Ammonius: On Aristotle, On Interpretation 9; with Boethius: On Aristotle, On Interpretation 9 9781472551733, 9780715626917

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Preface Richard Sorabji This is a volume on determinism. It contains the two most important commentaries on the determinist’s sea battle argument, and on other deterministic arguments besides. It includes the earliest full exposition of the Reaper argument for determinism, and a discussion of whether there can be changeless knowledge of the passage of time. It contains the two fullest expositions of the idea that it is not truth, but only definite truth, that would imply determinism. Ammonius and Boethius both wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation and on its ninth chapter where Aristotle discusses the sea battle. Their comments are crucial, for Ammonius’ commentary influenced the Islamic Middle Ages, while that of Boethius was of equal importance to medieval Latin-speaking philosophers. It was once argued that Boethius was influenced by Ammonius, but these translations are published together in this volume to enable the reader to see clearly that this was not the case. Ammonius draws on the fourth- and fifth-century Neoplatonists Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus. He arranges his argument around three major deterministic arguments and is our main source for one of them, the Reaper argument, which has hitherto received insufficient attention. Boethius, on the other hand, draws on controversies from 300 years earlier between Stoics and Aristotelians as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry. Ammonius’ commentary on the first eight chapters of Aristotle’s On Interpretation has appeared in a previously published volume in this series, translated by David Blank.

Acknowledgements My work on this translation owes much to comments and suggestions by Gerhard Seel and Jean-Pierre Schneider, the first of whom went over the translation with me in Claremont in January, 1996. Thanks are also due to Richard Sorabji, who again commented on my translation and allowed me to see his two essays for the volume, as well as Susanne Bobzien, who read the notes for me. David Blank I am very grateful to Nancy Hall Davenport for providing me with invaluable clerical help as I was revising this translation for publication. Norman Kretzmann

1. The three deterministic arguments opposed by Ammonius Richard Sorabji Ammonius, c. 435/445–517/526 AD, was taught by Proclus in Athens, took the Chair of the Neoplatonist school in Alexandria and had all the greatest sixth-century Neoplatonists as his pupils. His commentary on Chapter 9 of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione is a treatise on ancient arguments for determinism. By determinism I mean the view that whatever happens has been inevitable or necessary all along. The famous Sea Battle argument for determinism, reported and attacked by Aristotle, was commonly presented in a new form in the Middle Ages1 in terms of definite truth and definite falsity. Ammonius’ was not the first such exposition, but it is the earliest detailed one to survive. It was almost immediately followed by the Latin exposition of Boethius, which uses the same idea, drawing independently on an overlapping set of Greek sources.2 Boethius influenced the medieval Latin tradition, while the medieval Arabic was influenced by Boethius’ sources and by Ammonius possibly through the derivative commentary of Stephanus.3 Ammonius also tells us of two other arguments for determinism, not found in Aristotle. The one from Divine Knowledge raises a very interesting issue that is still being debated now, whether there could be changeless knowledge of the passage of time and if not, whether changeless knowledge would involve a loss of information. There are ancient discussions in Ammonius and (a little earlier) in Augustine, writing in Latin, and the debate was resumed in medieval Islam. Ammonius is also the main source for the content of the Reaper argument for determinism, other sources being later and derivative.4 He picks out the Reaper and the argument from Divine Knowledge, not the Sea Battle argument on which he is supposed to be commenting, as the two deterministic arguments which seem to create an impasse for those who hear them (131,22). I shall try to show that he is right: the Reaper does appear to create an impasse. Ammonius’ commentary, then, on Chapter 9 of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione constitutes a treatise on determinism, and supplies the first extant exposition of a number of seminal Greek ideas. Boethius and Ammonius between them influence the Latin and Arabic Middle Ages on the subject.

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I. Introduction

That is reason enough for devoting a separate volume, with descriptive chapters, to their expositions. By not only having the commentaries in English for the first time, but also having them published together, readers may find it easier to see the differences, as well as the similarities, and to assess the different influences they underwent from different sources. (i) The Reaper: there is no ‘perhaps’ about it Not only does Ammonius pick out the Reaper5 as one of two deterministic arguments that appear to create an impasse. We also have a report that 800 years earlier, Zeno the founder of Stoicism was so anxious to hear seven versions of the Reaper that he paid twice the price asked.6 The seller is called a dialectician, and the puzzle may have originated in the dialectical school of Diodorus Cronus.7 It has, however, excited surprisingly little modern interest. One standard work explicitly omits it as too uninteresting to discuss.8 Can we understand why it should have been found so interesting in antiquity? I believe we can, but it requires us to consider the ambiguity of the word ‘perhaps’ (takha).9 I believe the problem is this: ‘perhaps’ is ambiguous. It can be used to make a guarded statement about the future. One modern philosopher has suggested this,10 but it is not a meaning for which there is a standard symbol in formal logic. ‘Perhaps he will reap’, to take Ammonius’ example, can serve as a guarded statement that he will reap. It is in that case refuted if the person in question does not reap after all. But it is only in that case that it is refuted. The statement is often taken instead, especially by logicians, not as a statement about future reaping, but as a statement about present possibilities. The false inference can then be drawn that what has been refuted is not the guarded statement about future reaping, but the statement of anterior possibility. And if there was after all no anterior possibility of reaping, the reaping turns out to have been necessary, as the determinist wants it to be. But this appearance is gained only by illegitimate exploitation of ambiguity. Because logic is well accustomed to dealing with statements of possibility, but not with guarded statements of fact, it is worth emphasising for a moment that ‘perhaps’ can serve to introduce a guarded statement. Not only can ‘he didn’t reap’ be used to refute an earlier ‘perhaps he will reap’. But equally the would-be non-smoker’s ‘perhaps I will never smoke again’ can be contradicted by a ‘you will!’ What is contradicted, like what is refuted, is a guarded statement about the future. No claim of possibility has been refuted, or even contradicted. Nor is it necessary, in order to contradict our would-be non-smoker, to say ‘you must’, as a statement of possibility would require, rather than simply ‘you will’. Ammonius offers two answers. First he objects to the modal words which the determinist introduces in denying the applicability of ‘perhaps’. The determinist says that so far from there being any ‘perhaps’ about it, you

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will reap pantôs, which I would render ‘come what may’, or ‘whatever happens’. Ammonius complains that he is smuggling in without argument the claim he is meant to prove. What I have suggested is that the determinist does have an argument. His introduction of ‘come what may’ is merely an expression of the denial of alternative possibilities, and that denial gains its force from the ambiguity of ‘perhaps’. Ammonius’ other complaint is that the determinist’s premise, ‘either you will reap or you will not reap’, concedes the existence of alternative possibilities, the very point he goes on to deny. But in fact Ammonius is doubly mistaken. First, it is only an inference we make in ordinary (non-dialectical) conversation that a person who says ‘either you will reap or you will not reap’, regards either as possible, so far as he knows, in the absence of a warning to the contrary, since otherwise his remark might be unhelpful. This is not to say it is part of the meaning of the words. Secondly, even if the determinist had been conceding alternative possibilities for the sake of argument at the beginning of the discussion, his exploitation of the ambiguity of ‘perhaps’ would have withdrawn the concession. I conclude that the ambiguity of ‘perhaps’ gives the determinist’s argument plausibility and is hard to answer, because it is hard to diagnose where the plausibility comes from. It has not been diagnosed by Ammonius, nor, so far as I know, in modern literature. (ii) Divine knowledge The second threatening argument in favour of determinism, according to Ammonius, comes from divine knowledge.11 The gods’ knowledge of the future must surely be definite (hôrismenê). It is not merely knowledge that something may or may not happen.12 Does this not imply that the future must itself be definite, and therefore not contingent? Ammonius replies by drawing on the clever idea which starts in Neoplatonism with Iamblichus, but which also goes back before Neoplatonism, that knowledge need not have the same status as the known.13 Knowledge takes its status from the knower, Ammonius says, and therefore the gods can have definite knowledge of future contingents which are indefinite (aorista, 136,1-17). Ammonius equates indefinite knowledge with conjectural knowledge (eikastikê gnôsis, 133,29; cf. 133,16 where indefinite knowledge is connected with conjecturing eikazein). He argues that the gods do not have a relation to the future which requires (hôste, 133,29) such knowledge. His point, I think, is both ontological and epistemological. With the gods (para, 133,19 and 26; epi, 133,25; 136,18-20), nothing is past or future, so they know of future contingents, but not as future. If we want to know why nothing is past or future with the gods, we must recall that for Ammonius the gods are outside time. This should make it possible to formulate an even clearer argument. Dating something as past

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I. Introduction

or future is dating it by reference to one’s own position in time. But the gods have no position in time. No doubt, they can date contingent events by reference to other events. They can date the publication of this book to 1998. But that is not to date is as past or future. Since they do not see events as future, their knowledge of them does not have to be, like ours, conjectural. Ammonius applies Iamblichus’ idea not only to definite knowledge of the indefinite, but also to timeless knowledge of the temporal and changeless knowledge of the changing. But as regards timeless knowledge, he does not exploit the idea as effectively as Boethius after him. He does not diagnose what I see as the genuine deterministic threat in the idea of divine foreknowledge.14 If the gods’ knowledge of what I will do tomorrow is infallible, then tomorrow I cannot so act as to make them wrong. If in addition their knowledge is foreknowledge, then tomorrow it is too late for me so to act that they will have taken a different view. Rather their view of me is one they already possess irrevocably. It is this combination of infallibility and irrevocability that implies my tomorrow’s doings are inevitable. Take away one of them, the irrevocability, and my tomorrow’s doings are freed from inevitability. The merit of making divine knowledge into timeless knowledge, instead of foreknowledge, is that it removes the irrevocability. Of course the idea of timeless knowledge brings new problems of its own, but determinism will not be one of them. Boethius in Book 5 of his Consolation, though not yet in his commentaries on Int. 9 as we shall see, came closer than Ammonius to seeing the real value of postulating timeless knowledge. He did not get all the way, but at least he saw that timeless knowledge of my doings does not restrict my freedom any more than does the contemporary knowledge of someone who sees what I am doing (Consolation 5; prose 6,75). It is only divine foreknowledge that restricts my freedom. Ammonius makes one more important use of Iamblichus’ idea. He says knowledge of my changing activities is unchanging (133,22; 136,3 and 17-18). I think, moreover, he recognises that changeless knowledge of itself rules out seeing things as past or future. At any rate, he juxtaposes these ideas (133,16-27; 136,17-21). The gods’ knowledge does not change from being knowledge that I will do something to knowledge that I am doing it and knowledge that I have done it. Ammonius’ position had earlier been taken quite independently by Augustine (ad Simplicianum 2, 2.2; City of God 11.21).15 Unfortunately, Ammonius also accepts the view of his teacher Proclus, rejected by early Neoplatonism,16 that the gods know everything. But I think this is incompatible with his position. For the gods know that 1998 coincides with the publication of this book. But they do not know something I know, namely whether that is past, present or future. That this last is a distinct piece of knowledge has often been challenged.17 But I think it can be made clear by reflecting that, without such knowledge, a

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reader of this series cannot tell whether it is worth setting out to get a copy, however much he or she may know that the date of publication is 1998. The objection is admirably made by Avicenna.18 God, being changeless, cannot know that an individual eclipse is past, present or future. Or he would have to change from thinking ‘the eclipse is present’, to thinking ‘it is past’. Moreover, God cannot have one and the same knowledge first of the present event and then of the past event, thus avoiding change. Avicenna and the ‘philosophers’ rightly reply to this ‘one and the same knowledge’ defence first that the thing known is different, and secondly that even if it were not, the knower’s relation to the thing would change, and hence so would His state of knowledge. Avicenna has seen further than Ammonius, in recognising the negative implications for omniscience. There were also other Islamic thinkers who denied God’s knowledge of past, present and future, in order to avoid his changing,19 and the controversy was still raging in the time of Thomas Aquinas.20 I have presented Ammonius, and before him Augustine, as pioneers in the discussion of changeless knowledge. But each was building on the ideas of predecessors. Ammonius’ teacher, Proclus, says often enough that the gods can have changeless knowledge of the changeable.21 But it is Ammonius who seems to recognise that changeless knowledge of itself rules out seeing things as past or future. Long before Augustine, thinkers were saying that past and future are, or are as if, present to God and that nothing is past or future to him.22 But among these thinkers, only Philo, Seneca and Plotinus apply the point to the issue of preserving God’s changelessness. And only Philo and Plotinus come at all close to explaining the future’s being present to God in terms of his not seeing it as future. It is Augustine who brings this out fully. (iii) The Sea Battle (a) Aristotle Ammonius now turns to the Sea Battle argument, the argument for determinism expounded and answered by Aristotle in de Interpretatione Chapter 9. I have discussed it in fuller detail elsewhere.23 In fact, Aristotle formulates for rejection two deterministic arguments at 18a34-b9 and 18b9-16, and gives his reply in three parts at 19a23-7, 19a27-32 and 19a32-9. I need not consider whether the deterministic arguments form a unity and whether the reply does. It is enough to consider the deterministic argument at 18b9-16, which claims that all things happen of necessity because, for example, if something comes to be white, it has always been true to say, and hence is allegedly necessary, that it will become white. Among modern interpreters of the determinist’s argument, two suggestions have been prominent, neither of which seems to be very fully exploited by Ammonius. One view is that the determinist relies on the idea

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I. Introduction

of ‘always’, because in some contexts Aristotle appears to equate ‘always’ with ‘necessarily’.24 But I think a more threatening argument emerges if the determinist is taken to be trading on the irrevocability of the past. If it was true 10,000 years ago that tomorrow there would be a sea battle, isn’t it too late to stop it? There are two possible answers. One is the one ascribed to Aristotle by what is rather misleadingly called the traditional interpretation: it was neither true nor false 10,000 years ago. With suitable adaptations I think such an answer viable, but uneconomical, for there is no need to change ordinary language. (The necessary adaptation is that what becomes true and remains true after the sea battle is the tenseless proposition that a sea battle is associated with such and such a date.) The answer which I prefer is that past truth is not irrevocable. I can now make my most recent birthday to have been my last by plunging a dagger into my bosom. That is not really a case of my affecting the past, because to describe my most recent birthday as my last is to describe its relation to the future. It is to say that it has no successor. Similarly, to make a past prediction to have been true is not really to affect the past. It is to create a relation between the past prediction and a subsequent state of affairs. That is why it is not too late now to make a past prediction to have been true or false. By conducting or not conducting a sea battle tomorrow, I can make the prediction that I would conduct one to have been true or false. This second answer allows that past predictions have always been true, or been false. Whether Aristotle allows this or denies it has been a subject of debate. The following passage of his, for example, has been used as ammunition by both sides (19a36-9): For with these, it is necessary for one or other side of the contradictorily opposed pair to be true or false, not, however, for this one or that one, but for whichever chances. Or it is necessary for one to be true rather than the other, but not already to be true or false.

(b) Ammonius and Boethius on definite truth Ammonius and Boethius ascribe to Aristotle the view that predictions about whether, for example, a sea battle will take place tomorrow are true or false, but only indefinitely so. Aristotle, on this view, accuses the determinist of postulating definite truth and falsity. Initially at least, the view ascribed to Aristotle looks very different from the view that predictions are not yet true or false at all. ‘Definite’ is not an expression used in Aristotle’s discussion of the matter. But Kretzmann below identifies a passage in which Aristotle talks of a predicate belonging definitely. Indeed, Aristotle illustrates this with

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an example used also by Ammonius and Boethius, that being hot belongs definitely to fire.25 Besides talking of definite truth, Ammonius and Boethius ask if contradictorily opposed predictions, for example predictions about whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, definitely divide truth and falsehood between them.26 Again there might be different interpretations as to whether definite division would imply mere truth or definite truth. But mere truth should appeal as an interpretation only to someone who wants to leave room for predictions being neither true nor false in Ammonius’ interpretation of Aristotle, and that is not a plausible interpretation, as I shall explain. An indefinite division, on this interpretation, would be one in which the predictions simply lack truth or falsity as yet. What do Ammonius and Boethius mean by ascribing to Aristotle the idea that the truth (or falsity) of predictions is only indefinite? They insist that contradictory predictions are one true, one false.27 Boethius denies the Stoic interpretation of Aristotle according to which they are neither true nor false.28 This may seem to confirm at a stroke the interpretation according to which the indefinite truth (or falsity) of predictions is just plain truth (or falsity). It is indefinite merely in the sense that it is not a deterministic truth (or falsity), in other words, not a necessary one. Definite truth is deterministic or necessary. Nonetheless, another interpretation also flourishes, and Kretzmann’s is a version. On this view, ‘there will be sea battle tomorrow’ is either-trueor-false, but not yet true, nor yet false. Sarah Broadie has suggested the Aristotelian analogy that a shoot may be turning into a tree of some height or other, yet the tree into which it is turning is not of this height rather than that.29 But how would such an interpretation of Aristotle differ from the one which Ammonius and Boethius evidently reject, according to which such predictions are neither true nor false? I think the best (not the only)30 answer would be that Aristotle is taken to be focusing on the pair of predictions, ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’, ‘there will not be a sea battle tomorrow’. The pair is treated differently from the members taken singly: It has one member true, one false, and that is how ‘neither true nor false’ is avoided. But the truth and falsity are not yet distributed in one direction rather than the other. Picking up Boethius’ word volubilis, we can imagine the truth and falsity already contained somewhere within the pair, ready to roll (volubilis) into their appropriate positions, but not yet having rolled. I do not think this view coherent, but it has the advantage, as an interpretation of Ammonius and Boethius, of explaining why they often put their view in terms of the definite division of truth and falsity rather than more simply in terms of definite truth. Moreover, Boethius goes on to talk of the pair immediately after introducing his point in each of the two quotations to be given below. Definite truth, on this view, will be truth that is already distributed to

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I. Introduction

one member of the contradictory pair rather than the other. It has been pointed out that Boethius talks in the same context of definite truth and unqualified truth (simpliciter), or of truth that can be assigned to one member of the pair divided from the other (divise). This does not prove that the terms are synonyms, but this interpretation takes them to be so.31 The three principal passages cited so far do not enable us on their own to decide between the two main interpretations. Boethius II 208,1-18, tr. Kretzmann. Now some people – the Stoics among them – thought that Aristotle says that future contingents are neither true nor false. For they interpreted his saying that nothing [of that sort] is disposed more to being than to not being as meaning that it makes no difference whether they are thought false or true; for they considered them to be neither true nor false [in Aristotle’s view] – but falsely. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false but, of course, that each one of them is either true or false – not, however, definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters. [He says] instead that there is in a way a dual nature of statement-making utterances: some of them are not only such that the true and the false is found in them, but also such that one of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false; of the other [statement-making utterances], however, one is true [and] the other false, but indefinitely and mutably – and this as a result of their own nature, not relative to our ignorance or knowledge. Boethius II 106,30-107,16, tr. Kretzmann. For [in that connection] it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that one of them be definitely true, the other definitely false. For if someone else denies what we say, ‘Alexander is to be bathed’, and says ‘Alexander is not to be bathed’, it is indeed necessary that this whole state of affairs come about – that either he is bathed or he is not bathed – and it is necessary that one be true and the other false: either the affirmation, if he has been bathed, or, if he has not been bathed, the negation. But it is not necessary that the affirmation be definitely true, because in cases of this sort the negation could come about. Nor is it ever definite that the negation be true ([and] the affirmation false), because the negation can fail to come about. Accordingly, as regards the whole contradiction it is of course necessary that one be true and the other false. But that one be definitely true and the other definitely false – as is the case regarding those that are past or present – is not possible on the basis of any reason associated with the things, events, or states of affairs. Ammonius 140,1-4, tr. Blank. Next, he begins from the axiom of contradiction, saying that, necessarily, of singular contingent propositions taken in the future time, one or the other is true, since it is neither possible for both to be false together nor for both to be true together.

If these texts do not themselves impose an interpretation, does anything else? I shall consider three arguments, the first designed to support the ‘either-true-or-false’ interpretation, despite its incoherence. The source of

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support is the fact that Ammonius is careful to say of correct predictions that they will be true (future tense), rather than, as the rival interpretation requires, that they are true (present tense).32 The remaining arguments, however, are on the other side. An argument which has been used to support the ‘either-true-or-false’ interpretation turns out, in the case of Ammonius, to support the indeterministic truth interpretation instead. It has been suggested that Ammonius and Boethius thought the determinist needed an argument to pass from definite truth to necessity, so that ‘definite’ could not simply mean deterministic.33 But in fact, we seem to find the opposite. In neither author is the move presented as more than a simple entailment, and in Ammonius the point is positively emphasised. Not only does he talk of necessity following (hepesthai, akolouthein) from definite truth.34 He twice says it follows just (Blank translates ‘immediately’) from that (autothen).35 This positively favours the idea that definite truth is deterministic truth. The next argument makes this interpretation even more compelling for the case of Ammonius. The interpretation of definite truth as deterministic truth has a consequence which is very surprising. It means that the debate about whether predictions are definitely true is not a debate about the determinist’s basic premises. On the contrary, the determinist’s claim that predictions are definitely true (or definitely false) becomes little more than a statement of his deterministic conclusion, for which other premises must be found. It might seem very implausible that the concept of definite truth should have been imposed on Aristotle’s discussion and given such centrality, if it does not even address the determinist’s premises. Can this be what is intended? Curiously enough, in Ammonius it is. Ammonius often speaks as if the claim of definite truth is the penultimate step, from which the determinist’s final conclusion, the denial of contingency, follows.36 The very fact that Ammonius sees definite truth as a penultimate step, rather than as an early premise, favours our taking definite truth in Ammonius as deterministic. There is more evidence. For Ammonius equally treats the definite division of truth and falsity as a penultimate step from which the denial of contingency follows.37 In other words, the definite division of truth and falsity plays exactly the same deterministic role as definite truth and falsity. It would hardly be taken to play this role, unless it was taken to imply deterministic truth and falsity, which is exactly how this interpretation, but not its main rival,38 does take it. These arguments suggest that Ammonius may have thought of definite truth as deterministic truth. But I have not yet considered Mario Mignucci’s new and different interpretation. On his view, ‘definitely true’ does not mean the same as ‘necessarily true’, although it implies it. A proposition is evaluated as definitely true if, in addition to corresponding to an event, it has its truth value established once and for all at the time

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I. Introduction

of evaluation. It is indefinitely true if there is an event to which it corresponds, but at the time of evaluation that event is future and capable of not happening. The correspondence to an event, which characterises both cases, explains why in both cases there is truth. The rest of the definition explains why necessity follows only in one of the cases. So talk of indefinite truth is not a mere assertion of indeterminism, but incorporates an explanation of how truth is compatible with indeterminism. Without Mignucci’s interpretation, we seemed to be faced with a choice between an interpretation of ‘indefinitely true’ as ‘either-true-or-false’, which is not, as far as I can see, coherent, and an interpretation of it as merely asserting indeterministic truth, without examining the determinist’s case. On Mignucci’s interpretation, the notion of indefinite truth would incorporate an explanation of how to avoid determinism. But in fact Ammonius does not explain the meaning of ‘indefinitely true’, any more than Boethius does. Rather, Ammonius sometimes attempts to diagnose the determinist’s mistake in terms which go beyond the talk of definite truth. He does so in three places, at 139,26-140,21 (addressing Aristotle 18a34-9), at 144,9-145,19 (addressing 18b9-16) and at 152,33155,8 (addressing 19a23-b4). But the discussion is disappointing. He ascribes to the determinist some confusions in the scope of modal terms. But he gives little sense of what makes the determinist’s argument seductive. In particular, he does not see it as relying on the irrevocability, or on the omnitemporality of past truth, even though he mentions omnitemporality.39 Nor does he give Mignucci’s, or any other explanation, of how indeterminism is compatible with truth, past truth, or omnitemporal truth. My conclusion is that if the notion of indefinite truth was ever more explanatory, this will have been in Ammonius’ predecessors. And what Mignucci will have uncovered is an earlier rationale for the idea. But if that is the case, Ammonius will not himself have understood that rationale. I agree that the notion of indefinite truth he is in the main following is not that of either-true-or-false, for his notion of definite truth immediately implies necessity. But he will not have understood why in his predecessors it did so imply it. Moreover, if his predecessors also entertained the rival interpretation of ‘indefinitely true’ as either-true-or-false, Ammonius may be insouciantly reflecting this when he describes true predictions as things that merely will be true at some time in the future. Boethius’ discussion is, at one point, extremely different from that of Ammonius and in a very interesting way. In his fullest account Boethius reinterprets the inference from truth to necessity as a quite different inference from predictability to necessity and it is this different principle that he has Aristotle endorse. This is a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s point (18b36) that the determinist need not rely on predictions actually having been made. Ammonius understands this correctly, as meaning that the determinist relies on the truth of predictions, whether actually made

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or not.40 But Boethius takes it to mean that it is not after all the truth of a prediction, but a thing’s predictability, that implies its necessity. It implies its necessity because without that necessity, the thing would not be predictable.41 Ammonius has no discussion as adventurous as this and, on my interpretation, his treatment of the Sea Battle is disappointing. It is the less celebrated arguments, the Reaper and the argument from divine foreknowledge, that offer the excitement. It may be no accident that Ammonius cites these as the ones that have caused an impasse. He may have underestimated the difficulty of the Sea Battle argument. If he has also underestimated the difficulty of the Reaper argument, he has this in common, I believe, with all modern interpreters. Notes 1. N. Rescher, in Studies in the History of Arabic Logic, Pittsburgh 1963, ch. 5, and in ‘Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective’, in R. Gale (ed.), The Philosophy of Time: a Collection of Essays, London 1968. 2. Ammonius’ sources are described by David Blank in the introduction to his translation in this series of Ammonius, in Int. 1-8. For Boethius’ use of Alexander, Porphyry, and Syrianus see the index nominum in Meiser’s edition of Boethius’ two commentaries on Int. For Ammonius’ use of these and of Iamblichus and Proclus as well, see the index nominum in Busse’s CAG edition of Ammonius’ commentary on Int. Ammonius declares himself particularly indebted to Proclus, 1,6-11; cf. 181,30-1, Boethius to Porphyry, 2nd comm. on Int. 7,5-6; cf. 219,17. Robert Sharples has found an attack on definite truth as incompatible with contingency as early as Alexander Quaestio 1.4, pp. 12-13, translated London and Ithaca N.Y. 1992, p. 35, n. 81, which updates his ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestio 1.4’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64, 1982, 23-38. For the comment on this in Norman Kretzmann’s 1987 paper at p. 67, corrected in the reprint below, see Chapter 2. 3. Stephanus is suggested by F.W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione, Oxford 1981, LXXX-XCVIII, at XCIV. William Charlton’s translation of Stephanus will be appearing shortly in this series. 4. Stephanus, in Int., CAG 17.3,34,34-35,10; Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione, ed. Tarán, Meisenheim am Glan 1978, 54,8-55,5. 5. Ammonius, in Int. 131,20-132,7. 6. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.25. 7. It is listed at 7.44 alongside two puzzles which are ascribed to Diodorus at 2.111; so David Sedley, ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philospophy’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 (n.s. 23), 1977, 74-120. 8. I.M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam 1951. 9. I presented this interpretation of The Reaper at a conference on Ammonius’ text held at Neuchatel by Gerhard Seel in 1989. I am extremely grateful to him to his assistant Jean Pierre Schneider for the collaborative discussions which have helped me and several other contributors to this volume. 10. Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge 1958, ch. 2, esp. p. 49,

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Notes to pp. 5-8

developed from his ‘Probability’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 24, 1950, 27-62. 11. Ammonius, in Int. 132,8-137,11. For the interpretation that follows, see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1983, 260-4. 12. Boethius illustrates such indefinite knowledge with the example of Teiresias telling Odysseus that he and his crew either will or will not kill the sacred bulls of Helios, Consolation 5.3 prose. 13. Iamblichus is credited by Ammonius at 135,14. Among earlier Neoplatonists, Porphyry had not yet thought of this idea, to judge from Proclus, in Tim. (Diehl) 1.352,13, and Plotinus actually denies that God can have knowledge of change without changing, in a passage originally drawn to my attention by Mario Mignucci, 4.3.25 (13-27, esp. 20-4). Aristotle had similarly made God confine his thoughts to one thing, in order to avoid mental change, Metaph. 12.9, 1074b21-7. But the Christian Pantainos in the late second century AD had said that God knows intelligible things non-intellectually and perceptible things non-perceptually. 14. These ideas are presented in Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1980, 112-13, and Time, Creation and the Continuum, 255-6. 15. Translated in Time, Creation and the Continuum, 263-4. 16. Proclus, Prov. chs 62-5; de Dec. Dub. q. 1, chs 2-5; Platonic Theology 1.21; in Prm (Cousin) 958,30-961,18. Contrast Plotinus 4.3.25(20-4); 4.4.8; 6.7.1(45-58); 6.7.3. 17. I will not here repeat the challenges discussed in Time, Creation and the Continuum, 258-60. Mark Sainsbury, in ‘Fregean indexicals’, forthcoming, has put the point that, given my thought, ‘I have an appointment an hour from now’, a changeless thinker could think a thought sufficiently closely related to explain my actions, e.g. my travelling to work: ‘At 10 a.m. on May 1st 1996, Sorabji knows that he has an appointment an hour later than that.’ I agree the changeless thinker can thereby explain my setting out at 10 on May 1st. That is not to say, however, that the changeless thinker can have the same thought as I do, nor that he can explain my setting out now. I am very grateful to him for discussion. 18. Evidence in Time, Creation and the Continuum, 260-1. The main text can be found in Ghazali, Destruction of the Philosophers, replying to Avicenna, which is recorded by Averroes, Destruction of the Destruction, 13th Discussion, Bouyges, pp. 456-7; 458-9, translated by van den Bergh in Averroes’ Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, London 1954, vol. 1, 275-6; 278. Van den Bergh also translates vol. 2, p. 151, an extract from Avicenna’s own Najât (Cure). 19. Van den Bergh cites various Mu‘tazilite theologians, vol. 2, pp. 155-6. 20. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a, q. 14, a15, objection 3 and reply, reports the nominalists as holding that the same thing is signified by ‘Christ is born’, ‘Christ will be born’ and ‘Christ was born’, and hence that God’s knowledge of the nativity does not change, Thomas denies that the same thing is signified, but claims that God knows, without himself changing, that these enunciations change their truth value. 21. Proclus, Elements of Theology, proposition 124; in Tim. (Diehl) 1.352, 5-27; de Dec. Dub. q. 2, chs 7-8. 22. I have collected a number in Time, Creation and the Continuum, 264. 23. Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1980, ch. 5. 24. So e.g. Jaakko Hintikka, Time and Necessity, Oxford 1973, ch. 8.

Notes to pp. 9-13

15

25. Aristotle, Cat. 10, 12b38-40; Ammonius 154,9-12; Boethius II 187,29; cf. 236,8. 26. Ammonius 131,2-4; 138,11-139,20; 140,13; 144,9-14; 145,29-31; 147,20-2; 148,9-10. For Boethius, see Kretzmann below. 27. Ammonius 140,1-4; cf. 139,14-17; 140,12-13, all cited by Mignucci below; Boethius I 106,30-107,16; II 208,1-18, both translated by Kretzmann below. 28. Last reference. 29. Sarah Broadie, ‘Thinking about de Interpretatione 9’, in Mario Mignucci (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Symposium Aristotelicum, forthcoming 1998. 30. Kretzmann offers a different answer below. Yet another would be that Ammonius and Boethius treat predictions as true (or false) just so long as they will eventually become so. But this does not seem to match the complexity of what they are saying. 31. Richard Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future, Berlin 1995, ch. 12 ‘The commentators’ interpretation of de Interpretatione 9’, p. 151. 32. Ammonius 139,17; 145,12-14. 33. Gaskin p. 154. 34. Ammonius 143,19; 148,11. 35. 141,34; 144,11. 36. 141,31-6; 143,18-19; 148,11; 149,15-18. 37. 144,9-12. 38. Gaskin, p. 156. 39. Ammonius 144,17; 18; 20; 153,2-7; 15-16. 40. Ammonius 149,32. 41. Boethius I 118,15-119,13; II 228,3-4; 229,21-230,3.

2. Boethius, Ammonius and their different Greek backgrounds Richard Sorabji I shall here bring out some of the main differences between Boethius and Ammonius in their treatment of the same Aristotelian chapter, and further explain some of the controversies which Boethius reports. (i) How do they differ? Although Boethius and Ammonius both treat the Sea Battle argument in terms of definite truth, and both draw on earlier Greek commentaries, their own commentaries are very different from each other. The speculation of Pierre Courcelle that Boethius drew on Ammonius has been refuted by James Shiel.1 I shall not attempt to evaluate Shiel’s further view that Boethius had available only extracts from earlier commentators from the margins of a single codex. Boethius follows a precedent set by Porphyry’s two commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, of which one sticks closer to Aristotle’s text and the other (now lost) contained more philosophical speculation. Boethius similarly wrote two commentaries on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione and on Porphyry’s Isagoge and seems to have intended a second on Aristotle’s Categories,2 of which a possible fragment has been identified.3 But the areas of philosophical speculation which Boethius chooses for his longer commentary on the de Interpretatione are different from those chosen by Ammonius. Boethius omits the Reaper, and shows as yet no knowledge of the idea of definite knowledge of the indefinite and timeless knowledge of the temporal, which he was to use so effectively in his last work, written in prison before his execution, the Consolation of Philosophy (Book 5). What Boethius does include is a whole range of topics that were at issue between earlier Stoic determinists and Aristotelians. Is the idea of chance merely a function of our ignorance?4 Is there room for free choice of the will?5 For unactualised possibilities?6 For the idea of things being up to us?7 Is God benevolent, if his actions are inevitable?8 How far down the scale of beings does Providence spread?9 How is the possible defined by Stoics and Aristotelians and by the dialecticians Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo?10 Although Boethius used the Neoplatonist Porphyry as his main source,11 he also knows about the Aristotelian Alexander, who was engaged in

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17

putting the case for Aristotelianism against Stoic determinism in the late second century AD.12 He knows about Alexander apparently through Porphyry,13 who must have quoted Alexander extensively. It has reasonably been inferred that this is why Boethius’ commentary three hundred years later is so full of the Stoic-Aristotelian controversy.14 Boethius is also the main source for the dialecticians’ definitions of possibility, but these too, it has been pointed out, are discussed by Alexander.15 In reporting these debates, Boethius identifies with the Peripatetics, that is, with the Aristotelians.16 If Boethius and Ammonius have in common the treatment of Aristotle’s Sea Battle in terms of definite truth, this could be explained if Alexander had already introduced the idea. And indeed it has been convincingly suggested that Alexander did explicitly attack it.17 In addition, Boethius’ use of the idea of definite truth is different from that of Ammonius. There is not the same evidence that Boethius was tempted to take ‘definite’ as ‘deterministic’. If Ammonius omits mention of the Stoics and their controversy with the Aristotelians, and switches to an Iamblichan treatment of the gods as having definite knowledge of the indefinite, this is likely to be because of the different sources he and Boethius used. Ammonius’ sources have been described by David Blank in his introduction to the translation of Ammonius’ chapters 1 to 8 in our series. All I need say for now is that Ammonius’ main source was not Porphyry (although he did know Porphyry), but Proclus.18 And Proclus had shifted his allegiance to Porphyry’s probable pupil, Iamblichus. The enormous divergence between Iamblichus and Porphyry will thus have had repercussions even on this subject. Its consequences for the treatment of religion, of humans and of animals are well known.19 The commentary tradition did not stand still. There are still further differences between Boethius and Ammonius. As noted in Chapter 1 above, Boethius reinterprets the determinist’s principle that prior truth implies necessity as the principle that predictability implies necessity.20 This is a massive departure from Aristotle which puts the determinist’s argument on an entirely different basis. It ought to excite astonishment. Besides that, Boethius explains more fully the notion of the irrevocability of the past.21 He rules out more decisively than Ammonius the interpretation (which he calls Stoic), according to which Aristotle denies a truth value to contingents.22 But particularly interesting is Boethius’ treatment of the question how far Divine Providence extends. Alexander had said that Providence is brought to the world below the moon through movements of the heavenly bodies. But their providential effect here is only to guarantee the regeneration of species. Providence is not concerned with individuals.23 The Stoics, by contrast, had allowed Divine Providence to extend to individuals,24 but their gods neglected small things like damaged vineyards.25 Porphyry allows that good daimones may be in charge of certain animals or crops and demons may spoil crops.26 Am-

18

I. Introduction

monius speaks as if Divine Providence extends to everything.27 But Boethius gives a view which I have not encountered elsewhere in antiquity. The stars govern cattle (pecudes), but not other animals, nor plants.28 The nearest analogue to this concern of which I know comes in Augustine, who had to counter St Paul’s interpretation of Deuteronomy 25.4, ‘Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn’. In other words, the ox should be allowed to eat a little. St Paul’s comment is, ‘Doth God care for oxen?’, and he gives instead a metaphorical interpretation of the saying.29 Augustine reverts to assuring people that God does take providential care of their oxen;30 citing ‘You will make safe humans and beasts of burden (iumenta), o Lord’.31 This is, I think, the scriptural basis for Boethius’ view on the extent of Divine Providence. Augustine had to counter pagans who said, ‘there is no salvation in his god’, and he insisted that there was, even in matters temporal.32 Henry Chadwick has taken this to be a response to farmers who feared the Christian God would not be effective in caring for their beasts.33 In fact, the argument is odd, because God’s concern for us ought to be enough to look after both cattle and crops. Why should cattle be treated differently from crops, unless it is that things can be good or bad for them as sentient beings? But in that case, wild animals are equally in need of Providence. Boethius is also different from Ammonius in the treatment of oracles. Boethius’ worry is the one involved in the Stoic debate, whether oracular knowledge implies determinism.34 Ammonius’ worry is the opposite and he draws his discussion from a different source, the Neoplatonist Syrianus, who taught Proclus. Some oracles are ambiguous: does this mean that even the gods lack knowledge?35 Boethius refers to a related part of the Stoic debate. The Stoic Chrysippus wanted to maintain against the dialectician Diodorus Cronus that he had left room for alternative possibilities. Oracles should therefore not be couched in terms of genuine conditionals, such as ‘if Fabius was born at the rising of the Dog Star, he will not die at sea’.36 In a genuine conditional, the irrevocability of the antecedent (his having been born at the rising of the Dog Star) spreads necessity to the consequent (that he will not die at sea). All oracles are entitled to use is a material implication, rather than a genuine conditional: in other words, ‘It is not the case both that he was born at the rising of the Dog Star and that he will die at sea’. In a material implication, the irrevocability of the first part does not spread necessity to the second. Boethius cites the example of not dying at sea from the dispute between Chrysippus and Diodorus, without, however, bringing out its connection with oracles.37 Boethius treats qualifications in oracles not as a problem, but as a solution to his problem. Oracles sometimes say that one thing will happen unless another does. This suggests that the first thing is merely going to happen (eventurum), i.e. that it can be stopped, rather than that it will happen (futurum).38 Ammonius makes the same distinction of what is

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merely going to happen and what will happen (mellon versus esomenon in Greek), but he does not apply it to the case of oracles.39 (ii) Further controversies with Stoicism in Boethius My aim so far has been to illustrate the difference in the Greek backgrounds of the two commentators, Boethius drawing on the Stoic-Aristotelian-Dialectician debates recorded by Alexander and Porphyry; Ammonius on the post-Porphyrian Neoplatonists, Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus. In what remains, I shall briefly explain three of the remaining debates that Boethius draws from the tradition of controversy with the Stoics. (iii) Free choice of the will and up to us Boethius records a debate about how Stoic determinism can make room for free choice of the will (liberum arbitrium voluntatis),40 or for things being up to us (in nobis).41 The second had been the standard question in the original Greek debate. The concept and terminology of the will developed only gradually until its full flowering in the Latin of Augustine, whose On Free Choice was written in 388-395 AD. As regards terminology, the development was a Latin phenomenon. The phrase free will, libera voluntas, appears in Latin in the first century BC in the Epicurean Lucretius and then Cicero.42 The Christian Tertullian writing in Latin shortly after 200 AD uses the phrase ‘free power of choice’ (libera arbitrii potestas) and ‘freedom of choice’ (arbitrii libertas), the first as a translation of a completely different Greek term to autexousion, self-determination.43 It has been suggested that the phrase ‘free choice of the will’ originates with Augustine,44 who uses it extensively in his On Free Choice.45 From this account of terminology, it looks as if Boethius is reading an Augustinian Latin expression back into an earlier Greek debate. The concept of the will, however, had been developing to some extent independently of the terminology. As I see it,46 there are diverse criteria for a concept of the will, and we find a substantial proportion satisfied in authors much earlier than Augustine, but different selections in different authors, with the criteria not always featuring together in a single passage and not always attached by an author to a single word. The will may be thought of as a rational desire, which, though rational, is not identical with reason. It may be connected inter alia with freedom, secondly with will power and the effort to control, and thirdly with moral responsibility as represented by such expressions as ‘voluntary’ an ‘up to us’. I believe that a substantial proportion of these criteria, but not all, are recognized by Plato (not Aristotle), by such later Stoics as Posidonius, Seneca and Epictetus, by the Middle Platonist Didaskalikos and by Plotinus. The concept of freedom developed independently again, and is already

20

I. Introduction

in Epicurus,47 who probably takes it from Plato.48 The sturdy concept of freedom was not automatically, however, connected with a sturdy concept of will. And when Lucretius connects it with the word for will in the phrase libera voluntas the shift was more terminological than conceptual. Given all this, Boethius would have been more accurate to represent the Stoics’ manoeuvres as making room only for a concept of up to us, not also for a concept of free choice of the will. What the Stoic Chrysippus did was to insist that impulse and assent were up to us,49 because their principal cause is something internal, the character and quality of our minds. Chrysippus compares how the principal cause of a cylinder’s rolling is its internal character of volubility, even if an external push is also required.50 Four hundred years later, Alexander still ascribes an internality solution to his Stoic opponents.51 But we learn from Alexander and still later from Nemesius of further Stoic distinctions.52 For the Stoics had to show how humans differ from cylinders and indeed from animals as well as from inanimate things. So the type of internal cause had to be more carefully specified, and the specifications are in turn attacked by Alexander. It has been suggested that some of these further distinctions are referred to by Boethius in his second commentary.53 (iv) Alternative possibilities Boethius also records the controversy among Stoics, Aristotelians and Dialecticians on the nature of possibility.54 The account of the dialectician Diodorus Cronus had ruled out allowing for alternative possibilities. Nothing else is possible except what actually happens. His pupil Philo had gone to the opposite extreme. Possibilities exist for us so long as the relevant capacities exist, no matter how much external circumstances may remove any opportunity for capacities to be exercised. For example,55 a shell at the bottom of the sea has the capacity for being seen. So there is the possibility of our seeing it, however much the intervening ocean serves as an external obstacle. One might think that this definition would have helped the Stoic Chrysippus when he tries to show that, despite his deterministic belief in the necessity of all things, he has left room for alternative possibilities in some sense. Indeed, some Stoics do seem to have followed Philo, and in modern times the same kind of manoeuvre has been used for a different purpose: not for squaring determinism with the existence in some sense of alternative possibilities, but for refuting determinism.56 But in general the Stoics, according to Boethius and our other sources,57 disagreed with Philo, and required the absence of external obstacles as a second condition for ascribing possibility, over and above Philo’s condition of mere capacity or bare ‘fitness’ (psilê epitêdeiotês). Boethius accordingly complains that they cannot really accommodate alternative possibilities any more than Diodorus Cronus. But the Stoics do not require the absence of internal

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obstacles, like unwillingness, as a condition for ascribing possibility, and on one view58 they exploit this to allow alternative possibilities. Although Boethius reports the difference between Philo and most Stoics, there are difficulties in our sources which have led modern readers to offer very diverse interpretations.59 One difficulty is that one of the Stoics’ two conditions is sometimes cited without the other, something like Philo’s condition being attributed by Plutarch to the Stoics.60 Another problem is that the texts are sometimes ambiguous. The possible, for the Stoics, is that which admits of being true, there not being opposition from external obstacles. Is the absence of external obstacles intended by the Stoics as a second prerequisite for possibility, as I have claimed? Or are we merely being told more about the conditions in which what admits of being true will actually be true? (v) Chance Finally, what is the Aristotelian conception of chance which Boethius champions against the Stoic view that talk of chance is merely an expression of our ignorance?61 For Aristotle chance or luck (tukhê) is a coincidental conjunction of circumstances. Boethius illustrates it by my finding treasure (for clarity, one could say: there being treasure present) when I am digging a trench for a vine.62 Aristotle, quite rightly as I have argued elsewhere,63 denies that coincidences have explanations. We can say, ‘there is no explanation; it is just a coincidence’. Given his concept of causation, which I have also supported,64 Aristotle concludes that coincidences lack causes. But he then draws an uncharacteristic inference, which I believe to be unjustified,65 that coincidences are not necessitated, so that determinism is false. Boethius shows himself in this, as in many other issues in this commentary, to be influenced by Aristotle. However, he also transforms Aristotle in a number of ways. Most importantly, in his Consolation of Philosophy, though not yet in his commentaries, he regards coincidences as not real coincidences after all, because they are brought about, like everything else, by Divine Providence.66 He thus gives Christian believers in Divine Providence a way of still making room for a concept of Fortune,67 albeit a concept robbed of the Aristotelian idea of inexplicability. Notes 1. James Shiel, ‘Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle’, in R. Hunt, R. Klibansky, L. Labowsky (eds.), Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4, 1958, 217-44, substantially revised in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1990. Cf. Leonardo Tarán, Anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Meisenheim am Glan 1978, p. vii, n. 10. 2. Boethius, in Cat. 160B; cf. 180C. 3. P. Hadot, ‘Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les Catégories

22

Notes to pp. 17-18

d’Aristote dans le Codex Bernensis 363’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 26, 1959, 11-27. 4. Boethius II 193,26-195,2; cf. 224,3-9, ed. Meiser. 5. 195,2-197,10. 6. 197,10-198,3. 7. 217,17-219,9. 8. 226,13-22. 9. 231,11-232,13. 10. 234,10-236,4. 11. Boethius II 7,5-6; cf. 219,17. 12. See especially Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, with translation and commentary by R.W. Sharples, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1983. 13. Courcelle cites II 293,27 to show this, and Shiel points out (Aristotle Transformed, p. 358), that Boethius usually adds Porphyry’s criticism when citing earlier commentators like Alexander. 14. Fritz Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione, Oxford 1981, LXXXV-LXXXVI. 15. Fritz Zimmermann, loc. cit., referring to Boethius 234,10-236,4 and Alexander in An. Pr. p. 184; Quaestiones 1.4, p. 9,5-7; p. 12,5-12. 16. Boethius 195,3 (nobis); 197,5 (nostri Peripatetici). 17. Robert Sharples, on Alexander Quaestio 1.4, pp. 12-13, translated London and Ithaca N.Y. 1992, p. 35, n. 81, which updates his ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Quaestio 1.4’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64, 1982, 23-38. A ‘definitely’ was accidentally omitted from Sharples’ draft translation of Alexander p. 13,4, and this at first concealed the merits of Sharples’ case, which drew Kretzmann’s fire in the original version of his paper below. 18. Ammonius 1,6-11; cf. 181,30-1. 19. I have discussed some of these in Animal Minds and Human Morals, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1993, ch. 13. 20. I 118,15-119,13; II 228,3-4; 229,21-230,3. Contrast Ammonius 149,32. 21. 190,12-191,2. 22. II 208,1-18. 23. Alexander, Quaestio 1.25, p. 41,8ff.; Quaestio 2.19,63,15ff.; frag. 36 Freudenthal; de Providentia 33,1ff.; 87,5ff., Ruland. See Robert Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Divine Providence: two problems’, Classical Quarterly 198-211; ‘Nemesius of Emesa and Some Theories of Divine Providence’, Vigiliae Christianae 37, 1983, 141-56. 24. Epictetus 1.12.1-5. 25. Balbus in Cicero ND III.167. 26. Porphyry, Abstinence 1.38.2; 1.40.1. 27. Ammonius 134,7-135,11. 28. Boethius 231,12-19. 29. I Corinthians 9.9. 30. Augustine, Enarr. In Psalmos 145,13-14 (on verse 6). 31. Psalms 35 (36), 7-8. 32. Augustine, Enarr. In Psalmos 34, sermo 1,6 (on verse 6). 33. In correspondence, 6 April 1992. 34. Boethius 224,27-225,9. 35. Ammonius 137,12-25. 36. Cicero, On Fate 6.11-8.16, discussed in Necessity, Cause and Blame, 74-8. 37. Boethius 235,4-236,4. 38. Boethius 225,4-9.

Notes to pp. 19-21

23

39. Ammonius 139,2-6. 40. Boethius 195,2-197,10. 41. Boethius 217,17-219,9. 42. Lucretius 2.251-93; Cicero, On Fate 9.20. 43. Tertullian, de Anima 21.6 and 20.5, recorded by Charles Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will, from Aristotle to Augustine’, in John Dillon and A.A. Long (eds.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1988, 234-59, at 250-1. 44. So J.H. Waszink, commentary on Tertullian, de Anima, ad 20.5, reported by Kahn, loc. cit. 45. Augustine, de Libero Arbitrio 2.1.1 and passim. 46. I shall be explaining this in my The Emotions and How to Cope With Them: The Stoic Legacy. 47. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.133, noted by Charles Kahn, op. cit. 48. Plato, Republic 617E3 uses the same word adespoton. 49. Cicero, On Fate 18.41; 19.43, discussed in Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, 79-83. 50. Cf. also Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 7.2.7-11. 51. Alexander, On Fate chs. 13; 26; cf. Quaestiones 2.4, p. 50,30. 52. Alexander, On Fate ch. 13; Nemesius On the Nature of Man ch. 35. For a recent interpretation, see Susanne Bobzien, ‘Stoic conceptions of freedom and their relation to ethics’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle and After, Supplement 68 to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 1997, 71-89, based on her D.Phil. diss., Oxford 1995. 53. R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, de Fato: some parallels’, Classical Quarterly 28, 1978, p. 254, n. 119, referring to Boethius II 195,10. 54. Boethius 197,10-198,3; 234,10-236,4. I have discussed these and later debates on the nature of possibility in Necessity, Cause and Blame, 78-9; Time, Creation and the Continuum, 90-3; 264-7. 55. Philoponus, in An. Pr. 169,20; Alexander, in An. Pr. 184,12ff.; Simplicius, in Cat. 196,1. 56. See M. Ayers, The Refutation of Determinism, London 1968. 57. Besides Boethius 234, Diogenes Laertius 7.75. Others contrast the definitions without attributing them: Simplicius, in Cat. 195-6; Alexander, Quaestiones 1.4, p. 9,5-7; p. 12,5-12; ps-Plutarch, On Fate 571A. 58. Discussed in Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, 79-83. 59. Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, 78-9, supplements the definitive discussion of Michael Frede, Die Stoische Logik, Göttingen 1974, 107-17, while recording other interpretations. 60. Plutarch, Sto. Rep. 1055D-F. 61. Boethius 193,26-195,2; cf. 224,3-9. 62. There are some charming illustrations of this, one reproduced as the frontispiece of Necessity, Cause and Blame. 63. Necessity, Cause and Blame, ch. 1, interpreting Aristotle Metaph. 6.3. 64. Ibid. 65. Op. cit. ch. 2. 66. Boethius, Consolation 5.1 prose 32-58, and comments by R.W. Sharples, Cicero on Fate and Boethius the Consolation of Philosophy IV,5-7 and V, Warminster 1991, 215. 67. E. Reiss, Boethius, Boston 1982, 152. I am grateful to Robert Sharples for this reference and for his very helpful corrections to an earlier draft.

