Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674422773, 9780674422803

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Between Old and New Harvard, Middle Eastern Studies 15

Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Portrait by Konstantin Kapidagli, dated. 121811803-4.

Between Old and New The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807

Stanford J. Shaw

Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971

© Copyright 1971 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-131465 SBN 674-06830-0 Printed in the United States of America

This book is humbly dedicated to my teacher, colleague, and friend, Hamilton A. R. Gibb, without whose inspiration, encouragement, and support it would never have been written.

Preface

While the French Revolution convulsed Europe, the Ottoman Empire also reached a crucial point in its long history. Centuries of decay had brought it to a point where internal stresses and foreign dangers threatened its very existence. Previous efforts to rescue the empire by internal reform had been entirely unsuccessful, and it was continuing to survive more as a result of its enemies' inability to agree on a division of the spoils than anything else. Even the most intelligent Ottomans were hardly aware of the extent of the danger and conceived reform to be no more than a sterile restoration of the institutions and practices which had brought success in the past. Starting in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, however, and continuing into modern times, a new concept of reform arose which enabled the Ottomans to restore their empire from within —the idea that the old institutions had to be entirely abolished and replaced by new ones, largely imported from the West and far better suited to meet the problems and needs of modern times. This new concept is usually identified with the Tanzimat movement, which lasted from 1839 until the accession of Sultan Abd ulHamid II in 1876. It actually was inaugurated in 1826, when Sultan Mahmud II destroyed the Janissary corps, the military

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pillar of the old order. Yet, in many ways, it was during the reign of his predecessor, Selim III, that conditions arose which made this new idea of reform inevitable in the years which followed. In most ways Selim was a failure. His reforms were limited and were eventually dissipated in foreign conflicts and internal revolts. He went little beyond strictly military and technical innovations to the more fundamental political, social, economic, and judicial developments which had provided the necessary context for their successful operation in Europe. Yet in his efforts, and in the factors which defeated them, lay the seeds of modern Turkish reform. The great detail of this study, particularly in its description of diplomatic and political affairs, may seem anachronistic in an age in which historians have turned to synthesis and interpretation and to emphasis on social and economic developments. Yet I have felt my approach to be the correct one for the study of nineteenth-century Ottoman history because of the absence of previous studies of the kind that historians of Europe and America have been able to rely on for two generations. The historian must walk before he can run. It is not possible to describe Selim's reforms and the reasons for their failure without placing them in the context of the political, military, and diplomatic events of their time. The momentous events of the era of the French Revolution and of Bonaparte have been touched on in numerous studies, but never with the Ottoman Empire as their focus, never in relation to Ottoman problems, Ottoman conditions, and Ottoman policies, and—most important of all —never on the basis of Ottoman sources. An attempt has been made here to remedy these defects by giving a balanced account of events in all parts of the empire during this period: internal conditions and revolts in southeastern Europe, Anatolia, and the Arab provinces; European diplomacy in relation to the Eastern Question; and the various military campaigns and diplomatic maneuvers in which Selim was involved with the powers of Europe. The results of previous European research on these subjects have been incorporated. At the same time, I have added new information from Ottoman Turkish sources in an effort to provide a more balanced and objective account than

Preface

would have been possible in a study based solely on European sources. Recent Turkish studies of Selim's reign have been supplemented by detailed original research in all the source materials from his reign remaining in the Ottoman archives and libraries. The materials used in this work were gathered during a series of trips to Istanbul, Ankara, London, Paris, and Vienna between 1957 and 1967, made possible by fellowships and grants from the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the Harvard Foundation for Advanced Study and Research, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. I would like to express my gratitude to the friends and colleagues who gave me every possible assistance and encouragement during the course of my research; in particular to Midhat Sertoglu, Director of the Ba§ Vekälet Ar§ivi in Istanbul; the late Haluk Y. §ehsuvaroglu, former director, and Hayrullah Örs, present director of the Topkapi Saray Museum and Archives in Istanbul; Aziz Berker, former Director of the Department of Libraries in the Ministry of Education, Ankara, who made available the vast resources of manuscripts in the Turkish national library system; and to the directors and staffs of the Belediye Library and Archaeological Museum Library in Istanbul; the Türk Tarih Kurumu Library in Ankara; the Public Record Office and British Museum in London; the Archives Nationales, Archives du Ministöre des Affaires Etrangeres, and Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris; the Archives du Ministere de la Guerre, Chateau de Vincennes; the Haus-Hof- und StaatsArchiv, Vienna, and the Harry Elkins Widener Library at Harvard. My special thanks go to Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, who originally suggested this study, and to whom it is dedicated as a small token of appreciation for the advice, encouragement, and stimulation he has given me during the course of my work. Because the sources used in the research were in various languages, and the provinces included in the Ottoman Empire at the time of the study have been replaced by a number of independent states, each with its own system of spelling and transliteration as well as its own place names, this work had a

Preface

ix

χ

number of peculiar problems in this regard. For example, the city of Plovdiv (Bulgarian) used to be called Philippopolis (Greek) and Filibe (Turkish). The letter c is pronounced j in modern Turkish and ts in Serbo-Croat. In addition, the sound ch is rendered by ς in Turkish and by c or c in Serbo-Croat; and the sound sh becomes § in Turkish and Rumanian and s in Serbian. The letter for j in Arabic represents g in Egypt and zh in the Lebanon, and so forth. For this reason, the following system has been employed in this work: in the text itself, all proper nouns and technical words have been transliterated in a way to make them easily pronounceable by the English-speaking reader. In most cases, the traditional Western-language names for cities, towns, and provinces have been preferred to those currently used in the modern states; thus "Semendria" rather than "Smederevo," "Philippopolis" rather than "Plovdiv", "Cairo" rather than "al-Kahire," and so forth. But when the modern names have achieved common usage in English, these have usually been accepted, along with their current spellings, in place of the traditional ones: thus "Istanbul" rather than "Constantinople," "Edirne" rather than "Adrianople," and "Skopje" rather than "Üsküp." On the other hand, in the footnotes and bibliography, because of the need to cite recent publications in the various Balkan and Middle Eastern languages, current spelling systems had to be preserved, so all references and citations were made according to the transliteration systems currently in use for the language in which each of them was written. As a result, while the text reads "Jevdet," "Chorbaji," and "Nish," in the footnotes and bibliographies the same names are spelled "Cevdet," "Corbaci," "Nis." This change seemed necessary to satisfy the needs of readers and researchers alike and to prevent the text from becoming a morass of different spelling and transliteration systems. A complete glossary of all the names applied to each important city or town mentioned in the text is included in the index. S. J. S. Los Angeles, California

Preface

Contents

Parti. Introduction: Prelude to Reform

I II

Decline of the Ottoman Empire Education of a Prince

3 12

Part II. War with Russia and Austria, 1787-1792

III IV V VI VII

Origins of the War under Abd ul-Hamid I The Campaigns of 1787-1789 The Winter of 1789-90: Diplomatic Activities and Internal Developments The Campaign of 1790 The Campaign of 1791 and the Conclusion of Peace

21 28 40 51 61

Part III. The "New Order" of Selim III

VIII IX X XI XII

Wartime Reforms, 1789-1792 The Reformers Military Reforms Technical Reforms Revival of the Ottoman Navy

xi

71 86 112 138 150

xii

XIII XIV

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms Window to the West

167 180

Part IV. Disintegration of the Empire: Internal Revolts and Foreign Wars, 1792-1807

XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX

Disintegration of the Empire, 1792-1798 The Eastern Question, 1792-1798 The War of the Triple Alliance, 1798-1802 Disintegration of the Empire, 1799-1806 The Eastern Question, 1802-1807

211 247 257 283 328

Part V. The Triumph of Reaction

XX XXI XXII XXIII

The Politics of Ottoman Reform The Revolt Epilogue: Mustafa IV and the Ottoman Reaction The Deposition of Mustafa IV

Appendix Abbreviations Notes Bibliography Index

367 378 384 396 411 414 416 488 511

Contents

Illustrations

Unless otherwise indicated illustrations are from Mahmud Raif, Tableau des nouveaux reglemens de l'Empire Ottoman (Istanbul, 1798). Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Portrait by Konstantin, Kapidagli, dated 1218/1803-4. Topkapi Saray Portrait Collection, Istanbul. New Barracks of the Mortar and Mine-Laying Corps, constructed 1793. Training Ground and Barracks of the Nizam-i Jedid Army and Bostanji corps at Levend Chiftlik. Imperial Cannon Foundry (Tophane) and Barracks of Artillery Corps (Topji) and Cannon-Wagon Corps (Top Arabaji) at Tophane, Istanbul.

Frontispiece 200 201

202

Interior of the New Gunpowder Works at Azadli.

203

New Gunpowder Works at Azadli, constructed 1794.

204

The New Drydock at the Ottoman Naval Arsenal under Selim III.

205

The Ottoman Naval Arsenal under Selim III. Modern Ottoman Ship of the Line, Constructed under Sultan Selim III. Reception of Foreign Ambassadors by Sultan Selim III in the Topkapi Saray, Istanbul. Topkapi Saray Portrait Collection, Istanbul.

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206 207

208

Parti. Introduction: Prelude to Reform

I. Decline of the Ottoman Empire

On Thursday morning, December 24, 1761, Mustafa III, twentysixth sultan of the Ottoman line, received the welcome news that at long last, after almost five years on the throne, he had been presented with a son and heir by his fifth wife, Mihrishah Sultan. As the sound of celebrations reverberated throughout the ancient capital, the young prince and heir was given the name Selim, and his father rejoiced that the Ottoman lineage had been preserved. The state which young Prince Selim came to rule twentyeight years later was a far cry from that which his ancestors had controlled two centuries before. Ten great sultans had built a mighty empire which stretched from Hungary and the gates of Vienna south through the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia, down the valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and across Syria and Egypt almost to the Atlantic. But starting in the reign of Svileyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), a long series of weak, incapable, and dissolute rulers had gradually undermined the entire structure of Ottoman society.1 The Ottoman system had been developed in a complicated series of overlapping and intertwined classes, institutions, and organizations which depended largely on the person of the sultan himself for cohesion as a workable whole

4

as well as for successful operation within their own limited spheres. With such dependence on the rulers, it was inevitable that when the sultans became unwilling or unable to guide and direct the system, it should decay and decompose. At first, it was expected that strong grand vezirs* might replace the sultans in this role, but they proved to be inadequate because they could not replace their masters in their most important role, as a focus of loyalty in the empire. So a vacuum of power remained at the center, and struggles to fill it led to the rise of factions in the Palace and Porte, and to nepotism, inefficiency, dishonesty, and anarchy in all parts of the empire. Weakening central control and misrule and tyranny by the representatives of the sultanate led to increasing disorder and anarchy, and the rise of local brigands, autonomous notables,** and others who sought to use the situation for their own advantage. Because the provincial revenues gradually diminished and most of the revenues left to the central treasury fell into the hands of the ruling class, the whole structure of Ottoman military and civil organization weakened further, and the vicious cycle was repeated again and again over the centuries. Furthermore, to the internal causes of decay was added an external one—an increasing inferiority to the West. The great new nation states and empires of Europe were using their political unity to develop tremendous power; developments in science and technology during and after the Renaissance and Reformation were enabling them to build armies with weapons far more efficient than any known before; and the great gold and silver discoveries in the New World and the development of imperialism and international trade and commerce on a large scale were giving them the economic strength to support their new-found political and military power. In all of this activity the Ottoman Empire took no part. At best it remained stagnant, with a vast government unable to lead, hardly able to rule. As Europe became unified, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated; *The Grand Vezir, called Sadr-i Azem by the Ottomans, was the chief executive and military officer in the traditional Ottoman state. See Gibb and Bowen, III, pp. 107-115. **Generally called Ayan\ see chapter XV.

Prelude to Reform

as Europe developed a new military technology, the Ottomans relied on the weapons and techniques of the past; and European economic developments were viewed by the Ottomans with disdain. Ottoman merchants rarely participated in international trade, and the precious metals coming from the New World, when combined with great population increases during the sixteenth century and after, served only to fan the chronic inflation, famine, and economic and political chaos, which were to characterize Ottoman society during the remaining centuries of its existence.2 Much of the blame for these conditions must go to the peculiar reaction of the Ottoman ruling class. The primary characteristic of the Ottomans throughout these centuries was almost complete isolation and a lack of awareness of developments outside their own sphere, and the consequent assumption that the causes of Ottoman decline and its remedies lay entirely within their own practice and experience. Europe was wholly outside the frame of reference of even the most well-educated Ottomans. This was both cause for and manifestation of an unshakable belief in the superiority of Ottoman ways to anything which the infidel could possibly produce, an idea developed in an age when the Ottoman world was, indeed, more advanced, but which remained long after its basic assumption was entirely disproved by developments in Europe. Consequently, when the new armies of Europe began to defeat those of the Porte in the seventeenth century, the Ottomans assumed that their defeat was caused not by the superiority of Western armies but rather by their own failure to apply fully the organization, weapons, and techniques of warfare which had been so successful for them in the past. Moreover, most of the ruling-class Ottomans actually benefited from the abuses and stagnation. With revenues coming to them from salaries, fiefs, and bribes, for which they were required to do little or no work, and with their status and position in Ottoman society directly dependent on continued adherence to the techniques and ways of the past, it was inevitable that they should oppose any efforts to change, despite the consequent weakness of the empire in relation to the West. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there-

Decline of the Ottoman

Empire

5

6

fore, when increasing dangers threatened the empire on which their privileges depended, the "reforms" which they introduced were merely efforts to restore the past, without the realization that what had been successful in the sixteenth century could not possibly succeed against the power developed in Europe since that time. The most famous of the seventeenth-century reformers were Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640) and the Köprülü Grand Vezirs, Mehmed (1656-1661) and Ahmed (1661-1676).3 Each rose to office as the result of external crises and military defeats accompanied by internal decay. Each temporarily saved the empire by forcing it back into the patterns of the past; each eliminated corruption, weeded out the corrupt and incompetent from the army and government, and ruthlessly restored honesty, efficiency, and order. But they were doomed by their very success, since they were able to act only against the results of the decay, not the causes. The selfish rule of the vested interests and their absorption in the glories of the past remained unbroken, and as soon as the immediate dangers were overcome, the reforms were forgotten and the old ways resumed. What saved the Ottomans more than anything else in the seventeenth century was European ignorance of the extent of their decay and the absorption of the West in its own internal wars so that it was unable or unwilling to take advantage of this weakness. Only with Kara Mustafa Pasha's failure to take Vienna in 1683 and the resulting collapse of his army did Europe become fully aware of the Ottoman situation and move to take advantage of it. Hapsburg Austria now sought to reconquer Hungary, Serbia, and the eastern Balkans, and to reach the Mediterranean. Venice hoped to regain its Adriatic colonies and the Morea. Russia worked to extend its lands thrpugh the Balkans and the Straits to the open sea. All of them fought the Porte by fomenting dissatisfaction among its non-Muslim subjects and by forcing it into a series of wars which occupied most of its attention in the closing decades of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century: from 1683 to 1699 ending in the Treaty of Carlowitz; a somewhat more successful war with Russia in 1710 and 1711, ended by the Treaty of the Pruth (1711); the war of 1714 through 1718 with Venice and Austria, ended by the

Prelude to Reform

Treaty of Passarowitz (1718); and a war with Austria and Russia from 1736 to 1739, ended by the Treaty of Belgrade (1739). As a result, the Ottoman Empire lost Hungary, Serbia north of Belgrade, Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania; its boundaries in Europe were pushed all the way back to the Danube, where they had last rested before Süleyman the Magnificent's conquests early in the sixteenth century. Moreover, only a year after Selim's birth, Russia came under the rule of the dynamic Catherine the Great (1762-1796), and it was not long before she was undertaking new efforts to push her realm into the Ottoman territories bordering the Black Sea and the Straits, and through them to the open sea. As the danger signals became more and more apparent during the eighteenth century, the isolation of the Ottomans was slightly diminished. Ottoman ambassadors went to live in Europe for a time, to sign peace treaties, arrange alliances and the like, and their oral and written reports made at least a few Ottomans aware of what had gone on in Europe during the preceding two centuries. In addition, as large numbers of European merchants and diplomats poured into the empire to take advantage of its weakness, opportunities for contact between them and members of the Ottoman ruling class greatly increased, and Ottomans began to see at first hand the kind of life Europeans had made for themselves. An increasing number of European "renegades" now came to serve the empire, bringing with them considerable information about developments in Europe. For the most part, however, these channels of contact were simply ignored by the vast majority of Ottoman rulers and subjects alike. Such information did not fit into the patterns of life and thought of even the most well-educated Ottomans, so its effect was superficial at best. But there were some changes—at first in manners and tastes. During the "Tulip Period" (1717-1730), led by Sultan Ahmed III and Grand Vezir Damad Ibrahim Pasha, many members of the court and ruling class sought to imitate European architecture, court life, and entertainment. Chairs and sofas began to replace the lush pillows and divans of the past. The palaces of the French kings provided models for buildings and gardens

Decline of the Ottoman

Empire

7

8

built along the Bosporus and at the "Sweet Waters" at the head of the Golden Horn. The lavish entertainments of Versailles produced their direct counterparts in the Ottoman capital. The Tulip Period did show for the first time some awareness of Europe among upper-class Ottomans, but it was no more than this. The awareness was very limited, even for those who benefited from it at the time. Among the mass of rulers and subjects, European ways remained entirely foreign and unwanted and stimulated a violent revolt in 1730, which swept away all the leaders and accomplishments of the period.4 This defeat was only temporary, however. The increasing contacts with Europe, and numerous European victories during the century diminished the isolation of the Ottomans further. In 1727 a Hungarian renegade named Ibrahim Müteferrika was allowed to establish the first Turkish-language printing press in the empire, and he and his successor issued a series of books from then until 1742, when it was closed. Most of the printed texts were on traditional themes, in the classical manner, with little or no attention to the problems and needs of the time, but there were a few exceptions, of which the most outstanding was a treatise written by Ibrahim Müteferrika himself for Mahmud I (1730-1754) describing the countries and armies of Europe and emphasizing the importance of imitating them in order to save the empire.5 There were more concrete effects in the army, where the most damaging consequences of the decline were felt. Some isolated efforts were made to introduce European cannons, rifles, and other weapons along with the organization, discipline, and tactics which they required. These were brought by foreign renegades in Ottoman service. One of the earliest and most famous of these was the French Count Alexander de Bonneval, known as Humbarajibashi Ahmed Pasha, who between 1729 and 1742 built a bombardier corps along European lines and established the first engineering school in the empire to introduce some of the basic elements of the new science and technology of the West. His efforts had no effect at all on the main stream of Ottoman military development at this time. The older corps sternly opposed all attempts to extend his teachings to them, since

Prelude to Reform

they felt —quite rightly—that the new techniques threatened their old established privileges, security, and status. The new bombardier corps was no more than a mercenary body hired for a special purpose, and it was eliminated soon after its creator died. Yet its influence lived on. During the next decade, one of the school's instructors, Mehmed Said, wrote a geometry book. Other books appeared on medicine, military sciences, and European affairs — mostly translations, but important beyond measure for Ottomans never before even aware of the existence of such things. 6 During Selim's childhood, these limited reform efforts continued on an ever-increasing scale. Under Grand Vezir Ragib Pasha (1757-1763), Bonneval's modern bombardier corps was revived. His geometry school was secretly reopened and enlarged, with its teachers mainly coming from among the men trained in Bonneval's time. 7 Ambassador Ahmed Resmi visited Vienna (1757) and Berlin (1763) and sent back enlightening accounts of European events and conditions.8 The Sultan himself had a special passion for astronomy and secured various works on astronomy and mathematics from the French Academy. Some of them were translated into Turkish and made available in manuscript and in printed form.9 But starting late in Mustafa's reign and continuing into that of his brother and successor, Abd ul-Hamid I (1774-1789), the external and internal dangers again became acute. A disastrous war with Catherine's Russia began in 1768. In addition to the army's defeats on land, the Ottoman navy was almost entirely destroyed with a single blow at the Battle of Cheshme (1770). A Russian fleet from the Baltic, under Admiral Orloff, cruised the waters of the Adriatic and Mediterranean urging the Greeks and other subject peoples to rise against their masters. The fateful Treaty of Küchük Kaynaija (1774), which concluded the war, gave to Russia the lands west of the Black Sea between the Dnieper and the Bug. The Ottoman vassals living to the north and east and the Tatars of the Crimea, Koban, and Bujak were left in a precarious independence which made them virtually defenseless against the expanding Russian power. At the same time, Russia gained dominant influence in the empire through

Decline of the Ottoman

Empire

9

treaty clauses allowing the use of the Black Sea and the Straits for its shipping, giving its merchants privileges equal to those of Britain and France, and permitting it subsequently to claim the right of intervention on behalf of the Sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects. Moreover, Russia was provided with the means of extending that influence by establishing consuls and agents anywhere it wished in the Sultan's dominions. In the years which followed, the provincial anarchy became worse. Anatolia and the Balkans were infested by brigands and autonomous notables who acknowledged little more than the Sultan's suzerainty at best. In the Arab lands, Zahir al-Omar and Jezzar Pasha in Syria, and Ali Bey ul-Kebir in Egypt, Siileyman Pasha in Iraq, and the Saudis of Arabia, were becoming virtually independent, thus depriving the Sultan's Treasury of its most fruitful sources of revenue and Istanbul and the other great cities of the empire of some of their principal sources of grain. Russian intervention in the Danubian Principalities increased, and its occupation of the Crimea in 1783 had to be recognized by the Sultan in return for no more than the vaguest provisions allowing him to retain a position as Caliph there and for Russian promises —soon to be violated—to end its intervention in the Principalities and elsewhere. In response to these dangers, Abd ul-Hamid I introduced important reforms into the Ottoman armed forces. The navy was rebuilt under the leadership of one of the few Ottoman heroes to emerge from the Battle of Cheshme, Gazi Hasan Pasha, who served as Grand Admiral from 1774 to 1789. Foreign naval commanders and shipbuilders helped him develop the navy along modern lines and to train its officers in a new naval engineering school (Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun), established at Aynalikavak in 1784.10 Starting in 1773 Baron de Tott, a Hungarian officer in French service, formed a new corps of rapid-fire artillery men (Süratji) and engineers, built a gun factory to manufacture modern cannons and rifles, modernized and rebuilt the fortifications at the Dardanelles and along the Danube, established a new army engineering school at Hasköy, and modernized and enlarged the mathematics school. A group of French officers ex-

Prelude to Reform

panded the new artillery corps into a group of two hundred and fifty men able to use modern cannons. They continued to practice until 1781, when they were dissolved and the French officers went home.11 Under Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha (1782-1785), strenuous though largely unsuccessful efforts were made to reform the traditional Ottoman bureaucracy, the financial system, the Janissaries, and the feudal cavalry, with particular attention paid to weeding out the corrupt and those who would not or could not perform the duties assigned to them. The old press originally established by Ibrahim Müteferrika was revived, and books were once again produced, including important Turkish translations of European technical texts for use in the new schools. The foreign advisers were recalled to resume their work not only on the rapid-fire artillery corps, but also on the older artillery corps, and a new fortifications school was established. The rapid-fire cannon corps grew into a force of 2,000 men, and it was provided with the highest possible salaries in order to attract into its service the best fighting men of the empire. This work continued until 1787, when the new Ottoman war with Russia and Austria led Louis XVI to recall the French instructors on the pretext of retaining his neutrality. 12 But in the end, these reforms succeeded only when they did not harm the interests or monopolies of the established army corps. Only the navy, the artillery corps, and the new cannon corps were affected; here, new corps were induced to use new weapons, but the older corps were left without reform, living in the past, no longer able to fight the enemy successfully but still strong enough to resist the reforms at home and to prevent their application on a wide enough scale for them to be really effective. Here, then, was traditional Ottoman reform as applied during the eighteenth century. The main question we must examine in this study is whether Selim III merely carried on this tradition, or whether it was he who forged the new paths which led to its replacement by the much more radical midnineteenth-century Tanzimat reform in which the old institutions were entirely destroyed and replaced by new ones imported from the West.

Decline of the Ottoman

Empire

II. Education of a Prince

This was the world of young Prince Selim. What was his role in the momentous events swirling around him? What circumstances of his childhood made him different from his father and uncle? The beginnings were not promising. During the first five years of his life, Selim's education was handled entirely by the Ulema* in the traditional way. He concentrated on memorizing the Koran and learning the traditional religious sciences. After 1770, however, during the later years of his father's reign, Selim was allowed far more freedom than was customary for Ottoman princes at that time. Mustafa began to prepare his son for affairs of state as the Ottoman sultans had done in the sixteenth century and before. Father and son attended meetings of the Imperial Council and, more important, went to watch the new artillery and rifle corps training under the direction of Baron de Tott and others. 1 Selim grew up in the company of a number of young palace slaves who shared his adventures and who, with him, planned to revive and rejuvenate the empire when he came to power. These were his *The Ulema, or "men of 7/m/knowledge" in Islamic society, were the members of the Ilmiye institution of the Ottoman ruling class, which dealt with all matters of religion, culture, education, and law for the ruling class and the Muslim millet. See Gibb and Bowen, 1/2, pp. 81-164.

equerry, Hüseyin Agha (later Küchiik Hüseyin Pasha), his secretary, Ebubekir Ratib, Shakir Agha, Osman Efendi, Defteri zade Izzet Bey, Sirri Selim Pasha, and a somewhat older boy named Ishak Agha, stepson of Safiye Sultan, who had been a boy on an Ottoman ship at Cheshme, and who on his return had entered into the palace service through the influence of his patron, Gazi Hasan Pasha. 2 When Mustafa died and his brother, Abd ul-Hamid I, came to the throne in 1774, Selim became the eldest male in the family and therefore the ranking heir to the throne. In such a position, he could no longer enjoy the relative freedom allowed by his father, and he and his companions were shut into the traditional palace cage. If he had remained there from birth, entirely under the influence of the eunuchs and women who composed the harem, he would never have been aware of the outside world, and so would have made no more of an effort to break down the barriers than had any of his predecessors. But because he had been exposed to the outside world during the first thirteen years of his life, he was not content with the isolated, benign existence of the harem, and through his uncle's indulgence, he was allowed to continue to read and study, thus making the cage more of a school than anything else. While Selim himself had to remain in his place, his companions were not restricted. They attended the new schools, talked with foreign ambassadors and technicians, and thus kept him in touch with what was going on in the empire and the world. The foreign ambassadors sought to influence these companions in the hope of using them to control the future sultan. Küchük Hüseyin and Izzet Bey were influenced mainly by the British and Austrian ambassadors, Shakir Agha and Sirri Selim by the Russians, and Ishak Agha and Ebubekir by the French, who in the end proved most active and successful. Ambassadors Saint-Priest and Choiseul-Gouffier maintained contact and influence with Selim also through his private physician, Dr. Lorenzo, one of the few outsiders allowed to penetrate the harem walls and enter the cage for the purpose of ministering to the young prince and his companions. Lorenzo brought the prince books and papers and spoke with him about the outside world in a way which the Ottomans themselves never could have done.3

Education of a Prince

In 1785 disaster struck. Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha tried to put Selim on the throne in place of Abd ul-Hamid, but through the efforts of Gazi Hasan Pasha, he failed and was then dismissed. Selim's connection with the plot is not certain, but with Gazi Hasan's encouragement, Abd ul-Hamid I now tightened the young prince's conditions of confinement and for the most part cut off his connections with the outside world, Dr. Lorenzo alone maintaining some sort of contact.4 At the same time, Ishak Bey became friendly with Major Zorich, a Russian officer just released from the prison at Yedikule, and this brought down on his head the wrath of his old patron, Gazi Hasan, whose anti-Russian fanaticism had been nourished through the years since Cheshme. Gazi Hasan now set out to punish his former proteg6 by securing his demotion and execution. Ishak desperately sought to save himself by leaving the country, and Choiseul-Gouffier suggested that he go to France for an education. There he would not only come into direct contact with Europe so that he could advise his master on his return, but he also would be assimilated to French culture and become a firm and permanent friend of France in a way which would be impossible so long as he remained in Istanbul. It did not take much correspondence for the ambassador to convince Foreign Minister de Vergennes of the value of his plan especially since de Vergennes himself had been ambassador at the Porte for a number of years under Selim's father. The French government agreed to provide funds for Ishak Bey's trip, living expenses, and education, and a young French orientalist named Pierre Ruffin was chosen to house him in Versailles and to guide his education. Selim readily accepted the idea. Unable to experience Europe for himself, he felt his young slave would be a good substitute. On his return he would be appointed to a chief position of government, where he could put his experience to good use. At the same time, Selim entrusted Ishak with two letters, one for de Vergennes and the other for Louis XVI, who by now had become for him the model of the enlightened monarch he himself hoped someday to be. These letters are important clues to Selim's state of mind at this time. While he mentioned reforms and asked for French assistance, his emphasis always was on revenge against Russia for the defeats of the past. Nowhere was there any indi-

Prelude to Reform

cation that he had gone beyond Mustafa III or Abd ul-Hamid I in his concept of reform. 5 To Ishak Bey he wrote: Expose to him [Louis XVI] actively my intentions and my way of being and thinking. Tell him that Russia, our main enemy, victorious during the long war which it made on my late father, affronted this prince and his people and took by surprise, ruse, and treachery many of our provinces, and that it pursues more conquests by such illegitimate means . . . France has been our friend from times immemorial; when she reads my heart, she will understand that friendship shows itself especially in circumstances as critical as those of today. It is to her dignity to show us this sentiment while preparing for war. Russia believes itself superior to all other courts. It is not suitable for those which are older, especially as old as France, to allow Russia to maintain this pretension any longer. This is your mission.6 The letters to Louis XVI and de Vergennes were even more specific and hardly calculated to secure the favor of their recipients. Selim declared that it was as a direct result of French encouragement that Mustafa III had entered the war with Russia in 1768, despite contrary warnings from Britain and Prussia; that the Ottoman defeat was due mainly to French failure to provide his father with promised military and diplomatic assistance; and that France therefore now had a duty to help the Ottomans rebuild their strength and regain their possessions from the Czars. "We are meditating in secret on the proper means to repair the evils, damages, and losses that our enemies have caused us . . . When by the grace of God, the predestined day comes for our advancement to the throne of Süleyman, it will be for us to recognize and pay in return for whatever friendship and courtesy we have been given previously."7 While Abd ul-Hamid restricted the young prince's movements more during 1786, he agreed to allow Ishak Bey to leave, apparently in order to save him from Gazi Hasan's vengeance. Ishak arrived in Paris in December 1786. He presented his master's letters, began to receive his monthly allowance, and took up resi-

Education of a Prince

dence in Ruffin's house. Repelled by Ruffin's discipline and rigorous lessons, however, and attracted by the pleasures of the French capital, it was not long before he moved to new quarters and began to participate fully in Parisian society. While largely ignoring the original objects of his mission, he did occasionally visit French naval and military establishments and report on them in a series of somewhat vague letters to his master. He stated that he was delighted by the weapons, cannons, and powder that he saw, that he had become friendly with a number of French generals and officers, and that they would be happy to come to Turkey and help if the Sultan would give them only a little more salary than what they received at home. But he spent most of his time in debauchery, extorting money from the French foreign minister and others under the threat of turning his master against them when he returned home.8 While Ishak Bey became increasingly troublesome to his hosts, Louis XVI largely ignored Selim's letter, and when he finally delivered his answer on May 20, 1787, it was hardly of the type which the future sultan had envisaged. Selim had been blunt, and Louis was equally blunt. Denying that France had encouraged Mustafa to war with Russia or had promised his assistance, he urged Selim to avoid wars of revenge until he had the power to avoid disaster and made only vague promises of the same kind of limited technical assistance which Abd ul-Hamid I had received for some time: It appears to us, after a hard examination, that the late Emperor of France did not take it upon himself to cause your Glorious father to attack the Russians, although he was persuaded that it was to his interest, and that sooner or later war between him and the Empress of Russia was inevitable. But without returning to an event so far removed, your Imperial Highness cannot ignore the fact that since we came to the throne, we have used all our efforts to prevent a new war which would cause only embarrassment to the Porte, and that we are convinced that before thinking of avenging injuries it has received, it should prepare some indispensable way for placing itself outside the possibility of all insult. We have done

Prelude to Reform

more, we have sent at our cost to Istanbul officers and artisans to give the Muslims demonstrations and examples of all aspects of the art of war, and we are maintaining them so long as their presence is judged necessary. We are occupying ourselves to set aside the subjects of dispute between the Sublime Porte and its neighbors. Our friendship can do nothing more in the circumstances, and we hope that on his side His Highness will take no step that might lead to a rupture. War has become a very difficult science. To undertake it without being put on the level of one's adversaries is to expose oneself to certain losses. If God brings your Imperial Highness to the throne, the maturity of your spirit is a certain guarantee to us that you will not engage in any enterprise without putting in order all that can assure you of success.9 Selim was bitterly disappointed by the answer, and only the entreaties of Ebubekir Ratib prevented him from replying in a manner which would have severed his relations with the French court once and for all. But at this time, with the beginning of war and the withdrawal of the French technicians, Selim was forced to sit back and wait and see whether the limited reforms introduced during the previous two decades would serve to keep the empire from suffering even more damage before he finally could come to the throne.

Education of a Prince

Part II. War with Russia and Austria, 1787-1792

III. Origins of the War under Abd ul-Hamid I

When Selim III came to the Ottoman throne in April 1789, he found the empire embroiled in a disastrous war with Russia and Austria, already in progress for over a year, and his longnurtured plans for reform had to be subordinated to more pressing military needs. It was only after peace was concluded in 1792 that he and his associates could move ahead to examine the ills of the empire and attempt to solve them. The war itself, the long campaigns and battles, and the complex workings of European diplomacy which accompanied it are for the most part outside the scope of this study, so they cannot be examined here in detail. A brief account of the war must, however, be included, for in the military frustrations and diplomatic triumphs lay much of the background of Selim's accomplishments and failures during the years that followed. The origins of the war are well known. It evolved from the peace of Küchük Kaynaija, concluded between the Porte and Russia in 1774, but looked on by both as no more than a truce. To Catherine II of Russia, it marked only one more step along the road toward driving the Turk from Europe and the Straits and replacing him with Russian dominion, a dream nurtured since the time of Peter the Great. 1 With singular energy and devotion, the Russian Empress devoted the years following the

peace toward achieving her objective. Russian championship of Byzantine revival was given its modern expression in Catherine's "Greek Scheme," embodied in a secret agreement of monarchs concluded with the Emperor of Hapsburg Austria in 1783. The essential basis of the agreement was the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe and division of the spoils among the signatories in a mutually satisfying way. Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia would be united in a new independent Orthodox state to be called Dacia. Russian influence over it would be assured by the appointment, as its first prince, of Count Potemkin, Catherine's old favorite and commander of her southern armies, and in addition by Russian annexation of the great fortress of Khotzim on the Dniester as well as the area lying between the Dnieper and the Bug. In addition, the Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean would be established by the occupation of a few strategic Ottoman islands. Austria would take over the western part of the Balkans — Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the strips of land along the Dalmatian coast still under the control of the dying Venetian Republic, which in compensation would receive the Morea and the strategic islands of Crete and Cyprus. Finally, and perhaps most important of all in Catherine's eyes, the great city of Istanbul would be joined with Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and northern Greece in a restored Byzantine state under the rule of Catherine's grandson Constantine, who since birth had been trained specifically for this role.2 Even France, the Porte's chief defender in the councils of Europe, was involved in the scheme. Since the accession of Louis XVI and his Austrian queen, Marie Antoinette, France had been turning toward a policy of cooperation with Austria and Russia and abandonment of the Ottomans to their fate as part of a general reversal of alliances which was transforming the diplomatic alignment of Europe after the Seven Years War. According to the Greek Scheme, France was to receive Syria and Egypt and, thus, a virtual strangle hold on the Levant trade, to be shared perhaps only by England in return for her acquiescence in the plan. In consequence, France gradually withdrew her support and assistance from the Porte. In 1786,

War with Russia and

Austria

the French officers and technicians who for over a decade had been training units of the Ottoman army were recalled. In January of the next year, France signed a new treaty of friendship and trade with Russia, and allowed a similar one with England to lapse, thus exposing her new orientation unmistakably. 3 Against this background, Austria's bitter rival in Germany, the rising Prussian state, was moving closer and closer toward an alliance with England in order to make a joint effort to preserve their position in Europe by saving the Ottoman Empire from its predatory neighbors. Prussia had become aware of the full extent of Russian and Austrian intentions only a short time before, when its effort to join them in alliance with the Porte to preserve the provisions of Küchük Kaynaija was rejected by Catherine.4 For England, rumors of the Greek Scheme, when added to the first partition of Poland, had stimulated a major re-examination of her eastern policy, a soul searching which was still in progress. During the first half of the eighteenth century and before, Russian advances at the expense of the Porte had been looked on in London disinterestedly, if not with outright pleasure at the thought of the terrible Turk being pushed out of Christendom. Britain had originally welcomed Russia's entry into Europe both because of its use as a counterweight to French pre-eminence on the continent and as a reliable source of raw materials and markets for its newly rising industries. But now for the first time Britain was beginning to see clearly how much it was to its own interest to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russian expansion to the south and east. Britain's nineteenth-century role as defender of Ottoman integrity was evolving toward its definitive form.5 Furthermore, the Russian military threat to the Ottoman Empire was becoming more immediate and alarming in the years following Küchük Kaynaija. One of the most painful concessions which the Porte had been forced to accept in the treaty had been the establishment in independence of the Crimean Tatar state which had long acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty and made important contributions to the Ottoman army. In August

Origins of the War under Abd ul-Hamid I

1783, this state was annexed to the Russian Empire, and six months later the Porte was forced to recognize this annexation in the Treaty of Aynalikavak.6 Soon after, Russian soldiers entered the Caucasian principality of Georgia under the pretext of protecting its prince from his Ottoman suzerain. The Crimean example left the Porte with little doubt as to ultimate Russian intentions east of the Black Sea as well.7 In addition, Potemkin was beginning to undertake positive military measures north and west of the Black Sea. At the southern tip of the Crimea, to which the Greek name Thauridia was now given, the great new port of Sevastopol was built to serve as the base of the Russian fleet created to challenge the Ottoman naval monopoly in the area. To the west, at the mouth of the Dnieper, a small but no less important base was built at the ancient Greek colony of Kherson to receive and store the ships and supplies being sent down the Dnieper and the Bug in ever-increasing amounts for service in the Black Sea area. In May 1787 Russian ambitions were publicly demonstrated by Catherine's triumphal tour through her new province. Accompanied by the chief personages of her court and the ambassadors of Austria, England, and France, the Empress traveled by land from St. Petersburg to Kiev, and then in a great fleet of galleys down the Dnieper to Kherson. Meeting Joseph II of Austria outside the city, she entered it on May 14, passing under a triumphal arch on which the Greek inscription "The way to Byzantium" made her objectives apparent to all who could see. From there, the two monarchs continued on to the Crimea, passing through hastily erected villages and assembled masses of apparently enthusiastic subjects arranged by Potemkin to give at least the appearance of growth and confidence. At Sevastopol, the tour was concluded with a lavish display of the new Black Sea fleet, and the Empress distributed honors and rewards to her southern commander in return for all he had done and would do to expand her empire even more.8 Nor did Catherine neglect the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, stirring them to rise against their master despite the failure of such efforts to produce lasting results in the previous war. The Treaty of Küchük Kaynaija had allowed Russia to establish

War with Russia and

Austria

consulates at Jassy, Bucharest, and Scutari, and these now were being used as bases for Russian agents who spread through the Balkans fanning the flames of dissatisfaction and revolt. In the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, Greek pirates were at least partially armed and financed by Russia, and their attacks on Ottoman shipping and shores were increasing in frequency and intensity.9 In Turkey itself, the general, almost universal, reaction to these events was an increasing hatred of the infidel and, in particular, a desire for revenge and a determination to regain the Crimea by force if necessary. But there was great disagreement among the Ottoman leaders as to how and when this could be accomplished. Gazi Hasan Pasha, Grand Admiral of the Sultan's fleet, led those who felt that the time was not yet right for an armed attack on the Russians. While Britain and Prussia were encouraging the Porte to stand up against further Russian encroachments, no firm commitments had been made for financial and military support in case of war, and without such assistance Gazi Hasan felt that a new war could only be useless, if not ruinous. The military reforms which he was directing had just begun. The bulk of the army and navy was in the same disorganized and backward state which had led to defeat in the previous war. However, as Catherine's ambitions became more apparent and her insults more frequent after 1783, the partisans of war, led by the Grand Vezir Koja Yusuf Pasha, rose toward ascendancy in the Sultan's court. To them, as indeed to the people of Istanbul, there was only one honorable solution, one way to atone for past defeats, and that was war—forceful reclamation of previous losses. This group felt confident that the military reforms introduced during the past decade had restored the Ottoman armed forces to a state in which they could defeat anything the European powers could mount against them, and restore Ottoman prestige and authority in Europe to the position which they had held under Mohammed the Conqueror and Süleyman the Magnificent. Their traditional outlook led the Ottomans, still almost completely unaware of the extent of European technical progress and seemingly unaffected by the defeats inflicted on the empire during the past

Origins of the War under Abd ul-Hamid I

century, to assume that a revival of the old Ottoman institutions and ways would be entirely sufficient to restore Ottoman supremacy over their neighbors. Yusuf Pasha argued that the informal encouragements which he had received from the British and Prussian ambassadors would inevitably be followed by open assistance if the Ottomans would only have the courage to throw down the gauntlet and move openly against their tormentors. 10 In the spring and summer of 1787, conditions in the dominions of its enemies seemed to confirm the arguments of the "war party" and make the time right for a new Ottoman move. Even while Joseph II had accompanied Catherine through the Crimea, news came of a revolt in his Netherlands possessions, where he was forced to rush with most of the army which he had been preparing to move south across the Danube into Ottoman territory. In Russia, drought and famine were causing increasingly serious internal discontent which any foreign adventure could only intensify. At the same time, in Istanbul, Gazi Hasan's departure for Egypt at the head of an expeditionary force intended to reduce the rebellious Mamluk rulers there left Ottoman policy entirely in the hands of the advocates of immediate war. The Porte's demands that Russia evacuate Georgia and its refusal to accept Russian intervention in the Principalities strained relations even further and made some sort of conflict inevitable. When in August 1789 Grand Vezir Yusuf Pasha demanded removal of the Russian consuls in Egypt and the Principalities on the grounds of their encouraging and assisting local revolts, and ordered an inspection of all Russian merchant ships passing through the Straits, the Russians were indeed startled, for the Porte had long been the passive, although evasive, recipient of similar Russian demands. Now for the first time the game was reversed. In the absence of any firm Russian reply, on August 14 the Grand Vezir pushed the Imperial Council to an open declaration of war together with a demand for immediate Russian evacuation of the Crimea and the Caucasus as the only way to avoid it.11 Now it was Catherine's turn to be perplexed. She wanted a war with the Porte but only when she was ready, at a time and occasion of her choosing. And although the declaration was not directed against Austria, Joseph II was even more alarmed.

War with Russia and

Austria

He was fully occupied with internal discontent. He wanted to keep the Russian alliance in order to secure support against Prussia, but he did not want to be put in a position where he could do this only by joining a war against the Porte. Aside from the strain this would put on his own resources, it might also drive England closer to his Prussian enemy and might even lead to a war with both of them. So the allies entered into urgent diplomatic efforts to avoid war by peaceful means. The Austrian ambassador at the Porte, Baron Herbert de Rathkeal, was ordered to offer "disinterested" Austrian mediation, with the implied threat of intervention on behalf of Russia if some kind of peace was not made. The French ambassador at the Porte, Choiseul-Gouffier, made similar representations for Catherine.12 But the Sultan rejected all efforts at mediation and replied that peace could be made only on the basis of the conditions set out in his ultimatum, in particular by immediate Russian evacuation of the Crimea and Caucasus. This Catherine refused to do, so she finally issued a formal declaration of war on September 15, a full month after that of the Sultan. Joseph II's entry was delayed, both to enable him to move his armies back to the Danube from the Netherlands and to try to get the Ottomans to make the quick peace which he and his ally wanted at this time. It was only because of his failure to move the Sultan that Austria too finally declared war on February 19, 1788.13

Origins of the War under Abd ul-Hamid I

IV. The Campaigns of 1787-1789

If the Ottoman army had been poised on the Danube waiting for the signal to attack, it might well have achieved significant gains and at least captured the important Danubian forts before the surprised Russians and Austrians could organize themselves to resist. However, one of the main reasons for the lack of preparations north of the Danube was the certain knowledge in Vienna and Saint Petersburg, on the basis of their efficient spy networks in the south, that there had been no Ottoman build-up for such a campaign. The Ottoman commanders were as surprised as their enemies by Yusuf Pasha's sudden war declaration, so they were in no position to take advantage of the situation. 1 As a result, what was left of the 1787 campaign season was devoted mainly to preparations on both sides. The few engagements which did take place were indecisive but indicative of what was to follow in subsequent years. In October an Ottoman effort to storm the great Russian fort at Kinburn, located at the point where the Dnieper and Bug join and flow into the Black Sea, was repulsed by the vastly outnumbered Russian garrisons as a result of a series of brilliant tactical moves on the part of their commander, General Alexander Suvorov, combined with confusion and inefficiency on the part of the Ottomans. 2 In the Black Sea, Russian attempts to supply Kinburn through a series of convoys were frustrated more

by storms than by the Ottoman fleet.3 The only allied initiative came on December 2, when the Austrians tried to seize Belgrade by a surprise attack in advance of their war declaration but were repulsed as a result of their own blunders and lack of coordination at the crucial time.4 In 1788 both sides were diverted by bitter internal disputes and consequent delays in war planning and preparations. Gazi Hasan Pasha, now returned from Egypt, quarreled bitterly with the Grand Vezir over the timing of the war declaration and management of the campaign.5 Russian preparations were delayed by the sloth and indecision of Catherine's commander in the east, Potemkin, by the formation of a new Triple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, and the United Provinces (June 13, 1788) directed mainly against Catherine, and by Sweden's effort to take advantage of Russia's Ottoman diversion and regain Finland by surprise attack. Catherine's two naval commanders in the Black Sea, the German Prince Charles of Nassau-Siegen and the American revolutionary hero, John Paul Jones, continually fought with each other and with Potemkin over who should take the lead (and the credit), and as a result there was a complete absence of coordination of the various Russian military groups in the area.6 The Austrian forces in the west, ready and waiting to move across the Save, the Danube, and the Carpathians, were frustrated by Russia's consequent failure to divert the Ottomans in the east.7 As a result neither side took the initiative until the summer was almost over. On June 28, Gazi Hasan Pasha's fleet was routed by Nassau-Siegen and Jones at the mouth of the Bug, but the lack of cooperation between the two Russian commanders made possible an Ottoman withdrawal with relatively minor losses.8 On July 9, Gazi Hasan forced the return to Sevastapol of a Russian fleet attempting to reinforce Kinburn, but his own effort to reinforce Oczakov was in turn beaten off by the Russians.9 Sweden's collapse and withdrawal from the war in late July enabled Catherine to reinforce Potemkin, who as a result finally opened the siege of Oczakov on September 1, taking it by storm on December 17.10 Although the season was too far advanced for the Russians to take advantage of the victory, it prepared the way for an advance to the Danube and beyond as soon as spring arrived.

The Campaigns

of

1787-1789

But the siege and capture of Oczakov were the only important actions in the east. On the whole, both the Russians and Ottomans remained quiescent, and most of the action during the summer of 1788 took place in the west. At first, the initiative was taken by the Austrians, who moved into Bosnia and gained complete control of the Save up to Belgrade by the time summer had arrived. 11 At the same time, in April, a large Austrian force captured Jassy without resistance as the result of the help of the Ottoman Hospodar of Moldavia, Alexander Ipsilanti, who deserted the Grand Vezir at a crucial moment in the campaign. 12 This broke the land connections of the great Dniestr fort of Khotzim with the main Ottoman army and enabled Marshal Coburg to take it on September 19, after a long siege.13 Ottoman rule in northern Moldavia thus came to an end, and a push against Bender during the next year's campaign was made possible. While the Austrians were relatively successful in west and east, in the center the Grand Vezir achieved the most brilliant Ottoman victories of the war. Koja Yusuf was emboldened to action by Emperor Joseph II's failure to attack Belgrade as well as by the initial Russian failure to move against Oczakov. So in August the Grand Vezir led the main Ottoman army out of Wallachia, across the Danube, and into the Austrian Banat, where he took the key fortress of Mehadiye, on August 30. This gave the Ottomans control of the entire southern Banat and the whole length of the Danube from Orsova to Belgrade, and they quickly poured thousands of troops across the Danube. Joseph II moved to stop the surprise invasion, but his own conservatism and indecisiveness and the skillful moves of the Ottomans enabled the latter to rout the main Austrian army at Slatina, September 20, opening the entire Banat and parts of Hungary to Ottoman attack. Only the valiant efforts of the Emperor's rear guard in defending the passes leading into Transylvania kept the Ottoman army and raiding parties in check until the approach of winter forced their withdrawal back across the Danube. 14 Yusuf Pasha had bolstered the confidence of his men; he had defeated and disorganized the main Austrian army while securing huge stores of needed ammunition and supplies for his own forces; and he had held the Austrians and Russians far short

War with Russia and

Austria

of their objectives. Yet his gains were ephemeral. As the new year came, the Austrians were once again poised for an attack all along the Danube and the Save, and the Russians, with Oczakov in hand and with the Swedish diversion settled, were finally ready to make a coordinated push in the east.15 Despite their relatively advantageous situation, Russia and Austria were more anxious than ever to make peace with the Ottomans as soon as possible. Joseph II faced new difficulties in the Netherlands, where a revolution seemed about to break out. Britain, Prussia, and the United Provinces were taking diplomatic steps against the allies wherever they could, and in particular they were helping Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to prepare a new attack on Russia. Negotiations also were begun for Polish alliances with Prussia and the Ottomans, and for Ottoman financial assistance to both the Swedes and the Poles if they attacked Russia. In the face of all this, and especially in view of their relative failure against the Porte in 1788, Catherine and Joseph made overtures for peace, directly through agents sent to the Grand Vezir's winter camp at Ruschuk and indirectly through the mediation of the French ambassador in Istanbul. But neither was willing to give up the conquests already made, while Abd ulHamid I still insisted that the Crimea and Oczakov be returned as part of any peace settlement, a determination in which he was encouraged and supported by the British and Prussian ambassadors in his capital. To strengthen this determination, Prussia at long last began negotiations for a formal alliance with the Porte, and Sweden followed suit shortly thereafter. With this sort of backing, the Sultan felt it would be foolish for him to leave the war without achieving his territorial ambitions.16 In the spring of 1789, the Russians planned to move through Wallachia to the left bank of the Danube, with Kilya, Ismail, and Ibrail as their main objectives. Austria planned to cooperate by sending one army east from Galicia along the Sereth River to Galatz and Ibrail, while the army of Transylvania would move across the Carpathians into Wallachia toward Sistova and Ruschuk in order to prevent the main Ottoman army from moving north to defend against the Russian attack. To the west, the main Austrian army would besiege and take Belgrade, while the army

The Campaigns of

1787-1789

of Croatia planned to move into Bosnia toward Sarajevo and Novi Pazar. It was hoped that a rapid victory on all fronts would force the Sultan to reconsider his decision and make peace so that the more pressing European problems could be dealt with.17 But once again, it was the Grand Vezir who seized the initiative. Leaving a large force on the lower Danube to guard against enemy activity in Moldavia, Yusuf Pasha moved toward the Carpathians with the intention of breaking through into Transylvania and thus disrupting whatever offensive plans the Austrians might have had. At the same time, the Hospodar of Moldavia, Prince Mavrogeny, moved north in Wallachia against the Russians and Austrians at Jassy, where the winter garrisons had not yet been reinforced for the spring. Since the Carpathian passes were still blocked by ice and snow, Joseph II was unable to send reinforcements, and it seemed certain that Jassy would fall within a short time. But at this critical moment, the news came that a new sultan had come to the throne in Istanbul. Yusuf Pasha and Mavrogeny immediately pulled back their forces to await the orders of their new master. Once again the advantages of surprise were lost, and no advantage was taken of a very favorable situation. 18

Accession of Selim III Abd ul-Hamid I fell ill of a stroke on the evening of April 6, 1789, and died the following morning, at the age of sixty-eight. 19 Within three hours, Selim III came to the throne, and all the officials still in the capital swore their allegiance to him.20 Abd ul-Hamid in his later days had become increasingly addicted to the pleasures of the harem, and his prosecution of military and state affairs had become correspondingly lethargic and aimless. Much of the popular unrest which arose during the previous winter had come in reaction to the Sultan's luxurious and wasteful existence, which was contrasted unfavorably with the demands which the Grand Vezir was making for new sacrifices in order to prosecute the war. On the other hand, Prince Selim had already acquired a reputation for ability and energy, and his accession was therefore welcomed with enthusiasm by administrators,

War with Russia and

Austria

soldiers, subjects, and foreign ambassadors alike.21 The various ceremonies associated with the new Sultan's accession were watched by masses of wildly cheering people who felt confident that they finally had acquired a leader who would be able to pull the empire out of the morass into which it had fallen. Selim's initial moves seemed to confirm these hopes. As soon as he was officially installed, he immediately sent an order to Yusuf Pasha at Ruschuk confirming him and all his chief officials in their positions and urging them to resume the campaign against the enemy as soon as possible and with all their energy.22 Whatever desires Selim may have had to reform the empire, he saw that he could not make very profound changes so long as the war continued, and he determined to carry it on to a successful conclusion by reviving and invigorating the old institutions and ways without attempting to introduce anything new. His first effort was to raise the spirit and morale of his people and soldiers. In his accession speech, he glorified the past deeds of the Janissaries, attributed their current difficulties to a failure to obey their traditional laws and regulations, and urged them to make new efforts to return to their old ways. He stirred the emotions of all by appealing for revenge against the infidel, who had taken the lands of Islam and killed and imprisoned thousands of Muslims. Selim told his soldiers to be brave as of old, to trust in God and their leaders, and to fight on until the Crimea was retaken and Ottoman honor avenged.23 He rejected the efforts of the Spanish, French, and Prussian ambassadors to secure a settlement and determined to go to the Danube himself, if necessary, to assume direct command of the army in the tradition of his illustrious ancestors. To assure military support, he issued the regular quarterly wages a month in advance and added substantial bonuses in observance of an old tradition which Abd ul-Hamid I had allowed to lapse.24 To get the support of the Ulema, he replaced the reforming Mehmed Kämil Efendi as Sheyh ul-Islam* with Mehmed Sherif Efendi, a favorite with most of the Ulema, who had been sent into exile by Abd ul-Hamid three years before because of corruption and lack of ability. In addition, he reimposed and strengthened the old sumptuary laws which regulated *Head of the learned corporation of Ulema. See Gibb and Bowen, 1/2, pp. 84-86.

