Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 9780674422773, 9780674068308

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Between Old and New Harvard Middle Eastern Studies 15

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6,029 men and 27 officers in April 1800, and 9,263 men and 27 officers in July 1801.”° Not all the governors recruited and trained Nizam-t Jedid men, but nine did, of whom the most active were Abdurrahman Pasha, governor of Karaman and Alaiye, who was appointed colonel of the entire regiment in 1801, Jebbar zade, and Suleyman Pasha, independent governor of Baghdad.”’ Starting in 1802, Abdurrahman Pasha developed a system of military conscription throughout Anatolia to provide men for the Nizam-i Jedid. Each provincial and district official and notable

was required to send a certain number of men to Usktdar for training in the new army, for periods of between six months and one year. Generally, half the contingents were trained as infantry for service in the regular Levend Chiftlik and Uskiidar corps. The

other half were trained as cavalry so that they could return to form the local militias of the provincial governors and district notables.” After 1804 an effort was made to transform the entire Timar feudal system into the base for this Nizam-i Jedid militia. Fiefs were seized on the flimsiest of pretexts and administered by the Irad-i Jedid treasury as tax farms to provide revenue to support the recruitment and training of the same number of men for the Nizam-i Jedid militia as were formerly supported on a feudal basis. The fiction of feudal organization was preserved by the application of the name Sanjak Bey to their officers, but these were in fact salaried officers sent to the provinces by the Levend Chiftlik and Uskiidar corps. Regular barracks were built for the new provincial militia at the expense of the [rad-i Jedid treasury, at Ankara, Bolu, Kastamonu, Kutahya, Kayseri, Nicopolis, Kirshehir, Chorum, Menteshe, and Izmir, while elsewhere they were housed in buildings previously used by the local security forces. By the end of 1806, as a result of these efforts, there were 22,685 men and 1,590 officers enrolled in the Nizam-i Jedid army, of whom approximately half were stationed in Anatolia and the balance in Istanbul and the Balkans.” The success of this Anatolian venture led the Sultan to attempt the creation of a similar corps in Europe, with its central base at Edirne.*® But the Euro-

The “New Order” of Selim III

pean parts of the empire by this time were entirely too far re- 133 moved from central control for this sort of levy to be effective; it

was entirely unsuccessful. In this area, therefore, the Ottoman army continued to depend almost entirely on the independent local notables.

The rapid increase in the number of men enrolled in the new army after 1794 created a number of new problems, principally the same sort of disorderly, undisciplined behavior which had brought the older corps into disrepute. In the early days of the Nizam-t Jedid, most of the enlisted men were Turks enrolled mainly in Istanbul from among the large group of unemployed, who joined as the only alternative to starvation. Most of them were accustomed to the discipline, restraint, and sanitary methods required by living in close proximity to large numbers of persons. In contrast, most of the new men enrolled after 1794 came

from Anatolia; the enrollment lists show that by 1800, 90 per cent of the enlisted men in the army were Turkish peasants and tribesmen."! Many of them joined more for the weapons and plunder they hoped to gain than for anything else. Resistant to discipline and unaccustomed to the kind of life required by the corps,

they became increasingly turbulent and disorderly, and there were frequent incidents in which they descended to the Bosporus at Tarabya, Yeni Koy, and Beshiktash, attacking and robbing at will. Many of them fled from the camps shortly after receiving their uniforms and weapons, complaining that the work was too

hard, the discipline too severe, and the pay too low. Forming powerful new robber bands, they began to plague notables and governors alike in western Anatolia and the Balkans, the superior weapons provided by the Sultan giving them an inestimable advantage over their opponents.” To combat these problems, various changes were made in the organization of the corps. Additional officers were appointed. Pun-

ishments for infractions of the rules were made more severe. Efforts were made to control the men when they were not actually in the field or training at the practice grounds. The rapid increase in the number of men had so far outstripped the facilities at Levend Chiftlik and Uskitidar that it was impossible for all the men to practice daily, as was originally envisaged in their

Military Reforms

134 regulations. Those unable to practice were left with nothing to do for a good part of the time since such a contingency had not been provided for. The resulting idleness and lack of supervision were considered a major cause of the difficulties which the army was now experiencing. As a partial solution, new training regulations were introduced on April 6, 1801.°* A regular system of training rotation was set up in a manner similar to that of the artillery corps. As an additional measure to relieve the pressure

of idleness, those men wishing to engage in an outside trade when they were not required at the practice field were allowed to do so if they had performed their duties in full, if their work was “a trade in keeping with the honor of the corps,” and if they were located near enough to their barracks so that they could return at

night and be called up for instant duty when required. For the first time, officers were allowed to marry, but the men were sup-

posed to remain single so that they could be subjected to the severe discipline of the corps.

In addition, in order that the men might be commanded and supervised more efficiently, it was decided that the financial and military duties originally united in the person of the supervisor were in fact too much for a single man to perform properly, and in

late 1801 they were separated, with the post of Talimli Askeri Naziri being transferred to the supervisor of the cannon and cannon-wagon corps, while the Nizam-i Jedid supervisor was left with the posts of Treasurer of the New Treasury and the rank of Second Treasurer of the Imperial Treasury.** These reforms had some effect, but disciplinary cases on the

part of members of the Uskiidar mounted corps in particular continued to be reported periodically, manifesting a continued decline in the discipline and efficiency of the corps and also inflicting a final, crushing blow against the government’s effort to popularize the new army among the people.* This then was Selim’s Nizam-i Jedid corps. By the end of his

reign it numbered almost 23,000 men, who were armed with modern weapons, trained by European officers, and praised for their efficiency and good bearing by almost all the Europeans who observed them.** Together with the reformed and revamped

The “New Order” of Selim III

artillery corps, it should have provided the Sultan with an effec- 135 tive military force capable not only of meeting the enemy on equal terms but also of protecting the Sultan and itself against any attacks. On the occasions in which it was employed, the Nizam-i Jedid army effectively demonstrated its superiority over the Janissaries and the Spahis. In 1799, approximately 200 of its men were sent by sea to Gaza, where they performed important service in assisting its governor, Ahmed Jezzar Pasha, in his stal-

wart defense of that fortress against the French army of Bonaparte.*’ In 1800, when the British fleet blockaded the French in Alexandria, 2,000 Nizam-i Jedid soldiers were landed along with 6,000 regular Ottoman troops, and they managed to maintain a

successful blockade against the French at Rosetta, eventually forcing them to surrender in April 1801."* During the next six years the new army soldiers performed important, although somewhat limited, service against the mountain bandits in the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains.”” But the old corps absolutely refused to accept the new training

and weapons, and those politicians who were associated with them deviously undermined the efforts of the European advisers. In 1800, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Lord Elgin, reported

that “during the whole of their |the European advisers’| stay in Turkey, a very great deal of intrigue has been successfully exerted to impede the operations of the detachment and prevent the utility they were enabled to render this country. Every trick has been used to disgust the officers and men. Those who were anxious that no English land officers should be employed with the Grand Vezir, and those who wish the power of Turkey to be kept under, have been equally busy.”’® Similar complaints came from the French and from others.”' As a result of the Janissaries’ refusal

to serve with the new troops in the most important campaigns during the last decade of Selim’s rule, against the French in Egypt and the Serbs and Russians in 1806 and 1807, the Nizam-i Jedid troops performed only token service, and the main Ottoman army continued to be composed primarily of the unruly and ineffective

Janissaries and Spahis, with disastrous results.” General Koehler, who was the principal adviser for the regular

Military Reforms

136 Ottoman army during the Egyptian campaign, described it to his superiors in London:

As deficient as they are in all the camp duties of security and defense, than which nothing can be worse, so they are with respect to any rational system or foresight with respect to

the plan of operations to be carried on against the enemy, so weak, so frivolous and childish that an infant three years old would have more forecast. They are scattered over a large extent of ground in separate encampments according to their own fancy. The Grand Vezir

is exceedingly civil, has shown the greatest attention, provided you will talk about his fine horses, the great superiority of the Turks on horseback, or about his little fountain of water with a child’s ship in it, but directly to touch upon anything which relates to military operations or the enemy, he waives the conversation. What is expected from such troops, or rather mob thus commanded? Nothing but shame and disgrace, and yet they have fine men, excellent horses, good guns, plenty of ammunition

and provisions and forage, and in short great abundance of all the materials required to constitute a formidable army, but they want order and system, which would not be difficult to establish if their principal officers were not so astonishingly

adverse to anything tending toward it... The camp is composed of many different nations and natures

of troops, which though properly speaking are subject to the same sovereign and pretending to the same religion are however extremely distinct as to their views and separate interests, jealous of each other with very little public spirit, and only serving for plunder or personal advantage, and have very little zeal when they have no immediate prospect of satisfying their own particular views. The authority of the Vezir is equally incomprehensible; an apparent great submission and immediate power of life and death over individuals, but he himself seems to stand in great apprehension of offending them, seems not to dare to order such a detachment to encamp in this or that place, nor to give

The “New Order” of Selim III

them the least interruption or inconvenience, is obliged to use 137 the most gentleness and leniency towards them to prevail upon them to do anything of the most trifling nature and to prevent their entirely abandoning him.. .”° In 1807, when the opposition of the vested interests finally led to open revolt against Selim, the new army was almost completely ineffective in defending its master and itself against the common

enemy. The reasons for this failure to use the Nizam-i Jedid army, as well as, indeed, the failure of Selim’s entire reform program, will be examined in subsequent chapters.

Military Reforms

XI. Technical Reforms

Up to now we have been dealing with changes in the direction and organization of the military establishment and improvements in the training and discipline of its men. But such reforms, however successful they were in themselves, could have been really effective only if they were accompanied by even more drastic improvements in the weapons and equipment provided for the use of these men. The disorganization and inefficiency of the established Ottoman military corps had been compounded by an inferiority of arms which had become increasingly more serious since the end of the seventeenth century, when Europe had begun to develop the science of arms manufacture on a large scale. In the West the awkward and heavy muskets with their sputtering and inefficient firing pins, had long since been replaced by light and mobile rifles with flintlock firing systems, which could be carried

easily both by horsemen and infantrymen and which could be fired regardless of the weather. The old ponderous and awkward cannons, of use only in attacking and defending fortresses and much too heavy to be used in large numbers on warships or on the battlefield, were likewise replaced by much lighter and more mobile instruments. Changes in the compound ratios of saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur used to make the gunpowder employed in these weapons made it far more stable and dependable

than that previously employed. Similar developments in the alloy 139 of the metals used in these weapons and in the arts of ballistics contributed even further to the vast superiority of the modern weapons of Europe over the older ones still used by the Ottoman army at the end of the eighteenth century.' In fact the isolation of the Ottoman ruling class from Europe, its inherent conservatism and pride, its scorn of all things infidel,

its continued worship of everything that had brought the Ottomans greatness in the past, prevented it from accepting the new weapons. The repeated demands of the few European technicians who, for one reason or another, were employed in the army

during the eighteenth century had fallen on deaf ears for the most part. Worse yet, the old-style weapons still used by Ottoman

soldiers and sailors at the end of the eighteenth century were poor imitations of those of the past. The anarchy which had infected the military organization had spread to the factories. As a result the weapons were of extremely poor quality, with the metal badly forged and very brittle, the gunpowder filled with impurities and, in consequence, highly erratic, the cannons and muskets easily breakable and of varying dimensions, and the bullets and bombs of various sizes and qualities.” As late as 1793, a French observer, B. Jumelin, reported to the French Foreign Ministry that “until today, the Turks have founded only bronze cannon and

their army and navy have no other. Their foundries and their forges are pitiful. Their projectiles are older than their cannons, and their artillery men are good enough only to use such equipment.”* Under such conditions, even the most modern military

organizations, kept under the tightest discipline and training, would have had little success, and Selim seems to have fully realized this.* To secure modern weapons and ammunition for all the armed

forces, importation from Europe was simply not enough. Communications were too slow and too likely to be severed or interrupted in wartime. It was obvious that factories had to be built

within the empire to make the new army and navy relatively independent of foreign sources. For this it was necessary to sum-

mon European experts to direct the new factories and instruct the Ottoman officers and soldiers in the manufacture and use of the new weapons. Technical Reforms

140 The Manufacture of Cannons and Rifles. Selim’s first efforts in the technical field went into the modernization of the Imperial Cannon Foundry (Tophane), located next to the barracks and drill grounds of the artillery corps. Starting in March 1793, Selim

introduced the most important changes in this area since the time of Suleyman the Magnificent. Houses and shops near the foundry and barracks were purchased and destroyed to make way for the new barracks and factories; the old buildings were modernized; new machines were imported from England and France, and the training grounds were expanded considerably.” A year

later the buildings in Haskoy, originally constructed by Baron de Tott to manufacture the new style rapid-fire cannon and subsequently used in part for the assembly of the old-style muskets and

bullets reintroduced after de Tott’s departure, were turned over to a group of cannon founders and artisans sent by the French Directorate as the result of repeated Ottoman requests for technical assistance of this kind.® The Directory actually went far beyond the original Ottoman request in its desire to strengthen

the Sultan’s loyalty to revolutionary France. Seventy master workers were sent under the direction of Guion Pampelonne, Assistant Director of the foundry of Valence, to establish a cannon foundry, a mine and bomb factory, a shop for the manufacture and repair of rifles, a powder factory and a saltpeter factory, and, in addition, Pampelonne was authorized to take all the machines and equipment he needed from the Arsenal at Valence.’ Selim did not wish to depend entirely on a single European power for all his arms manufacture, however, and he assigned Pampelonne

to manufacture cannons and mines only. The manufacture of rifles and bullets was transferred to new shops built at Levend Chiftlik by a Spanish expert named Volla and at Dolmabahche by a British officer.®

In order to attract the best Ottoman artisans to serve in these shops, very high salaries were provided, strict examinations were set up, and the artisans were allowed to continue to work in their own private shops whenever their services were not required by the state. All the foundries and rifle factories were placed under the joint control of the supervisors of the artillery and Nizam-i Jedid corps, who were personally responsible for the success of