3. Boethius and the truth about tomorrow’s sea battle Norman Kretzmann (i) Lukasiewicz and the oldest interpretation In 1930 Jan Lukasiewicz published the following account of Aristotle on bivalence: The law of bivalence, i.e. the law according to which every proposition is either true or false, was familiar to Aristotle, who explicitly characterized a proposition  as discourse which is either true or false. We read in Int. 4, 17a2-3, ‘not every expression is a proposition, but only those in which there is truth or falsity’. Aristotle, however, does not accept the validity of this law for propositions dealing with contingent future events. The famous chapter 9 of de Interpretatione is devoted to this matter. Aristotle believed that determinism would be the inevitable consequence of the law of bivalence, a consequence he is unable to accept. Hence he is forced to restrict the law.1

Lukasiewicz’s account provides the basis for a dramatic reading of de Interpretatione. In ch. 4 Aristotle declares bivalence to be the differentia of propositions, only to discover in ch. 9 that that view of the essential nature of propositions entails a determinism under which ‘all things are and happen of necessity; accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble’ (18b30-2). Aristotle is thus faced with a dilemma: He must either accept determinism with its radically counter-intuitive implications or deny what had appeared to him to be the essential nature of propositions. According to Lukasiewicz, Aristotle then simply grasps the second horn of the dilemma, restricting the application of the law of bivalence to propositions about past events, present events, and such future events as are naturally necessitated – eclipses, for instance. Lukasiewicz’s interpretation of Aristotle’s response to determinism in Int. 9 has stood, in one version or another, at the center of the modern controversy that has its source in his 1930 article. His portrayal of Aristotle as confronted with the dilemma of either accepting logical determinism or abandoning universal bivalence, and as then opting for the latter, seems also to be the oldest interpretation on record. Boethius, in his commentaries on Int., attributes this view to the Stoics, along with other people whom he does not identify. Of those oldest recorded interpreters of Int. 9 Boethius says that they ‘thought that Aristotle says that contingent [propositions]

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about the future are neither true nor false’.2 But those Stoics also thought that Aristotle had grasped the wrong horn of the dilemma. When they themselves faced up to the choice between tampering with bivalence and accepting determinism, the Stoics declared that ‘it is the foundation of logic that whatever is stated  is either true or false’,3 and, true to their principles, they professed determinism. Lukasiewicz packs an impressive amount of original historical research on that oldest interpretation into a few paragraphs, but its status in antiquity is summarized more effectively in recent work by Richard Sorabji. He says that the interpretation adopted by Lukasiewicz (and by many others since 1930) ‘was the interpretation of Aristotle taken by the Peripatetics (i.e. the Aristotelian school) according to Simplicius.  Moreover, the denial of truth value  was accepted as being a correct view in itself, necessary for avoiding determinism, by Epicurus, by the Platonist Nicostratus, and probably by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias, while being rejected by the Stoic Chrysippus, by the Academic Carneades, and by Cicero.’4 Recent commentators on Int. 9, whether they accept or reject the oldest interpretation, have tended to follow Hintikka’s lead in designating it ‘the traditional interpretation’.5 Sorabji, for instance, says ‘I shall refer to this interpretation of Aristotle as the traditional one, although this is something of a misnomer, in view of  the fact that there are rival interpretations just about as old’.6 (ii) The second-oldest interpretation My concern here is with the principal ancient rival to the so-called traditional interpretation, a rival whose subsequent medieval career was so long and so eminent that it provides another reason for feeling uneasy about calling the simple denial of universal bivalence ‘the traditional interpretation’. Since the one I am focusing on is the second-oldest on record, I will refer to it simply as the second-oldest interpretation and continue referring to the denial of universal bivalence as the oldest. I will also continue to refer to both of them as interpretations even when I am primarily interested in them as responses to logical determinism, regardless of their accuracy as interpretations of Aristotle. The second-oldest interpretation’s claim to preserve bivalence while rejecting determinism is what essentially distinguishes it from the oldest interpretation. Its details will emerge gradually. Lukasiewicz, after expressing his own adherence to the oldest interpretation, admits that Aristotle does not restrict bivalence ‘decisively enough, and for this reason his way of putting the matter is not quite clear’.7 The passage Lukasiewicz cites as ‘the most important’ is certainly one whose ambiguities have given rise to differing interpretations, including both the oldest and the second-oldest: For regarding them [i.e. things that not always are and not always are not]

26

I. Introduction it is indeed (i) necessary that the one or the other part of the contradiction be true or false – not, however, this one or that one, but whichever one happens – and (ii) [necessary] that one is indeed true rather than the other, but not already true or false. (19a36-9)

As my inserted numerals indicate, I think the passage is naturally read as presenting two claims. The occurrence of a sea battle tomorrow is one of those things that not always are and not always are not, and the parts of the relevant contradiction are (A) There will be a sea battle tomorrow. (B) There won’t be a sea battle tomorrow. The oldest interpretation, then, may seem to find support in claim (ii), which can be read as saying that although either (A) or (B) must become true, neither of them is true (or false) at this time; and so (A) and (B) are exempted from bivalence. The second-oldest interpretation is one for which Lukasiewicz has little if any respect. He thinks it arose as an attempt on the part of the Peripatetics to defend Aristotle against the Stoics’ charge that he had abandoned universal bivalence ‘by puzzling out a “distinction” between the definitely true and the indefinitely true, non-existent in the Stagirite’s works’.8 I think his conjecture of a Peripatetic source for the second-oldest interpretation is plausible. Boethius thought of himself as a Peripatetic in writing his two commentaries on de Interpretatione,9 and although he could not have been one of those Peripatetics among whom the interpretation first arose, his elaborate presentation of it is expressly designed to defend Aristotle against the oldest interpretation. Boethius comments on claim (i) in the passage quoted above (19a36-9) in words that can serve as an introduction to the second-oldest interpretation: And so he [viz. Aristotle] concludes the whole question of propositions that are future and contingent, and says that it is evident that it is not necessary that all affirmations and negations be definitely true [or false]. (‘Definitely’ is missing [from Aristotle’s claim], however, and so must be supplied in one’s understanding.) For of those that are contingent and future it is never the case that one is definitely true [and] the other false.10

(iii) Sources of the second-oldest interpretation Before trying to discover what Boethius might have had in mind here, I want to say what little there is to say about concrete evidence regarding sources of the second-oldest interpretation. Boethius’ two commentaries may have been written not very long after Ammonius’, the earliest surviving commentary on de Interpretatione. In commenting on a similar passage (18b4), Ammonius, like Boethius, dis-

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plays his confidence that he knows what Aristotle intended but neglected to say: As if concluding on the basis of a syllogism, then, he next introduces this: ‘therefore, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false’ – i.e. with ‘definitely’ supplied in one’s understanding.11

As this comment suggests, Ammonius also subscribes to the second-oldest interpretation. But, despite the similarity between them on this point and others, it seems unlikely that Boethius depends on Ammonius at all in commenting on de Interpretatione.12 Both of them do, however, make use of earlier commentaries now lost – e.g. those by Alexander, Porphyry, and Syrianus. Ammonius says that he is drawing on lectures by Proclus,13 and Boethius indicates that he relies on Porphyry’s commentary.14 In the absence of those sources of their commentaries, it would not be surprising if we could not say anything further about the origins of Ammonius’ and Boethius’ interpretation; but Robert Sharples has recently made some progress in that direction. In his translation and discussion of one of the Quaestiones attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sharples claims that ‘it is in the final section of this text that the view of the Sea Battle paradox which was standard in later antiquity [i.e. the second-oldest interpretation] makes, as far as I know, its first appearance’.15 Here is the relevant passage in Sharples’ translation: none of those things, of which one part of the contradiction referring to the future (sc. ‘either p will be or p will not be’) is true definitely, would be [the case] contingently. But they say that in all cases one part of the contradiction is true definitely.16

I think it is too much to describe this passage as an early appearance of the second-oldest interpretation, or to say ‘that it is only the definite truth or falsity of future-tense statements that is incompatible with contingency’17 or to claim that it presents ‘the appearance, by implication, of the qualification “true or false, but not definitely” ’.18 Sharples himself characterizes ‘the standard view among later ancient writers’, the view he discerns in this Alexandrian Quaestio, as the claim ‘that statements are either true or false, but neither definitely’.19 But only a few lines further on in that same final section of the text we can find what looks very much like the restricted-bivalence response to logical determinism, denying that such statements are either true or false: But [if] it is alike possible for the same thing to come to be and not to come to be, how is it not absurd to say, in the case of these things, that one part of the contradiction uttered beforehand (sc. ‘either p will be or p will not be’) is [see note 21] true and the other false, [when] the thing in question is alike capable of both?20

28

I. Introduction

If we assume that the Alexandrian Quaestio is genuine, or at least earlier than Ammonius’ and Boethius’ commentaries, Sharples has called attention to a very interesting anticipation of the terminology of their interpretation, but not to a clear instance of the interpretation itself, even on his own understanding of it.21 I know of no other sources in the surviving philosophical literature between Aristotle and Ammonius. I think Aristotle himself may provide a source, however, one likely to have been overlooked because of Lukasiewicz’s attempt to dissociate this interpretation from Aristotle with his observation that Aristotle nowhere uses the expression ‘definitely true’ (alêthes aphorismenôs) or ‘indefinitely true’ (alêthes aoristôs).22 Nevertheless, in view of the confidence with which Ammonius and Boethius supply the adverbial modifier they think Aristotle must have had in mind at various points in ch. 9, it seems only reasonable to look into Aristotle for some support for their use of ‘definitely’ in emending his text. The support I think I have found fits Boethius’ emendation more closely than Ammonius’. In commenting on claim (i) in 19a36-9, Boethius expounds the claim ‘not, however, this one or that one, but whichever one happens’23 as ‘it is not necessary that all affirmations and negations be definitely true [or false]’, and then points out that he has added the ‘definitely’, which is ‘missing  and so must be supplied in one’s understanding’.24 A warrant for Boethius’ emendation lies no farther away than Categories ch. 10, where Aristotle is discussing contraries such as white and black, hot and cold. One such contrary, he says, may belong to a thing by nature (in such a way that the thing has no affinity for the other contrary), ‘as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow; and in these cases it is necessary that the one or the other belong definitely, and not whichever one happens’.25 What Boethius could have seen in these Categories passages is that when Aristotle says of something’s possession of either of two opposed characteristics that it is not a matter of whichever one happens, he also says it possesses the one and not the other of those characteristics definitely. And so when in de Interpretatione he says of something’s possession of either of two opposed characteristics – truth and falsity – that it is a matter of whichever one happens, he no doubt means to say also that it does not possess the one or the other of those characteristics definitely. I am not suggesting that Boethius was the discoverer of this Aristotelian warrant for the conceptual and terminological distinction that characterizes the second-oldest interpretation. The facts that there is evidence for Ammonius’ knowing of it too, and that the two of them depended on some of the same commentators, make it likely that the connection had already been pointed out in one of the no longer extant commentaries – perhaps in Alexander’s, if we extrapolate from the only available hint, the passage in the Quaestiones to which Sharples has called attention. But I

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am suggesting that the connection is there to be discovered, and that Boethius seems to be relying on it. (iv) Boethius on truth and logical determinism Having said all I have to say about sources of the second-oldest interpretation, I want now to try to say what it comes to. My ulterior motive for undertaking this critical exposition is my interest in the development of the response to logical determinism (and the interpretation of Aristotle’s response) among medieval philosophers, for whom the second-oldest interpretation had the stamp of Boethius’ authority. For that reason I have examined the interpretation in Boethius’ rather than in Ammonius’ version of it.26 Ammonius’ commentary remained inaccessible to the Latins until William of Moerbeke translated it in 1268, and so it is irrelevant to at least the earlier stages of the medieval development.27 Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation is based on his thoroughgoing Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth: ‘the nature of predicative [i.e. categorical] propositions is acquired from the truth and falsity of things, events, or states of affairs; for however they are, so will the propositions that signify them be’.28 For that reason propositions ‘about past and present things, events, or states of affairs are, indeed, like those things themselves, stable and definite;  [and], for that reason, of that which has happened it is true to say definitely that it has happened  And concerning the present as well: whatever is happening has a definite nature in that it is happening. It is necessary to have definite truth and falsity in the propositions, too; for of whatever is happening it is definitely true to say that it is happening, [definitely] false that it is not happening.’29 Boethius often emphatically associates these definite truth values with the necessity (or impossibility) which is at issue in the controversy over determinism – i.e. not logical necessity, but the condition of being beyond human power to bring about, to alter, or to prevent. (I will sometimes refer to this condition as ineluctability, following Ackrill,30 but it should be remembered throughout this discussion that the familiar modal words are not to be given their standard twentieth-century interpretations when they occur in Boethius.) For example, ‘if every affirmation is definitely true or definitely false, and [every] negation the same way, it will come about that all things occur with the inevitable character of necessity; and if that is the case, free choice comes to nothing’;31 and ‘if a thing is not settled or forthcoming by definite necessity, neither does the expression which designates that thing have definite truth’.32 So an event or state of affairs is ineluctable if a proposition about its occurrence, describing it in individuating detail, is definitely true, and all propositions about past or present events or states of affairs have definite truth values. But Boethius is on what he takes to be Aristotle’s side against logical determinism, and so it is his view that future events or states of affairs

30

I. Introduction

and hence propositions about them are fundamentally different from those belonging to the past or present: ‘It is entirely clear, then, as regards present and past matters, even those having to do with things, events, or states of affairs that are contingent, that the outcome is definite and settled. As regards future matters, however, it is clear that either one of the two [contradictory opposites] can happen, although it is not the case that one of them is definite; instead, [each] is inclined to either part. It is also clear, of course, that necessarily either this one or that one comes about, but [also] that it cannot happen that this one (whatever it is) or anything else at all [come about] definitely.’33 (v) The main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation Against that background of Boethius’ theory of truth and his understanding of and opposition to logical determinism I want to consider the following representative statement by Boethius of the second-oldest interpretation as applied to contradictory pairs of singular propositions regarding a contingent future event: For [in such a case] it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that either of them be definitely true, the other definitely false. For if someone else denies what we say – ‘Alexander is to be bathed’ – and says ‘Alexander is not to be bathed’, it is indeed necessary that this whole [state of affairs] come about – that either he is bathed or he is not bathed – and it is necessary that one be true and the other false: either the affirmation, if he has been bathed, or, if he has not been bathed, the negation. But it is not necessary that definitely the affirmation be true, because in cases of this sort the negation could come about; but neither is it ever definite that the negation be true ([and] the affirmation false), because the negation can fail to come about. Accordingly, as regards the whole contradiction it is of course necessary that one be true, the other false. But that one be definitely true, the other definitely false – as is the case regarding things that are past and those that are present – is not possible in any way.34

This passage contains more than a statement of the main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation, but since that thesis is my first concern, I will extract it in what I intend to be an accurate paraphrase. We can keep our original example, assuming that the occurrence of a sea battle on [tomorrow’s date] is a contingent future event in the Aristotelian or Boethian sense of ‘contingent’: Either (A) there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or (B) there won’t be a sea battle tomorrow. The main thesis: It is necessary that this whole state of affairs come about – i.e. that either a sea battle occurs or a sea battle does not occur on [tomorrow’s date]. But, as for propositions (A) and (B), although it is necessary that one be true and the other false, it is not possible that one be definitely true and the other definitely false.35

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I have chosen a relatively clear passage from among the many passages in Boethius’ two commentaries in which he presents the main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation, and I have tried to paraphrase it accurately, but I think that what we have before us is at best ambiguous. And so, before appraising this thesis, I need to sort out the readings of it that have occurred to me (and in some cases to Boethius’ medieval readers as well). (vi) Four readings of the main thesis As a preliminary move in that direction it is worthwhile considering the possibility that by ‘definitely true’ and ‘definitely false’ Boethius really means no more than he means by ‘true’ and ‘false’, in which case his thesis seems to be just hopelessly confused, claiming that the same arrangement is both necessary and impossible. There certainly are passages in Boethius’ commentaries, some of them lengthy and important to his analysis of Aristotle’s position or his own anti-determinism, in which Boethius derives ineluctability not from definite truth or falsity, but just from truth or falsity, using ‘true’ and ‘false’ in the way he more often uses ‘definitely true’ and ‘definitely false’.36 But immediately following at least two such passages he seems to be reminding the reader that the preceding discussion has to be understood in terms of definite truth and definite falsity.37 And in other places he clearly is insisting that a proposition’s being true or false is not to be confused with its being definitely true or definitely false – e.g. ‘as regards past things and those that are present, it is necessary as regards the affirmation and the negation not only that one be true and the other false, but the one is true definitely, and the other takes on falsity definitely’.38 So the only reasonable working hypothesis is that Boethius has different senses in mind for ‘true or false’ and ‘definitely true or definitely false’. Proceeding on that hypothesis, I think the main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation might, more or less warrantably, be given any of the following readings. I. Merely epistemically indefinite truth values: As of this moment, either (A) is true and (B) is false, or (A) is false and (B) is true, but no human being knows which. There are two apparent advantages to this reading: it preserves universal bivalence (a goal which is obviously an important motivation for Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation), and it is easy to understand. Furthermore, Boethius sometimes writes as if it is what he has in mind – e.g. ‘affirmations and negations regarding them [i.e. contingent future events] have indefinite truth or falsity; for one is always true [and] the other always false, but which of them is true or which false is not yet known as regards contingents.’39 Passages of this sort are misleading, however. Boethius plainly would, and sometimes expressly does, repudiate this first

32

I. Introduction

reading – e.g. ‘some one part of the whole contradiction is true [and] the other false, but unknowably and indefinitely – and not [just] from our point of view; rather, the very nature of the things that are expressed propositionally [is] dubitable’;40 ‘It must not be thought, however, that whatever things are unknown to us are in either of two ways and have the nature of contingents.  Rather, the only things that should be thought to be undoubtedly so [i.e. contingent] are those that are unknown to us in virtue of the fact that by their own nature they cannot be known in respect of which sort of outcome they have, because by reason of their own instability of nature they are inclined toward both ’41 Although medieval readers could have found passages in Boethius’ commentaries that seem to support Reading I, and although some of them adopted it, it cannot be attributed to Boethius himself. II. Truth values mutable before the event occurs or becomes ineluctable: As of this moment, either (A) is true and (B) is false, or (A) is false and (B) is true, but those truth values may change between now and the beginning of a sea battle on [tomorrow’s date] or midnight of that day, whichever is earlier. The stipulation ‘before the event occurs or becomes ineluctable’ is needed because, although Boethius does not remark on it, more than one medieval pointed out that if an affirmative proposition about a contingent future event is true at all times or at any time before the event, it becomes always false at and after the event; and if a negative proposition of that sort is false at all times or at any time before the event, it becomes always true at and after the event. (False affirmatives and true negatives undergo no such automatic changes.42) Reading II has only one advantage I can see: it preserves universal bivalence. But that advantage is entirely illusory in view of the fact that Reading II is incoherent. The claims ‘At 9 p.m. EST on [today’s date] (A) is true’ and ‘At 10 p.m. EST on [today’s date] (A) becomes false’ are incompatible. Nevertheless, there are passages in which Boethius can be read as taking that untenable position – e.g. ‘it is of course obvious that as regards a contradiction one is true and the other false; but just as the things, events, or states of affairs themselves are mutably and indefinitely going to be, so also the statements would be made with variable and not with definite truth and falsity’.43 But I can see no reason for treating such passages as more than mildly unfortunate results of a rhetorician’s attempt to avoid a monotonous vocabulary.44 There is absolutely no basis beyond such stray terminological suggestions for attributing Reading II to Boethius, and I am going to propose a different reading for Boethius’ association of mutability with indefinite truth and falsity. III. A third truth value: As of this moment, (A) has the truth value indefinite, and (B) has the truth value indefinite, but that intermedi-

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ate truth value will be superseded in each case by one of the two standard truth values, either very shortly before the beginning of a sea battle on [tomorrow’s date] (when there is no longer time for human choice or chance to intervene) or very shortly before midnight of that day, whichever is earlier. This reading’s resemblance to Lukasiewicz’s response to logical determinism is symptomatic of its most flagrant disadvantage: in introducing a third truth value, Reading III expressly abandons universal bivalence. If Reading III does not thereby simply reduce the second-oldest interpretation to the oldest, that is only because on this reading the second-oldest would add an affirmative detail to the purely negative thesis of the oldest interpretation: singular, temporally definite propositions about contingent future events are neither true nor false, but indefinite. I have noticed one passage in Boethius’ two commentaries that might conceivably suggest a third truth value – ‘with both [the affirmation and the negation] indefinite as regards truth and falsity and tending equally to truth and falsity’45 – but I have no good reason to think that the notion of a truth value other than true and false ever entered his mind. Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that Boethius intends his version of the second-oldest interpretation to preserve universal bivalence. We have already seen him saying that in contradictory pairs of singular propositions about contingent future events ‘it is of course necessary that one be true, the other false’.46 Here is his clearest, fullest statement to that effect: Now some people, the Stoics among them, thought that Aristotle says that contingent [propositions] about the future are neither true nor false. For they interpreted his saying that nothing [of that sort] is disposed more to being than to not being as meaning that it makes no difference whether they are thought false or true; for they considered them to be neither true nor false [in Aristotle’s view] – but falsely. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false but, of course, that each one of them is either true or false – not, however, definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters. [He says] instead that there is, in a way, a dual nature of statement-making utterances: some of them are not only such that the true and the false is found in them, but also such that one of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false; of the other (statement-making utterances], however, one is true and the other false, but indefinitely and mutably and this as a result of their own nature, not relative to our ignorance or knowledge.47

Along with further indications of Boethius’ own understanding of the main thesis, this passage presents clear evidence that he himself takes the second-oldest interpretation to preserve universal bivalence; and so Reading III cannot be ascribed to him. IV. Either-true-or-false as a disjunctive property: As of this moment,

34

I. Introduction (A) is either-true-or-false and (B) is either-true-or-false, but neither proposition has either truth value definitely, although either very shortly before the beginning of a sea battle on [tomorrow’s date] (when there is no longer time enough for human choice or chance to intervene) or very shortly before midnight of that day, whichever is earlier, either (A) will be true and (B) will be false, or (A) will be false and (B) will be true.

In the light of what we have seen so far, I think there can be no serious doubt that this fourth reading comes much closer than any of the preceding three to expressing what Boethius had in mind. It seems also to be the reading preferred by recent commentators who distinguish the secondoldest from the oldest interpretation, although they apparently see no need to explain it.48 But what exactly is the disjunctive property either-true-orfalse? (vii) The disjunctive property either-true-or-false I am going to try to answer that question on the assumption that Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation is coherent and more than superficially different from the oldest, and that Reading IV is on the right track. If Reading IV is not to collapse into Reading III, a proposition’s being either-true-or-false cannot be a third truth value; but either-true-or-false is no more a truth value than either-red-or-green is a colour. Nor can either-true-or-false as a property of a proposition be assimilated to eitherodd-or-even as a property of the number of stars in our galaxy at this instant; otherwise Reading IV collapses into Reading I. And so it cannot be the case that a proposition’s having the property either-true-or-false is entailed by its having the property true or by its having the property false; being either-true-or-false is different from being either true or false. The most helpful analogy that has occurred to me is either-winner-or-loser as a property that belongs to each runner in a two-person race just after they’ve left the starting-line, when neither runner has the property winner or the property loser. But if I am right in thinking that that is what indefinite truth values come to and in thinking that Reading IV is an important part of what Boethius has in mind, then how does he think he rebuts the Stoics’ charge that Aristotle abandoned bivalence, and in what interesting respect does the second oldest interpretation differ from the oldest? Boethius’ rebuttal of the Stoics’ charge begins with the claim that ‘Aristotle does not say that both [the affirmation and the negation] are neither true nor false’ – i.e. that Aristotle does not abandon bivalence – but, on the contrary, maintains that ‘each one of them is either true or false’. So, according to Boethius, Aristotle remains faithful to universal bivalence; every proposition is either true or false, including propositions

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about contingent future events, the only candidates for exemption from bivalence. But, Boethius continues, propositions about contingent future events are not true or false ‘definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters’, where ‘one of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false’ just in virtue of the fact that past and present matters are ineluctably settled. Because contingent future matters are not settled, Boethius interprets Aristotle as holding that of a contradictory pair of propositions about such matters ‘one is true and the other false, but indefinitely and mutably’.49 As far as I can see, to say that one is true and the other false indefinitely must mean that such propositions are not yet definitely true or definitely false, but as of now either-true-or-false in the sense that the properties true and false exhaust the possibilities of which one is to be realized for each such proposition. The eventual realization of a definite truth value is the mutation alluded to in ‘mutably’, I think – the exchange of the property either-true-or-false for the property (definitely) true or for the property (definitely) false. On Boethius’ view a proposition is definitely true (definitely false) if and only if it corresponds (fails to correspond50) to an already extant state of affairs. And, given Boethius’ strict adherence to the Aristotelian correspondence theory, it seems that once a definite truth value has been acquired by a proposition, it must attach to that proposition retrospectively. The proposition ‘There was a sea battle near Denmark on May 31, 1916’ is definitely true just because the event described is an ineluctably settled feature of reality. At any time before May 31, 1916, the proposition ‘There will be a sea battle near Denmark on May 31, 1916’ was only either-true-or-false because there was not yet a fact to which it could correspond or fail to correspond. But now that that battle is a fact, the Aristotelian correspondence theory seems to entitle and to require us to recognize that now that future-tense proposition is definitely true retrospectively for all time before May 31, 1916. (viii) Truth and falsity at a time and for a time My attempt to work out the details of the Boethian position depends on maintaining a distinction between truth (or falsity) at a time and truth (or falsity) for a time: a proposition true at a time is eo ipso true for that time, but a proposition true for a time is not eo ipso true at that time. Thus although at no time before May 31, 1916, was it definitely true or definitely false that there would be a sea battle on that day, at the present time, in 1986, it is definitely true for all time before May 31, 1916, that there would be a sea battle on that day. At any time at which a proposition is neither true nor false, it is either-true-or-false; and every proposition eventually is definitely true or is definitely false for every time. For example, ‘There will be a sea battle on May 31, 1916’ is at this present time definitely true for every time before May 31, 1916 and definitely false for every time after

36

I. Introduction

that date.51 It may be helpful to notice that present-tense and past-tense propositions are subject to retrospective acquisition of truth values in just the same way: the proposition ‘A sea battle is occurring today, December 31, 1999’ is now in 1986 only either-true-or-false, as is its past-tense counterpart. And it may be reassuring to notice that the apparent changes of the past effected in the retrospective acquisition of truth values are only Cambridge changes, retrospective evaluations no more worrisome metaphysically than is the retrospective identification that enables me to say naturally and truthfully that my mother was born in 1905. (ix) Narrow and broad bivalence If, as I am suggesting, for each contingent proposition about the future one of the two truth values is eventually and retrospectively going to become definite, Boethius’ rebuttal of the Stoics’ charge can be interpreted as his recasting of the principle of bivalence in order to show that the Stoics understood it too narrowly, having assumed that a proposition’s actual possession of just the one or just the other truth value must be simultaneous with the evaluation of the proposition. Thus the Stoics’ version of the principle might be formulated in this way: Narrow bivalence: At any given time every proposition has exactly one of these two truth values: true or false. And the version I take Boethius to be depending on (or at least working toward) can be put informally in this way: Broad bivalence: For any given time every proposition eventually has exactly one of these two truth values: true, or false; and so at any time at which it does not yet have one of those truth values it has the disjunctive property either-true-or-false.52 Broad bivalence is the heart of Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation as I view it, and the only available basis on which he can support his claim to have preserved bivalence and rebutted the Stoics. And broad bivalence, as I see it, does justify Boethius’ claim: necessarily, every proposition gets a definite truth value, and there is no time for which any proposition ultimately lacks a definite truth value, and although there are times at which some propositions lack definite truth values, at those times those propositions have the disjunctive property either-true-or-false. Returning to my foot-race analogy, suppose we lay down these rules in order to guarantee a decisive result: the two runners are arbitrarily assigned the numerals 1 and 2; in case of a dead heat or even if neither of them moves after the starter’s gun has been fired, 1 is automatically the winner and 2 the loser; otherwise the runner who is ahead at the end is

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the winner and the other is the loser. Then necessarily if P is a runner in the race and the starter’s gun has been fired, P has a race result: the differentia for having been a runner in this race is being either the winner or the loser of this race, and necessarily, ineluctably, between the firing of the gun and the end of the race P is either-the-winner-or-the-loser, ‘but indefinitely and mutably’ because during that time P is not yet the winner nor is P yet the loser. I see no reason why universal bivalence for propositions should not be conceived of along the lines of my foot-race bivalence. If it is conceived of in that way, there is no discrepancy between Aristotle’s taking bivalence to be the differentia of propositions in Int. 4 and his claiming (as Boethius takes him to do) in Int. 9 that at certain times some propositions do not have a definite truth value. The Stoics’ insistence that every proposition must have a definite truth value right now constitutes a gratuitous narrowing of the principle of bivalence – somewhat like objecting against taking rationality to be the differentia of human beings on the grounds that not every human being exhibits (actualizes) rationality at every time. (x) Boethius’ second contribution Important as it is to Boethius’ interpretation and defence of Aristotle, broad bivalence is not all there is to his position. I will conclude by presenting and examining the other component, which seems to have been completely neglected and almost completely overlooked in the literature.53 The hitherto-unrecognized component of Boethius’ position is given a full presentation only once in the discussions of Int. 9 in Boethius’ two commentaries, in connection with his second commentary on 18b9-16. The core of the material I want to focus on appears in this passage: Now impossibility of this sort [i.e. the determinist’s conclusion] comes about on the basis of what was granted earlier – that all things of any kind that have happened could have been definitely truly predicted. For if that which comes about occurs necessarily, then it was true to say ‘It will be’. But if it occurs not necessarily but contingently, it was not true to say ‘It will be’, but rather ‘It can happen’ (contingit esse). For anyone who says ‘It will be’ puts a kind of necessity in that very prediction,54 which is understood on this basis: if he says truly that that which is predicted is going to be, then it is not possible that it not happen, but it is necessary that it happen. Therefore, anyone who says of one of the things that come about contingently that it will be speaks falsely in that he says that that which perhaps comes about, contingently, is going to be.55 Even if the thing, event, or state of affairs he predicted should occur, he still spoke falsely; for it is not the outcome that is false, but the mode of the prediction. For he ought to have said ‘Tomorrow a sea battle contingently will come about’ – which is to say, if it does come about, it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about.56 Whoever speaks in that way says what is true, for he has predicted the outcome contingently. But anyone who speaks in this way: ‘Tomorrow there

38

I. Introduction will be a sea battle’ announces it as if it were necessary. And if it should come about, he will still not have said something true because he predicted it, since that which contingently was going to come about he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for that reason that the falsity is not in the outcome, but in the mode of the prediction. For just as someone has spoken falsely if while Socrates is walking he says ‘Socrates necessarily is walking’ – not because Socrates is walking, but because he is not necessarily walking and he declared that he is necessarily walking – so also in the case in which someone says that something will be he is mistaken even if it happens – not because it has happened, but because it has not happened as he predicted it was going to be. If it were definitely true, however, it would be necessarily going to be. Therefore, whatever he announced was going to come about, without any other mode, he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for that reason that the falsity is found not in the outcome of the event, but in the statement of the prediction;57 for where contingents are concerned, if the statement will be true, it must predict in such a way that it does indeed say that something is going to be, but [also], on the other hand, in such a way that it leaves open the possibility that it is not going to be. Now it is the nature of a contingent [event] to be predicted58 in a statement contingently; and regarding that which perhaps will come about, contingently, if anyone has predicted that it is simpliciter going to be, he predicts a contingent event as coming about necessarily. And, for that reason, even if that which is said has come about, he still spoke falsely in that the event has come about contingently, but he had predicted that it would come about necessarily.59

I apologize for quoting Boethius at such length, particularly since the passage is likely to seem repetitious and thus longer than it has to be. But the reason he says the same sort of thing more than once is, I think, that he is struggling to communicate a novel idea. In view of the historical setting of Boethius’ commentaries, his idea may, of course, not have been brand new when he was writing. But I have not found it in Aristotle, I have no reason to think it occurs in the surviving works of any of Boethius’ other predecessors,60 and, as I have said, I have not seen it discussed in the recent literature. So however new the idea may have been to Boethius himself, it is new to our (or at least to my) consideration of the problem of tomorrow’s sea battle; for that reason alone it seems important to let Boethius say all he has to say on the matter.61 (xi) Propositions and assertions For purposes of extracting and examining Boethius’ idea, it will be helpful to have a clear example in view. Assume that at this moment today, [today’s date], the occurrence of a sea battle tomorrow is contingent – i.e. not predetermined, not yet causally necessitated or precluded, eluctable – and that at this moment John says (A1) ‘Tomorrow [tomorrow’s date], there will be a sea battle.’62

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(A1), the proposition John has just asserted, is the paradigm of propositions about contingent future events, and I am claiming that if Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation has anything of its own to offer besides its account of truth values in terms of broad bivalence, it is to be found in this passage. So it should come as a surprise to find that according to Boethius here, John in asserting (A1) just now has spoken falsely. There is no mention of (A1)’s being indefinitely either-true-or-false, or of its being neither true nor false yet, just of John’s speaking falsely. Moreover, it is not because of the way the world will turn out to be tomorrow that John has spoken falsely: ‘Even if the thing, event, or state of affairs he predicted should occur, he still spoke falsely.’63 So he would also have spoken falsely if he had said (B1) ‘Tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], there will not be a sea battle.’ Boethius does not expressly claim that the speaker would also have spoken falsely if he had asserted the negation (B1), but that feature of his idea seems entailed by what he does say; and when we see more clearly what he has in mind, there will be no doubt that he would indeed make the corresponding claim about the falsity of John’s assertion of (B1) now. Taken together, the pair of claims about the falsity of those two assertions is very likely to seem not just surprising but shocking, because in the very next passage of Int. 9 on which Boethius must comment – 18b17-25 – Aristotle takes some trouble to reject the notion that both the affirmation and the negation might be said to be false. Without yet considering what Boethius has to say about this apparent embarrassment for his position, we might deepen the sense of perplexity by noticing what he has to say about some other (unidentified) people on this score: ‘if those who have thought that Aristotle thinks that both propositions [i.e. the affirmation and the negation] regarding future matters are false would read very carefully through the things he says now [in 18b17-25], they would never fall victim to such gross error’.64 We can make a first step toward understanding Boethius’ idea by noting that in this passage he is mainly concerned not with propositions simpliciter but with certain speech acts that involve propositions – saying, predicting, announcing, declaring, and the like. I propose to group all these under the convenient heading of assertion, and for present purposes I take an assertion to be a speaker’s use of a proposition in making a statement. Boethius’ notions of a proposition and of a speech act involving that proposition are obviously not precise, and his distinction between them is not always sharp, perhaps not even always completely deliberate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that some sort of distinction between a proposition and assertions of that proposition is at the heart of Boethius’ idea. One indication that this is so is the fact that nowhere in our passage is the truth value false ascribed to anything. Instead, the negative evaluations are

40

I. Introduction

mostly applied directly to the speaker or his speech acts: once he is described as mistaken (falsus est),65 four times he is said to have spoken falsely (mentitur, mentitus est),66 and there are two occasions on which something is rejected as not true to say (non verum dicere, non verum dixerit).67 On the three occasions when falsity is mentioned, it is carefully ascribed to ‘the mode [or the statement] of the prediction’,68 about which I will have more to say. In terms of our example, then, Boethius’ claim is not that propositions (A1) and (B1) are both false now – such a claim would have put him in the same boat with ‘those who have thought that Aristotle thinks that both propositions regarding future matters are false’69 – but rather that in asserting (Al) now John speaks falsely, just as he would speak falsely in asserting (B1) now. So it is my contention that understanding what is novel and interesting in our passage depends on attributing to Boethius a distinction between propositions and individual assertions of propositions.70 The distinction is important as an explanation of Boethius’ readiness, soon after our passage, to reject as a gross error the view that both the affirmative and negative propositions about a contingent future event are false. But it also has a deeper importance if I am right in thinking that Boethius’ evaluation of assertions is the other component of his response to logical determinism, complementary to his broad-bivalence account of the truth value of propositions. (xii) Boethius’ evaluation of assertion Bringing out the distinction between propositions and assertions of them helps to clarify Boethius’ claim that in asserting (A1) now John speaks falsely, but the distinction alone cannot justify the claim. We can more readily understand and appraise his own effort to justify it by supplementing our example with the stipulation that precisely at noon tomorrow a Swedish patrol boat unexpectedly locates a submerged, unidentified submarine well within Swedish waters, that the patrol boat’s captain orders depth bombs dropped, that his orders are promptly carried out, and that the submarine is destroyed. According to this stipulation, until noon tomorrow it will not have been predetermined that a sea battle will occur then, but, we are supposing, a sea battle will in fact occur tomorrow. All the same, Boethius would claim, in John’s presently asserting (A1) ‘Tomorrow [tomorrow’s date], there will be a sea battle’ John is speaking falsely. How does he justify this claim? At the beginning of our passage we read that the determinist’s intolerable conclusion stems from our having (too quickly) conceded that ‘all things of any kind that have happened could have been definitely truly predicted’.71 Our familiarity with Boethius’ version of the second-oldest interpretation is very likely to lead us to suppose that we know how he will propose amending the concession: by pointing out that some things that

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have happened could have been predicted only indefinitely truly. But obviously he does nothing of that sort here: definite truth crops up only once more in the passage,72 and the words ‘indefinite’ or ‘indefinitely’ do not appear at all. Instead, Boethius takes the position that it is true to say ‘It will be ’ or ‘There will be ’ (erit) if and only if the predicted event ‘occurs necessarily’,73 an expression which in this context evidently means the same as ‘is necessitated or ineluctable as of the time of the assertion’. If that truth condition for asserting ‘erit’ is acceptable, Boethius has, of course, justified his claim that John speaks falsely in asserting (A1) now, for on our hypothesis tomorrow’s sea battle is not ineluctable now. But that truth condition appears to be ridiculously too strong: under its strictures I have to concede even now that I spoke falsely when I told the editor of this volume that my contribution would be a paper on Boethius. Boethius’ first move toward warranting the super-strong truth condition on assertions of ‘erit’ is to suggest, as he does regarding so many things in this passage, that it applies to the speaker: ‘anyone who says “erit” puts a kind of necessity in that very prediction’.74 It is part of Boethius’ idea, I think, that the speaker is invariably responsible for the modality of his assertion not because it is invariably part of what the speaker chooses to assert – obviously it isn’t – but because it is invariably implied by the combination of his freely chosen act of assertion and the form of words he chooses to use in making his assertion, whether or not he intends an ascription of modality as part of his assertion. When Boethius tries to explain why the falsity of John’s present assertion is independent of the outcome of tomorrow’s events at sea, he says several times in our passage in slightly different ways75 that ‘the falsity is not in the outcome, but in the mode of the prediction’.76 The prediction, it seems clear, is John’s assertion of (A1) before the event occurs and, on our hypothesis, before the occurrence of the event becomes ineluctable. I am not so clear about how to characterize the mode of the prediction, because ‘modus praedictionis’ strikes me as ambiguous. On the one hand, Boethius’ ‘modus’ means something very close to the twentiethcentury philosophical use of ‘mode’, and in that sense the mode of John’s prediction is, according to Boethius, necessity (i.e. ineluctability77): ‘anyone who speaks [as John does] in this way: “Tomorrow there will be a sea battle” announces it as if it were necessary. And if it should come about, he will still not have said something true because he predicted it, since that which contingently was going to come about he predicted was necessarily going to be’.78 But in a broader sense, more natural to a pre-scholastic Latin author, ‘modus’ means something like ‘manner’, or even ‘standard characteristic’.79 In that sense the mode of John’s prediction is, I think, something like that which is properly inferable from his act of asserting (A1); and I think this interpretation is supported by the fact that in one of the three relevant passages the falsity is attributed not to the mode but to the statement of the prediction (enuntiatio praedictionis).80 I also think that the

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I. Introduction

mode in this sense can be brought out as an implicit proposition in which the asserted proposition is embedded, thereby rendering John’s assertion of (A1) susceptible to evaluation in terms of ordinary truth values. Putting such an embedding proposition in a form not utterly anachronistic and alien to Boethius, we might try making the implicit explicit in this way: (A1a)

(At [this time] on [today’s date] it is definitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], there will be a sea battle.81

Since according to Boethius’ broad-bivalence account of propositional truth values (A1) itself is now only either-true-or-false, (A1a), John’s assertion of (A1), clearly is false, as is (B1a)

(At [this time] on [today’s date] it is definitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], there will not be a sea battle.

It looks to me as if Boethius may have thought that Aristotle provided a suggestion leading to this account of assertional truth values. In a comment alluding, I think, to 18b11-13, Boethius says that Aristotle ‘connects the nature of present time with a statement of future [time]. For he says that to make a statement about future events is like making a statement about present matters, as far as the necessity of the truth is concerned. For if it is true to say that something is, it is necessary that it be; and if it is true to say that it will be, it is without doubt necessary that it be going to be.’82 Boethius himself assimilates assertions about the future to assertions about the present in the example of Socrates’ walking.83 Suppose that Socrates is walking before our very eyes. In that case Socrates’ walking now is settled, ineluctable, or ‘necessary’, and so the proposition ‘Socrates is walking’ is definitely true. If in those circumstances I assert that Socrates is walking, I speak truly, and if I assert that Socrates is not walking, I speak falsely; for, obviously, if every assertion is evaluated in terms of the truth value attaching to the complex proposition composed of the asserted proposition and the assertional prefix ‘At this time (t1) it is definitely true that ’, an assertion of a proposition that has a definite truth value at the time of the assertion will itself simply have the truth value of the proposition embedded in it. But, returning to the example, suppose that in a misguided attempt to show that I have grasped the point about the ineluctability of present facts I assert that Socrates necessarily is walking. In that case I have spoken falsely. The mode implicit in assertion itself is the necessity concomitant with definite truth, and so my explicit addition of a modal word to the asserted proposition leaves me asserting what I did not intend to assert – that Socrates’ walking is necessitated rather than freely chosen. Although Socrates is now walking, and although it is therefore necessary that he is now walking, my second

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assertion is false because Socrates is not now walking as I said he was. If I had instead asserted that Socrates is necessarily not walking, I would of course also have spoken falsely; but in that case the falsity of my assertion could be attributed to the fact that the asserted proposition is definitely false in fact, regardless of the mode of the assertion or of the proposition. Analogous considerations apply to the positive side of Boethius’ evaluation of predictions regarding contingent future events. In terms of our original example, John ought to have said (A2)

‘Tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], a sea battle contingently will come about.’

– ‘which is to say, if it does come about, it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about. Whoever speaks in that way says what is true, for he has predicted the outcome contingently’.84 In the context of Boethius’ evaluation of John’s assertion of (A2) we have every reason to think that it is like his evaluation of the assertion of (A1) in being independent of the outcome of tomorrow’s naval activity. That is, (A2a)

(At [this time] on [today’s date] it is definitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], a sea battle contingently will come about

– John’s present assertion of (A2) – is true whether or not a sea battle will take place tomorrow. We can make this plainer by replacing (A2) in the assertion with Boethius’ analysis of it: (A2a*) (At [this time] on [today’s date] it is definitely true that) if a sea battle does come about tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about. It is easy to see in the same way that John’s assertion now of (B2) would also be true: (B2a*) (At [this time] on [today’s date] it is definitely true that) if a sea battle does not come about tomorrow, [tomorrow’s date], it fails to come about in such a way that it could have come about. Just as the explicit addition of a modal word to the asserted proposition in the Socrates example falsified an assertion that would have been true if the implicit mode of the assertion had been left alone, so here the explicit modal word renders both the affirmative and negative asserted propositions true (on the hypothesis), thereby rendering both assertions true – assertions that would have been false if the implicit mode had been left alone.

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I. Introduction (xiii) Assertional truth values and broad bivalence

When an assertion is treated as a proposition embedding the asserted proposition, assertional truth values are just propositional truth values. But can Boethius’ account of assertional truth values be subsumed under broad bivalence? The only feature of this account that strikes me as likely to suggest any difficulty of that sort is Boethius’ retrospective assessment of the truth value of John’s prediction; for, on Boethius’ view, tomorrow evening, after the sea battle, when we evaluate the prediction John made today, we are bound not to concede that after all what he said was true: ‘he will still not have said something true because he predicted it’.85 But according to broad bivalence, when proposition (A1) acquires its truth value very shortly before noon on [tomorrow’s date], it acquires it retrospectively. Nevertheless, Boethius is right to insist that the falsity of John’s prediction is not affected by (A1)’s becoming definitely true. Even though at that time on [tomorrow’s date] the proposition (A1) becomes true retrospectively for the time when John made his prediction on [today’s date], John’s assertion of (A1) at that time remains forever false because it implicitly includes the claim that (A1) was true at the time of the assertion, at a time when it had not yet acquired its truth value definitely. As I understand Boethius’ treatment of assertions of propositions about contingent future events, it is intended to show that the act of assertion makes the future-tense proposition the subject of a present-tense claim; and so future events do not affect the truth value of such a temporally definite present-tense claim any more than they affect the truth values of any others. In developing the determinist’s arguments in Int. 9, Aristotle observes that it makes no difference whether anyone ever actually asserted either of the contradictory propositions about the supposedly contingent future event (18b36-8). In commenting on Aristotle’s observation, Boethius brings out clearly the respect in which the proposition’s being asserted or not makes no difference: ‘it would disturb nothing having to do with the necessity of the event that was going to come about’86 (on the determinist’s assumption of narrow bivalence). But by attending to assertions as well as to propositions Boethius has shown that someone’s asserting an assertoric proposition about a contingent future event does make a difference in the distribution of truth values in virtue of introducing a gratuitous falsehood. Conclusion In terms of subtlety, ingenuity, and precision, Boethius’ commentaries on Int. 9 and his response to logical determinism cannot compete with some of those developed during the thousand years of medieval philosophy,87 which began by depending altogether on his work. But for a straightforward, sensible anti-determinism which preserves bivalence and re-

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mains faithful to Aristotle, no commentator I know of, medieval or modern, is better than Boethius, whose work in this area has been misperceived or altogether overlooked for centuries.88 Notes 1. I am quoting from H. Weber’s translation of J. Lukasiewicz, ‘Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalkuls’ in S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic 1920-1939, Oxford 1967, pp. 63-4, but I am supplying detailed references to passages in ancient authors and translating the Greek and Latin quoted by Lukasiewicz and left untranslated by Weber. 2. Op. cit., p. 64, where Lukasiewicz is quoting from Boethius’ second commentary on de Interpretatione: K. Meiser (ed.), Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis PERI HERMENEIAS, Leipzig 1877-80, 2 vols., II 208,1-3. See p. 35 below and n. 47 for the remainder of this passage. 3. Op. cit., p. 65, quoting Cicero, Acad. Pr. ii 95. 4. R.R.K. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1980, pp. 92-3. See his thorough documentation of this summary account in notes 3 and 5 on those pages. It is not clear to me that the Simplicius passage cited by Sorabji (in Cat. 407,6-13) supports his claim about the Peripatetics. The occurrence of aphorismenôs in lines 10-11 suggests that Simplicius may be ascribing to these Peripatetics the interpretation Boethius presents as a Peripatetic antidote to the Stoics’ interpretation of Aristotle as having denied bivalence (see pp. 27-8 below). 5. J. Hintikka, ‘The Once and Future Seafight,’ Philosophical Review 73, 1964, 461-92; revised version in his Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle’s Theory of Modality, Oxford 1973, 147-78, esp. pp. 148-9. 6. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 92. 7. Lukasiewicz, op. cit. p. 64. 8. Ibid. Cf. remarks on Peripatetics in n. 4 above. 9. See, e.g., II 193,24. 10. I 125,16-22: ‘concludit igitur totam de futuris et contingentibus propositionibus quaestionem et ait: manifestum esse non necesse esse omnes adfirmationes et negationes definite veras esse (sed deest d e f i n i t e atque ideo subaudiendum est). illarum enim quae contingentes et futurae sunt, numquam definite una vera est, altera falsa.’ 11 in de Int. 141,18-20. 12. See L. Tarán, Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Meisenheim 1978, vii-viii and n. 10, where he reviews Courcelle’s evidence for Boethius’ dependence on Ammonius and concludes ‘there is no reason to think that in his commentaries on the de Interpretatione Boethius is dependent on Ammonius’. 13. See Tarán, op. cit., pp. vi-vii, and n. 9. 14. See, e.g., II 201,2-6. 15. R.W. Sharples, ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestio 1.4’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64, 1982, p. 24. 16. Op. cit., pp. 36-7. 17. Op. cit., p. 37. 18. Op. cit., p. 38; note the emphasis on ‘by implication’ in p. 38 n. 79. 19. Op. cit., p. 37. 20. Ibid.

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Notes to pp. 28-29

21. I think Sorabji is too generous when he reports that Sharples ‘has pointed out that the same view [as the one found in Ammonius and Boethius] appears in Quaestiones I.4 ’ (Sorabji, op. cit., p. 93 n. 10). [Editor: Sharples’ understanding of Alexander was obscured by a lapsus calami, subsequently corrected in his translation of Quaestio I.4 in our series. The word ‘determinately’ or ‘definitely’ had been omitted before ‘true’ in his translation of Alexander in Sharples’ 1982 article. Given that slip, the following comment by Kretzmann was fully justified, but with the slip corrected, Sharples’ view, I believe, can stand.] 22. See p. 27 above. Sharples appears to go much further than Lukasiewicz, but surely inadvertently, when he says ‘it may be noted, however, that Aristotle nowhere uses the terms ‘definitely’ and ‘indefinitely’, though something like the position of Ammonius and Boethius could be understood from de Interpretatione 9, 19a36-8’, R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: some parallels’, Classical Quarterly 28, 1978, 243-66, pp. 263-4. I agree with the second of his two claims here; for the falsity of the first, see n. 25 below. 23. Int. 9, 19a37-8: ou mentoi tode ê tode all’ hopoter’ etuchen. 24. See pp. 27-8 and n. 10 above. Boethius also expressly claims that ‘ “definitely” is to be understood’ in commenting (II 204,23-5) on 18a34-5: ‘For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is necessary also that everything be or not be.’ 25. Cat. 10, 12b38-40: epi de touton aphorismenôs anankaion thateron huparchein, kai ouch hopoteron etuchen; 13a2-3: toutois aphorismenôs to hen kai ouch hopoteron etuchen. Boethius’ translations: Cat. 10 12b38-40: ‘in his autem necesse est definite unum ipsorum inesse, et non hoc aut illud’; 13a2-3: ‘his definite unum, non autem hoc aut illud’; Int. 9, 19a37-8: ‘non tamen hoc aut illud, sed utrumlibet.’ It seems that the ‘utrumlibet’ he uses throughout Int. 9 to translate ‘hopoter etuchen’ would have served better than ‘hoc aut illud’ for the Categories passages as well. 26. I have noticed the following passages in Ammonius’ discussion of Int. 9 where he makes use of at least the distinctive terminology of the second-oldest interpretation. On definitely (or indefinitely) true (or false): 130,23-6; 131,2-4; 138,11-139,20; 141,18-25; 143,17-22; 144,9-14; 145,29-31; 147,20-2; 148,9-10; 149,16-18; 154,10-12; on definite or indefinite cognition: 133,15-16; 134,25; 135,2; 136,3; 136,14-15; 136,30-137,4; 137,13-14; on definite or indefinite nature: 134,28; 136,2; on nature bringing about all things ‘definitely and necessarily’; 148,21-2. 27. See G. Verbeke (ed.), Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d’Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Louvain 1961. The indispensable guide to the earlier medieval development is J. Isaac, Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boèce à Saint Thomas: Histoire littéraire d’un traité d’ Aristote, Paris 1953. 28. II 188,14-17: ‘praedicativarum autem propositionum natura ex rerum veritate et falsitate colligitur. quemadmodum enim sese res habent, ita sese propositiones habebunt, quae res significant.’ 29. II 189,5-7, 9-10, 13-18: ‘de praeteritis quidem et de praesentibus, ut res ipsae, stabiles sunt et definitae. idcirco de eo quod factum est verum est dicere definite, quoniam factum est  et de praesenti quoque: quod fit definitam habet naturam in eo quod fit, definitam quoque in propositionibus veritatem falsitatemque habere necesse est. nam quod fit definite verum est dicere quoniam fit, falsum quoniam non fit.’ 30. J. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione. Translated with notes and glossary, Oxford 1963, p. 139. 31. I 111,22-5: ‘si omnis adfirmatio vera est aut falsa definite et eodem modo negatio, eveniet ut omnia inevitabili necessitatis ratione contingant. quod si hoc est, liberum perit arbitrium.’

Notes to pp. 29-32

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32. I 124,21-3: ‘si res constituta non est nec definita necessitate proveniens, nec illa oratio, quae rem ipsam designat, definitae est veritatis.’ 33. II 191,2-10: ‘perspicuum ergo in praesentibus atque praeteritis vel earundem rerum quae sunt contingentes definitum constitutumque esse eventum, in futuris autem unum quidem quodlibet duorum fieri posse, unum vero definitum non esse, sed in utramque partem vergere et aut hoc quidem aut illud ex necessitate evenire, ut autem hoc quodlibet definite vel quodlibet aliud definite, fieri non posse.’ 34. 1 106,30-107,16: ‘necesse enim est ut aut adfirmatio vera sit aut negatio, sed non ut definite quaelibet earum vera sit, altera falsa definite. nam quod dicimus Alexander lavandus est, id si alius neget dicatque Alexander lavandus non est, totum quidem hoc necesse est evenire, ut aut lavetur aut non lavetur, et necesse est unam esse veram, alteram falsam, aut adfirmationem, si lotus fuerit, aut si non lotus fuerit, negationem, sed non necesse ut definite adfirmatio vera sit, idcirco quod in huiusmodi rebus poterit evenire negatio. sed nec umquam definitum est, ut negatio vera sit, falsa adfirmatio, idcirco quoniam potest non evenire negatio. quare in tota contradictione unam quidem veram, falsam alteram esse necesse est, ut autem definite una vera sit, altera falsa definite, sicut in his quae sunt praeterita quaeque praesentia, nulla rerum ratione possibile est.’ 35. In line with my remarks on pp. 31-2 above, ‘necessary’ and ‘not possible’ are to be interpreted here as ‘unpreventable by human power’ and ‘incapable of being brought about by human power’, respectively. 36. See, e.g., I 109,24-110,18; 111,8-22; 118,15-119,1; II 206,8-207,11; 210,23211,26; 228,1-230.3. 37. See, e.g., II 207,12-13; 211,26-8. 38. I 106,25-9: ‘quemadmodum in praeteritis et in his quae sunt praesentia non modo in adfirmatione et negatione unam veram, alteram falsam esse necesse est, sed definite una vera est, definite altera suscipit falsitatem ’ 39. II 200,14-18: ‘de his adfirmationes indefinitam habent veritatem vel falsitatem, cum una semper vera sit, semper altera falsa, sed quae vera quaeve falsa sit, nondum in contingentibus notum est’. Cf. II 200.28-201.1: ‘in adfirmationibus contingentia ipsa prodentibus veritas quidem vel falsitas in incerto est (quae enim vera sit, quae falsa secundum ipsarum propositionum naturam ignoratur) ’ (‘truth or falsity is of course uncertain as regards affirmations and negations presenting the contingents themselves; for in accordance with the nature of the propositions themselves it is unknown which is true and which is false’). 40. II 245,9-12: ‘totius contradictionis una quaelibet pars vera sit, altera falsa, sed incognite et indefinite, et non nobis, verum natura ipsa harum rerum quae proponuntur dubitabilis ’ 41. II 193,6-8, 15-19: ‘non autem oportet arbitrari illa esse utrumlibet et contingentium naturae, quaecumque nobis ignota sunt.  sed illa sola talia sine dubio esse putanda sunt, quaecumque idcirco nobis ignota sunt, quod per propriam naturam qualem habeant eventum sciri non possunt, idcirco quoniam propria instabilitate naturae ad utraque verguntur ’ See also II 208,1-18 (pp. 34-5 and n. 47 below). 42. For an informative and insightful discussion of the Stoics’ treatment of such changes in truth value, see G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam 1973, pp. 80-5. To avoid unnecessary complication, I will ignore these automatic changes in the body of the paper, taking account of them only occasionally in the notes. 43. I 126,17-21: ‘constat unam quidem veram esse, aliam vero in contradictione

48

Notes to pp. 32-34

mendacem; sed sicut res ipsae mutabiliter et indefinite futurae sunt, ita quoque enuntiationes variabili nec definita veritate et falsitate proferentur.’ See also II 247,7-10: ‘si res sint dubitabiles et indefinito variabilique proventu contradictio quoque quae de his rebus fit variabili indefinitoque proventu sit’ (‘if the things, events, or states of affairs are dubitable and of an indefinite and variable outcome, then the contradiction that is made regarding those things is also of a variable and indefinite outcome’); and I 108,4-5: ‘haec veritas atque falsitas indiscreta est atque volubilis’ (‘this truth and falsity is undifferentiated and alterable’). 44. The passages suggesting variable truth values are balanced by such as these: ‘one is always true [and] the other always false’ (II 200,14-18; p. 31 and n. 39 above); ‘in the latter [i.e. in contradictory opposites] it is necessary that one always be true, the other always false’ (I 115,30-1: ‘in hac enim unam semper veram esse necesse est, semper alteram falsam’). 45. I 213,26-8: ‘utrisque secundum veritatem et falsitatem indefinitis et aequaliter ad veritatem mendaciumque vergentibus ’ 46. See p. 31 and n. 34 above. 47. II 208,1-18: ‘putaverunt autem quidam, quorum Stoici quoque sunt, Aristotelem dicere in futuro contingentes nec veras esse nec falsas. quod enim dixit nihil se magis ad esse habere quam ad non esse, hoc putaverunt tamquam nihil eas interesset falsas an veras putari. neque veras enim neque falsas esse arbitrati sunt. sed falso. non enim hoc Aristoteles dicit, quod utraeque nec verae nec falsae sunt, sed quod una quidem ipsarum quaelibet aut vera aut falsa est, non tamen quemadmodum in praeteritis definite nec quemadmodum in praesentibus, sed enuntiativarum vocum duplicem quodammodo esse naturam, quarum quaedam essent non modo in quibus verum et falsum inveniretur, sed in quibus una etiam esset definite vera, falsa altera definite, in aliis vero una quidem vera, altera falsa, sed indefinite et commutabiliter et hoc per suam naturam, non ad nostram ignorantiam atque notitiam.’ 48. See, e.g., N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic, Pittsburgh 1963, pp. 43-54; 183-220, and R.M. Gale, The Philosophy of Time, New York 1967, pp. 183-220. As others have recently pointed out, Rescher is astonishingly wrong about Ammonius and Boethius, listing them along with Lukasiewicz as adherents of ‘the orthodox interpretation’ (see, e.g., Gale, op. cit., p. 186), and about the origin of what I am calling the second-oldest interpretation. Rescher calls it ‘the medieval interpretation’ – a designation for which there is some warrant – but he also thinks it originated with Al-Farabi (c. 870-950) (e.g. Gale, op. cit., p. 190). See also the articles by R.W. Sharples mentioned in nn. 15 and 22 above, esp. ‘Some Parallels’, p. 263: ‘Both Ammonius and Boethius interpret Aristotle’s position concerning the truth of future contingents as follows: before the event, of two propositions, one asserting that it will occur and the other that it will not, one is true and the other false, but neither definitely. This is to be contrasted with the view that predictions of future contingents do not have any truth value at all ’. Also Sorabji, op. cit., p. 93. In F.W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, London 1981, p. lxviii, Zimmermann provides a variation on Reading IV: ‘although a proposition can be definitely true (or false) according to the usage of Al-Farabi and his predecessors [such as Amonius and Boethius], it cannot be indefinitely so. The opposite to a proposition’s being definitely true (or false) is that it and its negation divide truth and falsity indefinitely. What it is for contradictories to divide the two truth-values indefinitely is best expressed by Al-Farabi at Treatise 79: indefinite division means that one of the alternatives is true (and the other false), but not this one rather than the other. In both expression and substance Al-Farabi’s view of Aristotle’s solution to the dilemma of Int. ch. 9

Notes to pp. 35-37

49

agrees with the standard interpretation of his Greek predecessors.’ Without presuming to challenge Zimmermann regarding Al-Farabi or his Greek predecessors, I think his reading of the second-oldest interpretation is plainly unsuited to Boethius, partly because of what Zimmermann has to say about the distinction between ‘definitely’ and ‘indefinitely’, partly because of his altogether atemporal approach. 49. All the quotations in this paragraph are from the passage translated in full on p. 35 above and quoted in Latin in n. 47 above. 50. Failing to correspond is, of course, narrower than not corresponding (just as failing to win a medal in the 1984 Olympics is narrower than not winning a medal in the 1984 Olympics). A proposition that fails to correspond to some state of affairs is one which properly understood purports to correspond and does not correspond to that (or such a) state of affairs. 51. This pattern of truth values in terms of truth at a time and truth for a time can be presented more completely as follows (where the automatic truth-value change is also taken into account). Let J = ‘There will be a sea battle on May 31, 1916’, to = the instant at which the battle began, tm-to = the interval during which the beginning of the battle was ineluctable. Then the truth about the Battle of Jutland can be put this way: At every t before tm J was either-true-or-false (at t). At every t in the interval tm-to J was true (at t). At every t after to J was, is, and will be false (at t). At every t after to J was, is and will be true for all t before to. 52. Counter-examples by Christopher Hughes and Peter van Inwagen showed me that this simple, informal formulation of broad bivalence is satisfactory only if time comes to an end or only temporally definite propositions are considered. I am grateful to Carl Ginet for offering the following general formulation in response to those counter-examples. A proposition is either-true-or-false (E-T-F) at t if and only if it is neither true at t nor false at t, and either (a) it will eventually have exactly one of those two truth values; or (b) (i) it is of the form not-p, and p is E-T-F at t, or (ii) it is of the form p & q, and neither p nor q is false, and either p is E-T-F at t or q is E-T-F at t, or (iii) it is truth-functionally equivalent to a proposition satisfying either (i) or (ii); or (c) (i) it is of the form (x)Fx, and no instance of Fx is false, and at least one instance of Fx is E-T-F at t, or (ii) it is of the form (x)Fx, and no instance of Fx is true, and at least one instance of Fx is E-T-F at t. 53. Simo Knuuttila calls attention to a detail of this component, but does not indicate what I take to be its significance. See ‘Time and Modality in Scholasticism’, in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies in the History of Modal Theories, Dordrecht 1981, 163-257, p. 176. 54. Reading praedictionis for praedicationis, at Meiser’s suggestion. 55. Professor de Rijk tried at least twice to convince me that my translation of this passage cannot be supported by Boethius’ Latin: ‘in eo quod futurum esse dicit id quod contingenter evenit fortasse mentitur.’ In his view the only supportable translation would read: ‘perhaps speaks falsely in that he says that that which contingently comes about is going to be.’ He is certainly right about the most natural reading of the passage. My reasons for retaining my translation are, first, that the line of thought taken by Boethius in this passage appears

50

Notes to pp. 37-38

to require ‘speaks falsely’ rather than ‘perhaps speaks falsely’ and, second, that later in this same passage Boethius appears to use fortasse and contingenter as linked modifiers of evenit as I take him to be doing here – i.e. ‘id quod fortasse contingenter evenit’ (see text in n. 60 below). 56. Although I am reluctantly disagreeing with Professor de Rijk regarding the clause discussed in n. 55 above, my reading of this long, difficult passage has been improved at this point and elsewhere as a result of his comments on my translations of Boethius in a companion-piece to this essay: ‘Nos Ipsi Principia Sumus: Boethius and the Basis of Contingency’, in T. Rudavsky (ed.), Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives, Dordrecht 1985, 23-50). 57. Reading praedictionis for praedicationis, at Meiser’s suggestion. 58. Reading praedici for praedicare; Meiser suggests praedicere. 59. II 211,26-213,18: ‘evenit autem huiusmodi inpossibilitas ex eo quod concessum est prius, omnia quaecumque facta sunt definite vere potuisse praedici. nam si ex necessitate contingit id quod evenit, verum fuit dicere quoniam erit. quod si ex necessitate non contingit, sed contingenter, non potius verum fuit dicere quoniam erit, sed magis quoniam contingit esse. nam qui dicit erit, ille quandam necessitatem in ipsa praedicatione ponit. hoc inde intellegitur, quod si vere dicat futurum esse id quod praedicitur non possibile sit non fieri, hoc autem ex necessitate sit fieri. ergo qui dicit, quoniam erit aliquid eorum quae contingenter eveniunt, in eo quod futurum esse dicit id quod contingenter evenit fortasse mentitur: vel si contigerit res illa quam praedicit, ille tamen mentitus est: non enim eventus falsus est, sed modus praedictionis. namque ita oportuit dicere: cras bellum navale contingenter eveniet, hoc est dicere: ita evenit, si evenerit, ut potuerit non evenire. qui ita dicit verum dicit, eventum enim contingenter praedixit. qui autem ita infit: cras bellum erit navale, quasi necesse sit, ita pronuntiat. quod si evenerit, non iam idcirco quia praedixit verum dixerit, quoniam id quod contingenter eventurum erat necessarie futurum praedixit. non ergo in eventu est falsitas, sed in praedictionis modo. quemadmodum enim si quis ambulante Socrate dicat: Socrates ex necessitate ambulat, ille mentitus est non in eo quod Socrates ambulat, sed in eo quod non ex necessitate ambulat, quod ille eum ex necessitate ambulare praedicavit, ita quoque in hoc qui dicit quoniam erit aliquid, etiam hoc si fiat, ille tamen falsus est, non in eo quod factum est, sed in eo quod non ita factum est, ut ille praedixit esse futurum. quod si verum esset definite, ex necessitate esset futurum. igitur ex necessitate futurum esse praedixit, quodcumque sine ullo alio modo eventurum pronuntiavit. quare non in eventu rei, sed in praedicationis enuntiatione falsitas invenitur. oportet enim in contingentibus ita aliquid praedicere, si vera erit enuntiatio, ut dicat quidem futurum esse aliquid, sed ita, ut rursus relinquat esse possibile, ut futurum non sit. haec autem est contingentis natura contingenter in enuntiatione praedicare. quod si quis simpliciter id quod fortasse contingenter eveniet futurum esse praedixerit, ille rem contingentem necessarie futuram praedicit. atque ideo etiam si evenerit id quod dicitur, tamen ille mentitus est in eo quod hoc quidem contingenter evenit, ille autem ex necessitate futurum esse praedixerat.’ 60. The closest approximation I have found in Ammonius to the material I want to call attention to in Boethius is at 145,9-19, where many of the features I think are most interesting in Boethius’ account are not to be found. I know very little about the Greek commentators, and so my observation about Boethius’ predecessors depends not on my first-hand knowledge of any sources other than Ammonius

Notes to pp. 38-44

51

but only on my perhaps rash assumption that if it does occur elsewhere it would have been noted in the literature and I would have come across the notice of it. 61. There is not much more in the second commentary that strikes me as directly relevant to this idea, and the corresponding portion of the first commentary (I 113,12-114,24) contains nothing essential to Boethius’ idea here. 62. Although Boethius’ examples always involve indexicals rather than temporally definite expressions, it is clear that he takes them to be temporally definite. See II 202,27-8, where he says expressly of propositions involving ‘tomorrow’ that they ‘define the time’. Cf. n. 52 above. 63. II 212,10-12; cf. II 212,26-213,1; 213,15-16. (References like these, to parts of the long passage quoted on pp. 37-8 and in n. 59 above, will not be accompanied by the Latin in the notes.) 64. II 215,16-19: ‘qui autem Aristotelen arbitrati sunt utrasque propositiones in futuro falsas arbitrari, si haec quae nunc dicit diligentissime perlegissent, numquam tantis raptarentur erroribus.’ 65. II 213,1. 66. II 212,10.12.23-4; 213,16 (In ‘Nos Ipsi Principia Sumus’, n. 56 above, I translated ‘mentitur’ in some of these passages as ‘says something false’.) 67. II 212,2-3.18-19. 68. II 212,12-13.21-2; 213,6-7. 69. See pp. 41-2 and n. 64 above. 70. As Simo Knuuttila has pointed out to me, there is a suggestion of a distinction between propositions and assertions of propositions in Boethius’ De syllogismo categorico I (PL 64, 803D). But it concerns only times of assertion and is irrelevant to Boethius’ idea here. 71. I 211,27-8. 72. II 213,3-4. 73. II 211,29-212,3. 74. II 212,4-5. 75. II 212,12-13.21-2; 213,6-7; and cf. 212,18-20; 213,1-2.15-18. 76. II 212,21-2. 77 See pp. 31-3 above. 78. II 212,16-20. 79. I translated it this way in my quotation of this passage in ‘Nos Ipsi Principia Sumus’ (n. 56 above). 80. II 213,6-7. 81. If I had no qualms about anachronistic formulations, I would lay out the implicit embedding proposition in this generalized way: As of the moment [time and date] of my present utterance of this very token of the (temporally definite) proposition p, it is already settled (i.e. definitely true) that p. I intend this formulation to be appropriate for assertion (as Boethius conceives of it) regardless of the tense of p. 82. II 210,15-21: ‘praesentis temporis naturam cum futuri enuntiatione coniungit. ait enim simile esse de praesentibus enuntiare secundum veritatis necessitatem et de futuris: nam si verum est dicere, quoniam est aliquid, esse necesse est, et si verum est dicere, quoniam erit, futurum sine dubio esse necesse ’ 83. II 212,22-213,2. 84. II 212,13-16. Cf. II 212,1-3; 213,7-10. 85. II 212,18-19. 86. II 229,11-12: ‘de necessitate rei eventurae nihil moveret.’ 87. For historical information about and philosophical appraisal of some of these

52

Notes to p. 45

developments see, e.g., M.M. Adams and N. Kretzmann, William of Ockham: Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, 2nd rev. edn., Indianapolis 1983; S. Knuuttila, ‘Modal Logic’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982; C. Normore, ‘Future Contingents’, ibid.; S. Knuuttila (1985, pp. 3-22) and C. Normore, ‘Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Future Contingents: an Overview’, in T. Rudavsky (ed.), op. cit., 3-22. 88. I benefited immeasurably from being able to discuss the materials of this paper with Eleonore Stump as I was writing it, and I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen, Gail Fine, Carl Ginet, Christopher Hughes, Peter van Inwagen, Simo Knuuttila, L.M. de Rijk, Richard Sorabji, Michael J. White, and David Widerker for their comments on earlier drafts.