The Campaigns

of1787-1789

the clothing worn by persons of different religions, classes, and professions and which imposed certain restrictions on non-Muslim subjects.25 The reformer Selim thus had to undo many of the advances made by his predecessor in order to prosecute the increasingly dangerous and difficult war. On April 20, Selim made his most important move. Gazi Hasan Pasha, the hero of Cheshme, who had directed the Ottoman fleet for two decades and who had been the leader of reform in the empire ever since the death of Halil Hamid Pasha, was now relieved of his command.26 This important change was the result of many factors. Gazi Hasan, the reformer, was the leader of those opposed to the Grand Vezir Yusuf Pasha, who led the conservative, antireform elements which had managed to eliminate Halil Hamid and slowly rise to ascendancy in the following years. Hasan had bitterly criticized the manner and timing of the Grand Vezir's declaration of war as well as his conduct of the campaign of 1788, and he had argued with the new Sultan that a more honest and vigorous man was needed to lead the empire in difficult times. Yusuf Pasha and his supporters were determined to get the Grand Admiral out of Istanbul as part of the reward they were to get from the Sultan in return for their continued support of the war effort, and now they were able to use his failure to save Oczakov to accomplish this. In Gazi Hasan's place as Grand Admiral, Selim appointed Giritli Hüseyin Pasha, who had distinguished himself as acting fleet commander while his chief had been in Egypt. Even more important, Giritli Hüseyin had been a close companion of the new Sultan while he was still a prince in his uncle's palace. So while Selim sacrificed Gazi Hasan to the Grand Vezir, he used the occasion to install in his place one of his own trusted confidants as a first step toward strengthening his personal power in preparation for the day when the war would be over, the conservatives could be driven out, and the contemplated reforms begun. But Selim was convinced that Gazi Hasan was in fact far too able and loyal a man for the empire to lose his services entirely, so he appointed him as governor of Ismail and commander of the land armies in Moldavia with the specific task of directing the effort to retake Oczakov and move to the Crimea by land, an im-

War with Russia and Austria

portant task, indicative of the Sultan's continued high regard for the former hero. The Grand Vezir was ordered to concentrate his efforts more in Wallachia and in the defense of Belgrade against the contemplated Austrian attack. Yusuf Pasha happily agreed in the hope that the new campaign would even further diminish the prestige of his enemy and make possible his complete elimination from the scene. Then Selim made preparations for a new eifort to remove the Russians from the Caucasus. Mehmed Kalga, son and heir of the Crimean Tatar Han, was appointed commander in the Koban area with the task of raising all the Caucasian Tatars against the Russians as well as supporting the Ottoman effort to retake the Crimea. 27 With this encouragement, Yusuf Pasha and Prince Mavrogeny were able to resume their operations in Wallachia in mid-April. But by then the Russian and Austrian forces had been reinforced and prepared so that it was impossible for the Ottomans to repeat their earlier successes. An initial Ottoman effort to take Galatz and clear the Russians from Moldavia was quickly foiled.28 In the west, Joseph II devoted all his resources to preparation for an attack on Belgrade, so the Banat and the Bosnian front remained relatively quiet during the remainder of the summer. It was at this point that politics emerged to undermine the Ottoman military effort, as the Sultan moved to secure a Grand Vezir more to his liking. Selim actually had wanted to dismiss Koja Yusuf Pasha as soon as he became Sultan, for Yusuf had played an active part in suppressing the abortive attempt by Halil Hamid Pasha to bring Selim to the throne in place of Abd ul-Hamid. Selim also was unhappy with the unrivaled power which Gazi Hasan's transfer had given the Grand Vezir and his associates, and he further wanted to secure in his place a man who would be more sympathetic to his own reform plans. But Yusuf had a good military reputation as a result of his Banat campaign and a strong following among the conservatives in the palace and government and among the Ulema, so for the moment Selim did not dare to dismiss him. But the Austrian victories in Moldavia gave Selim the pretext he needed. It did not take very long to tear down the reputation Yusuf had built up. Selim stated that his Grand Vezir had failed to make proper preparations for

The Campaigns

of

1787-1789

the campaign during the previous winter and that he spent most of his time with his concubines and cronies instead of caring for the affairs of state and of the army. On June 7, Yusuf Pasha was replaced as Grand Vezir and commander of the Ottoman armies by Hasan Pasha, who had distinguished himself as commander of Vidin during the previous year's fighting against the Hapsburgs. Yusuf Pasha was given the choice of becoming commander in Wallachia or at Vidin, and he chose Vidin. The new Grand Vezir set in motion a new series of military moves which led to the first major Ottoman disaster of the war and began the process by which the Ottoman army dissolved in the months which followed. In response to reports that Suvorov's main Russian force in Moldavia was about to unite with the Austrians under Coburg to attack Bucharest and occupy all Wallachia, the Grand Vezir sent the bulk of his army and Mavrogeny's to Fokshani to keep the two enemy forces apart. By means of a brilliant forced march, however, Suvorov managed to reach the Austrians at Martineshti, a few miles to the south, shortly before the Ottomans arrived. Then on the morning of July 30, the two surprised and completely routed the Ottoman army, which had been completely unaware of the arrival of the Russians. The Allied victory at Fokshani was itself of little strategic significance since the routed Ottomans were still only auxiliaries and reserves of the main army of the Grand Vezir, which remained at Ibrail waiting for the order to move into Wallachia. Coburg and Suvorov had too few soldiers to follow up the advantage by pursuing the routed armies, completing their destruction, and occupying new ground. But the rout was important in that it manifested and stimulated a growing disorder and lack of discipline in the Ottoman ranks which began with Yusuf Pasha's replacement and which had first shown itself in the failure at Galatz. Following Fokshani, the disorder spread rapidly. The Ottoman army began to fall apart, with desertion and confusion spreading like a disease. The remainder of the year witnessed a series of increasingly serious routs which ended with the army entirely destroyed and the way open for a rapid enemy advance all the way to Istanbul. 29 For the moment, Selim's response was a desperate effort to

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find more soldiers, while for the first time he began to consider the possibility of accepting the peace offers coming to him through neutral channels. He still was determined to regain the Crimea before peace was made, however, and he hoped he could get better terms by continuing the war until his enemies were desperate enough to give him anything he wanted. 30 So he raised new troops in Anatolia and Bosnia and ordered the Grand Vezir to reform his army and move to the attack once again. At the same time, on July 11, Selim gained what seemed to be a major diplomatic triumph when he signed a treaty of alliance with Sweden agreeing to provide annual cash subsidies of 2,000 purses* over a period of ten years in return for a renewal of the Swedish land and naval attacks against the Russians in the north. The allies bound themselves to continue the war until both secured satisfactory settlements, with neither making a separate peace without the agreement of the other. 31 The treaty was a victory for Prussia, which had urged Selim to continue the fight, while it was a defeat for France, which had taken the lead in trying to arrange a negotiated peace. Selim tried to follow up this alliance by securing similar agreements with Prussia and Great Britain, but here he was less successful. While they were willing to encourage and, to a certain extent, assist continued Ottoman campaigns against Austria and Russia, they were not willing to join the war openly or to commit themselves to assisting the Ottomans in any formal way.32 Although disappointed by his friends, Selim still was sufficiently encouraged by the Swedish alliance and Prussian promises to order the Grand Vezir to attack the enemy in northern Moldavia.33 The Ottoman army moved through Wallachia and Moldavia until on September 17 it reached the Rimnik River, the last main barrier before the Austrian camp at Fokshani. But once again, Suvorov and the Russians came to the rescue at the last minute, and the Ottomans were routed after a fierce battle (September 21).34 The Battle of the Rimnik, known to the Otto*By Ottoman financial reckoning, each "purse" (called kise or kese) contained 500 piasters (kurush) traditionally, but at the end of the 18th century, this had been reduced to 416 piasters. The total promised therefore was approximately 832,000 piasters.

The Campaigns of

1787-1789

mans as the battle of the Boza (Buzau) River and to the Austrians as the Battle of Martineshti, was the decisive encounter of the war. The vast new army gathered during the winter by the Grand Vezir was shattered. The inefficiency and disobedience shown by Ottoman commanders and men alike showed clearly that the untrained peasants and tribesmen who now formed the bulk of the army were incapable of performing the simplest maneuvers and were no match for the well-trained and brilliantly led Allied forces. Once again, there were no immediate results of the battle. Potemkin seemed to be jealous of the credit which Suvorov gained from the victory, and ordered him to return to his previous positions in Moldavia without occupying any new territory or pursuing the Ottomans. 35 Coburg had no new instructions from Vienna, so he retired to Fokshani. 38 The Grand Vezir returned to Ibrail, where he hoped to re-form his army, but since most of the survivors had already crossed the Danube and fled before his arrival, he finally gave up and followed them across, broken in body and spirit. 37 The news of the disaster also had a demoralizing effect on the remaining Ottoman forces in Wallachia, Serbia, and Bosnia, so for all practical purposes, no organized Ottoman force remained to meet the enemy attack. 38 The most immediate Allied benefit from the victory came to the west in Serbia, where a monthlong Austrian siege finally overwhelmed the defenders of Belgrade (October 8),39 the great bastion of the Danube defense line. The news electrified Europe and Istanbul alike. Only Nish remained as a major fortress between the advancing allied forces and Istanbul itself. The way seemed open for a spring offensive which might drive the Turks out of Europe. The news of Belgrade encouraged the Russian and Austrian commanders in the Principalities to move forward and take advantage of the Ottomans' helplessness following the battle at the Rimnik. The surviving Ottoman forces now saw it would be impossible for them to retain their positions on the left bank of the Danube, so they retired to Kilya, Ismail, and Vidin, which they hoped to hold to defend the Danube line in the east. 40 Potemkin reached the Dniester on October 1, and soon was able to take the great forts of Akkerman (October ll) 4 1 and Bender (November 14),42 both without resistance since shortages of men and supplies

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and the entreaties of the local populations to avoid bloodshed and damage induced the local Ottoman commanders to surrender. And in Wallachia, Coburg and the Austrian army came out of winter quarters in mid-October upon the direct order of Joseph II. They crossed back through the Carpathians and occupied Bucharest, again without resistance (November 9), while the Ottoman garrison fled toward the south.43 Thus concluded one of the most disastrous campaigns in Ottoman history.

The Campaigns of

1787-1789

V. The Winter of 1789-90: Diplomatic Activities and Internal Developments

As the winter began, the Ottoman Empire was on the brink of disaster. The new Grand Vezir was unable to administer the government and the army at the same time, and both were falling apart as a result. The Danube defense line had been broken by Austria in Serbia and Bosnia, and by Russia in the Principalities, and both were in a position to drive into the heartland of the empire during the next campaign. But as the winter passed, the diplomatic and political situation in Europe changed so radically that by the time spring arrived, the danger was eased, at least for the moment.

Diplomatic

Factors

The first and most important element which produced a change in the situation was a greatly increased desire on the part of all the European powers, including the belligerents, for the war to be brought to an end. In Sweden, Gustav III had used popular anger at the unpatriotic actions of the nobles to force through a new constitution which gave him supreme power, so he was ready and able to resume his campaign against Russia in Finland. In Poland, the nationalists were making new efforts to strengthen their government and escape from foreign control. In the Neth-

erlands, there was widespread unrest and open revolt against the Hapsburgs. In Hungary, separate racial and national interests had been causing greatly increased antagonism toward Austrian rule. Joseph IPs efforts to incorporate Hungary into a single centralized administration had led to a situation approaching open revolt. At the same time, the advent of the French Revolution and an increasing desire to stifle its growth before its "seditious" doctrines could spread over the entire continent led the members of the Triple Alliance to try even harder to secure a peace with the Porte as rapidly as possible. The Prussian foreign minister, Count von Hertzberg, was attempting to follow a policy very much like that of Frederick II at the time of the first partition of Poland— to use an eastern war in order to get territory and prestige for Prussia. Hertzberg hoped to act as a mediator who could dictate terms to the belligerents in such a way as to secure advantages for his master. He felt that the Ottomans had suffered such staggering defeats in 1789 that they would have to agree to make some concessions to Austria in the Principalities in order to save themselves. Austria, weakened by internal troubles, would have to accept the dictates of the balance of power while enlarging her territory at Ottoman expense. In return for her acquisitions along the Danube, she would have to give all or part of Galicia back to Poland. The Poles would reward Prussia by ceding it Danzig and Thorn, which would give the Prussians complete control of the Vistula. Von Diez, Prussian ambassador at the Porte, led a group which advocated a far more aggressive policy than Hertzberg's, involving the cooperation of the Triple Alliance with the Porte, Sweden, and Poland in order to dictate their will to Austria and Russia, by force if necessary. Poland would be rewarded for its cooperation by being freed from Russian control. With its new strong government, it would form a permanent bar against any further Russian advance to the west, while the rescued Ottoman Empire would perform the same function to the south. Austria would have to give up the Netherlands as well as Galicia, and would submit to Prussian ascendancy in Germany. Thus while Hertzberg's policy would avoid war, von Diez's would almost certainly bring it about,

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of1789-90

but it offered far more attractive rewards in the event of success. Selim III strongly favored von Diez's plan; in fact, he had been pushing for an open alliance with Prussia and England since 1787. But after the defeat at the Rimnik, he reluctantly decided that if he could not get such assistance from his European friends, he would have to make peace without achieving the territorial ambitions for which Abd ul-Hamid had entered the war. He was, however, fully informed about events in France and elsewhere in Europe. The British ambassador in particular pointed out to him how much the French Revolution was changing the diplomatic alignments of Europe and causing all its monarchies to end their foreign wars so they could join their forces against the contagion of revolution. As a result of this, by February Selim wanted to continue the war through another summer so that both his enemies would become anxious enough that they would at least return their conquests of the current war in exchange for peace. He felt that he could not continue the war successfully without an alliance and active assistance from Prussia or Britain, and he issued an ultimatum to that effect in November—alliance or peace. At the same time, he moved to strengthen his government by important changes of personnel.

Internal

Preparations

All through October and November 1789, the news of the successive disasters at Galatz, at Fokshani, at the Rimnik, at Belgrade, and finally at Bender had produced a crisis of the first order in Istanbul. The loss of Wallachia also deprived the capital of a major source of grain, and as the winter approached shortages of food added to popular dissatisfaction. Crowds were coming into the streets, looting shops and homes, and setting fires to show their discontent and alarm. Demands for the deposition of the Grand Vezir and his associates were increasing in frequency and intensity. 1 While much of the enthusiasm which accompanied Selim's accession had worn off, the anger of the crowd still was focused on the ministers rather than on the Sultan himself. In reaction to this popular protest, a large number of Selim's chief ministers wanted to make peace, and on October 23 a Grand

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Council met in the presence of the Sultan to consider the new proposals. Because of the Sultan's opposition, however, nothing was decided, and instead orders were sent out to prepare for the new campaign.2 To provide the money, Selim publicly sent his own gold and silver plate to the Imperial Mint to be melted down and made into coins, and he ordered all the notables of the empire to do likewise. Orders were again sent out prohibiting the use of gold or silver plate on houses, persons, and horses, and requiring all persons to deliver their valuable utensils to the Mint as soon as possible.3 All male subjects of the Sultan between the ages of fifteen and sixty were ordered to prepare themselves to serve in the army if they were needed. Decrees were issued to provide regular provisions and pay for the army which was to be newly created to go on the campaign. At the start of November, rumors abounded that the Austrian forces were already heading for Nish, and on the fifteenth, 5,000 Janissaries were sent from Istanbul to Sofia to meet them, despite the critical need for their services to keep order in the capital.4 Selim also moved to restore order and discipline in his government and army. Said Ahmed Pasha, able commander of the fortress at Sofia, was appointed governor of Rumelia, in place of Abdi Pasha, who, it was widely rumored, had accepted Austrian bribes to prevent the reinforcement of Belgrade at the critical time. The Sultan's brother-in-law, Mustafa Pasha, was sent to replace him as governor of Sofia, with orders to prepare it for a last ditch stand if necessary against the expected Austrian attack.5 On November 21, Selim made his most important move since coming to the throne. He removed Hasan Pasha as Grand Vezir and replaced him with the hero of Cheshme and Ismail, Gazi Hasan Pasha, the only commander who had been able to resist the Russian advance after the debacle at Fokshani and whose continued resistance at Ismail was the only bright spot in the otherwise dismal news that flowed from the front.6 Gazi Hasan now went to work with a ferocity and energy which astonished his colleagues and European observers alike. Most of the officers whom he considered responsible for the disasters of the previous year were executed, including all the garrison com-

The Winter of 1789-90

manders who had surrendered their posts without resistance. He appointed his predecessor as governor of Ruschuk, with the responsibility of preparing to resist any Austrian effort to push south across the Danube from Bucharest. Selim issued a decree giving his new Grand Vezir absolute authority in all matters and stating that no one else should interfere in state affairs or dispute what he ordered. In the middle of January, Hasan Pasha was so satisfied with his work that he left his camp, led a force of 10,000 men into northern Bulgaria, and successfully wiped out the bandits who had been interrupting his communications with the capital. 7 But despite his successes, despite his energy, despite the free hand which the Sultan had given him, it did not take long before Gazi Hasan and Selim III came into conflict. The first point of conflict came when the new Grand Vezir dismissed his successor as Grand Admiral, Giritli Hüseyin Pasha, and replaced him with the former Grand Vezir, Yusuf Pasha, then commander at Vidin. Hüseyin had been Selim's personal choice as Grand Admiral, so the Sultan refused to approve the change, stating that an able commander was needed at Vidin and that Yusuf Pasha was by far the best qualified man for this post.8 Gazi Hasan deeply resented this interference with the "full powers" which had been given him by decree, but he avoided an open conflict with the Sultan by accepting his decision without protest and turning back to his military preparations at Shumla. But in the end, the most important area of conflict came over the question of war or peace. Gazi Hasan Pasha had opposed the war right from the start. While he still was commander at Ismail, he had sent the Sultan a long and detailed report describing in agonizing detail the plight of the army and strongly recommending that peace be made at once. Now that he was Grand Vezir, he continued to recommend strongly that the European offers be accepted as soon as possible. Soon after his arrival in Shumla, he received direct peace proposals from Potemkin based on the status quo ante bellum, with Russian evacuation of Bessarabia but retention of the Crimea and the island of Tamara in the Koban. Similar proposals were also received from the Hapsburg Marshal Loudon, and Gazi Hasan sent them on to Istanbul together with his strong recommendations that they be accepted. At the same

War with Russia and

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time, he sent his agents to Potemkin and Loudon, and thus started peace negotiations on his own without waiting to hear from his master.

The Alliance with

Prussia

On November 26, the Prussian ambassador in Istanbul, von Diez, had offered a formal alliance to the Porte in order to keep it in the war. He told Selim that a Prussian war with Austria would divert Austria from the Ottoman front, and he supported this argument by pointing out how the Prussian alliance with England had prevented the Russian Baltic fleet from passing to the Mediterranean, and how recent Prussian purchases of large quantities of supplies from Poland had already caused Field Marshal Romanzov, Suvorov's commander in Moldavia, considerable difficulties in getting his own supplies for the new campaign. Diez promised Selim that Prussia would declare war on Russia and Austria in April if the Porte agreed to the alliance, and that it would fight on until both the Crimea and the Caucasus, as well as all their gains in the current campaign, were evacuated by the Russians. In return, he asked only for Ottoman support of Prussian claims to Danzig and Thorn and for the return of Galicia to Poland. Although Britain and Prussia were closely allied, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Robert Ainslie, was not informed about these negotiations, since Britain now preferred to end the war with the Porte as soon as possible by peaceful means rather than by an enlargement of the conflict. The French and Spanish ambassadors led the opposition to the Prussian proposal, telling Selim and his ministers that the Russians were now in control of the Polish Diet, that Gustavus Adolphus was losing his hold over the nobles in Sweden, and that Prussia would surely desert the Ottomans and make a separate peace just as soon as its own ambitions were satisfied. But Selim was not moved. The news of Austria's failure to take Ismail and Orsova at the end of the campaign strengthened his resolve and spirits. On January 15, he summoned a formal Imperial Council, including representatives of the Ulema and the various military corps, to discuss the matter, but by this time he had definitely

The Winter

of1789-90

resolved to accept the proposal and sign the alliance despite the anguished protests of his Grand Vezir. He allowed debate only on the question of whether such an alliance with an infidel power would be legal according to the Sharia. Ataullah Mehmed Shanizade, then an important member of the Ulema and later imperial historian, said that such a pact would not be legal. But the Sheyh ul-Islam, Hamidi zade Mustafa Efendi, managed to produce sufficient traditions to support the legality of the move, and with the backing of the Sultan this view was accepted. The formal alliance was signed on January 31, 1790, by the Reis ul-Kuttab, Mehmed Rashid Efendi, and the chief judge of Rumelia, Mustafa Ashir Efendi, for the Porte, and Ambassador Baron von Diez in the name of the King of Prussia. Prussia, "because of the prejudice which enemies have brought to the desired and necessary balance of power by crossing the Danube," agreed to declare war and move with all its power against Russia and Austria in the spring of 1790, and to continue in the war until the Porte secured a peace which would be satisfactory to it. In return, the Sultan promised to do all he could to obtain the restoration of Galicia to Poland. This would serve as a replacement for Danzig and Thorn, whose cession by Poland to Prussia would also be supported by the Porte. In addition, the Porte agreed to prevent attacks on Prussian trade ships by North African pirates in the Mediterranean, and in return Prussia agreed to demand the return to the Ottomans of Bender, Oczakov, the Crimea, and other areas lost in the current war before it would make peace. The Porte promised to make no peace in which Prussia, Sweden, and Poland were not included, and once peace was concluded, to regard as an attack on itself any attack made by Austria and Russia on any of those powers. The latter engagement was to be reciprocal among the four courts, who thus were to be joined in a mutual assistance pact once peace was concluded. It also was agreed that the Porte would not make peace with Russia except through the mediation of England and Holland. A relatively long term of five months was set for ratification of the treaty in order to give Prussia a chance to use all possible means to get Russia and Austria to accept a peaceful solution before it accepted the obligation to attack them. 9

War with Russia and

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Although Selim III ratified the treaty at once, Prussian ratification experienced various delays and difficulties. The Prussian government recalled von Diez soon after the treaty was signed on the grounds that he had exceeded his authority, and he was replaced as ambassador at the Porte by Knobelsdorf. Final ratification was postponed despite urgent Ottoman inquiries and requests for some definite statement on the subject.10 But in spite of the delay, the treaty had a tremendous effect in Istanbul. The peace talks, which had been carried out in Istanbul through the mediation of the French embassy as well as in the camp of the Grand Vezir, were now suspended.11 Orders were issued for the levy of two hundred thousand additional men in Anatolia and the Balkans. Work was resumed on several new ships. Rumors were spread that Selim himself would go to Edirne to lead the new campaign.12 Orders were sent to the Grand Vezir in Shumla to redouble his preparations for war but to keep the treaty secret and continue his talks with the enemy representatives in order to deceive them into foregoing their spring preparations.13 Although Gazi Hasan Pasha himself was bitter and disappointed, he resumed military preparations with his accustomed vigor and made such strenuous efforts to discipline and reorganize his army that the Janissary corps revolted against him on February 15, forcing him to flee until the dispute was settled.14 It was only on February 22 that the treaty was announced publicly, after which the Grand Vezir had to suspend his negotiations for peace. The Austrian and Russian representatives left Shumla to return to their camps, and war preparations were intensified on both sides. Gazi Hasan sent large numbers of men to strengthen his advanced posts, especially at Giurgevo, in Wallachia, where the Hospodar of Wallachia was building up a large force to defend his position against an Austrian offensive in the spring.15

Changes in the Grand Vezirate At this point, Selim's war effort suffered a staggering blow. Gazi Hasan had been under a great deal of pressure, not only because of the effort involved in rebuilding his shattered army but

The Winter of 1789-90

also because of criticism from his political enemies in Istanbul, who were trying to use the military failures of the previous campaign to remove him from power before he could turn against them. The frustrations and anxieties resulting from his various disputes with the Sultan also took their toll, for the sincerely loyal and able minister desperately tried to satisfy his master while pursuing a course which he felt to be in the best interests of the empire. The final blows were inflicted by his own disorderly and rebellious men, who met every order with sullen resentment and, sometimes, with open resistance. All these factors exhausted the energy and strength of the Grand Vezir, and left him an easy prey to illness. On March 24, he took to his bed with a bad cold and fever. Within five days he was dead, taking with him Selim's last hopes for an efficient and successful campaign against the enemy. The British and French ambassadors in Istanbul circulated reports that he had been poisoned by his political enemies or by the Sultan in an effort to offer up a scapegoat to the public for the defeats of the previous year. 16 But most Ottoman and Western observers who were witnesses to his fatal illness reported that it came from natural causes, and the rumors of foul play seem to have been without foundation in fact.17 The debates on Gazi Hasan's replacement were long and acrimonious. For the first time, Selim's confidants and ministers were beginning to group themselves into political factions, with the occupants of the harem and officials surviving from previous reigns gathering under the leadership of Yusuf Agha, the Lieutenant of the Queen Mother, and those who had risen to power in company with the new Sultan accepting the leadership of his closest friend, Ktichük Htiseyin Pasha. As was the case in previous centuries, these political groupings resulted more from considerations of personal relationships and advantages than from matters of principle and policy. Each group struggled to secure the Grand Vezirate and as many of the other important government positions and revenues as possible in order to increase its own power and prestige. The groups united only in a determination that whoever was chosen as grand vezir should be amenable to their direction and should not be a man like Gazi Hasan, with sufficient energy and strength to endanger their positions and

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revenues. For three weeks, the factions argued, bickered, and maneuvered for advantage without reaching any agreement. Without a leader, the army languished, preparations for the new campaign were halted, and the Treasury was rapidly emptied of its last resources. Finally, despairing of obtaining any recommendation to which all parties would agree, the Sultan appointed the obscure and incapable governor of Ruschuk, Chelebi zade Sherif Hasan Pasha on April 16,1790. 18 Son of the chief notable of Ruschuk, the new Grand Vezir proved to be a tool not of the capital factions surrounding the Sultan, but of the Balkan notables from whose ranks he came. He also was incapable of carrying out the difficult military and political tasks which fell to him. But for the moment at least the political crisis was solved and the increasingly powerful and vocal factions were satisfied, if not contented. Selim at once sent his new Grand Vezir a stern order to end bribery and misrule and prepare the army for the spring campaign. 19 While Selim III was preparing to continue the war, events in Europe were moving in the opposite direction; his allies and enemies alike were preparing for peace. On February 20, 1790, the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II died and was replaced by his able and intelligent brother, Leopold II, who inherited an empire racked by internal dissension and desperately needing peace so that its house could be put in order. Prussia's recent alliance with the Porte had made an Austrian-Prussian war inevitable if the Hapsburg armies moved south of the Danube into Ottoman territory, but with revolt threatening in both Hungary and the Netherlands and dissatisfaction and disorder widespread in the Austrian homeland, Leopold realized that Austria was not ready or able to fight Prussia at that time. He was not dazzled by the Russian Empress as his brother had been, and he was perfectly willing to abandon his ally if that would bring peace. He shrewdly perceived that Britain and Prussia had essentially different objectives in their alliance. Britain's main object was to limit Russian advances, and it had no special quarrel with Austria. Prussia's hostility was directed primarily toward its German neighbor rather than against Russia; the effect of the Austrian alliance with Russia was to push Britain into supporting Prussia against Austria. Leopold therefore decided that the best way to counter

The Winter

of1789-90

Prussian advances in Germany, while at the same time avoiding war, was to conciliate Britain by coming to terms with the Ottomans, thus suspending operation of the Russian alliance without openly breaking it. During the spring, therefore, he initiated proposals along those lines, with a general European peace settlement now seeming much closer at hand than before. The chief negotiations were now going on between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. Frederick William still had not ratified his alliance with the Porte, and he offered not to do so if Leopold would agree to return to the lines established by the Treaty of Passarowitz and give back Belgrade and parts of Moldavia and Bosnia to the Ottomans. In return, Prussia would agree not to recognize the independence of the revolting Belgian provinces, nor would it make any effort to stop Austria from forcing them to submit. In return for the latter concession, Prussia demanded that Leopold change his alliance with Russia into a purely defensive agreement and that he return to Poland all of Galicia except for the border province of the Bukovina. Leopold rejected these conditions, unwilling to cede anything to Poland. He did agree, however, to return to the Ottomans all districts on the right banks of the Save and the Danube as well as Belgrade on condition that the Porte cede to him Khotzim and its surrounding area, the portion of Wallachia lying on the right bank of the Aluta River, and the part of Bosnia bounded by Croatia and the Unna. To support these demands, he assembled a large army in Bohemia under the command of Field Marshal Loudon. With the breakdown of the negotiations, the Prussian armies in Silesia and eastern Prussia likewise were ordered to move south and begin hostilities. Frederick William left Berlin at the start of April to put himself at the head of his Silesian army, and all Europe braced itself for a general war over the Eastern Question.20

War with Russia and

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VI. The Campaign of 1790

While the peace negotiations waxed and waned, the armies of the belligerents moved back into the field. Sherif Hasan Pasha led the Ottoman army out of Istanbul toward Vidin and Nicopolis with the intention of fortifying the last remaining portion of the Danube defense line against enemy attack. But he soon found that it took more than good intentions to revive the army of the Porte, which had received such a severe beating the previous autumn. Weapons, ammunition, tents, and uniforms had been lost to the enemy in large quantities, and after Gazi Hasan died, his successor's efforts to replace them had been swallowed up in the struggles for positions and revenues on the part of the political parties in Istanbul. The new Grand Vezir had neglected his military duties while trying to strengthen his political position in the capital before embarking on the expedition, so little had been done to fill the storehouses and send out the food and supplies which the army would need. Moreover, the loss of Wallachia had deprived both the capital and the army of their most important source of grains remaining after Egypt had fallen to local usurpers. The frontier fortresses still in Ottoman hands were badly in need of reinforcements and supplies if they were to meet new enemy attacks; wagons and horses were needed to transport them; men had to be mobilized and sent where they were needed;

but none of these things had been done. So the Grand Vezir had to stop his march only a few miles outside of Shumla while orders were sent out to fulfill the army's needs. Various Balkan notables and bandit leaders had been ordered to send contingents of mounted men to the Grand Vezir as soon as possible, but almost no preparations had been made and the army remained immobilized.1 The British ambassador in Istanbul made a new effort to mediate a peace, but Selim said he would do nothing without the agreement of his Prussian and Swedish allies. For the moment, however, neither the Austrians nor the Russians moved to take advantage of the Grand Vezir's difficulties. Leopold still was hoping that peace might be concluded, while the Russians suffered from Potemkin's annual spring lethargy. Selim was pouring hordes of Anatolian troops across the Bosporus with their own ammunition and supplies in the hope of reinforcing the Grand Vezir before it was too late. 2 In mid-May, Leopold II became aware of these activities and decided that a show of strength was needed to press the Ottomans toward an early settlement. He ordered Marshal Coburg to march toward Ruschuk, with the implied threat of crossing the Danube unless the Ottomans began to negotiate in good faith. When he reached Giurgevo on the Danube, however, the Ottoman garrison resisted so fiercely that the arrival of reinforcements from Ruschuk panicked the Austrians, who fled back toward Bucharest, leaving all their equipment and supplies behind. 3 The news of Giurgevo strengthened Selim's determination to resist, exactly contrary to Leopold's intention. It also encouraged the Ottoman commanders to make a new push across the Danube in pursuit of the fleeing Austrians, but strong resistance by the Austrian rear guard at Kalafat caused the Ottomans to retire. For all practical purposes, military contact between Austria and the Porte was ended and awaited only a political settlement to confirm the fact.

The Agreement of Reichenbach Political settlement came not as a result of the bilateral negotiations, however, but in consequence of intervention on the part

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of the concert of Europe. As a result of Frederick William's assurances to the Ottomans that he would soon attack Austria, all of Europe was alarmed at the specter of a general European war over the Eastern Question. To prevent this possibility, a conference was assembled on June 27 at Reichenbach, a small town located only a few miles away from Frederick William's camp at Schönewalde. He agreed to forego his intended march against the Austrians with the understanding that the conference would achieve a settlement satisfactory to him. To Reichenbach came representatives of the Triple Alliance powers and Poland. Russia wished to treat separately with the Turks, so it refused to participate. Although the Ottoman Empire was directly concerned with the deliberations, the Porte was neither notified nor invited, since each of the participants hoped to "represent" its interests in such a way that it would be forced to provide territorial and economic rewards in return. Prussia, as the only Ottoman ally, claimed the particular right to represent the Sultan in all deliberations of this kind, but neglected to inform the Sultan of this sudden change from military to diplomatic efforts to secure their common ends. Prussia made the conference possible by modifying its previous demands on Galicia, asking that only a part of it be returned to Poland, although this still would be the compensation for Polish cession of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia. Prussia also agreed to leave the Ottoman areas of Orsova, Turnul, Giurgevo, and Ibrail to Austria so long as the latter returned the remainder of its conquests and agreed to the Polish cessions to Prussia. However, Austria's continued insistence that no part of Galicia be transferred stalled the conference and threatened it with failure. At this point a number of relevant changes took place in Poland. A party arose in the national parliament which opposed the cession of Danzig and Thorn and chose to renounce the Galician acquisition which Prussia was offering in return. This party managed to get Britain and Holland to persuade Frederick William to abandon his plan. Despite his disappointment, he finally agreed to drop the project until more propitious times and to adopt a policy of securing a general settlement on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, so that some sort of union could be formed as

The Campaign of 1790

soon as possible against the French Revolution. More than anything else, it was the growing importance of events in France which caused him to reach this conclusion, the spread of revolutionary agents throughout Europe with doctrines subversive to the existing social order. The sovereigns meeting at Reichenbach were now convinced that they had to forget their differences at once and unite against the menace emanating from the West, and a return to the status quo ante bellum, seemed to be the best way of accomplishing this. Finally on July 15, the Prussian Foreign Minister Hertzberg came forward with a plan which proved to be most acceptable to all, and it became the basis of the final agreement. He declared that his master would desist from the demand for a cession in favor of the Polish republic, but that in return he would demand that Austria renounce its claim to Wallachia in favor of the Turks. On July 25, Leopold II's acceptance arrived from Vienna. Peace was to be re-established on the basis of a strict status quo ante bellum although he declared his hope that, in the course of the negotiations which were to follow, the Porte would agree to minor modifications needed to assure the security of the Austrian frontiers. He added that if a peace between Russia and the Porte was not achieved at the same time, he would retain the fortress of Khotzim, which had been taken by a joint Russo-Austrian attack, and would maintain it as neutral until a Russo-Ottoman peace allowed him to return it to the Porte. The same day, Frederick William gave his official agreement, stating that he understood that the modifications of the status quo ante bellum mentioned by the Austrians would be only those to which the Porte agreed of its own will, through the mediation of the European powers, and that Prussia was to be fully compensated for any Austrian territorial gains made at Ottoman expense, however minor they might be. The ratifications of this agreement were exhanged at Reichenbach on August 5, and they were immediately transmitted to the Porte along with Prussia's entreaties that they be accepted.4 The agreement of Reichenbach marked an important turning point in European diplomatic affairs. The threats of a war between Austria and Prussia and of a general European conflict over the Eastern Question were averted. Austria escaped from

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its most serious crisis since that which followed the death of Maria Theresa. The Triple Alliance was now absorbed into the more general European concert, which was rising to meet the new problems imposed by the appearance of revolutionary France. In the meantime Selim III had had no word of the Reichenbach conference. He continued to count on Prussian and Swedish military assistance for a new concerted attack on the enemy. Reports that the Ottoman fleet had defeated a Russian squadron ofFKafa in the Black Sea and that Prince Coburg was taking his army back into Transylvania because of internal difficulties in Galicia strengthened his resolve and led him to order the Grand Vezir to march toward Bucharest at the beginning of August. At the same time, he ordered that all peace negotiations be ended in Istanbul and at the Grand Vezir's camp, and the Austrian and Russian agents were sent home. The Grand Vezir left a large force to guard Ruschuk and Shumla, and on August 5 he set out toward Bucharest with an army of about 50,000 men, mostly cavalry. Strong forces were sent to reinforce the garrisons at Ibrail, Silistria, Ismail, and Varna. On August 7, the Prussian ambassador officially informed the Porte that the alliance finally had been ratified in Berlin a month before, and he reassured the Sultan that Prussian military operations would soon begin. Koja Yusuf Pasha, the former Grand Vezir, was ordered to take his army from Vidin and move north, crossing the Danube, in order to assist the Grand Vezir in Wallachia. 5 Then on August 18, the bombshell of Reichenbach was dropped into the Ottoman camp. The Prussian ambassador in Vienna came to the Grand Vezir, informed him of the European agreement, and stated that he would have to move back south of the Danube and begin negotiations with the Austrians at once in order to conform with it. On August 24, the Grand Vezir's messenger arrived in Istanbul with the news, which left Sultan, ministers, and people alike in a state of fury at the betrayal which had been inflicted by the infidel ally. Seemingly Prussia had joined the enemy to bring the Ottomans to their knees. Selim's immediate reaction was to order the Grand Vezir to ignore the Prussian order and attack the Austrians, and he delivered to the Imperial Council a long speech bitterly criticizing the

The Campaign of 1790

Prussians for violating their agreement not to make a separate peace without Ottoman approval. During the next week, the Council discussed the matter, with a relatively even division arising between those who wished to fight to the bitter end and those who favored peace and acceptance of the agreement. A number of ministers and most of the Ulema felt that Austria was so burdened by internal difficulties that it would even give back Galicia and Bukovina as well as its conquests in the current war if only the conflict was prolonged and pressed. They seemed to be gaining the upper hand in the debates when the arrival of the news that Catherine had signed a separate peace with Sweden swung the Council in favor of peace, although not after hearing savage attacks on the infidel allies who had deserted the Porte in its time of need. The Ottoman government agreed to enter negotiations with Austria on the basis of the Reichenbach agreement. Selim asked England and Holland to use all their power to prevent the Russian Baltic fleet from passing into the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and he advised the new Prussian ambassador, Knobelsdorf, that Prussia would now be expected to live up to its obligations by attacking the Russians in order to force them to relinquish the Crimea and Oczakov. To push this demand, Ahmed Azmi Efendi was sent as Ottoman ambassador to Berlin with the rank of plenipotentiary. Selim also ordered the Grand Vezir to persuade Coburg to evacuate Wallachia before he entered negotiations, or at least to obtain his permission for the Ottoman army to march through the Austrian-controlled areas of Wallachia so it could move against the Russians as soon as possible. But Prussia and Austria both refused these requests, stating that their main aim was to secure an Ottoman peace with Russia as well so that it, too, could be brought into the European concert against France. 6

Peace

Negotiations

On September 17, the Grand Vezir and Coburg signed a ninemonth truce at Giurgevo, and preparations for a formal peace conference were begun. 7 Feelers which had been received from Potemkin for a peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum were rejected, and the main Ottoman army moved from Ruschuk toward

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Silistria in order to meet the Russians. 8 Official Ottoman acceptance of the terms of the Reichenbach conference was communicated to the ambassadors of England and Holland in Istanbul, and they were subsequently asked to go to the peace conference with the Prussian ambassador in order to mediate on behalf of the Ottomans, as stipulated in the Reichenbach agreement. Prussia hoped to enhance its own prestige by having the congress held on its territory as a "disinterested party." But the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Robert Ainslie, encouraged the Ottomans to insist on one of their own cities, and this view finally prevailed with the choice of Sistova, in northern Bulgaria on the southern bank of the Danube. The actual negotiations began in midDecember, and they continued throughout the winter and spring of 1791.9 In the meantime, Ottoman-Russian negotiations foundered. In April 1790, Potemkin had proposed peace on the condition that Bender and Akkerman would be returned to the Ottomans as well as the two Principalities. The Ottomans would be allowed to appoint whom they wished as princes, but once appointed they could not be changed so long as they ruled justly and well. The fort of Oczakov would be destroyed, and the area between the Dniester and Bug rivers would be left as a neutral zone occupied by the subjects of neither power. Russia would agree not to intervene in Georgia and to respect whatever arrangements the Ottomans were able to make with all the local princes in the Caucasus. There was no mention of war indemnities, but the Porte would agree to use its influence to prevent Prussia from attacking Russia. Selim, still unaware of the approaching European detente, refused these proposals and continued to rely on the expected assistance from Prussia and Sweden.10 So, while the negotiations with Austria proceeded at Sistova, the war with Russia continued and in fact was extended to a new front, the Caucasus, for the first time.

New Military

Actions

According to the Treaty of Küchük Kaynaija, the Ottomans had left the Kabartay area north of the Caucasus Mountains to Russia, which had built up its military strength in the entire area

The Campaign of 1790

north of the Black Sea to facilitate a subsequent move into Georgia as well as the Crimea. Starting in 1787, the Ottomans had stirred the people of Daghistan, Circassia, and Kabartay against the Russians and incited the Khan of Tiflis to move secretly against his new Russian protectors. In October 1787, the governor of Trebizond, Köse Mustafa Pasha, was sent to Anapa with a force of about 10,000 men to aid the revolts which Ottoman agents had been fomenting among the Caucasian tribes. At this time Russian attention was focused in the Balkans, so no attempt was made to meet this Ottoman incursion until the spring of 1789, when a strong Russian force moved to attack Anapa, the base of the Ottoman activity. In response to this attack, in March 1790, Selim sent Battal Hüseyin Pasha with a relief force of 5,000 men. Landing at Anapa, he successfully beat off the Russian attack, but he failed to aid the rebellious Kabartay and Caucasian tribes as he had been ordered to do. It was only in response to repeated orders from Istanbul that he finally left Anapa on August 8 with a large force, in the hope of helping the Kabartay tribes against the Russians. He seemed not at all anxious to fight the Russian army, and he moved as slowly as he could, not arriving at the Koban River until September 14. There he was met by the chief princes of the Kabartay, who told him that they had 30,000 men, who would join him when he attacked the Russians. Apparently Battal Hüseyin was in correspondence with the Russian commander, and in return for a large bribe he refused the Kabartay offer of cooperation. Instead he sent a small force of his own men, numbering between 4,000 and 5,000 against the main Russian army, which had retired from Anapa, but it was smashed and fell back toward Anapa with the Russians in hot pursuit. Although the rest of the Ottoman force remained undamaged and untried, Battal then surrendered to the Russians, in accordance with the secret arrangement which had been made. Left without a chief, the men of the Ottoman force fled in disorder. When the news of the betrayal and disaster reached the Sultan, he immediately sent Sari Abdullah Pasha to command at Anapa, but he also was not eager to reach his new post; and while traveling from Erzurum to Trebizond, he stalled as long as he could on the pretext that he was putting down the various local rebels in

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that area. In the meantime, Battal Pasha's desertion, the flight of the Ottoman army, and the failure of the new Ottoman commander to appear finally disquieted the Caucasian tribes, and they dispersed to their homes, entirely giving up the fight against the Russians. The Russians then were able to move against Anapa once again in early 1791, finally taking it after a long siege. Thus ended the last hope the Ottomans had of retaining their possessions north and east of the Black Sea." The summer of 1790 also saw the Russian army make important new gains against the Ottomans west of the Black Sea. The original allied plan for 1790 had Potemkin crossing the Danube at Ibrail and marching south along the Black Sea coast while Coburg would cross at Ruschuk and then move to the east in order to catch the Ottomans in a pincer movement. But with Austria's defection and the need to send large forces to watch the Polish and Prussian frontiers, Potemkin was forced to make much more limited plans for the campaign. As soon as the AustroOttoman peace was announced, Suvorov, who had been sent to Wallachia to coordinate operations with Coburg, was recalled. He then occupied Galatz and worked to build up a fleet of armed boats to assist Potemkin's advance when it came.12 Conditions in the Ottoman army and navy also made the situation ripe for a Russian advance. The army of the Grand Vezir became increasingly disorderly and disorganized while waiting at Giurgevo most of the summer. After he moved to Silistria, at least half of his force melted away as a result of desertion and the desire of the feudal cavalry members to return to their fiefs for the winter. The situation was very similar among the garrisons of the main Ottoman forts on the lower Danube—Kilya and Ismail —and as a result there were not enough men to defend them against a determined Russian attack.13 At sea the Ottoman plight was almost as bad. In July and again in early September, Ushakov's Sevastopol squadron inflicted decisive defeats on the remnants of the Ottoman Black Sea fleet, forcing it to retire to the Bosporus and leave the sea entirely under Russian control. The Russian Danube flotilla secured a similar supremacy, and this left the Danube entirely open to Potemkin whenever he chose to move across it and march to the south.14 But despite these advantages, he re-

The Campaign of 1790

mained inactive most of the summer, and only in mid-October, when the campaign season was almost gone, did he attack and take the principal Ottoman forts remaining along the Danube— Kilya (October 30),15 Tulcha (November 16),16 and Ismail (December 22);17 Ismail was of special significance since it was located at the intersection of the roads to Galatz, Khotzim, Bender, and Kilya, and was the storehouse for the entire Turkish defense system in the area. The news of Ismail's fall in particular astounded Europe and was celebrated in verse by Byron. At Sistova, negotiations were suspended for three days by the Reis ul-Kuttab* for fear that Austria would refuse to negotiate on the same basis as before because of the disaster. In Istanbul, the news led to the usual popular tumults, with riots in the streets, fires, stonings, and the like. To restore calm and order, Selim sacrificed almost all his chief officers as scapegoats to popular feeling.18 On February 14,1791, the Grand Vezir, Sherif Hasan Pasha, was shot in Shumla on Selim's orders. Two weeks later Koja Yusuf Pasha was made Grand Vezir for the second time because of his strong following in the army and among the Ulema. Sherif Hasan's associates also were replaced, and the Ulema and politicians whom he had banished were returned to their posts with honor. In addition, to appease popular Muslim feeling, the new Grand Vezir prohibited the use of wine and spirits and closed all the cabarets in Istanbul, although he did try to soften the blow to the Christians by giving them a week to store up supplies before the order went into effect.10 Selim thus turned to the reactionary opponents of his internal policies in order to get the support needed to continue the"external struggle. *The Reis ul-Kuttab, or "chief of scribes" (sometimes called also Reis Efendi), was at this time not only the Director of the Scribes of the Treasury but also in charge of the technical aspects of foreign relations, including the conduct of negotiations with foreign representatives as well as the dispatch of ambassadors and other emissaries. See Pakalin, III, 25-27; also Halil Inalcik, "Re'is ul-Kuttab," M , vol. IX, 671-683.

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VII. The Campaign of 1791 and the Conclusion of Peace

Negotiations continued at Sistova until February 10,1791, when they were broken off as a result of Austrian efforts to renege on previous promises to restore the status quo ante bellum. At the same time, Prussia encouraged new negotiations to renew the Ottoman alliance with Sweden; the Porte was to agree to supply at once the balance of the money it formerly had promised to pay over a long period of time, and Sweden was to obligate itself to attack Russia.1 Prime Minister William Pitt of England continued to support the Ottomans in the negotiations, over the opposition of the liberals, Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox, who condemned the policy of "allying England with the barbarous Turk." Although Parliament agreed to increase naval forces toward this end, Pitt finally decided against going through with his ultimatum to Austria because of the divided state of the country. Pitt had clearly seen how much it was to the interest of Britain to keep the Porte from falling into the hands of the Russians, but public opinion followed far behind, and less drastic means had to be used to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.2 While Yusuf Pasha remained at Shumla trying to restore his battered army and Sultan Selim rapidly changed his ministers in a futile effort to restore order at home, the Russian army, commanded by Prince Repnin while Potemkin wintered in Saint

Petersburg, moved to surprise the Ottomans with an attack in the early spring of 1791. On April 4, Repnin routed the Turkish garrison at Machin, a small town located about ten miles southwest of Ibrail, occupying a key position which controlled the passes through the mountains parallel to the Danube.3 Despite the large number of men in the Ottoman army it was clear even to Yusuf Pasha that their discipline, morale, and training were poor and that he lacked sufficient supplies and munitions for a serious campaign. But before the Ottoman army could retire to new positions, Repnin daringly recrossed the Danube and completely routed the Ottoman force (July 8), with only the opposing contingent sent by Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Epirus giving a good account of itself.4 But by now peace negotiations had come so close to success that Repnin contented himself with destroying the Ottoman camp and then returning to his original positions across the Danube. For all practical purposes, the Ottoman army was gone—the defense line was smashed once and for all. With the defeat at Machin, the game was up. It was at this point that peace came between Austria and the Porte, largely as the result of the mediation of Britain and Prussia, who forced the Sultan's representatives to accept the Austrian demands in order to secure peace and thus assure the preservation of the European concert against revolutionary France.5 The basis of the Treaty of Sistova,6 which was signed on August 4, was the status quo which existed before the war, essentially a return to the Treaty of Belgrade as modified by the cession of the Bukovina to Austria in 1775. A full amnesty was given the subjects of both powers who helped the enemy during the war, and in particular the Christians of Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia who had assisted the Hapsburg armies. The Porte confirmed its previous orders, promising to protect Austrian ships against attacks by North African pirates and to provide compensation for any damage resulting from such attacks, confirming freedom of trade and travel for Austrian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, and allowing flocks coming from Transylvania to pass the border freely and graze in Wallachia and Moldavia. In return Austria agreed to restore to the Porte in the condition

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in which they were taken all territories and forts conquered during the current war, in particular Wallachia and the parts of Moldavia which it occupied. Khotzim and its district were also to be returned but only after the Porte made peace with the Russians and under terms of evacuation agreed on with them. Until that time, Austria would remain in Khotzim, which it specifically promised to keep as a neutral place without giving any direct or indirect assistance to the Russians. All prisoners of war and slaves were to be exchanged without the payment of any purchase prices or ransoms. Subjects of either party who went to the territory of the other before or during the war and lived there of their own free will were not to be returned without their consent but were required to take the citizenship of the country in which they chose to reside and to dispose of their former properties except insofar as they were allowed to retain them under conditions granted to all subjects of the country to which they now were to be attached. All incursions on both sides were to be suppressed. Article 12 confirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Belgrade, allowing to Catholic priests and communicants in the Ottoman Empire absolute freedom to practice their religion and maintain and repair their churches and holy places and visit the latter without any hindrance on the part of the Ottoman government or its officials. The treaty was followed by a separate declaration by the ministers of Britain, Prussia, and Holland stating that it had been concluded by their mediation, thus satisfying their honor without actually including a specific statement in the treaty. In a separate convention concluded the same day,7 the Porte agreed that the town and area of Old Orsova would remain in the possession of Austria so that the Czerna would form the perpetual frontier between the two countries, but under the condition that the Hapsburgs would never fortify any part of the district ceded under this convention. The small plain north of the fort of the Island of Orsova was to remain neutral territory, as provided in article 5 of the Treaty of Belgrade, with neither side laying claim to it nor attempting to settle or use it in any way. The district situated on the left bank of the Upper Unna was ceded to Austria up to its western sources, where the Turkish, Austrian, and Dalmatian boundaries came together, leaving Sterniza

The Campaign of 1791

under Ottoman control. The Austrian government promised not to build fortifications in any of the areas ceded to them by this agreement and to regard the settlement as definitive and not subject to futher claims or alterations. Ratifications were exchanged within a week, thus bringing to a conclusion a war which had cost both sides very heavily in manpower and resources and which left both near collapse. Selim immediately sent Ebubekir Ratib Efendi to Vienna as ambassador with the special task of restoring good relations between the two powers and getting Austrian assistance for the reforms which he was planning to introduce as soon as the Russian war was ended. Various disputes on the exact boundary delimitations kept the boundary commissions working until late 1795, however, and it was only after that time that relations fully returned to normal.

