says next is negation so as to put affirmation first and negation second. But if he had said ‘the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation or negation, the next single sentences by conjunction’ it would have to be understood as if he meant that the simple sentence, which can be subdivided into affirmation and negation, is first and second is the sentence which becomes single by conjunction of some kind since it is formed of sentences. But because he connects first with affirmation when he says the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation and next with negation when he says next is negation we must say that he considers affirmation to be first, negation second, to which he closely added next. But once again we encounter a problem raised by Alexander. He says that negation and affirmation cannot be placed under the same genus, statement, because in things which admit before and after a common genus cannot be found. But we have already said97 in answer to this that one need not deprive all things which can in some way be before or after of a common genus (otherwise first and secondary substances could not be placed under the single genus substance; in the same way too simple and compound sentences, where simple propositions are primary and composite propositions secondary, would not be contained in a single genus). It is only those which we think are posterior or prior in respect of substance that we should not think could be placed under the same genus whereas nothing prevents what are equal in essence from being placed each of them under the same genus. And so since the essence of affirmation and negation is that truth and falsity are found in them, a statement is that in which the ratio of truth and falsity is constituted. Since neither affirmation is prior nor negation posterior to the fact that they signify what is false and true no one doubts that affirmation and negation can be put under the same genus in which they participate equally. But affirmation and negation participate equally in statement if in fact statement involves the signifying of truth and falsity, and affirmation and negation equally demonstrate truth and falsity. Therefore statement is to be posited as the genus of affirmation and negation. Then the words the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation. The rest are single through conjunction are to be understood as meaning that he proposed that affirmation is first and negation, to which he adds the word next, is second. For affirmation is prior, negation posterior in order of pro-

Translation

69

duction but not in designating truth or falsity. So there is no reason to prevent affirmation being considered as prior to negation and that both are still placed under the same genus – statement. The following sentence every statement-making sentence must have a verb or an inflexion of a verb has the following character. Though Aristotle wished to distinguish98 expression, affirmation, negation, statement and contradiction he mixed up their order in the confusion caused by brevity and wrapped them in the mists of obscurity. For he ought to have established firstly what expression is, then affirmation, negation, statement and contradiction in turn. But he omits this for the moment and now instructs us as to the nature of statement saying that every statement must have a verb. Because a simple expression is a name or a verb, every simple statement is such as to possess as predicate a verb or something with the same force as if there had been said ‘verb or inflexion of a verb’. The subject term need not always be a name but the predicate term must always be a verb. Imagine the following proposition ‘the sun rises’. In this proposition ‘sun’ is the subject, ‘rises’ is predicated of it. I call both of these expressions terms. But what is said first in a simple statement is the subject, as in this case ‘sun’, what afterwards the predicate, in this case ‘rises’. And so every statement-making sentence, if it is to be simple, must have a predicating verb like the verb ‘rises’ in our example ‘the sun rises’ or something with the same force such as ‘Socrates does not walk’; for ‘does not walk’ is an infinite verb and though not a verb has the same force as a verb. The inflexion of a verb is often applied as in ‘Socrates was’. The subject term does not always consist of a name; for it can also have an infinite name as in ‘not man walks’. It can also be a verb as in ‘to walk is to move’. And so it has, I think, been fully demonstrated that a subject is not always a name but the predicate always consists solely of a verb. In accepting that verbs are always put in predication he added: unless ‘is’ or ‘was’ or something else of this kind be added or what has the same force be joined, there is no statement. For when I say ‘man is’ I have placed the verb ‘is’ in predication. But if I said ‘man lives’ it has the same force as if I were to say ‘man is alive’. And so he taught that no affirmation or negation can be established without a verb when he said for the definition of man is not a statement-making sentence unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ or something of this kind is added; for he seems to say this: the definition of a man, for instance, is a two-footed land animal and this is the definition of the human substance. So this definition is not a statement unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ or some verb as explained above is added to it. Neither is it true or false; for if I say simply ‘a two-footed land animal’ no truth or falsity accompanies me. But if I say ‘a two-footed land animal is’ or ‘is not’ an affirmation or negation is immediately made. And who would doubt that these are statements? But when he was speaking about simple statements, he

20

25

30 100,1 5 10

15

20 25

30 101,1 5

10

70 15

20

25

30 102,1 5

10

15 20

25 30 103,1

5

10

Translation

said that the notion, i.e. the definition of man, is not a statement unless ‘is’, ‘will be’ or something of this kind is added to it, thus confirming that the definition of human being is a single rather than a complex sentence which, if ‘is’, ‘will be’ or ‘was’ is added forms a simple statement. What is it that makes such a sentence single? Our sentence ‘two-footed land animal’ does not consist of just two terms because there are several names. And this is why he reflected on his own thought and questioned the meaning of his own proposition which he refused to explain at this point when he said and the reason why ‘two-footed land animal’ is one thing and not many and cannot be one simply by being said together belongs to another enquiry. His question is as if he had himself actually said: I was speaking about all the simple statements and I laid it down that these cannot be without a verb and to prove this took the definition of man as an example and said that it does not become a statement unless ‘is’, ‘will be’ or ‘was’ is added, as though the sentence ‘a two-footed land animal’ from which can be made a simple statement is one and not multiple. But why ‘two-footed land animal’ will be a single sentence he says belongs to another enquiry since the object of enquiry should be things and not propositions: for ‘two-footed land animal’ is not a single sentence because it is said continuously and joined to itself. If this were the case we could say that a sentence like ‘Socrates the snub-nosed, bald, old philosopher’ which signifies many things, is also a single sentence if said continuously. Therefore how a sentence of this kind is multiple and not single we will say later. But for now it is clear that the sentence ‘Socrates the bald old snub-nosed philosopher’ is not single but multiple. If proximity of uttering could make a sentence single simply by contiguity this could be a single sentence too. But it will be shown that it is clearly not single. The sentence ‘two-footed land animal’ is not a single sentence because the words are pronounced continuously one after the other. What makes a sentence single he himself deferred telling us but explains in the Metaphysics.99 Theophrastus instructs us as follows in his book On Affirmation and Negation: a definition is always a single sentence and must be pronounced continuously, for a single sentence is one which designates a single substance. A definition, e.g. of man as a two-footed land animal is a single sentence because it points out a single subject – man. If it is uttered continuously and not in parts it is a single sentence both because it is said continuously and because it points out the substance of a single thing. But if someone divides and distributes a single sentence that signifies a single thing by disrupting the utterance it becomes a multiple sentence. Thus if I say ‘two-footed land animal’ my whole sentence points to a single thing and has been said continuously. But if I were to say ‘animal’ and next ‘land’ and, after a pause, recommence ‘two-footed’, the sentence becomes multiple since it has been distributed by

Translation

71

pauses. Against this is the objection: who would not rightly find fault with the claim that a sentence which is single becomes multiple because of the pauses in its utterance when continuous utterance does not make single a sentence that is multiple by nature? For just as continuous utterance cannot make a single sentence of those that are naturally multiple, so too what is one sentence by nature, i.e. it is a spoken of a single subject, ought not to become multiple by intermissions. Here is the solution: when we say ‘animal’ and after a pause ‘land’ and the same way again ‘two-footed’ we do not say this as though they were all joined in one. And so since there is ‘animal’ and next ‘land’ and next ‘two-footed’ and since they are several and said severally, i.e. separated, they do not seem to be able when separated to be predicated of a single subject just as when I say ‘Socrates, the bald, old philosopher’ all of this is not a simple sentence even if it is uttered continuously since it does not refer to a single substance, for they are accidents and come from outside. That neither the sentences spoken in division nor those which do not refer to a single substance are one is proved as follows: if someone says ‘animal’, then ‘land’, then ‘two-footed’, animal, land and two-footed are not one. But if I say ‘two-footed land animal’ continuously and together it is one thing these said together signify, namely man. Let us turn our attention to sentences which signify a plurality and are uttered continuously, e.g. ‘Socrates, the bald, old philosopher’. It looks as if ‘bald, old philosopher’ is a sort of definition of Socrates, but it does not follow that if Socrates was like this that everyone who is a bald, old philosopher, is Socrates. That sort of continuity can occur in many instances. And so it does not signify a single thing although said continuously. Therefore if a single thing is signified out of all and [the sentence] is expressed in a continuous form, it is a single sentence and so the parts of something that is defined and not the accidents are what are put in the definition. And continuous utterance is a help towards achieving a single sentence but does not suffice on its own unless there is also a single subject. And so Aristotle said that ‘two-footed land animal’ is a single sentence not because it is said continuously – for contiguity of expression is not sufficient to create a single sentence and nothing stops what are naturally plural from appearing to be one when uttered continuously and together. But Aristotle postponed giving an explanation of this. His meaning here is that every statement-making sentence must have a verb or an inflexion of a verb. For the definition of man, which is also a sentence, is not a statement-making sentence unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ or something of this kind is added. This happens only in simple statement-making sentences, and not at all in those that are one through conjunction as said above.100 For when I say ‘it is day’ the entire force is in the verb. But if I say ‘if it is day, there is light’, using

15

20 25

30 104,1 5

10 15

20 25

30 105,1 5

72

10

15

20

25

30 106,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

a conjunction, the force entirely consists in the conjunction, i.e. ‘if’. Conjunction alone carries the meaning of truth and falsity since it proposes a condition in the words ‘if it is day, there is light’; if there is this, then that follows. And so the whole force of this kind of proposition is in conjunction, whilst every simple proposition has its force in the verb. And just as conjunctions contain the force of the proposition in those propositions that are called hypothetical or conditional, so in simple propositions the predicate has the main force, which is why such propositions are called predicative in Greek, i.e. the simple ones, because in them the predication controls the whole proposition. Hence Aristotle said that the simple statement must have a verb or an inflexion of a verb. For there is no statement without that which contains the whole predicative proposition – namely the predicate. This is why negation is always attached to the predicate rather than to the subject. When I say ‘the sun rises’ the negative of this is not ‘not sun rises’ but ‘the sun does not rise’. And so a negation applied to the subject does not form a contrary proposition, but when it is applied to the predicate. And so Aristotle rightly said nothing about the subject for the subject term does not control a predicative proposition, but the predicate which in its own right confirms the entire statement. 17a15-17 A single statement-making sentence is one which signifies one thing or is single by virtue of a conjunction; there are more than one if more things are signified and not one thing or there are no conjunctions. From this it is clear that when he said the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation by first he was not talking about the kind of sentence that is one by nature but about affirmation. Otherwise he would have repeated himself and said there is a single first statement-making sentence which signifies one thing. But since he didn’t say this, it is clear that where he did say ‘first’ he was referring not to a sentence which is one without a conjunction but to affirmation which he established as being prior to negation. But this has already been said above. I will try to explain briefly what is the intention of this enumeration, for the passage, though most intelligently considered and honestly examined, has occasioned much confusion and many errors about sentences. No commentator before Porphyry101 saw the interpretation which follows. There is a difference between a sentence being single and many and being simple and combined. Single is different from simple and multiple from combined. And so the single sentence signifies one thing and a multiple signifies not one but many things. This occurs in the following sentence: ‘Cato is a philosopher.’ This sentence is not single since it does not signify one thing. For it can mean that Cato of Utica is a

Translation

73

philosopher and can also mean that the orator Cato the censor is a philosopher. Therefore it is not a single sentence and is in fact true in the case of Cato of Utica and false in the case of Cato the orator. Sentences of this kind we call multiple. But if a sentence refers to one thing, e.g. ‘it will be written on paper’, we say it is one. And so whether a sentence is one or multiple can be discerned from what they signify for if it signifies one thing it is single and if many things multiple. On the other hand simple and combined sentences are to be referred not to what they signify but to the actual terms and words which are contained in the proposition. A simple statement-making sentence is one which consists of just two terms, e.g. ‘man lives’. But if ‘every’ is added to these propositions, e.g. ‘every man lives’, or ‘no’ as in ‘no stone lives’ or ‘some’ as in ‘some man lives’, since the terms themselves are two it is called a simple proposition, but is called a combined proposition if it makes a pronouncement beyond the two terms, e.g. ‘Plato the philosopher walks in the Lyceum’. Here there are four terms or three for example in ‘Plato the philosopher walks’. These too remain equally combined, if ‘every’, ‘no’ or ‘some’ is added. And so a single or multiple sentence is meant where one or more things is signified and judged with respect to what they actually signify. The simple and combined sentence, however, is recognised not from its signification but from the number of verbs and names. If a proposition has more than two terms it is combined, if just two, simple. Then if a simple sentence, i.e. one consisting of two terms, would always have only one significance, [the terms] single and simple sentence can be applied indifferently, for the very sentence which is simple would also be single. But since not every simple sentence signifies one thing, not every simple sentence is single. It can be the case that a proposition is simple whilst the sentence is multiple, simple in respect to the verbal composition but multiple in the signification of ideas. And so there will be a twin distinction here; we say that one is a simple and single sentence, the other simple but multiple. Again if all combined sentences also signified many things we would say multiple and combined without distinction; but since it can happen that a proposition sometimes consists of numerous terms and more than two whilst displaying one meaning, it can happen that there is a combined proposition which in signification is a single sentence but combined in its wording, e.g. ‘rational mortal animal capable of thought and discipline.’ This is plural but one substance, man, and therefore one idea lies beneath the plurality. But if someone says ‘Socrates walks and talks and thinks’ they are many things, for walking, talking and thinking are different. And so sometimes a sentence will be combined but single. But since a combined sentence is sometimes spoken continuously without conjunctions, at other times is joined by conjunctions, there are four different types:

107,1 5

10 15

20

25

108,1

5

10

15 20

25

74 30 109,1 5

10 15

20 25

110,1 5

10

15

20

25

Translation

(1) There is the single sentence composed of terms pronounced continuously and signifying one idea without a conjunction, e.g. ‘rational mortal animal aware of thought and discipline.’ This sentence is composed of many terms but does not have a conjunction (in the phrase ‘aware of thought and discipline’ the conjunction ‘and’ has no force in the proposition as a whole for it does not combine the proposition but adds the skill which man seems to be capable of) and has one underlying idea, man. (2) A second type, composed of terms with no conjunction, is multiple and does not signify a single proposition, e.g. ‘Plato the Athenian philosopher disputes’. Plato, philosopher, Athenian and disputes are all different things which when joined do not make one substance as it were. So this is multiple but it is clear that it is not linked by any conjunction. Another type composed of unlinked propositions is multiple, e.g. ‘Jupiter is best and greatest, Juno is queen, Minerva is goddess of wisdom’. If someone utters them as one and continuous they are still several propositions and a multiple sentence but they lack conjunctions. (3) A third multiple type is composed either of terms or of propositions linked by conjunctions and signifying many things, e.g. ‘Jupiter and Apollo are gods’ is composed of terms, ‘Apollo is a prophet and Jupiter thunders’ is composed of propositions and signifies many things. (4) Besides these there is another proposition composed of propositions linked by a conjunction signifying one sentence, e.g. ‘if it is day there is light’. Here there are two propositions, ‘it is day’ and ‘there is light’, joined by the conjunction ‘if’. But this sentence does not signify many things; for it does not propose that there is day and light but if there is day there is light. Therefore it signifies a certain consequence, not the existence of a proposition. For it does not say that both exist but that if there is one the other follows and thus joins both in one idea as it were. But Porphyry regarded this as an external proposition because it appeared to signify more than one thing (the actual plurality of propositions simulates a number of significations) but, as said above, does not signify more than one thing but a single consequence. There are then two types of combined proposition which signify one thing – the combined sentence of unconnected terms signifying one thing, e.g. ‘mortal rational animal’, or a sentence combined from propositions and joined by a conjunction which gives the appearance of signifying more than one thing whilst in fact signifying one thing, e.g. ‘if it is day, there is light’. Since this is the difference between combined and simple sentences, sentences are single in two ways as are multiple sentences, whilst simple sentences are of one kind as are combined sentences. A sentence is said to be single when joined by a conjunction and in another sense when it signifies one thing. A sentence is said to be

Translation

75

multiple when it is without a conjunction and in another sense when it signifies many things.102 And this is what he says: a statementmaking sentence is single if it signifies one thing or is one by virtue of a conjunction, there are more than one if it signifies many and not one thing or there are no conjunctions. For a single sentence is meant in two ways, as already explained, when it has a conjunction or when it signifies one thing. A multiple sentence signifies many things or is not joined by a conjunction. For he called plural the sort of sentences which are multiple and signify a variety of things or are without conjunctions. The phrase or there are no conjunctions embraced the whole range;103 for a proposition is multiple either if it is un-composed, e.g. ‘Cato philosophises’, and still multiple if it is composed of terms without a conjunction, e.g. ‘Plato the Athenian disputes in the Lyceum’, or if composed of propositions without a conjunction, e.g. ‘man is, animal is’. But why did he add and not one to there are more than one if it signifies many? The reason is that there are some sentences which signify more than one thing in their words, but signify one thing in their composition as a whole, as for example ‘mortal rational animal’; for these words all signify many things – animal, rational, mortal are different things – but the whole together is one thing, man. But when I say ‘Socrates the Athenian philosopher’ both the individual words are plural and all taken together are still plural, for they are accidents and do not delineate any substance. And he said this about the sort of sentences that are single by virtue of a conjunction or by their signification as well as about the sort of multiple sentences that are multiple without a conjunction or by their multiple signification. What he later said about simple and combined sentences will be explained when our exposition has come to that passage.104 But let us now return to the order [of the text]. Now he had said above that the simple proposition, which the Greeks call categorical and which we can translate as predicative, always consists of a verb as a predicate but does not always have a name as subject because sometimes an infinite name, the inflexion of a name or verbs are the subject. Since he also said that a simple sentence consists of simple expressions and maintained that affirmation and negation are sentences he clearly made affirmation and negation consist of and be formed from expression in such a way that the expression of a verb alone as predicate always makes an affirmation and negation but the expression of a name as subject does not always do so. Since this is what he proposed he now explains what the expression is which forms predicative, i.e. simple, propositions. 17a17-18 Let a name and a verb then be simply an expression.

111,1

5

10 15

20 25 112,1

5

10

15

20

25

76

Translation

He used the words simply an expression because certain expressions are already affirmations or imperfect sentences as was explained above.105 He shows [now] why a verb and a name are simply expressions. 30 113,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 114,1

5

10

17a18-20 Since speaking in this way by signifying something with an utterance, whether another person poses a question or, rather the speaker takes the initiative, is not to make a statement. The meaning is as follows: a statement-making proposition is formed by these two factors in particular: by its own nature and substance, and by its use and employment. Its nature is that truth or falsity is found in it, its use is when some proposition or reply is made either in the context of a question, e.g. whether the soul is immortal, or when someone makes and pronounces a statement on his own account, e.g. if someone says on his own initiative ‘the soul is immortal’. Hence one definition of statement with respect to its nature and substance is formed as follows: a statement is a sentence in which there is truth or falsity. From its use and employment106 a statementmaking sentence is what we propose in a question when we want to hear whether something is true or false, or when we are alone involved, what we propose in demonstrating something to be true or false. And so since every statement-making sentence is located either in a question or in our own initiative and the actual nature and substance of statement is involved in both so that whether it possesses truth or falsity when it is located in a question and joined with an answer, or retains either of the two when it is stated on its own, he says that expressions do not contain truth or falsity whether another person is posing a question or someone is taking the initiative and speaking spontaneously. For if someone says in a question ‘is Socrates disputing?’ and another replies ‘he is disputing’ (disputat), his reply ‘he is disputing’ can have the meaning of a sentence signifying truth or falsity if it is joined to the complete question. But if ‘he is disputing’ is understood on its own, even though it is an answer to another’s question, it has nothing to do with truth or falsity. Similarly too if someone says ‘Socrates’ or ‘walks’ not in answer to a question but on his own initiative he is not signifying anything either true or false. And so verbs and names are merely expressions both because they are simple (for there are some other expressions in combined sentences and words which are not yet complete ideas) and because they do not signify truth or falsity either when another is posing a question or when someone says them spontaneously (for there are some other expressions such as retain truth or falsity both when another is posing a question and when someone says them spontaneously, that is to say, in affirmations or negations). And so this is the meaning, but the text is as follows: let

Translation

77

a name and a verb then be simply an expression because we cannot say that anyone signifying something (that is by a verb or name) is making a statement; for we cannot say that anyone who signifies something by a verb or name is making a statement whether another person poses a question or rather the speaker takes the initiative. This is the equivalent of saying that verbs and names in themselves are simply expressions since we cannot say that a man signifying something by verbs and names is making any statement whether someone is questioning him or whether he spontaneously and for himself utters a simple expression. But to make a statement is to utter a sentence which indicates truth or falsity. 17a20-2 Of these one is a simple statement, as [when we predicate] something of something or something from something,107 the other which is composed of these is a kind of combined sentence. Since he spoke above about single and multiple sentences and posited the single sentence as one which is single either by virtue of a conjunction in accordance with the way in which it is uttered or by the way it signifies in accordance with its nature, and multiple sentences as ones which either lack a conjunction or comprise many things by virtue of their own signification and since single, simple, combined and multiple sentences are different, he returns after them to the simple and combined sentence saying that a statement-making sentence is simple when it consists of two terms one of which is the subject, the other the predicate. By the words of these, he meant of course, the statement-making sentences of which one is a simple statement. What he means by simple statement he himself explains with the words something of something where we must understand ‘we predicate’ so that the meaning is: of these statement-making sentences a simple statement is when we predicate one thing of one other thing, e.g. if I say ‘Plato disputes’ I have predicated something, that is to say, ‘disputes’ of someone, ‘Plato’. And this is a simple statement because it is composed of two terms and parts. Wherever a sentence has more terms and its parts exceed the number of two terms, they are said to be combined sentences and an example of a combined statement is ‘if it is day there is light’; for ‘it is day’ and ‘there is light’ are two simple sentences which when joined make one combined statement. And this is what is meant by the other – i.e. the other kind of sentence – which is composed of these – i.e. of simple statements, is a kind of combined sentence. For this is not a simple sentence; for a simple sentence has only two expressions as its parts whereas a combined sentence has sentences as well like the one I mentioned above. This then is the order which he himself disrupted. Firstly he

15

20

25

115,1

5

10 15

20

25 116,1

5

78

10

15

20

25

30 117,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

explained which is first and which second, affirmation or negation. Then he spoke about single and plural sentences, lastly about simple and combined sentences. But because he inserted some things in the middle we have followed the direct line of his thought deferring them for a little while and cutting out Aristotle’s long transposition by joining the parts; for his words the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation. The rest are single by virtue of a conjunction do not appear to say the same as a single statementmaking sentence is one which signifies one thing or is single by virtue of a conjunction; there are more than one if more things are signified and not one thing or there are no conjunctions or, again, as of these one is a simple statement, as [when we predicate] something of something or something from something, the other which is composed of these is a kind of combined sentence. But his first words the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation have to do with his demonstrating the priority of affirmation and the posteriority of negation (for he said next is negation; therefore the word first is to be taken with affirmation). But the following remark little later that a single statement-making sentence is one which signifies one thing or is single by virtue of a conjunction; there are more than one if more things are signified and not one thing or there are no conjunctions had to do with showing which sentences ought to be considered single (explaining that they are either those which signify one thing or which a conjunction makes one) and which ought to be considered multiple (either those which retain a multiple signification or which are not composed with any conjunction). But his last addition that of these one is a simple statement, as [when we predicate] something of something or something from something, the other which is composed of these is a kind of combined sentence had to do with simple and combined sentences, saying that simple sentences are those composed of only two terms, and combined sentences those which are composed of simple statement-making sentences. This then is the complete order: The first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation and then one should omit what follows and give: a single statement-making sentence is one which signifies one thing or is single by virtue of a conjunction; there are more than one if more things are signified and not one thing or there are no conjunctions, and after this, omitting what follows as well, this should follow: of these one is a simple statement, as [when we predicate] something of something or something from something, the other which is composed of these is a kind of combined sentence. This is the equivalent of saying: the affirmative sentence is first

Translation

79

among statements, second is negation. Of affirmation and negation a single sentence is one that signifies one thing or that is one by virtue of a conjunction, a multiple one that signifies many things or that is not joined by a conjunction. And of these a simple sentence consists of two terms, as when we predicate something of something or something from something, whereas a combined sentence is one that is composed of simple affirmations. The phrase something of something or something from something has the following meaning. ‘Something of something’ signifies affirmation as when I say ‘Socrates disputes’ I predicate something, i.e. ‘disputes’ of someone i.e. ‘Socrates’ and so we have an affirmation. But if I say ‘Socrates does not dispute’ I separate disputation from Socrates and remove it from him and this is a negation. For an affirmation predicates one thing of another and joins it to it, a negation removes by predication one thing from another. Then the words ‘something of something’ signify simple affirmation, the words ‘something from something’ simple negation.