4. Ammonius’ sea battle Mario Mignucci (i) The problems raised by future contingent propositions are many and some of them have to do with the question of determinism. One might argue as follows. If it is now true that a sea battle will take place tomorrow, it cannot be the case that the sea battle does not occur tomorrow, otherwise it would not be true today that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. That there will be a sea battle tomorrow has always been fixed and determined. The future in this way appears to be unpreventable and necessary. Therefore, the question can be raised whether it is legitimate to speak of contingency in a proper sense in relation to the events of the world. As is known, Aristotle admitted the existence of truly contingent events and corresponding truly contingent propositions and he tried to avoid the deterministic consequences derived from admitting true future propositions.1 According to many scholars, his answer to the deterministic argument would be that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false before the time to which the events expressed by them refers. So the famous Aristotelian proposition (1) There will be a sea battle tomorrow can be properly described as neither true nor false before tomorrow. Unfortunately, this interpretation, which is usually called ‘the traditional interpretation’, is not shared by all scholars and it may be not Aristotle’s view.2 I am not concerned with Aristotle. What is relevant to me is that, in my view, Ammonius cannot be labelled as a follower of the traditional interpretation. This position is not new, since it has been convincingly defended by Richard Sorabji and Bob Sharples, and, more recently, by Gerhard Seel in a very subtle way.3 However, Dorothea Frede in a recent article published after Sorabji’s and Sharples’ works still attributes the traditional interpretation to Ammonius4 and Richard Gaskin in a very detailed book on Aristotle’s sea battle and its ancient interpretations has offered a solution which can be labelled as a variant of the traditional position.5 Thus, I think that we must pause a little to reconsider this problem. The core of Ammonius’ solution consists in the distinction he proposes between what is definitely and indefinitely true or false. To have an idea

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I. Introduction

of the way in which the distinction is formulated by Ammonius, we can read the following passage: (A)

says that singular propositions in the future tense divide the true and the false, but not in the same way as propositions in the present or past tense. For it is not yet possible to say which of them will be true and which will be false in a definite way (horismenôs), since before its occurring the thing can occur and not occur.6

Propositions which do not divide truth and falsity in a definite way are said by Ammonius to be indefinitely (aoristôs) true or false: (B)

This is precisely what we are looking for now, i.e. whether every contradiction divides the true and the false in a definite way, or there is some contradiction which divides them in an indefinite way (aoristôs).7

Therefore, future contingent propositions divide the true and the false in an indefinite way. Ammonius is explicit on this point. Commenting on the beginning of de Interpretatione ch. 9, he first recalls that Aristotle had said that some antithetical propositions do not divide the true and the false and then he attributes to Aristotle the purpose of establishing which propositions are opposed in such a way that they always divide the true and the false, but in an indefinite and not in a definite way: (C)

After that adds which affirmation is opposed to its negation in such a way that they always divide the true and the false, however not in a definite but in an indefinite way (diairein men autas aei to te alêthes kai to pseudos, ou mentoi aphôrismenôs all’ aoristôs).8

According to Ammonius, the result of this analysis would be that a pair of singular propositions antithetically opposed in the present and past tense and a pair of contradictorily quantified statements divide the true and the false in a definite way, while the corresponding non-quantified propositions in contingent matter do not divide the true and the false.9 Contradictorily quantified and non-quantified propositions put in the future tense behave in the same way as present-tensed statements with respect to truth and falsity.10 The story is different with singular statements. If they are in necessary or impossible matter they divide the true and the false in a definite way, while if they are in a contingent matter, they: (D)

divide in any case the true and the false, however not in a definite

4. Ammonius’ sea battle

55

but in an indefinite way (diairein men pantôs to alêthes kai to pseudos, ou mentoi aphôrismenôs all’ aoristôs).11 It is easy to guess that the ‘pantôs’ here corresponds to the ‘aei’ of text (C). Therefore singular future contingent propositions are different from nonquantified statements because the latter do not divide the true and the false, and they are different from present- or past-tensed singular statements because they divide the true and the false in an indefinite way. The conclusion seems to be that in Ammonius’ interpretation singular future contingent propositions do divide the true and the false, although in a peculiar way. As I have said, the view that singular future contingent propositions divide the true and the false has been resisted by several scholars, who attribute to Ammonius the traditional view. According to it, Ammonius would have restricted the validity of the so-called Principle of Bivalence. It is not true in general to claim that every proposition is either true or false. Future contingent statements are neither true nor false and in this sense they would constitute an exception to the Principle of Bivalence. Dorothea Frede for instance thinks that Ammonius’ speaking of indefinitely true or false propositions is only ‘a diplomatic way’ of saying that bivalence admits of exceptions.12 That is difficult to accept because there is no reason to believe that Ammonius had to be diplomatic or that he was not in a position to spell out his view in a proper and clear way. Richard Gaskin, on the other hand, has a more refined argument. His view is that Boethius and Ammonius do say that future contingent propositions divide the true and the false, but by adding ‘indefinitely’ they make clear that these propositions are not either true or alternatively false, but either-true-or-false, where by this expression a third truth-value is meant. For instance, if we state ‘Alexander will go to the market tomorrow’, which is by hypothesis a future contingent proposition, we cannot say that this proposition is true or that is it false. What we can say is that it is either-true-or-false, and we are not allowed to split the disjunction.13 In this way the Principle of Bivalence is still restricted, as in the traditional interpretation, and something logically equivalent to truth-value gaps is attributed to Ammonius.14 I am not sure that I have clearly understood what Gaskin means when he acknowledges that Ammonius says that pairs of future contingent antithetical propositions divide the true and the false, and when he interprets this as a claim that each member of them is either-true-or-false, but not either true or alternatively false.15 Let us examine the point. The metaphor of dividing truth and falsity is customary among Aristotle’s commentators and it refers to pairs of propositions one of which is supposed to be the (not necessarily logical) negation of the other. For instance, ‘every man is mortal’ and ‘some man is not mortal’ are among these pairs and they are said to divide the true and the false.16 On the other

56

I. Introduction

hand, non-quantified propositions such as ‘man is white’ and ‘man is not white’, which are also supposed to be antithetical, do not always divide the true and the false, because it may be that they are both true.17 This explains the metaphor of division: two propositions P and P* (where P* is antithetical to P) divide the true and the false if, and only if, one of them is true and the other is false. They do not divide the true and the false if it may happen that they are either both true or both false. Therefore, it seems that for a pair of propositions the necessary conditions required to divide the true and the false are that (i) they assign the truth-value True or False to a pair of antithetical propositions and (ii) they assign opposite truth-values to the members of the pair. Consider now a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions, e.g. ‘Socrates will bathe tomorrow’ and ‘Socrates will not bathe tomorrow’. According to Gaskin the same truth-value is assigned to both propositions, namely the Either-true-or-false truth-value. This truth-value is a truthvalue different from True and False. If a proposition P is either-true-orfalse, it is not true (false). Therefore, how can ‘Socrates will bathe tomorrow’ and ‘Socrates will not bathe tomorrow’ be said to divide the true and the false? Truth and falsity as such are not involved nor are truthvalues (whatever they are) divided. I think that Gaskin would answer this objection by pointing out that when Ammonius (and Boethius) say that future contingent statements divide the true and the false in an indefinite way, they are simply contrasting these statements to singular present or past propositions: the latter do really divide the true and the false; the former divide the true and the false in the way in which they are able to do it, i.e. indefinitely. But again, why should Ammonius have described this situation as a division of truth-values, if there is no such division? Non-quantified antithetical propositions are said not to divide the true and the false. It would have been far less confusing if Ammonius had referred to the situation of these pairs to single out the peculiarity of future contingent statements.18 On the contrary, Ammonius sharply distinguishes between the case of non-quantified propositions and the case of future contingent ones. The former can both be true, while the latter rule out this possibility. One might reply that a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions can be neither true nor false together19 and, in the case of future contingent statements, this may very well depend on their possessing a third truth-value (or no truth-value at all). Propositions which divide the true and the false do so because they can be neither true nor false together. Therefore, pairs of antithetical future contingent propositions do in some sense divide the true and the false as well. But division of truth and falsity for a pair of antithetical propositions P and P* does not consist simply in their being neither true nor false together. If a division takes place, P and P* must receive a truth-value, this truth-value must be either True or False, and True and False must be split in such a way that if P is true, then

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P* is false or vice versa. Nor is it a good way of avoiding this conclusion to claim that in the case of future contingent propositions an indefinite division and not a simple division is in question, i.e. a division sui generis, which cannot be counted as a proper and simple division. There are many passages, especially in Boethius, where it is pretty clear that indefiniteness attaches to truth-values and not to the division of truth and falsity.20 This can only mean that indefinite division must be understood as the operation by which the members of a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions receive different truth-values, namely indefinite truth and indefinite falsity, which are opposed and mutually exclusive.21 Gaskin’s interpretation is not at ease with some specific passages. He equates, I think correctly, Boethius and Ammonius’ interpretations, in the sense that for him they hold the same view. Therefore, he feels entitled to corroborate his interpretation of the one with texts coming from the other.22 Take for instance Boethius’ commentary on 18b17-25, where Aristotle rejects the view that the elements of a pair of antithetical future contingent statements both have to be considered as non-true.23 In Gaskin’s view, Boethius would be attacking here the Stoic interpretation of Aristotle, according to which Aristotle would have maintained that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false.24 It is difficult to understand why Boethius should insist on criticising a position which, according to Gaskin, is logically equivalent to his own and differs from his only from a rhetorical point of view.25 However, consider Boethius’ argument. He says that to claim that both members P and P* of a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions are not true does not differ from claiming that they are both false. But this cannot be the case because P and P* are in a contradictory relation and a pair of contradictory propositions cannot be both false.26 Now suppose that a ‘neither true nor false’ interpretation were Boethius’ target. How could he have argued against such a view by claiming that to hold that a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions are both non-true amounts to stating that they are both false? This equivalence would immediately be rejected by people admitting truth-value gaps. It is typical of such a semantic situation to deny that ‘non-true’ implies ‘false’. Boethius’ criticism would be pointless.27 To explain the text, Gaskin thinks that Boethius here treats truth-value gaps or the introduction of a third truth-value in bivalent terms and because of this he is entitled to assimilate ‘neither member true’ and ‘both members false’.28 I must confess that I do not understand Gaskin’s point. The only sense I can make of it is that Boethius might have contrasted here the Stoic view in which future contingent propositions are neither true nor false to his view in which they are either-true-or-false. But if that were so, it would be hard to understand what would be the role of the implication from ‘neither true’ to ‘both false’ in the argument.29 Boethius’ point seems to be different, because in his interpretation it is

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in some sense true to claim that the members of a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions are both non-true: (E)

If those who have thought that Aristotle maintained that future propositions are both false had carefully read what he is saying here, they would not have made such a big mistake. For it is not the same to say that none of them is true and to say that none of them is true in a definite way. That there will tomorrow be a sea battle and that tomorrow there will not be a sea battle are not said in such a way that both are altogether false, but in the sense that none is true in a definite way in such a way that either you take is false in a definite way,30 but this one is true and the other false, not one of them in a definite way however, but either you take in a contingent way.31

The point seems to me sufficiently clear. We can say of a future contingent proposition that it is not true, but this does not imply that it is false, because when we say that it is not true what we mean is that it is not true in a definite way. By the way, it should be pointed out that here Boethius clearly distinguishes between ‘being not true’ and ‘being not true in a definite way’. Take the usual pair of antithetical future contingent propositions, P and P*. To say simply that P and P* are both not true amounts to saying that they are both false, which is absurd in Boethius’ view. But to claim that P and P* are both not true in a definite way does not imply that they are both false. This claim is consistent with the view that P and P* are one true and the other false but in an indefinite way.32 The conclusion of this discussion is that Ammonius cannot be ranked among the partisans of the traditional interpretation (in the version proposed by Gaskin either). What I claim therefore is that the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true (false) propositions is not a distinction between propositions which possess and propositions which do not possess a truth-value (or possess a truth-value different from the two standard ones). Thus, we are allowed to say that not only definitely true but also indefinitely true propositions are true. This means that a proposition which is indefinitely true cannot be labelled as allegedly true or quasi-true. It is really true no more and no less than any other true proposition. Indefiniteness (or definiteness) qualifies the way in which a proposition is true just as biped and quadruped determine types of animals. A biped is no less an animal than a quadruped and a proposition is no less true or false than any other proposition for being qualified as indefinitely true or false. This point is clearly made by Boethius. For instance, in criticising the Stoic position he states: (F)

Aristotle does not say that, i.e. that both are neither true nor false, but that whichever of them you

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take is true or false, not however in a definite way as in the case of past and present propositions. The nature of sentences is in some sense double: some sentences are such that not only the true and the false is found in them, but also one of them is true in a definite way and the other is false in a definite way; in other sentences one is true and the other false, but in an indefinite and mutable way and this happens because of their nature, not with respect to what we do not know and what we know.33 It seems clear to me that here Boethius claims that there are propositions which are not only true but also true in a definite way. Since ‘being true’ is distinguished from and coupled to ‘being true in a definite way’, we are entitled to interpret ‘being true, but in an indefinite way’ in the same way: there are propositions which are true and true in a indefinite way. Our passage shows also that for Boethius (and Ammonius) the Principle of Bivalence holds not only for past and present but also for future contingent propositions. Since a future contingent proposition is either true in a indefinite way or false in an indefinite way, and a proposition which is indefinitely true (false) is also true (false), the Principle of Bivalence applies unconditionally to future contingent statements.34 (ii) Even if we agree that Ammonius cannot be ranked among the supporters of the traditional interpretation, the problem remains to understand what the distinction between indefinite and definite truth (falsity) amounts to. A long journey awaits us and as a beginning we must devote a little space to describing the character of the critical propositions discussed in de Interpretatione ch. 9. According to Ammonius, they are temporally qualified with reference to the future, in the sense that they refer to future events.35 From this point of view he seems just to repeat Aristotle. What is more interesting is that Ammonius states more clearly than Aristotle does that the propositions in question are not only future but also contingent. From Aristotle employing the expression ‘epi de tôn kath’ hekasta kai mellontôn’36 for qualifying what is at issue, where ‘mellontôn’ instead of ‘esomenôn’ is used, he infers that the events and propositions in question are contingent events and propositions,37 or, following Ammonius’ way of putting it, propositions in contingent matter (kata tên endekhomenên hulên).38 This means that the propositions in question are not propositions whose contingency is explicitly stated, but propositions which are said to be contingent because they refer to contingent events. Finally, Ammonius underlines that the propositions discussed by Aristotle are singular. This is the straightforward and obvious interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘epi de tôn kath’ hekasta’ at 18a34. What is strange is that Aristotle’s main example is (1), which is not in its most direct construction

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a singular proposition, since it does not refer to a particular sea battle. In fact Ammonius never quotes (1)39 and he prefers examples such as (2) Socrates will bathe tomorrow. In (2) a pseudo-date (tomorrow) is used, but there are also examples where the futurity of the event in question is left open as in (3) This sick person will recover.40 However, most of his examples do contain a pseudo-date.41 As is easy to see, Ammonius assumes that there is a correlation between contingency, futurity and the way in which a proposition is qualified in its truth-value. Past and present propositions about any matter, that is pastand present-tensed propositions which can be truly qualified as necessary or contingent, divide truth and falsity in a definite way and in this sense they are definitely true or false.42 On the other hand, being indefinite in its truth-value is something that can only happen to a proposition concerning the future. However, not every proposition concerning a future event is indefinite in its truth-value. If the event referred to is necessary, the proposition expressing such an event is definitely true or false.43 But the same happens for a contingent event, when all conditions for its realisation are given. The following passage makes the point to some extent. Ammonius claims that in some case we can have a definite knowledge of future events. He says: (G)

It is clear that even for our knowledge it is sometimes possible to know in a definite way (hôrismenôs) what is contingent, i.e. when it is no longer contingent in a proper sense but it follows by necessity from the causes which precede its generation. A sphere lying on a plane parallel to the horizon can be moved or not by someone, if the plane preserves its position. But if the plane is inclined, it is impossible for the sphere not to move.44

The example of the sphere shows what kind of contingency is at issue with future propositions. A sphere lying on an horizontal plane may be moved or not. It depends on the decision of someone. Before the decision is taken, it is open whether the sphere will be moved or not. But after the decision and when the plane has been inclined, the moving of the sphere cannot be prevented and in this sense it is no longer open whether it moves or not. Since no past and present events can be changed, only the future is open, at least for those events for which the causally sufficient conditions for their being or not being are not yet given. This text implies that one and the same proposition can be treated as necessary or contingent according to the different situations to which it is tied. If today, before the starting

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of the battle, the decision of the admirals is taken and this makes the event unpreventable, today (1) is no longer a contingent proposition. On the other hand, before the admirals’ decision, the future of the battle is still open and in this sense it is contingent that the battle will take place. In our passage, what is in question is definite or indefinite knowledge, a notion which is not the same as having a definite or indefinite truthvalue. However, one might assume that we can have definite knowledge of a proposition P only if P has a definite truth-value.45 Under this assumption the text implies that a future proposition concerning a contingent event may take a definite truth-value when all conditions for the realisation of the event are given and it becomes unpreventable. This explains why present and past propositions are said to have a definite truth-value. The events that they express are fixed. It is no longer open whether a sea battle took place yesterday. Either it happened or not, since the past and the present cannot be changed. To make the point in a different way, when a proposition has a truth-value which cannot be different, it is a necessary proposition and it has a definite truth-value. On the other hand, a future proposition concerning a contingent event has a truth-value which might be different and for this reason it is true or false in an indefinite way. This analysis suggests a further point about the way in which propositions such as (1) and (2) must be interpreted.46 A proposition concerning the past or the present is said to be necessary. The kind of necessity implied by it is not logical necessity, but a sort of historical necessity, the same necessity which is attributed to a contingent event when all conditions for its realisation are given. The historical necessity of a proposition entails that it cannot be otherwise: either it is true or it is false, and this holds without any possible change. Consider now a proposition such as (4) Yesterday a sea battle took place. According to Ammonius’ account (4) is a proposition about the past and it cannot change its truth-value. But this may not be true if we assign to ‘yesterday’ the meaning of a pseudo-date. Suppose that (4) is uttered today and that it is true. This means that yesterday a sea battle took place. Thus, it is not true tomorrow unless a sea battle takes place today, and so on for every day. To attribute an unchangeable truth-value to (4) we must take ‘yesterday’ as referring to a fixed date. Suppose that ‘yesterday’ is a way of referring to the 18th August, 1997. Then, one might reasonably claim that the proposition (5) A sea battle took place on the 18th August, 1997. is definitely true or false at any time after this date. The same point is made by Ammonius by discussing the so-called

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deterministic objection. According to him, this objection can be put as follows: (H)

in restarting the argument from the beginning says: ‘again, if something is white now’,47 for instance a baby just born, ‘it was true to say’48 the day before that a white baby would be born the next day, and not only the day before, but also at any preceding time. What is the result? It is not possible that something will not be the case, if we are always correct (aei  alêtheuomen) in predicting that it will be, any more than it is possible for something not to be the case, if we are correct in saying that it is. Therefore, it was impossible that a white baby would not be born, because the prediction effected in the indefinitely preceding time is true.49

The proposition which the determinist thinks true at any time cannot be (6) Tomorrow a white baby will be born since two days before the event, (6) will be true only under the condition that two white babies are born in the following two days. To overcome this difficulty we can proceed in this way. Let us introduce a temporal constant in the propositions we are going to consider, say k, and state as a correspondent of proposition (1) (1*) A sea battle takes place at k where k is a date and ‘takes place’ has to be taken atemporally. Needless to say, (1*) does not correspond to (1) completely, since (1*) does not involve any reference to the future. I take the reference to the future as depending uniquely on the moment of utterance of (1), or the moment in which (1*) is evaluated. In other words, (1*) represents the content of (1), which is located in the future with respect to the present of the utterance and is evaluated at the time of its utterance, expressed by (1), as true or false. To make the same point the other way round, (1) says that (1*) is taken as true or false at the time at which (1) is uttered and the truth-value of (1) is the truth-value that (1*) takes when it is evaluated at the time in which (1) is uttered. By this analysis I do not claim that in general propositions containing pseudo-dates can be reduced to propositions in which any relevant reference to time is made by real dates, or that the so-called ‘A-series’ can be reduced to the B-series.50 My point is simpler and weaker. In order to make sense of some of the ways in which Ammonius uses propositions like (1) and (2), it is convenient to read them in the above way.

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(iii) Before offering a positive interpretation of the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true (false) propositions, we have to reject a temptation which is too easy. Suppose that a contingent proposition such as (1*) is the case at a given date. Therefore, according to Ammonius at any time before k, (1*) is true and indefinitely true. One might try to explain this mysterious reference to an indefinite truth by connecting it to an epistemological situation. Before k, (1*) has a truth-value which is indefinite because we are not able to state it. On this view, indefiniteness does not depend on the objective state of the events and propositions, but on our inability to grasp them adequately. Were we gods, there would be no indefinite truth-value. There are some texts which may be invoked as evidence for this interpretation. Consider the final part of text (A). In our translation we have taken hôrismenôs (definitely) to refer to a proposition’s being true or being false, by analogy with the many passages where hôrismenôs specifies the truth-value of propositions. But it would probably be more natural to refer hôrismenôs to esti eipein (it is possible to say). If so, it is the possibility of saying that a proposition is true or false which is not yet defined. In another passage, in order to explain why ‘Socrates will bathe tomorrow’ and ‘Socrates will not bathe tomorrow’ are one true and the other false but in an indefinite way, Ammonius says that ‘it is not possible to know which of them is true before the event occurs’.51 Once again, the fact of having an indefinite truth-value is explained by reference to an epistemological situation. In a parallel way, with reference to a pair of contradictory propositions concerning the past or the present, their having a definite truth-value is explained by saying that ‘in so far as the event which is at issue has occurred, which of the two singular propositions is true and which is false is clear’.52 One might take this statement as asserting that a present or past proposition is definitely true or false because its truth-value is clear, i.e. can be grasped. Although this interpretation is attractive for its simplicity, it must be rejected. First of all, the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true (false) propositions is appealed to in order to avoid determinism. But a purely epistemic undecidability cannot do the job. In this perspective, although I cannot decide about the truth or falsity of (1*) before k, this proposition nevertheless has a fixed truth-value and this is sufficient for triggering off the deterministic argument. In order to escape determinism we need to interpret the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true or false propositions as an ontological distinction. Moreover, Ammonius more than once points out that contingent things have an indefinite nature53 and it is easy to guess that the indefinite truth-value assigned to propositions depends on the indefinite nature of the events expressed by

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them. This interpretation is confirmed by some statements made by Boethius, where the epistemological interpretation is overtly rejected.54 The conclusion is that we must look for a different interpretation of Ammonius’ distinction. The lack of knowledge or unclarity we have about the truth-value of future contingent propositions is a consequence of their not having a definite status with respect to truth and falsity. Contingent propositions about the future are indefinitely true or false not because the future is hidden or unknown to our mind, but because the ontological status of the facts they refer to is not yet established. What is uncertain is not the possibility of knowing before tomorrow that Socrates bathes tomorrow but the event itself, since it is put in the future and it is contingent.55 (iv) To provide a positive interpretation of the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true or false propositions is difficult, because Ammonius never defines or explains it, but introduces it as something already known to the reader. We have seen that the distinction between past and future contingent propositions depends on the way in which they divide truth and falsity. Past propositions are definitely true or definitely false, while future propositions are indefinitely true or indefinitely false, and this means that they are true or they are false, plus something else, i.e. their being indefinite. Moreover, a proposition, which is now evaluated as true and indefinite, may be evaluated tomorrow as true and definite. This means that characterising the truth-value of a proposition as definite or indefinite depends essentially on the time at which the proposition is uttered or evaluated. How can we explain all this? One might be tempted to answer this question in the following way. Consider the passages, taken especially from Boethius, where the commentators insist on characterising indefinite truth (falsity) as changeable (volubilis says Boethius in one place) and definite truth (falsity) as stable (constituta).56 Moreover, Ammonius clearly states, as we have seen, that a proposition can only be called true (false) in a definite way when the objective conditions for its truth (falsity) are there, i.e. when the appropriate states of affairs obtain or are causally necessitated by other states of affairs already established, and a proposition is true (false) in an indefinite way only if such conditions are not yet given. When a proposition such as (1*) is evaluated before k, its truth-conditions are not yet established. However, it is said to be true or false. Therefore, we might imagine that the attribution of a truth-value to this proposition is arbitrary, so that one might claim that to be indefinitely true for a proposition means to be true under an arbitrary assignation. Take a pair of antithetical contingent propositions P and P* and evaluate them before the time in which the conditions for their truth and falsity are given. Since by hypothesis these conditions are lacking, there is no other way to

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assign a truth-value to P and P* than by an arbitrary imposition. Imagine we assign the value True to P. Since P* is by hypothesis the negation of P, we have to assign the value False to it simply because of the logical form of these statements. In this way the Principle of Bivalence, which is accepted without restriction by Ammonius and Boethius, applies also to future contingent propositions. At a certain point of the history of the world the truth-conditions for the truth or falsity of P (and its negation P*) show up. At that time we can easily adjust the truth-value assignation to this pair, and say that e.g. P is true and P* is false or vice versa according to the nature of things. Since the attribution of a truth-value to P and P* now depends no longer on an arbitrary imposition but is led by the presence of a matter of fact situation, we are allowed to say that P and P* have now a stable and fixed truth-value, which cannot change for any future evaluation of this pair. In this sense P and P* are true or false in a definite way and they divide the true and the false accordingly. This picture raises some general problems, which are philosophically interesting but not relevant here, and, as far I can see, it is not inconsistent with the answer to the fatalist’s argument that Ammonius and Boethius offer as an interpretation of Aristotle’s point of view. However, it shares with the traditional interpretation a disadvantage, which in my view is crucial. If future contingent propositions have no truth-value, or an arbitrary one, predictions are pointless. Consider a proposition such as (1) and suppose that this proposition has an arbitrary truth-value (or no truthvalue at all), where its arbitrariness does not depend on epistemic conditions but is ‘ontologically’ determined. Anyone who agrees on this would refrain from seriously predicting that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, since what seems to be a necessary condition for performing a prediction is that the prediction can, at least in principle, be true. It is obvious that the kind of prediction considered here has nothing to do with those predictions that we would nowadays call scientific predictions, which are not about contingent events, but about events which are submitted to laws of some sort. Propositions about such events are definitely true or false even before the time to which the events refer. In Ammonius’ account, predictions refer to events which by definition are not submitted to any law. Nor are they referred to contingent events which are no longer contingent, because a causal chain has taken place which makes the originally contingent event unpreventable.57 Ammonius’ predictions concern really contingent future events. One might think that it is no great harm if such predictions are given up. We might even feel relieved, if in the ideal town ruled by logicians, fortune tellers, soothsayers and other people of this sort had no admission. But this was not Ammonius’ view. As is well known, the ancient world paid a great deal of attention and gave a large place to oracles, divination, prophecies and predictions in general. Philosophers were accordingly interested in these phenomena. The general attitude was more inclined to search for a justification for predictions and

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oracles than to question whether, or to deny that, they are reliable. In particular Ammonius maintains that oracles offer evidence that the Gods know contingent events,58 and their possible ambiguities do not constitute a sufficient reason for denying that the Gods’ knowledge of contingent events is definite.59 Therefore, since the possibility of human predictions is not ruled out, future contingent propositions cannot either lack a truth-value or have an arbitrary one.60 We must look for another explanation of the distinction between indefinite and definite truth. (v) The discussion of the arbitrary assignment of truth-values to future contingent statements, although it has been concluded negatively, brings us closer to the solution of our problem, i.e. the explanation of the distinction between indefinitely and definitely true (false) propositions. Let us consider the general view on truth held by Ammonius. He shares with many Peripatetics a correspondence conception: a proposition P is true (false) if and only if the event or the state of affairs signified by P and corresponding to it is (is not) the case.61 The obtaining (non-obtaining) of the event or state of affairs is the condition for assigning a truth-value to P. Take for instance (1*) and suppose that we consider it at k, the date at which the sea battle is supposed to take place. At k (1*) receives a fixed and stable truth-value: if the sea battle takes place at that time (1*) is true, otherwise it is false. Since its truth-conditions are in the world, (1*) is not only true or false, but also true or false in such a way that its truth-value cannot change. Whatever the development of the history of the world may be, the truth-value assigned to (1*) at k remains the same. This corresponds to the intuition that what has happened or is happening cannot be changed, so that it is irrevocable in every possible development of the world. Ammonius does not say this in so many words, but it may be implied by his claiming that what is stated about the present or the past is necessarily true or necessarily false: (I)

If it happens that Socrates does not bathe or did not bathe yesterday, it is clear that it is necessary that the negation taken according to the present or the past tense is true and the affirmation saying that Socrates bathes or bathed is false.62

If it is the case that Socrates bathes at k, however the world might develop it remains true that Socrates bathes at k. Past and present events are such that they rule out the possibility that the opposite occurs in their place and the corresponding true propositions do not admit the possibility of being false. The same must be said with respect to falsity. Let us call the situation in which a contingent proposition has received a truth-value because its truth-conditions are the case a situation in which the proposition has a

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settled truth-value. On the other hand, Ammonius recognises the presence of contingent events in the world.63 This means that the course of the history of the world is not fixed and the only possible one. Our future is an open one, in the sense that it may develop in different ways. While the past and the present are fixed, there are many possible different future histories of the world, each of which shares the same past. Therefore, it may very well happen that in one possible development of the world (1*) receives the settled truth-value True and in a conceivably different development it takes the settled truth-value False. It may happen that according to one possible history of the world the admirals decide immediately before k that no naval confrontation with the enemy must take place. In this case, such truth-conditions are laid down that (1*) takes the settled truth-value False. On the other hand, in a different possible history of the world it may happen that the decision of the admirals goes in the opposite direction and that the sea battle takes place. Therefore, in this conceivable situation we must give the settled truth-value True to (1*). However, once in a possible history of the world a settled truth-value has been assigned to a proposition, it remains constant in that history. In the development of the world in which the sea battle takes place at k according to the decision of the admirals, (1*) takes the settled truth-value True and this is fixed once and for all: in that history (1*) cannot change its settled truth-value. This corresponds to Ammonius’ intuition that present and past events are necessary in the sense that they cannot be changed: factum infectum fieri nequit. It should be clear that before the time in which its truth-conditions are laid down, a contingent proposition has no settled truth-value. Before k (1*) has no settled truth-value. Shall we conclude from that that before k (1*) has no truth-value at all? Well, since the truth-conditions for (1*), by hypothesis, are not given before k, we may be led to conclude that (1*) is neither true nor false, or that an arbitrary truth-value must be given to this statement. But this is not Ammonius’ position, as we have seen. His view is that even before k, (1*) is true or false, but not in a definite way: not in a way, we are tempted to say, that makes the happening of the event denoted by it inescapable, because the conditions for its being true or false are given. A possible way to interpret his claim is as follows. As we have seen, the history of the world may develop according to different paths and it may happen that the same proposition receives different settled truth-values in these different paths because of the different situations which are supposed to take place in them and constitute the truth-conditions for the proposition. Now imagine that we are able to refer to what is happening in the ‘real’ future history of the world, i.e. what in fact will happen, whatever that may be. What I mean is not that we are able to know what is going on in the ‘real’ future, but simply that we are in a position to mark off among the possible developments of the world the history which will be our ‘real’ history, i.e. the history which is not merely conceived or thought

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of as a counterfactual possibility, but that which as a matter of fact will take place and in which we are going to live and operate.64 If (1*) will ‘really’ take the settled truth-value True at k, then it is in some sense always true that (1*) will take such a value at k. If the settled truth-value True is assigned to (1*) at k in the real development of the world (whatever it may be), then we are entitled to say that (1*) is plainly or simply true. In other words, (1*) is plainly true if at some time the conditions for its truth will appear in the ‘real’ world. It does not matter whether these conditions are already there at the time of the evaluation of our proposition. The important point is that they will at some time come out in the ‘real’ history of the world to which we can refer even if it is not yet at our back, in the past. The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for plain or simple falsity. It is easy to see that the notions of truth and falsity involved in plain truth or falsity are to some extent atemporal, in the sense that they do not intrinsically depend on the time of utterance or evaluation of the propositions at issue. To qualify a proposition P as simply true or false it is sufficient to be sure that P takes a settled truth-value in the real history of the world. If a sea battle takes place at k, the proposition ‘there is a sea battle at k’ receives the settled truth-value True at k and before k it has no settled truth-value. But its being true, i.e. its expressing conformity to an event, is something which does not depend on the time at which P is uttered. To ensure the possibility of such a correspondence, we have just to admit that we are allowed to refer to the series of events which take place in the chain of ‘real’ events. We do not need to wait until the conditions which allow us to attribute a settled truth-value to a proposition are established in order to attach a simple truth-value to it. In this sense plain truth and plain falsity are not intrinsically related to time.65 Needless to say, it is with respect to simple truth and falsity that Ammonius can maintain that the Principle of Bivalence holds in every case, and that an indefinitely true proposition no more and no less than a definitely true one is (plainly) true. We are now in a position to characterise indefinitely and definitely true or false propositions. Here, the time at which the proposition is uttered with respect to the time of the event expressed by it is crucial and this makes a relevant difference with respect to the attribution of simple truth (falsity) to it. Consider the case of a definitely true proposition. As we have seen, a definitely true proposition is true, i.e., in our terminology, is simply true. On the other hand, a definitely true proposition is in some way unalterable, in the sense that its truth-value cannot change. Therefore, a definitely true proposition is such that it is evaluated as true when a settled truth-value has been assigned to it, since from this moment onwards its truth cannot change. By stating that our proposition is simply true, we say that the event denoted by it is an event of the ‘real’ world; by positing that it is evaluated only when its settled truth-value has been assigned to it, we account for its necessity and unpreventability.

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A characterisation of an indefinitely true proposition can easily be worked out from what has been said about definitely true propositions. An indefinitely true proposition is a contingent proposition, i.e. a proposition which denotes an event whose outcome is not yet fixed, and which at the same time is a simply true proposition. Therefore, its evaluation must take place before it receives a settled truth-value. On the other hand, it is a simply true proposition. With reference to (1*) we say that this proposition is indefinitely true if (i) it is evaluated before k, (ii) it is simply true (i.e. there are in the ‘real’ future the objective conditions for its truth), but (iii) there is also an ‘unreal’ development of the world in which conditions are given according to which (1*) turns out to be false.66 It is easy to see that our characterisation of definitely and indefinitely true propositions is able to explain in a simple way Ammonius’ claim that present or past propositions are definitely true or false, while future contingent ones are indefinitely true or false. Consider again (1*) and suppose that we evaluate it before k, let us say at k–1, when the conditions which make (1*) true or false in a settled way are not yet present. Therefore, there are two possible developments of the world starting from k–1. One development leads to a situation such that (1*) becomes true (in a settled way); the other development makes (1*) false (again in a settled way). Suppose that the ‘real’ development brings conditions for the truth of (1*). Therefore, at k–1 (1*) is indefinitely true and this leaves the possibility open for its falsity. On the other hand, consider (1*) at k or afterward. At that moment its truth-conditions are there and it receives a settled truth-value. Suppose again that in the ‘real’ path (1*) receives the settled truth-value True. Thus, (1*) is definitely true at k (and afterwards) and its possibility of becoming false is ruled out, because it refers to a fixed event in whose future no possibility of changing is left open. (vi) What we have to do now is to check our interpretation of Ammonius’ view against his effort to make the deterministic argument ineffective. Let us return to text (H) where the deterministic objection is summarised by the commentator. The argument can be generalised and divided in the following steps: (i) Suppose that a proposition such as (1*) is true at k. (ii) If (1*) is true at k, it is true at j which is before k. (iii) If (1*) is true at j, it is true at any time before k. (iv) If (1*) is true at any time before k, it is necessary. (v) Therefore (1*) is necessary. According to the traditional interpretation it is step (ii) that must be rejected. From the very fact that (1*) is true at k it does not follow that it

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is true at j and at any time before k. If the event denoted by (1*) is not causally determined before k, (1*) has no truth-value before k. But if (ii) does not hold, the deterministic conclusion can be avoided. We have already seen a consequence of this position, i.e. the invalidation of the Principle of Bivalence, and we know that Ammonius did not want to abandon it, nor was he prepared to introduce truth-value gaps. Ammonius not only avoided introducing truth-value gaps (or truthvalues different from the standard ones) but also, as we have seen, maintained the possibility of true human predictions. Therefore in his view step (ii) must be preserved. How can he then escape the conclusion of the deterministic argument? His answer consists essentially in denying step (iv). What he says is as follows: (J)

Against this argument67 it must be said that with respect to what has just occurred and has been already produced it is not true to say before its occurring that it will be white whatever happens (pantôs).68 It does not follow from the fact that time has established this event into being that we have to believe that the event has arrived in virtue of a preceding necessary condition. Therefore, among people who predict this event, one who says that the baby will be white by necessity does not say anything true, but one who says that all this will occur contingently. If so, it is clear that it was possible that the event should not occur. For otherwise it would not be true that it occurs in a contingent way. Then, people who say these things69 should not judge what is future from what has occurred, but by preserving it as not yet having occurred they should examine whether it occurs necessarily.70

Ammonius’ point seems to be that predictions are possible and they do not rule out contingency.71 Take a contingent proposition such as (1*) and suppose that it is true at k, so that (i) is satisfied. According to Ammonius nothing prevents us from admitting that (1*) is true at any time before k, in accordance with premisses (ii) and (iii) of the deterministic argument. The question is: in what sense is (1*) true before k, being a contingent proposition? Well, if we look at our analysis of the notion of definitely and indefinitely true, the answer is clear: it is indefinitely true. Because of (i), (1*) takes a settled truth-value at k. Since by hypothesis the event denoted by (1*) is the case in the real history of the world, it is simply true. It is precisely this situation which allows the possibility of (1*) being truly predicted. On the other hand, (1*) is contingent before k, in the sense that it leaves open the possibility of the opposite. This means that the possibility for (1*) of being false is not ruled out, or, if you prefer, that before k the conditions which determine the event denoted by it are not yet given. We must expect therefore that in one of the possible histories of the world

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different from the ‘real’ one, (1*) takes the settled truth-value False. Therefore, (1*) is indefinitely true according to our definition. If this interpretation is correct, the whole point of Ammonius’ refutation of determinism is in the distinction between definite and indefinite truth. If every proposition were definitely true or false before the time to which the event denoted by it refers, no contingency would be allowed in the world. As he says with reference to a pair of contradictory contingent propositions concerning the future: (K)

If one of them will be definitely true and the rejection of possibility is a consequence of one of the two propositions of a contradiction being definitely true, it is clear that possibility will be expelled from the things which are.72

The claim is clear. Suppose that (1*) is not only plainly true but definitely true before k, for instance at k–1. Then in no history developing from k–1 can the settled truth-value False be assigned to (1*) and in this sense the future is by no means open with respect to (1*). Its truth-value situation is settled and in this way (1*) is not different from present or past propositions. But once again the fact that (1*) is definitely true or false does not depend on its possibility of being predicted. It depends on the nature of the event it denotes. In this way the deterministic argument is made ineffective. Against this view one might object by repeating the deterministic argument. If (1*) is indefinitely true at k–1, it is simply true. This means that (1*) in due course will take the truth-value True in the real history of the world. Therefore, the future of (1*) at k–1 is not at all open, since it is already decided that (1*) will be true in the real world. In other words, the contingent state of (1*) before k is only apparent, since it does not play any role in the development of the real world. This difficulty, I believe, can be met by underlining the difference there is between being definitely and indefinitely true. What makes (1*) indefinitely true before k is that the real development of the world at the stage in which (1*) is evaluated is not yet fixed. We may refer to the future ‘real’ history of the world, but how the world will evolve is still completely open. Therefore, what we actually say when we claim that (1*) is indefinitely true at k–1 is that (1*) is true under the condition that the world develops in a certain way. And this condition is a real condition, because at k–1 the future of (1*) is still open. But again one might urge that at k–1, (1*) is either true or false. Then, since it is, say, true, then the ‘real’ development of the world will be such and such and in this sense already determined. This claim would be true if (1*) at k–1 had already a settled truth-value. But this is not the case. Attributing to (1*) a simple truth-value does not depend on the fact that the course of the events is fixed in the future, but it is the consequence of admitting that there will be a future and a real history of the world,

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whatever it may be. In other words, what is simply true, by itself, is not part of the furniture of the world in the sense that it refers to events which are, in some sense, already there and which can be causally related to other events. That there is a sea battle at k is not a fact before k nor is it causally implied by other facts which are already given, although the proposition which expresses this fact is true or false even before the actual obtaining of the fact. To admit such a possibility we must concede that the relation between propositions and facts is not a temporal relation. This point is important because it marks a relevant difference between the traditional interpretation and Ammonius’ view. As we have seen, the traditional interpretation is based on the idea that a proposition can only be said to be true or false, when the extra-linguistic conditions for this attribution are given. In the case of future contingent propositions these conditions do not obtain. Therefore, no truth-value can be assigned to them. What comes out from this view is that truth is a totally temporal notion, i.e. a notion which can only be applied when appropriate extra-linguistic conditions are the case. Notwithstanding its simplicity, one might find this position unpalatable. From the fact that now it is not true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, it cannot be inferred, according the traditional interpretation, that a sea battle will not take place tomorrow. This looks not at all obvious and one might prefer to think of truth as something which is not completely given in time. Of course, the conditions which make a proposition true or false are given in time. It is in time that a sea battle takes place and it is in time that a settled truth-value is assigned to the corresponding proposition. But it does not follow from this that the predicate ‘True’ can only be applied to a proposition when the corresponding extra-linguistic conditions occur. If at some time a proposition becomes true in a proper sense, we are allowed to refer to this fact even before it happens. If ‘there is a sea battle at k’ is true in a settled way at k, so that the conditions for its truth are given at k, then we can refer to the plain truth of this proposition at any time whatsoever. This does not mean that the conditions which make the proposition true are given at any time. By hypothesis they are not given before k. Nonetheless, if a sea battle happens at k, the proposition ‘there is a sea battle at k’ is in a sense ‘always’ or simply true because once and for all it takes the truth-value True at k. As Ammonius implies, its receiving this truth-value at k does not depend on the time we consider the proposition, but it holds atemporally.73 We cannot pursue any longer this inquiry which has deep and controversial philosophical implications. I would like to conclude this section by facing a further objection to our interpretation. Consider once more (1*) at k–1 and suppose, as usual, that it is indefinitely true at this time. Then it becomes definitely true at k. What makes the difference between its being indefinitely and definitely true is that when it is indefinitely true, it is (simply) true and it admits the possibility (never fulfilled) of being false at

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a further time, while this possibility is ruled out once (1*) becomes definitely true. Therefore, one might claim that, in some sense, if (1*) is true, it is always true. But, according to Ammonius, what seems to be characteristic of propositions about contingent events is that they are not always true.74 Therefore, these propositions change their truth-values, which does not happen with (1*) in our interpretation. Thus, one might claim that since (1*) is not a contingent proposition, it is necessary even when it has an indefinite truth-value, and conclude that the interpretation proposed is inadequate to express Ammonius’ view. I do not think that we should accept such a catastrophic conclusion. First of all, I am not sure that Ammonius’ position about the modal operators is such that it simply allows us to equate necessity with what is always true and contingency with what is sometimes true and sometimes false. What he says is in almost all cases plainly compatible with the claim that a contingent proposition is such that it can have a different truth-value (even if it never changes it) and a necessary proposition is a proposition which cannot have a different truth-value. In this vein, a proposition which is necessary in an absolute sense is defined by him as a proposition whose predicate is in such a way always true of its subject that the subject cannot exist without the predicate.75 Taken in this way, Ammonius’ view about modalities would be perfectly consistent with the claim that (1*) is a contingent proposition and never changes its truth-value. There is, however, at least one passage where Ammonius seems to hold that in some cases the contingent members of a contradictory alternative are not always true. He says: (L)

Therefore, it is clear that propositions expressing contingent events (and has signified contingency by eliminating the extremes, i.e. necessity and impossibility, which have been called by him ‘that which always is’ and ‘that which always is not’)76 are not in all cases such that one or the other part of the contradiction is true in a definite way, as we have stated at the beginning of this inquiry, but they are such that either both parts of the contradiction are equally capable of truth and falsity, as is the case of propositions referring to equally contingent events, or one part is more capable of being true and the other is more capable of being false; however, the part which is true is not always true and the part which is false is not always false, and has signified that by saying: ‘however not already true or false’.77

The first part of the passage is a standard repetition of Ammonius’ position: there are cases in which truth and falsity do not apply to a pair of contradictory propositions in such a way that one is definitely true and the other definitely false, and this happens with equally contingent and for the most part contingent propositions, when, of course, they are referring to

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future events.78 What is difficult is the last part of the text where Ammonius seems to claim that in the cases in question the part of a contradiction which is true is not always true and the part which is false is not always false. This seems to imply that ‘tomorrow there will be a sea battle’, if it is true, is not always true, and this statement is against our interpretation. I have two possible answers to this objection. The first consists in supposing that Ammonius here uses ‘always true’ and ‘always false’ not in the proper temporal sense, but in the sense in which he says that he has taken the corresponding Aristotelian expressions at the beginning of the passage, i.e. as synonymous with ‘necessary’ and ‘impossible’. In other words, what he claims is simply that ‘tomorrow there will a sea battle’ is a proposition which, if it is true, is not ‘always true’, i.e. necessarily true, in the sense that it does not rule out the possibility of its being false. Since it does not rule out this possibility, it is not definitely true, as we have seen, and it is not necessary in an absolute way. The second possible answer depends on taking ‘the part which is true is not always true’ as meaning ‘the part which is true is not always definitely true’, which fits our interpretation very well. ‘Tomorrow there will a sea battle’ is obviously not always true in a definite way: if it is true, it is indefinitely true before tomorrow, and it is only after tomorrow that it becomes either definitely true or definitely false. This interpretation of the passage has the advantage of making it easier to understand the meaning of expressions such as ‘both parts of the contradiction are equally capable of truth and falsity’ or ‘one part is more capable of being true and the other is more capable of being false’ by which Ammonius refers to propositions expressing contingent events that happen as often as not or for the most part. The truth and falsity which are in question here are clearly definite truth and falsity and not simple truth and falsity.79 Therefore, it may also be that what is not always true is meant to be what is not always true in a definite way. (vii) As is easy to guess, Ammonius was not the man who invented the theory we have tried to present. He did not possess the capacity for such a creative and difficult task. Moreover, the same theory can be found in Boethius and nowadays scholars are inclined to think that Boethius did not take it from Ammonius. There are similarities between the two commentators and the more natural way of explaining them is by supposing that they drew information from the same source in an independent way. The problem arises: which was the common source of Ammonius and Boethius? The question has been studied with reference more to Boethius than Ammonius and for the Latin commentator the answer seems to be: Porphyry.80 However, there is no clear evidence for Ammonius. He quotes

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more than once Porphyry who seems to be his main source for the discussion of alternative readings of Aristotle’s text.81 Sometimes he mentions with approval some of his views82 and in one case he says that he will follow in his exposition Porphyry’s theory trying to make it clearer.83 From this evidence we cannot even infer that Ammonius had direct access to the works of Porphyry, since it may be that his quotations of him were taken from a later source. In fact his main source seems to be Proclus, who is mentioned at the beginning of the commentary in a rather solemn way as the ‘divine teacher’ who has made possible Ammonius’ work by his research on Aristotle.84 In the course of the commentary on ch. 9 Iamblichus is quoted for the decisive step concerning the solution of the problem of how the Gods can know contingent events.85 Here the distinction between having definite and indefinite knowledge of future contingents plays an important role, but it is not clear whether this distinction has something to do with the distinction between definitely and indefinitely true or false propositions.86 At any rate, Iamblichus’ point was well known to Proclus,87 and we can once more suppose that Proclus was the direct source of Ammonius. A prudent conclusion may be that Ammonius refers to a doctrine whose existence can be traced back to Porphyry. However, we could try to push our inquiry a step further by asking whether Porphyry was the creator of the doctrine. There are some testimonies which render the answer controversial. A passage of Simplicius must be taken into account, to which Richard Sorabji first attracted attention.88 A certain Nicostratus is mentioned in it, who is probably to be identified with the Nicostratus who got an honorific inscription at Delphi and was a Platonic philosopher whose floruit has to be put in the middle of the second century AD.89 Simplicius reports that Nicostratus denied any truth-value to future contingent propositions, making of him a partisan of the traditional interpretation.90 If we are to trust Cicero’s testimony, Nicostratus was not the only ancient follower of the traditional interpretation, since Epicurus was among its supporters.91 After Nicostratus, Simplicius considers the position of the Peripatetics: (M)

But the Peripatetics say that the contradiction regarding the future is true or false, while it is by nature unseizable and uncertain which part of it92 is true and which part is false. For nothing prevents us from saying the contradiction with respect to any time, as for instance ‘it will be or it will not be’, and each of the two parts contained in it, as for instance ‘it will be’ or ‘it will not be’, is already (êdê) true or false in a definite way (aphôrismenôs) with respect to the present or past time. But those parts of a contradiction which are said with respect to the future are not yet (êdê) true or false, and they will be true or false. Let these things be sufficient against (pros) Nicostratus.93

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One might think that the view of the Peripatetics is not clear. On the one hand, the adverb aphôrismenôs (407,10-11), which is to be connected with ê alêthê ê pseudê, pushes one to imagine that Ammonius’ doctrine is hinted at here. On the other hand, contingent propositions concerning past or present events are not opposed to future propositions which have an indefinite truth-value, as one might expect, but to propositions which are not yet true or false. That future contingent propositions are not yet true or false would not be admitted by Ammonius and this statement reminds us rather of the traditional interpretation. Were the Peripatetics referred to by Simplicius followers of the traditional interpretation or partisans of the same position Ammonius holds? On reflection, I would be inclined to choose the second alternative. Suppose that the Peripatetics embraced the traditional interpretation. If P is a future contingent proposition, the Principle of Bivalence cannot hold for P. But Simplicius at the beginning of our passage says that according to the Peripatetics ‘the contradiction regarding the future is true or false’ and this statement can only mean that the Principle of Bivalence applies also to future contingent propositions. Moreover, if the Peripatetics adopted the traditional interpretation, they would have held the same view as Nicostratus. But the position of the latter is clearly opposed by Simplicius to the view of the Peripatetics.94 The conclusion is that the Peripatetics did not embrace the traditional interpretation. How can we explain then the view Simplicius attributes to them with respect to future contingent propositions? In what sense are these propositions not yet true or false? The question is easily answered if we admit that ‘not yet true or false’ means ‘not yet definitely true or false’, i.e. if we understand aphôrismenôs to be connected to êdê men ouk estin ê alêthê ê pseudê at 407,12-13. In this way the Peripatetics must be taken as representatives of the view defended by Ammonius.95 Unfortunately, Simplicius does not tell us who the Peripatetics holding the same view as Ammonius are. Nor does he give us any hint at identifying them. One might think that the Peripatetics were led to formulate their doctrine as a reaction to the position put forward by Nicostratus. If so, we have a terminus post quem for the origin of Ammonius’ view and we might suppose that it was created before Porphyry in a Peripatetic milieu after the middle of the second century AD. The name of Alexander of Aphrodisias comes spontaneously to mind. But Simplicius’ words assure neither the starting point nor the consequences of this interpretation. He exploits the Peripatetic view against Nicostratus to show that his position is not the only possible one. But this does not mean that the Peripatetics themselves elaborated their conception to avoid Nicostratus’ view. To make things worse, the position of Alexander about future contingents which is known to us from his remaining works is far from being clear. We cannot examine this question here. It is sufficient to remember that some scholars who have studied this problem at length are inclined to think that Alexander

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was rather near to the traditional interpretation, although the Greek commentator is never explicit on this point.96 Therefore, no relevant clue can be extracted from the Simplicius passage to find a way out for our question. There is however another testimony which has led some scholars to associate the origin of Ammonius’ doctrine with the Peripatetics near to Alexander.97 I am referring to a passage in the Quaestiones traditionally attributed to Alexander, but in fact made up by rather heterogeneous materials.98 This is true especially for the Quaestio which interests us, i.e. Quaest. I.4.99 In the last part of it an allusion is made to a doctrine which is prima facie similar to Ammonius’ position. There are two passages where aphôrismenôs is used in connection with the truth and falsity of a contradictory pair of future contingent propositions. The first of them runs as follows: (N)

And further, if that is possible, from which, if it is supposed that it is the case, nothing impossible results; and if, from everything of which the opposite is truly predicated, there results, if it is supposed that it is the case, something impossible, i.e. that the same thing both is and is not at the same time; then none of those things, of which one part of the contradiction referring to the future is true definitely (aphôrismenôs alêthes estin) would be the case contingently. But they say that in all cases one part of the contradiction is true definitely (aphôrismenôs alêthes einai).100

The Greek is in a rather poor condition and it is not very easy to follow the development of the argument in favour of determinism outlined here. The main idea seems to be that if a contingent proposition such as (1*) is definitely true before k, then it is necessary, because the hypothesis that the negation of (1*) is true entails a contradiction. What is important to underline is that in the last lines of the passage a sort of Principle of Bivalence is laid down with reference to definitely true propositions, which says that either P or not-P is definitely true. The relevant point is to see whether the predicate ‘definitely true’ which is mentioned here is the same as the predicate used by Ammonius. The simple fact that the same expression ‘definitely true’ is used is not a sufficient reason to give an affirmative answer to our question. It might be that aphôrismenôs alêthes used in the Quaestio has the same meaning as Ammonius’ expression, but that is neither necessary by itself nor imposed by the context. Aphôrismenôs alêthes might simply refer to what is already true with respect to what is not yet true. From this point of view the deterministic argument would have its main point in the premiss that even future contingent propositions always have a truth-value. But if (1*) is true even before k, then it is always true and therefore necessarily true.101

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The answer of the author of the Quaestio to the deterministic argument contains the other occurrence of aphôrismenôs alêthes. He says: (O)

But it is alike possible for the same thing to come to be and not to come to be, how is it not absurd to say, in the case of these things, that one part of the contradiction uttered beforehand is true definitely (aphôrismenôs alêthes), and the other false, when the thing in question is alike capable of both?102

Unfortunately, here it is not clear either what aphôrismenôs alêthes means. The core of the answer to the deterministic argument is that it is inconsistent to maintain that every proposition is definitely true or definitely false and that there are contingent events. If (1*) is always true in a definite way, then there is no possibility that the event denoted by it does not obtain. But it is absurd to reject the existence of contingent events. Therefore, it cannot be admitted that every proposition always has a definite truth-value. But the question here is: shall we infer that future contingent propositions have an indefinite truth-value or must the conclusion rather be that these propositions have no truth-value at all? If we give the first answer, we have Ammonius’ view and we are entitled to say that the doctrine was born among the pupils of Alexander. On the other hand, if we prefer the second answer, we have to reckon Alexander’s school among the supporters of the traditional interpretation and the problem of the origin of Ammonius’ theory is left in the dark. Needless to say, we would like to embrace the first answer, because it gives a nice solution to our problem. But it would be unfair to adopt it simply because it offers an explanation of what we are looking for. I do not see any reason to prefer the first interpretation to the second. In our passage it is not said to what aphôrismenôs alêthes is opposed, and it might be contrasted either to what is indefinitely true or to what is not yet true. Consequently, the author of the Quaestio might be equally a forerunner of Ammonius or a follower of Nicostratus. Although we do not know where his view ultimately comes from, Ammonius’ doctrine is far from being uninteresting in an historical and philosophical perspective. Its commitment to an atemporal theory of truth, on the one hand, and its exploiting of the notions of necessity and possibility, on the other, clearly show how ample the range of the problems involved is and how modern they are.103 Notes 1. This question is faced by Aristotle in Int. 9. As is well-known the literature on this chapter is immense. The bibliography up to 1973 can be found in V. Celluprica, Il capitolo 9 del De interpretatione di Aristotele. Rassegna di studi: 1930-1973, Bologna 1977. Further bibliographical references are available in D.

