Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis (The Gulf Research Centre Book Series at Gerlach Press) 3959940300, 9783959940306

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Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

The Gulf Research Centre Book Series at Gerlach Press The Gulf Region: Economic Development and Diversification (4 vols set) Ed. by L. Luciani, S. Hertog, E. Woertz and R. Youngs ISBN 9783940924001, 2012

Sustainable Development Challenges in the Arab States of the Gulf Ed. by David Bryde, Yusra Mouzughi and Turki Al Rasheed ISBN 9783940924629, 2015

The GCC in the Global Economy Ed. by Richard Youngs ISBN 9783940924018, 2012

The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments Ed. by Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock ISBN 9783940924667, 2015

Resources Blessed: Diversification and the Gulf Development Model Ed. by Giacomo Luciani ISBN 9783940924025, 2012

Africa and the Gulf Region: Blurred Boundaries and Shifting Ties Ed. by Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf and Dale F. Eickelman ISBN 9783940924704, 2015

GCC Financial Markets: The World’s New Money Centers Ed. by Eckart Woertz ISBN 9783940924032, 2012

Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges Ed. by Noel Brehony and Saud Al-Sarhan ISBN 9783940924681, 2015

National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC Ed. by Steffen Hertog ISBN 9783940924049, 2012

Science and Technology Development in the Gulf States: Economic Diversification through Regional Collaboration Ed. by Afreen Siddiqi and Laura Diaz Anadon ISBN 9783959940023, 2016

Asia-Gulf Economic Relations in the 21st Century: The Local to Global Transformation Ed. by Tim Niblock with Monica Malik ISBN 9783940924100, 2013 A New Gulf Security Architecture: Prospects and Challenges for an Asian Role Ed. by Ranjit Gupta, Abubaker Bagader, Talmiz Ahmad and N. Janardhan ISBN 9783940924360, 2014 Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond Ed. by Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall ISBN 9783940924322, 2014 State-Society Relations in the Arab Gulf States Ed. by Mazhar Al-Zoby and Birol Baskan ISBN 9783940924384, 2014 Political Economy of Energy Reform: The Clean Energy-Fossil Fuel Balance in the Gulf Ed. by Giacomo Luciani and Rabia Ferroukhi ISBN 9783940924407, 2014 The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf States Ed. by May Seikaly and Khawla Mattar ISBN 9783940924346, 2014 Security Dynamics of East Asia in the Gulf Region Ed. by Tim Niblock with Yang Guang ISBN 9783940924483, 2014 Islamic Finance: Political Economy, Performance and Risk Ed. by Mehmet Asutay and Abdullah Turkistani ISBN 9783940924124, 3 vols set, 2015 Employment and Career Motivation in the Arab Gulf States: The Rentier Mentality Revisited Ed. by Annika Kropf and Mohamed Ramady ISBN 9783940924605, 2015 The Changing Energy Landscape in the Gulf: Strategic Implications Ed. by Gawdat Bahgat ISBN 9783940924643, 2015

Higher Education Investment in the Arab States of the Gulf: Strategies for Excellence and Diversity Ed. by Dale F. Eickelman and Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf ISBN 9783959940122, 2016 Iran’s Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry Ed. by Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara and Paul Aarts ISBN 9783959940047, 2016 Egypt and the Gulf: A Renewed Regional Policy Alliance Ed. by Robert Mason ISBN 9783959940061, 2016 Intellectual Property Rights: Development and Enforcement in the Arab States of the Gulf Ed. by David Price and Alhanoof AlDebasi ISBN 9783959940108, 2016 The Arab States of the Gulf and BRICS: New Strategic Partnerships in Geopolitcs and Economics Ed. by Tim Niblock, Alejandra Galindo and Degang Sun ISBN 9783959940085, 2016 The Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States: Trends and Implications Ed. by David B. Des Roches and Dania Thafer ISBN 9783959940160, 2016 Strategies of Knowledge Transfer for Economic Diversification in the Arab States of the Gulf Ed. by Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Neema Noori and Jean-Marc Rickli ISBN 9783959940146, 2018 Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis Ed. by Helen Lackner and Daniel Martin Varisco ISBN 9783959940306, 2018 Conflict Resolution and Creation of a Security Community in the Gulf Region Ed. by Tim Niblock with Talmiz Ahmad and Degang Sun ISBN 9783959940368, 2018 The Future of Labour Market Reform in the Gulf States: Towards a Multi-Disciplinary, Evidence-Based and Practical Understanding Ed. by David B. Jones and Sofiane Sahraoui ISBN 9783959940344, 2018

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis Edited by Helen Lackner and Daniel Martin Varisco

GerlachPress

First published 2018 by Gerlach Press Berlin, Germany www.gerlach-press.de Cover Design: Frauke Schön, Hamburg Set by Anne Jeschke, Gerlach Press Printed and bound in Germany

© Gulf Research Centre Cambridge 2018 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced, or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any other information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Bibliographic data available from Deutsche Nationalbibliothek http://d-nb.info/1136382771

ISBN: 978-3-95994-030-6 (hardcover) ISBN: 978-3-95994-031-3 (eBook)

Contents

Introduction: Framing the Yemen Crisis Helen Lackner 1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations Helen Lackner

1 7

2. The Yemeni-Saudi Border: From Boundary to Frontline29 Ash Rossiter 3. The Future of Yemen: The Economic and Security Roles of the GCC45 Sterling Jensen 4. Omani-Yemeni Relations: Past, Present and Future Ahmed Abdullah Baabood

67

5. Yemen in the Context of Iran-Gulf Relations Mahjoob Zweiri

83

6. Conclusion: Searching for a Resolution Daniel Martin Varisco

101

Select Bibliography

113

About the Contributors

119

Note on Transliteration and Abbreviations

121

Chronology of Yemen (20th-21st Centuries)

123

Map129 Index131

Acknowledgements

The editors thank all the participants at the Gulf Research Meeting (GRM) 2016 workshop for their active and interesting contributions. The paper presenters and attenders added to the quality and scope of the discussion. We also thank the Cambridge GRM team for facilitating the workshop and making our stay in Cambridge pleasant and giving us a particularly agreeable room which enhanced discussion. Particular thanks are due to Elsa Courdier and Sanya Kapasi for their excellent organisation work. We thank Malcolm Campbell at Gerlach Press for helpful copy editing. Responsibility for the contents and views expressed in each chapter are those of the authors, which explains the wide range of positions found, giving an indication of the breadth of the dialogue on this important topic.

vii

Introduction: Framing the Yemen Crisis Helen Lackner For the third year in a row, the 2016 Cambridge Gulf Research Meeting held a workshop focused on Yemeni issues, reflecting the increased importance of Yemen for the Gulf states, particularly with respect to its political and military crisis. While the 2014 meeting resulted in the publication of Rebuilding Yemen, Political, Economic and Social Challenges, edited by Noel Brehony and Saud al Sarhan in 2015, this volume reflects the sad fact that the time for rebuilding has not yet arrived and that the Yemeni civil war, seriously worsened by the military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition, presents a major challenge to the stability and future of the people throughout the Arabian Peninsula and not only in Yemen. The Yemeni crisis has led to an increased interest in the country, and a number of collective publications have been published in English in recent years. Therefore, the editors have regretfully left out some excellent papers and presentations from our workshop in order to present a more focused volume, exclusively addressing the relations between Yemen and the states on both sides of the Gulf, i.e., the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran. This introduction will present a summary of the discussions in the meeting itself as well as of the book. Discussion throughout the workshop was particularly lively and relevant thanks to the very active participation of several Yemeni listening participants, representing different viewpoints. The fact that discussions took place under Chatham House rules facilitated open discussion. Some of the views expressed influenced the redrafting of the papers included in this volume. The long-time experience of participants in Yemen and the region as diplomats, consultants and policy makers contributed to a focus on solutions and a better understanding of the constraints currently faced by the coalition as well as the Yemeni parties. The range of positions represented included those of supporters and opponents of the internationally recognised government, differing views among the GCC states, as well as information on different Iranian points of view about the current crisis. In addition to the presentations listed below, Dr Abdulaziz Sager, Director of the Gulf Research Centre, provided his analysis of the relations between Yemen and the GCC. Such a group is rarely, if ever, found sitting around the same table for two full days of discussions. As an academic forum, the aim of the panel was to provide a context for better understanding the factors 1

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

relevant to the other Gulf states that have led to the current crisis and views about the future of Yemen, its rebuilding and security post-conflict. A major point of consensus in the workshop was that the current and future relations between Yemen and the GCC states are very complicated and cannot be reduced to support for, or opposition to, a particular side. The instability in Yemen, including the presence of Al-Qaida and Daesh is a problem that is not confined within Yemen’s borders. The humanitarian crisis, which is extensive, requires immediate alleviating measures in terms of provision of basic food and other necessities. In the medium term it will require a major influx of development aid and rebuilding of the damage to infrastructure, businesses, factories and historic sites, let alone lives and human capital. The fact that no participants predicted a likely outcome of the crisis or indeed its duration reflects both the complexity of the situation and the political and military stalemates which prevailed at the time of the workshop in August 2016 and are, with minor modifications both political and military, still relevant at the time of going to press in spring 2017. The workshop had thirteen presentations: six of them discussed internal issues whose understanding is essential to considering the country’s future relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. These included Daniel Varisco’s introduction which is given more attention here as it is the only discussion of internal Yemeni politics and culture in this book. It discussed the changes which have taken place in Yemen’s society, history and politics in the past four decades. Referring to the widespread description of Yemen as ‘Arabia Felix’ he demonstrated that this was largely a misnomer and that the history of the area had been far from happy, with a combination of isolation of remote areas and numerous military conflicts from local and other challengers in the past millennium. His examination of the Saleh regime is based on the author’s presence in Sanaa at the time Saleh came to power in 1978 and points out the importance of his control over military forces in his retention of the presidency for over three decades, and his control over oil revenue which enabled him to buy the loyalty of tribes. Varisco addressed the issue of the role of the tribes in Yemeni politics. All too often portrayed as war-mongering supporters of extremism, the reality is far different with serious analysts having focused on the importance of persuasion, reconciliation and mediation in resolving problems both within and between tribes. This theme was also addressed in Najwa Adra’s discussion of tribal governance including the important role for women which, she argues, is threatened by modernity and imported conservative interpretations of Islam, as well as urban elitist suspicion of tribes. The restraint and respect for tribal norms were among the many reasons why the 2011 uprisings remained peaceful. Both Adra and Varisco pointed out the potential contribution tribal negotiators might bring to reach a lasting peace in Yemen, using previously successful mediation mechanisms and procedures. Varisco also examined how Saudi Arabia’s role in encouraging sectarianism through the establishment of the Dammaj Salafi school in Sa‘da was a major element in reviving Zaydism in the northern part of the country and thus creating the Huthi movement. His 2

Introduction: Framing the Yemen Crisis

powerful comparison between the devastation currently being forced on Yemen with other historical cases of mass destruction of cities is an appropriate foretaste of the expected humanitarian disasters of famine and further destruction expected in 2017. His forecasts are pessimistic, focusing at the international level on the ongoing international conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran over dominance in the Muslim world, and the USA’s focus on counter terrorism. At the internal level, contributing factors to the crisis are the frustrations of the 70% of the country’s population who are younger than 25 years of age, the deteriorating position of women in recent decades and the history of inappropriate development policies imposed by the external funders. Three scenarios are possible outcomes of the current war: hegemony over Yemeni affairs by Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, military stalemate and a fragmentation of the country and, least likely but most positive, the emergence of a truly democratic Yemen. These are presented in detail in Chapter 6. Academic and policy discussions of Yemen have, in the past decade, concentrated on the concept of the fragile state. Maria Louisa Clausen discussed this and came to the conclusion that while the concept has no clear definition, it has been used to characterise Yemen, due to the presence of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which encouraged policy makers to regard the country as a chaotic safe haven for such organisations. The consequences of the Saudi-led coalition involvement have included deepening the conflict lines within the country, largely as a result of President of the internationally recognised government Hadi’s limited internal legitimacy. Issues of state effectiveness are particularly prominent with respect to its armed forces, and here Spencer and Wight’s presentation on Yemen’s security and military provided basic information for an understanding of the ways in which these essential sectors were used by Saleh to control the country and the reforms which are needed to ensure that they act in the interests of the nation as a whole rather than a faction. Marieke Brandt, an acknowledged expert on the Huthi movement, focused her presentation on the various mediation efforts undertaken to solve the Huthi wars, including both internal Yemeni and external ones, primarily Qatar’s attempts at mediation. She explains their failure as a result of Saudi interference, Saleh’s unwillingness to accept a solution, and Huthi perception of their own increased strength. The importance of examining past mediation attempts resides in their ability to provide clear pointers for the future about Huthi strategies and intentions in future negotiations. Her conclusion that Huthis have a history of failing to respect agreements they have made is obviously all too relevant in the context of attempts to achieve a solution to the current war. The rise of the Huthi movement also brought to the fore issues of sectarianism which were largely absent in Yemeni social and political discourse in recent decades. The development of such tendencies and the risks associated with them were addressed by Hanin Abou Salem who pointed out that the increasing focus on the sectarian aspects of the conflict presents dangers for the future as it might result in the current civil war worsening ‘because religious conviction will start to define the long term objectives 3

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

of the warring parties.’1 To back up her argument that such developments might lead to apocalyptic visions she quotes from a number of religious texts which have been used by Huthi ideologues and others as references to anticipate with some satisfaction such visions. Presenting a Pakistani journalist’s view of the Yemeni situation in the context of other Arab uprisings, Raza Naeem explained the reasons why Pakistan took the surprising decision of not participating in the Saudi-led coalition, while Cornelia Zeineddine’s paper gave an overview of various statements made by the different international direct and indirect participants in the current conflict. Ashraf Mishrif ’s paper forcefully presented the economic arguments for the inclusion of Yemen into the Gulf Cooperation Council while Iran’s position specifically on the Huthi movement was outlined by Arash Reisinezhad and Parisa Farhadi; both these papers are to be published elsewhere and therefore not included in our collection. The chapters in the book present some very detailed and illuminating aspects of different aspects of Gulf-Yemen relations. Helen Lackner’s chapter provides an overview of relations between the GCC states and Iran with Yemen in the past half century, designed to provide the background necessary to help readers understand the motivations and actions taken by the different parties since the crisis blew up into full-scale civil war in 2015 as well as the detailed analyses of the following more specialised chapters. Ash Rossiter addresses the important issue of the Saudi-Yemeni border, which has been the focus of disagreements between the two states at different times since the establishment of the Kingdom. In addition to providing details of the border agreements which have been made and their effectiveness, he brings up the important issue of the impact of these agreements on the communities living in those areas, and particularly the livestock herding groups whose access to pasture has been restricted by the fencing of the border. While these have lost out, others who are mainly smugglers (of people, goods and drugs) have profited. The border demarcation issue has also been relevant to the emergence of the Huthi movement, but its signature in 2000 marked a significant improvement in Saudi-Yemeni relations which lasted till the current war. Sterling Jensen addresses security issues relevant to future relations between the GCC states and Yemen, focusing on the situation since the beginning of the war. His analysis concentrates on Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran in addition to examining the positions of the different groups involved on the Yemeni side. He contrasts the Saudi vision which sees Yemen as a threat with that of the UAE which sees Yemen as an opportunity to increase its influence with its big brother Saudi Arabia. From the Yemeni perspectives, he explains Hadi’s determination to achieve total victory as his only strategy to remain in power. As for the other side, the Huthi movement is in search of increasing its political position and direct involvement within Yemen, to reach a level commensurate with its military strength and popular support, while Saleh’s aim is to survive not only physically but as an influential and respected figure, and to take revenge on all those who betrayed him, whether Hadi or the Islah party. Jensen uses the example of the Marshall aid plan in the reconstruction of 4

Introduction: Framing the Yemen Crisis

Europe after the Second World War as an appropriate model the GCC states could follow in helping reconstruction of Yemen. He argues that a long-term GCC military presence in Yemen might be useful but recognises that it may be unrealistic, though he does not say that this may be due to Yemeni military skills which have proved greater than those of the coalition forces. Oman is the only member of the GCC which has refused to join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Its role as a mediator has been, and will continue to be, important. Ahmed Baabood’s chapter contributes to explaining why Oman has followed such an independent path. He outlines Omani foreign policy since the 1970s including multiple examples of the state having taken positions both unexpected and independent from those of other GCC and indeed Arab states. He details the economic and political aspects of Oman’s good relationship with Iran throughout the period and regardless of the regime in Iran. Oman’s propensity for mediation is partly due to the fact that its leadership and population are neither Sunni nor Shi’a, a relevant factor in today’s sectarianised politics in the region. Going into details about relations between Oman and Yemen during the past half century, he concludes with details of the mediation attempts during the war and an explanation of Oman’s long-term security concerns about Yemen and perspectives on economic cooperation. His assessment is that it will remain in Oman’s interest to strive for good relations with Yemen, though there is a high level of uncertainty given the prospect of a new leadership in Oman itself within the foreseeable future. Although he expects a future sultan to follow a similar path, he considers the possibility of a surprise shift in policy as was seen with the new king in Saudi Arabia. The important role of Iran is addressed by Zweiri who examines in particular the historical place of Yemen within Gulf-Iran relations and then he looks at the aggravation of Iran-Saudi relations as a result of the current war. His chapter looks at the implications for Saudi Iranian relations of the various middle eastern conflicts in which both participate directly and indirectly on opposite sides. The possibility of Yemen becoming a pawn in negotiations between powerful interveners in Syria and Iraq has to be considered. The book concludes with an examination by Varisco of possible scenarios which might emerge in coming years. Given the state of flux at lack of any viable resolution of the conflict at the time of this writing, no conclusion of what is likely to happen is possible. It is obvious that at some point in the future the conflict will be mitigated. One of the major issues facing Yemen now and extending into the future is the unprecedented humanitarian crisis, which has worsened every day. While we express little hope of a solution which would benefit the majority of Yemenis, improve their living standards and give them a regime closer to the democratic and representative hopes of the movement in 2011, we also note some positive elements. One of them is the common theme to many chapters which see the possible inclusion of Yemen into the GCC as a major contribution to stability in Yemen. This would provide important investment and export opportunities for the GCC states and contribute to major improvements in standards of living in Yemen itself. But just as important is the 5

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

role of Yemenis themselves to put aside their differences and realize the benefits of a united state, even if divided in a federalist fashion. While we cannot predict any specific outcome, we do know that the crisis between Yemen and the GCC is not going away soon. Hopefully, the chapters in this volume will help clarify analysis of what is a ‘moving target.’

Note 1 Hanin Abu Salem, (2016) Yemen and the GCC: Sectarianism and Future Relations, paper presented to GRM 2016, 7.

6

1 The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations Helen Lackner

Introduction1 Yemen is situated in the Arabian Peninsula, but it is alone in not being a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). To explain this situation requires some fundamental analysis of the many factors which make the country unique in the area. Unlike the other states in the peninsula, Yemen is a republic, it has a relatively high population density, the overwhelming majority of its population are native Yemenis, and the majority of them are poor rural people living from agriculture, livestock herding and fisheries. State income from petroleum exports peaked in 2001 with a production of 400,000 barrels/day. To explain the significance of this one need only point out that at that time its population was 18 million nationals with a per capita GDP of USD 5462, while Saudi Arabia produced 8 million barrels/day of oil3 and had a population of 21 million [including 5.7 million non-Saudis] and a per capita GDP of USD 8,760.4 Regardless of any other factors, it is unarguable that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has played the most important role in determining both Yemen’s foreign relations and even its internal politics for decades. Given its population, its geographical size and its financial clout, Saudi Arabia is by far the most important state in the peninsula. Other GCC states, however wealthy per capita, cannot compete on the regional or global scale. With respect to Yemen, only Saudi Arabia and Oman share a joint border. Open public intervention of GCC states in Yemeni affairs is a new development, which emerged with the Saudi-led coalition’s military intervention since March 2015. But less obvious, though arguably as significant, discreet interference in Yemeni affairs has been a major element of Saudi Arabian policy since the creation of the Kingdom, and Yemen has also had a prominent role in the other GCC states, through migration, political influence, and economic relations. This chapter provides an outline of the history of the relations of 7

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

the various GCC states and Iran with Yemen, focusing on their visions and concerns, while not neglecting the Yemeni side. It presents an overview of the broader regional context to clarify the detailed analyses of specific issues to be found in the following chapters. This chapter will not examine the political or indeed detailed military role of the other members of the coalition, primarily because this book is concerned with Gulf-Yemen relations and the involvement of Egyptian, Sudanese and other forces are more closely connected with those states relationships with the GCC than with Yemen itself.

Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia and Yemen have had a tumultuous relationship since the foundation of the kingdom in 1932. Two years later, in 1934, Saudi Arabia easily and rapidly defeated the illorganised forces of Imam Yahya and took possession of the provinces of Jizan, Najran and Asir, on what was initially a 20-year renewable agreement. The 1934 Taif Treaty enabled Saudi Arabia to take control of the former Idrisi state, where these regions were located. Although renewed regularly under the Imamate, the treaty was rejected by almost all Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) governments after 1962, on the basis that it was only valid for 20 years and had been imposed by force.5 Concern about Yemen’s reclaiming its lost lands also played a significant part in the tension between the two states and this has persisted until recently. After the establishment of the republican regime in Sanaa there was regular, if not frequent, talk of reconquering or recovering the lands lost in 1934. The 1962 revolution in Sanaa, more correctly described as a military coup, established the Yemen Arab Republic. It led to the eight-year civil war in the YAR during which the republican forces were supported by Egyptian troops sent in by president Gamal Abdel Nasser and representing a form of secular Arab socialism throughout the Arab world.6 The new republic faced the overthrown Imam’s forces who were supported openly by the Wahhabi Saudi regime with covert assistance from Britain and others. During this period, Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to actively support a Zaydi Imam against the largely Sunni Republicans. The issue of the imam being a Zaydi, i.e, a Shi’a, was considered irrelevant by comparison with the importance of maintaining a royalist regime on its southern border, certainly a contrast with the current situation. In the Arab world, the 1960s was the peak period of confrontation between secular political movements ranging from those supporting Western-style social democracy to extreme socialist movements on the one hand, facing the emerging Islamist movements influenced by Saudi Salafism or Muslim Brotherhood ideology on the other. Although the Imam represented neither, he claimed authority on a religious basis and opposed secularism. This was enough to ensure firm Saudi support at the time. Saudi actions to oppose the republican regime included more than direct support for the Imam’s forces. Another form was the support to tribes, mainly in the northern part of the YAR, to enable them to oppose the central government in Sanaa.7 Again the majority 8

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

of these tribes and their leaders were Zaydi, as this area had been dominated by the Zaydi school for a millennium. In this way Saudi Arabia contributed to strengthening challenges to the central state in Sanaa by providing financial support to groups which could compete with the state and were not dependent on it financially.8 This created a political situation which continued throughout the following decades and well into the existence of the united Republic of Yemen (ROY) after 1990. It remained a political characteristic of the earlier YAR state, ensuring structural weakness of central authority and its inability to control certain powerful tribes and tribal leaders who were effectively rivals and had comparable financial clout. These tribal groups controlled significant populations, had their own military strength and were always able to have a significant influence on the state’s politics. Indeed, although gradually weakened, this ‘dual’ power only stopped functioning efficiently in 2011 with the death of then Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz in Saudi Arabia. He had run the ‘Special Office for Yemen Affairs’ which ‘remained the main locus of Yemen policy and patronage throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a role that was attenuated from 2000. Its annual budget was believed to be $3.5 billion per year until then, but was reduced following that year’s border agreement. In early 2011, the number of people thought to be receiving subsidies still remained in the thousands, but in April recipients were notified that payments were being terminated by order of the royal court.’9 The role of Saudi-influenced political groups was particularly prominent at the time of Yemeni unification in 1989-1990 when the anti-unification position of Saudi Arabia coincided with that of Islamist power brokers such as Abdul Majid al-Zindani as well as the Hashid leader Abdullah bin Hussain al-Ahmar. There is room for debate as to whether this was actually a shared position rather than one taken by the Yemenis under Saudi influence, but there is little doubt that both the Saudi regime and the Zaydi Islamists were strongly opposed to unification, primarily on the grounds of hostility to the secular, socialist policies in the PDRY and what they saw as the threat of ‘atheism’ and ‘communism’, both labels liberally used to describe the PDRY regime. As the PDRY regime after the 1986 crisis became far less extremist and also much weaker, the reduced threat its ideology presented was only recognised by a few senior Saudis. This change was insufficiently marked and the period too short to enable a fundamental move away from the widely disseminated hostility to this purported atheistic regime. The emphasis on this supposed problem could be read as reflecting their lack of confidence in the strength of Islam as a popular ideology. Final resolution of the Saudi-Yemeni border issue took place with the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah on 12 June 2000. This border agreement gave considerable advantages to the ROY which gained some 40,000km2, including an area rich in oil and gas in the eastern sector. It also includes a 5km demilitarised zone on either side of the border.10 Further to joint demarcation of the border in following years, as the relationship between the two countries deteriorated and the Huthi rebellion emerged, Saudi Arabia started building a fence along its border. This was intended, as these walls and fences usually are, to reduce the ability of people to cross illegally. In addition to making life difficult for smugglers (of 9

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

qat and other products), this contravened the part of the Jeddah treaty which entitled local pastoralists to have free movement in pursuit of pasture for their livestock. It is important to note that this measure was also designed to stop Somali and other African migrants from reaching Saudi Arabia, thus leaving them stranded in Yemen, which obviously did not provide them with the kind of economic opportunities these migrants were seeking. The border agreement, and later in the decade the deteriorating health of Prince Sultan, resulted in the Saudi regime reducing its interest and focus on Yemen during that decade. Since the relationships with their clients in Yemen deteriorated, due to a lack of attention and monitoring, Saudi policy makers had little detailed understanding of the changes in the balance of power in Sanaa or of the significance of the rise of the Huthi movement from 2004 onwards. This decade was also marked by a re-focusing of policy in Saudi Arabia, whose policy success within Saudi Arabia against Al-Qaida (AQ) led to the migration of leading AQ leaders and militants to Yemen and, in 2009, the formation of AlQaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Thus there was a clear convergence away from a focus on Yemeni politics per se towards concern with Al-Qaida, and later Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Between the death of Sultan bin Abdul Aziz and the beginning of the military intervention in 2015, Saudi policy on Yemen was transformed into a counter terrorism one, something which was also encouraged by Saudi Arabia’s main international ally, the USA. As a result, there was little serious analysis and understanding of the emerging problems and dynamics in Yemen. None of the currently influential leaders in Saudi Arabia has had the detailed knowledge and interest in internal Yemeni politics to develop a sophisticated policy based on the complexities of internal Yemeni politics. Following on his father, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, the minister of the Interior and Crown Prince (until 21 June 2017) remained the main focal point on Yemeni affairs until the war started. His hard line was based on a simplistic counter terrorism strategy and hostility to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In addition, personal experience explains his hostility to jihadi groups as he narrowly escaped death in August 2009 when a Saudi member of Al-Qaida pretended to be a repentant jihadi and came close to him before exploding a device, killing himself but only slightly injuring the Prince. The 2011 uprisings throughout the Arab world in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain were perceived as significant threats by the Saudi regime which responded in different ways. These included investing significant amounts in social and economic development for its population at a time when oil prices and national revenue were high. In addition, Saudi Arabia played a leading role in trying to ensure that the uprisings in Yemen did not bring about regime change in a direction it would consider threatening, i.e. towards a deeper democracy more responsive to the political, social and economic ambitions of the majority of the population. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Saleh had deteriorated over a period of time. His main supporter was King Abdullah while both his crown prince Nayef and the latter’s sons had been sceptical about Saleh’s loyalty for some time. When it became 10

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

clear that Saleh would not be able to defeat the joint efforts of the revolutionary youth and his elite rivals, the Saudi regime joined other GCC states, the USA and other members of the ‘international community’ in working towards a transition away from his regime. The transitional regime established in 2012 was formally led by Saleh’s former Vice President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a southerner, who has failed to live up to Saudi expectation.11 The transitional regime was intended to prevent the emergence of a state which would have been perceived as unthreatening by the Saudi regime while providing enough change to bring some stability to Yemen. Formed of a coalition between Saleh’s forces and the recognised opposition and lacking the necessary financial support to address the social and economic demands of the majority of Yemenis, the Hadi regime was unable to resist the rise of the Huthi movement in alliance with Saleh and his elite military forces, who had been supported and trained by the USA for the previous decade. The unravelling of the transitional regime in 2014 led to the takeover of power in Sanaa by the Huthi-Saleh alliance, a ‘slow coup’ which culminated on 6 February 2015 with the Huthi ‘Constitutional Decree’ which cancelled all constitutional processes and officially handed power to the Huthi leadership. Since many Yemenis and observers had been following the weakening and disintegration of Yemen over the years, the outbreak of internal fighting came as no surprise; the surprise element was the military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015. This was the first indication that the Kingdom’s policies would be very different under King Salman from what they had been under his more cautious brother Abdullah, who died in January 2015. While King Salman himself is also elderly and has major health problems, he has effectively started a serious transfer of power to a younger generation and done that by skipping the generation of those in their 50s and 60s by empowering his young son, Mohammed, in his early 30s, with a number of senior posts, including Defence, Economy and most importantly, culminating in his being nominated Crown Prince in June 2017. He has very significant challenges ahead to successfully address the kingdom’s considerable problems. These include reduced income from oil, considerable youth unemployment, scepticism about the family’s rule, a significant Islamist movement far more extreme than the current Wahhabi clerical establishment, the possible expansion of Salafi influence beyond the country’s borders, as well as the worsening situation in neighbouring Yemen. The perceived threat from Iran is, however, only one of the main reasons why Saudi Arabia led a coalition against the HuthiSaleh factions in Yemen. Others relate first to Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitions as well as to Saudi Arabia perceiving Yemen as a threat simply due to its large and insubordinate population which is poor. This poverty itself is seen as a threat due to the presence of many Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia, both legally and as undocumented migrants. For Mohammed bin Salman, the Yemen crisis no doubt first appeared to be a great opportunity. In the absence of any historical understanding of the region and Yemen in particular, he believed he could achieve a rapid and successful military victory over illequipped mountain tribesmen by his well-equipped and USA trained forces, especially since 11

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

he was assured of an easily achieved monopoly over air power. A quick victory would ensure his popularity within Saudi Arabia, and particularly among its youth. It would reverse the widespread view that the Saudi military was merely a ‘parade’ rather than a real army, and ensure respect for the country throughout the region for acting independently of its USA ally. Unfortunately for him, he had probably not read the memoir of Dr Ghazi al-Gosaibi about Saudi relations with Yemen. Recalling the 1930s, Dr. al-Gosaibi wrote: ‘My father was in Europe during the outbreak of the Saudi-Yemeni war in 1934. As soon as he heard about it he hurried back to take part in the war effort, only to find that King Abdul Aziz had already ordered his forces in Yemen to halt their advance, and then to withdraw. My father was surprised by the King’s decision and made his surprise known more than once. Finally the King summoned him and told him privately “Abdul Rahman, you know nothing about Yemen; it is mountainous and tribal; no one can control it. Throughout history all those who tried to control it, failed. The Ottoman state was the last of the failed invaders. I don’t want to embroil myself or my people in Yemen.”’12 Nor had Salman learned the lessons of the Saudi inability to reinstate the Zaydi imamate in the 1960s. Now well into the third year of the war and in the absence of any significant success, Mohammed bin Salman probably regrets his rashness and would like to find a face-saving solution which would enable him to concentrate his energies on internal reforms, his ‘Vision 2030’ and other matters more likely to improve his image. Success has been elusive in the face of strong military action from the Saleh Huthi troops, which have even resulted in significant incursions into Saudi Arabian territory. There are also factional divisions within the internationally recognized Yemeni government, which has proven to be unequal to the task of negotiating a settlement. Participation by members of the coalition has been unequal and often not forthcoming. Although a major military partner, the antipathy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Saudi support for the Yemeni Islah party creates a fault line within the coalition itself. International concern over the devastating humanitarian crisis has also tarnished the Saudi image in continuing the war with no resolution in sight.