30 118,1

5

10

15

17a23-6 A simple statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being in accordance with the divisions of time. Chapter 6 Affirmation is stating something of something else, negation is stating something from something else. After explaining about multiple and single, simple and combined statements, he deals with the simple statement which he embraces in definition saying that it is a spoken sound signifying that something is or is not. ‘Spoken sound’ has to do with the genus, ‘significant’ with the differentia of the spoken sound, about something being or not being, with the differentia of the significant spoken sounds;108 for that it signifies something depends on the actual spoken sound by which it is expressed, but what the statement signifies or what it is designating depends on the difference between spoken sounds. This is the equivalent of saying that a statement does not signify everything, but that a thing is or is not something. So a simple statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being, i.e. every statement is either an affirmation or a negation; for an affirmation lays down that something is, a negation that it is not. But some people have been deflected into a seriously false interpretation by not seeing how concisely he has compressed his definition. They maintain that statement is not the genus of affirmation and negation; for they argue, if this is the definition of statement and every definition of a genus can be applied to its own species (for

20

25

30 119,1 5

10

80 15 20 25

30 120,1

5

10 15

20

25

30 121,1

5

Translation

every genus is predicated univocally of its own species) there is no doubt that this definition of statement, if statement is a genus, fits affirmation and negation, if these are its species. But who would ever say [they argue] that the definition significant spoken sound about something being or not being fits affirmation? For it is impossible for an affirmation to be spoken sound about something being or not being but only about being. Next, negation cannot be a significant spoken sound about being and not being but only about ‘not being’, never about being as well; for negation always takes away, affirmation joins and establishes. Therefore, if this definition cannot apply to affirmation and negation, affirmation and negation are not species of statement. I think that they are making a grave error. As if anything should prevent affirmation and negation from having both of them at the same time the same definition. For I can say that affirmation and negation are a significant spoken sound about the being or not being of something in such a way that ‘significant spoken sound’ is common to both, whereas ‘about the being’ belongs to affirmation alone, ‘about not being’ just to negation alone. But nothing could be done in a more concise way than to both establish the nature of statement and make its subdivisions in the same definition. For his saying a statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being is the equivalent of his saying that a statement is a significant spoken sound in which truth or falsity are signified, of which one species is affirmation the other negation. For the phrase about what is or is not something is the equivalent of ‘which indicates truth or falsity][; for everything which states that something is, e.g., ‘it is day’, or is not, e.g., ‘it is not day’, indicates truth or falsity. If then something is said to be or not to be, truth or falsity is found in it. Thus, his saying that it is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being is the equivalent of saying that a statement is a significant spoken sound which signifies truth and falsity; for signifying about the being or not being of something is indicating truth or falsity. But he divided the species in the same definition in an eminently concise way; for his saying about something being or not being is the equivalent of saying that a statement is a significant spoken sound, in which truth and falsity are indicated, but one of its parts is affirmative the other negative. For a significant spoken sound about something being is an affirmation, about something not being is a negation. And so his wording that a statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being has brought both together in one idea, for the statement about something being or not being signifies both, the indication of truth or falsity as well as the division of affirmation and negation. But Alexander, however, did not abandon his own view but held to the same error as the others. For he too said that it is evident that

Translation

81

statement is not the genus of affirmation and negation, because he treated affirmation and negation as parts in his definition of statement. But everything composed and everything equivocal can be defined either by its own parts or by what is signified by it as, for example, if someone wanting to define the number three were to say that it is a number which is made up from one and two or if someone wanting to define man were to say that man is a mortal rational animal or an image of this made in colours or metal; and so the equivocal name has been demonstrated from the things which the equivocal name itself signified. The same is the case in this passage: a statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being is the equivalent of ‘a statement is a spoken sound that is either affirmative or negative’. Thus he slips into the same error without seeing how Aristotle has, with a single definition, made a division and shown the nature of statement. But neither Porphyry109 nor any other commentator as far as I know has seen this interpretation. Aspasius too agreed with Alexander, for Alexander says that Aristotle defined statement in the same way here as elsewhere i.e. in the Analytics.110 For there he established the following definition of a proposition, i.e. of a statement: ‘a proposition is then an affirmative or negative sentence [predicating] something of something else.’ Aspasius follows this too. But Porphyry says that the subtlety of his definition is admirable; for statement has been defined from the particular function of affirmation and negation whilst affirmation and negation themselves from the terms. For an affirmation consisting of two terms signifies that something is in something else but its overall function is to affirm something. A negation, too, signifies that something is not in something else but its overall function is to deny and separate. Or again an affirmation signifies that something is in something else but its overall function is to posit something (for when it signifies that something is in something else it posits something) and a negation declares that something is not in something else but its overall function is to remove. And so at this point, he says, Aristotle defines statement from the overall function of affirmation and negation when he says a statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being. This has to do with the function of negation and affirmation and is the equivalent of saying that a statement is a significant spoken sound which posits or removes something and these are the particular powers of affirmation and negation respectively. If he had said a statement is about something being or not being in something else, then he would appear to have defined statement from the terms of affirmation and negation. But when he says about something being or not being he is making a definition in accordance with the overall function of both. For in the affirmation ‘it is day’ I have shown that something is applied to something else as far as the terms concerned (for I have linked ‘is’ to

10 15

20 25

30 122,1

5

10

15

20

25 123,1

82

5

10

15

20

25

30 125,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

‘day’), but the overall function of this proposition is to declare that something is. Again when I say ‘it is not day’ I pronounce something not to be of something else but its overall function is to say that something is not. Therefore it is clear according to Porphyry that a statement has been defined from the overall function of affirmation and negation whilst affirmation and negation themselves have been defined from their terms. For he (Aristotle) says that affirmation is stating something of something else, taking the genus in the definition of affirmation, for statement is, as already said, the genus of affirmation and negation as Aristotle himself clearly demonstrates by putting in the name ‘statement’ in the definition of both when he says affirmation is stating; for this has to do with the genus. But his addition something of something else pertains to the terms. For in simple affirmation something is predicated of something else by stating as for example in ‘it is day’ that it is day. A negation is also defined like this: stating something from something else, and with respect to ‘stating’ it is defined from the genus, with respect to ‘something from something else’ it is defined in accordance with the terms; for in the negation ‘it is not day’ we remove ‘being’ from day in making a statement. But so that he would not appear to have defined only statement in the present time he added that the definition of statement is be understood for other times too. For he says a statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being adding in accordance with the divisions of time. The divisions of time are three. Every time is either future, present or past or a mixture of these. A statement is then a significant spoken sound signifying that something either is or is not; but since this designates present time, he says, we speak not only about the present but also about the divisions of time so that this being and not being applies both to the future and to the past. Thus on different occasions a statement signifies that something is or is not, that is to say, it posits and removes in such a way that it posits and removes the present time, e.g. ‘Socrates is’, ‘Socrates is not’; and it posits and removes the past time, e.g. ‘Socrates was’, ‘Socrates was not’; and similarly it posits and removes the future time, e.g. ‘Socrates will be’, ‘Socrates will not be’. And so in all these times the overall function of the statement is about something being or not being i.e. about positing and removing. This then is what he means by about something being or not being in accordance with the divisions of time which is the equivalent of saying that a statement-making spoken sound signifies about something being or not being either in the present, in the future or in the past, as times themselves are divided. But I will explain briefly why he ordered the definition in this way. He dealt firstly with name, then with verb, sentence, statement, affirmation and lastly with negation. Every composite is posterior to

Translation

83

its parts, every genus prior to its parts; thus in composites the parts are prior to the whole, in genera and species the parts are posterior to the whole. Further in composites the whole is posterior to the parts, in species and genera the whole is prior to the parts. So since verbs and names are not species of affirmation, nor of negation, nor of statement nor of sentence but parts of all of these, of which all of them are composed, and since sentence is the genus of statement, statement of affirmation and negation (and affirmation is prior to negation in order of production as he himself testified), then since all of these, sentence, statement, affirmation and negation, are composed of verbs and names, names and verbs are prior to them all. Now by a name is signified a thing that either is self-subsistent or is treated as if self-subsistent, and by a verb is designated an accident and what is as it were accidental to something else; this is clear from what has been said above.111 What subsists in itself is prior; therefore what name signifies is prior to what verb signifies; therefore name is prior to verb. And so since name and verb are prior to sentence, statement, affirmation and negation (for parts are prior to things which are composed), these have rightly been defined before everything else. And because name is prior to verb, name has been defined first and then verb. But since every genus is prior to its species, after name and verb he described sentence with a definition because it is the nearest genus to statement and a higher genus of affirmation and negation; then after sentence he described statement, which while being a species of sentence is the genus of affirmation and negation; after statement he described affirmation, since although it is as species equal to negation with respect to its own genus, statement, it is nevertheless prior to it in production as he already explained above when he said: the first single statement-making sentence is affirmation, next is negation. But since it was said by us above that he wants to define these five, expression, statement, affirmation, negation and contradiction, he showed what expression is with the words let a name and a verb then be simply an expression;112 what a statement is with a simple statement is a significant spoken sound about something being or not being in accordance with the divisions of time;113 what an affirmation is with affirmation is stating something of something else;114 negation he also defined with the words negation is stating something from something else.115 It remains then to discuss contradiction. And so he now continues by saying what a contradiction is: 17a26-34 Since it is possible to state both of what is that it is not, of what is not that it is, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not and also in the times which are outside the present, it must similarly be possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed and to affirm whatever anyone has denied. And so

25

30 125,1 5

10

15

20

25 126,1 5

10

15

84

Translation

20

it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation and for every negation there is an opposite affirmation. Let us call this a contradiction when an affirmation and negation are opposed.

25

After dealing with everything that he had promised to explain he comes in turn to contradiction which remains, and traces it from affirmations and negations by saying that for every affirmation there can be opposed its own negation and for every negation there can be established its own affirmation in opposition. This is assumed from the following: since we know that some things are and others are not and since we can say and understand that some things are and others are not, four statements, twin contradictions, derive from this. For if someone says that what is is not, e.g. if when Socrates is alive one says ‘Socrates is not alive’ one denies what is and the negation will be false. If someone affirms that what is not is, e.g. when Socrates is not alive says ‘Socrates is alive’ this is a false affirmation. If someone affirms in a statement that what is is, e.g. when Socrates is alive says ‘Socrates is alive’, it will be a true affirmation. But if he says what is not is not, it is a true negation, e.g. if when Socrates is not alive someone says ‘Socrates is not alive’. Then from these, that is to say, from true affirmation and false negation, and, again from true negation and false affirmation, we have four statements; affirmation is involved in two, negation in two, and there are two contradictions. This is what he means by since it is possible to state both of what is that it is not which demonstrates the false statement of a negation, and by the addition of what is not that it is, which posited false affirmation in a statement. And the phrase of what is that it is designates a statement in which what is is said to be in a true affirmation. And further the words and of what is not that it is not give us a model for a true negation. And so if what is can truly be said to be and similarly what is can be falsely said not to be and what is not can truly be stated not to be and what is not can be falsely affirmed to be, it is clear that every affirmation has some contradictory negation opposed to it and every negation forms a contradictory to an opposite affirmation. Indeed if whatever anyone affirms can be denied and whatever one denies can be affirmed, who can doubt that an affirmation cannot be formed which no negation can contradict or that a negation cannot be formed of which one cannot find an affirmation? And so every affirmation has its opposite negation, every negation its opposite affirmation. It is then a contradiction when an affirmation and negation are opposed. But what an opposition is must be said later, and what a contradiction is I will explain afterwards in a most careful exposition.116 The words and in the times which are outside the present are the equivalent of ‘there can be affirmation and negation in the past or

127,1

5

10

15

20 25

30 128,1 5

10

15

Translation

85

future just as in the present’. For just as what is can be said to be, so what was can be said to have been and what is about to be can be affirmed to be expected at a future time, as when we say ‘Socrates was’, ‘in the summer the sun will be in Cancer’. Thus affirmation and negation concerning the future and past are formed in the same way as those concerning the present. But the future and past are external and outside the present time, for the future will come and the past has already gone. And so he was right to say that affirmations and negations of this kind can occur also in the times which are outside the present. For in the past and the future which are external to present time it must similarly be possible (as he himself says) to deny whatever anyone has affirmed and to affirm whatever anyone has denied. Hence it is the case that in all times it holds that a negation can be opposed to every affirmation and an affirmation can be formed in opposition to every negation. He now demonstrates what kind of opposition ought to be inferred in affirmation and negation. For it is a contradiction when an affirmation and negation are opposed. But if these, when opposed, constitute a contradiction, he rightly follows up what kind of opposition there ought to be in them that constitutes a contradiction. 17a34-7 I mean that those statements are opposed that affirm or deny the same thing of the same thing, but not equivocally, and all the other things of that kind which we formulate in opposition to the attacks of sophists. Since a simple proposition consists of two terms, one the subject, the other the predicate, and the subject is what is said first, the predicate later, he says that an affirmation and a negation in opposition produce a perfect contradiction, if they have the same subject and the same predicate and where neither subject nor predicate have more than one signification. Otherwise there will not be a contradiction and no opposition. For example, when I say ‘Socrates is white’ and someone else says ‘an Ethiopian is not white’ this affirmation and negation are not opposites because the subject is different and the predicate identical. For in the affirmation ‘Socrates’ was the subject, in the negation ‘an Ethiopian’. Again when I say ‘Socrates is white’ and someone else says ‘Socrates is not a philosopher’ this negation is not opposed to the affirmation because a different thing is said as predicate in each case. For in the affirmation white is predicated of Socrates, in the negation philosopher. But if both are different it is much more the case that there is no opposition. For example when I say ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ and someone replies ‘Plato is not a Roman’ here neither the subject nor the predicate is the same. They are even more different, are not set against each other by any opposition and so both can be true and, if it be the case, both false or

20

25 30 129,1 5

10

15

20

25

130,1

5

86 10

15

20

25

30 131,1 5

10

15

20

25

Translation

one true and one false. There is nothing to prevent statements that do not cancel each other out from both being found false, both true or one true and the other false. And so statements where the subject or the predicate are different we do not call opposites. Whence it happens that [terms] too, whether subjects or predicates, that signify more than one thing cannot maintain a contradictory negation. If someone makes an equivocal name the subject and another name the predicate and if someone then produces a negation against this affirmation he does not make an opposition. For example when I say ‘Cato killed himself at Utica’ the name ‘Cato’ is equivocal; for one can understand both the orator and the man who led an army to Africa. Then if someone says ‘Cato killed himself at Utica’ it can perhaps be understood to refer to Cato the husband of Marcia and if someone replies ‘Cato did not kill himself at Utica’ he can have formed a negation about Cato the censor. But since Cato the censor is different from Cato the husband of Marcia and the name Cato signifies different things the affirmation and negation will be different from each other and the negation in no way abolishes what the affirmation has established; for the affirmation has established that Cato the husband of Marcia took his own life at Utica whilst the negation says that Cato the orator, if this is the case, did not take his own life at Utica. And so they do not establish between them truth and falsity because they are different from each other. For both are here true: that Cato, i.e. the husband of Marcia, killed himself at Utica and that Cato, i.e. the orator, did not kill himself at Utica. And here the equivocal subject has prevented this affirmation and negation from making any kind of opposition. But if the predicate were equivocal there would for the same reasons be no contradiction. For suppose someone says ‘Cato is strong’ and predicates strength of mind of Cato, whilst someone else replies ‘Cato is not strong’ referring to his physical weakness, the equivocation of ‘strength’ creates an ambiguity which prevents the formation of any kind of opposition. And if both terms, subject and predicate were equivocal there would be an even greater difference between the propositions and they would not be opposed nor would they divide truth and falsity between themselves, but both could be true and sometimes both false. And so the subject must be one and the predicate must be one, so that the negation divides and separates exactly the same thing that the affirmation has predicated and joined, and so that the negation denies it of the same subject of which the affirmation has predicated it. For if each or one of the terms is equivocal it can happen that the negation denies something other than what the affirmation posited and so there is no opposition. Opposition must not be made in this way, but there ought to be the same subject and predicate in the affirmation as in the negation. And this is what he means by those statements are opposed that affirm or

Translation

87

deny the same thing of the same thing. The phrase same thing refers to the predicate, of the same thing to the subject and we are to understand the sentence to be saying ‘I mean that an affirmation117 is opposed by the negation that negates the same predicate of the same subject, but only when neither subject nor predicate and least of all both of them are equivocal and both signify some one thing’. This is what he meant by but not equivocally. But the absence of equivocation alone is not enough in establishing an opposition. Aristotle formulated many arguments in On Sophistical Refutations against those who try to overturn the way of true reason with fallacious arguments, e.g. how propositions are to be formed and how one can discover the fallacies in arguments. And this is what he says in the words and all the other things of that kind which we formulate in opposition to the attacks of sophists which is the equivalent of saying: ‘I mean that an affirmation is opposed to a negation that negates the same predicate of the same subject, but not equivocally’; and along with this everything else in On Sophistical Refutations aimed against argumentative attacks. And, since he was concerned with other matters Aristotle appropriately alluded to this only briefly in this work, whereas we are not too troubled, as far as brevity allows, to add what he had formulated in On Sophistical Refutations about making a contradictory opposition. For it is not only when equivocation is located in propositions that there is no contradiction, but also if there is univocation in a negation the opposition will not possess contradiction. For an opposition possessing contradiction is one in which, if the affirmation is true, the negation is false and, if the negation is true, the affirmation appears to be false. And so when terms have been posited univocally it can happen that both, affirmation and negation, are true at the same time, as for example if someone says ‘man walks, man does not walk’ the affirmation is true for some man, the negation true for the species man; but species man and individual man are univocal; so there is no contradiction when we are dealing with univocals. But neither is there any division of truth and falsity if the affirmation and negation refer to different parts, but both can be true, e.g. ‘the eye is white, the eye is not white’ for it is white in one part and not white in another part; thus both the negation and the affirmation are true. Nor is any contradiction created if in referring to one thing and then to another one says, for example, ‘ten is double, ten is not double’; for if I am referring to five the affirmation is true, if to six the negation is true. Nor is there a contradiction if a different time is meant in the affirmation and negation, e.g. ‘Socrates sits, Socrates does not sit’; for sitting at one time makes a true affirmation, not sitting at another time a true negation. Furthermore one also precludes the force of contradiction if one says something in a negation in a different way from the way in which it is said in the affirmation; if one makes an

132,1

5

10

15

20

25 133,1

5

10

15

20

88 25

134,1 5

10

15

20

25 135,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

affirmation potentially and a negation actually, the affirmation and the negation can be truthfully made at one and the same time; for example in ‘the puppy sees, the puppy does not see’ it sees potentially but does not see actually. And so if a contradiction is to be made it must be made with the same predicate (as he explained), about the same subject, neither equivocally nor univocally, and with respect to the same part, referent, time and in the same way. Aristotle went through all of this most carefully in On Sophistical Refutations. Though he mentions a few of these things he postponed them for a full discussion in that book. A statement is about the being or not being of something: affirmation about being, e.g. ‘Plato is a philosopher’, negation about not being, e.g. ‘Plato is not a philosopher’. Both of these statements, ‘Plato is a philosopher’, ‘Plato is not a philosopher’ cancel each other out and placed in conflict in a kind of argument form a contradiction. Contradiction is then the opposition of an affirmation and a negation in which neither both can be false nor both true, but one is always true the other false. But if there are cases in which the affirmation and the negation do not distribute truth and falsity between themselves, in these cases there is found some difference but not sufficient for [forming] an opposition. Porphyry says that our common way of speaking with each other provides an argument for our claim that an affirmation ought to be opposed to a negation in such a way that if one of the opposed statements is true, falsity immediately enters into the other; for when someone says that something is and another says that it is not, we suspect that one of them is telling the truth, the other telling a lie. Moreover if something either is or is not and a mean between being and not being cannot be found, but affirmation posits that something is, negation that the same thing is not and there is a contradiction when affirmation and negation are opposed, this kind of opposition creates a perfect contradiction in which affirmation and negation cannot both be true. The nature of affirmation and negation is referred to a certain quality, for affirmation and negation are a particular quality. In addition to this quality there is the quantity of propositions about which we must speak a little later.118 But Aristotle in wanting to tell us what contradiction is, demonstrated firstly where it is; for all contradiction must be in opposition. And so since contradiction is in opposition but the sort of opposition that produces contradiction so far remains unknown and since this opposition is in either the quality or quantity of propositions or in both and since the quality of propositions which resides in affirmation and negation has been spoken of, now their quantity will be spoken of, so that when that too is known, it may be seen whether contradiction lies in the quality119 of propositions, in their quantity or in both.

Translation

89

Chapter 7 17a38-b3 Since of things some are universal, others singular (I call universal what is naturally predicated of a number of things, a singular what is not; e.g. man is a universal, Plato120 a singular), it is necessary to state that something is or is not, sometimes of a universal, sometimes of a singular. Every proposition takes the properties of its signification from the thoughts which underlie it. But since it is necessary that thoughts are likenesses of things, the function of propositions is also connected to things. And so when we want to affirm or deny something this has to do with the quality of a thought, i.e. of a mental concept. For we affirm or deny by positing in an affirmation or negation what we have conceived in our imagination or intellect. And propositions acquire their function and particular character primarily from thought and take it in the second place from the things of which it is necessary that the thoughts themselves consist. And so it comes about that a proposition participates in both quantity and quality, quality in the actual utterance of the affirmation and negation which a person emits and utters as a result of his own judgement, quantity from the underlying things of which our thoughts catch hold. For we see that there are some qualities in things of the kind that cannot fit anything other than some one singular and particular substance; for one kind of quality is singular, e.g. to Plato or Socrates; and there is another which is shared with more than one and gives itself in its entirety to individuals and to all, e.g. humanity itself. For there is a quality of the kind that is in its entirety both in singulars and in all. For whenever we think of something like this in our mind, in our mental processes we are not led by this name to some one person, but to all who share in the definition of humanity. Hence it comes about that the latter is common to all, but the former cannot be shared by all but is proper to one. For if I may coin a new word I would call the particular quality which cannot be shared with any other substance by an invented name of its own to make clearer exactly what I mean. Let us call that characteristic of Plato that cannot be shared Platonity.121 By inventing a word we can call this quality Platonity in the way in which we call the quality of a man humanity. And so this Platonity belongs to only one man and not to anyone but only to Plato, whereas humanity belongs to Plato and to the others who are embraced by this word. And so it happens that because Platonity fits only Plato, the listener’s mind refers the name Plato to one person and one particular substance, but when he hears ‘man’ he refers the thought to as many as he knows are embraced by humanity. And so since humanity is both common to all men and is in its entirety in the

25

136,1 5

10

15 20

25 137,1

5

10

15

90 20 25

138,1 5

10

15 20

25

30 139,1 5

10

15

20

Translation

singulars (for all men have humanity to the same extent as one man; for if this were not so, the definition of the species man would never fit the substance of a particular man), man is said to be something universal, whereas Platonity and Plato are particular. Having thus established this, since a universal quality can be predicated of all and of singulars, when we say ‘man’, it is ambiguous and one can be in doubt as to whether it has been said about the species man or about some particular man because the name ‘man’ can be said of all and of any singulars who are contained in the species humanity. And so it is indefinite whether the word ‘man’ is said of all or of any one individual and particular human substance. If we try to remove the ambiguity of thought from this quality of humanity, it has to be determined and either extended into a plurality or contracted into a numerical unity. For when we say ‘man’ it is indefinite whether we mean all or one, but if ‘every’ is added, so that the predication becomes ‘every man’ or ‘some’, then a distribution and a determination of universality is made, and the name ‘man’, which is universal, we utter either universally by saying ‘every man’ or particularly by saying ‘some man’; for ‘every’ is a name signifying universality. And so if ‘every’ which signifies universal is joined to the man which is also universal, a universal thing, namely man, is predicated universally insofar as a definition of its quantity has been added to it. But if ‘some man’ is said, then the universal man with the addition of particularity by having ‘some’ added to it is expressed particularly and it is called a universal thing expressed particularly. But since ‘some man’ is a particular predication and the predication ‘Plato’ is also particular (for ‘some man’ is said of one [person] and Plato is said of one [person]), the two are not said to be particular in the same way. ‘Plato’ indicates one definite substance and property which cannot apply to anyone else, whereas ‘some man’ determines a universal name by means of particularity, but if ‘some’ were removed the word ‘man’ would remain universal and thereby be ambiguous. The word ‘Plato’, however, could never be a universal; for although the name ‘Plato’ is sometimes given to more than one person, that does not make the name universal, for humanity is collected from the natures of individual men and reduced somehow to one thought and nature whereas the name ‘Plato’ may perhaps appear to be common to many as a name but the property and nature of the Plato who was the pupil of Socrates would apply to no-one [else], even if he possessed the same name. This is so because humanity is natural, a proper name however conventional. We are not now saying that a name cannot be predicated of more than one, but that the property of Plato cannot be predicated of more than one. For that property is not by nature said of more than one as the property of man is; and so Platonity is in itself an incommunicable quality (as has been said), whereas a universal quality which is both in many and in singulars is communicable.