The “New Order” of Selim III

their operations.’ From 1795 to the middle of 1798, all the arms 141 factories except the one in Hask6y were placed under the technical supervision of the two French experts, Aubert and Cuny,

replaced during and after the French expedition to Egypt by English and Swedish officers.!? Plans, models, and samples of numerous modern calibers and types of bombs, cannons, rifles, and bullets were sent to the Porte as gifts by the monarchs of France, England, Prussia, and Sweden as part of their efforts to secure the support of the Sultan in the diplomatic and military conflicts then going on in Europe.'! Thus, in many ways, Selim III was the first ruler of an “underdeveloped country” to manipu-

late and take advantage of the rivalries of the great powers to secure assistance in the development of his country. For one reason or another, none of these factories was entirely

successful. Rivalries among the various foreign contingents, sloth, negligence, and inefficiency on the part of the foreign experts themselves, many of whom were men who had failed in

their own countries, opposition to the entire program by the Janissaries and others, general disinclination on the part of Ottomans and Muslims to obey the orders of infidels, and corruption and political intrigues among Selim’s cabinet ministers greatly limited the effectiveness of these efforts.'? Pampelonne suffered the greatest difficulties. He was astounded to discover that the Porte would accept only twenty-five of his men as a result of the intrigues of the anti-French elements in the Imperial Council. The extra artisans were forced to return home without working at all for the empire, which in fact desperately needed them. Those remaining in the Ottoman service with Pampelonne were constantly disturbed by irregularity in the payment of salary and delivery of supplies, interference with their activities by the pro-

British ministers, and the like, so they finally withdrew at the end of 1797 as part of a general withdrawal of French technicians

at that time.’? It has been commonly assumed that the French technical assistants remained in Ottoman service until they were forced to leave by the outbreak of war between the two nations in 1798. In fact, however, it was the internal conditions within the Ottoman state which largely nullified their efforts and forced their departure before political and military events would have

Technical Reforms

142 led to the same end.'* As a result, once the war with France was concluded in 1802 neither the Ottomans nor their European “friends” were overanxious for a resumption of this sort of assistance, and only a few European technicians served at Istanbul during the last five years of Selim’s reign. As a result of these difficulties, although the Ottoman arms factories greatly improved

their product in both quantity and quality over that produced before 1794, the results were never as outstanding as was hoped for at the start.'” The Manufacture of Gunpowder. Without a doubt, the most successful of Selim’s technical efforts was that aimed at securing better gunpowder for new and old weapons alike. Before 1789, Ottoman gunpowder was manufactured at the Imperial Powder Works (Baruthane-i Amire) at Bakirkoy (built 1698), just north of Istanbul on the Sea of Marmara, and at provincial works located at Salonika, Galipoli, Baghdad, Cairo, Belgrade, and Izmir. Each of these factories was under the direction of an independent officer,

who purchased his position as a tax farm, or a retired officer of the Porte who was given this job as a kind of pension reward for previous service. Invariably the directors knew nothing about the manufacture of gunpowder, and for the most part they remained in Istanbul and did nothing to supervise the factory operations. They treated the factories principally as means of enriching themselves and diverted to their own profit most of the money provided for equipment and supplies. As a result, the powder was of extremely bad quality. The saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur required for gunpowder were still mixed with the sixteenth-century formula of 6-l-1, with 8 okkes* of materials producing 7 of powder. Even when manufactured properly this mixture produced an extremely unstable compound which exploded more as the result of changes of weather, humidity, and precipitation than it did in response to the urgings of a lighted fuse. The addition of dirt and other base substances by dishonest factory directors only heightened this tendency. As a result, even when the gunpowder did explode in the cannons and rifles, the explosive force was either so weak that the ball or bullet would *The okke, or vakiyye (also called kiyye), was an Ottoman unit of weight equal to 400 dirhems or 2.83 pounds. The exact equivalent varied according to the material being weighed and the place.

The“ New Order” of Selim III

not go as far as it was supposed to or so violent that the weapons 143 themselves were blown apart. In addition no more than 3,000 kantars*™ of even this poor-quality gunpowder were produced annually for the Ottoman army,'® an amount considerably below its regular needs.

Since the beginning of the eighteenth century Europe had produced a far more stable and dependable type of powder from a new compound mixed in the proportions of 75-15-10.'7 The Ottomans had not adopted this ratio for their own manufactures, but since 1768 they had recognized its superiority and had imported it in small amounts. Since the importation of this sort of powder in sizable quantities was extremely expensive and un-

reliable, Selim was determined to manufacture it in Turkey if at all possible. In 1790 a Venetian traveler managed to convince

the Sultan that he was an expert in the modern techniques of making gunpowder, and he was given a large grant from the Imperial Treasury to build a factory for that purpose at San Stefano. Having stolen all the money for himself without even beginning the work he had contracted for, he was arrested and imprisoned in January 1791.'* Selim’s first effort to manufacture gunpowder

was stillborn. No new efforts were made until the summer of 1794, when an attempt was made to reorganize and modernize the existing powder works. The works at Bakirkoy, Galipoli, and Salonika were placed under the direction of a single supervisor,

Tevkii Ali Raik Efendi,'? who was ordered to reorganize the factories and their staffs and bring in new equipment from Europe

so that at least 5,000 kantars of high-quality European-type powder could be manufactured every year. The supervisor was put under a strict system of controls so that he could not purchase inferior qualities or quantities of the raw material and pocket the difference for himself as others had in the past.?° Raik Efendi proved to be no more capable or honest than his predecessors, and little was done to implement these regulations until April 1795, when he was replaced by the former chief treasurer of the empire and governor of Jidda, Mehmed Sherif Efendi. Under his direction, and with the assistance of several British gunpowder experts, the twenty old wheels at Bakirkéy were re*“The kantar was an Ottoman unit of weight which normally came to 56.41 kilograms and was divided into 44 okkes.

Technical Reforms

144 modeled and five new ones were added, and within a year the previous annual production of 1,500 kantars of poor-quality powder was replaced by twice as much of a much better quality.”! Similar reforms were made in the powder works at Galipoli and

Salonika, which at this time were used primarily to supply the gunpowder needs of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet. In addition Sherif Efendi soon discovered that it was impossible to make fine powder of constant quality so long as the machines and wheels in the factories were moved by animal power, which was quite variable. Water power was far more suitable in all respects, but the Bakirkoy factory was not located anywhere near streams which could be used to move the wheels in the de-

sired manner. As a result of these considerations, he began to search for a new and more suitable location—a place far enough

away from settled communities so that it would not endanger them yet close enough to a running stream for power and to the Sea of Marmara for both supplies and products to be transported easily. After a long search, an ideal location was found at Azadh, further west on the shore of the Sea of Marmara, immediately north of Kuchuk Chekmeje lake and village near the Karimburgaz

caves. Under the management of an Armenian artisan named Erakil Efendi, a huge new powder works was built here during the spring of 1794. Its wheels and machines were moved entirely

by water supplied by canals built between the factory and the nearby stream.” It was so successful that after 1797 the old Imperial powder works at Bakirk6y was used only to store raw materials and finished products, while those at Galipoli, Salonika, and Izmir were closed entirely,?* and the Porte was completely relieved of the necessity of purchasing gunpowder abroad.”*

Consequently, depending on the extent that the Ottoman military corps could be provided with modern cannons and rifles, ammunition for both was available after 1795 in sufficient quantities to assure their proper use.

Technical Schools In addition to reorganizing the military corps and modernizing their weapons, Selim and his ministers also gave a great deal of

The “New Order” of Selim III

attention to educating their officers in the new techniques and 145 sciences of war so that they could eventually take over direction

from the foreign advisers who had to be relied on at the start. The engineering schools which had been developed in Turkey during the eighteenth century were intimately associated with the military services whose officers they trained. The schools of naval engineering (Mihendishane-i Bahri-i Hiimayun) and artillery (Topji Mektebi), founded in the years following the defeat at Cheshme, had introduced western military sciences and techniques into Turkey on a relatively large scale for the first time. They had been limited in scope, mainly emphasizing artillery. They had little to do with the arts of fortification, laying siege, navigation, and the like, which also were essential elements of modern armies and navies, and they went little beyond the practical techniques involved to their scientific bases. In addition, they depended primarily on French experts and teachers, and when these were withdrawn by Louis XVI in 1788, the schools fell into )

a rapid eclipse. From this experience, and from the renewed defeats suffered in the wars of 1787 to 1792, Selim learned to his sorrow that in order for reforms to be effective, they had to encom-

pass all the military arts, not just those shown most inferior in previous campaigns, and that it was very dangerous to rely on the assistance of a single European power for technical developments of this kind. Both these lessons bore fruit in the years after 1792. The only technical schools which Selim was able to continue during the war, although on a reduced basis, were the naval engineering school and a small new engineering school established by the Sultan (Mithendishane-i Sultani) in Eyub to train some of his young servants and companions in the elements of arithmetic and geometry, both to provide them with the basic education they needed to aid his reform efforts and to prepare at least some of them for the higher technical schools which he was planning to reopen after the war. Most of the teachers in the new school were trained in a small engineering school maintained at

Kagithane for a short time in the 1780s by Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Pasha, and many of its graduates went on to teach in the new schools subsequently established by Selim and his successors.”°

Technical Reforms

146 With the end of the war and the influx of western officers, it was possible for Selim to reopen and expand the technical schools, but

the number of students ready to take advantage of them was strictly limited. The Sultan preferred to concentrate the efforts of his foreign advisers in the field, to train his soldiers. It was only after this training was well along that Selim was willing to use at least some of these advisers to develop a full-fledged army engineering school out of the old artillery school, on the model of the long-established naval one.

Essentially what Selim now hoped to do was to provide the army with a higher-level technical school which would give its officers intensive training in the theoretical and practical sides not only of artillery, but also of fortification, mine-laying, and engineering. The Sultan’s engineering and naval schools provided

a nucleus of staff and students for the new army engineering school. Selim originally planned its buildings at Kagithane, near his summer palace at Saadabad, so that he could himself attend classes and exercises and follow what was being done. This idea was eventually abandoned because of the difficulties involved in

establishing the school so far from the barracks and training grounds of the military corps with which it was to be associated.”° In the summer of 1793, the new school was formally established

as the Imperial Land Engineering School (Miihendishane-i Berri-i Hiimayun), incorporating the old artillery school together

with whatever educational classes had been maintained by the mortar and mine-laying corps. Its basic regulations were included with those of the mine-laying corps issued at the same time.”’ At first a teaching staff of five persons was provided, with one Bash Hoja (chief teacher) and four teaching assistants. Instruction on a small scale began with forty students in special rooms in the mortar corps barracks at Haskoy while work also began on an entirely

new building for it in the vicinity. The final regulation for the organization and curriculum of the school was issued only in 1795, when the new building was opened; it expanded gradually

thereafter, with the number of instructors being raised to four and the students to eighty during the course of 1797.7" The chief teacher was for all practical purposes the principal of the school, under the general control of the supervisor of the three

The “New Order” of Selim III

artillery corps. He was responsible for making appointments of 147 teachers, assistants, and students, for preparing and enforcing the programs of class instruction, and for supervising the activities of students and teachers alike. From 1793 to 1800, this vital post was held by Abdurrahman Efendi, an intellectual and educational leader of the time,”’ and for the rest of Selim’s reign it was under the capable direction of Huseyin Rifki Efendi, who managed to retain this post until 1815.” When the school first opened and Abdurrahman Efendi was the only regular instructor, a good deal of the teaching was done by

his four assistants. In addition a number of teachers came from the naval school once a week, and the students of the army school

went to the naval school twice a week to take advantage of its superior equipment and shops. After 1795, when the army school

secured its own building and equipment, and especially after 1797 when its teaching staff was enlarged, the connection between the two schools became less direct although they were combined administratively for a short time, between 1803 and 1805.*! The assistants who helped the instructors were chosen from the best graduates of the school although on occasion expert persons

coming from outside were appointed if they were able to pass special examinations and suitable school graduates were not available to fill them. Assistants who showed special ability and promise were promoted to be instructors when vacancies occurred, but most of them were sent to the three artillery corps as officers

after serving four or five years in the school. While serving as assistants, they were required to continue their studies under the direction of those whom they assisted and had to pass periodic

examinations in order to retain their posts and advance in the army hierarchy. During this time they also were given practical experience through special missions with the army in times of war, preparing batteries, mines, and the like, while securing the combat training they needed. Originally provision was made for forty students (Shakirdan),

of whom ten were assigned to specialize in each of the four branches of the school: artillery, fortification, mine-laying and engineering. In 1798, the student body was doubled, with the students in a 20-10-30-20 ratio among the four specialties. Students

Technical Reforms

148 usually entered between the ages of ten and twelve, although occasionally youths up to fifteen were admitted if they had previously served in one of the corps. Admission was allowed only as the result of special examinations administered by the school

faculty under the supervision of the members of the Imperial Council and the Sheyh ul-Islam, and nepotism and favoritism were strictly prohibited. Students were divided into four one-year grades, with those of the first grade studying the lessons formerly given in the Sultan’s engineering school: calligraphy, spelling, writing numbers, draw-

ing, introduction to geometry, arithmetic, Arabic, and French. The second-year class studied arithmetic, geometry, and geography, in addition to continuing Arabic and French. In the third year, the students divided into separate classes for their specialties, and took common lessons in geography, plane trigonometry, algebra, surveying, the history of war, and recitation of the Koran. In the fourth and final year, in addition to the specialized lessons,

common classes were given in conic mathematics, differential calculus, tangents, and astronomy. The students were given gov-

ernment salaries and rations which varied according to their class and distinction. They had to attend all class meetings and were subject to punishments ranging up to dismissal from the school for unexcused absences as well as for violations of the other

regulations. Until 1801, they were given practical training in their specialties at training grounds near the school. After that time, this sort of training was given by their participation in the regular exercises of the cannon, mortar, and mine-laying corps. Students of the senior class were allowed to secure even more experience by accompanying the assistants when they left the school to perform special duties with the army.” Until 1796, there were few textbooks available, and the students made their own by writing down the lectures of their instructors. After that time, a press was established at the school

under the personal direction of Abdurrahman Efendi and it printed textbooks needed by the students as well as translations of technical books made by the various members of the staff. This became the principal press in Turkey until a new and larger one was begun in Uskiidar four years later.®®

The “New Order” of Selim III

From the time the school was established, its graduates who 149 did not remain to teach or assist were assured of officers’ positions in the cannon, mortar, and mine-laying corps. The engineers were

required to continue their studies while serving in the corps, and from time to time they returned to the school for further training so that they would not fall behind the new developments in their arts. Although these men were required to remain near the regiments to which they were assigned, they were not subject to the strict marital regulations applied to the enlisted men. They also

were allowed to live with their families if they were resident nearby and this did not interfere with their service to the corps. As far as can be made out, none of the foreign advisers and Turkish graduates of these schools were allowed to serve with the Janissaries. However, they did gradually take over most of the official posts in the Nizam-i Jedid army and the artillery corps and thus provided a nucleus of well-trained, modernist, and reformist officers to assist Selim and his successors in their efforts.”