Iran Prior to the Iranian revolution that deposed the Shah in 1979, relations between the Arab and Iranian sides of the Gulf were good. All the states in the region were aligned with the USA and the Shah of Iran was considered the ‘policeman’ of the region. None of the states on the southern coast were militarily strong and all relied on the promise of foreign military support in case of attack. Politically many of them were barely emerging from protectorate status less than a decade earlier, while Saudi Arabia was very focused on infrastructure construction and on political leadership within the Arab world. This included contesting the regional secularist republics by widely promoting its version of Islam both in the region and in the Third World. This situation changed dramatically with the Iranian revolution which instantly resulted in two main trends, both of which have been relevant ever since. The first 12

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

is an extreme tension and hostility between Iran and the USA and the second a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s ideological leadership of the Muslim world. The second was a fundamental change as the Shah’s claim to political authority beyond Iran’s borders was based on western modernization and made no appeal whatever to Islam. This left Islam-based influence to Saudi Arabia, where King Fahd in 1986 changed his title to that of ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ thus emphasizing his country’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world. In 1971 the Shah’s forces had occupied the Tunb and Abu Musa islands a mere two days before the end of the British protectorate and the establishment of the UAE. The response to this event can be seen as a litmus test of relations between the states on the north and south of the Gulf. While it led to weakly-worded protests on the part of the new state at the time, it has remained an issue brought up regularly since then and indeed is considered more contentious today. Hostility between Iran and the Arab Gulf states increased over the following decades and was marked by various incidents with Saudi Arabia, mainly regarding the pilgrimage (hajj). By contrast the UAE, and Dubai in particular, continued to maintain commercial and financial relations with Iran, providing Iran with a lifeline to international trade and helping it to cope with the increasingly constraining sanctions imposed by the USA and other states. Fear of the Shi’a majority in Bahrain was used as a tool to gain Saudi and other support by the ruling Sunni Khalifa regime in Bahrain, despite the weak evidence of Iranian involvement in Bahraini politics. Thus, the conflict between Shi’a Iran and the Arab states of the peninsula was focused on the Iran-Iraq conflicts for the three decades following the Iranian revolution which included in particular the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war which is estimated to have killed close to 1.5 million people and left countless scarred. Yemen remained marginal, verging on insignificant in the overall relationship between Iran and its peninsula neighbours until the rise of the Huthi movement in the mid-2000s. This took place following the fundamental change in the balance of forces in the region after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which was further affected by the civil war in Syria since 2011. During the six wars which, in the northern part of Yemen, bordering Saudi Arabia, opposed the Huthi movement to the Saleh regime between 2004 and 2010, Saleh made considerable efforts to involve Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to support his regime, politically, militarily and financially. His main tool was to claim that the Iranian revolutionary regime was providing material support to the Huthis on sectarian grounds and that the Zaydi Huthis had become clones of the Iranian Shi’a. At that time Saleh’s attempts ‘to portray the Shia rebels in north Yemen as Iranian cats-paws in order to secure American and Saudi support’13 were largely unsuccessful as his assertions were received with considerable scepticism in Washington, where allegations that the Huthis were receiving aid and weapons from Iran were interpreted as the Yemeni government’s ‘latest disingenuous attempt to garner Western and Sunni Arab support by casting the Huthis as terrorists, religious extremists, and allied with a hostile power’.14 Moreover at that time the USA expressed considerable dissatisfaction at Saleh for diverting USA support intended to strengthen Yemen’s counter terrorism capability to his war against the Huthis nothing 13

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

that ‘the CTU15 has been derailed from its principal mission: to combat genuine terrorist target like AQAP while it has been tied down in Sa‘da.’ 16 This was also highly relevant and topical for the Saudis, who were actively engaged in fighting Al-Qaida. In 2010 Christopher Boucek wrote: ‘There is no evidence that Operation Scorched Earth17 is a proxy conflict between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’i Iran. There are more than enough grievances in Yemen and Saada to perpetuate the fighting without drawing in regional dynamics. The Yemeni government has never produced any evidence to support its allegations that Tehran is supporting the Houthis; in fact, some Yemeni officials have confided that such assertions are unfounded.’18 This situation changed completely after 2015 when the Saudi-led coalition became involved in the Yemeni conflict. Other than its claimed objective of restoring legitimacy and returning the 2012 transitional regime to power, the main argument used to obtain official and popular international support is that this war is a proxy one against Iranian expansionism and a sectarian conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Islam. The coalition claims to be resisting Iranian expansionism; Yemen is one of the many fronts in that battle, whose main foci are Syria and Iraq, with Lebanon also being an important site due to the presence of Hezbollah. While such claims are largely propagandist and Iran’s role in Yemen is far less than claimed, the assertions by some of the more extremist Iranians do not help to reduce tension, rather the contrary. Conservative proponents of Iranian influence abroad encourage the war propaganda against those in the GCC and beyond who want to minimise the Yemeni elements of the conflict and turn it into yet another example of an international conflict based on sectarianism or nationalism. For example Alireza Zakani, a member of the Iranian parliament who is close to Khamenei, the Supreme Leader in Iran, declared in late 2014 that “three Arab capitals [Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad] have already fallen into Iran’s hands and belong to the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and Sanaa is the fourth.”19 Such a statement simply fans the flames and encourages further tension and sectarianism. While it certainly represents an extreme view in Iran, this is not the official view of the Iranian government which has made considerable efforts to try and reduce tension. Within the context of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over influence in the region, Yemen is a minor issue, but clearly one which is part of the debate. Certainly for the Iranian regime, its relationship, increased influence and support for Syria and Iraq are far more important than far-away Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, however, all three states are on their borders, and Yemen has been considered part of its ‘back yard’ for close to a century, whereas it has always had less influence in the other two states, so there is clearly a different perception with respect to the importance of Yemen. The Saudi regime can justifiably perceive its situation as being surrounded by hostile Shi’i states: the Iraqi regime is now Shi’a, Hezbollah now has a dominant position in Lebanese politics, Asad’s Alawi regime in Syria is not only still in charge of some parts of the country, but has also improved its military situation in 2016. In addition, the Ibadi Omani regime of Sultan Qaboos has 14

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

remained close to Iran regardless of the regime in power. The prospect of Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab strait being under the control or even the influence of Iran is a grave cause for concern among Iran’s rivals. So although Iranian involvement in Yemen is far less than portrayed in the media, it does exist beyond the propaganda elements. On the one hand, in the first two years of the war there has been no actual evidence to support the numerous coalition claims of killing and capturing Iranians on various Yemeni military fronts; no corpses, identity papers, photos or other credible evidence were ever produced. However, there have been seizures by various international forces of Iranian weapons and ammunition on the high seas. As these were outside of Yemeni territorial waters, proof of their destination is not available and despite claims that they were on their way to Eritrea or Sudan, it is quite likely that some at least were heading towards the Huthis in Yemen. Training of Huthi cadres in military and religious subjects has taken place over the decades both in Iran itself and in Lebanon, while Hezbollah cadres are said to be operating in Yemen. As for propaganda, there is significant evidence of verbal and rhetorical support from Iran. In addition to the above-mentioned statements, in September 2014 Ali Akbar Velayati, a close associate of Ayatollah Khamenei said that Tehran ‘supports the Houthis in their rightful struggles’.20 Far from refuting the allegations, Iranian sources close to the Revolutionary Guards expressed their satisfaction at their allies’ success and welcomed the new member of the ‘axis of resistance’.21 Whether or not the Iranian regime is actively interested in threatening the states on the Arab banks of the Gulf, there is no doubt that such a threat is an important perception on the part of the GCC regimes, primarily Saudi Arabia, followed by Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.

Oman Situated on the edge of the peninsula, with a small population and small oil production, as well as populated by Muslims who are neither Sunni nor Shi’a, Oman has systematically taken political positions which distinguish it from other states in the region. This may be partly due to its history of serious differences with its neighbours as well as the fact that it was closer to states it reached by sea rather than across the desert in past centuries. Oman’s border with the UAE was only settled in 1981 while that with Saudi Arabia in 1991. Both had been causes of conflict over the Buraimi oasis for many decades, partly explaining Oman’s independent approach to its neighbours. Although a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Oman has retained its own prerogatives both with respect to internal politics and to its international relations. With respect to the latter, Oman’s continued close relationship to Iran is the most relevant factor in the current Yemeni war and contributes to explain Oman’s refusal to participate in the Saudi-led coalition. Oman’s close relations with Iran date back many decades. In the early 1970s the Shah’s regime helped the Omani regime defeat the socialist rebels of the Popular Front for the 15

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

Liberation of Oman. Despite the change of regime in Tehran, Oman’s leadership remained close to Iran and more recently played a significant role as mediator between Iran and the USA in the secret negotiations which preceded the Geneva talks leading to the Five Plus One agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme reached in 2015. With respect to Yemen, Oman’s relationship with the country has gone through a number of changes in the decades. While in the 1970s, relations with the PDRY were tense to say the least, both because of the PDRY’s support for the Dhofari rebels and the socialist nature of its regime, the two states recognised each other in 1982. The border between Oman and Yemen was finally settled in 1992 after the establishment of the Republic of Yemen, although the fence built during the Dhofar conflict remains in place even today. Oman gave refuge to the southern leader Ali Salem al-Beedh after the 1994 civil war in Yemen, and only forced him to leave when he broke the condition imposed by Oman to stay out of politics. With the outbreak of full-scale civil war in Yemen complemented by massive international military intervention by the Saudi-led coalition in 2015, the Omani regime first refused to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Sanaa regime, and since then it has made every possible effort to assist in bringing the fighting to an end and to help negotiations between the conflicting parties to take off. Delegations from all warring factions have spent time in Muscat and been given the opportunity to discuss and reach agreement. The delegations from Sanaa, representing the Huthi-Saleh alliance were frequent and sometimes long residing guests in Oman, when they were unable to return to Sanaa due to coalition blockading the airport. Omani planes were used to transport them as well as to bring out released hostages of varying nationalities. While the Omani role as peace broker is respected and appreciated by most, the country’s internal politics might bring about change in its position. Sultan Qaboos’s reign of 47 years is likely to end in the very foreseeable future, due to his age and medical problems. One of the main failings of his regime has been to leave the issue of his succession unresolved. Given its geopolitical position, its history and its social, political and economic differences from other GCC states, it is likely that any future leadership in Oman will attempt to retain a neutral position within the GCC and with respect to its neighbours. However this may well take place within a less interventionist approach to solving regional problems, thus losing Oman’s active participation in the search for solutions in Yemen and elsewhere. Moreover, a new ruler may be less able to resist pressure from his powerful and wealthy colleagues within the GCC. Regardless, there is little doubt that uncertainty over the succession is a matter of concern and even anxiety, not only for Omanis but also for the country’s neighbours and particularly those who currently rely on Oman’s neutral mediation role.

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1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

Kuwait Kuwait’s historical relationship with Yemen must be understood as ‘before and after’ the Iraqi invasion phases. Prior to1990, Kuwait was particularly active internationally and in the region and a major supporter and financier of development initiatives in both the YAR and the PDRY. Indeed, it was the only peninsula state which had reasonably good relations with the PDRY and its support was widely appreciated. Financing of health and medical facilities in both parts of Yemen were also very popular as they came with far fewer strings attached than Saudi support to the YAR or indeed Soviet support to the PDRY, thus helping both states to have a modicum of financial independence from their main political supporters. This changed completely with the 1990 crisis. Recently united Yemen’s refusal to back the USA sponsored anti-Iraq resolution at the United Nations Security Council was interpreted by the Kuwaiti leadership as support for the Iraqi invasion. Kuwaiti aid stopped and the Saleh regime was considered hostile. As a result, Yemenis in Kuwait were among those expelled and sent home. The Yemeni regime was not forgiven for this move until well into this century. Generally, Kuwait’s policies were far less activist after this event, and more turned inwards, and aid to Yemen has remained modest. It is really only with the current war that Kuwait has, once again, taken a keen interest in Yemeni affairs and attempted to help solve the crisis. While it has joined the Saudi-led coalition, its involvement is minimal and its leaders agreed to host the main UN-sponsored negotiations between the warring parties which took place between April and August 2016. Despite their failure, Kuwait has expressed willingness to continue supporting discussions.

Bahrain Other than Yemen, Bahrain was the only other peninsula state where the 2011 uprisings hinted at possible major political transformations. This was promptly ended by the GCC military intervention in mid-March, under the name Peninsula Shield, which involved 1000 mostly Saudi troops, with Emirati police and Kuwaiti naval forces. As a result, the Khalifa regime in Bahrain is an active and loyal participant in Saudi initiatives both generally against anything Iranian and in particular in the coalition fighting in Yemen. Bahrain has provided 15 aircraft and 300 troops to the coalition. In response to its own internal challenges, it also suits the Khalifa Sunni regime to accuse all opponents of being Iranian agents, something which it finds relatively easy to do as the majority of Bahrain’s population are Shi’a and have suffered discrimination from the Sunni minority. The anti-regime movement in Bahrain started as non-sectarian but it has successfully been transformed into a sectarian one through the regime’s discriminatory repressive policies. So although the political struggle in Bahrain can be seen as a Shi’a-Sunni conflict, its roots are far more economic and social than they are sectarian, even if they can appear to be sectarian on the surface. Here again, extremist statements from some Iranian quarters have not helped reduce the conflict. 17

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

Qatar Qatar in the 2000s may be a very small state but it became very wealthy thanks to its massive gas reserves and oil production. It successfully put itself on the world map through its financial investments and involvement in various highly visible issues, such as its winning bid for the 2022 world football tournament. Its efforts to develop its international profile through soft power were largely successful during that decade, as its capital Doha almost overnight became a city of skyscrapers and luxury hotels. Among its strategies to achieve this, Qatar involved itself as a mediator in a number of Arab conflicts, including that between the Huthi movement and the Saleh regime during the fourth and fifth wars. In 2007, its mediation initially appeared to succeed, leading to a cease fire in June and a ‘peace agreement’ in February 2008. However, resistance from the Saleh regime who objected to the development investments proposed for Sa‘da as well as to the Huthis being treated as a fully-empowered party to negotiate, added to the Saudi Arabian resentment at any other state than itself meddling so closely in the internal affairs of Yemen between them led to the failure and non-implementation of the agreement. A repeat effort in 2009 also failed. Relations between Qatar and the Saleh regime remained stressed for the remaining period when Saleh was president of Yemen. Since the fall of Saleh, Qatar has taken an active part in the coalition in support of the internationally recognised government, and has provided troops to the coalition until June 2017. The incipient rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar which is manifested elsewhere in the Middle East is also visible in Yemen, where Qatar supports Islah-related individuals and groups, whereas Saudi Arabia is far more ambiguous, and the UAE are extremely hostile to anything remotely reminiscent of Muslim Brotherhood institutions. However, the accession of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad in 2013 after the 18-year reign of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa has led to warmer relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia until June 2017.

From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates In the 1960s, Aden was the most modern city in the Arabian Peninsula, the envy of many elsewhere, while Sanaa was already a city with a long history and world famous architecture. Abu Dhabi and Dubai were still little more than palm frond villages. There could not be a stronger contrast with the situation half a century later. Abu Dhabi and Dubai now boast the most modern and highest glass-cladded skyscrapers in the world, linked by 12-lane urban highways, while Aden and Sanaa lack any such constructions or market development. Sanaa is now likely to suffer serious long-term damage to the structure of its historic old city and much of Aden has been destroyed in the early months of the war. The earlier situation provided much satisfaction to European visitors who appreciated the ‘traditional’ national cultural characteristics of Arabia as seen in Yemen and absent from the UAE. Tourism to Yemen since the Arab 18

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

Spring has become impossible, as has most academic research or indeed, any other form of travel. Another historical contrasting comparison can be made with respect to political development between the South Arabian Federation which Britain established in 1962 and which did not outlive British political supremacy in Aden on the one hand and, on the other, the United Arab Emirates, created with British sponsorship out of the Trucial States protectorates less than a decade later. Today the UAE are a stable and very wealthy, albeit autocratic, federation thanks to the financing of the poorer statelets by the oil-exporting wealth of Abu Dhabi and the tax-free ‘no questions asked’ commercial and touristic success of Dubai. While there are certainly tensions between the seven statelets which form the UAE, the likelihood of them breaking up into separate independent entities is remote, while the prospect of Yemen remaining a single united state is almost as remote. Ruled by Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan until his death in 2004, the UAE expanded and developed a series of modern cities financed by Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues. With an expatriate population which largely exceeds that of nationals, Shaykh Zayed had a very welcoming attitude to Yemenis originating from the Mareb area, as he considered that his own ancestors came from that region. Not only did the UAE finance the reconstruction of the Mareb dam in the mid-1980s but many immigrants from that area and other parts of Yemen achieved Emirati nationality and the benefits that come with that status. Despite this, relations between the states were not particularly close and there were limited Emirati investments in Yemen. The UAE’s foreign policy over the decades has focused on ensuring good relations with other states and has not been particularly active, though its support for USA-led policies in the world justified its limited military involvement in Afghanistan in recent decades. It is also a refuge for political exiles in the region when out of favour and a haven for the wealthy who invest in real estate to be used as a bolt-hole if needed in the future. This includes former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who with his family still has large investments in the UAE. The UAE’s current military involvement in Yemen is far more intense and deep than its previous military ventures and reflects the importance of this neighbour within the peninsula.

The Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen The 1980s: The Rise of the GCC and Semi-Prosperity and Stability in Yemen The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 to counter the perceived threat of the Iranian 1979 revolution to the states on the other side of the Gulf. Its membership has remained the same ever since and it includes the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. In the 1980s, there were easily understandable reasons why neither of the two Yemeni states either applied or were invited for membership. The 19

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

PDRY, as a socialist country, was barely able to maintain cordial diplomatic relations with the GCC states and had relatively good relations only with Kuwait which provided considerable assistance. It was regarded as hostile by Saudi Arabia although diplomatic relations were established in 1976, after nearly a decade during which the Saudis actively supported armed and political opposition to the socialist regime. Relations with Oman were only established in 1982, when the PDRY agreed to stop the PFLOAG radio from operating from Aden at a time when the Omani revolutionary movement had been decisively defeated. In the 1980s, membership of the GCC was not an immediate imperative for the YAR. Already benefiting from privileged relations with Saudi Arabia as its citizens could go and work there without needing sponsorship or other bureaucratic impediments, the YAR was also buoyant with remittances-induced growth during the first half of the decade and oil-export income in the second. The state was indirectly benefiting from the remittances economy and, more importantly, the vast subsidies Saudi Arabia paid to various tribal leaders were ensuring adequate funds to finance local development and consumption. Ordinary citizens moved back and forth principally to Saudi Arabia more or less at will, and while they did not feel welcome in Saudi Arabia, the income they earned there allowed them to make massive improvements in their living standards at home and to buy necessary and ‘luxury’ goods. It also ensured that daily wages in Yemen were high, so those who did not migrate could also benefit from the situation indirectly.

The 1990s: Yemeni Unity Perceived as a Threat by Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Crisis and Isolation of the New Republic of Yemen All this changed in 1990. Yemeni unification, proclaimed on 22 May 1990, was an event greatly welcomed in Yemen, but rather less welcome beyond its borders. Saudi Arabia’s response was feared and, indeed, one of the reasons the proclamation was brought forward from the original plan for November 1990 was concern about Saudi reaction. President Saleh (who had ruled the YAR since 1978) and Vice President al-Beedh (who was the main decider and Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party after the 1986 intraparty crisis there) believed that Saudi opposition to the unification plan might be strong enough to prevent it from happening if there was time for opposing forces to organise themselves. Open opposition came from the tribal leaders in the far north, particularly Abdullah bin Hussain al-Ahmar, shaykh al-mashaykh of the Hashid confederation, and political conservative leaders like Abdul Majid al-Zindani who led the Muslim Brotherhood religious fundamental underground party opposed to, among other issues, the ‘atheistic’ southern communists. Both objected to unification on their own behalf due to their beliefs as well as on behalf of Saudi Arabia which, regardless of ideological considerations, was more than uncomfortable at the prospect of a state on its borders not only with a similar or larger national population to its own, but also a republic. For their part, the majority of the YSP leadership had wanted a more federal type of unification, 20

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

allowing internal politics to remain under their control; they were also considered possible opponents of the deal. While this opposition was unable to prevent unification, it certainly succeeded in undermining it and limiting its potential. With respect to its relations with the Republic of Yemen (ROY), Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August of that year marked a fundamental breaking point. Yemen’s refusal to endorse the US-sponsored anti-Iraqi resolution at the United Nations Security Council (resolution 678) enabled the GCC states to take strong measures against Yemen, both at the state level by reducing to almost nothing the funding they had previously given to the two states, as well as to private institutions or tribes. At the direct level of citizens, they forced over 800,000 Yemenis out of their states. This was also an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and other GCC states who were keen to get rid of Arabicspeaking labour who might be subversive, and replace them with non-Arabic speakers. It also enabled them to punish Yemen by plunging it into deep economic crisis and thus challenge the new state’s viability. Saudi Arabia simply demanded that Yemenis follow the same rules as everyone else, obtaining residence permits and sponsors. Thousands left, many of them losing much of their accumulated capital, including their belongings and savings. Some families had been in Saudi Arabia for generations and had no homes or villages to which they could return. This mass expulsion affected citizens of the former PDRY less than those of the former YAR as the former, when travelling with PDRY passports, were already subject to these regulations. Only those with passports from the former YAR, whether they came from there or from the PDRY, suddenly found their status changed and their previous freedom of movement transformed into a complex obstacle course. GCC states’ relations with Yemen remained tense in the first half of that decade and only improved gradually in the following years. The earlier status of easy access to jobs throughout the GCC was never restored, primarily because the GCC states decided to recruit their expatriate labour in south and southeast Asia, thus avoiding the importation of Arabic speakers who their regimes feared might be inclined to have political views considered ‘politically incorrect’ in their autocratic environments. With respect to Saudi Arabia, although the total number of Yemenis in 2014 was estimated at about one million, i.e. more than the number expelled in 1990, their working and living conditions on the one hand and the doubling of the population in Yemen on the other meant that their remittances made a significantly lesser impact on living conditions in Yemen. One aspect which is important to note is the rapid divergence of development modalities in the GCC states and Yemen in this period. While living conditions in Yemen deteriorated, poverty increased, and the country retained much of its traditional physical infrastructure and culture associated with a primarily rural and tribal society, the situation was the reverse in the GCC states which joined the wealthiest states in the world in the 2000s, with some of the world’s highest per capita incomes. There urbanisation in its most extreme form of late 20th century architecture of high rise towers and isolated villas 21

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

became the norm, rural lifestyles were abandoned and income from the state, real estate and government employment replaced camel herding and fishing for the national population. The Gulf states were also drowned in a sea of foreigners ranging from the labourers constructing everything to professionals working in government and the private sector and particularly medical staff and teachers. The new physical environment is the only one known by the younger generations whose points of reference are shopping malls, fast cars and a comfortable guaranteed income. For them camels are exotic beasts keep by their Pakistani workers in special enclosures far removed from their villas and apartments, and visited on Fridays for entertainment. This divergence is relevant as it affects both perceptions of Yemen by GCC citizens and perceptions of the GCC by Yemenis. In both cases the totally different environments now found in these states are viewed by some as positive or negative points of comparison. For Yemen, the idealised memories of the late 1970s and 1980s remain major factors in national consciousness, and therefore a return to free movement of labour to the GCC is widely perceived as a realistic target and priority but mostly as a solution to the prevailing internal poverty. In 1996, at the GCC Doha summit, the ROY formally applied to join the GCC. This was rejected and most experts and politicians believe that the GCC states are not prepared to include Yemen in their club under any conditions. They continue to fear the influence on their citizens’ beliefs that the presence of large numbers of Yemeni and other Arabic speaking workers might have. The regimes prefer contractual arrangements with south and southeast Asian companies, which bring labourers unable to complain and who will work and live under extremely unpleasant conditions. The sponsorship mechanism simultaneously enables GCC nationals to benefit from sponsorship fees, an important source of income demanding minimal work and creating a form of inclusion of its citizens into the rentier economy. In addition, political militancy remains a major concern of decision makers in the GCC states, though its nature has completely changed, having shifted from concern that Yemenis might bring in socialist revolutionary ideas to fear that they will bring in Islamist jihadi ones which might have some impact on their own youth.

The Current Century: Issues Around Yemeni Membership of the GCC In the face of the worsening economic crisis in Yemen, and prior to the political-military crises of this decade, the GCC summit in Doha in October 2002, agreed to allow Yemen to join four of its institutions, the Health Ministers’ Council, the Gulf Education Bureau, the Council of Ministers of Social and Labour affairs and the GCC Soccer tournament. For Yemenis, this was viewed as a first step towards inclusion in the GCC, while for the GCC states it was a means of pacifying Yemeni calls for membership without giving the country either authority in decision making or the means of achieving its main objective, namely free movement. Prior to the current crisis, the main views on the topic ranged from hostility to Yemeni participation based on concerns for security, i.e. concern that AQAP activists 22

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

might move into GCC states, the economic gap between the GCC and Yemen, i.e. the risk of mass migration of Yemenis to other states, and demands for greater social investments and particularly social security. Beyond this the monarchies feared that the republican spirit might inspire some of their citizens to demand more democratic involvement. It should also be noted that Yemen’s national population outnumbers that of all GCC states. While many of these fears can be seen as largely specious given that the reality of such threats are minimal or non-existent, they reflect a basic opposition, and indeed in some cases, racist/ ethnic hostility towards Yemenis from the citizens of these wealthy monarchies. The counter arguments in favour of Yemen’s GCC membership basically focus on the same issues: its large labour force could contribute to the GCC economies, its large population would provide a bigger market and increase consumption, Aden’s port could complement those of the Gulf and enable the GCC to avoid potential problems with the straits of Hormuz. Yemen’s strategic location would ensure that the whole peninsula could organise security issues collectively and also control the Bab al-Mandab at the entrance of the Red Sea. All these arguments have faded into the background since 2015 since the GCC states, apart from Oman, have engaged in the military coalition fighting in Yemen.

Social Aspects: Yemenis in GCC States While there are no figures for the numbers of Yemenis, or nationals of Yemeni origin, in the GCC states, they remain an important constituency. Certainly they have no official political influence and many, even those with GCC state nationality, believe that they are treated like second-class citizens. Their influence also varies according to their circumstances. Overall there are three main types of Yemenis in these states. First there are the wealthy successful business people, particularly in Saudi Arabia, who have direct contact with decision makers and are able, at the very least, to express their concerns as individuals of Yemeni origin. These are mostly second or third generation families, whose links with Yemen are tenuous and whose knowledge of the situation in Yemen is somewhat sketchy. They include some of the largest business families in the Kingdom and have direct easy contact with the ruling families. Some of them retain an interest in Yemen and would be interested in investing there, to provide jobs as well as increase their profits. Many of these are originally from the Hadhramaut. The second group is that of professionals and ‘middle class’ individuals and their families who may be first, second or third generation. They are active in a wide range of professions, including commerce, education, military and security sectors. Their knowledge of Yemen is also limited, but many of them are still bringing relatives over from Yemen and visit Yemen regularly. Their commitment to helping their relatives and groups in Yemen is greater for the more recent migrants, and particularly those who still have first degree relatives in Yemen. They are active in helping other Yemenis migrate to their work locations and when their status permits, are in a position to provide employment and sponsorship. 23

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

The third group is the most numerous. It is formed of single men who work mainly in unskilled or low skilled employment, mostly in Saudi Arabia but also in the security and other forces of the smaller GCC states. In some cases they have been brought in as relatives of citizens in the UAE or sponsored by regional or tribal connections in Saudi Arabia. Their connections are primarily in Yemen and their visions of the future are within the Yemeni context. They have no political influence in the GCC states but they are bringing into Yemen lifestyle and consuming ambitions based on their experiences as migrant workers.

The Civil War and the Role of the GCC in the Coalition The current decade is characterised by greater, direct and open intervention by the GCC in Yemeni affairs. First, the ‘GCC Initiative’ is the formal name of the mechanism which led to Ali Abdullah Saleh leaving the presidency of the country in 2012 after 33 years of rule, and the establishment of a transitional regime acceptable to the GCC and the major powers. This gave some, albeit minor, concessions to the 2011 popular movements, but less so to the Huthis. Clearly the GCC states wanted to be formally associated with this initiative as they did not have to give it this name and, indeed, the actual terms agreed were worked out and discussed primarily within Yemen by Yemenis, so this gave them credit (or otherwise) for what was effectively a Yemeni initiative. The title was presumably intended to encourage other states in turmoil from the 2011 uprisings to see the GCC as a positive partner which was willing to endorse democratic change. Without going into the details of the unravelling of the transition,22 by 2015 the country was falling into civil war. Although additional involvement and intervention of the GCC in its development was inevitable, given the geographic location of Yemen in the peninsula and its daily relevance for citizens of the GCC, the new element which played a major role, was the change of leadership in Saudi Arabia. While in previous decades, Saudi involvement in Yemen had been discreet and well out of the public eye, with cash transactions and unofficial support to different factions. An example of this was support for the separatists in 1994, seen as a means to end a unity which the Saudi regime did not like. But the situation changed rapidly and dramatically with the rise of King Salman to the throne in January 2015. His son Mohammed bin Salman initially saw the deterioration of the situation in Yemen as a golden opportunity to demonstrate his strength and military skills and thus increase his support for future advancement. Obtaining the support of nine other states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan), the Saudi-led coalition started a major bombing campaign on 26 March 2015 with the explicit aim of restoring the internationally recognised president Hadi to power. By then Hadi had escaped house arrest in Sanaa, reached Aden which he had named temporary capital, and then been driven out of there by a military Huthi-Saleh offensive. At this point Hadi asked for GCC military assistance. After a brief 24

1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

interlude at an Arab summit meeting in Sharm al Shaikh, he took refuge in Riyadh which has remained his primary base since then. The coalition was clearly hoping for a quick victory thanks to massive bombing, though by July they found they had to provide land troops and only regained a shaky control over Aden by the end of July 2015. The bombing continues to date. Ground fighting, mostly by Yemeni forces trained in Saudi Arabia and including UAE forces supported by experts from different nationalities, has reached a stalemate, and the quick victory had clearly not materialised within two years of the launch of the operation. Without going into details of the military situation, it is clear that the leaders of the coalition are Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Many other members, in particular Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan, are there merely to ensure continuation of GCC financial support to their regimes or, alternatively, as in the case of Senegal, to develop such support. With respect to having views and taking policy decisions, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only relevant forces, even though they also have some differences of opinion with regards to both strategy and tactics, with Qatar taking a somewhat independent position as it often does until it was expelled from the coalition in June 2017. These differences are manifested on the ground and particularly noticeable with respect to the role of the Islah party in the future. Islah was formed by Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani; thus it combined the Hashid tribespeople loyal to the al-Ahmar family and supporters of Islamist, Muslim Brotherhood, politics throughout the country loyal to al-Zindani. It also has significant military strength thanks to its tribal membership. Its al-Ahmar Hashid members are closely associated with conservative Islam, something which is not a problem for any of the external supporters. However, the Emiratis in particular are extremely hostile to its Muslim Brotherhood membership, led by al-Zindani and benefiting from mass membership support throughout the central and southern part of Yemen. In this way, as is true elsewhere, the GCC states have incompatible and indeed conflicting approaches to the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has reconciled itself to cooperating with Islah which includes individuals and groups which it had supported for many decades. By contrast, the UAE has taken an extremely hostile line against anything remotely related to Muslim Brotherhood and regard Islah as an impossible partner. Overall they have chosen to focus on the south in actively implementing their influence. Qatar, however, has been an open supporter of Muslim Brotherhood groups and, despite major differences within the GCC on the issue of Egypt’s 2013 coup, is a strong supporter of Islah. In practice, on the ground, in early 2017 the Saudis and Qataris are supporting the Islah-connected leadership. The troops on the Marib front included some Qataris. This is the area where the coalition has been threatening its proposed offensive on Sanaa for over a year, although realistically it does not seem imminent. This is the main area of operation of Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar who is known to be sympathetic to extreme Islamist positions and has been a major military leader whose alliance with Saleh finally broke in March 2011. 25

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

In early 2017, another major ongoing front opened along the Red Sea border with Saudi Arabia which involves both Saleh-Huthi incursions into the Kingdom’s territories and the increasing involvement of mainly Southern Yemeni Salafis who are officially part of the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces. These include men who were part of the Salafi movement which grew near Sa‘da after 1980. The Salafi madrasa in Dammaj, known as Dar al Hadith, was destroyed by the Huthis in 2014 after having forced the community to evacuate the area. Meanwhile the UAE are focusing their military ground interventions on the south, and in particular on the areas within the former PDRY borders, where they are very active and have not only had their own ground troops for a while but also a wide range of mercenaries from other nationalities, some of whom operate under the UAE flag. There is significant cooperation between them and a number of Salafi groups whose views range from something close to quietism at one extreme to violent jihadism on the other. The one group who are excluded from UAE support are the Islah who, in the case of Mukalla area in particular, appear to be the main victims of the arrest campaigns which are publicly stated to be targeting AQAP. A similar situation prevails on the southern Red Sea Front with the notable difference that here the Saudi naval forces are also involved and therefore the UAE and Saudi Arabia are operating in far closer coordination than elsewhere. The complex situations in al-Baidha governorate and in Taiz city reflect more the intricacies of internal Yemeni politics than those relating to relations between coalition states.

Conclusion Regardless of the outcome of the present war, Yemen remains a part of the Arabian Peninsula, especially in terms of its large population. The future of all these states is closely interlinked. One major problem which has not been discussed here but bears heavily on the future of the peninsula is the shortage of water in Yemen. Unless the country ends up with an effective government able to manage its very limited water resources, the most populated parts of Yemen will be unable to sustain their population within a few decades, raising the further spectre for the GCC of a mass influx of climate refugees. It would be far better for both the GCC states and Yemen if the country could be helped to develop in a manner satisfying the basic needs of its people and with a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship to the GCC states, ideally becoming an integral part of the Council, something which would be rationally possible, despite the fact that Yemen is likely to remain a republic, while the GCC states are unlikely to give up their monarchical governances. This, however, should not be an impediment preventing far closer economic, social and even political cooperation.

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1. The GCC, Iran and Yemen: An Overview of Relations

Notes 1 Thanks to Jamal al Hajri, Noel Brehony and Dan Varisco for helpful suggestions and comments. I alone am responsible for the final text. This chapter uses information and quotations also mentioned in my book “Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neoliberalism and the Disintegration of a State,” London, Saqi, 2017. The book provides a far more detailed analysis of other aspects of Yemen’s foreign relations. 2 http://tinyurl.com/y7n28ffp (Accessed March, 2017). 3 http://tinyurl.com/ybnj7dpt (Accessed March, 2017). 4 http://tinyurl.com/y9omnt4g (Accessed March, 2017). 5 Askar Halwan al-Enazy, “’The International Boundary Treaty’ Concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on June 12, 2000,” American Journal of International Law 96 no. 1, (2002):162. 6 For a discussion of Saudi Arabia’s use of religion as a primary element in its own state construction and as a consolidation mechanism for its internal structures through promotion of Wahhabism as a rival to nationalism in the Arab world, see Adham Saouli, The Arab State, Dilemmas of Late Formation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 95-100. 7 Readers should note that the capital of Yemen is transliterated in several ways, including Sana‘a, San‘a and Sanaa. 8 See the detailed analysis of the changes in tribal-state relations as a result of Saudi support in Joshua Rogers “The Making of the Tribal Republic: North Yemen’s Tribes and Central Authority during the Civil War 1962-70,” British-Yemeni Society Journal 24 (2016):12-18. 9 Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, (2011) Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy. Chatham House Briefing Paper, May 2011, p. 9. Electronic document: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/177061 (Accessed March, 2017). 10 Askar Halway al-Enazy, “’The International Boundary Treaty’ Concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on June 12, 2000,” 166. 11 For a detailed analysis of the transition and its problems, see Helen Lackner, Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ Transition from Autocracy: Could it have Succeeded? International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm, 2016). 12 Ghazi Abdul Rahman al-Gosaibi (2013) A Memoir of Yemen in Journal of the British-Yemeni Society 21 (2013):20. 13 Patrick Cockburn, “Threats to Yemen Prove America Hasn’t Learned the Lesson of History,” The Independent, 31 (2009):12. 14 Wikileaks, ‘Sa’ada War: Despite Claims of Ceasefire, Civilians Suffer, No End to the Fighting in Sight’, Wikileaks, August 2009. Electronic document: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANAA1599_a. html, 26 (Accessed 22 July, 2016). 15 Counter Terrorism Unit. 16 Wikileaks, ‘Yemen’s Counter Terrorism Unit Stretched Thin by War against Houthis’, Wikileaks, 17 December, 2009. Electronic document: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09SANAA2230.html (Accessed 22 July 2016). It is worth noting, though, that one of the missions of this group was in search of the group of western medical staff who had been kidnapped that year, some of whom were found murdered, the children were eventually released and their parents have been ‘declared deceased’ by the German embassy many years later. Suspicions about the identity of the kidnappers have remained just that, with no evidence to support any of the theories which range from the Huthis [least likely] to AQAP and General Ali Mohsen [most likely]. 17 Scorched Earth was the name Saleh gave to his 2009 campaign against the Huthis. 18 Christopher Boucek, Yemen on the Brink, War in Saada, From Local Insurrection to National Challenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 10-11. Readers should note that Saada, Sa‘da and Sa‘ada are all different spellings for the same place. When included in quotations, the spelling of the original quotation has been retained.