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Frede, ‘The Sea-Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3, 1985, 84-7; J. Talanga, Zukunftsurteile und Fatum. Eine Untersuchung über Aristoteles’ De interpretatione 9 und Ciceros De fato mit einem Überblick über die spätantiken Heimarmene-Lehre, Bonn 1986, pp. 169-85, and Aristoteles, Peri Hermeneias, translated and explained by H. Weidemann, Berlin 1994. 2. One of the best argued presentations of the traditional interpretation is due to R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1980, p. 91ff. Different views have recently been proposed by G. Fine, ‘Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, 1984, 23-48; J. van Rijen, Aspects of Aristotle’s Logic of Modalities, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1989; J. van Eck, ‘Another Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione IX. A Support for the so-called Second Oldest or “Mediaeval” Interpretation’, Vivarium 26, 1988, 19-38. 3. Cf. R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 92-3; R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: Some Parallels’, Classical Quarterly n.s. 28, 1978, 263-4; G. Seel, ‘Die Schlacht um die Seeschlacht. War Ammonius Anhänger der Standard-Interpretation?’, Proceedings of the 13th Symposium Aristotelicum (to be published 1998). Lukasiewicz had briefly expressed the same view in a famous article (cf. J. Lukasiewicz, ‘Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic’, in S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic, 1920-1930, Oxford 1967, p. 64. This paper is also available in J. Lukasiewicz, ‘Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic’, in L. Borkowski (ed.), Selected Works, Amsterdam and London 1970, 153-78. The article originally appeared in German: ‘Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalküls’, Comptes rendus des séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, Cl. III 23, 1930, 51-77). 4. Cf. D. Frede, ‘The Sea-battle Reconsidered’, pp. 43-5. She repeats here the interpretation already proposed in her book on Aristotle’s sea battle published in 1970 (cf. D. Frede, Aristoteles und die ‘Seeschlacht’. Das Problem der Contingentia Futura in De interpretatione 9, Göttingen 1970, pp. 24-7). On the same line is Jossip Talanga (cf. Zukunftsurteile und Fatum, pp. 144-5 and also ‘Review of Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by F.W. Zimmermann’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 68, 1986, 306-7). More recently Weidemann (Aristoteles, Peri Hermeneias, pp. 302-4) has sided with Dorothea Frede. 5. R. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future, Berlin 1995. Chapter 12 is dedicated to the interpretation of the ancient commentators, especially Boethius and Ammonius. 6. in Int. 130,20-6. 7. in Int. 131,2-4. 8. in Int. 138,15-17. 9. in Int. 138,17-28. 10. in Int. 138,28-34. 11. in Int. 139,15-17. See also in Int. 139,32-140,4; 140,11-13. 12. D. Frede, ‘The Sea-Battle Reconsidered’, p. 43; Aristoteles und die ‘Seeschlacht’, p. 25. 13. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 148ff.; pp. 156-8. 14. As Gaskin says, his interpretation is logically equivalent to the traditional one (The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 149). 15. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 157: ‘The claim must

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be that it is in principle impossible to assign truth to one member of a FCA [a future contingent antiphasis] and falsity to the other: it is metaphysically indeterminate which way round the truth-values go. But Ammonius has just said that the members do divide the true and the false as do statements about the present and the past. Hence the position must be that FCSs [future contingent statements] divide the true and the false to the extent of being either-true-or-false, but not to the extent of being either true, or alternatively false.’ 16. Amm., in Int. 109,13ff. 17. Amm., in Int. 110,22ff. 18. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 155, says that: ‘definite truth just is (divided) truth’, and ‘indefinitely true’ means ‘divides truth and falsity indefinitely with its negation’. But again if truth is divided from falsity ‘with its negation’ there is no division at all. 19. in Int. 140,4-11. 20. See e.g. Boethius, in Int. II 208,7ff. (text (F)), where indefiniteness is clearly attached to the truth-values of future contingent propositions and not to the way in which truth and falsity is divided among pairs of antithetical items. See also the following footnote. 21. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 151 points out that Boethius, in Int. I 107,20ff. characterises truth and falsity of future contingent propositions as ‘indiscreta’. But it can hardly be true that this means that we cannot divide the true and false in a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions, because Boethius, before saying that their truth and falsity is indiscreta claims that: ‘However, as regards those in connection with which it is contingent and future – i.e., variable and indeterminable (instabile) – the whole body of the contradiction does indeed separate into truth and falsity; but this truth and falsity is undifferentiated (indiscreta) and alterable’ (108,1-5). The expression which I have italicized corresponds exactly to what he says about past- and present-tensed propositions: ‘as regards [those that are] past or present, both the whole body of the contradiction is divided into truth and falsity, and one [of the contradictories] is definitely true’ (107,24-7). The ‘both  and’ (‘et  et’) construction shows that two conditions are laid down for past- and present-tensed contingent propositions: the members of an antithetical pair of them (i) divide truth and falsity and (ii) one is definitely true and the other definitely false. It is natural to suppose that a parallel double condition holds for future contingent antithetical pairs: their members (i) divide truth and falsity and (ii) one is indefinitely true and the other indefinitely false. The fact that ‘definite’ is sometimes glossed by Boethius with ‘divise’ (in Int. I 126,7-8), or ‘constitute’ (123,21-2), or ‘simpliciter’ (124,5) does not offer evidence for Gaskin’s interpretation. in Int. II 189,5ff. explains quite well the origin of this terminology. Past- and present-tensed contingent propositions pick up events which are stable and definite (‘res ipsae stabiles sunt et definitae’: 189,6-7) in the sense that they cannot be different from what they are since they have already happened (‘quod factum est non est non factum  idcirco de eo quod factum est verum est dicere definite, quoniam factum est, falsum est dicere, quoniam factum non est’: 189,7-10). On the other hand future contingent propositions refer to events which can happen or not happen. In this sense the truth-value of these propositions is not yet stable and settled or even divisus because the possibility of the opposite is not ruled out (‘things which are contingent, are contingent in both sides. What I mean is as follows: it is necessary that either I meet a friend or that I do not meet him today by going out from my house (in fact for every proposition either the affirmation or the negation holds); but that I meet him without any doubt in a definite way or with certainty (if it is not yet settled in

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a definite way that I do not meet him), in the way in which yesterday when by going out from my house I met a friend (this is definite, since it is not true that I did not meet him) is not the way it is with things which are contingent and future; only this or that is, and this necessarily, but it cannot be the case that one thing or only one of the events is definite and in some sense certain. And on this point propositions on future contingent events are different from propositions on past or present events. For while they are similar because in them either the affirmation or the negation holds, as is the case with past and present propositions, they differ because in the latter case, i.e. with past and present propositions, the result of the things is definite, and in the case of future contingent propositions it is indefinite and uncertain, not only because of our ignorance but also by nature’: 191,10-192,5). What makes a future contingent proposition indefinita or incerta or instabilis is that it picks up a contingent outcome which is not yet settled and therefore contains an intrinsic indeterminacy: it may be different. 22. As is known, Boethius does not depend directly on Ammonius for his commentary on the de Interpretatione, but the similarity of their treatment of future contingent propositions strongly suggests that they draw their inspiration from a common source. Courcelle’s thesis according to which Ammonius would have been Boethius’ main source is nowadays rejected by all scholars (cf. P. Courcelle, Les lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore, Paris 1948, p. 264). The view that both commentators depend on a common source has been proposed by J. Shiel, ‘Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle’, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4, 1958, 228-34, reprinted in M. Fuhrmann and J. Gruber (eds.), Boethius, Darmstadt 1984, 155-83 and R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London 1990, 349-72, and is shared by L. Obertello, Severino Boezio, 2 vols., Genova 1974, I 522-44; F.W. Zimmermann (ed.), Al-Farabi, Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, London 1981, p. lxxxviii); and N. Kretzmann, ‘Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow’s Sea-Battle’, reprinted above, Chapter 3. 23. Boethius, in Int. II 214,25ff. 24. Boethius, in Int. II 208,1-7. 25. Cf. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 149. 26. Boethius, in Int. II 214,25-215,11. 27. Strangely enough, Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 160 seems to hold the same: ‘In his first commentary, Boethius writes briefly but in a way which clearly rejects the anti-realistic solution: he regards “neither true” as equivalent to “both false” ’. 28. Cf. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 161: ‘But, in any case, for anyone who, like Boethius, finds truth-value gaps repugnant (at least that is his official line, although as we have seen he cannot strictly avoid them), the postulation of such gaps, or of a third truth-value, is likely to be heard in bivalent terms, the gap, or third value, being assimilated to one of the two standard values. Boethius thus recognises no difference between a “neither member true” and “both member false” solution’. It is difficult to understand how the introduction of a truth-value gap, or a third truth-value, can ‘be heard in bivalent terms’. 29. I suspect that Gaskin’s view depends on his interpretation of the way in which Boethius (in Int. II 208,1-7) reports the Stoic position. Boethius says: ‘Some people (among them the Stoics) believed that Aristotle said that contingent propositions in the future are neither true nor false. They took his statement that is no more related to being than to not being as a statement that there is no difference between considering true and considering them false. For they thought that these propositions are neither true

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nor false. But falsely.’ The statement that ‘there is no difference between considering true and considering them false’ cannot be interpreted, in my view, as implying that a future contingent proposition is true if and only if it is false, but as saying that there is no reason to consider it more true than false, since it has no truth-value at all. Therefore, Boethius is not claiming that the Stoic view entails that a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions, being no more true than false, are both false. I do not see any reason to attribute such a nonsense to Boethius. 30. The Latin is awkward. Altera would be easier than quaelibet. Substituting aut for ut (or either you take) does not help, because we want the sense: nor is either you take  31. Boethius, in Int. II 215,16-26. 32. The distinction between ‘not true’, which is equivalent to ‘false’, and ‘not true in a definite way’ is disturbing for Gaskin’s interpretation because he argues for an equivalence between ‘true’ and ‘definitely true’ (cf. e.g. The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 153). 33. Boethius, in Int. II 208,7-18. 34. To avoid this conclusion the supporters of the traditional interpretation are compelled to distinguish between the Principle of Bivalence (every proposition is either true or false) and the Law of the Excluded Middle (for every proposition P, either P or not-P). I am not at all sure that evidence for such a distinction can be found in the texts. When for instance Boethius says that past- and present-tensed contingent propositions and future contingent ones are similar in that ‘in his autem adfirmatio est aut negatio’ (in Int. II 191,24-5) or when Ammonius (in Int. 139,1417) claims that a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions ‘divide in any case truth and falsity, however not in a definite but in an indefinite way; for (gar) it is necessary that Socrates tomorrow either will or will not bathe and it is not possible that both or neither will be’ it is hard to believe that they endorse the Law of the Excluded Middle, but not the Principle of Bivalence. The gar in the Ammonius passage is against this hypothesis. 35. Although Ammonius does not say so explicitly, I assume that he would not have counted as a proposition concerning the future a sentence such as: ‘it will be true tomorrow that three years ago Philip had a car accident’. 36. Int. 9, 18a33. 37. in Int. 138,34ff. 38. See, e.g., in Int. 139,10. 39. As far as I remember the only exception is at in Int. 154,32. However, later on he considers a proposition such as ‘a white baby will be born tomorrow’ (e.g. in Int. 144,15-16), which seems to be of the same type as (1). For ‘historical’ reasons I take the liberty of referring to (1) as a typical future contingent proposition. 40. in Int. 140,15-16. 41. I take the terminology of ‘pseudo-dates’ from N. Rescher and A. Urquhart, Temporal Logic, Wien-New York 1971, p. 27. 42. in Int. 130,1-20. 43. in Int. 130,1-5. 44. in Int. 137,1-7. 45. The question of how the Gods can have a definite knowledge of contingent events is a different question (cf. Ammonius in Int. 135,12ff.). On this problem see M. Mignucci, ‘Logic and Omniscience. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3, 1985, 219-46. 46. We leave aside (3) where no pseudo-date is expressed. However, (3) can be treated in the same way as dated future contingent propositions if we assume that

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after the disappearance of the particular referred to (this sick person) the proposition denying the predicate of him becomes in any case definitely true. 47. These are Aristotle’s words: Int. 9, 18b9-10. 48. Again Aristotle’s words: Int. 9, 18b10. 49. in Int. 144,14-21. 50. As is well known, a debate is going on among philosophers on this subject. A useful discussion of the question can be found in R.R.K. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 97-102. 51. in Int. 139,17-18. 52. in Int. 130,11-14. 53. e.g. in Int. 136,12-13. 54. Boethius, in Int. II 208,11-18; 245,19-28. 55. From the fact that the prohibition against assigning a definite truth-value to future contingent propositions is sometimes spelled out in epistemic terms Gaskin (The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 149 and 157) infers that future contingent statements are metaphysically indeterminate and therefore have an indefinite truth-value. Commenting on our text (A) he says: ‘Aristotle, on Ammonius’ interpretation, says that FCSs [i.e. future contingent statements] do divide the true and the false just as present- and past-tensed statements do  But they do not divide the true and false in the same way. For unlike the case of statements about the present and the past, if it is not possible to say definitely which member is true and which false  That impossibility cannot be merely epistemic  Rather, the claim must be that it is in principle impossible to assign truth to one member of a FCA [future contingent antiphasis] and falsity to the other: it is metaphysically indeterminate which way round the truth-values go’ (p. 157). Gaskin connects hôrismenôs to esti eipein, which is, as we have seen, possible and perhaps natural. But even if we read the text as a claim that it is impossible to say in definite way which of two antithetical future contingent statements is true and which is false, I do not think that we can infer from this that the two propositions of the pair are neither true nor false. The parallel passages show that ‘saying in a definite way which of a pair is true or false’ is only possible when we can say which is true in a definite way and which is false in a definite way. Therefore, the metaphysical impossibility involved is not the impossibility of being true or false, but the impossibility of being definitely true or definitely false. This is confirmed also by Boethius’ evidence. When he says that in a pair of antithetical future contingent propositions P and P* nobody knows which is true and which is false he does not mean that they do not have a truth value: ‘For instance if we say: ‘the Franks will overcome the Goths’ and someone puts forward the negation: ‘the Franks will not overcome the Goths’, one of these propositions is true and the other is false, but nobody knows before the result which one is true and which one is false’ (in Int. II 184,22-6). If, as Gaskin claims (p. 150), Boethius would mean that ‘it is simply metaphysically indeterminate which member is true’ he would contradict himself: P and P* do have a truth-value (una quidem vera est, una falsa). The only way to interpret this and other similar passages safely is by taking them to mean that before the happening of the event to which the propositions refer, it is metaphysically impossible to state whether P or P* will be definitely true or false. 56. See, e.g., Boethius, in Int. I, 108,4-5; 123,20-2; 124,6-7; II 190,7. 57. See text (G). 58. Ammonius, in Int. 135,12-14. 59. in Int. 137,12-23. 60. Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, pp. 171-3 correctly points out that the gods’ knowledge of contingent events cannot be considered a case of

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foreknowledge because their knowledge takes place outside time. Therefore, what they think cannot be evaluated at a certain time, which is before the event to which the thought refers takes place. But he seems to go too far when he says, misinterpreting (in my view) in Int. 137,12-23, that Ammonius thinks ‘that oracles and prophets cannot foresee what will happen, but only what is likely to happen, or perhaps what will happen if advice is followed (or not) – but not then whether advice will be followed’ (p. 173, n. 90). Ammonius is implying neither that every prophecy is useless, as 135,12-14 shows, nor that only what is no longer contingent can be an object of a true prediction. 61. in Int. 139,26ff.; 140,32ff. and 154,16-20. 62. in Int. 130,17-20. 63. in Int. 137,25ff.; 147,25ff. 64. One might challenge this claim as something which is against the view that the future is completely open before us. So e.g. N. Belnap, ‘Branching Space-Time’, Synthese 92, 1992, 385-434. 65. This view has recently been developed by G.H. von Wright ‘Determinism and Future Truth’, Truth, Knowledge and Modality, Oxford 1984, p. 6. 66. This characterisation of definite and indefinite truth shows quite clearly that my interpretation does not consist in equating indefinite truth with contingent truth and definite truth with necessary truth, pace Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 148 n. 12. It relies on a philosophically committed analysis of the notion of truth as in some sense an atemporally determinable notion and on the assumption that we can refer to the ‘real’ future. Therefore, in my interpretation ‘definitely’ and ‘indefinitely true’ cannot be taken as synonymous, but only as entailing, with ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently true’. 67. i.e. the determinist argument developed in text (H). 68. Ammonius is here hinting at the example of the white baby who is just born, mentioned in text (H). 69. hoi auta legontos is probably a misprint since the sense requires legontes. 70. in Int. 145,9-18. 71. According to Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 155 n. 39, Boethius would not ‘allow prediction of the simple truth of FCSs [future contingent statements], compatible with their contingency’. But this does not seem to be Boethius’ view, when e.g. he says: ‘oportet enim in contingentibus ita aliquid praedicere, si vera erit enuntiatio, ut dicat quidem futurum esse aliquid, sed ita, ut rursus relinquat esse possibile, ut futurum non sit’ (in Int. II 213,7-10). I take it to mean that (i) it is possible to state a prediction; (ii) this prediction can be true; (iii) in order to be true the prediction should not be formulated as a necessary proposition, in the sense that it must have the form: ‘it will be so, but it might be differently’. 72. in Int. 143,17-20. 73. See text (J). 74. See, e.g., in Int. 154,34-155,6. 75. in Int. 153,13-15. 76. Properly speaking, Aristotle uses the plurals aei ousin/aei mê ousin: 19a36. 77. in Int. 154,34-155,6. The Aristotelian reference is at 19a39. 78. On what is contingent ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu) and ‘equally’ (ep’ isês) see also in Int. 142,1ff. 79. Pace Gaskin, The Sea Battle and the Master Argument, p. 157 n. 51. 80. Cf. M. Mignucci, ‘Boezio e il problema dei futuri contingenti’, Medioevo 13, 1987, 38-41. What is still on dispute is whether Boethius had direct access to Porphyry’s commentary on the de Interpretatione or he only translated a Greek

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codex with marginalia mostly taken from Porphyry. On this question which does not affect very much our problem see J. Shiel, ‘Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle’, 356-61 and S. Ebbesen, ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London 1990, p. 375ff. 81. For instance, a different reading of Int. 16b9-10 is attributed by Ammonius to Porphyry (in Int. 50,8-12) and the same happens with reference to Int. 16b22 (in Int. 56,14-18). Again, Porphyry’s discussion of Int. 17b16ff. is considered with his reading apophantikôs instead of antiphatikôs at Int. 17b17 (in Int. 109,24ff.), and a variant at Int. 19b24-5 is discussed by quoting Porphyry (in Int. 171,1-6). 82. e.g. in Int. 32,3-5; 70,3ff.; 99,8 ff. 83. in Int. 94,25-8. 84. in Int. 1,6-11. Strangely enough, Proclus is quoted only in another passage at 181,30ff. (cf. Stephanus in Int. 46,25-6). 85. in Int. 135,14. 86. in Int. 135,12ff. 87. Inst. 124 (110,10-13, Dodds); Theol. Plat. I 15 (69,10-12, 70,22-25, 74.9-16, Saffrey-Westerink); Decem Dubitationes II 6-23 (Isaac). 88. Cf. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 92-3. 89. Cf. K. Praechter, ‘Nikostratos der Platoniker’, in Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim-New York 1973, 101-13; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 BC to AD 220, London 1977, pp. 233-6. 90. Simplicius, in Cat. 406,13-16. 91. Cicero, De fato 9,18; 10,21; 16,37; Acad. II 97. 92. Adopting Kalbfleisch’s suggestion I read at 407,7 poteron de estai morion autês alêthes instead of  autôn alêthes. Cf. 407,9-10. 93. in Cat. 407,6-14. 94. This remark has been made also by Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: Some Parallels’, p. 263. 95. Richard Sorabji has suggested me another possible interpretation of what Simplicius says. It may be that he only pointed out that future contingent propositions are such that they eventually get a truth-value. Their view would still be different from Nicostratus’ position. I have two worries about this interpretation. First of all, is the fact that a future contingent proposition becomes true or false eventually sufficient to warrant that the Principle of Bivalence holds unconditionally? I am not sure that we can easily give a positive answer to this question. Secondly, if for a future contingent proposition it is essential to become at some time true or false, the reference to a date or fixed time becomes crucial: (1*) surely becomes either true or false at k. But what happens with a statement such as ‘it will be raining’ (without addition of a date)? Suppose that tomorrow it does not rain. Can we say that it is false? Of course not, because it may be raining the day after tomorrow. Until it does rain we cannot attribute a truth-value to our statement, and so it may never happen that it receives a truth-value. One might retort that the interpretation of indefinitely true or false propositions is also focused on dated future contingent propositions and it cannot be extended to every kind of non-dated future-tensed statements. However, since their truth or falsity is not strictly dependent on the time of their utterance, I think that it is not impossible to accommodate the theory underlying the distinction between indefinite and definite truth (falsity) to cover also the case of ‘it will be raining’. 96. Cf. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: Some Parallels’, p. 264; id., Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, Text, Translation and Commentary, London 1983, pp. 11-12. See also Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 92-3 and

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especially p. 93 n. 5; D. Frede, ‘Could Paris (Son of Priam) Have Chosen Otherwise? A Discussion of R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Fato’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2, 1984, p. 286. 97. Cf. D. Frede, Aristoteles und die ‘Seeschlacht’, p. 26; Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, de Fato: Some Parallels’, p. 264; id., ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestio 1.4’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64, 1982, 38-9; Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, p. 93 n. 10. 98. On the Quaestiones see R.W. Sharples, ‘The School of Alexander?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London 1990, 83-111. In particular for Quaest. I 4 which will be at issue here see I. Bruns, ‘Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias, I: Der Begriff der Möglichen und die Stoa’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie N.F. 44, 1889, 619-30; M. Mignucci, ‘Pseudo-Alexandre critique des Stoïciens’, Proceedings of the World Congress on Aristotle, Thessaloniki, August 7-14, 1978, I, Athens 1981, 198-204; R.W. Sharples, ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility’, 23-38. 99. Cf. Sharples, ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility’, pp. 24-5. 100. Quaest. I.4, 12,13-18. Following Bruns I delete mê at 12,13 and I add sumbêsetai at 12,15. For an analysis of this passage see also I. Bruns, ‘Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias’, pp. 627-8, and H. Weidemann, ‘Ein drittes modallogisches Argument für den Determinismus: Alexander von Aphrodisias’, in W. Lenzen (ed.), Das weite Spektrum der analytischen Philosophie: Festschrift für Franz von Kutschera, Berlin and New York 1997, 429-46. The translation is taken from Sharples, ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility’, pp. 36-7 with one change. 101. Norman Kretzmann, ‘Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow’s Sea Battle’, pp. 67-8 expresses similar worries about the interpretation of this passage. 102. Quaest. I.4, 13,2-6. Also here I follow Bob Sharples’ translation: ‘An Ancient Dialogue on Possibility’, p. 37. 103. This is an extensively revised version of a paper that appeared originally as: ‘Ammonius on Future Contingent Propositions’, in M. Frede and G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford 1996, 279-310.

Textual Emendations Ammonius 141,32 141,33 144,17 145,18

omitting tên heteran with G omitting heteran with AGMa Reading tis hê apoplêrôsis with Busse Reading mega (‘large’) both in the lemma and in the commentary, while Minio-Paluello reads melan (‘dark’) in the text of Aristotle Boethius: first commentary

108,2 115,29 116,13 118,16

Reading contingens est et futurum with two of the MSS Reading oppositione instead of dispositione Rejecting Meiser’s insertion of falsa before adfirmatio Reading dicatur with the mss, rejecting Meiser’s praedicatur Boethius: second commentary

204,18 211,14 215,24 215,26 230,7 231,24-5 234,10 237,21 237,24 241,24

Reading dicta instead of ducta Reading vere instead of vera Reading ut with the MSS rather than aut Reading illarum rather than illa Reading et with the MSS rather than Meiser’s nec Reading et non fiunt si nolimus instead of ut fierent si velimus Reading vero rather than ergo Reading quamlibet in place of quam Omitting non Reading non dicimus in place of dicimus non

Ammonius the son of Hermeias: Commentary on On Interpretation 9 18a28 Now, in the case of things which are or have happened it is necessary that the affirmation or negation be true or false: in the case of universals taken universally one true and the other false, and also among singulars, as has been said, while for universals not said universally it is not necessary, but these too have been discussed. But with future singulars it is not the same.

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Having taught us in the preceding1 the division of propositions (protaseis) based on their subject and distinguished the propositions which can in some cases be true together or false together from those which always divide the true and false,2 Aristotle in these words adds the difference which arises among propositions based on their predicate with regard once again to dividing or not dividing the true and false. For since the predicate in propositions must be a verb, and we said (48,3) that a verb additionally signifies time (khronos), and we divide time three ways, into the past (parelêluthos), present (enestos), and future (mellon), it is necessary to take each of the propositions in one of the three times. Now, there being four oppositions (antitheseis) among propositions according to the division based on their subject, those of the two diagonals on the one hand, the ‘every’ to the ‘not every’ and the ‘some’ to the ‘none’, then third that of the undetermined (aprosdioristoi) propositions, and in addition to these that of the singulars (hai kath’ hekasta), Aristotle very carefully says that three of the kinds of oppositions among propositions divide the true and false or are true together in the same way in every time, i.e. the diagonal and the undetermined , but not the singulars.

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Let us discuss one of the aforementioned three oppositions, so as to make clear how the singular propositions differ in the stated manner from them, since the same are obviously able to help us

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distinguish the singular propositions from the remaining two oppositions. So let us take the particular (merikê) affirmation and the universal (katholou) negation. If, then, you take these in the necessary matter (hê anangkaia hulê),3 you will find that the affirmation is always true and the negation false; if in the impossible (adunatos) matter, that the affirmation is false and the negation true.4 But in the contingent (endekhomenê) matter you will again find that the affirmation is true, since it says that the contingent holds for some cases, exactly as is its nature to hold, but the negation is necessarily false, as it completely destroys (anairei) the contingent (to endekhomenon), which is such as to hold of some and not of others. For just as in the present time ‘Some man is pale’ is true while ‘No man is pale’ is false, so too in the past ‘Some man was pale’ is true while ‘No man was pale’ is false, and similarly in the future ‘Some man will be pale’ is true while ‘No man will be pale’ is false. The same argument will obviously apply also in the other diagonal opposition, that between ‘every’ and ‘not every’. In fact, in whichever matter the parts of that opposition are taken, they are understood as behaving the same in every time with regard to dividing the true and false. If, however, you examine the so-called ‘undetermined’ propositions in the necessary or the impossible (adunatos) matter, you will see that in every time they divide the true and false in the same way: if in the contingent matter they are true together, as was said before (111,15), it will hold for them that they will be true together in every time, and not that they will be true together in, say, the present time but not in the past or the future, and if they divide the true and false, since the undetermined (adioristos) negation expresses the same as the universal but not the particular negation, they will again contradict one another in every time similarly to the opposition of the particular affirmation to the universal negation.

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Since the three oppositions discussed are similar in every time with regard to making a contradiction or not, Aristotle says that the singular propositions in the necessary and the impossible matter divide the true and false in every time in a definite manner (hôrismenôs),5 as do the others (for in the necessary matter the affirmation, since it says that what necessarily holds does hold, must be true, while the negation must be false, since it destroys what necessarily holds; in the impossible matter the affirmation must be false, as saying that what is impossible holds, while the negation, since it destroys it, must be true). In the contingent matter, however, he says they no longer behave the same with regard to the assignment of the

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true and false when they are taken in each time. For in the past and present, inasmuch as the thing about which one is speaking has already occurred (ekbebêkos), the true and false singular propositions are obvious: if, say, Socrates happens to be bathing or to have bathed yesterday, the affirmation ‘Socrates is bathing’, ‘Socrates bathed yesterday’ will be true, while the negation which attempts to destroy what holds or held will clearly be false, and if he happens not to be bathing or to have bathed on the previous day, it is clear that the negation taken in the present or the past must be true, while the affirmation, since it says that what has not occurred either holds or held, must be false. In the future time, on the other hand, he says that the singular propositions still divide the true and false even so, but no longer in the same way as the propositions taken in the present or past time: it is no longer possible in a definite manner (hôrismenôs) to say which of them will be true and which will be false, since the thing has not already occurred but can both occur and not occur.6

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Although the study now advanced by Aristotle seems to be a logical one, it is actually necessary for all the parts of philosophy. For, in all of ethical philosophy it is necessary to admit that not all things are or come to be of necessity (ex anankês), but that there are also some things which are up to us (eph’ hêmin),7 since indeed, being masters of some actions and it being up to us to choose or not to choose certain things and to do or not to do them, we say that some choices (proaireseis) and actions are praiseworthy and others blameworthy and we think we should exhort our neighbours to the fine and good actions but dissuade them from their opposites. Further, this study is also seen to be useful for natural philosophy (phusiologia), since the natural philosopher too will investigate whether all that comes to be arises of necessity (ex anankês) or whether some things arise from chance (apo tukhês) and spontaneously (ek t’automatou).8 And similarly regarding the discipline of logic, since this is actually the object of the present investigation: whether every contradiction divides the true and false in a definite manner (aphôrismenôs) or whether there is also a contradiction which divides them in an indefinite manner (aoristôs).9 You will also find that this study extends to first philosophy. For the theologian too will investigate how the things in the world (kosmos) are governed by providence (pronoia), and whether all that comes to be arises in a definite manner and of necessity, like what holds in the case of eternal things, or there are also some things which occur contingently, whose coming to be one must ascribe to causes which are, obviously, particular and at each time different. You will not find even the most inexpert

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(idiôtikôs) of people neglecting to think about this study, but some try to ascribe the fault for their errors to fate (heimarmenê) or to divine or demonic providence, as though all things occurred of necessity, like the man who ignorantly says in Homer:10 15

 but it is not I who am responsible, but Zeus and Fate (Moira) and Fury, who comes in the mists (Iliad 19.86-7)

while others, assuming that there are also some things which are up to us, fight off those who make everything necessary and they hold that we take care for our upbringing and virtue11 as self-movers (autokinêtoi).12

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Now, since this study has such great force in regard to our entire life, I consider it necessary to set out and resolve those of the arguments attempting to make all things necessary which are thought (dokountes) to pose a puzzle (aporia) for those who hear them.13 Of these two, one more verbal (logikôteros) and the other more troublesome (pragmateiôdesteros), the more verbal one proceeds as in the case of some activity (energeia) of ours, e.g. our activity of reaping (therizein),14 in the following manner: ‘If you will reap’, it says, ‘it is not the case that perhaps (takha) you will reap and perhaps you will not reap, but you will reap, whatever happens (pantôs);15 and if you will not reap, in the same way it is not that perhaps you will reap and perhaps you will not reap, but, whatever happens, you will not reap. But in fact, of necessity, either you will reap or you will not reap’. Therefore the ‘perhaps’ has been destroyed (anêirêtai),16 given that it has no place either in the opposition of reaping to not reaping, one of these occurring of necessity, or in what follows from either of the hypotheses. But the ‘perhaps’ was what introduced the contingent.17 Therefore, the contingent is gone. Now, against this argument it is easy to answer that ‘whenever you say “If you will reap, it is not so that perhaps you will reap and perhaps you will not reap, but you will reap, whatever happens”, how do you think that the “will reap” (to theriein) is presupposed, as necessary or as contingent?’ If it is as contingent, we have what we are seeking, and if it is as necessary, then, first, you are asking that we grant you as evident just what you have been seeking from the beginning, and second, ‘will reap, whatever happens’ will be true, but there will no longer be room to say ‘but in fact either you will reap or you will not reap’ – for, if one of these occurs necessarily and the other, obviously, is impossible, how is there

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room to say ‘but in fact either this will be or this’? Thus, this argument does not work for them so far.

The other argument,18 which is so troublesome and difficult to face that even many of those who are thought most expert are led off to the belief which destroys the contingent, proceeds from the following sort of division: ‘The gods’, they say, ‘either know in a definite manner the outcome (ekbasis) of contingent things or they have absolutely no notion (ennoia) of them or they have an indefinite knowledge (gnôsis) of them, just as we do.’19 Yet it is not possible for them to be ignorant of anything which exists, since they bring about and arrange all things and are intelligences wholly unmixed with matter, or rather (to speak more accurately) even establish (hidrumenoi) their own real existence above the very character of the intellectual itself. For neither shall we say that the nature and order of the things which exist is spontaneous, nor is it reasonable either that the gods be ignorant of the very things they bring about or that they neglect the knowledge and arrangement of these things as though they were careless. The assumption that we make the life of the gods toilsome, ‘unleisured’, and lacking the ‘wise ease’ which befits the gods20 when we state that they care for particular things (ta kata meros) belongs to those who have not comprehended the transcendence (huperokhê) of the gods’ knowledge and power in comparison to our own, who think because of their ignorance that divine things can be measured by our standards, and who transfer our weakness to them.21 it is as though on the one hand King Sun were able to illuminate at once everything in the world, except that some non-transparent, solid bodies occasionally block certain things, but on the other hand the incorporeal and totally immaterial power of the gods would not be able unimpededly and instantly to be present at once to all existing things, although nothing is able to block it except our own ineptitude (anepitêdeiotês).22 And even then, the providence of the gods is not truly impeded either in its knowledge of our affairs or in its solicitude, but we ourselves suffer something similar to those who fall asleep or just close their eyes in the sunlight.23 Just as they receive the warmth which is provided from the sun to things here , but they deprive themselves of the sun’s illuminating power by their own choice and not because the god’s wrath causes him to deflect from them his own rays, in the same way those who are said to fall outside the providence of the gods because of their evil life are not entirely outside of it.24 For no one, as the Athenian Stranger says,25 could be small enough to sink into the depths of the earth and escape the providence which surveys everything, even the smallest things, or so

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large as to leap over the heavens and come to be outside of the providence which arranges all things; but rather, although they deprive themselves of the powers of the gods, which immediately distribute good things to us, these people necessarily receive the which bring them through punishment and chastisement back to what is in accordance with nature.

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Since these points are agreed according to the common and undistorted conceptions (ennoiai) of our souls and have been clearly demonstrated in the tenth book of the Laws,26 it is neither possible for the gods to be ignorant of our affairs nor for them to have an indefinite knowledge of them, as though they were conjecturing (eikazontes) about their outcomes (ta ekbêsomena).27 First,28 as Timaeus29 taught us and as Aristotle himself reveals in his theology,30 and Parmenides before them – not only in Plato,31 but also in his own verses32 – there is neither past nor future among the gods, since indeed each of these is not-being: the former is no longer, the latter is not yet; the former is changed (metabeblêkos), the latter is such as to be changed; and it is impossible for things of this sort to fit with things which truly exist and which cannot even be imagined to admit change. For, what is entirely unchanging necessarily precedes what changes in any way, in order for it also to persist while changing. Thus, in the case of the gods, who have the rôle of a principle (arkhê) with respect to what exists, it is impossible to think of the past or future; rather, all things among them are established (hidrumena) in the one (hen) eternal (aiônion) ‘now’ (to nun), while temporal measures appear together with the existence (hupostasis) of the universe and measure only what has either its existence or its activity in time. Thus, it is also necessary that conjectural (eikastikê) knowledge stand banished somewhere far from the gods and at the extreme edge of the rational life. Second, how could we think that we had the least share of wisdom when we believe we should not assign anything more to the gods’ knowledge than to our own, but rather dare to agree that it is ambiguous (amphibolos) and indefinite?33 The same thought – or rather, lack of thought – will also compare the knowledge of irrational animals to our own and make them too share in the grasp of universals and intelligibles. In sum, if it is absolutely necessary for the gods to be causes (aitioi) or anterior causes (proaitioi) of all existing things,34 how could it be rational for them to be ignorant of their own creations (gennêmata), or the results of their own creations, or what is brought about in any way whatsoever by them, or for them to have

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ambivalent knowledge of these things, as though they did not concern them at all or depend upon them?

On neither of these hypotheses is it possible for the gods to care for our affairs in the providential manner which would befit the gods, that is, that from their very essence they take care of the very objects of their providence and arrange them from the stern, so to speak, not by deliberating about them, as the poets say (for deliberation is a lack of wisdom), nor by deliberating and doing different things at different times (for this is foreign to their single, simple, and wholly unchangeable activity and would befit only beings measured by time, who perform their activities by rational choice [proairesis]),35 but by their very being,36 they say, like the sun, which neither deliberating nor moving, but by being, fills what is able to partake of it with its own light, even if it be imagined to be standing still. Neither, then, is it possible for their providence to be such, nor would it be far from madness to pray and supplicate them for, say, rain or the safety of crops or victory, whose outcome they do not know.37 If this is impossible, impious either to think or to say, and also refuted by experience, as the lengthy tales of divine activities and what happens, in a manner of speaking, every day show to those who are capable of paying attention,38 then clearly one must say both that contingent things are arranged by the gods and that they know their outcome in a definite manner. For it would be more likely that the gods neglect the eternal things, which would be deprived by the gods of the providence due to them, than the things which have a flowing nature, if the former are indeed definite (to hôrismenon) by their own nature and have received an unchanging existence of this kind from the gods, while the things in genesis, which are such as to undergo total change because of the flowing of their own matter, can neither exist nor be held together and arranged without receiving the mighty demiurgic and providential cause (aitia) of those things which are always the same, not merely the cause which is more total and transcendent, but also a more particular and more proximate cause, just as we see that human children require more care than adults and the stupid than the intelligent. But if the gods know (ginôskousi) contingent things and they know (ginôskousi) them in a definite manner, so that, as we said, we do not make their knowledge of them indefinite, and they know (isasi) that ‘Only the wooden wall will save Athens from the danger of the barbarians’, and that ‘Divine Salamis will destroy the children of the women’, and that ‘If Croesus crosses the Halys, he will destroy a great empire’, and that ‘If Laius begets children, he will utterly destroy his entire house’,39 then it is clear that it is impossible

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for these things not to occur; but if not, then they must be lying. Thus, one of the two: either we shall say that all things occur necessarily and as they are both known and foretold by the gods, and the ‘contingent’ will be an empty name, or we shall say that things here are neither known by the gods nor are they the objects of divine providence. But the latter is certainly impossible; therefore the contingent disappears.

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Against this argument which, as we have said, is difficult to oppose and appears to be strengthened by its very evidence (enargeia), as the prophecies of the oracles show, we answer in accordance with the teaching of the divine Iamblichus and we shall think it right to distinguish the various degrees of knowledge by saying that knowledge (gnôsis) is intermediate between the knower and the known, since it is the activity of the knower concerning the known – for example, the activity of sight concerning the pale – and it sometimes knows the known in a way better than the nature of the knowable thing itself, sometimes worse, and sometimes on the same level.40 For when we say that our own intelligence (nous) while dealing with political actions knows the individual affairs by referring them to the universals and attempting to know them by means of those, as they are akin to them, it is clear that then we shall say that the knowledge is better than the known, since the individual is divisible and changing, but reason (logos), according to which the practical intelligence knows these things, is indivisible and unchanging. But when intelligence, returning to itself and acting according to the purifying virtues, observes its own essence, its knowledge is necessarily on the same level as what is known. And when intelligence, having risen to the peak of its own perfection and dealing with the theoretical virtues, observes what concerns the divine arrangements, how they are derived from the single principle of all things, and what is the proper quality (idiotês) of each of them, its knowledge is necessarily worse than what is known.

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Now, these things being so, we must say: that the gods know everything which has occurred, which is , and which will be (ta esomena) or is going to be (ta mellonta) in the way appropriate for the gods, that is, by one definite and unchanging (ametablêtos) knowledge;41 that hence the gods encompass the knowledge of contingents

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as well, inasmuch as they bring about all things in the world, are on the one hand causes of the eternal essences and on the other anterior causes of generated things according to the actualities proper to each of these things, and since they, so to speak, see not only the essences themselves but also their potentialities and actualities, both those according to and contrary to nature (what is contrary to nature entered along with those things which are such as sometimes to partake of this state, not primarily but in the so-called manner of ‘parasitic existence’ [parupostasis], along with the necessary degradation [huphesis] due to the decline [hupobasis] of what exists); that, however, they know the contingents in a manner better than the contingents’ own nature, which is why these things have an indefinite nature and can both occur and not occur, while the gods, who have preconceived (proeilêphotes)42 the knowledge of the contingents in a manner better than their nature, know these things too in a definite manner. In fact, it is necessary for them to know divisible (merista) things indivisibly (ameristôs) and without partition (adiastatôs), as well as multiplied (peplêthusmena) things by a single act (henoeidôs), temporal (enkhrona) things eternally, and generated (gennêta) things ungeneratedly (agennêtôs).43 For we shall certainly not allow ourselves to say that the gods’ knowledge parallels the flux (rhusis) of things, nor that there is for the gods anything which is either past or future, nor that ‘was’ or ‘will be’, which would be significant of some change, are said in the case of the gods, as we have learned in the Timaeus,44 but only ‘is’, and not the ‘is’ which counted along with ‘was’ and ‘will be’ and is opposed to them, but the ‘is’ which is conceived (epinooumenon) before any manifestation (emphasis) of time and which signifies the gods’ constancy (atrepton) and immutability (ametablêton). This is also what the great Parmenides reveals belongs to the whole intelligible : ‘for it was not, nor will it be’, he says, ‘all together, but it only is’.45 One must not think that the things we are calling ‘contingent’ will have a necessary outcome because of the fact that they are known in a definite manner by the gods:46 it is not because the gods know them that they will occur necessarily; but since, having a contingent and ambiguous nature, they will have an end (peras) which, whatever happens (pantôs), is either so or so, it is necessary that the gods know how they will occur. And the same thing is contingent in its own nature, but in the gods’ knowledge it is no longer indefinite, but rather definite. It is clearly possible for the contingent sometimes to be known in a definite manner even by our own knowledge, namely when it is no longer contingent properly-speaking, but necessarily follows from the causes leading the way to (proêgêsamena) its own generation: it is possible, for example, for a sphere which rests on a horizontal surface, while the surface keeps the same position, to be moved by something or not,

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but when the surface is tilted it is impossible for it not to be moved.47 Hence, we also see that physicians sometimes lack the confidence to pronounce anything about whether their patients will recover or perish, thinking both are possible (endekhomena), while they sometimes indubitably pronounce about one or the other of these as certainly going to happen to the patient.

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Since some people who are too bold (thrasuteron) in their occupation with the investigation of the present theory believe that when they adduce for us oracles which make ambiguous (amphibolôs) pronouncements about future events they are demonstrating that definite knowledge of contingents does not even belong to the gods,48 we must say to them just what the great Syrianus says: First, that one must note that the knowledge and understanding (noêsis) of the gods is one thing, and the activity of the prophetess is another, since, although she is moved by the god, she brings to birth in herself speech which has parts, verses, and ambivalent knowledge: surely what is illuminated is not such as that which illuminates it. Second, that it is for the benefit of the listeners that ambiguous oracles are given, which exercise their intelligence: the gods treat us as self-movers (autokinêtoi) and it is in this way that they govern our affairs and distribute all things to us according to our own desert. But perhaps these matters are both audacious and far afield of the investigation of the present issues. In general, does the argument which makes everything necessary also say that this very thing of necessity happens to humans, that they say that everything is necessitated, or does it say that our opinions about the manner of the generation of things are up to us? If the second is true, then not everything is of necessity. If the first, how can some people believe the opposite, that many things are up to us? It is utterly irrational for us to be moved in a way contrary to nature by a nature which necessitates everything, as their argument claims, so that we condemn the things which are brought about by that nature.49 It is almost as if someone, while teaching the art of medicine, by this very act prepared his pupils to refute the principles of the art in which they shared;50 and, although it is likely that the technician will do something contrary to his art, not qua technician – as when the doctor administers an abortifacient or a poison, inasmuch as he has a self-moving soul and the art contributes nothing to the actual perfection of the soul, being instead occupied with the body or external things – it is impossible for nature to do anything contrary to its proper end. Nor, indeed, shall we hold an excess or deficiency of matter responsible for our opinions, as for monsters: even if they want to exercise their imagina-

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tion, it will not be easy for them to explain the causes of the different opinions from the difference in matter, nor will they be agreeing that fate (hê heimarmenê) is still the cause of all things. But enough on this subject.

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Returning our discussion to the explication of what Aristotle says in this passage, we shall say first that what is taught in these words follows from what was said a bit earlier.51 He said, namely, just above about the opposition of affirmation and negation, that they do not always divide the true and false. Consequent to this, then, he adds52 what sort of affirmation is opposed to what sort of negation in such a way that they always divide the true and false, not in a definite (aphôrismenôs), however, but in an indefinite manner (aoristôs). First, he teaches us what holds in common (koinôs) of the diagonal contradictions and of the contradiction of the singular propositions, saying that it holds of all of these that they distribute the true and false in a definite manner in the present and past time (for this is ‘in the case of things which are or have come to be [sc. it is necessary] that the affirmation or negation be true or false’), teaching first that this holds of the diagonal , which he called ‘universal taken universally’ since these have one of their two propositions as universal, and next adding that the same thing happens in the case of the singular propositions as in the diagonals, which is the sense of ‘as has been said’. But he also indicates that, of the undetermined (aprosdioristoi) propositions taken in the contingent matter, it is not necessary for one to be true and the other false, and he then brings in the difference in the future time between the singular propositions and the remaining species of contradictions when he says ‘But with future singulars it is not the same’, and he shows us in these words that, while the other propositions, the diagonals and the undetermined ones, behave in the future time just as they do in the present and past time, the singular propositions no longer do so (he defines with great precision what is proper to the propositions he is speaking about, saying ‘with future singulars’ and meaning by ‘future’ that which is taken in the contingent matter; for what is going to be [to mellon] is different, as he himself makes the distinction in On Generation and Corruption,53 from what will be [to esomenon], since ‘what will be’ signifies what will occur, whatever happens [to pantôs ekbêsomenon], as when we say ‘there will be winter’, or ‘ summer’, or ‘ an eclipse’, while ‘what is going to be’ what can either occur or not occur, for example, ‘I am going to walk’, ‘I am going to sail’). So, showing that in the other matters, i.e. the necessary and the impos-

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sible, the singular propositions behave similarly in regard to dividing the true and false in a definite manner (18a31) – just as in the preceding time and the present, so too in the future – but that they no longer do so in the contingent matter, even though all the other contradictions behave the same toward the future in this matter as they do in the other matters too, he has added ‘it is not the same’, thereby signifying at the same time in what respect these no longer behave the same when taken on the stated assumption, namely that they always divide the true and false, but in an indefinite, not in a definite manner; it is necessary that Socrates bathe or not bathe tomorrow, and it is impossible that either both or neither happen, but which of these will be the true one it is not possible to know before the outcome of the matter, if indeed each of them can either happen or not happen because of the very nature of the contingent. This, then, is what he concisely showed us by saying ‘it is not the same’. 18a34 For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is also necessary that everything be the case or not be the case. Indeed, if one person says something will be and another denies the same thing, it is clearly necessary that one of them is speaking truly—if every affirmation or negation is true or false; for under these circumstances both will not be true together.

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wants in these words to support the opinion which destroys the contingent, in order to refute it when it is at its strongest, and here, acting the part of those who defend this opinion, he first takes as a kind of assumption (lêmmation) that it is necessary that the existence of the things (pragmata) necessarily follow upon the truth of the sentences, their non-existence upon falsity, which is the meaning of his ‘For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is also necessary that everything be the case or not be the case’. Next, he begins from the axiom of contradiction, saying that, necessarily, of singular contingent propositions taken in the future time, one or the other is true, since it is neither possible for both54 to be false together nor for both to be true together. The latter of these, that both are not true, is clearly mentioned here in the words ‘for under these circumstances both will not be true together’; that is, such propositions55 will not undergo the same thing as the undetermined propositions which are taken in the contingent matter (we said [129,25-31; but cf. 31-5] that those are true together; but it is impossible for these to be true together, lest the same thing at once hold and not hold of the same thing, for example that both bathing on the next day and

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not bathing on the next day hold of Socrates). The former case, where it is not even possible for them to be false together, he will add in what follows (18b17). Thus, with these cases excluded and it being established by this that these propositions divide the true and false – that they do this in a definite manner, he means, we shall show if we take two people who pretend to be capable of prophecy and attempt to make predictions about some individual, e.g. a sick person, and one says he will get well, the other that he will not get well. Obviously it is necessary that one of them is speaking truly and the other falsely. Now, if the one saying the person will get well is speaking truly, it is necessary that he will get well (for it was assumed beforehand [139,29-30] that the outcome of the facts follows the truth of the sentences, whatever happens [pantôs]); but if the one who stated the negation is speaking truly, then obviously it is impossible that the person will get well. Thus, the event will either occur necessarily or it will have an impossible outcome. Therefore, the contingent has been destroyed. 18a39 For if it is true to say that it is pale or is not pale, it is necessary that it be pale or not pale, and if it is pale or not pale, it was true to affirm or deny this. If it does not hold, it is false, and if it is false, it does not hold. Thus, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false. Therefore, nothing either is or is happening either by chance or however it chances, or will be or will not be, but everything of necessity and not however it chances. For, either the one who affirms it or the one who denies it will be speaking truly; otherwise, it might equally well happen or not happen, since what is however it chances neither is nor will be any more thus than not thus.

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Wanting to strengthen the foregoing assumption, that the existence of the things follows upon the truth of the sentences and non-existence upon their falsity, Aristotle shows by means of examples that this is so, since indeed examples usually clarify arguments which are given without them.56 Now, the causal conjunction ‘for’ (gar) in the phrase ‘For if it is true to say’ was chosen to explain the addition of what is now being said, namely that it contains a confirmation of the point stated above. He says that, if it is true to say of something, say of this cloak, that it is pale, then it is necessary that it be pale, and if that it is not pale, then it is necessary that it not be pale. Then he adds something here to what was said before,

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believing that the assumption is convertible; I mean that it is not only necessary that the existence of the things follow upon the sentences being true, but also the truth of the sentences upon the existence . Hence he says ‘and if it is pale or not pale, it was true to affirm or deny this’, teaching us at once by not saying ‘it is true to say’ but ‘it was true ’ – just what he will add clearly in what follows, namely that it is not only in the very time in which the things (pragmata) occur (ekbainei) and exist (huphestêken) that it is true to say of them that they are such as they are, but even before their occurrence the prediction about them is true; and he necessarily anticipates this, thinking that it will be useful to him for the destruction of the contingent and that it contains, as we shall see, the entire force of the attack. So, drawing the conclusion as if from a syllogism, he infers ‘Thus, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false’, obviously understanding ‘in a definite manner’.57 And he is correct in this. For if it is necessary that the pale be or not be, and there is nothing besides these, and if, when it exists, the previous affirmation about it is true in a definite manner, while when it does not exist the negation is, then it is reasonable for him to infer as a conclusion following upon the previous statements the line ‘Thus, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false’. Having shown the truth of the sentences and the existence of the facts to be interconvertible (antistrephousai) with one another, before bringing on the stated conclusion, he adds parenthetically that the falsity of the sentences and the non-existence of the facts are also interconvertible with one another in the words ‘If it does not hold, it is false, and if it is false, it does not hold’.

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These things being so, having taken from the preceding that, necessarily,58 of singular contingent propositions which contradict one another in the future time one59 is true in a definite manner and the other false, thinking that it follows immediately that the contingent is destroyed by what has been assumed, he says ‘Therefore, nothing either is or is happening either by chance (apo tukhês) or however it chances (hopoter’ etukhen)’, signifying by the ‘therefore’ that it follows from the necessity of the assumptions that the contingent is destroyed. The contingent is divided into three: one is called ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), for example that a man is born with five fingers or becomes gray with age (for things behaving otherwise are rare); another is ‘for the lesser part’ (hôs ep’ elatton), for example that one digging comes upon a hoard; and the last is ‘equally ’ (ep’ isês), for example to bathe or not to bathe and to walk or not to walk.60 Concerning the contingent ‘for the most part’, there

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are two causes, nature and art. For we see that nature is for the most part successful in her own products – since monsters are rare – and that the arts sometimes fail because of the flux of their subject matter, although they promise to succeed for the most part (no one would use them if they did not promise this, which is why the orator gives assurances that he will for the most part persuade the juror, the physician that he will for the most part cure the patient, and every other kind of technician that he will for the most part obtain his particular end). Concerning the contingent ‘for the lesser part’, there are these two , chance (tukhê) and spontaneity (to automaton). These differ61 from one another in that what is by chance is said to exist parasitically (parhuphistasthai) or supervene (episumbainein) unexpectedly and rarely upon what happens by choice (proairesis), i.e. upon the works of people (for ‘choice’ is said only of people,62 who are such as to deliberate and choose one thing instead of another, given that the beings who are better than we are have no need of deliberation and that the irrational animals are incapable of deliberating), and so what is by chance, as we said, exists parasitically (paruphistatai) upon what happens by choice, and what is spontaneous upon what happens naturally. For if one of us goes out to meet his friend, unexpectedly encounters someone selling a book and buys it, he is said to have bought it by chance,63 because his buying the book existed parasitically (parupestê) or supervened (episumbebêken) from outside upon a choice which moved him to his outing, since there was no proximate (prosekhês) cause which did this in a definite manner (in fact, he could have bought the book while going off to a bath, while intending to offer a prayer, or while intending to observe a spectacle); but, indeed, if there had been an earthquake and a fissure opened in the earth and a spring of water gushed where previously there was none or an existing spring disappeared, the spring would not be said to have appeared or disappeared by chance, but spontaneously; or if a stone fallen from some height should occupy a position such that it could serve as, say, a seat,64 it is said to be a seat spontaneously, not by chance, because this event (sumptôma) attended not upon a choice, but upon the stone’s own natural tendency (rhopê), according to which it was borne downward from on high. Concerning the contingent ‘equally ’ there is only choice, for example to go out or not to go out, to converse or not. Only this species of the contingent is called ‘however it chances’, because its existence is no more or less than its non-existence, but whichever part of the contradiction it chances can equally occur. So it is, as we said, to destroy the contingent that he says ‘Therefore, nothing either is or is happening either by chance or however it chances’, i.e. ‘therefore nothing has now already occurred which is a contingent either for the lesser part

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or equally, nor will one ever occur later’. Then he added ‘or will be or will not be’, universalizing the destruction of every contingent. For every contingent differs in this way from what occurs necessarily and from what is impossible, namely that of the former we say only that it will be and of the impossible only that it will not be, while we say that the contingent either will be or will not be. So, ‘nothing’, he says, ‘either is or is happening’ in the way contingents do, ‘but everything of necessity and not however it chances’. Then as if to remind us of the attack, according to which these things seemed to follow, he infers ‘For, either the one who affirms it or the one who denies it will be speaking truly’. But if one of these will be speaking truly in a definite manner, and the destruction of the contingent followed from the fact that one premiss of the contradiction is true in a definite manner, then it is apparent that the contingent will disappear from among the things which exist, both the rest of it and also its point, so to speak, the ‘however it chances’, which Aristotle used for the whole of the contingent. If, however, it did have any existence, ‘it might equally well happen or not happen’ – this is what we say either is or is happening ‘however it chances’, that which ‘neither is nor will be any more thus than not thus’, where we obviously say ‘is’ of what has happened and is already in existence (hupostasis) and ‘will be’ of what will happen. 18b9 Further, if it is pale now, it was true to say earlier that it would be pale; thus, it was always true to say that anything that happens was or would be. But if it was always true to say that it was or would be, it was not possible for this not to be or not to be going to be; and it is impossible for that not to happen which cannot not happen; and if it is impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary for it to happen. Therefore, all things which will be happen necessarily. So nothing will be however it chances or by chance: for if it is by chance, it is not of necessity.