Translation

91

Hence it is the case that when I say ‘every man’ I extend the proposition numerically [i.e. to signify a plurality], but when I say ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’ I do not project it numerically but restrict the quality and property of one to, and predicate it of, the unity of its own individual and particular substance. There is this further great difference between the two particulars, ‘some man’ and ‘Plato’, that when I say ‘Plato’ I have designated with the name what man I mean and the characteristic of the particular man I am naming, whereas when I say ‘some man’ I have only rejected plurality and reduced the proposition to unity but this particularity does not help me [to determine] about whom I am speaking; for ‘some man’ can be Socrates, Plato, Cicero or anyone of the singulars whose properties are different from each other in the nature and rationale of their singularity. And so Theophrastus very appropriately called particular propositions of the kind ‘some man is just’ indefinite particular propositions. For it removes a part from man that is universal either by the name or by the nature but it does not determine or define what part that is or by what property it is described. And so he called universal what is naturally predicated of many, not as the name Alexander is applied to the Trojan, the Macedonian, son of Philip, and many more; for the latter is said of many by convention, the former by nature. Aristotle’s phrase what is naturally predicated of a number of things is very subtle; for this universality is natural, but the property of name and thing which is particular he called singular with the words Plato a singular. The following sentence it is necessary to state that something is or is not sometimes of a universal, sometimes of a singular is the equivalent of ‘every affirmation and negation demonstrates that something is or is not in [something]. And whatever statement is made, it is proposed either about being, e.g. ‘Plato is a philosopher’ (for this proposition establishes that philosophy is in Plato) or about not being in, e.g. ‘Plato is not a philosopher’, where by separating philosophy from Plato it is proposed that philosophy is not in him. And so since it is necessary to say either that something is in something or that something is not in something, it is also necessary that that in which we say that something is is either universal (e.g. when we say ‘man is white’ we show that whiteness is in a universal thing, i.e. man) or particular and individual, e.g. if someone says ‘Socrates is white’ for he has signified that whiteness is in Socrates, in a particular substance and in its incommunicable property. But in the case of individuals, whether something is affirmed or denied, there is one type of opposition which possesses the function of contradiction; for since a particular and individual is not divided by any cutting, there will be one type of contradiction about an individual. But in the case of universals there is not just one form of contradiction. For when I say ‘Socrates is a man, Socrates is not a man’ this is

25

140,1

5

10

15

20 25

30 141,1

5

10

15

92 20

25 142,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 143,1 5

10

Translation

the only kind of opposition to be found suitable to produce a contradiction, if all those things apply which we have mentioned above in answer to argumentative attacks. But if there is a subject about which something is predicated, which is universal and is naturally predicated of a number of things (as Aristotle says), there is not only one type of contradictory opposition; for there are three different kinds of proposition about universal things: one which includes ‘every’, e.g. when I say ‘every man is an animal’; another one which contracts and restricts to one the function of a proposition from an indefinite multitude and an innumerable plurality – this is the sort where one says ‘some man is an animal’; yet another one which neither extends a proposition to plurality nor reduces it to particularity, e.g. one which is proposed without any determination as ‘man is an animal’, ‘man is not an animal’; for here we have added neither ‘some’ which is an indication of particularity nor ‘every][ which is an indication of universality. Thus it is the case that individuality is predicated simply, universality sometimes universally, e.g. ‘every man is an animal’ where man, a universal thing, is predicated universally. For since ‘man’ is universal the addition of ‘every’ makes the universality be described universally. Or universality is predicated particularly, e.g. when I say ‘some man is an animal’; ‘some’ points to the particular thing, but when it is joined to ‘man’ it brought about that a universal substance is predicated particularly. It is also possible to predicate a universal not universally whenever a universal name is posited simply without adding any mark of universality or particularity, e.g. ‘man is an animal’. Expressions are called determinations which, like ‘every’, spread out a universal thing to a totality or draw it back to a part, like ‘some’. ‘Every’ and ‘some’ determine the quantity of a proposition and this quantity when joined with the quality of propositions is varied in four different ways (the quality of propositions is found in affirmation and negation): either it predicates a universal thing universally in the affirmative, e.g. ‘every man is an animal’, or a universal thing particularly in the affirmative, e.g. ‘some man is an animal’, or a universal thing universally in the negative, e.g. ‘no man is a stone’, or a universal thing particularly in the negative, e.g. ‘some man is not a stone’. In propositions with the universal determination the negative must be in the determinations. Thus since the determination of a universal thing is in a universal manner, the negation in a universal way of ‘every man is just’ would be ‘no man is just’. The word ‘no’ cancels the universality of ‘every’ and not the universality of ‘man’. Again if I want to negate particularly the same statement ‘every man is just’, I would say ‘not every man is just’ thus canceling the function of universality with a particular negation. But this is not so in particulars. For if I want to negate a particular determination of a universal thing, e.g. ‘some man is just’, I would say particularly

Translation

93

‘some man is not just’. And this is so because there is a certain similarity and ambiguity between a thing being said particularly and universally if in universal propositions the negative particles are put with the predicates rather than with the determinations.122 For if against the affirmation ‘every man is just’ I oppose ‘every man is not just’ this will appear to signify two things: that on the one hand no man is just, for it proposed that every man is not just, and on the other hand that some men are not just, for it denied that every man is just. But this does not prevent some man from being unjust and another from being just; for if someone is just, that does not stop the proposition from being true that ‘every man is not just’ for not every man is just if some are just and others are unjust. And so, because there is double signification, the determination of universal negation, that is to say ‘no’, cancels out the determination of universal affirmation, that is to say ‘every’. And so in particular negations it is necessary that the negation be applied to the universality of the affirmations; e.g. in ‘every man is just’ the opposing negation is ‘not every man is just’ and not ‘every man is not just’, which prevents the ambiguity between universal and particular negation; for it has been explained that the negation ‘every man is not just’ designates both the denial of universality and the proposition of particularity. Whenever some particular is cancelled the negative particle is put with the predicate rather than with the determination, e.g. in ‘some man is just’ no one says ‘not some man is just’; for here the negation is not placed with the particular determination, ‘some’. Rather we say ‘some man is not just’ putting it with the predicate ‘just’. And so too in the case of indeterminate propositions, which are without the determination ‘every’ or ‘no’ or ‘some’, the negative particle is always placed with the predicate, e.g. ‘man is just’, and no one says ‘not man is just’ but ‘man is not just’. In individual negations too I do not say ‘not Socrates is just’ but ‘Socrates is not just’. Unless an ambiguity would sometimes prevent it the negation would always be placed with the predicate. But all things which are posited with a determination are like one of the following: they either bring together a totality in the affirmative like ‘every’, or destroy a totality in the negative like ‘no’, or bring together a part in the affirmative like ‘some’, or destroy a part in the negative like ‘some … not’, or destroy a whole in the negative in a particular way like ‘not every’. But ‘some … not’ and ‘not every’ are particular negatives. For whether someone takes a part from the whole, what remains is particular because it has departed from the perfection of the whole, or someone denies that the whole is but leaves a part, again what is left is particular. For when I say ‘some man is not just’ I have taken away the part and when I say ‘not every man is just’ when I negate ‘every’ I have pointed out someone who is not just. Thus ‘every’ and ‘some’ are the clearest determinations and subject to common intelligence. Two particular

15 20

25 30 145,1

5 10 15

20

25 30 145,1

5

94 10 15 20

25 146,1

5

10

15

20 25

30 147,1 5

Translation

negatives correspond to them: ‘some … not’ denies the particular determination, ‘not every’ denies the universal determination but both restrict the negation to the particularity as I have explained. The word ‘no’123 seems to be a special kind of word. For the phrase ‘not every’ removes ‘every’ by the negative adverb ‘not’; when we say ‘some … not’ the adverb ‘not’ added to ‘some’ separates the particular from the subject term, but ‘no’ does not show in its own form what it separates and seems to be somehow as much an affirmation as a negation; for it is neither an adverb nor a conjunction; for an adverb and a conjunction do not have inflexions, whereas ‘no’ has both gender and case endings. What then is it? Is it a name? But it can be shown that no negation is a name. We have to enquire what it is with the following investigation. It seems that ‘no’ is the equivalent of saying ‘not even one’ for when one says ‘no man is an animal’ it is the equivalent of ‘not even one man is an animal’. Now the word ullus (‘any’) is derived from the word unus (‘one’), for ullus is the diminutive of unus as if there were a word unulus. And so when someone denies even a diminutive he denies more, e.g. if someone says not only ‘he does not have any jewel’, which is greater, but even ‘not even a little jewel’, which is less. So then if someone wants to deny even one his denial will be greater if he says that there is not even the diminutive of one; so if you want to say that there is not even one man in the theatre you say not just that there isn’t one man there (non … unus), but ‘not any’ (nec ullus). Thus when we say ‘no’ (nullus) we use it as ‘not any’ (nec ullus). Thus the determination ‘no’ has the role of a negation and of a name, of a negation in that it contains ‘not even’ (nec), of a name in that it contains ‘any’ (ullus) which is the diminutive of ‘one’. So one provides the greatest negation of the smallest thing, ‘one’, if one removes its diminutive ‘any’ as well. And so the negation which when predicated removes even the diminutive of ‘one’ instantly cancels out both ‘every’ and ‘some’, e.g. ‘no man (nullus) is just’; this is the equivalent of saying ‘not any man is just’ which has the same force as saying ‘not even one man is just’. And so since we have said enough about this let us come back to Aristotle’s words in the next passage. 17b3-6 So if one states universally of a universal that it is or is not, there will be contrary statements. I mean by a universal statement of a universal, e.g. ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’. His intention is to demonstrate the opposition of contradiction. But because he has mixed up the direction and order of enquiry we are making a few preliminary observations before resuming our exposition of the text124 lest the reader be disturbed by the dark obscurity of confusion. There are four kinds of simple propositions which the Greeks call categorical and which we can call predicative. For there

Translation

95

is either a universal affirmation and negation, e.g. ‘every man is just’, ‘no man is just’, or a particular affirmation and negation, e.g. ‘some man is just’, ‘some man is not just’, or an indefinite affirmation and negation, e.g. ‘man is just’, ‘man is not just’, or affirmation and negation of an individual subject, e.g. ‘Cato is just’, ‘Cato is not just’. Truth and falsity does not hold amongst these in the same but in different ways. We will first talk about universal and particular propositions, i.e. those which are determined, and afterwards discuss the rest. Thus we should place universal affirmation – ‘every man is just’ – and contrariwise to it universal negation – ‘no man is just’, and under universal affirmation is to be placed particular affirmation – ‘some man is just’, and under universal negation is to be placed particular negation – ‘some man is not just’. This is shown in the following diagram: Every man is just No man is just Some man is just Some man is not just. The pair universal and particular affirmation are called subalternates. Universal and particular negation are also called subalternates because particularity is always included under universality. Here one has to understand that where there is a true universal affirmation the particular affirmation is also true and where there is a true universal negation the particular negation is also true. For if it is true that every man is an animal it is true that some man is an animal. And if it is true that no man is a stone it is true that some man is not a stone. But if a particular affirmation is false, e.g. ‘some man is a stone’, the universal affirmation is false that every man is a stone. The same holds in the negation; if a particular negation is false, e.g. ‘some man is not an animal’ the universal ‘no man is an animal’ is false. So the particular propositions give the lead in stating what is false as the universal do in stating what is true. Universal affirmation and negation are said to be contraries. This is because contraries have this kind of nature that they are very far apart from each other and if there is any mean between them one of them is not always in the subject, as for example with black and white; we cannot say that every body is black or white because there can be a body that is neither black nor white and each of the above [affirmations] is false because there is a colour in between. But if there is no mean, one of them must be in the subject, e.g. when we say that every body is either at rest or moves there is no mean between these and it is necessary that every body either stands still or moves. It is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. For it is not possible for the same thing to be black and white. This is clear in universal affirmations and negations. For a negative and an affirmative universal differ very greatly from each other. What the latter posits in everything, the former removes from everything and totally denies. The proposition ‘every man is just’ posits every man,

10 15

20 25

30 148,1

5 10

15

20

25

30 149,1

96 5 10

15

20

25 150,1 5

10

15 20

25 30 151,1

Translation

the proposition ‘no man is just’ allows that nothing which comes under the definition of humanity is just. So they are in this way very far apart from each other. In addition if the things which they signify have some mean between them, it is not necessary that one is true and one false, e.g. ‘every man is just’ and ‘no man is just’ since there can be some mean; e.g. it is not the case that no man is just if some man is just, nor that every man is just when some man is not. And both affirmation and negation can turn out to be false for neither is it true that every man is just nor that no man is just. Therefore it can happen that in propositions in which some mean is found a universal affirmation and a universal negation do not distribute truth and falsity between themselves but that both are false, e.g. in contraries which have some mean between them; for it can happen in these cases that both contraries are able not to be in the subject as we showed above. But in those which do not have a mean it is necessary that one is always true, the other always false, e.g. ‘every man is an animal’ and ‘no man is an animal’. These propositions are of the kind that one is true and one false because there is nothing between being an animal and not being an animal as in the case of the contraries which lack a mean. For in them it was necessary that one was in the subject. Thus a universal affirmation and a universal negation can both be false and it is also allowed that that one is true the other false; but it cannot be the case that both are true just as it is true that there cannot be contraries at the same time. And so universal affirmation and universal negation are very correctly called contraries. But a particular affirmation, e.g. ‘some man is just’, and a particular negation, e.g. ‘some man is not just’ have the opposite properties to universal and contrary propositions. For the latter could not be true at the same time, though there was often no reason to prevent them both being false at the same time. But it can happen that particular propositions are both true but not that they are both false; e.g. both ‘some man is just’ and ‘some man is not just’ are true; but it cannot be that both are false. In this they are unlike contraries. But they do seem similar to them in that just as contraries sometimes distribute truth and falsity between themselves so that one is true the other false so too with particulars one can be true the other false, e.g. ‘some man is an animal’ and ‘some man is not an animal’. But they retain a stable and unchanging pattern of similarity and contrast. For in the case of contraries, since they can both be false, in the cases where both contraries are found to be false, the subcontraries are both true, but because both contraries cannot be found to be true both subcontraries cannot be found to be false, e.g. ‘every man is just’ and ‘no man is just’; here because these are false, the particular propositions which are subsumed under them are true, i.e. ‘some man is just’ and ‘some man is not just’. But if the universal propositions distribute truth and falsity between them and one is true the other false, the

Translation

97

particular propositions will do the same, e.g. in the case of ‘every man is an animal’ and ‘no man is an animal’ the universal affirmation is true, the negation false. But when I say ‘some man is an animal’ and ‘some man is not an animal’ the particular affirmation is true, the particular negation false. And so these are called subcontraries, either because they are placed under (sub) the contraries or because they themselves have, as already pointed out, characteristics opposite to those of their superiors under which they are set. And so in this rectilinear opposition of contraries and subcontraries there can be falsity but never truth in both superiors whereas in both inferiors there can be truth but never falsity. But if you look at the diagonal oppositions and oppose a universal affirmation to a particular negation and a universal negation to a particular affirmation, one will always be found true the other false and it can never be the case that when the universal affirmation is true the particular negation is not false or when the latter is true that falsity does not immediately attach to the former. In turn if the universal negation is true the particular affirmation is false and if the particular affirmation is true the universal negation is false. You can check this in the diagram below and you will see the same thing also in any other terms which you might care to examine. For in the case of ‘every man is just’ because this is false it is true that ‘some man is not just’ and with ‘no man is just’, when the negation is false, the affirmation ‘some man is just’ is true. The univer-

Note: some man is not just = not every man is just cf.167,2f.

5

10

15

20

25 30 152,1

98

5

10

153,1

5 10

15 20

25 30 154,1 5

10

15

Translation

sal affirmation and particular negation which are diagonal and the universal negation and particular affirmation which are likewise diagonal are called contradictories. And this is the contradiction about which he is enquiring, that one is always true the other always false. We have appended a comprehensive diagram to the discussion above. Something conceived in thought and in the mind is the more firmly implanted in the memory when it is presented visually. With these relationships now established let us look at indefinite propositions and individual propositions. But first of all we must deal with indefinite propositions. Indefinite propositions do not distribute truth and falsity between themselves. For when I say ‘man is just’ and ‘man is not just’ both indefinites can be true. This is why we distinguish them from a contradiction; for a contradiction is formed, as we have often explained, by the fact that both can never be found to be true or false but one is always capable of truth the other of falsity. But propositions which express an indefinite universal have the function of definite particulars. An example is ‘man is just’ which is the equivalent of ‘some man is just’ or another is ‘man is not just’ which is the equivalent of ‘some man is not just’. This is proved by the fact that just as definite and particular propositions can in some cases be true and in others they distribute falsity and truth, but it never happens that both are false, so too in indefinite propositions signifying a universal both can be true at the same time, e.g. ‘man is just’ and ‘man is not just’, and it is impossible to make both false though we very easily find one of them to be true the other false, that is to say, in the case of terms which by nature and of necessity inhere or cannot inhere in subject substances. For example because animal is necessarily in man, if someone says ‘man is an animal’ and the denial is made ‘man is not an animal’ or ‘man is a stone’ and ‘man is not a stone’ if one is true the other is automatically false. And so these produce a contradiction to universal propositions predicated universally; for if ‘man is not just’ is formed in opposition to ‘every man is just’, one is always true the other false; and if the indefinite proposition ‘man is just’ is opposed to ‘no man is just’ the propositions distribute truth and falsity between themselves, just as also definite propositions of universals predicated particularly and their opposite universal quantities produce contradictory opposites. And so it is agreed that propositions which express a universal not universally and are indefinite, expressing neither a universal nor a particular, do not always distribute truth and falsity between them but are similar to particular definite propositions. But individual [propositions] have only one type of opposition between them: if you state these with respect to the same subject, the same predicate, the same part, the same time, the same relation and in the same way, they distribute truth and falsity between them, e.g. ‘Socrates is just’ and ‘Socrates is not just’.

Translation

99

There are then two forms of contradiction: (1) between universals diagonally opposed to particulars, (2) between individual opposed propositions taking into account all the determinations discussed in On Sophistical Refutations. Then because we have shown how propositions relate to each other and how they form contradictory opposites, let us now return to Aristotle’s words which will be very easy to understand when we have taken in these preliminaries. So if one states universally of a universal that it is or is not, there will be contrary statements. I mean by a universal statement of a universal, e.g. ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’. He sets down fully the thought of the diagram above. For he says: when a universal thing is designated universally and someone affirms it universally, if another denies the same thing universally, then the two propositions, when put side by side, are contraries. And he shows his own view of the matter clearly when he says: I mean by a universal statement of a universal, e.g. ‘every man is white’. For since ‘man’ is a universal, such a statement of the universal man is universal in which ‘every man’ is contained. So a universal thing, ‘man’, is predicated universally by ‘every’ which is its determination and in the affirmative. Negatively it is universally expressed ‘no man is white’ for ‘no’ is the universality which is added to the universality, ‘man’. Then when affirmations and negations make a statement of a universal universally in this way they are contraries, just as he testifies and we have discussed in our foregoing exposition. 17b7-12 But when one states of a universal not universally, the statements are not contrary though what is signified may be contraries. I mean by stating of a universal not universally such statements as ‘man is white’ and ‘ man is not white’. For though ‘man’ is a universal the statement is not treated universally for ‘every’ signifies in addition not that a thing is universal but that it is treated universally. If someone wanted to show what an indefinite proposition is not only should universal determination have been removed from the universal term but also particular determination, and it ought to have been expressed as follows: but when one states of a universal not universally, and not particularly, the statements are not contrary. But now because he has not added ‘particularly’ he appears to be speaking not about indefinite propositions in which there is neither universality nor particularity but only about particular propositions, from which he has removed only the universal but not the particular. But he has himself made clear to us with apt examples what he wants to show us. For he has not given us examples of a particular proposition but of an indefinite one; for he says I mean by stating of a universal not universally such statements as ‘man is white’ and ‘man is not white’.

20

25 30 155,1 5

10

15

20

25

30 155,1

5

100 10

15

20 25

157,1 5

10

15

20 25

30 158,1

Translation

But if he had wanted to show a particular proposition, he would say ‘e.g. “some man is white” and “some man is not white”’. But since he has indicated with an example what he wanted, we ought to consider the phrase ‘or particularly’ to be missing from his first proposition but when one states of a universal not universally so as to remove both particularity and universality from the whole expression, as afterwards the examples showed that he was not speaking about the particular but about the indefinite proposition. And so his meaning is as follows: but if propositions are neither universal nor particular (the latter has to be understood) they are not contraries; for contrary propositions are ones which propose a universal term universally whereas indefinite propositions do not apply a universal determination125 to a universal term. And he removed only universality and not particularity from indefinite propositions because he was distinguishing indefinite propositions only from contraries and not from particulars as well. What I mean is that if he wanted to show indefinite propositions in their own right he would have said they are neither particular nor universal. Propositions that are stated of a universal neither universally nor particularly, i.e. which are neither universal nor particular, are indefinite. For those that are neither universal nor particular are neither contraries nor subcontraries. They are not subcontraries because they do not have added to them a particular determination and they are not contraries because there is no universal determination in them. But in fact since he only wanted to show that they are not contraries and wanted for the present to omit discussion of subcontraries, he said that propositions are indefinite which have a universal not determined universally so that we understand that they are not contraries. But he did not add that they do not have particularity because he wanted to distinguish indefinite propositions only from contraries and not from subcontraries. Therefore if he had wanted to distinguish indefinite propositions from contraries and subcontraries he would say ‘but when one states of a universal not universally and not particularly, the statements are not contraries nor are they subcontraries.’ But since he did not want to prove now that they are not subcontraries but only that they are not contraries he did not add ‘or particularly’ to but when one states of a universal not universally. If he had added this he would be extending it to include subcontraries about which he has not given any further information. And so he said the following: propositions which are indefinite are not contraries because they do not possess universality. But although they are not in themselves contraries some can, nevertheless, signify contraries. What this means is set out in many ways in the treatment of the commentators. Herminus says that indefinite propositions can sometimes signify contraries though they lack contrariety themselves, because they are said of universal

Translation

101

things yet do not have a universal added, but only in those cases where what is affirmed or denied is naturally in the subject, e.g. when we say that ‘man is rational’, ‘man is not rational’; because rationality is something which is in the nature of man, affirmation and negation distribute truth and falsity between themselves and contraries of some kind are somehow designated by them. But this has no relevance to the signifying of contraries in indefinite propositions. For particulars themselves too in similar cases distribute truth and falsity, e.g. ‘some man is rational’, ‘some man is not rational’. We see then that these, too, according to Herminus can signify contraries.126 Why then did he not127 say in the case of indefinite propositions also that there cannot be contraries ‘though what is signified may be contraries’? Alexander says that because they are indefinite there is nothing to prevent us reducing the ones that seem to be contraries to universals as much as to particulars, e.g. because the propositions ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is not an animal’ are indefinite they can be understood also as quasi-contraries, for the proposition ‘man is an animal’ can be taken to mean ‘every man is an animal’ and equally ‘man is not an animal’ can be understood to be the equivalent of ‘no man is an animal’. But with the propositions ‘man walks’ and ‘man does not walk’ the listener’s mind is not led to contraries but to subcontraries. Indefinite propositions can then sometimes signify contraries because the very fact that they are indefinite in no way prevents them being brought to signify contraries and universals. And this interpretation has some point but does not fully explain what Aristotle actually said. And Alexander purposely rejected the better explanation which Porphyry later approved. According to this there are certain negations which retain within them the contrary of the very affirmation which they deny, e.g. in ‘he is well’ and ‘he is not well’ ‘he is not well’ signifies that ‘he is ill’ which is the contrary of ‘to be well’. Again if we negate ‘man is white’ with ‘man is not white’ it could signify that ‘man is black’ (for whoever is black is not white), but ‘to be black’ and ‘to be white’ are contrary. Therefore certain negations and affirmations signify contraries though this is not always the case. For no contrary is found in ‘man walks’ and ‘man does not walk’ for there is no contrary to walking. And so he says that these are not contraries since they are universals stated not universally but that they can sometimes signify contraries when the contrary of an affirmation is included in the negation. Aspasius accepted both this interpretation and that of Alexander, but we say that Alexander’s interpretation is not unreasonable but that this one is better. For Alexander has not explained the wording: But when one states of a universal not universally, the statements are not contrary though what is signified may be contraries; but has only said when propositions can in fact be contraries, whereas Porphyry has ex-

5

10

15

20

25 159,1 5

10 15

20

25 160,1 5

102

10

15

20

25 30 161,1 5

10

15

20

25 162,1 5

Translation

plained carefully when what is signified can be contrary, which is what the text of Aristotle actually said. Although Alexander also saw the same explanation as Porphyry accepted he purposely rejected it, as I have said, and confirmed that he did not like the idea contained in this explanation. I think that either both interpretations should be accepted or Porphyry’s judged to be the better; for a little later Aristotle, too, himself demonstrates this where he says for it is true to say at the same time that ‘man is white’ and that ‘man is not white’ or that ‘man is noble’ and ‘man is not noble’; for if he is base he is not noble and if something is becoming it is not.128 We will demonstrate the interpretation of this passage when we come to it. We must understand and commit to memory that whenever universal propositions are predicated universally, if one is affirmative, the other negative, both are always contraries, so long as no equivocation or time or of any of the other things we set out above prevents the forming of a contrary opposition. However not all propositions which are contrary state universals universally or are one affirmative, the other negative, e.g. ‘Socrates is well’ and ‘Socrates is ill’; for in this case neither is a universal predicated of a universal nor is one an affirmation the other a negation and yet they are contrary propositions because what they signify are contraries. And so it has very correctly been said that propositions that state things universally of universals, would, when one of them is affirmative, the other negative, automatically be contraries by nature; but what is going to be a contrary does not have to be a proposition stating universally of a universal or one affirmative, the other negative, but sometimes those propositions can be contrary which do not signify a universal universally, but this is the case only with those that are naturally present in the subject about which the affirmation is made, e.g. man and animal. ‘Man is an animal’ 129 seem to be contraries because ‘animal’ is in the nature of man and one proposition affirms this and the other denies it, even though in this example no particular or universal determination is added. * * *130 17b12-16 Where there is a universal predication it is not true to predicate the universal universally; for there can be no affirmation where a universal is predicated of a universal predicate, e.g. ‘every man is every animal’. This is what he means: every simple proposition consists of two terms. To these is often added the determination of either universality or particularity. But Aristotle explains to which part these determinations are added, for he thinks that a determination ought not to be added to the predicate term; for in the proposition ‘man is an animal’ the question is put whether the subject ought to be stated with a determination, i.e. ‘every man is an animal’ or the predicate,

Translation

103

i.e. ‘man is every animal’ or both, i.e. ‘every man is every animal’. But neither of the last two ought to occur; for a determination is never joined to the predicate but only to the subject. For it is not true to say that ‘every animal is every man’ because every predication is either more than or equal to the subject (in ‘every man is an animal’ animal is more than man and in ‘man is capable of laughing’ capable of laughing is equal to man), but it is impossible for the predicate to be less and narrower than the subject. And so where predicates are greater than the subject, e.g. ‘animal’ there is clearly a false proposition if a universal determination is applied to the predicate term. For if we say ‘man is every animal’ with this determination we have contracted animal, which is greater than man, down to the subject man although the name ‘animal’ can apply not only to man but to other things. The same thing happens where there is equality; for if I say ‘every man is every thing capable of laughing’, firstly it is superfluous to add the determination if I am referring to humanity itself, but if I am referring to some individual men the proposition is false; for when I say ‘every man is every thing capable of laughing’, I appear to signify that individual men are the entirety of what is capable of laughing, which cannot be the case. Then a determination must be put with the subject and not with the predicate. Aristotle’s words are as follows and express this idea: it is not correct in the case of universal predicates to add something universal to them so that the universal predicate is predicated universally; for this is what he says Where there is a universal predication which means that which has a universal predication – it is not true to predicate this very universal universally. For in the case of a universal predicate, i.e. that which is universal and is predicated, it is not true to predicate universally this very predicate which is universal by adding to it the determination of universality. For it is impossible for there to be an affirmation in which a universal determination is predicated of a universal predicate. He reveals the sense of this in his example ‘e.g. every man is every animal’. We have already said above how unsuitable this is. 17b16-26 I mean that an affirmation is opposed to a negation in a contradictory way where one signifies the same universal the other signifies not universally, e.g. ‘every man is white’ and ‘not every man is white’, ‘no man is white’ and ‘some man is white’; but a universal affirmation and a universal negation are opposed in a contrary way, e.g. ‘every man is just’ and ‘no man is just’. These cannot be true at the same time, but their opposites can occur at the same time, e.g. ‘not every man is white’ and ‘some man is white’. He shows in these words what a perfect contradiction is. He says that