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19 20 21

http://tinyurl.com/hfoujzx. (Accessed March, 2017). Quoted in Arash Reisinezhad and Parisa Farhadi, Ambiguous Connections: Iran and the Yemeni Houthis, Paper presented to the Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge, UK, 2016, 4-5. Quoted in Arash Reisinezhad and Parisa Farhadi, Ambiguous Connections: Iran and the Yemeni Houthis, Paper presented to the Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge, UK, 2016, 4-5. 22 I have written a detailed analysis of this in Helen Lackner, (2016) Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ transition from Autocracy: Could It Have Succeeded? (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2016). Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yarkdqr4 (Accessed March, 2017).

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2 The Yemeni-Saudi Border: From Boundary to Frontline Ash Rossiter

Introduction In 2017 Saudi Arabia defends its southern border with thousands of heavily armed troops and a Patriot anti-ballistic missile defense system. Yet until quite recently, Riyadh looked upon this border area with only passing interest. Disagreement over the demarcation of the boundary was an important feature of Saudi-Yemeni relations during the twentieth century, but neither government saw the need to manage cross-border movements. Tribes and communities that straddle both sides continued to trade and interact as if Ibn Saud had never wrested the provinces of Asir, Najran and Jizan from the Yemeni Imamate in the early 1930s. By the turn of the millennium, Riyadh increasingly came to see its national security threatened by transnational clandestine actors – principally terrorists, illegal migrants and smugglers of illicit items. This perceived new security paradigm recast Saudi Arabia’s thinking and behaviour towards its southern border. Controlling borders, as distinct from defending borders, is about restricting territorial access. States employ a variety of physical, technical and administrative measures to regulate what and who enters their space. Since the early 2000s, Saudi Arabia attempted to implement such measures at its borders with Iraq and Yemen. The Yemeni government’s inability jointly to manage the border impelled Saudi Arabia to pursue an increasingly unilateral and interventionist policy at and beyond the border. This chapter will show that regulating access to Saudi territory from Yemen fueled a shadow economy in northern Yemen, distorting local power dynamics. In the mountainous borderlands that characterize much of the terrain between the Empty Quarter and the Red Sea, smugglers, rogue military units and, where they existed, corrupt officials have profited from clandestine trade. Saudi Arabia considered the presence of ungoverned space beyond its southern border a vulnerability before the Huthis and their allies seized power. Indeed, it was fear 29

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

that growing lawlessness in northern Yemen would spill over into Saudi Arabia that led to Riyadh’s decision to intervene militarily in 2009-2010. Geopolitical rivalry with Iran was likely the leading factor in Saudi Arabia’s decision in 2015 for direct military action in the Yemen conflict; but the need to seal the border to stop fighting spreading into Saudi territory was also a pressing concern. Conflict has redefined the Saudi-Yemeni border, both symbolically and materially. Aside from a small number of discussions about the Yemeni-Saudi negotiations over the contested boundary,1 no attempt has been made to explain the transition of the border from a largely porous frontier into a defended border.2 This chapter addresses this omission. In doing so, it contributes to current discussions in the field of international relations about the relevance, or indeed irrelevance, of borders in dealing with transnational as opposed to inter-state problems.3

Establishing a Boundary Almost from its inception as a unified state in 1932, Saudi Arabia was at war with its southern neighbour, the Imamate of Yemen. In the war that followed, Saudi Arabia’s largely Bedouin army succeeded in conquering the Yemeni coastal region of Asir and its northernmost provinces of Najran and Jizan.4 A post-war treaty, the 1934 Taif agreement, temporarily settled the boundary between the two states in Saudi Arabia’s favour. Subject to renewal every twenty years, the treaty recognized Asir, Najran and Jizan as part of Saudi Arabia. This rough exercise in delimitation resulted in an arbitrary division of people: anthropogeographically speaking, there is nothing natural about much of the Saudi-Yemen boundary. With little call to impose any control at the newly established border, the social, cultural and economic landscape of this corner of the Arabian Peninsula was in many respects unaffected by this superimposed boundary. As one observer notes: ‘Initially, the signing of the treaty [of Taif ] ushered in three decades of relative tranquility between the two countries, with their porous border frequented by traders and families from tribes that straddle both sides of the frontier.’5 Little attempt was made to restrict territorial access. The 1934 agreement, in fact, recognized the right of Yemenis to enter Saudi Arabia and gave them ‘special privileges’ to work and reside in the kingdom. After the Yemeni Imam was deposed and the new Yemen Arab Republic established in 1962, the issue of the boundary was resuscitated. The leaders of the new republic considered the 1934 treaty as invalid and proclaimed that they would take back the three provinces – by force if necessary. Riyadh did not take these declarations seriously; that is, until the arrival of tens of thousands of Egyptian troops into Yemen in support of the Republic against the Saudi-backed guerilla opposition of Imam Badr and his tribal followers.6 After the civil war between republicans and royalists ended, Riyadh recognized the state of the Yemen Arab Republic. Despite Saudi Arabia’s considerable financial support, North Yemeni leaders continued to refer to Asir, Najran and Jizan provinces as an integral 30

2. The Yemeni-Saudi Border: From Boundary to Frontline

part of Yemen. Saudi Arabia was willing to overlook this rhetoric so long as North Yemen did not undermine Saudi claims to hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, Riyadh had considerable leverage over Sanaa through direct payments to the North Yemeni government and the fact that many Yemenis were dependent on remittances from several hundred thousand of their kin working in Saudi Arabia under the special terms of the Taif agreement. Whilst there was a slowdown in Yemeni economic migration into Saudi Arabia in the 1980s due to an influx of South Asians and economic retrenchment, the principle of the right of Yemenis to work and reside in Saudi Arabia remained important to the Yemeni economy and, therefore, a significant feature of relations between the two countries. For these reasons, the YAR was careful not to press its claims too vigorously over the disputed provinces and the position of the boundary. Saudi Arabia tried to create a new reality on the ground. By building roads and establishing border posts, Riyadh was unilaterally demarcating a border. Riyadh even offered citizenship to some tribesman living in the borderland to strengthen its de facto right to territory claimed by Yemen.7 The re-unification of Yemen in 1990 led to a fresh series of boundary negotiations between Sanaa and Riyadh. The discovery of oil in both Yemeni states a few years prior to reunification raised the stakes in settling outstanding territorial disputes. Renewed talks, however, came to an end within weeks after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s failure to condemn Saddam’s action at the UN Security Council in the terms decided by Washington led Riyadh to break off discussions and to revoke the special privileges of the 1934 treaty. Consequently, Saudi Arabia expelled hundreds of thousands of Yemenis; according to official Yemeni figures, Yemen had to reabsorb 880,000 returnees8 sending the Yemeni economy into free fall. After Iraq’s eviction from Kuwait in early 1991, Saleh made a public call for a final settlement of borders with its neighbours. Saudi Arabia responded positively, agreeing to bilateral talks that were held in Geneva in July 1992. The Yemeni War of Secession in mid-1994 interrupted follow-on negotiations but talks resumed in 1995 against an inauspicious backdrop. This included armed clashes inside Yemen, an attack on a Saudi aircraft believed to be violating Yemeni airspace, the establishment the National Front for the Liberation of Najran and Asir, and the build-up of Saudi forces in the Empty Quarter. Negotiations continued, helped along by President Saleh’s announcement that Yemen would accept all the provisions of the Taif Treaty. The talks resulted in the signing of an 11-point agreement in Mecca on 26 February 1995.9 The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which led to the creation of a joint committee to oversee the procedural framework for settling the outstanding issues. As part of the MoU (Article 4), they agreed on the creation of a common border and a demilitarized zone along either side. Before signing a final agreement, however, Yemen demanded the restoration of the right of its citizens to work and reside in Saudi Arabia and, by extension, enter and exit Saudi territory freely, as well as a guarantee from Riyadh that economic aid would continue.10 A further sticking point was the location of the eastern boundary, which was the site of border clashes in 1997.11 31

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

Given these obstacles, most observers were greatly surprised when in 2000 the two countries reached a final and permanent settlement over the Rea Sea maritime border, the border covered by the Taif Treaty and the long desert border to the east that reached the intersection with Oman.12 Yemen renounced its claim to Jizan, Asir and Najran and, in return, Saudi Arabia gave up claim to parts of contested territory in the Empty Quarter.13 The agreement included the creation of a demilitarized zone along the border as well as a buffer area for the free grazing of livestock. It was also supposed to set in motion cooperation between the two countries in the management of the border. In reality, Yemen was in no position to exercise much control over its side of the borderline.

Lawless Borderlands One of the key issues in the boundary negotiations in the 1990s was how each country would manage its side of the border. Discussions called for greater cooperation on crossborder problems, such as the trafficking of people, the smuggling of weapons and drugs, and undesired migration. Indeed, alongside the division of contested hydrocarbon deposits, the future management of cross-border movement of people and goods was the critical issue at the talks before the final settlement.14 Security considerations may have in fact been a contributing factor in Saudi Arabia’s decision to push for the final deal when it did. With greater attention given to transnational security threats in the late 1990s, it made sense for Saudi Arabia to try to rebuild relations with Yemen and work with it to manage cross-border movement.15 Yet what chance was there for any degree of joint management of the border when Yemen was by most definitions a weak state, unable to impose its authority across much of its territory, especially at the periphery? This was especially true of the mountainous western stretch of borderlands running from the Red Sea to the Empty Quarter desert.16 Efforts by the Yemeni central government to extend its writ into remote areas would test Sanaa’s relations with local elites.17 Before reunification, the North Yemen state was extremely weak and exercised little control over much of the territory nominally within its sovereign space.18 Earlier attempts by President Ibrahim al-Hamdi (1974-77) to build a strong state in Yemen and rein in the independent power of the tribes had largely failed.19 When President Ali Abdullah Saleh began his 33-year rule in 1978, he took over a government that had next to no influence in the governorates abutting Saudi Arabia. Initially, President Saleh did not challenge this status quo. Arguably one reason he was able to remain in power for so long was because he chose to co-opt many of the powerful tribes, binding them to him through a system of rewards but accepting them as the real powerbrokers in their respective regions. Increasingly concerned about transnational threats to national security, Riyadh pressured President Saleh in the early 2000s to gain a tighter grip over the northern governorates. Despite his proclaimed tough anti-smuggling stance, ‘the tribes’, according to Elham Manea, ‘continued their economically damaging smuggling business across Saudi 32

2. The Yemeni-Saudi Border: From Boundary to Frontline

borders’.20 At best, Yemeni government officials ignored this lucrative criminal activity, at worst they were active participants. Saudi Arabia was ironically partly to blame for the situation in northern Yemen. For decades past, Riyadh’s overriding objective was to keep its southern neighbour weak and compliant. To achieve this, Saudi Arabia made North Yemen financially dependent through an annual payment to the state finances. However, Riyadh also made separate payments to many of the country’s influential tribal sheikhs. This twolayered patron-client relationship ensured that much of the country, including those Yemeni governorates along the Saudi border, could remain financially autonomous from the central state, or certainly less in need of patronage from Sanaa.21 Saudi Arabia’s long interference in Yemeni tribal affairs in part prevented a strong central government from emerging.22 The discovery of oil in the northern region complicated matters further as the independently minded tribes became even more resentful of central government attempts to take control of resources that they considered it their right to reap any benefits from their harvest. Unable to disarm the well-armed tribes, the government conceded de facto control to local power brokers.

Transnational Threats Yemen, the only country in the Arabian Peninsula to have signed the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, had long been a conduit for migrants, especially from the Horn of Africa. Eritreans (in the 1970s and 1980s) and Somalis (since 1991) have sought refuge from conflict, but a great number of economic migrants have also used Yemen as an entry point to reach the Gulf states and beyond. The expulsion of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia in 1990 amplified the issue of the clandestine movement of people into Saudi Arabia in several ways. The simultaneous need to accommodate a sudden influx of returnees and the loss of remittances caused an acute economic crisis throughout Yemen.23 For want of a livelihood, many Yemenis turned to smuggling. Further driving this ‘unvirtuous cycle,’ the revocation of the right of Yemenis to reside in Saudi Arabia increased the demand for illicit means of crossing the border.24 Of the 800,000 or so returnees, many had spent a lifetime abroad and found reintegration very difficult; many tried to re-enter Saudi Arabia with the aid of professional smugglers. Greater efforts to discriminate who could enter Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first century – which the 2000 border agreement was intended to enable – meant African migrants not only remained on average considerably longer in Yemen than in the past but also that they were more likely to turn into professional smugglers. The diminished number of legal options open to migrants ironically increased opportunities for criminals. As Hélène Thiollet forcefully argues: ‘The securitization of mobility and anti-immigration policies at the regional and international levels eventually ends up fueling criminal networks in a selfperpetuating cycle of insecurity.’25 The people-smuggling market is a significant factor in the creation of a mafia-style economy in the northern governorates of Yemen. Corruption 33

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

in local administration and at the border means that smuggling networks operated in the early 2000s with near impunity. Human-trafficking networks require operators on both sides of the border. Gangs in Saudi Arabia profited handsomely from trading in women (recruited for brothels in Saudi Arabia) and children (for slave labor or sexual exploitation). This activity increasingly formed a significant portion of a larger illicit economic system that also included piracy and the trafficking of weapons and drugs.26 If transnational issues became increasingly prominent in Saudi Arabian security thinking by the beginning of the twentieth-first century, this became even more true after the start of Al-Qaida’s campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003. This resulted in a major reallocation of Saudi resources to the security and intelligence apparatus and a sustained crackdown on known and suspected violent extremists. Under intense pressure from Saudi counter-terrorism efforts, Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia relocated to Yemen in 2009 and merged with Yemen branch to form Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).27 In the new millennium, refugees and migrants were increasingly viewed as potential jihadi fighters, or arms smugglers feeding the illegal arms-trade networks between the Horn of Africa and jihadist groups in Yemen. People crossing the Gulf of Aden into Yemen and then moving undetected into Saudi Arabia became a major issue in the security-dominated agenda of the 2000s. Riyadh thus viewed the southern border principally through a security lens.

Erecting a Barrier Against the backdrop of transnational security threats emanating from Yemen, Riyadh embarked on an ambitious project to fortify the western section of the border with a concrete wall. The principal aim was to impede movement of those seeking to cross the border.28 In purely security terms, walls alone rarely stop people determined to cross them.29 It is not uncommon for states to build walls on their borders to try to keep people out (or to keep people in, as was the case with the Berlin Wall). However, as numerous case studies show, determined people – such as those running the smuggling and trafficking networks serving both Yemenis and immigrants from the Horn Africa – will usually find a way to get past walls.30 Walls do not stop the entry of undesirable people and illicit items but they do make it more difficult, placing high costs on transgressors. Walls and other physical barriers also serve a symbolic function. They broadcast a state’s sovereignty over territory. Physical barriers create an “us-and-them” reality on the ground that builds upon the “here-and-there” that follows the demarcation of a boundary. Riyadh’s increased interest in border control, and barriers more specifically, was also part of a larger Saudi government effort to project its presence into peripheral areas of its territory, which it had hitherto only loosely governed.31 The Yemeni government vehemently opposed the project, comparing it to the Israelibuilt wall in the West Bank. Local leaders in Yemen’s northern governorates, especially in Sa‘da, probably foresaw a post-wall future that left them economically cut off from Saudi Arabia. In January 2004, the Yemeni government lodged an official protest with Saudi 34

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Arabia, claiming that building a wall on the border violated the 2000 Jeddah Treaty which stipulated that there would be a demilitarized zone.32 Work by a German firm to demarcate the precise line of the border was suspended.33 Saudi Arabia agreed to put construction of the wall in abeyance in return for Sanaa’s promise to increase its efforts to build up its border security force and conduct joint patrolling with Saudi Arabia.34 Increased regulation on both sides of the borderline created more opportunities for those able to circumnavigate the control measures. Border officials and tribes along the frontier increasingly became involved in an unvirtuous system of corruption, gun and drug smuggling, and people trafficking. Cross-border crime was an increasing concern for the Saudi government, especially when it intersected with terrorism. The suicide-bombing attempt in August 2009 against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the deputy minister of the interior at the time and the crown prince between January 20015 and June 2017, underscored the terrorist threat. Although the bomber was not smuggled across the border, a perception gained ground in Saudi thinking that as long as the border with Yemen remained poorly managed and largely porous, counter-terrorism efforts inside Saudi Arabia could only achieve so much. At about the time of the attempt on the life of Mohammed bin Nayef, the idea of constructing a barrier along the border re-emerged on the policy agenda. This time the Saudi government looked to replicate the complex system of high-grade fencing and electronic surveillance that it had already installed along its northern border with Iraq. Such a system, it was proposed, would enable Saudi Arabia to detect people engaged in a range of activities across the security spectrum. Talking to reporters at a press conference in July 2009 about the proposed integrated border protection system, General Mansour al-Turki, spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, remarked, ‘Of course terrorism is important, but there is also drug and weapon trafficking, and we also have to consider illegal immigrants.’35 Whereas the complex system of sensors (video surveillance, thermal cameras, and detection wiring), physical barriers (high-grade fencing and artificial anti-vehicle ridges called ‘berms’) and heavily armed guards seemed to work well on the border with Iraq, it is doubtful, owing to the more challenging terrain, whether this same infrastructure could ever be effective on the southern border.36 Before the Saudi government had a chance to begin construction and installation, however, the Huthi-led tribes embarked on a major rebellion against the government, dragging the borderlands into a military conflict.

The Border as a Zone of Conflict The 2009 conflict in northern Yemen was the sixth act of rebellion against the central government since 2004. Instability and an ailing economy further eroded the Yemeni government’s ability to meet its end of the bargain in managing border flows jointly with Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni government’s inability to control the border created, according to Hélène Thiollet, ‘the very conditions that allow the conflict to fester (such as abundant 35

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

supply of accessible weapons) and push[ed] the local economy towards illegal activities (drugs, clandestine migration).’37 More than ever, a myriad of non-state armed groups (including rogue army battalions) controlled the economy of the northern region, largely living off profits derived from illegal border activities. When these armed groups were not organizing smuggling operations themselves, they profited from selling guns and ammunition to the smuggling networks.38 The series of conflicts since 2004 placed even greater strains on an already fragile formal economy. Instability in northern Yemen created a self-perpetuating conflict economy ‘based on the smuggling of drugs, cars, weapons and medicine’.39 Indeed, the country’s largest arms bazaar was (and some say still is) in the north of the country at al-Talh market near to Sa‘da.40 During periods of government offensives in the north, smugglers would shift their routes temporarily to the Red Sea coastal plain, but they would quickly return to mountains around Sa‘da governorate when government troops left. The series of rebellions led by the Huthis after 2004 are often presented as a culturalreligious struggle. Others, however, have noted how a wider disenfranchisement of large sections of Yemeni society and their grievances towards the government in Sanaa triggered these uprisings.41 Violence in northern Yemen may ironically result from Saudi efforts to enforce border controls. In anticipation of Saudi efforts to change its border management regime, as Blumi argues convincingly, the people of Sa’da governorate felt threatened by the loss of cross-border revenue and the political leverage they had by being in control of this activity.42 Sa‘da governorate, once the seat of power for Yemen’s first imamate and the wellspring of Zaydism, a branch of Shi’a Islam that provided the doctrinal underpinnings for the imamate, had become ‘an impoverished and underserved region.’43 The extent to which tougher border arrangements contributed to instability in northern Yemen requires further enquiry, but it is not too speculative to propose a link. On 11 August 2009, the Yemeni government launched a major offensive against the Huthis. Code-named ‘Operation Scorched Earth,’ the campaign consisted of air and artillery strikes on Huthi positions. The operation soon expanded to include a full ground operation. Riyadh entered the conflict on 4 November 2009 after Yemeni rebels attacked a Saudi border patrol the previous day.44 The Huthis, claiming to be acting in self-defense, audaciously occupied two small border towns in Saudi territory before Saudi troops drove them out.45 Saudi Arabia’s military involvement expanded with airstrikes on Huthi positions around Sa‘da and on Jabal al-Dukhan, which straddles the Yemeni-Saudi boundary.46 Expecting a drawn-out conflict and fearful of the threat the Huthis posed to Saudi towns close to the border, Riyadh mobilized army units and deployed its special forces to the border. Armed clashes along the borderline led to the evacuation of residents from nearby settlements and their relocation to tent camps away from the fighting. As the conflict continued during November, the Saudi government decided to close schools in the border areas and undertook a more substantial evacuation of civilians, resulting in the partial depopulation of the borderlands.47 Offering compensation to those displaced by the fighting, 36

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the governor of Jizan province, Mohammed bin Nasser, announced that the government would move those affected to new houses in locations within the Saudi security forces’ field of surveillance, that is, away from remote border locations.48 On the Yemeni side, thousands of people living near the border fled their homes. Suffering from malnutrition, many of these internally displaced people sought aid from humanitarian relief agencies that had established camps in northwest Yemen close to the Saudi border. Moreover, Saudi authorities formally designated the western segment of the border a restricted conflict zone.49 This allowed Saudi land forces to pound Huthi positions with heavy shelling.50 Saudi Assistant Minister of Defense Prince Khaled bin Sultan declared anyone entering within ten kilometers of the border would be ‘in a killing zone.’51 By the end of November, Saudi forces carried out regular clearance operations at various points across the border. Saudi authorities, however, denied that their forces had taken the fight beyond the border and into Yemeni territory.52 Instead, the Saudi government reiterated its intention to reinforce the southern border in order to prevent future Huthi incursions into Saudi territory.53 Hostilities at the border did not end with the defeat of the Huthis but through a ceasefire. On balance, the military intervention was very costly to Saudi Arabia. The fighting resulted in the death of about 130 Saudi soldiers for little discernable security gains.54 The border was no more secure than it had been at the start of this short conflict. If anything, it became more insecure. Within a year of the conflict at the border ending, Saudi Arabia watched its southern neighbour descend into a political crisis. The Arab Spring revolts in 2011 triggered popular protests in Yemen that called for Saleh, who was in his 33rd year as president, to step down. Demonstrations gradually turned into fighting between competing armed militias and a divided military. Saleh was almost assassinated in June, but was flown to Saudi Arabia for recovery from severe injuries. In February 2012, Saleh handed over power to his deputy Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi who had been elected to replace him under the GCC-sponsored plan. The political situation, however, remained precarious for much of the 2012 to 2015 period. The border became more insecure as the political crisis in Yemen worsened. For example, five Saudi border guards died in early 2013 after a firefight with well-armed smugglers.55 In response to the growing disorder in Yemen, Saudi Arabia once again revived the idea of a barrier, allocating resources for the rapid erection of a high-grade security fence along vulnerable sections of the border. Media reports claimed the government was accelerating the construction of the border fence but the Saudi Ministry of Interior conceded that it would take some time to complete.56 As with previous attempts to regulate cross-border mobility, the construction of the high-grade fence angered Yemenis living close to the border. Even though only a small part of the fence along the Red Sea coastal plain had been completed by the end of 2013, Yemenis were already claiming that it was affecting their livelihoods and cutting off contacts with relatives living on the other side. Yemenis could justifiably make the claim that a barrier was in breach of the 2000 Jeddah agreement, which had stipulated that social relationships 37

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between families and relatives and communities living on either side of the border must continue and be protected. Moreover, many Yemenis depended on commercial transactions with Saudis, especially the revenue from selling agricultural produce such as vegetables, fruit and honey. The deputy governor of Hajja governorate abutting the border told media sources in April 2013 that the fence ‘will have a terrible impact on the people and will stoke the humanitarian and economic crises.’57 After the National Dialogue ended in early 2014, without agreement on some major issues such as federalism, the Huthis, allied with some northern tribes and military units loyal to Saleh, embarked on a bid to take control of Yemen. The central state institutions had never looked weaker. Writing in 2014, Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, observed how the central Yemeni government’s lack of coercive strength allowed ‘some groups to build their own autonomous domains that have dismembered territorial integrity and challenged its sovereignty.’58 When, a year later, Huthi-led forces began moving south of Sanaa towards the port city of Aden, Saudi Arabia intervened directly.

Saudi Arabia’s Soft Underbelly After the Arab Spring uprisings, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy became more interventionist.59 Seeking to shape developments in the region rather than accept them, Saudi channeled billions of riyals to allies to stave off state collapse and funneled money and arms to anti-Assad rebels in Syria. In March 2011, Riyadh sent over a thousand troops into Bahrain as part of a GCC Peninsula Shield Force to shore up the Bahrain government against the demonstrators calling for political reform. On 26 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition, backed by US intelligence and logistical support, launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. It followed a request by beleaguered President Hadi who had fled from the port city of Aden to Riyadh in the face of the advancing Huthis and their pro-Saleh allies. The coalition declared its principal aim to be the restoration to power of the legitimate government of President Hadi, but one of the other implicit goals of the Saudi-led campaign was to protect Saudi Arabia’s borders.60 Saudi Arabia viewed political chaos in Yemen as a direct threat to its territory. Prince Abdullah bin Faisal bin al-Turki, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, explained Saudi Arabia’s perception of the direct danger to Saudi territory in March 2016, stating that: ‘Our neighbour was almost completely controlled by a militia influenced and supported by Iran, an internationally recognized state sponsor of terrorism. This armed militia on the border was in control of ballistic missiles and an air force.’61 In his letter of appeal to the GCC, Hadi also evoked the threat the Huthis posed to Saudi Arabia’s territory. He requested intervention because ‘the presence of heavy weapons and short- and long-range missiles beyond the control of the legitimate authorities’ presented a ‘grave and ongoing threat to our countries [Yemen and Saudi Arabia].’62 More specifically, Hadi warned of an attack on Saudi Arabia, as the Huthis ‘have already carried 38

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out a bare-faced and unjustified attack on the territory of Saudi Arabia, in November 2009, and their current actions make it clear that they intend to do so again’.63

Return of a Frontline With the Saudi-led military intervention, the border reverted to being a frontline. The initial main thrust of the coalition’s intervention was in the south of Yemen to ensure that Aden did not fall. The coalition and forces loyal to President Hadi were able to regain control of Aden in July 2015 after three months of brutal street fighting and airstrikes. Throughout this period, the Huthis and their allies launched attacks across the border into Saudi Arabia with increasing frequency. It is likely that as Huthi and pro-Saleh forces suffered setbacks in Aden and Lahj governorate, they used attacks on the border as an attempt to knock Saudi Arabia off balance. Pitted by deep wadis, the mountainous terrain of sections of the border provides excellent ground for guerilla-style attacks.64 Occupying fixed positions, Saudi troops have been particularly vulnerable to hit and run tactics.65 Exposing Saudi Arabia’s inability to prevent armed border incursions, small parties of Huthis have overrun border forts and conducted deadly ambushes on Saudi forces on their own turf.66 Reluctant to send troops into northern Yemeni in response to these incursions, or to create a military buffer zone lest it fuel Huthi propaganda about Saudi territorial ambitions, Saudi forces have been in the unenviable position of mounting a static defense against a mobile adversary capable of attacking with a large degree of impunity. The Saudi-led coalition has publicized the number of civilians killed – more than five hundred by the end of 2016, according to Saudi official statements – but does not share information about the number of soldiers killed at the border.67 The vast majority of attacks since the outbreak of the recent conflict have taken the form of projectiles (mortars, shells and rockets) launched from Yemen into Saudi territory. Many of these explosive devices have landed in open spaces, but some have hit population centers causing casualties and material damage. Between the second half of 2015 and the temporary UN-brokered truce in April 2016, the Saudi-led coalition claims that on average over 100 mortars, shells and rockets were fired against Saudi positions and into Saudi territory every day. Although these figures are impossible to verify, it is clear that there is a steady rate of projectiles fired daily across the border. Most worrying for Saudi Arabia was the ability of the Huthis to violate its territory with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles fired from mobile launchers. Within days of the start of the conflict, Saudi officials claimed that it had neutralized the medium-range ballistic missile threat. Yet the Huthis continued to fire missiles (mainly North Koreanbuilt Hwasong-6, a Scud C variant) with a range of up to 500 kilometers into the kingdom, disproving the claim of successful destruction.68 Whilst the Saudi Patriot missile-defense batteries deployed along the border have intercepted a number of medium-range ballistic 39

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missiles, they are unable to protect civilians in the border provinces from short-range, multisalvo rocket attacks.69 Indirect fire attacks and cross-border assaults, which have killed and injured hundreds of civilians inside Saudi Arabia, underscore the limitations of militarily fortifying the borderline. Unable to halt attacks, Saudi Arabia has once again evacuated villages close to the border and shut schools.70 As of January 2017, the main airport of Najran remained closed.71 There seems little prospect of ending the conflict and the violence it continues to produce is having a profound effect on the border area. Residents from both sides are unable to return to their homes and the historic flow of goods and people across the border has all but halted. The large-scale military intervention in Yemen has made the border area into a frontline of war.72

Conclusion Borders are key sites where maturing states attempt to demonstrate sovereignty over their territory. The 2000 Saudi-Yemeni agreement over the location of the border settled, in cartographical terms, the limits of their respective territories. In practice, the border remained poorly administered. Riyadh’s perception that lack of border management presented a national security threat proved a powerful incentive to impose greater control over undesired access. Saudi Arabia’s heightened efforts in the twentieth century to manage its southern border had several consequences. Restricting access into Saudi territory hindered traditional cross-border linkages between northern Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia, impinging on the functioning of the local economy. Regulating movement also had the unintended consequence of feeding the illicit economy in northern Yemen and stoking instability in northern Yemen. The inherent weakness of the Yemeni state meant there was little prospect of a successful joint management of the border. Accepting this reality, Saudi Arabia’s approach to the border became more proactive and unilateral in the new millennium. Riyadh hoped its barrier programs (initiated first in 2004 and then in 2009) would inhibit unauthorized movement of people and illicit items. Although never more than partially completed, these physical obstacles, when taken together with additional security personnel and surveillance and detection technology, placed some costs on transgressors, inadvertently pushing business in the direction of professional smugglers and corrupt officials. Overall, northern Yemen’s economy, which relied in part on the unregulated export of foodstuffs to Saudi Arabia, suffered. Poor economic conditions were in some way responsible for the series of rebellions in northern Yemen between 2004 and 2009. In an attempt to stave off violence from spilling across the border, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in 2009. Operation Scorched Earth, however, did not produce security dividends; Riyadh continued to see the border area as a source of insecurity and the country’s weak spot. More than this, Saudi Arabia’s view of its southern boundary shifted irrevocably after 2009: it was now a frontline to defend rather than simply a border to manage. This 40

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evolution in thinking towards its southern border helps explain Saudi Arabia action in 2015 – both the decision to intervene and Saudi Arabia’s emphasis on military operations in the borderland area. The inability, despite a heavy military buildup, to stop attacks from Yemen into Saudi territory – most notably from ballistic missiles – has again frustrated Riyadh’s efforts to insulate the kingdom. Impoverished and prone to rebellion, northern Yemen will continue to have a considerable bearing on Saudi security calculations for decades to come. Regardless of the composition of any future Yemeni government, it is difficult to imagine the border returning to a zone of exchange rather than what Saudi Arabia now sees it as – a progenitor of national security threats.

Notes 1 The most comprehensive work in this area is Richard Schofield (ed.), Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States (London: UCL Press, 1994). 2 For a classic discussion on the definition of political boundaries, see S. Whittemore, International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), and Richard Hartshorne, “Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries,” Annual Association of American Geographers 36, no 1. (1936):56-57. On the distinction between boundaries, borders and frontiers see J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 3 For a useful introduction into the study of border dynamics, refer to Vladimir Kolossov, “Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches,” Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (1936):1-27, 2005; George Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford: Berg, 1999). 4 See Askar Halwan, Al-Enazy, “The International Boundary Treaty’ (Treaty of Jeddah) Concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on June 12, 2000,” The American Journal of International Law 96, no. 1 (2002):161-173. 5 A. Orkaby, “Saudi Arabia’s War with the Houthis: Old Borders, New Lines,” Washington Institute, Policywatch 2404, April, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y95jtwna (Accessed January, 2017). 6 Orkaby, ‘Saudi Arabia’s War with the Houthis.’ 7 Robert D. Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, Second Edition (Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2010), p. 61. 8 Nora Ann Colton, “Yemen: A Collapsed Economy,” Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 (2010):415. 9 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 10-11. 10 Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, p. 63. 11 John Duke Anthony, “Whither Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations?: Interests and Implications for U.S. Policies,” Issue Briefs No. 3. US-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee, 1999, p. 8. 12 John Duke Anthony, “Whither Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations?: Interests and Implications for U.S. Policies,” pp. 63-4. 13 John Roberts, “The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Treaty,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Summer 2000, pp. 70-73. 14 Hélène Thiollet, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen.” In Helen Lackner, editor, Why Yemen Matters (London: Saqi, 2010), p. 277. 15 Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, p. 64. 16 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges (London: Praeger Security International, 2005), p. 12.