Technical Reforms

XIT. Revival of the Ottoman Navy

With the heartland of the empire surrounded by water, with great forests able to provide wood and masts in abundance, with numerous fine ports on every coast, and with thousands of subjects whose lives and livelihoods were intimately tied to the sea, the Ottoman Empire had all the attributes needed for maritime greatness. In the sixteenth century, under the successive commands of Hayruddin Barbarossa and Turgut Reis, the Ottoman navy fully exploited these advantages, and Ottoman naval supremacy was accepted throughout the Mediterranean area. Even after the Battle of Lepanto, when the elements of decay which gnawed away the great institutions of Ottoman life also affected

the navy, the Ottomans were still able to maintain at least a semblance of their old position in the eastern Mediterranean, if for no other reason than the similar decline of their traditional naval enemy, the Republic of Venice. It was only the long period of peace during the second and third quarters of the eighteenth

century which left the Ottoman navy idle and led to its rapid disintegration in the years that followed. As was the case with the other institutions of the empire, decay

in the navy began at the top, in this case the great Arsenal of Istanbul, which was its military, administrative, and financial center, as well as the source of most of its ships and their principal

anchorage. Negligence and corruption in its adminstration, when 151 combined with the stifling effects of the half century of peace after 1718, reduced it to almost complete impotence by the end of the century. Most of its positions were held as sources of extra revenue by persons serving elsewhere in the government. With-

out the stimulus of active direction or military necessity, its officers were able to divert more and more of its resources to their own benefit. The few ships which were built and launched

at this time, as well as all the older ships, were so stripped of essential maintenance and supplies that they often sank within a stone’s throw of their docks. Without the addition of significant numbers of new ships, the forms and lines of the fleet remained little altered from those of

the seventeenth century, completely ignoring the important changes which had been made in European shipbuilding since that time. The ships of the Ottoman fleet at the end of the eighteenth century were invariably massive and bulky, with excessively high poops, superstructures, and riggings, almost as wide as they were long, and with unusually deep drafts which denied

them access to any but the deepest harbors. These ships were extremely difficult to maneuver in the ordinary course of sailing, let alone in battle, and were prone to capsize as the result of sudden movements by inexperienced hands during storms or battles.

In addition the ships were structurally unsound: excessive distances between their principal beams caused them to break up entirely during violent storms; the use of soft wood, because of its finer appearance, and the failure to apply caulking regularly between the underwater planks caused them to be unusually porous and to ship water almost continuously. Nor were they better manned. Corruption, negligence, and inefficiency among their commanders were inevitable results of conditions in the Arsenal. The captains and other officers purchased their positions for profit and obtained it by depriving their

men and ships of even the meager moneys which the Treasury provided for them. Needed repairs were avoided, and the men were often left without pay and adequate rations. Captains reduced the actual complements of their ships far below those established by law by failing to report deaths, by discharging many

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

152 of their men at the most convenient ports, and by entering the names of nonexistent persons in their places in order to collect their salaries and rations. Even those few sailors who remained to man the ships were unable to perform their tasks adequately because of the ignorance and lack of ability of their officers. Since captains and other offi-

cers were picked according to the amount of money they could pay rather than according to their ability, they often had very little knowledge of the tasks they were supposed to perform. Few knew more than the most elementary essentials of seamanship and navigation. The Greeks and North Africans employed to guide the ships across the seas were themselves usually ignorant of anything more technical than what they acquired by practical experience in navigation. Often there was not a single man on board who could determine position and course by celestial readings. Even at the very end of the eighteenth century, there were many Ottoman ships that had to keep in sight of land in order to find their way. The erratic and disorganized maneuvers of the ships composing the squadrons of the fleet were inevitable causes

of defeats, founderings, and abandonments. Few of the sailors were experienced or capable. The poor pay and conditions caused by corrupt captains led the best seamen to avoid service whenever they could. Most of the men recruited to sail the ships were inexperienced peasants and vagabonds impressed by force whenever the fleet was ready to leave. Many of them were the worst sorts of thieves, murderers, and ruffians, who were incapable of absorbing

instruction and accepting discipline even if these had been applied as required. The consequent disorderliness of Ottoman crews was well known throughout the Mediterranean. Even in Istanbul itself, the concentration of more than a few ships in the harbor was sufficient reason for most of its inhabitants to close their shops and retire to their homes in fear of robbery and murder at the hands of the crews. Since the fleet, like the army, was disbanded and the men dispersed during the winter months, it was impossible for any sort of permanent, trained, and experienced body of sailors to be built up and maintained.’ Nor was this all. Conditions aboard ship were chaotic. Huge

areas were set aside for the captains and chief officers, conse-

The “New Order” of Selim III

quently most of the men had to sleep on deck or in the hold. The 153 officers and men were divided into many small food messes, each

of which kept and cooked its own food and maintained its own kitchens and dining areas for this purpose. The ships were therefore filled with small shacks along all the decks and corridors set aside for this purpose, as well as with shops maintained by private merchants who sold articles to the men. Little effort was made to insulate the wooden beams of the ships from the stoves of the crews, and as a result more ships were lost as a result of internal fire than from any other cause. Crew members of various nationalities and religions formed themselves into violently hostile groups whose efforts to settle grievances and arguments by organized actions often left their ships in utter anarchy. In addition, as

in the army, each ship was armed with a miscellaneous assortment of cannons of various dimensions and calibers requiring shot and powder of different sizes and quantities, and the effort to

match cannon and shot often consumed the bulk of the men’s energies during the course of their battles. Often the guns were placed on the decks with no regard at all for their weight and effect on the ship’s sailing qualities and stability, and frequent groundings and capsizings resulted from this fact alone.’ In sum, neglect and corruption, incapable officers and men, poorly designed and built ships, and disorder and anarchy aboard them caused the Ottoman fleet in every way to mirror the inter-

nal condition of the empire which it was intended to defend. Eighteenth-century Naval Reforms. Selim was not the first eighteenth-century Ottoman monarch to make an attempt to correct the situation. The disastrous defeat at Cheshme (1770), in which almost the entire Ottoman fleet was destroyed by a small Russian squadron sent to the Mediterranean from its base in the Baltic, had stimulated a series of naval reforms directed by the only genuine Ottoman hero to emerge from that affair,

Gazi Hasan Pasha, who served as Grand Admiral of the fleet during most of the subsequent years until shortly after Selim’s accession.” Efforts were made to correct the principal causes of decay. Under the guidance of two French naval architects, LeRoy and Durest,’ new ships were built on modern lines. Inefficient and absentee captains were summarily dismissed. Action was taken

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

154 to establish a corps of regular, salaried, disciplined, and trained sailors, and barracks were built for them at the Arsenal. The impressment of inexperienced ruffians and vagabonds was restricted although not entirely eliminated. In 1773, the Grand Vezir, Halil Hamid Pasha, assigned Baron de Tott, an English convert, Campbell Mustafa Agha, and a Frenchman, Karmoran, to set up a new mathematics school (Mekteb-i Riyaziye) at Okmey-

dan to provide technical training to younger naval officers.” In 1776, this developed into an engineering school (Hendese Odas1), which was located in the Arsenal, with one instructor, two assistants, and ten students. The first instructor was Gazi Hasan Pasha himself. In 1783, it was given a new building next to the Jamialti mosque and expanded into a full-fledged naval engineering school

with foreign and native teachers instructing officers and potential officers of the fleet in the sciences and techniques of their trade.®

As a result of these efforts, some advances were made. In 1784,

the Ottoman fleet had twenty-two ships of the line and fifteen frigates, of which only nine were considered to be in poor condition by a French observer of the time.’ These physical improvements

were not accompanied by a similar improvement in the men appointed to serve the ships, however. Only a small number of officers attended the new schools. Appointments continued to be made in return for bribes and in disregard of ability despite all the efforts of the Grand Admiral. Conditions aboard the ships remained about as bad as they had ever been, and the few able

officers trained by Hasan Pasha were frustrated and driven to despair by their complete inability to alter the situation. Gazi Hasan Pasha himself by now had become old and, according to the historian Asim, had built up a large fortune for himself by accepting bribes in return for appointments, thus returning to the practices he had earlier attempted to end. How much the fleet had declined was aptly demonstrated by its fate in 1791 at the hands of a Russian Black Sea fleet which itself was newly created and

hampered by similar conditions, although on a smaller scale. In 1789, Gazi Hasan Pasha was replaced by Giritli Huseyin Pasha, but the demands of war and the ineptitude of the entire officer corps gave little opportunity for change. With the end of

The “New Order” of Selim II

the war, however, Htiseyin was replaced as Grand Admiral by 155 the far more energetic Ktichuik Htiseyin Pasha.® With the assist-

ance of the Sultan’s boyhood companion and private envoy to France, Ishak Bey,? he managed to push through a series of radi-

cal and far-reaching reforms in the Arsenal, the fleet, and the system by which officers and men were appointed and educated,

all of which completely revolutionized the fleet in a way that Selim was never able to do with his land forces. In late 1791, Selim ordered that only able men be appointed as captains and that their salaries be increased to compensate them more fully for their responsibilities and end the need for bribery. Then starting in July 1792, a series of decrees was issued which

entirely reorganized the naval service. To attract and retain knowledgeable officers of high quality, a regular hierarchy was established, with appointments and promotions based on experience and ability rather than bribery and nepotism. When vacancies occurred in senior posts, promotions were given to the officers

holding those posts immediately below them in the hierarchy, the post of admiral going to the vice admiral (Patrone), the post of

vice admiral to the commander of the port of Istanbul (Liman Reisi), the post of port commander to the rear admiral (Riyale), and so on down the line. The salaries of officers and men alike were doubled. In addition the previous practice of lowering the officers’ salaries to almost nothing while they were in port was changed to payment of a sum equal to one-half their salaries when they were on active duty. Pensions equal to one-third their active-duty salaries were provided for those who retired because of old age, and to one-half or more if they retired because of service-acquired disability.'°

Regulations were introduced in order to prevent the captains from using the food and equipment assigned to their ships for their own profit. Each captain had to give detailed receipts to the Arsenal and port commander for all food and equipment on board before every cruise. The men and officers were required to sign

statements for everything used or lost during the voyage, at the end of which the vessel was examined once again, and the captains were required to pay personally for anything which was not accounted for in some way. The captains were admonished to do

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

156 all they could to prevent the loss and waste of supplies and to make sure that the men received all the food and salaries they were entitled to; bonuses were provided for anyone who reported violations. Important reforms were also made in the supply of food to the

ships. The numerous kitchens and stoves which had cluttered Ottoman ships for generations were replaced by central kitchens and dining quarters, with cooks paid by the Treasury and common meals served at regular hours. The old practice of delivering the rations for each voyage to the men in their own homes in advance of sailing was also abandoned, and all food was delivered

to the captains, who were solely responsible for its distribution during the course of each cruise under the regulations mentioned above. Iron plates were affixed to the inner sides of the ships where the common galley stoves were located in order to lessen the danger of fire.!! Once the matters of equipment and supply were settled, Htiseyin

Pasha was able to turn to the systems of recruitment and training of sailors, which were reorganized in a series of regulations issued during January and February 1793.'* The Treasury had always supported a small group of regular professional sailors, but by this time all of these positions were held for purposes of income alone by persons unwilling to perform service in return. Now they were inspected, and within a year almost all of them were dismissed and replaced by youths enlisting for life terms in the navy. A strong effort now was made to develop the sailors into

a professional and permanent group serving the navy in winter and summer alike. To man this corps, a kind of conscription was restored to the Aegean coastal provinces traditionally included within the sphere of the navy. All the men living in these areas who were experienced at sea, whether as fishermen, merchant sailors, or navy men, were registered in a special survey carried

out by the census department. Three thousand of them were conscripted for immediate service in the navy on a salaried basis. They were required to remain at their barracks in the Arsenal at all times and to accept whatever training, discipline, and duties were imposed on them. No more than one sailor could be taken from a single family without its consent. Conscripted men were

The “New Order” of Selim II

allowed to avoid service by hiring a substitute and paying a “sub- 157 stitute tax” (Kalyonju Bedeli) to the naval treasury. Half the wages of these men was paid them when their ships left Istanbul for the summer cruise. One quarter was paid immediately after their return in November, and the other quarter was kept from them until March, so that they would have enough money and

food to sustain them through the entire winter season.’ Provisions were introduced for regular examinations of the men to rank and promote them according to ability. Those who merited promotion were allowed to rise to the ranks of officers. Revival of Ottoman Shipbuilding. Starting in the summer of 1793, efforts also were begun to modernize the Arsenal itself so that it could build the new ships which the fleet needed. Almost all the men serving in the Arsenal up to that time were dismissed, and salaries and conditions were improved enormously in order to attract the best artisans of Istanbul. As added inducements, they were allowed to continue their private work whenever they were not required at the Arsenal and to live at home with their

families.'4 At the same time, the work of shipbuilding at the Arsenal was reorganized on European lines under the direction of Jacques Balthasard Le Brun, a French naval architect who entered Ottoman service in June 1793, and his two associates, Jean Baptiste Benoit and Toussaint Petit. They did not return to

France until 1804, having established a surprisingly modern naval establishment in Istanbul and trained a number of highly capable Ottoman naval architects to continue their work." Between 1792 and 1797, the construction and repair facilities at the Arsenal were modernized and enlarged, under Le Brun’s guidance.'® The two old wooden drydocks previously in use, which were almost constantly in need of some sort of repair and rebuild-

ing, were replaced by three permanent stone ones which were far superior in capacity, efficiency, and durability.'’ Five new shipbuilding forms were constructed as well as a new drydock designed on the model of the drydock at Toulon.'® With the foreign experts virtually directing shipbuilding operations in the Arsenal of Istanbul, Hiiseyin Pasha was free to devote his herculean energies to reviving the ruined Ottoman shipyards elsewhere in the empire.'!? Arrangements were made to supply

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

158 them regularly with oak, pine, iron, and other shipbuilding materials.”° To secure these supplies in sufficient quality and quantity, the traditional Ottoman government efforts to obtain them at below-market prices were replaced by a system allowing the shipyard directors to purchase them as needed at the normal market rates.”! French models were used for all new ships, and in addition, as time permitted, the older ships of the fleet which were still serviceable were remodeled along the same lines. The poops and superstructures were lightened and lowered considerably and the drafts were raised in order to improve the maneuverability of the ships, and copper plates were applied to the hulls of new and old ships alike to increase their maneuverability and speed.”?