10

15 20

25

30 163,1

5

10

15

20

25 164,1

104 5 10

15

20

25

165,1 5

10 15

20

25 30 166,1 5

Translation

a contradictory opposite is any proposition which states a universal thing not universally as opposed to one which proposes a universal thing universally. And this is what he means by I mean that an affirmation is opposed to a negation in a contradictory way where one signifies the same universal the other signifies not universally as, for example, when a proposition signifying a universal not universally, e.g. ‘some man is not just’, is opposed to the proposition ‘every man is just’; for he means universal man not universally when he says ‘not every man is just’.131 This is a contradictory opposition when where there is a universal affirmation there is a particular negation and when there is a universal negation there is a particular affirmation. For the diagonals alone, as I have said, form contradictions. His wording is unclear but the meaning is obvious. He says that an affirmation opposes a negation and a negation an affirmation in a contradictory way whenever the universal which one thing signifies universally the other signifies not universally as in the examples above. Thus ‘every man is just’ signified a universal thing universally whereas ‘not every man is just’ when opposed to the same affirmation made a denial of the universal man not universally in saying ‘not every man is just’. Again ‘no man is just’ denied a universal thing universally by saying ‘no’ whereas ‘some man is just’ affirmed a universal thing particularly and not universally. For it proposed that some man is just but stated man as a universal thing not universally. Aristotle follows then all the proper characteristics of propositions when he says but a universal affirmation and a universal negation are opposed in a contrary way. For just as he said above that propositions that signify a universal universally either in affirmation or negation are contraries so now too he repeats it when he says that a universal affirmation and a universal negation are contraries. And he gives as examples of propositions which both demonstrate universals ‘every man is just’ and ‘no man is just’. He has set out what is the characteristic of these where he says that it is impossible for propositions of this kind to be both truly consistent with each other, but those opposite to them can be both true. The opposites of these are both particular, for a particular negation is opposed to a universal affirmation and a particular affirmation to a universal negation. And so these two, a particular affirmation and a particular negation, which are opposed to a universal affirmation and negation diagonally, can sometimes be true even at the same time, e.g. ‘some man is just’ and ‘some man is not just’.132 But ‘some man is just’ is opposed to ‘no man is just’ whereas ‘some man is not just’ is opposed to ‘every man is just’. But ‘some man is just’ and ‘some man is not just’ are both consistent with each other. This is what he means by but their opposites can occur at the same time and he illustrates with the examples ‘not every man is white’ and ‘some man is white’. We need to apply skill when faced with two propositions, a universal affirma-

Translation

105

tion and a universal negation, of finding out what exactly are their opposites. I mean by opposites contradictories and not contraries or any other mode. Take the affirmation ‘every man is just’ and the negation ‘no man is just’. The following negations appear to be opposed to the affirmation ‘every man is just’: (1) ‘no man is just’, (2) ‘some man is not just’, (3) ‘not every man is just’, and lastly (4) the indefinite proposition ‘man is not just’. Which of these is formed in a contradictory way to ‘every man is just’? By contradictory I mean an opposition in which the affirmation and the negation are neither both true nor both false, but one is always true the other false. If you oppose ‘no man is just’ to ‘every man is just’, a universal negation, there is no opposition, for both are false. But if you oppose the indefinite ‘man is not just’ that too does not form an opposite. For because it is indefinite it can sometimes be taken as a universal negation according to the expectation of the listener. Therefore neither does this make an opposition. For if it is heard in such a way as to be taken as a contrary it happens that they are both found false. It remains then that the contradictory is either ‘not every man is just’ or ‘some man is not just’. But these are consistent with each other, for you propose the same thing when you say ‘some man is not just’ and ‘not every man is just’. For if some man is not just, not every man is just and if not every man is just some man is not just. Therefore both particular negations are opposed in a contradictory way to the universal affirmation, for neither are both of these true nor both false but one is true and the other false. Let us now take the universal negation ‘no man is just’. These appear to be the opposite affirmations: (1) ‘every man is just’, (2) ‘man is just’, (3) ‘some man is just’. But if you oppose ‘every man is just’ to ‘no man is just’, they can both be false. Therefore they are not opposed in a contradictory way. But also ‘man is just’ because it is indefinite can in some circumstances be understood to say the same as ‘every man is just’. But if this is so it could sometimes be false along with the negation ‘no man is just’. Therefore it is not an opposite. It remains then that ‘some man is just’ appears to be the contradictory opposite of ‘no man is just’. And so contradictory propositions must be sought diagonally so that against a universal affirmation is to be ranged that which is placed beneath universal negation, against universal negation is to be set what is placed beneath universal affirmation.133 This is of course what Aristotle means to demonstrate when he says: 17b26-29 Then of any contradictions of universals universally, one must be true or false. The same is the case with singulars, e.g. ‘Socrates is white’ and ‘Socrates is not white’. In those propositions that are contradictories of the universals predi-

10

15 20 25

167,1 5 10 15

20

25

30 168,1 5

106

10

15

20

25

169,1

5

10 15

20

25 170,1 5

Translation

cated universally, truth and falsity is always distinguished. Particular negation is the contradictory of universal affirmation, and particular affirmation of universal negation. And so in these one is always true, the other always false. This is what he means by then of any contradictions said of universals universally; and here a distinction has to be made so that it is understood as follows: of any possible contradictions of universal propositions proposed universally, one must be true and the other false. And in these there is firstly a distinction of truth and falsity which are opposed to each other in quality and quantity: in quality because one is a negation, the other an affirmation; in quantity, because one is universal, the other particular. But truth and falsity are distinguished in a second way in singular contraries, if there are no obscurities in the propositions, e.g. in ‘Socrates is white’ and ‘Socrates is not white’. For one is true, the other false, if as we have said no ambiguity caused by equivocation prevents it. 17b29-37 But if they are about a universal not universally it is not always the case that one is true the other false; for it is true to say at the same time that ‘man is white’ and that ‘man is not white’ or that ‘man is noble’ and ‘man is not noble’; for if he is base he is not noble and if something is becoming it is not. But this will seem odd at first sight because ‘man is not white’ seems to signify at the same time ‘no134 man is white’. But this does not signify the same nor is it necessarily at the same time. He is attempting to show that propositions which are said of universals not universally are not always true or false. He shows this with contraries; for the proposition ‘man is white’ and its negation ‘man is not white’ are shown in the following way sometimes not capable of distinguishing truth and falsity between them: if it is true that the two affirmations ‘man is white’, and ‘man is black’ are both true at the same time, it is also true that an indefinite affirmation and an indefinite negation are sometimes both found to be true; for it is true that man is white and also true that man is black (for though a Gaul is fair-skinned, an Ethiopian is very black), it is therefore true to say at the same time that ‘man is white’ and ‘man is black’. But the man who is black is not white. Therefore it is true to say at the same time that man is white and that man is not white. The same is also the case with noble and base; for if it is true to say that man is noble, when someone says this about a philosopher, and if it is true to say that man is base when someone says this of Sulla, each is true, both that man is noble and that man is base. But he who is base is not noble; therefore it is true to say at the same time that man is noble and man is not noble. But he will seem perhaps to have said something self-contradic-

Translation

107

tory and the proof moves with some difficulty when it uses examples of the kind that look like contraries. For white and black, noble and base are contraries and there might be some doubt whether these contraries could be found at one time in some cases. But he adds another example, which though it is not a contrary, nevertheless produces a negation as with the contraries too, e.g. if someone says ‘man is noble’ and another says ‘man is becoming noble’ (e.g. if some mental discipline shines out either because of someone’s teaching or through self-correction), to be noble and to become noble have nothing contrary; for it is not a contrary in the way a man being noble and being base is. Then if there is no contrariety there is no doubt that they can be at the same time. But what is becoming is not when it is still becoming; therefore he who is becoming noble is not yet noble. But it is true to say ‘man becomes noble’ along with ‘man is noble’; but whoever becomes a noble man is not a noble man; therefore it is true to say at the same time that man is noble and man is not noble, although the examples cited involving contraries are not invalid. For nothing prevents contraries from being in different subjects at the same time. Therefore it is agreed that indefinite propositions, judging by the examples he proposed above, sometimes seem to be true at the same time and do not always distinguish truth and falsity between them. The sentence but this will seem odd at first sight because ‘man is not white’ seems to signify at the same time ‘no man is white’ has the following meaning: he said that the affirmative proposition ‘man is white’ can be true along with the proposition ‘man is not white’. Now he makes the observation that this sometimes seems odd and that it is incongruous to say that ‘man is white’ and ‘man is not white’ can be true at the same time, because the proposition ‘man is not white’ gives out some kind of impression (imaginatio) that it signifies that no man is white; for a negation of the kind ‘man is not white’ seems to signify at the same time that ‘no man is white’, so that if someone says ‘man is not white’ you must think he has said ‘no man is white’. But this, i.e. ‘man is not white’ and ‘no man is white’ does not signify the same nor are they always at the same time. For whoever says ‘no man is white’, in determining the universal has made a negative proposition about a universal, whereas whoever says ‘man is not white’ denies nothing about the universal as a whole but it is just sufficient for him to have made a denial about the particular. And the proposition ‘no man is white’ is false if one man was white, whereas the proposition ‘man is not white’ is true even if only one man was not white. And so they do not signify the same. But I mean that whenever ‘man is not white’ is said it does not automatically signify that ‘no man is white’. For when I say ‘no man is white’ this signifies the same as ‘man is not white’ (for the universal contains within itself the indefinite), but when we say ‘man is not white’ it does not at all

10

15

20

25

30

171,1 5

10 15

20

25 30 172,1

108

5

10

15 20

25

30 173,1 5 10

15

20

Translation

signify that ‘no man is white’ for the indefinite [proposition] does not contain the universal within itself. For above135 we showed that indefinite propositions possess the function of particulars. Therefore if when there is a universal negation there is an indefinite negation, but when there is an indefinite negation there is no universal negation at all, there is no conversion as to imply there is. Therefore they are not at the same time. For propositions which are not convertible do not hold at the same time, as the Categories has taught us.136 Therefore the negations ‘man is not white’ and ‘no man is white’ do not signify the same and do not hold at the same time because they are not convertible as to the implication of existence. Syrianus, however, tries to show that an indefinite negation has the function of a definite negation. He tries to prove this with many arguments in spite of Aristotle’s loud protests. And if this were not enough he attempts to prove with both Platonic and Aristotelian ideas that a proposition like ‘man is not just’ is similar to ‘no man is just’. But we hold to the authority of Aristotle and approve of what is truthfully said by him. For with regard to Syrianus’ claim that an indefinite affirmation has the function of a particular affirmation and an indefinite negation of a universal negation we have already shown above and have explained most carefully in book one of our work On Categorical Syllogisms how wrong he is and how correct it is to say that both kinds are to be counted as particular propositions. And now Aristotle himself is our witness and Syrianus is refuted with the very simple argument that in the Analytics, too, he says that a syllogism cannot be made up of two indefinite propositions, since a particular negative combination can be formed from an affirmative particular and a negative universal. But if indefinite affirmations and negations had the function of universal negations and particular affirmations, Aristotle would never say that these propositions do not form a syllogism. But it is more likely that, because no syllogism is formed from two particulars in any combination of propositions he said that nothing can be formed from indefinite propositions, because he thought that indefinite propositions have the function of particulars. Then Syrianus’ arguments are refuted in a number of ways. But let us turn the course of our explication to what follows. 17b37-18a7 It is clear that a single137 negation belongs to a single affirmation. For the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirmed and about the same thing, whether it is about some individual or some universal, whether it is said universally or not universally. I mean e.g. ‘Socrates is white’ and ‘Socrates is not white’. But if a different thing is said of something or the same thing about a different thing it will not be opposite but different from that. ‘Not every man is white’

Translation

109

is the opposite of ‘every man is white’ and ‘no man is white’ is the opposite of ‘some’ man is white’ and ‘man is not white’ is the opposite of ‘man is white’. From this passage, too, it appears that an indefinite affirmation and an indefinite negation are not always one true and one false. And hence we learn that an indefinite negation cannot have the same function as a universal negation, and a universal and an indefinite negation are different. For if a single negation is apparently opposed to each affirmation and since the affirmation ‘man is white’ is different from ‘some man is white’, they will have different statements in their negations. An indefinite affirmation will have an indefinite negation, e.g. ‘man is not white’ is the opposite of ‘man is white’ and ‘some man is white’ will have as its opposite negation ‘no man is white’. Then if a particular definite affirmation and an indefinite affirmation are in themselves different from each other it is true that they have also different negations as their opposite contradictories. And so ‘no man is just’ is different from ‘man is not just’. And this is what Aristotle now expounds; for he says that a single negation can always be formed in opposition to a single affirmation. And he tries to show the reason, that every negation has the same terms in its statement but differs in the manner of stating them. For the negation takes away the same thing which the affirmation posits and what the affirmation joins as predicate to the subject the negation divides and separates. Then if the same predicate and subject as the affirmation had posited before is in the negation, there is no doubt that a single negation seems to belong to a single affirmation. For if they are to be two, one of them must change either the subject or the predicate; but ones of this kind are not opposites. This is what he means by but if a different thing is said of something or the same thing about a different thing it will not be opposite but different from that; the sense is: if a negation denies by predicating of something a thing different from what was in the affirmation (e.g. if the affirmation is ‘man is white’, and the negation were to say ‘man is not just’, it predicated in the negation something other than what had been established in the affirmation) or if it predicated the same thing as was in the affirmation but of a different subject than in the affirmation (e.g. if the affirmation is ‘man is just’, and the negation gives the reply ‘lion is not just’, the same thing has been predicated but the subjects are different); if then a proposition predicates in its statement some other thing or predicates the same thing about another subject than the affirmation had previously posited, that affirmation and negation will not be opposites, but only different from each other; for they do not cancel each other out either. He added the following examples which would also be an argument that a single affirmation can have only one negation whether in the case of individuals as in his own

25

174,1 5 10

15 20

25

30 175,1

5

10

15

110 20

25

30 176,1

5

Translation

example Socrates is white, Socrates is not white or in the case of universals predicated universally. Particular propositions are constituted in contradictory opposition with universals predicated universally, e.g. every man is white in a universal affirmative taken universally and not every man is white in a universal negative taken particularly. The negative proposition no man is white with a universal taken universally is the opposite of the affirmative universal taken particularly some man is white; the negative universal taken not universally man is not white is the opposite of the universal affirmative taken not universally man is white so that the words whether it is about some individual refer to the examples Socrates is white, Socrates is not white and the following words or some universal, whether it is said universally seems to have been said with respect to the examples every man is white, not every man is white, some man is white, no man is white and the addition of not universally of course of universals would refer to the examples man is white, man is not white. [18a8-12 And so that a single affirmation is opposed to a single negation in a contradictory manner and what these propositions are has already been said, and that contraries are different and what these are and that not every contradiction is true or false, why this is and when they are true or false.]138

10

15

20

25 177,1 5

10

He then repeats everything very briefly when he says that he has already said that a single affirmation is opposed to a single negation and this not in any way whatsoever but in a contradictory manner in which truth and falsity are distinguished. He recalls too that he had said which were the propositions which he called contradictory. He said that they are the diagonals, the affirmative universal and the negative particular, the affirmative particular and the negative universal. I also maintained, he says, that contraries are different. For contraries are not the same as contradictories. A universal affirmation and a universal negation are contraries of each other. I also explained, he says, that not every contradiction is true or false. He did not now mean contradiction in the proper sense but generally those which are opposites, either in a contrary or subcontrary mode. For these do not always distinguish true and false between them so that one is always true, the other false. For it can happen that contraries are both found to be false, subcontraries both true. But he continues with proper contradictions and recalls that he had already explained both why and when one is true or false. For universal affirmation is opposed to particular negation by the force of contradiction because in every case they differ from each other in quality and quantity; this one an affirmation, that a negation, this a universal, or that a particular. And so then they can neither both be found false nor both

Translation

111

found true. But whenever that is the case it is agreed that one is true and the other false. And this is what he means with the words why this is and when they are true or false where he recalls of course that it had been said why there is opposition and when one is always true, the other false: it is then when they are formed diagonally because the propositions are different from each other in quantity and quality. But we must add when opposites that are contrary or subcontrary are either both false at the same time or both true at the same time or one is found to be true, the other false. For in contraries if the predicates are not natural, e.g. whiteness because it is not natural to man, both of those which predicate whiteness are false; for ‘every man is white’ and ‘no man is white’ are both false. But when both are false their subcontraries are true, ‘some man is white’, ‘some man is not white’. But if something natural is predicated in contraries, the affirmation is true and the negation false; so because it is natural for a man to be an animal, the affirmation ‘every man is an animal’ is true and the negation ‘no man is an animal’ is false. In the same way in subcontraries the affirmation is true, the negation false. But if something impossible is predicated the affirmation is false and the negation true; so since it is impossible that a man is a stone, if we say ‘every man is a stone’ it is false, whereas ‘no man is a stone’ is true. The subcontrary by its nature also has the same function, for in this case too the affirmation is false, the negation true.

15

20

25 30 178,1

5

Chapter 8 18a12-17 A single affirmation and negation is one which signifies one thing about one thing, either when it is a universal universally or not in the same way, e.g. ‘every man is white’, ‘not every man is white’ or ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’ or ‘no man is white’, ‘some man is white’, if ‘white’ signifies one thing. He now shows us himself more clearly what we have carefully explained above. For we said that a single proposition is one which signifies any single thing and not more than one in such a way that it does not have an equivocal subject or an equivocal predicate; for this is how a proposition is single. He now says that a single proposition is one which signifies one thing, i.e. which has neither a subject or predicate that is equivocal. Whether it is a universal affirmation, a universal negation, a particular affirmation, a particular negation or both are indefinite or are placed diagonally opposite each other, a proposition is single if it signifies one thing in affirmation or negation. But the enquiry here is how a universal affirmation can signify one thing, when the universal itself is predicated not of one but of several. For when I say ‘every man is white’, by signifying individual men who are plural I signify many things in my predication of the

10 15

20

25

179,1

112 5

10

15

20

25

180,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

affirmation. And so there will be no universal affirmation or negation which can signify one thing because the universal itself is predicated of many individuals as we have said. But we reply to this that when something universal is said the arrangement of the entire proposition is drawn to a unified collection as it were and it is applied not to the particular in it but to the universal which is a single quality, e.g. when we say ‘every man is just’ we do not then understand the individual men but whatever is said about man is drawn to a single humanity. Therefore whether it is a universal affirmation, a universal negation or is about individuals these can be single if they are held together by a single signification. And this is what he means when he says that the propositions which he cited above, ‘every man is white’, ‘not every man is white’ or ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’ or ‘no man is white’, ‘some man is white’, seem to be single if ‘white’ signifies one thing. For if white which is predicated signified many things or if man which is the subject were not one, it is not a single affirmation or a single negation. He shows this more clearly in the following: 18a18-21 But if one name is given to two things which do not form one thing, there is not a single affirmation, e.g. if someone gives the name cloak to a man and to a horse, ‘a cloak is white’ would not be a single affirmation nor a single negation. The meaning of this is that if one thing signifies several things and from these many one thing can be made, the affirmation in which that name is predicated or made the subject does not signify many things, e.g. ‘man’. The word ‘man’ signifies ‘animal’, ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ but from these many significations a unity can be made, a mortal rational animal. Therefore although ‘man’ is plural in signification, yet because when joined together they come into one body as it were and make some single thing when joined to each other and since it has been described just as though one single thing came to be from the plurality it signified, it is clear that this name signifies a single thing, namely that which all those things joined made. And this is what he means when he says but if one name is given to two things which do not form one thing there is not a single affirmation. For if any word signifies many things such as cannot when joined form a single body and what is signified by that one single name cannot unite in one kind of substance, it is not a single affirmation. What kind of name it is which when posited does not make a single affirmation because it signifies several things from which a single thing cannot come into being, he showed with a very clever example when he said:

Translation

113

18a19-23 e.g. if someone gives the name cloak to a man and to a horse, ‘a cloak is white’ would not be a single affirmation nor a single negation. For this does not differ from saying that ‘a horse and a man is white’ and this is no different from ‘a horse is white and a man is white’. If someone gives the name cloak to a man and a horse, he says, and this name is put in a proposition, that proposition is not single but multiple. For if a man and a horse are for example called a cloak so that when someone says ‘cloak’ he designates either a horse or a man, if the proposition is made: ‘a cloak is white’, it is not a single affirmation. For ‘a cloak is white’ is the same as saying ‘a man and a horse is white’. For ‘cloak’ signified horse and man. ‘A man and a horse is white’ is no different from saying ‘a horse is white, a man is white’. But these are two propositions and not similar, for the subjects in them are different. Therefore if these are two affirmations, the affirmation ‘a man and a horse is white’ is also a double affirmation. But if this is a double affirmation, then because it has been proposed that ‘cloak’ signifies ‘horse’ and ‘man’, when we say ‘a cloak is white’ it signifies not one thing but more than one. Therefore if an affirmation that designates many things is not single, the affirmation too will not be single of which either the predicate or the subject is equivocal. And this is what he means by the words: 18a23-6 If then these signify many things and are more than one, it is clear that the first signifies either many things or nothing, for no man is a horse. But if, he says, ‘a horse is white and a man is white’ signify many things then also the first proposition, ‘a cloak is white’, from which these flowed, designates many things. Or if someone says that it does not signify many things he is conceding that the proposition has no signification whatsoever. For a single name signifying many things could come together to form a single signification as often as from the things which it signifies a single substance could be joined and formed as in my former example when ‘man’ signifies ‘animal’, ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ which when joined can converge into a single thing. But in this case if ‘cloak’ signifies ‘man’ and ‘horse’ it designates a number of things but these things do not themselves form a unified body, for it is impossible that any man is a horse. Therefore either it signifies a number of things, which is true, or if anyone maintains that it does not signify a number of things but some joint thing made from the things it signifies, then because there is not anything made up from a horse and a man it signifies nothing at all. This is what he means by ‘for no man is a horse’ and this has to be

181,1 5

10

15

20 25

30 182,1 5

10

15

20

114

25 183,1

5

10

15 20

25 184,1

Translation

read as one and not pronounced separately, ‘man’ and then ‘horse’ but ‘man horse’ so that it is apparent that nothing can be made up from these when they are joined. The following sentence shows why he said this. If an opposite is to be formed so that opposite the affirmation is to be placed a negation of the kind which in its opposition distinguishes true and false, so that one proposition is true the other false, the affirmation must be single and the negation single, which occurs when neither the subject nor the predicate signifies a number of things. But if it signifies more than one thing and is equivocal, in propositions of this kind there cannot be one proposition which is always true and another which is false. But Herminus thought that with the words but if one name is given to two things which do not form one thing, there is not a single affirmation139 Aristotle meant a proposition like ‘man is capable of walking’140 because what we describe as ‘capable of walking’ could be shown to be a biped, a quadruped and an animal with more than four feet. From these, he says, can be formed a single thing, ‘having feet’. That kind of affirmation, he says, does not signify a number of things. But this does not follow Aristotle’s thought at all. For a single thing is not formed from these nor do ‘four-footed’, ‘two-footed’ and ‘many-footed’ make up having feet, for this is the number of feet and not the existence of feet. Therefore we must disregard Herminus. Aspasius, Porphyry and Alexander in the commentaries which they published on this book agreed with the interpretation which I expounded above. But we must have a look at this, using some well-known example and name, in case Aristotle’s example keeps us any longer in the dark. When we say ‘Ajax committed suicide’ it points to both Ajax the son of Telamon and Ajax the son of Oileus. And one single thing cannot be formed from these two, for no combination can be made of two individuals. Then this kind of proposition signifies a number of things. But this is enough. Chapter 9

5 10

15

He now makes clear that what he had said above about propositions referred to their truth and falsity not in every time but only in the present and past. In future propositions one does not make the same kind of judgement as in propositions in the past and present because truth and falsity is found in propositions when [truth and falsity] has occurred or when it is definite. For example when I say ‘Brutus was the first to introduce the consulship in the time of king Tarquin’ and another says ‘Brutus was not the first to introduce the consulship in the time of king Tarquin’, one is true and one is false and the affirmation is already definitely true, the negation definitely false. Coming to the present, when we say ‘it is springtime’ and ‘it is not springtime’, if this was said in springtime the affirmation is true and

Translation

115

definitely true, the negation false and definitely false. But if this was said in autumn the affirmation is definitely false and the negation is definitely true. And this is because whether in the past or the present the truth or falsity of the affirmation or negation has already occurred. But this is not the case in the future. When we say ‘the Franks will defeat the Goths’ and someone denies this with ‘the Franks will not defeat the Goths’,141 one is true and one false, but no one knows which is true and which false before the outcome. And this is what he means when he says: 18a28-31 Then with regard to the things that are and that have been, an affirmation or negation must be either true or false; in universals taken universally one is always true and one false and in individual propositions, too, as we have said. And so not only is one always true and the other false in complete contradictions, but it is also the case that definite truth or falsity is found in either one, so that in these individual propositions truth and falsity is distinguished in the propositions themselves, whilst in universals, if they are placed in opposition to particulars (as has been stated142), one is necessarily true, the other false, but only if the truth or falsity of the propositions is defined, as I have explained above. So in what follows some issues concerning future propositions have to be dealt with. But because it is a more major undertaking than can be treated briefly, as we will see,143 and we have made our second volume rather long, we will end our lengthy and perhaps over detailed-treatment at this point.