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17 Elham Manea, Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 63. 18 Robert D. Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, p. 61. 19 Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 23 (1991):487. 20 Elham Manea, Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 43. 21 Elham Manea, Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, p. 37. 22 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 10-11. 23 Nora Ann Colton, “Yemen: A Collapsed Economy,” p. 415. 24 See for example, Isa Blumi, Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism (Routledge, 2011), pp. 104-8. 25 Thiollet, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis,” p. 282. 26 Thiollet, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis,” pp. 275-78 27 Christina Hellmich, “Fighting Al-Qaida in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35 (2012):618-633. 28 For a recent treatment of fortified boundaries refer to Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015):157-190. 29 Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe (Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 2007); Mark B. Salter & Elia Zureik, Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity. New York: Routledge, 2005; and W. Walters, “Border/Control,” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (2006):187-203. 30 For an instructive discussion on this issue, see Brendon J. Cannon, “Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, no. (2016):23-37. 31 Author’s observations during fieldwork in Jizan and Najran Governorates in February 2015. In addition to economic and educational projects, Saudi Arabia has established a new regional base for one of its elite units on the northern outskirts of Jizan City. 32 The Wailah tribe in particular has virulently protected its historic right to move back and forth across the borderland. 33 Final agreement about the final border took place in March 2006 when both governments approved the demarcations and maps. Crown Prince Sultan, who had overseen Saudi-Yemen relations since the mid1970s, signed the final maps, fixing the precise border permanently. See Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen, p. 64. 34 Nasser Arrabyee, “Yemen Seeks Halt to Saudi Border Wall Construction,” Gulf News, 1 February 2004. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y8xfnet6 (Accessed January, 2017). 35 Quoted from Grace V. Jean, “Good Fences, Good Neighbours: Saudi Arabia Securing its Borders with Sensors and Software,” National Defense, 1 December 2009, p. 34. 36 Grace V. Jean, “Good Fences, Good Neighbours: Saudi Arabia Securing its Borders with Sensors and Software,” p. 35. 37 Thiollet, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis,” p. 276. 38 Thiollet, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis,” p. 276. 39 Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 1 (2011):112. 40 Refer to Shaun Overton, “The Yemen Arms Trade: Still a Concern for Terrorism and Regional Security,” Terrorism Monitor 3 no. 9 (2005). 41 See, in particular, Jack Freeman, “The al-Houthi Insurgency in the North of Yemen: An Analysis of the Shabab al Moumineen,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2009), pp. 1008-1019; Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), pp. 129-158; and Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst, 2017). 42 Blumi, Chaos in Yemen, p. 92. 43 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen,” p. 103.

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44 Al Arabiya, “Yemen Denies Saudi Air Strike Targeted its Soil,” Al Arabiya, 5 November 2009. Electronic document: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/05/90326.html (Accessed January, 2017). 45 Al Jazeera, “Saudi Forces Keep up Houthi Assault,” Al Jazeera, 6 November 2009. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ybkfra39 (Accessed January, 2017). 46 Robert F. Worth, “Yemeni Rebels and Saudis Clash at Border,” New York Times, 6 November 2009. 47 Khaled Abdullah, “Saudi Villages Evacuated due to Yemen Violence – UNICEF,” Reuters, 13 November 2009. Electronic document: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-yemen-violence (Accessed January, 2017). 48 Mohamed Yehia, “Yemen Rejects Iranian ‘Interference’ in its Affairs,” Al Arabiya, 11 November 2009. Electronic document: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/11/90937.html (Accessed January, 2017). 49 Abdul Rahman Shaheen, “More Al Houthi Rebels Arrested in Saudi Swoop,” Gulf News, 10 November 2009. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yalqnn9f (Accessed January, 2017). 50 See Joost Hiltermann, “Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia’s War inside Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, 16 December 2009. 51 Taken from Katherine Zimmerman and Steve Gonzalez, “Tracker: Saudi Arabia’s Military Operations Along Yemeni Border,” American Enterprise Institute (Critical Threats program), 4 January 2010. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ycs44jk8 (Accessed January, 2017). 52 Al Arabiya, “Saudi Denies Military Troops Entered Yemen,” Al Arabiya, 25 November 2009. Electronic document: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/11/25/92314.html. (Accessed April 27 2016). 53 Michael Horton, “Borderline Crisis: Saudi Intervenes in Yemen,” Janes Intelligence Review, January 2010. 54 Orkaby, “Saudi Arabia’s War with the Houthis.” 55 BBC, “Saudi Arabia Builds Giant Yemen Border Fence.” BBC, 9 April 2013. Electronic document: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22086231 (Accessed January, 2017). 56 McDowall, “Saudi Arabia’s New Yemen Strategy.” 57 Abdurrahman Shamlan, “Yemenis say Saudi Fence will have Adverse Effects on Economy and Security,” Yemen Times, 22 April 2013. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ybdjjhxg (Accessed January, 2017). 58 Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security,” in Henner Frteg, editor, Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 202. 59 Thomas Richter, “Saudi Arabia: A Conservative P(l)ayer on the Retreat?” in Henner Frteg, editor, Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 177-8. 60 Statement Issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait, Enclosure to Annex of Identical Letters Dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (27 March 2015) UN Doc S/2015/ 217, 5 (Coalition statement in letters to UN, dated 26 March 2015). Taken from: Tom Ruys and Luca Ferro, “Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65 (2016):62. 61 Abdullah Al-Saud, “One Year Later: Why We Saudis Went to War in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, 25 March 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ybxx2t9c (Accessed January, 2017). 62 Coalition statement in letters to UN, dated 26 March 2015. Quoted in Ruys and Ferro, “Weathering the Storm,” p. 66. 63 Ruys and Ferro, “Weathering the Storm,” p. 66. 64 Hani al-Sefiaan, “Al-Quwaat al-Saudiyya tirud ‘ala a‘tidaa’ Saleh ‘ala al-hudud,” [Saudi forces respond to an attack by Saleh militias], Al-Arabiya, 24 July 2015. Electronic document: http://www.alarabiya. net/ar/saudi-today/2015/07/24/-‫الحدود‬-‫على‬-‫صالح‬-‫ميليشيات‬-‫اعتداء‬-‫على‬-‫ترد‬-‫السعودية‬-‫القوات‬.html (Accessed January, 2017).

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65 The Huthis have been less successful when attempting more conventional attacks, such as against the al-Tuwal border crossing on 22 July 2015; see Hani al-Sefiaan, “Al-Quwaat al-Saudiyya tahabit hajum Milishiaat Saleh ‘ala munfith al-Tuwal,” [Saudi forces thwart attack by Saleh militias on al-Tuwal post], Al-Arabiya, 22 July 2015. Electronic document: http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2015/07/22/‫الطوال‬-‫منفذ‬-‫على‬-‫حوثي‬-‫هجوم‬-‫تحبط‬-‫السعودية‬-‫القوات‬.html (Accessed January, 2017). 66 Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello, “The Escalating Northern Front in Yemen,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Policywatch 2490), 24 September 2015. Electronic document: http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-escalating-northern-front-in-yemen. (Accessed January, 2017). Huthi-affiliated media have regularly posted videos of raids by Huthi fighters into Saudi Arabia. Broadcasting from Lebanon since 2012, the Huthi-aligned al-Masirah TV station has reported on daily attacks; see Mariam Goldman, “What’s Going on along the Saudi Saudi-Yemeni Border?” National Interest, 28 July 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y77avsxc (Accessed January, 2017). 67 Lori Plotkin Boghart and Michael Knights, “Border Fight Could Shift Saudi Arabia’s Yemen War Calculus,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Policywatch 2736), 6 December 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ybfxm8bs (Accessed January, 2017), and Angus McDowall, Phil Stewart and David Rohde, “Yemen’s Guerilla War Tests Military Ambitions of Big-spending Saudis,” Reuters, 19 April 2016. Electronic document:http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/saudi-military/ (Accessed January, 2017). 68 See James C. O’Halloran, editor, “Scud C’ variant (Hwasong 6), ‘Scud D’ variant (Hwasong 7, and ‘Scud ER’),” In IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016 (United Kingdom: IHS, 2015), p. 63. 69 Boghart and Knights, “Border Fight Could Shift Saudi Arabia’s Yemen War Calculus.” 70 Mark Piggott, “Saudi Arabia: Houthi Shelling in Town of Najran Results in Casualties and Closure of Airport,” International Business Times, 5 May 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y89mleps (Accessed January, 2017). 71 Glen Carey, ‘Saudi Cash Can’t Buy Military Clout,” Bloomberg, 12 January 2017. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y9vqdvb6 (Accessed January, 2017). 72 McDowall and Rohde, “Yemen’s Guerilla War…”

44

3 The Future of Yemen: The Economic and Security Roles of the GCC Sterling Jensen

This chapter explores and analyzes how the interests of the main actors in the Yemen war shape the options the GCC has for its role in the future of Yemen’s economy and security. The analysis is based on current research on Yemen-GCC relations, news reports and media interviews with Yemeni and GCC officials about the war. It also includes insights from author’s interviews with current and former Yemeni officials as well as regional and Western officials working on stabilizing and humanitarian efforts Yemen. The chapter starts by placing the GCC role in Yemen in the context of political economy theory, then discusses and analyzes what interests are at stake in Yemen for the main supporters of the coalition (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and the main factions in Yemen (the Hadi government, the Huthis, and Ali Abdullah Saleh). This is followed by a comparative discussion of lessons from the reconstruction of Western Europe to analyze different policy options for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. The chapter concludes with a summary of the options with their risks and benefits.

Theoretical Framework for Understanding GCC Role in Yemen There are theoretical frameworks for understanding the GCC’s role in Yemen within international relations, social and political science. International relations theories interpret how the national interests of Yemen and the GCC players are served in their relationship. A realist perspective might focus on those actors with access to military and economic power, while a liberal perspective might focus on the regional and political dynamics at play in the conflict, such as between the former North and South Yemeni states. A constructivist perspective might likely focus on how history and grievances are at play. A political scientist might be more interested in looking at the political dynamics of the relationship and whether Yemen’s political structure is in harmony or in tension with the political structure of GCC countries, i.e. republican vs. monarchy. A social science perspective might concentrate on the 45

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

tribal, religious and socio-political institutions, ideologies and preferences in interpreting how the GCC might play an effective role in Yemen. This chapter takes a political economy approach to interpreting potential GCC security and economic role in Yemen, which includes elements of the international relations approach as well as political science.

Interests in Yemen Saudi Arabia The analysis in this chapter argues and assumes Saudi interests in Yemen are directly related more to the security of its southern border than to economic, social or internal political considerations. The Saudi-led coalition’s public objective – to restore the legitimate government of Yemen – is directly linked to the threat of the Huthis coming to power and using that new power to threaten the Saudi border in the Sa‘da region. Border security is a top priority for most countries, especially those with hostile neighbours. Who a country chooses to ally with in order to secure its borders influences its foreign policy priorities. Perceived threats from Saddam Hussein after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 strengthened Saudi Arabia’s defense ties with the USA, which arguably influenced the rise of violent Islamists and the USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2011 Shi’a protestors in Bahrain threatened the rule of the Khalifa family, an important Saudi ally, which would potentially expose Saudi Arabia to unrest in its Eastern regions with a large Shi’i population. Many of the GCC governments blamed the uprising in Bahrain on Iranian interference and used external interference as a main justification for sending military reinforcements to aid Bahrain’s government. US policy on Bahrain condemned the government’s response to the protestors’ demands, so Saudi Arabia led the Peninsula Shield Force in response to Bahrain’s King Hamad’s request for intervention. Similarly, in Yemen the Huthi take-over of power in late 2014 and near control of the whole country prompted the Saudi-led coalition operation ‘Decisive Storm’ in March 2015. In contrast to international support to secure Saudi Arabia’s northern border from Iraqi aggression in 1990 and 2003, the USA and other great powers did not consider the conflict in Yemen and the security of Saudi Arabia’s southern border as enough of a threat or challenge to their strategic interests to justify stronger support. Simply stated, Yemen did not enjoy the same strategic value for the international community as Iraq did. While the USA and the international community have shown interest in preventing the rise of violent Islamists in Yemen, they do not share the scope of Saudi Arabia’s concern about the rise of the Huthi movement in Yemen. Saudi policy and interests in Yemen are heavily debated in academic and policy circles. There is general consensus that ideally Saudi Arabia prefers equilibrium in Yemen among rival groups reflecting tribal, political and sectarian differences.1 Neither a weak nor a strong and assertive Yemeni government serves Saudi interests because both could be sources of 46

3. The Future of Yemen: The Economic and Security Roles of the GCC

Saudi insecurity. Regardless of its relationship with Iran, Saudi Arabia would not tolerate a Yemeni government with strong defensive and offensive military capabilities or ideology precisely because it would perceive those military capabilities as being directed against Saudi Arabia through its southern border.2 At the same time, a weak Yemeni government incapable of containing a militant group such as the Huthi from attacking Saudi Arabia or creating a base of support for hostile militant groups is unacceptable and can be grounds for unilateral Saudi military action, as was seen with the Huthi-Saleh insurrection in late 2014. As one senior Yemeni official remarked, Saudi Arabia is the only country with a direct strategic interest in northern Yemen, whereas international strategic interests are located in southern Yemen.3 Yemen’s natural resources are concentrated in the central and southern regions and Aden is of strategic importance to countries with interests in the Red Sea and shipping in the Arabian Sea. Saudi perceptions of its interests in Yemen may differ from those of many Yemeni and international observers, but understanding how Saudi Arabia perceives potential threats and challenges to its southern border is essential to a correct analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Yemen policy. On the other hand there are commonly held views among Yemenis, reinforced by some Western scholars, that Saudi Arabia’s guiding policy in Yemen is to keep it divided and weak.4 A popular Yemeni narrative is that the Saudi government has an interest in being the standard bearer of Islam (as it is the custodian of the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina) and since Islam came from Arab culture, Saudi Arabia has an interest in being a main source of traditional Arab culture and dominating the Arabian Peninsula. Those Arab cultures questioning Saudi Arabia’s narrative on traditional Arab culture are therefore challenges and potential threats to Saudi legitimacy. As Yemeni identity prides itself on being the birthplace of the Arabic language and Arab culture, with all Arabs originating from Yemen, a Saudi interest to shape and control the narrative of Arab culture can come into conflict with Yemeni national identity and strategic priorities. This narrative of Saudi interests interprets Saudi Arabia’s use of tribal politics as its preferred way for keeping Yemen weak and divided. Those who espouse this narrative, both Yemeni and non-Yemeni, assume Saudi Arabian leaders view a democratic and republican Yemen as a direct threat to Saudi legitimacy, and thus Saudi Arabia adopts a divide and conquer strategy to prevent Yemen from achieving its potential.5 Within this vision, Saudi Arabia is the main instigator of Yemen’s current problems and the Yemenis themselves cannot improve their future without a change in Saudi policy. A common counter argument to this anti-Saudi analysis is that Saudi Arabia has invested more in the stability of Yemen than any other country and that Yemenis are to blame for jockeying amongst themselves in order to gain Saudi patronage. After the uprisings in 2011, Saudi Arabia was the stakeholder which invested most in keeping Yemen united, safe and democratic. It supported the National Dialogue Conference and was the leading donor in aid to Yemen through the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative.6 Saudi Arabia did not appear to pick favourites among the competing factions and worked closely 47

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

with the international community to support a transitional government that was legitimate and sustainable.7 Some have said that Saudi Arabia should have taken a firmer position after the uprising, doing more to either undermine or support Saleh.8 However, Saudi Arabia aligned its Yemeni policy with Western allies and international institutions during the postSaleh transitional period before the war in 2015. Those who espouse this view blame the Saudi mistakes in the military campaign on Yemeni groups such as the Islamist Islah Party and other Yemeni opportunists who exploit Saudi fears. For those who do not view Saudi Arabia as the prime culprit for Yemen’s ills, Saleh is an illustrative example of how a Yemeni leader has used Saudi Arabia’s interests in Yemen to his own advantage. Saleh has played off Saudi fears of Zaydis, Iranians, Islamists, AQAP and any other potential challenge or threat to the security of the Yemeni-Saudi border. Saleh famously said that managing the disparate factions in Yemen was like dancing on the heads of snakes. This self-acknowledged ability to play off and manipulate the interests and perceptions of Yemen’s diverse factions has most likely also been implemented by Saleh in his management of foreign relations. Both the popular Yemeni and academic narratives of Saudi Arabia’s interests in Yemen are at play in the current conflict. The Huthi and Ali Abdulla Saleh have capitalized on the Yemeni narrative of Saudi Arabia to “keep Yemen divided and weak” to dissuade Yemenis from supporting the Hadi government and the Saudi-led coalition, which they view as an agent of a larger Saudi conspiracy against Yemen. There is also the narrative that the Saudis seek to convert Yemeni Zaydis and Shafi’is to Wahhabism.9 Saudi Arabia has historically supported Yemen’s offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islah. Islah and other Wahhabi institutes and schools have received a considerable amount of funding from Saudi citizens and the government. A Saudi perspective would interpret Yemen as an ungoverned space which is difficult to influence. Yemen is fractured along tribal, socio-economic, political and sectarian lines. If Saudi Arabia’s top interest in Yemen is the security of its border with Yemen, then tribal politics might be the most pragmatic and proven mode of interstate relations to secure the border. On top of that, Iran’s ambitions in the Arab world, manifest in its increasing footprint in Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut, and its attempts to gain a stronger presence in Egypt during the Morsi government and Bahrain during the Arab Spring, has alarmed many in Saudi Arabia and encouraged them to take a more proactive stance on Iranian expansionism.10 While the nature and extent of Iranian interests in Yemen is uncertain, Gulf Arab perceptions of Iranian intervention in Yemen have given the Saudi-led coalition domestic legitimacy.11 In summary, Saudi Arabia’s main interests in Yemen are linked to securing its southern border and preventing Iran from gaining more influence in the Arabian Peninsula.

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United Arab Emirates (UAE) Where Saudi Arabia sees Yemen as a source of potential challenges and threats to its security, the UAE sees in Yemen opportunities to advance Emirati interests. Many commentators conclude that the UAE has heavily invested in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen due to Emirati fears of Iranian expansionism, especially since Iran occupies three Emirati islands in the Straits of Hormuz.12 The UAE has a well-respected Air Force and, despite its relatively small size, has invested heavily in its special operations and technical war fighting capabilities. Others have assumed that the UAE’s involvement in Yemen was an opportunity to demonstrate its military capabilities. However, UAE interests in Yemen are more nuanced than mere fear of Iranian expansionism or an opportunity to demonstrate and increase military capability. The UAE not only has economic and social interests in Yemen but also, and likely more importantly, a vital interest to demonstrate to its most strategic ally, Saudi Arabia, that a strategic threat to Saudi Arabia is considered a strategic threat to the UAE. Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed has publicly expressed this view and there are compelling reasons to believe this is more than an act of brotherly kindness.13 The UAE, and in particular the economic power houses of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, have a very different economic and political model than Saudi Arabia’s. As a federal system, the UAE has decentralszed power with individual emirates retaining much autonomy on how they pursue their economic and social interests. The UAE prides itself on its majlisstyle federalism that is suited to its cultural background and many believe is a system to be emulated in tribal societies that have a bad history with centralised government.14 Observers have commented how, given the diverse and disparate interests of multiple factions in Yemen, it is highly improbable there will be a strong central government in Yemen.15 The UAE is the only federal state in the region and therefore a possible structural ally to a future federal state in Yemen. The UAE would have an interest in influencing the future political make up of Yemen, especially if it becomes a federal state that is of high interest to Saudi Arabia. Gaining influence in Yemen provides the UAE with more leverage with Saudi Arabia, which is both a strategic ally and a ‘big brother.’ In many ways the UAE has competed with Saudi Arabia in its political, social and economic order. The UAE has demonstrated forward thinking in diversifying its economy, especially Dubai, and has created an infrastructure and business environment that made the UAE a regional hub for international finance and trade. It has done so with a significantly large expatriate population that is largely integrated in the UAE’s developing cosmopolitan culture. This is a very different model from Saudi Arabia’s where the expatriate community is segregated from the local population and there is more rigidity in social activities. Yet despite structural and demographic differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia as well as a sort of competition for regional influence, the stability of Saudi Arabia is intimately linked to the security of the UAE. The UAE does not have an established 49

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

religious body that regulates religious affairs. Many Emiratis look to Saudi Arabia’s clerical establishment for religious guidance. While al-Azhar in Egypt is also an important religious reference point for Emiratis, a significant disruption in the status quo in Saudi Arabia could adversely affect the UAE if the religious establishment were to turn against the ruling family and its foreign alliances, especially the USA and Western allies. It may be difficult for the UAE to withstand attacks by the Saudi religious establishment, which could undermine UAE unity and increase chances for extremists to attack the UAE and its business model. Therefore, helping the Saudi family maintain the status quo could be of strategic importance to the leadership of the UAE. Additionally, the UAE has chosen to be seen as a vital partner and leader in maintaining regional security and the cohesion of the GCC rather than being seen as independent, as Oman and Qatar have been seen to do. (This text was written prior to the internal crisis focused on Qatar in the GCC.) Qatar and Oman are seen as less committed to Saudi leadership in the GCC when their interests are not in line with Saudi national interests. While this might help Qatar and Oman maintain more autonomy in foreign policy and not get bogged down by the costs of Saudi-led initiatives such as the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia would likely be less committed to address threats and challenges to Qatar’s and Oman’s top national interest. As for the UAE, being highly committed in a military coalition in Yemen for the sake of Saudi national interests gives the UAE more strategic space for manoeuvre without losing trust in the eyes of Saudi leaders. For example, when Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran after Iranian protestors entered and vandalized the Saudi embassy in Tehran in early 2016, other GCC countries were pressured to follow suit. The UAE summoned its ambassador, but it did not cut ties with Iran. The UAE is Iran’s second largest trading partner. The UAE has significant economic interests with Iran. Yet the UAE’s commitment to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has likely given the UAE extra flexibility to pursue diplomatic and economic ties with countries like Iran that are not in the interest of Saudi Arabia. The UAE has gained more respect, negotiating power and influence with Saudi Arabia because of its role in Yemen. However, the UAE’s involvement in Yemen is not only about its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Social ties between UAE and Yemen are often overlooked by outside observers interpreting Gulf behaviour. USA government officers expressed confusion as to why the UAE would be so committed to operations in Yemen when they believed UAE vital interests were not at stake.16 Many Emiratis have Yemeni origin or are intermarried with Yemenis and still maintain ties with their tribes in Yemen.17 These links mean there is an Emirati constituency with an interest in Yemen. Many Yemenis living and working in the UAE at the time of independence in 1971 were given Emirati citizenship and passports and maintain contact with families and tribesmen. Additionally, many Emiratis have received religious education in Yemen. These links not only create solidarity with Yemen, but also security concerns because it is difficult to detect if someone with Yemeni roots or ties has been radicalized or might be susceptible to radicalization.18 An example of this was the ‘Reem Island Ghost’ incident in December 50

3. The Future of Yemen: The Economic and Security Roles of the GCC

2014 in Abu Dhabi. The terrorist, Alaa al-Hashimi, was a 38 year old Emirati of reported Yemeni origin and was accused, along with her husband, of wiring funds to Al-Qaida operatives in Yemen.19 An Emirati law enforcement officer has also stated there is a serious Emirati concern of Yemenis coming into the UAE legally and bringing with them extremist ideas.20 It can be challenging for Emirati law enforcement to know the precise backgrounds and political leanings of Yemeni coming into the UAE and it would be relatively easy for one to integrate into Emirati society. UAE involvement in Yemen is a way to build its intelligence capabilities and government and social ties. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is actively involved in Yemen and could pose a serious threat to the UAE. The UAE will need more situational awareness in Yemen to correctly assess potential threats to UAE security originating from Yemen. Additionally, Iran could potentially exploit Huthi fighters sympathetic to Iranian foreign policy to conduct espionage or other clandestine and covert Iranian operations in the UAE. Lastly, UAE commitment to Yemen could be explained by economic interests. The UAE has invested heavily in its maritime capabilities and ports. As such, the Gulf of Aden is of strategic interest to the UAE as much UAE trade goes through the Red Sea. In 2008 Dubai Ports World (DPW) bought a 50% share contract to run two container ports in Aden in a 30-year management deal.21 After four years of the deal, the post-Saleh government created a strained relationship with DP World over the contract and DP World sold its 50% share of the deal to a Yemeni company in 2012.22 The port of Aden may be a strategic priority for DP World and UAE economic diversification as DP World has negotiated port managing contracts with Djibouti (2000), Egypt (2008) and Somaliland (2016). The UAE has a strategic interest in managing the hub which connects trade routes to Asia, Africa and Europe through Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea. Therefore, maintaining strong political and economic ties to the south of Yemen serves UAE interest as a regional hub for international trade. Additionally, with a population of over 27 million with dismal infrastructure and public services, Yemen offers the UAE more strategic depth and opportunities for regional investment and economic statecraft. Yemen desperately needs a trusted and reliable regional partner that is interested in investing in Yemen in the long term. It could be argued that the UAE enjoys a much more favourable reputation in Yemen than Saudi Arabia. The UAE also has a business model that is more in harmony with Yemen’s socio-political infrastructure than Saudi Arabia. As a federal system, the UAE has valuable experience in de-centralised governance and in maintaining an inclusive society. Building more strategic depth in Yemen would also allow the UAE to tap into Yemen’s labor force which could potentially help alleviate some of the UAE’s demographic concerns. A politically stable environment in Yemen opens up opportunities for the UAE to invest in Yemen’s industrial, agricultural and manufacturing sectors which rely on low-skilled labor. Producing UAE goods in Yemen would help the UAE kick its addiction to low-skilled Asian labor. In summary, UAE interests in Yemen are directly linked to its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia, its desire to be a leader in regional security, its social ties to Yemen, 51

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potential threats to UAE domestic security, UAE needs for more strategic depth in the region and the UAE’s economic strategy.

Yemen: Hadi Government The defining characteristic of Yemen’s foreign policy is its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Like Russia to the Ukraine, Iran to Iraq, or China to Taiwan, Saudi Arabia perceives Yemen as an inseparable part of its national security. As such, Saudi Arabian leaders feel they need to influence Yemen as much as possible in order to prevent any faction within Yemen from becoming a potential threat or challenge to Saudi interests. As mentioned previously, Yemeni leaders have a history of using this fact to their advantage and disadvantage. When the Soviets supported South Yemen during the 70s and 80s, northern leaders were able to get financial and military support from Saudi Arabia. When Saleh sided with Saddam Hussein for the Kuwait invasion, southern leaders were eventually able to convince Saudi Arabia to give them financial and military support during the separatist civil war in 1994. This Yemeni use of Saudi Arabia has created a culture of dependency on Saudi support in order to gain, grow and maintain power in Yemen. Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis also work in Saudi Arabia, and Yemen’s economy has long been dependent on remittances from Saudi Arabia. In this regard it is in the interest of the current Hadi government to use Saudi Arabia as much as it can to stay in power. Other than personal survival, the Hadi government’s claimed top objective is to regain control over Yemen in order to transition it to a more representative government. It believes that to achieve this, it must have a military victory against the Huthi-Saleh alliance.23 So much so, that it is campaigning heavily to keep the military option open for the Saudi-led coalition. Events on the ground have shown that the Hadi-government relies heavily on coalition airstrikes to make gains on the ground and that it is difficult to motivate many pro-government fighters outside of the South to mobilize, other than some of the more religiously oriented fighters. Broadly speaking, many Yemenis have decided not to fight. From a partisan perspective, one senior official in the government said the Hadi government had much more popular support than was being reported in the news, which in Yemen is heavily influenced by Ali Abdulla Saleh supporters.24 Yet, another senior Yemeni official said the Hadi government has much less negotiating power than the Huthis and Saleh and that is what prompts it to reject compromise in the peace talks. A main narrative among Hadi officials is that compromising with the Huthi-Saleh alliance without a military victory will reward Huthis and Saleh to return to arms if they are not given their way in the future. The Hadi government is asking them to disarm before further negotiations occur, whereas the Huthi-Saleh alliance is seeking a comprehensive peace deal before they disarm. A senior Yemeni official was much more skeptical of the Hadi government’s ability to negotiate a peace with the Huthi-Saleh alliance. From his point of view, the most important factor to weakening the insurgent alliance was to convince General Ali Mohsin, through the backing 52

3. The Future of Yemen: The Economic and Security Roles of the GCC

of the Saudis and Americans, to convince Saleh to go into exile thus leaving the Huthis without an army. This would most likely only occur if Hadi steps down from power and a compromise leader is appointed for a transitional government. According to this official, Hadi and his southern constituents are mainly interested in survival and the only way they can survive is for the coalition to achieve a military victory.25 From Hadi’s perspective, the main threat to his interests has been Saleh undermining the reforms and resolutions agreed upon in the National Dialogue Conference. From his and his supporters’ perspectives, it was expected that Saleh and his family would lose access to power and resources with the new government. However, security sector reform, a fundamental initiative needed to enable the political, social and economic initiatives that would provide more promise to the new Yemen, required the disbanding of the old guard still loyal to Saleh, a significant reduction of defense spending and the re-organisation of the armed forces. Therefore, it became a zero-sum game between Hadi and Saleh. Decreasing Hadi’s threats meant increasing Saleh’s threats. And measures that decreased threats to Saleh’s interests translated into threats for Hadi’s interests. In summary, it is safe to assume that the Hadi government’s main interest is to maintain power and achieve a complete military victory against the Huthi-Saleh alliance.

Yemen: Huthi The Huthi have an interest in more political power and ensuring that Sa‘da province is not connected to Sanaa in any future federal state and has access to the sea through Midi, Haradh on the Red Sea coast.26 The Huthi were under intense pressure from National Dialogue Conference (NDC) organizers to acquiesce to the six regions proposed by conference organizers after the NDC had already ended. They rejected this map and the Huthi eventually mobilized their forces. Yet, it is important to distinguish between the Huthi and other Zaydis. While there is overlap in Huthi and Zaydi interests, Saudi Arabia is not reportedly concerned with Zaydis as much as it is about the militant Huthis.27 Saudi Arabia has a history of supporting Zaydi interests that matched their own, including support for the Zaydi Imam and his forces against the Egyptians in the 1960s. They also financed social and health projects in Sa‘da in the 1970s, and continued relations with traditional Zaydi leaders in the 1990s to maintain the peace.28 Huthi gains in Northern Yemen and their military successes have increased the movement’s bargaining power with respect to any future political settlement and have resulted in more militant rhetoric against Saudi Arabia. International relations theory would predict that with the Huthis’ increased power, their ambitions and objectives are also likely to change.29 Their objectives after taking power may include guaranteeing senior government positions for Huthis, re-drawing future federal borders to suit Huthi interests in the North and giving Huthi leverage over future Yemeni security forces. For the Huthi, returning Yemen to the status quo before March 2015 is a threat to their interest in gaining 53

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more representation in government decision making. They have also created new ground realities with their insurgency, gaining much power and access to government resources. Controlling Yemen’s most populous areas gives them an opportunity to gain more sympathy for their cause and win the loyalty of people. Huthi connections with Iran have been linked more to internal capacity building and counseling rather than ideological allegiance to Iran.30 However, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash explained that the UAE and the Saudi-led coalition felt threatened by the likelihood of the Huthis becoming ideological allies to Tehran as Hezbollah in Lebanon has become, thus changing the nature of relations away from their current ties to Iran.31 In Arab Gulf countries, an often heard justification for the military intervention in Yemen is to prevent Iran from gaining a proxy in the Arabian Peninsula. It is unknown whether the Huthi currently have an interest in becoming an Iranian proxy, or might develop such an interest in the future. However, the perception of the Huthis interest in being or becoming Iranian supporters is an important domestic factor for Gulf participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Meanwhile, the literature has summarized Huthi objectives as seeking more representation in the government in Yemen as well as holding grievances against Saudi Arabia, Saleh, and the Islah party.32 Popular perceptions that the National Dialogue process only enriched the elites and that change did not lead to better livelihoods provided the Huthis with an opportunity to seize power in Sanaa, which was the center of political power. Also, the alliance with Saleh provided them with the access they needed to effective security forces to coerce the Hadi government from power. In summary, Huthis seek more political power to influence policy decisions affecting their constituents. They feel threatened by a government in Sanaa that marginalizes their concerns and has sought to undermine their movement. Domestic discontent with the National Dialogue, a rapprochement with the Saleh camp and a potential Iranian interest to undermine Saudi Arabia provided Huthis opportunities to gain political power through a military coup.