As a result of these efforts, forty-five modern fighting ships were built and launched between 1789 and 1798.7* These included three of the largest ships the Ottoman fleet ever had possessed, each forty-seven meters long and with three cannon decks, all built by Le Brun: the Selimiye, with 122 cannons and 1,200 men, launched in 1796,”4 the Badi-i Nusret, with 82 cannons and 900 men, launched in 1797,7> and the Tavus-u Bahri, with the same complement, launched a year later.”® The fleet increased in

size from 17 ships of the line and 20 frigates and corvettes in 1796 to 20 ships of the line and 25 frigates a decade later, and with 2,156 cannons and 40,000 sailors and seagoing soldiers, it was able to compete with the fleets of Europe in a way that the Ottoman army was unable to do at that time.”’

While reforms were carried out in the Arsenal and the fleet, important changes were also introduced in the Imperial Naval Engineering School at Haskoy. Previous to 1787, training here had been primarily in geometry and arithmetic. Practical seamanship and navigation had been taught the graduates only after

they joined their ships and went to sea. Since no comparable infantry engineering school yet existed, the naval school also had to provide some training in the theory and practice of fortification and mine-laying for students preparing for the army, and

this further limited its ability to meet the more practical needs of its naval students.”*> After 1786, the chief instructor of the school was Gelenbevi Ismail Efendi,” who taught geometry, and

The “New Order” of Selim III

his only assistant was the supervisor of the school, Kasap Bashi 159 zade Ibrahim Efendi, an expert in mathematics.®® In addition there were three French naval officers who gave lessons in navigation and seamanship; most of their lectures, translated into Turkish, were printed by the French embassy press in Istanbul for the use of the students.*' After the French experts were withdrawn in the middle of 1788, and especially until the war’s end in 1792, the lack of qualified teachers caused Ismail Efendi and Ibrahim Efendi to use their best students as instructors, teaching them three days a week and sending them to teach the rest of the students what they had learned every Tuesday and Friday. During the war the naval school continued to emphasize mathematics and geometry. It was only in 1792 that special lessons in

seamanship and navigation were introduced for those planning to enter active sea service; but even then, the students received most of their training in these subjects only after they went to sea. There was no training in naval architecture at the school; this was handled entirely through the apprentice system by Le Brun and his associates in the Arsenal. It was not until the establishment of the army engineering school in 1793 and the consequent transfer of the mine-laying and fortification classes to it that the naval school was able to expand its curriculum to in-

clude these more practical naval subjects. At the same time, Le Brun began to appeal strongly for the establishment of a regular division of naval architecture in the school so that the students could secure a more systematic and complete education than was possible at the Arsenal and also so his own staff would be released for its primary duty, that of shipbuilding. As a result of his recommendation and the generally felt need for changes in the school’s curriculum, it was given an entirely new building in the Arsenal in 1795, and a year later it was re-

organized, with two distinct divisions established to meet the needs of the students. The navigation division (Fenn-i Derya ve Jugrafya) was devoted to navigation, geography, and cartography, and a new construction (Inshaiye) division was established with Le Brun as chief instructor, assisted by two of his Turkish pupils.” Ten students were enrolled in the construction division and twenty in the navigation division, with students attending classes from

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

160 nine in the morning until sunset daily except Friday and Sunday. Both divisions first met in common classes for their arithmetic and geometry lessons, and they then split into specialized sections for the remainder of the day. On Fridays the navigation students were required to go to the shipyards for observation and practical training, and on Mondays and Thursdays they went to the army engineering school for lessons with its newer and much superior equipment. In addition to the regular teachers, the navigation section also employed a few ship captains, who came on special occasions to give students and teachers alike the benefit of their experience. In 1796, a group of twenty apprentices was established to provide servants for the teachers while preparing the youths involved for entry into the school as vacancies occurred.”? After that time, no one could become a student without first serving at least a year as an apprentice. Although continuous records of the school are not extant, there are enough references in other sources to indicate that it operated successfully through the crisis of the French expedition to Egypt, and was in operation when Selim was deposed. In 1805, Osman

Efendi was its chief instructor, and it had forty regularly enrolled students, of whom twenty-four were present at the school and sixteen were with the fleet. The course apparently was for three years, and the students in their senior year were allowed to serve as apprentices on naval ships if they could find captains willing to take them. At the same time, there were twelve students in the architectural section studying four-year courses.*4

Naval Reorganization With the rapid development of the navy and its schools during

the decade following the Peace of Jassy, the relatively simple organization established in 1795 became inadequate to the increasingly complex tasks of administration which arose. The original failure to define and distinguish the responsibilities and authorities of the Grand Admiral and the chief of the Arsenal led to continuous disputes, which began to disrupt the efficiency and proper development of the entire naval service.* To resolve these problems, a series of regulations were issued between November

The “New Order” of Selim II

1804 and May 1805, by which the navy was almost completely -.- 161 reorganized and a ministry of the navy was established for the first time.*®

The post of chief of the Arsenal was abolished and replaced by a new Umur-u Bahriye Naziri (Superintendent of naval affairs). For the first time, the Admiralty was given its own independent

treasury (Tersane Hazinesi), with revenues assigned to it from the Jizye (poll tax) collected from non-Muslim subjects, the Avariz (household tax), the naval substitution tax paid by naval conscripts wishing to avoid service, and from the Nizam-i Jedid treasury.’’ The director of the Arsenal treasury (Tersane Hazinesi Defterdari) was also given the position of third treasurer (Shikk-1

Salis) of the Imperial Treasury to provide him with rank and revenues in the Ottoman hierarchy, thus placing him immediately

after the director of the /rad-i Jedid treasury, who retained the rank of second treasurer.”*®

In addition to the regular taxes set aside for the navy treasury, it was also given a number of tax forms as well as all the fiefs previously given to naval officers, and it was ordered to farm them: out to the highest bidders to secure further revenues for its operations. As in the case of the Jrad-i Jedid holdings of the same kind,’ the naval treasury was required to pay the Imperial

Treasury the regular purchase price of the tax farms, equal to five times their average annual profit to the tax farmers. Aside from his financial duties, the director of the Arsenal treasury also was in charge of enrolling and conscripting the men

subject to service in the fleet and of collecting the substitution taxes from those wishing to evade this service. The Mediterranean

and Aegean Islands, which traditionally had been held as fiefs by the Grand Admiral to provide the fleet with men and revenues,

now were administered jointly by the Treasurer and the Grand Admiral, who were admonished to act justly and avoid any sort

of misrule. While sharing responsibility and authority, the Grand Admiral was primarily responsible for administering the

islands and the Treasurer concentrated on recruiting and taxcollecting.

The naval treasury was given a separate building in the Imperial Palace and was required to use its funds to meet all ex-

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

162 penses of the Arsenal, the construction and repair of ships, the wages and rations of the sailors and artisans, and the ammunition and other supplies needed by the ships of the fleet. All supplies had to be purchased at the market price and in cash, and various checks and balances were introduced to prevent corruption in the process.

The minister and treasurer of the navy were required to follow

complicated legal channels before they could make any major purchases. They had to send special agents to the markets to determine the current prices of every article they wanted and then send lists of articles and prices to the Porte for approval before the actual purchases could be made. At the end of each year, detailed registers were drawn up of all the ships built, the materials and supplies used in them, and the wages paid out. To assist the minister, he was given an executive assistant called Kalyonlar Katibi (naval scribe), who was not a treasury scribe but a member of the Imperial Council with previous scribal training. Thus it was a major political post which had to be filled by someone with rank in the Ottoman hierarchy. He was appointed

for a term of three years, without payment of fees or bribes, so that he would not be tempted to use his position for personal gain or profit.

For all practical purposes naval affairs were divided into two separate but interdependent divisions, military and administrative. The organization, arrangement, equipment, and training of the fleet in peace and war, command and direction of naval maneuvers and tactics, the organization, assignment and disciplining of all captains, officers, and men, and the maintenance and administration of all ships, were primarily assigned to the Grand Admiral, with the minister of naval affairs having supervisory powers at most. However, the minister of naval affairs was appointed Lieutenant (Vekil) to the Grand Admiral so that whenever the Grand Admiral was absent from Istanbul on naval duty, the minister had to take over his duties. All matters concerned with provisions, supplies, and weapons of the Arsenal and fleet, the food, rations, and salaries of officers and men, the acquisition of grains and other supplies, the manu-

facture and distribution of ammunition, and the collection and

The “New Order” of Selim III

expenditure of all Arsenal and fleet revenues were assigned to 163 the minister of naval affairs, acting as, or through, a director of the naval treasury. In addition to these administrative and financial duties, he was also responsible for supervising and managing the building and repair of ships in all the shipyards of the empire, in Istanbul and elsewhere. In addition, detailed regulations were issued concerning the officers and men of the fleet, and their enrollment, promotion, training, wages, and rations. A strict hierarchy of rank was established. In the first rank of officers below each ship captain were

his executive officer (Reis-t Evuvel), artillery chief (Ser Topi-i Kalyon), and chief scribe and instructor (Bash Hoja). The second group of officers included the executive assistant (Reis-i Sant) and the chief sailmaker (Bad Bani-i Kalyon). The lower officers were

placed in similar groups. Three-decker ships were staffed with 370 officers of various ranks, including the carpenters and caulkers, who, as already noted, were given officers’ rank under the new regulations. Smaller galleons with fewer than 55 cannons were given 242 officers. Frigates had 163, and corvettes 116, officers, with lesser numbers assigned to smaller ships. Seamen were supposed to be enrolled only from among ablebodied men with sea experience, and they came mainly from the Greek Islands and from the area surrounding the capital. Efforts

also were made to send graduates of the naval schools aboard ships as instructors to train both officers and men. Three instructors were carried on the largest ships. One would serve as chief instructor, caring for the captain’s correspondence and the ship’s accounts, keeping and using the signal flags, and keeping registers of the men and supplies aboard together with their disposition. The second instructor was in charge of the cooking and distribution of meals, along with the accounts of the food stocks and their use. The third instructor kept the ship’s log of daily events. All the instructors also held daily classes for the officers and men,

and the captains were required to educate them in the more practical aspects of seamanship and navigation. One or two instructors were assigned to each of the smaller ships, according to need and the desires of the captain.

The entire force of officers and men was formed into a strict

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

164 ’ hierarchy, with promotions based almost entirely on seniority. Salaries were raised considerably over the amounts set in 17985,

and the captains’ salaries in port were increased from one-half to two-thirds of their active campaign pay. When the post of vice-admiral of the Imperial fleet (Kapudane-i

Hiimayun) was vacated, the commander of the port of Istanbul was supposed to fill it, and everyone else moved up one notch. When there was a vacancy among the captains, it was supposed to be filled by the executive officer (Bash Reis) on the same ship, with preference given to the former if they came out equally well in their examinations. When the post of Bash Reis was vacated, it could be filled either by the second or third Reis or by an expert sailor in the same crew, whichever man did best in the examina-

tion. Only if none of these proved capable of filling the post in question, could officers and men on other ships be considered. While the fleet was in port, an officer called Lonja Bashi (club chief) were appointed to make sure that its officers and sailors were properly dressed at all times and to prevent persons not in the fleet from claiming its rights and privileges.*° In addition, a regular corps of enlisted salaried naval riflemen was established on the model of the Nizam-i Jedid corps to serve on the ships of the fleet as marines. In previous campaigns, such men had been assigned from the regular land corps, and in particular from the Nizam-i Jedid army, but they had proven to be unsuitable for regular sea service because of their unfamiliarity with its special conditions and needs. The new naval rifle corps was given organi-

zation, discipline, and training very similar to those of the Nizam-i Jedid army, but changes were made so that they could fit in with the existing naval organization and the unique conditions at sea. A corps of 1,000 men was established in two regiments of 500 men and officers each. The chief officer of the corps was called the Tuifenkji Kapudani (rifle captain), with each regi-

ment commanded by two of his assistants (Tiifenkji Kapudani Miilazimi) and divided into ten companies of 45 men each. All men who entered the corps had to serve first as ordinary riflemen,

and they were allowed to rise through the ranks after demonstrating their ability through service and examinations. The wages and salaries of the corps were the same as those provided

The “New Order” of Selim III

in the Nizam-i Jedid corps. These men and officers were also 165 trained in the regular naval skills of seamanship and navigation so they could handle their ships when required. As a result, if they wished, they were allowed to transfer to the active branch of naval service and to rise as high as they could.*! Efforts were also made to improve naval medicine. In the past,

so-called doctors had been hired to accompany the ships and do what they could for the men, but few of them had any training in medicine, and they knew nothing aside from what they could learn from experience. In general their efforts were of little value, and once a man was wounded, there was little chance of his recovering. In 1806, a full-fledged medical school was established at the Arsenal. A chief doctor (Hekim Bashi) and chief surgeon (Jerrah Bashi/Ser Jerrah) were appointed to direct the education of doctors and surgeons and their assignment and service with the fleet.*? Students were taken into the hospital for the first time in late 1806, with the hope that they would be trained in sufficient numbers so that each ship could be given at least one doctor and one surgeon. Students there were given training in both medicine and surgery. In their third year, they were supposed to be sent out with the fleet to obtain experience under fire and to assist the regular ships doctors. Students were required to serve the state at least four years after graduation in order to pay back the cost

of their education. If they chose to enter private practice after completing their terms of service, the chief doctors and surgeons

supplied them with diplomas (ijaze), indicating the length of their training and service, and these were confirmed by special decrees of the Imperial Council issued upon application by the minister of the navy. European medical books were translated into Turkish by mem-

bers of the staff. Instruments and books were purchased for the school from Europe with the assistance of the various European

embassies in the capital, and a number of European medical journals were secured for its library. Each of the medical students was required to serve at least one day and night per week in the public hospital (Bimarhane) of Istanbul as well as in the Arsenal hospital. A special hospital was built in an isolated section of the Arsenal to be used for treating infectious diseases, in particular

Revival of the Ottoman Navy

166 for persons suffering from the plague. Thus for the first time the idea of quarantine penetrated into a land which had accepted the plague almost without question for centuries. Prisoners who died in the Arsenal jail were turned over to the medical students for their anatomy lessons and experiments although this was kept very secret so as not to antagonize the more orthodox elements of the community. Surgical instruments and medicines were now regularly supplied to each ship so that the doctors and surgeons would have sufficient equipment for their work.