20

25

185,1

5

10

15

BOOK 3 The matter which the course of this book will contain almost belongs to a loftier subject area than is normally treated in the discipline of logic, but since, as I have often said, meanings are expressed by sentences which clearly have things as their subject matter, there is no doubt that what is in things is often transferred to spoken sounds. And so my plan was right to reveal Aristotle ‘s subtlest ideas in a double edition of the commentary. For the contents of the first edition prepare a kind of easier path for those entering upon these loftier and more subtle matters. And the careful work of the second edition in opening up sophisticated ideas is offered as something to be read and studied by those advanced in study and learning. And so we must make a few prefatory remarks so that the things we are going to deal with later do not appear strange to our readers. The Greeks call categorical propositions those which are expressed without any condition in the way they are posited, e.g. ‘it is day’, ‘the sun is’, ‘man is’, ‘man is just’, ‘the sun is hot’ and all those which are

20 186,1 5

10

15

116

20

25

30 187,1 5 10

15

20

25

188,1 5

10

Translation

proposed without any binding condition and link. Conditional propositions on the other hand are of the following kind: ‘if it is day, it is light’. The Greeks call these hypothetical. They are called conditional because a condition is posited of the kind to express ‘if this is so, that is so’. And the ones which the Greeks call categorical, we Latin speakers can call predicative. For if a category is a predicament why not also call categorical propositions predicative propositions? Of these there are some which signify what is sempiternal; and just as the things which they signify exist always and never depart from their proper nature, so too the propositions themselves have an unchanging signification, e.g. ‘god is’, ‘god is immortal’. For just as these propositions are applied to immortals, they also have a sempiternal and necessary signification. And this is not seen in the nature of just one tense but in all; for when we say ‘god is immortal’, ‘was immortal’, or ‘will be immortal’, there is no departure from the proper necessity of the signification. Now we call necessary propositions those in which what is said either was, is or certainly will be, must occur. And those which signify sempiternal things are sempiternally necessary. For even if the nature of the truth is not clear in these, nothing prevents the constancy of necessity in their nature from being fixed so that even if it is unknown to us whether the stars are even or odd [in number], it could not, however, for that reason happen that they would appear neither even nor odd, but without any doubt whatsoever they are either even or odd, for every multitude has one of these in its nature. Therefore even if someone says: ‘the stars are even’ and another replies ‘the stars are not even’ or ‘the stars are odd’ and ‘the stars are not odd’ then one of these is of necessity propounding the truth, because, as I say, if it is unknown to us which of these is telling the truth, it is nevertheless necessary that what is said is so without any change. And these are unchangeably necessary propositions. There are others, however, which though not signifying sempiternal things are still themselves necessary provided that the subjects about which a proposition affirms or denies something exist, e.g. when I say ‘man is mortal’, man must be mortal as long as there is a man. For if someone says ‘fire is hot’ the proposition is of necessity true so long as there is fire. There are others, however, which have nothing to do with necessity and signify only contingent things. And these either relate equally to affirmation and negation or tend more frequently towards one. If someone says ‘I must get washed today’ and ‘I do not have to get washed today’ relate equally, for neither the affirmation nor the negation is the more likely to happen, for both are equally not necessary. Those that tend more towards one side are the sort where one says that a man grows white hair in old age and that a man does not grow white hair in old age. It more often happens that he does grow white hair, but it is not ruled out that he doesn’t.

Translation

117

The nature of predicative propositions is gathered from the truth and falsity of things. For propositions behave in the same way as the things which they signify. For if things have any necessity in themselves, the propositions are also necessary. But if they signify only that something is in something (e.g. if someone says ‘man walks’ demonstrates that walking is in man), in only signifying being-in, apart from any necessity, they are themselves devoid of all necessity. Further, if the things are impossible, the propositions which display those things are called impossible propositions. And if the things come and go contingently, the proposition which expresses them is called a contingent proposition. And because future, present and past time are different, the things that are subject to times also are varied according to these differences of time. Some belong to the present, some to the future, some to the past; in the same way too some propositions are bound by the signification of past time, as when I say ‘the Greeks overturned Troy’, some of the present, as ‘the Franks and Goths are joining in battle’, some of the future, as ‘the Persians and Greeks are going to make war’. Now propositions about the present and past are, like the things themselves, stable and definite, for what has been done has not not144 been done and what has not been done has not yet been done. So it is true to speak definitely about what has been done because it has been done, and it is false to speak [definitely] about what has not been done because it has not been done. Again it is true to say about what has not been done that it has not been done, and false to say that it has been done. And in the present too, what is coming about has its definite nature in the fact that it is coming about; in the propositions there must also be definite truth and falsity. For of what is coming about it is definitely true to say that it is coming about, false to say that it is not coming about. Of what is not coming about it is true to say that it is not coming about and false to say that it is coming about. Now, accordingly we have spoken already about the definition of propositions concerned with the present and past. Now he turns the direction of his discourse to the truth and falsity of propositions which are said to be in the future and which are contingent. But it is customary to call future the things he usually called contingent. Now in Aristotle’s opinion the contingent is whatever either chance brings about or comes about from someone’s free choice and of their own volition or something which by the workings of nature can tend to either side [of contradictory opposites], to come about and not come about. So the things of the past and present have a definite and established outcome. For what has happened cannot not have happened and it is impossible for what is now coming about not now to be coming about when it is coming about. But in the case of future and contingent things it is possible for something to come about or not come about. But since we have proposed above three types of contingent proposition, which we have dealt with better in

15

20

25

30 189,1

5 10

15

20 190,1

5

10

118 15

20

25 191,1 5

10

15

20 25 192,1 5

10

15 20

Translation

our physics,145 let us just add examples of each type. If I went out of the house yesterday and found a friend whom I was intending to look for, but was not actually then looking for him, it was possible that I might not find the man I did find before actually finding him, but when I had found him or after I had found him, it is not possible for me not to have found him. Again if last night I went out of my own accord into the countryside, before this happened it was possible for me not to go out, but after I had gone out or when I went out, it was not possible that what was happening should not be happening or that what had happened should not have happened. Further it is possible for this cloak which I am wearing to be cut. If it was cut yesterday, it was not possible that it was not being cut or had not been cut when it was being cut or after it had been cut, but it was possible for it not to be cut before it was cut. It is clear then that in the present and past even of things that are contingent that the outcome is definite and established, but in the future one of two [contradictory opposites] can happen; but there is no definite one, but a tendency in both directions, and either this or that happens of necessity, but it cannot be the case that this definitely or that definitely will happen. For contingents are contingent in each direction. What I mean is this: when I go out today I must either find my friend or not find him (for either affirmation or negation is in everything), but definitely and without a doubt to find him or, if this is not the case, definitely not to find him, as I found my friend when I went out yesterday (it is definite because it is not true that I did not find him), cannot come about in the same way in contingent and future situations but only and of necessity the alternatives, this or that. But that one thing or any one outcome is definite and, as it were certain, is impossible. Contingent and future propositions differ from past and present propositions in the following way. Although they are similar in that affirmation or negation is found in the former as well as in present and past propositions, they differ in that the outcome of things is definite in present and past propositions but in future and contingent propositions it is indefinite and uncertain not only to us because we don’t know it but also to nature. For although we do not know whether stars are even or odd, it is, however, clear that one of these is definitely the case in the nature of the stars. And this is unknown to us, but quite evident to nature. But it is not the case that the outcome of whether I will see my friend today or not see him is unknown to me but known to nature. For this does not occur naturally but by chance. And so propositions of this kind will be brought not to our knowledge but to that of nature itself, with an uncertain outcome and inconstant truth and falsity. For the nature of the contingent is such that both sides can be equal, e.g. ‘I must get a wash today or I must not get a wash today’, or one is more likely, the other less, e.g. that a man grows white hair as he gets older or that he

Translation

119

doesn’t, where the former is more likely, the latter less, but there is nothing to prevent what is less often the case from happening. And so Aristotle subtly sets out to discuss these matters by beginning with individuals and then opening the way for discussion of universals. For there were two kinds of contradiction: either in individuals or in universals predicated universally and their opposites. A start is made from the three cases which we mentioned above, by chance, by free choice, by possibility, which he called by the one name ‘in either of two ways’, a name which he invented to suit the fact that they do not have a single certain outcome but the outcome of ‘whichever’ occurs and in whatever way. And this points to the instability of nature and its tendency towards either side when nothing stands in the way. But we must not think that what is unknown to us is ‘in either of two ways’ and naturally contingent. For just because we do not know that ambassadors have been sent by the Persians to the Greeks does not mean that it is an uncertain occurrence that ambassadors have been sent. And when a doctor has seen in the face of a sick person a fatal sign that he is bound to die and we do not know this because of our lack of medical skill, we are not to decide that the impending death of the sick man is ‘in either of two ways’ and of a contingent nature. Only those things are to considered without a doubt as contingent which are unknown to us because they cannot be known on account of their own nature what outcome they will have; and this is because they tend to either side by their own natural instability, i.e. they are changed in the direction of an outcome of affirmation and denial by their own instability and lack of constancy. There is a dispute, however, amongst philosophers about the causes of things, whether everything comes about by necessity or some things by chance. And in this matter there is considerable disagreement between Epicureans, Stoics and our Peripatetics. We will take a brief look at their views. The Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle is the main representative, uphold chance, the exercise of free choice and necessity in events and actions with both impressive authority and very clear reasoning. And they affirm that there is chance in physical things: whenever something is done and the outcome is not that for which the thing which was done was initiated, then the outcome must be considered to have occurred by chance. Thus chance does not come about without any action, but as long as something unexpected happens through the action which is put into effect, the traditional view of the Peripatetics is that it has occurred by chance. For if someone while digging the ground or making a ditch for agricultural purposes finds treasure, the treasure has been found by chance though not without some action (for the ground had been dug when the treasure was found), but it was not the agent’s intention that treasure be found. Thus though the man was doing something, a different result happened to

25 193,1

5

10

15

20

25 194,1 5

10

120 15

20

25 195,1 5

10

15 20

25 196,1 5

10

15

Translation

him while he was doing something else. So something is said to come about by chance that comes about through some action not initiated for that thing which happens to the agent when he is doing something. And it is also in the nature of things that it is not through our ignorance that it happens that things seem to happen by chance because they are unknown to us, but rather they are unknown to us because what in nature happens by chance has no constancy of necessity or mode of providence. The Stoics, however, since they think that everything happens by necessity and providence measure what happens by chance not by the nature of fortune itself but by our own ignorance. For whatever happens of necessity but unknown to men they think happens by chance. There is the same argument between us and the Stoics about free choice as well. For we locate free choice, when there is nothing compelling us externally, in the fact that we seem to judge and consider what we must do or not do and having once taken thought come to complete or do that thing, so that what happens takes its start from us and from our judgement, if nothing externally compels us or impedes us by force. The Stoics, however, though they assign everything to necessity, try by a kind of volte-face to keep free choice of the will. For they say that the soul naturally has a certain will towards which the particular nature of the will itself is moved. And just as in inanimate bodies the heavy are naturally carried downwards to earth, the light move upwards, and no one doubts that this happens by nature, so too there is a natural will in all men and other animals. And whatever comes about by us they think is in accordance with the will which is something natural in us. But they add that we want what the necessity of providence orders, so that, although we are naturally given will and what we do we do by the will which is of course within us, yet that very will is bound by the necessity of providence. Everything happens of necessity in the sense that our natural will follows necessity, and also what we do happens from ourselves because our will itself is from us and in accordance with our nature as living beings. But we say that free choice is not what each person wants but what each person has thought about with judgement and consideration. Otherwise mute animals will also have free choice; for we see that they shrink from some things of their own accord and go along with others of their own accord. But if to want or not want something is the real meaning of the word free choice, it would belong not only to humans but also to the other animals too, and yet everyone knows that they do not have this power of free choice. But free choice is exactly what the words themselves express, our free judgement about our will. For whenever any mental images run along with the mind and stir the will, reason considers these and judges them and does what seems to it to be better once it has weighed them with its power of discrimination and considared them

Translation

121

with its judgement. And so we reject some things that are pleasant and display an appearance of usefulness whilst some bitter things we bravely accept though not wanting them. And so the exercise of free choice consists not in the will but in judgement and not in a mental image but the evaluation of the mental image. And in certain activities we are the instigators but do not see them through. This is to use reason and judgement. For we have everything in common with the other living beings, but are distinguished from them by reason alone. But if judgement is the only difference between us and the rest of the animals, why do we hesitate to use reason i.e. judgement. If anyone removes judgement from things he has removed human reason and once human reason is destroyed humanity itself will not remain. Then our Peripatetics did far better by making chance fortuitous in things themselves and by locating our free choice too beyond necessity, neither in what necessarily is nor in that which of necessity is not. It is in us not as chance, but rather in the choice made by judgement and the examination of the will. There is a certain disagreement too between Peripatetics and Stoics about what is said to be possible which we have dealt with briefly as follows. The Stoics define the possible as what can come about and that which is prevented from coming about is not, thus referring it to capacity in us so that what we can do they say is possible and what is impossible for us they say is not possible. The Peripatetics on the other hand located it not in us but in nature itself that some things are as much possible to come about as not possible to come about, e.g. it is possible for this stalk to be broken but it is also possible for it not to be broken; and they refer this not to any capacity in us but to the nature of the thing itself. This idea is contrary to the Stoic idea which claims that everything comes about by fate. For what happens by fate comes about from primary causes; but if this is so what does not happen cannot be changed. But we say that some things can happen in such a way that it is possible for the same things not to happen and we judge this to derive neither from necessity nor from any capacity in us. After these explanations it is enough to add that it was easy for Aristotle to reveal the modality of contingent propositions about the future when he had these ideas carefully thought out and settled, i.e. that they operate both ways and thus do not have a determined consistency in their outcome. If that were not the case, everything would be thought to happen of necessity, which will appear more clearly when we come to Aristotle’s actual words. Aristotle’s changing the discussion to loftier matters and ones not perhaps relevant to logic is not unfitting or out of place since he was speaking about propositions and he couldn’t determine the correctness and significance of propositions until he had first shown this to be so from things. For predicative propositions, as I have explained, are con-

20

25 197,1 5

10

15

20

25 198,1

5

10

15

122

20

25

199,1

5

10

15

20

25

200,1 5

10

Translation

cerned not with words and the joining of predications but with the signifying of things. Then now that we have expounded all our necessary introductory material let us get down to clarifying and unraveling Aristotle’s own ideas. 18a28-33 Then with regard to the things that are and that have been, an affirmation or negation must be either true or false; in universals taken universally one is always true and one false and in individual propositions too as we have said. But in universals not said universally, it is not necessary. We have already spoken about this. He distinguishes with a perfect standard of reasoning the types of categorical propositions which, as we have already said above, can be called predicative propositions in Latin, from the things which they signify. For the propositions which we call hypothetical or conditional derive their proper force from the condition itself and not from what they signify. For when I say ‘if it is a man, it is an animal’ and ‘if it is a stone, it is not an animal’ one is consequent agreement, the other incompatible. So the whole force of the propositions is derived from consequence and incompatibility. This is why it is not the signification but the condition put forward in hypothetical statements that constitutes their force and nature. Predicative propositions, as we have said, derive their substance primarily from things. And so because some things belong to the present and some to the past, just as the actual outcome of things in present and past time is certain, so too the truth and falsity of predicative propositions concerning the present and past is certain. But there was a double kind of contradiction; for either a universal was opposed diagonally to particulars or an individual affirmative signification cancelled out in contradictory opposition an individual negation; in these one was found to be always true, the other false. But in indefinite propositions it was not necessary that one was true, the other false. But in those in which truth and falsity were distinguished not only is one always true, the other always false, in both past and present, but one possessed certain and definite truth, the other certain and definite falsity. But in future propositions, if they are necessary propositions, even though they are said in terms of the future, it still must be the case that not only is one true and the other false but also that one is definitely true and the other definitely false. Thus when I say ‘this year the sun will enter the Ram in spring time’, if another denies this not only is one true and the other false, but also the affirmation, in this case, is definitely true, the negation false. But Aristotle does not usually talk about future things which are necessary but rather about those that are contingent. Contingents are, as

Translation

123

we said above, whatever are indifferent with respect to being or not being and just as they themselves have being and not being as something indefinite, so too their affirmations have indefinite truth and falsity, since one is always true and the other always false, but in contingents it is not yet known which is true or which is false. For just as in things which are necessary the ‘are’ is definite and in what are impossible the ‘not are’ is definite, so too with what can be and cannot be neither the being nor the not being is definite, but truth and falsity is derived from the fact that they ‘are’ or ‘are not’. For if what is said is, it is true, if what is said is not, it is false; and so in contingents and futures, just as their existence and non-existence is unstable but it is necessary that they either are or are not, so too in affirmations which express contingents themselves, truth or falsity is uncertain (for which is true and which is false is not known by the nature of the propositions themselves), but it is necessary that one is true and the other is false. Porphyry includes some things about Stoic dialectic which we will omit from our study since it is not familiar to Latin ears and the actual subject of enquiry is ignored [in Porphyry’s treatment]. 18a33-b16 But with singular future propositions it is different. For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is necessary too that everything either is or is not. For if one person says that something will be and another person says the same thing will not be, it is clear that one of them must be speaking the truth if every affirmation is either true or false. For in such cases both cannot be true at the same time. For if it is true to say that it is white or is not white, it must be white or not white; and if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or deny it. And if it is not the case, it is false, and if it is false, it is not the case. Therefore it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation is true. Therefore nothing is, happens, will be or will not be either by chance or ‘in either of two ways’, but everything is of necessity and not ‘in either of two ways’. For either he who affirms or he who denies is saying the truth. For similarly it might happen or not happen; for what is ‘in either of two ways’ is or will be no more thus than not thus. Further, if it is white now, it was true to say earlier that it will be white; therefore it was always true to say of anything that has happened that it would be. But if it is always true to say that it is or will be, then it cannot be the case that it is not or will not be. But if it cannot not happen, it is impossible for it not to happen. But if it is impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary that it must happen. Therefore everything that will be, will

15

20 25

30 201,1 5

10

15

20

25 202,1 5

124

Translation

happen necessarily. Then nothing will be ‘in either of two ways’ or by chance; for if it is by chance, it is not of necessity. 10

15

20

25 30 203,1 5

10

15

20 25

204,1 5

We said above146 that there are twin contradictories in propositions and we have now been reminded in which cases one has to be true and the other false. But what will be said about futures and contingents will be better understood if we speak about contingents which are expressed in a singular contradiction. For there is a universal diagonal contradiction in contingents of the kind ‘tomorrow all Athenians will fight in a naval battle, tomorrow not all Athenians will fight in a naval battle’. In singular cases it is expressed as follows: ‘tomorrow Socrates will dispute in the palaestra, tomorrow Socrates will not dispute in the palaestra’. We must note that the following are not contingent in the same way: ‘Socrates will die, Socrates will not die’ and ‘Socrates will die tomorrow, Socrates will not die tomorrow’. The former are not contingent at all but are necessary (for Socrates will of necessity die) whilst the latter which define the time are not themselves to be included in contingents because it is uncertain to us that Socrates will die tomorrow but is not uncertain to nature and so is not uncertain to god who fully knows nature itself. Properly contingent are the propositions which are neither in nature nor in necessity but by chance or by free choice or by the possibility of nature: by chance is for example when I go out of the house and see a friend when this was not my purpose in going out; by free choice, because I can will and not will, before it actually happens it is uncertain whether I will will; by possibility, there is uncertainty whenever something can happen or not happen before it happens because it can be either way. And so ‘tomorrow Socrates will dispute in the palaestra’ is contingent because it comes about from free choice. Therefore in contingents of this kind if in the future one is always true, the other always false and one definitely true, the other definitely false and if the things correspond to the words, it is necessary that everything is or is not and whatever happens happens of necessity and it is not possible for something to be which was possible not to be nor will there be free choice or chance in anything, but necessity will hold sway in everything. For in these, i.e. singular contradictories, each cannot be saying the truth. For contradictories are what cannot hold at the same time. But neither can both, affirmations and negations, be false when in contradiction; for those were contradictories when both cannot not hold at the same time. Therefore one person will speak the truth, the other what is false. But if it is granted that in this kind of proposition, i.e.contingents, nothing comes about where the outcome is in an irregular sequence and the statement of truth and falsity uncertain, then whatever is stated in affirmation to be definitely true, must be definitely the case, and whatever is said in negation to be false, this must not be the case.

Translation

125

Therefore everything either will be of necessity or will not be of necessity. Therefore there will be no chance, freewill or any possibility in things, if necessity holds everything. Now Aristotle assumes the hypothetical proposition that if every future statement is either definitely true or definitely false, then everything happens of necessity and nothing by chance, judgement or possibility, and shows those consequences in a suitable order. Having posited that one is definitely true, the other false, he proves in the following way from the agreement of things and propositions that everything happens of necessity. For he proposes this conditional and confirms that it is true from the necessity of the things themselves. The conditional is that if every affirmation or negation applied to the future is definitely true or false, then everything too which happens happens of necessity and nothing by chance, by individual free choice and judgement, or by any kind of possibility – all of these things he called with the phrase ‘in either of two ways’. This is the conditional he lays down when he says: for if every affirmation or negation is true or false it is necessary too that everything either is or is not. – We have to understand ‘definitely’ here – For if one person says that something will be and another person says the same thing will not be it is clear that one of them must be speaking the truth if every affirmation is either true or false. For in such cases both cannot be true at the same time. The meaning of this then is as follows: if every affirmation or negation, he says, is true or false, everything which either the affirmation posits or the negation denies must also either be or not be. For if someone says that there is something and another says that the same thing is not, one affirms and the other denies, but in affirmation and negation which are placed in contradiction, one is always true and the other false. For it is impossible for both to be true. For the discussion is not now about subcontraries or indefinite propositions. For subcontraries, i.e. a particular negation and a particular affirmation, and indefinite propositions can both be true of the same thing, but contradictories never. For it is impossible for contradictories in individual propositions or universal diagonally opposed propositions both to be true at the same time. This is what he means by for in such cases both cannot be true at the same time, i.e. both statements cannot be true in contradictory statements. So after positing the conditional if every affirmation is definitely true or false, everything turns out of necessity he tries to prove this very sequence and similarity between the things themselves and the propositions when he says: for if it is true to say that it is white or is not white, it must be white or not white; and if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or deny it. And if it is not the case, it is false, and if it is false, it is not the case. Therefore it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation is true. Every

10

15

20

25 205,1 5

10

15

20

25 30 206,1

126 5

10

15

20

25

30 207,1

5

10 15

20

25

Translation

affirmation, he says, and every negation along with the things themselves is either true or false. He takes examples of this from the present. For statements in the future will hold by necessity in the same way as those in the present. Let us then consider what in present time is the necessity of things and propositions. If any proposition has been said truly of any thing, then that thing which it mentioned must be. For if it stated that snow is white, and this is true, the necessity of the thing follows the truth of the proposition; for it is necessary that snow is white, if the proposition predicated of that thing is true. But if someone said that tar is not white and this is true, it is clear that the thing also follows the truth of the proposition. And moreover propositions too follow the necessity of things. For if there is some thing, it is true to say of it that it is, and if there is not some thing, it is true to say of it that it is not. Thus according to whether the affirmation and negation are true necessity follows the substance of the thing and the necessity of things accompanies the necessity of propositions. And this is the case in true propositions. The same is the case in false propositions in reverse. For if an affirmation is false, it is necessary that the subject of the affirmation ‘is not’, e.g. if the affirmation ‘tar is white’ is false, it is necessary that tar is not white. Again if the negation ‘snow is not white’ is false, it is necessary that snow is white. Again if the thing is not so, the affirmation about that thing is also false, but if a thing is not what a false negation could say of it, that negation is without doubt false and it is necessary that the thing is this, e.g. because a false negation can say of snow that it is not white, then snow is not the very thing which the false negation says, i.e. it is not white; for snow is not not white. Therefore falsity and truth correspond to the necessity of things; for if something is, it is truly said of the same thing that it is, and if it is truly said, then that thing about which something is truly predicated must be. But if that which is said is not, the affirmation is false, and if affirmations are false it is necessary that the things ‘are not’. But if this is so it is posited that every affirmation and negation is definitely true because the necessity of things according to whether they are or are not accompanies the truth or falsity of propositions (to be according to truth, not to be according to falsity, as has been explained), nothing happens by chance, free choice or any kind of possibility. For the things we call ‘in either of two ways’ are what can happen and not happen when they have not yet taken place and once they have happened could have not happened, e.g. that I am reading a book of Virgil today, which I have not yet done, can not happen but can also happen; but once I have done it, I could not have done it. These are the kind of things that are called ‘in either of two ways’. He shows clearly what he means by ‘in either of two ways’ when he says for what is ‘in either of two ways’, is or will be no more thus than not thus. What is ‘in either of two ways’ is what is equally inclined to be or not

Translation

127

to be, i.e. must neither be so or not be so. But some people, including the Stoics, thought that Aristotle was saying that future contingents are neither true nor false; for when he said that they are no more inclined to be than not to be they thought this meant that there was no difference between them being thought true or false. But that is wrong. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false but that any one of them is true or false, not however definitely as in past propositions nor as in present propositions, but that the nature of statement-making spoken sounds is somehow double. And one of these is not only where truth and falsity is found but also where one is definitely true and the other definitely false, but in the second one is true and the other is false, but indefinitely and changeably, and this with respect to its own nature and not to our ignorance and awareness. And so it was right to say that if every affirmation or negation were definitely true, nothing would happen either by chance or by the general term ‘in either of two ways’, nor would anything be or not be contingently, but definitely would be or definitely not be; but rather everything is of necessity. For this conclusion follows from the view of the person who says or affirms that it is true or who denies it. But if this is true, then similarly what is said by those making true or false statements would happen when the statement is true and not happen when the statement is false. But if this is impossible and there are some things which are not necessary (we see some things are by chance, some depend on freewill, some on the possibility in their own nature), it is useless to think that one is true and the other definitely false in future statements as it is in past statements. This was his single argument, but as though posing himself another problem as an objection he carries on in more robust style. 18b9-16 Further, if it is white now, it was true to say earlier that it will be white; therefore it was always true to say of anything that has happened that it would be. But if it is always true to say that it is or will be, then it cannot be the case that it is not or will not be. But if it cannot not happen, it is impossible for it not to happen. But if it is impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary that it must happen. Therefore everything that will be, will happen necessarily. Then nothing is ‘in either of two ways’ or by chance; for if it is by chance, it is not of necessity. He now examines a different level of action to add that not all future statements are definitely true or false, though he uses the same type of argument and the same notion of possible outcome. For he has already concluded from what has not yet happened that there can be only necessity in things if they were truly foretold as going to happen. But he now takes his argument from those things that have hap-