Yemen: Ali Abdullah Saleh After agreeing to hand over power to Hadi in 2011, Saleh felt deeply betrayed by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Hadi.33 There is a compelling argument that Saleh ultimately seeks respect for his legacy and his family. He also has a large constituency that he patronized for decades and who do not want their personal interests to be significantly affected by the new reforms proposed by the National Dialogue Conference. These focused on reforms in the security sector where many units would be disbanded, law enforcement would be decentralised and the structure of the armed forces would be significantly transformed with changes in command. These reforms were intended to dilute the power and resources of Saleh loyalists, who have been willing to fight in order to retain their status and access to government resources. 54

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Saleh’s alliance with the Huthis in 2014 clearly made him a Saudi enemy. The HuthiSaleh alliance that overthrew the government starting in September 2014 led to a precipitous series of events that eventually led to forces loyal to the Huthi-Saleh alliance to capture the last bastion for the legitimate government led by Hadi in Aden in March 2015.34 Forcing Hadi to flee the country and staging an armed coup against the internationally recognized and GCC-backed Hadi government significantly undermined Saudi leadership and provided Iran with an opportunity to exploit the situation as Iran had done in Egypt and other Arab countries during the Arab Spring. Allowing the Huthi-Saleh alliance to usurp the legitimate government and take control of the whole country would change realities on the ground and the stakes for Saudi Arabia in securing its border with Yemen and it would have potentially allowed Iran to gain a vassal government along the kingdom’s borders. In late 2016 there was a growing argument that Saleh had been significantly undermined by the Huthi and no longer enjoyed much leverage over Yemeni security forces. One senior Yemeni official even described Saleh as being under “city arrest,” meaning he is unable to freely travel outside of or within Yemen because his movements are being monitored by the Huthi.35 With Saleh and the Huthis’ long history of mutual enmity it is not surprising that the Huthi would immediately exploit any opportunity to purge Saleh loyalists from the top military ranks and replace them with Huthi loyalists. Perceptions of the Saleh-Huthi alliance, some Yemeni argue, have been distorted by Saleh’s political enemies and rivals in the Muslim-Brotherhood influenced Islah Party. The Islah Party has long been a Saudi surrogate in Yemen and has deep-seated animosity with both the Huthis and Saleh. The Islah Party exploited the anti-Saleh protests of 2011 to gain more power and were behind important demands in the National Dialogue Conference that were not acceptable to Saleh or the Huthi. The argument is that Saudi Arabia has relied on informants connected to the Islah Party which have made accusatory analysis of Saleh and the Huthi in order to settle scores with their traditional rivals, rather than objective information that would help Saudi Arabia restore the legitimate government and secure its interests in Yemen. This narrative portrays Saleh as a victim of an Islah plot to undermine and prevent him from coming to an understanding with Saudi Arabia. From Saleh’s perspective, anything that prevents him, his family and close constituents from maintaining an honorable and privileged status is a threat to his interests. The lack of sufficient reconciliation and the inability of the new Hadi government to adequately address Yemen’s vital economic and institutional problems allowed Saleh to exploit public sentiments of disillusionment and frustration with the National Dialogue Conference and other aspects of the transition. To summarize, Saleh’s objective is the survival of himself and his family, as well as re-gaining respect from Saudi Arabia for himself and his close associates as the guarantors of security in Yemen. Saleh felt betrayed by the new Hadi government with his pride being hurt. His alliance with the Huthi can be seen as a way to settle scores with Hadi’s government and Islah which sought to undermine and marginalize him in a way Saleh interpreted as disrespectful and insulting. 55

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The Saudi-Iranian Geo-Political Rivalry The Saudi leadership views Huthi control of Yemen, with easy access to arms, as not only a direct threat against its southern border, but also an opportunity for its chief regional rival, Iran, to gain regional influence. As mentioned previously, the Huthis have shown their ability in the past to attack Saudi Arabia on its borders with Sa‘da governorate. They have also gained some control and influence over Yemen’s armed forces which significantly increased their capability to attack the Saudi border and harass the local population. However, it is the possibility of Iran exploiting Huthi-Saleh rule as it did by increasing flights to Yemen when the Huthis took over control in 2014 and supplying Huthi fighters with weapons during the ensuing civil war that compounds Saudi fears of Huthi rule. As is often repeated in commentaries about the Yemen conflict, the possibility of the Huthis becoming Iranian proxies in the Arabian Peninsula is viewed as a direct threat to the geo-political position of Saudi Arabia. Iran seeks more geo-political power in the Arabian Gulf and the Huthis are potential allies in this endeavor. A common Iranian narrative is that Arab monarchies that struck it rich with oil have inflated geo-political power and are protected by the United States and the West at the expense of Iran’s rightful geo-political position. It is safe to assume that Iran is likely to exploit discontent of Saudi leadership in the region. Since the Huthis feel they are victims of Saudi aggression, they are likely to seek the support of antiSaudi powers such as Iran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has grown comfortable with its recent rise as a regional power. The decline of Egypt, Syria and Iraq as Arab regional powers allowed Saudi Arabia to fill the void and take a leading role. Since the Iranian Revolution turned Iran into a USA foe, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed American support for its new regional role. However, after the attacks of September 11, the USA re-evaluated its support to Saudi Arabia as a main regional power. As it became clear that the re-emergence of Iraq as a regional power would take much longer than expected, the USA has vacillated in determining to what extent it should give Saudi Arabia the guarantees it needs to remain the main regional power in the Arabian Gulf. President Barak Obama stated that he wished to see Saudi Arabia and Iran reach an agreement on sharing influence in the region, suggesting a more balanced U.S. approach to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry.36 Yet the inauguration of Donald Trump as president in January 2017 and an increased rhetoric against perceived Iranian intervention in the region are likely to tip the balance sought by the Obama administration back in favour of the Saudi position. International relations theories predict a high probability of conflict when there are rising powers and changing geo-political forces in regional and international relations. Many regional conflicts, such as in Yemen, are easily exploited and influenced by geo-political conflicts, such as the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries view the Iranian regime as exploiting a mix of political Islam, Persian nationalism and sectarianism to maintain its hold on power and that it is using violence and terrorism 56

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as a means to gain more regional influence. On the other hand, a counter view, and one frequently mentioned by Iranian officials and pundits, sees the spread of Wahhabism from the Arabian Gulf into the multi-sect countries of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and the strong backing of the United States to Arab Gulf governments as fueling terrorism, extremism and regional instability. The environment of another regional rivalry where competing regional powers use ideological differences and inducements to gain allies might shed light on how GCC-Yemen relations might evolve in the context of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. As the Saudi-led coalition studies options for its security and economic roles in Yemen and the risks involved, a comparative analysis with cases in which an outside power or coalition has played a decisive and constructive role in post-war reconstruction and security sector reform can be informative. Lessons learned from the reconstruction of Western Europe after WWII and during the Cold War with post-coalition military operations in Yemen are particularly insightful, and are discussed below.

Western Europe after World War II After the Germans were defeated in 1945, European countries were devastated from the effects of war. Infrastructure was destroyed, communities displaced, unemployment rampant and inflation soaring. Then in June 1947 US Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a plan to European governments to coordinate their needs for aid that could be funded by the USA. This plan became known as the Marshall Plan and is arguably one of the most successful state-led post-war reconstruction plans in the last century. The Marshall Plan was in effect from 1948 to 1952 and had significant strategic consequences still felt by many governments today. The Soviet Union had lost much blood and treasure to defeat Nazi Germany and arrived in Berlin from the East. When Soviet troops occupied East Berlin, they intended to stay to ensure that Soviet interests would be served in post-war Germany. In a similar vein, the American-led allied troops occupied West Berlin, intending to stay as long as they could to serve USA, UK and French interests. Both the USSR and the USA had an interest in preventing the rise of another belligerent Germany and in shaping the future of Europe. It soon became apparent after the Berlin blockade from 1948-1949 that there were competing economic and political visions of how Germany – and to a large extent post-war Europe – should be governed. The USA promoted free market capitalism and democracy, whereas the Russians promoted a communist state-led economy and a one-party socialist political system. It became important for the US and its European allies to prevent the Russians from spreading revolutionary communist and socialist ideologies into Europe, while Russia sought to prevent Western capitalism and what it saw as bourgeois democracy from spreading into Soviet spheres of influence. When the United States entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, it was clear that they and their European allies sought to keep the Russians out of Europe and the Americans in. 57

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While the Marshall Plan transferred $12 billion into Western Europe, it was not about giving free aid. Western European countries, in need of debt relief and reconstruction funds, had no other feasible option than to accept USA requirements to get the aid and join USA-led monetary and financial organisations. Reconstruction was funded in USA dollars, USA exports to Europe boomed, and USA influence in Europe increased. Additionally, European countries hosted American troops on large military bases. While most of these troops were in Germany, the alignment of economic, political and military tools is what arguably helped the Marshall Plan succeed. Some argue the successful reconstruction of Europe had more to do with the previous economic and political foundations of Western European countries, rather than an imposed American hand.37 Either way, it could be well argued that the Marshall Plan helped enable a more integrated, prosperous and safe Europe. Lessons from the post-war reconstruction of Europe might provide perspective to GCC countries seeking to understand their role in a post-conflict Yemen. Of particular relevance are issues of Yemeni integration into the GCC, the political, religious and economic relationship with Iran, and the role of a pan-Arab military alliance centered in the Arabian Peninsula.

Yemeni Integration into the GCC For the last century Yemen has not had a consistent and unified foreign policy regarding its political relationship with Arab governments in the Arab Gulf. Before unification in 1990, the Marxist-led South Yemen was hostile to most of the Arab monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula. And the republican leaning Yemen Arab Republic was also not a natural ally to those Arab monarchies aligned with the West, even though it was later seen as a client state of Saudi Arabia.38 Yet when unified Yemen finally had a more unified foreign policy regarding the GCC, in particular after signing the border agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2000, it appeared that GCC countries were more oriented toward potential challenges, threats and opportunities to the north in Iraq, Iran and the Levant rather than south in Yemen.39 Assuming Yemen remains united and interested in joining the GCC, lessons from post-war reconstruction of Europe can provide lessons for GCC countries to ensure that there is a marriage between security and economic development. The USA maintained large military bases in Europe while it spent reconstruction funds, facilitated financial loans and increased trade. The USA did not merely rely on its European partners to provide their own security or to be able to spend their funds as they wished. The USA insisted funds be spent on infrastructure projects that would enable peace between France and Germany, such as in enabling the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which integrated European coal and steel industries (two fundamental ingredients for building weapons) and laid the foundation for the European Union. Western Europe became reliant on American military power for physical security and the dollar for financial security. Similarly, GCC countries 58

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might need to explore playing a similar role in Yemen. One of the major questions the GCC needs to address in considering its role in integrating Yemen includes considering how the GCC can ensure Yemen stays together as a country and is able to prevent armed insurrections and foreign meddling. Will GCC forces need to maintain military bases, whether jointly or independently held, in Yemen to ensure physical security? This would likely require a large commitment from GCC countries and would need to be done at the request of a Yemeni government with political legitimacy. Without a significant security footprint in Yemen, the GCC risks relying on what many see as a corrupt, bloated, factional and inadequate security sector to ensure the security required for lasting economic development projects. Another important question is how would the GCC manage negative Yemeni perceptions of a more permanent security presence in order to keep the country together and enable security sector reform and economic development? Yemenis are likely to see a large GCC security footprint, especially one by Saudi Arabia, as an occupation by its ‘big brother’ and could prompt insurgent activities if provoked. Any GCC security footprint would need to be directly linked to immediate economic relief, an increase in local security and employment to be successful. It might be easier for GCC countries like the UAE, which have a better reputation in Yemen than Saudi Arabia, to maintain an effective security footprint. However, Saudi Arabia is the only GCC country with the required manpower to provide such a service. Saudi Arabia would likely need to embark on a successful public diplomacy campaign in Yemen, to include economic incentives (such as increasing worker permits in Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries), political concessions and security guarantees to succeed.

Relations with Iran While not exactly analogous with the Cold War competition between free market capitalism and communism, many argue that an ideologically-driven Iran is pushing to alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in a way comparable to how the Russian-led Soviet Union sought to expand its sphere influence into Europe. During the Cold War there was often deep mistrust between Russian and American leaders. While diplomatic relations were maintained, the USA and Russia engaged in what many saw as proxy wars throughout the world. Some would argue that tensions between the USA and the Soviets were not driven by misunderstandings, but rather incompatibility of interests. Based on this logic, if the GCC countries, (in particular Saudi Arabia) and Iran are unable to ease tensions by understanding each other better through dialogue and other diplomatic measures and the rivalry is in fact largely based on incompatible interests, then lessons from post-war reconstruction in Europe might demonstrate that maintaining geo-political power requires full government commitment to strategic allies in order to prevent a strategic foe from altering the status quo. For the GCC this might mean larger, wider and deeper commitments to countries such as Yemen, Jordan and Egypt to prevent Iranian advances in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Then 59

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they need to have a long-term strategy to build trust and cooperation with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in a way that prevents Iran from using these three countries as anchors in its efforts to alter the geo-political landscape. One important point to mention, though, is that even if the GCC were able to secure the political allegiance of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the nature of the GCC-Iranian rivalry is regional rather than global. The Cold War between the USA and Russia was global; as the world’s two superpowers, they did not have to factor in the support of nations with more power than their own to maintain their relative strength. For Iran and the GCC countries, if the USA and other global powers see their strategic interests as being better served by a more dominant Iran in the Middle East, this might make it much more difficult for GCC countries to maintain their geo-political power. Many assume that the origin of much of GCC’s geo-political power comes from an alignment of USA and GCC strategic interests. Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the USA balanced its relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain its strategic interests. However, the Iranian Revolution tilted that balance towards Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies. Lessons from Europe’s postwar reconstruction might encourage GCC countries to ensure their efforts in Yemen are in harmony with the interests of global powers.

Pan-Arab/Islamic Military Alliance NATO is a residual institutional legacy of the Cold War. As noted earlier, NATO was formed while the Marshall Plan was being implemented. It is debatable whether NATO could have succeeded without the Marshall Plan or the Marshall Plan without NATO. One could argue the two went hand in hand, even if their command structures and policies were not completely synchronized. A lesson from the Marshall Plan and NATO for GCC efforts in Yemen could be that a pan-Arab or Islamic military alliance, similar to the one announced by Saudi Arabia in December 2015, will have to align members’ overlapping interests in order to succeed. It will also have to have a clear mission and clear objectives in order to justify its operations and facilitate burden sharing. In the case of NATO, some countries such as France and Italy, did not share the same fear of the Russian threat as the US, while other countries such as the UK and Western Germany did. In fact, France exited NATO’s military integration structure in 1966, only reintegrating it in 2009. Significant US commitment and leadership in NATO helped the alliance maintain its existence and influence, even after the fall of the Soviet Union. Similarly, members of a pan-Arab or Islamic military alliance might not all view the sources of regional security threats and challenges in the same way. An Egyptian soldier will need to know how his country’s interests are being served if ordered to risk his life fighting in Yemen and a Saudi soldier will need to know how his country’s interests are being served if ordered to risk his life fighting in Sinai. The main lesson from Europe’s post-war reconstruction for a potential pan-Arab or Islamic military alliance in Yemen is that a committed stronger power is needed to help align overlapping 60

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interests, including the use of economic tools, to a common security threat, whether that threat originates from a state or non-state actor. Without USA interest in and leadership of NATO the military alliance in Europe would not have survived. If the Marshall Plan and NATO could offer relevant considerations for GCC efforts in a post-war Yemen, they include that economic and security measures need to be compatible and in harmony with each other to succeed. It will require a real long-term commitment from GCC countries to integrate Yemen into the GCC. While the GCC is not likely to have the same type of security footprint in Yemen as the USA had in Germany after World War II, it is worth GCC countries considering how GCC forces can help maintain the security required for economic development in Yemen, whether through maintaining permanent or temporary military bases or by other means. Additionally, GCC countries could re-assess the nature of the tensions with Iran. Are these tensions more based on misunderstanding, mistrust and misperceptions? Or are they more based on the incompatibility of national interests? If the latter, the GCC might need to have a long-term strategy to outlive the Iranian strategy, by showing that they are in Yemen for the long-haul. And finally, a panArab or Islamic military alliance might require constant and sustainable leadership and support of a regional power to align overlapping interests and provide the logistics and physical support necessary to increase the integration of members’ forces. Past sponsors to do this in the region, in particular the efforts of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, have not been encouraging in this regard. Ultimately Yemenis will have to decide their own fate. History has shown that much of Europe chose to stay aligned with the West rather than the Soviet East. However, this European political climate was nourished, enabled and supported by a superpower. While different in context and scope, Europe’s post-war reconstruction offers a possible perspective to GCC countries contemplating what’s next in Yemen.

Saudi and Emirati Options: Security The Emiratis have approached the mission in Yemen on the assumption that ground troops would be vital for a successful air campaign. The reasoning is that ground troops are needed to hold liberated areas. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was not convinced that ground troops were needed in the campaign, possibly based on an assumption that if Huthi-Saleh forces and capabilities were degraded though airpower, then pro-government (Hadi) fighters would be enabled to advance against the Huthi-Saleh alliance and hold the ground themselves. The Emiratis appear to have been more correct in their assessment than the Saudis.40 It is clear that Emirati forces have been able to make more gains (while with added risk and cost of soldiers’ lives) on the ground in their area of responsibly in the South, than the Saudis in the North. This raises an important question for the post-campaign environment: to what extent will GCC troops need to maintain a military presence in Yemen in order to maintain security and enable economic growth? This option will largely rely on its feasibility. Would 61

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the Yemenis accept an established GCC troop presence in their country? What would it look like? Any serious attempt at insurrection against the GCC troop presence would raise the stakes for the GCC countries stationing their troops in Yemen. If stationing a significant number of GCC troops in Yemen is not feasible, then there is the option of supporting local militias to maintain security. One Yemeni official argued that the most feasible way to keep the Huthis out of power and Yemen together is for GCC countries to support local militias, de-centralize the government, and wait for a new consensus on the future of Yemen and a new consensus leader emerges.41 This logic is based on the assumption that there is currently no leader in Yemen who can establish security by himself and that attempting to prevent the emergence of a single strong leader will only deepen and lengthen the conflict, cause more poverty, tax national resources and stoke more sectarianism and extremism in Yemen, which can be exported into GCC countries. Supporting local militias to maintain short-term security would enable more effective political dialogue and better allow the most capable and unifying leader to emerge without having to rely on suppressing political opposition with the use of military force.

Saudi and Emirati Options: The Economy A senior Emirati suggested that the UAE’s strategy in Yemen is to use economic power in different stages in order to enable a more conducive environment for successful Yemeni political negotiations leading to a more stable environment for post-conflict reconstruction.42 Currently the Emirati Red Crescent and the Saudi King Salman Center for Relief and Humanitarian Aid are the two main GCC entities funneling humanitarian assistance in Yemen.43 These humanitarian organisations could potentially become the institutional platform for future economic aid and investment that will be needed to rebuild the country. These organisations are significantly involved in coordinating and assisting international humanitarian aid efforts in Yemen, which pales in comparison to UAE and Saudi contributions. In 2016 the UAE was the top contributor to humanitarian assistance in Yemen at $471 million (96% of which was funneled through its own organisations such as the Emirati Red Crescent) and Saudi Arabia the second donor at $292 million (79% of which was funneled through Saudi organisations).44 In 2016 GCC countries contributed 82% of the total humanitarian funds to Yemen, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia share ($762 million) equaling 77% of all humanitarian funds accounted for by the UN in Yemen.45 Yemeni President Hadi singled out the leading role of the Emirati Red Crescent and the King Salman Center for Relief and Humanitarian Aid in a public speech he gave in Socotra in February 2017, which highlights the importance of these two organisations to the Hadi government.46 The Emirati argument for relying on the Emirati Red Crescent as a future institutional platform is that Yemen desperately needs investment, reconstruction and economic re-vitalization. Not only is it a challenge to distribute international humanitarian assistance, but international investors and bankers will be reluctant to invest in Yemen while 62

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it remains in conflict and is unstable. The UAE and Saudi forces, along with their Yemeni security partners, are the best positioned to provide the required logistics for distributing humanitarian and financial assistance. This logistics infrastructure can then be used for future investment and financing of re-construction and development projects. The UAE sees its role as more of a long-term commitment to Yemen where if it establishes itself in the country through its humanitarian efforts, it will be able to build lasting partnerships with local economic actors and can be a guarantor for international investment into Yemen. This implies that the UAE and other GCC troops would need to be stationed in Yemen longterm similar role to the USA in Germany post WWII where the Marshall Plan could only be administered if there was a significant American troop presence in Europe. A possible tradeoff to facilitate the stationing of GCC troops is gradual inclusion of Yemen into the GCC. Another economic option for the Saudi and Emirati efforts in Yemen is to rely on international organisations, such as UNICEF and the World Bank to distribute developmental economic assistance through the Yemen government. While this option would be less feasible while Yemen remains in conflict, it would likely enable the Yemeni government to build its domestic logistical capacity rather than relying on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Less of a UAE and Saudi security footprint required for development assistance and investment would weaken the narrative that neighbouring countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are violating Yemeni sovereignty. However, this option also risks mismanagement of Gulf funds and could ultimately result in a dysfunctional, corrupt and inefficient Yemeni government. One of the main challenges in post-conflict Yemen will be the future security arrangement and disarmament. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a Yemeni official close to the negotiations suggested that the Huthis have a better negotiating hand than the Hadi government. This is possibly because the Huthi-Saleh alliance is negotiating with ground realities in their hand rather than more abstract international legitimacy. Without significant changes on the ground, Hadi will likely have to compromise and give up his preference for a military victory. Hadi stated in an interview with Saudi TV that he was open to negotiate the future boundaries of Yemen’s governorates.47 The Huthis will want more autonomy for Sa‘da and Saleh will want more control over his family’s future. However, the Huthis will not likely disarm unless they are given senior positions in the government, most notably Prime Minister or Minister of Defense. Pressures for a quota government similar to Lebanon and Iraq are mounting if there is no decisive military victory. Yet, the Saudi-led coalition is under international pressure, especially from the USA, to end the military campaign in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also been limited by the drop in oil prices since late 2014. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE envisaged that the conflict would last as long as it has.

Conclusion The Saudi-led coalition’s options for its role in the future of Yemen’s economy and security are largely shaped not only by the interests of the different Yemeni factions, but also 63

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those of the coalition partners. The different stakeholders’ perceived threats, challenges and opportunities to their main interests in Yemen often stand in the way of a sustainable peace. Lessons from the USA reconstruction of Europe after WWII illustrate the close linkage between economic and security assistance in post-conflict reconstruction. The role of foreign forces based in a war-torn country is closely related to the ability to identify and distribute economic development assistance. The process of re-building local security forces and establishing effective law enforcement institutions is related to the ability of the host government to achieve reconciliation about past grievances. Any negotiated settlement between Yemeni factions will require assistance from the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. An analysis of the threats, challenges and opportunities of the main Yemen and regional players, as well as a comparative analysis of the experience of the US in the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II suggest economic assistance will need to be closely linked to the security relationship of the coalition and the Yemeni government. Important questions for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen include the following. What is the feasibility of a long-term coalition security presence in Yemen? Will the coalition try to encourage or prevent the emergence of a new strongman to ensure stability for Yemen’s reconstruction? If a heavy coalition security footprint in Yemen is not feasible, how will the coalition support international efforts to bring humanitarian aid and investment into Yemen? Saudi Arabia and the UAE will continue to play a leading role in stability operations in Yemen. Leaders from both countries have expressed the long-term nature of their commitment to Yemen’s development and preventing its government, or factions of its government, from becoming an Iranian proxy. However, the drop in energy prices concurrent with the beginning of coalition military operations in Yemen in 2015 and the fiscal challenges facing Saudi Arabia and the UAE have meant the coalition must re-assess its options for a long-term presence in Yemen. Those options will have to navigate through the disparate interests of Yemen’s main actors, as well as the varying interests of coalition partners. In the end, the lessons in security operations and economic development from the Yemen conflict might shape future studies of military intervention by regional powers into regional conflicts.

Notes 1 Edward Burke, “‘One blood and one destiny”? Yemen’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” London School of Economics, Kuwait Programme of Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, no. 23 (2012); Roby Barrett, “Saudi Arabia’s Return to Traditional Yemen Policy,” The Middle East Institute, May 5, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y899gswp (Accessed March, 2017). 2 Remarks by a Saudi official at the Gulf Research Meeting, Cambridge UK, Aug 15-19, 2016 3 Author interview with a senior Yemen official, Dubai, March 20, 2016.

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4 Barrett, “Saudi Arabia’s Return to Traditional Yemen Policy.” 5 Brian Whitaker, “Yemen and Saudi Arabia: A Historical View of Relations,” Al-Bab, March 25, 2015. Electronic document: http://al-bab.com/blog/2015/03/yemen-and-saudi-arabia (Accessed December, 2016). 6 Charles Schmitz, “Yemen’s National Dialogue,” The Middle East Institute, Policy Paper Series, February 2014. Electronic document: http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue (Accessed March, 2017). 7 Charles Schmitz, “Yemen’s National Dialogue.” 8 Author interviews with Yemen officials from Hiraak, Hadi government, and former Saleh government, in Sanaa, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, 2013-2016. 9 Al-Monitor, “Yemeni Religious, Political Movements Divided Over Future,” al-Monitor, December 6, 2013. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/meaem7r (Accessed December 15, 2016). 10 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State,” Chatham House, May, 2016. Electronic document: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-stemming-rise-chaos-state (Accessed March, 2017). 11 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War,’” Chatham House, February, 2015. Electronic document: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-and-saudi-iranian-cold-war (Accessed March, 2017). 12 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, “Why the UAE is fighting in Yemen,” Gulf News, October 12, 2015. 13 Al-Arabiya TV, “Tasrihat Muhammad ibn Zayed ‘an al-tahaf wa-al-Sa‘udiya wa-al-Yemen,” [video of a speech by Mohammed Bin Zayed on the coalition, Saudi Arabia and Yemen]. December 29, 2015. 14 Karen Young, Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the UAE (Palgrave: London, 2014). 15 Barrett, “Saudi Arabia’s Return to Traditional Yemen Policy.” 16 Interview with US military officers currently working on Yemen, Abu Dhabi, April 13, 2016. 17 Author interviews with Emiratis in Abu Dhabi, 2016; Peter Hellyer, “A 2,000-year Bond between the UAE and Yemen that Will Never Break,” The National, October 13, 2015. 18 Interview with Emirati officer, Abu Dhabi, May 2, 2016. 19 Aysha al-Khoori, “New Bride to Militant Killer: 10 Years that Led to Murder on Reem Island,” The National, June 29, 2015. 20 Interview with Emirati law enforcement officer, Abu Dhabi, May 2, 2016. 21 Simeon Kerr and Michael Peel, “DP World Faces Loss of Yemen Port Deal,” Financial Times, September 17, 2012. 22 Dania Saadi, “DP World to Support Yemen Maritime and Trade Efforts,” The National, October 15, 2015. 23 Interview with senior Yemeni official, Dubai, March 20, 2016. 24 Interview with senior Yemeni official, Dubai, March 20, 2016. 25 Interview with senior Yemeni official, Abu Dhabi, March 26, 2016. 26 Interview with senior Yemeni official, Dubai, March 20, 2016 27 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War.’” 28 Barrett, “Saudi Arabia’s Return to Traditional Yemen Policy.” 29 Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 30 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War.’” Author interview with various Yemeni officials, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 2016. 31 Speech from Dr. Anwar Gargash at the Future Warfare Conference at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, September 25, 2016. 32 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. (London: Hurst, 2017); Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State,”; Maria Louise Clauson, “Understanding the Crisis in Yemen: Evaluating Competing Narratives,” The International Spectator 50 no. 3 (2015). 33 Interview with former Saleh vice-minister who attended many meetings with Saleh and his domestic and international visitors, Dubai, 2016; Barrett, “Saudi Arabia’s Return to Traditional Yemen Policy.” 34 See Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State.”

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35 Author interviews with a senior Yemeni official, Abu Dhabi, September 2016. 36 Jeffery Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, March 10, 2016. 37 Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, “The Marshall Plan,” in Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition, 2009. 38 F. Gregory Gause, III Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 39 Burke, “‘One Blood and One Destiny’? Yemen’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council.” 40 Kenneth Pollack, “Fight or Flight: America’s Choice in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2016. 41 Author interview with former senior Yemeni official, Abu Dhabi, March 26, 2016. 42 Interview with senior Emirati officer, Abu Dhabi, May 2, 2016. 43 Interview with senior Emirati officer, Abu Dhabi, May 2, 2016. 44 UN, Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, January 2017 p. 14. Electronic document: http://www.unocha. org/yemen; Also see the Financial Tracking Service at https://fts.unocha.org/ (Accessed March, 2017). 45 UN, Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. 46 Yemen24, “al-Ra’is Hadi yakshaf ‘an mustabil al-Yaman al-jadid wa-yuwajih,” Yemen24, February 8, 2017. Electronic document: http://yemen-24.com/news43856.html (Accessed February, 2017). 47 Okaz Newspaper, “al-Ra’is alYamani li-Okaz….” March 1, 2015. Electronic document: http://www. okaz.com.sa/article/1045508/‫الرأي‬/ (Accessed on December 15, 2016).

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4 Omani-Yemeni Relations: Past, Present and Future Ahmed Abdullah Baabood

The historical relationship between Oman and Yemen dates back over one thousand years, with the ancient kingdoms of Sheba and Himyar, the Persian Empire and the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates all encompassing much of what is now modern Oman and Yemen at some point in time. Roman sources included both Oman and Yemen into one region named Arabia Felix’ or ‘Happy Arabia’ due to the greenness and fertility of South Arabia. It is widely believed that the original inhabitants of Oman migrated from Yemen, particularly from Yemen’s eastern region of Hadhramaut. According to Arab folklore, the bursting of the Marib Dam about 600 CE resulted in the mass exodus of tribes from Yemen to Oman. It has been established that trade links existed between what are now Oman and Yemen as early as the 6th Century CE, particularly the trade of frankincense from Oman’s southern region of Dhofar. In more recent times, the history of Oman and Yemen has been significantly shaped by their relationships with the British, establishing relations with the British East India Company in the 17th and 19th centuries respectively. With Oman and South Yemen falling under varying forms of British jurisdiction, it was their relationships with the British that would come to shape the modern day border between the two states. In the modern historical relationship of the Sultanate of Oman and Yemen, the Dhofar rebellion of 1963-1975, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s (PDRY ) support for the communist-led rebels aiming to overthrow Oman’s Sultanate, played a defining and controversial role. Even with Sultan Qaboos defeating the guerrillas in 1975, with significant British military assistance, diplomatic relations between Oman and South Yemen were not established until a reconciliation took place in 1982. Ambassadors between the two states were not exchanged until 1987. The unification of the PDRY and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) of North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY ) in 1990 ushered in a new chapter in Omani-Yemeni relations leading to the signing of a border agreement between the two states in 1992. When a South Yemeni faction declared secession from the North in 1994, Oman, unlike several of its Gulf Cooperation Council 67

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(GCC) counterparts, refused to take sides in the subsequent civil war in order to prevent the conflict from spilling over into its territory. This calculated diplomatic stance came to form a defining aspect of Oman’s foreign policy and finds echo in Oman’s role as a mediator in the current conflict in Yemen. In 2011 Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh, facing a popular uprising in the wake of the Arab Spring, agreed to end his 21-year tenure as President of the united Republic of Yemen (33 years including his time as President of the YAR) under the terms of a GCCbrokered transitional agreement known as the GCC Initiative. Saleh ceded power to Vice President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was elected as President for the transitional period in a one-candidate election, in February 2012. Through a National Dialogue Conference (NDC), supported by the United Nations (UN), President Hadi aimed to guide Yemen through a transformative transitional process that would include decisions on key national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution. The Gulf Initiative aimed to incorporate key elements of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the Huthis (a Zaydi Shi’a movement based in Yemen’s northern Sa‘da province), the Southern Secessionist Movement (from hereon, Hiraak) and Yemen’s youth who had been the driving force of the popular uprising. However, the transitional process was dominated by Yemen’s old power elites, challenging the legitimacy and popular support of the Gulf Initiative. In September 2014 Huthi militias discontent with the transitional process stormed the capital city of Sanaa and were met with no resistance. In January 2015 Huthi militias clashed with a faction of security forces loyal to President Hadi and forced the resignation of President Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah. In March 2015 President Hadi, who had since escaped from house arrest imposed by the Huthis and fled to Aden, made a request to the UN Security Council for intervention by ‘all available means.’1 In response to this request, Saudi Arabia spearheaded a coalition of Arab countries (including Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan and the UAE) in a military operation known as ‘Decisive Storm’ to restore Hadi as President of Yemen and defeat the Huthis. Oman is the only member of the GCC not to have joined this military campaign, instead pursuing a role as an active mediator. Oman’s Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi stressed the need to reach a lasting political solution to the conflict through peace talks. The conflict in Yemen has taken on a sectarian dimension, due to Iran’s alleged support for the Huthis, and has become increasingly framed in most media as a proxy war for Middle East hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Oman’s strong ties with Iran, both political and economic, as well as its status as a key GCC member, has allowed it to act as a diplomatic bridge between Riyadh and Tehran. This study will assess Oman’s role as a mediator in the current Yemen conflict and measure the potential for future Omani involvement in Yemen beyond its current mediation efforts. In doing so it will analyze contemporary Omani-Yemeni relations, Oman’s foreign policy towards Yemen and the region and Omani security concerns in regard to Yemen. I explain the reasons for Oman not taking part in Decisive Storm and how Oman has created 68

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a role for mediation and conflict resolution through diplomatic efforts to foster dialogue and ceasefire agreements. Given that negotiations will be instrumental in bringing the fighting to a close, Oman will undoubtedly play a key role in reconciling both positions due to its stance of non-intervention and non-alignment and its relationship with Yemen’s warring factions, the GCC states and Iran, who are all a part of the conflict.

Omani Foreign Policy Since overthrowing his father in a bloodless coup on 23 July, 1970, Sultan Qaboos has fostered substantial progress in Oman’s foreign policy. Seeking to undo the isolationist foreign policy favoured by his father, Qaboos established Oman’s diplomatic relations with neighbouring Arab states as well as other non-Arab states by gaining admission to the Arab League and the United Nations (UN) in 1971. Oman’s history demonstrates that the Sultanate has often been willing to take an independent stance in its foreign policy, even when this has meant that its decisions were not aligned with those of its allies, particularly those of its fellow GCC states. Oman’s willingness to follow a unique and sovereign foreign policy has been demonstrated on a number of occasions, one example being its outright opposition to forming a GCC union. The idea for forming this union was initially proposed by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at the 2013 GCC summit but the move was not backed by Kuwait, Oman, Qatar or the UAE2. Oman’s decision was not unexpected, but the manner in which its position was asserted was unforeseen as Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi ‘surprised the audience when he bluntly declared that his country is against the union and will withdraw from the new body unless it sees the light.’3 While the Sultanate does favour closer ties with the GCC for security assurances, it has constantly looked to preserve the sovereignty of its foreign policy, especially from Saudi Arabia. Muscat’s stance on its relations with Israel and Iran hold testament to this. Oman’s display of public support for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s peace efforts with Israel, including the 1978 Camp David peace talks and the subsequent Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979, as well as its refusal to break diplomatic ties with Cairo and attend the 1978 Baghdad Rejectionist summit (in which Egypt’s actions were condemned), were met with disapproval not just from its GCC neighbours but from the majority of Arab states.4 Moreover, Oman’s support for the Israel-Jordan peace treaty of 1994 confirmed both its independent foreign policy approach and its commitment to maintaining stability in the wider region.5 While its GCC neighbours had no relations with Israel, Oman became the first of the Arab Gulf states to welcome a public visit by an Israeli leader, hosting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 and agreeing to open an Israeli trade representation office in 1996. Once again, Oman demonstrated its desire to remain outside the sphere of influence of its GCC neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, in pursuit of its own foreign policy path. Oman’s dialogue with Israel was said to be ‘undermining Omani autonomy and corroding both Arab and Islamic solidarity.’6 However, the Israeli trade representation office 69

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was closed by Oman in 2000 in retaliation to the Second Intifada, proving Oman’s rational and calculated stance towards its diplomatic relations. Friendly relations with Iran, dating back to the Shah’s military assistance to the Sultanate during the Dhofar Rebellion, have played a defining and, at times, controversial role in Oman’s foreign policy. Unlike other Gulf states, Oman did not perceive Iran’s 1979 Revolution as a threat to regional and domestic security. Oman’s bilateral relations with Iran remained amicable in spite of the Shah’s replacement by the Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini. While agreeing to closer security and defense collaboration with its Gulf neighbours, leading to the formation of the GCC, Oman cited its opposition to the transformation of the GCC into an anti-Iran coalition. During the Iran-Iraq War, Oman, in contrast to the other GCC states that affirmed their support for Iraq, declared its neutrality and was involved in peace negotiations between the two sides. Oman and Iran share responsibility for the security of the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 30% of globally traded oil passes, and it is in both of their national interests to safeguard this strategically important thoroughfare. Economic cooperation has been central to Oman’s relationship with Iran. In 1992 Oman and Iran signed an agreement to increase their economic cooperation, particularly in the transport and shipping sectors, and in 1998 bilateral discussions took place on combatting smuggling activities in the Strait of Hormuz. A joint ministerial commission for oil cooperation was set up in 1990 with the aim of developing the joint Henjan oil and gas field on the maritime border between Oman and Iran. The Sultanate has become increasingly dependent on Iran for gas, signing accords on oil and gas cooperation with Iran in May 2006. These accords allowed for Oman’s investment in the Iranian hydrocarbons sector, construction of a gas pipeline connecting Oman and Iran and the formation of a joint oil company. For the first time since the Shah’s overthrow, Sultan Qaboos paid a visit to Iran in August 2009 to promote bilateral trade between Oman and Iran. What is clear from Oman’s foreign policy decisions is that the Sultanate prioritizes domestic security and regional stability. Lefebvre states, ‘As the head of a small, military weak state, the sultan realizes that making friends or avoiding making enemies is practical from a security vantage point.’7 The Sultanate’s turbulent experience with the Dhofar rebellion made a lasting impact upon its foreign policy calculations as it illustrated that Oman is incapable of defending itself without the assistance of external powers. Oman’s alliances with Britain and Iran during the Dhofar rebellion were fundamental in preserving its domestic security. In more recent times, Oman has looked to maintain these alliances whilst simultaneously increasing its security cooperation with the GCC and the USA. Muscat’s foreign policy strategy has evolved into a careful and calculated balancing act whereby it attempts to play off the insecurities and political divisions of its allies in order to maintain regional stability and thus its own long term security without getting drawn into any specific political faction. In the aftermath of the instability brought about by the Arab Spring, the perceived threat of Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony has reached its peak. This perception has 70

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urged the GCC members to increase their cooperation and hasten their move towards forming a union. However, Oman’s foreign policy strategy of balancing, which O’Reilly has termed ‘Omanibalancing,’8 has caused the Sultanate to view Iran as a potential ally rather than a threat. Nevertheless, Oman’s concept of regional security differs significantly from Iran’s. Whereas Iran views the presence of external powers, especially the US, as a root cause of instability and insecurity in the region, Oman has traditionally relied on the world’s strongest naval power (once Britain and now the USA) as a security guarantor. Oman’s cooperation with the USA led to the signing of the Facilities Access Agreement in 1980, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, that allowed the USA to preposition military equipment in Oman. This agreement, which came ‘at a time when other pro-West Arab Gulf States wished to keep the United States at arms length,’9 threatened to isolate Oman from both Iran and the GCC. This flexible foreign policy has allowed Oman to act as a diplomatic bridge between its allies in times of conflict and has caused the Sultanate to develop a reputation as a trustworthy mediator in regional disputes. Although, Oman’s ability to maintain its carefully crafted network of alliances has been increasingly challenged in recent times, most notably due to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen and the growing hostility between the GCC and Iran.