In this way a regular state medical service based on modern principles and methods was introduced into Turkey. Once again,

basie reform entered the Ottoman system through the military although in this case it was the navy which led rather than the army. Since the medical reforms were legislated in 1805 and begun in 1806, only a start had been made before Selim’s deposition

brought them to a sudden halt. By the summer of 1807, there were no more than two doctors and six students comprising the staff of the uncompleted Arsenal hospital.** Yet this was an important beginning, and a nucleus of doctors and medical students was left for a renewal of the effort in subsequent reigns.

The “New Order” of Selim II

ALU, Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

Selim III was a true heir of the eighteenth-century Ottoman reformers in devoting most of his attention and energy to military reform. There is little to show that he or his advisers understood how much the technological reforms of Europe were themselves the product of the social, economic, and political revolutions which had been going on since the Reformation, and how they could not be successfully applied in the Ottoman Empire except in

the context of the economic, social, and political development which had produced them. Nowhere was this more evident than in the attempts at administrative reform. The anarchy within the Ottoman adminstration at the end of the eighteenth century, reflected so often in military dissolution, need not be described again. Bribery, corruption, nepotism, negligence, venality, and cruelty, all were endemic to the Ottoman sys-

tem. Few officials thought of their positions as anything other than means for personal profit at the expense of state and subjects alike. Even more serious, the central government had almost no control at all over the expenditure of its funds. There was no central budget in the modern sense. Traditionally in the Ottoman fiscal

system each government department and bureau was assigned specific Treasury revenues to spend as it saw fit. If these were not

168 sufficient, the department directors were able to issue promissory notes obligating the Treasury to pay back whatever they borrowed to meet expenses in addition to the customary ones and, of course,

to fill their own pockets. The traditional means by which the fiscal activities of each department were checked within the Treasury had broken down. The Treasury and Imperial Council had no effective control over the issuance of these promissory notes, but they still had to pay for them. There was no effort at all to draw up a budget of revenues at the beginning of each year and to allocate expenditures according to means. There was no one who knew what the total revenues and expenditures of the government were. Government officials had always been relatively independent in their posts according to the dictates of the Ottoman concept of “hadd,”! and so long as they had been bound

by the moral and religious codes of the Ottoman ruling class, this independence had never become license. But now they were bound by nothing except their own greed, which was limitless in most cases. And of course this sort of disorganization and anarchy

at the center had weakened central control over the provinces, over both the Ottoman provincial officials and the local notables,

who had taken advantage of central weakness to interpose effectively between the government and the people.’ Selim’s response to these conditions in no way equaled his military reforms, either in intensity or in success. In 1793, his princi-

pal administrative reform was introduced, an attempt to restore the corps of ministers (sing. vezir, pl. vuzerd), the highest-ranked

administrative officers of state, who occupied the principal government positions.” In 1797, efforts were made to equalize the revenues available

to the various officials holding the rank of vezir. Most of them secured most of their revenues by serving as provincial governors,

holding their provinces as tax farms, delivering a fixed annual amount of tax revenue to the Treasury, and keeping the balance of their tax collections as profit for themselves. Ordinarily, vezirs served as governors of the twenty-eight provinces of the empire: Egypt, Damascus, Baghdad, Basra, Shehrizor, Aleppo, Karaman, Rakka, Diyarbekir, Adana, Sidon, Mosul, Anatolia, Trebizond,

Erzurum, Childir, Van, Kars, Marash, Sivas, Jidda, Tripoli of

The “New Order” of Selim III

Syria, Crete, Rumelia, Serbia, Bosnia, the Morea, and the Aegean 169 Islands. However, Kars, Marash, and Adana at this time were relatively poor provinces, which could not produce sufficient revenues to support separate vezirs. Mosul was traditionally given to whoever was governor of Tripoli, and the provinces of Shehrizor and Basra were reserved for the governor of Baghdad. Moreover, much of the land belonging to the provinces of Belgrade

and Vidin had been lost to the enemy in the last war, so these positions too were no longer sufficient for vezirs. This left only twenty regular provinces still producing enough revenue for a vezir-governor to maintain nimself and his suite. By Selim’s time, however, there were over thirty-five men having the rank of vezir. So that they would be satisfied, they were given jobs ordinarily going to persons with the next lower administrative rank of beylerbey, and so on down the line, the general administrative hierarchy thus being upset.

Selim’s solution was to order the number of vezirs drastically cut—no more than twenty-three vezirs were allowed at one time, with three of them serving the Sultan as Grand Vezir and sub-

ordinates and the remaining twenty serving as governors. No vezir thereafter was to be allowed to hold any job not specifically

set aside for a person of his rank, and care was to be taken that only experienced and intelligent persons were appointed as vezirs,

preferably those who had demonstrated their merit by previous service in lower ranks.‘

Detailed regulations were issued to reorganize fees and payments required from officials in return for their appointments and the profits received from their positions. The principal gifts of this kind by Selim’s time were the Yillik-. Hiimayun (annual Imperial payment), given by most officials to the Sultan and members of his family every year at the beginning of Ramazan, [diye

(holiday) payments given by subordinates to superiors in the bureau of the Treasury and the Grand Vezir’s office at the same time, and Iftariye gifts of watches provided for members of the Ulema by the Grand Vezir shortly before the close of Ramazan each year. The multiplicity of gifts which each official was obliged to provide proved to be an extremely heavy burden far beyond the

ability of their regular salaries to satisfy, and so they were

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

170 forced to use their positions for personal profit, even in cases where they did not wish to do so.° Selim hoped that by regulating and limiting these gifts, he would relieve his officials of the neces-

sity and desire to steal and thus provide the key to restoring equilibrium and order to the traditional administrative system. In 1795, the gifts in kind were abolished and replaced by established cash sums, which were raised or lowered according to the annual revenues of each official. The annual Imperial payments were now required only from offiicials who could afford them and then only on a very restricted basis.®

Efforts also were made to increase the power and prestige of the provincial governors (vali) so that they would be much better able to resist the efforts of the local notables to gain independence

from Ottoman authority and carry out their obligations and duties. To accomplish this, Selim ordered that their terms be increased from one to three or five years. During a term they could not be dismissed unless they were convicted of crimes con-

nected with their official activities. In addition Selim provided that if provincial governors were found to have ruled well, their terms could be extended indefinitely so that state and subjects alike would benefit from continuity and good rule. The Sultan also issued various regulations to lessen the burden imposed on his subjects by officials traveling through the empire.

Every official had the right to impose the cost of his food and

lodging on the inhabitants of the villages through which he passed. The empire was filled with governors and their assistants moving back and forth, using this right as a means of inflicting heavy charges on the hapless people living along their routes. Selim hoped that this source of tyranny might be eliminated by strictly defining the charges which could be levied and by reducing the number of officials traveling on official business.

In late 1796, he instituted the first part of this program by decreeing that when governors were transferred to new positions, care should be taken that they be located close to their previous ones so they would have to travel as little as possible.’ All officials

with the rank of vezir were divided into two great geographical services, those of Anatolia and Rumelia, and it was expressly stipulated that those in one service should not be transferred to

The “New Order” of Selim Ill

positions in the other without special approval.*® The governors 171 were strictly limited in the number of agents (miibashir) they could send through the provinces, but a failure to define specifically the fees each agent would charge nullified this reform in practice.’

Nor were the operations of the central administrative and financial departments entirely ignored. Most of the normal administrative tasks of government, the reception and disposition of petitions, letters, and communications of various kinds, and the issuance of official decrees and statements had been concentrated in the scribal departments of the Imperial Council, directed by the Reis ul-Kuttab, under the traditional Ottoman system.

But as the Council lost its importance during the eighteenth century, these departments had gradually been transferred to the authority of the Council of the Grand Vezir (kindi Divan), l\ocated at the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali), which in response to its new position gradually assumed the name Bab-1 Asafi and be-

came the principal administrative center of Ottoman government.!'° All of these reforms had been accomplished informally. Nothing had been done to alter the laws to correspond with the fact or to adjust the regulations of the Grand Vezir’s office to include its new obligations and powers, and those of the Imperial Council to cover its losses. The result was administrative chaos, confused lines of authority, and an increasingly rapid decline of the Ottoman scribal standards, which had been maintained at a fairly high level until that time. It was only under Selim III that efforts were made to regulate

and regularize the new system and, in particular, to establish regular channels of authority and lines of control in the greatly expanded Bab-. Asafi administrative department of the Grand Vezir.'! Supreme executive authority in the expanded department was now given to his Lieutenant, the Kethuda-1 Bab-1 Asafi, who thus became in fact the administrative director of the central government, assisted by the Reis ul-Kuttab.'* The four departments now officially transferred from the Imperial Council to the Grand Vezir’s office were: (a) the Amedi bureau, directed by the Amedji (Amedi Efendi), which was assigned to care for the records, correspondence, and decrees of the Grand Vezir, agree-

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

172 ments and correspondence with foreign states and subjects as carried on by the Reis ul-Kuttab, and communications between the Imperial Council and the Sultan; (b) the Beylikji or Divan Kalemi, directed by the Beylikji Efendi, which had the job of recording the deliberations and decisions of the Imperial Council, including its Muhimme registers, and the various firmans and decrees issued by the council; (c) the Riius-t Hiimayun department, which was in charge of recording the positions and tax farms held by all members of the ruling class except those with the rank or Vezir and Beylerbey and those holding fiefs;'*> and (d)

the Kise department, also called Nishan Kalemi and Tahvuil Kalemi, which was in charge of recording possession and transfers of all fiefs held by officials of the Porte.'® The functions of these offices thus remained about the same as they always had been; but now their distinct duties were set down, and their interrelationships and their relations with their new superiors, and their internal regulations were revived, restated, and restored. The Imperial Council was left with only two bureaus of any consequence; the Teshrifat Kalemi, in charge of protocol, ceremonies, and rewards bestowed by the Sultan," and the Vak’aniivis Kalemi, the office of the official state chronicler.'®

Emphasis was also given to an improvement of the quality of the scribes and of their work in the bureaus of the Grand Vezir. During the last quarter of the century, the number of scribes, students, and apprentices in each department had expanded far beyond their original numerical limits and the number actually needed. Most of these posts had come to be filled by relatives and

children of the older scribes, many of whom were entirely unqualified for them. In addition the general overcrowding of the existing office space left the departments in a state of anarchy. To

end this sort of situation strict limits now were applied to the number of scribes, students, and apprentices who could be employed in each office and new high standards were imposed on the process by which they were selected. All new appointments were suspended for two years so that posts could be abolished as they became vacant until the original limits of each cadre were

restored. During this time, no more than twelve new students could be appointed each year, of whom six were for the Divan

The “New Order” of Selim III

office, and three each for the Riius and Kise departments. Prefer- 173 ence was given to applicants with previous experience, but examinations were required for all in place of the recommendations which had formerly enabled ministers and notables to get their own favorites and relatives enrolled. In 1797, the number of new students who could be enrolled each year was doubled to twentyfour because of an urgent need for them. Of these, twelve were assigned to the Divan offices each year and six each to the Riius

and Kise departments. The section in charge of keeping the Miihimme registers of the Imperial Council was separated from the Beylikji department and made into an independent division,

with fifteen scribes assigned to its service. Each of these was allowed one apprentice and one student appointed from among scribes who had performed previous service in other departments.

The Mektubi bureau of the Amedi department, which cared for the Grand Vezir’s correspondence, was limited to forty scribes and thirty apprentices and students, but children of members

were allowed to serve as apprentices without regard to these limits. In the other parts of the Amedi department, the number of

scribes was cut to six and total number of apprentices and students was also cut to six, all coming from service in the other departments of government.'®

New regulations were also introduced concerning the service and compensation of scribes and apprentices. Compensation was provided for most of them from fiefs still attached to their departments.?° The administration of the fiefs was assigned to special

agents appointed by the grand vezirs so that the scribes themselves would be entirely free to perform their duties at all times.”?

An effort also was made to restore the standards of scribal skill and calligraphy. Scribes were required to write the various documents and registers in the proper scripts and according to the traditional methods, with the traditional forms and phraseologies, and the new tendencies toward individualistic and careless writing and expression were sternly suppressed under threat of heavy penalties. Scribes were also cautioned time and again to make

certain that the facts presented in petitions to the Imperial Council and the Grand Vezir were not incorporated intact into the resulting Imperial orders unless they were verified by investi-

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

174 gation. They were also ordered to refuse bribes offered in return for the incorporation of such false information in official documents and to ascertain that they were within the powers and authority of their particular departments when they issued administrative decrees and regulations.”” Ordinarily, vacated scribal posts were supposed to be given to the most qualified of the apprentices and students in the depart-

ments concerned, but Selim made various modifications in this rule in order to improve the morale of the scribes and make them much more amenable to his administrative reforms. Scribes were allowed to bequeath their posts and the attached fiefs to their sons if they were qualified and willing to perform their duties. Only if such heirs were not available were the posts in question declared vacant and awarded to students and apprentices. Those sons and heirs of dead scribes who were minors were not allowed to assume their fathers’ posts and fiefs, but provisions were made

for them to serve as assistants of fief-holders in Anatolia until they reached their majority and could become apprentices in their fathers’ departments.”° As a result of these efforts, the number of scribes, apprentices, and students serving in the offices of the Porte was reduced from over 200 in 1789 to 110 in the spring of 1798,”4 and the efficiency and standards of the departments were improved enormously.”