The Treaty of J assy Shortly before the Treaty of Sistova was signed, a truce was finally agreed upon between the Porte and Russia. Immediately after the Agreement of Reichenbach, Frederick William II had urged Catherine to accept his mediation to secure peace with the Porte, but she refused on the grounds that she could make a peace with her enemies without any foreign intervention. This stirred Frederick William to prepare for possible military action in order to force Russian compliance. While peace negotiations went on at Sistova in December 1790, he gathered an army of 90,000 men while Catherine prepared to meet his threat by recruiting men in Livonia and White Russia. Britain gave its full support to Prussia, telling Catherine that while it would not demand that Russia accept its mediation, it would not allow a settlement which would impose undue sacrifices on the Porte, and it declared its determination to secure an agreement based on a strict status quo ante bellum, arrangement. Britain had just completed its war in Spain, and its fleet was now released for action in the Baltic and Mediterranean if it should prove necessary. In February 1791, the powers of the Triple Alliance were granted the good offices of Denmark in their effort to get Catherine to return her conquests to the Porte, and while she rejected

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the idea of status quo ante bellum, she finally accepted the Danish mediation, declaring that the honor and security of her empire would not permit her to accept the conditions which the powers wished to impose but that she would be willing to accept a modified status quo agreement by which she would return the bulk of her conquests but would retain the town and district of Oczakov. The Danes proposed that Russia be given Oczakov and all the territory up to the Dniester, under the condition that they remain without fortifications, but all concerned objected to this. The Porte was not consulted during these negotiations since the main object of the Tripartite Alliance was to make a settlement at the Sultan's expense. On May 26, the members of the Triple Alliance proposed a peace settlement by which Oczakov would be ceded to Russia on the principle that it was required for the security of Russia's frontiers. They elaborated this in a new plan by which the area enclosed by the Bug and the Dniester, including Oczakov, would become independent. On July 20, the Empress replied that she could not agree to destroy the fortress of Oczakov because that would leave her frontier unguarded, but she added that she would agree to free navigation on the Dniester. The mediating powers and Catherine finally agreed on the cession of the area between the Bug and the Dniester with the condition that all other Russian conquests be evacuated, adding that if the Porte refused this arrangement, they would abandon it.8 Thus the basis for peace negotiations was laid, and only the Sultan's agreement was needed before the final talks could be begun. In Istanbul, Selim had continued to hold out for war in the hope that Prussia would join the attack on Russia. But in early July, a series of new disasters finally forced him to give in to the inevitable. The news of Prussia's desertion as a result of the Reichenbach agreement was only the beginning. On July 5 Selim received reports (subsequently learned to be false) that the Wahhabi sect had captured and pillaged Mecca, the holiest place in Islam. 9 Five days later, he learned that the Russian army which had been besieging Anapa since the previous autumn finally had taken it in April, thus eliminating the last Ottoman foothold north of the Black Sea. The arrival of the news from Machin

The Campaign of 1791

(captured on July 9) was the last straw, so on July 15, two weeks before the powers presented their ultimatum, Selim instructed his plenipotentiaries at Sistova to proceed to similar negotiations with the Russians as soon as their work was completed, and he ordered the Grand Vezir to meet Repnin at once to arrange a truce, which was signed at Galatz on July 31. Catherine concealed these arrangements from the western allies until the last minute in an effort to demonstrate that the essential peace arrangement with the Ottomans had been made directly, without their pressure and mediation.10 Ahmed Vasif Efendi, official court historian of the Sultan, who had accompanied the Grand Vezir's army during much of the previous year, was sent to Galatz to continue the talks with the Russians in preparation for the final peace conference. Vasif was instructed to try to get the Russians to modify their demand to extend their boundary to the Dniester, but in this he was entirely unsuccessful because the mediating powers had previously agreed to this line. In order to show sincerity and good faith, Selim ordered the immediate release of a large number of Russian merchants who had been held as prisoners in Istanbul since the start of the war. The Russians in turn released a number of Muslim war prisoners, including Mehmed Pasha, grandson of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, who had been captured at the battle of the Rimnik. The main terms of the truce agreement were that the Ottomans would accept as the basis of negotiations the Treaty of Küchük Kaynaija with the exception that the Russian boundary would be moved up to the Dniester, thus including Oczakov and all of Bessarabia. The Russians thus were able to dictate the principal territorial arrangements in direct negotiations with the Ottomans and present the mediators with a fait accompli when the actual peace conference opened.11 Negotiations were then transferred to Jassy, where Potemkin set up his headquarters. After a delay due to Potemkin's death, discussions resumed on December 1. While the principal territorial arrangements had been agreed on in advance, the conference dragged on, with disputes on Russian demands for war compensation of 12,000,000 piasters and for territorial concessions east and west of the Black Sea preventing a final settle-

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ment.12 Finally, Russian submission on the former demands, and Ottoman on the latter, led to an agreement, which was signed on January 9, 1792.13 A "perpetual and solid" peace was established between the two empires, and a general amnesty and pardon was given to the subjects of both. All those banished or exiled from one, because of service for the other, were allowed to return to their former homes if they wished. The Treaty of Küchük Kaynaija formed the basis of the agreement, as amended by the treaty of 1783, accepting the incorporation of the Crimea into the Russian Empire and fixing the Koban River as the frontier between the two north of the Black Sea, thus also confirming the Russian protectorate over Georgia. In accordance with the truce agreement signed at Galatz, the Dniester was established as the perpetual boundary between the two. Russia received the port of Oczakov as well as the tongue of land extending between the Bug and the Dniester, on which the great port of Odessa was soon to be built as the center of the Russian naval establishment on the Black Sea. Russia agreed to evacuate Moldavia, Akkerman, Kilya, Ismail, and Bender by the end of May, and the Porte promised to restore all former privileges to Moldavia, to exempt it from all taxes for a time so it might recover from the damage caused by the war, and not to demand from it any taxes in arrears or special contributions to pay for war expenses. In addition the Porte agreed to order the governor of Ahiska to prevent Ottoman subjects from raiding across the Koban into the Russian provinces of Tiflis and Carthalina and to pay compensation for any damage caused and booty taken in such raids as well as in North African pirate attacks on Russian shipping in the Mediterranean. All prisoners of war taken during the war were to be exchanged except for those who voluntarily accepted the citizenship or religion or both of the other and who wished to remain in their new homes. One month later, ratifications were exchanged and the war was officially over. The Ottoman Empire had entered the war to regain the Crimea but instead had seen its boundaries driven back to the Dniester and the Koban. Russia was finally and definitively entrenched on the shores of the Black Sea, with

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Kherson and Sevastopol established as great naval bases and the territory provided for the emergence of Odessa as the new instrument of Russian naval supremacy. Russia now controlled the mouths of most of the major rivers emptying into the Black Sea. The Porte had been saved from even greater damage more by the grace of the French Revolution and the dictates of European concert diplomacy than by its own efforts. The war had revealed the extent of Ottoman weakness not only to all of Europe but also to Sultan Selim and to many of his associates, and they emerged from it with a determination to reform the empire at once before it was too late.

War with Russia and

Austria

Part III. The "New Order" of Selim III

VIII. Wartime Reforms, 1789-1792

What did "reform" mean to the Ottoman Sultan? The letters which Selim wrote to the King of France and others while he was still a prince as well as his actions after coming to the throne, make it clear that at that time his concept of change and reform was little different from that of his predecessors. As far as he was concerned, the empire was in difficulty abroad because the traditional institutions were not being operated properly; it could be saved only if they were restored to their original state. Abuses and inefficiency had to be ended and discipline and obedience re-established. Only where military necessity required the acceptance of modern weapons and techniques developed in the West could new military organizations be created to make use of them so that the equilibrium of traditional Ottoman society would not be upset by damage to one of its intergral parts. Throughout his reign Selim did little more than apply this concept, although the conditions in which he found himself caused its manifestations to be more grandiose, more significant, and more striking than ever before. The immediate, pressing needs of prosecuting a war against powerful European enemies caused Selim to subordinate even this limited concept of reform to the necessity of securing the full cooperation of the established military and religious classes

until the war could be brought to an end. However inefficient these groups might be, however much they might ignore their own laws and regulations, they still provided the only administration and army which the empire had, and without them the enemy simply could not be held off at all. Selim understood quite well what his successor Mahmud II was to find out from bitter experience three decades later—that destruction of the old institutions, however bad they might be, would be disastrous if it was accomplished at a time when foreign enemies were ready and waiting to take advantage of every weakness. So for the moment, the emphasis had to be on restoring order and discipline in the regular military corps and the administration and on raising the morale and spirit of the people.

Reform by

Consultation

The most important change which the Sultan introduced in the wartime period was less a reform than it was an elaboration of a traditional process — consultation with all segments of the ruling class on important matters facing the empire. In the past, all laws and regulations introduced in the Sultan's dominions had been drawn up and applied by the Sultan and his ministers, who together constituted the Imperial Council (Divan-i Hiimayuri). Legislation and administration thus were concentrated in a single all-powerful body composed of the appointees and assistants of the Sultan. Other members of the ruling class had no voice in its deliberations and decisions beyond the right to submit petitions and to appear before it on request. When unusually important matters required wider support, the approval of specially assembled councils of notables, representing all the groups of the ruling class, was sought and obtained. But this was the exception not the rule, and for the most part, these assemblies did no more than sanction policies previously decided upon by the Imperial Council. They did provide Selim with a precedent, however, an existing body which could be developed to fill a new need without offending those who would be angered by open innovation. The need was simply obtaining the advice of those who were experts in

The "New Order" of Selim III

the areas of Ottoman life which the Sultan sought to reform. The members of the Imperial Council could not be —and were not—experts in all aspects of the Ottoman system, so they could not draw up the kind of detailed regulations that the Sultan felt were necessary preliminaries to, and parts of, reform. To obtain the needed advice, the previously infrequent councils of notables now were made regular, permanent parts of the legislative and executive processes. Starting in 1789 and continuing throughout Selim's reigns, specialized councils were assembled to discuss particular areas, to draw up regulations for them, and to see that those regulations were carried out. To these new bodies, the Imperial Council in fact transferred most of its legislative and administrative duties, with only the formality of legal assent left to the ministers of whom it was composed. Thus a major step was taken to secure more efficient and regular handling of the affairs of state. By this device also, Selim was able to secure the assistance and sanction of many members of the existing ruling class for the program of restoration and reform which he hoped to accomplish.1 On May 14, 1789, a little over a month after Selim came to the throne, he inaugurated his reforms by calling a general consultative council (Mejlis-i Meshveret) of notables, which met in the Revan Pavilion of the Imperial Palace three days later. 2 To it came over two hundred leaders of the ruling class—judges and administrators, scribes and teachers, active and retired military officers and soldiers, all invited to discuss what could be done to save the empire. The meeting was opened with a short speech by the Sultan, who asked all those present to give him their frank evaluations of the ills of the empire and the remedies which could be applied. The Reis ul-Kuttab then read a list of subjects to be considered, the areas of the Ottoman structure where the disorder was especially apparent, in particular the army, the provincial administration, and the systems of justice and finance. Those in attendance were also asked to add any other subjects which they thought appropriate. After the Reis sat down, there was a long period of silence. Many of the officials who were present benefited in some way from the abuses which the Sultan wanted them to

Wartime

Reforms

expose. Most of them were not accustomed to speaking out freely and frankly in the presence of their master. No one wanted to be the first to criticize the established order. Finally, the Sultan's childhood tutor in the Imperial palace and now Rumeli Kadiasker (Judge of Europe), Hamidi zade Mustafa Efendi, rose to lead the discussion, apparently by prearrangement with his master. Soon to be appointed as Sheyh u-Islam, known to be a close friend of the Sultan, he was a man who clearly was to be heard and taken as an example. 3 Mustafa Efendi pointed out that the subjects of the Sultan were being oppressed in innumerable ways, in violation of the religious and civil laws of the empire, that extralegal taxes were being collected from them for the benefit of corrupt officials, and that in such a situation it was impossible for them to provide the material and manpower which the empire needed in its time of crisis. He went on to describe in detail the disorder which was becoming widespread in the army, the inferiority of its tactics and weapons, and the breakdown of its supply system. Diplomatically, he added that these conditions had developed long before the time of his master, but he emphasized that they would have to be corrected at once if the European enemies were to be defeated. This statement set the tone for the discussion which followed. It indicated to all those present the type of criticism which the Sultan would accept and the extent to which they could propose reform without incurring his wrath. Once the ice was broken and the lines of conduct made clean, similar statements came thick and fast. The commander of the fortress of Tirana, Niman Bey, described how judicial decisions in his district were given in favor of those who offered the largest payments to the judges, how cultivators were turned out of their lands so the tax farmers could substitute persons paying them bribes and increased taxes, how the bulk of the military positions in the empire were held by persons unable or unwilling to perform their duties, and how as a result the army was composed primarily of untrained and undisciplined rabble plucked from the streets in times of crisis. Niman Bey was followed by Hakki Efendi, former Director of the Imperial Treasury, who gave details on how nepotism and corruption had destroyed the once

The "New Order" ofSelim III

efficient administrative and financial systems of the empire and deprived the Treasury of the bulk of its tax revenues. Other officials recited similar tales of abuse and incompetence, supplementing in detail the grim picture drawn by their predecessors. But speaker after speaker offered as remedy no more than the elimination of the abuses and restoration of the institutions to their original state and mode of operation. For two days the statements continued. After all the notables who wished to had spoken, the Sultan himself rose once again and read a prepared statement in which he appealed to all his subjects to do what they could to end the oppressions, injustices, and inefficiencies which had been described. Asking those present to draw up detailed written statements containing their analyses of difficulties and proposals for reform, he promised to receive and consider their proposals and to cut off the heads of anyone who dared to betray state and religion by opposing them. The great Imperial Council held in mid-May 1789 was a public proclamation of the Sultan's determination to reform the empire. It was followed by similar councils held at periodic intervals in the Imperial palace and in the quarters of the Sheyh ul-Islam. So long as the war went on, their deliberations resulted in little positive action. But various efforts were made to remedy at least the principal sources of popular discontent, manifested in increasingly violent uprisings during 1790 and 1791.

Sumptuary

Laws

The rise of prices and scarcity of food, the spread of nationalism among minorities, the arrival of bad news from the war fronts, and the flight of peasants from provincial misrule into the overcrowded cities, made the urban population an increasingly uncontrollable and volatile mass ready to vent its frustrations at the slightest provocation. The most numerous and in many ways most successful of the wartime reform measures were those which were introduced to end the resulting social ferment, which was disturbing order and security in the large cities of the empire. These measures were restrictive, rather than palliative. All members of the subject class resident in Istanbul, Galata, Eyiib,

Wartime

Reforms

and Edirne, were registered by officials of the census department in 1790 and again in 1792. Those who could not show evidence of regular employment were required to leave the cities at once and return to their village homes. Only persons who could demonstrate long-standing urban domicile and employment or, in the absence of these, could produce a guarantor among established urban residents willing to pay for their housing and food were allowed to remain. Lodging houses in working-class quarters were closed so that vagrants and vagabonds would have no place to stay, and persons harboring them were subjected to severe penalties. Guards stationed at the gates leading into the cities were instructed to admit only those peasants who could demonstrate pressing business and prove that they planned to return to their homes in a short time. In many cases, peasants were required to leave their children as hostages at the city gates to guarantee their prompt return. By driving the peasants back to the land, Selim hoped to restore large areas to cultivation while at the same time relieving the cities of the worst problems of overpopulation.4 These efforts were at least partially successful, but ferment remained common in the towns, and more direct measures finally were introduced in an effort to control it. The most important of these restored the laws of previous centuries regulating the dress and conduct of individuals in the streets and other public places. In the multinational and multireligious Ottoman Empire, social order traditionally had been preserved by a system of compartmentalization in society, that is, the isolation and separation of the various social, religious, and economic groups. The basic division between ruling Ottoman and subject raya* classes was supplemented by guild organizations and millet** com' In Ottoman Turkish re'äyä, or "protected flock" of the Sultan. In Ottoman usage, this name was applied to all subjects of the Sultan, not only non-Muslims, but also all Muslims who were not members of the ruling class. See Gibb and Bowen, 1/2, pp. 252-3. In traditional Ottoman usage, all subjects of the Sultan were divided into autonomous communities called millet, each led by its own religious leader. Each millet was governed according to its own laws and maintained its own systems of education, justice, social security and the like , all of which were outside the scope of the central government. See Gibb and Bowen, 1/2, pp. 219-226.

The "New Order" of Selim III

munities, each governed by its own leaders according to its own laws and traditions. The place of each individual in Ottoman society was determined by a combination of his class, institution, millet, and position, and indicated by his dress and headgear. These provided instant indications of his rights, privileges, and duties and thus enabled everyone else to treat him properly and avoid violating or infringing on them in any way. The clothing regulations thus played an important part in maintaining the social fabric of the community. 5 Since by the end of the eighteenth century, the social order, and the clothing regulations which went with it, had broken down almost completely, Selim assumed that men attacked each other on the streets, robbed each other's houses, and violated the lives and properties of others mainly because failure to observe the old clothing regulations had made the status of individuals unclear. Jewish and Christian merchants who had amassed huge fortunes had begun to flaunt their wealth by wearing the more prestigeful satins and silks set aside by law and custom for members of the ruling class. Members of the military corps wore the clothing set aside for artisans and merchants, because they were more artisans and merchants than they were soldiers. Since individuals no longer limited themselves to the clothing and headgear prescribed for them, it was impossible to tell their rank and position merely by looking at them, and numerous disputes and conflicts resulted. With this simple analysis, the solution was obvious. Decrees were issued requiring all subjects to wear only those garments, hats, and decorations to which they were entitled by law. Heavy punishment was provided for violators, and inspectors were sent out into the streets and markets to check on compliance. Sultan Selim himself began to roam his capital in disguise to uncover violators and turn them over to his officials for punishments. 6 In the same way, decrees were issued ordering the suppession of dissolute and sinful behavior among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The sale and use of spirits was prohibited although nonMuslims were allowed to continue their use in the privacy of their own homes. Taverns and coffeehouses were closed on the not entirely unwarranted premise that they were centers of

Wartime

Reforms

misbehavior and stimulants of the mass actions which periodically engulfed the capital. These particular restrictions were the result of various factors which had exacerbated relations between Muslims and non-Muslims for several decades. The influx of non-Muslim merchants and soldiers from Europe into the empire, and the general relaxation of the old Ottoman urban codes during the last years of the eighteenth century, had led to a proliferation of public taverns, especially in Istanbul and Galata, and the relative ease with which spirits could be purchased in these places led an increasing number of Muslims to succumb to the temptation. Muslims who were not themselves seduced were increasingly irritated by the sight of practices which they believed to be sinful and to be leading their fellow believers into wrongdoing, and on various occasions their efforts to close or wreck the taverns and prevent the sale of spirits led to largescale battles among members of different millets. Consequently, in the interest of social harmony and order, these particular irritants were prohibited, although the fact that these decrees were continually repeated throughout Selim's reign indicates the government's lack of success in enforcing them. 7 Administrative Reforms. Efforts also were made to allay popular discontent in town and country by reforming the judicial and provincial administrative systems. The state of the religious class had fallen to a new low in the eighteenth century. The ranks of the Ulema had been flooded with persons who were entirely ignorant of religious law and practices and who had managed to purchase their positions or transfer their military or civilian salaries into Ulema pensions in order to avoid the service they were supposed to perform in return. Such persons were able to appropriate the leading positions in the Ulema and use them for their personal profit. Through their efforts, admission to the class was given more and more to those who could pay the highest bribes, without consideration of qualifications. Standards of education inevitably declined as these men occupied most of the teaching positions and gave the degrees and certificates of accomplishment in return for bribes and fees rather than as the result of proper examinations. Persons appointed as judges in the provinces farmed their posts to the highest bidders, who made use of the

The "New Order" of Selim III

courts to recoup their purchase prices and make a profit by selling justice to those who paid the most. Here, too, Selim's sole object was to restore the religious class to its previous state and to eliminate the abuses in its operations. In December 1789, Hamidi zade Mustafa Efendi was appointed Sheyh ul-Islam with the specific task of reforming the Ulema, and with the support of the Sultan he moved to accomplish this task as rapidly as possible. Inspectors were sent into the provinces to see whether the holders of judicial and teaching posts were actually performing their duties and performing them adequately. Those found to be absent or incapable were dismissed and their appointments nullified. In the schools, enrollment, promotion, and graduation were made subject to a rigid system of examinations. Efforts were made to examine the teachers, with those unable to pass being removed to less demanding work. The traditional admonitions against bribery and corruption were issued frequently, as they had been in the past.8 Selim's provincial reforms were also very limited and very conservative. During the last half of the eighteenth century, the breakdown of government at the center had led to a similar dissolution of its provincial branches and to the rise of virtually independent provincial and local notables. As the central government had lost its ability to control its own officials and as their tyranny and misrule consequently increased, notables (ayans) arose among the local bandits, as well as some of the leading families, first in response to the need of the people for some sort of protection against official tyranny, and eventually because of the government's need for some local force to balance and play off against its increasingly disobedient and disloyal agents. It was also necessary for someone to organize and carry out the basic functions of security, irrigation, and taxation, which the regular officials had largely abandoned in their search for personal profit. Abd ul-Hamid I had tried to control these notables and enlist them in the service of the state by adapting an old and forgotten position especially for them, that of Shehir Kethiidasi (City Steward). This position was supposed to be filled by election among the local inhabitants under the supervision of the Ottoman governor. Its functions were essentially those which the notables had pre-

Wartime

Reforms

viously assumed for themselves. The Shehir Kethildasi in each town was supposed to organize cultivation, tax collection, and security, and represent the local inhabitants in their relations with the central government and its officials. Thus the notables were brought under state control by putting their elections under government supervision and making them subject to the laws and regulations of the state. However, as was the case with so many other efforts to remedy abuse, the new position became no more than another level of misrule and tyranny over the people. While it might have solved the problem if the governors had been honest and loyal men, the problem had in fact arisen because they were not, and the new office did no more than give them another opportunity to sell positions to the highest bidders, with the successful purchasers overtaxing and tyrannizing to recoup their payments and make a profit. At the same time, those notables who had risen to power because of their military strength were able to ignore the new officials as they previously had ignored the other Ottoman laws and officials. They continued to exercise their local authority as before, hampered only by the need to deal with one more Ottoman authority. 9 The war of 1789-1792 served only to increase the strength and bargaining power of the notables as opposed to the governors and the Shehir Kethüdasi. Since the regular Ottoman standing army was unable to supply sufficient numbers of trained men to fight the Russians and Austrians, Selim III was absolutely dependent for such troops on the notables. In return for military contributions at critical times, Selim had to abandon his predecessors' efforts to control the notables. In 1790, the position of Shehir Kethüdasi was abolished, and orders were issued for the Ottoman governors to accept as notables anyone who was able to get the approval of the local population, that is, those notables who had the force to establish their local domination. In many cases, Selim had to go even further than this and appoint the notables as governors to secure their military support. Under existing conditions, this was the only thing he could do. The notables were in fact far more able to perform the duties of local administration and provide military contingents than were the regular Ottoman officials.10 However, the long-term consequences of this policy

The "New Order" of Selim 111

were much more serious; they will be dealt with in the next chapter. Selim's financial measures during the war were less reforms than they were desperate efforts to secure sufficient money for needed war expenditures. The drop in cultivation and, consequently, in land tax revenues, the subjection of large areas of the empire to independent notables, and the loss of numerous taxpaying provinces to the enemy reduced the revenues of the Imperial Treasury just at the time when the needs of war raised its obligations enormously. Each winter's preparations for spring operations consisted mainly of frantic efforts on the part of the Sultan and Grand Vezir to scrape together all the money they could find to secure the supplies which the army needed and to provide pay for the men, who would and did revolt whenever their salaries fell into arrears, even during the campaigns. The large sums of money paid to the Swedish government in return for its alliance only added to the Treasury's difficulties. Selim tried various expedients to raise the money he needed, but they were useless or self-defeating. He tried to borrow from Holland, but its merchants refused because they considered the risk to be too great in view of the Ottoman military defeats. He then turned to Spain, which refused on the grounds that it would violate its neutral position by giving money to any belligerent, a decision which was determined and reinforced by dynastic connections with the Hapsburgs of Vienna. In desperation, Selim turned to his own vassals, the King of Fez and the Deys of Algiers and Tunis, whose treasuries were bulging from the profits of pirate raids against Ottoman and European ships alike, but he received in response only evasions and excuses." These rebuffs forced him to turn to the more traditional Ottoman solutions for financial difficulties. Coins were clipped and debased so the Treasury would not have to pay the face value of its debts. Decrees were issued prohibiting the manufacture or use of implements made of gold and silver, except for women's ornaments and rings, and requiring all subjects of the Sultan and members of the ruling class to sell their gold and silver objects to the Imperial Mint at fixed prices considerably below those of the free market. These objects were then melted down and made into coins, but at

Wartime

Reforms

weights and alloys far inferior to those established by law.12 Military Reforms. Finally, efforts were made to restore some sort of order and discipline in the Janissary corps and the other elements of the permanent Ottoman military establishment. The state of these corps was indeed lamentable. In 1790, it was estimated that of the 12,000 names registered in the Janissary rolls, only 2,000 could or would perform service when needed in campaigns. Most of the corps members actually were women, children, artisans, and merchants, untrained in the military arts, holding their memberships only for their revenues, and completely unable and unwilling to perform the military services supposedly required of them in return for their salaries. The consequent dependence of the Porte on contributions of men sent by the provincial notables and vassals and on rabble dragged from the streets of the major cities produced a body of untrained and undisciplined soldiers, better able to ravage friend and foe alike than to combat the disciplined, well-armed, and well-trained troops of the enemy. In addition, few of the officers were trained in the military arts. Most of them held their positions only for the revenues they brought. Officers often kept the salary and ration monies of their troops and sold the ammunition and supplies sent them by the Grand Vezir, further contributing to the lack of discipline of their men.13 Disorder, desertion, and revolt were normal conditions in the Ottoman army, no matter how great the danger it faced. As the war went on, Selim did make some efforts to remedy these conditions. He ordered the immediate retirement of old and infirm members of the corps so their positions could be filled by young recruits able to perform the tasks expected of them. Inspectors were sent to the army to compare the rolls of each corps with the men who actually reported for duty, and orders were issued for the dismissal of all those who did not appear or who sent substitutes. The Janissaries were ordered to wear their uniforms at all times and to drill regularly in their established techniques.14 Efforts were made to revive the feudal cavalry corps sent from the provinces. Inspectors were sent to the fiefs, and orders were issued for all those too ill or old to perform their duties to be retired, and their fiefs given to persons able to provide military service in

The "New Order" of Selim III

return. All fief-holders who refused to perform their duties were to be dismissed. Efforts were to be made to assemble as many Spahis as possible and to send them to the Balkan front.15 Selim admonished all the corps to observe their old laws and customs, to expel persons who violated them or could not perform their duties, and to accept new weapons when they were necessary.16 Special attention was paid to the mortar (Humbaraji) and mine-laying (Lagimji) corps. New regulations were drawn up to provide them with modern organization and techniques, and a few officers came from France and Sweden to train them and help build new weapons and wagons. A new barracks was built for the mortar corps at Saadabad in order to end its previous fragmentation among the infantry barracks at Tophane, Hasköy, and the Imperial Arsenal.17 The engineering school at Hasköy was enlarged and efforts were made to expand its curriculum and student body. Plans were drawn up for an entirely new building, and funds were provided for its construction although this finally was postponed until the conclusion of the war.18 Members of both corps as well as students in the school were subjected to regular examinations, and those receiving poor grades were removed from the corps or retired, according to their age and experience.19

Results of Wartime

Reforms

All these wartime efforts barely touched the manifestations of an illness whose origins lay far deeper in the Ottoman body politic, far beyond the power of such limited measures to affect or change. The conditions leading to disruption of Ottoman society had been developing since the seventeenth century, and the wartime efforts were no more than pinpricks which hardly touched the manifestations, let alone the causes. Exemptions from the sumptuary laws were easily purchased by all those able to pay. The efforts to cut down Istanbul's population were similarly unsuccessful. Those who returned to their villages found only local maladministration and disorder, and this drove them to join marauding bands and maintain themselves by pillaging their more fortunate brethren who remained on the land. In the end even more peasants fled to the cities despite all the efforts of the

Wartime

Reforms

Sultan to stop them. In Istanbul in particular thousands of unemployed men and women were hidden from the police and census takers by sympathetic friends and relatives and by innkeepers who stood to lose all if the decrees were effectively applied. Selim's financial measures, when combined with the inevitable results of depopulation of the countryside, loss of fertile lands to the enemy, and the need to divert existing resources to feed the army, led to rapid inflation and increasing shortages of food and supplies, which in turn added to the difficulties. These conditions were a legacy of the war which was to plague the Sultan long after it ended. In addition, Mustafa Efendi's stern efforts to restore the courts and schools created so much opposition on the part of the Ulema and religious students that Selim was forced to remove him in March 1791 and replace him by a man much more to their liking, Yahya Tevfik Efendi, who had been banished by Abd ul-Hamid I because of corruption and nepotism.20 The effort to reform the Ulema created such an intense reaction that Selim did not dare to resume it even after peace was finally attained. The provincial reforms restored some sort of order because they recognized the fact that the notables were autonomous and entirely ended the efforts of the central government to regulate them. By depriving the central government of any effective means of controlling the notables in peacetime, however, the reforms sowed the seeds for complete provincial autonomy and even independence, especially once the notables' fear of foreign attack was ended and the Ottoman state, whose survival was a necessary prerequisite for their own existence, was made secure. Nor were the wartime military reforms any more successful. The Janissary corps absolutely refused to accept the Sultan's decrees.21 While its members were no longer capable of fighting the armies of Europe on an equal basis, they still had enough power to impose their will at home by force if need be. Selim's agents were simply murdered whenever they tried to find out which members of the corps were serving and which were not, which of the officers and men were capable of further service and which should be removed. Whenever the Treasury cut off the salaries of Janissary members who were not performing their

The "New Order" of Selim III

duties, the entire corps revolted, whether at home or on the battlefield, and the Grand Vezir usually was forced to yield to their demands as the result of the exigencies of war. Efforts to make the Janissaries use new weapons or even to train with the old ones were met in the same way. Selim's efforts to reform the mortar and mine-laying corps were somewhat more successful, but the difficulty of obtaining experts from abroad combined with the opposition of the Janissaries to every move limited their progress. Fewer than 1,000 men were enrolled under their banners, and the Janissaries' refusal to serve with them forced the Grand Vezir to leave them at home whenever campaigns were undertaken. The experiences of the war thus showed the Sultan quite clearly the difficulties involved in trying to reform or even change the older corps. The lesson was not lost on him.

Wartime

Reforms

IX. The Reformers

Much more significant than Selim's limited and often frustrated wartime reform efforts were the plans he was drawing up for far more extensive and fundamental peacetime reforms and the efforts he was making to build up a cadre of reformers to carry them out. From the day of his accession, he began to surround himself with men who thought as he did about what was wrong with the empire and how it could be saved, men whom he felt he could depend on to carry out his wishes in more propitious times, and whom he gradually placed in key government and army positions as they became vacant. Most of the members of this new elite had grown up with Selim as his slaves, companions, and friends while he was still a prince in the palace. Some of them were young men recruited after his accession from among apprentices and lower officials in the scribal and military institutions, whose intelligence and goodwill seemed to qualify them to join in the reform effort which was to follow. A few of them were older men who long had served in the institutions of state but who had broken out of the bonds of the traditional Ottoman beliefs sufficiently to see the extent of change which was needed in the established order if it was to be saved. But no matter what their origin, they agreed on certain common ideals. They shared with the Sultan the revelation that what had strengthened the West might also revive the

East if wisely applied. They dared to hope that in him they had found a champion who would give them the means of making fundamental reforms and who would support them in the face of opposition. While the war went on, these reformers met together with each other and with the Sultan; they debated, discussed, and planned. In the years that followed, some of them held important military and administrative positions. Others influenced events from behind the scenes and were noticed neither by Ottoman nor by foreign observers. But together they provided the real directing force in the Ottoman government regardless of who was Grand Vezir and what were the decisions of the Imperial Council. They formed a "Kitchen cabinet" which met informally with the Sultan to formulate laws and regulations which later were submitted for more open consideration by the official councils of state. They were the driving force and backbone of the "New Order." Never numbering more than twenty at a single time, often falling to half that number as its members were removed by death and the vagaries of political life, the elite was a vague, shadowy institution whose existence was known to only a few. The most important of the reformers by far was Chelebi Mustafa Reshid Efendi, the spiritual teacher of the Sultan. 1 Like most of his colleagues, Mustafa Reshid came into the Ottoman system as a slave of Selim and rose to power with him. Between 1793 and 1798 he served as director of the Nizam-i Jedid infantry and artillery men in the use of new weapons and maneuvers (see page 129). After that time, he served as Director (Defterdar) of the Imperial Treasury, but regardless of his official position, he always remained the Sultan's closest confidant and the power behind the throne in his reform efforts. Of all the cabinet members, he was the most sympathetic to England, depending on the British ambassador's physician for books and advice and on the ambassador himself for gifts of various kinds. He always advocated the use of British advisers and accession to British desires in Ottoman foreign and military policy. Only a short distance behind him in influence and power was Küchük Hüseyin Pasha, a man of Circassian origin who had entered the Imperial palace as Selim's slave and so captured his

The

Reformers

affections that he was allowed to marry Selim's cousin Esma Sultan, a daughter of Abd ul-Hamid I, and to become Grand Admiral of the fleet in place of the grand old hero and reformer, Gazi Hasan Pasha. Despite his lack of naval training, he turned out to be an excellent commander, an energetic reformer, and because of his personal connections with the Sultan, an expert and powerful politician within the councils of state, leading the more radical reformers against those who wished to study, examine, and conciliate.2 The third most active figure in the councils of the sultan was Yusuf Agha, the Lieutenant of the Queen Mother. Born in Crete, one of the four sons of a poor cobbler, he was sold at the age of seven to the Janissary leader in Crete, Süleyman Agha, who educated him as his own son. When Süleyman became chief of the Janissary corps in Istanbul, Yusuf became his Seal-Bearer (Miihiirdar), and when he rose to be Lieutenant of the Grand Vezir, Yusuf went along to the Porte as his personal secretary. Through the influence of his master, Yusuf later served in other posts, finally rising to be director of the Imperial powder works at Gallipoli and chief of the palace kitchens. It was while he was serving in the latter post that he became acquainted with some members of the harem, a connection which led to his appointment as Lieutenant of Mihrishah Sultan, Selim's mother, in 1789.3 Selim apparently was very fond of Yusuf because of some assistance he once had given to Selim's sister Beyhan Sultan, 4 and this made him a very powerful member of the reforming elite until the Queen Mother died in October 1805.5 Yusuf Agha was not a visionary and reformer in the same sense as were most of Selim's other advisers; neither was he a reactionary opponent of reform. He advocated caution so as not to stir up the older corps, and the Sultan valued his counsel because of his personal knowledge of the feelings and ideas of those who directed the Janissaries and the Ulema. Through this influence with the Sultan as well as his connection with the Queen Mother, he became the leader of the party of harem inhabitants and functionaries and army officers who had been in power before Selim's accession and who opposed those who rose to power with him. So while not an opponent of reform, for political reasons he opposed those who advocated reform most strongly and so ac-

The "New Order" of Selim III

quired the reputation of being the leader of the conservatives. Despite the Sultan's usual support for those whom Yusuf Agha opposed, he did nothing to remove Yusuf or stifle his party because he found it useful to play them off against the reformers, the traditional means by which sultans divided and controlled various political groups for their own purposes.6 Throughout Selim's reign, Yusuf Agha remained a powerful figure and a man whose opinions and desires always had great weight. Mahmud Raif Efendi, son of Abd ul-Hamid I's granary director, was educated in the bureaus of the Sublime Porte and rose in Selim's early years as the protege of the Reis ul-Kuttab, Mehmed Rashid Efendi. In 1793 he was appointed chief scribe of the Porte's first ambassador to England, Yusuf Agäh Efendi, and he remained there for several years learning western geography, history, and politics, as well as English and French. Between 1800 and 1805 he served as Reis ul-Kuttab, now the Sultan's chief adviser on foreign affairs and main contact with the foreign ambassadors and technicians then swarming into Istanbul. His most important function, however, was unofficial. Far less of a power in the councils than the three persons mentioned above, he was a leader in the effort to spread knowledge of western technical advances among the members of the Ottoman ruling class and to secure their support, or at least acquiescence, in the Sultan's efforts. By translating western books into Turkish, by importing and using western clothing and furniture, and by aping the manners and customs of westerners living in the capital, he provided a most important channel for transmitting western ways and ideas to the Ottoman ruling class. He was always closest to the British, and so imitated their ways that he was called Ingiliz Mahmud Efendi, "Mahmud the Englishman," by his contemporaries. He finally was killed by the guards of one of the forts along the Bosporus when he tried to clothe them in the new European uniforms on the instructions of his master, the event which touched off the revolt against Selim in May 1807.7 Tataijik zade Abdullah Efendi, oldest of Selim's major supporters, was born in 1730, the son of a member of the Ulema, and was himself a judge in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Medina before Selim came to the throne. He served Selim as judge of the Imperial army during the campaigns of 1789 and twice as chiefjudge (Kadiasker)

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of Rumelia, in 1789-90 and again in 1795. A firm advocate of reform in his own profession, he also became an expert on military matters and helped to direct the reorganization and modernization of the Imperial cannon foundry as well as to instruct the soldiers of the artillery corps in the new ways until his death in 1797.8 Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, son of a judge, was educated in the Treasury and became a close friend of young Prince Selim when assigned to train him in the scribal arts. During Abd ul-Hamid I's later years, Ebubekir served as Selim's personal scribe, and in fact composed the letters sent to Louis XVI and acted as his principal adviser at the time. When Selim came to the throne, one of his first acts was to send Ebubekir as ambassador to Vienna to restore good relations with the Hapsburgs after the Peace of Sistova and to observe and report directly on the modern ways of Europe. On his return in May 1792, he presented a detailed report on Austrian military, social, and governmental organization, which he had secured from personal observations and from conversations with various Austrians. 9 Ebubekir served as Reis ul-Kuttab between May 1795 and August 1796, and then as director of provisions (Zahire Naziri) but he fell victim to the intrigues of his enemies and was executed by Imperial order in 1799.10 Ibrahim Nesim Efendi was the son of a former chief treasurer and one of Selim's few close associates who did not enter the Ottoman class as a slave. Called "gizli sitma" (meaning literally "itch" or "pruritus") because of his merciless character and determination to push through reforms at all cost, he reorganized the Imperial Treasury and was also director of the shipyard of Istanbul. While he was an ardent reformer and promoter of Selim's policies, he became a bitter political opponent of Mustafa Reshid and for that reason usually cooperated with the party led by Yusuf Agha.11 Mehmed Rashid Efendi, son of a scribe in the offices of the Imperial Council, received his education as an apprentice in the Beylikji department* and rose through its ranks until he became *The main function of this department was the preparation and conservation of imperial orders and decrees. Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, p. 121; Pakahn, I, 221. The Beylikji was under the supervision and control of the Reis ul-Kuttab.

The "New Order" of Selim III

its director in 1786. After 1787, he served as Reis ul-Kuttab three times, in 1787-88, when he accompanied the Grand Vezir on his successful campaign into the Banat, in 1792-1794, when he replaced his bitter rival Abdullah Berri Efendi in that post, and from early 1797 until his death in March 1798. In between these terms, he also served for a time as director of the Imperial Arsenal and energetically promoted reforms in the construction of ships and the recruitment and training of sailors.12 Arabaji zade Ibrahim Efendi was the son of an Imam at Khotzim. After his father's death he was raised by the mother of Arabaji Bashi Mehmed Agha, whose nickname (Arabaji Bashi) he carried thereafter. Later he was sent to Istanbul and trained in the offices of the Porte, rising until he became chief scribe (Ser Halife) in 1793 and chief letter-writer (Mektubi) a year later. After that he served several times as Lieutenant of the Grand Vezir and secretary of Selim's sister Beyhan Sultan, through whom he gained a voice in the Sultan's councils. Ibrahim Efendi died less than a year later, while participating in a campaign against Russia.13 While there were other men who planned or administered reforms in one way or another, these were the leaders, the most forceful and effective advocates of change, the men who determined what would be done, and who drew up most of the legislation pushed through the councils of state during Selim's reign.

Reform Proposals Perhaps the most interesting and significant product of the wartime period was a series of reform proposals written at Selim's request for presentation to the Imperial Council by his close associates as well as others, twenty-one Ottomans and two Europeans in all. Of these reports, three came from members of the Imperial Class, those who directed the overall operations of the Ottoman system under the immediate supervision of the Sultan: Koja Yusuf Pasha, then serving as Grand Vezir for a second time, a man who had demonstrated unusual military ability and who possessed considerable support among the Janissaries and the other older military groups;14 Mehmed Hakki Bey (later Pasha),

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who was just rising as a leader of the Ottoman efforts against the bandits and rebels who arose in the Balkans during and after the war; 15 and Mustafa Reshid Efendi, then Lieutenant of the Grand Vezir as well as leader of the Sultan's private reform council.16 Five reports came from members of the religious class: Ahmed Esad Efendi, then chief judge of Anatolia and later a reforming Sheyh ul-Islam between 1803 and 1806;17 Ashir Mustafa Efendi, then chief judge of Rumelia and subsequently Sheyh ulIslam

between 1798 and 1800;18 Emin Mehmed Efendi, three

times chief judge of Rumelia and one of the wealthiest men of his time; 19 Hafiz Hayrullah Mehmed Efendi, later chief judge of Anatolia; 20 and Tatarjik zade Abdullah Efendi, the author of the longest and most influential of the reports.21 By far the bulk of the reform proposals came from members of the Ottoman scribal class, however, those who at one time or another had served in the offices of the Grand Vezir, the Imperial Council, and the Treasury and were expert in the day-to-day operations of the Sultan's administration: Abdullah Berri Efendi, Reis Efendi

between 1789 and 1792 and chief Ottoman pleni-

potentiary at the congresses of Sistova and Jassy,22 Mustafa Rasih Efendi, once a scribe in the rapid-fire rifle corps founded by Baron de Tott, and chief executive of the Sultan's offices in the Imperial palace when he submitted his report, later ambassador to Russia in 1793-94;23 Mehmed Rashid Efendi, at this time chief of the Chavush

corps (Chavush Bashi)

an appointment which

provided him with a position and revenues in Istanbul until a more important position could be made available for him; 24 Sadullah Enveri Efendi, official chronicler in the Imperial army between 1788 and 1792 and a holder of a number of important Treasury posts;25 Halil Nuri Bey, his successor as official chronicler until 1798;26 Sherif Mehmed Pasha, chief treasurer from October 1790 until A p r i l 1793;27 Morali Osman Efendi, director of the Imperial Arsenal in 1792, subsequently chief treasurer, noted for his unusually penetrating knowledge of Ottoman financial affairs; 28 Ibrahim Nesim Efendi, then chief accountant in the Treasury; 29 Laleli Mustafa Efendi, who had retired after many years of service in the Treasury and was especially esteemed for his wisdom and experience; 30 A l i Raik Efendi, once dismissed as

The "New Order" of Selirn III

chief treasurer because of corruption, who was serving as chief Ruznameji* of the Treasury;31 Mustafa Iffet Efendi, then chief of the palace kitchen;32 Safi Efendi, at that time secretary of the Imperial Council;33 and Firdevsi Mehmed Emin Efendi, second Ottoman plenipotentiary at Sistova and Jassy and now Tezkere-i Evvel** in the Treasury.34 The two foreign advisers who submitted reform proposals were the well-known Armenian chief dragoman of the Swedish Embassy in Istanbul, Mouradgea d'Ohsson,35 and a French artillery officer named Bertrand, one of the French officers who trained the Ottoman mortar corps.36 There were others who submitted notes and small papers to the Sultan on various subjects, but these were the only ones whose reports were broad enough in scope and detailed enough in language and comprehension to merit full discussion in the Imperial Council. The reports themselves are of extreme interest, not only for what they describe of the Ottoman system but also for what they reveal of the outlooks of their authors, the limitations imposed by the Ottoman system on even the most liberal of its members, the extent to which observation was affected by background and tradition, and the individual's position in the Ottoman system.37 In areas touching their own positions and interests, the authors of the reports were, not unexpectedly, vague and hesitant, except for Tatarjik Abdullah, who presented a detailed statement on all aspects of Ottoman society including the religious institution with which he was intimately connected, and who included recommendations for basic changes, many of which were later adopted.38 Concerning his own class, he recommended that all members be examined by a special board appointed by the Sultan and that those found wanting be expelled at once and that bribery and nepotism be replaced by strict examinations for all future admissions and promotions. The numbers of positions and salaries available to members would be restored to their original limits to save * Keeper of the daily register (Ruzname) of Treasury revenues and expenditures. ** Chief of the section in charge of issuing payment documents (tezkeres), entitling the holders to certain privileges or to collect certain revenues from the Treasury.

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the Treasury a considerable amount of money and prevent the use of the religious institution as a gigantic source of extra income for members of the other institutions of the Ottoman ruling class. Positions in the Ulema would be given only to persons able and willing to perform the various tasks required of them in return not as sinecures for members of the military and administrative classes. Only honest and able persons would be appointed as Sheyh ul-Islam and to the other chief religious positions, and they would be given terms of five or ten years so that they would have the time and freedom needed to investigate the situation, weed out incompetents and restore the order of Ulema to its original state without fear of imminent dismissal as the result of pressures imposed by those whose interests would be harmed. Even this was not a recommendation for radical change. There was no thought of changing or modernizing the type of education required of the Ulema or the means by which they secured and held their positions and exercised their authority, but at least it was a proposal comparable to those in the military field to make the institution in question operate as it was supposed to do. In analyzing the Sultanate and the Imperial Institution closely attached to it, Tatarjik Abdullah laid the blame for many of the troubles of the empire on the manner in which these institutions had developed in the previous two centuries, and in particular to the isolation which had increasingly separated the Sultan from his people and the army. While the first Ottoman sultans had lived with the men of their army and had been readily available to their subjects, those who ruled following the conquest of Istanbul had found themselves increasingly isolated by the complicated systems of protocol and ceremonial inherited from their Byzantine predecessors. According to Abdullah, this deprived the Sultan and his ministers of any sort of detailed knowledge of actual conditions in the Empire which they ruled, and left them at the mercy of reports submitted by subordinates, who thus were in a position to shape them to suit their own interests and to suppress or distort unfavorable information. Abdullah's recommendation for change was simplicity itself. From time to time, the Sultan and his ministers should leave their palaces and go into the country to find out how their policies were operating, what the needs of the provinces were, what the people were think-

The "New Order" of Selim III

ing, and what they wanted. This would indeed have been a radical change for rulers whose only contact with the outside world in the eighteenth century consisted of furtive incognito prowls through the back alleys of Istanbul. In dealing with the bureaucracy, Abdullah Efendi attributed most of the nepotism and corruption then existing in their ranks to the heavy fees and bribes imposed on the higher officials by the Sultan and those surrounding him in the palace, and on the consequent charges of a similar nature which they imposed on their subordinates in the hierarchy in return for appointments and reappointments every year. This procedure inevitably caused positions to be given to those who could pay the most rather than to the best qualified, and required able and incompetent officers alike to treat their posts as means of recouping these fees and securing profits for themselves rather than as opportunities for service to subjects and state alike. Abdullah's solution was to abolish or considerably lower official appointment fees and to eliminate the possibility of bribery by imposing systems of ratings and examinations for all positions. In addition, he proposed that the established one-year terms of office be replaced by terms of three to five years, both to reduce opportunities for bribe-taking each time an appointment was made, and to give officials in the provinces and towns the security and wealth needed to carry out their duties effectively and according to current needs, without having to worry about sudden changes in their status and position as the result of politics and other factors in Istanbul. Finally, he offered the interesting suggestion that wealthy men be preferred for the higher positions of government since they would have no reason either to steal from the subjects and the Sultan or to require bribes from their subordinates. This would effectively end the vicious cycle of bribery and corruption in the bureaucratic ranks, which had to be suppressed if the government's efficiency was to be restored. The only other report received by the Sultan in these years with breadth, detail, and impact at least approaching that of Tatarjik Abdullah was the memorial submitted by Ebubekir Ratib Efendi as the result of his observations while serving as Ottoman ambassador to Vienna in 1792 and 1793. It was not one of the reform memorials submitted to the Sultan following the Peace of SisThe Reformers

tova. It was rather an ambassadorial report submitted as the result of a prior request, but it was of the same general nature and organization, and although cloaked in the form of a description of Austrian institutions and ways of doing things, it was submitted about the same time and was considered along with the regular memorials, thus meriting our consideration here.39 Ebubekir wrote in detail about what he had learned of the military and civil organizations of the European states, their methods of taxation, their military and financial organizations and practices, their postal systems, roads, mines, agriculture, industry, trade, banks, and the like. He praised the freedom left to individuals to do what they wanted without restriction by the state, an ideal which had little appeal to Ottoman and Turkish reformers even into the twentieth century. He stressed the European idea that government was instituted to look out for the welfare and security of individuals, a concept in stark contrast to the traditional Ottoman idea that the sole purpose of government was to extend, defend, and exploit the wealth of the empire for the benefit of the ruling class.40 In European states, the laws, organizations, principles and taxes laid down by their kings are observed properly by high and low persons. So long as their taxes are paid on time, no king or general or official can interfere with anyone because of i t . . . Whatever cloth a man wants, he buys. He says what he wants, and there is no restriction on a person's eating and drinking and going and coming, nor is there interference with his food and clothing and shops and earnings.41 Turning his attention to the courts, Ebubekir Efendi remarked: They have no religious law. That is, out of the laws set down by Jesus, there remains only something of value in regard to marriage, and even this is not always administered according to Jesus in the case of kings. Religion is no longer observed in the matter of inheritance, so at present the European states are in such a form that they can no longer be called people of the book 42

The "New Order" ofSelim

III

Novel ideas indeed, even for the relatively liberal mind of Selim III, as Ebubekir was to find out seven years later when he was executed by order of his master. To Ebubekir, a major problem which the Sultan had to face was the immense size of the empire and the consequent difficulty which the central government had in controlling the various officials and provinces. To him, the essential bases of European greatness were: (1) the organization and obedience of the soliders; (2) the efficiency and fullness of the Treasury; (3) the honesty, ability, and loyalty of the ministers and bureaucrats; (4) the arrangements for the tranquility, comfort, and protection of the people; and (5) the ability of the European states to cooperate for their mutual benefit and to make agreements for mutual assistance. These were the objects which the Sultan would have to keep in mind in reforming his state if he wished to achieve the grandeur and power of those he sought to imitate. Although he did not say so explicitly, what Ebubekir meant here was that the Ottoman Empire would have to undergo the same sort of basic social and economic changes which the states of Europe had experienced if it wished to achieve their unity and strength. No longer could government be instituted by and for the ruling class alone; the interests, cooperation, and support of the mass of the people also would have to be considered if the techniques and forms of organization invented in Europe were to be successfully applied to the Ottoman situation. Much of Ebubekir's report paralleled the other memorials in content and recommendations. He stated that the Ottoman sultans had been the first rulers in the world to establish military laws in order to organize their armies, so that the imposition of such laws in the nineteenth century would hardly be an imitation of Europe. Ottoman cavalry and infantry had achieved greatness because they had observed their laws and supplemented them when necessary. It had been the failure of their successors to observe them and change them according to the needs of the times which had led to disintegration and disorganization. This was the reason the military corps had become filled with men unable to perform military duties adequately or to accept the discipline required by battle and war. The old laws, modified according to

The Reformers

the needs of the time, had to be restored. Able soldiers and officers had to be secured and given the weapons and training required to combat the modern armies of Europe. He described the tremendous advances which Europeans had made in the military arts—the light and powerful new cannons, rifles, and ships —and he strongly recommended that they be introduced into the Ottoman Empire at the earliest opportunity. Every European state had created what he called a "New Order" (Nizam-i Jedid) to make use of these weapons, and the Sultan would have to do the same — here were the direct antecedents of the reforms and even the terminology which Selim was to adopt within a few years' time. To Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, it was self-evident that every state strengthened itself by accepting the laws and organizations of war developed by states superior to it, by using its own knowledge and energy to apply these to its own needs and ways of thought and life. Here were two powerful and analytical statements to the Sultan, that of Tatarjik Abdullah representing the best which could be produced by traditional Ottoman training, and that of Ebubekir Ratib Efendi showing how much the traditional Ottoman outlook could be affected by even a short period of direct contact with the new forms of political, economic, and military organization developed in the West. Both of them were debated at length in the councils of the Sultan, and the recommendations of both came to fruition often in the deluge of laws and decrees which followed.