Oman’s Role as a Mediator Several factors have contributed to Oman’s prominence as a mediator in international disputes. Oman’s strategic position on the Strait of Hormuz means that it is in the best interest of regional powers to retain peaceful relations with the Sultanate. As Iranian relations with the West and with other states in the Persian Gulf have generally been frayed, Oman has enjoyed the status of a trusted and valuable custodian of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s several threats to close the strait in times of political turmoil have contributed to Oman’s perceived strategic importance by other states. Additionally, Muscat’s unique ability to maintain respectable relations with both its neighbours and with the external powers that hold interests in the region has earned it a reputation as a trustworthy ally. As a peaceful nation that has historically preferred non-interference, neutrality and diplomatic processes as opposed to conflict, Oman is the ideal candidate for conducting mediation efforts. During the Yemeni Civil War of 1994, Oman’s decision to remain neutral, in contrast with other GCC states, allowed it to host talks in Salalah to help ease the tensions between the warring factions. Oman granted political asylum to the exiled Yemeni Vice President Ali Salem al-Beedh after his defeat in the civil war, however it discouraged him from remaining politically active so as not to jeopardize its relationship with Yemen and in order to maintain its neutrality. 10 In 2009, when al-Beedh declared himself leader of Hiraak, Yemen’s Southern Secessionist Movement, Oman once again demonstrated its commitment to neutrality by revoking his Omani citizenship. Oman’s status as a non-Sunni monarchy makes it unique from the other states of the GCC and affords it more leeway in terms of its mediation efforts. The Omani leadership, 71

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and a sizeable portion of Oman’s population, are neither Sunni nor Shi’a but rather Ibadi, a generally tolerant branch of Islam followed in Oman and parts of North Africa. Thus, it has remained free from the troubles of sectarian strife that have plagued other parts of the Middle East.11 This has benefitted the perception of the Sultanate as a neutral location for conducting talks and negotiations between states of opposing sectarian natures, which was the case in March 1991 when Oman hosted a meeting to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 1985 Oman carried out initiatives to encourage a diplomatic rapprochement between India and Pakistan, showing that its value and influence as a dependable and impartial mediator extends well beyond the Arab Gulf. Even in instances where Oman has disapproved of the actions of a certain state it has still offered to conduct mediation efforts, such as its mediation between Iraq and Kuwait despite its condemnation of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as a violation of international law. In this case, Oman’s refusal to break off diplomatic relations with Baghdad allowed it to successfully facilitate these talks. Oman’s most notable achievement to date was its efforts in facilitating secret talks between the US and Iran which led to the reaching of the P5+1 nuclear deal in 2015. This was a landmark achievement that led to a reduction in hostilities between the US and Iran, the lifting of sanctions against Iran and international recognition of Oman’s constructive role as a mediator.

The Modern History of Oman and Yemen In order to assess the future role of Oman in Yemen, an understanding of the shared and eventful recent history of these two states is essential. Stability in Yemen has long been a factor in Oman’s security concerns and there is no doubt that the Sultanate’s experiences with Yemen have had a deep impact upon its current foreign policy calculations. Upon claiming the position of Sultan, Qaboos was faced with a separatist Communist-oriented insurgency supported by the PDRY, the Soviet Union and China in Oman’s southern province of Dhofar, which borders Yemen. The Dhofar rebellion had in fact preceded Qaboos, beginning in 1963, but Sultan Said bin Taymur’s inability to contain it and his unwillingness to expand his armed forces and fund much-needed development projects prompted the British to support his overthrow in favour of his son.12 By 1970 the rebels, known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), had made significant gains in Dhofar and exerted their influence over much of the province outside of its administrative capital of Salalah.13 In order to contain the rebellion Qaboos commenced a restructuring of the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and relied heavily on two regional powers for much needed military assistance, namely Britain and Iran. Both of these powers had a significant stake in the conflict. The British, having been forced to withdraw from South Yemen in the face of an armed independence struggle, intended to prevent the newly formed PDRY from exporting its revolution to neighbouring states, fearing that it might cause a domino effect.14 Similarly, 72

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the Shah of Iran was ‘acutely concerned with the growth of Soviet and Soviet-allied influence along his southern periphery.’15 In response to Qaboos’ appeal for military assistance, the Shah gave Oman five AB205 helicopters and stationed around 3000 Iranian Special Forces in Dhofar.16 In addition to this, Qaboos’s counterinsurgency benefited from the support of two British Special Air Service squadrons and a sizeable Jordanian military force.17 With a revitalized army and weighty international military backing, the Sultan succeeded in suppressing the rebellion, with the conflict effectively coming to an end by 1975. While the war had come to an end, the relationship between Oman and the PDRY remained sour. Oman retained combat-ready troops on its border with the PDRY in order to deter any further attacks and the PDRY continued to support the rebels, who since 1973 had rebranded themselves as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).18 In August 1981 the PDRY formed the Aden Tripartite Alliance along with Ethiopia and Libya as a means to counterbalance the GCC. Additionally, a number of border incidents took place in the early 1980s involving PDRY troops and PFLO guerrillas, demonstrating that the PDRY remained an active threat to Oman’s security. Qaboos’ offer of amnesty to all Omanis involved in the PFLO in March 1976 (which resulted in the surrender of 322 guerrillas), alongside his financing of new development projects in Dhofar, meant that the PFLO’s influence had significantly declined.19 By this point, the PDRY leadership came to view their support for the PFLO as ‘increasingly counterproductive’20 as it continued to present an obstacle to its relations with its neighbours in the GCC. Additionally, the US military presence in Oman represented a threat to the PDRY.21 Shortly after coming to power, PDRY President Ali Nasir Mohammed called for an end to PFLO activities in Oman. This decision would pave the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and the PDRY in 1982. In spite of the opening of diplomatic relations, Oman’s relationship with the PDRY remained unpredictable yet somewhat improved. Oman and Saudi Arabia provided essential financial support to the PDRY to help deal with disastrous flooding in 1982.22 Official visits between Oman and the PDRY were exchanged a few times and the border commission met frequently to work towards demarcation of their respective borders.23 The PDRY’s crisis of 1986, involving a civil war over leadership of the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) was a source of anxiety for Oman, with fears that a change in the leadership of the YSP might cause a revival of the PFLO. The new YSP leadership assured Oman that relations would remain the same and, despite a border clash in October 1987 (in which at least ten soldiers reportedly died) that was not publicly acknowledged and a minor dispute over border claims, relations remained relatively stable.24 In November 1987 the two states exchanged ambassadors and in October 1988 PDRY President Haidar al-Attas visited Muscat to sign agreements regarding trade, industry, judicial affairs, Islamic affairs and communications.25 From this point onwards, the diplomatic relations between Oman and the PDRY remained acceptable until the May 1990 unification of the PDRY and the YAR to form modern day Yemen. 73

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Oman saw in the unification of north and south Yemen a vital opportunity to resolve its security concerns on its southern border and begin a new chapter in its bilateral relations with Yemen. ‘Motivated by a sense of conciliation, Oman strengthened its bilateral efforts, acknowledging that changing circumstances warranted bold initiatives.’26 The long awaited Oman-Yemen border treaty was signed in Sanaa in October 1992. Qaboos’s willingness to make territorial concessions to Yemen in the border demarcation of the Mahra region demonstrated his determination towards achieving a lasting peace with his southern neighbour. In October 1993, bilateral relations between the two states took another step forward as Sultan Qaboos pledged $21 million towards the construction of a road linking Oman and Yemen. Relations continued to gradually improve as Oman saw opportunities for investment and economic cooperation with Yemen and discussions for establishing a free trade zone along the border took place. The Al-Mazunah Free Zone, based in Oman’s southern province of Dhofar along the border with Yemen, was not established until 1999 due to the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in 1994.27 In 1993, Yemen’s Vice President Ali Salem al-Beedh left the capital Sanaa for the PDRY’s former capital of Aden in protest at the perceived economic marginalization of southern Yemen by the north. Sultan Qaboos’s official visit to Yemen was cut short as tension brewed until in April 1994, a mere four years after the unification of Yemen, a civil war broke out between the northern and southern armies (which had not yet been integrated). Omani military personnel, ‘part of a Yemeni unification military committee designed to aid the merger of the two former armies,’28 endeavored to bring a stop to the conflict. Despite Qaboos’ efforts in hosting talks between Vice President al-Beedh and President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s southern leaders announced their secession and declared the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). Oman remained impartial during the conflict, not wanting to make new enemies and, with the experience of the Dhofar rebellion still in mind, not willing to risk drawing another conflict into its own territory. Furthermore, by resisting pressure from the GCC to side with the DRY, especially from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Oman exhibited that it is willing to favour neutrality, diplomacy and independence in its foreign policy in order to handle its security needs.

Oman’s Role in the Current Yemen Conflict Oman has declined to take part in the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s military intervention in Yemen, favouring diplomatic measures towards the conflict and repeatedly stressing the need for a political rather than a military solution. Given the Sultanate’s stance in previous regional conflicts and its independence from its GCC neighbours in terms of its foreign policy making, this decision is not surprising. Despite his coming to power by means of British intervention, Sultan Qaboos has long favoured non-intervention in other states’ affairs. In parallel to its position during the Yemeni Civil War of 1994, Oman has not taken a side in the current conflict, with Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi stating, ‘We cannot 74

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work on peace efforts at the same time we would be part of a military campaign.’29 Given its past experience with Yemen, Oman is hesitant towards involving itself militarily in its neighbour state and risking a spillover of conflict across its border. As stability in Yemen remains a crucial element of Oman’s national security outlook, Oman has striven to foster dialogue and negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. Much like in past mediation efforts, Oman has utilized its peaceful relations with all of the factions involved in the conflict to promote discussion and offer a neutral venue for peace talks. Muscat has played host to Huthi representatives, who have taken advantage of this neutral venue to conduct talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as well as officials from the GCC, the US State Department and the UN.30 Oman’s reputation as a nation free from sectarian friction and its close proximity to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have made it a convenient location for such dialogue to take place. In November 2016, Muscat was the venue for discussion on a ceasefire between the Huthis and the Saudi-led coalition, conducted by US Secretary of State John Kerry.31 Aside from its mediation, Oman has made itself valuable in Yemen through humanitarian efforts. As of May 2015 Oman hosted over 25,000 Yemeni refugees who fled the conflict, mainly from Yemen’s southern provinces of Hadramaut and Mahra.32 In March 2015, 40 injured Yemenis were transferred to hospitals in Oman after multiple suicide attacks in Sanaa claimed by ISIS. Oman has also provided essential humanitarian relief to Yemen, including financial aid, food, water, medical supplies and assistance and shelter.33 In addition to this, Oman’s friendly relationship with Iran has allowed it to transfer humanitarian aid from Iran to Yemen as the Saudi Arabian air and naval blockades have prevented Iran from doing so due to concerns over possible Iranian weapons deliveries to the Huthis. Oman has also played a role in securing the release of foreign civilians detained by militant groups in Yemen, securing the release of an American journalist and a Singaporean national in June 2015, a French national in August as well as three Saudis, two Americans and a British national captured by Huthi rebels in September 2015.34 Oman has been less concerned about Huthi expansion in Yemen than its GCC neighbours, who view the Huthi movement as an Iranian proxy that poses an imminent threat to the security of the GCC. Instead, Oman’s primary concern focuses on the presence and expansion of extremist factions in Yemen’s southern provinces who have carried out terrorist attacks in Yemen and abroad, posing a significant threat to Omani national security. With the growing extremist influence in southern Yemen, made apparent by the merging of the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al-Qaida to form Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009 and the recent emergence of extremist groups linked to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Oman’s security concerns regarding its border with Yemen have begun to resurface. It is suspected that Said Kouachi, one of the terrorists involved in the November 2015 Paris attacks, entered Yemen through Oman to receive terrorism training.35 It comes as no surprise then that Oman closed two of its border crossings with Yemen in January 2016 due to fears of militant attacks. According to Lefebvre, ‘Al-Qaida apparently 75

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has not established an organisational presence in Oman, and no Omanis are known to have joined (or have been caught in) any radical religious-based terrorist group.’36 The tolerant nature of the Ibadi doctrine followed by many Omanis may have contributed greatly to this. Nevertheless, Oman’s experience of the Dhofar rebellion has made it well aware that it is far from immune from the influence of foreign ideologies. The security of Oman’s historically neglected southern province of Dhofar is a matter of key concern for Omani authorities. Aside from the prospect of groups in Dhofar rejecting the legitimacy of Qaboos’ successor, the southern province sits just across the border from Yemen and is thus vulnerable to the infiltration of extremist groups whose influence in southern Yemen has expanded as a result of the security vacuum brought about by the protracted conflict. Oman’s harboring of Yemeni refugees presents a notable risk to its security, with the threat of extremists entering Oman under the guise of refugees posing a security dilemma to the Sultanate. Yemen’s political stability has historically been, and will remain, one of the Sultanate’s security priorities. The reality of Yemen becoming a failed state poses a substantial existential threat to Oman’s security and is a situation that the Omani leadership is determined to avoid. Muscat’s opposition to foreign military intervention in Yemen means that it is in its best interests for a political compromise to be reached by Yemen’s warring factions. The relationships that Oman holds with the numerous foreign powers that have a stake in Yemen (namely the USA, the GCC and Iran) mean that Muscat’s role in resolving the conflict is unlikely to extend beyond mediation efforts in order to maintain its neutral status. The growing hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the aftermath of Saudi Arabia’s execution of the Shi’a leader Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016 and the storming of the Saudi embassy in Iran by Iranian protesters in retaliation posed a sensitive diplomatic dilemma for Oman. While Saudi Arabia and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Iran and Kuwait and the UAE downgraded theirs, Oman withheld from doing so but did issue a statement of condemnation against the attacks on the embassy.37 This situation exhibited the predicament that Oman faces in trying to remain on good terms neighbours whose stances on diplomatic harmony do not match those of Oman’s. To this end, Oman will be limited in terms of how much it can achieve in Yemen without overstepping its role as an impartial mediator. The potential for Oman increasing its economic cooperation with Yemen is dependent on a number of key factors. A ceasefire in the conflict and a return to a political process in Yemen will be an essential precondition for Omani involvement in the rebuilding process. Yemen is unlikely to attract the investment that its economy so desperately needs, from Oman or from any other state or institution, without guarantees of a peaceful and stable political transition. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 14.4 million Yemenis (more than half of the population) are affected by food insecurity, 2.76 million are internally displaced and approximately $1.8 billion in funding is required to deal with the current humanitarian crisis in Yemen.38 Additionally Yemen is facing an unprecedented water crisis, with Sanaa estimated to become the first capital city in the world to run out of water. With Yemen’s rapidly growing 76

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population set to reach over 59 million by mid-century,39 the strain on its domestic water supply is a matter of urgency. As Oman experiences similar, albeit less imminent, water concerns as Yemen, water management and desalination are potential opportunities for cooperation between the two states. Yemen’s lack of any desalination infrastructure means that Oman’s experience in the construction of desalination plants could prove to be valuable in this regard.40 Due to the close proximity of Oman and Yemen and the similarities in their economic activities, there is potential for Omani-Yemeni cooperation in the fields of power generation, fishing and tourism. However, the potential for economic cooperation between Oman and Yemen will depend heavily on Oman’s growing economic concerns and its ability to invest in Yemen. The global slump in oil prices may be a significant obstacle to Omani investment in Yemen. The Sultanate, like other GCC states, is experiencing decreasing petroleum revenues, with the government already carrying out large reductions in subsidies, development funding and investment as a result. A worsening economic situation in Oman is also a cause for concern for its leadership as it may lead to domestic instability similar to that experienced during the Arab Spring, when Omanis took to the streets to protest against corruption and insufficient job opportunities. Nevertheless, Oman is aware of the economic opportunities that Yemen can offer, especially if it were to achieve GCC membership. Oman has supported Yemen’s admittance to the GCC in the past, seeing it as a vital step towards improving the dire economic, humanitarian and security situation that Yemen faces and hence improving regional security.41 If Yemen were to gain GCC membership, it would boast the second largest population of the GCC states after Saudi Arabia. Yemen represents an unexplored market that could offer substantial export opportunities for other GCC states as well as a significant source of labor that could reduce the dependency of the GCC states on labor from South and Southeast Asia. Additionally, Yemen’s GCC membership could permit a more comprehensive security arrangement between the GCC states and Yemen, allowing for greater cooperation in border security and thwarting the spread of extremism in Yemen. However, the prospects of Yemen gaining GCC membership in its current state are extremely unlikely due to the security risk that it poses. Yet, if Yemen manages to overcome its conflict and return to a political process, it is likely that Oman will once again advocate its admittance to the GCC.

The Question of Succession A fundamental and deciding factor in Oman’s future role in Yemen is the question of who will succeed Sultan Qaboos, who has ruled the country for 46 years. The ageing Sultan, now 75 years old, has no children and has yet to name an heir. This has left a great deal of uncertainty as to who will lead the country once he passes away, an issue that has increasingly come under the spotlight due to the Sultan’s health concerns, having recently spent eight months in Germany for alleged cancer treatment. Article 6 of Oman’s 77

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Basic Law states that within three days of the position becoming vacant the royal family should decide upon a successor to the Sultan. Failing this, a letter in which Qaboos has named his successor is to be opened in the presence of ‘a defense council of military and security officials, supreme court chiefs and heads of the two quasi-parliamentary advisory assemblies.’42 This format for succession is likely a means of assuring a stable transition process in the event of Qaboos’ passing. One does not have to look too far from Oman to see the impact that succession can have upon a state’s foreign policy. Only two months after being crowned King on 23 January, 2015, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman initiated Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. On 21 April 2015 Saudi Arabia announced that Operation Decisive Storm had achieved its goals’43 and that it would now begin a reconstruction initiative known as Operation Restoring Hope. Despite this, the Saudi-led bombing campaign against the Huthis continued. It is likely that the Saudi intervention in Yemen was a move intended to build support for the new king and his son and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman, with the king hoping for a swift and convincing military victory in Yemen to inaugurate his reign. With almost a month gone by and no significant gains made, the announcement of Operation Restoring Hope was a symbolic act to portray military success for the Saudis, despite the fact that they had become drawn into an extended and costly conflict. With this in mind, it is critical to question if Sultan Qaboos’ successor may alter the Sultanate’s foreign policy position on Yemen in an attempt to build up his domestic popularity and legitimacy. Without a doubt, Qaboos’s successor will not enjoy the same authority and recognition that the sultan currently wields. By overthrowing his father, whose tyrannical reign is remembered as a dark period in Oman’s history, and improving the daily lives of Omani citizens through sweeping reforms, Qaboos is heralded as a hero in his country. Additionally, as Qaboos’s mother was from Dhofar and he spent much of his early life under house arrest in Salalah, he has enjoyed substantial popularity in Oman’s Sunni-majority southern province; this is a factor that his successor will be lacking. The vast developments made under Qaboos’s tenure, with Oman experiencing a renaissance due to its oil revenue-funded progress, will be a tough act to follow by any potential successor. Oman’s current economic situation will be unfavourable to Qaboos’s successor; the decline in the country’s oil revenues (its primary source of income) has resulted in the adoption of austerity measures. A significant drop in government spending has resulted in cuts of petrol, electricity and water subsidies as well as lower salaries in the public sector. This is already a cause for concern amongst Omani authorities, particularly in regard to Dhofar where development spending has been vital for maintaining stability. Thus, Oman is at risk of a return to the same preconditions that led to the Dhofar rebellion: a sultan who lacks popular support, economic discontent in the south and political instability across the border in Yemen. To this end, Qaboos’ potential successor will almost certainly be keeping a close eye on developments in Yemen.

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Concluding Remarks As a small nation that lacks the military capabilities of the more powerful regional powers, Oman has come to rely on carefully balanced bilateral relations and security guarantees as a means of survival. Thus, foreign intervention and military solutions have not come to form a part of Oman’s foreign policy toolkit. Instead, Oman has preferred to deal with regional disputes through diplomatic routes by remaining impartial and offering its services as a go-between to assist in achieving peace. The economic, political and security concerns of Yemen will continue to feature strongly in Oman’s foreign policy-making considerations, no matter what form of political scenario takes hold in Yemen once the conflict has concluded. Oman’s foreign policy track record has demonstrated that long-term security is a priority for the Sultanate. Oman has typically pursued its long-term security through political neutrality, non-interventionism and diplomatic balancing. Oman’s proximity to Yemen and its problematic history with the PDRY have deeply influenced its contemporary foreign policy stance towards Yemen. Muscat’s impartial position during the Yemeni Civil War of 1994, stemming from its experience of the Dhofar rebellion, demonstrated that it has come to view Yemen principally through the lens of security. Oman’s tendency to follow an independent foreign policy was seen in its refusal to support the breakaway DRY in the civil war despite pressure from other GCC members. Moreover, the Sultanate’s diplomatic relations with Israel and Iran has proved its commitment to diplomatic balancing as a means of ensuring its security. In the current Yemeni conflict, Oman has yet again displayed that it is not averse to pursuing an independent approach from its GCC neighbours on matters in which its own security is at stake. By not involving itself in the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen, Oman has looked to keep its portfolio of diplomatic relations intact. Understanding that a number of its allies, most notably the US, the GCC and Iran all have a stake in the conflict, Oman has found an opportunity to strengthen its ties via mediation. While the political outcome in Yemen is equally important to Oman, its neutrality and attempts at mediation are aimed at assuring that it does not lose crucial allies or make new enemies. A worst-case scenario for Oman, and for the region as a whole, is a failed state in Yemen. While a Huthi-led government or a return of Ali Abdullah Saleh to power would most likely be manageable for Oman, as it has not presented itself as an enemy, a failed state poses a significant threat to the Sultanate’s national security as it offers a larger security vacuum in which extremist groups such as AQAP and ISIS could expand, as seen in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. Political compromise in Yemen would be the ideal scenario for Oman as it would bring an end to the protracted conflict and achieve some semblance of stability, alleviating Oman’s concerns about its border security. Oman is most likely to continue to pursue its mediation and humanitarian efforts in Yemen as the conflict drags on and will prefer not to engage itself militarily in the conflict unless its national security is directly threatened. Oman’s relationships with the US, Britain, other GCC states and 79

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Iran provide it with guarantees over its security, meaning that even if its mediation efforts are unsuccessful in bringing about a negotiated solution to the Yemen crisis, it remains safeguarded from potential threats emanating from Yemen. Economic cooperation between Oman and Yemen will depend heavily upon the outcome of the current conflict. Oman has much to gain from stepping up its economic cooperation with Yemen. However, this is unlikely to take place unless Omani investors are satisfied that political progress is being made in Yemen. The current investment climate in Yemen is less than inviting and the economic conditions in Oman make the potential for investment in Yemen even less likely. If Yemen were to regain a sense of political stability and Oman were to recover from the current slump in oil prices, there would certainly be increased scope for economic cooperation. Besides investment, Omani expertise in oil extraction and the development of the tourism sector would be greatly beneficial to Yemen’s struggling economy. Oman’s successful advocacy for Yemen’s accession to GCC membership would perhaps be Yemen’s best bet for achieving economic recovery. However, yet again, the ongoing conflict in Yemen presents a barrier to this. Also, it is probable that Omani support for Yemeni GCC membership will be met with continued opposition from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as has been the case previously. Finally, Oman’s future role in Yemen will be contingent on the foreign policy adopted by Sultan Qaboos’ successor. Qaboos’ ascent to the throne in 1970 ushered in a new chapter in Omani-Yemeni relations, with his determination to secure Oman’s borders and work towards a lasting peace with Yemen resulting in the demarcation of borders, the establishment of diplomatic relations and the first incidence of economic cooperation between the two states. Oman’s next sultan will be interested in preserving the peace that Qaboos has worked to achieve between Oman and Yemen, however his methods of doing so may differ. The popularity that Qaboos enjoys has allowed him to be flexible and authoritative in his foreign policy and the progress that he has made towards Yemen has almost become a personal mission that has made his reign distinct. It remains to be seen whether Qaboos’ successor will follow a similar foreign policy or whether or to what extent he will choose to deviate from it. What is certain is that Yemen’s stability will factor into Oman’s foreign policy calculations no matter who takes charge after Qaboos. As Oman’s vulnerable and politically unstable neighbour, Yemen’s future will be tied to that of Oman much like its history has been. If Oman wishes to assure its security, it will maintain a long-term role in Yemen in order to prevent a continuation of the political turmoil that has affected Yemen. For the time being, this role will involve carefully crafted diplomacy, mediation efforts and humanitarian assistance. Once the conflict has ceased, Oman’s interests will turn to the rebuilding of Yemen’s exhausted infrastructure and, more importantly, the safeguarding of a stable political process.

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Notes 1 BBC, “Yemen’s President Hadi Asks UN to Back Intervention,” BBC, 25 March, 2015. Electronic document: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32045984 (Accessed March, 2017). 2 Giorgio Cafiero, “Who in the GCC Wants a Union?,” Al-Monitor, 2016. Electronic document: http:// tinyurl.com/y7vkt2pd (Accessed January, 2017). 3 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Omani Rejection of GCC Union Adds Insult to Injury for Saudi Arabia.” AlMonitor, 2013. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yaf7rctr (Accessed January, 2017). 4 Joseph A. Kechichian, “Oman: A Unique Foreign Policy Produces A Key Player In Middle Eastern And Global Diplomacy,” Rand.Organisation, 1995. Electronic document: http://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_briefs/RB2501.html (Accessed January, 2017). 5 UPI, “Oman Backs Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty,” UPI, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ yauuvqdj (Accessed January, 2017). 6 Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, A Modern History of Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 219. 7 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre (2010), “Oman’s Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century,” Middle East Policy 17 no 1 (2010):99-114. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y9ojw8x3 (Accessed January, 2017). 8 Marc J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing; Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future.” Middle East Journal 52, no. 1 (1998):70-84. 9 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Oman’s Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010):99-114. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y9ojw8x3 (Accessed January, 2017). 10 Helen Lackner, Why Yemen Matters (London: Saqi, 2014), 3. 11 Valerie Jon Hoffman, The Essentials of Ibadi Islam (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012), 29. 12 Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at War, 1500-1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 317. 13 Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 77. 14 Marc DeVore, “The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-7.” Cold War History 11, no. 3 (2011):441-471. 15 Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at War, 1500-1988, 317. 16 Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at War, 1500-1988, 317. 17 Marc DeVore, “The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-7.” 18 Calvin H Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 19 Richard F Nyrop, Area Handbook For The Persian Gulf States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1977), 376. 20 Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided, 117. 21 Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided, 147. 22 Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided, 145. 23 Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 154. 24 Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, 154. 25 Calvin H Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos. 26 Joseph A Kechichian, Oman and The World (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995). 27 Joseph A Kechichian, Oman and The World, 97. 28 Calvin H Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 189. 29 Giorgio Vafiero, “Oman Breaks from GCC on Yemen Conflict,” Al-Monitor, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yco4zw4y (Accessed January, 2017). 30 Reuters, “Yemen’s Houthis in Talks with U.S. Officials in Oman – Yemen Government.” Reuters UK, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ycsqdw6a (Accessed January, 2017). 31 Arafat Madabish, “Kerry Holds Discussions with Houthi Officials in Muscat,” Asharq Alawsat, November 15, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ybwaqwgw (Accessed January, 2017). 32 Oman Observer, “Oman Taking Care of Over 25,000 Yemeni Refugees,” Oman Observer, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7sgsr9c (Accessed January, 2017).

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33 Hassan Kamanpoori, “Sultanate Extends Relief to Victims of War in Yemen.” Oman Observer, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7zg669y (Accessed January, 2017). 34 Times of Oman, “Oman Looks for Peace in Yemen”, Times of Oman, 2016. Electronic document: http:// tinyurl.com/ybavxgqy (Accessed January, 2017). 35 Paul Cruickshank and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Working Premise: AQAP Ordered Kouachi to Attack.” CNN, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y8mjzlv8 (Accessed January, 2017). 36 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Oman’s Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010):111. 37 Times of Oman, “Oman Condemns Attack on Saudi Embassy in Iran,” Times of Oman, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yaw5s9jo (Accessed January, 2017). 38 OCHA, “Yemen,” Unocha.Org, 2016. Electronic document: http://www.unocha.org/yemen (Accessed January, 2017). 39 Prb, “Yemen’s New Government Faces Long-Standing Demographic Challenges,” Prb.Org, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yaxpjfj7 (Accessed January, 2017). 40 World Bank, “Projects: Yemen-Water Sector Support.” Worldbank.Org, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7sxoao2 (Accessed January, 2017). 41 Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Peter Ridout, A History of Modern Oman, 236. 42 Reuters, “Succession Question Fuels Uncertainty in Oman,” Reuters, 2016. Electronic document: http:// tinyurl.com/y9tmoqe3 (Accessed January, 2017). 43 Reuters, “Saudi-Led Coalition Announces End to Yemen Operation,” Reuters, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7pasuah (Accessed January, 2017).

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5 Yemen in the Context of Iran-Gulf Relations Mahjoob Zweiri During the Arab Spring issues and tensions in the Middle East which appeared to have been overcome resurfaced and worsened. Since its eruption in early 2011 in Yemen, Middle East traditional and emerging powers made strategic calculations about how they could influence the pace and scope of change in Yemen in line with their national interests. Thus, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, notably Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, played their cards in the early stage of the revolution to convince the people of Yemen to reach a political consensus that they hoped would pave the way for political stability in region. However, the decision to grant political immunity to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was an integral part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement, backfired as he mobilized his former military units and allied with the Huthis to challenge the legitimacy of the Gulf-backed government led by Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The political drama that followed the unexpected advance of Huthi and Saleh forces to the capital Sanaa gave the Islamic Republic of Iran a rare opportunity to reinforce its relevance in shaping the direction of political changes in Yemen. Although the reality of Iran’s involvement in Yemen is beyond certainty, compared to the massive Saudi footprint, the political turmoil in Yemen post 2011 has reflected negatively on Iran-Gulf relations. More precisely, it has also reconfirmed that Saudi-Iranian relations are dominated by mistrust and a blame-game. Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to examine how Iran-Yemeni relations have shaped Iran’s dealings with the Gulf countries. In more specific terms, this analysis endeavours to describe how recent political developments in Yemen and Iran’s subsequent involvement have been mirrored in Iranian relations with its Gulf neighbours. To this end, the focus will be on Iran-Saudi relations in the shadow of Iran-Yemen engagement. Therefore, how Iran and Saudi countered each other in Yemen and other strategic locations that are close to Yemen will be considered. Saudi-Iranian confrontation in Syria, Lebanon and the Horn of Africa will also be considered. The goal is to shed light on the implications of the Saudi-Iran confrontation on other political dynamics in the Middle East region. There is no doubt that Iran has attempted to influence and drive domestic political struggles in the Arab and the Gulf countries – where regimes are struggling to control their own 83

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societies. There is also an attempt to gain regional power that strains Iran’s relations with the Gulf States in general, and with Saudi Arabia in particular. Yemen presents a typical case in which Iran’s quest to strengthen its relations with political actors in the region antagonizes Saudi Arabia and its smaller Gulf neighbours, and consequently has shaped its relations negatively with Saudi Arabia. The first part of the analysis contextualizes how Yemen’s relations with Iran have shaped Iran’s relations with Arab regimes in general, and the Gulf in particular. While the first section of this part will be dedicated to the discussion of the presence of the Yemen factor in the historical relations of Iran and Arab countries, including the Gulf States, the second section will deal exclusively with how this has been reflected in IranSaudi relations through the years. The second part of the paper will highlight the ways in which Yemen’s ongoing political deadlock has jeopardized Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia. In this focus, the emphasis will be placed on Saudi Arabia’s initiatives to confront Iran in Yemen and other locations where both countries are competing for influence. The implications of the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the dynamics of politics in the Middle East will be explored.