Similar regulations were issued in the departments of the Treasury. The number of scribes, students, and apprentices serv-

ing in its various branches was reduced from 170 to 60, with strict entrance examinations and work regulations restoring a great deal of the Treasury’s old standards and efficiency.”® Nothing was done to modernize its methods, however, and much of the work which was accomplished was offset by the creation of the

new Irad-i Jedid treasury. Although it operated in a much more modern fashion, using European accounting principles and the like, and while it attracted many of the best scribes of the Imperial

Treasury because of the higher salaries which it offered, the resulting duplication of effort and overlapping of authority, plus - the failure to distinguish exactly between the revenues and expenditures assigned to each of the two treasuries, created new confusion and inefficiencies and doubled the opportunities for theft and misrule.??

The“ New Order” of Selim III

Economic and Social Reforms 175 Selim’s efforts to improve the chaotic state of Ottoman society followed closely the policies inaugurated in the years immediately after his accession.”® Periodic efforts were made to reduce the population of Istanbul and to force those without homes or jobs to return to the villages from which they had come.”” Decrees were issued closing taverns and coffeehouses,” prohibiting the construction of new hotels (han) to house transients,*'! and re-

quiring persons to wear only the clothing allowed to them by their class and rank,” but this did little to calm the discontent. Efforts made to purify the Ulema and to substitute examinations in place of influence and bribes for appointments and promotions were largely unsuccessful.*?

Selim’s economic and financial measures also imitated those adopted during the 1787-1792 war. Although the conclusion of peace removed the pressure of military expenditure upon the state Treasury, the tremendous expense of the Sultan’s military reforms, combined with the rise of Balkan notables and bandits who not only cut off the Treasury’s provincial revenues but also

forced the Porte to spend large sums for annual expeditions against them, further increased the financial difficulties of the state and made it very difficult for the Sultan and his ministers to find sufficient money to run the government. In response to these difficulties all they could do was to increase

taxes, debase coins, seize private property, and melt down gold

and silver utensils (the tried and true Ottoman methods of financial survival), but these efforts had the same unfortunate results as before—economic disorder, inflation, famine, and chaos. The devaluation of coins and increase in foreign imports led to general price increases and a further flow of Ottoman precious metals abroad, thus increasing the economic difficulties.** The most concrete and successful of Selim’s economic programs

were those introduced to organize the provision of grain and coffee for the great cities of the empire. Recurrent shortages, beginning during the war and continuing sporadically thereafter, had been a principal cause of popular discontent, and had been used by the opponents of the Nizam-i Jedid to foment opposition to it. Now the previously unimportant position of supervisor of Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

176 grains (Hububat Naziri) was raised in status so that its holder would have the power to enforce the new grain regulations intro-

duced by the government. He was provided with the rank of Third Treasurer of the Imperial Treasury, so that he would not only have a place in the Ottoman hierarchy but also the authority needed to carry out his duties. The principal problem of the supervisor was to provide Istanbul with sufficient grain to feed all its inhabitants during the winter

months. A combination of high seas, muddy roads, and piracy had made it increasingly difficult to bring grains to the capital from Egypt and Anatolia. The grains of the Principalities, formerly procured without difficulty, had been unobtainable since 1792. To solve the problem, large state granaries were now built in Istanbul so that grains still available from Anatolia could be brought into the city more easily for storage during the summer. Since private merchants in the past had used the slightest hints of shortages to raise prices, often withholding supplies from the

famished population in order to increase their own profits, the provision and supply of grains in Istanbul was socialized under the direction of the supervisor of grains. He was given state funds

totaling 125,000,000 piasters as capital to set himself up as the sole grain merchant in the capital, buying all grains from their producers at the current market prices, storing them in the various granaries put at his disposal, and selling them at fixed prices

to the bakers and householders of the capital in summer and winter alike. In addition he was given absolute authority to enforce established retail prices for all bread and grain goods and to punish with death any merchants who violated these regulations. One of the duties of the department was supervising the bakers of the capital, checking on standards and prices of bread, and making sure that each loaf had the proper amount of flour and was not filled with straw and other waste materials. When necessary, the supervisor of grain was also authorized to purchase extra grains from the state granary, which received them as tax revenues and was ordinarily supposed to use them only for the rations given to various employees of the state. Similar efforts were made to regulate the distribution of coffee. Merchants often had mixed grain with the coffee sold in the mar-

The “New Order” of Selim II

ket, and the tax farm monopolies held for the sale of coffee had 177 been misused for the profit of the holders at the expense of the state Treasury and the consumer.** Early in 1794, Mustafa Reshid, treasurer of the /rad-i Jedid, was appointed to investigate the entire problem, and his report was used as the basis of a new coffee regulation introduced in the spring of 1795.37 The most essential element of the new law was its abolition of the tax farm which controlled the coffee trade. No longer was the power of regulation to be held by a tax farmer who collected taxes from the

coffee merchants and turned over only a portion of them to the state Treasury. Control of the entire coffee industry now was placed in the hands of a salaried Ottoman official, the Tahmis Emini, assisted by four of the most knowledgeable coffee experts available. He enforced standards of quality and price on all coffee producers and merchants in the empire and was specifically prohibited from collecting any sort of tax from them in return. Only the state roasting plant was allowed to levy specified charges on

the coffee brought in by merchants for roasting and grinding, but these were considerably smaller than those applied by the tax farmers in former times. Strict regulations were introduced to prevent attempts to mix anything with the coffee before selling it to consumers, and inspectors were sent into the markets by the

Tahmis Emini to make certain that these regulations were obeyed.”*®

Some efforts were also made to improve the position of the Ottoman Empire in international trade. In the past, almost all goods shipped into and out of the Empire were handled by foreign merchants in foreign ships. The Capitulations “rights” of foreign

merchants in the Empire, originally granted as privileges by the powerful sixteenth-century sultans, had become means for them to ignore Ottoman laws and regulations entirely and thus acquire considerable advantages over those Ottoman subjects who attempted to compete with them. Those Ottomans who did try to participate in foreign trade, for the most part members of the non-Muslim minorities, had to acquire a competitive position either by obtaining foreign nationality from sympathetic European ambassadors or by acquiring European protection and thus becoming members of the ever-increasing “protected” (himayelu)

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

178 class. Many Ottoman merchants acquired such protection by being appointed to the post of “translator” or to other positions in the foreign consulates since such employees, by definition, were included in the Capitulations rights. These appointees and their families were excused from all Ottoman taxes and were entitled to pay the same low customs duties charged foreigners under the various Capitulations treaties. Foreign consuls clearly abused this right by selling such appointments at considerable profit to Ottoman merchants wishing to escape the regulation and control of the Sultan’s laws.

Selim made strenuous efforts to curb these abuses. Starting in

1794, he ordered that foreign ambassadors should appoint no more translators and others than those actually needed, and that such persons who were not performing real service as prescribed by the Capitulations treaties should be subjected to all the laws and taxes to which they were liable by virtue of their Ottoman allegiance.*® In addition efforts were made to force foreign merchants to pay at least the three per cent customs tax on imports and exports required by the treaties and to eliminate the abuses which corrupt customs officials had brought into the system by charging considerably less than the legal customs rate and accepting bribes for themselves in return.*® Restrictions were imposed on Ottoman subjects desiring to transfer to foreign nationality and protection.*’ Efforts were also made to interest Ottomans

in carrying on foreign trade. The Sultan encouraged wealthy officials to build and sail their own merchant ships in order to build up an Ottoman merchant fleet, and for the first time in over

a century a few Ottoman trade ships began to make their appearance in the ports of the Mediterranean.” These economic regulations were almost entirely unsuccessful, however. Periodic shortages of grains and coffee, as well as price inflation, plagued Istanbul throughout Selim’s reign.**® The conse-

quent price rises and famines contributed in large measure to the

increasingly hostile attitude of the people toward his reforms. International trade continued in the hands of foreigners. Ottoman efforts to rationalize the Capitulations and reduce abuses in their administration were violently and successfully opposed ~ by the European ambassadors and consuls, who saw in every

The “New Order” of Selim II

reform only a new attempt to reduce the profits which they and 179 their protegés received from these abuses.** The European repre-

sentatives at the Porte thus began a policy which was to prevail during much of the nineteenth century despite idealistic sentiments for reform. They opposed really fundamental reforms because of the threats posed to their traditional privileges. Thus in many ways Europeans in the Empire became as strong defenders of their vested interests and opponents of real reforms as were the

most reactionary members of the old Ottoman ruling classes.

Administrative, Economic, and Social Reforms

XIV. Window to the West

Most of Selim’s military, administrative, financial, and economic

reforms were at best only partially successful, but they were opening wedges and essential guides for the efforts of his successors. At the same time and perhaps even more meaningful and

important in the long run was the concurrent introduction into the empire of an awareness of the West which had barely existed before his time. The iron curtain protecting the “Ottoman way, erected in an age of greatness and maintained in times of decay by a ruling class convinced of the superiority of its institu-

tions over anything which could possibly be conceived in an infidel world, had effectively prevented the entry of the ideas and artifacts of the Renaissance and Reformation and the movements which they had spawned and encouraged in the West. But now this iron curtain was pierced on a large scale for the first time, although it still was not destroyed, and into the Ottoman ‘ world flowed not only the military and technical achievements of Europe but also many of the political, economic, and social ideas and institutions which had made possible those achievements — such as a recognition of the rights of the individual and of the duty of the state to protect and serve him, and the need to provide some means by which all classes of society might participate in

their own government. To be sure, in a society long confined

within itself and based on a religion which provided a close-fitting 181 cloak of protection for the traditions of the past, such an opening could at best have a very slight effect. Yet it laid the groundwork for more widespread and significant penetration in later years, when the real foundations of modern Turkey were laid. The channels through which knowledge of the West penetrated the East during the era of Selim III were many and varied. Different levels of Ottoman society were affected in different ways. Military Instruction. By far the most important of these channels was the process by which the military techniques and wea-

pons of the West were introduced into the Ottoman Empire. Western languages and ways of thought, imparted to hundreds of young Ottomans enrolled in the new corps and schools, opened for them the whole scope of western civilization and broke down

the confines and restrictions imposed by traditional Ottoman training as nothing else had ever done. Those whose training was limited to technical and military subjects were able to understand

all aspects of European thought and achievements as no other Ottomans before them could.

The principal agents of transmission in the military field were the European technical experts who came to the empire with the new weapons and ideas of the West. To be sure, there had always been western experts of this kind in the empire. Western renegades had taught the Ottomans how to use the cannons, rifles,

and gunpowder which made possible the great Ottoman conquests in Europe and Asia. But during the eighteenth century, the culmination of centuries of internal decay in increasingly serious military defeats had led to a rapid increase in their military advisers. The Count de Bonneval and Baron de Tott were only the most conspicuous of these. In addition there were numerous unnamed Europeans who fled from the lands of their births for one reason or another and who assumed the identities and habits of the East so completely that their true origins will for-

ever remain a mystery, although the evidences and results of their work are clear. But even the technical contribution of these men was strictly limited to their own years of service and to the individual Ottomans with whom they were in contact. Their influence extended little beyond the small corps which they created

Window to the West

182 or served in and was usually wiped away after their departure. Furthermore they were almost invariably constrained to accept the dress and life of the society which they came to serve and were

isolated from the mass of Ottoman society; hence their role in transmitting western culture and thought to traditionally edu-

cated Ottomans was negligible. .

It was only in Abd ul-Hamid I’s later years and in particular under Selim III that such military technicians and instructors had a significant and widely felt effect on Ottoman society. Most of them now came to Turkey in groups in response to specific Ottoman requests to their governments for assistance of various kinds. They were no longer renegades absorbed into Ottoman society but salaried foreign advisers who were allowed to retain their own identities and uniforms and to have contacts far wider than those of their predecessors. The Porte invariably stipulated that these men be of high ability, character, and morals, and that they agree to remain in Ottoman service for at least three years. In the contracts issued early in Selim’s reign, they were required to wear Ottoman uniforms and reside in buildings close to their places of work so as not to arouse the reactionaries, and they were warned to refrain from association with any Ottomans other

than those they supervised or instructed. But these stipulations were largely ignored and were omitted entirely from the contracts issued after 1795. To secure foreign advisers of high quality, the

Porte agreed to pay their travel expenses and to give them salaries and wages considerably higher than those paid Ottomans with the same ranks and duties. Technicians were given special

servants and guards, and those who particularly pleased the Sultan were presented with huge bonuses on special occasions, making this service far more profitable than similar work in Europe.

The individual technicians and their work have already been mentioned in the sections devoted to the military corps which they served. About six hundred foreign technicians were in the pay of the Porte at any one time. Of these approximately half came from France and the balance from England, Austria and Sweden. These men comprised the first western social group ever thrust into the midst of Ottoman society without special arrange-

The “New Order” of Selim III

ments designed to prevent their contact with the Ottomans. While 183 the Sultan ordered them to live and work away from the populace,

it was not long before they roamed the streets of the capital at will, frequenting its places of amusement and commerce, and in the process demonstrating western dress and behavior to all classes of Ottoman society, most of whom had never seen Europeans before and who had cultivated unspeakable images of life beyond the pale of Islam.!

This is not to say that the appearance of these westerners in Ottoman society had an entirely beneficial effect on the cause of

modernization of Turkey or that their contacts with Ottomans were uniformly influential and without incident. While many of them were experienced and experts in their trades and willing to do their jobs, many were not. Some were men who had failed in their own countries and who took advantage of unsuspecting and inexperienced Ottoman officials to present themselves as experts in fields of which they really knew nothing. Many came only for the financial rewards and chose to spend most of their time savoring the entertainments and enticements of Istanbul. The boisterous and rowdy behavior of a few of the European artisans and soldiers and their evident scorn for Muslims led to numerous clashes with the mobs of Istanbul and was hardly conducive to endearing the western way of life to those Ottomans who were unfortunate enough to encounter them.’

Nor were the abler members of these foreign delegations as effective as they wished to be. Much of their work was of course

undermined by negligent and incapable colleagues sent from Europe. But more than this, the limitations of the Ottoman outlook made it very difficult for even the most sincere Ottoman

partisans of reform to accept or even comprehend what they had to say, and in many cases their instructions and advice were

simply ignored. In addition there were many Ottomans who joined the reform movement only for the financial and political rewards offered by the Sultan, and who obstructed the technicians’ efforts for their own personal advantage. The influence and positions of the technicians became closely attached to those of the politicians who arranged for their employment, and they and their work soon were involved in the complicated political

Window to the West

184 rivalries of Selim’s court. Each ambassador did all he could to complicate and nullify the work of his enemy’s technicians, working through politicians favorable to his own cause. The inevitable consequence of all these factors was delay, frustration, and often defeat of the efforts of even the most sincere and expert foreign advisers, with promised equipment diverted to other uses and salaries and expense moneys delayed interminably.*® But at

least in their contacts with individual Ottomans as well as in their instruction itself, the technicians certainly did have some effect. If nothing else, the stark contrast of continued Janissary and Spahi failure as opposed to the successful operations of the new corps when they were employed most certainly made many Ottomans much more amenable to change than they had been before.