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What was said in the foregoing with insufficient clarity to establish that the propositions taken in the future time, about which he is speaking, also divide in a definite manner the true and false, from which it immediately followed that the contingent had no place among existing things, he here wants to show us more clearly, extending his discourse with greater elaboration. Hence, he speaks as though making his argument from a new beginning. ‘Further, if something is pale now’, like a newborn child, ‘it was true to say’ on the previous day that tomorrow a pale child would be born – actually,

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no more on the previous day than at any previous time at all. How, then, is perfected?65 If we speak truly each time we say in advance that something will be, it is not possible that this will not be, just as neither is it possible that something not exist, if we say truly that it exists. Thus, it was impossible for the pale child not to be born, because the prediction made about it in indefinite preceding time was true. For, ‘it is impossible’ he says, ‘for that not to happen which cannot not happen; and if it is impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary for it to happen’, extending his argument to the necessitation of all things, which was his intention, from propositions which, while they are clearer and more agreed upon, still have the same force as those into which they are transposed. In fact, ‘cannot’ means ‘impossible’, and ‘cannot not happen’ amounts to the same as ‘impossible not to happen’, and ‘impossible not to happen’ ‘necessary to happen’, just as ‘impossible to happen’ ‘necessary not to happen’. We are, however, more moved by ‘impossible not to happen’, which is more clear, than by ‘necessary to happen’, which is why the physician too, saying for example that it is necessary for the patient to have his veins opened if he wants to get well, adds ‘for it is impossible that he will get well if his veins have not been opened’, brings this about and ought to do more to persuade the patient. Thus, Aristotle says, we were right to say that everything which will be happens of necessity and nothing either by chance or by another kind of contingency.

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To this argument one must reply that it was not true of what has occurred now or has already happened to say before the event that ‘it will’, whatever happens, ‘be pale’. For just because time has brought it into being we should not think it has happened by a necessary pre-establishment (prokatabolê).66 Thus, of those who make predictions about it, it is not the one who says that of necessity it will be pale who will speak truly, but rather the one who says that all of this will occur in a contingent manner. If this is so, it is clear that it was also possible for it not to occur, since it would not otherwise have been true that it would occur in a contingent manner. Therefore, let those who say this not judge what is still going to be from what has already occurred, but let them keep it as not yet having occurred and inquire whether it will occur of necessity. For they will not be able to show this, as Aristotle himself will teach us clearly in what follows.67 18b16 Nor, however, can one say that neither is true, e.g. that it will neither be nor not be. First, although the affirmation is

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false the negation is not true, and although the latter is false it follows that the affirmation is not true. Moreover, if it is true to say that it is pale and large,68 both have to hold; and if they will hold tomorrow, they will have to hold tomorrow. But if they will neither be nor not be tomorrow, there would be no ‘however it chances’, as with a sea battle: a sea battle would have neither to happen tomorrow nor not to happen.

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Since it has been assumed for purposes of the destruction of the contingent that the propositions about which we are speaking divide the true and false in a definite manner – he assumed this because of the fact that they cannot be true together with one another, which was said in the words ‘for under these circumstances both will not be true together’ (18a38-9) – and that one could suppose that it was not necessary that they either be true together or divide the true and false, since they could also be false together, for this reason he now proposes to show that it is not even possible for these propositions to be false together, which would not at all help one choosing to speak in this way to introduce the contingent, and is in any case impossible. For it will be shown that, even on this very hypothesis, the same thing both necessarily occurs and has an impossible outcome. Thus, he says that it is not even possible to say this, that the singular contingent propositions in the future time are false together with one another, which he signified by the words ‘nor  that neither is true’, since, first, he says, we shall destroy the axiom of contradiction, from which, as most evident, we develop all proofs.69 In addition, it will happen that the thing at the same time will not be, because of the falsity of the affirmation which says that it will be, and on the other hand will be, because of the falsity of the negation which says that it will not be, so that it will both of necessity be and of necessity not be: what could be more monstrous than that? In order to conclude this, he reminds us again of the assumption that the outcome of the affairs (pragmata) follows upon the truth of the sentences, not just in the present time but also in the future. For, if someone, having prophesied that tomorrow there would be born a pale, large child, prophesied truly, a child would have to be born tomorrow of whom both the foretold would hold. So, not speaking about the consequence of this, that it also follows upon the falsity of the sentences that the things do not hold good, since this has already been taught by him previously, together with this theorem he deduces what follows from the theorem he (cf. 140,10-11) left out, saying ‘But if they will neither be nor not be tomorrow, there would be no

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“however it chances” ’, i.e. if such propositions are indeed false together, even so the contingent will be destroyed, and it will be destroyed because of the fact that the thing at the same time both necessarily occurs and has an impossible outcome. 18b26 These and others of the same sort are the absurdities which result if it is necessary, for every affirmation and negation, either of universals spoken of universally or of singulars, that one of the opposites be true and one false, and that nothing that happens be however it chances, but that everything be and happen of necessity. Thus, there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble that if we shall do this, this will happen, but if we do not do this, this will not happen. For nothing prevents someone from having said ten thousand years ago that this would happen and someone else that it would not; so that whichever of them it was true to say then will happen of necessity. Nor, however, does it make a difference whether any people stated the contradiction or did not state it, since it is clear that the things are this way even if one person did not affirm something and another deny it. For it is not because of the affirmation or denial that it will be or not be, nor ten thousand years ago more than any amount of time at all. Hence, if in the whole of time it was so that one of the two was true, it was necessary that this happen, and everything that happens was always such as to happen of necessity. For what someone has truly said would be so cannot not happen, and it was true to have said of what happens that it would be so.

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From the beginning it was proposed to see whether the propositions of every contradiction taken in the future time divide the true and false in a definite manner, and it has been shown in more than one way that the elimination of the nature of the contingent follows from this, some things occurring of necessity and others having an impossible outcome, and that nothing is up to us, which one must still show is absurd and contrary to the evidence. Now, concentrating in these words his entire argument, Aristotle reminds us of the problem which was posed at the beginning, adds certain things which have been shown to follow from it, and calls them ‘absurdities’, although he has not yet shown that they are absurd, relying upon the innate concepts (autophueis ennoiai) of our souls and intending to bring on immediately the demonstration of the absurdity of the argument which

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attempts to destroy the contingent (which he refutes in two ways, now by showing all the impossibilities which follow from it, and a little later by attacking also what has been falsely assumed by it). For he had to show what the nature of the thing itself was by itself by saying that the contingent was among the things that exist (since many impossible things follow for those seeking to destroy it, and evidence shows that it exists), and in addition he had to show that the aforementioned argument, which tried to make everything necessary and to expel the contingent from the things that exist, was unsound. So, teaching thus far in these words the impossible things which follow for those who destroy the contingent, he says that if one should think that every contradiction behaves in the same way in every time with respect to dividing the true and false, and that not just the diagonal contradictions, which he has been calling ‘universal as universal’, always have in a definite manner one of their propositions true and the other false in every matter, but the singular contradictions as well, from which it would follow that the contingent is eliminated, then one would be accusing nature of vain toil70 for having made us capable of deliberation.71 For it is clear that, if nothing is up to us, we shall try in vain to deliberate about what does not lie in our power, and we shall do something similar to those who deliberate as to how the sun will rise or not rise. Moreover, to say that nature vainly made us capable of deliberation is completely illogical: this very thing by itself has been demonstrated ‘with geometrical necessity’, as they say,72 that nothing is done by nature in vain, and it is agreed upon for its evidence more than for any proof. Even those who make everything necessary and eliminate the contingent will certainly agree that it is nature herself, again, which does everything, in their words, ‘in a definite manner and of necessity’ and nothing in vain. So, how can it not be ridiculous to say that nature both has left nothing in our power and makes us capable of deliberation, as though we were in charge of our doing or not doing certain things?73 For, if one says that uses our intelligence (dianoia) as a tool to bring about our actions, then, we shall reply, it was necessary for us, on the contrary, to be driven immediately (autothen) toward those actions to which nature forced us, just as in the case of things which are really moved by nature we see it happen that they are unhesitatingly borne to their proper ends. Hence, we too, whenever we imitate nature by acting in accordance with some art, do not deliberate, if we indeed have the perfect and ready understanding of the art which must necessarily belong to him who would imitate nature.

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If, then, everything of necessity, ‘there would be no need to deliberate’, he says, ‘or to take trouble’, i.e. to deal with the starting points (arkhai) of our actions. For example, if we intend to sail from Egypt to Athens, we need not go down into the harbour, seek a ship, or stow our baggage. In fact, even if we have done none of these things, it is necessary for us to arrive in Athens. Next, sketching for us the manner in which we usually deliberate, he says ‘that if we shall do this, this will happen, but if we do not do this, this will not happen’. For, if the intention is, say, to go off to this place here, to which one can go either by ship or using a cart, we deliberate as to which of the ways of arriving there is preferable for us, comparing and balancing against one another the goods and evils arising from each one, since whichever turns out to entail either the greater good or the lesser evil is the one we choose. So too does the poet say that Achilles knows that, if he remains at Troy and fights, he will be short-lived but famous, while, if he retires from the war and is content to spend his time in his fatherland, he will be long-lived but without fame, and that he prefers fame to reaching old-age.74 Then, having reminded us again of the argument which appeared to destroy the contingent (I mean, of the fact that, of two people foretelling a contradiction, one speaks the truth in a definite manner and for this reason what is said by him occurs), what someone would have thoughtlessly said believing that he was refuting the argument by saying ‘but nothing of the sort happened, nor did anyone foretell that the thing would occur, so that we should say, even if we have agreed that he speaks truly, that the thing occurred necessarily’; having posited this he attacks it and shows that it is not correctly stated. We shall not say that the thing occurred because those who said before the outcome of the thing that it would occur spoke truly, but, on the contrary, it is because of the nature of the thing that the sentence about it true. As was also said in the Categories (14b14), even if these are interconvertible, namely the nature of the thing and the true sentence about it, it is not the sentence which is responsible for the thing’s being, but the existence of the thing which is responsible for the sentence being true. Thus, if the occurrence of the thing is no less so for the fact that the sentence declaring that it would occur was not actually said in advance, then all prophecies of what happens contingently which are said before their outcome, whether actually or potentially, will be true. This being so, each of these things occurred necessarily, and it was not possible for it not to occur.

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19a7 What, then, if this is impossible? For we see that what will be has an origin both in deliberation and in doing something, and in general, that in those things which are not always actual there is the possibility of being and not being; here both are possible, both to be and not to be, and hence both to happen and not to happen. It is clear to us that many things are such, e.g. that it is possible for this cloak to be cut up, and yet it will not be cut up, but will wear out first. Similarly, that it not be cut up is also possible: for it would not have been the case that it would wear out first, unless it was possible for it not to be cut up. Hence, this is also the case for all events (geneseis) which are spoken of with regard to this kind of possibility. Now, it is clear that not everything either is or happens of necessity, but some things occur however it chances, where the affirmation is no more true than the negation, while for other things one of the two occurs rather or for the most part, although it is possible for the other to happen and this not.

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Having taught us in the preceding how many impossible things follow for those who destroy the contingent – that it is vain to deliberate, vain to deal at all with actions, and everything that follows from these, e.g. that it is vain to hold certain people responsible for cooperating with us or thwarting us, vain to praise certain people as good or blame them as bad, and that these much bandied-about terms, virtue and vice, are empty names (for where can they have a place, if nothing is up to us, but we, as they say, are of necessity brought to do these particular things, which, it is clear, are evidently irrational and turn all of human life completely on its head)75 – he proposes in these words and directly from the actual evidence (enargeia) of the things (pragmata) to show both that the contingent is among the things that exist and among which things it is , namely, that it is not among the eternal things but only among those which have their existence in coming to be and passing away. Now, that deliberation has great force with respect to actions and many things are up to us which would not have been done had we not deliberated and dealt with the means of their occurring, he shows by the example of the cloak, which it is up to us either to cut up or leave whole and uncut until it either wears out from use and being worn or rots with time, even if it lies used.76 It is clear that the same arguments will also apply to many ten thousands of other cases. Thus, it is obvious that nature made us masters of all things which happen in this way. It was to indicate this that Aristotle said that

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‘what will be has an origin both in deliberation and in doing something’, using ‘what will be’ here in a loose way of what has not yet occurred but can occur unless something prevents it, and indicating by ‘doing something’ dealing with the origins of action, what he previously called ‘taking trouble’.

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Among which of the things that are the contingent has its existence, he concisely taught by saying ‘that in those things which are not always actual’, which is the same as saying ‘among those which sometimes exist and sometimes do not exist’. These are intermediate between the things which always exist and those which always do not exist: insofar as they are actual they would be completely different from what always does not exist, and insofar as they are not always actual they would differ from what is always existent and actual. What sort of things are those which are not always actual, he again concisely taught by saying ‘here both are possible, both to be and not to be’, i.e. for those in coming to be and passing away. For, neither is it possible for anything which always does not exist ever to be actual (how could it, if it is such as not even to partake of existence in the first place?) nor is it possible for anything which always exists ever not to be actual; for, if it always exists, it is clear that it is always perfect and its own essence is in accordance with nature (it could not otherwise have been eternal) and being such it will have an actuality in perfect conformity with its essence (ousiôdês), according to which it must always be actual, lest, remaining inactive for any time at all, it show its own nature to be vain and itself be counted incorrectly among the things that are. Thus, Aristotle was correct to characterize those things which sometimes are and sometimes are not by the fact that they are not always actual. Now, this holds of all contingents, that they can both be and not be, so that even before their occurrence it will hold of them that they can both happen and not happen. However, some of them have the same relation both to being and to not being, and therefore also to happening and not happening, namely all those which depend upon our choice and are called ‘however it chances’, while others rather incline either towards being and happening and are called ‘for the most part’ or towards not being and not happening and are called ‘for the lesser part’. Wanting to indicate both of these together he said ‘for other things one of the two occurs rather or for the most part, although it is possible for the other to happen and this not’: for, the very thing that is called in this way ‘for the most part’ has its outcome for the most part, it being possible, however, for it also not to occur, even if that is more rare than its occurrence; while what is ‘for the lesser part’ is what ‘for the most

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part’ does not occur, it being possible, however, for it also to occur, even if that is more rare than its non-occurrence. Thus, by allowing us to apply as we see fit the ‘one of the two’, that which is ‘for the most part’ – evidently concerning being and not being – and its opposite, that which is ‘for the lesser part’, which he also calls ‘one of the two’, to being and not being, Aristotle encompassed in the same words the significations of the ‘contingent’ which differ most from one another, the ‘for the most part’ and the ‘for the lesser part’. It is clear that assertions behave in the same way with regard to truth and falsity as do the things which they are about.77 19a23 Now, that what is, is, when it is, is necessary, and also that what is not, is not, when it is not. It is not the case, however, either that it is necessary that everything which is, is, or that it is necessary that everything which is not, is not: that everything which is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as that it simply is of necessity; and the same for what is not. For the contradiction, too, the same argument : it is necessary that everything is or is not, and will be or will not be, but not to divide them and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean, for example, it is necessary that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or that there will not be; but it is not necessary that a sea battle happen tomorrow or that one not happen – even though it is necessary that one happen or not happen. Thus, since the sentences are true in the way that the things are, it is clear that for all things which are such as to be however it chances and to have their contraries be contingent, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories as well. This happens in the things which do not always exist or which do not always not exist: of these it is necessary for one member of the contradiction to be true or false – not, however, this one or that one, but however it chances – and one must be rather true than the other, but not already true or false. Thus, it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites one be true and the other false. For, it is not the same among things which are not, but which are possible, as it is among things which are; rather, it is as has been stated.

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claiming to judge what is still going to be from what has already occurred. It assumed that, if something is now pale, one who says just this about it, that it is now pale, necessarily speaks truly, and it was true not just now but also in the entire preceding time to predict that it would be pale (as though this were no different from the other); and because the thing which it was true to say during the entire preceding time, that it would be pale, happens necessarily, wanted to conclude that everything that happens happens of necessity.78 Hence, refuting this argument here in a very technical manner, Aristotle first makes a distinction regarding things which happen in the present time before clarifying the statements which bear on the future, how they do or do not have the of being necessarily true. Then, taking the distinction of these from the nature of the things, since the true sentence must of necessity harmonize with the thing about which it is said, he says that there are two kinds of ‘necessary’ : first, that which is absolutely and properly so called, namely what always holds of the subject so that the subject cannot exist without it (the word ‘always’ is understood either as in infinite time, as in the case of eternal things, for example, whenever we say that ‘of necessity’ the sun moves or the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or as long as the subject exists, as when we say that ‘of necessity’ this fire is hot or Socrates is an animal); second, what is not , but has the qualification (prosdiorismos) ‘as long as that is true which is predicated by the one who says that it is so’, and no longer absolutely, no matter whether the subject is eternal or perishable. That the sun is of necessity obscured by a cloud or by the moon, as long as it is obscured, is true, but it is no longer absolutely ; and that you of necessity are sitting or walking, as long as one of these holds of you, is true, but it is no longer absolutely : we are neither always walking or sitting, nor even as long as we partake of existence. The same point also in the case of that which of necessity does not exist. In fact, this has two kinds as well: first, what is absolutely (e.g. that the diagonal is not commensurate with the side or that the sun does not cease its motion or that this fire is not cold); second, as long as what is predicated does not belong (e.g. that you of necessity are not walking, whenever you are not walking: this is not absolutely true, but as long as you are not walking, since it is impossible for one who is not walking to be walking at the same time as he is not walking). Thus, you have here the distinction of propositions taught according to their matter: what absolutely is signifies the necessary; what absolutely is not signifies the impossible; and what is as long as the predicate belongs to the subject, and what is not as long as it does not, signifies the contingent.

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Having made these distinctions, Aristotle says that the necessary belongs to the truth in sentences in a manner similar to what he said about existing things. For, some sentences are of necessity true in the absolute sense of ‘necessary’, no matter what things they are said of – whether of eternal or perishable, existing or non-existent things – such as those uttered about the whole of a contradiction, e.g. that Socrates is either walking or not walking (for this whole is necessarily true, not only if Socrates exists, but even if he does not), or that fire is either hot or not hot, even if it happens in such cases that, due to the nature of the thing, one of the two parts of the contradiction is true in a definite manner, and not just the contradiction as a whole.79 So, he says that among sentences, some are necessarily true in the absolute sense of ‘necessary’, but the others in the other sense, i.e. as long as the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject, such as that Socrates of necessity is walking or of necessity is not walking. For, sentences necessarily have truth in the same way, which is what Aristotle says, as the things signified by them behave according to their nature,80 since sentences are interpreters of the things and for this reason imitate their nature, as Plato taught us81 before Aristotle.

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But what, you may ask, has this to do with the present question, and how is the argument which appears to destroy the contingent shaken by this? It is, I shall reply, that if every sentence were of necessity true in the absolute sense of ‘necessary’, then those who destroy the contingent, upon seeing that those sentences are necessarily true which, when said about things which have already occurred, are in conformity (oikeios) with the outcome (ekbasis) of those things, would have correctly assumed that also those sentences which affirmed before the occurrence (ekbasis) of the things that they would occur (ekbêsesthai) are of necessity true, and thus it would have actually happened that the contingent was destroyed. But, since this holds, as we said, of the whole contradiction, but not of its parts, in which the predicate sometimes holds of the subject and sometimes not, it is clear that they do not reach the conclusion they propose.82 For example, as Aristotle himself says, it is absolutely (pantôs) necessary that tomorrow a sea battle take place or not take place, but dividing them and stating only one part of the contradiction, we shall not safely announce that it will be so, whatever happens, or it will not be so, whatever happens. Therefore, it is clearly necessary for sentences said about contingent (which he meant by the elimination

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of the extremes, i.e. the necessary and the impossible, of which he called the one those ‘which always exist’ and the other those ‘which always do not exist’) not always to have one member of the contradiction be true in a definite manner – which was what we were to investigate from the beginning – but either to have both members equally receptive of truth and falsity, as what is said about contingents which are however it chances, or to have one member which is rather such as to be true and the other rather such as to be false, but not to have that which is true be always true nor that which is false be always false, which he indicated by ‘but not already true or false’. It is clear that, in the case of what is said for the most part, it is the affirmation that is rather true, and in the case of what is for the lesser part, it is the negation.83

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Notes to Ammonius’ commentary 1. Ch. 7, 17a38ff.; cf. 88,29ff., vol. 1. The subject of a proposition is either singular (‘Socrates walks’ vs. ‘Socrates does not walk’) or universal; if universal, it is either with a determination (prosdiorismos) or without one (‘Man walks’ vs. ‘Man does not walk’); there are two universal determinations, viz. ‘every’ and ‘none’ (‘Every man walks’ vs. ‘No man walks’), and two particular determinations, ‘some’ and ‘not every’ (‘Some man walks’ vs. ‘Not every man walks’). The propositions with determined subject terms can be arranged in a ‘square of opposition’, in which the relationships of contradiction (the ‘diagonals’ of the square: ‘Every man walks’ vs. ‘Not every man walks’, ‘Some man walks’ vs. ‘No man walks’), contrariety (‘Every man walks’ vs. ‘No man walks’, ‘Some man walks’), subcontrariety (‘Some man walks’ vs. ‘Not every man walks’), and subalterity (‘Every man walks’ vs. ‘Some man walks’, ‘No man walks’ vs. ‘Not every man walks’) are illustrated.

2. By propositions which ‘divide the true and false’, Ammonius means those pairs composed of a negation and an affirmation where one or the other proposition must be true and the other false. Note that Ammonius’ conception of ch. 9 as accomplishing the classification of the types of predicates which may or may not produce a contradiction is crucial to his entire approach to

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its explication: he is not so much interested in the effects of modalization on sentences as in the properties of different predicates or states of affairs. 3. i.e. take a proposition whose predicate necessarily holds of its subject: ‘Some man is an animal’ and ‘No man is an animal’; cf. 94,5ff. 4. e.g. ‘Some man is winged’ and ‘No man is winged’. 5. ‘In a definite manner’ (hôrismenôs, aphôrismenôs; the opposite is ‘in an indefinite manner’ [aoristôs]) will play a large rôle in Ammonius’ explication of this chapter. It is applied to: propositions which divide the true and the false in a definite manner (e.g. 130,4), saying or knowing something in a definite manner, which implies (though not for Ammonius, who adopts Iamblichus’ thesis that things can be known in a manner different from their nature: 135,12ff.) that it is in a definite manner (Categories 7, 8a36ff.; cf. D. Frede, ‘The Sea-Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3, 1985, pp. 31-83 at p. 42 n. 23: ‘This must have been the phrase that inspired the commentators in their need to specify the limitation of PB [i.e. the principle of bivalence]’); he also speaks of determinists who say that nothing happens by chance, but ‘for everything there is a definite cause’ (Physics 2.4, 196a1-2). 6. R.W. Sharples conjectures that the first intimation of this approach to the interpretation of Aristotle on the truth-values of singular future contingent statements is found in Alexander, Quaestiones 1.4.12-13: ‘And further, if that is possible from which, if it is supposed that it is the case, nothing impossible results; and [if], from everything of which the opposite is truly said beforehand, there results, if it is supposed that it is the case, the impossibility that the same thing both is and is not at the same time; [then] none of those things, of which one part of the contradictory disjunction referring to the future (sc. ‘either p will be or p will not be’) is true determinately, would be [the case] contingently. But they say that in all cases one part of the contradictory disjunction is true determinately.  So nothing is contingent.  But [if] it is a contingency similarly for the same thing to come to be and not to come to be, how is it not absurd to say, in the case of these things, that one part of the contradictory disjunction spoken beforehand (sc. ‘either p will be or p will not be’) is determinately true, and the other a falsehood, [when] the thing in question is similarly capable of both? For it follows, for those who say that the things that come to be do so in this way, that they are saying [either] that both the assertion and the negation similarly come to be true in the case of things that come to be in this way, or that each [of them] similarly [comes to be] false’ (R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, London 1992: Quaest. 1.4.12.13-13.9; cf. p. 35 n. 81). 7. The expression ‘up to us’ (eph’ hêmin) appears in Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary (hekousion) at Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b30, also 3.3, 3.5, Eudemian Ethics 2.6, 2.10, describing that which we may choose or about which we may deliberate. From there it becomes the usual way to refer to that which is in our power. On the whole question of Aristotle’s view of what is up to us, and its later development, see R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1980, pp. 227ff, and S. Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem’, forthcoming in Phronesis 1998. 8. These terms are considered in many places by Aristotle in his works on natural science; cf. especially Physics 2.4-6. 9. Sorabji, Kretzmann, and Mignucci discuss what it means for two

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contradictory propositions to divide the true and false in a definite manner, particularly whether this means only whether one is merely true and the other false, or whether one is true in a definite manner and the other false in a definite manner, then what it means for a proposition to be or to become true or false in a definite manner. At 141,11 Ammonius indicates that, if contradictory future singular propositions divide the true and false in a definite manner, as present- and past-tensed contradictory singular propositions do, there will be eo ipso (autothen) no room in the world for the contingent. 10. Agamemnon is addressing the Greeks after Achilles has agreed to renounce his anger and rejoin their side. Agamemnon has just commented that many of the Greeks have reproached him for angering Achilles. Now he claims that it was not his fault. As to his ignorance, one must admit that he is fairly self-serving, since Homer states quite clearly (1.5-7) that the ‘plan of Zeus’, which kept Achilles out of battle and had the Greeks suffering great losses, was conceived by the King of the Gods after Agamemnon’s quarrel with Achilles, in response to the request of Achilles’ mother Thetis. The same passage is quoted by Olympiodorus to illustrate how some people do not take responsibility for their own errors (in Gorgiam 131.12 Westerink, in Alcibiadem 101.17f. Westerink). 11. That we take care for our upbringing and virtue is important in two ways. First, the fact that we take care for or deliberate about anything indicates for an Aristotelian that that thing is not necessary (e.g. EE 3.3, 1112a21-6; 6.1, 1139a13). Second, Aristotle teaches that one’s character only gradually takes its full form, as we act many times and form dispositions to make certain kinds of choices, and it is only after one’s character is fixed that one can be called vicious or virtuous (NE 3.5, 1114a4ff.). Cf. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 227ff. and n. 1. 12. Cf. 137,22 below: ‘the gods treat us as self-movers’, which may be from Syrianus, who is cited at 137,16. The notion of being a self-mover and its inferiority to being moved by the gods figures prominently throughout Olympiodorus’ commentary on Alcibiades I. According to Platonists, the soul is a ‘self-mover’ or a ‘self-moving number’. Animals are called ‘self-movers’ by Aristotle at Physics 8.5, 258a2, but he also denies that they are ‘unmoved’ (akinêta). On the question of whether being a self-mover, or having the origin of one’s actions within oneself, entails being free of necessity, cf. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 229ff; for all aspects of self-movers, see the papers in M.L. Gill and J.G. Lennox (eds), Self-Motion, Princeton 1994. 13. Neither of these puzzles is directly related to Aristotle’s text: they are treated by Ammonius because they are thought to cause a difficulty. The ‘reaper’, he thinks, is not really difficult, but is more a dispute about words; Stephanus, who depends upon Ammonius, glosses ‘verbal’ with ‘superficial’ (epipolaios: 34,6). The problem about divine foreknowledge is more difficult and occasions more discussion by Ammonius. 14. Ammonius is our best source for the argument of the ‘reaper’, the discussion in the Anonymus commentary edited by Tarán (54,12ff.) being shorter, as is that of Stephanus in Int. 34,36ff., which derives from Ammonius. The ‘reaper’ is mentioned in Diogenes Laertius’ summary of Stoic dialectic as one of the sophisms against which dialectic is useful: ‘ veiled arguments, horned ones, no ones, and reapers’ (7.44). The ‘reaper’ and the ‘horned’ arguments are attributed by Diogenes to Diodorus Cronus (2.111), and a ‘dialectician’ (cf. D. Sedley, ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philo-

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sophy’, PCPS n.s. 23, 74-120) is said to have offered to teach Zeno of Citium seven ‘logical forms’ of the ‘reaper’; hearing that the dialectician wanted 100 drachmas for this lesson, Zeno promptly offered him 200 (DL 7.25). Thus, there is some possibility that the ‘reaper’ should be attributed to Diodorus (the Anonymus commentary [54.8 Tarán] attributes both the ‘reaper’ and the argument from divine foreknowledge to ‘the Stoics’). Ps.-Plutarch speaks of the ‘lazy and reaper arguments’ together as sophisms (On Fate 574E). Despite the paucity of our sources, the reaper was apparently well known. In Lucian’s Auction of Lives (22) Chrysippus offers to teach Zeus ‘the reaper and the master arguments, and on top of those Electra and the veiled man’. In his Symposium (23) Lucian includes a letter of Hetoimokles to Aristainetos, in which the former mocks the ignorance of his friend’s philosophers Zenothemis and Labyrinthus, who knew hardly anything, ‘let alone any of the problematic arguments, the horned or the sorites or the reaper argument’. On the Reaper, see G. Seel, ‘Zur Geschichte und Logik des therizôn logos’, in K. Döring and Th. Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker, Stuttgart 1993. 15. Alexander (On Fate 30, 200.25) uses pantôs in a similar way: ‘it is similarly impossible for them (sc. the gods) to have foreknowledge concerning what has in its own nature the possibility of both coming to be and not coming to be, that, whatever happens, it will be or that, whatever happens, it will not be.’ 16. Note that Ammonius later says that the determinist argument would ‘destroy’ the contingent (141,34f.). 17. Takha is an adverb derived from takhus (‘swift’). Hence, it originally indicated something which would ensue immediately (‘quickly’, ‘soon’, ‘now’), and this is the way it is used with the future tense of the indicative in Plato. It also came to be used, especially with the conjunction an, to mean ‘perhaps’. Aristotle, who does not use takha with the future indicative, uses it – as also isôs – to indicate doubt or to make a modest or cautious assertion (cf. Rhetoric 2.13, 1389b14-19, where old men are said to be cautious because they have often been deceived in the past, and therefore they do not state anything positively and say everything less strongly than they ought to, and they ‘think’, but they ‘know’ nothing; and when they argue they always add isôs and takha and say everything in this way, and nothing firmly). Ps.-Plutarch, in the context of the theory of conditional fate (i.e. our choices are not fated, but certain consequences are fated to follow from them), speaks of all the things which are ‘contained within fate’, but which do not occur ‘according to fate’: ‘the contingent and the possible, along with choice and what is up to us, and further, chance and the spontaneous and what is related to these, among which are the takha and the isôs’ (572F), then goes on to treat divine foreknowledge, which comprehends fate. 18. Ammonius expounds this deterministic argument over three paragraphs. In the first two, he gives three theses about divine foreknowledge of contingent events. The second two are shown to be absurd, which leaves the first, viz. that the gods have definite knowledge of future contingent events. In the third paragraph, this remaining thesis is taken as the premise of an argument which leads to the view that all contingent events are deterministically necessitated. It may well be a Stoic argument, then. 19. The first of these interpretations of divine foreknowledge is supposed to be Stoic, the second Epicurean; the third is what Ammonius will say is the Aristotelian position (cf. Alexander On Fate 30, 200.24-6, cited above). For

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the Stoic appropriation of divine foreknowledge as an argument for determinism, cf. SVF 2.939ff. Proclus (On Providence 63.1ff. = SVF 2.942) says that ‘others, however, attributing definite knowledge (determinatam cognitionem) to god, admitted necessity in all things which come to be’, doctrines he ascribes to the Peripatetic and Stoic sects’. Alexander gives an important account of divine foreknowledge and the possibility of prophecy in his On Fate 30-1, 200.12ff. (see R. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, London 1983, 164-8 and id., ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato: some parallels’, CQ 28, 1978, 243-66). 20. These are the terms used by Aristotle at On the Heavens 2.1, 284a31f. to describe what would happen if the heavens were moved by soul, as in Platonic theory. That the gods live a life of ease and leisured wisdom, which would be disrupted if they cared for human affairs, is the thesis of the Epicureans (e.g. Epicurus, Principal Doctrines 1). 21. The argument against the Epicurean thesis that the gods’ serenity would be destroyed if they had to bother with all our affairs is couched in terms which have much in common with Iamblichus, On the Mysteries 1.9. There, the light of the sun is praised as the most pure of corporeal entities, as is shown by the fact that the sun’s light vanishes once the sun has set, while its warmth lingers in the air. The light of the gods, however, is infinitely transcendent (huperokhê) in its causality and, without being divided, it is present to all those capable of partaking of it, since it is stably established (monimôs hidrumenon) in itself. 22. This refers to the fact that we are not very efficient at carrying out the gods’ wishes or becoming what they want us to become; cf. Simplicius, cited in the following note. 23. The same expression for sunlight is used in a similar context by Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Enchiridion 104,5-26, where we are told that god and his goodness are everywhere, at all times present to all things in the world, unlike even the best of corporeal things. Each thing partakes of the goodness of sunlight in accordance with its own ‘aptitude’ (epitêdeiotês), and this is no trouble for the sun; all the more, then, does each thing partake of god’s goodness, which is not difficult for god, according to the measure of its ‘aptitude’. 24. i.e. we can stop ourselves from seeing (using the sun’s light) by closing our eyes, but we cannot prevent ourselves from being warmed by the sun. Thus, we can turn away from the goodness of the gods, refusing to use it to guide our actions, but we cannot escape their providence. 25. Laws 10, 905A. 26. Laws 899Dff. The Athenian Stranger admonishes those who concede the gods’ existence, but deny, on the basis of the injustices they see in the world, that the gods take an interest in the affairs of men. 27. Ammonius equates indefinite with conjectural knowledge (eikastikê gnôsis) about the contingent: cf. 133,29 and the discussion of areas of expertise which do not always achieve their aim (which are elsewhere called ‘stochastic’ tekhnai), at 142,8ff.; on stochastic expertise, cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Questions 2.16, p. 61.1ff. Bruns = SVF 3.19, and Cicero, On Ends 3.22 = SVF 3.18, 3.24 = SVF 3.11. 28. Ammonius’ first point is that, since there is no past or future among the gods, for whom all things are in the eternal present, there can be no thought of them not knowing any event due to its futurity. His second point

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will be that we must attribute a better kind of knowledge to the gods than the ambiguous and indefinite knowledge available to us. 29. Timaeus 37Dff. Timaeus states that time and heaven came into being together, and that there is no ‘was’ or ‘will be’ which can be applied to eternity, but only ‘is’. The tenses, like ‘before’ and ‘after’ are only relevant in time, which is an imitation of eternity. 30. Metaph. 12, 1072a25ff. Aristotle says that the first sphere of the heavens is fixed and eternal. For a Platonist, however, being eternal implies being outside of time, as in the two citations from Timaeus and Parmenides. 31. Parmenides 140Eff. Plato’s Parmenides says that the one is neither older nor younger nor the same age as anything else, and indeed, it cannot occupy time at all. 32. B 8.5 (Diels-Kranz). Ammonius cites this verse at 136,24f. 33 Cf. Ammonius’ reference to Iamblichus as author of the idea that knowledge could have the quality of the one who knows, rather than merely the inferior quality of the thing known (135,12ff.). Ammonius will have found the idea in Proclus as well, as in On Providence 64: the gods know everything in a way better than its own nature, for example, they know what is in time in a timeless manner, and their causation and knowledge is established as timeless (akhronos). 34 Cf. 136,6 below, where Ammonius states clearly that the gods are considered to be the causes of eternal essences, for whose existence they are directly responsible, but they are the anterior causes of created things, from which they are two steps removed. 35. On choice (‘the impulse with desire towards what has been preferred as a result of deliberation’) as the peculiar activity of man, see Alexander, On Fate 11, 178.17-28 and 12, 180.7ff.; cf. 142,17-20 below. See also Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, pp. 139-41. 36. Action in virtue of one’s being is the second kind of action whose principle or origin lies in the agent. This mode is attributed to gods and the demiurge, as well as to a select group of corporeal entities, which include the sun, fire, and snow. In the case of the gods, their action is in virtue of their goodness. Cf. e.g. Proclus, Elements of Theology 122. 37. It would appear at first that the possibility that prayer might cause god to do something for a supplicant was incompatible with the mode of activity attributed to god in this paragraph. Yet the Neoplatonists believed in prayer as an activity which affected the supplicant, making him receptive to divine activity, rather than the god, who remains impassive. Porphyry, who apparently gave an extensive treatment of prayer, says that those who think that the gods exist and have foreknowledge and also that many of the things which come to be could also be otherwise are right to pray to the gods (cited in the lengthy discussion at Proclus in Tim. 1.206.26-214.12, at 208.3f.). He bids Marcella to ask the god for that which the god himself wants and what he is (Letter to Marcella 12f.). 38. For the efficacy of prayer, cf. e.g. Proclus, On Providence 37f. 39. These are famous oracles delivered by the Pythia at Delphi. The ‘wooden wall’ was interpreted by Themistocles as referring to ships, in which the Athenians should take refuge from the Persian invasion in 480, ferrying the non-combatants to Troizen and Salamis; the part of the oracle dealing with Salamis was worded in a troubling way (cf. Herodotus 7.141f., who also reports various other interpretations). Croesus interpreted the oracle he received from the Pythia as a prediction that he would defeat Persia, if he

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crossed the River Halys, which formed the border between Persia and Lydia; in the event, it was his own empire which was destroyed (in 547/6). The oracle given to Laius, King of Thebes, of course concerned his son Oedipus, but also his grandsons Eteocles and Polynices, who were fated to kill one another; Alexander has a discussion of the case of Laius and Oedipus at On Fate 31, 201.32ff, as do Oenomaeus, Cicero (On Fate 33), Diogenian (in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 4.3), and others; these treatments derive from Chrysippus’ On Fate (cf. SVF II 939, 941, 957). 40. The Neoplatonic thesis here attributed to Iamblichus (cf. 133,32f., with note; there is no telling where Iamblichus wrote about this) was also espoused by Proclus (cf. Decem Dub. q. 2, On Providence 63f., Elements of Theology 124; Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato: some parallels’, pp. 260-2). Boethius, in his commentary, held the Aristotelian theory according to which the truth of propositions depended on the things they signified, so that propositions could not be known in any way which was more exact or more permanent than the nature of the things (2, 188.14-17; cf. Kretzmann, below, but also Ammonius 154,16ff.). 41. ‘Unchanging’ here bears a heavy burden: the gods’ knowledge must be unchanging, as the gods themselves are unchanging and impassive; their knowledge may not be subject to change in the sense that they would at first know something as possibly true, then later as definitely true; their knowledge of the future may not include the knowledge that it is future, since nothing is past or future for the gods, and since the events in question would eventually become past, changing the gods’ knowledge of them. These considerations would seem to prohibit the gods from knowing contingent events as contingent, except insofar as they may know that an event (whether that event is, was, or will be) is of a contingent nature, that it is of such a sort as to have a development from possible to definite. 42. Ammonius seems to be using ‘preconceive’ chronologically (as opposed to the outline or general knowledge which ‘preconceptions’ are in Epicureanism), but from our point of view: the gods know the outcome of contingent things before we do. 43. Cf. Proclus, On Providence 64, where a similar list appears. 44. Timaeus 37E 45. Cf. B 8.6 (Diels-Kranz). 46. Cf. Proclus, On Providence 65: ‘It is not the case that insofar as they (sc. the gods) know what will be, its outcome is brought about of necessity.’ On the other hand, Alexander agrees with the Stoic premiss that there can be definite foreknowledge of what is not contingent, but he restricts this to what is predetermined. He argues instead that foreknowledge of anything which is can only be knowledge of it as it is, so that foreknowledge of contingent events must be knowledge of them as contingent, which will not lead to determinism (On Fate 30, 200.28ff., 201.13ff.). 47. When the surface is tilted, the sphere rolls of necessity, due to its own nature. A cylinder, which rolls on a surface after it has been pushed, is the standard example used by Chrysippus in his explanation of causality in On Fate: both a moving cause and an internal cause found in the nature of a cylinder are required (Cicero, On Fate 42-3: ‘but he comes back to his cylinder and his spindle, which can not begin to move unless they are pushed; but when that happens, for the rest the cylinder rolls and the spindle turns by its own nature, “Just as”, he says, “he who pushed the cylinder gave it a beginning of motion, but did not give it its tendency to roll, so will the object

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which is seen impress and inscribe its own shape in our soul, but assent will be in our power, and as was said of the cylinder, once pushed from outside, for the rest it will move by its own force and nature. Thus, if anything were effected without antecedent causes, it would be false to say that all things happen by fate; but if it seems true that everything which happens is preceded by some cause which could bring it about, then why should we not say that everything happens by fate?” ’ [= SVF II 974]; Gellius, Attic Nights 7.2: ‘ “Just as”, he says, “if you roll a cylindrical stone on a steeply sloping piece of ground you actually do provide to it a cause and beginning of its descent, but soon it rolls onward, not because you make it do so, but because of its own quality and its shape’s tendency to roll; in the same way the order, reason and necessity of fate move the various kinds of things themselves and also the beginnings of causes, yet each person’s will and the characteristics of his mind regulate the motions of our plans and thoughts, and our very actions” ’ [= SVF II 1000]; cf. M. Frede, ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford and Madison 1987, pp. 125-50, and S. Bobzien, ‘Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes’, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998. Alexander, On Fate 13, 181.15ff. talks about the different natures of things in the context of a determinist argument from the natural behaviours of different types of things (cf. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, London 1983, pp. 142f. and id., ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato: some parallels’, CQ 28, 1978, 253-8 for parallels). On the six causes of the Neoplatonists, of which the internal or ‘containing’ cause is the ‘highest’, cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 2.2-3.9, 322,14ff.; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 207,27ff.; Philoponus, On the Eternity of the World 1595ff. 48. This argument is obviously not a determinist claim, but is at least taken to be relevant to the third possibility, mentioned above at 132,12f., i.e. that the gods have an indefinite knowledge of future contingent events. One who did claim that the ambiguity of oracles was a sign of the gods’ ignorance of the future was Oenomaus of Gadara (in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 5.20-6, cf. J. Hammerstaedt, Die Orakelkritik des Kynikers Oenomaus, Frankfurt a.M. 1988, 60ff. and 152). ‘Too bold’ (thrasuteron: 137,12) and ‘audacious’ (tolmêra: 137,24) would suit a cynic well. 49. Alexander, On Fate 12, 180.20ff. and 24ff. argues that a deterministic analysis of deliberation goes against our intuition that we do deliberate, and it is strange that nature should have forced most men to fall into error on this point. See also 148,24ff. below. 50. Aristotle himself likens the activity of nature to that of art: e.g. Physics 2.2, 1194a21; Gen. An. 4.2, 767a17; cf. also 137,7ff. above. 51. Ch. 7, 17b3ff.; cf. 91,5ff. above. 52. The reference is to the end of the present lemma (18a33-4) on future singular propositions, which Aristotle says behave differently from others. 53. GC 2.11, 337b3-7. In the cited passage, Aristotle says that ‘if it is true to say of something “it will be”, it must be true at some time that this “is”; if it is now true to say of something “it is going to be”, nothing prevents this from coming about, for although one is going to walk, he might not walk’. Aristotle is using the ‘voluntative’ sense which mellô has, when used instead of a future tense. 54. i.e. both the affirmation and the negation of the same thing. 55. i.e. (contingent) singular future propositions. 56. Aristotle considers examples a kind of ‘proof ’ leading to persuasion:

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cf. Rhetoric 1.2, 1356b5-7 (‘example is a rhetorical [form of] induction’), 1.9, 1368a29, 2.20, 1393a23ff. 57. Cf. 19a39-b2. Boethius II 204.23-5 and I 125,16 also states that ‘definitely’ is to be understood in these sentences by the reader (cf. Kretzmann below). 58. Omitting tên heteran with G. 59. Omitting heteran with AGMa. 60. What Aristotle says happens ‘by chance’ (18b5) is here called ‘contingent for the lesser part’ (the first type is inferred from the opposition of the second, although it is not mentioned by Aristotle: cf. Topics 2.6, 112b10 for the opposition between what is for the most part and what is for the lesser part, although Aristotle does not explicitly use the phrase hôs ep’ elatton), while what Aristotle says occurs ‘however it chances’ (18b6) is here the ‘contingent equally ’; cf. e.g., Ps.-Plutarch, On Fate 571C; Alexander, in Top. 177,22ff. 61. Cf. Aristotle Physics 2.4-5. 62. Cf. 134,13-16 above and Alexander, On Fate 11, 178.17-28 and 12, 180.7ff., with Sharples’ commentary, pp. 139ff. 63. Aristotle’s example is that of the creditor who goes out for another reason, but happens upon his debtor and is paid back (Physics 2.5, 196b32ff.). 64. Aristotle’s example is of a tripod which has fallen and is now used as a seat (Physics 2.6, 197b16-18). 65. Reading, with Busse, tis hê apoplêrôsis; the variant apoklêrôsis in FGMa might be preferable: ‘What is strange ?’ 66. This refers to necessitation by preceding causes (cf. 137,3ff.); it is opposed to something truly contingent, which can happen one way or the other until the moment it occurs. 67. 19a23-9. 68. Our text of Ammonius has the reading mega (‘large’) both in the lemma and in the commentary (146,21). Minio-Paluello reads melan (‘dark’). 69. Aristotle expounds at length the status of the principle of non-contradiction as the most fundamental of all axioms, without which there can be no rational thought, in Metaphysics 4.3. 70. ‘Nature does nothing in vain’ is a favourite principle of Aristotle: e.g. On the Heavens 1.4, 271a32. 71. Cf. 18b31-2. As Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, we can only deliberate how to do what is up to us (1112a30-2), not about what is either necessary or impossible. The argument that, if nothing is contingent, we would not deliberate is also used by Alexander, On Fate 11, 178.8-15 and de Anima Mantissa 182.25ff. (also Boethius II 220.8ff.); cf. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, pp. 139-41. 72. The phrase is first found in Plato Republic 5, 458D5. 73. Ammonius’ point is that it is strange to think we have been forced to deliberate although we cannot do what we decide, apparently a point against the Stoic theory that our assents, though not what we ultimately do, are up to us. Cf. 137,25ff. above. 74. Homer, Iliad 9.412-6. 75. Alexander, On Fate 16, 186.18 (cf. 18, 188.17f.) uses the same phrase in the same context, viz. the practical consequences of the determinist’s argument. ‘Overturning human life’ presumably refers in Ammonius, as in Alexander, to consequences of determinism such as the uselessness of praise and blame or the ‘lazy argument’ (argos logos), which said that, if some

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outcome was fated, irrespective of my attempt to do anything about it, I might as well not bother to try to do anything. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate, pp. 10, 150f. points out that determinism does not necessarily entail that our actions can never influence the outcome of events, given Chrysippus’ doctrine of co-fated events (cf. SVF 2.956f.). This doctrine was used against the ‘lazy argument’: if the outcome is co-fated with my action, my action is required for it to occur; but I certainly will act, since I am fated to do so. On the lazy argument and co-fated events, cf. S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, ch. 7. 76. 19a12-18. 77. Cf. 154,16ff. below and, e.g., Boethius II 188,14-17: ‘the nature of predicative propositions is acquired from the truth [and] falsity of things, events, or states of affairs; for however they are, so will the propositions that signify them be’; see also Kretzmann, below. 78. The determinist argues that what is now true was true to predict in all prior time, and what could be said truly in all prior time is necessary. Ammonius’ analysis of Aristotle’s reply is to distinguish necessary from unnecessary things, then transfer that distinction to statements. The distinction, then, is between what is necessary absolutely, with no qualification made with respect to time (the key being that, in one of two senses of ‘always’, either throughout all time or at every time throughout the subect’s existence, the thing must ‘always’ be so), and what is necessary in a qualified way, or only so long as the predicate holds of the subject. Thus, while everything true is necessary, while it is true, not all things are necessarily true in an absolute sense. 79. Such a case would in fact be that of fire, as Aristotle gives ‘fire is hot’ and ‘snow is cold’ as examples where one of the two predicates belongs to the subject ‘in a definite manner (aphôrismenôs), and not as it chances’; cf. Kretzmann, below. What Ammonius says in his commentary on Categories 13a8 at 99,19ff. is instructive. He notes that Aristotle distinguishes contraries opposed as privation and state, where one of the contraries of necessity belongs to the subject, from contraries that have an intermediate, such as pale and dark, where it is not the case that one or the other is of necessity present in the subject, so that only in some of them does one of the contraries belong to the subject of necessity, such as warmth in fire. Even these special cases are distinguished from contraries opposed as privation and state, since one of them belongs of necessity in a definite manner (aphôrismenôs), while the other could never belong; in contraries opposed as privation and state, such as blindness and sightedness, it is not necessary that either sightedness or blindness belong in a definite manner to what receives them, but rather ‘whichever of the two happens to be the case’. Here the qualification ‘in a definite manner’ could be glossed here as ‘whatever happens’, ‘under any circumstances’, ‘only’. It is distinct from ‘of necessity’ in that it is necessary that either sightedness or blindness belong to the subject which is capable of receiving them, and it is necessary that warmth belong to fire, but only the second belongs in a definite manner, as the only possible one of two contraries. 80. Cf. 152,9-11 and 153,12-13 above. 81. Cratylus 385B. 82. Thus, the ‘absolutely necessary’, which does not apply to whatever only sometimes belongs, can not apply to one of a pair of contingent outcomes, but only to the entire disjunction ‘either it will be so, or it will not’. The same

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result, Ammonius says, can also be inferred from Aristotle’s use of ‘however it happens’ (pantôs) only to apply to the disjunction, but not to either of the contradictory statements. 83. Ammonius’ use of the phrase ‘equally receptive of truth and falsity’ is ambiguous. For it could mean that the sentence has neither truth nor falsity, but is capable of receiving either, or that the sentence has truth (or falsity), but could have had the other. The former interpretation would favour the view that singular future contingent sentences have no truth value until the occurrence of the event to which they are tied. When the same ambiguity appears, e.g. at 57,17 (‘when joined with something else it [sc. “being”] signifies a composition which is now [êdê: cf. “but not already (êdê) true or false”] receptive of falsity and truth’), it seems that the phrase is equivalent to ‘is now true or false’. This second reading would favour the view that a singular future contingent sentence always has a truth value, but not one which was determined beforehand. The second reading is perhaps strengthened by the last sentence, in which it appears that statistically qualified truth-values are attributed to singular future contingent sentences of various types: rather true than false, rather false than true. For the first interpretation, see Simplicius, in Cat. 407,6-14: ‘However, the Peripatetics say that while the contradiction concerning the future is true or false, which of its parts is true and which false is ungraspable and inconstant by nature. For nothing prevents the contradiction – “it will be or it will not be” – from being said of any time whatever, but each of the parts contained in it – such as “it will be” or “it will not be” – is, in the present and past time, already either true or false, while those which make an assertion about the future are not already either true or false, but will be of this kind or that kind’ and the remarks of D. Frede, ‘The Sea-Battle Reconsidered’, pp. 44-5; for the second, see the forthcoming commentary by G. Seel et al.

Boethius’ First Commentary on Aristotle On Interpretation 9 18a28 Therefore, as regards the things that are and that have happened, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false. Indeed, as regards universals [said] universally, [it is] always [necessary] that the one be true but the other false; also as regards those that are singulars, as has been said. [But as regards universals that are not said universally, it is not necessary; these, however, have also been spoken of.] Regarding contradictory statements that have been made regarding present and past things, events, and states of affairs (res),1 he says that one is always definitely true and the other always definitely false.2 For example, suppose someone says ‘All the Fabians perished who advanced to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy’. If that is denied in this way: ‘Not all the Fabians perished who advanced to battle against the Veientes in a private conspiracy’, it is of course necessary that one be true and the other false. But the affirmation is definitely true and the negation definitely false. For when what has happened is said to have happened, it is definitely true; if it is denied that it has happened, that is definitely false. Therefore, whether the contradiction is made by means of an opposition of particularity regarding universals universally predicated,3 or regarding singulars4 – e.g. regarding Socrates and other individuals – regarding those that are past one is always true and the other false. For example, in this case: ‘Socrates was slain by poison’, ‘Socrates was not slain by poison’, the affirmation is definitely true, and so, on the other hand, the negation is false. It is necessary that it be the same also as regards present things, events, and states of affairs. For suppose that while Socrates is disputing someone says ‘Socrates is disputing’ and someone else denies it. Then just as Socrates’ disputing is definite because of the present time, so also the affirmation definitely holds truth, the negation falsity. And, indeed, it is the same as regards universals, either affirmative or negative, to which either a particular affirmation or a particular negation is opposed. For that is why he says ‘as regards the things that are and that have happened’ (18a28) – i.e. as regards present

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and past things, events, and states of affairs – one is always definitely true and the other always definitely false, whether [or not] one is universal and the other particular. This is shown by his saying ‘Indeed, as regards universals [said] universally, [it is] always [necessary] that the one be true but the other false’ (18a29-30), or as regards singular and individual statements (praedicamentis), as he indicates by means of this addition: ‘also as regards those that are singulars’ (18a31). But after he spoke of contradictories he added: As regards those that are indefinite, however, it is indeed not necessary always that this one be true but that one false – indicating this by what he said: ‘But as regards universals that are not said universally, it is not necessary’ (18a31-2). For as regards them it is not necessary that one be put forward as true and the other as false, since it can happen that those which are indefinite are both true.5 18a33 But as regards [those that are] singular and future, it is not like that.