The Yemen Element in Iran-Gulf Relations: Historical Perspective Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, relations between the new clerical regime and its Gulf neighbours were fraught with mistrust and tension. This is explained, partly, by Iran’s attempt to directly or indirectly intervene in the domestic affairs of the Gulf States as manifested throughout the history of Tehran’s attempt to export revolution to Arab countries and instigate the anger of Shi’a minorities against their rulers. Yemen represents one of the countries in which Iran found it easy to interfere due to its weak central government.1 Given the importance of Yemen’s internal political problems to stability in the Arabian Peninsula – including security for the wealthy Arab Gulf States – Iran’s intervention in Yemen has reflected negatively on Iran’s relations with the Gulf States in general, and especially with Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s Interference in Arab Heartland and its Implications on Iran-Gulf Relations Yemen is not an isolated case in which Iran’s direct or indirect interference in domestic politics disturbed Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbours. The aroused anger frustrated Arab Gulf regimes who were aware of the inspirational power of the Iranian revolution, which embodied Shi’a Islamic identities.2 On the one hand, the embodiment of the activist Islamic element in the revolutionary ideology was antithetical to the existing ideologies, either Wahhabism or Arab nationalism, which were internalized and institutionalized by Arab regimes and people. This has been a source of inspiration for many oppressed and 84

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sometime marginalized Islamic groups under Arab nationalist regimes, such as Iraq.3 On the other hand, the incarnation of Shi’a identity in the revolution was perceived as morally uplifting by Shi’a populations across the Arab world in general and in Bahrain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in particular. These factors have collectively aroused the suspicion of the Arab regimes, be they nationalist or monarchical, about Iran’s intentions and activities in their countries. The separate cases of Iran involvement in supporting Islamist and secessionist Shi’a groups in various Arab countries necessitated that Iran’s relations with its Arab Gulf neighbours would be characterized by tension and lack of trust. This is especially true in the case of Iran’s relations with certain Arab Gulf neighbours. It is the embodied element of weakness in these countries which could be exploited by Iran to project its regional ambitions, since the Gulf States were lacking the necessary standard army and military capability to stand up against Iran’s meddling in their domestic affairs. The Gulf States are the homes of a considerable number of Shi’a minorities and the Islamic Republic of Iran did not hide its pronounced animosity against the Gulf monarchies as it called on the people to revolt against what Tehran considered as self-appointed and nonIslamic regimes. The apprehensions of Riyadh regarding the Iranian religious authorities is vindicated by the Shi’a community in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, the 1981 coup plot under the Iranian-backed Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain caused many Gulf States to consider Iran a greater threat. This in turn led the smaller Gulf States to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with Saudi Arabia in 1981.4 The serious security concerns in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia did not only strain Iran’s relations with its Gulf neighbours, but it also forced the Gulf States to count on Iraq to balance Iranian threats. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq challenged Iran’s regional ambition and tried to isolate it from the Arab word. This forced the Arab Gulf States to back Iraq in its eight-year war with Iran between 1980 and 1988.5 Iran’s interference in the affairs of its Arab neighbours was muted to a larger extent from 1982 to late 1988 as Tehran’s military energy was devoted to its war with Iraq. The period that followed 1989 also witnessed lesser Iranian involvement in the domestic affairs of its neighbours. Consequently, its relationship with Arab governments improved to a certain extent. This was also due to the changes in direction, leadership and ambition as Iran changed from an ideological foreign policy to a more realistic one.6 However, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 destabilized Iraq and put Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, on the defensive, leading it to pursue a policy countering what it understood as rising Iranian power. This geopolitical shift allowed Iran to play a very influential role in Iraq, and it is now in an ideal position to influence the internal dynamics of Iraqi politics.7 Arab apprehension of Iran’s growing power was vindicated by the eruption of the Arab spring which has been a golden opportunity for Iran to extend its influence across the Arab world, thus endangering its relations with Arab States.

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Iran-Gulf Relation in the Shadow of Iran’s Yemen Overture Yemen stands out as a typical example of Iran’s attempt to influence the political landscape in Arab countries, since Iran allied itself with a non-state actor, the Huthis that were in conflict with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Historically, Iran’s involvement in Yemen was motivated by Tehran’s eagerness to export its political values to Yemen as it pursued an approach grounded on spreading its religious ideology under the umbrella of exporting the Islamic revolution. This was manifested in the recruitment of Yemeni students in Iran’s various religious schools in order to spread its particular brand of Shi’a ideology in Yemen, where the Zaydi Shi’a perspective was dominant. It is hard to know the exact number of students, but from what I saw while I was doing my PhD in Iran, tens of Yemeni students were studying in Iran. The impact of this strategy was minimal largely due to social and religious motivations related to the nature of Yemeni society.8 Historically, the Zaydi were described of being the closest Islamic sect to the Sunni, especially the Hanafi school. This was due to their positive position towards the companions of the prophet and the acceptance of the legitimacy of Abu Bakr and Umar.9 Iran’s endeavour to exercise influence in Yemen did not produce an instant impact at the time; however, it is believed that Iran’s present involvement in Yemen is the aggregate result of several previous attempts to build more opportunities for playing a significant role in Yemen. The Iranian insistence on this can also be viewed in the context of President Saleh’s reliance on Iraqi support and his pronounced backing of the Iraqi regime in IranIraq war between 1980 and 1988.10 However, the two decades that followed the end of the Iraq-Iran war demonstrated the prevalence of cordial relations between Tehran and Sanaa. In 2006, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh met with Iranian Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Manoucher Mottaki and conveyed his support for Iran and its right to have a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. This was restated in 2008 during a meeting between Saleh and Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, in which Saleh emphasized his country’s support of Iran’s right to a nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.11 Nevertheless, from 2004 to 2010 Iran’s relations with Yemen were countered by Saleh’s accusation of Iran for supporting the Huthis against his government. At that time, the most serious differences between Iran and Yemen centred on the conflict between Yemen’s government and the Huthi rebels, which involved a chain of counterinsurgency wars fought between 2004 and 2010. The wars were triggered partly by the Huthi leadership and their supporters’ increasing sense of alienation from the Yemeni government over what they characterized as economic discrimination against their home province of Sa‘da in the north. Another factor revolved around Huthi concerns that Saleh’s government supported Saudi-inspired proselytizing by militant Salafi Sunnis in northern Yemen. Huthis as Zaydi Shi’a (sometimes called ‘fiver Shi’a’) quite understandably perceived such activities as threatening. The fact that these activities were carried out mainly by Saudi-trained clerics, 86

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who were believed to be financed by Riyadh, as well as various northern Sunni tribal leaders who disliked the influence of the Huthi family and its supporters, was seen by the Huthis as challenging to their survival in Yemen’s political scene.12 Huthi apprehension was further vindicated by Yemeni Salafi support of the Islah party, the country’s prominent opposition party that is sometimes considered the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, who are both extremely anti-Huthi and hostile to Iran. Amid this fear and apprehension, problems between the Yemeni government and the Huthis intensified into a war on the heel of the Saleh government’s unsuccessful attempt to arrest the family’s leader, Hussein al-Huthi in June 2004 for his pronounced agitation against the government.13 This was followed by the expulsion of government troops by the Huthi political/militia organisation from Sa‘da, which also allowed them to extend their territorial control over the area. This move angered the Saleh regime which responded to the Huthi rebellion by doubling its military footprint in the northern area, ultimately resulting in Hussein al-Huthi’s death in September 2004.14 From 2004 onwards, the wars between the Yemeni government and the Huthis were overshadowed by accusations from Saleh of Iranian backing for the Shi’a rebels in northern Yemen. The Yemeni government claimed that the Huthis were funded by Iranian dignitaries, and that their training was akin to Hezbollah’s, which is backed directly by the Iranian government. Analysis of the accusation forwarded by Yemen gave the initial impression that this was an effort to win Western and Saudi financial and military support for the regime’s wars against Huthi resistance. It seems that the Yemeni government was distorting the legitimate political and economic demands of Huthis by alleging that Huthis were acting in line with an Iranian conspiracy. Nevertheless, the fact that Huthi leaders used anti-United States, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic rhetoric and that they have principally criticized the Sanaa government for its close ties with Washington vindicated the Yemen government accusation that Iran was supporting the Huthis in the eyes of Saudis.15 Consequently, the Huthi wars with the Yemeni government took a new dimension with the military involvement of Saudi Arabia into the fighting in November 2009. The Huthis went into Saudi territory and killed at least two border guards and apparently took control of two or more Saudi border villages. These actions caused Saudi Arabia to take decisive action through military strikes against Huthi rebels. Although a ceasefire was achieved in February 2010, brokered by Qatar, it did not result in addressing Huthi grievances over discrimination and lack of development.16 Regardless of the nature of this ceasefire, Iran’s alleged support for the Huthis triggered Saudi involvement in Yemen. The stability of Yemen and its internal political problems were increasingly linked to the need for future stability in the Arabian Peninsula, including security for the wealthy Arab Gulf states. This explained why Riyadh retains a strong interest in the northern region, which directly borders the hilly frontier region of Saudi Arabia. The support Riyadh provided to friendly tribes, institutions, and local leaders in Yemen was meant to neutralize the growing influence of the Huthis, who were perceived to be supported by Saudi’s regional rival.17 The growth of the Huthis in the vicinity of 87

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Saudi Arabia jeopardized Saudi security and indicated vulnerability of the Saudi regime. Iran’s support of the Huthis in Yemen has given a new dimension to Iran’s relations with Arab countries in general, and with Saudi Arabia in particular, since the Yemen issue is a major element in Saudi-Iranian rivalry for influence and position in the Middle East region. Despite the assertion that Iran has been involved in supporting northern Huthis, the Iranian military assistance for them has not been easy to prove. Nevertheless, this accusation has contributed to the straining of Saudi relations with Iran, and it continues to overshadow Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the ongoing civil war in Yemen. This was manifested in Saudi direct military involvement in Yemen in 2015. In the next section, I will focus on how the ongoing war in Yemen has shaped Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia.

The Yemen Factor in Saudi-Iranian Relation in the Shadow of the Arab Spring The Arab Spring, which started in 2011 in North Africa continues to have repercussions throughout the Middle East region. While the struggle for political legitimacy that sparked the popular unrest in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen continues, it has also led to an intense competition for influence across a region which was already visible in the challenges of the sectarian Sunni and Shi’a labels. In the context of this Sunni and Shi’a division, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia worsened considerably as the results of Iran’s proactive involvement in the affairs of Arab countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This led to Saudi Arabia responding with direct and indirect strategies in response to Iran’s activities in these countries. The Arab Spring brought significant changes in the entire Arab world, including the hope to have democracy in the Middle East. The USA appeared to be in full support of this kind of idea. Unfortunately, the Arab Spring has resulted in chaos in most of the Arab countries such as Libya, after the fall of Qaddafi, and Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood regime of Mohammed Morsi was overturned by the dictatorial Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi. Yemen is another pertinent example, due to the Huthi overthrow of the transitional government. Syria remains one of the worst examples, where the citizens attempting to protest for a better leadership saw a war turned against them with disastrous consequences. Bahrain has been especially susceptible to the influence of Iran, even prior to the Arab Spring, due to its considerable Shi’a population. Thus, the Arab Spring has been perceived as a long-awaited chance for Iran to implement its strategies in Bahrain through local Shi’a allies. Accordingly, the outburst of the Arab Spring in Bahrain in 2011 was not only seen as popular unrest against the Sunni Al Khalifa dynasty ruling the tiny island; it was understood to be part of the context of Iranian long-standing strategies to agitate the Shi’a population against the ruling family.18 While this is how the regime in Bahrain read the protests of 2011, Saudi Arabia alongside with other Gulf States also perceived the events of 2011 as an Iranian threat to regime survival in Bahrain and overall regional stability. Consequently, in March 2011, soldiers from Saudi Arabia and police forces 88

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from UAE were deployed to back the ruling Al Khalifa family against pro-democratic movements mostly made up of the Shi’a population.19 The Saudi and the UAE military support was supplemented by financial support from the GCC to subdue the protest in the Pearl Roundabout in Manama.20 Similar to that in Bahrain, Iran’s intervention in Iraq predated the Arab Spring. In the case of Iraq, since the fall of Saddam Hussain’s regime in Iraq and the subsequent civil war in the country, Iran became the closest ally of the Iraqi government. Saudi Arabia has regarded this as anti-Sunni, while Iran on the other hand sees Saudi Arabia as trying to undermine an elected Shi’a government in Iraq. Iran’s influence has continued to grow since then and reached a climax with the growth of Daesh in Iraq as the Iraqi government rightly perceived this as a threat to the regime in Baghdad.21 Similarly, Iran took an unapologetic approach to backing Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria amid the popular rising that called for him to step down as president. Like Iraq, the rise and the emergence of different Islamic groups in different parts of Syria prompted Iran to intervene military in Syria to guarantee the survival of the regime it supported in the context of U.S ambivalence to act against Bashar. Ultimately Saudi Arabia and Qatar backed armed opposition groups in their fight against the Iranian-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad. This has amplified the violent nature of the Syrian uprising, and the bitterness between Iran and Saudi Arabia has deepened.22 While Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States are uneasy about Iran’s intervention and the support of the Iraqi government and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Iranian activism in Yemen has been perceived by Saudi Arabia as a direct threat to its stability. Prior to the Arab Spring, the GCC in general and Saudi Arabia in particular looked at Yemen through the lens of counter terrorism, as the country was seen as a safe haven for Al-Qaida. The Saudi regime has long been aware of Yemen’s strategic importance to AlQaida’s global network. Yemen’s proximity to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), with a coastline stretching to the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, constitutes a vulnerability that would be ripe for exploitation given the recent chaos wreaked on international shipping by Somali pirates.23 All these factors forced Saudi Arabia to assume that political anarchy in Yemen would eventually threaten the stability of the region. Consequently, Saudi Arabia showed its support for the pro-democracy protest in Yemen while opposing it in other countries, but this was to maintain the security of Yemen and the security of their own soil. Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia has been instrumental in directing changes in Yemen since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. In this context, it has played a critical role in trying to force a political solution between the parties in Yemen. However, the rise of the Huthis and their subsequent alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh challenged the status quo in Yemen and presented an opportunity for Iran’s quest to strengthen relations with political actors in Yemen. The substantial shift in the political scene of Yemen further deepened Saudi-Iranian rivalry and it increased their involvement on opposing sides of other regional conflicts. Iran’s support for the Huthis led Saudi Arabia to intervene with the Saudi Air Force, in conjunction with several regional 89

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allies, and begin a campaign of airstrikes in Yemen to target Iranian-allied Huthis as well as forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The Decisive Storm Operation Principally, Saudi intervention in Yemen through Operation Decisive Storm is the Saudis’ attempt to curb Iranian expansion in Yemen and the Arab world at large rather than a step towards protecting Yemen and its legitimacy. Therefore, the Saudi operation in Yemen, which started in March 2015, is a reflection of the kingdom’s increasing frustration with Iranian expansion in the Arab world, including Yemen. Within the Arab world, there are feelings that the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken advantage of a power void due to delayed or derailed revolutions and reform movements. These feelings deepened due to Iran’s firm decision to stand by revolutionary movements which led to a fuelling of sectarian conflicts, civil wars and internal divisions. In Yemen the dominance of the Huthis in the political scene after the Arab Spring was not taken for granted by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Huthi activities in Yemen do not represent the kind of threat to Saudi Arabia that warrants a fully-fledged and very expensive military action. In the course of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia had dealt with the Huthi phenomenon within the context of the political disintegration in Yemen through diplomacy in a non-military way. However, the Saudis’ approach to the Huthi problem in Yemen changed after the Huthi takeover of Sanaa in September 2014. This development appeared to Saudis as a dangerously close Huthi-Iranian alliance.24 The entrance of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who continued to exercise strong influence over the Yemeni armed forces, into the Huthi-Iran alliance made Saudi Arabia feel further threatened, believing that its regional rival, Iran, had embarked on directing political development in Yemen with the help of a political minority. Given Iran‘s increased influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia supposed that the development in Yemen would permit Iran to fortify its presence in its vicinity. This would enhance the existing instability which would lead to further disruption of the social and political situation in Saudi Arabia, especially the potential for revolt in the Eastern province. Ultimately, as Huthis expanded their geographical gains, after taking control of Sanaa the Huthis, with support of the Republican Guard and Special Forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh, furthered their advance towards other areas in the centre, south and coastal regions of Yemen. Their attempt to take over Aden after President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled there from Sanaa was a turning point for Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Huthi geographical expansion was of great strategic importance because this meant that, for the first time, Iran would have a foothold in the southern entry of the Red Sea, exactly on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which separates Asia from Africa. The Huthi control of the western coast of Yemen, which links to the western coast of Saudi Arabia, presented a double threat of freedom of movement in the strait and to Saudi security. The 90

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Huthi takeover of key areas in Yemen, while Al-Qaida had at least nominal control of the country’s central and eastern areas, presented a clear danger to Saudi Arabia.25 The Saudis knew that Iran was a great supporter of political unrest in Saudi Arabia’s eastern region, as well as the Iran-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, who were believed to have trained and equipped the Huthis. Thus, in the absence of direct U.S. military intervention in Yemen in order to reinstate the balance of political power, Saudi Arabia sensed that it had to interfere regardless of the American stance in order to confront Iran’s threat in Yemen. The result was the use of Saudi Air Force jets, with American logistical support, for a bombing campaign of military targets across Yemen starting on March 26, 2015. Only a few hours after the launch of the operation, a number of Arab countries began to state their support for the operation while other countries like UAE, Qatar, Sudan promised troops for the battle. The Saudi led-coalition’s principal target was to destroy air defence sites, centres of command, lines of supply and logistics and warehouses of forces loyal to Saleh and the Huthis. The operation also involved extending military assistance to forces loyal to Hadi and other tribal forces which were anti-Huthi, especially in Aden, Shabwa, Dhamar, Dhala, Marib, Lahj and al-Baidha. The Saudi-led operation also aimed at imposing a complete embargo on Yemeni ports in order to prevent military supplies reaching the Huthis and forces loyal to Saleh from Iran and other sources. Rallying a sufficient ground force to protect Saudi borders against any efforts to penetrate them by the Huthis was central to the strategy of the operation.26 The war against the Huthis and the military intervention in Yemen had come after the request of Hadi for Saudi and GCC to intervene in order to save Yemen from a total Huthi takeover. However, Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes in Yemen were also justified as a step to primarily stop Iranian expansionism in the Arab World. Thus, Saudi airstrikes in Yemen took the Iranians by surprise and weakened any plans they might have had to strengthen and enhance their presence there. Despite this and due to geographic considerations, Iran has found it difficult to confront Saudi Arabia on this new front in addition to its heavy military engagement in Iraq and Syria. Given the Saudi position in the Muslim world as the custodian of the two holy mosques, Iran is reluctant to consider a war against Saudi Arabia which could isolate the Islamic Republic in the entire Muslim world. Although Tehran could not really affect the Saudi military operation in Yemen, its direct presence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon serves as an indication that Yemen is trivial to Iran’s calculation for regional influence. Tehran is enhancing its control over Iraq and rearranging its cards in Syria with its Russian allies, regardless of the outcome of the war in Yemen.

Iran-Saudi Confrontation beyond Yemen Regardless of the nature of Iran’s defeat and Saudi dominance in Yemen, what is clear is that Iran’s relations with political actors in Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent military action 91

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have deepened hostility between Tehran and Riyadh. Their confrontation in Yemen also revealed the growing regional rivalry as Saudi Arabia continues to confront Iran in Syria, Lebanon and the Horn of Africa. The Saudi regional role as an Arab and Sunni leader and its increasing power in the region are due to the influence it has exerted after the failure of many institutions and the concurrent declining influence of other Arab states. The Saudi stand against Iran’s expansionist policies in the Arab world in general and in Yemen in particular has led to less discord between several countries and to the emergence of Arab and Muslim coalitions to rival Iran. In relation to Syria, Iran’s active engagement in Syria prompted Saudi Arabia to support armed opposition groups in their fight against the Iranian-backed regime of Bashar alAssad since the outset of the revolution in Syria. However, Saudi interest in Syria increased after its confrontation with Iran in Yemen when Saudi Arabia announced in February 2016 that it would send ground troops to Syria in order to fight ISIS with the possibility that they would confront al-Assad’s forces backed by Iran and Hezbollah.27 It appears that the Saudi decision to get indirectly involved in Syria is a reflection of the Saudis’ attempt to confront Iran in Syria as a result of Iran’s perceived involvement in Yemen. Similarly, the Iran-Saudi confrontation in Yemen also extends to Lebanon. Since the outbreak of the Syrian war, Iran’s ties with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite group, have strengthened. Both Iran and Hezbollah are fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria, and their joint-military cooperation in Syria has further engulfed the region in a sectarian chaos in which Iran Shi’a blocs assist a Shi’a regime as part of their opposition against Sunnis. Thus, in this context and that of Iran’s support for the Huthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has worked closely with its Gulf allies to demonize Iran’s ally Hezbollah in the region. Saudi Arabia supports the opposing parties in Lebanon and has pushed for a resolution in the Arab League to condemn Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Similarly, the GCC members led by Saudi Arabia imposed a travel ban on their citizens to Lebanon days after Riyadh halted $4 billion in aid to Lebanese security forces in response to ‘hostile’ positions linked to the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah.28 Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry over the war in Yemen has been felt beyond the Middle East region. In the Horn of Africa, Riyadh and Tehran are engaging in a fierce competition for position and influence. This antagonism reached a pinnacle when a number of countries in the Horn of Africa followed Saudi lead by severing diplomatic ties with Iran following the Iranian attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Iran, sparked by the execution of a Saudi Shi’a cleric Nimr al-Nimr in early January 2016.29 Prior to the war in Yemen, Iran was enjoying unchallenged growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Due to its isolation in the region by the international players, Iran made successful overtures to Africa by establishing strong economic and political relations with individual countries. Therefore, the Saudi ongoing assertive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is understood in the context of their effort to diminish Iran’s influence in a region which is critical for any Iranian attempt to supply arms and military aid to the Huthis in Yemen.30 92

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Beyond the Saudi efforts to take the ground from Iran in Syria, Lebanon and the Horn of Africa, the intensification of Iran’s activities in providing military and paramilitary support to its allies in Yemen pushed other Arab states, especially the Gulf States, into the orbit of Saudi Arabia as they all share fears of Iranian hegemonic ambitions. This has also played out in parallel rising identity-based coalitions, especially Sunni-Arab and Shi’a-Persian in the region. This was a new development in the Middle East region, which witnessed the evolution of three coalitions since the eruption of the Arab Spring and prior to the Yemen war. These coalitions include (1) an Iranian-led coalition that comprises President al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the Shi’a Islamist group Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Prime Minister Noor al-Maliki’s government in Iraq; (2) the block or coalition that is sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and which consists of Qatar and Turkey and which exploited its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood to project influence in the region after the Arab spring; and (3) the anti-Muslim Brotherhood bloc which includes the Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other smaller Gulf States. Nevertheless, competition between the second and third blocks for influence in the region subsided as their priority remained centred around facing the common threats of Iran and ISIS.31 In this respect, King Salman, with the help of his nephew Muhamad Bin Nayef and his son Mohammed bin Salman, mobilized the support of Arab and Muslim countries to join in isolating Iran in the Middle East region and the Muslim World. Saudi Arabia’s formation of a Muslim ‘Anti-terrorism’ Coalition Alliance, which includes 34 mainly Muslim states but excludes the regional rival Iran as well as Iraq and Syria, was a reflection of the Kingdom’s intention to isolate Iran.32 In the light of Saudi diplomatic and military efforts, Iran resorted to a war of words to label Saudi actions against Iran and its regional allies. In the wake of Saudi airstrikes against the Huthis in Yemen, Iranian speeches cast the Saudis as irresponsible. Khamenei is said to have described the security leadership under the new Saudi king as ‘inexperienced youngsters’ who ‘have come to power and replaced composure with barbarism.’33 Additionally, the execution of the Saudi Shi’a cleric Nimr Baqer Nimr in early 2016 was condemned by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who warned Saudi officials that they will face “divine” revenge for their actions (Nasseri 2016). This statement was issued as Iranians were storming the Saudi embassy in Tehran and setting the building on fire which angered Saudi Arabia and prompted it to cut diplomatic relations and give Iran’s ambassador 48 hours to leave the country. This was just the latest episode of a war of words which Iran had launched against Saudi Arabia. Following the killing of Iranian pilgrims in the 2015 Hajj stampede at Mecca, Iran’s Supreme Leader threatened Saudi Arabia with ‘tough and harsh’ retaliation.34 While the execution of Nimr and the Hajj stampede could be considered to be independent from the regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Saudi and Iranian responses to the two incidents carry political weight given the complex dynamics in the region. This is especially the case for Yemen, where Saudi Arabia strives to take ground from the Iran-backed rebels, while Iran’s focus remains centred on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. 93

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Iran’s Huthis and Omani Exceptionalism Oman has a unique relationship with Iran compared to other states in the Gulf region since it is strategically located at the entrance to the 40-kilometre-long Strait of Hormuz. This waterway is where 30% of the world’s oil exports go through. Oman is understandably eager for alliances to keep this strait accessible in order to have opportunities to engage peacefully with Iran and avoid escalated conflict. For Oman, the strategic significance of Iran is different from the other Gulf States, both in terms of political diplomacy and the diverse environment. Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970 by leading a palace coup against his negatively viewed father, Said bin Taimur. He became a popular, respected person who could improve the country and make it brighter than its neighbours. He was seen as someone who would move the country forward from its isolation. Oman developed both regional and worldwide connections, including cordial relations with Iran and Israel in order to improve their commercial connection. However, Sultan Qaboos has been slow in implementing the 25 years ‘renaissance’ because he believes that the progress that he is making is ‘not a sudden evolution’.35 Sultan Qaboos’s priority is to step forward economically and politically and at the same time to maintain the local Ibadi sect and preserve Omani traditions. He has sought to balance between the conservative elements of religion and modernization. In the 1970s and 1980s Muscat introduced a massive modernization plan which covered the expansion of water supply systems, manufacturing, new roads, streets, houses and hospitals.36 Oman’s current population is above four million and is growing at a rate approximately 8.5% in 2010-2015.37 Oman’s ethnic diversity is high. With respect to religion, the majority of Omanis follow the school of Ibadism, which distinguishes the country from other Arab regions. The tension between Shi’a and Sunni is a current problem due to Huthis receiving support from Iran whose aim is to spread the Shi’a ideology and the Saudi Sunni response. Ibadi Muslims, however, are neither a Shi’a nor a Sunni sect. Oman has chosen to be independent from other Arab countries; for instance, during the Iraq-Iran war they did not support Iraq like other Arab states.38 Since the oil is going through the Straits of Hormuz, Sultan Qaboos declared ‘Oman’s neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war and concluded an Access Agreement with the United States.’39 Oman at that time did not have a close relation with Tehran and Baghdad, neither with the other GCC countries. Oman has relied on American support and protection. Furthermore, when Iran is looking for relations with the Gulf Arabs, Oman gives the best opportunity to maintain this link between the Arabs and Persians. For example, the UAE and Bahrain are not close to Iran at all. Oman has to maintain good relations with Iran, because it needs its natural resources to provide for the population the proper level of living standards, especially when Oman will run out of oil and natural gas resources.40 Due to the political and economic conflicts, there is anxiety in the region which has an overall negative effect on security. This started with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, then the 94

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Iran-Iraq war and was followed by the Gulf War in 1990. The Arab Spring (Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, bloody conflicts in Syria, in Yemen and in Libya) has also influenced the Gulf region, particularly Oman and Bahrain. Oman, however, has been able to isolate itself. Nevertheless, security has become an important factor due to the multiple instabilities in the region.41 The Omani-Iranian relation is close in the sense that Sultan Qaboos has an “Omani balancing” strategy which is unique and represents a balance between the external and internal threats to Oman and his rule. Iran and Oman have bilateral agreements, which is a unique relationship between the two countries and has an influential effect on the security of the GCC. Oman to a certain extent supports Iran and Israel, which are the enemies of the Arab countries. In addition, Oman is looking for economic partners outside of the region to keep up the living standards of its population and to advance the economic and political systems. ‘Omanis are taking steps to transform their petroleum-based economy into a more diversified, post-oil economy,’ argues O’Reilly.42 Oman’s political system is based on inherited legitimacy. Omani diplomacy has chosen to develop its unique relations with the other states. Oman was a founder of the GCC in 1981, but although it participates in the GCC’s political and economic relations, it does not interfere in the affairs of other states. Its diplomats are also loyal to this concept of neutrality which has continued since the 1970. Oman has rejected the proposed Gulf Union because of the fear of losing its sovereignty and because it could be an offensive step against Iran. The Saudi Arabian–led coalition includes UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, but this does not include Oman since it has preferred to keep a distance. The disputed Iran nuclear deal has elevated the country’s profile, encouraging it to play an increasingly active role in efforts to stop the violence in Yemen and Syria. Sultan Qaboos visited Iran in 2009 and in 2013 and this made relations between the two countries closer to each other.43 Oman initiated a generous spirit of cooperation towards to Iran. They have emphasized that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provides the right for Iran to use their nuclear power for peaceful purposes. There are doubts whether Iran has uranium mines or not, a fact which could fail to solve the Iranian nuclear problem diplomatically. The founders of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, Germany, USA and UK) recently reached an agreement with Iran – “P5+1” – regarding the nuclear program to control its use to peaceful purposes.44 Oman played a significant role as a mediator between Iran and the United Nations Security Council. The meetings were initially held in Muscat under ‘secret channels.’45 Sultan Qaboos is interested in improving the tourism industry. He notes that only 34% of the country’s income is based on oil. Oman has other developed industrial production, such as stainless steel or ferrochrome products as well as medicines,46 but it still needs to improve the economic context as the population grows. Oil, however, remains of paramount importance at the moment, especially with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Oman and Yemen together launching the Trans-Arabia Oil Pipeline project in 2007. The 95

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plan is to construct new pipelines that go directly to the Gulf of Oman, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, as well as a suggestion for two lines to flow directly to the Gulf of Aden. As Ahmed Nafeez notes, ‘Yemen has as yet untapped potential to provide an alternative set of oil and gas trans-shipment routes for the export of Saudi oil, by-passing Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.’47 At the same time, Oman and Iran have signed a pipeline deal, which is an agreement to construct a new design of an undersea natural gas pipeline to avoid the United Arab Emirates. This pipeline would connect Iran’s vast gas reserves and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants to Oman. Furthermore, ‘Oman is attempting to import gas from Iran by constructing a subsea pipeline between the countries and the two parties are discussing the development of joint offshore gas fields.’48 The two governments have agreed to change the pipeline route to avoid United Arab Emirates.49 Oman and Yemen share a border and have bilateral relations. They are members of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. In the Gulf, Oman has a significant role due to its linking the Red Sea-Indian Ocean trade network, especially for access to the important Yemeni port of Aden. While the Huthis control of Sanaa and the Iranian strong involvement in Yemen are threats to the security of the Gulf States, Oman has the potential of being able to help solve the current crisis and stabilize the political situation in Yemen. As the crisis in Yemen goes on, efforts have been suggested from different players, starting with the United Nations and ending with regional players, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. Despite numerous diplomatic efforts since 2014, all of these have failed to end the suffering of the Yemeni people and have not also put end to the fragility of the Yemeni state, which is undergoing complete collapse. The international role led by Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, was late and did not contribute positively to the conflict. The efforts of the UN aimed to maintain the political status quo, but this led to more differences between Yemeni players. In addition, the recognition of Iran’s role has strengthened the Huthi advance which resulted in the control of Sanaa in September 2014. The earlier GCC initiative is not respected enough by some Yemeni players, so the ongoing political views within the GCC and neither have the political distance between Saudi Arabia and Oman have not contributed positively. The role of Riyadh in leading the Arab coalition in Yemen and the rejection by Oman of military intervention in Yemen continue to be ineffective and have not had a serious impact. So as long as the domestic politics is hijacked by the impact of external players, it seems there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Yemen and Future of Iran-Saudi Relations Although the ongoing escalation of sectarian rift and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is deepened by the Yemen war, it would be misleading to conclude that the possible defeat of the Huthis in Yemen would determine the future relations between the powerhouses of the Middle East. This is because multiple regional and domestic factors are responsible for 96

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the antagonistic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the polarization of sectarian divisions in the region remains instrumental in shaping the future relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the conflicts in Syria and Iraq will remain the central factors that will dictate the nature of their relations. Nevertheless, the fact that Yemen continues to descend into Riyadh’s sphere of influence, just as Tehran is busy in Iraq and Syria, does not guarantee the resolution of future tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are aware of the strategic importance of Yemen in their regional rivalry for position and influence. If the Huthis should be defeated militarily or if the ongoing and future peace talks lead to a permanent ceasefire in Yemen, Saudi Arabia will have a lion’s share in terms of directing any resolution given its position in the war. Iran with its established ties with the Huthis could exploit its leverage of military capability to arm the Huthis, should the war in Syria be settled in its interests. Moreover, despite what appears to be a Saudi current upper hand in Yemen, the expansion of Al-Qaida in Yemen and the falling oil prices with an adverse effect on Saudi military spending in the future could shift the attention of Saudi Arabia to focus on the immediate threat of Al-Qaida and ISIS, since they are already threatening the peace in Saudi Arabia. The future of U.S. engagement in the region is also crucial in determining the military burden that the Saudis need to shoulder. Thus, this could affect its future rivalry with Iran in Yemen. The recent Iran nuclear agreement and its positive effects on Iran’s economy could permit Iran to re-enter in Yemen despite its engagement in Syria and Iran. Now with the transition to the Trump administration in the United States, the future is even less clear for the entire Middle East region.