: Rise of an Ottoman Press. An extremely important by-product of the military reforms introduced under Abd ul-Hamid I and Selim was the concurrent revival of a Turkish-language press. The first Turkish press in the Ottoman Empire, established by Ibrahim Muteferrika in 1725, had been used only sporadically after his death a few years later. Abd ul- Hamid I had revived it under the direction of the official historians, Vasif and Rashid,

who purchased the remnants of Miteferrika’s equipment and added machines and type purchased from the French embassy in Istanbul. But, soon after, Vasif went to Spain as ambassador and the press lapsed again into relative inactivity.’ Under Selim III, the old Muiteferrika press was restored under

the direction of Rashid Efendi, and it printed three military technical books by Vauban, translated into Turkish by Constantine Ipsilanti, for use as textbooks in the new technical schools.° This press seems to have been too small to meet the demand, for when the engineering school was built in Haskoy in 1795, it was given a new press and funds for fifteen workers to

operate it under the direction of Abdurrahman Efendi. During the next seven years it printed eight large volumes, including Mahmud Raif Efendi’s French-language description of Selim’s reforms, Tableau des nouveaux reglements de Il’ empire ottoman.

In the summer of 1802, the Miithendishane press was given an

additional building with new equipment in Usktdar to print

The “New Order” of Selim ITI

books of general interest and technical books, both under the 185 continued direction of Abditirrahman Edendi. The Imperial press remained at Uskudar until 1831, when it moved back to Istanbul by order of Sultan Mahmud II.° These presses made an important contribution to transmitting knowledge of Europe to the Ottoman Empire. Their publication and diffusion of Turkish translations

of western-language books made available to those who read only Turkish the mass of information which previously had been available only to the very few who had learned the languages of the West.

Diplomatic Missions. While the military teachers and their presses provided important windows to the West for upper- and lower-class Ottomans alike, the various channels of diplomacy also made their contribution in this respect, although in a more

limited way. The principal agents of this sort of transmission were the Sultan’s representatives sent to the important capitals of Europe, and those of the various European powers stationed at the Porte. Throughout the centuries of Ottoman greatness and decay, no permanent Ottoman embassies were established in Europe since it was felt that nothing could be learned from the infidels of the

West and that it was for the inferior monarchs of Europe to petition for the Sultan’s favor through their representatives at the Porte. Special Ottoman missions were sent to European capitals but only for limited times to accomplish specific purposes,

principally to sign trade agreements and, more and more frequently during the eighteenth century, treaties of peace ceding territories and making other concessions to the victorious powers

of Europe. In general the Ottomans who were sent on these missions were neither qualified nor motivated to go beyond their instructions and observe the lands through which they passed.

Only a few of them submitted any reports at all, and these for the most part went little beyond descriptions of the ceremonials and negotiations participated in during their trips. But there were some exceptions. In 1664, Kara Mehmed Pasha, a member of the Bostanji corps,

was sent to Vienna with a suite of almost a hundred and fifty persons, and his short description of that imperial capital was the

Window to the West

186 first work of any kind to give the leaders of the Porte a look at western life.’ In 1720, Second Treasurer Ibrahim Pasha provided

a similar short description of the same city on his return from negotiations there in comnection with the execution of the Treaty of Passarowitz.® In the same year, Yirmisekiz Chelebi Mehmed

Faiz Efendi was sent to Paris as special Ottoman ambassador to the court of Louis XIV and, after a stay of two years, submitted

to his master a long and detailed report describing life not only

in the French capital, but also in several other French cities which he visited, by far the most important and detailed report of this kind received by the Porte until the time of Selim III.’ In 1754 and again in 1764, the scribe of the Silahdar corps, Mehmed Dervish Efendi, was sent as Ottoman plenipotentiary to Saint Petersburg, and his reports gave a great deal of detail on the Russian modernization program then in progress.'® Ahmed Resmi submitted two reports of this kind, one describing Vienna

during his sojourn there in 1757-58 and the other depicting Berlin in great detail, as a result of his mission to the Prussian court in 1764.'' Mehmed Nahifi Efendi a member of the mission

sent to Saint Petersburg in 1772 to negotiate the peace treaty signed two years later at Kichuk Kaynarji, provided the Sultan with another account of the things he saw in Catherine’s capital, as well as of the negotiations themselves. !”

None of these reports are of great value by our standards; many of them are more interesting for what they did not include

than for what they did. Yet they did provide the sultans and those around them with some notion of the technical and moral

achievements of the West and they were, in the absence of anything better, means of making some breaks in the wall of Ottoman isolation. For the most part, however, the sultans had to rely on the European ambassadors and others resident in Istanbul for regular reports of events and conditions in Europe. Since each ambassador naturally limited and distorted the news so as to

favor the prestige and position of his own country, the sultans and their ministers remained by far the most poorly informed of any European rulers concerning events and conditions outside their own domains.

By Selim’s time, the conditions which made possible such

The “New Order” of Selim II

ignorance were changing so rapidly that progress would probably 187 have been made even if the Sultan had not been especially eager to learn about Europe. The Ottoman government was now becoming intimately involved with European powers by military alliance. It was seeking their technical and financial assistance on a large scale. It was maneuvering for position among them.

This hardly fitted in with the old picture of a Porte content to wait for foreigners to come and beg favors. The Porte now required a knowledge of European affairs far more regular, detailed, and objective than that which seemingly had sufficed before. When added to Selim’s desire to learn of European life and technical accomplishments, reform of the Ottoman diplomatic service was inevitable, and in 1793 it was decided to estab-

lish permanent Ottoman legations in the important capitals of Europe as soon as possible.

It would seem that Paris should have been the most natural choice for the first Ottoman embassy. Selim had always been most favorable to France, and he hoped that it would provide most of the technical assistance that he wanted. Europe was now embroiled in the opening stages of the wars of the French Revolution, however, and while Selim was most anxious to receive technicians from revolutionary France, he was quite unhappy about the fate of the French king with whom he had corresponded so hopefully only a few years before. Moreover France was in mortal combat with most of the royal powers of Europe, who hoped to stamp out the “contagion” of democracy before it could spread. The new regime had been outlawed, and no one had yet officially recognized it. An Ottoman embassy to Paris at this time would most certainiy have involved official recognition, and Selim did

not wish to recognize the new government until a precedent had been established by another great European power. So France was ignored at the start.'? Likewise Selim did not wish to honor the court at Saint Petersburg with one of his representatives because of the bitterness engendered by the recent war and various disputes which had arisen over the execution of the Treaty of Jassy.'* So it was that in 1793 the first permanent Ottoman legation

was established at the Court of St. James, a traditional and

Window to the West

188 important friend, second only to France in the Sultan’s eyes. As his first ambassador to London, Selim appointed Yusuf Agah Efendi, a member of the Ottoman scribal class, who previously

had served as chief scribe of the Grand Vezir and then of the naval Arsenal.'!° To assist him a young scribe in the offices of the Grand Vezir named Mahmud Raif Efendi was appointed as first secretary,'® along with several Christian translators appointed to

help them in a land of whose language neither man had more than an elementary command. For two years, this was the only permanent Ottoman embassy in Europe. Then in April 1795, a decision was made to extend Ottoman representation to the two courts of Germany, with Ibrahim Afif Efendi, scribe of the Lieutenant of the Grand Vezir, appointed as ambassador to Vienna,

and Morali Ali Efendi, Kisedar (purse bearer) of the Imperial Treasury, appointed to Berlin. The French agent in Istanbul, Raymond Verninac, still not recognized officially as ambassador and unable to occupy the palace of the French embassy, protested

so vigorously about the continued slight to the prestige of his own nation that Selim decided to delay indefinitely the departure of these two ambassadors, and the situation remained as it had been for another six months.'’ It was only in the fall of 1795 that French successes in Europe

emboldened the Sultan sufficiently to decide to recognize the French government and to add an embassy in Paris to those established in London, Vienna, and Berlin a few months before. To accomplish this, Morali Ali Efendi was transferred to Paris from his original Berlin assignment and was replaced as ambas-

sador to the Prussian court by the scribe of the cannon-wagon corps, Naili Mehmed Efendi.'® The latter was unable to accept this appointment because of illness and was replaced early in 1796 by the former treasurer of the province of Belgrade, Ali Aziz Efendi.'® At the same time, Yusuf Agah Efendi’s three-year

appointment as ambassador to London was coming to an end, and he was replaced by the director of the Imperial granaries, Ismail Ferruh Efendi,”° Within a few months, all of these ambassadors set out for their posts with the secretaries and translators assigned to them, and for the first time the Porte was represented

by permanent missions in all the European capitals with the

The“ New Order” of Selim III

exception of Saint Petersburg, and thereafter it received regular 189 reports from them on European events and conditions.?! Moral Ali Efendi served until 1802 as the first Ottoman am-

bassador to the court of France with the assistance of his chief interpreter, Codrika, a Greek subject of the Sultan’s who was actually in the employ of the French.?? He was replaced successively by Halet Efendi (1802-1805)?? and Muhib Efendi (1806-1811),”4 with Vahid Efendi (1807-1808) and Galib Efendi (1802 and 1811)*© coming to Paris as special plenipotentiaries for short periods of time.

In Great Britain, Ismail Ferruh Efendi served as ambassador

from 1796 through 1802?’ and then was replaced by Neshet Efendi, who remained in London for most of the remainder of Selim’s reign.”* In Vienna, the most important Ottoman ambassador was the Sultan’s close friend and confidant, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, who was sent in 1791 to establish relations following the Treaty of Sistova and was instructed to study Austrian military and civil institutions and report on them directly to the Sultan. During his stay, he came into very close contact with an Austrian junior consular official named Joseph von Hammer, later to become the founder of Ottoman historical studies in Europe, and their exchanges seem to have been of immense value for both,

before Ebubekir returned to Istanbul at the end of 1792.”° Ibrahim Afif Efendi served in Vienna between 1797 and 1800.

The Sultan’s most important representative in Prussia was Ahmed Efendi, who remained in Berlin from 1790 to 1794.?° Ali Aziz Efendi served in Berlin during most of 1797 and 1798. The only Ottoman ambassador to Saint Petersburg during this period was Mustafa Rasih Pasha, sent in 1792 in accordance with the Treaty of Jassy stipulation that the signatories exchange diplomatic missions. In return, the Czar sent General Kutuzov with a large entourage.*! The two met briefly on the Dniester as

they passed into each other’s territory on June 4, 1793. Little was accomplished, however. Rasih ran into difficulties from the

start with the Russian insistence that the Porte return all captives, including those converted to Islam during the war. As a result he left on February 8, 1794, and Kutuzov had to leave Istanbul because of the reciprocity involved. Since both sides

Window to the West

190 regarded the Treaty of Jassy as no more than a truce, the type of permanent representation entablished in the other countries was clearly impossible here. Whether appointed a regular ambassador, a secretary, or a

special representative, each Ottoman sent abroad was specifically instructed to do all he could to learn about the country

to which he was assigned and to send regular messages and periodic reports in order to provide the Porte with a regular flow

of detailed information of all kinds about Europe,” But only a few of them were successful in this. Azmi Efendi presented a short report describing the cities and towns through which he passed in Hungary and Austria and his experiences in the Imperial capital during his eleven-month stay.*? Ebubekir Ratib Efendi submitted a long and detailed report full“Of information about Europe’s achievements, and, as already noted, this report was a major influence on the Sultan’s reform efforts.*4 Galib Efendi’s reports from Paris were unusually detailed and useful, and Muhib Efendi’s description of Paris was second only to that

of Ebubekir Ratib in understanding and detail but had less influence because his master was dethroned shortly after receiving it.°6

But these were notable exceptions. For the most part, the same factors which limited the effectiveness and understanding of earlier ambassadors also applied to Selim’s representatives. They were Ottomans, trained in the Ottoman tradition and limited by

Ottoman attitudes. Most of them were members of the scribal - class and recipients of its traditional education, which included Arabic and Persian but none of the modern western languages or technical education introduced in the military schools. The few Ottoman Turks who did have a good command of western lan-

guages at this time as the result of education in these schools were needed too much at home to be sent abroad. And while a few Ottoman Greeks, Jews, and Armenians were sent along as trans-

lators, they invariably sold their services to the governments to which they were accredited and conspired with them to control and limit the information offered to the Ottoman envoys.’