Military

Recommendations

There were other reports, the vast majority of the memorials, which paralleled those of Tataijik Abdullah and Ebubekir only in length, not in understanding and breadth. For the most part, they gave primary emphasis to military reform since the danger there was seen most clearly and, perhaps even more important, since none of the writers was directly involved, none of them were members of the military corps or had any direct connection with them. Since few of the writers had any military experience or knew anything of the European techniques they wished to imitate, many of their recommendations were of limited value.

The "New Order" of Selim III

There were certain things on which all the reports agreed: Military decay was due mainly to a failure to obey the traditional laws and customs of the individual corps. It could be remedied by their restoration. Men should be chosen for ability alone. The corps should be inspected to determine which members were able and willing to serve and which held the positions only for the revenues which they made possible, and the latter should be dropped from the rolls as soon as possible to make room for youths who could be molded into expert and brave soldiers from an early age. The men had to be kept together in the barracks in order to be subjected to iron discipline, and they should be prevented from accepting outside employment and income. Preferably they would be unmarried in order to be available at all times for regular training and military service. According to almost all the writers a major component of the decay of the military was the practice of selling the leading positions of the corps to the highest bidders regardless of their military qualifications or experience although the question of whether this was the cause or result of decay was not considered. The result of this practice was said to be that even the few soldiers who did remain in the army and did report for training and service were poorly led. In addition their officers withheld all or most of the wage money and supplies sent by the Treasury, even going so far as to conceal vacancies resulting from illness or death and continuing to collect for their own profit the salaries and wages for vacant positions. The result was that only a small portion of the names on the rolls of the corps assembled when they were called on to fight, and those who did join the army were riotous, undisciplined, liable to run in the face of danger, and dependent for their subsistence on booty secured from friends and foes alike along the road of march. An initial solution proposed for these conditions by almost every writer was to appoint only able and honest officers and abolish the fees required in return, although how this was to be accomplished in the face of an Ottoman society that was almost entirely built around such a system was not discussed. Once these almost universally accepted diagnoses were set down, the writers became much more varied in their proposals on how new and able men and officers should be recruited, organized, and trained.

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100

Morali Osman and Tataijik Abdullah felt that the decline of the Janissaries in particular was due to their resentment of the government's increasing neglect of them in favor of the experimental new rifle and cannon corps and their consequent loss of prestige in Ottoman society. If they were given the proper support, if they were given able officers exempted from all fees—in other words, if they were given their old prestige and esteem— they would automatically return to their own discipline and ways, and they might even be willing to accept the new weapons and methods. European experts could be summoned to train the Janissaries and the other old corps, but they would have to accept Islam since true believers could not be expected to accept the statements and teachings of infidels. Such were the words of two of the most enlightened members of the Ottoman ruling class. Sherif Efendi and Mehmed Hakki Bey attributed many of the army's difficulties to its annual winter dispersal. Many of the enemy gains had occurred after the Ottoman army had evacuated its advanced positions for winter quarters leaving behind only token guards. As solutions, both suggested the division of the entire army into summer and winter groups, each serving six months and spending the rest of the time training and working at other gainful occupations which would give them sufficient revenue to maintain and supply themselves at minimum cost to the state. Hakki Bey went on to suggest that the winter soldiers be drawn from the Janissary corps and feudal contingent of Rumelia and the summer soliders from the other standing corps and the Anatolian feudal contingents. In addition, each minister and official in the service of the Sultan, especially each provincial governor, would assume the burden of recruiting, training, and maintaining a certain number of disciplined soldiers in his own entourage, supplying them as recruits to the regular corps whenever vacancies occurred and also for special service with the Imperial Army in summer or winter, as they were needed. The cost of maintaining this reserve force would be met partly by the Imperial Treasury, partly by the officials involved, and partly by wealthy judges in the provinces. Thus for the first time in Ottoman history, a kind of reserve army was proposed. Enveri, Salih zade, Nuri, and Rasih felt that the army's dis-

The "New Order" of Selim III

orderliness in peace and war was due mainly to the enrollment of far more men than the corps' old regulations permitted and to the government's insistence that they remain in service during peacetime. To remedy this difficulty, Salih zade recommended that vacancies be ignored until the corps were reduced to their original numerical limits, and after that time they be filled only by youths willing to serve all their lives. He felt that only a few Janissaries and members of the other corps should be kept in Istanbul and that these should be kept busy training in the use of weapons and tactics. The remainder would be sent to serve with the provincial governors and along the borders for terms of five years, afterwards returning to the capital for further training. Enveri, on the other hand, proposed a partial demobilization of the corps in peacetime, with their members forming a kind of ready reserve available for service at a moment's notice. They would return to their homes and keep up their skills by participating in weekly training periods directed by the local governors and district officers. At the same time they would serve periodically in the governors' suites to assist in the task of maintaining peace and security. Ibrahim Efendi and Yusuf Pasha proposed a plan which would revive the Deushirme recruiting system, which had manned the Janissary corps during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.* The best of the rayas would be recruited by periodic forays through the Christian provinces. They would be trained as Ajemi Oglan slaves in the suites of the provincial governors or in special camps established for them in the vicinity of Istanbul. When they were ready, they would be supplied to the regular corps as needed to fill vacancies and thereafter would serve as regular salaried soldiers except that they would be required to remain in service all their active lives. The willingness of the subject Christians to cooperate in such a plan was not discussed. Mustafa Iffet Efendi felt that the best way of securing a steady flow of qualified recruits for the army was for the corps them*In this system, Ottoman recruiting officers periodically went on tours (deushirme) of the principal Christian provinces, chosing the best youths in each district for a lifetime of service to the Sultan. The recruits were brought to the courts of the Sultan and other major Ottoman officials, where as "foreign youths" (Ajemi Oglan) they were trained to be Ottomans.

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102

selves to maintain auxiliary groups of trainees, numbering 100 or 200 youths each, who would serve as apprentices and assistants to the regular soldiers while in training, and who would have first call at filling vacancies in the corps. In addition all ministers and officers assigned to duty in the provinces would have to take along with them between 100 and 1,000 trainees each. These trainees would be drilled and maintained at the expense of the ministers and officers concerned, and would form an additional pool of 10,000 to 15,000 trained men ready to fill vacancies in the corps. Ashir Efendi felt that a major difficulty with the corps was that their officers came from their own ranks and essentially represented them against the central government. His solution was for the chief officers of the corps to be appointed from among the Sultan's men in the inner palace service. Such men would be far more loyal to him, they would prevent any independent action on the part of the corps, and they would keep the soldiers disciplined and obedient. No mention was made of how such palace men without military experience would be able to improve the military abilities of the corps in question. Sherif Efendi concentrated his attention on the salaried border guards stationed along the Danube, contending that their officers kept most of the salaries and supplies sent from the Porte and actually maintained only a very small number of men for border duty. His solution was the abolition of these corps, with half their salaries being eliminated and the other half given as bonuses to the officers and men serving on the Russian front. Hajji Ibrahim Efendi perceived the same weakness in the border organization; but instead of eliminating it, he suggested that it be reorganized and reformed, with the local judges supervising wage distribution so that only persons actually performing the service would be paid and vacancies would be uncovered and filled. Many of the reports devoted particular attention to the established artillery corps—the cannon, cannon-wagon, rapid-fire, mortar and mine-laying corps —since it was they who showed the clearest inferiority to the Austrians and the Russians and also since the tradition of reform in this field had already been established in previous reigns. Yusuf Pasha and Sherif Efendi felt that the older artillery

The "New Order" of Selim III

corps had been demoralized by the attention paid to the rapidfire artillery corps and that the latter were of little use and should be abolished and replaced with a system in which each high official in Istanbul and the provinces would be given two new cannons and one mortar and required to train and maintain seven men for each of them. In this way, a large number of trained artillerymen would be available for service with the infantry and cavalry corps whenever they were needed. Hayrullah Efendi said that the rapid-fire artillery corps should be retained, but only as a training and recruiting vehicle, with its men being assigned to the regular artillery corps for service in battle. Tatarjik Abdullah, Eashid, and Rasih felt exactly the opposite. Instead of abolishing the rapid-fire artillery corps or limiting its importance, they wanted it to be expanded and sent into battle as a unit rather than as a part of the older corps. While they felt that efforts should certainly be made to reorganize and restore the older artillery corps, to them only the rapid-fire corps offered a possibility for immediate reform, hence they had to be expanded and put under the direction of foreign officers as soon as possible. To restore the cannon and cannon-wagon corps, Sherif Efendi proposed that since they were complementary they should be united into a single service, given 200 of the most modern cannons available, with 100 men assigned to each of the large divisions and 50 to the small, forming a corps of about 15,000 men. With the distinction between those who fired cannons and those who moved them eliminated, improved efficiency and discipline would be possible. Each group of men would be assigned to a specific cannon which they would be in charge of maintaining, moving, and firing in battle. If it was disabled, they would have to repair it, or at least make sure that it did not fall into the hands of the enemy. If a cannon was left behind in battle, the men attached to it would be dismissed from service and held up to scorn and mockery by the people. Ibrahim Efendi proposed that an elite of 100 master cannoneers be trained to act as supervisors for the older corps and that special funds be provided to assist them in their efforts and to provide them with the new cannons and equipment they needed. Both Osman Efendi and Rasih Efendi felt that the best solution was to

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104

cut the number of men in each artillery corps in half and double their salaries to assure that they got the best possible men. Fifty men would be attached to each cannon and given special bonuses in return for their standing in turns by their cannons day and night, year after year, so that they would be prepared to take them into action at a moment's notice. When they were fully trained, they would be sent in rotation to the various border forts, provincial governors, and others needing their services, and would serve for periods from six months to a year before returning to Istanbul for further training. Yusuf Pasha reported that the mortar and mining corps were filled with ignorant persons entirely incapable of using the old weapons which they had, let alone the complicated new weapons being imported from Europe, and recommended that they be entirely replaced. He also proposed that the previous system by which the officers and more experienced men in these two corps were rewarded with fiefs instead of salaries be abolished since it enabled them to become independent of their officers and to leave their positions to sons or relatives regardless of ability. Salaries would have to be provided for all members of the two corps as the best means of keeping their members disciplined and orderly. The statements concerning the Ottoman cavalry corps were of a similar nature. Rashid Efendi reported that of the 30,000 men then on the rolls, only 2,000 to 3,000 horsemen could be counted on to report when summoned for battle although all of them managed to show up whenever wages were paid. The solutions proposed by almost every writer involved the usual combination of weeding out incompetents, raising salaries, and training the men in the use of modern rifles. Abdullah Efendi despaired entirely of making the Spahis into an efficient and useful military force within the foreseeable future because of the tremendous stake of the vested interests in the status quo. He suggested that an entirely new, regular, salaried cavalry corps be formed from the irregular mounted men called Delis, who in the past had been recruited from the "bandit" bands of Rumelia for service during campaigns and had been supported entirely by the booty they were able to amass for themselves. He felt that this reorganization would require so much energy and effort, however, that it

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would have to be postponed until after the reorganization of the Janissaries was completed, and that the new corps would therefore have to be developed quickly to perform cavalry service in the meantime. Ibrahim Efendi also realized the vast difficulties involved in attempting to restore the cavalry and suggested that the reforms be introduced very gradually, with experts spending a number of years investigating conditions before any final programs were put forward. Enveri and Firdevsi Efendi attributed much of the cavalry's difficulty to the addition of over 20,000 men above the numerical limits established during the eighteenth century and recommended a return to the original number as the best way to restore the corps. Bertrand and d'Ohsson, the two foreign experts who submitted reports, were much more hesitant to include details, apparently because of a realization that they could easily disturb their own position by angering one or another of the many factions within the Imperial court. They did, however, at least risk such difficulties by referring to the problem with which they were most familiar—that of the foreign advisers in the Ottoman service—and blamed much of their lack of success on betrayal by the Ottoman officials with whom they came into contact, on their neglect in carrying out the recommendations of their advisers, and on their acceptance of many reform ideas without making any further effort to carry them out, coordinate them, or consider their effect on the state and army as a whole. Bertrand stated that most of the Ottoman reformers seemed content just to issue orders, without bothering to see that they were properly executed. He suggested that they be required to inspect their commands regularly to eliminate difficulties as they arose, instead of letting them drag on interminably until the entire reform program was undermined. D'Ohsson disapproved of the Sultan's stress on the artillery corps and emphasized that new weapons and techniques should be given to all soldiers of the Porte, and in particular to the old infantry and cavalry corps since they remained the bulk of the standing army. Thus far we have been discussing primarily the manner in which the various reports described conditions in the established corps, with recommendations for their reform. This always was

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their emphasis. Only a few of them actually suggested that new corps be formed to take over the infantry and artillery tasks previously performed by the Janissaries, Spahis, and others. Yusuf Pasha admitted that it would indeed be a long and difficult task to restore the old corps, but he felt that this would have to be done in the long run. For the moment, to protect the state until this reorganization was completed, he suggested that a number of entirely new groups be created to meet the immediate need. Ten to twelve thousand youths would be recruited in Anatolia and Rumelia and organized into new artillery and mortar corps, which would be given separate barracks and subjected to intensive discipline and training under the supervision of foreign officers. In addition, an even more novel and revolutionary proposal was made by Yusuf Pasha, the creation of provincial rifle militias manned by a type of universal conscription among the peasants. A new census would be carried out all over the empire, and on the basis of its findings, one man out of three in each house would be enrolled under the command of the provincial governors. They would remain in their own homes and perform their normal daily occupations but would be required to come to provincial or local training centers twice a week for intensive training in the use of European-style rifles under the direction of officers sent from Istanbul. Whenever the Ottoman Empire went to war, these militiamen would be brought into the regular army under the command of their governors in the same way that the latter served as commanders of the feudal contingents under the old Timar "fief" system. The men would be paid regular wages only while they were on active duty in the army. When they served in the reserve in their own homes, their compensation would be limited to tax exemptions for themselves and their families. The governors would be responsible for making sure that a sufficient number of trained and armed men were available at all times in the provincial militias to augment the army when needed; furthermore they would be punished for neglect of this obligation and for any consequent efforts to fulfill their contributions at the last minute by conscripting untrained peasants as had been done in the past. Thus for the first time in Ottoman history, the Turkish peasants of Anatolia would be conscripted into the military service of the empire on a large scale. A Turkish national

The "New Order" of Selim III

guard would be created to save the empire from its enemies. Tatarjik Abdullah Efendi also suggested that new rifle and cannon corps be established in the provinces in addition to those already present in the capital, but he preferred that they be placed under more direct central control than was suggested in the plan presented by Yusuf Pasha. Expert officers would be sent by the central government to the villages and towns, where they would enroll young peasants and instruct them in the use of the new weapons. Once trained, the peasants would be stationed near their own homes, but under the command of these central government officers rather than the governors, and supported both by the Treasury of Istanbul and provincial sources. He forecast that within eight years a force of about 42,000 men could be prepared in this way. They would be summoned to the Porte from time to time so the Sultan could inspect them to see that they were being prepared properly. Thus there would be a provincial militia formed of Turkish peasants, but it would be as much an instrument of central control in the provinces as it was a reserve for the national army. Abdullah Efendi also proposed the novel plan of eliminating provincial disorders by giving large bribes to provincial bandits and then settling them on fiefs along the borders of the empire, thus channeling their destructive energies directly into activities which would benefit the state. This would restore provincial security and give the frontiers the kind of permanent protection they once received in olden times from the Gazi organization.* Mehmed Rashid Efendi, on the other hand, felt that general conscription for a new corps of the type proposed by Yusuf Pasha and Abdullah Efendi was not the answer to the empire's military problems. He pointed out that the Janissaries of old had achieved spectacular success through a system of recruiting a small number of candidates especially selected for their strength and intelligence and subjecting them to intensive training in the arts of government and war so that they truly merited their place as the ruling and military elite of the empire. Such men did not attack subjects along the road. They obeyed their officers, *The name Gazi was traditionally applied in Islamic society to the "fighters for the faith" against the Infidel. The Ottomans themselves arose as Gazis in western Anatolia fighting against the Byzantines.

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punished those of their fellows who violated their laws and customs, and were eager to accept new weapons and techniques in order to maintain their supremacy at home and abroad. Therefore the solution to the Ottoman problem was to collect youths in Anatolia and Rumelia through a kind of Devshirme system for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to form them into a new elite corps especially to use the new weapons, just as the Janissaries had been established in the fifteenth century to make use of the newly invented muskets and gunpowder, to provide them with European officers and instructors, food, clothing, supplies, and modern weapons, and to make them into the new military elite. In return, those enrolled in this new corps would agree to serve the empire all their lives, to remain unmarried so they could live in their barracks at all times, and to pledge loyalty to the Sultan. To avoid trouble with the older corps, this new unit would be attached to the Janissaries at the start until it had 20,000 to 30,000 well-trained rifle and cannon men, after which it could become fully independent since it would be in a position to beat off any attacks that might be made. He recommended that the menbers of this corps be given salaries almost twice those paid to the members of the older corps at that time so the very best men would be attracted to and retained in the new corps but that this high salary be paid them only so long as they were able to train and participate in battles. If they became old and infirm, they would be retired at once on special pensions provided by the Treasury so their salaries in the corps could be used to pay newly enrolled younger men. Abdullah Berri Efendi felt that 20,000 new infantrymen and 5,000 cavalrymen should be enrolled as soon as possible from among youths aged between ten and twenty-five, primarily Anatolian village boys who never had seen cities or towns or had any contact with corrupting influence of the older corps. Barracks and training grounds able to accommodate 5,000 recruits at a time would be built, preferably far from Istanbul in order not to excite the populace or members of the old corps until they were ready. He also mentioned the possibility of recruiting strong and brave city youths if they were orphans and unemployed and desperate enough to give their whole lives

The "New Order" of Selim III

to the service of the Sultan. The recruits might include nonMuslims, but they would have to be circumcised and converted to Islam during the course of their training. To train these recruits instructors would be imported from Europe, to each of whom ten Ottoman officers would be assigned so that in a single year 100 Europeans might be able to train 3,000 to 4,000 recruits. Within three years there would then be 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalrymen trained in the new ways and ready to engage in battle at a moment's notice. After they were trained Abdullah Berri wanted them to be isolated from the old corps, however much the latter might be reformed, so they would not be diluted or contaminated by the ideas and ways of the past. This could best be accomplished by stationing the new corps along the borders of the empire until they were needed by the army itself. Mustafa Reshid's proposals in this respect were very similar to those of Abdullah Berri. He also attributed the military disasters of the past to the army's winter dispersals and proposed to remedy this difficulty by creating an entirely new army which would serve in the winter alone. For it, 15,000 to 20,000 youths aged about fifteen would be recruited and trained in places far from the cities of the empire, with the well-known name Segban* applied to them so they would not attract the suspicion of the old corps while they were in training. At first a group of no more than 400 recruits would be intensively trained in order to form the vanguard of the new army and to lead and train its recruits as it gradually expanded. To finance the new army a special Irad-i Jedid treasury would be provided, separate and distinct from the regular Imperial Treasury, with appropriate taxes established to support it. With this winter army the empire could once again compete with the powers of Europe, reconquer Rumelia, save Muslims from oppression, suppress the provincial rebels, and restore order and good rule in the dominions of the Sultan. Here was a direct source of Selim's reforms. *This term (also corrupted to Segmen) originally was applied to a subordinate wing of the Janissary corps. Later it was applied to infantrymen in general, and particularly to the provincial infantry corps under the command of the provincial governors. See Gibb and Bowen, 1/2, pp. 59 and n., 60 and n., and notes on pp. 181, 191, 193, 315, and 321; also Pakalin, III, pp. 145-146.

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Non-Military

Recommendations

On the subject of the administrative and religious institutions of government, the bulk of the reports were far more vague, far less specific, far less radical. Most of them admitted that unqualified persons occupied positions of importance, that corruption and nepotism had increased, and that the government simply was not as efficient as it should be. But inevitably their solutions followed the same pattern—follow the old laws, restore the old ways, eliminate the abuses. The abolition of fees and bribes required for appointments would end the necessity for officials to steal from the subjects and the state. The institution of a system of examinations for appointments and promotions would end nepotism and ensure that the best men were chosen. The production of decrees banning sin and crime, and suppressing wrongdoing and evil, would automatically restore the empire to the state of the past. Perhaps it is not fair to judge Selim's advisers on the basis of their proposals. These were areas which had not been touched in past reforms, problems which had been discussed only briefly in the councils of state. Besides they were areas in which the writers of the reports had a great deal to lose if the abuses which they described were remedied. How much safer it was for them to concentrate their attacks on their opponents in the Ottoman system— the officers and soldiers of the military corps —where patterns for criticism and reform had already been established and where the writers knew how far they could go without incurring Selim's wrath. It is mainly on the basis of the military recommendations, therefore that this series of reports must be judged. Here the writers were willing to make basic criticisms and suggest important changes although most of their reports did no more than recommend the same sort of restoration which they wanted for the administrative and religious fields of Ottoman society. In proposing the establishment of new corps to make use of modern weapons and techniques they were going no further than Mehmed II had done when he expanded the Janissary corps, making it the greatest military unit of the age by its use of new muskets and gunpowder only recently imported from abroad. Nowhere was

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there any proposal for the destruction of the older corps, although a few of the reports did come close enough to this by recommending that the new corps be kept hidden until they became strong enough to deal with any opposition, presumably that of the older corps. Many of the writers used the reports to advance their own interests and to secure the favor of the Sultan in some way. Some used the occasion to try to discredit the reforms and, covertly, even the Sultan, with the people as a whole. Nevertheless if even the limited reforms that were proposed had been carried out, something of value might well have been accomplished in a state which was rapidly falling apart.

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Chapter X. Military

Reforms

As soon as the Peace of Jassy relieved the Ottoman Empire of the immediate pressures of war, Selim III and his followers were able to proceed to the even more difficult task of introducing some of the changes which were envisaged in the reports and plans. During the remaining years of Selim's reign, while the empire teetered precariously on the brink of involvement in the wars resulting from the French Revolution, an unprecedented number of laws and regulations were issued. While all aspects of Ottoman life were in some way affected, the emphasis was laid on the military, for it was there that the war had made decay most apparent, the danger most immediate, and the cure most evident. It seemed to the Sultan and to most of his supporters that if only the army and navy could be restored, the other institutions of the empire would remain relatively untouched, and could restore themselves without outside pressure or assistance. As a result, the primary efforts of Selim's reign went into restoring the feudal cavalry, the Janissaries and various other infantry corps, and the groups associated with artillery.

General

Regulations

Military decrees came with a rush in the two years which followed the Peace of Jassy. 1 Their analyses of the faults of the

old military institutions invariably paralleled those of the "memorials to the Sultan" on which they were based. The solutions ordered in each law for each corps were almost identical, with only minor variations imposed by the nature of the services to which they were being applied. To each corps a supervisor (Nazir) was appointed from among the men of the Imperial Council, those with the greatest political influence of the time, so that the corps would have adequate representation when their interests were under discussion. Each supervisor was directed to manage the administrative and financial activities of his corps so that the commander (Agha), formerly the sole authority, would be free to concentrate on his military duties —the recruitment, training, and leadership of the corps in peace and war. Each corps was to be administered jointly by these two. Orders could not be sent to the men, appeals for new laws and revenues could not be directed to the Porte, and salaries and bonuses could not be paid without the participation and consent of both. The current commanders and other officers were examined by special agents sent from the Porte, and those found deficient in ability or honesty were replaced by men fully trained in the particular arts of their corps, especially those who served in one of the units trained by European advisers in the time of Selim's predecessor. The terms of the commanders and the other officers were set at three years, and they were supposed to be appointed without any fees or bribes but only according to their ability. The corps were divided into regiments (orta) and these into squads (bölük) of various sizes according to the nature of the service in question. In the artillery corps, the squads were attached directly to the cannons or mortars, the size and requirements of which determined the exact number of men in each. The operations of each regiment were directed by a colonel ΟChorbaji) assisted by a steward (Odabashi). Each squad was commanded by a captain (Bölük Bashi) assisted by a sergeant (Chavush) and other subordinates. All official positions were arranged in a hierarchy; and whenever one of them became vacant, it was filled by the officer holding the position immediately below it, with everyone else moving up one rank, the vacancies at the bottom of the offiicers' corps being filled by the highest ranking noncommissioned officers in the division.

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Standard regulations were drawn up for the regular soldiers in each corps. Those already enrolled were subjected to immediate examination. Men who refused to report or were found incapable were dismissed on the spot although special pensions were provided for those who had performed honorably in the past. Enrollment was limited to unmarried youths under twenty-five. Only officers above the rank of colonel were allowed to be married. Men who married after enlistment were not allowed to rise above the rank of steward. In the mortar corps, marriage was prohibited entirely for officers and men alike. Common soldiers already in the corps who were not trained up to the new standards were given various periods of time, ranging from one to two years, to get the training they needed, and it was only after that time that they were finally dismissed if they still proved to be deficient. The apprentices were usually children of officers and soldiers, but, occasionally, outsiders who performed exceptionally well as irregulars in battle were also appointed. They were supposed to assist the regular members in peace and war, care for their equipment and animals, and the like. At the same time, they learned the arts of war so that when vacancies occurred they could be filled by these trained and experienced replacements. Children were no longer allowed to inherit directly the positions and revenues left by their fathers but were given a better than even chance of entering their fathers' corps if they had the ability to pass through this apprentice stage. Promotion within each regiment and squad went according to a strict hierarchical system which was arranged in the same way as that of the officers. If the colonel died, he was replaced by the steward of the regiment, with everyone else moving up one notch, the highestranked common soldier being appointed as sergeant to fill the lowest officer's post in the squad. Where there were several candidates of equal ability, examinations were supposed to be held to determine the best one, but preference was given to children of current or former members. Barracks were provided for each corps in Istanbul, and where they already existed, they were enlarged and modernized. Training grounds were also set aside in the vicinity of each barracks, and where there was no room, private homes and shops were torn

The "New Order" of Selim III

down to provide it. Members of the army practiced with weapons five days a week, with Tuesday and Friday usually being left for rest and relaxation. Some of the corps were too large for all their members to practice at the same time, so they came in rotation, which permitted each group to get to the training grounds at least two or three days a week. Failure to appear was grounds for severe punishment up to and including dismissal from the corps for both officers and common soldiers. In addition to his salary, each officer and enlisted man was given daily rations of bread, meat and condiments. Officers were given far more than what they needed for their personal use so they could feed and maintain their private servants and others in their personal employ. Salaries and wages were usually distributed quarterly in the Imperial Council of Istanbul to the scribes of the corps, in the presence of their supervisors and commanders, and they in turn distributed them to the officers and soldiers in the barracks. Members were required to collect salaries, wages, and rations in person, so that they could not turn their positions over to agents or others as was the practice in the past. If the men whose names were on the rolls did not appear, the scribes were supposed to keep their money for a certain length of time, usually between six months and a year. If the man in question appeared at the barracks during that time, he was entitled to receive his money only if he was able to prove that his absence was due to illness or assignment to a distant post, or some other legitimate cause. The men of each corps were admonished to go on expeditions whenever required and never to abandon their weapons so that they could fall into the hands of the enemy. If such a thing happened and the men survived, their names were stricken from the rolls and they were subjected to severe punishments. Civil and religious judges and policemen had no jurisdiction over corps members —they had to turn such military prisoners over to the corps authorities. In return for this autonomy, the corps were required to make sure that their members were punished for such violations, and in fact punishments meted out by the corps in such cases usually were much more severe than those set by nonmilitary authorities for similar crimes.

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The old practices by which officers failed to report vacancies, and collected these salaries for their own profit, were strictly prohibited, and investigators were constantly sent out to uncover violators and inflict punishments. Officers were specifically forbidden to collect the salaries or wages belonging to any individual in a position in the corps other than their own, and immediate dismissal was the punishment for any violation of this regulation. Retirement on pension (vazife) was allowed only to active soldiers and officers who had served honorably and had to retire because of old age or infirmity, in which case the pension usually equaled one half of the individual's active salary at the time of his retirement; if retirement was because of wounds or other injuries received in battle, he was entitled to a pension equaling the full amount of his active salary or even more in certain cases. In the mortar corps, however, the pensions were doubled, with a man retiring because of old age or illness receiving his full salary as pension, and a man retiring because of service disability receiving double his salary. Individuals in all corps were given bonuses in addition to their regular salaries and wages* in return for acts of heroism in battle, special services to the state, and the like, with special bonuses called ihbariye (information fees) provided for those who reported violations of any of the military regulations.2 These rules were repeated in the regulations decreed for each corps during Selim's reign. They were general standards which the Porte applied to all the military units regardless of their specialties. In addition there were regulations which varied substantially according to the nature, function and past organization of each corps.

Reform Regulations in Corps of the Old Army In the case of the Spahi cavalry corps the reform efforts,3 which were applied mainly to the fiefs which supported them, *In Ottoman financial usage, a distinction was made between the "annual salaries," called Säliyäne, paid to the principal officers of state, and the "wages," called Meväjib, given to lesser officials as well as to members of the salaried military corps. Regardless of the name, both categories usually were paid on a monthly basis.

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were based primarily on the proposals submitted by Tatarjik Abdullah Efendi.4 The Alay Bey (Commander) and other officers of each feudal district (sanjak) drew up new registers of all the the fiefs under their supervision together with the names and descriptions of the individuals to whom they were assigned. They then traveled around their districts to make sure that the nominal fief holders were permanently residing on them and performing the required agricultural and administrative duties and that they were persons who were able and willing to supply military service to the army when required. In addition inspectors were sent from the Porte every three years to make sure that fiefholders and officers alike were performing their duties and that the commanders were really eliminating all those who violated the regulations. If the fief-holders were not present on their fiefs when the inspectors came or if they did not respond to calls for their military service, they were supposed to be dismissed at once, but the frequency with which this regulation was repeated during Selim's reign seems to indicate the difficulty which the government had in enforcing it. 5 A pool of apprentices had long existed to assist the feudatories and provide trained replacements for them when needed, but by Selim's time it had become little more than a catch-all for children and relatives of the fief-holders to provide them with additional revenue without requiring any service in return. An effort was therefore made to revive and reorganize the apprentice system. The number of apprentices in each district was limited to 10 per cent of its active fief-holders, and it was stipulated that only these apprentices could replace the feudatories when the fiefs became vacant. Inheritance was allowed here much more than in the salaried infantry corps. Fiefs were not supposed to be declared vacant (and thus available for an apprentice) if the fiefholder in question died honorably in active service and left heirs capable of taking over his position at once. If the feudatory died of natural causes, his heirs could not inherit his position. If he left sons who were not of age, they could not inherit his fief, but they were allowed to join the corps of apprentices ahead of other applicants when they came of age. One of the principal causes of Ottoman failure in the war with Austria and Russia was the insistence on the part of the feudal

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contingents that they be allowed to return home to administer their fiefs during the winter months. Under the traditional feudal system, it was, indeed, necessary for them at some point to collect the revenues they needed to maintain themselves and their suites in the Imperial army. As a result of this practice, much territory taken by successful military action against the enemy during the summer was lost without a fight during the winter months. Under the new reform policy, Selim tried to satisfy the needs of the feudal system without disrupting the army by decreeing that the feudatories no longer had the absolute right to return to their fiefs during the winter months; it was now to be only a privilege granted them by the Sultan at his pleasure. Every ten feudatories in the army holding lands in the same or neighboring districts were allowed to get together and choose one of their number to go home for a time to administer his own lands and the lands of the others, who continued to serve in the army. Special efforts were also made to secure capable and honest men as feudal officers. District Commanders (Alay Bey) were chosen for three-year terms by vote of the fief-holders in each district. Local and national officials were prohibited from interfering in these elections or from collecting fees or bribes in return for confirming their results. To make certain that each fief provided revenues sufficient to support the armed contingents which its holder was supposed to send to the army, Selim ordered that fiefs whose annual revenues were less than 500 piasters be joined to others of the same size. Fiefs over that amount could not be included in such unions, so as to prevent the establishment of unusually large fiefs whose revenues would give their holders dominant power in their districts. Appointments to vacant fiefs were to be made only from among the apprentices of their districts by the district commanders. Officials in Istanbul and provincial governors were specifically enjoined from attempting to secure the appointments for their own favorites or relatives. Efforts were also made to curb the practice of giving military fiefs to persons serving the government in Istanbul to provide them with revenues in addition to their salaries without requiring them to perform the military services for which the fiefs in question were originally set aside. This practice had deprived the

The "New Order" of Selim III

state of a great deal of needed military service and at the same time had made the officials in question much more independent of the Sultan and the Grand Vezir than they would have been if they were dependent for their maintenance on Treasury salaries alone. About five hundred fiefs held in this way were abolished, and only a small number was set aside to support certain palace and scribal officials who were not given regular salaries in return for their work. Thus an effort was made to restore the feudal system to the state in which it had operated so successfully in previous centuries. Turning to the Janissary corps, the Sultan hoped that a similar process of inspecting the currently enrolled members would reduce the corps from the 50,000 men currently enrolled to less than half that number, and that this would automatically increase the efficiency and ability of those remaining in the corps. The provincial governors were ordered to train men in their own entourages to provide pools of experienced replacements when needed. Sons of current or former members were allowed to enter the corps in preference to outsiders, but only if they were willing to accept its duty and discipline and to devote their entire lives to its service.6 Orders were also issued for the provision of new European-type rifles and ammunition to the Janissary corps as soon as possible, and it was hoped that they would be entirely armed with the new equipment by the end of 1794. Each regiment was given eight trained riflemen and eight assistants to teach the men to use the new weapons and to lead them in campaigns.7 Thus the government had a dual purpose — to restore the Janissaries' traditional organization while at the same time getting them to accept new rifles and tactics. The Sultan tried various devices to conciliate both the Spahis and the Janissaries so they would be willing to accept the new ways. Salaries and wages were paid on time and in full for the first time in over half a century although efforts to make up the more than four years of arrears which had accumulated were largely unsuccessful.8 The Janissary barracks in Istanbul were rebuilt and enlarged. Various tax farms were turned over to key officers of the corps, virtually as bribes for their acquiescence.9 Decrees were repeatedly issued

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assuring the corps that the Sultan had no intention of violating their traditional rights and immunities and re-emphasizing their position as the most favored and important of the soldiers defending the Porte.10 The Sultan even went so far as to pay them the "accession tax" (jiilus bahshishi), traditionally delivered by each new sultan to the principal military corps but discarded by Abd ul-Hamid I.11 But all these efforts were to little avail. It is not known whether Selim and those around him actually believed they could reform the Spahis and Janissaries by these methods, but it is known that all efforts made to enforce these regulations were vigorously and violently opposed. The inspectors sent to examine the provincial fiefs had to rely on information supplied by the local feudal officers and men, who managed to conceal anything which it was not to their advantage to reveal. While some fiefs were seized and turned over to the Irad-i Jedid treasury, the vast majority of them remained in the hands of their previous owners, few of whom performed the military duties expected in return. For all practical purposes, the feudal Spahi cavalry did not exist as a fighting force during Selim's reign. The cavalry forces used in his army came from a corps of about 10,000 newly hired salaried Spahis maintained by the Imperial Treasury and by contributions of provincial notables in times of emergency.12 Efforts to deprive Ottoman officials of fiefs held for income alone were effectively counteracted by bribery and mutual cooperation. Nor were the Janissaries any more cooperative. They rioted in the streets whenever any effort was made to give them new uniforms or weapons or to provide them with instructors trained in the new ways. Each effort made to reduce the size of the corps by dismissing inactive members who were artisans or merchants was successfully opposed, and the number of men in the corps actually increased from 43,402 in 177613 to 54,458 in 1794,14 55,256 in 1800,15 98,539 in 1806,16 and 109,791 in 1809,17 thus becoming a heavy burden on the Treasury. Yet when they were called on to attack the independent Balkan notables and when they moved against the French invasion of Egypt between 1798 and 1802, their fighting qualities proved to be just about as bad as they had been before 1789.18

The "New Order" of Selim III

The Sultan's efforts to apply similar reforms to the established artillery and mortar corps were much more successful, perhaps because they had been anticipated by similar attempts during the two preceding decades and because these corps were less closely tied to the interests of the Ottoman ruling class than were the infantry and cavalry corps. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ottoman artillery had been the most advanced in Europe. The Ottoman cannoneers had made vital contributions to the conquest of Istanbul and to Selim I's successful sweep through the Arab world. During subsequent centuries, however, the same elements of decay which had sapped the other branches of Ottoman society also had made the artillery corps only caricatures of their former selves. In 1776, there were 3,258 men enrolled in the cannon corps and 1,482 men in its auxiliary, the cannon-wagon corps, but only 500 of these actually reported for duty in the campaigns against Russia during the same year.19 Most of the corps memberships were held by Istanbul investors and officials as incomeproducing property, and only a few were left to pay for artillerymen actually serving in the army. In addition, its equipment was no longer equal to that used in Europe. The Ottomans remained attached to the old Balyemez and Shahi cannons long after they were completely outmoded by new developments in ballistics in Europe. And even these weapons were often unusable as a result of graft and corruption in the Imperial Cannon Foundry and Powder Works. Under Abd ul-Hamid I, the new-style artillery corps trained by Baron de Tott had been increased in size from 500 to 2,500 men, and a foundry established for them under the direction of a Scotch renegade named Campbell, called "Ingiliz Mustafa" by the Ottomans. In 1783 also a French officer named Lafitte had begun a military engineering school to produce officers for the corps, and a rapid-fire rifle and light artillery corps was also created.20 All of these reforms were introduced and directed by the Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha, but they had only begun when Janissary opposition led to his deposition and execution in late 1788.21 In the meantime the older corps, which continued to perform most of the service of this kind in the army, had been left untouched and unreformed.

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Starting in the spring of 1793, Selim moved to change this situation by reforming the artillery corps, the foundry, and the powder works. The first artillery unit to feel the effect of the new program was the cannon corps, for which a new code was promulgated on March 1, 1793.22 The Sultan's urgent desire to revive the corps was demonstrated by the appointment as its supervisor of his close friend, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, with instructions to eliminate all opposition and reform the corps as soon as possible. The barracks and training grounds of the corps were enlarged and modernized.23 The inefficiency and duplication of effort resulting from the existence of two independent groups concerned with artillery were ended by uniting their direction, with the supervisor of the cannon corps being also appointed as commander of the foundry. The supervisor was in charge of all administrative and financial affairs of the two corps including the acquisition of equipment and supplies, while each corps continued to have its own commander to deal with the more technical problems of training and leading the cannoneers and manufacturing the cannon and powder which they needed. To assist the supervisor and the commanders in using the new weapons, European artillery officers were assigned, the most influential of whom were the French officers Cuny and Aubert, who had served Abd ul-Hamid I in a similar capacity before they were withdrawn by Louis XVI in 1788. 24 Most of the soldiers serving in the corps were dismissed, and new ones were enrolled, mainly from the province of Bosnia. 25 Each regiment was given 10 cannons, of which 4 normally were the new rapid-fire (Sürat) cannons, 2 were the smaller Abus cannons and 4 were the older Balyemez and Shahi, making a total of 250 cannons in all. Ten men were assigned to each cannon, forming a squad.26 Expansion of the corps went ahead rapidly, and by the end of 1796 there were 2,875 well-trained cannoneers stationed at the Tophane, organized in fifteen companies of 115 officers and men each along with an additional company of 115 men stationed at Levend Chiftlik to assist the new Nizam-i Jedid army. In 1806, it had 4,910 men, who were reputed to be by far the ablest fighting men among the old established corps.27 A month after the basic artillery law was issued on April 19,

The "New Order" of Selim III

1793, the same sort of reform was extended to the allied cannonwagon corps, which cared for the transport of the cannons of the Topji corps and for the maintenance of the animals and wagons provided for this task by the state.28 Both by origin and function, this corps was auxiliary and subordinate to the cannon corps, but traditionally it maintained an independent organization with separate regulations and officers. Now the position of cannonwagon supervisor was joined to that of cannon corps supervisor, thus uniting the administrative and financial operations of the two groups. The selection and promotion of officers and men and the supervision and command of their training and service in war was left to the individual commanders of the two corps as before. The cannon-wagon corps originally was given a complement of six hundred men and officers organized into five regiments, but it expanded almost continuously to keep pace with the increasing needs of the cannon corps: 759 men and officers in 1793, 902 in 1803, and 2,129 in 1806.29 Strenuous efforts also were made to attract the ablest artisans to serve the corps. Special bonuses were provided in addition to their regular salaries, and in peacetime, artisans were allowed to work privately in their own shops when the corps had no immediate need for them. Those who accepted the "retainer" in peacetime and then tried to evade their obligation in war were punished by long prison terms, which in most cases continued until they were able to repay all the wages which they had received since entering the corps.30 Similar efforts also were made to expand and revive the mortar and mine-laying corps. Traditionally organized as independent groups for the purposes of recruitment and training, they were in fact little more than financial fictions for their members, who spent all their time serving in the infantry and artillery corps.31 Originally supported entirely by fiefs, the mortar corps had shared the decay of the Spahis, in particular after 1689. In 1731, part of it had been reorganized in the European manner by Count Bonneval, who established a salaried mortar corps separate from the older feudal one, recruiting able Bosnians for both and building new barracks and training grounds for them as well as a factory to manufacture the mortars and shells which they needed. His aim was eventually to wipe out the feudal corps so that the mor-

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tar men remaining would be dependent on salaries and therefore more obedient and disciplined than feudal men could be. By the time Bonneval left Ottoman service, the corps had been built up into six regiments of 100 men each, with approximately 300 men paid by salary and 300 continuing to hold their fiefs.32 But his departure was the signal for a new decline and disintegration. De Tott's efforts to reform them in 1783 and 1784 were only momentarily successful,33 and when Selim came to the throne, they were almost entirely useless from a military point of view. Starting in September 1792, strenuous attempts were made to revive the mortar corps with the assistance and advice of Aubert and Cuny. New barracks, stables, and storehouses were built for them at Hasköy and Sütlüje, on the northern shore of the Golden Horn in Istanbul. As was the case with the other corps, a supervisor was appointed to handle financial and administrative matters, while the former chief, the Humbaraji Bashi, was limited to military affairs. In one respect the supervisor had greater power over the corps than similar officers in the other corps, for he was empowered to dismiss the corps commander without reference to the Imperial Council if he felt him to be inadequate for the job or violating the regulations of his position in some way. Thus the supervisor was the supreme officer and the commander (Dizdar) was his subordinate whereas in the other corps they commanded jointly. 34 The new organization laid out for the mortar corps during the spring of 1793 was somewhat special by virtue of the special nature of its military task. The corps had 50 mortars in all and to each of them there were assigned teams of 9 mortar men commanded by one assistant (Halife) helped by 9 apprentices. The teams were organized into five companies, each composed of 191 officers, men, and assistants, under the command of a Ser Halife. This organization provided a total of 450 men, 450 apprentices, 50 Halifes and 5 Ser Halifes, with the superintendent, the commander, and 3 subordinate corps officers bringing the total of men and officers to 960 in all. Whenever new cannons or mortars were added to the corps along with their men, new companies were created for them, so that the size and organization of the existing companies remained as they were established in the regulation. 35

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Because of the special skills and discipline required of members of this corps, they ordinarily were not allowed to marry, regardless of rank, and had to live in the barracks at all times. Salaries and wages were higher than those paid for service in the other corps, and the pensions were considerably better. Those members who held fiefs were allowed to go to them only once every three years, so that no more than one third of the men would be away from the barracks at any one time. Special agents were appointed by the commander to administer the fiefs.36 As was the case with the other artillery corps, most of the recruits came from Bosnia, often from members of bandit groups who sought to better their circumstances by entering the service of the Sultan. 37 In addition, the mortar and mine-laying corps both received a considerable number of able recruits from the Spahi feudal cavalrymen of Albania who had been dispossessed by the sultan to provide revenues to the members of his Nizam-i Jedid army. 38 At the same time, the mortar corps' affiliated group, the minelayers corps, was subjected to similar reforms. 39 Traditionally, it was divided into two groups, one attached to the Jebejis (armorers)40 and receiving monthly salaries from the Treasury, and the other a group based on fiefs, but both had decayed considerably before 1792. Now the supervisor of the mortar corps was appointed to a similar position with the mine-laying corps to supervise the reform and end the duplication of effort between them. In 1794, two new barracks were built for the corps in Hasköy, near those of the mortar corps, and members were required to remain in them at all times so that they could receive the necessary training. The corps was divided into two groups, according to specialty, with the first concentrating on the sciences and techniques involved in preparing and laying mines, and the second being an engineering group in charge of the various branches of military architecture. 41 Direction of its military and technical activities was left to the Lagimji Bashi (head of the mine-laying corps) who also cooperated with the supervisor in administrative and financial functions. The corps at this time was formed primarily of men supported by fiefs, but their number was restricted to 200, and after that figure was reached, vacancies were retired by the Treas-

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ury as soon as they became available. In addition, 50 orderlies were evenly divided between the mine-laying and engineering divisions of the corps, and given the sole right to take over the regular positions in the corps as they became vacant. If children of current or former members wished to enter the corps, they were allowed to do so only by serving first as orderlies and then advancing into the regular mine-laying corps ranks through the normal processes of promotion. The mine-laying corps members were not allowed to leave their positions or fiefs to their children under any circumstances.42 The last of the established military forces to be reformed and reorganized during Selim's reign were those which garrisoned the forts scattered along both sides of the Bosporus. Those on the Anatolian side were given 500 additional men and officers, bringing their grand total to 1,000,43 and they were placed under the command of a Bosporus superintendent (Bogaz Naziri). The men were given considerably higher salaries than those in the regular infantry corps because of the constant attendance to duty required of all of them during both winter and summer.44 The forts on the Istanbul side were given a somewhat different organization since they were composed entirely of batteries guarding the Black Sea entrances to the Bosporus. Their garrisons were tied entirely to the new corps being trained at Levend Chiftlik,45 which provided both men and officers trained in the new ways.46 These then were the efforts which Selim made to reform the older corps: new commanders, organizations, methods, officers, and men where possible. In the artillery corps Selim was far more successful than in the Janissary and Spahi corps, where the force of resistance was too strong. Information on the fate of these reforms, however, is very limited. The Ottoman sources themselves do little more than repeat and summarize the official decrees without describing how they were applied. The foreign reports, even the secret ones sent by the foreign technicians to their home governments, are so vague as to be almost useless. Nevertheless it is clear from the fate of the Ottoman army during the wars in which it fought under Selim that the reforms, however thoroughly they were applied, had little effect on the fighting ability of the Ottoman army as a whole. The infantry and

The "New Order" of Selim III

cavalry alike were just as disorderly in 180047 and 180748 as they had been earlier.