208,1

5 10 15

20

25

209,1 5

10 15

20

25

128

30 210,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 211,1 5

10

15

20

Translation

pened that if they were truly foretold before they happened, the outcome of all events is held by a bond of necessity. For those who say that there is also a stable way of stating contingent propositions in respect of their truth and falsity, think that of everything that has happened it could have been foretold that it would happen. For this was before in nature but revealed to us only by the outcome of the thing. Therefore if everything that has happened is and everything that is could have been predicted as going to be, it is necessary that everything that is said is either definitely true or definitely false, because their outcome is definite in present time. Therefore in every case where something has turned out it is true to say that it would turn out even if it has not yet happened. The very fact that what could be predicted did turn out proves that it was true for this to be said. But if it had been predicted, it would be predicted as going to happen with definite truth. Aristotle takes this up and leads it to the same impossible conclusion with a very strong argument and then joins the nature of present time with a future statement. For he says that it is similar to make a statement about the present and the future with respect to the necessity of truth. For if it is true to say that something is, it must be, and if it is true to say that something will be, it is without a doubt necessary that it will be; then everything in the future necessarily will be. Thus he reduces his argument to the same impossibility. He reaches this impossible conclusion by taking propositions which are relatively easy to understand, but have the same force. Thus he says if it is always true to say that something is or will be, whatever it was then true to predict, it cannot be the case that it is not or will not be. For just as what is in the present truly said to be, cannot not be, if the proposition which said that it is is true, so too in the case of the future, if the proposition which says that something will be, what it predicts cannot not come about. But if what is predicted by a true proposition cannot not happen, it is impossible for it not to happen. For to say that it is impossible for it not to happen is the same as saying that it cannot not happen. But if it is impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary that it must happen. For what is impossible can be predicated in a contrary way of necessity as he pointed out himself next. For what is impossible to be necessarily must not be. For what does not have the possibility to be, must not be. But if this is so, the contraries will behave in the same way. What cannot not be must necessarily be. But it has already been said that it is impossible for what is truly predicted not to be, and that this necessarily must be the case. Therefore what is predicted necessarily will be. Then nothing is ‘in either of two ways’ or by chance nor at all by free choice. The meaning of ‘in either of two ways’ embraces all of these; for the expression ‘in either of two ways’ contains possibility, chance and free choice in its signification. Therefore nothing happens by chance. For if someone

Translation

129

says that some things happen by chance, he does away with necessity in this case. For what is by chance is not by necessity. But nothing happens by chance since everything which a true statement predicts comes about by necessity. But an impossibility of this kind arises from what has been previously conceded, that everything that has happened could be predicted truly and definitely. For if what turns out happens of necessity, it was correct to say that it would be. But if it happens not of necessity but contingently, it is less correct to say that it will be than to say that it happens to be. For if you say it will be, you put a certain necessity in the prediction itself. From this it can be understood that if you say truly what is predicted will happen, it is not possible for it not to happen, that is that it must happen. Therefore whoever says that any of the things that happen contingently will happen, is perhaps making a false statement in so far as he says that what happens contingently will happen. But once that thing which he predicts has actually happened, he really has made a false statement; for it is not the event that is false, but the mode of its prediction; for he ought to have said: a naval battle will happen tomorrow contingently, i.e. it happens, if it does happen, in such a way that it would be possible for it not to happen. If you put it that way you tell the truth for you have predicted the event contingently. But if you say: there will be a naval battle tomorrow, you make the announcement as if it is something necessary. If the battle does happen you have said what is true not because you have predicted it, since you predicted that something that would happen contingently would happen of necessity. Therefore the falsity is not in the event but in the mode of prediction. For just as someone who says, when Socrates is walking, ‘Socrates is walking of necessity’, has told a falsehood not insofar as Socrates is walking but in that he is not necessarily walking, because he described him as necessarily walking, so too in the case of the man who says that something will be, even if this does come about, he is wrong not in respect of what did happen but insofar as it did not happen in the way he predicted it would happen. But if it had been definitely true then it would have happened of necessity. And so what he pronounced would come about under no other circumstances, he predicted would happen of necessity. Therefore the mistake is found not in the outcome of the thing but in the statement of the prediction. In contingents one should always describe something, if the statement is to be true, in such a way as to say that something will happen but that it remains possible for it not to happen. But if someone predicts absolutely that what probably will happen contingently will happen, he is predicting that a contingent thing will happen necessarily. And so even if what is predicted does come about, he has still told a falsehood insofar as this

25

212,1 5 10

15

20

25 213,1

5

10 15

130

20

25

30 214,1 5

10

15

20

25 30 215,1

5

Translation

has happened contingently whereas he had predicted that it would happen of necessity. Then since there are four modes of stating truth and falsity ( either that what is said both will be and will not be, i.e. so that both the affirmation and negation is true, or that it neither will nor will not be, i.e. so that both the affirmation and the negation are false, or that it will be or will not be, where one is definitely true, the other false, or that it will be or will not be when both are indefinite in respect of truth and falsity and equally inclined to truth and falsity) he gave his opinion above on future propositions that it cannot happen that they both are and are not when he said for in such cases both cannot be true at the same time.147 A little later he gave as his opinion that in contingent and future propositions it cannot be that propositions either are or are not definitely [true]. He now adds that they neither are nor are not, i.e. that one cannot correctly say that both future propositions can be found to be false. But if neither both are true nor both false nor one definitely true, the other definitely false, it remains that one is true, the other false, not definitely however but ‘in either of two ways’ and in an unstable state so that it is necessary that this or this happens, in such a way, however, that it cannot happen that any one thing turns out or does not turn out in any kind of necessary or definite way. [To show] how both cannot be false, he begins as follows: 18b17-25 But neither is it possible to say that neither is true, i.e. that it neither will be nor will not be. For firstly though the affirmation is false, the negation will not be true, and though the negation is false, the affirmation need not be true. Moreover if it is true to say that something is white and large, both must be the case; and if it will be so tomorrow, it is so tomorrow; but if it neither will be nor will not be so tomorrow, there will be no ‘in either of two ways’, e.g. a sea-battle; for it will have to be that there neither will be nor will not be a sea-battle. The meaning of the argument is as follows: it is not possible to say of contingent propositions that neither is true in the future. And this is no different from saying that both are false. And this is impossible. For in contradictories both cannot be found to be false. For it is the particular nature of contradictories that they escape the property of subcontraries in that they cannot be simultaneously true, and avoid that of contraries in that they are not found to be simultaneously false. Therefore they have as their particular nature that they are neither both true or false simultaneously. Therefore one of them is always true, the other always false. It is then impossible when the negation is false that the affirmation is not true, and in reverse that when the affirmation is false that the negation is not true. Therefore

Translation

131

you can’t say that both are not true. And this is what he means with the words but neither is it possible to say that neither is true, i.e. it is not possible for us to say, i.e. it is impossible to say that neither is true, that is of what is proposed in contingent and future affirmations and negations. Those who thought that Aristotle thought that both propositions in future propositions are false, would never have been caught up in such errors if they had read carefully what he is now saying. For to say that neither is true is not the same as to say that neither is definitely true; for we don’t say that tomorrow there will be and will not be a naval-battle because both are completely false but because neither one of them is definitely true or definitely false, though one is true and the other false, not however one of them definitely so but one or other of them contingently. To this he adds another point when he says that if the truth of propositions depends on the substance of things so that in propositions it is necessary to say that whatever is true is; then if it is true to say that something will be white the necessary outcome follows the truth of the thing. But if someone says that some particular thing will be white tomorrow, if he says this truly, it will tomorrow be white of necessity. So then if anyone says that neither future proposition is true, what is said and signified by those propositions must neither be nor not be. For when both the affirmation and the negation is false, neither what the affirmation or negation says can happen. Therefore neither what the affirmation nor what the negation says happens of necessity. Therefore if the affirmation says that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow because the affirmation is false. Again if the negation denies the same proposition and says that there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow, because this too is false, there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. Therefore neither will there be a sea-battle tomorrow because the affirmation is false, nor will there not be a sea-battle tomorrow because the negation is false. But not even the mind could invent this bit of nonsense on its own; for who would ever say that something of necessity neither is nor is not? But of course that is what those say who assert that both future propositions are false.

10

18b26-36 Then these absurdities and others like them happen if in the case of every affirmation and negation in what is said universally of universals or in the case of singulars it is necessary that one of the opposed propositions is true and the other false and that nothing of what happens is ‘in either of two ways’, but that everything is or happens of necessity. And so there will be no need to deliberate or take pains [thinking that] if we do this, this will happen, if we don’t it will not. For there is nothing to stop one man saying that this will happen in a thousand years

25

15 20

25 216,1 5

10

15

20

217,1 5

132 10

15

20

25

218,1 5

10 15

20

25

219,1 5

Translation

and another that it will not happen; so whichever of the two was true to say then will be the case of necessity. If you think that all future propositions are definitely true or false these impossibilities are the consequence; for nothing at all can happen either by free choice, by any kind of possibility or by chance, if everything is subjected to necessity. Nevertheless some people did not hesitate to say that everything is of necessity and tried to join by certain contrivances what is in us with the necessity of things. For certain people, including the Stoics, say that everything that happens occurs under the necessity of fate and everything which the principle of fate accomplishes happens without doubt through necessity, but that only those things that the power of fate completes and perfects through our will and through us ourselves are in us and depend on our will. For, they say,148 neither is our will up to us, but we will and do not will for what the necessity of fate has commanded, so that our will too seems to depend on fate. And so because some things are dependent on us and happen in us through our will and because our will is itself dependent on the necessity of fate, even what we do with our own will, because necessity has commanded it, we do under the compulsion of necessity. And so changing completely the signification of free choice in this way, they then attempt to join and link in an impossible way necessity and what is up to us. For the free choice in us is something that is free of all necessity, innate and with its own power, and we are somehow masters of whether we do or do not do certain things. But if the necessity of fate also orders our will, that will will not be in us but in fate; nor will their choice be free but rather serve necessity. And so it happens that those who bind all our actions with the necessity of events are saying that for this reason we do not bend even the knee unless fateful necessity has commanded it, nor scratch our head, nor for this reason do we wash or do anything [without fate commanding us]. And to these I will add doing or experiencing anything successfully or unsuccessfully. Hence they maintain that there is neither chance nor free choice nor any possibility in things, although because they are afraid of destroying free choice they invent another signification for it by which man’s freewill is still overthrown. But Aristotle’s authority so strongly confirms that [free choice, chance and possibility] are established and fixed in things that he does not explain at this point what chance is or possibility or what is in us, nor does he prove and demonstrate that these things exist, but it is only so far made clear that this is what he meant in that he says that the idea that all future propositions are true is impossible precisely because it overturns chance, possibility and free choice. For he thinks that these are so established in things that there is no need of any demonstration, but the idea is judged impossible that tries to overturn chance,

Translation

133

possibility or what is in our power. He has shown above how definite truth in future propositions does away with chance. And he now he explains with great vigour of argument how the very same defined truth in future contingent propositions does away with the faculty of free choice, when he says that if one claims that one part of a statement is definitely true or false, all those kinds of absurdities occur. But we were following Porphyry when at the beginning of our exposition of this argument we said that Aristotle spoke first about ‘singular future propositions’ because it would be easier to understand the argument if the singular propositions were first looked at. Now that he has finished speaking most carefully about singular propositions he now speaks about universal propositions taken universally and their contradictions. This is why he says: if in the case of every affirmation and negation in what is said universally of universals or in the case of singulars it is necessary that one of the opposed propositions is true and the other false. But Alexander thinks that by singular future propositions he meant the future propositions which are in coming into being and passing away. For there are some future things which are not found with coming into being and passing away, e.g. what is related about the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies. But in propositions which include natural coming into being and perishing it is not necessary that one proposition is always true and the other always false. But I do not disapprove of either interpretation since both are founded on firm argument. But the overall meaning, with which Aristotle overthrows the idea that necessity alone is the ruling force in things, is as follows: everything in nature is not in vain; men naturally deliberate; but if necessity is to be the sole ruler in things, deliberation is pointless; but deliberation is not in vain for it is natural; therefore necessity cannot be in entire charge of things. This is then how his argument is arranged starting with the words then these absurdities and others like them happen because any chance in things is done away with; and others because possibility and freewill are lost. He then proceeds to tell us how this happens: if in the case of every affirmation and negation in what is said universally of universals or in the case of individuals it is necessary that one of the opposed propositions is true and the other false and that nothing of what happens is ‘in either of two ways’, but that everything is or happens of necessity. Those absurdities happen then if every affirmation or negation is definitely true or false whether in universal diagonal contradictions or in singular contradictory propositions. For in this case there is no ‘in either of two ways’, but everything is by necessity since the outcome of events of necessity follows the truth and falsity of propositions. And so there will be no need to deliberate or take pains over things [thinking that] if we do this, this will happen, if we don’t it will not. For deliberation is overturned if it is in vain and he says that it is

10 15

20 25 30 220,1

5 10

15 20

25

221,1 5

134

10

15

20

25

30 222,1

5

10

15

20

25 223,1

Translation

in vain wherever anyone puts only the necessity of fate in things. For why should anyone take counsel if he is not going to achieve anything by deliberation since necessity controls everything? Therefore there will be no need to deliberate or, if some one does, he ought not to take much trouble over it. To take trouble over something is to do something with performance and care, not to make money, but to plead a case or perform a task. Then a person will not complete anything by his own action or deliberation unless the necessity of fate orders him. He explained what deliberation is with the words if we do this, this will happen, if we don’t it will not. For this is how deliberation takes place. For example we can imagine Scipio deliberating: if I take the army to Africa, I will remove the disastrous presence of Hannibal from Italy; but if I do not take it, Italy will not be rescued. This is to say, if I do this, i.e. if I take the army to Africa, this will happen, i.e. Italy will be rescued; but if this, i.e. if I stay here, this will not happen, i.e. Italy will not be rescued. And it is the same in everything else. But he also showed at the same time that there is no necessity in deliberations. For if, he says, I do this, this will happen, and if this, it will not happen. But if there were necessity in things, whether anyone did it or did not do it, what is necessary would happen. Therefore what happens through reasoned deliberation does not happen through the force of necessity. And he added take pains over to deliberate. The order is to be taken in this way: And so there will be no need to deliberate ([thinking that] if we do this, this will happen, if we don’t it will not. For there is nothing to stop one man saying that this will happen in a thousand years and another that it will not happen; so whichever of the two was true to say then will be the case of necessity.) or take pains over things which means to commence an action and carry through a task. For first comes the deliberation and then the task. But he put the task after deliberation and everything which ought to belong to the nature of deliberation he added after slipping the task in between. This is how the argument goes: if necessity does everything, there is no need to deliberate that if we do this this will come about for us, but if we do that it will not come about. For there is nothing to stop one of them uselessly affirming and another denying by saying ‘if we do this, this will happen or will not happen’. For what is going to happen will happen, whether one man conjectures through deliberation that this can happen if he does some other thing, or the other denies that this can happen if he does what he said. For whichever [turns out to be true] of the things they said, will happen of necessity. But if there is no need for any deliberation, there will also be no need to take pains, i.e. to initiate any task. For whether anyone begins or does not begin, what is of necessity will proceed without a doubt. Therefore nothing will distinguish one man form another; for we judge men to be better insofar as

Translation

135

they are stronger in deliberation. But when deliberation is pointless, since necessity does everything, men too do not differ from each other in any way. For there is no distinction between good or bad deliberation when the necessary outcome of events is in the hands of fate’s administration. Then if men are worthy of praise for their good counsel and of criticism for bad counsel, this can only make sense if bad action and bad counsel, and their opposites, are in our power and not in that of fate. For only when the outcome of a thing is not at all constrained by necessity, is there then free choice such that no subservience is shown to fate and necessity. And so we should not accept those who lay down simple chains of events in this world and we should reject those who think that in this varied earthly mass the causes of actions are not also varied. For those who say that everything comes about by chance are making a mistake and those who make everything happen by the force of necessity do not hold a sound view; nor is it clear that everything depends on free choice; but of all these things both the causes and the outcomes are varied. For some things are by chance, some caused by a certain necessity, others we see come under the control of judgement. And willing our own actions is in our power; for our will is somehow the mistress of our actions and of our entire life of reason, but the outcome is not in our power in the same way. For chance arising from the same causes can intervene on those doing something with free choice for another purpose, e.g. if someone while digging a trench to plant a vine finds a treasure, the digging of the trench happens by free choice but chance alone has brought it to finding treasure. But chance in its turn has as cause what the will has contributed. For if he had not dug the trench, the treasure would not have been found. But whilst one event contributes to what we will, certain others are impeded by a kind of violent necessity. For just as dining, reading and other things of this kind often depend on our will, their outcome too often depends on our will. But if a Roman wants to rule the Persians now, the free choice to do so lies with him but a more resistant necessity attaches to its outcome and forbids it being brought to completion. And so chance, will and necessity hold sway over all things and no one of these is to be placed in things but a force mixed from the three. This is why it happens that the intention of sinners is given more consideration than the event and the thought is punished rather than the deed because our will is free but sometimes the manner of effecting the deed is constrained. But if everything happened by chance or necessity, praise would not be suitable for those who act rightly nor punishment for those who do wrong nor would any laws be just which assign either rewards to the good or punishments to the bad. Now I come to a question which is raised in various forms, whether there can still be prophecy, if not everything in things happens by necessity. For what is in true prophecy is also found in the case of

5

10

15

20 224,1

5

10 15

20

25

136 225,1

5

10

15

20

25 226,1 5

10

15

20

Translation

knowledge. Just as when someone predicts the truth, what is truly predicted must be, so what anyone knows will be, must be in the future. But prophecy does not announce everything as going to happen of necessity and for this reason prophecy often takes the following form which is very easy to pick up from the books of the ancients: this is going to happen, but if that does not happen then this will not occur, as though it could be intercepted and turn out in some other way. But if this is so, it does not happen by necessity. The question whether everything must be so, if god knows everything that is going to happen, let us examine like this. If someone says that god’s knowledge of future events follows from the necessary nature of the events, he will have to accept the consequences: god cannot know all things if everything does not happen of necessity. For if the necessity of events is bound up with god’s knowledge, if there is no necessity in events, the divine knowledge is abolished. And whose mind is so distorted by such an impious idea that he would dare to say this of god? But perhaps someone might say that it cannot happen that god would not know everything that is to come and that for this reason it happens that everything is of necessity, because it is wrong to remove from god knowledge of future events. But if someone says this it would occur to him that while he strives to ensure that god knows everything, he contends that he does not know all things. For if someone proposed that he knew that two is an odd number, he would not know it but in fact be ignorant. So to think we know something which is not in our power to know is a mark of our impotence. Then whoever says that god knows everything and because of this everything will come about of necessity, is saying that god thinks that future events happen of necessity, events which in fact do not come about of necessity. For if god knows that everything will come about of necessity, he is contradicting himself. For all things do not come about of necessity, but some things contingently. Therefore if he knows that what is going to come about contingently will come about of necessity, he is false in his own providence. For god knows that things come about not as happening of necessity, but contingently in such a way that he knows that another thing could happen but is fully aware of what happens as a result of the reasoning of humans and of their actions. Therefore if someone says that everything happens of necessity, he must be removing god’s good will also. For his goodwill produces nothing when necessity controls everything so that god’s very beneficence is somehow dependent on necessity and not on his own will; for if some things depend on his will so that he is not restrained by any necessity, not everything happens of necessity. Who then is so impiously clever as to constrain god too by necessity? Who would say that everything comes about of necessity if that kind of impossible situation is also to occur? Then we must admit that in events some things can occur by chance,

Translation

137

brought about by the will and constrained by necessity and the view that undermines each of these is to be judged impossible. So Aristotle rightly leads us to this impossible notion when he says that possibility, chance and free choice perish (which of course cannot in fact happen) if in all future statements one is always definitely true and the other always definitely false. For their truth and falsity is linked to necessity which has control over chance and free choice concerning events. So now too he repeats the same thing, that nothing can stop someone from saying a thousand years before that something will happen or another from denying it. For things are done and are not done not because they are affirmed or denied, but if it is necessary that when someone affirms or denies the things affirmed or denied follow, then the things which it was necessary would come about according to what they said, must come about even if they did not say them. This is what he means when he says: 18b36-19a6 Nor does it make any difference whether any people have said the contradiction or not. For it is clear that the things are thus even if someone did not affirm it nor another deny it. For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be the case nor in a thousand years rather than in any time whatsoever. Therefore if in all of time things were so that one of them was said truly, it was necessary that this would come about and any of the things that come about would be such as to come about of necessity. For when someone truly says that something will be, it cannot not happen and of what has happened it was always true to say that it would happen. Aristotle in considering the outcome of necessary things as dependent not from the truth of what predicts them but from the nature of the things themselves says that although when someone has predicted truly about something that the thing which he has predicted must happen, the necessity of the things does not, however, for that reason depend on the truth of the prediction but rather the truth of the prophesying is dependent on the necessity of the things. For it is not necessary that something is because something true has been predicted, but it was possible for something to be predicted truly of the thing because it was necessarily going to happen. But if this is so the man who predicts or denies that something will happen is not the cause of that thing happening or not happening. For it is not necessary that there be an affirmation or negation, but future things must come about because they possess a certain necessity in their own nature. If anyone hits on this necessity, what he predicts is true. And so if it would have been true to say about whatever has now come about that it would happen, whether anyone said it or not, the things that have now come about were of necessity going to come about. For

25 227,1 5

10

15

20

25 228,1

5

10

15

138 20

25 229,1

5 10

15

20

25 230,1

5

10

15

Translation

there is necessity in things not because of someone affirming or denying, but truth or falsity is found in a prediction because of the necessity of the things. Then if what has now happened could also have been truly predicted as going to happen and, under these circumstances the thing had to come about, whether they predicted it or not, it is necessary that everything that happens will happen of necessity and there is no ‘in either of two ways’ at all in things. For if prophecy in no way enhances the necessity of things and it does not matter whether anyone predicts or denies that something is going to happen or whether no one predicts anything in affirmation or negation, it is clear that there is no difference whether someone has predicted ages ago that something would truly happen or just a few days, hours or moments ago. It does not matter; for whether someone predicted a thousand years ago what of necessity was going to happen, or whether a year, month, day, hour or a moment ago, it would in no way affect the thing that was going to happen. For because it would not have mattered whether it is predicted or not, it doesn’t also matter whether it is predicted just before or a long time ago. But if all this is the case and everything which has happened must of necessity have been going to happen, all free choice is abolished, all chance is removed and every possibility in things other than necessity is excluded. But at the same time by linking prediction and outcome Aristotle confirms that the necessity of things depends on the truth of the propositions themselves when he says: if this is so, that in all of time anything that has come about is in itself such that this outcome can be truly predicted of it, it would have to come about, i.e. it would have been necessary for what had been truly predicted of it to come about. For anything which comes about and is truly predicted is so constituted that it comes about of necessity. And this is the reason why this happens: whatever someone says truly, of necessity comes about; for its truth is created by the necessity of things. But if what has come about is also truly predicted as going to come about, there is no doubt that everything proceeds from necessity. But if this, he says, is impossible (for we see that some things are derived from a starting point of free choice and from the source of our own actions), why do we hesitate to throw out this superficial notion of universal necessity and not cease destroying choice in human life by interposing necessity? For what distinction will there be between men if the judgement of free choice is abolished? Why do we go to the trouble of establishing laws? Why are legal decisions given in public? Why are rules and traditions, public and private acts embraced by established principles and legal ties, if it is certain that what is proposed by humans has no validity? For everything is in vain, if there is no free choice. For we know that laws and the rest were established to control human spirits. But if our minds are not in control of themselves and some kind of necessary force impels

Translation

139

them, there is no doubt that laws laid down for those who do nothing of their own free choice are meaningless. But Aristotle himself understands how impossible such a situation is; his true opinion does not abolish either chance or necessity or the possibility of a thing inclining to either side of its nature or free choice, but by mixing them together he thinks that a world composed of many factors is not contained by just simple chance or necessity or the judgement of free choice. 19a7-9 But if these things are not possible; for we see that what will be has a beginning both from our deliberations and from our actions. It is impossible, he says, for all those things to come about from necessity. For in certain things we ourselves are also the starting point, and our mind when formed by reason and our actions when directed by that reason form the starting point of some things. For this is how we see that we have free choice; when nothing external impedes or compels us we jump to doing what we decide on the judgement of reason. And not everything is snatched away from under us by necessities. For every kind of animal, just by being animal, is subjected one to nature, another to the heavenly paths of the stars, yet another to mental reasoning and the thought of the mind. For trees and irrational animals are subject only to nature, but cattle also to the laws of the heavenly bodies.149 Men, however, are subject both to nature, the stars and their own will. We do or experience many things under the influence of nature, e.g. death or a particular bodily condition. The necessity of things themselves brings much with it, e.g. when we do not have the strength to do things we want to do. And free choice contributes many things which happen because we will them. And so it happens that nature which is the principle of motion shares in the faculty of free choice and reason, whilst the soul insofar as it is bound to the body, which is under the control of nature, shares in images, desires, heat of anger and the rest of the things which body contributes, because of nature itself to which the soul is bound. We are also all subject to divine providence and dependent too on the divine will. And so it is not that the necessity of the heavenly bodies is entirely removed nor does this argument get rid of chance from things and it confirms free choice. But these topics are too great for us to be able to deal with them properly now. And so we also are the starting point of things and in our affairs many things derive from our own plans and actions. But if what this argument has disproved is clear, but the proposal that all future affirmation and negation is true is not equally clear, why do we hesitate to escape from a deceitful form of reasoning and to uphold what is clear when it is true but reject those things the truth of which is not all certain and whose clarity is not yet manifest? From