With the exceptions already noted, most of the reports were filled with news of ceremonies, negotiations, and problems of

The “New Order” of Selim Il

diplomatic protocol, with occasional reference to European thea- 191 ters, fashions, and foods, but little more.*® And many of these did

not even reach the Ottoman capital, for the Porte itself maintained no regular courier service of its own between Europe and

Istanbul. Its representatives had to entrust their reports and messages to the couriers of the powers to which they were accredited, who made a regular practice of opening and reading all such

documents entrusted to them and of “losing” those injurious to their interests.*” So in the end, Selim and his ministers were forced to continue their reliance on foreigners at the Porte for information about the outside world. Many of the European ambassadors resided in the Ottoman Empire for years. They were acquainted with its languages and customs, and cultivated close and lasting relationships with Ottoman officials, paying regular bribes in order to learn their policies and decisions and to influence them when possible.*° As a result, the reports they sent to Europe concerning internal Ottoman af-

fairs give far more reliable and detailed information on Turkey than do the Ottoman chronicles and governmental materials of the time. At the same time, each European nation maintained its own regular courier service to and from the Porte, sending newspapers and memoranda containing information and news, and these were often passed on to Ottoman officials through various channels, providing them with their only regular news of Europe. While Selim was still a prince in the palace of Abd ul-Hamid I,

his main source of contact with the outside world had been the French ambassadors. After Selim’s accession, he continued to rely on the French ambassador Choiseul-Gouffier more than any other

European, often meeting him outside the Palace in disguise in order to dispense with the formalities required by protocol.*! But Choiseul, a nobleman and royalist, was ousted by the revolutionary government of France in October 1792 and fled to Russia in exile two months later, leaving France without official representation.** During the next three years, France was represented by agents sent to secure Ottoman favor and official recognition if possible, Citizens Semonville, Henin, Descorches, and

Raymond Verninac. Verninac re-established a regular French embassy after Ottoman recognition in late 1795.*7 He was fol-

Window to the West

192 lowed as ambassador by General Aubert du Bayet, who served between 1796 and 1798 and was an important provider of technicians, equipment, and ideas to the Ottoman Sultan although he never achieved Choiseul’s unusually close personal contact with Selim.* In addition to these ambassadors, very important sources of

ideas and information for the Ottomans were the Jeunes de - Langues in the service of the embassy. These were French youths trained in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish by the most outstanding

French orientalists in order to serve in French diplomatic and consular posts and enable the French representatives to dispense with the uncertain, inaccurate, and often disloyal services of local Armenians, Greeks, and Jews formerly used for such tasks. The most important of those who served the French embassy during the age of the French Revolution were Venture de Paradis, later chief interpreter for Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt; Amédée

Jaubert, also later involved in the Egyptian expedition; Daniel Kieffer and Xavier Bianchi, authors of an important TurkishFrench dictionary later in the nineteenth century; and Pierre Ruffin, subsequently one of France’s leading orientalists.* These men were able to discern local conditions, report on events and, at

the same time, inform and influence Ottomans as no one else could in their own embassies or the embassies of other powers. Without the need for interpreters, they were able to establish personal friendships with Ottomans and discuss things with them in a way that persons not knowing Turkish were unable to. Ruffin in particular was close to Chelebi Mustafa Reshid and Kiichtik Huseyin and was Selim’s most important advocate in his appeals for aid to the French government.” It also fell to his lot, however, to be France’s chargé d’affaires in Istanbul when war broke out in 1798, so he and his associates were forced to spend three years in the dismal confinement of the Ottoman political prison at Yedi-

kule.*’ After peace was restored, the French ambassadors and their Jeunes de Langues secretaries regained a strong position of influence at the Porte, with the Sultan relying more and more on the advice of the last two French ambassadors of his reign, Marshal Marie-Anne Brune (1803-1804) and Bonaparte’s confidant and advisor, General Horace Sébastiani (1806-1808).

The “New Order” of Selim HI

There were other European representatives at the Porte who 193 were able to influence certain Ottoman officials, but none with the consistency of the French. The most important of these were the

British Ambassadors Robert Ainslie (1772-1793), Sir Robert Liston (1793-1799), Lord Elgin (1799-1802) and C. Arbuthnot (1804-1807); the Austrian internuncio during most of Selim’s reign, Baron Herbert de Rathkeal; the Swedish dragoman and later minister at the Porte, Mouradgea d’Ohsson; the minister of Denmark and Saxony, Baron de Hiibsch; the Prussian ambassador Knobelsdorf; and the Russian ambassadors, Count Mikhail Golenischev-Kutuzov (1792-1794), Victor Pavlovich Kochubeg (1793-1798), and Vasily Tamara (1798-1802). Each of them had excellent sources of information at the Porte and contributed in various ways to Ottoman awareness of the West. Of course all these diplomatic contacts had only a slight effect on Ottoman society as a whole. Access to the reports sent from Ottomans in Europe, as to the Europeans themselves at the Porte, was limited to a very few Ottomans who were directly concerned

with foreign affairs. The knowledge imparted through these sources was transmitted to other Ottomans only indirectly, if at all. However, in the unofficial activities of the European representatives, merchants, and technicians now present in increasing numbers in Istanbul, there was an impact which was much more extensive and in the long run even more significant for the whole of Ottoman society.

| Social Contacts The time of the French Revolution saw a tremendous relaxation in the social barriors which isolated the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire from the Ottomans among whom they lived. In previous centuries the few foreigners who did reside in the Sultan’s dominions isolated themselves almost entirely in their own compounds. Mutual distrust and even hostility and scorn, combined with a more practical and justified European fear of contracting the plague then widespread in the empire, limited contact

to purely formal occasions. And even then most of the actual intercourse was left to the mediation of translators serving both

Window to the West

194 sides, who used their positions to advance their own causes and interests at the expense of those whom they were supposed to be serving. But new developments during Selim’s reign made it impossible for this sort of isolation to continue. The very fact that foreign

diplomats, merchants, and soldiers were living in Istanbul in far greater numbers than in earlier times made it inevitable that opportunities for contact would greatly increase. Selim’s reforms and his efforts to popularize them whetted the appetities of many Ottomans, at least to the extent of making them for the first time somewhat curious about the strange infidels in their midst and desirous of learning of their manners and ways. Moreover Europeans long content to ignore the Ottomans in the past were now compelled by the need to compete for the favor of the neutral Porte to try to cultivate the friendship and understanding of all segments of the population. As a result of these factors, intercourse increased on all levels of society. European parties and entertainments held in the great embassy palaces and private homes were now attended by Ottoman officials, including the Sultan himself in disguise. Upperclass Ottomans began to imitate the practices of European society and hold parties in their own homes and palaces, into which their European acquaintances were invited for the first time. Western merchants, technicians, and soldiers met subjects of the Sultan in the streets, bazaars, and coffeehouses. Street performances by European actors, buffoons, jugglers, and the like became regular features of lower-class Ottoman city life.** The large cities of the empire witnessed a craze on the part of all classes of the population for European clothing, architecture, and furniture, so much

so that the British ambassador, Sir Robert Liston, reported in 1796 that “the fashion of the day is strongly in favor of European imitation in every rank of society.”*° Selim himself is said to have invited European actors to perform in his palace, attempted imitations of western music and poetry in his own compositions, and imported western flowers and miniature pictures for his personal use.*°

These were the effects produced by Europeans of all nationalities, but in addition the French had a special impact. Turkey at

The“ New Order” of Selim III

this time was one of the few neutral countries in Europe, and it 195 therefore provided a unique place where friend and foe of the Revolution could dwell in uncomfortable proximity. Exiled French royalists lived side by side with the most ardent supporters of the

Revolution, and conflicts and competition were inevitable. The Jacobins in Istanbul affixed revolutionary emblems to their persons and homes, held public ceremonies to celebrate the great events of the Revolution, and did all they could to secure public and private support for their cause among Ottomans and foreigners alike. They went into the coffeehouses, spoke of the rights of man and the evils of the old regime, and distributed Turkish- and French-language leaflets and broadsheets expounding the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity.*' In many cases, they tried to

provoke riots among the volatile Istanbul mob as a means of exerting pressure on the Turkish government to support the new regime in France.*” In January 1793, they even went so far as to plant a Tree of Liberty on a terrace in full view of the Sultan’s palace!

Much of this activity was inspired and directed locally by Frenchmen in Istanbul wishing to show their loyalty to the new regime. Some of it was directed by agents sent from France. Numerous revolutionary societies and clubs were organized, of which the most important were the Société Républicaine des Amis de la

Liberté et de l’Egalité, established by Descorches in August, 1793,’ and the Société Populaire Républicaine, inaugurated by Hénin about the same time.* These, and others as well, occasionally cooperated, but more often they were as violently hostile to one another on ideological and personal grounds as they were to the royalists.» Once the French government was officially recognized by the Porte and French ambassadors came from Paris to occupy the palace of the embassy, these groups were directed on a

more centralized basis and their mutual hostility was curbed although not entirely eliminated. The French embassy now also took the main role in spreading revolutionary propaganda in the empire. In April 1795, Louis Allier, director of the Imprimerie Nationale in Paris, was sent to Istanbul with two new presses and several assistants to reorganize and expand the small press previously operated at the embassy there under Descorches’s aegis.*®

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196 Biweekly bulletins of European and French news were begun, and these were replaced on September 23, 1796 by the Gazette Francaise de Constantinople, a newspaper supposed to be issued fortnightly but which in fact appeared somewhat more irregularly during the next two years.*’ In addition, the Bulletin de la Légation de la République Francaise pres la Porte Ottomane was also published by the French Embassy to provide information on the deliberations of the National Convention in Paris and to present various official bulletins and announcements of the French government.”* The Constitution of the French Republic, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and other revolutionary documents

were translated into Turkish and widely distributed although it was admitted by the translator that “there were great difficulties offered by the translations .. . all of whose ideas are so strange to the Turks and almost all of whose expressions lack equivalents in the Turkish language.”>* Although the embassy press was confiscated during the Ottoman-French war, it was restored in 1803 and was very active during the remainder of Selim’s reign. On the

- whole, the activities of French propagandists in Istanbul were so widespread during this time that Lord Elgin wrote home with alarm that “the propagation of democratic principles here is, I am afraid, extremely rapid.’® These revolutionary activities were supported by a number of foreign sympathizers living at the Porte, of whom the most effective was Mouradgea d’Ohsson, who finally was expelled by the

Ottomans in 1798 as a result of his open activities on behalf of the French.*! A most unusual case was that of John Montagu Humphrys, a British national who had been born in North America, from which he had fled because of the American Revolution.

He seems to have converted to the revolutionary cause, for he came to Turkey with his family to establish a trading company and spent most of his time joining revolutionary meetings and publishing English-language pamphlets on their behalf, much to the disgust of the British ambassadors.” The spread of revolutionary propaganda was just as vigorously opposed in Turkey as it was elsewhere in Europe. The ambassa-

dors of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were especially vehement in their demands that the public demonstrations and

The “New Order” of Selim III

propaganda be curbed, pointing out the effect that such ideas . 197 might have on the Ottoman Empire itself.®’ The French royalist emigrés organized their own societies on lines similar to those of the Jacobins and attacked them openly, often in the full view of the amused Turks.** Most of this counterrevolutionary activity was financed by the British ambassador, who also arranged for

the dispatch to Istanbul of thirty French royalist officers previously resident in England.® An antirevolutionary newspaper entitled Le Mercure Oriental was published irregularly after September 1796, presenting European news and reports unfavor-

able to the French Revolution and its armies.® In addition, a violently antirevolutionary French-language newspaper printed

in Frankfurt was imported and distributed regularly by the Austrian embassy.®’ Similar pamphlets were published in English by the British embassy, although its efforts in no way equaled those of the French revolutionaries either in volume or effectiveness. ®8

During most of this time, the Ottoman government was trying to maintain its neutrality among the warring European powers, and this effort was reflected in its attitude to the revolutionary and antirevolutionary activities and appeals. The Ottoman cabinet itself was divided on what should be done. Kuchuk Huseyin Pasha, the Treasurer Ibrahim Efendi, and Ebubekir Ratib Efendi

usually advocated a conciliatory policy toward the Jacobins, while Mustafa Reshid and Yusuf Agah led those who favored the British and royalist position.®’ As a result, the Porte vacillated,

sometimes restricting the Jacobins and sometimes giving them full freedom so that in the end they were able to continue their work most of the time.” There was also another channel through which revolutionary doctrines entered the Ottoman Empire at this time. In Paris, the documents of revolution were translated into Serbian, Greek, and Armenian, as well as into Turkish, and these were disseminated widely in the European portions of the empire and the Mediterranean islands. Even in times of closest French cooperation with the Porte, French agents were sent to Ali Pasha of Janina, to Dalmatia, to Serbia, Greece, Crete, and Cyprus, preaching the

advantages of republicanism and liberty and trying to make

Window to the West

198 certain that if the Porte did choose to side with the enemies of the Revolution, France too would have its friends within the Ottoman dominions.”' French occupation of the Venetian territories along

the Adriatic and of various Mediterranean islands served to intensify these activities which, although they were resisted strongly by Ottoman, British, and Russian agents, were quite successful, inaugurating a ferment which led directly to the subsequent Balkan revolts against the Sultan. Another source of transmission which cannot be entirely overlooked was provided by non-Muslims in the service of the Porte and the Sultan. Selim himself had a German and an Italian doctor, who used their positions to tell him of the West and to stimulate his taste for it.”” There were European women in the harem of the Sultan, and they are reputed to have provided important channels of contact between the Palace and the West. Also the

Jews of the empire as well as Greek and Armenian merchants and aristocrats long had been in intimate contact with relatives, friends, and business associates living in the various countries of Europe. Through private correspondence, they were in constant touch with Europe, and it must be assumed that they passed on

at least a certain amount of the information derived to their Ottoman associates. The most direct means by which this sort of

information was communicated to the Porte was through the office of Bash Terjuman, the chief translator of the Imperial Council and official in charge of relations with foreign representatives.”

After the late seventeenth century, this important position was held exclusively by members of the wealthy Greek Phanariote families of Istanbul, who kept it just because their contacts with the West made them more knowledgeable of Europe than their Ottoman brothers.” In addition, these and other Greek and Armenian families often sent their children to be educated in Europe,

in Italy in particular, thus preparing them both linguistically and intellectually to receive the new western ideas of their time and to transmit them to the Ottomans at the Porte.” It is difficult to assess the extent to which these Western influences and ideas took root among the Ottomans of Selim’s time. The fact that he and those around him did try to imitate Europe in some respects, and the certainty that their efforts had some

The “New Order” of Selim III

support among rulers and subjects alike, would seem to indicate 199 that there was at least some effect. Yet this should not be overstressed. As we have seen, most of the “reforms” were in fact traditional Ottoman responses to the needs of the time, and the relative ease with which Selim was deposed in 1807 indicates his lack of deep-seated support among rulers and subjects alike. That the Sultan himself retained in essence the spirit and mentality of the past is demonstrated further by the nature of the literary efforts which were supported in his court. With the doctrines of revolution swirling around him, Sultan Selim chose to promote the efforts of poets and writers who reflected only the themes and values of the past. Thus the great writers of the French

Revolutionary era in Istanbul were the Mevlevi leader Sheyh Galib (1757-1799) and his brother dervishes at the Galata monastery, Hulusi Dede (d. 1805) and Esrar Dede (d. 1797) as well as Seyyid Vehbi (d. 1809) and the great Fazil Bey (d. 1808), who represented the last great flourish of the traditional Ottoman literary schools. For them, as for their patron, it was the empty, mystical searchings for the supreme being and the never-ending descrip-

tions of court frivolities that excited attention rather than the political, social, and economic problems of their time. That no modern school of literature appeared in Selim’s time seems to be clear evidence that the ideas of the West, however freely they came into the capital, took no root but at best left the seeds for a flowering which was to come only under Selim’s successors.”°

Window to the West

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