The Nizam-i Jedid

Army

In the long run, however much attention Selim gave to the older corps, most of his hopes and a good portion of his energies went into the creation of an entirely new army, the Nizam-i Jedid or "New Order" and an independent treasury organized specifically to support it, the Treasury of the New Revenue (Irad-i Jedid Hazinesi). And it was in this effort that Selim was most successful. The nucleus of the "new army" actually came into being some time before the Sultan knew about it or had made a definite decision to organize such a force independent of the older corps. In late 1791, while Koja Yusuf Pasha was still in the field against the Russians, he assembled a small number of renegades captured in the course of the campaign. Working with a few members of Yusuf's personal guard, they began to train with captured Russian weapons, using European-style exercises and maneuvers and performed periodically in front of the Grand Vezir's tent as a kind of entertainment to divert the army's leaders from their increasingly difficult problems. At this stage, the new group was no more than a toy, a personal caprice of the Grand Vezir. No effort was made to force the other corps to accept or even observe the infidel practices since such a revolutionary step had not yet been authorized by the Sultan. 49 When peace was concluded and the Imperial army returned to Istanbul, the Sultan went to see the new corps perform. He was so impressed with the massed firepower it was able to assemble that he decided to create the new army mentioned in Yusuf's report, with this group as its nucleus. 50 In late March 1792, the British ambassador provided a few new muskets and bayonets for the Grand Vezir on an informal basis and asked his government for permission to provide additional assistance of the same sort.51 To man the new corps, one hundred Turks were enrolled from the streets of Istanbul, and the German and Russian renegades brought back by the Grand Vezir became its officers and

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drill masters. In April, Levend Chiftlik, an isolated spot ten miles north of the capital, formerly used by the rapid-fire cannon force trained by de Tott, was chosen as the drill grounds since it was far enough from the population and the old corps that it would not excite their disapproval or anxiety.52 In addition, much to the chagrin of the British ambassador, four French infantry officers were appointed to advise on its operations.53 Up to this point all of this action was taken secretly by the Sultan and the Grand Vezir, without obtaining any formal approval from the Imperial Council. It was only during late April and early May that approval was obtained in a series of meetings held in the rooms of the Imperial Council.54 Since the Sultan's determination to establish the corps was made clear right from the start, there was little open opposition to its establishment, and the only disputes came over the question of whether it should be independent or part of one of the older corps. The proponents of the latter view, led by Yusuf Ziya Pasha, argued that an entirely new corps outside the established military hierarchy would needlessly antagonize the Janissaries before the new army was strong enough to defend itself. They stated that if the new force was in some way made part of the old system, at least in form, its true significance would be veiled and the opposition deluded until it was too late. The advocates of independence, led by Tatarjik Abdullah Efendi, emphasized the financial aspect, pointing out that the expenses involved in creating the new army would overwhelm the established treasury, and offering a new treasury with new taxes supplying an independent army as the best solution. In the end, on May 14, 1792, a compromise was reached. The Sultan decided to create a new treasury with new taxes to provide for the new army, but both were clothed in the garb of established organizations in the Ottoman system in order to satisfy the conservatives and delude the reactionaries. Since the financial aspect always was considered to be the most important aspect of any Ottoman administrative operation, legislation for the treasury came first. On March 1, 1793, an entirely independent treasury was established for the new army with the name Irad-i Jedid, or "New Revenue."55 Mustafa Reshid Efendi was made director of the entire Nizam-i Jedid organiza-

The "New Order" of Selim III

tion, with the formal titles of Irad-i Jedid Defterdari (Treasurer of the New Revenue) for his financial duties and Talimli Askeri Naziri (Supervisor of the Trained Soldiers) for his military ones. To provide him with rank and prestige in the regular Ottoman hierarchy, the now-honorific post of Shikk-i Sani Defterdari (Second Treasurer) 56 was set aside for him, thus making him an equal with the other chief officers of state in the Imperial Council. As revenues for the new treasury, the Sultan gave it all the tax farms (lltizam) belonging to the state treasury and to the Holy Cities which produced annual profits of more than ten purses each to the tax farmers who administered them. To lighten the effect of the loss of these revenues on the state treasury, the Sultan also decreed that this transfer should take place only when the holdings in question were vacated by their current tax farmers, and that as soon as the new treasury took them over, it should pay the state treasury the purchase price it normally received for those farms, equal to five years profits of their tax farmers, in addition to the regular annual taxes which it normally received from the tax farmers. 57 In essence then the new treasury itself became the tax farmer of these holdings for the state treasury, administering them by "subfarming" them to its own tax farmers. 58 In addition, all fiefs previously set aside for members of the mortar corps and the navy and all military fiefs worth more than 15,000 piasters per year whose holders were found to be absent from their lands or failing in their duties in any way were seized for the new treasury. In addition various excise taxes were turned over to it or created especially for it. The Imperial Treasury thereafter had to pay only those expenses incumbent on it in peacetime before the Nizam-i Jedid corps was established and the artillery and navy reformed. The new treasury was provided with special revenues to pay for the reforms plus all extraordinary expenditures required by wartime expeditions. All surpluses left in the new treasury at the end of each fiscal year had to be placed in a special war chest and saved for emergencies in order to spare the new and old treasuries alike from the extraordinary burdens of military emergencies.59 Mustafa Reshid immediately set about to organize his treasury and collect its revenues. 60 In 1793 and 1794, no more than

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200 men and officers were enrolled, and most of its resources were used to build barracks and prepare drill grounds at Levend Chiftlik, to import officers and equipment from Europe, and to make new uniforms and weapons for the men. At the same time, efforts were initiated to popularize the new force among the people of Istanbul and the men of the older corps, or at least to break the news gradually so that when the establishment of the new corps itself was publicly proclaimed, they would not be taken by surprise and goaded into sudden, violent action.61 It was only in the late summer of 1794 that the Sultan and his advisers were satisfied that the public was prepared. The official regulations establishing the military organization therefore were finally proclaimed on September 18, almost two years after it originally began its work.62 In order that the Nizam-i Jedid army would fit into the established Ottoman military hierarchy and attract as little attention as possible, it was attached to the old Bostaniyan-i Hassa corps as its infantry-rifle branch, the Bostani Tiifenkjisi (Bostani riflemen) corps.63 While the regulation expressed the hope that the full corps would eventually have 12,000 officers and men, for the moment a single regiment of 1,602 officers and men was organized at Levend Chiftlik as a model for later expansion.64 The basic internal regulations of the corps were very similar to those given to the older corps two years before. A regular hierarchy of promotion was established, with vacancies filled by the persons occupying the posts immediately beneath them. Provision was made for the advancement out of order of unusually qualified men in special cases, especially if they had demonstrated their ability in battle. Among persons of equal ability, however, preference had to be given to age and seniority. At the time the regulation was issued and the organization of the Nizam-i Jedid corps officially proclaimed, there were only 468 men and 20 officers training at Levend Chiftlik, and they were living in tents and flimsy wooden shacks because the regular barracks had not yet been completed.65 Nevertheless during the next six months recruits came rapidly, mainly from among unemployed youths roaming the streets of Istanbul and from the private armies of the leading notables of Anatolia, 66 and the regiment soon reached its full strength. At the same time, most of the permanent buildings were soon completed, including three barThe "New Order" of Selim III

racks, a rifle factory, two mosques, and a school.67 Members of the corps were dressed in the French manner, with blue berets and red breeches and jackets. 68 Training went ahead rapidly under the direction of Veli Agha and the French official advisers and under the frequent inspection of the Sultan and his officials. At the same time, the Irad-i Jedid treasury collected its revenues so efficiently that it was left with a large surplus even after all its obligations were met.69 With this very favorable financial situation, the Sultan finally felt that the new corps could be safely expanded, and with the added stimulus of the French invasion of Egypt, a second regiment was created on November 23,1799. The organization of the new force was somewhat different from that of the original one. The various provincial governors were ordered to recruit men locally and train them in the Nizam-i Jedid way under the direction of officers sent from Istanbul, with their salaries and equipment provided by the Irad-i Jedid treasury. Here indeed was the provincial militia proposed by Yusuf Pasha. 70 While these men were to continue to serve with the provincial governors in order to maintain order, a central regiment was established for them at Uskiidar to direct their operations and control their training. By 1800, barracks and training grounds were built for it at Kadiköy, including a hospital, a library, and a press.71 Most of the men in this regiment came from the villages of Anatolia; it was almost entirely a Turkish peasant force, something without precedent in Ottoman history, with enlistment encouraged not only by high salaries but also by tax exemptions given to the families of those who enlisted. 72 The internal organization of the Usküdar regiment was exactly the same as that of Levend Chiftlik, with the exception that its total number was without limit. To coordinate the activities of the two Nizamd Jedid regiments, a new post was created, Ojak Kethiidasi (Lieutenant of the Corps), and it was given to one of the Binbashis of the two regiments. Finally, the new regiment was given the color light blue for its jackets and breeches, to distinguish its men and officers from those of Levend Chiftlik. 73 At the same time, the old barracks at Levend Chiftlik were repaired and expanded and a second regiment was created there. 74 With three regiments and with large and increasing revenues,

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the Nizam-i Jedid corps expanded rapidly. In May 1797, it had 2,536 men and 27 officers.75 By September 1799, this number had increased to 4,317 men and 30 officers, and it continued to rise to 6,029 men and 27 officers in April 1800, and 9,263 men and 27 officers in July 1801.76 Not all the governors recruited and trained Nizam-i Jedid men, but nine did, of whom the most active were Abdurrahman Pasha, governor of Karaman and Alaiye, who was appointed colonel of the entire regiment in 1801, Jebbar zade, and Siileyman Pasha, independent governor of Baghdad.77 Starting in 1802, Abdurrahman Pasha developed a system of military conscription throughout Anatolia to provide men for the Nizam-i Jedid. Each provincial and district official and notable was required to send a certain number of men to Usküdar for training in the new army, for periods of between six months and one year. Generally, half the contingents were trained as infantry for service in the regular Levend Chiftlik and Usküdar corps. The other half were trained as cavalry so that they could return to form the local militias of the provincial governors and district notables.78 After 1804 an effort was made to transform the entire Timar feudal system into the base for this Nizam-i Jedid militia. Fiefs were seized on the flimsiest of pretexts and administered by the Irad-i Jedid treasury as tax farms to provide revenue to support the recruitment and training of the same number of men for the Nizam-i Jedid militia as were formerly supported on a feudal basis. The fiction of feudal organization was preserved by the application of the name Sanjak Bey to their officers, but these were in fact salaried officers sent to the provinces by the Levend Chiftlik and Usküdar corps. Regular barracks were built for the new provincial militia at the expense of the Irad-i Jedid treasury, at Ankara, Bolu, Kastamonu, Kütahya, Kayseri, Nicopolis, Kirshehir, Chorum, Menteshe, and Izmir, while elsewhere they were housed in buildings previously used by the local security forces. By the end of 1806, as a result of these efforts, there were 22,685 men and 1,590 officers enrolled in the Nizam-i Jedid army, of whom approximately half were stationed in Anatolia and the balance in Istanbul and the Balkans.79 The success of this Anatolian venture led the Sultan to attempt the creation of a similar corps in Europe, with its central base at Edirne.80 But the Euro-

The "New Order" of Selirn III

pean parts of the empire by this time were entirely too far removed from central control for this sort of levy to be effective; it was entirely unsuccessful. In this area, therefore, the Ottoman army continued to depend almost entirely on the independent local notables. The rapid increase in the number of men enrolled in the new army after 1794 created a number of new problems, principally the same sort of disorderly, undisciplined behavior which had brought the older corps into disrepute. In the early days of the Nizam-i Jedid, most of the enlisted men were Turks enrolled mainly in Istanbul from among the large group of unemployed, who joined as the only alternative to starvation. Most of them were accustomed to the discipline, restraint, and sanitary methods required by living in close proximity to large numbers of persons. In contrast, most of the new men enrolled after 1794 came from Anatolia; the enrollment lists show that by 1800, 90 per cent of the enlisted men in the army were Turkish peasants and tribesmen. 81 Many of them joined more for the weapons and plunder they hoped to gain than for anything else. Resistant to discipline and unaccustomed to the kind of life required by the corps, they became increasingly turbulent and disorderly, and there were frequent incidents in which they descended to the Bosporus at Tarabya, Yeni Köy, and Beshiktash, attacking and robbing at will. Many of them fled from the camps shortly after receiving their uniforms and weapons, complaining that the work was too hard, the discipline too severe, and the pay too low. Forming powerful new robber bands, they began to plague notables and governors alike in western Anatolia and the Balkans, the superior weapons provided by the Sultan giving them an inestimable advantage over their opponents.82 To combat these problems, various changes were made in the organization of the corps. Additional officers were appointed. Punishments for infractions of the rules were made more severe. Efforts were made to control the men when they were not actually in the field or training at the practice grounds. The rapid increase in the number of men had so far outstripped the facilities at Levend Chiftlik and Üsküdar that it was impossible for all the men to practice daily, as was originally envisaged in their

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regulations. Those unable to practice were left with nothing to do for a good part of the time since such a contingency had not been provided for. The resulting idleness and lack of supervision were considered a major cause of the difficulties which the army was now experiencing. As a partial solution, new training regulations were introduced on April 6, 1801.83 A regular system of training rotation was set up in a manner similar to that of the artillery corps. As an additional measure to relieve the pressure of idleness, those men wishing to engage in an outside trade when they were not required at the practice field were allowed to do so if they had performed their duties in full, if their work was "a trade in keeping with the honor of the corps," and if they were located near enough to their barracks so that they could return at night and be called up for instant duty when required. For the first time, officers were allowed to marry, but the men were supposed to remain single so that they could be subjected to the severe discipline of the corps. In addition, in order that the men might be commanded and supervised more efficiently, it was decided that the financial and military duties originally united in the person of the supervisor were in fact too much for a single man to perform properly, and in late 1801 they were separated, with the post of Talimli Askeri Naziri being transferred to the supervisor of the cannon and cannon-wagon corps, while the Nizam-i Jedid supervisor was left with the posts of Treasurer of the New Treasury and the rank of Second Treasurer of the Imperial Treasury. 84 These reforms had some effect, but disciplinary cases on the part of members of the Usküdar mounted corps in particular continued to be reported periodically, manifesting a continued decline in the discipline and efficiency of the corps and also inflicting a final, crushing blow against the government's effort to popularize the new army among the people.85 This then was Selim's Nizam-i Jedid corps. By the end of his reign it numbered almost 23,000 men, who were armed with modern weapons, trained by European officers, and praised for their efficiency and good bearing by almost all the Europeans who observed them. 86 Together with the reformed and revamped

The "New Order" of Selim 111

artillery corps, it should have provided the Sultan with an effective military force capable not only of meeting the enemy on equal terms but also of protecting the Sultan and itself against any attacks. On the occasions in which it was employed, the Nizam-i Jedid army effectively demonstrated its superiority over the Janissaries and the Spahis. In 1799, approximately 200 of its men were sent by sea to Gaza, where they performed important service in assisting its governor, Ahmed Jezzar Pasha, in his stalwart defense of that fortress against the French army of Bonaparte.87 In 1800, when the British fleet blockaded the French in Alexandria, 2,000 Nizam-i Jedid soldiers were landed along with 6,000 regular Ottoman troops, and they managed to maintain a successful blockade against the French at Rosetta, eventually forcing them to surrender in April 1801.88 During the next six years the new army soldiers performed important, although somewhat limited, service against the mountain bandits in the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains.89 But the old corps absolutely refused to accept the new training and weapons, and those politicians who were associated with them deviously undermined the efforts of the European advisers. In 1800, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Elgin, reported that "during the whole of their [the European advisers'] stay in Turkey, a very great deal of intrigue has been successfully exerted to impede the operations of the detachment and prevent the utility they were enabled to render this country. Every trick has been used to disgust the officers and men. Those who were anxious that no English land officers should be employed with the Grand Vezir, and those who wish the power of Turkey to be kept under, have been equally busy."90 Similar complaints came from the French and from others.91 As a result of the Janissaries' refusal to serve with the new troops in the most important campaigns during the last decade of Selim's rule, against the French in Egypt and the Serbs and Russians in 1806 and 1807, the Nizam-i Jedid troops performed only token service, and the main Ottoman army continued to be composed primarily of the unruly and ineffective Janissaries and Spahis, with disastrous results.92 General Koehler, who was the principal adviser for the regular

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Ottoman army during the Egyptian campaign, described it to his superiors in London: As deficient as they are in all the camp duties of security and defense, than which nothing can be worse, so they are with respect to any rational system or foresight with respect to the plan of operations to be carried on against the enemy, so weak, so frivolous and childish that an infant three years old would have more forecast. They are scattered over a large extent of ground in separate encampments according to their own fancy. The Grand Vezir is exceedingly civil, has shown the greatest attention, provided you will talk about his fine horses, the great superiority of the Turks on horseback, or about his little fountain of water with a child's ship in it, but directly to touch upon anything which relates to military operations or the enemy, he waives the conversation. What is expected from such troops, or rather mob thus commanded? Nothing but shame and disgrace, and yet they have fine men, excellent horses, good guns, plenty of ammunition and provisions and forage, and in short great abundance of all the materials required to constitute a formidable army, but they want order and system, which would not be difficult to establish if their principal officers were not so astonishingly adverse to anything tending toward it . . . The camp is composed of many different nations and natures of troops, which though properly speaking are subject to the same sovereign and pretending to the same religion are however extremely distinct as to their views and separate interests, jealous of each other with very little public spirit, and only serving for plunder or personal advantage, and have very little zeal when they have no immediate prospect of satisfying their own particular views. The authority of the Vezir is equally incomprehensible; an apparent great submission and immediate power of life and death over individuals, but he himself seems to stand in great apprehension of offending them, seems not to dare to order such a detachment to encamp in this or that place, nor to give

The "New Order" of Selim III

them the least interruption or inconvenience, is obliged to use the most gentleness and leniency towards them to prevail upon them to do anything of the most trifling nature and to prevent their entirely abandoning him . . ,93 In 1807, when the opposition of the vested interests finally led to open revolt against Selim, the new army was almost completely ineffective in defending its master and itself against the common enemy. The reasons for this failure to use the Nizam-i Jedid army, as well as, indeed, the failure of Selim's entire reform program, will be examined in subsequent chapters.

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XI. Technical Reforms

Up to now we have been dealing with changes in the direction and organization of the military establishment and improvements in the training and discipline of its men. But such reforms, however successful they were in themselves, could have been really effective only if they were accompanied by even more drastic improvements in the weapons and equipment provided for the use of these men. The disorganization and inefficiency of the established Ottoman military corps had been compounded by an inferiority of arms which had become increasingly more serious since the end of the seventeenth century, when Europe had begun to develop the science of arms manufacture on a large scale. In the West the awkward and heavy muskets with their sputtering and inefficient firing pins, had long since been replaced by light and mobile rifles with flintlock firing systems, which could be carried easily both by horsemen and infantrymen and which could be fired regardless of the weather. The old ponderous and awkward cannons, of use only in attacking and defending fortresses and much too heavy to be used in large numbers on warships or on the battlefield, were likewise replaced by much lighter and more mobile instruments. Changes in the compound ratios of saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur used to make the gunpowder employed in these weapons made it far more stable and dependable

than that previously employed. Similar developments in the alloy of the metals used in these weapons and in the arts of ballistics contributed even further to the vast superiority of the modern weapons of Europe over the older ones still used by the Ottoman army at the end of the eighteenth century.1 In fact the isolation of the Ottoman ruling class from Europe, its inherent conservatism and pride, its scorn of all things infidel, its continued worship of everything that had brought the Ottomans greatness in the past, prevented it from accepting the new weapons. The repeated demands of the few European technicians who, for one reason or another, were employed in the army during the eighteenth century had fallen on deaf ears for the most part. Worse yet, the old-style weapons still used by Ottoman soldiers and sailors at the end of the eighteenth century were poor imitations of those of the past. The anarchy which had infected the military organization had spread to the factories. As a result the weapons were of extremely poor quality, with the metal badly forged and very brittle, the gunpowder filled with impurities and, in consequence, highly erratic, the cannons and muskets easily breakable and of varying dimensions, and the bullets and bombs of various sizes and qualities.2 As late as 1793, a French observer, B. Jumelin, reported to the French Foreign Ministry that "until today, the Turks have founded only bronze cannon and their army and navy have no other. Their foundries and their forges are pitiful. Their projectiles are older than their cannons, and their artillery men are good enough only to use such equipment."3 Under such conditions, even the most modern military organizations, kept under the tightest discipline and training, would have had little success, and Selim seems to have fully realized this.4 To secure modern weapons and ammunition for all the armed forces, importation from Europe was simply not enough. Communications were too slow and too likely to be severed or interrupted in wartime. It was obvious that factories had to be built within the empire to make the new army and navy relatively independent of foreign sources. For this it was necessary to summon European experts to direct the new factories and instruct the Ottoman officers and soldiers in the manufacture and use of the new weapons.

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The Manufacture of Cannons and Rifles. Selim's first efforts in the technical field went into the modernization of the Imperial Cannon Foundry (Tophane), located next to the barracks and drill grounds of the artillery corps. Starting in March 1793, Selim introduced the most important changes in this area since the time of Süleyman the Magnificent. Houses and shops near the foundry and barracks were purchased and destroyed to make way for the new barracks and factories; the old buildings were modernized; new machines were imported from England and France, and the training grounds were expanded considerably.5 A year later the buildings in Hasköy, originally constructed by Baron de Tott to manufacture the new style rapid-fire cannon and subsequently used in part for the assembly of the old-style muskets and bullets reintroduced after de Tott's departure, were turned over to a group of cannon founders and artisans sent by the French Directorate as the result of repeated Ottoman requests for technical assistance of this kind. 6 The Directory actually went far beyond the original Ottoman request in its desire to strengthen the Sultan's loyalty to revolutionary France. Seventy master workers were sent under the direction of Guion Pampelonne, Assistant Director of the foundry of Valence, to establish a cannon foundry, a mine and bomb factory, a shop for the manufacture and repair of rifles, a powder factory and a saltpeter factory, and, in addition, Pampelonne was authorized to take all the machines and equipment he needed from the Arsenal at Valence.7 Selim did not wish to depend entirely on a single European power for all his arms manufacture, however, and he assigned Pampelonne to manufacture cannons and mines only. The manufacture of rifles and bullets was transferred to new shops built at Levend Chiftlik by a Spanish expert named Volla and at Dolmabahche by a British officer.8 In order to attract the best Ottoman artisans to serve in these shops, very high salaries were provided, strict examinations were set up, and the artisans were allowed to continue to work in their own private shops whenever their services were not required by the state. All the foundries and rifle factories were placed under the joint control of the supervisors of the artillery and Nizam-i Jedid corps, who were personally responsible for the success of

The "New Order" of Selim III

their operations.9 From 1795 to the middle of 1798, all the arms factories except the one in Hasköy were placed under the technical supervision of the two French experts, Aubert and Cuny, replaced during and after the French expedition to Egypt by English and Swedish officers.10 Plans, models, and samples of numerous modern calibers and types of bombs, cannons, rifles, and bullets were sent to the Porte as gifts by the monarchs of France, England, Prussia, and Sweden as part of their efforts to secure the support of the Sultan in the diplomatic and military conflicts then going on in Europe.11 Thus, in many ways, Selim III was the first ruler of an "underdeveloped country" to manipulate and take advantage of the rivalries of the great powers to secure assistance in the development of his country. For one reason or another, none of these factories was entirely successful. Rivalries among the various foreign contingents, sloth, negligence, and inefficiency on the part of the foreign experts themselves, many of whom were men who had failed in their own countries, opposition to the entire program by the Janissaries and others, general disinclination on the part of Ottomans and Muslims to obey the orders of infidels, and corruption and political intrigues among Selim's cabinet ministers greatly limited the effectiveness of these efforts.12 Pampelonne suffered the greatest difficulties. He was astounded to discover that the Porte would accept only twenty-five of his men as a result of the intrigues of the anti-French elements in the Imperial Council. The extra artisans were forced to return home without working at all for the empire, which in fact desperately needed them. Those remaining in the Ottoman service with Pampelonne were constantly disturbed by irregularity in the payment of salary and delivery of supplies, interference with their activities by the proBritish ministers, and the like, so they finally withdrew at the end of 1797 as part of a general withdrawal of French technicians at that time.13 It has been commonly assumed that the French technical assistants remained in Ottoman service until they were forced to leave by the outbreak of war between the two nations in 1798. In fact, however, it was the internal conditions within the Ottoman state which largely nullified their efforts and forced their departure before political and military events would have

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led to the same end.14 As a result, once the war with France was concluded in 1802 neither the Ottomans nor their European "friends" were overanxious for a resumption of this sort of assistance, and only a few European technicians served at Istanbul during the last five years of Selim's reign. As a result of these difficulties, although the Ottoman arms factories greatly improved their product in both quantity and quality over that produced before 1794, the results were never as outstanding as was hoped for at the start. 15 The Manufacture of Gunpowder. Without a doubt, the most successful of Selim's technical efforts was that aimed at securing better gunpowder for new and old weapons alike. Before 1789, Ottoman gunpowder was manufactured at the Imperial Powder Works (Baruthane-i Amire) at Bakirköy (built 1698), just north of Istanbul on the Sea of Marmara, and at provincial works located at Salonika, Galipoli, Baghdad, Cairo, Belgrade, and Izmir. Each of these factories was under the direction of an independent officer, who purchased his position as a tax farm, or a retired officer of the Porte who was given this job as a kind of pension reward for previous service. Invariably the directors knew nothing about the manufacture of gunpowder, and for the most part they remained in Istanbul and did nothing to supervise the factory operations. They treated the factories principally as means of enriching themselves and diverted to their own profit most of the money provided for equipment and supplies. As a result, the powder was of extremely bad quality. The saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur required for gunpowder were still mixed with the sixteenth-century formula of 6-1-1, with 8 okkes* of materials producing 7 of powder. Even when manufactured properly this mixture produced an extremely unstable compound which exploded more as the result of changes of weather, humidity, and precipitation than it did in response to the urgings of a lighted fuse. The addition of dirt and other base substances by dishonest factory directors only heightened this tendency. As a result, even when the gunpowder did explode in the cannons and rifles, the explosive force was either so weak that the ball or bullet would *The okke, or vakiyye (also called kiyye), was an Ottoman unit of weight equal to 400 dirhems or 2.83 pounds. The exact equivalent varied according to the material being weighed and the place.

The "New Order" of Selim III

not go as far as it was supposed to or so violent that the weapons themselves were blown apart. In addition no more than 3,000 kantars** of even this poor-quality gunpowder were produced annually for the Ottoman army,16 an amount considerably below its regular needs. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century Europe had produced a far more stable and dependable type of powder from a new compound mixed in the proportions of 75-15-10. 17 The Ottomans had not adopted this ratio for their own manufactures, but since 1768 they had recognized its superiority and had imported it in small amounts. Since the importation of this sort of powder in sizable quantities was extremely expensive and unreliable, Selim was determined to manufacture it in Turkey if at all possible. In 1790 a Venetian traveler managed to convince the Sultan that he was an expert in the modern techniques of making gunpowder, and he was given a large grant from the Imperial Treasury to build a factory for that purpose at San Stefano. Having stolen all the money for himself without even beginning the work he had contracted for, he was arrested and imprisoned in January 1791.18 Selim's first effort to manufacture gunpowder was stillborn. No new efforts were made until the summer of 1794, when an attempt was made to reorganize and modernize the existing powder works. The works at Bakirköy, Galipoli, and Salonika were placed under the direction of a single supervisor, Tevkii Ali Raik Efendi,19 who was ordered to reorganize the factories and their staffs and bring in new equipment from Europe so that at least 5,000 kantars of high-quality European-type powder could be manufactured every year. The supervisor was put under a strict system of controls so that he could not purchase inferior qualities or quantities of the raw material and pocket the difference for himself as others had in the past.20 Raik Efendi proved to be no more capable or honest than his predecessors, and little was done to implement these regulations until April 1795, when he was replaced by the former chief treasurer of the empire and governor of Jidda, Mehmed Sherif Efendi. Under his direction, and with the assistance of several British gunpowder experts, the twenty old wheels at Bakirköy were re**The kantar was an Ottoman unit of weight which normally came to 56.41 kilograms and was divided into 44 okkes.

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modeled and five new ones were added, and within a year the previous annual production of 1,500 kantars of poor-quality powder was replaced by twice as much of a much better quality. 21 Similar reforms were made in the powder works at Galipoli and Salonika, which at this time were used primarily to supply the gunpowder needs of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet. In addition Sherif Efendi soon discovered that it was impossible to make fine powder of constant quality so long as the machines and wheels in the factories were moved by animal power, which was quite variable. Water power was far more suitable in all respects, but the Bakirköy factory was not located anywhere near streams which could be used to move the wheels in the desired manner. As a result of these considerations, he began to search for a new and more suitable location — a place far enough away from settled communities so that it would not endanger them yet close enough to a running stream for power and to the Sea of Marmara for both supplies and products to be transported easily. After a long search, an ideal location was found at Azadli, further west on the shore of the Sea of Marmara, immediately north of Küchük Chekmeje lake and village near the Karimburgaz caves. Under the management of an Armenian artisan named Erakil Efendi, a huge new powder works was built here during the spring of 1794. Its wheels and machines were moved entirely by water supplied by canals built between the factory and the nearby stream. 22 It was so successful that after 1797 the old Imperial powder works at Bakirköy was used only to store raw materials and finished products, while those at Galipoli, Salonika, and Izmir were closed entirely, 23 and the Porte was completely relieved of the necessity of purchasing gunpowder abroad. 24 Consequently, depending on the extent that the Ottoman military corps could be provided with modern cannons and rifles, ammunition for both was available after 1795 in sufficient quantities to assure their proper use.

Technical

Schools

In addition to reorganizing the military corps and modernizing their weapons, Selim and his ministers also gave a great deal of

The "New Order" of Selim III

attention to educating their officers in the new techniques and sciences of war so that they could eventually take over direction from the foreign advisers who had to be relied on at the start. The engineering schools which had been developed in Turkey during the eighteenth century were intimately associated with the military services whose officers they trained. The schools of naval engineering (Mühendishane-ί Bahri-i Hilmayun) and artillery (Topji Mektebi), founded in the years following the defeat at Cheshme, had introduced western military sciences and techniques into Turkey on a relatively large scale for the first time. They had been limited in scope, mainly emphasizing artillery. They had little to do with the arts of fortification, laying siege, navigation, and the like, which also were essential elements of modern armies and navies, and they went little beyond the practical techniques involved to their scientific bases. In addition, they depended primarily on French experts and teachers, and when these were withdrawn by Louis XVI in 1788, the schools fell into a rapid eclipse. From this experience, and from the renewed defeats suffered in the wars of 1787 to 1792, Selim learned to his sorrow that in order for reforms to be effective, they had to encompass all the military arts, not just those shown most inferior in previous campaigns, and that it was very dangerous to rely on the assistance of a single European power for technical developments of this kind. Both these lessons bore fruit in the years after 1792. The only technical schools which Selim was able to continue during the war, although on a reduced basis, were the naval engineering school and a small new engineering school established by the Sultan (Mühendishane-i Sultani) in Eyiib to train some of his young servants and companions in the elements of arithmetic and geometry, both to provide them with the basic education they needed to aid his reform efforts and to prepare at least some of them for the higher technical schools which he was planning to reopen after the war. Most of the teachers in the new school were trained in a small engineering school maintained at Kagithane for a short time in the 1780s by Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha, and many of its graduates went on.to teach in the new schools subsequently established by Selim and his successors.25

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With the end of the war and the influx of western officers, it was possible for Selim to reopen and expand the technical schools, but the number of students ready to take advantage of them was strictly limited. The Sultan preferred to concentrate the efforts of his foreign advisers in the field, to train his soldiers. It was only after this training was well along that Selim was willing to use at least some of these advisers to develop a full-fledged army engineering school out of the old artillery school, on the model of the long-established naval one. Essentially what Selim now hoped to do was to provide the army with a higher-level technical school which would give its officers intensive training in the theoretical and practical sides not only of artillery, but also of fortification, mine-laying, and engineering. The Sultan's engineering and naval schools provided a nucleus of staff and students for the new army engineering school. Selim originally planned its buildings at Kagithane, near his summer palace at Saadabad, so that he could himself attend classes and exercises and follow what was being done. This idea was eventually abandoned because of the difficulties involved in establishing the school so far from the barracks and training grounds of the military corps with which it was to be associated.26 In the summer of 1793, the new school was formally established as the Imperial Land Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Berri-i Hiimayun), incorporating the old artillery school together with whatever educational classes had been maintained by the mortar and mine-laying corps. Its basic regulations were included with those of the mine-laying corps issued at the same time.27 At first a teaching staff of five persons was provided, with one Bash Hoja (chief teacher) and four teaching assistants. Instruction on a small scale began with forty students in special rooms in the mortar corps barracks at Hasköy while work also began on an entirely new building for it in the vicinity. The final regulation for the organization and curriculum of the school was issued only in 1795, when the new building was opened; it expanded gradually thereafter, with the number of instructors being raised to four and the students to eighty during the course of 1797.28 The chief teacher was for all practical purposes the principal of the school, under the general control of the supervisor of the three

The "New Order" of Selim III

artillery corps. He was responsible for making appointments of teachers, assistants, and students, for preparing and enforcing the programs of class instruction, and for supervising the activities of students and teachers alike. From 1793 to 1800, this vital post was held by Abdurrahman Efendi, an intellectual and educational leader of the time,29 and for the rest of Selim's reign it was under the capable direction of Hüseyin Rifki Efendi, who managed to retain this post until 1815. 30 When the school first opened and Abdurrahman Efendi was the only regular instructor, a good deal of the teaching was done by his four assistants. In addition a number of teachers came from the naval school once a week, and the students of the army school went to the naval school twice a week to take advantage of its superior equipment and shops. After 1795, when the army school secured its own building and equipment, and especially after 1797 when its teaching staff was enlarged, the connection between the two schools became less direct although they were combined administratively for a short time, between 1803 and 1805.31 The assistants who helped the instructors were chosen from the best graduates of the school although on occasion expert persons coming from outside were appointed if they were able to pass special examinations and suitable school graduates were not available to fill them. Assistants who showed special ability and promise were promoted to be instructors when vacancies occurred, but most of them were sent to the three artillery corps as officers after serving four or five years in the school. While serving as assistants, they were required to continue their studies under the direction of those whom they assisted and had to pass periodic examinations in order to retain their posts and advance in the army hierarchy. During this time they also were given practical experience through special missions with the army in times of war, preparing batteries, mines, and the like, while securing the combat training they needed. Originally provision was made for forty students (Shakirdan), of whom ten were assigned to specialize in each of the four branches of the school: artillery, fortification, mine-laying and engineering. In 1798, the student body was doubled, with the students in a 2 0 - 1 0 - 3 0 - 2 0 ratio among the four specialties. Students

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usually entered between the ages of ten and twelve, although occasionally youths up to fifteen were admitted if they had previously served in one of the corps. Admission was allowed only as the result of special examinations administered by the school faculty under the supervision of the members of the Imperial Council and the Sheyh ul-Islam, and nepotism and favoritism were strictly prohibited. Students were divided into four one-year grades, with those of the first grade studying the lessons formerly given in the Sultan's engineering school: calligraphy, spelling, writing numbers, drawing, introduction to geometry, arithmetic, Arabic, and French. The second-year class studied arithmetic, geometry, and geography, in addition to continuing Arabic and French. In the third year, the students divided into separate classes for their specialties, and took common lessons in geography, plane trigonometry, algebra, surveying, the history of war, and recitation of the Koran. In the fourth and final year, in addition to the specialized lessons, common classes were given in conic mathematics, differential calculus, tangents, and astronomy. The students were given government salaries and rations which varied according to their class and distinction. They had to attend all class meetings and were subject to punishments ranging up to dismissal from the school for unexcused absences as well as for violations of the other regulations. Until 1801, they were given practical training in their specialties at training grounds near the school. After that time, this sort of training was given by their participation in the regular exercises of the cannon, mortar, and mine-laying corps. Students of the senior class were allowed to secure even more experience by accompanying the assistants when they left the school to perform special duties with the army.32 Until 1796, there were few textbooks available, and the students made their own by writing down the lectures of their instructors. After that time, a press was established at the school under the personal direction of Abdurrahman Efendi and it printed textbooks needed by the students as well as translations of technical books made by the various members of the staff. This became the principal press in Turkey until a new and larger one was begun in Usküdar four years later. 33

The "New Order" of Selirn III

From the time the school was established, its graduates who did not remain to teach or assist were assured of officers' positions in the cannon, mortar, and mine-laying corps. The engineers were required to continue their studies while serving in the corps, and from time to time they returned to the school for further training so that they would not fall behind the new developments in their arts. Although these men were required to remain near the regiments to which they were assigned, they were not subject to the strict marital regulations applied to the enlisted men. They also were allowed to live with their families if they were resident nearby and this did not interfere with their service to the corps.34 As far as can be made out, none of the foreign advisers and Turkish graduates of these schools were allowed to serve with the Janissaries. However, they did gradually take over most of the official posts in the Nizam-i Jedid army and the artillery corps and thus provided a nucleus of well-trained, modernist, and reformist officers to assist Selim and his successors in their efforts.35

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XII. Revival of the Ottoman Navy

With the heartland of the empire surrounded by water, with great forests able to provide wood and masts in abundance, with numerous fine ports on every coast, and with thousands of subjects whose lives and livelihoods were intimately tied to the sea, the Ottoman Empire had all the attributes needed for maritime greatness. In the sixteenth century, under the successive commands of Hayruddin Barbarossa and Turgut Reis, the Ottoman navy fully exploited these advantages, and Ottoman naval supremacy was accepted throughout the Mediterranean area. Even after the Battle of Lepanto, when the elements of decay which gnawed away the great institutions of Ottoman life also affected the navy, the Ottomans were still able to maintain at least a semblance of their old position in the eastern Mediterranean, if for no other reason than the similar decline of their traditional naval enemy, the Republic of Venice. It was only the long period of peace during the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century which left the Ottoman navy idle and led to its rapid disintegration in the years that followed. As was the case with the other institutions of the empire, decay in the navy began at the top, in this case the great Arsenal of Istanbul, which was its military, administrative, and financial center, as well as the source of most of its ships and their principal

anchorage. Negligence and corruption in its adminstration, when combined with the stifling effects of the half century of peace after 1718, reduced it to almost complete impotence by the end of the century. Most of its positions were held as sources of extra revenue by persons serving elsewhere in the government. Without the stimulus of active direction or military necessity, its officers were able to divert more and more of its resources to their own benefit. The few ships which were built and launched at this time, as well as all the older ships, were so stripped of essential maintenance and supplies that they often sank within a stone's throw of their docks. Without the addition of significant numbers of new ships, the forms and lines of the fleet remained little altered from those of the seventeenth century, completely ignoring the important changes which had been made in European shipbuilding since that time. The ships of the Ottoman fleet at the end of the eighteenth century were invariably massive and bulky, with excessively high poops, superstructures, and riggings, almost as wide as they were long, and with unusually deep drafts which denied them access to any but the deepest harbors. These ships were extremely difficult to maneuver in the ordinary course of sailing, let alone in battle, and were prone to capsize as the result of sudden movements by inexperienced hands during storms or battles. In addition the ships were structurally unsound: excessive distances between their principal beams caused them to break up entirely during violent storms; the use of soft wood, because of its finer appearance, and the failure to apply caulking regularly between the underwater planks caused them to be unusually porous and to ship water almost continuously. Nor were they better manned. Corruption, negligence, and inefficiency among their commanders were inevitable results of conditions in the Arsenal. The captains and other officers purchased their positions for profit and obtained it by depriving their men and ships of even the meager moneys which the Treasury provided for them. Needed repairs were avoided, and the men were often left without pay and adequate rations. Captains reduced the actual complements of their ships far below those established by law by failing to report deaths, by discharging many

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of their men at the most convenient ports, and by entering the names of nonexistent persons in their places in order to collect their salaries and rations. Even those few sailors who remained to man the ships were unable to perform their tasks adequately because of the ignorance and lack of ability of their officers. Since captains and other officers were picked according to the amount of money they could pay rather than according to their ability, they often had very little knowledge of the tasks they were supposed to perform. Few knew more than the most elementary essentials of seamanship and navigation. The Greeks and North Africans employed to guide the ships across the seas were themselves usually ignorant of anything more technical than what they acquired by practical experience in navigation. Often there was not a single man on board who could determine position and course by celestial readings. Even at the very end of the eighteenth century, there were many Ottoman ships that had to keep in sight of land in order to find their way. The erratic and disorganized maneuvers of the ships composing the squadrons of the fleet were inevitable causes of defeats, founderings, and abandonments. Few of the sailors were experienced or capable. The poor pay and conditions caused by corrupt captains led the best seamen to avoid service whenever they could. Most of the men recruited to sail the ships were inexperienced peasants and vagabonds impressed by force whenever the fleet was ready to leave. Many of them were the worst sorts of thieves, murderers, and ruffians, who were incapable of absorbing instruction and accepting discipline even if these had been applied as required. The consequent disorderliness of Ottoman crews was well known throughout the Mediterranean. Even in Istanbul itself, the concentration of more than a few ships in the harbor was sufficient reason for most of its inhabitants to close their shops and retire to their homes in fear of robbery and murder at the hands of the crews. Since the fleet, like the army, was disbanded and the men dispersed during the winter months, it was impossible for any sort of permanent, trained, and experienced body of sailors to be built up and maintained.1 Nor was this all. Conditions aboard ship were chaotic. Huge areas were set aside for the captains and chief officers, conse-

r v e "New Order" of Selim III

quently most of the men had to sleep on deck or in the hold. The officers and men were divided into many small food messes, each of which kept and cooked its own food and maintained its own kitchens and dining areas for this purpose. The ships were therefore filled with small shacks along all the decks and corridors set aside for this purpose, as well as with shops maintained by private merchants who sold articles to the men. Little effort was made to insulate the wooden beams of the ships from the stoves of the crews, and as a result more ships were lost as a result of internal fire than from any other cause. Crew members of various nationalities and religions formed themselves into violently hostile groups whose efforts to settle grievances and arguments by organized actions often left their ships in utter anarchy. In addition, as in the army, each ship was armed with a miscellaneous assortment of cannons of various dimensions and calibers requiring shot and powder of different sizes and quantities, and the effort to match cannon and shot often consumed the bulk of the men's energies during the course of their battles. Often the guns were placed on the decks with no regard at all for their weight and effect on the ship's sailing qualities and stability, and frequent groundings and capsizings resulted from this fact alone.2 In sum, neglect and corruption, incapable officers and men, poorly designed and built ships, and disorder and anarchy aboard them caused the Ottoman fleet in every way to mirror the internal condition of the empire which it was intended to defend. Eighteenth-century Naval Reforms. Selim was not the first eighteenth-century Ottoman monarch to make an attempt to correct the situation. The disastrous defeat at Cheshme (1770), in which almost the entire Ottoman fleet was destroyed by a small Russian squadron sent to the Mediterranean from its base in the Baltic, had stimulated a series of naval reforms directed by the only genuine Ottoman hero to emerge from that affair, Gazi Hasan Pasha, who served as Grand Admiral of the fleet during most of the subsequent years until shortly after Selim's accession.3 Efforts were made to correct the principal causes of decay. Under the guidance of two French naval architects, LeRoy and Durest,4 new ships were built on modern lines. Inefficient and absentee captains were summarily dismissed. Action was taken

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to establish a corps of regular, salaried, disciplined, and trained sailors, and barracks were built for them at the Arsenal. The impressment of inexperienced ruffians and vagabonds was restricted although not entirely eliminated. In 1773, the Grand Vezir, Halil Hamid Pasha, assigned Baron de Tott, an English convert, Campbell Mustafa Agha, and a Frenchman, Karmoran, to set up a new mathematics school (Mekteb-i Riyaziye) at Okmeydan to provide technical training to younger naval officers.5 In 1776, this developed into an engineering school (Hendese Odasi), which was located in the Arsenal, with one instructor, two assistants, and ten students. The first instructor was Gazi Hasan Pasha himself. In 1783, it was given a new building next to the Jamialti mosque and expanded into a full-fledged naval engineering school with foreign and native teachers instructing officers and potential officers of the fleet in the sciences and techniques of their trade.6 As a result of these efforts, some advances were made. In 1784, the Ottoman fleet had twenty-two ships of the line and fifteen frigates, of which only nine were considered to be in poor condition by a French observer of the time.7 These physical improvements were not accompanied by a similar improvement in the men appointed to serve the ships, however. Only a small number of officers attended the new schools. Appointments continued to be made in return for bribes and in disregard of ability despite all the efforts of the Grand Admiral. Conditions aboard the ships remained about as bad as they had ever been, and the few able officers trained by Hasan Pasha were frustrated and driven to despair by their complete inability to alter the situation. Gazi Hasan Pasha himself by now had become old and, according to the historian Asim, had built up a large fortune for himself by accepting bribes in return for appointments, thus returning to the practices he had earlier attempted to end. How much the fleet had declined was aptly demonstrated by its fate in 1791 at the hands of a Russian Black Sea fleet which itself was newly created and hampered by similar conditions, although on a smaller scale. In 1789, Gazi Hasan Pasha was replaced by Giritli Hiiseyin Pasha, but the demands of war and the ineptitude of the entire officer corps gave little opportunity for change. With the end of

The "New Order" of Selim III

the war, however, Hiiseyin was replaced as Grand Admiral by the far more energetic Küchük Hüseyin Pasha.8 With the assistance of the Sultan's boyhood companion and private envoy to France, Ishak Bey,9 he managed to push through a series of radical and far-reaching reforms in the Arsenal, the fleet, and the system by which officers and men were appointed and educated, all of which completely revolutionized the fleet in a way that Selim was never able to do with his land forces. In late 1791, Selim ordered that only able men be appointed as captains and that their salaries be increased to compensate them more fully for their responsibilities and end the need for bribery. Then starting in July 1792, a series of decrees was issued which entirely reorganized the naval service. To attract and retain knowledgeable officers of high quality, a regular hierarchy was established, with appointments and promotions based on experience and ability rather than bribery and nepotism. When vacancies occurred in senior posts, promotions were given to the officers holding those posts immediately below them in the hierarchy, the post of admiral going to the vice admiral (Patrone), the post of vice admiral to the commander of the port of Istanbul (Liman Reisi), the post of port commander to the rear admiral (Riyale), and so on down the line. The salaries of officers and men alike were doubled. In addition the previous practice of lowering the officers' salaries to almost nothing while they were in port was changed to payment of a sum equal to one-half their salaries when they were on active duty. Pensions equal to one-third their active-duty salaries were provided for those who retired because of old age, and to one-half or more if they retired because of service-acquired disability.10 Regulations were introduced in order to prevent the captains from using the food and equipment assigned to their ships for their own profit. Each captain had to give detailed receipts to the Arsenal and port commander for all food and equipment on board before every cruise. The men and officers were required to sign statements for everything used or lost during the voyage, at the end of which the vessel was examined once again, and the captains were required to pay personally for anything which was not accounted for in some way. The captains were admonished to do

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all they could to prevent the loss and waste of supplies and to make sure that the men received all the food and salaries they were entitled to; bonuses were provided for anyone who reported violations. Important reforms were also made in the supply of food to the ships. The numerous kitchens and stoves which had cluttered Ottoman ships for generations were replaced by central kitchens and dining quarters, with cooks paid by the Treasury and common meals served at regular hours. The old practice of delivering the rations for each voyage to the men in their own homes in advance of sailing was also abandoned, and all food was delivered to the captains, who were solely responsible for its distribution during the course of each cruise under the regulations mentioned above. Iron plates were affixed to the inner sides of the ships where the common galley stoves were located in order to lessen the danger of fire.11 Once the matters of equipment and supply were settled, Hiiseyin Pasha was able to turn to the systems of recruitment and training of sailors, which were reorganized in a series of regulations issued during January and February 1793.12 The Treasury had always supported a small group of regular professional sailors, but by this time all of these positions were held for purposes of income alone by persons unwilling to perform service in return. Now they were inspected, and within a year almost all of them were dismissed and replaced by youths enlisting for life terms in the navy. A strong effort now was made to develop the sailors into a professional and permanent group serving the navy in winter and summer alike. To man this corps, a kind of conscription was restored to the Aegean coastal provinces traditionally included within the sphere of the navy. All the men living in these areas who were experienced at sea, whether as fishermen, merchant sailors, or navy men, were registered in a special survey carried out by the census department. Three thousand of them were conscripted for immediate service in the navy on a salaried basis. They were required to remain at their barracks in the Arsenal at all times and to accept whatever training, discipline, and duties were imposed on them. No more than one sailor could be taken from a single family without its consent. Conscripted men were

The "New Order" of Selim III

allowed to avoid service by hiring a substitute and paying a "substitute tax" (Kalyonju Bedeli) to the naval treasury. Half the wages of these men was paid them when their ships left Istanbul for the summer cruise. One quarter was paid immediately after their return in November, and the other quarter was kept from them until March, so that they would have enough money and food to sustain them through the entire winter season.13 Provisions were introduced for regular examinations of the men to rank and promote them according to ability. Those who merited promotion were allowed to rise to the ranks of officers. Revival of Ottoman Shipbuilding. Starting in the summer of 1793, efforts also were begun to modernize the Arsenal itself so that it could build the new ships which the fleet needed. Almost all the men serving in the Arsenal up to that time were dismissed, and salaries and conditions were improved enormously in order to attract the best artisans of Istanbul. As added inducements, they were allowed to continue their private work whenever they were not required at the Arsenal and to live at home with their families.14 At the same time, the work of shipbuilding at the Arsenal was reorganized on European lines under the direction of Jacques Balthasard Le Brun, a French naval architect who entered Ottoman service in June 1793, and his two associates, Jean Baptiste Benoit and Toussaint Petit. They did not return to France until 1804, having established a surprisingly modern naval establishment in Istanbul and trained a number of highly capable Ottoman naval architects to continue their work.15 Between 1792 and 1797, the construction and repair facilities at the Arsenal were modernized and enlarged, under Le Brun's guidance.16 The two old wooden drydocks previously in use, which were almost constantly in need of some sort of repair and rebuilding, were replaced by three permanent stone ones which were far superior in capacity, efficiency, and durability.17 Five new shipbuilding forms were constructed as well as a new drydock designed on the model of the drydock at Toulon.18 With the foreign experts virtually directing shipbuilding operations in the Arsenal of Istanbul, Hüseyin Pasha was free to devote his herculean energies to reviving the ruined Ottoman shipyards elsewhere in the empire.19 Arrangements were made to supply

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them regularly with oak, pine, iron, and other shipbuilding materials. 20 To secure these supplies in sufficient quality and quantity, the traditional Ottoman government efforts to obtain them at below-market prices were replaced by a system allowing the shipyard directors to purchase them as needed at the normal market rates. 21 French models were used for all new ships, and in addition, as time permitted, the older ships of the fleet which were still serviceable were remodeled along the same lines. The poops and superstructures were lightened and lowered considerably and the drafts were raised in order to improve the maneuverability of the ships, and copper plates were applied to the hulls of new and old ships alike to increase their maneuverability and speed.22 As a result of these efforts, forty-five modern fighting ships were built and launched between 1789 and 1798.23 These included three of the largest ships the Ottoman fleet ever had possessed, each forty-seven meters long and with three cannon decks, all built by Le Brun: the Selimiye, with 122 cannons and 1,200 men, launched in 1796,24 the Badi-i Nusret, with 82 cannons and 900 men, launched in 1797,25 and the Tavus-u Bahri, with the same complement, launched a year later. 26 The fleet increased in size from 17 ships of the line and 20 frigates and corvettes in 1796 to 20 ships of the line and 25 frigates a decade later, and with 2,156 cannons and 40,000 sailors and seagoing soldiers, it was able to compete with the fleets of Europe in a way that the Ottoman army was unable to do at that time.27 While reforms were carried out in the Arsenal and the fleet, important changes were also introduced in the Imperial Naval Engineering School at Hasköy. Previous to 1787, training here had been primarily in geometry and arithmetic. Practical seamanship and navigation had been taught the graduates only after they joined their ships and went to sea. Since no comparable infantry engineering school yet existed, the naval school also had to provide some training in the theory and practice of fortification and mine-laying for students preparing for the army, and this further limited its ability to meet the more practical needs of its naval students. 28 After 1786, the chief instructor of the school was Gelenbevi Ismail Efendi,29 who taught geometry, and

The "New Order" of Selim III

his only assistant was the supervisor of the school, Kasap Bashi zade Ibrahim Efendi, an expert in mathematics. 30 In addition there were three French naval officers who gave lessons in navigation and seamanship; most of their lectures, translated into Turkish, were printed by the French embassy press in Istanbul for the use of the students. 31 After the French experts were withdrawn in the middle of 1788, and especially until the war's end in 1792, the lack of qualified teachers caused Ismail Efendi and Ibrahim Efendi to use their best students as instructors, teaching them three days a week and sending them to teach the rest of the students what they had learned every Tuesday and Friday. During the war the naval school continued to emphasize mathematics and geometry. It was only in 1792 that special lessons in seamanship and navigation were introduced for those planning to enter active sea service; but even then, the students received most of their training in these subjects only after they went to sea. There was no training in naval architecture at the school; this was handled entirely through the apprentice system by Le Brun and his associates in the Arsenal. It was not until the establishment of the army engineering school in 1793 and the consequent transfer of the mine-laying and fortification classes to it that the naval school was able to expand its curriculum to include these more practical naval subjects. At the same time, Le Brun began to appeal strongly for the establishment of a regular division of naval architecture in the school so that the students could secure a more systematic and complete education than was possible at the Arsenal and also so his own staff would be released for its primary duty, that of shipbuilding. As a result of his recommendation and the generally felt need for changes in the school's curriculum, it was given an entirely new building in the Arsenal in 1795, and a year later it was reorganized, with two distinct divisions established to meet the needs of the students. The navigation division (Fenn-i Derya ve Jugrafya) was devoted to navigation, geography, and cartography, and a new construction (Inshaiye) division was established with Le Brun as chief instructor, assisted by two of his Turkish pupils.32 Ten students were enrolled in the construction division and twenty in the navigation division, with students attending classes from

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nine in the morning until sunset daily except Friday and Sunday. Both divisions first met in common classes for their arithmetic and geometry lessons, and they then split into specialized sections for the remainder of the day. On Fridays the navigation students were required to go to the shipyards for observation and practical training, and on Mondays and Thursdays they went to the army engineering school for lessons with its newer and much superior equipment. In addition to the regular teachers, the navigation section also employed a few ship captains, who came on special occasions to give students and teachers alike the benefit of their experience. In 1796, a group of twenty apprentices was established to provide servants for the teachers while preparing the youths involved for entry into the school as vacancies occurred.33 After that time, no one could become a student without first serving at least a year as an apprentice. Although continuous records of the school are not extant, there are enough references in other sources to indicate that it operated successfully through the crisis of the French expedition to Egypt, and was in operation when Selim was deposed. In 1805, Osman Efendi was its chief instructor, and it had forty regularly enrolled students, of whom twenty-four were present at the school and sixteen were with the fleet. The course apparently was for three years, and the students in their senior year were allowed to serve as apprentices on naval ships if they could find captains willing to take them. At the same time, there were twelve students in the architectural section studying four-year courses.34

Naval

Reorganization

With the rapid development of the navy and its schools during the decade following the Peace of Jassy, the relatively simple organization established in 1795 became inadequate to the increasingly complex tasks of administration which arose. The original failure to define and distinguish the responsibilities and authorities of the Grand Admiral and the chief of the Arsenal led to continuous disputes, which began to disrupt the efficiency and proper development of the entire naval service.35 To resolve these problems, a series of regulations were issued between November

The "New Order" of Selim III

1804 and May 1805, by which the navy was almost completely reorganized and a ministry of the navy was established for the first time.36 The post of chief of the Arsenal was abolished and replaced by a new Umur-u Bahriye Naziri (Superintendent of naval affairs). For the first time, the Admiralty was given its own independent treasury (Tersane Hazinesi), with revenues assigned to it from the Jizye (poll tax) collected from non-Muslim subjects, the Avariz (household tax), the naval substitution tax paid by naval conscripts wishing to avoid service, and from the Nizam-i Jedid treasury. 37 The director of the Arsenal treasury (Tersane Hazinesi Defterdari) was also given the position of third treasurer (Shikk-i Salis) of the Imperial Treasury to provide him with rank and revenues in the Ottoman hierarchy, thus placing him immediately after the director of the Irad-i Jedid treasury, who retained the rank of second treasurer. 38 In addition to the regular taxes set aside for the navy treasury, it was also given a number of tax forms as well as all the fiefs previously given to naval officers, and it was ordered to farm them out to the highest bidders to secure further revenues for its operations. As in the case of the Irad-i Jedid holdings of the same kind,39 the naval treasury was required to pay the Imperial Treasury the regular purchase price of the tax farms, equal to five times their average annual profit to the tax farmers. Aside from his financial duties, the director of the Arsenal treasury also was in charge of enrolling and conscripting the men subject to service in the fleet and of collecting the substitution taxes from those wishing to evade this service. The Mediterranean and Aegean Islands, which traditionally had been held as fiefs by the Grand Admiral to provide the fleet with men and revenues, now were administered jointly by the Treasurer and the Grand Admiral, who were admonished to act justly and avoid any sort of misrule. While sharing responsibility and authority, the Grand Admiral was primarily responsible for administering the islands and the Treasurer concentrated on recruiting and taxcollecting. The naval treasury was given a separate building in the Imperial Palace and was required to use its funds to meet all ex-

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penses of the Arsenal, the construction and repair of ships, the wages and rations of the sailors and artisans, and the ammunition and other supplies needed by the ships of the fleet. All supplies had to be purchased at the market price and in cash, and various checks and balances were introduced to prevent corruption in the process. The minister and treasurer of the navy were required to follow complicated legal channels before they could make any major purchases. They had to send special agents to the markets to determine the current prices of every article they wanted and then send lists of articles and prices to the Porte for approval before the actual purchases could be made. At the end of each year, detailed registers were drawn up of all the ships built, the materials and supplies used in them, and the wages paid out. To assist the minister, he was given an executive assistant called Kalyonlar Katibi (naval scribe), who was not a treasury scribe but a member of the Imperial Council with previous scribal training. Thus it was a major political post which had to be filled by someone with rank in the Ottoman hierarchy. He was appointed for a term of three years, without payment of fees or bribes, so that he would not be tempted to use his position for personal gain or profit. For all practical purposes naval affairs were divided into two separate but interdependent divisions, military and administrative. The organization, arrangement, equipment, and training of the fleet in peace and war, command and direction of naval maneuvers and tactics, the organization, assignment and disciplining of all captains, officers, and men, and the maintenance and administration of all ships, were primarily assigned to the Grand Admiral, with the minister of naval affairs having supervisory powers at most. However, the minister of naval affairs was appointed Lieutenant (Vekil) to the Grand Admiral so that whenever the Grand Admiral was absent from Istanbul on naval duty, the minister had to take over his duties. All matters concerned with provisions, supplies, and weapons of the Arsenal and fleet, the food, rations, and salaries of officers and men, the acquisition of grains and other supplies, the manufacture and distribution of ammunition, and the collection and

The "New Order" ofSelim

III

expenditure of all Arsenal and fleet revenues were assigned to the minister of naval affairs, acting as, or through, a director of the naval treasury. In addition to these administrative and financial duties, he was also responsible for supervising and managing the building and repair of ships in all the shipyards of the empire, in Istanbul and elsewhere. In addition, detailed regulations were issued concerning the officers and men of the fleet, and their enrollment, promotion, training, wages, and rations. A strict hierarchy of rank was established. In the first rank of officers below each ship captain were his executive officer (Reis-i Evvel), artillery chief (Ser Topi-i Kalyon), and chief scribe and instructor (Bash Hoja). The second group of officers included the executive assistant (Reis-i Sani) and the chief sailmaker (Bad Bani-i Kalyon). The lower officers were placed in similar groups. Three-decker ships were staffed with 370 officers of various ranks, including the carpenters and caulkers, who, as already noted, were given officers' rank under the new regulations. Smaller galleons with fewer than 55 cannons were given 242 officers. Frigates had 163, and corvettes 116, officers, with lesser numbers assigned to smaller ships. Seamen were supposed to be enrolled only from among ablebodied men with sea experience, and they came mainly from the Greek Islands and from the area surrounding the capital. Efforts also were made to send graduates of the naval schools aboard ships as instructors to train both officers and men. Three instructors were carried on the largest ships. One would serve as chief instructor, caring for the captain's correspondence and the ship's accounts, keeping and using the signal flags, and keeping registers of the men and supplies aboard together with their disposition. The second instructor was in charge of the cooking and distribution of meals, along with the accounts of the food stocks and their use. The third instructor kept the ship's log of daily events. All the instructors also held daily classes for the officers and men, and the captains were required to educate them in the more practical aspects of seamanship and navigation. One or two instructors were assigned to each of the smaller ships, according to need and the desires of the captain. The entire force of officers and men was formed into a strict

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hierarchy, with promotions based almost entirely on seniority. Salaries were raised considerably over the amounts set in 1795, and the captains' salaries in port were increased from one-half to two-thirds of their active campaign pay. When the post of vice-admiral of the Imperial fleet (Kapudane-i Hümayun) was vacated, the commander of the port of Istanbul was supposed to fill it, and everyone else moved up one notch. When there was a vacancy among the captains, it was supposed to be filled by the executive officer (Bash Reis) on the same ship, with preference given to the former if they came out equally well in their examinations. When the post of Bash Reis was vacated, it could be filled either by the second or third Reis or by an expert sailor in the same crew, whichever man did best in the examination. Only if none of these proved capable of filling the post in question, could officers and men on other ships be considered. While the fleet was in port, an officer called Lonja Bashi (club chief) were appointed to make sure that its officers and sailors were properly dressed at all times and to prevent persons not in the fleet from claiming its rights and privileges.40 In addition, a regular corps of enlisted salaried naval riflemen was established on the model of the Nizam-i Jedid corps to serve on the ships of the fleet as marines. In previous campaigns, such men had been assigned from the regular land corps, and in particular from the Nizam-i Jedid army, but they had proven to be unsuitable for regular sea service because of their unfamiliarity with its special conditions and needs. The new naval rifle corps was given organization, discipline, and training very similar to those of the Nizam-i Jedid army, but changes were made so that they could fit in with the existing naval organization and the unique conditions at sea. A corps of 1,000 men was established in two regiments of 500 men and officers each. The chief officer of the corps was called the Tiifenkji Kapudani (rifle captain), with each regiment commanded by two of his assistants (Tiifenkji Kapudani Milläzimi) and divided into ten companies of 45 men each. All men who entered the corps had to serve first as ordinary riflemen, and they were allowed to rise through the ranks after demonstrating their ability through service and examinations. The wages and salaries of the corps were the same as those provided

The "New Order" ofSelim III

in the Nizam-i Jedid corps. These men and officers were also trained in the regular naval skills of seamanship and navigation so they could handle their ships when required. As a result, if they wished, they were allowed to transfer to the active branch of naval service and to rise as high as they could.41 Efforts were also made to improve naval medicine. In the past, so-called doctors had been hired to accompany the ships and do what they could for the men, but few of them had any training in medicine, and they knew nothing aside from what they could learn from experience. In general their efforts were of little value, and once a man was wounded, there was little chance of his recovering. In 1806, a full-fledged medical school was established at the Arsenal. A chief doctor (Hekim Bashi) and chief surgeon (Jerrah Bashi/Ser Jerrah) were appointed to direct the education of doctors and surgeons and their assignment and service with the fleet.42 Students were taken into the hospital for the first time in late 1806, with the hope that they would be trained in sufficient numbers so that each ship could be given at least one doctor and one surgeon. Students there were given training in both medicine and surgery. In their third year, they were supposed to be sent out with the fleet to obtain experience under fire and to assist the regular ships doctors. Students were required to serve the state at least four years after graduation in order to pay back the cost of their education. If they chose to enter private practice after completing their terms of service, the chief doctors and surgeons supplied them with diplomas (ijaze), indicating the length of their training and service, and these were confirmed by special decrees of the Imperial Council issued upon application by the minister of the navy. European medical books were translated into Turkish by members of the staff. Instruments and books were purchased for the school from Europe with the assistance of the various European embassies in the capital, and a number of European medical journals were secured for its library. Each of the medical students was required to serve at least one day and night per week in the public hospital (Bimarhane) of Istanbul as well as in the Arsenal hospital. A special hospital was built in an isolated section of the Arsenal to be used for treating infectious diseases, in particular

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for persons suffering from the plague. Thus for the first time the idea of quarantine penetrated into a land which had accepted the plague almost without question for centuries. Prisoners who died in the Arsenal jail were turned over to the medical students for their anatomy lessons and experiments although this was kept very secret so as not to antagonize the more orthodox elements of the community. Surgical instruments and medicines were now regularly supplied to each ship so that the doctors and surgeons would have sufficient equipment for their work. In this way a regular state medical service based on modern principles and methods was introduced into Turkey. Once again, basic reform entered the Ottoman system through the military although in this case it was the navy which led rather than the army. Since the medical reforms were legislated in 1805 and begun in 1806, only a start had been made before Selim's deposition brought them to a sudden halt. By the summer of 1807, there were no more than two doctors and six students comprising the staff of the uncompleted Arsenal hospital.43 Yet this was an important beginning, and a nucleus of doctors and medical students was left for a renewal of the effort in subsequent reigns.