20

25

231,1

5

10

15

20 25 232,1 5

10

15

140 20 25

233,1

5

10 15

20 25

234,1

5

10

15

Translation

his previous comment and so there will be no need to deliberate or take pains150 he has now interpreted deliberate with a beginning from our deliberations and to take pains with the addition and from our actions. Then this passage is so tautly composed that it possesses the compelling force of reasoned and ordered argument. 19a9-22 And that to be possible or not be possible is generally found in what is not always in act; in these both occur, to be and not to be, and therefore to become and not to become. And it is clear to us that many things are like this, e.g. it is possible for this garment to be cut and it will not be cut but will first wear out. But it is equally possible that it will not be cut. For it wouldn’t be possible for it first to wear out, unless it were possible for it not to be cut. So in other future events too which are spoken of in terms of this kind of capacity. It is clear that not all things either are or come about by necessity, but some ‘in either of two ways’ and the affirmation is no more [true] than the negation, in others one of them is more true in most cases, but the other too can come about and the first not. The continuity of the meaning with what has gone before is as follows: to the sentences but if these things are not possible, i.e. that necessity controls everything, for we see that what will be has a beginning of some kind from us, both from our actions and deliberations, he has now added that there are some things which can be although they are not and not be although they are. These are immediately removed if necessity is in total control. And that is how the meaning is linked with the previous sentence. But what the drift of the whole argument is may be seen in the following way. What is possible is whatever can easily incline to either side by the configuration of its own nature such that when it is not something it could be it and that when it is something nothing stops it from not being it. In this way then we also separate what we say is possible from necessity. For there is a difference between saying that it is possible for me to walk when I am sitting and to say that the sun is now in Sagittarius and is moving into Aquarius in a few days. For the latter is possible in the sense that it is necessary. But we usually say that the possible is what can be something when it is not and what can not be something when it is. Then if someone subjects everything to necessity, he cuts off the nature of possibility. There are three theories of possibility. Philo says that the possible is what sustains truth by the actual nature of its statement. e.g. when I say that today I am going to reread Theophrastus’ bucolic poems. If nothing external prevents it, taken in itself it can be truly stated. In the same way Philo defines the necessary as what when it is true, taken in itself, can never be capable of falsity. And what is

Translation

141

not necessary he similarly defined as what can be capable of falsity when taken in itself. The impossible is what in its own nature can never sustain falsity. He strongly asserts that the contingent and the possible are identical. Diodorus decides that the possible is what either is or will be; the impossible, what when it is false will not be true; the necessary, what when it is true will not be false; what is not necessary, what either already is or will be false. The Stoics defined the possible as what would be capable of true predication provided there was nothing to prevent it which though external to it could come to be along with it; the impossible, what never sustains any truth whenever other things externally prevent its outcome; the necessary, what when it is true does not sustain any false predication whatsoever. But if everything comes about by necessity, definite objections must be raised against Diodorus’ view. For he thought that if someone were to die at sea, he could not have met his death on land. Neither Philo nor the Stoics say this. But although they don’t say this, if however they assess one part of a contradiction by the outcome they are forced to take the same view as Diodorus. For if when someone has died at sea it was necessary for him to be killed at sea, it was impossible for him to die on land. But this is false. And those who say that there is only necessity in things when they maintain that one part of a future contradiction is definitely true, are forced to accept all these impossibilities. For if someone perished in the ocean in a shipwreck, he would not have been going to live immortally on the land if he had never gone on the voyage. But the contradictions in propositions maintaining the outcome of events must be judged from their own nature and not from the outcome of the things. If all the conditions are right for me to go to Athens, even if I don’t go, it is clear that I still can go; and when I do go, that I could not have gone. This is all quite clear to those who with correct reason judge events from the nature of things. It does not then follow that if something is possible it is necessary but although what is necessary is possible, there is, however, another kind of external possibility which is separate from the impossible and from necessity. For Aristotle has this view about the things which must always be. For these things have no relationship to contraries, e.g. because snow is always cold, it is never joined with heat; fire too is never related with cold because it is always found in the contrary of cold, i.e. in heat. Therefore all necessary things have no relation with the contraries of the qualities which they possess themselves. But if fire does have some relation to cold that relation would be fruitless if fire never turned its quality into cold. But we know that nothing born with its own quality normally brings its nature in vain to completion. Therefore let those things be considered necessary which have no relation to their contraries. And whatever do have such a relationship are not

20

25

235,1

5 10

15

20 25 236,1 5 10

15

142 20 25 237,1 5

10 15

20

25 238,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

necessary, but because they seem to be linked by a natural relation of contrariety to each side, their outcome on either side is possible, e.g. this log can be cut, but it has an equal relation to its contraries, for it can not be cut and water can become hot but nothing stops it also being joined with cold. And in general one can say that the things which neither always are nor always are not, but sometimes are and sometimes are not, by the very fact that they are and are not have a relation to contraries. And these come midway between impossibles and necessaries. For the impossible can never be, the necessary never not be; between these there is the particular nature of certain things, which is between both of these and which can be and not be. This is then what he means when he says that we see in what is not always in act (things not always in act are those which have a relation to both contraries, e.g. fire is always actually hot, water is not always [hot]). Then we see in what is not always in act that some things are possible and not possible, i.e. that they both are and are not. This happens where these both occur, to be and not to be, e.g. water is both hot and not hot, and also becomes hot and does not become hot. And it is obvious to us that many things are like this, that their outcome is found on either side when there is no external impediment, e.g. a garment which can be cut, but it can perhaps happen that it is not cut in two by a sword before age wears it away. And it can happen that a particular garment is less likely to be cut up by a sword than to be worn out by actual use. Equally it is possible that it is not only cut but also not cut. For it wouldn’t be possible for it first to wear out before it could be cut, unless it was possible before for it not to be cut. For when it is worn out, it is not cut. He clarifies where this generally occurs; for it occurs, he says, in future events. Future events are ones in which there is coming into being and passing away. For whether something happens by nature or by art he has said that what will occur occurs as a result of some action. In future events then some are potential, others actual, e.g. water is potentially hot for it can become hot, but is actually cold for it is cold. Actuality and potentiality here come from the matter; for when the matter can accept contrariety and has of itself a relation to each contrary, considered on its own it possesses none of the things it accepts into itself and is itself nothing actually but everything potentially. But in accepting contraries though it possesses only one contrary it still has the other at the same time but not actually, e.g. in the same water; for the matter of the water can accept heat and cold, but when it has accepted one of these, either heat or cold, it is, if that is the case, hot, and it is also at the same time cold but not in the same way. For it is perhaps actually hot, potentially cold. Therefore potentiality in things comes from the matter. Besides in divine bodies there is no potentiality, but everything is in act, e.g. the sun’s light is

Translation

143

never potential; it is never obscured and there is no rest in the whole of the heavens. These things have their character then from the matter so that they are everything potentially, but nothing actually, by the direction of nature which distributes in matter itself individual motions in an ordered way and places particular quality properties in particular parts of matter, so that nature has herself ordered some parts as necessary such that as long as the thing exists its property remains in it, e.g. heat in fire; for as long as there is fire, there must be heat in fire; to others nature gave the kind of qualities which can be lost. Now those necessary qualities form each thing’s substance; for that type of quality is joined with matter itself by nature. Those other qualities, which can be received and not received, are external. And it is from these that coming into being and passing away arises. The possibility that is found in things comes then from nature and from matter. Chance also sometimes creeps in here, an undetermined cause and one occurring in no rational order. For it is not nature, which does nothing in vain, nor free choice, which consists in judgement and reason, but chance that is external and which arises of its own accord suddenly and without warning in certain actions done for another purpose. From possibility as we have described it also comes the working of free choice. For if it was not possible for something to come into being, but everything of necessity was or was not something, free choice would not survive. Then Aristotle was right to propose that not everything comes about by chance like Epicurus, nor everything by necessity like the Stoics, nor again everything by free choice, but, by mixing them all, to propose that in a varied world the causes of things are also varied, so that some things happen of necessity, others by chance or free choice, not to mention possibility. There is one term, ‘in either of two ways’, for all of these, whether in chance, will or possibility. But he divides up what can be ‘in either of two ways’: some incline equally to affirmation and negation, e.g. today I am going to read Virgil and am not going to read Virgil; each of these is in either way. This is what he means by and the affirmation is no more [true] than the negation. For it is equally the case that I can read Virgil now and I can not read him. Others do not incline equally to either side. But although the outcome is more frequently in one direction, it is not forbidden for it to turn out the other way, e.g. where a man grows white hair in old age. This happens in numerous cases: but the other too can come about, i.e. he doesn’t grow white hair, and the first not, i.e. he does grow white hair. It is in this way then that he maintains in a very firm and valid argument that as a result of possibility, chance and free choice a future contradiction cannot be definitely true or false on one side. To this he then adds:

25 239,1

5 10

15

20

25 240,1 5

10

15

20 25

144

30 241,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 242,1 5

10

Translation

19a23-6 Therefore what is, necessarily is, when it is and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is, nor everything that is not, necessarily is not; for to say that everything that is, necessarily is, when it is, is not the same as to say unconditionally that it is of necessity. Two kinds of necessity are brought to light here:151 one which is stated with the necessity of some accident, a second which is expressed in simple predication. An example of the latter is when we say that it is necessary that the sun moves; for necessity enters the sun’s motion not only because it is moving now but also because it never will not move. An example of the other conditional kind is when we say that it is necessary that Socrates is sitting when he is sitting and it is necessary that he is not sitting when he is not sitting; for since the same person cannot be sitting and not be sitting at the same time, whoever is sitting cannot not be sitting at the time when he is sitting; therefore it is necessary that he is sitting. Then when someone is sitting, it is necessary that he is sitting at the time when he is sitting; for it cannot happen that when he is sitting he is not sitting. Again when someone is not sitting, it is necessary that he is not sitting at the time when he is not sitting; for the same person cannot be sitting and not sitting. A conditional necessity can occur if, when someone is sitting, he is necessarily sitting, at the time when he is sitting and when he is not sitting, he is necessarily not sitting, at the time when he is not sitting. But the kind of conditional necessity which is proposed here does not entail simple necessity (for it is not the case that whoever is simply sitting, must of necessity be sitting, but only with the addition of ‘at the time when he is sitting’). For example we do not say ‘it is necessary that the sun moves’ when it is moving and we do not put in the additional phrase that it is necessary that the sun moves when it is moving, but we only say simply that it is necessary that the sun moves. And this simple necessity applied here to the sun will, in its actual expression, establish truth, whereas with conditional necessity, e.g. when we say that it is necessary that Socrates is sitting at the time when he is sitting, if we separate the phrase ‘at the time when he is sitting’ and this temporal condition from the proposition, the truth of the proposition as a whole vanishes. For we cannot say that Socrates is of necessity sitting; for he can also not be sitting; for Socrates’ capacity has a kind of affinity and relation as much to sitting as to not sitting. And so we are looking to the accident when we make the proposal that Socrates of necessity is sitting at the time when he is sitting. For because Socrates happens to be sitting and at the time at which it happens it cannot not have happened (for if that were so it will happen that the same thing is happening and not happening to the same person at one and the

Translation

145

same time, which is impossible), we say, taking the accident into account, that it is necessary that Socrates is sitting, not simply but ‘at the time when he is sitting’. And just as it is false to say simply that an Ethiopian is white, but true that he is white in some aspect (for there is white in his eyes or teeth), so too it is false to say simply that Socrates is sitting of necessity, whereas it is true to apply this necessity to him at some particular time, not simply but by saying ‘at the time when he is sitting’. For if we say that it is necessary that Socrates is sitting in the same way as we say of the sun that it is necessary that the sun moves, i.e. simply, it is false. But if we say of a marble statue of Socrates, that it is necessary that the marble Socrates is sitting, if it happens that he has been sculptured as sitting, it is true and necessity could be predicated simply of that kind of Socrates. But this kind of necessity is not said of the real Socrates. For it cannot happen that Socrates is of necessity sitting, except in the case of when he is sitting. For at the time when he is sitting, he is of necessity sitting, because he is sitting and cannot not be sitting. In other words he is of necessity sitting, not simply, but contingently; for he can get up; but what is simply of necessity, cannot change that necessity, e.g. because it is necessary that the sun simply moves, it cannot in any way stand still. As Aristotle puts it, everything that is, when it is, and everything that is not, when it is not, necessarily is and is not conditionally, but cannot either be or not be unconditionally. For the latter applies only to those necessities which have no potentiality or relation to opposites, e.g. the sun to rest or fire to cold. For, Aristotle says, for something to be of necessity when it is, or not be when it is not, conditionally, is not the same as to say that it is necessary that everything is or is not simply. For in the former it is the condition that has made it true, in the latter the natural unconditionality established the truth. And it is the same with what is not.152 The same is also the case with what is not; not everything which is not, necessarily is not, but at the time when something is not, it necessarily is not; and once again this is meant conditionally, not simply. Once he has demonstrated these two kinds of necessity, conditional and simple, he now comes back again to future contradiction and contingency. 19a27-36 And the same account applies in contradiction. It is necessary that everything is or is not and will be or will not be; but one cannot separate and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean, for example, that it is necessary that there will or will not be a sea-battle tomorrow, but it is not necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow nor that there will not be one, though it is necessary that there will or will not be one. Then since statements are true according to how the things

15 20

25

243,1 5

10

15 20

25

244,1

5

146 10 15

20 25 245,1 5

10

15

20

25

246,1 5

Translation

actually are, it is clear that when things are such as to be ‘in either of two ways’ and for there to be contraries, it is necessary that the contradictories are of the same kind. This happens with things that are not always so or are not always not so. He has explained in the clearest manner his view of contingent future propositions when he says that there is full contradiction where any one proposition is true and the other false, but not that someone could separate them and reply that this one is necessarily true, but the other one necessarily false, e.g. when we say ‘the sun sets today, the sun does not set today’, someone can easily separate these and say that the sun necessarily sets today is true, that it does not necessarily set is false. For the nature and arrangement of the heavenly bodies is such that there is no relation in them to opposites. And so they either necessarily are what they are or necessarily are not what they are not. But things susceptible to growth and decay are not like this. For, insofar as they come into being and pass away, they have a relation to opposites and so with them it is not possible to take one side of the contradiction and say that it is necessarily so and vice versa state that the other is not necessarily so, even though any one side of the entire contradiction is true, the other false; but in an unknowable and indefinite manner, not merely for us, but nature itself is in doubt about the things proposed. E.g. in the proposition ‘Socrates will read today, Socrates will not read today’, one part of this entire contradiction is true, one is false (for either he will read or he will nor read) and this is seen mixed all together in the contradiction as a whole. But no one can separate them and reply that it is true that he will read or that it is true that he will not read. And this is not because when we hear this we do not know about the future, but because the same thing cannot both be and not be the case. Besides if this happened because of our ignorance and not because of the indefinite and changeable way in which things actually turn out, we would again have the impossibility that necessity controls everything. For it is not because of our knowledge that what is necessarily so will turn out so, but, even if we do not know the outcome of something, it will still be established and sure; it is necessary that this thing will happen. Then since this cannot happen and there are some things which do not turn out of necessity, but contingently, although in these cases truth or falsity is in one part or the other of the contradiction as a whole, it is not possible for anyone to separate and say that this one is true, the other false. He demonstrated this with the following example. Tomorrow it is necessary that a sea-battle either takes place or does not take place, but it will not, however, necessarily take place tomorrow or necessarily not take place tomorrow, in the sense that someone could separate them and make a prediction with the

Translation

147

words ‘it will take place tomorrow’, understanding that he is saying what is true and it will definitely happen this way, or conversely ‘it will not take place’ understanding that it will turn out so in the same way. None of this can be the case, but only in an indefinite sense is any one part of the contradiction true and the other false, but it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be. Their outcome cannot be separated; for both this and that could turn out. And this is so because the outcome of these things does not depend on some farback causes so that there is somehow a kind of chain of necessity, but these rather depend on our judgement and freewill, in which there is no necessity. The idea statements are true according to how the things actually are he has taken from Plato, who said153 that statements are similar to the things and are somehow related in their signification, so that if the things are unchangeable and of constant arrangement their statement too would be true and necessary, but that if it was the kind of thing that, due to the variety of its nature, never remained permanently, in statements about it too there would be no fixed truth and no demonstration could take place with statements of this kind. Aristotle then taking this as well expressed says that since statements are similar to the things, it is clear that where things are such as to be ‘in either of two ways’ and their contraries can occur, then the sort of contradiction which deals with things that are naturally unstable and indefinite must be such that if the things are doubtful and of indefinite and variable outcome the contradiction relating to these things also has a variable and indefinite outcome. What sort of things these would be whose outcome is varied and indefinite he showed very clearly where he says this happens with things that are not always so or are not always not so. For the things which happen ‘in either of two ways’ are the ones which neither always are (for they can pass away) nor always are not (for they can be generated and come to be). For these are the things that have a relation to opposites just as the outcome demonstrates in the proper substance of the things themselves; for to be and not to be are opposed. What was not is generated and comes into being from what was not. Then there is a tendency in this towards to be and not to be, i.e. a relation to opposites. But if the very same thing that is passes away, it will not be from what was. Once more then it will have a relation to opposites. And so just as the outcome of things that come into being and pass away is indefinite, so too are the parts of contradictions, although in the contradiction as a whole one is true, the other false. For which one of these is true and which false is indefinite and inseparable. 19a36-b2 For of these one part of the contradiction must be true or false; not however this or that one, but ‘in either of two ways’

10

15

20

25

247,1

5 10

15 20

25 248,1

5

148

10

15

20

25 249,1

5

10

15

20

25 30 250,1

Translation

and one is more likely to be true but not however already true or false. Therefore it is clear that in every affirmation or negation this opposite is true but the other false. He instructed us above154 in the case of things that are contradictory ‘in either of two ways’ that one side is not definitely true and the other definitely false. He now takes his argument from what is more or what is less likely to occur. For above he showed that there are certain things that happen more frequently, but that does not stop the opposite from sometimes happening too. For to happen more rarely or more frequently is contingent. So if in the case of what happens in the majority of cases, it is not necessary that one proposition is true, the other false (because if someone should say that a man grows white hair in old age and asserts that this is necessary, he is making an error, for he can also not grow white hair); if then in those where one thing is more likely to happen, one is not definitely true and the other false, much less will this be the case where the outcome of the opposites is equal. And it is true to say that a thing happens more frequently, rather than just saying that it happens, because the opposite happens, although more rarely. But if in the more common case one is not definitely true and the other false and much less so where the outcome is equally indistinguishable, it is clear that in future contingent propositions one is not true and the other false. For this is what in the beginning he set out to prove with a most convincing argument. 19b2-4 For it is not the same in the case of things that are not but could be or not be as in the case of things that are; but we have already said how it is with them. He brings the whole enquiry back to the division of times made at the beginning. For he said before that propositions which are to be framed are predicated either in the present, the past or the future. And those which are said of the present or the past possess definite truth or falsity, whether they are said of sempiternal and divine things or those which are born and die, which happen ‘in either of two ways’ so that they have a relation to opposites. But in future predications, if someone is speaking about divine and unchangeable things, one is definitely false and the other definitely true in the same way. For things of this nature do not have a relation to opposites. But where what comes into being and passes away is the subject of future predications, whether in affirmation or denial, there is not the same kind of definite truth, but in the contradiction as a whole one part is true and the other false, though never one definitely true and the other definitely false. But here he did not mention both times, present and past, but only the present. For he said in the case of

Translation

149

things that are i.e. those that are present. But with the words things that are not but could be he is speaking of future things, which, though they are not, still can be. For things that are ‘in either of two ways’ and happen to come into being and pass away do not behave in the same way when a proposition is predicated of them in the present as in the future. In present and past propositions one is definitely true, the other false; in future and contingent propositions the truth and falsity of the propositions is not definitely constrained. But because we have explained Aristotle’s view of future propositions as carefully as we could, let us end our long volume.

5

10 15

Notes 1. Alexander of Aphrodisias. His commentary does not survive. 2. Died in 384 AD. 3. 317-388; Neoplatonist of strong Aristotelian tendencies. 4. L. Minio-Paluello has tentatively identified Albinus’ lost work on dialectic with the Latin adaptation of Themistius’ paraphrase of the Categories ascribed to Augustine (Aristoteles Latinus I.1-5 p. LXVIII. Text ibid. pp. 133-75, Bruges 1961). Cf. Chadwick p. 113. 5. It was traditional in the preface to a commentary to discuss the text under a number of headings. In the course of his introduction Boethius covers four of the traditional six didascalica or cephalaia: intentio (skopos), inscriptio (epigraphê), authenticity and utilitas (to khrêsimon), omitting the question as to what part of philosophy it belongs and the order of topics discussed. The formal arrangement of this list seems to go back to Proclus according to Elias in cat. 107,24. Cf. I. Hadot, ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.), Les règles de l’interprétation, Paris 1987. The early commentators have only two or three of these. Porphyry has only two (title and purpose) in the preface of his short commentary on the Categories, though order and utility are mentioned later on. His larger commentary may have included more. 6. Elementum may mean written letter or the sound of the letter. Cf. 23,15 below. 7. For ‘blityri’ cf. 54,5 and 53,29 scindapsos. Ammonius in Int. 17,20-5; 30,17-19; 31,14. Both are used by the Stoics, cf. SVF II 149. 8. On connectives see Ebbesen in Sorabji 1990, p. 157n.42 and references: Dexippus in Cat. 32-3; Ammonius in Int. 12-13; Boeth. syll. cat. I PL 64 796CD; Simplic. in Cat. 64-5; Porph. in Cat. 57,32. 9. Poet. 1456b20ff. 10. Poet. 1456b20-1. 11. cf. 95 for the same five types. 12. vocabat for Meiser’s vocabant. 13. cf. 9,6. 14. lit. ‘and this is added …’ Shiel in Sorabji 1990, p. 361 translates ‘this too is in the margin’ and interprets as an indication that Boethius was using marginal notes on his Aristotle edition. 15. 18,9-10. 16. This principle of ‘sameness’ is also found in Ammonius in Int. 19,1-9. Cf Magee (1989) p. 75f. 17. ‘thing itself’ = transcendent Idea. Cf. Magee p. 79 and De Righ cited there. 18. cf. Tarán (1981) fr. 76 p. 435. 19. cf. Heinze fr. 8. 20. It should be noted that Aristotle’s Greek text has sumbola here and sêmeia in 16a6. Boethius has chosen deliberately to ignore the difference, perhaps to avoid confusion. It is likely that the equivalence of sumbola and sêmeia in this passage,

152

Notes to pages 28-46

which is explained by Ammonius (in Int. 19,32f.) goes back at least as far as Porphyry. Cf. Magee (1989) p. 54f. See also Kretzmann, ‘Semantics, history of’ in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Macmillan, vol. 7, p. 367. 21. Usually taken to refer to DA 432a12-14. Boethius himself probably thought this as he cites this passage at 28,lf. Cf. Magee 32. 22. 25,15-29,29 = Porph. 78F Smith. 23. Platonic Ideas. See Magee 95-6. 24. Possibly the intermingling of Forms is meant. Cf. Plato Soph. 259E. Porphyry wrote a commentary on the Soph. Cf. Porph. 169F,5 Smith = Boeth. De divisione 875d. 25. Aristotle Frag. 87[76] Rose; 5 Ross. 26. DA 3.8 432a10-14. 27. See 34,3. 28. References in Magee n.113. 29. 29,29-33,24 = Porph. 79F Smith. 30. Ammonius, too, compares the conventional signification of sounds (of interest to philosophers) with a coin (in Int. 22,27f.). Cf. also Ammonius in Cat. 11,7-12,1; Simpl. in Cat. 15,2-16; Dexippus in Cat.11,4-17; Magee (1989) p. 38n.105. Its origins perhaps in Plato Republic 371B8 and Arist. EN 1133a30-1. 31. Porphyry distinguishes first imposition (of interest to philosophers) and second imposition (of grammatical interest) in in Cat.57,2-58,20. 32. See Arens 217 and the discussion in Magee 120. 33. 37,30-40,28 = Porph. 80F Smith. 34. cf. Magee 12. 35. See Ebbesen (Sorabji, 1990) p. 159 who assigns this argument to Porphyry as an explanation of false combination of concepts. Magee p. 74 also sees Porphyry here. 36. This point is also raised by Ammonius, in Int. 27,27-33 who excludes the intelligible realities and our intellectual apprehension of them. These might correspond with Boethius’ second and third exclusions (i.e. substantial truths, god). 37. This is also raised by Ammonius, in Int. 27,9f. who includes only statements. 38. In Greek and Latin the single word lego means ‘I read’. The pronoun ego may be added for clarification or emphasis. 39. Latin est (is) which does not always need a subject expressed. 40. 30 end. 41. There is a parallel relationship (in fact Boethius has already said this at 30,24-8), but not as strong as Alexander wanted – ‘similar to’ rather than ‘exactly as’. 42. The Latin is una (one) which I have translated here and in the following discussion of this passage of Aristotle by ‘single’ which is less awkward in English. 43. Int. Ch. 5, 17a8. Cf. 96,18-19. 44. Ebbesen in Sorabji 1990, p. 168. There is little enough clear evidence for the ascription of truth and falsity to concepts as a Porphyrian idea, but Ebbesen cites Porph. in Cat. 101,24ff. and refers to Dexippus in Cat. 10,3-6 and to the present passage. Cf. also Ammonius in Int. 18,2-12; 21,4ff. 45. Int. 16a1. 46. cf. n. 7 above. 47. According to Strabo (13,618) he was renamed Theophrastus by Aristotle. 48. Aristotle uses two examples: Kallippos, epaktrokelês (pirateboat). It is difficult to see the difference between these two in the context of the present

Notes to pages 47-53

153

argument. The fact that the former is a proper name serves only to confuse (see Ackrill p. 117). It is interesting to note that Boethius avoids a proper name in his translation of the Aristotle passage and uses only one word (‘wildhorse’). In the commentary he introduces a second, ‘suburban’; but it too is not a proper name. We should also note that the word ‘wildhorse’ in Latin is a whole rather than a hyphenated word – equiferus, made up from equus (horse) and ferus (wild). A better English equivalent might be Ackrill’s suggestion ‘thermometer’. 49. Int. 16a28. 50. 60,16-25 = Porph. 83F Smith. 51. Int. 16a29. 52. Reading quae for MS quod as suggested by Meiser. 53. The genitive, dative and accusative cases are given. I have omitted the latter as having no English equivalent in this instance. Aristotle’s example is Philo. 54. i.e. either nominative or vocative. All other cases are termed ‘oblique’. 55. Added by Meiser. 56. The word ‘it’ is not expressed in Latin. 57. 16a32-b1. The full text of Boethius’ translation of 16a32-b5 is: ‘Cato’s’ or ‘to Cato’ and the like are not names but cases of a name. The same account holds for them as for names except that when a case is combined with ‘is’, ‘was’ or ‘will be’, it is neither true nor false, whereas a name always is, e.g. ‘Cato’s is’ or ‘Cato’s is not’; so far neither is true or false. 58. i.e. the proper name in oblique cases. 59. Int. 16b1-2. 60. Int. 16b2-3. 61. Int. 16b3-4. 62. Int. 16b4. 63. semper: aei is not in Minio-Paluello who follows cod. Ambrosianus. It is found in cod. Marc. 201, Ammonius, Stephanus and the Armenian and Syriac translations. 64. cf. 57,12f. 65. Int. 16b8-9. The Greek examples are hugieia (health) and hugiainei (is healthy). 66. Int. 16b9-10 This differs from the standard text of Aristotle always a sign of things which are, i.e. things [that are] of a subject. The addition of or in a subject is taken from the discussion in Cat. 1a20ff. Porphyry apparently suggested this reading or at least understood of a subject to embrace in a subject. Cf. Porph. 86F Smith (= Ammonius in Int. 50,8-13). Similarly Porphyry reads things said of something else instead of things which are (cf. Ammonius). In this case Boethius has the text as adjusted by Porphyry and makes no mention of any other reading, e.g. the standard readings as adopted by Ammonius. We may conclude either that Boethius has ignored Porphyry’s arguments for adjusting the text or that Porphyry did not argue for them or that Porphyry himself had the same text as that presented by Boethius. 67. The second and third explanations are found in Ammonius too. The second, on the explicit testimony of Ammonius, goes back to Porphyry, who is probably also the author of the third interpretation which both Ammonius and Boethius prefer. 68. The Greek expressions mean ‘does not recover’, ‘does not ail’. 69. There appears to be a lacuna at this point where the discussion moves on to the next section of text (16b16-18). The transition is found in the first edition (I 60-1) though it adds little to what we have here. 70. I have added this to complete the sense.