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There are some propositions that signify only inherence.6 For instance, suppose that while Socrates was alive someone said ‘Socrates is bald’ and someone else denied it: ‘Socrates is not bald’. The former laid it down that baldness inheres in Socrates, and the latter disjoined baldness from Socrates. Other [propositions], however, are necessary. For instance, suppose someone says ‘It is necessary that the sun return again to Aries every year’. In declaring that the thing, event, or state of affairs is necessary and comes about necessarily, he made the whole proposition necessary.7 Other [things, events, or states of affairs] are contingent: those of which, while they are not, it is nevertheless possible that they come about in the future. For instance, suppose someone says, ‘Today Alexander is going to have breakfast’, ‘Today Alexander is not going to have breakfast’. For indeed while those things are being said, since breakfasting does not inhere in him so far, it is contingent that it inhere, and it can happen that he have breakfast today. It is for that reason that we call them contingent; for of that which so far has never happened it is contingent that it happen. But these, of course, are not inhering, as has been said, for they belong to future time. Those that do not inhere but can inhere are not necessary, however, since they retain a nature of this sort, that it is possible both that they be and that they not be. For it can happen that today Alexander has breakfast, and, on the other hand, it can happen that today he does not have breakfast. And this possibility of coming about or not coming about we call ‘in-either-of-two-ways’ (utrumlibet). For as regards

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things, events, or states of affairs of this sort it turns out in either of two ways, either the affirmation or the negation; and it is not necessary that either the affirmation happen or the negation. For since the affirmation is not necessary, its turning out to be the negation has not been ruled out. On the other hand, since the negation is not necessary, it sometimes happens that it turns out to be the affirmation. Accordingly, this sort of capacity for coming about or not coming about is called ‘in-either-of-two-ways’, because as regards these it is granted that they come about in either of two ways – i.e. either affirmations or negations. Now, therefore, Aristotle undertakes, by means of very powerful argumentation, to add this: as regards past things and those that are present, it is necessary as regards the affirmation and the negation not only that one be true and the other false, but the one is definitely true and the other takes on falsity definitely; [and that] is not the way it is in connection with those that are called contingent. For [in that connection] it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that one of them be definitely true and the other definitely false. For if someone else denies what we say, ‘Alexander is to be bathed’, and says ‘Alexander is not to be bathed’, it is indeed necessary that this whole state of affairs come about – that either he is bathed or he is not bathed – and it is necessary that one be true and the other false: either the affirmation, if he has been bathed, or, if he has not been bathed, the negation. But it is not necessary that the affirmation be definitely true, because in cases of this sort the negation could come about. Nor is it ever definite that the negation be true ([and] the affirmation false) because the negation can fail to come about. Accordingly, as regards the whole contradiction it is of course necessary that one be true and the other false. But that one be definitely true and the other definitely false – as is the case regarding those that are past or present – is not possible on the basis of any reason associated with the things, events, or states of affairs. But Aristotle proves this first as regards propositions of singular statements (praedicamentorum); afterwards, however, he teaches that the same must be understood regarding universals. For that is why he says ‘But as regards [those that are] singular and future, it is not like that’ (18a33-4). That is, as regards singular propositions, which he treats first, and as regards [those that are] future – i.e. contingents – the way of true and false propositions is not the same as it is regarding [those that are] past or present. For as regards [those that are] past or present, both the whole body of the contradiction is divided into truth or falsity and one [of the contradictions] is definitely true so that someone who is certain and has knowledge about them can say that the affirmation is true or, on the other hand, that the negation [is true]. Or even if no one were to say it, the logical

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character (ratio) of past or of present time is certain in accordance with its own nature – i.e. the outcome is certain. However, as regards those in connection with which it is contingent and future8 – i.e. variable and indeterminable (instabile) – the whole body of the contradiction does indeed separate into truth and falsity; but this truth and falsity is undifferentiated (indiscreta) and alterable. For no one can say that the affirmation is true, since it is not necessary that the affirmation be true because it is possible that the negation happen. Nor, on the other hand, [can anyone say it regarding] the negation, since it is not impossible that the affirmation turn out to be the case. And, finally, since either of the two of them turns out to be the case, it cannot naturally be that one of them is definitely true and certain. From which arguments this follows will be evident in the following way. 18a34 For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is necessary also that everything be or not be. For if, indeed, this person says that something is going to be, but that one does not say the same thing, [it is evident that it is necessary that one or the other of them be saying what is true, if every affirmation is true or false; for in such cases both will not be together.] If whatever is put forward in affirmations and negations is definitely true, or false, it follows that regarding whatever those negations and affirmations signify it is necessary either that it come about or that it not come about. For that is why he says: ‘For if every affirmation or negation is true or false ’ (18a34) – [i.e.] definitely. And that is why he adds ‘every’, because he is undertaking to prove regarding those that are future or contingent that the affirmations and negations are not definitely true, or false. For if one person says that something is going to be and another denies it, it cannot happen that both come about. For who would say that if someone says ‘Socrates is going to have dinner’ and someone else denies it – ‘Socrates is not going to have dinner’ – both can be correct regarding one and the same thing? So that cannot happen. Therefore, one of them will have said what is true, and the other will have said what is false. For suppose that one of these is definitely true, or false. Then if every affirmation and negation is definitely true, or false, and it cannot be that both the person denying and the person affirming are correct where contradictions are at issue, then it is necessary that the one say what is true, the other what is false – and that one be definitely true and the other definitely false. If that is the way it is as regards all affirmations and negations – that one is definitely false and the other definitely true – then whatever the true one says is going to come about, it is necessary that it come about,

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[and] whatever [it says] will not come about, it is necessary that it not come about. For that is why he says: ‘it is evident that it is necessary that one or the other of them be saying what is true’ (18a36-7). For it cannot happen that the affirmation and the negation agree in such cases – i.e. in the propositions of a contradiction. Rather, it is necessary that whatever is said by an affirmation that is definitely true come about, and that whatever is proclaimed by a negation that is definitely true not come about – which he proves in the following way. 18a39 For if it is true to say that a thing is white or not white, it is necessary that it be white or not white. And if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or to deny; [and if it is not, it is false; and if it is false, it is not. Accordingly, it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true.] He draws an example from present things [to show] what a judgment about the future can be. For he says that it is a consequence of the state of affairs (rerum) that the truth of the proposition follows along with the occurrence of the state of affairs, that the being (essentia) of the state of affairs of which the proposition speaks accompanies the truth of the proposition. For if this stone, or anything else, is white, it is true to say of it that it is white. This also goes the other way: for if it is true to say of it that it is white, then without doubt it is white, and that it is white is necessary.9 And in this way it happens that the state of affairs conforms to truth, and truth to the state of affairs the proposition is about. On the other hand, if the stone is not white, it is true to say of it that it is not white. And if it is true to say of it that it is not white, then it cannot happen that it is white while it is said truly that it is not white. The same holds good also as regards false [propositions]. For if anything is not when someone puts forward the claim that it is, he says what is false. And if someone says what is false about something, that about which the false [statement] is made is not – if, for instance, someone says of something that it is white when it is not white, he says something false. Therefore, it is necessary also that that about which someone says something is false is not. And so truth is indeed interchangeable with the state of affairs that is, and the state of affairs that is is interchangeable with truth, while falsity is interchangeable with a state of affairs that is not, and a state of affairs that is not is interchangeable with falsity. If that is the way it is as regards all things, events, and states of affairs, and whatever is said with truth or falsity, whether it is a negation or an affirmation, is interchangeable with a state of affairs that is or is not, and it is necessary that one [thing said] is always true and the other always false,10 [then] if one is definitely true, it is impossible on that view that anything be contingent. For it will come

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about that all things that are or happen happen necessarily and nothing by chance; and that of nothing is it possible that it be and possible that it not be. Moreover, nothing would be left to the governance of free choice (liberum arbitrium); but everything, whatever comes about, will be necessarily. For if it is definitely true to say of any thing, event, or state of affairs that it will be, it is without doubt necessary that it be going to be, and it cannot come about that it does not happen. For it is true to say of it that it is going to be, and it could not be said truly of it that it is going to be unless it were necessary that it is going to be. Accordingly, if as regards every affirmation and negation either the affirmation or the negation regarding the future is definitely true, or false, then it is necessary that either what is said by the definitely true affirmation or what [is said] by the [definitely true] negation come about. The explanation is similar also as regards falsity. For of that which will not be it is false to say that it will be; and that of which it is false to say that it will be will necessarily not be. Again, of that which will be it is false to say that it will not be; and that of which it is false to say that it will not be will necessarily be. Therefore, just as from true propositions a necessary outcome follows – that that which is said happen – so also from false propositions a necessary outcome follows – that that which is said by the false proposition not happen. For if as regards the future every affirmation or negation always divides truth and falsity definitely, there will be a necessary outcome of things, events, or states of affairs that are foresaid; and [in that case] everything occurs or does not occur of necessity. And so also chance, possibility, and free choice come to an end. There is, however, a syllogism of this sort: If every affirmation is definitely true, or false, and [every] negation likewise, it will come about that everything occurs with the inevitable character of necessity. And if that is the case, free choice comes to nothing. But that is impossible. Therefore, it is not true that every affirmation or negation is definitely true, or false. But a syllogism of this sort shows that everything occurs necessarily if those are definitely true, or false: Every definite truth or falsity regarding the future has established the outcome of the state of affairs necessarily – either as going to be or as not going to be. But all future propositions are definitely true, or false. Therefore, as regards all states of affairs there is a necessity of coming about or of not coming about. It is for the sake of that conclusion that Aristotle made this remark. 18b5 Nothing, therefore, either is or happens by chance or in-either-of-two-ways, or will be or will not be; but all things of necessity [and not in-either-of-two-ways. For either he who says it or he who denies it is correct.]

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For chance and that which is in either of two ways is abolished, and free will is also taken away, if everything whatever that will happen is necessarily going to be. And he proves the conclusion above, which says that everything occurs necessarily, by means of this remark of his: ‘For either he who says it or he who denies it is correct’ (18b7-8). If, therefore, truth is interchangeable with the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs, and either the one who denies is correct or the one who affirms, then it is necessary that everything happen necessarily. For if [the things, events, or states of affairs] will not be necessarily, [the propositions] will not be definitely true – which is what he added. 18b8 For it would in the same way either happen or not happen, since nothing that is in either of two ways is or will be disposed more in this way or not in this way. For he explained what the nature of the contingent is when he explained what is in-either-of-two-ways. What is in-either-of-twoways is something the outcome of which is undecided – i.e. that of which it is equally contingent that it be or not be. For that is why he says, ‘For it would in the same way either happen or not happen’ (18b8). For it does not have one direct and necessary way either to affirmation or to negation. Instead, nothing [of this sort] is more disposed in this way or not disposed in this way. And what is in-either-of-two-ways is that which maintains an even course both to coming about and to not coming about. For nothing [of this sort] is more disposed in this way or not disposed in this way – i.e. it is equally disposed to being and to not being. For nothing [of this sort] is more disposed to happen than not to happen. 18b9 Furthermore, if it is white now, it was true to say at first that it would be white. Accordingly, it was always true to say of any of the things that have happened that it would be. He raises an objection against himself with very powerful argumentation by which he can show that affirmations and negations are definitely true, or false. And he says that one must be careful to avoid its turning out to be necessary to suppose that regarding what has already happened one could have said truly before it happened that it was going to happen. For example, if Socrates had dinner last night, it was true yesterday morning that he was going to have dinner. For that reason if it had been predicted, it would also have been definitely true. Therefore, everything that happens could have been predicted with definite truth. For that is why he says: ‘if it is white now, it was true to say at first that it would be white’ (18b9-10). For regarding any thing that is white now, if it was true before to say that it would

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be white, then it was accordingly [possible] also to predict with definite truth regarding ‘any of the things that have happened’ (18b11). Moreover, the outcome of the state of affairs itself confirmed this. He attacks this objection in return by the same means. For the person who says these things is not permitted to escape the trap of the argument above. On the contrary, those same things joined together surround him, and he is once more hemmed in by those same troubles. 18b11 But if it is always true to say that it is or will be, this [thing in question] cannot not be or not be going to be. [But of what cannot not happen, it is impossible that it not happen; and of that of which it is impossible that it not happen, it is necessary that it happen. Of all things, therefore, that are going to be, it is necessary that they happen. Nothing, therefore, will be in either of two ways or by chance; for if by chance, not of necessity.] By means of marvellous reasoning he has brought those who express the argument above to the same difficulty, saying that if it is true that everything whatever that has happened could have been predicted with definite truth, then, since the necessity of the state of affairs follows the truth of the proposition, what had been predicted with definite truth could not have failed to come about. But if it could not have failed to come about, then it was impossible that it would fail to come about. But of that of which it is impossible that it not happen, it is necessary that it happen. Therefore, its outcome follows necessarily. ‘Nothing, therefore, will be in either of two ways or by chance’ (18b15-16); for if it could be by chance, then it is not necessary that it is going to be. Because if anything is not necessarily going to be, it is not impossible that it not happen; if it is not impossible that it not happen, it can not happen; if it can not happen, it cannot be predicted with definite truth. For whatever is predicted with definite truth is necessarily going to be; but whatever is by chance does not come about necessarily. 18b17 Nor, however, can one say that neither is true – e.g. that it neither will be nor will not be. [For, in the first place, when the affirmation is false, the negation will not be true; and when the latter is false, it turns out that the affirmation is not true.] The diversity of future contingents consists in four differences. For regarding what is affirmed and denied regarding the future, either both will be true, or both will be false, or one true and the other false definitely, or one true and the other false indefinitely. That both the affirmation and the negation are indeed not true as regards those

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propositions that are put forward regarding things occurring in future time he showed by what he said above: ‘it is evident that it is necessary that one or the other of them be saying what is true, if every affirmation is true or false; for in such cases both will not be together’ (18a36-9). For it cannot happen that in a contradictory opposition of propositions you can find both [propositions] true. Now, however, he shows that neither can it happen, of course, that both are false. For he says, ‘Nor, however,’ can this, indeed, be said by us: ‘that neither is true’ (18b17) – i.e. neither the affirmation nor the negation. But it could turn out that both are false – viz., the affirmation and the negation – if neither that which the affirmation said was going to be would be, nor that which the negation said was not [going to be] would not be. For in that case it would happen that neither that which the affirmation declared to be would be, nor that which the negation proposed as not being would not be. Therefore, if anyone says that that is the way it is, ‘in the first place’ (18b18), he says, it is absurd and impossible that in a contradictory opposition when the affirmation is false the negation is not true and, on the other hand, that when the negation is false the affirmation is also false. For this could happen only in connection with contraries,11 not also in the case of contradictory opposition;12 for in the latter case it is necessary that one always be true and the other always false. 18b20 In connection with these things, if it is true to say [of something] that it is white and large, it must be both; [but if it will be [white and large] tomorrow, [it must] be [both] tomorrow. If, however, it neither will be nor will not be tomorrow, it will not be in either of two ways – e.g. a sea battle; for it will have to be that neither does a sea battle happen nor does a sea battle not happen. These, therefore, and others like them are the absurdities that occur if of every affirmation and negation, either as regards those that are said universally regarding universals or as regards those that are singulars, it is necessary that this one of the opposites be true but that one false – that, moreover, as regards things that happen, nothing is in-eitherof-two-ways, but all things are or happen of necessity. Accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble: that if we do this, this will be, but if that, it will not be. For nothing prevents someone’s saying a thousand years ago, indeed, that this was going to be, but another’s not saying [so]; accordingly, necessarily whichever of them it was true to say then will be. Nor does it make any difference if any people spoke the contradiction or not; for it is evident that the actual things are disposed in this way even if it is not the case that one person indeed

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affirmed it but another denied it. For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be, nor [is it a question of its being] a thousand years rather than as much time as you please. Accordingly, if at every time the situation was such that one thing would be said truly, it would be necessary that that happen, and that every one of the things that happen be disposed in such a way that it would happen necessarily. For when anyone says truly that [something] will be, it cannot not happen; and of whatever has happened, it was always true to say that it would be.]

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He adds something else as well, by means of which what is said may be seen to be the more incongruous. For everything that is predicted regarding the future will be, if it is predicted truly. For if anyone says at the present time of any animal that it is white, or that it has a big body, and says this truly, then that that animal is white and big is necessary. So also as regards the future: if anyone says truly that this animal will become white and have a bigger body tomorrow, it is necessary that both those things occur tomorrow – that it both become white and have a bigger body. But if something is predicted falsely, it is necessary that what is said not be, if it is an affirmation.13 For example, if someone falsely affirms a future sea battle, it is necessary that what is predicted by means of the false affirmation not happen. But if it is a false negation, then what the false negation predicted was not going to be must necessarily be. But if both are false, then what is said will necessarily not be, because the affirmation is definitely false, nor will what is said necessarily not be, because the negation is definitely false. And so it happens that what is in either of two ways as regards things, events, or states of affairs is entirely cut off. For both are necessary and occur necessarily, and the necessity is itself impossible. For if someone says that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow and someone else denies it and announces that it is not going to be, if both [propositions] are false, it will indeed be necessary that there not be a sea battle tomorrow (since the affirmation that says there is going to be one is false); [and], on the other hand, it is necessary that there be a sea battle tomorrow (since the negation that says there is not going to be one tomorrow is also false). Accordingly, it will be necessary that there be a sea battle and not be one – which is impossible and outside the bounds of thought’s common nature. Therefore, it is not true that both – i.e. the affirmation and the negation – are false at once. ‘These, therefore,’ he says, ‘and others like them are the absurdities that occur ’ (18b26). If anyone says regarding those that are universal and are predicated universally, or regarding those that are

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stated as singulars in propositions, that necessarily one is definitely true and the other definitely false, then such absurdities, he says, and others like them pursue such a person – viz., one who says this of the preceding arguments, in which he showed that all things occur necessarily if anyone should say that one is definitely true and the other definitely false. Now the other absurdities and impossibilities that he says keep company with people who claim that the one is definitely true [and the other definitely false] are these: for if anyone claims that one is true and the other false, he removes the in-eitherof-two-ways as regards things, events, or states of affairs, as was said above, and establishes that all things are or happen necessarily, nothing by chance, nothing by one’s own will. And so it turns out that it is useless to take trouble or to undertake an action, all of which are conducted on the basis of deliberation. For deliberation itself is totally empty when of everything whatever that is going to be it is necessary that it come about. For why should anyone say ‘If I do this, then that will come about for me and occur; but if I do this other thing, then that thing will come about’? For nothing prevents one person’s affirming that something should be done but another person’s denying it, when everything comes about by the force of necessity. For if anyone predicted truly beforehand everything that is happening now, who doubts that what has happened has come about by the immutable vehemence of necessity? For this is what he says: ‘accordingly, necessarily whichever of them it was true to say then will be’ (18b35-6). But lest it seem absurd that we decide the outcome of things, events, or states of affairs not on the basis of their nature but on the basis of the truth or falsity of propositions, he himself dispelled this worry in saying ‘Nor does it make any difference if any people spoke the contradiction or not’ (18b36-7). For in order that deliberation be removed and annihilated, so that people need not deliberate about anything at all, it is not enough that something can be predicted. For whether or not something is said,14 it is necessary regarding whatever could have been predicted truly that it come about even if it is not said. For it is predicted truly for this reason, that it can be predicted truly; [and] it can be predicted truly because it is immutably going to be. Accordingly, it is going to be if it is predicted truly, and not only if it is predicted, but even if it can be predicted truly. For whether it is said or not said, whatever can be predicted truly is necessarily going to be. ‘For it is evident,’ he says, ‘that the actual things are disposed in this way’ (18b37-8) whether or not one person affirms it [and] another denies it. If it is going to come about, the negation opposes nothing to it; if it is not going to come about, the affirmation is good for nothing. ‘For,’ he says, ‘it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be’ (18b38-9), nor will time alter this force of nature.

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For things that people believe are going to come about after a thousand years come about in the same way as those that are necessarily going to be after any length of time whatever. And so it happens that if at every time everything is so constituted that one can be said with definite truth and the other with definite falsity, then everything whatever that has happened or that will happen occurs by an immutable rationale associated with things, events, or states of affairs. For that is why he says ‘it would be necessary that that happen, and that every one of the things that happen be disposed in such a way that it would happen necessarily’ (19a2-4). And he confirms this by the previous argumentation, saying ‘For when anyone says truly that [something] will be, it cannot not happen’ (19a4-5), for the necessity of the outcome follows truth; ‘and of whatever has happened, it was always true to say that it would be’ (19a5-6), for truth comes to propositions from the necessary outcomes of things, events, or states of affairs. 19a7 What if these things are not possible? For we see that there is also a source of things that are going to be in the fact that we deliberate and do something, [and that as regards things that are not always in actuality, it is altogether possible that they be and also not [be]. As regards these things, both occur, both being and not being; accordingly, both happening and not happening. And many things disposed in that way are evident to us. For example, that it is possible that this cloak be cut up, and it is not cut up but wears out first; it is likewise possible, however, that it not be cut up, since it would not be the case that it wears out first if it were not possible that it not be cut up. Accordingly, also as regards other things that are going to have happened – whichever ones are spoken of in accordance with a capacity of this sort – it is evident that not all things necessarily either are or happen; but some, indeed, [are or happen] in either of two ways, and neither the affirmation nor the negation [is true] rather [than the other]; but [with] others, indeed, [it is] the one rather [than the other] in most cases, although also the other can happen, but the other not.]

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[This] is a long inversion (hyperbaton): first we explain what we carry on afterwards. Now it is clear that we are the source of some things, such as our actions. For if anyone does something with deliberation, he himself is the source of whatever he will have accomplished by means of taking counsel; for it is in taking counsel that he begins whatever is managed by the ingenuity of deliberation.

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Now there are some things that are not in actuality but in potentiality, a potentiality that is not actualized necessarily – i.e. it can indeed happen, but it is not necessary. For example, of this or any cloak it is of course possible that it be cut up with a knife, but it is not necessary; for it may become old with use and fall apart with daily wearing. Therefore, it can of course be cut up; but perhaps it will not be cut up but wear out before it can be cut up. Again, it can happen that it not be divided; for it would not be possible that it wear out if it were not first possible that it not be cut up. Accordingly, certain things can indeed happen, but if it turns out in such and such a way, perhaps they will not happen. Therefore, certain things that are possible are not necessary. And as regards other things, too, which do happen, the reasoning is the same. For of everything that happens as the result of any deliberation, the source of that thing, event, or state of affairs is not necessity but the person who deliberates. And whatever is possible will come about changeably; for what is said in accordance with any possibility does not come about in accordance with necessity. And so it happens that it is evident that not everything either is or happens of necessity, but there are some that either happen or do not happen in an equal way; and this is what it is to happen in either of two ways. But others, indeed, occur in most instances, although in a few instances they do not occur. And the former indeed happen equally – e.g. that a person leaving his house sees his friend; for that happens and does not happen equally. Some things, however, happen more often than they do not happen – e.g. turning grey happens in more sixty-year-old men than not turning grey, and yet this can happen in such a way that it is also not impossible that it not happen. For that is why he says: ‘but [with] others, indeed, [it is] the one rather [than the other] in most cases’ – e.g. turning grey in more sixty-yearolds than not turning grey – ‘although also the other can happen’ – viz , that he not turn grey – ‘but the other not’ (19a20-2)– viz., that he turn grey. Now the inversion occurs in this way, if we see these impossibilities. For we are the source of some things ourselves, and whatever is possible can happen and not happen. Therefore, if it is possible both that those things are and that they are not, ‘it is evident that not all things’ occur ‘necessarily’ (19a18). Instead, some come about equally, but others of course come about in most instances (although in a few instances they do not come about, but it is not necessary that they not come about). 19a23 Therefore, it is necessary that whatever is is when it is, and that whatever is not is not when it is not. But it is not

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necessary that everything that is be, nor is it necessary that everything that is not not be. For that everything that is is necessarily when it is is not the same as its simply being necessarily; similarly as regards whatever is not. And the reasoning is the same as regards contradiction: it is indeed necessary that everything be or not be, and be going to be or not – not, however, that anyone dividing [the contradiction into its two parts] says the one or the other necessarily. But I mean that it is indeed necessary that there is going to be or is not going to be a sea battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow, or that there is not going to be one; rather, it is necessary that there is going to be one or not going to be one. 20

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Now he describes what is necessary temporally.15 For he says that regarding everything, when it is, it is without doubt necessary that it be; for it cannot happen that when it is, it is not. And, on the other hand, regarding something that is not, when it is not, it is necessary that it not be; for neither can it happen that when it is not it is. But if when it is, it is necessary that it be, it is not for that reason necessary unconditionally (simpliciter) and without the ascription of present time. For when I am seated, it cannot happen that I am not seated, and being seated is necessary for me then when I am seated; but being seated itself does not inhere in me necessarily, since I can get up. On the other hand, when I am not seated, not being seated is necessary for me then; but not being seated itself does not inhere in me necessarily, since I can sit down. Therefore, regarding whatever is, when it is, it is necessarily; and regarding whatever is not, at the time when it is not, it cannot happen that it is. Nevertheless, not everything whatever either is or is not; or is necessarily beyond the designation of the present time, or is not necessarily with no mention of the present time having been made. It is for that reason, he says, that it is not the same to be temporally necessary – as [being seated] is necessary for me when I am seated – and to be unconditionally necessary – as mortality [is necessary] for a human being. Nor is it the same necessarily not to be when it is not (as being seated does not inhere in me when I am not seated) and what I do not have with unconditional necessity – e.g. three eyes, or immortality. And that is why he says: ‘similarly as regards whatever is not’ (19a26-7). But the reason why he said this follows: ‘And the reasoning is the same as regards contradiction: it is indeed necessary that everything be or not be, and be going to be or not’ (19a27-9). The reasoning, he says, is similar as regards contingent contradictions16 and as regards those which when they are are necessary in accordance with time.

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Those [which are necessary] in accordance with time, however, are not unconditionally necessary. For it is necessary as regards future and contingent contradictions that the whole contradiction have one part true and the other false. For example, if someone affirms that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow – it is not therefore necessary – and if, on the other hand, someone denies it – that it is not going to be – it is indeed necessary either that it be or that it not be. It is, however, not necessary that it be, nor, on the other hand, is it necessary that it not be – only that it either be or not be. For that reason the whole contradiction will indeed have one part true, the other false; but there will not be one of them definitely true and the other definitely false. Now as regards things that are past we speak in this way: ‘Romulus founded Rome’, ‘Romulus did not found Rome’. One is of course true and the other false. But as regards these, the affirmation is definitely true, the negation definitely false; for a contradiction regarding the past is definitely true or false, because when something has happened it cannot happen that it has not happened. It is not the same, however, as regards future propositions – as regards those, namely, that signify contingents. For example, if I say ‘Philoxenus is going to have dinner’, ‘Philoxenus is not going to have dinner’, then as regards the whole contradiction, indeed, one is true and the other false. But no one can divide it so as to say that the affirmation is determinately and definitely true, or the negation. For before he has dinner, it is indefinite and variable whether he will have dinner; but after he has had dinner, the past is definite. Therefore, as regards future contingents, it is necessary that something either be or not be, but it is not necessary that one thing happen and one thing not happen. In what, then, is the likeness of a contradiction that is contingent and has temporal rather than unconditional necessity? In this, namely, that just as it is necessary that that which is be when it is, although it is not unconditionally necessary that it be, beyond the attribution of the time, so as regards a contingent contradiction it is indeed necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true, but not that either the affirmation be unconditionally and definitely true, or the negation; rather, either of the two. And the outcome of certain truth will establish which. 19a32 Accordingly, since expressions are true in a way that is like the way in which the actual things are, it is evident that of any that are so disposed that they are in either of two ways and that their contraries occur, it is necessary that the contradiction be so disposed as well. [This occurs in connection with those that

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not always are and not always are not. For of them it is indeed necessary that the one or the other part of the contradiction be true or false – not, however, this one or that one, but in either of two ways – and that one is indeed true rather [than the other], but not already true, or false. Accordingly, it is evident that it is not necessary that of all affirmations or negations this one of the opposites is indeed true but that one false. For things that are are not disposed as are those that are not but possibly are or are not; how it is [with them] has already been said.] 15

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Things, events, or states of affairs, he says, and those that designate them with a proper signification17 have a certain connection. Accordingly, the expression that designates and signifies the reality (rem) will also be disposed in such a way that it is as the reality is. Therefore, if the thing, event, or state of affairs will not be, the expression is false; if it will be, the expression is true. And if the expression is either true or false, what it says will be or will not be, so that the reality and the expression are interchangeable with each other. Therefore, if the reality is not settled or forthcoming by definite necessity, neither does the expression that designates it have definite truth. Therefore, as regards things, events, or states of affairs regarding which it is possible that they be – not now – but also that it turn out that they not be, the affirmation and the negation are disposed in either of two ways. And however the thing, event, or state of affairs can both be and not be, so also will it turn out that the contradiction is indefinitely both true and false. Now he explains in which cases this happens. For he says ‘in connection with those that not always are and not always are not’ (19a35-6). For it is only those that can both be and not be that not always are and not always are not. For if they always were, their status could not change, and so they would of necessity be; but if they always were not, it would be necessary that they not be. For of course just as the very nature of the things, events, or states of affairs coming about is various, so also does the one or the other part of the contradiction have variable truth. And, indeed, it is always true or false – not, however, one definitely, in such a way that this one is determinately true, or that one – but in either of two ways. And so just as the very status of the things, events, or states of affairs is mutable, so also is the truth or falsity of the propositions dubitable. And indeed it comes about that as regards some things the one is more often but not always true, and the other is more rarely true although it is not necessary that it be false. He has shown this by the following remark: ‘and that one or the other is indeed true rather [than the other], but not already true, or false’ (19a38-9). And so he concludes the whole question of propositions that are

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future and contingent, and says that it is evident that it is not necessary that all affirmations and negations be definitely true. (‘Definitely’ is missing [from Aristotle’s claim], however, and so must be supplied in one’s understanding.) For of those that are contingent and future it is never the case that one is definitely true and the other false. ‘For,’ he says, ‘things that are not disposed as are those that are not but possibly are or are not; how it is [with them] has already been said’ (19b2-4). For, indeed, just as the being of those that belong to the present time is definite, so also the truth and falsity of propositions regarding them is definite. But, of course, those that are not but can be and can not be, and so are future so that they do not come forth necessarily but can be in such a way that they can also not be – as regards those, the contradiction will be disposed as ‘has already been said’ (19b4). What has already been said is that it is indeed necessary that everything be or not be and that it is not necessary that it be going to be or not; nevertheless, it is not necessary that the one or the other of them already be, dividedly and definitely. There were, however, four different cases: either that both were true (which he put down by means of this remark: ‘for in such cases both will not be together’ (18a38-9), or that both were false (which he overthrew by means of this remark: ‘Nor, however, can one say that neither is true’ (18b17)), or that the one would be definitely true, the other definitely false (which he destroyed by means of the argument by which he showed that all things come about of necessity if one were to admit that). But if those cases do not occur, it is of course obvious that as regards a contradiction one is true and the other false; but just as the things, events, or states of affairs themselves are mutably and indefinitely going to be, so also the statements would be made with variable and not with definite truth and falsity.

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The things that the course of this [third] book18 will contain almost belong to a discussion more profound than is appropriately carried on in the teaching of logic. But since, as has often been said, linguistic expressions reveal thoughts, to which things, events, or states of affairs are manifestly subjected, there is no doubt that the same as is in those things, events, or states of affairs is often transferred to utterances. Accordingly, it has been my plan to disclose Aristotle’s subtlest doctrines in a commentary organized in two versions; for what the first version contains prepares, to some extent, an easier path for those who are entering into these more profound and subtler matters. But because the second version develops in connection with the expositor’s subtle doctrines, it is presented to be read and studied by those who are advanced in this inquiry and study. And so there are a few things that should be said beforehand, so that the things we are going to be discussing later may not appear unknown to the readers. The Greeks call those propositions categorical that are expressed without any condition on the affirmation – e.g. ‘It is day’, ‘The sun exists’, ‘A man exists’, ‘The man is just’, ‘The sun is hot’, etc. – those that are put forward without the knot and tie of any condition. Propositions of the following sort, however, are conditional: ‘If it is day, it is light’. These the Greeks call hypothetical. They are called conditional because some such condition is put forward, as if to say ‘If this is, that is’. And those that the Greeks name categorical we Latins can indeed call predicative; for if a category [Greek] is a predicament [Latin], why are categorical propositions not called predicative as well? Now some of these signify in connection with what is sempiternal: just as the things they signify exist always and never forsake their proper nature, so also those propositions themselves have immutable signification – e.g. if someone says ‘God exists’, ‘God is immortal’. For just as those propositions are said of immortal things, so they also have sempiternal and necessary signification; and it is seen clearly not in the nature of a single time, but rather [in the nature] of all times. For it makes no difference to the necessity proper to the

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signification when we say ‘God is immortal’ or ‘was immortal’ or ‘will be immortal’. For we call propositions necessary in case it is necessary regarding what is said [by means of those propositions] either to have been, or to be, or to be certainly going to be, that it come about. And, indeed, those that signify sempiternal things are sempiternally necessary; for even if the nature of the truth has not been made manifest in them, still, nothing prevents there being a fixed constancy of necessity in nature.19 For example, if it is unknown to us whether the stars are even or odd [in number], nevertheless it could not on that account come about that they seem to be neither even nor odd; rather, they are without any doubt either even or odd, since in nature every multitude holds one or the other of those [characteristics]. For that reason in these cases, too, if someone says ‘The stars are even’ and someone else replies ‘The stars are not even’ (or if someone says ‘The stars are odd’ and someone else replies ‘The stars are not odd’), one of them necessarily claims what is true. And, I maintain, even if it is unknown to us which thing that any of them said is true, it is nevertheless necessary that it be immutably [one of those] that is said. And these propositions are indeed immutably necessary. There are others, however, which although they do not signify sempiternal things are also necessary to the extent to which the subjects the proposition affirms or denies something about do exist. For example, when I say ‘A human being is mortal’, as long as there is a human being it is necessary that a human being be mortal. For if someone says ‘Fire is hot’, as long as there is fire the proposition is necessarily true. There are others, however, that draw away from the nature of necessity and signify only certain contingent things. These, however, are either equally disposed to affirmation and negation or incline more often to one of them. And some are indeed equally disposed – e.g. if someone says that I am to be bathed today – for the affirmation will happen no more than the negation, since both are equally not necessary (aequaliter necessariae non sunt). But those that incline more to one or the other part are of this sort – e.g. if someone says that a man turns grey in old age, [or] that a man does not turn grey in old age. It does of course happen more often that he turns grey, but that he not turn grey is not ruled out. Now the nature of predicative propositions is acquired from the truth and falsity of things, events, or states of affairs; for however they are, so will the propositions that signify them be. For if they hold any necessity in themselves, the propositions, too, are necessary. But if the propositions signify only inherence20 – e.g. if someone says ‘A man is walking’, he has indicated that walking inheres in a man – they are beyond any necessity, signifying only inherence, devoid of every necessity. And if the things, events, or states of affairs are

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impossible, the propositions that indicate them are called impossible. But if the things, events, or states of affairs come and go contingently, the proposition that puts them forward is designated contingent. Now since some times are future, others present, still others past, things, events, or states of affairs that are also subject to times are varied also as regards these temporal differences; for there are some belonging to present time, others to future, others to past. In the same way, too, the signification holds some propositions to belong to past time – as when I say that the Greeks overthrew (evertisse/evertere) Troy – others to the present – e.g. the battle of the Franks and the Goths is beginning – others to the future – e.g. the Persians and the Greeks are going to go to war. And, of course, those belonging to the past and to the present are, like the things, events, or states of affairs themselves, stable and definite; for what has happened has not not happened, and what has not happened has not yet happened. For that reason, of that which has happened it is true to say definitely that it has happened, [and] it is false to say that it has not happened. On the other hand, of that which has not happened it is true to say that it has not happened, [and] it is false that it has happened. And concerning the present as well: whatever is happening has a definite nature in that it is happening; it is necessary to have definite truth and falsity in the propositions, too. For of whatever is happening it is definitely true to say that it is happening, [definitely] false that it is not happening. The definition of propositions of the past or of the present has already been spoken of above, but now he [Aristotle] turns the plan of the discussion toward the truth and falsity of those propositions that are spoken as regards the future and that are contingent. (It is customary, however, to call those things future that he typically called contingent.) Now according to the Aristotelian doctrine, that is contingent which chance brings, or which comes from anyone’s free choice and his own will, or which in virtue of a readiness of nature it is possible to bring into both parts [of contradictory opposition] – viz., that it happen and that it not happen. Accordingly, things in the past and the present do indeed have a definite and established outcome; for those that have come about cannot not have come about; and, as regards those that are happening now, it cannot happen that while they are happening they are not happening. As regards those that have to do with the future and are contingent, however, something can both happen and not happen. But since we put forward the three modes of the contingent above21 (which we treated better in connection with physics),22 let us append examples of each one. If having left the house yesterday I found my friend, whom I was thinking of looking for but whom I was not looking for then, before I found the person I found, it could have happened

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that I did not find him. But when I found him, or after I found him, it cannot happen that I had not found him. Again, if I freely walked out into the field last night, before that happened it could have happened that I did not walk out (proficiscerem/proficiscerer). After I walked out, or when I walked out, it could not happen that what was happening should not have been happening, or that what had happened should not have happened. Further, it is possible that this cloak which I am wearing be cut up. If it was cut up yesterday, then when it was being cut up, or after it was cut up, it could not happen that it was not being cut up, or that it had not been cut up; but before it was cut up it could have happened that it not be cut up. It is entirely clear, then, as regards present and past matters, even those having to do with things, events, or states of affairs that are contingent, that the outcome is definite and settled. As regards future matters, however, [it is clear] that either one of the two [contradictory opposites] can happen, although it is not the case that one of them is definite; instead, [each] is inclined to either part. It is also clear, of course, that necessarily either this one or that one comes about, but [also] that it cannot happen that this one (whatever it is) or anything else at all [come about] definitely. For those that are contingent come about (contingunt) in either part. Now I maintain that this case is of that sort. It is necessary that I, leaving my house today, either find my friend or do not find him; for as regards all things there is either the affirmation or the negation. But that I find him without doubt, definitely, or certainly – on the other hand, if that is not the case, that I definitely do not find him – as was the case yesterday when I found him as I was leaving (it is, however, definite that it is not true that I did not find him) – that is not the way it is as regards those that are contingent and future. Instead, only this or that indeed is, and that necessarily; but in such a way that one thing, event, or state of affairs, or any one outcome that is definite and as if already certain, cannot happen. And in this matter propositions having to do with things that are contingent and future are unlike those that have to do with things that are past or present. For while they are alike in the fact that as regards the former it is either the affirmation or the negation (just as it is also as regards those that are past or present), they differ in the fact that as regards the latter – i.e. those that are past and present – the outcome of the things, events, or states of affairs is definite, while as regards those that are future and contingent it is indefinite and uncertain, as unknown not only to us, but to nature. For although we do not know whether the stars are even or odd, it is evident that in the nature of the stars it is definitely the one or the other; and this is indeed unknown to us but altogether known to nature. But it is not the case that as regards my either seeing my friend or not seeing him later

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today what comes about is indeed unknown to us but known to nature, for this comes about not naturally but by chance. Accordingly, propositions of this sort will be brought to cognition – not ours but that of nature itself23 – in accordance with an uncertain outcome and inconstant truth and falsity. For the nature of the contingent is such that it is either equally disposed as regards both parts – e.g. that I am to be bathed today or that I am not to be bathed today – or more as regards the one, less as regards the other – e.g. that a man growing old becomes grey or that a man growing old does not become grey; for the one happens more, the other less, but nothing prevents its being the case that what happens more rarely does happen. The Aristotelian subtlety in disputation opens a way for treating these, then, beginning first with individuals [and going on] to universals. For contradictions arose in two ways: either as regards individuals or as regards universals universally predicated and their opposites.24 He begins, however, from the three that have already been mentioned above:25 by chance, by free choice, by possibility – all of which he called by the one name ‘in-either-of-two-ways’ (utrumlibet), devising the name for this reason, that these are not of a single and certain outcome, but [the outcome] occurs in either of two ways, and somehow or other. But what is picked out by this name is of a nature that is unstable and that tends to either part [of a contradictory opposition] without the obstruction of any thing, event, or state of affairs. It must not be thought, however, that any and all things that are unknown to us are in either of two ways and have the nature of contingents. For if it is unknown to us that envoys have been sent by the Persians to the Greeks, it is not therefore the case that the fact that they have been sent is of uncertain outcome. And if a physician observes a fatal symptom in his patient’s face, so that it cannot be otherwise than that he is dying, although it is unknown to us because of our inexperience in the art [of medicine], it must not for that reason be judged that the sick man’s being about to die is in either of two ways and of a contingent nature. Rather, the only things that should be thought to be undoubtedly so [i.e. contingent] are those that are unknown to us in virtue of the fact that by their own nature they cannot be known in respect of which sort of outcome they have, because they are inclined toward both by reason of their own instability of nature – i.e. they are altered to the outcome of the affirmation and of the negation by reason of their own instability and inconstancy. There is a dispute among philosophers, however, regarding things, events, or states of affairs that happen by causes – whether they all happen by necessity or some by chance. And there is a great quarrel over this involving the Epicureans, the Stoics, and our own Peripatetics.26 Let us explain their views a little.

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The Peripatetics, whose leader is Aristotle, affirm with the weightiest authority as well as the clearest reasoning chance, the choice associated with free judgment (liberi arbitrium iudicii), and necessity in connection with things that happen and that are done. And that there is indeed chance they prove in connection with natural philosophy (physicis): whenever something is done, and what comes about is not that for the sake of which the thing that was being done was begun, that which comes about must be thought to have come about by chance. So there is indeed no chance without some action; but whenever something other than what is expected comes about by means of an action that is done, the Peripatetic authority proves that it came about by chance. For if someone digging up the ground or deepening a trench in order to cultivate a field should find a treasure, then that treasure has been found by chance – not, indeed, without some action, for the ground was dug when the treasure was found; but it was not the agent’s intention that he should find a treasure. Therefore, for the man who is doing something, and yet doing something else, a different thing has taken its place. This, therefore, is said to come about by chance: whatever comes about as a result of some action [but] not on account of the thing that was begun, whose place will have been taken by something [else] for the agent. And this is indeed in the very nature of things, so that it is not our ignorance from which this is derived in such a way that some things would seem to be by chance because they were unknown to us; instead, they would be unknown by us because those things that happen by chance in nature would retain no constancy of necessity or of providence. The Stoics, on the other hand, who think that all things do indeed happen of necessity and providence, reckon that that which happens by chance [does so] not in accordance with the nature of fortune but in accordance with our ignorance. For they think that that happens by chance which occurs with necessity but is unknown by human beings. And as for free choice (liberum arbitrium), their position is almost the same as ours. For we claim that our choice is free when we are judging and carefully considering, and there is nothing external compelling what appears to us as that which should be done or should not be done – the thing, event, or state of affairs to the carrying out and doing of which we come with forethought – in such a way that what happens as a result of us and our judgment has its source in nothing external that forcibly compels or forcibly restrains [us]. The Stoics, on the other hand, who give over all things to necessities, try to preserve the free choice of the will (voluntatis) by a kind of converse arrangement. For they say that the soul does indeed have a certain will naturally, one to which the proper nature of will itself is impelled. And just as among inanimate bodies certain heavy ones

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are naturally brought down to earth [while] light ones pass upwards (and no one doubts that these things happen by nature), so also in all men and other animals, they assert, there is indeed a natural will; and whatever is done by us in accordance with the will that is in us [naturally] is natural. They add, however, that we will the things that the necessity of that providence has commanded. Thus will has indeed been granted to us naturally, and what we do we do by means of the will that is in us, but the necessity of that providence constrains the will itself. Indeed, all things happen necessarily in such a way that the natural will itself follows necessity [and that] even the things we do of ourselves happen [necessarily], because the will is our own and in accordance with the nature of an animal. But we do not say that the free choice of the will (liberum voluntatis arbitrium) is whatever anyone might want (voluerit); [it is] rather whatever anyone might decide (collegerit) on the basis of judgment (iudicio) and examination. Otherwise dumb animals, too, will have free choice of the will: for we see that of their own accord they flee certain things and of their own accord flock around other things. But if wanting or not wanting something should rightly acquire the designation of free choice, it would belong not only to men but also to the other animals; and who does not know that this power of free choice is lacking in them? Free choice is rather what those very words disclose: a judgment of the will (de voluntate iudicium) that is free for us. For whenever certain images come together in the mind and stir the will, reason weighs them carefully and judges regarding them, and then, when it has carefully weighed in choice and considered in judgment, it does what seems better to it. And for that reason we disdain some things that are sweet and give the appearance of usefulness; other things that are bitter we bravely endure, even though we do not want them (non in voluntate). To that extent free choice corresponds not to the will but to the judgment of the will (in iudicatione voluntatis), and it is based not on the imagination but on the careful weighing of that same imagination. And it is for that reason that of certain actions we ourselves are the sources, not the attendants; for to use reason is to use judgment. For everything [else] is common to us and other animate beings; we are distinguished by reason alone. But if it is also in respect of judgment alone that there is a distance between us and the other animals, why should we doubt that to use reason is to use judgment? If someone should remove that from reality (ex rebus), he would have removed human reason; and if human reason has been removed, humanity itself will not remain. Our Peripatetics, therefore, do better in granting fortuitous chance also to things, events, or states of affairs themselves. And they have established free choice as well, beyond any necessity – neither as

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regards what is necessarily (in necessitate) nor, of course, as regards that which necessarily is not. They have, however, [established free choice] in us not as chance but in connection with the decision of judgment and the examination of will. There is also some disagreement between the Peripatetics and the Stoics regarding what is said to be possible, which we have resolved in a few words in the following way. For they [the Stoics] define the possible to be that which can happen (and that which is prevented from happening is not); and they trace this back to our capacity (possibilitatem), so that what we can is what they would call possible; but what would be impossible for us is what they would deny is possible. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, established this not in us but in nature itself, so that of some things it would be possible that they happen in such a way that it would be possible that they not happen. For example, that this reed be broken is of course possible, but also that it not be broken; and this they trace back not to our capacity but to the nature of the actual thing itself. Contrary to this view is the one that says that all things happen by fate, of which the Stoics are the authors. For whatever happens by fate comes about as a result of fundamental causes; but if that is the way it is, then what does not happen cannot be altered. We say, however, that regarding some things it is possible that they happen in such a way that regarding the same things it is also possible that they not happen, basing this neither on necessity nor on our capacities. Now that these things have been set out, let it suffice to add this – that these things have been established on Aristotle’s behalf as regards doctrine and instruction for easy retention, to show the way contingent propositions about future things [are]: [viz.,] that they operate in both parts [of contradictory opposition] and so do not have a determined constancy of outcome. If that were not the case, everything would be believed to happen necessarily – as will be clearer when we come to Aristotle’s words themselves. But it is not inopportune or inappropriate that Aristotle has turned the discussion to deeper matters that perhaps do not belong to the logical art, because he was speaking of propositions. For he would not have grounded the correctness and significance of propositions if he had not proved on the basis of things, events, or states of affairs that that is the case. For, as has been said, predicative propositions consist not in the words, or in the construction, but in the signifying of things, events, or states of affairs. Accordingly, now that all the things that were to have been said first have been explained, let us go on to expound and untangle the doctrines of Aristotle himself.

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18a28 Therefore, as regards the things that are and that have happened, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false. Indeed, as regards universals [said] universally, [it is] always [necessary] that the one be true but the other false; also as regards those that are singulars, as has been said. But as regards universals that are not said universally, it is not necessary; these, however, have also been spoken of. He distinguishes categorical propositions (which, as we have already said above, could be called ‘predicative’ in Latin), in accordance with an impeccable standard of reasoning, on the basis of the things, events, or states of affairs those propositions signify. For those that we call hypothetical or conditional draw their proper force from the condition itself, not from the things they signify. For when I say ‘If it is a human being, it is an animal’ and ‘If it is a stone, it is not an animal’, the one is consequent, the other incompatible.27 Accordingly, the whole force in a [conditional] proposition depends on the consequence and the incompatibility of the [constituent] propositions. In this way it happens that it is not the signification but the condition that is put forward that establishes the force and nature of hypothetical statements. Predicative propositions, as has been said, acquire their substance principally from the things, events, or states of affairs. And so, since some things, events, or states of affairs belong to present time and others to past, just as the very outcome of the things, events, or states of affairs belonging to present or to past time is certain, so also the truth and the falsity of predicative propositions about past things and present things is certain. Now there are two modes of contradiction. For either the universal was diagonally opposed to particulars, or the affirmative signification of a singular had destroyed a singular negation in contradictory opposition.28 And as regards these, one was always found to be true, the other false. As regards those that were indefinite, however, it was not necessary that one be true and the other false. But as regards those in which truth and falsity was divided, not only is one always true [and] the other false – viz., regarding the past and the present – but also one contains certain and definite truth, the other certain and definite falsity. As regards those that have to do with the future, however, if the propositions are indeed necessary even though they are said in accordance with future time, it is necessary not only that one be true [and] the other false, but also one definitely true, the other definitely false. For example, when I say ‘The sun this year in springtime is going to be in Aries’, if someone else denies this, not only is one true [and] the other false, but also in this case the affirmation is definitely

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true [and] the negation definitely false. Aristotle, however, usually does not talk about (dicere) future things, events, or states of affairs that are necessary, but rather about those that are contingent. Now, as we have already said above, the contingents are whichever ones are equally disposed to being or to not being. And just as they themselves have indefinite being and not being, so also affirmations and negations regarding them have indefinite truth or falsity; for the one is always true [and] the other always false, but which of them is true or which false is not yet known as regards contingents.29 For just as regarding those that must be it is definite that they be, and regarding those that cannot be it is definite that they not be, so also regarding those that both can be and can not be it is definite neither that they be nor that they not be. But truth and falsity is acquired on the basis of the being of the thing, event, or state of affairs [the proposition is about] and on the basis of its not being; for if that which is said is, it is true; [and] if that which is said is not, it is false. Therefore, just as being and not being itself is variable as regards those that are contingent and future (although it is necessary that they be or not be), so also truth or falsity is indeed uncertain as regards affirmations and negations presenting these contingents; for in accordance with the nature of these propositions it is unknown which is true and which is false. All the same, it is necessary that one be true [and] the other false. (Porphyry mixes in some things from Stoic dialectic, however.30 Since Latin ears have not become acquainted with these things, and since [in his introduction of those things] no attention is paid to what comes into question, we will omit them from consideration.) 18a33 But as regards [those that are] singular and future, it is not like that. For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is necessary also that everything be or not be. For if, indeed, this person says that something is going to be, but that one does not say the same thing, it is evident that it is necessary that one or the other of them be saying what is true, if every affirmation is true or false; for in such cases both will not be together. For if it is true to say that a thing is white or not white, it is necessary that it be white or not white. And if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or to deny; and if it is not, it is false; and if it is false, it is not. Accordingly, it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true. Nothing, therefore, either is or happens by chance or in either of two ways, or will be or will not be; but all things of necessity and not in either of two ways. For either he who says it or he who denies it is correct. For it would in the same way either happen or not happen, since

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nothing that is in either of two ways is or will be disposed more in this way or not in this way. Furthermore, if it is white now, it was true to say at first that it would be white. Accordingly, it was always true to say of any of the things that have happened that it would be. But if it is always true to say that it is or will be, this [thing in question] cannot not be or not be going to be. But of what cannot not happen, it is impossible that it not happen; and of that of which it is impossible that it not happen, it is necessary that it happen. Of all things, therefore, that are going to be, it is necessary that they happen. Nothing, therefore, will be in either of two ways or by chance; for if by chance, not of necessity. That there are twin contradictories as regards propositions [i.e. universal/particular and singular/singular] has already been mentioned and is now recalled as well.31 As regards those [contradictories], it is necessary that the one be true, the other false. But those that will be said about things that are future and contingent will be better understood if we speak of the contingents that appear in a singular contradiction. There is, of course, this sort of diagonal contradiction [i.e. universal/particular] regarding contingents: ‘Tomorrow all the Athenians are going to be fighting in a sea battle’, ‘Tomorrow not all the Athenians are going to be fighting in a sea battle’. Regarding singulars, however, it is of this sort: ‘Tomorrow Socrates is going to be disputing in the Palaestra’, ‘Tomorrow Socrates is not going to be disputing in the Palaestra’. It is essential to know, however, that these are not contingents in the same way – [viz.,] the ones that say ‘Socrates will die’ and ‘Socrates will not die’, and the ones that say ‘Socrates will die tomorrow’ [and] ‘Socrates will not die tomorrow’. For the former ones are not contingent at all but necessary, since Socrates necessarily will die. But the latter, which define the time, are not included in the number of the contingents either, for this reason: Socrates’ dying tomorrow is indeed uncertain to us, but it is not uncertain to nature and so neither is it uncertain to God, who knows nature itself perfectly.32 Those are properly contingents, however, which are neither in nature nor in necessity, but either in chance, or in free choice, or in the possibility of nature. From chance, indeed, as when I see my friend as I leave my house although I am not leaving for that purpose; from free choice, because since I can both will and not will, before it happens it is uncertain whether I will will; from possibility, because since it can happen and can not happen, what can happen in both ways is uncertain before it happens. And so ‘Tomorrow Socrates is

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going to be disputing in the Palaestra’ is contingent because it comes from free choice. Therefore, in connection with contingents of that sort, if as regards the future the one is always true [and] the other always false, and the one is definitely true [and] the other definitely false, and things, events, or states of affairs agree with words, then it is necessary that all things are or are not, and whatever happens happens necessarily, and of nothing regarding which it is possible that it not be is it possible that it be. Nor will there be free choice, nor will there be chance in any things, events, or states of affairs, necessity dominating all things. For as regards those – i.e. as regards singular contradictories – it is true to say that both cannot be; for contradictories were those that cannot be at once. But neither can both negations and affirmations be false as regards contradictions; for those were contradictories that could not not be at once. Accordingly, one is going to be called true, one false. But if there is nothing in things, events, or states of affairs of this sort – i.e. contingents that appear in an indeterminable order of outcome and an uncertain statement of truth and falsity – then of whatever is said to be definitely true as regards the affirmation, it is necessary that it definitely be; [and] of whatever is said to be false in the negation, of that it is necessary that it not be. And so all things will necessarily be or will necessarily not be. Nothing, therefore – neither chance, nor free choice, nor possibility of any sort – is in things, events, or states of affairs, if necessity does indeed bind all things. Aristotle, however, taking up the hypothetical proposition that all things happen necessarily and nothing by chance, nothing by judgment, nothing by possibility, if everything that is said regarding the future is either definitely true or definitely false, discloses these matters in an appropriate order. That all things occur necessarily on the supposition that one is true [and] the other false definitely he shows on the basis of the agreement between the things, events, or states of affairs and the propositions, in the following way. For he puts forward this condition, and he confirms that it is true on the basis of the necessity of the things, events, or states of affairs themselves. Now this is the condition: that it happens that everything whatever happens necessarily and nothing either by chance, or by a free and proper will and judgment, or by any sort of possibility (all of which he here named with the locution ‘in either of two ways’) if every affirmation or negation said33 about the future is true or false definitely. Now he sets out this condition when he says ‘For if every affirmation or negation is true or false’ – ‘definitely’ is to be understood – ‘it is necessary also that everything be or not be. If, indeed, this person says that something is going to be but that one does not say the same

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thing, it is evident that it is necessary that one or the other of them be saying what is true, if every affirmation is true or false; for in such cases both will not be together’ (18a34-9). The sense, then is something like this: If, he says, every affirmation or negation is true or false definitely, it is necessary also that everything either be or not be – either that which the affirmation sets up or [that which] the negation destroys. For if anyone were to say that something is and someone else were to say that that same thing is not, the one of course affirms [and] the other denies. But as regards the affirmation and negation that are put forward in a contradiction, the one is always true, the other false. For it cannot happen that both are true, since the discussion now does not have to do either with subcontraries34 or with indefinites.35 For the subcontraries – i.e. the particular negation and the particular affirmation – and the indefinites could both be true as regards the same thing, but not the contradictories. For it cannot happen that those that are contradictories regarding singulars or those that are opposed diagonally as regards universals are ever true together;36 for that is what he says: ‘for in such cases both will not be true together’ (18a38-9) – i.e. both statements will not be true where contradictory statements are concerned. Having laid down this condition, then – that all things come about necessarily if every affirmation is definitely true or false – he undertakes to show this consequence, and the likeness between the things, events, or states of affairs themselves and the propositions, when he says the following: ‘For if it is true to say that a thing is white or not white, it is necessary that it be white or not white. And if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or to deny; and if it is not, it is false; and if it is false, it is not. Accordingly, it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true’ (18a39-b4). Every affirmation, he says, and every negation is either true or false together with the things, events, or states of affairs themselves. He draws examples of this from present things, events, or states of affairs, however; for just as statements are disposed in accordance with necessity as regards present time, so will they be disposed also as regards the future. Let us, therefore, explore that which is the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs and propositions as regards the present. For if a proposition said regarding anything is true, then it is necessary that the thing that has been said be.37 For if anyone were to say that snow is white, and this is true, then the necessity of the state of affairs follows the truth of the proposition. For it is necessary that snow be white, if the proposition that is asserted regarding it is true. But if anyone says that pitch is not white, and this is true, then it is evident that the state of affairs also follows along with the truth of the proposition. Furthermore, propositions also follow the necessities of the things, events, or states of affairs. For if something is, it is true

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to say of it that it is; and if something is not, it is true to say of it that it is not. And so in accordance with the truth of the affirmation and of the negation necessity follows the substance of the reality, and the necessity of the things, events, or states of affairs accompanies the necessity of the propositions – as regards those that are true, of course. As regards those that are false, it is the same, [but] vice versa; for if the affirmation is false, then of the thing, event, or state of affairs that is spoken of it is necessary that it not be. For example, if the affirmation that says that pitch is white is false, it is necessary that pitch be not white. On the other hand, if the negation that says that snow is not white is false, it is necessary that snow be white. Again, if the thing, event, or state of affairs is not, the affirmation regarding it is also necessarily false. And if, on the other hand, the thing, event, or state of affairs is not that which a false negation can say, then that negation is indubitably false, and it is necessary that it be. For example, since a false negation can say of snow that it is not white, the very state of affairs that the false negation says – i.e. that it is not white – is not, since snow is not not white. Accordingly, falsity and truth corresponds (convertitur) with the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs. For if something is, it is truly said of it that it is; and if it is truly said, then of that of which something is truly asserted (praedicatur), it is necessary that it be. But if that which is said is not, the statement is false; and if the statements are false, it is necessary that the things, events, or states of affairs not be. But if these things are so, one has moreover supposed that every affirmation and negation is true [or false] definitely, since the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs as regards their being or not being follows along with the truth or falsity of propositions (being, of course, accords with truth, as has been said, [and] not being accords with falsity): nothing happens by chance, or by free will, or by any sort of possibility. For the things we describe as in-either-of-two-ways are of such a sort that when they have not yet happened they can both happen and not happen; moreover, if they have happened, they could have not happened. For example, that I read a book of Vergil today, which I have not yet done, can indeed not happen and can also happen; [and] if I will have done it, I could have not done it. Any things of this sort are therefore said to be in either of two ways. But he shows more clearly what it is to be in either of two ways when he says ‘since nothing that is in either of two ways is or will be disposed more in this way or not in this way’ (18b8-9). For what is in either of two ways is what is equally disposed to being or to not being – i.e. it is not necessary that it be, and it is not necessary that it not be. Now some people – the Stoics among them – thought that Aristotle

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says that future contingents are neither true nor false. For they interpreted his saying that nothing [of that sort] is disposed more to being than to not being as meaning that it makes no difference whether they are thought false or true; for they considered them to be neither true nor false [in Aristotle’s view] – but falsely. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false, but, of course, that each of them is either true or false – not, however, definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters. [He says] instead that there is in a way a dual nature of statement-making utterances: some of them are not only such that the true and the false is found in them, but also such that one of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false; of the other [statement-making utterances], however, one is true [and] the other false, but indefinitely and mutably – and this as a result of their own nature, not relative to our ignorance or knowledge. Consequently, it has been rightly said that if every affirmation or negation were true [or false] definitely, then nothing would happen or be either by chance (or – to use the general term – in-either-of-twoways), or be or not be contingently, but either be definitely or not be definitely; but, rather, all things necessarily. For this follows along with the person who says or the person who affirms that it is true, or with the person who denies it. But if that were true, then in like manner what was said truly or falsely by means of statements would either happen (along with truth) or would not happen (along with falsity). If that is impossible, however, then there are some things, events, or states of affairs that are not by necessity. Now we see that some are by chance, some stem from the will, some from the possibility of their own nature. It is foolish for anyone to think that as in connection with those that are past, so also in connection with future statements – one is true [and] the other false definitely. So that was one of his lines of argument. But, as if opposing himself, he [then] introduces another question along with a more powerful treatment. 18b9 Furthermore, if it is white now, it was true to say at first that it would be white. Accordingly, it was always true to say of any of the things that have happened that it would be. But if it is always true to say that it is or will be, this [thing in question] cannot not be or not be going to be. But of what cannot not happen, it is impossible that it not happen; and of that of which it is impossible that it not happen, it is necessary that it happen. Of all things, therefore, that are going to be, it is necessary that they happen. Nothing, therefore, will be in either of two ways or by chance; for if by chance, not of necessity.