The "New Order" of Selim III

XIII. Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

Selim III was a true heir of the eighteenth-century Ottoman reformers in devoting most of his attention and energy to military reform. There is little to show that he or his advisers understood how much the technological reforms of Europe were themselves the product of the social, economic, and political revolutions which had been going on since the Reformation, and how they could not be successfully applied in the Ottoman Empire except in the context of the economic, social, and political development which had produced them. Nowhere was this more evident than in the attempts at administrative reform. The anarchy within the Ottoman adminstration at the end of the eighteenth century, reflected so often in military dissolution, need not be described again. Bribery, corruption, nepotism, negligence, venality, and cruelty, all were endemic to the Ottoman system. Few officials thought of their positions as anything other than means for personal profit at the expense of state and subjects alike. Even more serious, the central government had almost no control at all over the expenditure of its funds. There was no central budget in the modern sense. Traditionally in the Ottoman fiscal system each government department and bureau was assigned specific Treasury revenues to spend as it saw fit. If these were not

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sufficient, the department directors were able to issue promissory notes obligating the Treasury to pay back whatever they borrowed to meet expenses in addition to the customary ones and, of course, to fill their own pockets. The traditional means by which the fiscal activities of each department were checked within the Treasury had broken down. The Treasury and Imperial Council had no effective control over the issuance of these promissory notes, but they still had to pay for them. There was no effort at all to draw up a budget of revenues at the beginning of each year and to allocate expenditures according to means. There was no one who knew what the total revenues and expenditures of the government were. Government officials had always been relatively independent in their posts according to the dictates of the Ottoman concept of "hadd,"1 and so long as they had been bound by the moral and religious codes of the Ottoman ruling class, this independence had never become license. But now they were bound by nothing except their own greed, which was limitless in most cases. And of course this sort of disorganization and anarchy at the center had weakened central control over the provinces, over both the Ottoman provincial officials and the local notables, who had taken advantage of central weakness to interpose effectively between the government and the people.2 Selim's response to these conditions in no way equaled his military reforms, either in intensity or in success. In 1793, his principal administrative reform was introduced, an attempt to restore the corps of ministers (sing, vezir, pi. vüzerä), the highest-ranked administrative officers of state, who occupied the principal government positions.3 In 1797, efforts were made to equalize the revenues available to the various officials holding the rank of vezir. Most of them secured most of their revenues by serving as provincial governors, holding their provinces as tax farms, delivering a fixed annual amount of tax revenue to the Treasury, and keeping the balance of their tax collections as profit for themselves. Ordinarily, vezirs served as governors of the twenty-eight provinces of the empire: Egypt, Damascus, Baghdad, Basra, Shehrizor, Aleppo, Karaman, Rakka, Diyarbekir, Adana, Sidon, Mosul, Anatolia, Trebizond, Erzurum, Childir, Van, Kars, Marash, Sivas, Jidda, Tripoli of

The "New Order" of Selim III

Syria, Crete, Rumelia, Serbia, Bosnia, the Morea, and the Aegean Islands. However, Kars, Marash, and Adana at this time were relatively poor provinces, which could not produce sufficient revenues to support separate vezirs. Mosul was traditionally given to whoever was governor of Tripoli, and the provinces of Shehrizor and Basra were reserved for the governor of Baghdad. Moreover, much of the land belonging to the provinces of Belgrade and Vidin had been lost to the enemy in the last war, so these positions too were no longer sufficient for vezirs. This left only twenty regular provinces still producing enough revenue for a uezir-governor to maintain himself and his suite. By Selim's time, however, there were over thirty-five men having the rank of vezir. So that they would be satisfied, they were given jobs ordinarily going to persons with the next lower administrative rank of beylerbey, and so on down the line, the general administrative hierarchy thus being upset. Selim's solution was to order the number of vezirs drastically cut—no more than twenty-three vezirs were allowed at one time, with three of them serving the Sultan as Grand Vezir and subordinates and the remaining twenty serving as governors. No vezir thereafter was to be allowed to hold any job not specifically set aside for a person of his rank, and care was to be taken that only experienced and intelligent persons were appointed as vezirs, preferably those who had demonstrated their merit by previous service in lower ranks. 4 Detailed regulations were issued to reorganize fees and payments required from officials in return for their appointments and the profits received from their positions. The principal gifts of this kind by Selim's time were the Yilhk-i Hümayun (annual Imperial payment), given by most officials to the Sultan and members of his family every year at the beginning of Ramazan, Idiye (holiday) payments given by subordinates to superiors in the bureau of the Treasury and the Grand Vezir's office at the same time, and Iftariye gifts of watches provided for members of the Ulema by the Grand Vezir shortly before the close of Ramazan each year. The multiplicity of gifts which each official was obliged to provide proved to be an extremely heavy burden far beyond the ability of their regular salaries to satisfy, and so they were

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forced to use their positions for personal profit, even in cases where they did not wish to do so.5 Selim hoped that by regulating and limiting these gifts, he would relieve his officials of the necessity and desire to steal and thus provide the key to restoring equilibrium and order to the traditional administrative system. In 1795, the gifts in kind were abolished and replaced by established cash sums, which were raised or lowered according to the annual revenues of each official. The annual Imperial payments were now required only from offiicials who could afford them and then only on a very restricted basis.6 Efforts also were made to increase the power and prestige of the provincial governors (vali) so that they would be much better able to resist the efforts of the local notables to gain independence from Ottoman authority and carry out their obligations and duties. To accomplish this, Selim ordered that their terms be increased from one to three or five years. During a term they could not be dismissed unless they were convicted of crimes connected with their official activities. In addition Selim provided that if provincial governors were found to have ruled well, their terms could be extended indefinitely so that state and subjects alike would benefit from continuity and good rule. The Sultan also issued various regulations to lessen the burden imposed on his subjects by officials traveling through the empire. Every official had the right to impose the cost of his food and lodging on the inhabitants of the villages through which he passed. The empire was filled with governors and their assistants moving back and forth, using this right as a means of inflicting heavy charges on the hapless people living along their routes. Selim hoped that this source of tyranny might be eliminated by strictly defining the charges which could be levied and by reducing the number of officials traveling on official business. In late 1796, he instituted the first part of this program by decreeing that when governors were transferred to new positions, care should be taken that they be located close to their previous ones so they would have to travel as little as possible.7 All officials with the rank of vezir were divided into two great geographical services, those of Anatolia and Rumelia, and it was expressly stipulated that those in one service should not be transferred to

The "New Order" of Selim III

positions in the other without special approval. 8 The governors were strictly limited in the number of agents (milbashir) they could send through the provinces, but a failure to define specifically the fees each agent would charge nullified this reform in practice. 9 Nor were the operations of the central administrative and financial departments entirely ignored. Most of the normal administrative tasks of government, the reception and disposition of petitions, letters, and communications of various kinds, and the issuance of official decrees and statements had been concentrated in the scribal departments of the Imperial Council, directed by the Reis ul-Kuttab, under the traditional Ottoman system. But as the Council lost its importance during the eighteenth century, these departments had gradually been transferred to the authority of the Council of the Grand Vezir (Ikindi Divan), located at the Sublime Porte (Bab-ι Ali), which in response to its new position gradually assumed the name Bab-ι Asafi and became the principal administrative center of Ottoman government. 10 All of these reforms had been accomplished informally. Nothing had been done to alter the laws to correspond with the fact or to adjust the regulations of the Grand Vezir's office to include its new obligations and powers, and those of the Imperial Council to cover its losses. The result was administrative chaos, confused lines of authority, and an increasingly rapid decline of the Ottoman scribal standards, which had been maintained at a fairly high level until that time. It was only under Selim III that efforts were made to regulate and regularize the new system and, in particular, to establish regular channels of authority and lines of control in the greatly expanded Bab-ι Asafi administrative department of the Grand Vezir.11 Supreme executive authority in the expanded department was now given to his Lieutenant, the Kethiida-i Bab-i Asafi, who thus became in fact the administrative director of the central government, assisted by the Reis ul-Kuttab,12 The four departments now officially transferred from the Imperial Council to the Grand Vezir's office were: (a) the Amedi bureau, directed by the Amedji (Amedi Efendi), which was assigned to care for the records, correspondence, and decrees of the Grand Vezir, agree-

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ments and correspondence with foreign states and subjects as carried on by the Reis ul-Kuttab, and communications between the Imperial Council and the Sultan; 13 (b) the Beylikji or Divan Kalemi, directed by the Beylikji Efendi, which had the job of recording the deliberations and decisions of the Imperial Council, including its Mühimme registers, and the various firmans and decrees issued by the council;14 (c) the Rüus-i Hümayun department, which was in charge of recording the positions and tax farms held by all members of the ruling class except those with the rank or Vezir and Beylerbey and those holding fiefs;15 and (d) the Kise department, also called Nishan Kalemi and Tahvil Kalemi, which was in charge of recording possession and transfers of all fiefs held by officials of the Porte.16 The functions of these offices thus remained about the same as they always had been; but now their distinct duties were set down, and their interrelationships and their relations with their new superiors, and their internal regulations were revived, restated, and restored. The Imperial Council was left with only two bureaus of any consequence; the Teshrifat Kalemi, in charge of protocol, ceremonies, and rewards bestowed by the Sultan, 17 and the Vak'aniivis Kalemi, the office of the official state chronicler.18 Emphasis was also given to an improvement of the quality of the scribes and of their work in the bureaus of the Grand Vezir. During the last quarter of the century, the number of scribes, students, and apprentices in each department had expanded far beyond their original numerical limits and the number actually needed. Most of these posts had come to be filled by relatives and children of the older scribes, many of whom were entirely unqualified for them. In addition the general overcrowding of the existing office space left the departments in a state of anarchy. To end this sort of situation strict limits now were applied to the number of scribes, students, and apprentices who could be employed in each office and new high standards were imposed on the process by which they were selected. All new appointments were suspended for two years so that posts could be abolished as they became vacant until the original limits of each cadre were restored. During this time, no more than twelve new students could be appointed each year, of whom six were for the Divan

The "New Order" of Selim III

office, and three each for the Riius and Kise departments. Preference was given to applicants with previous experience, but examinations were required for all in place of the recommendations which had formerly enabled ministers and notables to get their own favorites and relatives enrolled. In 1797, the number of new students who could be enrolled each year was doubled to twentyfour because of an urgent need for them. Of these, twelve were assigned to the Divan offices each year and six each to the Riius and Kise departments. The section in charge of keeping the Mühimme registers of the Imperial Council was separated from the Beylikji department and made into an independent division, with fifteen scribes assigned to its service. Each of these was allowed one apprentice and one student appointed from among scribes who had performed previous service in other departments. The Mektubi bureau of the Amedi department, which cared for the Grand Vezir's correspondence, was limited to forty scribes and thirty apprentices and students, but children of members were allowed to serve as apprentices without regard to these limits. In the other parts of the Amedi department, the number of scribes was cut to six and total number of apprentices and students was also cut to six, all coming from service in the other departments of government. 19 New regulations were also introduced concerning the service and compensation of scribes and apprentices. Compensation was provided for most of them from fiefs still attached to their departments. 20 The administration of the fiefs was assigned to special agents appointed by the grand vezirs so that the scribes themselves would be entirely free to perform their duties at all times. 21 An effort also was made to restore the standards of scribal skill and calligraphy. Scribes were required to write the various documents and registers in the proper scripts and according to the traditional methods, with the traditional forms and phraseologies, and the new tendencies toward individualistic and careless writing and expression were sternly suppressed under threat of heavy penalties. Scribes were also cautioned time and again to make certain that the facts presented in petitions to the Imperial Council and the Grand Vezir were not incorporated intact into the resulting Imperial orders unless they were verified by investi-

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gation. They were also ordered to refuse bribes offered in return for the incorporation of such false information in official documents and to ascertain that they were within the powers and authority of their particular departments when they issued administrative decrees and regulations. 22 Ordinarily, vacated scribal posts were supposed to be given to the most qualified of the apprentices and students in the departments concerned, but Selim made various modifications in this rule in order to improve the morale of the scribes and make them much more amenable to his administrative reforms. Scribes were allowed to bequeath their posts and the attached fiefs to their sons if they were qualified and willing to perform their duties. Only if such heirs were not available were the posts in question declared vacant and awarded to students and apprentices. Those sons and heirs of dead scribes who were minors were not allowed to assume their fathers' posts and fiefs, but provisions were made for them to serve as assistants of fief-holders in Anatolia until they reached their majority and could become apprentices in their fathers' departments. 23 As a result of these efforts, the number of scribes, apprentices, and students serving in the offices of the Porte was reduced from over 200 in 1789 to 110 in the spring of 1798,24 and the efficiency and standards of the departments were improved enormously.25 Similar regulations were issued in the departments of the Treasury. The number of scribes, students, and apprentices serving in its various branches was reduced from 170 to 60, with strict entrance examinations and work regulations restoring a great deal of the Treasury's old standards and efficiency.26 Nothing was done to modernize its methods, however, and much of the work which was accomplished was offset by the creation of the new Irad-i Jedid treasury. Although it operated in a much more modern fashion, using European accounting principles and the like, and while it attracted many of the best scribes of the Imperial Treasury because of the higher salaries which it offered, the resulting duplication of effort and overlapping of authority, plus the failure to distinguish exactly between the revenues and expenditures assigned to each of the two treasuries, created new confusion and inefficiencies and doubled the opportunities for theft and misrule. 27

The "New Order" of Selim III

Economic and Social

Reforms

Selim's efforts to improve the chaotic state of Ottoman society followed closely the policies inaugurated in the years immediately after his accession.28 Periodic efforts were made to reduce the population of Istanbul and to force those without homes or jobs to return to the villages from which they had come.29 Decrees were issued closing taverns and coffeehouses, 30 prohibiting the construction of new hotels (han) to house transients, 31 and requiring persons to wear only the clothing allowed to them by their class and rank, 32 but this did little to calm the discontent. Efforts made to purify the Ulema and to substitute examinations in place of influence and bribes for appointments and promotions were largely unsuccessful. 33 Selim's economic and financial measures also imitated those adopted during the 1787-1792 war. Although the conclusion of peace removed the pressure of military expenditure upon the state Treasury, the tremendous expense of the Sultan's military reforms, combined with the rise of Balkan notables and bandits who not only cut off the Treasury's provincial revenues but also forced the Porte to spend large sums for annual expeditions against them, further increased the financial difficulties of the state and made it very difficult for the Sultan and his ministers to find sufficient money to run the government. In response to these difficulties all they could do was to increase taxes, debase coins, seize private property, and melt down gold and silver utensils (the tried and true Ottoman methods of financial survival), but these efforts had the same unfortunate results as before—economic disorder, inflation, famine, and chaos. The devaluation of coins and increase in foreign imports led to general price increases and a further flow of Ottoman precious metals abroad, thus increasing the economic difficulties. 34 The most concrete and successful of Selim's economic programs were those introduced to organize the provision of grain and coffee for the great cities of the empire. Recurrent shortages, beginning during the war and continuing sporadically thereafter, had been a principal cause of popular discontent, and had been used by the opponents of the Nizam-i Jedid to foment opposition to it. Now the previously unimportant position of supervisor of

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grains (Hububat Naziri) was raised in status so that its holder would have the power to enforce the new grain regulations introduced by the government. He was provided with the rank of Third Treasurer of the Imperial Treasury, so that he would not only have a place in the Ottoman hierarchy but also the authority needed to carry out his duties. The principal problem of the supervisor was to provide Istanbul with sufficient grain to feed all its inhabitants during the winter months. A combination of high seas, muddy roads, and piracy had made it increasingly difficult to bring grains to the capital from Egypt and Anatolia. The grains of the Principalities, formerly procured without difficulty, had been unobtainable since 1792. To solve the problem, large state granaries were now built in Istanbul so that grains still available from Anatolia could be brought into the city more easily for storage during the summer. Since private merchants in the past had used the slightest hints of shortages to raise prices, often withholding supplies from the famished population in order to increase their own profits, the provision and supply of grains in Istanbul was socialized under the direction of the supervisor of grains. He was given state funds totaling 125,000,000 piasters as capital to set himself up as the sole grain merchant in the capital, buying all grains from their producers at the current market prices, storing them in the various granaries put at his disposal, and selling them at fixed prices to the bakers and householders of the capital in summer and winter alike. In addition he was given absolute authority to enforce established retail prices for all bread and grain goods and to punish with death any merchants who violated these regulations. One of the duties of the department was supervising the bakers of the capital, checking on standards and prices of bread, and making sure that each loaf had the proper amount of flour and was not filled with straw and other waste materials. When necessary, the supervisor of grain was also authorized to purchase extra grains from the state granary, which received them as tax revenues and was ordinarily supposed to use them only for the rations given to various employees of the state. 35 Similar efforts were made to regulate the distribution of coffee. Merchants often had mixed grain with the coffee sold in the mar-

The "New Order" of Selim III

ket, and the tax farm monopolies held for the sale of coffee had been misused for the profit of the holders at the expense of the state Treasury and the consumer.36 Early in 1794, Mustafa Reshid, treasurer of the Irad-i Jedid, was appointed to investigate the entire problem, and his report was used as the basis of a new coffee regulation introduced in the spring of 1795.37 The most essential element of the new law was its abolition of the tax farm which controlled the coffee trade. No longer was the power of regulation to be held by a tax farmer who collected taxes from the coffee merchants and turned over only a portion of them to the state Treasury. Control of the entire coffee industry now was placed in the hands of a salaried Ottoman official, the Tahmis Emini, assisted by four of the most knowledgeable coffee experts available. He enforced standards of quality and price on all coffee producers and merchants in the empire and was specifically prohibited from collecting any sort of tax from them in return. Only the state roasting plant was allowed to levy specified charges on the coffee brought in by merchants for roasting and grinding, but these were considerably smaller than those applied by the tax farmers in former times. Strict regulations were introduced to prevent attempts to mix anything with the coffee before selling it to consumers, and inspectors were sent into the markets by the Tahmis Emini to make certain that these regulations were obeyed.38 Some efforts were also made to improve the position of the Ottoman Empire in international trade. In the past, almost all goods shipped into and out of the Empire were handled by foreign merchants in foreign ships. The Capitulations "rights" of foreign merchants in the Empire, originally granted as privileges by the powerful sixteenth-century sultans, had become means for them to ignore Ottoman laws and regulations entirely and thus acquire considerable advantages over those Ottoman subjects who attempted to compete with them. Those Ottomans who did try to participate in foreign trade, for the most part members of the non-Muslim minorities, had to acquire a competitive position either by obtaining foreign nationality from sympathetic European ambassadors or by acquiring European protection and thus becoming members of the ever-increasing "protected" (himayelu)

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class. Many Ottoman merchants acquired such protection by being appointed to the post of "translator" or to other positions in the foreign consulates since such employees, by definition, were included in the Capitulations rights. These appointees and their families were excused from all Ottoman taxes and were entitled to pay the same low customs duties charged foreigners under the various Capitulations treaties. Foreign consuls clearly abused this right by selling such appointments at considerable profit to Ottoman merchants wishing to escape the regulation and control of the Sultan's laws. Selim made strenuous efforts to curb these abuses. Starting in 1794, he ordered that foreign ambassadors should appoint no more translators and others than those actually needed, and that such persons who were not performing real service as prescribed by the Capitulations treaties should be subjected to all the laws and taxes to which they were liable by virtue of their Ottoman allegiance.39 In addition efforts were made to force foreign merchants to pay at least the three per cent customs tax on imports and exports required by the treaties and to eliminate the abuses which corrupt customs officials had brought into the system by charging considerably less than the legal customs rate and accepting bribes for themselves in return. 40 Restrictions were imposed on Ottoman subjects desiring to transfer to foreign nationality and protection.41 Efforts were also made to interest Ottomans in carrying on foreign trade. The Sultan encouraged wealthy officials to build and sail their own merchant ships in order to build up an Ottoman merchant fleet, and for the first time in over a century a few Ottoman trade ships began to make their appearance in the ports of the Mediterranean. 42 These economic regulations were almost entirely unsuccessful, however. Periodic shortages of grains and coffee, as well as price inflation, plagued Istanbul throughout Selim's reign. 43 The consequent price rises and famines contributed in large measure to the increasingly hostile attitude of the people toward his reforms. International trade continued in the hands of foreigners. Ottoman efforts to rationalize the Capitulations and reduce abuses in their administration were violently and successfully opposed by the European ambassadors and consuls, who saw in every

The "New Order" of Selim III

reform only a new attempt to reduce the profits which they and their proteges received from these abuses.44 The European representatives at the Porte thus began a policy which was to prevail during much of the nineteenth century despite idealistic sentiments for reform. They opposed really fundamental reforms because of the threats posed to their traditional privileges. Thus in many ways Europeans in the Empire became as strong defenders of their vested interests and opponents of real reforms as were the most reactionary members of the old Ottoman ruling classes.

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XIV. Window to the West

Most of Selim's military, administrative, financial, and economic reforms were at best only partially successful, but they were opening wedges and essential guides for the efforts of his successors. At the same time and perhaps even more meaningful and important in the long run was the concurrent introduction into the empire of an awareness of the West which had barely existed before his time. The iron curtain protecting the "Ottoman way," erected in an age of greatness and maintained in times of decay by a ruling class convinced of the superiority of its institutions over anything which could possibly be conceived in an infidel world, had effectively prevented the entry of the ideas and artifacts of the Renaissance and Reformation and the movements which they had spawned and encouraged in the West. But now this iron curtain was pierced on a large scale for the first time, although it still was not destroyed, and into the Ottoman world flowed not only the military and technical achievements of Europe but also many of the political, economic, and social ideas and institutions which had made possible those achievements— such as a recognition of the rights of the individual and of the duty of the state to protect and serve him, and the need to provide some means by which all classes of society might participate in their own government. To be sure, in a society long confined

within itself and based on a religion which provided a close-fitting cloak of protection for the traditions of the past, such an opening could at best have a very slight effect. Yet it laid the groundwork for more widespread and significant penetration in later years, when the real foundations of modern Turkey were laid. The channels through which knowledge of the West penetrated the East during the era of Selim III were many and varied. Different levels of Ottoman society were affected in different ways. Military Instruction. By far the most important of these channels was the process by which the military techniques and weapons of the West were introduced into the Ottoman Empire. Western languages and ways of thought, imparted to hundreds of young Ottomans enrolled in the new corps and schools, opened for them the whole scope of western civilization and broke down the confines and restrictions imposed by traditional Ottoman training as nothing else had ever done. Those whose training was limited to technical and military subjects were able to understand all aspects of European thought and achievements as no other Ottomans before them could. The principal agents of transmission in the military field were the European technical experts who came to the empire with the new weapons and ideas of the West. To be sure, there had always been western experts of this kind in the empire. Western renegades had taught the Ottomans how to use the cannons, rifles, and gunpowder which made possible the great Ottoman conquests in Europe and Asia. But during the eighteenth century, the culmination of centuries of internal decay in increasingly serious military defeats had led to a rapid increase in their military advisers. The Count de Bonneval and Baron de Tott were only the most conspicuous of these. In addition there were numerous unnamed Europeans who fled from the lands of their births for one reason or another and who assumed the identities and habits of the East so completely that their true origins will forever remain a mystery, although the evidences and results of their work are clear. But even the technical contribution of these men was strictly limited to their own years of service and to the individual Ottomans with whom they were in contact. Their influence extended little beyond the small corps which they created

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or served in and was usually wiped away after their departure. Furthermore they were almost invariably constrained to accept the dress and life of the society which they came to serve and were isolated from the mass of Ottoman society; hence their role in transmitting western culture and thought to traditionally educated Ottomans was negligible. It was only in Abd ul-Hamid I's later years and in particular under Selim III that such military technicians and instructors had a significant and widely felt effect on Ottoman society. Most of them now came to Turkey in groups in response to specific Ottoman requests to their governments for assistance of various kinds. They were no longer renegades absorbed into Ottoman society but salaried foreign advisers who were allowed to retain their own identities and uniforms and to have contacts far wider than those of their predecessors. The Porte invariably stipulated that these men be of high ability, character, and morals, and that they agree to remain in Ottoman service for at least three years. In the contracts issued early in Selim's reign, they were required to wear Ottoman uniforms and reside in buildings close to their places of work so as not to arouse the reactionaries, and they were warned to refrain from association with any Ottomans other than those they supervised or instructed. But these stipulations were largely ignored and were omitted entirely from the contracts issued after 1795. To secure foreign advisers of high quality, the Porte agreed to pay their travel expenses and to give them salaries and wages considerably higher than those paid Ottomans with the same ranks and duties. Technicians were given special servants and guards, and those who particularly pleased the Sultan were presented with huge bonuses on special occasions, making this service far more profitable than similar work in Europe. The individual technicians and their work have already been mentioned in the sections devoted to the military corps which they served. About six hundred foreign technicians were in the pay of the Porte at any one time. Of these approximately half came from France and the balance from England, Austria and Sweden. These men comprised the first western social group ever thrust into the midst of Ottoman society without special arrange-

The "New Order" of Selim III

ments designed to prevent their contact with the Ottomans. While the Sultan ordered them to live and work away from the populace, it was not long before they roamed the streets of the capital at will, frequenting its places of amusement and commerce, and in the process demonstrating western dress and behavior to all classes of Ottoman society, most of whom had never seen Europeans before and who had cultivated unspeakable images of life beyond the pale of Islam. 1 This is not to say that the appearance of these westerners in Ottoman society had an entirely beneficial effect on the cause of modernization of Turkey or that their contacts with Ottomans were uniformly influential and without incident. While many of them were experienced and experts in their trades and willing to do their jobs, many were not. Some were men who had failed in their own countries and who took advantage of unsuspecting and inexperienced Ottoman officials to present themselves as experts in fields of which they really knew nothing. Many came only for the financial rewards and chose to spend most of their time savoring the entertainments and enticements of Istanbul. The boisterous and rowdy behavior of a few of the European artisans and soldiers and their evident scorn for Muslims led to numerous clashes with the mobs of Istanbul and was hardly conducive to endearing the western way of life to those Ottomans who were unfortunate enough to encounter them. 2 Nor were the abler members of these foreign delegations as effective as they wished to be. Much of their work was of course undermined by negligent and incapable colleagues sent from Europe. But more than this, the limitations of the Ottoman outlook made it very difficult for even the most sincere Ottoman partisans of reform to accept or even comprehend what they had to say, and in many cases their instructions and advice were simply ignored. In addition there were many Ottomans who joined the reform movement only for the financial and political rewards offered by the Sultan, and who obstructed the technicians' efforts for their own personal advantage. The influence and positions of the technicians became closely attached to those of the politicians who arranged for their employment, and they and their work soon were involved in the complicated political

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rivalries of Selim's court. Each ambassador did all he could to complicate and nullify the work of his enemy's technicians, working through politicians favorable to his own cause. The inevitable consequence of all these factors was delay, frustration, and often defeat of the efforts of even the most sincere and expert foreign advisers, with promised equipment diverted to other uses and salaries and expense moneys delayed interminably.3 But at least in their contacts with individual Ottomans as well as in their instruction itself, the technicians certainly did have some effect. If nothing else, the stark contrast of continued Janissary and Spahi failure as opposed to the successful operations of the new corps when they were employed most certainly made many Ottomans much more amenable to change than they had been before. Rise of an Ottoman Press. An extremely important by-product of the military reforms introduced under Abd ul-Hamid I and Selim was the concurrent revival of a Turkish-language press. The first Turkish press in the Ottoman Empire, established by Ibrahim Müteferrika in 1725, had been used only sporadically after his death a few years later. Abd ul- Hamid I had revived it under the direction of the official historians, Vasif and Rashid, who purchased the remnants of Müteferrika's equipment and added machines and type purchased from the French embassy in Istanbul. But, soon after, Vasif went to Spain as ambassador and the press lapsed again into relative inactivity.4 Under Selim III, the old Müteferrika press was restored under the direction of Rashid Efendi, and it printed three military technical books by Vauban, translated into Turkish by Constantine Ipsilanti, for use as textbooks in the new technical schools.5 This press seems to have been too small to meet the demand, for when the engineering school was built in Hasköy in 1795, it was given a new press and funds for fifteen workers to operate it under the direction of Abdiirrahman Efendi. During the next seven years it printed eight large volumes, including Mahmud Raif Efendi's French-language description of Selim's reforms, Tableau des nouveaux reglements de I' empire ottoman. In the summer of 1802, the Mühendishane press was given an additional building with new equipment in Usküdar to print

The "New Order" of Selim III

books of general interest and technical books, both under the continued direction of Abdürrahman Edendi. The Imperial press remained at Usküdar until 1831, when it moved back to Istanbul by order of Sultan Mahmud II.6 These presses made an important contribution to transmitting knowledge of Europe to the Ottoman Empire. Their publication and diffusion of Turkish translations of western-language books made available to those who read only Turkish the mass of information which previously had been available only to the very few who had learned the languages of the West. Diplomatic Missions. While the military teachers and their presses provided important windows to the West for upper- and lower-class Ottomans alike, the various channels of diplomacy also made their contribution in this respect, although in a more limited way. The principal agents of this sort of transmission were the Sultan's representatives sent to the important capitals of Europe, and those of the various European powers stationed at the Porte. Throughout the centuries of Ottoman greatness and decay, no permanent Ottoman embassies were established in Europe since it was felt that nothing could be learned from the infidels of the West and that it was for the inferior monarchs of Europe to petition for the Sultan's favor through their representatives at the Porte. Special Ottoman missions were sent to European capitals but only for limited times to accomplish specific purposes, principally to sign trade agreements and, more and more frequently during the eighteenth century, treaties of peace ceding territories and making other concessions to the victorious powers of Europe. In general the Ottomans who were sent on these missions were neither qualified nor motivated to go beyond their instructions and observe the lands through which they passed. Only a few of them submitted any reports at all, and these for the most part went little beyond descriptions of the ceremonials and negotiations participated in during their trips. But there were some exceptions. In 1664, Kara Mehmed Pasha, a member of the Bostanji corps, was sent to Vienna with a suite of almost a hundred and fifty persons, and his short description of that imperial capital was the

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first work of any kind to give the leaders of the Porte a look at western life.7 In 1720, Second Treasurer Ibrahim Pasha provided a similar short description of the same city on his return from negotiations there in connection with the execution of the Treaty of Passarowitz. 8 In the same year, Yirmisekiz Chelebi Mehmed Faiz Efendi was sent to Paris as special Ottoman ambassador to the court of Louis XIV and, after a stay of two years, submitted to his master a long and detailed report describing life not only in the French capital, but also in several other French cities which he visited, by far the most important and detailed report of this kind received by the Porte until the time of Selim III.9 In 1754 and again in 1764, the scribe of the Silähdar corps, Mehmed Dervish Efendi, was sent as Ottoman plenipotentiary to Saint Petersburg, and his reports gave a great deal of detail on the Russian modernization program then in progress.10 Ahmed Resmi submitted two reports of this kind, one describing Vienna during his sojourn there in 1757-58 and the other depicting Berlin in great detail, as a result of his mission to the Prussian court in 1764." Mehmed Nahifi Efendi a member of the mission sent to Saint Petersburg in 1772 to negotiate the peace treaty signed two years later at Küchük Kaynarji, provided the Sultan with another account of the things he saw in Catherine's capital, as well as of the negotiations themselves. 12 None of these reports are of great value by our standards; many of them are more interesting for what they did not include than for what they did. Yet they did provide the sultans and those around them with some notion of the technical and moral achievements of the West and they were, in the absence of anything better, means of making some breaks in the wall of Ottoman isolation. For the most part, however, the sultans had to rely on the European ambassadors and others resident in Istanbul for regular reports of events and conditions in Europe. Since each ambassador naturally limited and distorted the news so as to favor the prestige and position of his own country, the sultans and their ministers remained by far the most poorly informed of any European rulers concerning events and conditions outside their own domains. By Selim's time, the conditions which made possible such

The "New Order" of Selim III

ignorance were changing so rapidly that progress would probably have been made even if the Sultan had not been especially eager to learn about Europe. The Ottoman government was now becoming intimately involved with European powers by military alliance. It was seeking their technical and financial assistance on a large scale. It was maneuvering for position among them. This hardly fitted in with the old picture of a Porte content to wait for foreigners to come and beg favors. The Porte now required a knowledge of European affairs far more regular, detailed, and objective than that which seemingly had sufficed before. When added to Selim's desire to learn of European life and technical accomplishments, reform of the Ottoman diplomatic service was inevitable, and in 1793 it was decided to establish permanent Ottoman legations in the important capitals of Europe as soon as possible. It would seem that Paris should have been the most natural choice for the first Ottoman embassy. Selim had always been most favorable to France, and he hoped that it would provide most of the technical assistance that he wanted. Europe was now embroiled in the opening stages of the wars of the French Revolution, however, and while Selim was most anxious to receive technicians from revolutionary France, he was quite unhappy about the fate of the French king with whom he had corresponded so hopefully only a few years before. Moreover France was in mortal combat with most of the royal powers of Europe, who hoped to stamp out the "contagion" of democracy before it could spread. The new regime had been outlawed, and no one had yet officially recognized it. An Ottoman embassy to Paris at this time would most certainly have involved official recognition, and Selim did not wish to recognize the new government until a precedent had been established by another great European power. So France was ignored at the start.13 Likewise Selim did not wish to honor the court at Saint Petersburg with one of his representatives because of the bitterness engendered by the recent war and various disputes which had arisen over the execution of the Treaty of Jassy.14 So it was that in 1793 the first permanent Ottoman legation was established at the Court of St. James, a traditional and

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important friend, second only to France in the Sultan's eyes. As his first ambassador to London, Selim appointed Yusuf Agäh Efendi, a member of the Ottoman scribal class, who previously had served as chief scribe of the Grand Vezir and then of the naval Arsenal. 15 To assist him a young scribe in the offices of the Grand Vezir named Mahmud Raif Efendi was appointed as first secretary, 16 along with several Christian translators appointed to help them in a land of whose language neither man had more than an elementary command. For two years, this was the only permanent Ottoman embassy in Europe. Then in April 1795, a decision was made to extend Ottoman representation to the two courts of Germany, with Ibrahim Afif Efendi, scribe of the Lieutenant of the Grand Vezir, appointed as ambassador to Vienna, and Morali Ali Efendi, Kisedar (purse bearer) of the Imperial Treasury, appointed to Berlin. The French agent in Istanbul, Raymond Verninac, still not recognized officially as ambassador and unable to occupy the palace of the French embassy, protested so vigorously about the continued slight to the prestige of his own nation that Selim decided to delay indefinitely the departure of these two ambassadors, and the situation remained as it had been for another six months. 17 It was only in the fall of 1795 that French successes in Europe emboldened the Sultan sufficiently to decide to recognize the French government and to add an embassy in Paris to those established in London, Vienna, and Berlin a few months before. To accomplish this, Morali Ali Efendi was transferred to Paris from his original Berlin assignment and was replaced as ambassador to the Prussian court by the scribe of the cannon-wagon corps, Naili Mehmed Efendi. 18 The latter was unable to accept this appointment because of illness and was replaced early in 1796 by the former treasurer of the province of Belgrade, Ali Aziz Efendi. 19 At the same time, Yusuf Agäh Efendi's three-year appointment as ambassador to London was coming to an end, and he was replaced by the director of the Imperial granaries, Ismail Ferruh Efendi, 20 Within a few months, all of these ambassadors set out for their posts with the secretaries and translators assigned to them, and for the first time the Porte was represented by permanent missions in all the European capitals with the

The "New Order" of Selim III

exception of Saint Petersburg, and thereafter it received regular reports from them on European events and conditions.21 Morali Ali Efendi served until 1802 as the first Ottoman ambassador to the court of France with the assistance of his chief interpreter, Codrika, a Greek subject of the Sultan's who was actually in the employ of the French.22 He was replaced successively by Halet Efendi (1802-1805)23 and Muhib Efendi (1806-1811),24 with Vahid Efendi (1807-1808)25 and Galib Efendi (1802 and 1811)26 coming to Paris as special plenipotentiaries for short periods of time. In Great Britain, Ismail Ferruh Efendi served as ambassador from 1796 through 180227 and then was replaced by Neshet Efendi, who remained in London for most of the remainder of Selim's reign.28 In Vienna, the most important Ottoman ambassador was the Sultan's close friend and confidant, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, who was sent in 1791 to establish relations following the Treaty of Sistova and was instructed to study Austrian military and civil institutions and report on them directly to the Sultan. During his stay, he came into very close contact with an Austrian junior consular official named Joseph von Hammer, later to become the founder of Ottoman historical studies in Europe, and their exchanges seem to have been of immense value for both, before Ebubekir returned to Istanbul at the end of 1792.29 Ibrahim Afif Efendi served in Vienna between 1797 and 1800. The Sultan's most important representative in Prussia was Ahmed Efendi, who remained in Berlin from 1790 to 1794.30 Ali Aziz Efendi served in Berlin during most of 1797 and 1798. The only Ottoman ambassador to Saint Petersburg during this period was Mustafa Rasih Pasha, sent in 1792 in accordance with the Treaty of Jassy stipulation that the signatories exchange diplomatic missions. In return, the Czar sent General Kutuzov with a large entourage.31 The two met briefly on the Dniester as they passed into each other's territory on June 4, 1793. Little was accomplished, however. Rasih ran into difficulties from the start with the Russian insistence that the Porte return all captives, including those converted to Islam during the war. As a result he left on February 8, 1794, and Kutuzov had to leave Istanbul because of the reciprocity involved. Since both sides

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regarded the Treaty of Jassy as no more than a truce, the type of permanent representation entablished in the other countries was clearly impossible here. Whether appointed a regular ambassador, a secretary, or a special representative, each Ottoman sent abroad was specifically instructed to do all he could to learn about the country to which he was assigned and to send regular messages and periodic reports in order to provide the Porte with a regular flow of detailed information of all kinds about Europe,32 But only a few of them were successful in this. Azmi Efendi presented a short report describing the cities and towns through which he passed in Hungary and Austria and his experiences in the Imperial capital during his eleven-month stay.33 Ebubekir Ratib Efendi submitted a long and detailed report full of information about Europe's achievements, and, as already noted, this report was a major influence on the Sultan's reform efforts.34 Galib Efendi's reports from Paris were unusually detailed and useful,35 and Muhib Efendi's description of Paris was second only to that of Ebubekir Ratib in understanding and detail but had less influence because his master was dethroned shortly after receiving it.36 But these were notable exceptions. For the most part, the same factors which limited the effectiveness and understanding of earlier ambassadors also applied to Selim's representatives. They were Ottomans, trained in the Ottoman tradition and limited by Ottoman attitudes. Most of them were members of the scribal class and recipients of its traditional education, which included Arabic and Persian but none of the modern western languages or technical education introduced in the military schools. The few Ottoman Turks who did have a good command of western languages at this time as the result of education in these schools were needed too much at home to be sent abroad. And while a few Ottoman Greeks, Jews, and Armenians were sent along as translators, they invariably sold their services to the governments to which they were accredited and conspired with them to control and limit the information offered to the Ottoman envoys.37 With the exceptions already noted, most of the reports were filled with news of ceremonies, negotiations, and problems of

The "New Order" of Selim III

diplomatic protocol, with occasional reference to European theaters, fashions, and foods, but little more.38 And many of these did not even reach the Ottoman capital, for the Porte itself maintained no regular courier service of its own between Europe and Istanbul. Its representatives had to entrust their reports and messages to the couriers of the powers to which they were accredited, who made a regular practice of opening and reading all such documents entrusted to them and of "losing" those injurious to their interests. 39 So in the end, Selim and his ministers were forced to continue their reliance on foreigners at the Porte for information about the outside world. Many of the European ambassadors resided in the Ottoman Empire for years. They were acquainted with its languages and customs, and cultivated close and lasting relationships with Ottoman officials, paying regular bribes in order to learn their policies and decisions and to influence them when possible.40 As a result, the reports they sent to Europe concerning internal Ottoman affairs give far more reliable and detailed information on Turkey than do the Ottoman chronicles and governmental materials of the time. At the same time, each European nation maintained its own regular courier service to and from the Porte, sending newspapers and memoranda containing information and news, and these were often passed on to Ottoman officials through various channels, providing them with their only regular news of Europe. While Selim was still a prince in the palace of Abd ul-Hamid I, his main source of contact with the outside world had been the French ambassadors. After Selim's accession, he continued to rely on the French ambassador Choiseul-Gouffier more than any other European, often meeting him outside the Palace in disguise in order to dispense with the formalities required by protocol.41 But Choiseul, a nobleman and royalist, was ousted by the revolutionary government of France in October 1792 and fled to Russia in exile two months later, leaving France without official representation. 42 During the next three years, France was represented by agents sent to secure Ottoman favor and official recognition if possible, Citizens Semonville, Henin, Descorches, and Raymond Verninac. Verninac re-established a regular French embassy after Ottoman recognition in late 1795.43 He was fol-

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lowed as ambassador by General Aubert du Bayet, who served between 1796 and 1798 and was an important provider of technicians, equipment, and ideas to the Ottoman Sultan although he never achieved Choiseul's unusually close personal contact with Selim.44 In addition to these ambassadors, very important sources of ideas and information for the Ottomans were the Jeunes de Langues in the service of the embassy. These were French youths trained in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish by the most outstanding French orientalists in order to serve in French diplomatic and consular posts and enable the French representatives to dispense with the uncertain, inaccurate, and often disloyal services of local Armenians, Greeks, and Jews formerly used for such tasks. The most important of those who served the French embassy during the age of the French Revolution were Venture de Paradis, later chief interpreter for Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt; Amädee Jaubert, also later involved in the Egyptian expedition; Daniel Kieffer and Xavier Bianchi, authors of an important TurkishFrench dictionary later in the nineteenth century; and Pierre Ruffin, subsequently one of France's leading orientalists. 45 These men were able to discern local conditions, report on events and, at the same time, inform and influence Ottomans as no one else could in their own embassies or the embassies of other powers. Without the need for interpreters, they were able to establish personal friendships with Ottomans and discuss things with them in a way that persons not knowing Turkish were unable to. Ruffin in particular was close to Chelebi Mustafa Reshid and Küchük Hüseyin and was Selim's most important advocate in his appeals for aid to the French government. 46 It also fell to his lot, however, to be France's charge d'affaires in Istanbul when war broke out in 1798, so he and his associates were forced to spend three years in the dismal confinement of the Ottoman political prison at Yedikule.47 After peace was restored, the French ambassadors and their Jeunes de Langues secretaries regained a strong position of influence at the Porte, with the Sultan relying more and more on the advice of the last two French ambassadors of his reign, Marshal Marie-Anne Brune (1803-1804) and Bonaparte's confidant and advisor, General Horace Sebastiani (1806-1808).

The "New Order" of Selim III

There were other European representatives at the Porte who were able to influence certain Ottoman officials, but none with the consistency of the French. The most important of these were the British Ambassadors Robert Ainslie (1772-1793), Sir Robert Liston (1793-1799), Lord Elgin (1799-1802) and C. Arbuthnot (1804-1807); the Austrian internuncio during most of Selim's reign, Baron Herbert de Rathkeal; the Swedish dragoman and later minister at the Porte, Mouradgea d'Ohsson; the minister of Denmark and Saxony, Baron de Hübsch; the Prussian ambassador Knobelsdorf; and the Russian ambassadors, Count Mikhail Golenischev-Kutuzov (1792-1794), Victor Pavlovich Kochubeg (1793-1798), and Vasily Tamara (1798-1802). Each of them had excellent sources of information at the Porte and contributed in various ways to Ottoman awareness of the West. Of course all these diplomatic contacts had only a slight effect on Ottoman society as a whole. Access to the reports sent from Ottomans in Europe, as to the Europeans themselves at the Porte, was limited to a very few Ottomans who were directly concerned with foreign affairs. The knowledge imparted through these sources was transmitted to other Ottomans only indirectly, if at all. However, in the unofficial activities of the European representatives, merchants, and technicians now present in increasing numbers in Istanbul, there was an impact which was much more extensive and in the long run even more significant for the whole of Ottoman society.