154

Notes to pages 53-75

71. The Greek means literally ‘the others [signify in addition] the [time] round about’. 72. Porphyry has ou = not, a reading adopted by Minio-Paluello (cf. Porph. 88F Smith = Ammonius in Int. 56,14-32). The manuscripts, later commentators and Ackrill read oude = not even. 73. 71,13-18 = Porph. 87F Smith. Cf. Simplic. in Cat. 2,8. 74. Boethius here translates the reading ou (not) for oude (not even) either inadvertently or because he is following Porphyry who defended the former. See the note on the lemma above. 75. yet: not until combined with a subject. 76. it: vague in Aristotle. Boethius means an actual thing. See n. 87. 77. cum aliquid dictum: I have interpreted this as implying something said on its own, e.g. ‘walks’. 78. Boethius (and Aristotle?) is here talking about affirmations and negations and not about the reality or actual truth of such statements (an affirmation may be true or false). 79. The transition of thought is difficult, but Boethius seems to be partly thinking of ‘is’ in such periphrases as ‘is walking’. His conclusions, however, apply to all verbs: walks, is, is walking. 80. actual thing (res): perhaps ‘state of affairs’ might be a better translation. Boethius does not mean just the subject of which the verb is predicated, i.e. ‘Socrates’ in ‘Socrates walks’ but the whole concept ‘Socrates walks’. 81. On ‘being’ as a connective (and therefore without independent signification) see Ebbesen (1990) p. 157 n. 42 referring to Ammonius in Int. 55-7; Simplic. in Cat. 42,23-4. 82. 77,13-78,26 = Porph. 89F Smith. 83. una: see note on 48,28 and 173,14. 84. cf. 16a22 and Boethius 58,5f. as in the sentence wild horse: the whole sentence in which this phrase occurs in Aristotle (16a21-23) does not appear as a lemma in Boethius, although it is found both in his translation and in the first edition of the commentary (48,9-10 in oratione quae est equus ferus). See the note on 58 for Boethius’ substitution of ‘wildhorse’ for Aristotle’s Kallippos. 85. Adopting the reading vocem suggested by Meiser. 86. Virgil, Aeneid 4.360. 87. Adopting from the Basil edition (1570) the reading ipsius for ipsarum of the MSS. 88. The name is taken from Virgil, Aeneid. 89. Porph 91F Smith. 90. Reading est for sit. 91. Reading consignificat with T1 rather than Meiser consignificet. 92. Cratylus 387D-390E. 93. Virgil Aeneid 1.734. 94. ibid. 8.150. 95. Virgil Ecl. 9.1. 96. Virgil Aeneid 1.229-230. 97. 17,24f. 98. See 86,4. 99. cf. 998b12. 100. 97,4f. 101. Porph. 90F Smith; cf. Ammonius in Int. 74,22-75,2. 102. This simplified schema brings us back to a direct interpretation of the text

Notes to pages 75-108

155

and need not be seen to contradict the more complex analysis given above. The types omitted here (single without conjunction, multiple with conjunction) should perhaps be understood as being self-evidently included in single or multiple signification as not requiring to be separately pointed out. 103. i.e. both simple and combined sentences. 104. See 115f. 105. cf. 85,28f. 106. Reading tractatu with b. 107. i.e. when we affirm or deny something of something, cf. 118,5-16. 108. There seems to be a problem here with the text. M. would like to read significativarum vocum (rather than rerum) at 118,30. 109. 94F Smith. 110. cf. An. Pr. 24a16. 111. For name cf. 62f., for accident 67f. 112. Int. 17a17-18. 113. Int. 17a23-4. 114. Int. 17a25. 115. Int. 17a25-6. 116. 263f. 117. Add . Cf. 132,16. 118. 136. 119. cf. 142 end. 120. Boethius has changed the Kallias of Aristotle’s text to Plato. 121. Platonitas: we can hardly translate as Platonism! The analogy humanitas/humanity may serve as a model. 122. Reading determinationes with FT. Meiser terminationes. 123. ‘no’ = nullus. 124. Which he does at 154. 125. Reading determinationem with TE for Meiser’s terminationem. 126. i.e. Herminus’ principles of interpretation apply equally to particular propositions and do not then explain why Aristotle made a point of emphasing the signification of contraries by universals. 127. Reading non dixit with T for Meiser’s dixit. 128. Int. 17b30-4, cf. Boethius 169f. 129. Added by Meiser. 130. I think that Meiser is probably right to suggest a lacuna here since this summary includes only the case of contradiction mentioned by Herminus (which Boethius found to be an unsatisfactory explanation of the wording) and not those adduced in the explanations of Alexander and Porphyry. 131. i.e. Boethius equates ‘some man is not just’ and ‘not every man is just’; cf. 167,2f. 132. i.e. the subcontraries can both be true at the same time. 133. He means ‘beneath’ in the literal sense of his diagram on p. 152 in which these two are found at the foot of the columns ‘universal affirmation’ and ‘universal negation’ respectively. 134. Here Boethius translates Aristotle’s oudeis with nemo rather than the usual nullus. 135. 153,7f. 136. Cat. 14a30. 137. As in 48,28 the Latin una (one) is rendered by ‘single’.

156

Notes to pages 110-148

138. The lemma is not given in the text but is taken from the continuous translation. 139. Int. 18a17, cf. Boethius 179f. 140. ‘capable of walking’ is a single adjective in Boethius (gressibilis). 141. cf. also 189,4. The reference to conflict between the Franks and Ostrogoths is probably as generic as the reference to Greeks and Persians, and cannot be used to give a precise date to the work, e.g. 507-509 as suggested by Usener, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 370, 1880. 142. i.e. diagonally opposed, therefore as contradictories, cf. 151,17f; 153,4f. 143. The text is suspect here. 144. I have translated literally here, but it should be noted that ‘non est’ can in classical Latin mean ‘it is not possible that …’, especially since Boethius is probably looking at an esti in Greek, which is normally equivalent to exesti. 145. His commentary on Aristotle’s Physics does not survive. Cf. also in Int. 458,27. 146. 192,22-193,6. 147. Int. 18a38. 148. cf. Alexander On Fate 182; SVF 2.979. 149. I have restored the MS reading illa … subiecta which gives cattle a special status amongst irrational animals. Boethius may be referring to the particular status of domestic sacrificial animals whose entrails were examined, e.g. for divination purposes, and could be regarded as being significant as manifesting the workings of cosmic sympathy which would include the influence of the stars. 150. Int. 18b31-2. 151. cf. Consolation 5.4.7. 152. Int. 19a26-27. This sentence is not given in the lemma. 153. Plato Timaeus 29B-C. Is this Platonic parallel taken from Porphyry or could it be an independent observation and part of his plan to show that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement? 154. 245-7.

Select Bibliography Greek text of Aristotle De Interpretatione: Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford 1949. Latin text of Boethius’ second commentary on De Interpretatione: Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermêneias, pars posterior, rec. Carolus Meiser, Lipsiae 1880. Latin text of Boethius’ first commentary and translation of De Interpretatione: Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermêneias, pars prior, rec. Carolus Meiser, Lipsiae 1877. Aristoteles Latinus I.1-5, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges 1961. Ackrill, J.L., Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963. Arens, H., Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1984. Chadwick, H., Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy, Oxford 1981. Courcelle, P., Les lettres grecques en occident, Paris 1948 (2nd edn). Ebbesen, S., ‘Porphyry’s legacy to logic: a reconstruction’, in Sorabji 1990, 141-72. Ebbesen, S., ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian commentator’, in Sorabji 1990, 373-92. Hadot, I., ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.) Les règles de l’interprétation, Paris 1987. Heinze, R., Xenokrates, Leipzig 1892 (reprint Hildesheim 1965). Magee, J., Boethius on Signification and Mind, Philosophia Antiqua LII, Leiden 1989. Shiel, J., ‘Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’, in Sorabji 1990, 349-72. Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990. Sorabji, R., ‘The ancient commentators on Aristotle’, in Sorabji 1990, 1-30. Tarán, L., Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary, Leiden 1981. Usener, H., Review of Meiser, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 370, 1880. Wehrli, F., Die Schule des Aristoteles 8, Basel 1969 (2nd edn).

English-Latin Glossary addition: adpositio affection: passio affirmation: adfirmatio belief: opinio capability: potestas category: praedicamentum combination: conplexio , conpositio combined: conpositus communication: interpretation concept: conceptio conjoined: coniunctus conjunction: coniunctio convention, by: positione, secundum placitum definite: definitus defined: definitus denote: designare determination: determinatio disposition: adfectio division: divisio element: elementum equivocal: aequivocus equivocation: aequivocatio essence: esse expression: dictio finite: finitus image: imago imagination: imaginatio, imago indefinite: indefinitus, indeterminatus individual: individuus infinite: infinitus intellect: intellectus name: nomen negation: negatio particular: particular particularity: particularitas

privation: privatio property: proprietas proposition: propositio proprium: proprium quality: qualitas relation(ship): habitudo sense-perception: sensus sentence: oratio separation: divisio sign: nota significant: significativus signification: significatio signify: significare, signare signify, additionally: consignificare simple: simplex singular: singularis single: singulus sound: sonus speech: oratio spoken sound: vox state: habitus statement: enuntiatio statement-making: enuntiativus subject: subiectum substance: substantia term: terminus, vocabulum, verbum, nomen thing: res thought: intellectus univocal: univocal utter: profero utterance: locutio prolatio verb: verbum will: voluntas word: sermo, verbum, vocabulum, nomen, particula

Latin-English Index * indicates that the listed Latin word is used by Boethius for the marked Greek word in his translation of de interpretatione or categories or is specially glossed by him. adfectio, disposition, 11,25 adfirmatio (*kataphasis, phasis), affirmation, 13,27 adpositio (prosthesis), addition, 391,18 aequivocatio, equivocation, 39,28 aequivocus (*homonumos), equivocal, 16,12 conceptio, concept, 8,1; conception 21.13 = intellectus coniunctio (*sundesmos), conjunction, 5,7; connecting, 16,31 coniunctus, conjoined, 5,10 conplexio (sumplokê), combination, 173,8 conpositio (*synthesis), combination, 43,30 conpositus (*sunthetos), combined, 5,10 consignificare, additionally signify, 65,29 contradictio, contradiction, 99,29 (contradictory) contradictorius, contradictory, 199,22 contrarietas, contrariety, 158,1 contrarius, contrary, 19,30 definitio, definition, 4,26 definitus, definite, defined 62,3 (opposite of indefinitus) designare, denote, 5,17 determinatio, determination, 138,12 dictio (*phasis), expression, 5,7 divisio (*diairesis), division, separation, 43,30 = separatio elementum (stoikheion), element, 4,24 (written letter, sound of a letter, 21,6).

enuntiatio (*apophasis), statement, 13,27 enuntiativus (*apophantikos), statement-making, 9,13 esse, essence, 17,31 finitus, finite, 256,8 habitudo (skhesis), relation(ship), 46,6 habitus (hexis), state, 17,17 imaginatio (*phantasia, phantasma), image, mental image, mental imaging, 28,1 imago, image, 35,6 indefinitus (= indeterminatus), indefinite (opposite definitus), 138,3 indeterminatus, 144,17 = indefinitus individuus, individual, 179,7 infinitus (*aoristos), infinite (opposite of finitus), 61,7 intellectus thought 8, 1(*noêma) = conceptio; intellect 7,16; comprehension 9,4 intelligentia, mind 29,2; thought 136,9 interpretatio, communication, 6,3 locutio (*lexis), utterance, 5,4 = prolatio negatio (*apophasis), negation, 13,26 nomen (*onoma), name, 8, 11; word 12,27; term 7,2 nota (*sumbolon, sêmeion), sign, 25,7 opinio, belief, 467,2 oppositio, opposition, 160,26 oratio (*logos), sentence 8,11, speech, 13,6 particula, word 48,12 particular, particular, 69,14

Latin-English Index particularitas, particularity, 69,4 passio (*pathêma), affection, 25,7 positione (*thesei), by convention, 23,5 potestas, capability, potentiality, 446,24 praedicamentum (*katêgorêma), category, 4,14 privatio (sterêsis), privation, 17,18 profero, utter, 47,4 prolatio, utterance, 18,10 = locutio propositio, proposition, 12,19 proprietas, property, 138,29 proprium, proprium, 18,32 qualitas, quality, 7,22 res (*pragma), thing, 20,16 secundum placitum (*kata sunthêkên), by convention, 52,29 sensus (aisthêma, aisthêsis), sense perception, faculty of sense perception, a sense perception, 24,17; meaning 36,24 separatio = divisio, 49,22

161

sermo, word, 5,6 significare = signare (sêmainô, dêloô), signify, 6,14 significatio, signification, 6,24 significativus (*sêmantikos), significant, 5,23 simplex, simple, 7,23 singularis, singular, 135,24 singulus, single, 86,8 sonus (*psophos), sound, 4,26 subiectum (hupokeimenon), subject, 18,6; what underlies 136,2 substantia, substance,17,31 terminus, term 100,5 universalis, universal, 15,28 univocus (*sunônumos), univocal, 16,14 unus, one, 5,9; single 48,28 verbum (*rhêma), verb 8,11; word 13,24; term 12,6 vocabulum, term, 6.7; word 56,10 voluntas, will, 34,7 vox (*phônê), spoken sound, 4,18

Index of Names Africa, 221,19.22 Ajax, 183,25.26 Albinus, 4,4 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 3,1; 10,5.14; 11.15.31; 16,15.18.20; 17,26; 18,22; 19,19; 26,1.15; 35,22; 36,3.10.25; 37,5.18.19.30; 40,10.26.30; 77,3; 82,4; 83,21; 85,13.23; 86,14; 93,9.22; 121,6.27; 158,17; 159,25.26; 160,3.8; 183,21; 219,29 Alexander of Troy, 140,14 Alexander, son of Philip of Macedon, 140,15 Andronicus, 11,13.26; 12,26; 98,15 Aristocles, 56,2 Aristotle, 4,1; 7,17; 43,13; 56,4; 79,16.20; 80,2; 193,26; (passim with reference to de Interpretatione) Aristotle, works Analytics, 3,7; 12,22; 122,1; 172,30 Categories, 172,10 De Anima, 11,23; 28,2; 43,17 De Iustitia, 27,13 Metaphysics, 102,25 Poetics, 6,16; 8,7 Sophistici elenchi, 132,9; 134,4 Aspasius, 10,4; 37,17; 41,13; 74,32; 86,17; 121,27; 122,3; 159,25; 183,20 Athenians, 202,17.18 Athens, 235,22 Brutus, 184,10.12 Cato, 63,19; 64,1-3.17; 66,20; 106,26.28; 107,1.4; 111,14; 130,19f.; 131,1-11; 147,16 Cicero, 62,1; 92,15; 140,4 Diodorus (Cronus), 234,22; 235,5.11 Epicureans, 193,24 Epicurus, 239,25 Ethiopian, 242,15 Franks, 184,23; 189,4

Goths, 184,23; 189,4 Hannibal, 221,20 Herminus, 25,22; 26,12; 39,25; 40,3; 157,30; 158,14; 183,7.19 Italy, 221,20.21.23 Mezentius, 88,23.24 Peripatetics, 29,17; 30,3; 95,9; 193,24.26; 194,8; 197,5.12.18 Persians, 189,5; 193,9; 224,14 Philo (of Megara), 234,10.15; 235,9 Plato, 9,3; 24,15; 26,27; 47,18.19; 56,2; 57,19; 66,30; 79,23; 80,2; 81,1; 82,13; 85,31; 86,20.22; 88,2; 89,6.9; 93,1.20; 95,16; 97,16; 107,19.21; 109,11; 111,16; 115,20; 130,4; 134,9-11; 136,20; 137,7.12-15.25; 138,26-8; 139,2.39.10.11.16.22.26; 140,4.20.29; 141,1; 246,21 Plato, works Cratylus, 93,1 Platonity, 137,7.10.14.25; 139,19 Porphyry, 7,6; 11,1; 16,10.19; 17,24; 18,19; 26,17; 29,29; 33,20; 36,10; 37,16; 40,9.27; 60,20; 71,13; 77,13; 85,24; 88,29; 89,1; 106,20; 110,10; 121,25; 122,3; 123,5; 134,20; 159,7; 160,9; 183,21; 201,2; 219,17 Scipio, 221,18 Scylla, 62,8 Socrates, 9,3; 14,17.20.23; 16,31.32.33; 17,7.8.13.14; 19,2.3.5; 28,19.22.26; 46,30; 47,18.19; 48,32; 49,1-20; 56,30; 57,19; 63,22.25; 64,13.25; 66,30; 71,24.25; 73,10.11; 74,14.15; 75,30.31; 76,1; 77,18-23; 81,1; 82,10.12; 84,24; 85,27.31; 86,5.716.19; 97,16; 100,16.19; 102,13.17; 103,28; 104,9.12.13; 108,22; 112,1; 113,26; 114,2;

Index of Names 118,7-10; 124,6-10; 127,5.9.12.14; 128,20; 129,25.27; 130,1.4; 136,21; 140,4; 141,9.16; 144,23; 154,15; 160,30; 168,4.5.23.24; 175,19.32; 202,20.21.23.24.27.30; 203,11; 212,22-4; 241,30; 242,4.6.8.10.14.18.23.25.27.28; 243,2; 245,12.13 Speusippus, 24,16 Stoics, 9,26; 24,20; 34,19; 71,13; 193,25; 194,23; 195,10; 197,12.24; 201,3; 208,2; 217,20; 234,27; 235,9; 240,1

163

Sulla, 170,1 Syrianus (Philoxenus), 18,26; 86,30; 88,28; 172,13.22.29; 173,11 Tarquin, 184,11.13 Themistius, 4,2 Theocritus, 234,13 Theophrastus, 9,24; 12,3.8; 17,26; 56,3; 102,26; 140,7 Troy, 189,3 Tyrtamus, 56,4 Vetius Praetextatus, 3,7 Virgil, 240,10.14 Xenocrates, 24,16

Subject Index adverbs, 15,2 affections of the soul, 11,22f.; 25,15f.; 33,25f. affections as likenesses, 35,15f. natural, 39,1f. affirmation and negation, 49,5f.; 89,10f. as species of statement, 16,15f.; 98,15f.; 120,1f. Aristotle categories (ten), 7,16f. Boethius first and second edition, 186,1f. harmonizes Plato and Aristotle, 80,2f. plan to translate and comment on all Aristotle, 79,12 cases, direct and oblique, 63,27f. causality, necessity/chance/free choice Peripatetics on, 193,26f. Stoics on, 194,23f. causes, primary, 197,25 centaurs, 22,5 chance, 190,2f.; 192,12; 193,1; 203,4; 219,5f.; 223,16; 239,15f. combination and division, 45,26f. communication, 6,3f. conjunctions, 5,16; 6,16; 14,32 contingency, 193,16f.; 202,14ff.; 226,7f.; 246,1f. contingent prediction, 212,1f. contradiction,126,14f.; 152,5f.; 154,16.f; 164,2f.; 168,6f.; 174,16; 176,10f.; 192,25; 199,19f.; 202,10f.; 214,30f.; 244,17f.; 247,6f. apparent contradictions, 132,15f.; contraries, 148,16f.; 156,20f.; 165,6f.; 169,10f.; 176,13f.; 236,5f.; 247,2f. quasi-contraries, 158,24f. De Interpretatione genuineness of, 11,13f. obscure and difficult style, 4,10f.; 12,1; 99,26;

purpose of, 7,30 title of the work, 6,25f.; 9,23; 10,15f. definition, by genus and differentiae, 53,1f. deliberation, 221,16f. determinations, 142,20f.; 157,7f. divine things, 249,19 divine bodies (e.g. sun) have no potentiality, 238,21f. without affection, 13,2 expression, 85,25f.; 112,25f. falsity and truth, 45,25f. four modes of stating, 213,20f. not in all cases of combination and division, 47,20f. fate, 197,24f.; 217,21f.; 221,8; 223,5 Forms, 25,2f.; 34,13 free choice, 190,2f.; 193,1; 195,2f.; 203,4; 218,5f.; 219,5f.; 223,11; 230,15ff.; 231,17; 246,17 god as simple truth, 46,15f. divine providence, 232,6f. divine will, 232,7 ‘god is’ does not refer to time, 51,8f.; 186,29f. god’s favour invoked, 79,10 knows everything, 22,10; 203,1; 225,9ff. (and prophecy) worship diverse, nature the same for all, 42,4 heavenly bodies, 244,25f. image, mental, 5,24f.; 27,25f.; 196,14f. imagination (phantasia), 28,1f. (provides outline); 44,17f.; 136,9 indefinite affirmation/negation, 169,18f.; 172,14f.; 174,1f. indefinite particular propositions,140,6f.; 152,11f.; 154,10f. ‘is’ designates existence or time, 51,5f. simply (present) or with time (past, future), 51,17f.

Subject Index judgement, 196,22f. letter and element difference, 23,15f. likeness, in perception, 35,1f. memory, 35,11 name, definition of, 53,12f. combined, 58,22f. infinite name, 61,5f. single name neither true nor false, 50,1f. names and verbs, 14,1f.; 20,10f. nature, 192,5f.; 203,1f.; 208,17; 210,3; 220,10f.; 228,15; 231,15 necessity, 203,4f.; 204,14f.; 206,6f.; 209,20f.; 217,15f.; 220,10f.; 223,17f.; 246,16 conditional/simple, 241,1ff. negation, 174,1f. as division, 49,14 why does A. deal with it before affirmation? 19,10f. negative, position of, 143,1f. ‘no’, 145,20f. participles, 14,32 Porphyry as main guide, 7,5 possibility, 193,1; 197,10f.; 203,4; 219,5f.; 233,25ff. predicate always a verb, 100,25 prediction, modes of, 211,27f. prophecy, 224,27f. propositions, 14,32 contingent, 188,1f.; 214,25f. future contingent, 189,20ff.; 200,11f.; 208,1f; 215,15f. future necessary, 200,1f. future, present and past, 189,1f. hypothetical (conditional), 105,13; 186,16f.; 199,1f. impossible, 188,25. indefinite, 152,11f.; 155,26f.; 199,24f.; 205,15f. individual, 152,11f.; 154,10f. necessary, 187,5f. particular affirmation/negation, 147,20f. simple (predicative), 105,14; 147,7f (four kinds of: universal, particular, indefinite, of an individual subject) singular future, 202,19f. universal affirmation/negation, 147,20f.

165

providence, 194,23; 195,23 quality, 136,5f.; 142,24; 171,7f. necessary/inessential, 238,26f. quantity, 136,12; 142,23; 171,7f. sempiternity, 186,25; 249,17f. sensations, between things and thoughts, 24,15 different from thought, 27,10 sentence, 6,22; 44,10f; 80,17ff. imperfect, 86,23 multiple/combined distinction, 106,20f. perfect and imperfect, 9,1f. perfect, five kinds, 9,5f. signifies by convention, 92,25f. simple and combined sentences, 115,1f. single, 102,16f.; 178,21f. single/simple distinction, 106,20f. species of perfect sentence, 95,1f. species of, 125,21 signification, 6,1 singulars, 140,20 sound, 4,20f. speech, three forms of: letter, spoken, thought, 29,16f.; 36,11; 42,15f. spoken sound, 4,15f.; 25,15f. as names of things but signify affections of the soul, 41,9f. imperfect spoken sounds as sentences, 81,1f. statement making, simple (and combined), 9,15; 14,12f.; 96,18ff. spoken sounds and letters by convention, 23,4; 25,1 stars, men subject to, 231,17 statements definition of, 113,11f. genus of statement, 124,31 simple, 86,5f.; 118,16f. single, 96,27f.; 106,1f. subalternates, 147,30f. subcontraries, 151,10f.; 157,5f.; 205,14f. syllables, 6,16; 88,22ff. teaching and learning, 23,24f. thing, thought, spoken sound, letters, 20,20f.; 24,10 things, 136,11; 188,15f.; 198,16f.; 199,14f.; 206,4f.; 246,22f.

166

Subject Index

things and thoughts natural, 23,2; 24,26 thoughts, 20,16f.; 136,5f. time present, 206,7f. simple (present), past, future, indeterminate, 51,5f.; 124,25f.; 128,15f.; 188,27f.; 249,12f. (future, present, past); 133,19; 184,5f.

universal and particular, 137,25f. universal predicate cannot be determined universally, 161,24f. utterance (=articulated spoken sound), 5,5f. verb, definition of, 66,1f. as a predicate, 68,2f. as a name, 71,16f. infinite verbs, 69,25f. will, 34,8; 196,14f.; 217,25f.; 223,22f.