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He enters upon yet another plan of action in order to add, on the basis of what is indeed the same force of argumentation as regards the same outcome of possibility, that not all statements are definitely true or false regarding the future. For a short while ago he inferred regarding things that had not happened yet that if they were predicted truly, there could be only necessity in connection with the things, events, or states of affairs. Now, however, he takes his argument from things that have happened: if they were predicted truly before they happened, then the outcomes of all things would be bound by necessity. For those who say that the status (modum) of a statement – even of contingent propositions – is stable as regards truth and falsity think that of all things whatever that have happened, they say, it could have been predicted that they would happen. For in nature this was indeed beforehand; but it was made clear to us by the outcome of the actual thing itself. So, if all things whatever that will come about are, and those that are going be could have been predicted, then it is necessary that all things that are said are either definitely true or definitely false, since their outcome is definite as regards present time. Accordingly, as regards all things in connection with which something comes about, it is true to say that it is going to be, even if it has not happened yet. But the thing, event, or state of affairs proves that it was true to be said then, since what comes about is what could have been predicted; and if it had been predicted, then the definite coming about of the thing, event, or state of affairs would have been predicted truly. Taking this up, Aristotle reduces it to the same impossibility on the basis of very powerful reasoning. He also connects the nature of present time with a statement of future time. For he says that to make a statement about future events is like making a statement about present matters, as far as the necessity of the truth is concerned. For if it is true to say that something is, it is necessary that it be; and if it is true to say that it will be, it is without doubt necessary that it be going to be. Therefore, all things necessarily are going to be – drawing the line of argument to the same impossibility. But although he derives the order of this impossibility from propositions that are easier for the understanding, they have the same import, as follows: ‘if,’ he says, ‘it is always true to say that it is or will be,’ whatever it was then true to predict ‘cannot not be or not be going to be’ (18b11-13). For however that is which is truly said about the present, it cannot not be that, if the proposition about it was true – the proposition that said that it is. So, too, as regards the future – if the proposition that says that something is going to be is true, then what it predicts cannot not be going to be. But if that ‘cannot not happen’ which is predicted by a true proposition, then ‘it is impossible that it not happen’ (18b13-14). For it is the same to say that it cannot

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not happen as to say that it is impossible that it not happen. But ‘of that of which it is impossible that it not happen, it is necessary that it happen’ (18b14). For what is asserted as impossible has the same import, contrariwise, as necessity, as he himself said afterwards;38 for of that of which it is impossible that it be, it is necessary that it not be (for of that of which it is not possible that it be, that it not be is necessary). And if that is the case, the contraries will be disposed in the same way: of that of which it is impossible that it not be, it is necessary that it be. But it has been said that of those things that are truly39 predicted it is impossible that they not be – i.e. they are of necessity. Those things, therefore, that are [truly] predicted are necessarily going to be. ‘Nothing, therefore, [will be] in either of two ways or by chance’ (18b15-16), or in accordance with free choice at all, because the signification of ‘in-either-of-two-ways’ included the whole; for what ‘in-either-of-two-ways’ says contains possibility, chance, and free choice in its signification. Therefore, nothing happens by chance. For if anyone says that anything happens by chance, he rules out necessity in it; for whatever is by chance is not of necessity. But nothing happens by chance, since all things, events, or states of affairs – whatever a true statement has predicted – develop necessarily. Now impossibility of this sort [i.e. the determinist’s conclusion] comes about on the basis of what was granted earlier – that all things of any kind that have happened could have been definitely truly predicted. For if that which comes about occurs necessarily, then it was true to say ‘It will be’. But if it occurs not necessarily but contingently, it was not true to say ‘It will be’, but rather, ‘It can happen’ (contingit esse). For anyone who says ‘It will be’ puts a kind of necessity in that very prediction, which is understood on this basis: if he says truly that that which is predicted is going to be, then it is not possible that it not happen, but it is necessary that it happen. Therefore, anyone who says of one of the things that come about contingently that it will be speaks falsely in that he says that that which perhaps comes about, contingently, is going to be. Even if the thing, event, or state of affairs he predicted should occur, he still spoke falsely; for it is not the outcome that is false, but the mode of the prediction. For he ought to have said ‘Tomorrow a sea battle contingently will come about’ – which is to say, if it does come about, it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about. Whoever speaks in that way says what is true, for he has predicted the outcome contingently. But anyone who speaks in this way: ‘Tomorrow there will be a sea battle’ announces it as if it were necessary. And if it should come about, he will still not have said something true because he predicted it, since that which contingently was going to come about he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for that reason that the

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falsity is not in the outcome, but in the mode of the prediction. For just as someone has spoken falsely if while Socrates is walking he says ‘Socrates necessarily is walking’ – not because Socrates is walking, but because he is not necessarily walking and he declared that he is necessarily walking – so also in the case in which someone says that something will be he is mistaken even if it happens – not because it has happened, but because it has not happened as he predicted it was going to be. If it were definitely true, however, it would be necessarily going to be. Therefore, whatever he announced was going to come about, without any other mode, he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for that reason that the falsity is found not in the outcome of the event, but in the statement of the prediction; for where contingents are concerned, if the statement will be true, it must predict in such as way that it does indeed say that something is going to be, but [also], on the other hand, in such a way that it leaves open the possibility that it is not going to be. Now it is the nature of a contingent [event] to be predicted in a statement contingently; and regarding that which perhaps will come about, contingently, if anyone has predicted that it is simply going to be, he predicts a contingent event as coming about necessarily. And, for that reason, even if that which is said has come about, he still spoke falsely in that the event has come about contingently, but he had predicted that it would come about necessarily. Therefore, since there are four modes of the truth and falsity of statements (of those propositions, namely, that are predicted about the future) – either that [1] what is said both will be and will not be (i.e. that both the affirmation and the negation is true), or that [2] it neither will be nor will not be (i.e. that both the affirmation and the negation are false), or that [3] it will be or it will not be, but the one is definitely true [and] the other [definitely] false, or, again, that [4] it will be or it will not be, with both of them indefinite as regards truth and falsity and tending equally to truth and falsity – [regarding such propositions] he has indeed taught above that it cannot happen that [1] they both are and are not: when he says ‘for in such cases both will not be true together’ (18a38-9). He also taught, a while later, that as regards contingent and future propositions it cannot be that [3] they are or are not definitely. Now he adds this, that [it cannot be that] [2] they neither are nor are not – i.e. that neither can it be said truly that both propositions that are said regarding the future can be found to be false. But if neither [1] both are true, nor [2] both are false, nor [3] the one definitely true [and] the other definitely false, it remains that [4] the one is indeed true [and] the other false, only not definitely but in either of two ways and in an unstable state; so that it is indeed necessary that this or that come about, but in such a way that it

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cannot happen that any one thing, event, or state of affairs develop or not develop as if necessarily and definitely. Now the way in which he would show that both are not false he begins here: 15

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18b17 Nor, however, can one say that neither is true – e.g. that it neither will be nor will not be. For, in the first place, when the affirmation is false, the negation will not be true; and when the latter is false, it turns out that the affirmation is not true. In connection with these things, if it is true to say [of something] that it is white and large, it must be both; but if it will be [white and large] tomorrow, [it must] be [both] tomorrow. If, however, it neither will be nor will not be tomorrow, it will not be in either of two ways – e.g. a sea battle; for it will have to be that neither does a sea battle happen nor does a sea battle not happen. The sense of the argumentation is of this sort: nor, he says, could it be said that neither of [two contradictory] contingent propositions is true as regards the future. But to say this is in no way different from someone’s saying that both are false, [and] that is certainly impossible; for as regards contradictories both cannot be found to be false. For this is a proprium40 of contradictories: as they shun the special characteristic of subcontraries, in that they cannot be true together, so too do they avoid the special characteristic of contraries, in that they are not to be found false at once.41 They have, therefore, their own nature: that they are neither false nor true together. Accordingly, one of them will always be true, the other always false. It is therefore impossible when the negation is false that the affirmation not be true, and, on the other hand, when the affirmation is false that the negation not be true. Therefore, one is not to say that both are not true. He said that by means of this remark: ‘Nor, however, can one say that neither is true’ (18b17) – i.e. it is not open to us to say, it is impossible to say, that neither is true – viz., whatever is put forward in contingent affirmations or negations, even those that are future. Now if those who have thought that Aristotle thinks that both propositions [i.e. the affirmative and negative contradictories] regarding future matters are false would read very carefully through the things he says now, they would never fall victim to such gross errors. For to say that neither is true is not the same as to say that neither is true definitely. For [of the propositions] that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow and that there is not going to be one, it is not said that both are altogether false, but that neither is definitely true, so that42 either of them is definitely false. Rather, this one is indeed true [and] that one false – not, however, one of them definitely, but each of them43 contingently.

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Now to these things he adds something else, saying that if the truth of propositions depends on the substance of the things, events, or states of affairs, so that of whatever it is true to say in propositions it is necessary that it be, then if it is true to say that something will be white, the necessary outcome of it follows the truth. But if anyone says that any particular actual thing is going to be white tomorrow, if he says this truly, then tomorrow it is necessarily going to be white. And so if anyone says that it is true that neither of those propositions that are said about the future is true, then it is necessary that what is said and signified by those propositions neither be nor not be. For if the affirmation and the negation are false, neither what that affirmation says nor what the negation says can happen. Therefore, necessarily neither happens – what either the affirmation or the negation says. Therefore, if the affirmation says that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow, then, since the affirmation is false, there will not be a sea battle tomorrow. On the other hand, if the negation denies it, saying that there is not going to be a sea battle tomorrow, then, since this too is false, there will be a sea battle tomorrow. Accordingly, there will neither be a sea battle (because the affirmation is false) nor will there not be a sea battle (because the negation is false). But this absurdity the mind cannot picture for itself. For who would ever say that any thing, event, or state of affairs necessarily neither is nor is not? But that is what anyone does say who says that both [contradictory] propositions about the future are false. 18b26 These, therefore, and others like them are the absurdities that occur if of every affirmation and negation, either as regards those that are said universally regarding universals or as regards those that are singulars, it is necessary that this one of the opposites be true but that one false – that, moreover, as regards things that happen, nothing is in either of two ways, but all things are or happen of necessity. Accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble: that if we do this, this will be, but if that, it will not be. For nothing prevents someone’s saying a thousand years ago, indeed, that this was going to be, but another’s not saying [so]; accordingly, necessarily whichever of them it was true to say then will be. Those who think that, as regards propositions, all things having to do with the future are either true or false definitely are pursued by this impossibility: nothing whatever can happen by free choice of the will, by any possibility, or by chance, if all things are subject to necessity. And yet some have not hesitated to say that all things are of

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necessity. They have even tried, by means of certain arts, to connect that which is up to us (in nobis) with the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs. For some say – the Stoics among them – that any and all things that happen develop by the necessity of fate, and that all the things that the fateful principle (ratio) brings about undoubtedly occur by necessity, but that those things alone are up to us, and from our will, which the force of fate carries out and completes by means of our will and through us ourselves (per nos ipsos). For they say that not even our will is up to us; instead, what we will for and what we will against is whatever the necessity of fate has commanded, so that even our will is seen to depend on fate. Thus since it is by means of our will that certain things happen as a result of us (ex nobis) and that those things happen that are up to us, and since the will itself belongs to the necessity of fate, even the things we carry out by our will we carry out impelled by necessity itself, because necessity has commanded them. Accordingly, thoroughly altering the meaning of free choice in this way, they strive to do the impossible, to connect and link necessity with that which is up to us. For that which is up to us is free choice, which is devoid of all necessity, freeborn (ingenuum), and with power of its own over those things of which we are in any way the masters, either to do them or not to do them. But if the necessity of fate should order even our will for us, the will itself will be not up to us but up to fate; and there will be no free choice, but rather slavery to necessity. Thus it happens that those who constrain all actions by the necessity of their outcomes say that we do not even bend our knee, do not even scratch our head, and, accordingly, do not wash or do anything at all unless fateful necessity has ordered it. To these let me add also: or do or undergo anything well (feliciter) or badly (infeliciter). And so it turns out that they contend that there is neither chance nor free choice nor anything possible in connection with things, events, or states of affairs – although, fearful of destroying free choice, they make another meaning for it, as a consequence of which human free will is overturned. The Aristotelian authority, on the other hand, declares that these matters are situated and established in things, events, or states of affairs, [but] in such a way that he does not now explain what chance is, or what is possible, or what is up to us; nor does he prove and demonstrate that these are in things, events, or states of affairs. Instead, that they are so is so obvious to him that he says that the view on the basis of which one thinks that all statements regarding the future are true [or false] is impossible just because it overturns chance, possibility, and free choice. For he thinks that these are so established in things, events, or states of affairs that there is no need for any demonstration regarding them; instead, any theory that tries

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to overturn either the possible, or chance, or that which is up to us is judged to be impossible. He did, indeed, show above how definite truth in future propositions destroys chance. Now, however, by means of extremely powerful argumentation he traces out the way in which that same definite truth of future and contingent propositions destroys the faculty of free choice, saying that if someone contrived to make one part of [such] a [contradictory] statement definitely true or false, all the impossible things of this sort would occur. But we, having followed Porphyry when we began the exposition of this disputation,44 mentioned earlier that he said what he said before ‘as regards [those that are] singular and future’ (18a33) for this reason, that the understanding of the disputation is easier if these matters are first thoroughly investigated in connection with singular [propositions]. Having first spoken with the greatest care of those singulars, he speaks now of universals expressed universally and the contradictions that are made in connection with them.45 For he says: ‘if of every affirmation and negation, either as regards those that are said universally regarding universals or as regards those that are singulars, it is necessary that this one of the opposites be true but that one false’ (18b26-9). Alexander,46 on the other hand, thinks that Aristotle said ‘as regards [those that are] singular and future’ (18a33) as if to say ‘as regards those [that are] future that have to do with generation and corruption’; for there are some [propositions that are] future that do not have to do with generation and corruption – e.g. whatever is said about the sun or the moon or the other heavenly bodies.47 But of those [propositions] that concern things whose nature it is to be brought into existence and to suffer corruption, it is not necessary that the one [contradictory opposite] always be true and the other false. I reject neither of these expositions, however, for both are founded on very reliable reasoning. Now Aristotle destroys every interpretation that presents necessity alone as in command of things, events, or states of affairs. Nothing that is by nature is in vain, but deliberating is something that human beings have naturally. But if necessity alone will have mastery over actual things, deliberation is for no reason. Deliberation is not in vain, however, since it is by nature. Therefore, there cannot be necessity as regards all actual things. Now the order [of presentation] goes like this: ‘These, therefore,’ he says, ‘and others like them are the absurdities that occur’ (18b26) – namely, that any chance in actual things is overturned, and the others: that possibility and the will associated with free choice is banished. And he has followed up the way in which they occur, saying: ‘if of every affirmation and negation, either as regards those that are said universally regarding

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universals or as regards those that are singulars, it is necessary that this one of the opposites be true but that one false – that, moreover, as regards things that happen, nothing is in either of two ways, but all things are or happen of necessity’ (18b27-31). For those absurdities occur in case every affirmation and negation is definitely true or false, whether as regards those contradictions that occur diagonally (in connection with universals) or as regards singulars.48 For in that case nothing is in either of two ways, but all things of necessity, since the outcome of things, events, or states of affairs follows along with the truth and falsity of propositions. ‘Accordingly,’ as he himself says, ‘there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble: that if we do this, this will be, but if that, it will not be’ (18b31-3). For deliberation is overturned if it is in vain, and anyone who supposes the necessity of fate in things, events, or states of affairs says that it is in vain. For why does anyone engage in deliberation if nothing results from deliberating because necessity controls all things? Accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate. Or, if anyone does deliberate, he need not take trouble (to take trouble is to carry out something in fact and with difficulty – not financial gain, but some legal matter or public deed). For he will achieve nothing by his public deed or deliberation unless the necessity of fate orders it. Now he explained what deliberation is by saying ‘that if we do this, this will be, but if that, it will not be’ (18b32-3); for deliberation always takes place in that way. For example, if you are Scipio, you will deliberate in this way: If I lead the army into Africa, I will draw Hannibal’s devastation away from Italy; but if I do not lead, Italy will not be rescued. That is to say: if I do this – e.g. if I lead the army into Africa – this will be – i.e. Italy will be rescued; but if I do not do this – i.e. if I stay here – this will not be – Italy will not be rescued. (And it is the same in all other cases.) But he has at the same time shown that there is no necessity in deliberations. For if I do this, he says, this will be; and if that, it will not be. But if there were necessity in actual things, what would come about would be necessary, whether anyone did or did not do this. Accordingly, what happens by reason of deliberation does not happen by the vehemence of necessity. But he added ‘or to take trouble’ to ‘there will be no need to deliberate’ (18b31-2), and the order [of presentation] goes like this: Accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate: ‘that if we do this, this will be, but if that, it will not be’ (18b32-3). ‘For nothing prevents someone’s saying a thousand years ago, indeed, that this was going to be, but another’s not saying [so]; accordingly, necessarily whichever of them it was true to say then will be’ (18b33-6). Or to take trouble – i.e. to begin an action and to carry out a difficult matter. For

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deliberation comes first and taking trouble comes afterwards. But he put taking trouble [immediately] after deliberation, and after the intervention of taking trouble he attached all the things that had to be added relative to the nature of deliberation. Now this is the way it goes. If necessity does everything, he says, there is no need to deliberate: that if we do this, this will develop for us, but if we do that, it will not. For nothing prevents one person’s saying in vain ([but] another’s denying it), saying ‘If we do this, this will be’ (or not be). For what is going to come about will happen, whether one person infers on the basis of deliberation that this can happen if he were to do something else, or another person denies that this can happen if he does what he said; for whatever the one of them that was right said is of necessity going to be. But if there is no need to deliberate, neither will there be any need to take trouble – i.e. to undertake any difficult matter. For whether anyone undertakes it or does not undertake it, what is of necessity will undoubtedly develop. Accordingly, nothing will distinguish one person from another. For we judge people to be better in virtue of their being more able in deliberation; but when deliberation is in vain, necessity bringing about all things, people do not differ from one another [in that respect] at all. For it makes no difference whether the deliberation is good or bad when necessity establishes the results in the administration of fate. Accordingly, if people who are good at deliberation are worthy of praise and those who are bad at deliberation are worthy of contempt, this will be warranted only if bad action and bad deliberation (and, conversely, good) are in our power and not up to fate. For when the outcome of the thing, event, or state of affairs is constrained by no necessity, then so is the free choice of the will, so that it is not enslaved to fateful necessity. Therefore, those [thinkers] who have posited simple orderings of things, events, or states of affairs in this world are not to be accepted, and those who do not perceive confused causes of actions in the confused complexity of the world are to be repudiated. For those who say that all things come about by chance are not thinking straight, nor are those who shape all things by the vehemence of necessity under the influence of a sane point of view, nor is it manifest that all things are based on free choice. Instead, causes and outcomes are a mixture of all of them. For some are by chance, some are of necessity, and we see also that some are under the control of free judgment. And the willing (voluntas) of our actions is indeed up to us – for our will is in a way the mistress of our actions and of the whole plan of life – but their outcome is not also in our power in the same way. For when people do something by free choice, then chance, arising from the same causes, [sometimes] intervenes on behalf of some other

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thing, event, or state of affairs. For example, if someone digging a trench in order to plant a vine should find a treasure, the digging of the trench did indeed arise from free choice, [but] chance alone contributed the finding of the treasure – a chance which nevertheless has the cause that the will contributed. For if he had not dug the trench, the treasure would not have been found. Now one sort of outcome is suited to our wills, [but] a kind of violent necessity holds others in check. For just as having breakfast, or reading, or other such things stem from our will, so too do their outcomes often depend on our will. But if a Roman should wish now to rule over the Persians, the choice of his will is indeed up to him; but a sterner necessity holds back the outcome and prohibits it from being brought to completion. And so chance, will, and necessity are in charge of everything, but no one of them is to be supposed in connection with all things, but rather the combined power (mixta potentia) of the three of them. This is why one should pay more attention to the intention of wrong-doers than to outcomes, and why not the completion [of the deed] but the intention should be punished: because the will is indeed free for us, but the pattern of the completion is often held in check. But if all things happened either by chance or by necessity, praise would not be fitting for those who do well, nor retribution for transgressors; nor would any laws be just that conferred rewards on good people or penalties on bad people. I come now to that which is asked in many ways: whether there is still prophecy if not all things, events, or states of affairs occur of necessity. For what is in a true prediction is the same as is in knowledge. Just as when someone predicts what is true, it is necessary that what is truly predicted come about, so of that which someone knew was going to be it is necessary that it be going to be. But prophecy does not claim that all things are of necessity going to be, and for that reason prophecy is frequently expressed in a way that is very readily observed in the books of the ancients: This is indeed going to come about (eventurum est); but if that happens, it will not come about – as if it could be interrupted, and come about in some other way. But if that is the way it is, it does not come about of necessity. Let us ask in this way, however, whether if God knows all future things it is necessary that all things be.49 If someone says that the necessity of outcomes is a consequence of God’s knowledge of future things, he surely will have the tables turned on him: [viz.,] that God cannot know all things if all things do not occur by necessity. For if the necessity of outcomes follows God’s knowledge – [i.e.] if there is no necessity of outcomes [themselves] – divine knowledge is prevented; and who is so perverted in spirit by impious reason as to dare to say such things of God? But perhaps someone may say, since it

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cannot come about that God does not know all future things, that that is the source from which it comes about that all things are necessary, since it is wicked to rob God of the knowledge of actual future things. If anyone does say that, however, it must occur to him that while he strives to show that God knows all things he is contending that God fails to know all things. For if anyone claims that he knows that two is an odd number, he does not know it but rather fails to know it: what he thinks he knows belongs not to a capacity [of his] but rather to an incapacity. Therefore, whoever says that God knows all things and that, for that reason, all things are necessarily going to be, says that God believes regarding whatever things do not come about necessarily that they are going to come about necessarily. For if God knows that all things are going to come about necessarily, he is mistaken in that knowledge of his, since not all things come about necessarily, but some contingently. Therefore, if he knows regarding the things that are going to come about that they are going to come about necessarily, he is deceived as regards his own providence. For God knows future things not as coming about necessarily but as [coming about] contingently, in such a way that he does not fail to know that something else can happen too. Nevertheless, he has complete knowledge of what happens by reason of human beings themselves and their actions.50 Accordingly, if anyone says that everything happens necessarily, it is necessary also that he rob God of benevolence; for [in that case] his good will produces nothing, since necessity governs all things, with the result that it is somehow of God’s necessity that he confers benefits, and not of his own will. For if some things happen of his own will, in such a way that he is confined by no necessity, then not all things occur necessarily. Who, then, is so impiously wise as to restrict God, too, by necessity? Who says that everything happens necessarily, if that impossible compulsion (vis inpossibilitatis) will also result? Accordingly, it must be asserted that as regards things, events, or states of affairs, some can be by chance, some are effected by will, and some are constrained by necessity; and a line of reasoning that undermines any of these is to be judged impossible. It is, therefore, not without warrant that Aristotle leads us on to the impossible line of reasoning, saying that possibility, chance, and free choice are demolished (which cannot happen) if of all future statements the one [contradictory opposite] is always definitely true [and] the other always definitely false. For necessity follows along with their truth and falsity, a necessity that condemns chance in connection with things, events, or states of affairs, and free choice as well. Thus now, too, repeating the same thing, he says that there is no obstacle, whether someone says a thousand years ago that something is going to be or someone else denies it; for it is not in accordance

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with saying or denying that all things are going to be done or not going to be done. But if it is necessary that the things, events, or states of affairs affirmed or denied follow upon the saying or the denying of whatever would necessarily have come about with those people saying it, then it is necessary that it come about also without their saying it. Now he speaks in this way. 18b36 Nor does it make any difference if any people spoke the contradiction or not; for it is evident that the actual things are disposed in this way even if it is not the case that one person indeed affirmed it but another denied it. For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be, nor [is it a question of its being] a thousand years rather than as much time as you please. Accordingly, if at every time the situation was such that one thing would be said truly, it would be necessary that that happen, and that every one of the things that happen be disposed in such a way that it would happen necessarily. For when anyone says truly that [something] will be, it cannot not happen; and of whatever has happened, it was always true to say that it would be. Considering the outcomes of necessary things, events, or states of affairs not on the basis of the truth of predicting [them] but on the basis of their nature, Aristotle says that although it is necessary, [if] anyone has made a true prediction about something, that what he declared beforehand come about, nevertheless the necessity of things does not depend on the truth of prediction. Rather, the truth of prophesying depends on the necessity of things. For the fact that something true has been predicted is not the reason why it is necessary; instead, something could be truly predicted regarding that thing because it necessarily was going to be. But it is necessary that those things be that are going to be because they have a certain necessity in their own nature. If someone stumbles upon that necessity, then what he predicts is true. Therefore, if it would have been true to say of whatever things have now happened that they would be, then whether he said it or did not say it, the things that have now happened were of necessity going to be. For it is not because of the saying or the denying that there is necessity in things; it is rather that truth or falsity is found in foretelling in virtue of the necessity belonging to things. Accordingly, even if it could have been truly predicted of the things that have now happened that they would be, and [if] with those things supposed it would be necessary that the thing, event, or state of affairs come about whether they predicted it or did not predict it, then it is necessary that everything that happens was necessarily going to be, and there is nothing at all in either of two ways as regards

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things, events, or states of affairs. For if prophecy in no way aids the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs, and it makes no difference whether some one predicts that something is going to be or denies it, [or] whether no one at all predicts anything either in an affirmation or in a negation, then it is evident that there is no distinction to be drawn on the basis of whether someone predicted truly as long ago as you like that something was going to be, or as few days, hours, or moments ago as you like. For it makes no difference whether someone said a thousand years ago that it was necessarily going to be, or a year, a month, a day, an hour, or a moment ago. It would disturb nothing having to do with the necessity of the event that was going to come about. For because it would make no difference whether it was predicted or not predicted, it also makes no difference whether it was predicted later or sooner. But if these things are so, and it is necessary regarding all things whatever that have come about that they were going to be, then all free choice perishes, all chance is taken away, [and] every possibility of things, events, or states of affairs beyond necessity is excluded. At the same time, however, Aristotle, linking the foretelling and the outcome, bases the necessity of things, events, or states of affairs on the very truth of propositions, saying that if these things are so (in such a way that everything that has happened has at every time been so disposed that that very thing would have been truly predicted), then ‘it would be necessary that that happen’ (19a2-3) – i.e. it would be necessary that what has been truly predicted come about. For every one of the things that happen and are truly predicted is disposed in such a way that it happens of necessity. But the reason why it happens is this: of whatever anyone says truly it is necessary that it happen, for that truth stems from the necessity of the things, events, or states of affairs. But if regarding that which has happened it had also been correctly foretold that it was going to happen, then there would be no doubt that all things come about of necessity. But, he says, if that is impossible (for we see that some things, events, or states of affairs flow from the source of free choice and from the spring of our actions), why do we hesitate to rule out the frivolous theory of the necessity of all things, and51 to get rid of the regimentation of human life by the interposition of necessity? For what sort of capacity for discernment will there be among people at all if the judgment of free choice is lost? Why, after all, have laws been laid down, [and] why in the name of the state have rights been established in return? Why have standards of behavior been instituted, [and why] are public and private deeds comprised in rulers’ codes of law and in judges’ binding regulations, if it is certain that nothing is permitted to human purposes? For all these are in vain if there is no free choice. For we know that the laws and the rest have been established for the

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purpose of curbing people’s characters. But if those characters do not govern themselves but some sort of vehement necessity impels them, then there is no doubt that these laws, proposed for beings who do nothing of their own accord, are empty. Aristotle himself proves how impossible these things are, however. His correct view removes neither chance, nor necessity, nor possibility in any part of nature, nor free choice; instead, mixing all of them together thoroughly, he does not think that the world composed of many actual things is limited by simple chance, necessity, or the judgment of free will. 19a7-9 What if these things are not possible? For we see that there is also a source of things that are going to be in the fact that we deliberate and do something  These things, he says, [which are] such that everything develops necessarily, are impossible. For we ourselves are also the sources of some things; and our spirit, formed by reason, together with our actions directed by that same reason, comprise the source of certain things, events, or states of affairs. For we see that it is in this way that we have that which is up to us: when, neither impeded nor compelled by anything, we zealously strive for what appears to us as we judge in accordance with reason. Nor must all things be snatched away by necessities. For in the genus of all animals, considered just as animals, one [sort] is subject to nature, another to the heavenly courses of the stars, still another to the mind’s reason and the spirit’s thought. For of trees and irrational animals, trees are indeed subject to nature only, but cattle to decrees of heavenly bodies as well. Human beings, on the other hand, are subject to nature, to the stars, and to their own will. For we do or undergo many things, such as death or a bodily condition of that sort, under the domination of nature. The necessity of things, events, or states of affairs themselves draws many things along with it – e.g. things we are incapable of doing even though we will to do them. The free choice of the will, however, provides the many things that happen when we are willing and that do not happen if we will against them.52 And so it happens that it partakes of nature (which is the source of motion) and of the faculty of free choice, the spirit’s reason. But the soul, bound to bodies, which nature dominates – [along with] fancies, longings, rage, and the other fiery passions which bodies bring – has a share of the nature to which it is bound. All of us, however, subject to divine providence, hang on the will of the gods as well. And so neither the whole necessity associated with heavenly things is snatched away, nor does this disputation eliminate chance from things, events, or states of affairs; moreover, it strengthens free

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choice. But these matters are too great to be appropriately considered in the present circumstances. We ourselves, then, are also sources of things, events, or states of affairs, and many of them arise from our deliberations and actions. But if the things that are taken away by means of this reasoning are perfectly clear, although what is asserted is not equally clear – i.e. that every affirmation and negation regarding the future is true [or false] – why do we hesitate to shun the false path of reason and to cling to those things that are as true as they are manifest, repudiating those that neither are associated with any solid truth nor made evident with transparent clarity? And since he had already said above ‘Accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble’ (18b31-2), he now assigns this to deliberating, saying ‘there is also a source of things that are going to be in the fact that we deliberate’ (19a7-8). To taking trouble he assigns what he added: ‘and do something’ (19a8-9). Accordingly, the passage has been compressed with such brevity so that the necessity of the reasoning and of the ordering may be preserved in it. 19a9  and that as regards things that are not always in actuality, it is altogether possible that they be and also not [be]. As regards these things, both occur, both being and not being; accordingly, both happening and not happening. And many things disposed in that way are evident to us. For example, that it is possible that this cloak be cut up, and it is not cut up but wears out first; it is likewise possible, however, that it not be cut up, since it would not be the case that it wears out first if it were not possible that it not be cut up. Accordingly, also as regards other things that are going to have happened – whichever ones are spoken of in accordance with a capacity of this sort – it is evident that not all things necessarily either are or happen; but some, indeed, [are or happen] in either of two ways, and neither the affirmation nor the negation [is true] rather [than the other]; but [with] others, indeed, [it is] the one rather [than the other] in most cases, although also the other can happen, but the other not. The meaning is indeed continuous in the following way with matters dealt with earlier. For he says above ‘What if these things are not possible?’ (19a7) – i.e. that necessity governs all things – ‘For we see that there is also a source of things that are going to be’ (19a7-8) – something [stemming] from us and from our actions and deliberations. To these [observations] he adds also that there are some that indeed can be when they are not, and can not be when they are. These,

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too, are done away with if necessity dominates all things. And in this way the meaning is indeed connected with matters dealt with earlier. But the whole significance of the line of argument must be viewed in this way. It is said that by reason of its own nature it can be turned easily to each of the parts, so that when it is not, it is possible that it be, and so that when it is, no thing, event, or state of affairs prevents it from not being. In this way, then, we disjoin what we call possible from necessity. For in one way it is said to be possible when I am seated that I walk, in another way that the sun is now in Sagittarius and that after a few days it will move into Aquarius.53 For the latter is possible in such a way that it is also necessary. For we ordinarily call that possible which when it is not can be and, again, when it is can not be. Therefore, if anyone subjects everything to necessity, he snatches away the nature of possibility. There are, however,54 three views regarding possibility. For Philo55 says that the possible is this: that the very nature of the statement is supportive of truth – as when I say that I am going to reread Theocritus’ Bucolica today, [since] considered in itself, if nothing external prevents it, this can be truthfully asserted. At the same time, Philo defines the necessary in the same way to be [this:] that [the very nature of the statement is such that] when it is true, then considered in itself it can never be supportive of falsity. And he delimits the non-necessary as that which considered in itself can be supportive of falsity; but the impossible as that which in accordance with its own nature can never be supportive of truth. But he confirms that the contingent and the possible are one. Diodorus55 delimits the possible as that which either is or will be; the impossible as that which when it is false will not be true; the necessary as that which when it is true will not be false; the nonnecessary as that which either now is or will be false. But the Stoics, indeed, have set up the possible as that which would be supportive of true predication when [other things] which can happen together with it (even though they are external to it) do not in any way prevent it; the impossible as that which is never supportive of any truth with other things eternal to its own outcome preventing it; the necessary as that which when it is true is not supportive of false predication for any reason. But if all things happen necessarily, then, no doubt, one must come to Diodorus’ incorrect view. For he thought that if someone were to die at sea, then he could not have met his death on land – something that neither Philo nor the Stoics say. But even though they do not say such things, if they evaluate one part of a contradiction by the outcome, they are compelled to maintain the same as Diodorus. For if anyone has died at sea, it was necessary that he be killed at sea, it was impossible that he meet his death on land – which is completely

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false. And those who are compelled to support these impossible things are any who, when they contend that one or the other part of a contradiction regarding the future is definitely true, say that there is only necessity in things, events, or states of affairs. For it is not the case that if someone perishes in a shipwreck on the ocean, he would therefore have been going to be immortal on land if he had never gone to sea. And therefore contradictions are to be judged not on the basis of the outcome of things, events, or states of affairs but on the basis of the nature of the very (ipsius/ipsos) outcome of the propositions that enter into them. For if all things are now prepared for me to go to Athens, it is obvious that I can go even if I do not go; and it is also undoubted by those who determine outcomes by right reason, on the basis of the nature of things, events, or states of affairs, that when I do go I could have not gone. It is not the case, therefore, that it is possible in such a way that it is necessary. Rather, although what is necessary is possible, there is another, extrinsic nature of possibility, which is detached both from the impossible and from necessity. Aristotle, in fact, has the following view of those things regarding which it is necessary that they always be: he thinks that they have no affinity for contraries.56 For example, since snow is always cold, it is never conjoined with heat; fire, too, never has an affinity for cold, because it always remains in the contrary of cold – i.e. in heat. Therefore, all things whatever that are necessary have no affinity for the contraries of the qualities they retain. And if fire did have any affinity for cold, that affinity would be in vain, since fire would never convert its quality to cold. But we know that nature regularly develops no natural property in vain. Therefore, whichever things have no affinity for contraries are those that have been established as necessary. Whichever things do have [such an affinity] are those that are not necessary. But since they are evidently conjoined to both parts of a contrariety by a certain natural affinity, their outcome is possible as regards both parts. This wood, for example, can be cut up; but it nevertheless has an affinity for contraries, for it can be not cut up. And water can indeed grow warm, but nothing prevents it from being conjoined with cold, too. And one must say in general that whichever things neither always are nor always are not, but sometimes are [and] sometimes are not, have some affinity for contraries by the very fact that they are and are not. These are midway between things impossible and things necessary, however; for the impossible can never be, the necessary never not be. Between these – midway between the two of them – is the proper nature of certain things, [a nature] which can, of course, both be and not be. Therefore, he now says this: ‘We see’, he says, ‘that as regards things that are not always in actuality’ (19a7-9) – now things that are

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not always in actuality are those that have an affinity for both contraries (e.g. fire is always hot in actuality, but water not always) – we see, then, ‘that as regards things that are not always in actuality’, some can be and also not be – i.e. so that they both are and are not. Because as regards them it comes about (‘as regards these things, both occur’ – i.e. ‘both being and not being’ (19a10-11)) – e.g. that water both is hot and is not hot, that it also becomes and does not become hot. And it is clear to us that many things are so disposed that the outcome is turned as regards both parts without the hindrance of any thing, event, or state of affairs. For example, it is indeed possible that any57 cloak be cut up, but it may turn out in such a way that the cloak is not divided by a knife before old age wears it out. It can happen also to any cloak that it goes58 to bits under the knife rather than being worn out by use. But it is likewise possible not only that it be cut up but also that it not be cut up, ‘since it would not be the case that it wears out first’ (19a15-16) unless it were first possible that it not be cut up. For when it is worn out, it is not cut up. He shows, however, the things regarding which this comes about in general. For this comes about, he says, regarding things that are going to have happened. Now things that are going to have happened are those in connection with which there is generation and corruption. For whatever is done, whether by nature or by art, he has described as a thing that is going to have happened as regards the things [that result] from [such] doing. As regards these things that are going to have happened, therefore, some are indeed in potentiality (potestate), others in actuality. [This] water, for example, is indeed hot in possibility (possibilitate), for it can be made hot; but it is cold in actuality, for it is cold. Now this ‘in actuality’ and ‘in potentiality’ comes from matter. For since matter is susceptible to contrariety and has in itself an affinity for both [parts] of a contrariety, if it is considered in itself it has nothing of those [contraries] to which it is susceptible in itself. Indeed, in itself it is nothing in actuality but everything in potentiality. But what is susceptible to contraries, even though it has one contrary (contrariam/contrarietatem), also has the other at the same time, but not in actuality. For example, as regards the same water: for its matter is susceptible both to heat and to cold, but when it has taken on either one of them, heat or cold, it is indeed hot – if it has turned out to be hot. It is also cold at the same time, but not in the same way. For it may be hot in actuality, cold in potentiality. Therefore, what is in potentiality in things, events, or states of affairs comes from matter. (For the rest, as regards the divine bodies, there is nothing at all in potentiality, but everything in actuality. For example, with respect to the sun, light is never in potentiality; indeed, there is no darkness with respect to it, or rest with respect to the heavens as a whole.)

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And so things are disposed on the basis of matter in such a way that everything would be in potentiality but nothing in actuality, [which is effected] under the direction of nature, which distributes individual changes in matter itself in keeping with a plan, and puts individual properties of the qualities in individual parts of matter. In this way nature itself ordains some things, events, or states of affairs as necessary in such a way that as long as the thing would exist its property would remain in it, as heat in fire; for as long as there is fire, it is necessary that fire be hot. But on other things nature has imposed qualities such that the things can lack them. And the former, necessary quality informs the substance of each and every thing, for that quality of it is conjoined with matter itself by nature. But the other, latter qualities are extra: they can be admitted and also not admitted. (And it is on this basis that there is generation and corruption.) Therefore, it is on the basis of nature and on the basis of matter itself that there comes to be possibility in things, events, or states of affairs. It is on the basis of possibility also that chance, which is an indeterminate cause coming to pass without any plan, sometimes surprises [us] in reality. For it is neither nature, which does nothing in vain, nor free choice, which consists in judgment and plan. Beyond these is chance, which arises, sudden and unexpected, when certain things have been done for the sake of some other thing, event, or state of affairs. Even the essence of free choice comes out of that possibility, however. For if it were not possible for anything to happen, but all things necessarily were or necessarily were not, free choice would not remain. He therefore claimed correctly that it is neither the case that all things happen by chance, as Epicurus claims;59 nor that all things happen by necessity, as the Stoic claims; nor, again, that all things happen by free choice. Instead, mixing things together in a world that is mixed together, he claimed that the causes of things, events, or states of affairs are also mixed together, so that some of them would indeed occur necessarily, but others by chance, by free choice, or, finally, by possibility. The single name for all of these is ‘in-either-of-two-ways’, whether as regards chance, or will, or possibility. But he makes a division of them. For of those that are in either of two ways there are some that are disposed equally to the affirmation and the negation – e.g. that I am going to read Vergil today and not going to – for both are in both ways. For that is what he says: ‘and neither the affirmation nor the negation [is true] rather [than the other]’ (19a19-20); for equally I can read Vergil now, and I can not read [him now]. There are others, however, that are not equally disposed. Instead, although the one thing, event, or state of affairs comes about more often, the other is

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not prevented from coming about, as in the case of a man’s turning grey in old age. That does indeed occur in most cases ‘although also the other can happen’ – i.e. that he does not turn grey – ‘but the other not’ (19a21-2) – i.e. that he does turn grey. He has therefore established by the solidest and most acceptable argumentation that on the basis of possibility, chance, and free choice a contradiction about the future is not definitely true or false as regards one part. To these things, however, he adds the following. 19a23 Therefore, it is necessary that whatever is is when it is, and that whatever is not is not when it is not. But it is not necessary that everything that is be, nor is it necessary that everything that is not not be. For that everything that is is necessarily when it is is not the same as its simply being necessarily; [similarly as regards whatever is not.] Two types of necessity are exhibited: one that is put forward with the necessity of some accidental characteristic, another that is revealed by simple predication.60 And it is indeed revealed by simple predication when we say that it is necessary that the sun move; for necessity appears in the motion of the sun not only because it moves now, but because it will never not move. But the other, which is expressed with a condition, is of this sort: when we say of Socrates that it is necessary that he be seated when he is seated, and that it is necessary that he be not seated when he is not seated. For since the same person cannot be seated and not seated at the same time, whoever is seated cannot not be seated at the time when he is seated; therefore, it is necessary that he be seated. Therefore, when anyone is seated it is necessary that he be seated at the time when he is seated, for it cannot happen that when he is seated he is not seated. Again, when anyone is not seated, it is necessary that he be not seated when he is not seated; for the same person cannot be not seated and seated. And there can be this necessity with a condition – e.g. when someone is seated, then he is necessarily seated at the time when he is seated; and when he is not seated, then he is necessarily not seated at the time when he is not seated. But this necessity which is put forward with a condition does not drag the unconditional sort along with it. For of anyone who is seated, it is not unconditionally necessary that he be seated, but [only] with that addition: ‘at the time when he is seated’. For instance, we do not61 say ‘it is necessary that the sun move at the time when it is moving’, nor do we add that it is necessary that the sun is moving when it is moving. Instead, we say it only unconditionally: ‘it is necessary that

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the sun move’. And this unconditional necessity expressed regarding the sun will complete the truth in the expression. However, regarding that which is expressed with a condition, as when we say ‘it is necessary that Socrates be seated at the time when he is seated’, if we separate from the proposition [the rest of] what we said – ‘at the time when he is seated’ – and that temporal condition, then truth vanishes from the whole proposition. For we cannot say that Socrates necessarily is seated since he can also not be seated. For just as Socrates’ capacity has a suitability and affinity for being seated, so has it also for being not seated. Therefore, what we say – ‘Necessarily, Socrates is seated at the time when he is seated’ – we put forward with an accidental characteristic in view. For since Socrates’ being seated occurs as an accidental characteristic of his, at the time when it does occur as an accident of his it cannot not have occurred as an accident. For [in that case] it would happen that the same thing, event, or state of affairs would both occur as an accident and not occur as an accident of the same person at one and the same time – which is impossible. Therefore, it is with an accident of his in view that we say that it is necessary that Socrates be seated – not unconditionally, however, but at the time when he is seated. And just as it is false to say unconditionally that an Ethiopian is white, although it is true that he is white as regards something (for there is whiteness in him as regards his eyes or his teeth), so also it is false to say unconditionally that Socrates necessarily is seated; but it is true to predicate this necessity as regards some particular time – not unconditionally – as [when] we say ‘at the time when he is seated’. For however we speak as regards the sun – that it is necessary unconditionally that the sun move – if we say in that way that it is necessary that Socrates be seated, it is false. But if we say of a marble Socrates that it is necessary that that marble Socrates be seated (if it happens to have been carved seated), it is true; and necessity could be predicated unconditionally of such a Socrates. Of Socrates himself, however, such a necessity is not expressed unconditionally; for it can happen that Socrates is necessarily seated only when he happens to be seated. For at the time when he is seated, since he is seated and cannot not be seated, he is necessarily seated. Otherwise he is seated not unconditionally necessarily, but contingently, since he can get up. But whatever is unconditionally necessary cannot alter the necessity [it has]. For instance, since it is unconditionally necessary that the sun move, the sun cannot for any reason stand still. Aristotle therefore says this: that of everything that is, when it is, and of everything that is not, when it is not, it is necessary that it be, and that it not be – with the condition, but not without the condition – either that it be, or that it not be, unconditionally. For things have been attributed to those necessities only when they have no capacity

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or affinity for opposites – e.g. the sun for rest, or fire for cold. For, Aristotle says, [to say] that something is necessarily when it is – taking the condition into account – or is not when it is not, is not the same as to say unconditionally that everything is or is not necessarily. For the condition made the former true, [and] the nature of unconditionality accounted for the truth as regards the latter. ‘Similarly,’ he says, ‘as regards whatever is not’ (19a26-7). It is the same also as regards that which is not. Not that it is necessary of everything that is not that it not be; rather, at the time when it is not, then it is necessary that it not be – and this, again, in connection with the condition, not unconditionally. Therefore, having shown these two necessities – one conditional, the other unconditional – he now returns to the contingent contradiction about the future. 19a27 And the reasoning is the same as regards contradiction: it is indeed necessary that everything be or not be, and be going to be or not – not, however, that anyone dividing [the contradiction into its two parts] says the one or the other necessarily. But I mean that it is indeed necessary that there is going to be or is not going to be a sea battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary that there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow, or that there is not going to be one; rather, it is necessary that there is going to be one or not going to be one. Accordingly, since expressions are true in a way that is like the way in which the actual things are, it is evident that of any that are so disposed that they are in either of two ways and that their contraries occur, it is necessary that the contradiction be so disposed as well. This occurs in connection with those that not always are and not always are not. He has very plainly expounded the view he holds regarding contingent future propositions, saying as regards them that the whole aforesaid contradiction does indeed have either one true [and] the other false, but not in such a way that someone may divide [the contradiction] and reply that this one is indeed necessarily true but the other necessarily false. For example, as regards our saying ‘The sun is setting today’, ‘The sun is not setting today’, someone dividing these says very easily that it is necessarily true that the sun is setting today and that it is necessarily false that it is not setting. For the principle and nature of the divine bodies is so disposed that there is no affinity for opposites in them. And so what they are they necessarily are, or what they are not they necessarily are not. But [bodies] that are associated with generation and corruption

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are not like that. For in the very fact that they come into being and are corrupted they have an affinity for opposites. And so as regards them one is not to take one part of the contradiction and assert that it necessarily is, and to claim, on the other hand, that the other necessarily is not. [This is so] even though some one part of the whole contradiction is true [and] the other false, but unknowably and indefinitely – and not [just] from our point of view; rather, the very nature of the things, events, or states of affairs that are expressed propositionally [is] dubitable. Thus as regards the proposition ‘Socrates is going to read today’, ‘Socrates is not going to read today’, seen confusedly as regards the whole expression,62 one [part] of the whole contradiction is indeed true [and] one false (since either he is going to read or he is not going to read). But no one can divide [it] and reply that it is true that he is going to read, or that it is certainly true that he is not going to read. This is not because we do not know how to listen in on the future, however, but because the same thing, event, or state of affairs can both be and not be. Otherwise, if this were to come about on the basis of our lack of knowledge and not on the basis of the variable and indefinite issue of the things, events, or states of affairs themselves, that [familiar] impossibility would again occur – viz., that necessity governs all things. For it is not on account of our knowledge that what necessarily is is going to come about. Rather, even if we do not know it, there will be an established and undoubted outcome of any thing, event, or state of affairs: it is necessary that that thing, event, or state of affairs be. Therefore, since that cannot happen, and since there are certain things that do not develop necessarily but contingently, although truth or falsity is found in either part of the whole contradiction regarding them, it is not in such a way that someone may divide [it] and say that this one is indeed true but that one false. He has shown this with an example of this sort: for it is necessary that a sea battle either happen or not happen tomorrow. But, all the same, it will neither happen tomorrow necessarily nor not happen tomorrow necessarily in such a way that someone can divide [it] and make an assertion, saying ‘It will happen tomorrow’ so that he says it truly and it occurs in that way on the basis of something definite, or, on the other hand, ‘It will not happen tomorrow’, and it turns out in that same way. That cannot happen. Instead, one part of the contradiction is true [and] the other false only indefinitely. But which one will have come about? Now their outcome is not sorted out, for both the one and the other could come about. But this is so because the outcome of the things, events, or states of affairs is not dependent on certain older causes, as if somehow there were a sort of chain of necessity; but these [the occurrence or the non-

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occurrence] are based instead on our choice and free will, in which there is no necessity. But if, he says, ‘expressions are true in a way that is like the way in which the actual things are ’ (19a32). He took this over from Plato,63 who said similarly that expressions are related to things, events, or states of affairs, and that there somehow are corresponding entities in signification itself, so that if there are things, events, or states of affairs that are immutable and permanent by a stable principle, an expression regarding them would also be true and necessary. But if there were a thing, event, or state of affairs which by a diversity of nature would never remain perpetually, there would also not be fixed truth in the expressions; and no demonstration would emerge by means of expressions of that sort. Aristotle, then, taking this over as having been very well said, says this: Since, he says, expressions are arranged similarly to the way in which the things, events, or states of affairs are, it is obvious that since certain things, events, or states of affairs are such that they are in either of two ways and their contraries can occur, it is necessary that a contradiction that has to do with those that are unstable and indefinite by nature be arranged in such a way that if the things, events, or states of affairs are dubitable and of an indefinite and variable outcome, then the contradiction that is made regarding those things is also of a variable and indefinite outcome. Now he showed very plainly which things, events, or states of affairs would be of the sort whose outcome would be various and indefinite, saying ‘This occurs in connection with those that not always are and not always are not’ (19a35-6). For those regarding which it occurs in either of two ways are the ones that neither always are (for they can be corrupted) nor always are not (for they can be generated and come to be). For they are the ones that have an affinity for opposites, just as the outcome teaches regarding the very substance itself of the things themselves: for being and not being are opposed. But whatever was not and is generated and comes to be is out of that which was not. As regards that fact, then, it had an affinity for being and not being – i.e. for opposites. But if the very same thing that exists is corrupted, it is out of that which has been that it will not be. Again, then, it will have an affinity for opposites. And, accordingly, just as the issue of those actual things that have to do with generation and corruption is indefinite, so also the parts of the contradictions, too, even though as regards a whole contradiction one [part] is true [and] the other false. For which one of them is true and which one false is indefinite and not sorted out.

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19a36 For of them it is indeed necessary that the one or the other part of the contradiction be true or false – not, however, this one or that one, but in either of two ways – and that one is indeed true rather [than the other], but not already true, or false. Accordingly, it is evident that it is not necessary that of all affirmations or negations this one of the opposites is indeed true but that one false. He taught us above regarding those actual things that are in either of two ways that it is not that one part of the contradiction is definitely true but the other definitely false. Now he draws an argument from the more frequent and the more rare. For he showed above that there are certain things, events, or states of affairs that do indeed occur more frequently, although it is not ruled out that opposite things do sometimes occur, for what is rarer and less frequent does occur. Therefore, if as regards any things that come about in most cases it is not necessary that the one be true [and] the other false (because anyone who would say that a man turns grey in old age and claim that this is necessary would say what is false, for he can also not turn grey) – if, therefore, as regards those in connection with which the one thing, event, or state of affairs occurs more frequently [and] the other more rarely, the one is not definitely true [and] the other [definitely] false, then so much the less as regards those in connection with which the outcome of the opposites is equal. And it is indeed true to say that this occurs more frequently, but not absolutely that it occurs, because the opposite does occur, even though more rarely. But if it is not the case, as regards those things that are claimed in most cases, that one is definitely true [and] the other [definitely] false, and so much the less as regards those the outcome of which is equally unsorted out, then it is obvious as regards future contingent propositions that it is not the case that the one is true [and] the other false. This, of course, is what he contended at the outset by means of a very powerful line of argument. 19b2 For things that are are not disposed as are those that are not but possibly are or are not; how it is [with them] has already been said. He recalls the entire question raised at the outset relative to the division of times. For he said before that the propositions that would be framed are stated as regards the present, as regards the past, or as regards the future, and that those that were said about the past or the present do indeed have definite truth and falsity, whether they were said as regards things, events, or states of affairs divine and

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sempiternal or as regards things subject to birth and death, regarding which it would occur in either of two ways, since they had an affinity for opposites. However, if anyone were to speak in terms of the future as regards divine, immutable things, then in the same way one [contradictory opposite] is definitely true, and the other definitely false; for such natures have no affinity for opposites. But as regards those having to do with generation and corruption that have been stated about the future either affirmatively or negatively, [he said] that there is not the same sort of definite truth, but that one part of the whole contradiction is indeed true [and] the other false – not, however, one definitely true [and] the other definitely false. Now, however, he has introduced not both times – the present and the past – but only the present. For he has said ‘For things that are’ – i.e., those that are present – ‘are not disposed ’ (19b2-3). But in saying ‘as are those that are not but possibly are’ he is speaking of future things, which can be, even when they are not. For the stated proposition is not disposed regarding the present as it is disposed regarding the future – viz., in connection with things that are in either of two ways and are associated with generation and corruption. For as regards the former – i.e. past and present things – the one is definitely true [and] the other [definitely] false. As regards the latter – i.e. future and contingent things – the truth and falsity of propositions is constrained by nothing definite (nulla definitione). But now that we have to the best of our ability explained Aristotle’s position on future propositions, we will bring this lengthy volume to a close.

Notes to Boethius’ two commentaries 1. In order to bring out the breadth of meaning in Boethius’ use of res in these commentaries, I frequently translate it as ‘things, events, and states of affairs’. 2. Boethius uses ‘definitely true’ and ‘definitely false’ as technical terms, stronger than ‘true’ and ‘false’. What he means by those terms emerges gradually in these two commentaries. See, e.g., 106,23-107,16 below. 3. The standard ‘square of opposition’ for classical and medieval logic:

The upper corners are occupied by affirmative and negative universal propositions, the lower by affirmative and negative particular propositions. Boethius’ ‘opposition of particularity regarding universals universally predicated’ picks out the diagonal relations. A pair of contradictory propositions is such that the truth of either entails the falsity of the other, and the falsity of either entails the truth of the other. 4. The affirmative and negative forms of a singular (or individual) proposition are mutually contradictory, like a pair of universal affirmative and particular negative propositions with the same subject and predicate. 5. A subject-predicate proposition that is not singular and that lacks a quantifier (such as ‘every’ or ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘some’) is an indefinite proposition – e.g. ‘A man is walking.’ In the universal affirmative proposition ‘Every man is walking’, the universal man is ‘said universally’. In the corresponding

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indefinite proposition, the universal is ‘not said universally’, and so the corresponding negative indefinite proposition, ‘A man is not walking’, can be true together with the affirmative. 6. i.e. the inherence of the predicate in the subject. 7. ‘The sun returns to Aries every year’ is a necessary proposition (not logically necessary, like ‘Either P or not-P’, but physically or really necessary). Boethius confuses the example by claiming that what ‘made the whole proposition necessary’ is its including the modal expression ‘It is necessary that ’. (See his clearer treatment of a closely related example in the second commentary, 200,1-11.) Attaching that expression to ‘Socrates is bald’ or ‘Socrates is walking’ would make the whole proposition not necessary, but simply false, as Boethius himself recognizes in the second commentary (212,8-213,6). 8. At this point (108,2) Meiser has contingens est futurum (the contingent is future), but two of his manuscripts (MSS) have contingens est et futurum, and I base my translation on that variant. 9. What Boethius means to say, or is entitled to say, might be expressed this way: Necessarily, if ‘This stone is white’ is true, then this stone is white. But in his concluding clause here he seems to be guilty of a modal fallacy, inferring the necessity of the consequent – that this stone is white – from the necessity of the whole conditional statement. He expresses himself in this way more than once; see, e.g., 116,3-20 below. He puts the matter less misleadingly in the third sentence after this one: ‘it cannot happen that it is white while it is said truly that it is not white.’ 10. i.e. one proposition and its contradictory. 11. See n. 3 above. From the truth of one of a pair of contraries, the falsity of the other can be inferred; from the falsity of one, nothing can be inferred about the truth-value of the other. 12. At this point (115,29) Meiser reads dispositione (disposition), where several of his MSS have oppositione (opposition). 13. At this point (116,13) Meiser inserts the word falsa, which is not found in the MSS, and which would lead to this translation: ‘if it is a false affirmation’. 14. At this point (118,16) Meiser reads praedicatur (is predicted), where all his MSS have dicatur (is said). 15. Boethius distinguishes what is necessary temporally – e.g. necessarily, when I am seated, I am seated – from what is necessary unconditionally – e.g. necessarily, a human being is mortal (see 122,9-20). However, in the second commentary he introduces a condition for the necessity of the proposition that a human being is mortal. See n. 19 below. 16. i.e. a contradictory pair of propositions, each of which is contingent. 17. i.e. propositions or, as Boethius says here, ‘expressions’ about them. 18. The entire third book of Boethius’ second commentary is devoted to his treatment of De int. 9. Boethius’ introduction to the third book runs from 185,17-198,21. 19. Offhand, sempiternally or immutably necessary propositions would seem to be coextensive with those called unconditionally necessary in the first commentary (see n. 15 above). But in 187,22-188,2 Boethius says that his paradigm of unconditionally necessary propositions, that a human being is mortal, is necessary ‘as long as there is a human being,’ a condition that may not be always (or sempiternally) satisfied. And so perhaps sempiternally or immutably necessary propositions should be considered to be a limiting

Notes to pp. 147-164

189

case of those that are temporally necessary – i.e. necessary at all times. See also ‘the necessity  revealed by simple predication’ (or ‘unconditional necessity’) and ‘the necessity of some accidental characteristic’ (or ‘conditional necessity’) in 241,1-243,28. 20. See n. 6 above. 21. i.e. chance, possibility, and free choice; see, e.g. the first commentary (120,1-121,16). 22. Boethius’ annotations to Aristotle’s Physics, now lost, are referred to in his in Int. 190,13 and 458,27, and in his commentary on Cicero’s Topics 1153B. 23. Despite Boethius’ apparent personification of nature in the notion of what is ‘known to nature’, he seems to mean no more than what is in fact the case, whether or not it is known to human beings. 24. See nn. 3 and 4 above. 25. See 189,19-190,11. 26. In fact, Boethius does not consider Epicurean views in the following comparative consideration; cf. 239,20-4. Notice that he allies himself with the Aristotelians in this matter; cf. 195,2-10 and 197,5-10. 27. i.e. being animal is a consequence of being human, while being animal is incompatible with being stone. 28. See nn. 3 and 4 above. 29. Here and in the penultimate sentence of this paragraph he must mean that their truth or falsity is not yet known even to nature. See n. 23 above. 30. Boethius acknowledges his dependence on Porphyry’s commentary on de Interpretatione, which is lost. See also 219,17-28. 31. See, e.g., 104,4-22 in the first commentary; 192,22-193,6 in the second. 32. Socrates, of course, did not die of natural causes but as a consequence of free choice – the executioner’s and his own. Consequently, the claim that his dying tomorrow is certain to nature and to God makes this a peculiarly troublesome example for Boethius, who argues skilfully and famously at the end of the Consolation of Philosophy against the alleged incompatibility between God’s omniscience and human freedom. The account of the relationship between divine foreknowledge and ‘the necessity of outcomes’ he provides later in this commentary (225,9-226,13) makes no use of the concept of atemporal eternity and is pretty clearly unsuccessful. (See n. 50 below.) The sort of example Boethius seems to want here depends on someone’s dying tomorrow as a consequence of the unimpedable progress of a disease. 33. At this point (204,18) Meiser has ducta (drawn); two of his MSS have dicta (said). 34. See n. 3 above. From the falsity of one of a pair of subcontraries, the truth of the other can be inferred; from the truth of one, nothing can be inferred about the truth-value of the other. 35. See n. 5 above. 36. See nn. 3 and 4 above. 37. See n. 9 above. 38. Aristotle Int. Ch. 13. 39. At this point (211,14) Meiser has vera (of those truths that are predicted); one of his MSS has vere (truly). 40. In the strict sense of ‘proprium’, a proprium is a characteristic entailed by but not explicitly part of the definition of a thing – the fourth of Porphyry’s five predicables. (The others are genus, species, differentia, and accident.) The standard example of a proprium is the capacity for laughter as a

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proprium of a rational animal. It is in this sense that the impossibility that both propositions be false is here said to be a proprium of a pair of contradictories. 41. See nn. 34 and 11 above. It might be said to be a proprium of subcontraries that they can be true together, and of contraries that they can be false together. 42. At this point (215,24) Meiser has aut (or), although his MSS have ut (so that). 43. At this point (215,26) Meiser has illa (that); one of his MSS has illarum (of them). 44. See n. 30 above. 45. See n. 5 above. 46. Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentary on de Interpretatione is also lost. 47. It is a thesis of Aristotelian cosmology that generation and corruption take place only on earth (or below the sphere of the moon). 48. See nn. 3 and 4 above. 49. See n. 32 above. 50. The issue here is not the modal status – necessary or contingent – of the propositions God knows to be true. The issue is ‘the necessity of outcomes’, where the only relevant outcome is the actual obtaining of the state of affairs regarding which God knows that it will obtain. Necessarily, if X knows that P, then P – regardless of whether or not X is God, and regardless of whether P is necessary or contingent. And that uncontroversially necessary conditional seems to guarantee the unavoidability of all outcomes in case there is an X who now knows that P for every future-tense proposition P that will turn out to be true. Boethius insists that even though there is just such a universal knower of the future, his knowledge must include knowledge of the modal status of the propositions. And, of course, all the interesting ones among them will be not necessary but contingent. However, if God knows now both that John will freely sin tomorrow, and that John’s freely sinning is of course not necessary but contingent, John’s freely sinning tomorrow is nonetheless ineluctable – an outcome that must occur. Presumably Boethius himself would have disowned this earlier treatment of the problem when, near the end of his life, he came up with his solution in terms of the atemporality of God’s knowledge (Consolation V, pr. 6). 51. At this point (230,7) Meiser has nec (and not), although his MSS have et (and). 52. At this point (231,24-25) I am using one of the readings – et non fiunt si nolimus – Meiser supplies in his apparatus as preferable to the rejected reading ut fierent si velimus. 53. Capricorn is between Sagittarius and Aquarius. Either Boethius’ knowledge of the zodiac is shaky, or he considers thirty days or more to be only a few. 54. Reading vero rather than ergo. 55. The views of Philo and Diodorus are discussed briefly in Chapter 2 above and more fully in Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, ch. 4. 56. These examples are derived originally from Plato Phaedo 103C-105C. 57. At this point (237,21) I am using one of the readings – quamlibet – Meiser supplies in his apparatus as preferable to the rejected reading quam. 58. Omitting non. 59. See n. 26 above.