Social

Contacts

The time of the French Revolution saw a tremendous relaxation in the social barriors which isolated the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire from the Ottomans among whom they lived. In previous centuries the few foreigners who did reside in the Sultan's dominions isolated themselves almost entirely in their own compounds. Mutual distrust and even hostility and scorn, combined with a more practical and justified European fear of contracting the plague then widespread in the empire, limited contact to purely formal occasions. And even then most of the actual intercourse was left to the mediation of translators serving both

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sides, who used their positions to advance their own causes and interests at the expense of those whom they were supposed to be serving. But new developments during Selim's reign made it impossible for this sort of isolation to continue. The very fact that foreign diplomats, merchants, and soldiers were living in Istanbul in far greater numbers than in earlier times made it inevitable that opportunities for contact would greatly increase. Selim's reforms and his efforts to popularize them whetted the appetities of many Ottomans, at least to the extent of making them for the first time somewhat curious about the strange infidels in their midst and desirous of learning of their manners and ways. Moreover Europeans long content to ignore the Ottomans in the past were now compelled by the need to compete for the favor of the neutral Porte to try to cultivate the friendship and understanding of all segments of the population. As a result of these factors, intercourse increased on all levels of society. European parties and entertainments held in the great embassy palaces and private homes were now attended by Ottoman officials, including the Sultan himself in disguise. Upperclass Ottomans began to imitate the practices of European society and hold parties in their own homes and palaces, into which their European acquaintances were invited for the first time. Western merchants, technicians, and soldiers met subjects of the Sultan in the streets, bazaars, and coffeehouses. Street performances by European actors, buffoons, jugglers, and the like became regular features of lower-class Ottoman city life.48 The large cities of the empire witnessed a craze on the part of all classes of the population for European clothing, architecture, and furniture, so much so that the British ambassador, Sir Robert Liston, reported in 1796 that "the fashion of the day is strongly in favor of European imitation in every rank of society."49 Selim himself is said to have invited European actors to perform in his palace, attempted imitations of western music and poetry in his own compositions, and imported western flowers and miniature pictures for his personal use.50 These were the effects produced by Europeans of all nationalities, but in addition the French had a special impact. Turkey at

The "New Order" of Selim III

this time was one of the few neutral countries in Europe, and it therefore provided a unique place where friend and foe of the Revolution could dwell in uncomfortable proximity. Exiled French royalists lived side by side with the most ardent supporters of the Revolution, and conflicts and competition were inevitable. The Jacobins in Istanbul affixed revolutionary emblems to their persons and homes, held public ceremonies to celebrate the great events of the Revolution, and did all they could to secure public and private support for their cause among Ottomans and foreigners alike. They went into the coffeehouses, spoke of the rights of man and the evils of the old regime, and distributed Turkish- and French-language leaflets and broadsheets expounding the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity.51 In many cases, they tried to provoke riots among the volatile Istanbul mob as a means of exerting pressure on the Turkish government to support the new regime in France.52 In January 1793, they even went so far as to plant a Tree of Liberty on a terrace in full view of the Sultan's palace! Much of this activity was inspired and directed locally by Frenchmen in Istanbul wishing to show their loyalty to the new regime. Some of it was directed by agents sent from France. Numerous revolutionary societies and clubs were organized, of which the most important were the Societe Republicaine des Amis de la Liberte et de l'Egalite, established by Descorches in August, 1793,53 and the SociAte Populaire Republicaine, inaugurated by Henin about the same time.54 These, and others as well, occasionally cooperated, but more often they were as violently hostile to one another on ideological and personal grounds as they were to the royalists.55 Once the French government was officially recognized by the Porte and French ambassadors came from Paris to occupy the palace of the embassy, these groups were directed on a more centralized basis and their mutual hostility was curbed although not entirely eliminated. The French embassy now also took the main role in spreading revolutionary propaganda in the empire. In April 1795, Louis Allier, director of the Imprimerie Nationale in Paris, was sent to Istanbul with two new presses and several assistants to reorganize and expand the small press previously operated at the embassy there under Descorches's aegis.56

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Biweekly bulletins of European and French news were begun, and these were replaced on September 23, 1796 by the Gazette Franqaise de Constantinople, a newspaper supposed to be issued fortnightly but which in fact appeared somewhat more irregularly during the next two years.57 In addition, the Bulletin de la Legation de la Ripublique Franqaise pres la Porte Ottomane was also published by the French Embassy to provide information on the deliberations of the National Convention in Paris and to present various official bulletins and announcements of the French government.58 The Constitution of the French Republic, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and other revolutionary documents were translated into Turkish and widely distributed although it was admitted by the translator that "there were great difficulties offered by the translations . . . all of whose ideas are so strange to the Turks and almost all of whose expressions lack equivalents in the Turkish language."59 Although the embassy press was confiscated during the Ottoman-French war, it was restored in 1803 and was very active during the remainder of Selim's reign. On the whole, the activities of French propagandists in Istanbul were so widespread during this time that Lord Elgin wrote home with alarm that "the propagation of democratic principles here is, I am afraid, extremely rapid."60 These revolutionary activities were supported by a number of foreign sympathizers living at the Porte, of whom the most effective was Mouradgea d'Ohsson, who finally was expelled by the Ottomans in 1798 as a result of his open activities on behalf of the French.61 A most unusual case was that of John Montagu Humphrys, a British national who had been born in North America, from which he had fled because of the American Revolution. He seems to have converted to the revolutionary cause, for he came to Turkey with his family to establish a trading company and spent most of his time joining revolutionary meetings and publishing English-language pamphlets on their behalf, much to the disgust of the British ambassadors.62 The spread of revolutionary propaganda was just as vigorously opposed in Turkey as it was elsewhere in Europe. The ambassadors of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were especially vehement in their demands that the public demonstrations and

The "New Order" ofSelim

III

propaganda be curbed, pointing out the effect that such ideas might have on the Ottoman Empire itself.63 The French royalist emigres organized their own societies on lines similar to those of the Jacobins and attacked them openly, often in the full view of the amused Turks. 64 Most of this counterrevolutionary activity was financed by the British ambassador, who also arranged for the dispatch to Istanbul of thirty French royalist officers previously resident in England. 65 An antirevolutionary newspaper entitled Le Mercure Oriental was published irregularly after September 1796, presenting European news and reports unfavorable to the French Revolution and its armies. 66 In addition, a violently antirevolutionary French-language newspaper printed in Frankfurt was imported and distributed regularly by the Austrian embassy.67 Similar pamphlets were published in English by the British embassy, although its efforts in no way equaled those of the French revolutionaries either in volume or effectiveness.68 During most of this time, the Ottoman government was trying to maintain its neutrality among the warring European powers, and this effort was reflected in its attitude to the revolutionary and antirevolutionary activities and appeals. The Ottoman cabinet itself was divided on what should be done. Küchük Hüseyin Pasha, the Treasurer Ibrahim Efendi, and Ebubekir Ratib Efendi usually advocated a conciliatory policy toward the Jacobins, while Mustafa Reshid and Yusuf Agäh led those who favored the British and royalist position.69 As a result, the Porte vacillated, sometimes restricting the Jacobins and sometimes giving them full freedom so that in the end they were able to continue their work most of the time.70 There was also another channel through which revolutionary doctrines entered the Ottoman Empire at this time. In Paris, the documents of revolution were translated into Serbian, Greek, and Armenian, as well as into Turkish, and these were disseminated widely in the European portions of the empire and the Mediterranean islands. Even in times of closest French cooperation with the Porte, French agents were sent to Ali Pasha of Janina, to Dalmatia, to Serbia, Greece, Crete, and Cyprus, preaching the advantages of republicanism and liberty and trying to make

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certain that if the Porte did choose to side with the enemies of the Revolution, France too would have its friends within the Ottoman dominions.71 French occupation of the Venetian territories along the Adriatic and of various Mediterranean islands served to intensify these activities which, although they were resisted strongly by Ottoman, British, and Russian agents, were quite successful, inaugurating a ferment which led directly to the subsequent Balkan revolts against the Sultan. Another source of transmission which cannot be entirely overlooked was provided by non-Muslims in the service of the Porte and the Sultan. Selim himself had a German and an Italian doctor, who used their positions to tell him of the West and to stimulate his taste for it.72 There were European women in the harem of the Sultan, and they are reputed to have provided important channels of contact between the Palace and the West. Also the Jews of the empire as well as Greek and Armenian merchants and aristocrats long had been in intimate contact with relatives, friends, and business associates living in the various countries of Europe. Through private correspondence, they were in constant touch with Europe, and it must be assumed that they passed on at least a certain amount of the information derived to their Ottoman associates. The most direct means by which this sort of information was communicated to the Porte was through the office of Bash Terjuman, the chief translator of the Imperial Council and official in charge of relations with foreign representatives.73 After the late seventeenth century, this important position was held exclusively by members of the wealthy Greek Phanariote families of Istanbul, who kept it just because their contacts with the West made them more knowledgeable of Europe than their Ottoman brothers.74 In addition, these and other Greek and Armenian families often sent their children to be educated in Europe, in Italy in particular, thus preparing them both linguistically and intellectually to receive the new western ideas of their time and to transmit them to the Ottomans at the Porte.75 It is difficult to assess the extent to which these Western influences and ideas took root among the Ottomans of Selim's time. The fact that he and those around him did try to imitate Europe in some respects, and the certainty that their efforts had some

The "New Order" of Selim III

support among rulers and subjects alike, would seem to indicate that there was at least some effect. Yet this should not be overstressed. As we have seen, most of the "reforms" were in fact traditional Ottoman responses to the needs of the time, and the relative ease with which Selim was deposed in 1807 indicates his lack of deep-seated support among rulers and subjects alike. That the Sultan himself retained in essence the spirit and mentality of the past is demonstrated further by the nature of the literary efforts which were supported in his court. With the doctrines of revolution swirling around him, Sultan Selim chose to promote the efforts of poets and writers who reflected only the themes and values of the past. Thus the great writers of the French Revolutionary era in Istanbul were the Mevlevi leader Sheyh Galib (1757-1799) and his brother dervishes at the Galata monastery, Hulusi Dede (d. 1805) and Esrar Dede (d. 1797) as well as Seyyid Vehbi (d. 1809) and the great Fazil Bey (d. 1808), who represented the last great flourish of the traditional Ottoman literary schools. For them, as for their patron, it was the empty, mystical searchings for the supreme being and the never-ending descriptions of court frivolities that excited attention rather than the political, social, and economic problems of their time. That no modern school of literature appeared in Selim's time seems to be clear evidence that the ideas of the West, however freely they came into the capital, took no root but at best left the seeds for a flowering which was to come only under Selim's successors.76

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^ .a n 0 - 1 6 ( 1 6 May 1794); TKS, E3752; BVA, Cevdet Askeri 35308. 83. The supplementary regulations for the Nizam-i Cedid corps, dated 21 Dhu 1-Qa'da 1215/6 April 1801, are given in Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fol. 71b; and Istanbul University Library, TY 3208. 84. Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fol. 46a; Cevad, Tarih-i Askeri Osmani, II, 18-20. 85. BVA, HH 10731. 86. Chenier, "Apergu de la situation militaire," pp. 362-363; Olivier, I, 95-96; HHS, Türkei 11-107, no. 29 (10 Sept. 1794); 108, no. 32 (25 Oct. 1794). 87. Cevdet2, VII, 249; Cevad, Tarih-i Askeri Osmani, II, 43; TKS, D7014, E3404. BVA, HH 13828; Saint-Denys, Histoire, II, 15; HHS, Türkei-120, no. 13 (25 Feb. 1799); no. 14 (2 March 1799); no. 33 (18 May 1799); no. 37 (3 June 1799). 88. TKS, E2320, E4241; BVA, Kepeci 3247; HHS, Türkei 11-122, no. 11 (26 March 1800); Cevdet2, VII, pp. 97-100, 249. 89. TKS, E3752; HHS, Türkei 11-113, no. 31 (31 Oct. 1796); 122, no. 11 (29 March 1800). AE 211, fols. 91-92 (15 Feb. 1806); HHS, Türkei 11-128, no. 13 (25 May 1802). Cevdet2, VII, 249-250. 90. FO 78/28 (29 Jan. 1800). 91. FO 78/25 (25 May 1799). 92. Saint-Denys, Histoire, II, 16-36. Hobhouse, II, 1009-1017. Cevdet', VIII, 92-96; Cevdet2, VIII, 54-60. 93. FO 78/28 (29 Jan. 1800).

XI. Technical

Reforms

1. Developments in European weapons during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are outlined in Albert Manucy, Artillery through the Ages (Washington, D. C., 1949); M. Surirey de Saint-Remy, Memoires d'artillerie, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1745); Col. Fave, Etudes sur le passe et l'avenir de l'artillerie (Paris, 1863); H. W. L. Hime, The Origin of Artillery (New York, 1915). 2. The state of Ottoman artillery and other weapons at the end of the eighteenth century is exhaustively described by Cuny in "Apergu de la situation des artilleurs," fols. 99-104, 167-168. See also Eton, pp. 76-77 and Uzunjargili, Kapukulu, II, 48-51. 3. Anon., "Reflexions sur l'empire ottoman," AE, Mem. et Doc. Turquie, no. 15. 4. HH2, pp. 59-63. 5. Hüseyin Aksarayi, Hadikat ul-Cevami, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1281/ 1864), II, 76; BVA, HH 6739, 10798; AE 198, fol. 8 (3 Germinal an VI);

Notes to pages 132-139

HHS, Türkei 11-103, no. 4 (10 April 1793), no. 19 (10 July 1793); Olivier, I, 107. 6. BVA, H H 12193. A list of all the artisans who accompanied Pampelonne, including biographies and vital statistics for each, is given in AE 194, fol. 41 (3 Messidor an V ) and AE 196, fols. 150-151. 7. AE 196, fols. 291-292; Antonin Debidour, ed., Recueil des actes duDirectoireExecutif, 4 vols. (Paris, 1910-1917), I, 585. 8. BVA, HH 8978,10101; FO 78/15, no. 31 (25 Dec. 1794); Chenier, p. 361; Olivier, I, 95-96. 9. Vasif, IV, 92b-93b; Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fol. 48a-b. 10. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 1204. 11. AE 191, fol. 7 (2 Floreal an III); AE 193, fol. 25 (6 Pluviöse an IV); AE 196, fols. 50-51; Saint-Denys, I, 12. 12. AE 192, fols. 115-116 (4 Brumaire an IV). 13. AE 193, fols. 390-391; AE 195, fol. 349 (2 Pluviöse an V), fols. 361-366 (5 Pluviöse an V), fol. 390 (8 Pluviöse an V); AF 111-75 (24 Frimaire an V). 14. AE 196, fols. 291-292; AE 197, fol. 74 (20 Brumaire an VI), fols. 99-100 (11 Frimaire an VI); AE 198, fols. 110-113 (3 Floreal an VI), fols. 158-159 (2 Prairial an VI); Olivier, 1,27. 15. Turgut I§iksal, "III Selim'in Türk Topguluguna dair bir Hatt-i Hümayun," TD, VIII (1955), 179-184; Chenier, "Apergu de la situation militaire," pp. 353-354; FO 78/15, no. 31 (25 Dec. 1794); BVA, HH 14553; Kepeci 6618. 16. Muzaffer Erdogan, "Argiv vesikalarina göre Istanbul Baruthaneleri," Istanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi, II (1956), 115-138; Tahsin Esencan, Nizam-i Cedidden evvel ve sonra Türk topqulugu ve kaynaklari (Ankara, 1946), pp. 48-51; Chenier, "Apergu de la situation militaire," p. 356; BVA, H H 6707. 17. Manucy, Artillery through the Ages, p. 23. 18. Olivier, I, 98-99; Chenier, "Apergu de la situation militaire," p. 361; AE 191, fols. 345-364. 19. The slave of Bozogli Mustafa Pasha, he rose in the Inner Service of the Imperial Palace as Mabeyinci (Court Chamberlain) and then Kethüda (Lieutenant) of the private treasury of the Sultan (Hazine-i Hümayun). He then served as Ba§ Muhasib (Chief of the Accounting Department) in the Imperial Treasury (Hazine-i Amire) of the state three times, in 1774, 1779, and 1784. In January 1787, he became Director of the Istanbul shipyard (Tersane Ε mini), but he was dismissed after a few months as a result of a dispute with the Grand Vezir. He then returned to the Imperial Treasury, where he served as Ba§ Muhasib for a fourth time in 1788 and as Ruznäme-i Evvel in 1789. After Selim's accession, he was appointed as Chief Treasurer (Defterdar-i Shikk-i Evvel) in April 1790, but he soon was demoted to the post of

Notes to pages 139-143

437

438

Ruznäme-i Euuel once again because of irregularities in his conduct. In 1791-92 he became Tevki'i, and two years later he was appointed to direct the Baruthane. Once again, he was dismissed after only a short time in office because of irregularities. He died in May 1794. SO, III, 550-551. 20. Nuri, fols. 70b-72b. 21. Erdogan, "Baruthaneleri," pp. 121-125; Cevdet 1 , V, 353-355; Nuri, fol. 74a-b; FO 78/15, no. 31 (25 December 1794). 22. Erdogan, "Baruthaneleri," pp. 130-138; Ata, IV, 121-123, 128129; Cevdet2, VI, 181; Tahsin Oz, "Sir Kätibi," p. 197; BVA, Cevdet Askeri 3603, 38593. 23. BVA, Cevdet Askeri 5035, 5136, 5688, 6366; Erdogan, "Baruthaneleri," p. 118; Cevdet1, VI, 181; Ata, IV, 121-123; Nuri, fols. 70b75a; Vasif, IV, 38a; Cevdet2, VI, 180-181, 263; Mahmud Raif, pp. 25-28; HH\ pp. 61-62; BVA, Cevdet Askeri 1425 and 3603; AE 190, fols. 14-16 (4 Nivöse an IV); Tahsin Esencan, Nizam-ι Cedidden evvel ve sonra Türk topgulugu ve kaynaklari (Ankara, 1946), pp. 48-51. 24. AE 191, fol. 363; Mahmud Raif, pp. 27-28. 25. A. Adnan-Adivar, Ilim, p. 186; Ergin, Tiirkiye Maarif Tarihi p. 274; Mehmed Esad, Mirat-ι Miihendishane-i Berri-i Hümayun (Istanbul, 1895), p. 9. 26. BVA, HH 9783A, 9783B. 27. Esad, Mirat, pp. 13-15. 28. BVA, Cevdet Maarif 222. 29. SO, III, 325; Esad, Mirat, pp. 38-39, 61; (Jagatay Ulu§ay and Enver Kartekin, Yiiksek Milhendis Okulu (Istanbul, 1958), pp. 87-93. 30. Ulugay and Kartekin, pp. 61, 81, 85, 505, 645, 31. The most famous of the Hocas who taught in the school under Selim III in addition to the directors were: a. Kirimh Haci Hüseyin Efendi. His books included: Lagim Risalesi, Usul-u Hendese, Imtihan ul-Mühendisin, Humbara Ate§ Cedveli, Telhis ul-Eqkal, Irtifa Risalesi, and a translation of Euclid's Mathematics under the title Usul-u Hendese (Ulucay and Kartekin, p. 72). b. Seyyid Ali Efendi, who taught lessons in fortification and geometry and published two books, Mahrutiyet and Istihkamat-i Cesime (Ulugay and Kartekin, p. 73). c. Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, a student of Le Brun's in the shipyard, himself the builder of a number of ships in Istanbul and elsewhere. d. Selim Efendi, an English convert who specialized in mathematics (Ergin, Türkiye Maarif Tarihi II, 270-271; BVA, Cevdet Maarif 5689). e. Ingiliz Mahmud Raif Efendi. 32. BVA, Cevdet Maarif 6201; HH 10330. 33. Selim Nüzhet Ger?ek, Türk Matbaaciligi (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 85-88.

Notes to pages 143-147

34. Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fols. 70b-71b; Cevad, Tarih-i Osmani, pp. 42-44; Cevdet2, VII, 43. 35. Cevdet', VII, 122.

Askeri

XII. Revival of the Ottoman Navy 1. Olivier, I, 60-64. 2. Conditions in the Ottoman fleet at the end of the eighteenth century are described in the anonymous "Essai sur la puissance navale des Turcs," AE, Mem. et Doc., Turquie no. 30, fols. 350-361; see also Uzuncargih, Merket Tegkiläti, pp. 500-503; Olivier, I, 64-65; Nuri, fols. 89a-90a; HH\ pp. 63-71. 3. Cezayirli Hasan Pasha's career and naval reforms are described in Uzun^argili, "Hasan Pa§a," pp. 17-40. 4. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 5849; Olivier, I, 58. 5. This school is described in Uzungar§ih, "Halil Hamid," pp. 233-238 and BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 5084. It seems likely that the Karmoran mentioned in the Ottoman sources was the Breton Professor Kerwomand, under whom an Ottoman military school was established in 1775 according to the Annual Register, XVII, 107. 6. It is described in d'Ohsson, IV, 214-215 and BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 5849,5861. 7. "Essai sur la puissance navale des Turcs," AE, Mem. et Doc. Turquie, no. 30, fols. 361-367; Karal, "Osmanli Tarihine dair vesikalar," Belleten, IV (1940), 175-180. 8. On the life and career of Küchük Hüseyin Pasha, see Nejad Göyüng, "Kapudan-i Derya Kügük Hüseyin Pa§a," TD, II (1952), 35-50. 9. Ishak Bey's career until Selim Ill's accession is discussed in Chapter II. After 1787, he maintained himself on a lavish scale in Paris by securing money and other gifts from the French Foreign Minister and the British and Russian ambassadors, promising each of them that he would use his influence with the Sultan on their behalf. His dissolute behavior and increasingly imprudent demands finally caused the French government to encourage him to depart, and he left Marseilles in February 1790. But rather than going directly to Istanbul, he first landed at the Dardanelles and then went to Izmir, where he waited to find out whether or not his master had forgiven him. In the capital, the diplomatic maneuvers of the various foreign ambassadors for the moment concentrated on Ishak Bey, with the French striving to have him admitted and the British and Swedish representatives trying to secure his punishment and banishment in the fear that he would persuade Selim to favor the French. In April 1790, he returned to Istanbul but was at once banished to Lemnos, where he spent the next three years. Finally, in the spring of 1794, he was pardoned and returned to Istanbul. But he

Notes to pages 148-155

439

440

never achieved the high position which Selim as prince had originally intended for him, and he was given a relatively minor position as assistant to the Grand Admiral Kiichük Htiseyin Pasha, who became his guardian and protector. Thereafter Ishak acted mainly as French translator for the Grand Admiral and as a guide for foreigners who wished to visit the shipyard. Biographical material on Ishak Bey up to the time of his return to Turkey can be found in Munir, "Louis XVI," pp. 516-548, and Uzungargili, "Muhabere," pp. 191-246. The information on his two sojourns in France and his life in Turkey after returning in 1790 has been secured from the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: AE 180, fol. 22, no. 29 (8 July 1789), no. 34 (14 Aug. 1789), no. 36 (7 Sept. 1789), no. 37 (8 Sept. 1789), no. 39 (14 Sept. 1789), no. 41 (22 Sept. 1789), no. 42 (22 Sept. 1789), no. 43 (1 Oct. 1789), fol. 221 (30 Sept. 1789), fols. 231-233 (8 Oct. 1789), AE 181, no. 9 (22 April 1790), no. 10 (8 May 1790), no. 11 (22 May 1790), no. 12 (22 May 1790); AE 182, fol. 21 (6 Jan. 1791). Also FO 78/11, no. 9 (22 April 1790); Omer Efendi, Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-i Sani, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, Esad Efendi MS 2152, fol. 30b. 10. Selim's naval regulations, dated 21 Zilkade 1206/12 July 1792, are given in BVA, HH 4497, 4500, 4546; Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fols. 15b-18b. They are summarized in Cevdet1, V, 235-237 and Asim, I, 5255. 11. FO 78/15, no. 31 (25 Dec. 1794). 12. These regulations are given in Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fols. 18b20b. 13. The winter salary was called Maa§-i $ita'i officially and Ki§ Ulufesi by the men themselves; the literal translation of both terms is "winter pay." 14. See Shaw, Financial Organization, p. 278; Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fols. 15b-18b. 15. AE 184, fols. 120-121 (30 Dec. 1792); AE 186, fol. 330 (1 Messidor an II), fol. 411 (18 Frimaire an II); AE 191, fols. 52-55 (1 Prairial an III); FO 78/18, no. 14 (15 June 1797); FO 78/14, no. 14 (25 May 1793); BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 1444; Thornton, II, 112; HHS, Türkei-118, no. 35 (25 Sept. 1798), 120, no. 6 (16 Jan. 1799); AE 205, no. 13 (19 Brumaire an XI); AE 210, fol. 406 (30 Brumaire an XIV); AE 211, no. 3 (13 Feb. 1806). 16. AE 191, fols. 231-233; AE 194, fols. 238-248; AF 111-75 (25 Floreal an V); Enver Ziya Karal, "Selim III devrinde Osmanli Bahriyesi hakkinda vesikalar," TV, I (1942), 203-211, gives the name of the builder of each ship. 17. Nuri, fol. 101a. 18. Olivier, I, 68-69; FO 78/18, no. 14 (15 June 1797); HHS, Türkei 11-110, no. 42 (24 Dec. 1795); Debidour, I, 561; II, 630-632; HHS, Türkei 11-102, no. 4 (9 Feb. 1793); AE 191, fols. 231-233 (7 Frimaire an IV); AE

Notes to pages 155-157

194, fols. 239-248 (1 Fructidor an IV); AE 196, fols. 218-219 (10 Prairial an V); AE 198, fol. 59 (21 Germinal an VI); AE 198, fol. 174 (12 Prairial an VI); AF 111-75 (21 Germinal an V); AE 204, no. 48 (12 Messidor an X); Vasif, IV, 101a-103a. The basin was 14 zira deep and 24 zira long, Cevdet2, VII, 83-84. On the Gemlik shipyards, see Olivier, II, 5-7; BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 6383; FO 78/14, no. 27 (25 Nov. 1793); HHS, Türkei II101, no. 36 (10 Nov. 1792). 19. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 4830 and 5794; AE 191, fol. 24b; Uzungar§ili, Merkez Tegkil&ti, pp. 503-506; Olivier, I, 34, 59; HHS, Türkei 11-97, no. 10 (26 Nov. 1790), no. 11 (12 Dec. 1791); Istanbul University Library, TY 8827, fols. 64a-66a; Karal, "Osmanh Bahriyesi," pp. 209-211; Vasif, III, 147b. 20. D'Ohsson, VII, 422-423. 21. BVA, HH 11308. 22. AE 193, fol. 346. 23. Karal, "Osmanh Bahriyesi," pp. 203-211, inventories these ships in full, giving the number of officers and men in each together with their sizes, cannons, and builders. 24. The anonymous French "Essai sur la puissance navale des Turcs," fol. 355 says that the Englishman Spurring built the Selimiye. The Ottoman document published by Karal, "Osmanh Bahriyesi," says it was Le Brun. 25. Unzuncargih, Merkez Tegkilati, pp. 505-506; HHS, Türkei II114, no. 7 (25 Feb. 1797). 26. HHS, Türkei 11-112, no. 9 (10 March 1796). 27. In 1784, a French naval officer named Bonneval (not the artillery officer of that name earlier in Ottoman service) reported that at that time the Ottoman fleet had 24 ships of the line (of which 16 were in good condition, 6 in bad condition, and 2 under construction), 15 frigates (of which 12 were in good condition and 3 in bad), and 16 smaller ships, totaling 68 in all (Karal, "Osmanh tarihine dair vesikalar," Belleten, IV [1940], 175-189). In May of 1788, a Venetian in the service of the Austrian consulate, Ludolf, reported that the Ottoman fleet had 24 ships of the line (including 5 under construction), 10 frigates, and 176 smaller ships and boats, with 3,422 cannons and 30,000 men in all (HHS, TurkeiII, 96). The anonymous Ottoman list made in 1800 and reprinted by Karal described 45 newly built ships of the line, frigates, and corvettes constructed between 1789 and 1800, with these ships alone having 22,245 men and officers and 2,376 cannons. In January 1806, Pierre Ruffin, then acting French ambassador in Istanbul, reported that the Ottoman fleet had 20 ships of the line (with between 118 and 50 cannons each), 20 frigates (between 30 and 48 cannon), and 14 corvettes (24 to 20 cannons), with an additional 5 ships of the line under construction at Istanbul, Bodrum, Gemlik, Rhodes, and Sinop (AE Turquie 211, fol. 51, 10 Jan. 1806). At the same time, the

Notes to pages 157-158

441

442

anonymous French official report "Essai sur la puissance navale des Turcs," fols. 350-357, which was submitted in 1806 but presumably must have been based on information gathered in previous years, estimated that the Ottoman fleet had 120 ships in 1789, including 17 ships of the line and 20 frigates and corvettes, and 25,000 sailors; 20 ships of the line, 15 frigates, many small boats, and 25,000 sailors in 1805; and 20 ships of the line, 15 frigates, 32 small boats, 2,156 cannons, and 40,000 sailors and seagoing soldiers in 1806. In January 1807, the British ambassador in Istanbul, James Arbuthnot, reported that the Ottomans had 9 ships of the line, 14 frigates, 10 corvettes, and some small ships anchored at Istanbul or vicinity, but that "there is hardly a man on board the ships who can be called a real seaman" (FO 78/55, no. 10, 27 Jan. 1807), Cevdet2 (VII, 292-294) reported that in the year 1219/ 1804, the Ottoman fleet had 20 ships of the line, 22 frigates, 15 corvettes, totaling 61 warships in all. In 1803, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Drummond, reported to his government that the Ottoman fleet at that time was one of the "finest fleets" he ever saw (FO Turkey 40, 11 June 1803). 28. Olivier, I, 59-60; Uzuncargih, "Halil Hamid," pp. 233,236; BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 5849. 29. Born in 1730, Galenbevi Ismail Efendi was the son of a member of the Ulema class, and trained in the religious schools of Istanbul. He entered the Ottoman religious class and became a Müderris (teacher in a Medrese) in 1763, rising until he was a Kadi at the time of Selim's accession. At the same time, he specialized in mathematics — with particular attention to logarithms and trigonometry, according to the traditional Eastern techniques —and wrote numerous works on these subjects, becoming a recognized authority. Under Abd ul-Hamid I, he was close to Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha and Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, who appointed him to teach in their new mathematics school shortly after it was opened. Continuing in that position during Selim's first year, he finally was appointed Kadi of Yenigehir in 1790 as a reward for his long service, but he died within a year. For accounts of his life and works, see OM, III, 293-297 and Uzungargih, OT, IV/2, 622-623; SO, I, 372. 30. Uzuneargili, OT, IV/1,483,486; Ulugay and Kartekin, pp. 25-26, 472. 31. Lafayet Kilave, Elements de castrametation de fortification passagere (1787), translated into Turkish as Usui ul- Maarif fi tertib ulordu ve tahsinuhu (1788), in 2 vols, (copy in TKS, no. 570/35, 923). Charleton, Traite de manoeuvre pratique, translated into Turkish as Usui ul-Maarif ft fenn-i vech-i tasnif-i sefain-i donanma ve fenn-i tedbiri h&rekatiha (1202/1788), 96 pages and 13 illustrations (copy in the Archeological Museum, Istanbul, no. 5814; and in TKS, no. 573/35,

Notes to pages 158-159

937). Tondo, "Traite de pildage et de navigation. Elements de geometrie," translated into Turkish but never printed. 32. BVA, HH 10405. 33. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 5849; Uzungargili, Merkez Tegkilati, pp. 531-541; Kurdoglu, Deniz, II, 3-12. 34. Kurdoglu, Deniz, II, 37-38; Uzungargili, Merkez Te§kiläti, p. 509. 35. BVA, HH 11907; Uzungargili, Merkez Tegkilati, p. 509. 36. These naval regulations are given in full in the Istanbul Municipal Library (Belediye Kütiiphanesi), MS Cevdet Yazmalar B25, fols. lb-18b. Part of it is published by Safvet as "Umur-u Bahriye Nezareti," TOEM, I, (1911), pp. 1350-1351. Summaries are given in Nuri, fols. 89b-101a; Vasif, IV, 70a, 165a; Cevdet 2 , VI 118, 181; Omer Efendi, 30b; Eton, 81-90; Karal, OT, V, 6 9 ; H H \ pp. 63-71; Uzungar§ili, Merkez Tegkil&ti, pp. 528-541; Kurdoglu, Deniz, II, 1-37; J. Dallaway, 45-46. 37. BVA, HH 8591; Cevdet Maliye 7508. 38. Cevdet2, VII, 240-241; Vasif, V, 163a-b. 39. BVA, Cevdet Maliye 2019; TKS, Ε 3967. 40. BVA, HH 7860. 41. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 8709. 42. Istanbul Municipal Library, Cevdet Yazmalar B25, fols. 16b17b; AE Turquie 211, fols. 249-252 (28 April 1806). 43. Bedi N. gehsuvaroglu, "Türkiyede Tip Ögretimi," Istanbul Universitesi Tip Fakültesi Mecmuasi, XXII (1959), 735-752; Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fol. 47a.

XIII. Administrative,

Economic, and Social Reforms

1. The power, status, and duties of every individual in the Ottoman ruling class was determined by his rank and position, and was indicated and defined as his Hadd, or "limit," within which he was free to act according to law and custom but beyond which he could not transgress. To "violate the limits" of one's own Hadd or that of another Ottoman was considered a flagrant violation of the mores of Ottoman society and was cause for severe punishment, in degrees up to the loss of position in the Ottoman ruling class itself. Stanford J. Shaw, ed. and trans., Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 23 n. 2. See Avdo Suceska, "Bedeutung und Entwicklung des Begriffes A'yän im Osmanischen Reich". Südost-Forschungen, XXV (1966), 3-26. 3. Ottoman society was divided into a small group of slaves of the Sultan who, as such, formed the Ottoman ruling class, and the mass of subjects (reäyä). The ruling class divided itself into a number of "institutions" to carry out its functions, and of these, the Imperial Institution,

Notes to pages 159-168

443

444

which managed the entire structure, gave the rank of vezir to its higher officials. The display of three horse-tails was allowed to publicly indicate this rank. See Pakalin, III, 590-593; Uzungargili, Merkez Tegkiläti, pp. 195-213. 4. On the Mir-i Mirans and Beylerbeys, see V. L. Manage, "Beglerbegi," E P , 1 , 1159-1160; Gibb and Bowen, 1/1,137; Pakalin, I, 216-222. 5. The laws reorganizing the corps of vezirs are given in full in Istanbul Municipal Library, MS Cevdet Yazmalar 032, fols. 25b-28a, and in Qavanin-i Sultan Selim, fols. 23a-26a; also Cavdet 2 , VI, 301-304; BVA, Maliyyeden Müdewere 7584; they are summarized inUzun?ar§ili, Merkez Tegkiläti, p. 196. The laws on Caize fees alone can be found in Cevdet Yazmalar, 032, fol. 4a-b, dated 22 Ramadan 1206/14 May 1792. They are discussed in HHS, Türkei 11-103, no. 10 (12 April 1793). 6. The Yillik-i Hiimayun (Annual Imperial Payment) was made by most high officials to the Sultan and members of his family once a year, usually at the start of the month of Ramazan. It was finally abolished in 1836 by Mahmud II. Pakalin, III, 637. 7. BVA, HH 6878. 8. BVA, Cevdet Maliye 1082. 9. BVA, Cevdet Bahriye 8709. 10. Bernard Lewis, "Diwan-i Humayun," EP, II, 337-339; Midhat Sertoglu, Muhteva Bakimindan Basvekalet Ar§ivi (Ankara, 1955), pp. 13-14; Uzungargili, Merkez Te§kilati, pp. 1-110; d'Ohsson, VII, 211-232. 11. Sertoglu, Bagvekalet Argivi, p. 45; Uzungargili, Merkez Tegkiläti 249-267. Vasif, V, 166a-b. 12. Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, 117, 121-124; Uzungar§ih, Merkez Teskildti, pp. 242-248; Pakalin, III, 25-27. 13. Gibb and Bowen, 111, 122; Pakalin, I, 55-57; Uzuncargili, Merkez Tegkiläti, pp. 55-58; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Amedji," EP, I, 433; Sertoglu, Bagvekalet Ar§ivi, p. 13. 14. Pakalin, I, 221; Uzunfargili, Merkez Te§kilati, pp. 40-43; Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, 121-122; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Beylik," EP, I, 1191; Sertoglu, Bagvekalet Argivi, p. 14. 15. Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, 121-122; Uzuncar§ili, Merkez Te§kilati, pp. 45-55; Sertoglu, Bagvekalet Argivi, p. 30. 16. Nedim Filipovif, "O izrazu 'tahvil'. L'expression 'tahvil,' " Prilozi za orijentalni filologiju i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom, II (1951), 239-247; Uzungargili, Merkez Te§kiläti, pp. 4345; Sertoglu, Basvekalet Ar§ivi, p. 30; Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, 121-122. 17. Uzungarjili, Merkez Te§kilati, pp. 58-64; Sertoglu, Basvekalet Ar§ivi, p. 31; Gibb and Bowen, 1/1,120-121; d'Ohsson, VII, 170; Pakalin, III, 477-478. 18. Uzungargili, Merkez Te§kilati, pp. 64-68; Pakalin, III, 574-575. On the official Ottoman historians, see Babinger; Cemaluddin, Osmanli Tarih ve Miiverrihleri (Istanbul, 1314/1898-99); and see the following

Notes to pages 169-172

articles in Historians of the Middle East, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962): Halil Inalcik, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," pp. 152-167; V. L. Mfenage, "The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography," pp. 168-179; Ercüment Kuran, "Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period," pp. 422-429. 19. BVA, Mühimme 203, p. 7 (1 Rebi I 1211), Mühimme 222, p. 60 (end Zilhicce 1219); Vasif, V, 166a-167a. 20. The scribal regulations are given in full in BVA, Kalem Nizamnamesi, reg. no. 37, pp. 1-30, and are summarized in Vasif, IV, 142b. 21. BVA, Mühimme 204, p. 4 (12 Rebi II 1213). 22. Cevdet2, VI 195; Vasif, IV, 142b-143b. 23. BVA, Cevdet Dahiliye 2080. 24. BVA, Cevdet Dahiliye 2080. 25. BVA, HH 10897. 26. BVA, Cevdet Dahiliye 2080-2081; HH 8978. 27. Nuri, fols. 39a-43a. 28. See Chapter VIII. 29. HHS, Türkei Π-138, no. 13 (24 May 1806); Vasif, IV, 5a-b; Nuri, fol. 88b. 30. BVA, HH 3702, 11470; Cevdet 2 , VIII, 61; H H \ p. 99; Ahmed Refik, "Sultan Selim-i Salisde Halk ve Milliyet Muhabbeti," Yeni Mecmua, I (1917), 450. 31. HHS, Türkei 11-138, no. 13 (24 May 1806); BVA, HH 3870; Vasif, III, 99b; Edib, fols. 157a-158a; Cevdet2, VIII, 61; Asim, 1,138-140. 32. BVA, HH 9782; H H \ pp. 101-102; Vasif, V, 55b-56a; Cevdet2, VII, 147-148. 33. Vasif, IV, 116a-b, 120a, 139b-140a; Cevdet 1 , VIII, 79; Cevdet2, VII, 82, 84, 207. 34. Ekrem Kolerkihg, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Para (Ankara, 1958), pp. 112-117; BVA, HH 3732, 4371, 4414; Vasif, III, 120b-123a, 162a-163a, 177b; IV, 104b-105a, 115b, 119b; V, 94a; Nuri, fols. 10a13b, 150b-154a; Cevdet', VI, 148-154; VIII, 187-188; Cevdet2, VI, 225226; VII, 84, 219. 35. AE 190, fol. 210 (29 Pluviose an III). 36. H H \ pp. 137-139; Karal, OT, V, 74; Vasif, IV, 22a-24a; Pakalin, III, 646. 37. Vasif, IV, 89a, 145a. 38. A copy of the coffee regulation is given in Vasif, IV, 145-146a, with a summary in Cevdet2, VI, 195. 39. Cevdet1, VIII, 107-108; Cevdet2, VIII, 61; Asim, I, 127-129; BVA, HH 13962; FO 78/50, no. 23 (5 May 1806). 40. Cevdet2, VII, 134; Asim, I, 130-131. 41. Cevdet1, VIII, 107-108; Cevdet2, VIII, 61; Asim, I, 131-132. 42. Vasif, III, 124a-125b, 154a-b; Nuri, fol. 101a; Asim, I, 130-133; BVA, HH 5140; Cevdet, VI, 69-70.

Notes to pages 173-178

445

446

43. Uzungargili, OT, IV/1, 597-602. The only detailed information we have on the price level in Istanbul at this time comes from a report of the British ambassador in Istanbul, dated 25 March 1801, showing the price rises for major commodities during the previous half century (FO 78/32, 25 July 1801). (Prices in paras per okke, 400 dirhems = 2.8 lb.) Commodity Beef Veal Mutton Lamb Best fish Ordinary fish Bread Common wine Barley Straw Firewood Charcoal (per cwt.) Chickens Pigeons Mecca coffee Rice Oil Soap Tallow candles Wax candles Butter Milk Powdered sugar Loaf sugar

1756 to 1779 -

8 10 20 5 -

15 13 -

4 -

6 12 13 13 -

12 — ft

20 -

5 9 10 12 24 6 5 3 16 15 25 60 5 4 66 7 14 15 16 100 17 4 25 50

1780 to 1789 10 14 16 18 40 20 -

7 25 30 40 -

10 10 -

8 -

16 26 -

40 -

12 15 18 20 50 30 10 8 30 40 60 100 20 12 100 10 20 20 28 130 45 6 30 70

1790 to 1800 12 18 16 18 80 20 -

50 -

16 16 220 -

28 -

40 8 110 160

16 20 24 24 100 30 12 14 60 90 70 200 18 18 240 28 32 36 40 140 50 12 120 200

44. Vasif, III, 124a-125b, 154a-b; Nuri, fol. 101a; Asim, I, 130-133; BVA, HH 5140; Cevdet, VI, 69-70.

XIV.

Window to the West

1. FO 78/18, no. 13 (10 June 1797). 2. See Chapter XI. 3. FO 78/28, no. 33 (18 March 1800); HHS, Türkei 11-109, no. 27 (25 Aug. 1795). 4. The history of the Turkish press during the 18th century is discussed in T. Halasi-Kun, "Ibrahim Müteferrika," ΙΑ, V, 896-900;

Notes to pages 178-184

Osman Ersoy, Tiirkiye'ye Matbaamn Giri§i ve Ilk basilan eserler (Ankara, 1959); Ahmed Rasim, Matbuat Tarihine Medhal,Ilk Büyük Muharrirler (Istanbul, 1927); John Kingsley Birge, "The Printing of Books in Turkey in the Eighteenth Century," Moslem World, XIII (1943), 292-294; Gergek, Türk Matbaaciligi; Server Iskit, Türkiye'de Neqriyat Hareketleri Tarihine bir baki§ (Istanbul, 1939); H. Omont, "Documents sur l'imprimerie ä Constantinople au XVIIIe siecle," Revue des Bibliotheques (1895), pp. 185-200, 228-236; Toderini; Ahmed Refik, Ilk Turk Matbaasi (Istanbul, 1929); Hasan Refik Ertug, Basin ve Yaym hareketleri tarihi (Istanbul, 1959). 5. Ger^ek, Turk Matbaaciligi, p. 86; Karal, OT, V, 70; Ergin, Ttirkiye Maarif Tarihi, p. 274; BVA, Cevdet Maarif 2905. 6. Iskit, Turkiye'de Nearly at Hareketleri, pp. 27-29; Gergek, Türk Matbaaciligi, p. 68. 7. Kara Mehmed Pasha's report is printed in Mehmed Ra§id, Ra§id Tarihi, 5 vols. (Istanbul, 1867), I, 120-125, and in Findiklili Silähdar Mehmet Aga, Silähdar tarihi, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1928), I, 403-409, and it was translated by J. von Hammer in Archiv für Geographie, Historie, Staats- und Kriegskunst, XIII (1822), 257-259. On Kara Mehmed, see SO, IV, 186; Köpriilüzade Ahmed Pa§a and Ahmed Refik, Viyana'da Osmanh Sefiri (Istanbul, 1932), pp. 40-42; Mehmed Zeki Pakalin, "Begte Osmanli Sefiri", Edebiyat-ι Umumiye Mecmuasi, no. 15/46 (1932), pp. 325-329; Faik Re§it Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri ve Sefaretnämeleri (Ankara, 1968), pp. 47-49. 8. Ibrahim Pasha's report was published by Ahmed Refik as "Pasarofpe Muahedesinden sonra Viyanaya sefir izami," TOEM, III (1918), pp. 211-227, and translated by Kraelitz as "Bericht über den Zug des Grossbotschafters Ibrahim Pascha nach Wien im Jahre 1719," Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften. PhilosophischeHistorische Klasse, 158 (Vienna, 1907), 9-65. On the author, see SO, II, 120 and Mehmed Ra§id, Ra§id Tarihi, V, 131-136; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 52-53. 9. Mehmed Efendi's report was published in Paris in the original and with French translations in three editions: Relation de l'Ambassade de Mehemet Effendi ä la cour de France en 1721, ecrite par lui-mSme et traduite du turc (Paris, 1757); Mehmet Efendinin SefaretnamesURelation de l'ambassade de Mohammed Effendi (Paris, 1841); and by Ali Suavi as ΕΙςί Mehmet Efendinin takriri/Takryr ou Relation de Mohammed Effendi (Paris, 1872). It was published in Turkish in Istanbul as Sefaretname-i Fransa (Istanbul, 1283/1866), by Ebuzziya Efendi as Paris Sefaretnamesi (1306/1890), and in Mehmed Ragid, Ra§id Tarihi, V, 330-367. On the embassy and the report, see A. d'Aubigny, "Un ambassadeur turc k Paris sous la regence. Ambassade de Mehemet Efendi en France . . . ," RHD, III (1889), 78-91, 200-235; John Seeker, Voyage d'un ministre ottoman, Mehemet Effendi (Montpellier, 1874);

Notes to pages 184-186

447

448

Babinger, pp. 326-327; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Maarif Vekäleti, Istanbul Kiltilphaneleri Tarih-Cografya Yazmalari Kataloglan, 12 fascs. (Istanbul, 1943-1957), pp. 780-782; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 53-58; SO, IV, 225; OM, III, 164. 10. Mehmed Efendi's report was summarized in Vasif, I, 64-68 and translated by J. Dumoret as "Relation de l'ambassade du dervich Me'hemmed Efendi ä St. Petersbourg, en 1168 de l'hegire (J.-C. 1754), extraite des annales de l'empire ottoman de Vassif Efendi et traduite du Türe par J. du Moret," JA, VIII (1826), 118-125. See also SO, II, 333; Babinger, p. 328; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 99-102. 11. Ahmed Resmi's report on Vienna was published under the title Viyana Sefaretnamesi by the Ebuzziya Press (Istanbul, 1304/1888) and in Vasif, I, 77-85. His report on Prussia was published by Ebuzziya as Sefaretname-i Ahmet Resmi (Istanbul, 1303/1887) and in Vasif, I, 154168. It was translated by Willy-Bay Bolland as Ahmed. Ressmi Effendi, eine türkische Botschaft an Friedrich den Grossen (Istanbul, 1903). Both reports were translated together by J. von Hammer as Wiener und Berliner Gesandtschaftsbericht: Resmi Achmet Effendi, Gesandtschaftliche Berichte von seinen Gesandtschaften in Wien im Jahre 1757 und in Berlin im Jahre 1763 (Berlin and Stettin, 1809). See also SO, II, 380; OM, III, 58; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 102-105, 112-116. 12. Mehmed Nahifi Efendi was in the suite of the Ottoman ambassador Abdülkerim Efendi; his account was published in Istanbul as Sef&retname-i Abdülkerim Pa§a (1316/1900). See Babinger, p. 329; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 129-133; SO, III, 355; OM, III, 189. 13. Cevdet1, VI, 88-89; Zinkeisen, VI, 858-859; Β. Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey"; Journal of World History, I (1953), 105-125; E. de Marcere, Une Ambassade ä Constantinople, I, 35; Ercümend Kuran, Avrupa'da Osmanli Ikamet Elgiliklerinin Kurulugu ve Ilk Elgilerin Siyasi Faäliyetleri, 1793-1821 (Ankara, 1968), p. 13. 14. Nuri, fol. 29a; Zinkeisen, VI, 846-847; Halil Inalcik, "Ya§ muahedesinden sonra Osmanli-Rus münasebetleri," Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi, IV (1946), 202; Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, p. 14. 15. Cevdet 1 , VI, 89; HH2, pp. 169-177; Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, pp. 15-22; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 168-178; SO, IV, 671; OM, III, 190; Ismail Hakki Uzungargih, "Ondokuzuncu asir baglarina kadar Tiirk-Ingiliz münasebätina däir vesikalar," Belleten, XIII (1949), 573648. Yusuf Agäh Efendi's report was published in Cevdet 2 , VI, 357-385 and in Muharrerat-i Nadire (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 384-396; also in part by Mehmed Zeki, Edebiyat-ι Umumiye Mecmuasi, II (1335/1919), 36-41. It was translated by J. von Hammer as "Account of the Mission of Yusuf Agha, Ambassador from Turkey to the British Court," Transactions of

Notes to pages 186-188

the Royal Asiatic Society, VIII (1833), 496-505. The only known copy of the full report is Ali Emiri Tarih MS 840 in the Millet Library of Istanbul (22 fol.). 16. Mahmud Raif Efendi's unpublished Journal du Voyage de Mahmoud Raif Ejfendi en Angleterre, ecrit par luy meme, is found at the Topkapi Saray, Istanbul, Ahmed III collection MS 3707. Upon his return from England, he did publish a French-language description of Selim's reforms, entitled Tableau des nouveaux reglements de l'Empire Ottoman (Istanbul, 1213/1798), printed at the Mühendishane press in Hasköy; Icalet ul-Jugrafya (Istanbul, 1219/1804), printed at the new Mühendishane press in Üsktldar. He later held important positions at the Porte, including that of Reis ul-Kuttab from 1800 to 1805, but was killed by the group of Bosporus soldiers whose uprising began the revolt that overthrew Selim III. Lewis, "French Revolution", p. 112; SO, IV, 329-330; OM, III, 317; Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 178-179. 17. Cevdet2, VI, 231-232; HH2, pp. 167, 177; Zinkeisen, VII, 18; Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, pp. 23-24. 18. Vasif, IV, 140a; SO, IV, 530; Kuran Ikamet Elgiliklerin; p. 24; Cevdet, VI, 232. 19. Vasif, IV, 140a; Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin; pp. 24-25; Cevdet, VI, 232. 20. He was officially appointed on 26 Rebi II 1211/30 Oct. 1796; Vasif, IV, 142a, 262a; Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, p. 24. 21. General accounts of these appointments are given in Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, pp. 23-26; and in HH2, pp. 167, 177; Cevdet2, VI, 257-260; Uzungar§ili, "Tiirk-Ingiliz Mtinasebatina dair Vesikalar," pp. 581-648; Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa-Misir ve Osmanli Imparatorlugu, 1797-1802 (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 169-171; Zinkeisen, VII 18-27; Lewis, "French Revolution," p. 112; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 61. On Ibrahim Efendi's appointment to Vienna, see Vasif, IV, 164b; V, 203a; Nuri, fols. 222a-223b; Cevdet 2 , VII, 119. 22. For the biography of Seyyid Ali Efendi, see SO, III, 554; OM, III, 190; and Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 179-181. His arrival in Paris is described in Nuri, fol. 224b and Vasif, IV, 165a. He returned from Paris on 8 Safar 1218/30 May 1803 with a report which was published by Ahmed Refik as "Morali al-Sayyid Ali Efendinin Sefaretnamesi," TOEM, I (1329/1911), 1120-1138, 1246-1259, 1332-1343, 1378-1390, 1458-1466, 1548-1560. It was described and summarized in Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa-Misir ve Osmanli Imparatorlugu, 1797-1802 (Istanbul, 1940) and Cevdet2, VIII, 219. On his mission, see Maurice Herbette, Une ambassade turque sous le directoire (Paris, 1902), and Kuran, Ikamet Elgiliklerin, pp. 25-35; Shaiik Ghorbal, "The Missions of Ali Effendi in Paris and of Sedki Effendi in London, 1797-1811," Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University of Cairo, vol. I (1933), 114-129; and Ismail

Notes to pages 188-189

449

450

Soysal, Fransiz Ihtilah ve Türk-Fransiz diplomasi miinasebeleri, 17891802 (Ankara, 1964). 23. His mission was analyzed and many of his reports were published by Enver Ziya Karal, Halet Efendinin Paris Biiyiik Elqiligi, 1802-1806 (Istanbul, 1940). See also Kuran, Ikamet Elqiliklerin, pp. 48-52; Erciimend Kuran, "Halet Efendi," EP, III, pp. 90-91. 24. Muhib Efendi's embassy in France is described in detail in Kuran, Ikamet Elqiliklerin, pp. 52-63 sind Unat, Osmanli Sefirleri, pp. 184-201. See also OM, III, 145, 189; SO, IV, 98; Babinger, pp. 341-342; and Ayntabi Ahmed Asim, Tarih-i Asim, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1867), I, 75-90,141-146. 25. Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi's report on France was published with translation as Sefaretname-i Seyyid Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi: Relation de l'ambassade de Mohammad Wahid Effendi (Paris, 1843), with the Turkish text being printed in Istanbul as Sefärtnäme-i Seyyid Vahid Efendi (Istanbul, 1283/1837-38) and Fransa Sefaretnämesi (temsil-i sani) (Istanbul, 1304/1886-87). On his life and embassy, see Unat, Osmanh Sefirleri, pp. 201-203; SO, IV, 605; OM, III, 160, 189; Asim, I, 174-177, II, 119. 26. Unat, Osmanh Sefirleri, pp. 181-184; Vasif, V, 203a; Cevdet2, VII, 119; SO, III, 615; OM, III, 114, 190; Ismail Hakki Uzunparjili, "Amedi Galip Efendi'nin Murahhasligi," Belleten, I (1937), 357-448. His report exists in a unique manuscript copy in the Millet Library, Istanbul, MS 832, and it was published in part in the Edebiyat-i Umumiye Mecmuasi, I, 160-163, 204-206, 222-223, 336-339, and 236-239. 27. Cevdet 2 , VII, 136; Kuran, Ikamet Elqiliklerin, pp. 35-41. 28. Vasif, IV, 262a; Kuran, Ikamet Elqiliklerin, p. 47. 29. Von Hammer then was a student at the Oriental Academy and, along with a number of his colleagues, he was assigned to serve as Ratib's translator during his visit to Vienna. Hammer describes his meetings with Ratib Efendi in his "Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben 1774-1852," Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Historische Kommission (Vienna and Leipzig, 1940), Bd. 70, pp. 26-27 and his Geschichte der Osmanischen Dichtkunst bis auf unsere Zeit, 4 vols. (Pest, 1837), IV, 418-419, but says he had no influence on him. 30. For accounts of the life and career of Azmi Efendi, see OM, III, 189; SO, III, 466; Babinger, pp. 329-330; on his report, see note 33. 31. For Mustafa Rasih's biography, see SO, II, 347 and Babinger, p. 331; also Ahmed Resmi, Halifet ul-Ruesa (Istanbul, 1296/1880), pp. 140-141. His report was published by Hayr ud-Din Nedim as Bir elqinin tarihqe-i sefareti (Istanbul, 1333/1917). On his mission, see Halil Inalcik, "Ya§ muahedesinden sonra Osmanli-Rus Münasebetleri: Rasih Efendi ve General Kutuzof elgilikleri," Ankara UniversitesiDil ve Tarih-

Notes to pages 189

Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi, IV (1946), 195-203; F. Clement-Simon, "Un ambassador extraordinaire russe ä Constantinople", RHD, XXI, 1907, pp. 25-39. 32. HIP, p. 79; Karal, OT, V, p. 11; Lewis, "French Revolution," p. 112; d'Ohsson, VII, 509-510, 513. 33. Azmi Efendi's report on Prussia was published in Istanbul in 1303/1887 by the Ebuzziya Press under the title Sefaretname-i Ahmed Azmi, and in Cevdet1, V, 411-426, and Cevdet2, V, 285-296. It was translated by Dr. Otto Müller-Kolshorn as 'Azmi Efendis Gesandtschaftsreise an den preussischen Hof. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen Beziehungen Preussens zur Hohen Pforte unter Friedrich Wilhelm II (Berlin, 1918). 34. See Chapter IX. 35. Galib Efendi's report describes his trip to Paris via Bulgaria and Austria, and something of the negotiations which led to peace with France in 1802; the only extant text is available in MS form as Ali Emiri Tarih, no. 832, Millet Library, Istanbul. His even more valuable dispatches were published in part by Ismail H. Uzungargili, "Amedi Galib Efendinin Murahhasligi ve Paristen gönderdigi §ifreli mektuplar," Belleten, I (1937), 357-410. 36. Muhib Efendi wrote two reports on Paris. The longer one, including information on French administration, economics, finance, art, science, and the army, is available only in MS form in Istanbul at the Millet Library (Ali Emiri 833, 834 and Re§id Efendi 614) and at the Beyazit Library (Cevdet-Veliuddin 128). The shorter report, with more general information on Paris, was published by Bertrand Bareilles, ed., as Un Turc a Paris, 1806-1811. Relation de voyage et de mission de Mouhibb Effendi (Paris, 1920). 37. Ali Aziz Efendi, Ottoman ambassador in Berlin in 1797-98 exchanged notes with the German orientalist Friedrich von Diez on philosophic and scientific matters, but while he demonstrated some interest in these matters, his replies showed once again the limits of Ottoman training—he had no idea whatsoever about experimental science and the rational philosophy developed in the West since the Enlightenment. See Erciimend Kuran, "Osmanli daimi elgisi Ali Aziz Efendi'nin Alman §arkiyatgisi Friedrich von Diez ile Berlin'de Ilmi ve Felsefi muhaberati, 1797," Belleten, XXVII (1963), 45-58. 38. Cevdet2, VI, 253; Zinkeisen, VII, 18-19, 558; AE, M6m. et Doc. Turquie 23, suppl., fols. 52-53,58; FO 78/18 (10 Feb. 1797). 39. FO 78/21 (25 Feb. 1799), 78/26 (30 June 1799), 78/29 (23 July 1800); Thornton, 1,34. 40. Bertold Spuler, "Die europaische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Beograd," Jahrbuch Kultur Geschichte Sloven, Nf. 11 (1935), 53-115,171-222, 313-366, continued in Jahrbuch Geschichte Osteuropas, I (1936), 229-262; 383-439.