Notes to pp. 180-184

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60. See nn. 15 and 19 above. 61. At this point (241,24) Meiser has dicimus non (we say ‘it is not’), where one of his MSS has non dicimus (we do not say). 62. i.e. considering those two singular propositions as ‘the whole contradiction’. 63. See Timaeus 29B-C (I owe this reference to Terry Irwin).

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English-Greek Glossary absolutely: haplôs activity, actuality: energeia affirm, to: diabebaiousthai all: pan, panta always: aei ambiguous, ambivalent: amphibolos anterior cause: proaitios argument: epikheirêsis, logos art: tekhnê assignment: diakrisis assumption: lêmmation attack: ephodos axiom: axiôma

definite manner, in a: aphôrismenôs, hôrismenôs deliberate, to; deliberation: bouleuesthai destruction: anairesis diagonal: diagônios, diametros different things at different times: allote alla different at each time: allote allôs directly: eutheia, ep’ eutheias divide, to; make distinctions: diairein, diorizesthai divine: theios

being: on blameworthy: psektos bring about, to; derive: paragein

ease: rhaistônê either so or so: toios ê toios empty: kenos end: peras, telos enter along with, to: suneiserkhesthai equal, equally: isos, ep’ isês essence; in conformity with its essence: ousia; ousiôdês eternal: aïdios, aiônios ethical: êthikos event: sumptôma evidence: enargeia exercise, to: gumnazein exhort, to: protrepein exist, to; being: einai exist parasitically, to: paruphistasthai existence: huparxis, hupostasis experience: peira express, to: phthengesthai

cause: aitia cause (of); responsible: aitios chance: tukhê change (n.): metabolê change, to : metaballein character, proper quality: idiotês choice: hairesis, proairesis coming to be: genesis comprehend, to: sunoran conception, concept: ennoia conclude, to; draw a conclusion: sunagein conclusion: sumperasma confirmation, establish: kataskeuê conjectural: eikastikos contingent: endekhomenon contradict, to: antiphaskein contradiction: antiphasis contrary: hupenantios convertible, to be: antistrephein cooperate, to: sumprattein creation: gennêma decline: hupobasis deficiency: endeia definite: hôrismenos

false; falsity; to be false: pseudês; pseudos; pseudesthai famous: eukleês fate: heimarmenê first: prôtos fit, to: prosarmottein flowing, flux: rheustos, rhusis follow, to: hepesthai follows from or upon: akolouthos force (n.): dunamis force, to: katepeigein

198 future: mellôn generated: gennêtos geometrical: geômetrikos god: theos going to be: mellon govern, to: diakubernan grasp: antilêpsis hypothesis, assumption: hupothesis hold, to: huparkhein ignorant, to be: agnoein illuminate, to: ellampesthai imagination: epinoia immaterial: aülos inactive: anenergêtos incorporeal: asômatos indefinite: aoristos indefinite, infinite: apeiros indicate in addition, to: episêmainesthai indivisible: adiairetos indivisibly: ameristôs indubitably, unhesitatingly: anendoiastôs inexpert: idiôtikôs innate: autophuês intellectual: noeros intelligence: nous intelligible: noêtos interpreter: exêgêtês investigation: zêtêsis irrational, illogical: alogos know, to; knowledge: ginôskesthai; gnôsis, eidêsis lack of thought: anoia light: phôs logical, verbal, rational: logikos manifestation: emphasis master, in charge: kurios matter: hulê monster: teras moon: selênê most part, for the: hôs epi to polu multiplied: peplêthusmenon name: onoma nature; natural: phusis; phusikos necessity; necessary: anankê; anankaios

Indexes non-existence: anuparxia now: nun occur, to: ekbainein opposed, to be: antidiairein oracle: khrêsmos, manteia outcome: ekbasis parasitic existence: parupostasis particular: oikeios particular; divisible; particular cause: kata meros; meristos; merikê aitia passing away: phthora past: parelêluthôs, parôikhêkôs pay attention, to; note: ephistanein perfection: teleiotês perhaps: takha perishable: phthartos philosophy: philosophia physician: iatros pious: hosios political: politikos power: exousia practical: praktikos praiseworthy: epainetos pray, to; offer a prayer: eukhesthai precede, to: proêgeisthai predicate: katêgoroumenon pre-establishment: prokatabolê present: enestôs principle, beginning, origin: arkhê problem: problêma properly-speaking, properly: kuriôs prophecy, to: manteuesthai prophecy, prediction: prorrhêsis prophetess: prophêtis providence; providential; foretell, to: pronoia; pronoêtikos; pronoeisthai purifying: kathartikos puzzle: aporia rare: spanios reap: therizein reason: logos refute, to: dielenkhein result: apotelesma seat: kathedra seek, to; what one is seeking: zêtein; zêtoumenon self-mover: autokinêtos sense (meaning) of, to be the; want: boulesthai sentence: logos

Indexes show, to; indicate: endeiknusthai signify additionally, to: prossêmainein similar, the same: homoiôs simple: haplous single act, by a: henoeidôs singular, individual: hekastos sphere: sphaira spontaneous, spontaneously: automatos, ek tautomatou stern, from the: ek prumnês strengthen, to; be strong: kratunein study: theôrêma succeed, to: katorthoun sun: hêlios supervene, to: episumbainein surface: epipedon syllogism: sullogismos teaching: huphêgêsis technical; technician: tekhnikôs; tekhnitês temporal: enkhronos, khronikos tendency: rhopê theoretical: theôrêtikos thing: pragma thought, intelligence: dianoia time: khronos toilsome: ergôdês tool: organon transcendence: huperokhê

199

transcendent: exêirêmenos true; truth; to be true: alêthês; alêtheia; alêtheuein unchangeable: atreptos unchanging, immutability: ametablêtos uncut: adiatmêtos understanding: noêsis undetermined: adioristos undistorted: adiastrophos ungeneratedly: agennêtôs unleisured: aphereponos, askholos unmixed: amigês unsound: sathros up to us: eph’ hêmin utter, to: propherein vainly; vain; vain toil: matên; mataios; mataioponia verb: rhêma vice: kakia virtue: aretê whichever, however: hopoteros wisdom: sôphrosunê wise: emphrôn word: lexeidion worse (adj.): kheirôn

Greek-English Index adiairetos, indivisible, 135,25 adiastatôs, without partition, 136,15 adiastrophos, undistorted, 133,13 adiatmêtos, uncut, 150,32 adioristos, undetermined, 129,32 aei, always, 128,23; 129,10; 134,32; 138,14.17; 144,18; 148,9; 151,10-14.16.18-19.21.24; 153,14.15.25; 154,37 agennêtôs, ungeneratedly, 136,17 agnoein, be ignorant, 132,13-14 aülos, immaterial, 132,28 aïdios, eternal, 131,8; 134,26; 136,5; 150,27; 153,17.21; 154,6 aiônios, eternal, 133,26.27 aiôniôs, eternally, 136,17 aitia, cause, 131,9.12; 134.32; 138,9-10; 142,27; 149,28; aitiologikos, causal, 141,2 aitios, cause (of); responsible, 134,3; 136,5; 149,27.28 akhris, until, 150,32 akleês, without fame, 149,14 akolouthos, follows from or upon, consequent, 138,12.15; 141.18; 150,18 akros; ta akra, peak; absolutely, 135,28; 153,36 alêtheia, truth, 130,28; 132,21; 139,29; 140,18.33; 141,10.26; 146,18; 154,4; 155,3 alêtheuein, be true, 129,11.13-14; 130,5.9.13.15.19.24; 140,3-4.16-17.19; 141,8.33; 143,17-19; 144,18-19; 145,13; 149,20.23.28; 152,10; 153,2.9.12.21; 154,5.12-13.23.25; 155,1.4.5 alêthês, true, 128,24.26; 129,3.18-9.21.25.28.31; 130,4.22; 131,3; 132,3; 137,28; 138,15.17.22.28; 139,10.15.17.31; 140,12; 141,3-4.11-12.14-15.19.22.25; 144,15.21; 145,10.30; 146,11; 147,21; 148,8.10.25.27.32;

153,4-5.23.25.31; 154,9.16.27; 155,6.8 allote alla, different things at different times, 134,13 allote allôs, at each time different, 131,9 alogos, irrational, illogical, 134,1; 137,32; 148,16; 150,23 ameristôs, indivisibly, 136,15 ametablêtos, unchanging, immutability, 133,23; 135,25; 136,3.23 amigês, unmixed, 132,14 amphibolos, ambiguous, ambivalent, 133,33; 134,7; 136,28; 137,15.19.21 anaireisthai, be destroyed, 141,34-5 anairesis, destruction, 141,16 anankaios, necessary, 128,27; 129,10.26; 130,3.5.29; 131,21.34; 132,2; 133,30; 135,7; 136,9.16.26.30; 139,7; 144,28; 145,1.12; 146,2; 151,21; 152,34; 153,13.34; 154,4.6.13.23.36 anankaiôs, necessarily, 130,6-7; 132,5; 133,11; 135,8; 140,20; 141,15; 143,12; 146,7.28; 149,21.33 anankazein, make necessary, necessitate, 131,18.21; 137,25.30; 144,23; 148,4.19 anankê, necessity, be necessary, 128,29; 129,16; 130,6.30.36; 131,7.10.12.28.30; 133,23; 134,3; 135,27.31; 137,3.26.29; 138,15.29.32; 140,1.16-17; 141,5-6.19.21.24.31.37; 143,5; 144,23; 145,2-3.7.13.18; 146,16; 147,23; 148,17.21.30.32; 149,3; 150,22; 153,2.6-7.9.12.16.18.22. 24.27.30; 154,5.8.13.15-16.23-4.27.32.35 anaphainesthai, appear, 133,28 anarrhêgnunai, gush, 142,29 anastellein, deflect, 133,4 anastrephein, occupation, 137,12

Indexes anendoiastôs, indubitably, unhesitatingly, 137,10; 148,28 anenergêtos, inactive, 151,22 anepitêdeiotês, ineptitude, 132,30 anoia, lack of thought, 133,33 antidiairein, be opposed to, 136,23 antilêpsis, grasp, 134,2 antiphasis, contradiction, 130,2; 131,3; 138,19.30; 139,11; 140,1; 143,5.18; 146,12; 147,20; 148,7; 149,17; 154,7.11-12.29.33; 155,1 antiphaskein, contradict, 129,34; 141,32 antiphrattein, block, impede, 132,27.30 antiprattein, thwart, 150,19 antisêkoun, balancing, 149,9 antistrephein, be convertible, interconvertible, 141,7.25.28; 149,26 anuparxia, non-existence, 139,30; 140,34; 143,5 aoristos, indefinite, 132,12; 133,15.33; 135,2; 136,12; 137,1 aoristôs, in an indefinite manner, 131,4; 138,17; 139,15 apagesthai, be led off, 132,9 apantan, answer, 135,14 aparapodistôs, unimpededly, 132,29 apeiros, indefinite, infinite, 144,20; 153,15 aperiskeptôs, thoughtlessly, 149,18 aphereponos, unleisured, 132,18 aphôrismenôs, in a definite manner, 131,3; 138,17.20; 139,9.15; 141,20; 144,11; 145,30; 148,9; 154,11; 155,1 apokathistanai, bring into being, 145,11 apokhrêsthai, absurdity, 147,29 apoklinein, incline, 151,30 apoperatôsis, extreme edge, 133,30 apoplanasthai, be (far) afield, 137,25 apoplêrôsis, perfected, 144,17 aporia, puzzle, 131,22 aporriptesthai, banish, 133,30 apotelesma, result, product, 134,5; 142,7 apotrepein, dissuade, 130,34 ardên, completely, 150,24 aretê, virtue, 135,26.29; 150,21 arkhê, principle, beginning, starting point, origin, 138,1; 147,20.26; 148,33; 151,7

201

arrôstos, patient, sick person, 137,8.10; 140,15 askholos, unleisured, 132,20 asômatos, incorporeal, 132,28 atreptos, unchangeable, unchanging, constancy, 134,14.29; 136,23 autokinêtos, self-mover, 131,18; 137,22; 138,3 automatos, ek tautomatou, spontaneous, spontaneously, spontaneity, 131,1; 132,17; 142,15.21.22 autophuês, innate, 147,28 autothen, immediately, 133,10; 141,34; 148,26 axia, desert, 137,23 axiôma, axiom, 146,11 boulesthai, be the sense (meaning) of, want, 138,26; 139,26.30; 140,32; 144,12; 145,4 bouleuesthai, deliberate, deliberation, 134,12-13.17; 138,8; 142,18.20; 148,13-14.29.32; 149,4.7; 150,17.28-9; 151,4 bouleutikos, capable of deliberation, 148,12.16.23; 151,32 boulê, deliberation, 134,12; 142,19 daimonios, demonic, 131,13 dêlêtêrion, poison, 138,3 diabebaiousthai, give assurances, affirm, 142,11; 154,27 diagônios, diagonal, 129,3.22; 138,18.23.32-3; 148,8 diairein, divide, make distinctions, 129,3-4; 154,3 diakosmein, arrange, 132,14; 133,9; 134,11.31 diakosmêsis, arrangement, 132,19; 135,30 diakrisis, assignment, 130,11 diakubernan, govern, 131,6 diametros, diagonal, 153,28 dianoia, thought, intelligence, 134,1; 137,21; 148,25 diaphanês, transparent, 132,27 dielenkhein, refute, 139,27 diïstanai, open, 142,28 dikhothen, in two ways, 147,31 diorizesthai, make a distinction, 153,10 dunamis, force, 141,17

202

Indexes

dusantibleptos, difficult to face/oppose, 132,8; 135,12 eidêsis, knowledge, 136,4 eikastikos, conjectural, 133,29 einai, exist, being, 133,22; 149,27; 150,27; 151,23 ekbainein, occur, 130,12.25; 131,8.30; 132,5; 133,16; 135,7.9; 136,13.15.28.30; 139,4-5; 140,20; 141,13; 143,9.12; 145,14.16.19; 146,8.28; 147,23; 149,18.20.23-4.30; 152,3-4.27; 154,27 ekbasis, outcome, 132,11; 134,20-1.26; 136,26; 139,18; 140,19.21; 145,10; 146,8.19.29; 147,24; 148,25; 149,23.29, 31; 150,31; 141,26; 152,1; 154, 25-6 ekpodôn, elimination, 147,22; 148,11 ekteinein, extend, 131,4 ektithesthai, set out, 131,22 ellampesthai, illuminate, 137,19 elpis, par’ elpida, unexpectedly, 142,23 emphasis, manifestation, 136,22 emphrôn, wise, 132,21 emplêxia, madness, 134,21 enargeia, evidence, 135,13; 147.25; 148,3-4; 150,25 enargês, evident, 132,3; 146,12; 150,23 endeia, deficiency, 138,7 endeiknusthai, show, indicate, 138,31; 139,6.20; 151,3 endeixis, explain, 141,3 endekhomenon, contingent, 140,21; 141,35; 142,1-2; 143,3; 150,26; 151,27-8 endekhomenôs, contingently, 131,8 energeia, activity, actuality, 133,29; 134,14.23; 136,8; 151,21 energein, be actual, 151,10-11 enestôs, present, 129,17.30; 130,12.18.23; 138,20.33; 139,9; 146,19; 153,10 enkatalegesthai, be counted, 151,23 enkheirein, deal with, 148,33; 150,17 enkhronos, temporal, 136,16 ennoia, conception, concept, 133,13; 147,29 epagein, bring on, 147,29 epainetos, praiseworthy, 130,32 epanagein, return, 138,11 epexergasia, elaboration, 144,13

eph’ hêmin (etc.), up to us, 130,31; 131,17; 137,27.30 147,24; 148,13; 150,22-3.29.31; 134,7 ephistanein, pay attention, note, 134,24; 137,16 ephodos, attack, 141,17; 143,16 epiballein, be due, 134,27 epikheirêsis, argument, 132,7; 144,14; 145,9; 149,15.19 epinoia, imagine, 133,22 epipedon, surface, 137,5-6 epiprostithesthai, be obscured, 153,22.23 episêmainesthai, also indicate, 138,26 episkepsis, investigate, 155,2 epistatikôteros, most expert, 132,9 epistrephesthai, return, 135,26 episumbainein, supervene, 142,16.26 epopteuein, survey, 133,8 ergôdês, toilsome, 132,20 erkhesthai eis tauton, amount to the same, 144,27 êthikos, ethical, 130,29 eukleês, famous, 149,13 eukleia, fame, 149,15 eukhesthai, pray, offer a prayer, 134,19; 142,27 eutheia, ep’ eutheias, directly, 150,25 exêirêmenos, transcendent, 134,33 exêgêtês, interpreter, 154,18 exousia, power, 148,14.23 genesis, coming to be, 150,27; 151,16 gennêma, creation, 134,5 gennêtos, generated, 136,6.17 geômetrikos, geometrical, 148,17 gêras, old-age, 149,15 ginôskesthai, know, 135,16-17 gnôsis, knowledge, 132,12.19.23.32; 133,16.29.32; 134,1.7; 135,2.15-16.19.23.28.32; 136,3.14.18; 137,1-2.14.17.19; 148,30 gnôstos, knowable, 135,19 gumnazein, exercise, 137,21 gônia, angle, 153,17 hairesis, choice, 133,3 hairetôteros, preferable, 149,8 haplôs, absolutely, 153,14.21.23.25.27.31.33-4; 154,5.13.23

Indexes haplous, simple, 134,14 heimarmenê, fate, 131,13; 138,9 hekastos, singular, individual, 130,2-3; 135,21.24; 138.19 hêliakon phôs, sunlight, 132,33 hêlios, sun, 135,15; 153,17.23.29 hêlios basileus, King Sun, 132,25; 133,2 henoeidôs, by a single act, 136,16 hepesthai, follow, 146,25; 147,22 hidrumenos, establish, 132,16; 133,27 hodos, means, 150,30 hoion, so to speak, 143,20 hoios dêpote, whatsoever, at all, 134,6; 144,17 holikôteros, more total, 134,33 homoiôs, similar, the same, 130,1.10 hopoteros, hopoter’ an etukhen, whichever, however it chances, 141,36; 143,4-5.7.21.23; 146,26; 149,10; 151,29; 155,3 hôrismenos, definite, 134,27 hôrismenôs, in a definite manner, 130,4.24; 131,7; 132,11; 134,25-6; 135,1; 136,3.14.27; 137,1-2.13.14; 140,13; 141,32-3; 142,26; 143,18-9; 147,21; 148,21; 149,17 horizôn, horizontal, 137,5 hosios, pious, 134,22 hote men, de, sometimes, 137,8.11 hulê, matter, 134,30; 138,7.27; 142,9 huparxein, will hold, 129,29; 130,17.20; 137,11; 140,5; 141,9; 146,1.22; 151,26 huparxis, existence, 132,16; 139,30; 140,33; 141,9.26; 143,4; 149,28 hupenantios, contrary, 138,5 huperokhê, transcendence, 132,22 huperpetesthai, leap over, 133,9 huphêgêsis, teaching, 135,15 huphesis, degradation, 136,9 hupobasis, decline, 136,9 hupographein, sketching, 149,4 hupokrinesthai, act the part of, 139,28 hupopteuein, suppose, 146,2 hupostasis, existence, 133,27.28; 143,22.25; 151,9 hupothesis, hypothesis, assumption, 131,31; 134,8; 139,14; 146,7 iatrikê tekhnê, art of medicine, 137,33 iatros, physician, 137,7; 142,12; 145,2

203

idiotês, character, proper quality, 132,16; 135,31 idiôtikôs, inexpert, 131,10 isos, ep’ isês, equally, 142,4; 143,1.9 kakia, vice, 150,21 kakozôïa, evil life, 133,5 katagelastos, ridiculous, 148,22 katalampein, illuminate, 132,26 kataskeuê, confirmation, establish, demonstration, 141,4; 144,9; 147,29 katepeigein, force, 148,26 katêgoroumenon, predicate, 128,24.26; 153,20.30; 154,1.15.30 kathartikos, purifying, 135,26 kathedra, seat, 142,32.33 katorthoun, be successful, succeed, 142,7.9 katô, downward, 143,1 kenos, empty, 135,9; 150,20 kentron, point, 143,20 kharaktêrizein, characterize, 151,24 kheirôn, worse (adj.), 135,31 kheironôs, worse (adv.), 135,19 khôra, room, place, 132,4.6; 144,12; 150,21 khrêsmos, oracle, 137,14-5.21 khronikos, temporal, of time, 133,27; 136,22 khronos, time, 128,27.29; 129,2.17.24.27.29.33; 130,1.4.10.18.21.23; 133,28; 134,15; 138,20.28-9.33-4; 139,8.12; 140,2; 141,13.32; 144,10.17.21; 145,11; 146,10.19; 147,21; 148,7; 150,33; 151,22; 153,4-5.9-10.16; 153,15 koinos, common, 133,13; 143,10 koinôs, in common, 138,18; 151,32 koinoteron, in a loose way, 151,6 kratunein, strengthen, be strong, 135,13; 139,27; 140,32 kreittôn, better (adj.), 135,22 kreittonôs, better (adv.), in a manner better, 135,18; 136,11.13 kurios, in charge, master, 130,31; 148,24; 151,2 kuriôs, properly-speaking, properly, 137,3; 153,14 lêmmation, assumption, 139,28; 140,32; 141,8; 146,18 lexeidion, word, 152,7 logikos, logical, verbal, rational, 130,28; 131,24.25; 133,30

204

Indexes

logos, argument, rôle, reason, speech, sentence, 131,21; 133,25; 135,24; 137,18; 149,27; 154,18 makhesthai, be contrary to, 147,25 manteia, oracle, 135,13 manteuesthai, prophesy, 140,14 mataioponia, vain toil, 148,11 mataios, vain, 151,22 matên, vainly, vain, 148,13; 150,17-18 mellôn, future, 128,28; 129,20-1.31; 130,21; 133,20.25; 136,2.19; 138,29.31.33; 139,5-6.12; 140,2; 141,32; 144,10; 145,17; 146,10.20; 147,20; 153,1.8 mellon, going to be, 139,2.3 mênis, wrath, 133,4 merikê aitia, particular cause, 131,9; 134,33 meristos, divisible, which has parts, 135,23; 136,15; 137,18 meros (to kata meros), particular, 132,21.22 metaballein, change (vb.), 133,21.24 metabolê, change (n.), 133,22; 134,30; 135,24; 136,20 metalambanesthai, transpose, 144,25 meteôros, from some height, 142,31 metharmozein, apply, 152,6 muein, close one’s eyes, 133,1 nephos, cloud, 153,22 noeros, intellectual, 132,16 noêsis, understanding, 137,17 noêtos, intelligible, 134,3; 136,24 nous, intelligence, 132,14; 135,20.24.25 nun, now, 133,26 oikeios, particular, 138,6; 142,13; 148,28 oikhesthai, disappear, 143,20 oligokhronios, short-lived, 149,12 oligos (hôs ep’ elatton), lesser, 142,3.9; 151,31; 155,8 ôneisthai, buy, 142,24 onoma, name, 135,9; 150,20; 151,4 organon, tool, 148,25 ousia, essence, 136,5.7 ousiôdês, in conformity with its essence, 151,21

pan, panta, all, 132,14; 133,27; 135,30 paragein, bring about, derive, 132,14.18; 135,31; 136,5 parapodizein, impede, 132,31 parelêluthôs, past, 128,28; 129,19-20.31; 130,12.19.23; 133,19.25; 136,19; 138,34 paristanai, support, 139,26 parôikhêkôs, past, 138,21 paruphistasthai, exist parasitically, 142,15-16.21.25.34 parupostasis, parasitic existence, 136,11 pêgê, spring, 142,29.30 peira, experience, 134,22 pelas, neighbour, 130,34 peras, end, 136,29 periagein, bring back, 133,12 perioran, neglect, 134,26 phthartos, perishable, 153,22; 154,6 phthengesthai, express, 129,33 phthora, passing away, 151,16 phthorion, abortifacient, 138,3 philosophia, philosophy, 130,29; 131,5 phôs, light, 132,33 phôtistikos, illuminating, 133,2 phusikos, natural, 142,34 phusiologia, natural philosophy, 130,35 phusiologos, natural philosopher, 130,36 phusis, nature, 132,17; 133,12; 134,28; 135,19; 136,8.12.14.28.30; 137,30-1; 138,5; 139,19; 142,6-7.22; 147,23; 148,1.12.16.18.21-2.26-7.29.31; 149,24.26; 151,2.19.22; 153,11; 154,11.17.19 piptein, fall, 133,5 pleein, sail, 139,6 pleonexia, excess, 138,7 peplêthusmenon, multiplied, 136,16 politikos, political, 135,20 polus (hôs epi to polu), for the most part, 142,1.5.7.9.11-13; 151,31.33-4; 155,7 polustikhos, lengthy, 134,22 poluthrullêtos, much bandied-about, 150,20 pragma, thing, 130,12.25; 134,26; 135,21; 136,15.18; 137,28; 139,18.30; 140,19-20.33;

Indexes 141,9.26.28; 146,7.13.28; 148,1; 149,20-1.23.26-9; 152,10; 153,11.13; 154,6.11.18.25 pragmateia, tales, 134,23 pragmateiôdês, troublesome, 132,8 pragmateiôdesteros, more troublesome, 131,23 pragmateuesthai, take trouble, 148,33; 151,7 praktikos, practical, 135,25 proagein, proceed, extend, develop, 131,24; 144,13.23; 146,12 proairesis, choice, 130,33; 134,15; 142,16.18-19.21.25.34; 143,2; 151,29 proaitios, anterior cause, 134,4; 136,6 problêma, problem, 147,26 proêgeisthai, precede, 133,23 proêgoumenôs, primarily, 136,10 proïenai, work, proceed, 132,7.10 proïstasthai, defend, 139,27 prokatabolê, pre-establishment, 145,12 prokheirizesthai, deal with, 135,20.29 prolambanein, prolabôn, foregoing, preceding; preconceive, 128,21; 144,9.21; 150,16; 136,14 pronoeisthai, have providence, foretell, 134,10; 135,10 pronoêtikos, providential, 134,32 pronoia, providence, 131,6.13; 132,31; 133,5.8 134,9-10.18 proodos, outing, 142,25 prorrhêsis, prophecy, prediction, 135,14; 141,15; 144,22; 149,31 prosarmottein, fit, 133,23 prossêmainein, additionally signify, 128,27 prosthesis, addition, 141,3 propherein, utter, 154,7 prophêtis, prophetess, 137,17 protrepein, exhort, 130,33 prôtos, first, 131,5 prumna (ek prumnês), from the stern, 134,11 psektos, blameworthy, 130,33 pseudês, false, 130,17; 138,22.28; 139,31; 141,19-20.25; 147,22; 148,10; 155,6 pseudesthai, be false, 130,7-8.14.20; 135,7; 140,3.11.17; 141,29.34; 146,14-15; 152,11; 155,4-5 pseudos, falsity, 130,5.11.22; 131,3; 138,15.17; 139,10.15.30;

205

140,13.33-4; 141,27; 144,11; 145,31; 146,3.23; 148,8; 155,2 pseudôs, falsely, 147,32 rhaistônê, ease, 132,21 rhêma, verb, 128,26.27 rheustos, flowing, flux, 134,27.30; 142,9 rhopê, tendency, 142,34 rhusis, flux, 136,17 saleuesthai, be shaken, 154,22 sathros, unsound, 148,3; 152,34 seismos, earthquake, 142,28 selênê, moon, 153,22 sôphrosunê, wisdom, 133,31 spanios, rare, 142,2.8 spaniôs, rarely, 142,16 spaniôteros, more rare, 152,2.4 sphaira, sphere, 137,4 sphingein, concentrate, 147,25 stathmasthai, be measured, 132,24 stereos, solid, 132,27 sullogismos, syllogism, 141,18 summetros, commensurate, 153,28 sumparatheein, parallel, 136,17 sumperasma, conclusion, 141,23.27 sumprattein, cooperate, 150,19 sumptôma, event, 142,33 sunagein, draw a conclusion, lead to a conclusion, 141,18; 152,34-5 suneiserkhesthai, enter along with, 136,9 sunekhesthai, be held together, 134,31 sunoran, comprehend, 132,22 sustoikhos, on the same level (adj.), 135,27 sustoikhôs, on the same level (adv.), 135,19 takha, perhaps, 131,25-8.31.33 teleios, perfect, 148,30; 151,19 teleiotês, perfection, 135,28; 138,4 telos, end, 138,6; 142,13; 148,28 teras, monster, 138,6; 142,8 teratôdesteros, more monstrous, 146,17 tekhnê, art, 137,34; 138,1; 142,6; 148,29 tekhnikôs, technical, 153,8 tekhnitês, technician, 138,1; 142,13 têide, here, 135,10 tênallôs, incorrectly, 151,23

206

Indexes

teôs, so far, thus far, 132,7; 148,5 thea, spectacle, 142,28 theios, divine, 131,13; 134,22; 135,14.30 theos, god, 132,11-12.20.28.31; 133,4.5.10.15.19.25.32; 134,4.8.9; 135,8.10 therizein, reap, 131,25-9.33-4; 132,3-4 theôrêma, study, 130,27 theôrêtikos, theoretical, 135,29

toios ê toios, either so or so, 136,29 trigônon, triangle, 153,17 tukhê, chance, 131,1; 142,14-15.20.24.30.33.36; 143,7; 145,7 zêtêsis, investigation, 137,12 zêtoumenon, what one is seeking, 132,2.3

English-Latin Glossary accidental characteristic: accidens action: actio, actus actuality: actus affinity: cognatio affirmation: adfirmatio, positio agent: agens alterable: volubilis animal: animal art, logical: ars logica attendant: sequax being: essentia capacity: potentia category: categoria cause, fundamental: principalis causa certain: certus chain of necessity: catena necessitatis chance: casus cognition: notitia condition: condicio conditional: condicional conform (v.): subsequi consequence: consequentia consequent: consequens contingent: contingens contingent (v.): contingere contingent, future: futurus contingens contingent, properly: proprie contingens contradiction: contradictio contradiction, contingent: contingens contradictio contradiction, diagonal: angularis contradictio contradiction, future and contingent: futura et contingens contradictio contradictory: contradictorius contradictory (n.): contradictum contrary: contrarius corruption: corruptio decision of judgment: electio iudicationis definite: definitus

definitely true/definitely false: definite verus/definite mendax definition: definitio deliberate (v.): consiliari deliberation: consiliatio, consilium demonstration: demonstratio designate (v.): designare determinately: constitute determinately true: determinate verus disposed (v.): habere se divine body: divinum corpus doctrine: sententia equally: aequaliter essence: ratio event: res explanation: causa expression: oratio fate: fatum fateful principle: ratio foretelling: praenuntiatio fortune: fortuna free choice: liberum arbitrium freeborn: ingenuus generation: generatio God: deus ignorance: ignorantia imagination: imaginatio immortal: inmortalis impossibility: inpossibilitas in-either-of-two-ways: utrumlibet incompatible: repugnans incongruous: incongruus indefinite: indefinitus indefinite (n.): indefinitum indeterminacy of nature: instabilitas naturae indeterminable: instabilis individual: individuus inherent (v.): inesse intention: animus, intentio interchangeable (v.): convertere

208

Indexes

interpretation: sensus inversion: hyperbaton judgment: iudicium knowledge: notio, scientia knowledge of God: scientia dei logical character: ratio matter: materia mind: animus mode: modus motion: motus nature: natura nature, proper: propria natura necessary: necessarius necessity: necessitas necessity, sempiternal: sempiterna necessitas negation: negatio occurence of a state of affairs: res subsistens oppose diagonally (v.): opponere angulariter opposite: oppositus opposition: oppositio opposition, contradictory: contraria dispositio opposition of propositions: oppositio propositionum outcome: eventus particularity: particularitas plan: ratio possible: possibilis possibility: possibilitas potentiality: potentia power: potentia, potestas predicament: praedicamentum predicated: praedicatus predication, simple: simplicis praedicatio predict (v.): praedicere property, natural: proprium prophecy: divinatio proposition: propositio proposition, categorical: categorica propositio proposition, hypothetical: hypothetica propositio

proposition, necessary: necessaria propositio proposition, predicative: praedicativa propositio proposition of a contradiction: oppositio contradictionis proprium: proprium providence: providentia providence, divine: divina providentia quality: qualitas reality: res reason: ratio reasoning: ratio sempiternal: sempiternus sense: sensus signification: significatio signification, proper: propria significatio signification, immutable: immutabilis significatio signification, sempiternal and necessary: sempiterna et necessaria significatio signify (v.): significare singular: singularis soul: anima source: principium spirit: animus state of affairs: res statement: enuntiatio, praedicamentum, praedicatum status: modus, status subcontrary: subcontrarius substance: substantia suitability: convenientia syllogism: syllogismus temporally: temporaliter theory: ratio thing: res thought: cogitatio, sensum time: tempus truth: veritas unconditional: simplicis unconditionality: simplicitas unconditionally: simpliciter understanding: intellectus undifferentiated: indiscretus universal: universalis up to us: in nobis

Indexes utterance: vox utterance, statement-making: enuntiavara vox variable: variabilis various: varius

view: sententia way: modus will: voluntas will, natural: naturalis voluntas

209

Latin-English Index References are to the first or second commentary (I or II), followed by the page and line numbers of the Latin text which appear in the margins of the translation. accidens, accidental characteristic, II 241,2 actio, action, II 194,6 actus, actuality, I 120,7; II 238,23 action, II 223,22 adfirmatio, affirmation, I 104,12 aequaliter, equally, II 188,9 agens, agent, II 194,13 anima, soul, II 195,13 animal, animal, II 196,3; II 231,12 animus, mind, II 216,21 intention, II 224,20 spirit, II 231,6 arbitrium (liberum arbitrium), free choice, I 110,26 ars logica, logical art, II 198,13 casus, chance, I 110,25 categoria, category, II 186,23 catena (necessitatis), chain of necessity, II 246,18 causa, explanation, I 111,9 (principalis), fundamental cause, II 197,25 certus, certain, I 108,11 cogitatio, thought, I 117,1; II 195,7 cognatio, affinity, II 236,14 (naturalis), II 236,20 condicio, condition, II 186,14 condicional, conditional, II 186,19 consequens, consequent, II 199,8 consequentia, consequence, I 109,26 consiliari, to deliberate, II 220,11 consiliatio, taking counsel, I 120,4 deliberation, II 220,13 consilium, deliberation, I 117,21 constitute, determinately, I 123,21 contingens, contingent, I 105,29 (futurus), future contingent, I 107,22 (proprie), properly contingent, II 203,2 contingere, to turn out to be, I 106,20 to be contingent, I 110,23

contradictio, contradiction, I 104,16 (contingens), contingent contradiction, I 122,23 (futura et contingens), future and contingent contradiction, I 123,1 (angularis), diagonal contradiction, II 202,16 contradictorius, contradictory, II 205,16 contradictum, contradictory, I 105,11 contrarius, contrary, I 115,28 convenientia, suitability, II 242,5 convertere, to be interchangeable, I 110,18 corpus (divinum), divine body, II 238,22 corruptio, corruption, II 238,4 definite (verus, mendax), definitely true/definitely false, I 104,5 definitus, definite, I 104,26 definitio, definition, II 189,19 demonstratio, demonstration, II 246,28 designare, to designate, I 124,16 determinate (verus), determinately true, I 125,9 deus, God, II 225,10 dispositio (contraria), contradictory opposition, I 115,29 divinatio, prophecy, II 224,28 electio (iudicationis), decision of judgment, II 197,9 enuntiatio, statement, I 104,5; II 199,12 essentia, being, I 109,28 eventus, outcome, I 111,14 fatum, fate, II 197,24 fortuna, fortune, II 194,25 generatio, generation, II 238,3

Indexes habere se, to be disposed, I 124,17 hyperbaton, inversion, I 120,1 ignorantia, ignorance, II 194,26; II 208,18 imaginatio, imagination, II 196,23 in nobis, up to us, II 217,19 incongruus, incongruous, I 116,4 indefinitus, indefinite, I 105,12 indefinitum, indefinite, II 205,14 indiscretus, undifferentiated, I 108,4 individuus, individual, I 104,18 inesse, to be inherent, I 105,20 ingenuus, freeborn, II 218,10 inmortalis, immortal, II 186,30 inpossibilitas, impossibility, II 226,22; II 245,23 instabilis, indeterminable, I 108,2 instabilitas (propria naturae), II 193,19 intellectus, understanding, II 210,25 intentio, intention, II 194,13 iudicium, judgment, I 109,24; II 193,27 materia, matter, II 238,9 modus, way, I 107,23 mode, II 190,12 status, II 209,31 motus, motion, II 239,2 natura, nature, I 106,10; II 187,11; II 192,5; II 194,18; II 196,3 (propria), proper nature, II 186,27; II 195,14 necesse, necessary, I 104,11 necessarius, I 105,24; II 239,9 necessitas, necessity, I 105,27 (sempiterna), sempiternal necessity, II 187,9 negatio, negation, I 104,13 notio, knowledge, II 226,6 notitiam, cognition, II 192,14 opponere (angulariter), to be diagonally opposed, II 199,20 oppositio, opposition, I 104,16 (contradictionis), proposition of a contradition, I 109,16 (contradictoria propositionum), contradictory opposition of propositions, I 115,13 oppositus, opposite, II 245,1

211

oratio, expression, I 124,16 particularitas, particularity, I 104,17 positio, affirmation, II 186,14 possibilis, possible, I 106,11 possibilitas, possibility, I 106,14; II 203,5 potentia, capacity, I 106,21 power, II 224,19 potestas, potentiality, I 120,7; II 238,23 power, II 218,10 praedicamentum, predicament, II 186,23 praedicatio (simplicis), simple predication, II 241,3 praedicatum, statement, I 105,9 praedicatus, predicated, I 104,16 praedicere, to predict, I 113,19 praenuntiatio, foretelling, II 228,22 principium, source, I 120,3 propositio, proposition, I 105,20 (categorica), categorical proposition, II 186,13 (hypothetica), hypothetical proposition, II 186,19 (necessaria), necessary proposition, II 187,5 (praedicativa), predicative proposition, II 186,22 proprium, proprium, II 215,1 (natum), natural property, II 236,16 providentia, providence, II 194,23 (divina), divine providence, II 232,6 qualitas, quality, II 236,15; II 239,7 ratio, essence, II 239,21 fateful principle, II 217,22 logical character, I 107,30 plan, II 239,16 reason, II 196,16 reasoning, I 120,19; II 226,24 theory, II 219,7 repugnans, incompatible, II 199,8 res, thing, event, state of affairs, I 104,4 reality, II 197,3 (subsistens), occurrence of a state of affairs, I 109,26 scientia, knowledge, II 225,1 (dei), knowledge of God, II 225,11

212

Indexes

sempiternus, sempiternal, II 186,25 sensum, thought, II 185,20 sensus, interpretation, II 220,9 sense, II 205,4 sententia, doctrine, II 186,3 view, II 193,25 sequax, attendant, II 196,25 significare, to signify, I 123,17 significatio, signification, II 199,11 (propria), proper signification, I 124,15 (inmutabilis), immutable signification, II 186,28 (sempiterna et necessaria), sempiternal and necessary signification, II 187,1 simplicis, unconditional, I 123,28 simpliciter, unconditionally, I 121,26; II 243,13 simplicitas, unconditionality, II 243,20 singularis, singular, I 104,17 (praedicamentum), singular statement, I 107,17

(propositio), singular proposition, I 107,21 status, status, I 125,3 subcontrarius, subcontrary, II 205,13 subsequi, to conform, I 110,6 substantia, substance, II 199,14 syllogismus, syllogism, I 111,22 temporaliter, temporally, I 122,13 tempus, time, I 119,7 universalis, universal, I 104,15 utrumlibet, in-either-of-two-ways, I 106,14 variabilis, variable, I 108,2 varius, various, I 125,6 volubilis, alterable, I 108,5 veritas, truth, I 124,23 voluntas, will, I 117,20; II 195,12 (naturalis), natural will, II 195,19 vox, utterance, II 186,2 (enuntiavara), statement-making utterance, II 208,12

Subject Index Page numbers marked ‘A’ are to CAG numbers of Ammonius’ text, those marked ‘B’ are to Meiser’s text of Boethius’s two commentaries. absurdity/incongruity, A147,25ff; B116,4; 117,10ff; 216,21 Achilles, A149,12 action, A130,33; 135,21; 148,24ff; 150,28; 151,4-8; B117,21; 120,3; 194,6ff; 196,24; 223,22; 226,12; 231,7; 232,20; activity, A131,24; 133,29; 134,14; 135,17; 137,17 actuality, A135,6.8; 151,21; B120,7; 237,10ff affinity for opposites, B243,14; 245,1; 247,17; 249,21 Alexander, B219,29 animals, A134,1; 142,20; B116,6ff; 195,18; 197,1; 231,12 Aristotle, A130,3.27; 138,11; 140,33; 143,22; 145,19; 147,26; 151,3; 153,8; 154,3.17.19; B112,5; 186,3; 193,26; 198,4ff; 200,9; 208,2ff; 210,14; 215,16; 218,25ff; 226,26ff; 229,18; 230,20; 236,5; 243,9; 247,1; 250,14 Cat., A149,25 Metaph., A133,17 art, A137,33-138,4, 142,6f; 148,29f; B238,5 being, B109,28 body, B232,2ff causes, A131,9; 134,3ff; 135,5-6; 137,4; 138,7ff; 142,6.27; B223,19ff; 226,27ff; 239,16; 240,3; 246,16; chance, A131,1; 141,36; 142,14ff; 143,7; 145,7; B111,21.25; 114,17; 117,19; 190,3; 192,28; 193,27ff; 197,5ff; 209,2; 211,18ff; 217,15ff; 226,27ff; 230,21ff; 239,15ff choice, A130,33; 134,15; 142,16ff; 151,29; B110,26; 111,21; 190,3; 193,1ff; 197,7ff; 211,18ff; 217,14ff; 230,23ff; 239,17; 246,18

cloak, A141,5; 150,31; B120,10; 190,25; 237,24 coming to be/generation, A131,9; 150,27; 151,16; B220,1; 238,3; 245,3; 247,25; 249,26 concepts, A133,13; 147,29 conclusion, A141,18; 152,34f; 154,31 conjunction, A141,2 contingent, A129,13ff; 131, 31ff; 135,9ff; 136,1-137,11; 138,27; 143,21; 151,9.25; 154,2ff; B106,1ff; 123,27; 188,3; 190,23ff; 193,6ff; 200,11ff; 211,29ff; 234,22; 243,5 destruction of the contingent, A129,15; 132,10; 134,8-135,11; 139,26; 140,21; 141,34.37; 143,10.19; 145,29; 146,27; 147,22ff; 149,16; 152,34; 154,22; B110,23 contradiction/contradictories, A130,2; 131,3; 138,18-30; 148,7ff; 149,17; 154,3-20; B104,4; 105,11; 107,25; 108,3; 109,6ff; 118,12; 122,21ff; 122,27ff; 199,19; 214,29; 219,24ff; 235,10; 240,22; 243,27; 245,7ff; 247,27ff axiom of contradiction, A140,1; 146,11 contraries, B115,28; 211,12; 215,3; 238,10ff; 247,5 affinity for contraries, B236,7ff subcontraries, B215,1 deliberation, A134,12-17; 142,18ff; 148,12-151,8; 150,28ff; B117,21ff; 120,4ff; 220,11ff; 233,20 demiurge, A134,32 Diodorus, B234,22 division of true and false, A128,23f; 129,25ff; 130,4.21; 131,3; 138,14f; 139,9; 140,12; 144,11; 146,3, 147,21; 148,7; B107,26; 111,18; 199,26; 245,17ff

214

Indexes

end, A136,29; 148,28 Epicureans, B193,24; 239,25 equally/in an equal way, A142,4; 143,1ff; B112,24; 120,26ff; 188,4; 192,17; 200,13; 207,28; 240,15; 248,26 essence, A134,10; 135,27; 136,5; 151,21 eternal/sempiternal things, A131,8; 134,26; 150,27; 151,20; 153,16ff; B186,25ff; 249,18 existence, A132,27f; 139,30; 140,34; 141,9.14; 143,4.25; 149,28; 153,14.26 parasitic, A136,11; 142,15.25; 150,27; 151,9-152,11 fate, A131,13.16; 138,9; B217,21; 221,15 fire, A153,19; B236,8; 243,16 flux, A136,17; 142,9 for the most part/more frequent, A142,1.5-13; 151,30ff; 155,7 for the lesser part/more rare, A142,3.14-143,9; 151,31ff; 155,8 fortune, B194,25 God/gods benevolence, B226,14 knowledge, A132,11-135,11; 136,1-138,10; B225,9ff power, A132,23ff Greek, B186,13ff Homer, A131,14 ‘however it chances’, A141,36; 143,3ff; 146,26; 151,29; 153,3 Iamblichus, A135,12-32 ignorance, B194,19 imagination, B196,15ff impossibility, A144,18ff; 153,31; 154,36; B114,14ff; 117,14; 121,9; 210,14ff; 211,26; 217,13; 226,25; 236,4; 245,23 ‘in a definite manner’, A130,4.23; 131,3.7; 132,11; 134,25; 135,1; 136,1-137,11; 138,20; 139,9; 140,13; 141,20ff; 142,26; 143,18; 145,30; 147,21; 148,9.21; 149,17 ‘in an indefinite manner’, A131,4 ‘in either of two ways’, B106,14-22; 112.9ff; 114,17; 117,18; 120,27;

124,25; 193,2ff; 207,19ff; 211,17ff; 214,9; 220,25f; 240,6ff; 247,4ff ‘in our power’, A148,14.23 inherence, B105,20ff; 122,4ff; 188,4 intelligence, A135,20f; 137,21; 148,25 intelligibles, A134,3 interchangeability/interconvertibility of statements and things, A141,7.25.28; 149,26; B109,25ff; 112,15; 124,20; 204,14; 207,7ff; 215,26ff; 221,2 inversion, B120,1; 121,8 judgement, B109,24; 193,27; 195,9ff; 223,21; 230,9ff; 239,18 knowledge ambivalent, A134,7 conjectural, A133,29 definite, A136,3; 137,13 degrees of knowledge, A135,12-32 divine foreknowledge, A132,8ff; 136,1-138,10; B225,9ff indefinite, A132,12; 133,33; 135,2 preconceived, A136,14 Latin, B186,22; 199,1; 201,4 law, B224,25, 230,10 light, A134,18; B238,24 matter, A132,15; 134,30; 138,7.9; 142,9; B238,10 of propositions, A129,10ff; 130,3ff; 138,27-139,20; 153,33 medicine, A137,8; 138,3; 142,12; 145,2; B193,11ff monsters, A142,8 more frequent/for the most part, B248,13ff more rare/for the lesser part, B248,14ff nature, A136,8-14.30; 137,30.31; 138,5; 142,6; 148,1; 151,2; 153,11; B106,10; 187,11; 190,4; 192,9; 194,18; 197,18ff; 210,3; 238,4ff; 246,26 according to nature/natural, A133,12; 142,22; 151,19; B220,12 art imitates nature, A148,28 known/unknown to nature, B192,9ff; 202,30 ‘nature does nothing in vain’, A148,11ff; 151,22; B220,10; 236,16; 239,17

Indexes possibility of nature, B203,5 nature (of things) A134,28ff; 149,24; B107,30; 118,9; 186,27; 193,5ff necessity, A130,30.36; 131,7ff; 135,8; 137,25-9; 145,7.13ff; 147,23; 148,21ff; 150,22ff; 152,34-154,36; B111,1ff; 114,12; 118,3ff; 120,21ff; 187,11; 188,2; 193,28ff; 195,11ff; 207,6; 209,1; 211,15; 217,16ff; 220,9; 228,7; 230,21ff; 233,18; 236,4; 245,24ff definite, B124,21 in accordance with time, B122,25ff two types, B241,1ff unconditional, B121,26ff; 241,22ff oracles, A135,13; 137,13.21 opposition, A128,30ff; 129,23ff; 130,1; 138,14; B104,16, 115,13ff, 199,22 square of opposition, A128,30; 129,22; 138,18ff; B104,16; 199,19ff; 220,29 outcome, A134,20; 146,19.29; 149,23ff; 152,2ff; B108,1; 111,14; 112,24; 118,9; 123,7; 191,5ff; 198,8; 210,4; 212,21; 221,3; 223,20; 228,1; 237,20; 246,14; 247,11ff; 248,25 necessity of outcome, B119,18; 225,15 Parmenides, A133,14; 136,24 passions, B230,4ff perhaps, A131,27ff. Peripatetics, B193,24ff; 197,5-198,3 Philo, B234,10ff philosophy ethics, A130,29 first philosophy; A131,5 logic, A130,27; 131,2, B185,18; 198,13 physics/natural philosophy, A130,35; B190,13; 194,2 plan, B239,16ff Plato, B246,21 Cratylus, A154,19 Laws, A133,6.14 Parmenides, A133,14 Timaeus, A133,17; 136,19 Porphyry, B201,2; 219,17 possibility; A151,15; B111,21; 188,23; 193,1; 209,3; 211,20; 217,15ff; 226,27ff; 230,22ff; 240,7ff three views, 234,10ff potentiality; A136,7; 149,32; B120,7; 238,6

215

praise and blame, A130,32; 150,19; B223,6ff pre-establishment, A145,12 predictions, A145,13; 149,17ff; 153,4; B114,11; 116,4ff; 118,15; 210,2; 211,28; 212,21ff; 213,20; 224,29; 228,6 principle/source, A133,25; 135,30; B231,6; 233,19 prophecy; A135,14; 140,14; 149,31; B224,28; 228,6 propositions/statements categorical, B186,14ff; 199,1 conditional, B186,17ff; 199,5 future contingent, B108,24; 115,1; 125,17; 189,22ff; 198,6ff; 208,3; 214,1; 219,12; 243,27; 249,5 hypothetical, B186,18; 199,4 indefinite, B105,12.18 particular affirmation/affirmative, A129,9.34; B105,1 particular negation/negative, A129,32; B105,1 predicative, B186,22; 198,16ff; 199,12 singular, A129,1f; 130,13ff; 138,29ff; B107,17 singular contingent, A141,33; 146,9 universal affirmation/affirmative, B104,27 universal negation/negative, A129,9ff; B104,27 undetermined, A128,32ff; 129,25.32; 138,27 propositions ‘A human being is mortal’, B187,27 ‘A man exists’, B186,15 ‘A man is walking’, B188,20 ‘Alexander is to be bathed’, B107,3 ‘All the Fabians perished ’, B104,7 ‘Divine Salamis will destroy ’, A135,4 ‘Fire is hot’, B187,29 ‘God exists’, B186,29 ‘God is immortal’, B186,29; 187,3 ‘I am going to sail’, A139,6 ‘I am going to walk’, A139,6 ‘If Croesus crosses ’, A135,4 ‘If I lead the army into Africa ’, B221,19 ‘If it is a human being ’, B199,7 ‘If it is a stone ’, B199,7 ‘If it is day, it is light’, B186,18 ‘If it is white now,’ B113,21 ‘If Laius begets children ’, A135,5 ‘If we shall do this ’, A149,4

216

Indexes

‘If you will reap ’, A131,25 ‘It is day’, B186,14 ‘It is necessary that the sun ’, B105,25; 241,24 ‘Only a wooden wall will save ’, A135,3 ‘Philoxenus is going to have dinner’, B123,18 ‘Romulus founded Rome’, B123,11 ‘Socrates is bald’, B105,21 ‘Socrates is bathing’, A130,15; 139,16; 140,10 ‘Socrates is going to be disputing ’, B104,24 ‘Socrates is going to have dinner’, B108,29 ‘Socrates is going to read today’, B245,12 ‘Socrates is seated’, B241,8ff ‘Socrates walks/is walking’, A154,8; B212,23 ‘Socrates was slain by poison’, B104,20 ‘Socrates will die’, B202,23 ‘Some man is pale’, A129,17ff. ‘The man is just’, B186,15 ‘The sun exists’, B186,15 ‘The stars are even’, B187,17; 192,6 ‘The sun is hot’, B186,15 ‘The sun is setting today’, B244,22 ‘The sun this year in springtime ’, B200,6 ‘There will be an eclipse’, A139,5 ‘There will be summer’, A139,5 ‘There will be winter’, A139,4 ‘Today Alexander is going to have ’, B106,2 providence, A131,6.13; 132,31; 133,5.8.10; 134,9ff; 135,10; B194,23; 195,22ff; 224,14; 232,6

spirit, B231,6 spontaneity, A131,1; 132,17; 142,15.20.31.33 Stoics, B193,24; 194,23-196,3; 201,3; 208,2; 217,20; 234,27ff; 240,1 stone, B110,1ff substance, B239,10; 247,18 sun, A132,26; 133,2; 134,16; 151,17ff; B223,3; 238,23; 241,4.5; 243,15 supervene, A142,15.26 syllogism, A141,18; B111,22ff Syrianus, A137,13

quality, A135,31; B239,2ff

universals, A134,2; 135,21; 138,23f; 148,8; B104,15; 117,7; 192,24; 219,23ff ‘up to us’, A130,31f; 137,30ff; 147,24; 148,13; 150,22; B217,19ff; 231,8

rain, A134,19 reaper argument, A131,20ff reason, B196,26ff; 231,6ff sea battle, A154,32; B116,14ff; 123,3; 212,13; 215,22ff; 246,6 self-movers, A131,13; 137,22; 138,3 sight, A135,17 singulars, B104,17; 219,19ff Socrates, A153,19; B104,17 soul, A138,3ff; 147,29; B195,13; 232,2 sphere, A137,4

taking trouble, A151,7; B221,5ff Theocritus, B234,13 transcendence, A132,22; 134,33 true or false (cf. ‘in a definite manner’, ‘in an indefinite manner’) always, B110,21; 115,30; 200,16 definite, B104,5ff; 106,28ff; 110,22; 113,19ff; 115,4ff; 116,18; 117,9ff; 189,16ff; 199,29; 208,11ff; 213,24ff; 219,10; 227,1; 240,23; 248,13, 249,17ff ‘definitely true, or false’, B108,18-109,19; 111,6.23ff; 113,14 four modes, B115,1-5; 126,8-16; 213,18-214,12 inconstant, B192,15 indefinite, B115,5; 200,15; 213,27 indeterminable, B108,2 indubitably, B207,1 mutable, B208,16 necessarily, B206,31; 244,20 variable, B108,2; 125,7; 126,20 ‘false together’, A128,23; 146,3ff; B115,12ff ‘true together’, A128,22; 129,28ff; 145,31ff; B115,12ff

Vergil, B207,21; 240,10.14 virtue and vice, A131,17; 150,20 ‘whatever happens’, A131,26ff; 140,18; 154,34ff will, B112,10; 117,20; 190,4; 195,12ff; 209,3; 217,14ff; 226,17; 230,26ff; 240,7ff; 246,19