Notes to pages 190-191

451

452

41. AE Turquie 182, fols. 361-366 (9 Jan. 1790); HHS, Türkei II95 (3 Feb. 1785). 42. FO 78/13, no. 32 (27 Dec. 1792); HHS, Türkei 11-101, no. 41 (27 Dec. 1792). 43. E. de Marcere, Une ambassade a Constantinople: La politique Orientale de la revolution franqaise, 2 vols. (Paris, 1927), II, 103-105. 44. General du Bayet was born in New Orleans and fought in the American Revolution under the leadership of Lafayette before joining him in France and fighting in the French Revolution (Lewis, "French Revolution," p. 116). 45. Dehe'rain, Ruffin, I, 4-5; Deherain, "Les Jeunes de Langue a Constantinople sous le premier empire," Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Frangaises, XVI (1928), 385-410. 46. FO 78/16, no. 5 (15 July 1795). 47. FO 78/13 (25 April 1792). 48. FO 78/18, no. 13 (10 June 1797). 49. FO 78/17, no. 12 (25 Aug. 1796). Asim, I, 374-376; Cevdet 1 , VIII, 196-203; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 71-72. 50. FO 78/15, no. 26 (25 Nov. 1794); HHS, Türkei 11-100, no. 29 (15 July 1792). 51. AE 185, fols. 420-424 (20 Sept. 1793); FO 78/14, no. 3 (25 Jan. 1793), no. 5 (25 Feb. 1793), no. 17 (10 July 1793); HHS, Türkei 11-103, no. 3 (25 Jan. 1793), 106, no. 8 (25 Feb. 1794); Cevdet 1 , VI, 119-121. 52. FO 78/15, no. 3 (10 Feb. 1794); Marcere, I, 33-35, 217-219. 53. AE 185, fols. 307-312. 54. AE 185, fols. 365, 394. This society was closed 19 December 1793 by order of the French government, and Henin was recalled to Paris because of his efforts to undermine Descorches and his mission. The two had quarreled for some time as to who was the rightful and leading agent of the Revolution at the Porte (AE Turquie 185, fol. 434). 55. FO 78/14, no. 15 (10 June 1793), no. 20; FO 78/15, no. 2 (25 Jan. 1794). Henin arrived in mid-August 1793, and left in late 1795, despite efforts of the French government to recall him during the previous two years. Descorches arrived 10 June 1793 and left in December 1795, after Verninac's arrival. See "Sommaire de la correspondance d'EtienneFelix He'nin, charge d'affaires de la Republique Fragaise a Constantinople," AF, ADXV, 54. 56. L. Lagarde, "Note sur les journaux frangaises de Constantinople ä l'epoque revolutionnaire," JA, 236 (1948), 271-276; Selim Nüzhet Gergek, Türk Gazeteciligi, 1831-1931 (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 10-16. 57. AE 195, fol. 482 (15 Oct. 1796). Copies of the Gazette Franqaise were enclosed in the Austrian, British, and French ambassadorial reports sent from Istanbul. I have consulted the following numbers: no. 1 (2 Vendemaire an V/23 Sept. 1796); no. 3 (7 Brumaire an V/28 Oct. 1796); no. 4 (3 Frimaire an V/3 Dec. 1796); no. 6 (13 Pluviöse an V/l

Notes to pages 191-196

Feb. 1797); no. 7 (20 Ventöse an V/10 March 1797); no. 8 (1 Floreal an V/20 April 1797); no. 9 (7 Floreal an V/6 May 1797). A photograph of no. 8 in full is presented in Niizhet, Türk Gazeteciligi, pp. 10-14. 58. HHS, TUrkei 11-110, no. 37 (10 Nov. 1795). 59. HHS, Türkei 11-103, no. 20 (25 July 1793); AE 182, fols. 279280 (31 Oct. 1791), fols. 290-300 (12 Dec. 1791). 60. FO 78/18, no. 11 (5 April 1797); Lewis, "French Revolution," pp. 114-115; H. von Sybel, "La propagande re'volutionnaire en 1793 et 1794." Revue Historique, XI (1879), 107-108. 61. FO 78/15, no. 7 (10 April 1794); Zinkeisen, VI, 861, 867, 880; VII, 70-73, 755; Sybel, pp. 111-113; Lewis, "French Revolution," p. 115; HHS, Türkei 11-101, no. 41 (27 Dec. 1792). 62. FO 78/14, no. 3 (25 Jan. 1793), no. 18 (25 July 1793); 78/15, no. 2 (25 Jan. 1794); AE 191, fol. 382 (4 Sept. 1795). 63. HHS, Türkei 11-103, no. 3 (25 Jan. 1793); FO 78/14, no. 9 (10 April 1793). 64. FO 78/14, no. 24 (25 Oct. 1793). 65. HHS, Türkei 11-102, no. 45 (7 Sept. 1792); FO 78/14, no. 21 (15 Sept. 1793). A number of royalist officers entered Ottoman service in 1794 and 1795 on the recommendation of the British ambassador; most of them were French emigre officers living in England. These included M. le Comte de Bizemont, Chevalier des ordres de St. Louis et St. Lazare, former Captain of the Royal Regiment, 41 years old, who was attached to the Ottoman general staff; M. le Chevalier de Montclair, Chevalier de Malte, former Captain of the artillery regiment of Besangon, aged 42; M. de Cauessin, Lieutenant in the artillery regiment of Auxonne, aged 32; M. le Baron de Merle, former Captain of Cavalry, now with rank of Colonel; M. Guief de Ville, Colonel in the artillery regiment of Auxonne and later sub-director of the Arsenal at Valenciennes, aged 40; M. de Tardif, Captain in the artillery regiment of Auxonne, aged 45; M. de Montpesat, Captain in the same regiment, aged 40; Marquis de la Riviere, Brigadier des armes du Roi; Mismond, Chevalier de Montclair and M. de Cauessin came from London on October 27. They were hired for terms of six years from 1 July 1795 (HHS, Türkei 11-110, no. 37, 10 Nov. 1795). 66. Each issue was eight pages long and cost 13 piasters. Two issues were supposed to be printed every month. The first issue was printed on the French Embassy press before the ambassador discovered its antirevolutionary sentiments. FO 78/18, no. 10 (10 May 1797); no. 12 (25 May 1797); AE Turquie 196, fol. 302 (22 June 1797). The only issues I have seen are no. 5 (12 June 1797) and no. 6 (21 June 1797), both enclosed in HHS, Türkei 11-107, no. 20. 67. AE Turquie 195, fol. 482. 68. FO 78/15, no. 3 (9 Feb. 1794). 69. HHS, Türkei 11-101, no. 39 (10 Dec. 1792); FO 78/14, no. 29

Notes to pages 196-197

453

454

(12 Dec. 1793); HHS, Türkei II-106, no. 12 (31 March 1794); FO 78/17, no. 19 (25 Sept. 1796). 70. FO 78/14, no. 17 (10 July 1793); Karal, HaletEfendi, pp. 56-57; E. Driault, La politique orientate de Napoleon: Säbastiani et Gardane 1806-1808 (Paris, 1904), p. 76. 71. FO 78/14; AF, BIII/415. 72. FO 78/15, no. 26 (25 Nov. 1794); HHS, Türkei 11-100, no. 29 (5 July 1792). 73. On the Chief Translator (Ba§ Tercuman), see Ε. I. Stamatiadis, Biographies of the Greek Dragomans in the Service of the Ottoman Porte in Greek (Athens, 1865), trans, into Rumanian by Constantin Erbiceanu as Biografiile marilor dragomani greci din Imperiul otoman 1661-1821 (Bucharest, 1897); J. Gottwald, "Phanariotische Studien," Vierteljahrschrift für Südosteuropa, V (1941); Gibb and Bowen, 1/1, 123; J. H. Kramers, 'Terdjüman" EP, IV, 762-763; d'Ohsson, VII, 165-166; 506; Ergin, Türkiye MaarifTarihi, II, 611-615; Uzungarjili, Merkez Teqkilati, pp. 71-72. 74. M. Guboglu, Paleografia Si Diplomatica Turco-Osmanä (Bucharest, 1958), pp. 107-108 lists every Chief Translator who served the Porte. Those who served in Selim's time were: Manuil Caradja (17881790); Alexander Constantin Moruzi (1790-1792); Gheorghe Constantin Moruzi (1792-1794); Alexander Callimachi (1794); Gheorghe Moruzi (1795-1796); Constantin Alexander Ipsilanti (1796-1799); Alexander Nicolae Suzzo (1799-1802); Alexander Mihail Suzzo (18021807). 75. Lewis, "French Revolution," p. 113. 76. E. J. W. Gibb, A History of Ottoman Poetry, 6 vols. (London, 1900-1909), IV, 107-323; Tanpinar, Edebiyati Tarihi, I, 18-29. XV. Disintegration of the Empire 1. The brigands and notables active in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th and early 19th centuries are described in Avdo Suceska, "Bedeutung und Entwicklung des Begriffes A'yän im Osmanischen Reich," Südost-Forschungen, XXV (1966), 3-26. See also Ismail Hakki Uzungar§ih,"Ayan,"M,11,41-42; Harold Bowen, "Ayän,"£:/ 2 ,1,778; OsmanNuri Ergin, Mecelle-i Umur-u Belediye, 5 vols., (Istanbul, 1912-1917), I, 1654-1668; Nuri, Netayic ul-vukuat, III, 74; IV, 35-36, 42, 71-72, 9899; A. F. Miller, Mustafa Pasha Bayrakdar (Moscow, 1947), pp. 363-365; Ismail Hakki Uzungargili, Alemdar Mustafa Pa§a (Istanbul, 1942), pp. 2-7. On the Celäli movement, which left a basis for local separatism in Anatolia, see Mustafa Akdag, Büyük Celäli Karisikliklarinm Baglamasi (Erzurum, 1963), and idem, Celäli Isyanlan, 1550-1603 (Ankara, 1963). 2. J. H. Mordtmann, "Derebey," EP, II, 207-208; Qagatay Ulugay,

Notes to pages 197-215

"Karaosmanogullarina ait bazi vesikalar," TV, Π (1942-1943), 193-207, 300-308, 434-440; Cagatay Ulugay, Manisa Ünlüleri (Manisa, 1946), pp. 54-62; F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1929), II, 597-603; Königlichen Museum, Altertümer von Pergamon, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1885), I, 84-91. 3. J. Macdonald Kinneir, Journey through Asia Minor (London, 1818), pp. 84-91, 107-109; Georges Perrot, Souvenirs d'un voyage en Asie Mineure (Paris, 1864), pp. 386-392. 4. Cevdet2, III, 144-146; SO, III, 548-549; Uzungar§ili, OT, IV/1, 447-451; IV/2, 32-33; B. Lewis, "Djänikli Hädjdji 'Ali Pasha," EP, II, 446-447. 5. Edib, fols. 85a-88b, 126b; Vasif, III, 77b-79a; Cevdet2, V, 110127, 209. 6. Cevdet2, V, 110-127. 7. The history and administration of Ottoman Egypt are discussed in Shaw, Financial Organization; idem, Eighteenth Century; Stanford J. Shaw, trans., Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). Also see E. Combe, L'Egypte Ottomane de la conquete par Selim (.1517) ä l'arrivee de Bonaparte, 1798 (Cairo, 1935); H. Deherain, L'Egypte Turque, Pashas et Mameluks du XVIe au XVI1P siecle (Paris, 1934); J. J. Marcel, Histoire de l'Egypte depuis la conquete des Arabes jusqu'a celle des Frangais (Paris, 1848); and Gibb and Bowen. 8. 'Abd al- Rahman b. IJasan al-Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-Athar, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1888-1894), III, 321; Cevdet, III, 10. On his life and career, see Shaw, Eighteenth Century, p. 7 η.; M. C. §ehabeddin Tekindag, "Cezzar Ahmed Pa§a," I A, III, 156-158; Haydar Ahmad Shihäb, Ta'rikh Ahmad Bäshä al-Jazzär, ed. Antüniyüs Shibli and Ighnätiyüs 'Abduh Khalifa (Beirut, 1955). 9. Vasif, III, 130a; Cevdet 2 , VI, 88, 173-174; Said Efendi, Vasf-i Cezzar Ahmed Pa§a, Istanbul University Library, MS TY 6206, fol. 5; HHS, Türkei 11-101, no. 36 (10 Nov. 1792); M. Chebli, Une histoire du Liban ä l'epoque des emirs, 1635-1841 (Beirut, 1955), pp. 125-147. 10. Η. Lammens, La Syrie: precis historique, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Beirut, 1921), II, 115, Sheykh b. Yusuf al-Shadyak, Akhbär al-ayän ft Jebel al-Lubnän (Beirut, 1859), 417; Jabarti, III, 321; W. R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 13-18; Chebli, pp. 192-202. 11. 'Abbäs al-'Azzäwi, Tä'rikh al-'Iräq bayn Ihtilalayn vol. V: 16391750 (Bagdad, 1953); vol. VI: 1749-1831 (Bagdad, 1954); S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford, 1925), pp. 75-186; Rasul Havi Efendi, Devhat ul-Vüzerä (Bagdad, 1830); Emin ibn Hasan al-Halwani al-Madini, Mutäli' us-Su'üd (Bombay, 1885); Säbit (Süleymän Bey b. Häj Tälib Kethüdä), Bagdad kölemen hükümetinin te/jkilüe inkiräzina dair risale (Istanbul, 1875). 12. Longrigg, pp. 187-203; 'Azzäwi, VI, 103-152; Olivier, vol. IV;

Notes to pages 215-221

455

456

J. Jackson, Journey from India towards England in .. . 1797 (London, 1799); Rasul Havi, Devhat ul-Vüzerä, pp. 183-226; Säbit, Mutäli' us-Su'üd, pp. 58-103. 13. Longrigg, pp. 203-212; 'Azzäwi, VI, 94-101, 118-119; Devhat ul-Vüzerä, 194-202; Säbit, Mutäli' us-Su'üd, pp. 103-167; Edib, fols. 84b, 119b; W. Franklin, Observations made on a tour from Bengal to Persia in 1786-7 (London, 1790), pp. 263-264; T. Howel, Voyage en retour de Finde par terre (Paris, an V/1797-98), pp. 23-36; H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (London, 1955), pp. 75-76, 78. 14. Philby, pp. 30-40; George Rentz, "Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4-1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1947); ' Azzäwi, VI, 121; Cevdet2, VII, 152-161. 15. Philby, pp. 40-59; 'Azzäwi, VI, 125-126. 16. Philby, pp. 60-100. 17. Cevdet2, VII, 161. 18. Cevdet2, V, 30-31, VII, 161-162. 19. Cevdet2, VI, 100-102, VII, 44, 77, 162; Vasif, III, 132b-133b; Philby, pp. 81-84. 20. Cevdet2, VII, 162; Philby, 85. 21. Philby, 86-88; Vasif, IV, 169a-b; Nuri, fols. 231b-232a; Cevdet 2 , VII, 26. 22. Cevdet 2 , VII, 26-29, 69, 162-164; Philby, 89-93; 'Azzäwi, 126136, 140-141; Vasif, IV, 270b. 23. HHS, Türkei 11-103 (10 July 1793); 100, no. 31 (10 Sept. 1792); Vasif, IV, 112b; Edib, fol. 112b; FO 78/15 (10 May 1794); Em. Gh. Protopsaltis, "Le mouvement revolutionnaire grec pendant la deuxieme guerre russo-turque (1787-1792) sous Catherine II", Deltion Tis Istorikis ke ethnologists etaireias tis ellädos, XIV (1960), 33-155 (in Greek, with French summary). 24. Vasif, IV, 36a, 67b; Nuri, fol. 104a; Cevdet 2 , VI, 175-6; HHS, Türkei 11-106, no. 1 (9 Jan. 1796); FO 78/15 (15 May 1794); AE Turquie 207 (18 Brumaire an XII). 25. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha's rise to power is described in detail in P. Aravantinos, Historia Ali Pasha (Athens, 1895), pp. 1-57; F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, Histoire de la regeneration de la Grece, 4 vols. (Paris, 1824), 1,1-42; G. Remerand, Ali de Tebelen, Pacha de Janina, 1744-1822 (Paris, 1928), pp. 11-32; W. Plomer, Ali the Lion: Ali ofTebeleni, Pasha of Jannina, 1741-1822 (London, 1936), pp. 17-47; Cavid Baysun, "Ali Pa§a, Tepedelenli," ΙΑ, I, 343-344; BVA, Mühimme 182, fol. 100. 26. BVA, Mühimme 187, p. 242; Baysun, "Ali Pa§a, Tepedelenli," ΙΑ, I, 344; Plomer, pp. 55-58; Remerand, 38-41; Pouqueville, Regineration, III, 42-62. 27. The Suliotes are described in Notis Botzaris, Visions balkaniques dans la preparation de la revolution grecque, 1789-1821 (Paris, 1962),

Notes to pages 221-229

pp. 47-48; Ch. Perraivos, Historia tou Soulliou kai Parqas, ed. Karabinis, 3rd ed. (Athens, 1857), pp. 11-16; and Aravantinos, pp. 69-72; see also Remerand, pp. 43-44; Plomer, pp. 58-61. 28. R6m6rand, pp. 44-46. 29. Botzaris, pp. 51-52; Aravantinos, 86; Pouqueville, Regeneration, I, 115, 125; Plomer, pp. 61-65; Remerand, 44-48. 30. Cevdet1, 284; Cavid Baysun, "Mustafa Pa§a, Igkodrali, Bu§atli, §erifi," ΙΑ, VIII, 727-730; Uzungargili, OT, IV/1, pp. 615-617; S. Gopcevi6, Geschichte von Montenegro und, Albanien (Gotha, 1914), pp. 222232. 31. Gopcevic, pp. 245-246; F. Lenormant, Turcs et Montenegrins (Paris, 1866), pp. 213-214; Remerand, pp. 44-46, 50-51. 32. BVA, Ali Emiri, I Abd ul-Hamid, 997; Cevdet2, VI, 198. 33. Gopcevic, pp. 225-232; Lenormant, pp. 208-209; Glogor Stanojevic, "Vasilije Brkic u Crnoj Gori 1788," Istoriski Pregled, 2 (1954), 6367; S. MijuSkovic, "Politicki manevri guvernadura Jovana Radonica," Istoriski zapisi, IX (1953), 161-182; DuSan Vuksan, Mitropolit Petar I Petrovic-Njegos i njegovo doba (Cetinje, 1951); Dusan Lekic, Spoljna politika Petra I Petrovica Njego&a (Cetinje, 1950); Zgodovina Narodov Jugoslavije. Druga Knjiga, Od Zaöetka XVI, stoletja do knoca XVIII. stoletga (Ljubljana, 1959), pp. 1066-1080. 34. Gopcevic, pp. 246-247; Lenormant, pp. 214-215; A. Andric, Geschichte des Fürstentums Montenegro von der ältesten Zeit bis 1852 (Vienna, 1853), p. 57; P. Coquelle,Histoire duMonUnegro et delaBosnie depuis les origines (Paris, 1895), pp. 238-239; Trifun Dukic, "Izvestaji ο bojevima Crno-goraca s Mahmut pasom Buäatlijom" Istoriski zapisi, VII (1951), 480-487. 35. BVA, Mühimme 178, p. 344; Lenormant, pp. 217-219; Gopievic, pp. 247-248; Coquelle, Montenegro, pp. 239-240. 36. Lenormant, pp. 221, 355-359; Gopcevic, pp. 248-249; Coquelle, Montenegro, pp. 239-240. 37. Gopcevic, pp. 249-265; Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 240; Lenormant, p. 221. 38. Gopieviö, pp. 250-251; Coquelle, Montenegro, pp. 241-242; Lenormant, pp. 222-223. 39. Cevdet2, VI, 197-198; Vasif, III, 142a. 40. Andric, Montenegro, p. 64; Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 244; Lenormant, p. 227; Gopievic, pp. 266-267. 41. Andric, Montenegro, pp. 60-61; Medakovic, Povijestnica Crnegore od najstarijeg vremena do 1830 (Zemun, 1850), p. 85; Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 245; Lenormant, pp. 227-228. 42. Gopcevic, pp. 267-270; Coquelle, Montenegro, pp. 245-247; Lenormant, 234-236. 43. Cevdet2, VI, 198; BVA, Ali Emiri, I Abd ul-Hamid, 1945. 44. Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 244; Andric, Montenegro, p. 64; Lenor-

Notes to pages 230-234

457

458

mant, p. 227; Gopcevic, pp. 266-267; Rem6rand, pp. 50-51; Plomer, p. 45; HHS, Türkei 11-107, no. 36 (25 Sept. 1794); Cevdet2, VI, 201; Vasif, IV, 144a. 45. Gopievic, pp. 270-272; Lenormant, pp. 236-237; Medakovic, pp. 86-88; Cevdet2, VI, 201; Vasif, IV, 144a. 46. Gopcevic, pp. 274-278; Lenormant, pp. 238-239; Coquelle, Montenegro, pp. 249-250; Andric, Montenegro, p. 69. 47. Gopcevic, pp. 279-280; Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 251; Lenormant, p. 241; Medakovic, pp. 95-100; Andric, Montenegro, p. 73; Cevdet2, VI, 197-200. 48. Cevdet 2 , VI, 201; Vasif, IV, 144a. 49. Lenormant, pp. 359-369, gives the full text of the judicial code. See also Coquelle, Montenegro, p. 254. 50. FO 78/13 (24 March 1792); HHS, Türkei 11-98, no. 7 (10 March 1792), no. 10 (24 March 1792); 104, no. 22 (10 Aug. 1793); 106, no. 9 (16 March 1794), no. 13 (10 April 1794); Vasif, IV, 36a, 72a. 51. Cevdet2, VI, 176-178. 52. Cevdet2, V, 223; BVA, Cevdet Maliye 2261, 9499; Cevdet Dahiliye 6447, 16960; BVA, Mühimme-i mektum, II, 46. 53. Nikolai Todorov, Polozhenieto Να Β ulgarskiya Narod pod Tursko Robstvo (Sofia, 1953), pp. 168-181; HHS, Türkei 11-104, no. 11 (23 March 1793), no. 22 (10 and 17 Aug. 1793). 54. On the life of Pasvanoglu, see Auguste Boppe, "La mission de l'adjutant commandant Meriage ä Widdin", Annals de l'Ecole des Sciences Politiques, I (1886). G. Yakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan-Oglu 17581807 par l'adjudant-commendant Meriage, "La Revue Slave, I (1906), 261-279, 418-429; II (1906), 139-144, 436-448; III (1907), 138-288. Fehim Bajraktarevic, "Paswan-Oghlu," E I \ III, 1034-1035; I. Pavlovic, Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva (Belgrade, 1890), pp. 103-128; S. Novakovic, Tursko Carstvo pred srpski ustanak, 1780-1804 (Belgrade, 1906), pp. 332-389; Asim, I, 218-223; Cevdet 2 , VIII, 87-88; C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren (Prague, 1876), pp. 486-503; A. Hajek, Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft (Berlin and Leipzig, 1925), pp. 64-82; J. Georgiev, Kardzaliite i Osman Pasvantoglu (Tirnovo, 1900). 55. Hajek, pp. 65-69. 56. Cevdet 2 , VI, 177-178; HHS, Türkei 11-110, no. 35 (24 Oct. 1795), no. 39 (25 Nov. 1795). 57. HHS, Türkei 11-110, no. 39 (25 Nov. 1795), no. 42 (24 Dec. 1795); III, no. 4 (2 Feb. 1796), 6 (10 Feb. 1796); 115, no. 15 (10 May 1797). Cevdet 2 , VI, 244-247; Zinkeisen, VII, 222-240; Iorga, V, 118-123. 58. A.-D. Xenopol, Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie Trojane, 2 vols. (Paris, 1896), II, 245-258; R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 155-158. 59. Branislav Djurdjev, "Bosna," EI2, I, 1268; Zgodovina Narodov

Notes to pages 234-240

Jugoslavije, pp. 1113-1133; Ivo Andric, Bosnian Chronicle (New York, 1963); Edib, fol. 108b; G. Yakschitch, L'Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1834 (Paris, 1907), pp. 17-21; Leopold von Ranke, The History of Servia and the Servian Revolution trans. A. Kerr (London, 1853), pp. 67-68; HHS, Türkei-Ii, 101, no. 36 (10 Nov. 1792); H. Kresevljakovic, "Cefilema sarajevskih krscana iz 1788 godine: La caution (guarantie) collective des Chretiens de Sarajevo en 1788 "Prilozi, III-IV (195253), 195-214; idem, "Prilozi povijesti bosanskih gradova pod turskom upravom: Contribution ä l'histoire des vi lies de Bosnie sous l'administration turque," Prilozi, II (1951), 115-184; V. Stojancevic, "Prvi srpski ustanak prema Bugarskoj i Bugarima. La Premiere insurrection serbe et ses relations avec la Bulgarie," Istoriski glasnik, 1-2 (1954), 121-147. 60. On the special status of the Kraina, see Dusan Pantelic, "Oko krajinski povlastica," Istoriski Glasnik, 1 (1949),62-82; and Zgodovina Narodov Jugoslavije. Druga Knjiga, Od Zacetka XVI, stoletja do konca XVIII. stoletja (Ljubljana, 1959), pp. 952-978. On Pasvanoglu's attacks, see HHS, Türkei 11-106, no. 9 (16 March 1794); Yakschitch, Insurrection de la Serbie, pp. 21-22; Vasif, IV, 69b-70a; Nuri, fols. 66a, 104a. 61. Yakschitch, Resurrection de la Serbie, p. 22; Vasif, IV, 152b; Nuri, fol. 138a. 62. Cevdet2, VI, 243-244; HHS, Türkei 11-112, no. 17 (10 June 1796). 63. An exhaustive study of Hakki Pasha's career is provided in Ismail Hakki Uzungar§ili, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 177-284; see also Ibn ulEmin Mahmud Kemal Inal, "Mehmed Hakki Pa§a," TTEM, VIII (1926), 351-367. 64. Vasif, IV, 41b-42a; Nuri, fols. 76b-77b; Cevdet2, VI, 178-179; AE Turquie 193 (15 Pluviöse an IV). Uzungargili, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 182-183. 65. HHS, Türkei 11-111, no. 7 (25 Feb. 1795). 66. Cevdet2, VI, 178; Nuri, fol. 247a-b; FO 78/17 (10 March 1796); Uzunjargili, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 183-185. 67. BVA, HH 394 (14 Ramazan 1210/19 March 1796); Uzungargih, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 184-185. 68. Cevdet2, VI, 177; FO 78/16 (10 July 1795). 69. Vasif, IV, 72a; Nuri, fol. 104a; HHS, Türkei 11-111, no. 1 (9 Jan. 1796). 70. Cevdet2, VI, 178; HHS, Türkei 11-112, no. 9 (10 March 1796), no. 10 (25 March 1796), no. 11 (9 April 1796), no. 13 (25 April 1796), no. 14 (10 May 1796), no. 15 (25 May 1796); Uzun ? ar§ili, "Hakki Pa§a," p. 185. 71. HHS, Türkei 11-112, no. 17 (10 June 1796), no. 18 (25 June 1796); 113, no. 20 (9 July 1796), no. 22 (25 July 1796). 72. HHS, Türkei 11-113, no. 24 (10 Aug. 1796), no. 26 (10 Sept. 1796), no. 27 (24 Sept. 1796), no. 30 (25 Oct. 1796), no. 34 (25 Nov. 1796), no. 38 (24 Dec. 1796); 114, no. 5 (10 Feb. 1797), no. 7 (25 Feb. 1797); HHS, Türkei 11-113, no. 9 (24 March 1797), no. 10 (3 April 1797), no. 11 (10

Notes to pages 241-243

459

460

April 1797), no. 13 (25 April 1797); Uzungar^ili, "Hakki Paja," pp. 175176. 73. Cevdet 2 , VI, 203-204; AE Turquie 207, no. 12 (4 Frimaire an XII); Uzungar§ili, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 187-188. 74. Cevdet 1 , VI, 246; Cevdet2, VI, 202-203; Uzungargili, "Hakki Pa§a," p. 186. 75. Cevdet 2 , VI, 202; Nuri, fols. 140b-141a, 138b; HHS, Türkei 11-115, no. 16 (24 May 1797). 76. Ahmed Refik, Türk Idaresinde Bulgaristan, 973-1255 (Istanbul, 1933), pp. 66-68; FO 78/18 (20 July 1797); HHS, Türkei 11-115, no. 16 (24 May 1797), no. 20 (26 June 1797), no. 21 (10 July 1797); Uzungar§ili, "Hakki Pa§a," pp. 187-189; BVA, Mühimme-i mektum, III, '30-31. 77. HHS, Türkei 11-115, no. 24 (25 July 1797), no. 25 (10 Aug. 1797), no. 28 (9 Sept. 1797), no. 30 (10 Oct. 1797); 116, no. 34 (10 Nov. 1797). 78. HHS, Türkei Π-116, no. 38 (25 Nov. 1797); Cevdet2, VI, 263. 79. Cevdet2, VI, 242-244, 263; Vasif, IV, 90a-b. 80. Vasif, IV, 170b-177b; Cevdet2, VI, 218. 81. Cevdet 2 , VI, 242-244. 82. HHS, Türkei 11-117, no. 2 (11 Jan. 1798), no. 5 (10 Feb. 1798), no. 6 (24 Feb. 1798). 83. HHS, Türkei 11-117, no. 12 (11 April 1798), no. 13 (25 April 1798); Zinkeisen, VII, 230; BVA, HH, III Selim 2185, 2379, 2521, 2550, 6605, 8263, 8779,15482. 84. HHS, Türkei 11-117, no. 6 (24 Feb. 1798), no. 8 (10 March 1798). 85. Xenopol, II, 255-256. 86. HHS, Türkei 11-117, no. 19 (9 June 1798), no. 20 (25 June 1798), no. 25 (10 July 1798); BVA, HH, 2378a, 2378b, 2378d.

XVI. The Eastern Question 1. Cevdet2, V, 220-222; Zinkeisen, VI, 858-859. 2. Β. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey p. 64. 3. Cevdet 2 , VI, 151-158; Tahsin Öz, "Sir Kätibi," 184; Halil Inalcik, "Osmanli-Rus," p. 202; Zinkeisen, VI, 846-847. 4. See Chapter XIV. 5. AE Turquie 184, fols. 125-140; Marcere, vols. I and II; M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London, 1966), pp. 23-24. 6. See Chapter XI. 7. Cevdet 2 , VI, 153-154, 162-163; AE Turquie 188 (21 Thermidor an II); AF"1 75/308 (7 Oct. 1793). 8. Cevdet 2 , VI, 152, 157-159; AE Turquie 185 (9 June and 8 Aug. 1793). 9. AE Turquie 185 (8 Aug. 1793); HHS, Türkei 11-107, no. 26 (9 Aug. 1794).

Notes to pages 244-250

10. Cevdet1, VI, 140,183-184; Cevdet2, VI, 151-159; Marcere, I, 94284; Zinkeisen, VI, 851-872; Iorga, V, 109,112,115; FO 78/15 (25 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1794); FO 78/18 (10 Aug. 1797; 10 Feb. 1798). 11. FO 78/18 (10 Aug. 1797); AE Turquie 196 (3 April 1797). 12. Marcere, I, 89-90; Cevdet1, VI, 159, 202-203; Cevdet 2 , VI, 161, 165-167; Zinkeisen, VI, 866-872; Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 56-57, 106; FO 78/14 (11 March 1793). 13. Boris Mouravieff, L'Alliance russo-turque au milieu des guerres Napoleoniennes (Neuchatel, 1954), pp. 7-8; A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 (Durham, N.C., 1947), p. 24; Vasif, IV, 147a; Nuri, fol. 138a; H. Temperley and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt, 1792, to Salisbury, 1902 (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 1-22. 14. Marcere, II, 142-143; FO 78/18 (10 Aug. 1797); Karal, FransaMisir, p. 59; Vasif, IV, 149a-b. 15. Vasif, IV, 67a; HHS, Türkei 11-116, no. 38 (25 Nov. 1797); 117, no. 2 (11 Jan. 1798), no. 13 (25 April 1798), no. 20 (25 June 1798). 16. G.-Fr. Martens, ed., Recueil des principaux traitis de 1761 ά 1801, 7 vols. (Göttingen, 1791-1801), VI, 460. 17. Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 63-64; Cevdet 2 , VI, 231-235, 277-280, 285-286, 295; Asim, I, 62, 71; Iorga, V, 128-129; Zinkeisen, VII, 37-38; P. Pisani, La Dalmatie de 1797 a 1815 (Paris, 1893), pp. 32-47; FO 78/19 (10 Nov. 1797); AE Turquie 196 (31 Aug. 1797); 197 (10 Nov. 1797). I. H. Uzungar§ili, "On dokuzuncu asir baglarina kadar Türk-Ingiliz münasebatina däir vesikalar," Belleten, XIII (1949), 589. 18. BVA, HH 1987 (15 §evval 1215); R6m£rand, p. 52. 19. Plomer, 84; R£m6rand, pp. 54-55; Auguste Boppe, L'Albanie et ΝαροΙέοη, 1797-1814 (Paris, 1914), pp. 1-9; AE Corfu II (14 March 1798). 20. Rem6rand, p. 55; Plomer, pp. 85-86. 21. Remerand, pp. 55-56; Boppe, L'Albanie et ΝαροΙέοη, pp. 9-11; AE Corfu II (14 March 1798); J.-P. Bellaire, Precis des operations generales de la division frangaise du Levant (Paris, 1805), p. 20; Olivier, I, 192-223. 22. Boppe, L'Albanie et ΝαροΙέοη, pp. 12-15; D. and N. Stephanopoli, Voyage de Dimo et Nicolo Stephanopoli en Grece pendant les annees 1797 et 1798, 2 vols. (London, 1800); E. Driault, ΝαροΙέοη et la resurrection de la Grece (Paris, 1924); C. Kerofilas, "Napoleon et la Grece," Les etudes franco-grecques, II (1919), 145-155, 202-211, 273-281. 23. Lobanov-Rostovsky, p. 16; Cevdet 2 , VI, 207-208, 233; FO 78/18 (15 May 1797); AE Turquie 196 (31 Aug. 1797); Zinkeisen, VII, 26-27. 24. FO 78/18 (15 May 1797); AE Turquie 196 (1 Dec. 1797); Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 57-58; Karal, "Yunan Adalarinin Fransizlar tarafindan isgali ve Osmanli-Rus münasebati," TSD, 1/1 (1937), pp. 100-125. 25. Karal, "Yunan Adalan," pp. 113-117; Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 63-64, 113-114; Cevdet1, VI, 248-249, 282-284.

Notes to pages 250-254

461

462

26. Karal, "Yunan Adalan," pp. 119-120; Karal, Fransa-Misir, p. 58; AE Turquie 196 (15 Jan. and 15 Sept. 1797). 27. Iorga, V, 123-124; Zinkeisen, VII, 25; Cevdet 2 , VI, 233-235,283, 289; Marcere, II, 338; FO 78/19 (24 July 1798); AE Turquie 196 (25 April 1797); 197 (27 Dec. 1797, 1 and 10 Feb. 1798); Deherain, Rufjin, 1,122123,134-137. 28. Iorga, V, 123-124; Marcere, II, 338; FO 78/19 (24 July 1798); AE Turquie 197 (18 Jan. 1798). 29. Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondence de Napoleon Ier: publiee par ordre de l'empereur NapoUon III, 32 vols. (Paris, 1858-1870), III, 215, 236; IV, 52-53; Shafik Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise ofMehemet Ali (London, 1928), pp. 12-13, 52-53; Mouravieff, p. 14; Pisani, Dalmatie, 199; Zinkeisen, VII, 34 η.; Maurice Herbette, Une Ambassade Turque sous le Directoire (Paris, 1902), pp. 212-217; J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 2 vols. (Princeton, N. J., 1956), I, 62. 30. Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 62-66,149-153; Herbette, pp. 219-226; Cevdet2, VI, 236-237, 327, 332; Karal, "Yunan Adalan," p. 113; AE Turquie 198 (25 May 1798); AE Turquie 23 suppl. (15 Aug. 1798). 31. AE Turquie 197 (15 March 1798); Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, pp. 34-35; Deherain, Ruffin, I, 126-130; Mouravieff, p. 169; Marcere, II, 313; AE Turquie 198 (16 Sept. and 5 Oct. 1798), 199 (3 Oct. 1798). 32. AE Turquie 198 (15 June 1798). 33. FO 78/21 (24 March 1799); AE Turquie 198 (3 July 1798); Cevdet 1 , VI, 295; C. de la Jonquiere, L'Expedition d' Egypte, 1798-1801, 5 vols. (Paris, 1899-1907), I, 587. 34. Deherain, Ruffin, I, 131-134; Cevdet1, VI, 319-334; Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 67-68; Herbette, pp. 219-220; AE Turquie 198 (20 and 27 June 1798); FO 78/20 (11 Sept. 1798). 35. Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 68-69, 154-157; Cevdet 1 , VI, 290, 321322; AE Turquie 198 (26 July 1798). 36. Karal, Fransa-Misir, p. 69; Cevdet1, VI, 290-291, 332-333; Cev2 det , VI, 240-241; AE Turquie 198 (24 July 1798); FO 78/19 (23 and 25 July 1798).

XVII. The War of the Triple Alliance 1. The most important accounts of the French Expedition are Jonquiere; L. Reybaud, Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expedition francaise en Egypte, 10 vols. (Paris, 1803-1836); Gaston Wiet, ed. and trans., Nicolas Turc, Chronique de'Egypte, 1798-1804, (Cairo, 1950); 'Abd alRahmän b. Hasan al-Jabarti, 'Ajä'ib al-Äthär, 4 vols. (Bulak, 18881894); French trans, by Chefik Mansour Bey and others as Merveilles biographiques et historiques ou chroniques du Abd el-Rahman el-Djabarti,

Notes to pages 254-257

9 vols. (Cairo, 1888-1896). See also Shaw, French Revolution; Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (London and New York, 1963) and 'Abd al-Rahmän al-Räfi'i. Tä'rtkh al-IJarakat al-Qawmiyye wa tatawwur nizäm al-Hukm ft Misr, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1948). A complete bibliography of the literature on the Expedition is found in H. Munier, Tables de la description de l'fcgypte suivies d'une bibliographie sur I'expedition frangaise de Bonaparte (Cairo, 1943). The archives of the expedition are held by the French Ministry of War, Archives de la Guerre, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris. 2. Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 21-22; Herold, pp. 88-95; Rafi'i, I, 195200.

3. Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 23-24; 'Ali Pasha Mubarak, Khitat elTaufiqiyya, 20 vols. (Bulak, 1306/1888), VIII, 89-91; Jabarti, III, 63-66; Räfi'i, I, 207-220; Herold, pp. 96-100. 4. Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 26, 28-37; Räfi'i, I, 193-200; Karal, Fransa-Misir, p. 81; Herold, pp. 100-101; Jabarti, III, 3. 5. Rafi'i, I, 354-368, 378-416; Herold, pp. 225-262; Jonquiere, III, 531, 607; Vasif, IV, 198a-204b. 6. Herold, pp. 267-284, 287-300, 309-310; Jonquiere, IV, 1-238, 241-354, 355-439, 463-638; Rafi'i, II, 20-36; Cevdet2, VII, 13-21; Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance, V, 3982, 4011, 4018,4026,4035; Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 53-65; Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, p. 85; Chebli, pp. 203-208; Shihäb, pp. 186-192; Vasif, IV, 221a-222a; TKS, E113, E7016; HH1 pp. 66-67; P. Benoit, "Saint Jean d'Acre," Revue des Deux-Mondes, XXV (1935), 721-748; XXVI (1935), 1-34, 241-267; Ismail Hakki Uzungar§ili, "Bonapart'in Cezzar Ahmed Pa§a'ya mektubu ve Akkä muhasarasma dair bir deyi§," Belleten, XXVIII (1964), 451-457. 7. Rafi'i, I, 221-231; Herold, 102-129; Wiet, Nicolas Turc, 39; Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, pp. 56-58; Jonquiere, II, 399-425. 8. Rafi'i, II, 116-120, 320-325; Vasif, III, 157a-b; IV, 263a-266a, 270a; Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 85-96; Cevdet2, VII, 62-63, 282-285; Herold, pp. 353-355; F. Charles-Roux, "Une negotiation pour I'evacuation de l'Egypte. La convention d'El-Arich, 1800," RHD (1923), 48-88, 304-347; A. M. Blanc d'Hauterive, Observations et pieces relatives a la convention d'El-Arisch (Paris, an IX/1800); H. Nahoum, Recueil des Firmans Imperiaux Ottomans addresses aux Valis et aux Khedives d' Egypte, 1597-1904 (Cairo, 1934); HIP, pp. 75-76; FO 78/26 (23 Sept., 17 Nov., and 15 Dec. 1799); AE Turquie 201 (24 Jan. 1800), 202, fols. 9 7 103; FO 78/23 (31 Jan. 1800), 78/28 (16 Feb., 4 and 5 March 1800); FO 78/29 (27 April 1800). 9. Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 96-98; Cevdet2, VIII, 62-68; Räfi'i, II, 121-133; Herold, pp. 356-357; FO 78/29 (19 March, 1 and 11 April 1800). 10. Cevdet2, VII, 74-75; Wiet, Nicolas Turc, pp. 115-116, 123; Shihäb, II, 312-314; Räfi'i, II, 137-143, 325-329; G. Rigault, he general Abdallah Menou et la derniere phase de I'expedition d'Egypte, 1799-1801

Notes to pages

257-258

463

464

(Paris, 1911), pp. 163-164, 288-289; Deherain, L'Egypte Turque, pp. 74, 510-514; AE Turquie 201 (8 Oct. 1801); FO 78/29 (17 May and 6 June 1800). 11. Herold, pp. 383-388; Wiet, Nicolas Türe, pp. 136-137; Cevdet2, VII, 105, 109; Anderson, Naval Wars, 391; Noradounghian, III, 41-47; Räfi'i, II, 335-344; de Testa, II, 37; Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 134-135; Zinkeisen, VI, 899-904; Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, p. 137; FO 78/32 (21 Sept. 1801). 12. French internal policy in Egypt during the Expedition is outlined in Shaw, French Revolution, pp. 22-29, 99-100,116, 123-125, 142-144, 147-148,156-163. See also M. R. X. Esteve, Compte-rendu de l'administration des finances pendant l'etablissement des Francais en Egypte", (Paris, 1802); M. Chevalier, "La politique financiere de I'expedition d'Egypte", CHE, VII (1955), 165-186, 223-243; VIII (1956), 47-68,176197, 213-240. 13. Deherain, L'Egypte Turque, p. 250. 14. Räfi'i, I, 93-115; Shaw, French Revolution, pp. 23-24. 15. Räfi'i, II, 14-19; Shaw, French Revolution, pp. 24-25. 16. Shaw, French Revolution, p. 26. 17. Ibid., pp. 142-143, 158; Chevalier, VIII, 213-222; G. Rigault, pp. 112-135, 240-260. 18. Karal, "Yunan Adalan," pp. 123-124; idem, Fransa-Misir, pp. 98-99; FO 78/19 (23 July 1798); AE Turquie 198 (24 July, 1 and 10 Aug. 1798). 19. Cevdet2, VI, 283-292; Asim, I, 70-71; Karal, "Ingilterenin Akdeniz Hakimiyeti Hakkmda vesikalar, 1798-1805," TV, I (1941), 122134; Karal, Fransa-Misir, p. 93; AE Turquie 198 (25 Aug. 1798); FO 78/19 (3 Sept. and 26 Oct. 1798); J. Kabrda, Quelques firmans concernant les relations franco-turques lors de I'expedition de Bonaparte en Etypte (Paris, 1947), pp. 64-70. 20. Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, pp. 61-63; Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 95-96; Herbette, pp. 238-246; Kabrda, pp. 13-14; FO 78/20 (1 and 2 Sept. 1798); AE Turquie 198 (Sept. 1798). 21. Cevdet 2 , VI, 264-267, 294; Vasif, IV, 188a-b; HIT, pp. 55-56; Karal, Fransa-Misir, pp. 94-95; AE Turquie 198 (30 Aug. 1798); FO 78/20 (3 Sept. 1798). 22. P. Pisani, "Une expedition russo-turque aux lies Ioniennes", RHD, II (1888), 190-225; Cevdet2, VII, 5-6; Vasif, IV, 212b-217b; Mouravieff, pp. 18-19; Asim, I, 62, 70-75; Pisani, Dalmatie, p. 205; FO 78/20 (8 and 10 Sept. 1798); J. C. Hurewitz, "The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits: A Reassessment," Belleten, XXVIII (1964), 459-503, esp. pp. 482-483. 23. Cevdet 2 , VII, 6; Asim, I, 71; Mouravieff, pp. 16-18; Anderson, Naval Wars, p. 367.

Notes to pages 258-264

24. Boppe, L'Albanie et ΝαροΙέοη, pp. 14-15; Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance, V, 233-234; AE Turquie 199 (27 Sept., 8 Oct., and 23 Dec. 1798); FO 78/20 (2 Nov. 1798); Cevdet 2 , VII, 6-8; Remerand, pp. 56-60; Iorga, V, 128-129; Zinkeisen, VII, 84-98. 25. FO 78/21 (24 March 1799); AE Turquie 198 (25 Sept. 1798). 26. Zinkeisen, VII, 239-240; Cevdet 2 , VII, 37-38; FO 78/21 (7 March 1799); BVA, HH, III Selim, 2252, 6856, 12505. 27. R6merand, pp. 58-62; Zinkeisen, VII, 184-188; Cevdet2, VII, 7; E. Rodocanachi, Bonaparte et les lies loniennes: Un episode des conquetes de la Ripublique et du Premier Empire, 1797-1816 (Paris, 1899), pp. 67-78, 105-115. 28. Karal, "Yunan Adalari," pp. 100-112; Mouravieff, p. 20; FO 78/21 (24 March 1799). 29. Rodocanachi, pp. 1-66, 79-104; G. Pautier, Les lies loniennes pendant l'occupation franqais et le protectorat anglais (Paris, 1863), pp. 12-20; FO 348/2 Corfu (5 July 1797). 30. Cevdet2, VII, 7; Rodocanachi, pp. 116-133. 31. Hurewitz, "Background of Russia's Claims," p. 479. 32. Cevdet', VI, 284; Asim, I, 67; Zinkeisen, VII, 45; Ghorbal, Egyptian Question, pp. 65-66; FO 78/19 (28 Aug. and 25 Sept. 1798); 78/20 (3 Oct. 1798); AE Turquie 199 (7 Oct. 1798). The Koehler mission is described by its physician, William Wittman, in his Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor. . . (London, 1803). Koehler's reports are found in the dispatches of the British ambassadors to London in FO 78. 33. Marcere, II, 320; Zinkeisen, VII, 755-756; Kabrda, pp. 82-85; Cevdet2, VII, 4-5. 34. Herbette, pp. 245-257; AE Turquie 199 (8,27, and 31 Nov. 1798). 35. FO 78/20 (30 Dec. 1798), 78/21 (6 Jan. 1799); AE Turquie 199 (2 Nov. 1798); Cevdet2, VII, 788; Asim, 1,62; Uzungar§ili, "Tiirk-Ingiliz," pp. 589-590. 36. The public text of the Turko-Russian alliance is given in full in Mesut Pa§a, Mecmua-i Muahedat, IV, 14-19; Noradounghian, III, 2427; Vasif, IV, 204b-207b; Cevdet 2 , VII, 254-257; it is discussed in Cevdet2, VII, 7-8; Asim, I, 62; Karal, OT, V, 33-35. The French text of the secret agreement is found in BVA, Muahedeler, 481-482, and is reprinted in Hurewitz, "Background of Russia's Claims," pp. 498-500. The Ottoman text is given only in Asim, I, 65-68, and is discussed in Hurewitz, "Background of Russia's Claims, pp. 483-486, and Karal, OT, V, 35. Both public and secret articles are given in full in FO 78/21 (24 March 1799) and summarized in Re§at Ekrem, Osmanli Muakedeleri ue Kapitulasiyonlar, 1800-1920 (Istanbul, 1934), pp. 114-118. 37. The text of the Turko-British alliance is given in full in Mesut Pa§a, Mecmua-i Muahedat, I, 262-263; Noradounghian, III, 28-31; J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary

Notes to pages 265-267

465

466

Record, 1535-1914, 2 vols. (Princeton, N. J., 1956), I, 65-67; Cevdet 2 , VII, 257-260; Asim, I, 68-70; Vasif, IV, 207b-210b; FO 78/21 (6 Jan. 1799); and Uzungar§ili, "Turk-Ingiliz," pp. 590-592. 38. Pisani, "Une expedition," pp. 197-221; Uzungargili, "Ar§iv vesikalarina göre Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti," Belleten, I (1937), 627-630; Vasif, IV, 249a-b; Mouravieff, pp. 24-25; Anderson, Naval Wars, pp. 367-371; Asim, I, 71-72; Kabrda, pp. 86-90; AE Turquie 199 (20 Feb. and 18 March 1799); FO 78/21 (3 March 1799); Rodocanachi, pp. 129173; Itemerand, 63. 39. Asim, I, 71; Rodocanachi, pp. 175-178; FO 78/21 (5 Feb. 1799), 78/22 (17 Feb. 1800); AE Turquie 201 (13 March 1800); Iorga, V, 133, 137; Uzungar§ili, "Yedi Ada," pp. 631-637. 40. Mouravieff, pp. 28-29; Pisani, "Une expedition," pp. 218-219; Iorga, V, 137-138; Uzungar§ili, "Yedi Ada," pp. 634-638. 41. AE Turquie 201 (13 March 1800); FO 78/22 (25 Oct. 1799). 42. Vasif, IV, 255a; Mouravieff, pp. 39-40; Anderson, Naval Wars, pp. 380-383; FO 78/22 (19 and 22 Sept. and 7 Oct. 1799). 43. FO 78/24 (24 Dec. 1799), 78/28 (29 Jan. 1800), 78/29 (8 April 1800); Rodocanachi, pp. 177-178; Cevdet 2 , VII, 43. 44. The text of the convention is found in Mesut Pa§a, Mecmua-i Muahedat, IV, 28-34; Noradounghian, III, 36-41; Asim, I, 71-75; FO 78/30 (10 Oct. 1800); AE Turquie 201 (8 Aug. 1800). It is discussed in Cevdet2, VII, 43; Uzun