Notes 1 Andrew W. Terrill, “Iranian Involvement in Yemen,” Orbis 58, no. 3 (2014):429–440. 2 Stephanie Cronin and Nur Masalha, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC States: Revolution to Realpolitik?” London School of Economic and Political Science Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, no. 17, 2011 Electronic document: http://tinyurl. com/yap8g3r6 (Accessed January, 2017). 3 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Conflicts between Iran and the Gulf Arab States: An Economic Evaluation.” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 4 (2012):542–553. 4 Kevin Downs, “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain,” Journal of Politics and International Studies 8 (2012):203–237. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/jqhqhjn (Accessed January, 2017). 5 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran under Ahmadinejad: When Crisis becomes a Pattern,” In A. Ehteshami and M. Zweiri, editors, Iran’s Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011), 141-156. 6 Kevin Downs, “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain.” 7 Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen,” Digest of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (2016):4-18. 8 Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen,” 8. 9 Etan Kohlberg, Etan, “Some Zaydī Views on the Companions of the Prophet,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 39, no. 1 (1976): 91-98; and, Marshall Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shî’a

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become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955):1-13. 10 Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen.” 11 W. Fulton and A. Farrar-Wellman, “Yemen-Iran Foreign Relations.” Iran Tracker, 2011. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7w2ek6e (Accessed January 2017). 12 Andrew W. Terrill, “Iranian Involvement in Yemen,” 432. 13 Marieke Brandt, “Sufyan’s ‘Hybrid’ War: Tribal Politics during the Huthi Conflict,” Journal of Arabian Studies:Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no 1 (2013):125. 14 Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, “Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2011. Electronic document: http:// tinyurl.com/yd95jw2f (Accessed January, 2017). 15 Andrew W. Terrill, “Iranian Involvement in Yemen,” 432. 16 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi – Iranian ‘Cold War,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/hqpdna3 (Accessed January, 2017). 17 Noel Brehony, “Yemen and the Huthis: Genesis of the 2015 Crisis,” Asian Affairs 46, no. 2 (2015):232–250. 18 Simon Mabon, “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 2, (2012):84–97. 19 Bessma Momani and Crystal A. Ennis, “Between Caution and Controversy: Lessons from the Gulf Arab States as (Re-)Emerging Donors,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2013):605–627. 20 Silvia Colombo, “The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring, Between Outreach, Patronage and Repression,” IAI Working Papers 12 | 12 (March, 2012):1–16.. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ ycbbq2dk (Accessed January, 2017). 21 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “The GCC–Iran Conflict and Its Strategic Implications for the Gulf Region,” Strategic Analysis 35, no. 2 (2011):265–76. 22 Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in Syria: Toward a New Chapter?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 3 (November, 2014):25–34. 23 Edward Burke, “‘One Blood and One Destiny’? Yemen’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, no. 23, 2012. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y9zfmr5v (Accessed January, 2017). 24 Matthew J. McInnis, J Matthew, “What Does Iran Really Want in Yemen?” AEIdeas, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y7czhkyk (Accessed January, 2017). 25 Al-Jazeera, “Operation Decisive Storm: Reshuffling Regional Order,” 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yd8dkmns (Accessed January, 2017). 26 Al-Jazeera, “Operation Decisive Storm: Reshuffling Regional Order,” 2015. 27 Kim Sengupta, “Syria Civil War: Saudi Arabia Ready to Send Ground Troops into the Conflict, but Fears of Sectarian Strife Remain,” The Independent, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ jyxodee (Accessed January, 2017). 28 Al-Jazeera, “Operation Decisive Storm: Reshuffling Regional Order,” 2015. 29 Nicola Slawson, “Saudi Execution of Shia Cleric Pparks Outrage in Middle East,” The Guardian, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/yd6ocyof (Accessed February 2017). 30 Yasser Seddiq, “Iranian support to Houthis via Eritrea: Reality or myth?” al-Ahram Online, 2015. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/ycbks4um (Accessed January, 2017). 31 Brian Katulis and Peter Juul, “U.S. Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition: Lessons for U.S. Policy from the Past Three Year,” Center for American Progress, 2014. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/y8mq5jfx (Accessed January, 2017). 32 Al-Jazeera, “Saudi Arabia forms Muslim ‘anti-terrorism’ coalition,” al-Jazeera, 2015. http://tinyurl.com/ ognkvvk (Accessed January, 2017). 33 Matthew J. McInnis, “What Does Iran Really Want in Yemen?” 34 Susannah Cullinane, “Iran’s Khamenei Threatens ‘Harsh’ Retaliation over Hajj Stampede at Mina, CNN, 2015. Electronic document: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/30/middleeast/hajj-deaths-saudi-

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iran-yemen/ (Accessed January, 2017). 35 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future,” Middle East Journal 52, no 1 (1998):71. 36 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future,” 73. 37 United Nations, UN Data, 2016. Electronic document: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile. aspx?crname=Oman (Accessed February, 2017). 38 Richard J. Schmierer, “The Sultanate of Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Middle East Policy 22, no. 4 (2015):113-120. 39 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future.,” 74. 40 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future,” 76-78. 41 M. Al-Bolushi, “The Effect of Omani-Iranian Relations on the Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries after the Arab Spring.” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 9, no. 3(2016):383. 42 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future.” 43 M. Al-Bolushi, “The Effect of Omani-Iranian Relations on the Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries after the Arab Spring.” 44 Richard J. Schmierer, “The Sultanate of Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Middle East Policy, pp. 113120, 2015. 45 M. Al-Bolushi, “The Effect of Omani-Iranian Relations on the Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries after the Arab Spring,” 393. 46 M. J. O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future,” 7. 47 Ahmed Nafeez, “Saudi war for Yemen Oil Pipeline is Empowering Al-Qaida, IS, Middle East Eye, 2016. Electronic document: http://tinyurl.com/hqkqu3r (Accessed January, 2017). 48 M. Al-Bolushi, “The Effect of Omani-Iranian Relations on the Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries after the Arab Spring,” 390. 49 Reuters, “Oman Says to Change Iran Gas Pipeline Route to Avoid UAE,” Reuters, August 10, 2016. Electronic document: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oman-iran-gas-idUSKCN10L21N (Accessed January, 2017).

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6 Conclusion: Searching for a Resolution Daniel Martin Varisco The ancient Greek and Roman geographers were in the habit of dividing Arabia into three great provinces, – Arabia Felix, Arabia Petrea, and Arabia Deserta: the first nearly corresponding to the modern Yemen, but including Mahra, and Hadramaut; the second the modern Hejáz; and the third extending north-east from Arabia Felix as far as the Euphrates. These divisions, however, were purely arbitrary, and neither known to nor recognised by the inhabitants of the country. – Sir Robert Lambert Playfair1

The part of the Arabian Peninsula labeled two millennia ago by outsiders as Arabia Felix is today in a terrible fix, once again largely due to both internal strife and outside intervention. There is no little irony in Sir Robert Playfair’s stark assessment some century and a half ago that the divisions imposed from the outside are not recognized by the people who actually live in the area, especially the failed state of the Republic of Yemen. The modern state of Yemen, contested by several competing parties, has reached an estimated population of over 27 million inhabitants. The only other nation on the Arabian Peninsula rivaling this size is Saudi Arabia with some 28 million total inhabitants, but almost a third of these are migrants. If one adds in the number of citizens of the rest of the states of the GCC, the result of national citizens excluding immigrant labor is higher in Yemen than all the other states on the peninsula combined. There are also perhaps several million more Yemenis dispersed throughout the GCC states and worldwide. By this standard alone, assessing the future of Yemen in relation to the other states on the Arabian Peninsula is long overdue. The chapters in this volume examine both the history and current conflict between Yemen, the GCC states and Iran, but the current political and military crisis in Yemen extends beyond these borders in the form of alliances and sympathies. The authors are to be commended for trying to make sense of what is a moving target, the political and humanitarian crisis that has engulfed the entire region, either directly or indirectly. The original papers were written when the conflict in Yemen was barely a year old and with no clear indication of how long it would take to mitigate or resolve the fighting. As the volume 101

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went to press in early 2017 the aerial bombing continued, the fighting on the ground appeared to be a stalemate between several competing groups in fragile, even if articulated, alliances. Thus, the only viable conclusion at this stage of analysis is that it is not yet possible to reach a conclusion that will stand the test of time. One does not need a crystal ball, however, to understand the major factors that have led to the current impasse, as the chapters in this volume address and are summarized in the introduction. It should be obvious, despite the rhetorical cloud that covers much of the media reporting on the situation in Yemen, that the current conflict did not erupt in a vacuum. The evolution of governments in Yemen after the departure of the Ottomans in the north over a century ago and later for the British in the south led to two separate states that failed to provide lasting stability and effective governance in either one. The unification of the YAR and PDRY in 1990 turned out to be a disaster due to the economic crisis following the first Gulf War in which Yemeni workers were sent home and then dealt a final blow when Ali Abdullah Saleh took hegemonic control of the former south. The growth of AlQaida (aka Ansar al-Shariah) cells and the Huthi (aka Ansar Allah) rebellion in the north created a situation in which Saleh was unable to survive the widespread dissatisfaction with his power at the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. The launch of a war on the Huthi/Saleh alliance by the Saudi-led coalition, although a surprise in many circles, continued active Saudi involvement in the political affairs of Yemen before and after the protracted civil war that ended the Zaydi imamate in 1962. These details are well described in the preceding chapters, but a fundamental set of questions gives rise to the need for further analysis. The most pressing is when the fighting will end and life can start to return to some sense of normality. As several UN agencies have reported, Yemen is suffering from a humanitarian disaster that is unprecedented, certainly in its modern history. According to OCHA’s 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, published in January, 2017, almost 19 million of the estimate 27.4 million population of Yemen were defined as ‘people in need.’2 Over half of the population was food insecure, with reports of famine in some areas. Over 3 million were internally displaced, on top of the Somali and other refugees already living in Yemen due to conflict in their own countries. Official estimates place the number of killed or wounded at 44,000, although this is probably an underestimate. Numerous factories, bridges, government offices, schools, businesses, mosques and heritage sites have been destroyed or severely damaged. Less than half of health facilities, most of which no longer have essential supplies, are functioning, some 1,600 schools cannot be used and 2 million children are out of school. Security is factional, civil rights are abused and the economy is in shambles. While some areas, especially those in the north and coastal region, have been more affected than others, the entire country is in a crisis mode. As a failed nation state by any definition, what are the scenarios for the future of Yemen and its diverse population? Are there lessons from the past that will help explain how the situation deteriorated so dramatically? What are the cultural factors that must be brought into play for resolution of conflict and viable future development? These are the 102

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questions that will haunt analysts as the current conflict continues. My approach to these questions is as an anthropologist, historian and development consultant with experience in Yemen since 1978, when I first arrived to conduct ethnographic and ecological fieldwork on traditional water resource use in the Yemeni highlands. I spent over a year living in the fertile spring fed valley of al-Ahjur, the headwater of Wadi Surdud, which flowed to the Red Sea.3 This highland valley was famous over the centuries for its rich agricultural tradition due to the plentiful supply of water from local springs. My wife, anthropologist Najwa Adra, and I arrived in al-Ahjur soon after the car road reached the valley and a little before the nearby villages had electricity. This was Yemen in transition, soon after Ali Abdullah Saleh had been thrust into power after the assassination of the previous two presidents, Ibrahim al-Hamdi and Ahmad al-Ghashmi. The reconciliation that ended a prolonged civil war in the 1960s was only a decade old and was already coming apart. Beyond the political change, Yemen was on the verge of a remittance-fueled development boom. Yemeni men working abroad, primarily in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, were sending home hard cash to develop infrastructure, build new homes, local schools and even clinics.4 In the absence of most government services in the rural sector, local development initiatives were the engine of change. Cash in the rural sector had a major impact on traditional household subsistence production. When I first arrived to alAhjur, the primary summer crop was sorghum (dhura), a staple for centuries due to its nutritious grain which could be made into porridge (‘asid) or bread, leaves and upper stalks for animal fodder and bottom stalks for fuelwood in the tannur ovens. Several local farmers were starting to experiment with new crops, like tomatoes and citrus trees, but the major change was bringing more and more fields into production of qat (Catha edulis) trees, the leaves of which were used as a stimulant for social gatherings.5 After receiving my Ph.D. I returned to Yemen over a dozen times in the 1980s and 1990s as a development consultant on projects related to agriculture, irrigation, environmental impact, biodiversity, local plant protection methods, sanitation, education and other factors. I participated in development as a social scientist, usually working with economists and technical experts in various fields. Building on the knowledge I learned during my fieldwork and my ability to use Yemeni dialect, I was able to provide a more nuanced context for project design and assessment. My development work gave me a chance to visit virtually all regions of Yemen and appreciate the variety and diversity of Yemeni culture and the magnitude of the challenges facing development efforts. Throughout the 80’s I believed that Yemen was making progress with a vivid entrepreneurial spirit that overshadowed the limitations of the government. As a historian working on Rasulid era (13th-15th century) Yemeni texts on agriculture, my research among traditional farmers gave me a profound respect for the ingenuity of Yemeni farmers over the centuries in creating a fertile land out of often harsh environmental conditions. Beyond my interest in the history of Yemen’s agricultural history, I also gained an appreciation for the longue durée of Yemen’s political history. The past, as the well-known saying goes, is prologue to the future. Thus, in 103

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order to speculate on the question of the future of Yemen, one can benefit from knowing more about its past.

Can Arabia Be Felix Again? It thus turns out that the earliest mentions of Arabia eudaímõn locates it in the Arabian Gulf as lying opposite the island of Bahrayn. It seems that the epithet eudaímõn originally is connected with the island and originates from the role it plays in the ancient Mesopotamian myths about Dilmun… Originally, the concept had nothing to do with Yemen. – Jan Retsö6

Given the loss of life, the lack of security, physical damage to the infrastructure, destruction of heritage, and the ongoing environmental and economic challenges in the current conflict, can this part of Arabia ever be felix again, if indeed it ever was? Descriptions of Yemen often begin with noting that it was known in Latin as Arabia Felix, a translation of the Greek eudaímõn. In Arabic the term ‘Yemen’ connotes both ‘happy’ and ‘south,’ making it a seemingly obvious connection due to the fertility of southern Yemen compared to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. Yet, by examining the early Greek texts and maps based on the 2nd century CE geographical work of Claudius Ptolemaeus, it appears that Arabia Felix originally referred to the entire Arabian Peninsula.7 Indeed, the original sense was probably for the old Mesopotamian myths about Dilmun. This revelation does not undo the centuries of usage in which Arabia Felix refers to Yemen, but it does suggest that there is no intrinsic reason why this southern part of Arabia should ever have been uniquely felix (happy) at all. My diversion into an ancient terminological conundrum is even more relevant when it appears that the original Greek term that inspired locating Arabia Felix in Yemen was due to a clever alibi by Caesar Augustus for the failure of the 24 BCE expedition of Aelius Gallus to reach the fabled Dilmun of the day.8 History is far more a story of unhappiness than happiness, at least in terms of the wars and political intrigue that are commonly recorded. As the home of the valued frankincense, Arabia Felix as the southern part of the peninsula was justly famous. This important commodity was traded far and wide, allowing several kingdoms to rise and fall in the south while much of the rest of the peninsula was populated by Bedouin and small coastal towns. But local dynasties battled with each other, even when there were periods of relative security. The lucrative trade along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean network also attracted pirates throughout its long history, not just after the more recent insecurity of contemporary Somalia. When the historical details from texts, inscriptions and archaeological fieldwork are melded together, much of the past is anything but happy, except in reinvented hindsight. The history of Yemen during the Islamic era is also one of upheaval with hardly any period of sustained stability. Although it is claimed that the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson ‘Ali first brought the message of Islam to Yemen, it is doubtful that most of the population were won over or had detailed knowledge of the evolving faith in the Umayyad 104

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and early Abbasid periods. The Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun sent Muhammad ibn Ziyad, the younger brother of the Umayyad caliph Mu‘awiya, in 818 CE to put down a revolt. He was able to wrest control of the coastal Tihama, although the rugged highlands presented a problem for any force trying to subdue the tribes or local dynasties. Half a century later the local ruler of the Ziyadid dynasty declared himself a monarch and stopped sending taxes back to the Abbasid court in Baghdad. Other power brokers soon emerged in the highlands, including the Zaydi Shi’a entry from the north in the late 9th century CE. In the 12th century the Ayyubids took nominal control of the coast, port of Aden and southern highlands, followed a half century later by the Rasulid sultans, who owed no allegiance to any power outside Yemen. By the 16th century Yemen was ripe for the taking by new imperial domains. The Portuguese first attempted to capture the port of Aden in 1513 but were never successful. By 1538, however, the Ottomans were able to subdue Aden and eventually establish control of much of Yemen for a century, returning later in the 19th century after the British had seized Aden in 1839 as a refueling port.9 The Zaydis in the north were never able to establish full control over the whole of Yemen, although by the early 20th century Imam Yahya was able to expand his power southward to the borders of the British protectorate of Aden and drive out the Ottomans.10 The expansion of the Wahhabi regime of King Ibn Sa‘ud in the 1930s resulted in the loss of Yemeni influence in the Asir region and Najran. Yahya was assassinated in 1948 in an attempted coup, but his son Ahmed managed to gain control until his death in 1962. The protracted civil war lasted until 1969 and witnessed a major loss of life by the forces of Egypt’s Abdul Nasser, who supported the republican cause.11 There is relatively little felix in the long historical narrative of Yemen. Due to its strategic location at the bottom of the Red Sea with sea access to the east coast of Africa and east to the Gulf, Iran, India and beyond, there has always been interest in controlling this southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. While the coast was often difficult to defend, the rugged highlands have always been a challenge that favours the local inhabitants. This is as true today for the combined forces of the Huthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh as it was for Nasser during the republic civil war, the Ottomans, the Rasulids and the caliphs in Baghdad. Global concerns about shipping through the strait of the Bab al-Mandab at the bottom of the Red Sea, along with the political future of states in the Horn of Africa, make the future of Yemen a fundamental concern not only for the GCC states, but for the global interest in stability of the region.

Dreaming Up Scenarios A meaningful political settlement will need to address a highly complex and interconnected matrix of issues, not least the hard power dynamics on the ground, the wide variety of demands from the different armed groups that have emerged during

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the war, and the interests of regional players who have become party to the conflict. – Peter Salisbury12

It has become common place for discussion of the current conflict in Yemen to quote the words of Saleh that he danced on the heads of snakes.13 Apart from its self-serving emphasis, it can be argued that he himself was one of those snakes and that indeed the history of Yemen has been a political snake pit from the start. The problem with the current poisonous atmosphere in Yemen today is that there are many kinds of snakes seeking power at the expense of others. Some are home-grown, but others have slithered in from other countries. The snake metaphor, however, does not provide a solution to the resolution of Yemen’s conflict. A better image, I suggest, is the blue agame lizard found throughout the Yemeni highlands and into the southern part of Saudi Arabia.14 This lizard likes to sun itself on rocks, quickly vanishing when anyone approaches. Such a metaphor would seem better suited to the myriad forces battling each other in Yemen, not as snakes able to gobble each other up but lizards looking for space to show themselves off. What does the future hold for Yemen? The possible scenarios depend on what will happen both inside and outside Yemen. The transition to the Donald Trump administration in the USA may alter the role of America in the conflict, especially in stepped-up attacks on Al-Qaida and Daesh in Yemen, while the provision of military hardware to the GCC states is not likely to abate. The successor of Sultan Qaboos in Oman will necessarily impact relations with Yemen, as well as Oman’s future decisions within the GCC. It is not clear if the successor will continue to stay out of the current conflict and attempt to play a mediation role. A change of succession in Saudi Arabia, given the age of King Salman, may signal a change in the Saudi will to continue a war that so far has not resulted in achieving the initial goals. The possibility of President Hadi stepping down or being removed from the picture may yield a negotiated settlement. What if Saleh or Abd al-Malik al-Huthi are removed from the scene? The variables defy prediction at this stage. Whatever the political situation will be in the future, several things will need to be negotiated in the long run. The war has created not only a humanitarian disaster but also destroyed much of the infrastructure and decimated the economy. There will be a need for massive amounts of development aid. The sectarian strife, fueled during the Saleh regime, is not likely to go away. Yemenis in the north are not likely to quickly forgive and forget the massive damage done by the Saudi-led coalition. The conditions that led to the growth of AlQaida and ISIS are not going to be resolved overnight, especially with continuing American involvement in the conflict. Perhaps most importantly, will it be possible for a democratic Yemen to be forged, given that all the other states on the peninsula are monarchies eager to defend their autocratic power? I have called this section “Dreaming up Scenarios” to note that the complexity of the problems facing Yemen makes it extremely difficult to predict the future of a Yemeni state, especially while the ongoing conflict is not yet resolved. Rather than suggest a preferred or 106

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even a likely scenario, I outline what might happen in three very different short-term futures for Yemen. The first assumes a Saudi/GCC hegemony either through military victory or hardlined soft power. I do not think that the current war is winnable in the air or on the ground, but it is useful to think what could happen if the Saudi-led coalition was successful in most of their goals. The second assumes a stalemate in which Yemen remains divided into factions, whether coupled together for some kind of state structure or not. The third assumes, for the sake of visionary argument, either a major victory for the Huthi/Saleh forces or a united front with other Yemeni factions against Saudi and GCC hegemony, leading to shared and “democratic” leadership.

Scenario A: Saudi/GCC Hegemony The stated objective of the Saudi-led coalition war against Yemen has been to reinstate the ousted president Hadi and disarm the Huthi/Saleh forces. The justification for this goal is UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (April 2015) that called for the Huthis to withdraw their forces from the capital, cease all hostilities and return arms seized from Yemen’s military and security institutions.15 If there was an all-out victory in which Saudiled ground troops were able to take Sanaa, capture the Huthi leaders and overcome the resistance of the Huthi-led tribesmen and former military troops loyal to Saleh, the situation would be reminiscent of the 1962 civil war in which Nasser’s Egyptian troops provided the main security for the capital. But it would be bloody. As an outside occupying force, composed either of Yemeni mercenaries or soldiers from other Arab or African states, the newly returned government would have to launch a major development campaign restoring the basic infrastructure and rebuilding the damage done by the bombing campaign. At this stage it would require billions of dollars of aid just to return Yemen to the shape it was in under the final years of Saleh. The likelihood of such a military victory is very limited. No occupying force has ever been able to hold on to Yemen, especially when challenges erupt back home. The current budget crisis and lingering regime change situation of the Saudis would make a major foreign occupation by Saudi-backed troops difficult. Even if a mercenary force were brought in, it is hard to image how Yemenis would accept this, especially after the major destruction of the Saudi campaign. In addition to holding on to the capital and winning over the hearts and minds of Yemeni citizens, there would have to be a major thrust against Al-Qaida and Daesh, which have already demonstrated their ability to terrorize the Saudi troops and Yemenis allied with the Hadi government. A Saudi takeover of Sanaa would not soften the desire of the southern secessionist movement, but might actually make it even more opposed to a central government dominated by Saudi interests with American support. More questions arise about the implications of such a scenario than can be answered. Would the Saudi/GCC accept a democratic state in Yemen when each of the GCC states is run by a royal family? Would they prefer another ‘elected’ dictator that can be controlled, 107

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as they did with Saleh for a number of years? Would they allow the Zaydis to practice their faith in peace or would they support the imported Salafi claim that Zaydis (and now Shi’a in general) are not good or trustworthy Muslims? Would the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia have to be redrawn yet again, this time with greater favour to the Saudi government? Would the GCC divide up Yemen for development the way that the Allied Forces did in the Middle East after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire with Saudi controlling the northern oil fields and the Emirates rebuilding the port of Aden on a Dubai model? Would the proposed idea of a waterway through the Empty Desert to take GCC oil directly to the Gulf of Aden be followed up?16

Scenario B: Fragmented Yemen Stalemate A second scenario basically assumes the forward projection of the status quo in which none of the factions fighting for control of a united Yemen are able to achieve dominance. As has been the case in Syria, a protracted civil war could last for years into the future. The northern civil war from 1962-1969 was different in that there were two main rivals; the situation in Yemen now has multiple factions, some of which are in temporary alliances that could break at a moment’s notice. One possibility is Huthi/Saleh dominance north of Taiz with an uneasy border truce, the reinstatement of the former regime in Aden with support from the southern secessionist movement, and continued outbreaks of Al-Qaida or Ansar al-Shariah and Daesh in the east and Hadramawt. It is not clear that Ansar al-Shariah and Daesh could be eliminated without a strong central government that was committed to this and major external firepower. This would obviously be a disaster for forming a state in Yemen, as it has been for Syria and Iraq, in part because Yemen’s population has nowhere to flee to. There might be forced migration of northerners in the south to the north and southerners in the north to the south, thus uprooting families. Restitution of the last ‘official’ government in the south might be recognized by the UN and international community, but it would not be able to function well outside, nor in the other parts of Yemen. Such a scenario would also increase rather than moderate the sectarian overtones to the political contest. There would be more competition to control the gas and oil resources, limited as they currently are. The instability of such a stalemate would be unlikely to attract exploration for new oil and gas fields or to promote international business investment in any part of the country. Stalemate would be a disaster, a failure to resolve the issues that have led to conflict over decades. The security of the GCC would be harmed if there was such a division of Yemen into isolated zones unable to reconcile their differences. To the extent that an unstable Yemen remained a haven for radical groups, many of which have called for the removal of the GCC leaders, there would be a greater threat to security within the GCC states. Even if Iran was kept from playing a role in supporting the Huthis in the north, the current sectarian clash within Yemen would not be reduced. Such a stalemate, measured in future 108

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decades, could not last, but it would severely damage the current population, especially the youth with limited access to education and meaningful employment.

C: Scenario for a New Democratic State If the war continues and the humanitarian crisis worsens but the Saudi-led coalition is still unable to win a decisive victory in Yemen, this could force a compromise in which the Huthi forces are allowed to remain in power in the north by breaking with Saleh, settling a truce along the Saudi border and distancing themselves from Iranian support. It is unlikely that the Huthi forces would ever agree to work with Ansar al-Shariah or Daesh, which are both dedicated to creating an Islamic state of an extreme Sunni perspective, so this position could be a good bargaining chip for making a deal with the Saudis. In theory, there could be reconciliation with the southern secessionists if Saleh were removed from the picture and there was a common purpose in resisting Saudi hegemony, which few in the south want. The advantages of returning to a unified state, if there was in fact fairness and justice rather than crony patronage and elite cooption of power, outweigh the return to two separate states. A reconciliation, not unlike the one that ended the republican civil war in the 1960s, would resolve the problem of access to oil and gas fields and create an opportunity to rebuild Aden as a major world port. Given the radical changes the south went through switching from British colonial control to a socialist state and then bearing the brunt of Saleh’s exploitation in the unified state, it is not impossible that a reunification could take place. Historically, enemies at one stage are at times able to become allies and even friends, as happened after World War II. Redefining a vibrant Yemeni nationalism would not be easy, but there is a rich heritage of mediation and common values to drawn on. A democratic Yemen would not be easily accepted by the GCC, since it would represent an alternative to their own royal oligarchy governance. The most affected would be Saudi Arabia, which has a population in the south that traditionally allied more closely with Yemen than the Saudi family in Riyadh. The presence of a successful democratic state on their southern border would no doubt encourage those segments of Saudi society which have not benefited from the oil wealth. Yemen should be able to maintain good relations with Oman, given the buffer zone of Mahra between their borders and the fact that Oman has not intervened in the current war. Similarly, Yemen would pose no physical threat to the other Gulf states with which they do not share a border. Historical ties, including tribal genealogical origins, could be called up for reconciliation if the current political tension is reduced. In theory, the ongoing rhetoric of American foreign policy would seem to suggest support for a democratic Yemen rather than one ruled by a dictator or the re-emergence of a religious oligarchy. If the current beginnings of a realist questioning of American support for the Saudis continue to gain ground, in part because the USA no longer depends on Saudi oil, the presence of a unified and democratic Yemen could be welcomed, since it would 109

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not pose a single sectarian frame as in Saudi Arabia. There were hopes that the National Dialogue Conference brokered by the GCC would lead to a viable state, so that hope could be revived if some of the current players are no longer involved. Rapprochement with Iran was clearly an emerging U.S. foreign policy shift under President Obama, although what the Trump administration plans is still not known. If Iran as a regional player no longer feels directly threatened, as they were in the past by Saddam’s Iraq and Saudi Arabia, resolving the Yemen crisis could have far reaching impact in the region. Unfortunately, by arming the Saudis and other GCC states rather than agreeing to simply provide military protection, as demonstrated in the first Gulf War, the USA and other Western powers are actually creating a scenario for more future warfare. The question posed at the start of this chapter is if Arabia can ever be felix again. The fact that Yemen never really was happy is a telling reminder that the notion of a past golden age is always a myth. The realization that Arabia Felix originally meant more than the southern part known as Yemen is a reminder that the future of Yemen cannot be determined except in relation to other states of the peninsula. Yemen is the poor relative of the Arabian Peninsula states, the GCC being a consortium of wealthy states that has been able to maintain political structures that favour an elite family rule. Without the oil wealth, which has created at the same time a dependence on expat labor at all levels, the Arabian Peninsula would look far different. Indeed, if Yemen had oil as early as its sister states and if the port of Aden had continued its global dominance past the 1950s, Yemen would probably be the main power broker today, not the victim of a humanitarian disaster. Despite the ongoing strife, even the dimmest glimmer of hope is needed for the future of a people who have no choice but to survive a hell on earth.

Notes 1 Robert L. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen. (Bombay: Education Society’s Press, 1859), 1. 2 OCHA, 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview. New York: UNOCHA, January, 2017. Electronic document: http://www.unocha.org/yemen. (Accessed March, 2017). 3 This fieldwork is documented in my The Adaptive Dynamics of Water Allocation in al-Ahjur, Yemen Arab Republic. Ph.D. dissertation, Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. See also Daniel Martin Varisco, “Reflections on Fieldwork in Yemen: The Genealogy of a Diary in Response to Rabinow’s Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco.” Anthropology of the Middle East 1(2):35-62, 2006. 4 For a description of local development at the time, see Daniel Martin Varisco and Najwa Adra, “Affluence and the Concept of the Tribe in the Central Highlands of the Yemen Arab Republic,” In R. Salisbury and E. Tooker, editors, Affluence and Cultural Survival, (Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society, 1984), 134-149. 5 The issue of qāt is often brought up in regards to Yemen. For details on the introduction and use of qāt in Yemen, see my “Qât and Traditional Healing in Yemen,” in H. Schönig and I. Hehmeyer, editors, Herbal Medicine in Yemen. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 69-102. 6 Jan Retsö, “Where and What Was ‘Arabia Felix’”? Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 30:191, 2000. 7 Jan Retsö, “When Did Yemen Become ‘Arabia Felix’”? Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 33:233, 2003.

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8 Jan Retsö, “When Did Yemen Become ‘Arabia Felix’?,” 233. 9 For an overview of the British presence in Aden, see R.J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule: 1839-1967. (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975). 10 For an overview of the history of Yemen in the 20th century, see Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For a Yemeni diplomat’s perspective, see Mohsin A. Alaini, 50 Years in Shifting Sands: Personal Experience in the Building of a Modern State in Yemen (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar An-Nahar, 2004). 11 See Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 12 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State,” Chatham House, May, 2016. Electronic document: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-stemming-rise-chaos-state (Accessed March, 2017), 41. 13 This even become the title of a book on the events leading up to the Arab Spring by Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 14 For an image of this lizard, see http://tinyurl.com/ybedp9h6 (Accessed March, 2017). 15 The formal resolution (2216) was issued in April, 2015 (http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ sc11859.doc.htm), following any earlier UN condemnation of the Huthis in February (http://www. securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php?page=2). Conveniently ignored in this resolution is the call “on all member States to refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability and instead to support the political transition.” Western arms sales of items such as cluster bombs are apparently not regarded as fomenting conflict, especially on civilians; see http://tinyurl.com/ ybw3at46 (Accessed March, 2017). 16 See http://tinyurl.com/yajruvax (Accessed March, 2017).

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Select Bibliography This bibliography only lists the published sources and does not include the newspaper citations or unauthored weblinks mentioned in the footnotes. Alaini, Mohsin A. 50 Years in Shifting Sands: Personal Experience in the Building of a Modern State in Yemen. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar An-Nahar, 2004. Al-Bolushi, M. “The Effect of Omani-Iranian Relations on the Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries after the Arab Spring.” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 9, no. 3 (2016):383-399. Al-Enazy, Askar Halwan. “‘The International Boundary Treaty’ Concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Republic on June 12, 2000.” American Journal of International Law 96 no. 1, (2002):161-173. Al-Gosaibi, Ghazi Abdul Rahman. “A Memoir of Yemen.” Journal of the British-Yemeni Society 21 (2013):19-22. Allen, Calvin H and W. Lynn Rigsbee. Oman Under Qaboos. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Al Tamamy, Saud Mousaed. “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security,” in Henner Fürteg, editor, Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts, 191-208. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco. “The Marshall Plan.” In Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition, 2009. Anthony, John Duke Anthony. “Whither Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations?: Interests and Implications for U.S. Policies,” Issue Briefs No. 3. US-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee, 1999. Badeeb, Saeed M. The Saudi-Egyptian conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. Berti, Benedetta, and Yoel Guzansky. “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in Syria: Toward a New Chapter?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 3 (2014):25–34. Blumi,Isa. Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism. New York: Routledge, 2011. Boghart, Lori Plotkin and Michael Knights. “Border Fight Could Shift Saudi Arabia’s Yemen War Calculus.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Policywatch 2736), 6 December 2016. Electronic document: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/border-fight-could-shift-saudiarabias-yemen-war-calculus (Accessed January, 2017). Boucek, Christopher. Yemen on the Brink, War in Saada, From Local Insurrection to National Challenge. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010. Brandt. Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. London: Hurst, 2017. Brandt, Marieke. “Sufyan’s ‘Hybrid’ War: Tribal Politics during the Huthi Conflict,” Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 3, no 1 (2013):120-138. Brehony, Noel. “Yemen and the Huthis: Genesis of the 2015 Crisis.” Asian Affairs, 46, no. 2 (2015): 232–50. Brehony, Noel. Yemen Divided. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. Brunet-Jailly, Emmanuel. Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe. Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 2007. Burke, Edward. “‘One Blood and One Destiny’? Yemen’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council.” Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, no. 23, 2012. Electronic document: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/ Yemen-and-the- GCC.pdf (Accessed January, 2017).

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Burrowes, Robert D. Historical Dictionary of Yemen, Second Edition. Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2010. Cannon, Brendon J. “Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, no. 2 (2016)23-37:. Clark, Victoria. Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Colombo, Silvia. “The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring, Between Outreach, Patronage and Repression.” IAI Working Papers 12 (March): 1–16, 2012. Electronic document: http://tashbek.net/arabspring/ attachments/article/1475/iaiwp1209.pdf (Accessed January, 2017). Colton, Nora Ann. “Yemen: A Collapsed Economy.” Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 (2010):410-426. Cordesman, Anthony H. Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges. London: Praeger Security International, 2005. Cronin, Stephanie, and Nur Masalha. “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC States: Revolution to Realpolitik ?” London School of Economic and Political Science Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, no. 17, 2011. Electronic document: http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/Cronin and Masalha.pdf (Accessed January, 2017). Deibel, Terry L. Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. DeVore, Marc. “The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75,” Cold War History, 11, no. 3 (2011):441–471. Donnan, Hastings and Thomas Wilson. Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State. Oxford: Berg, 1999. Downs, Kevin. “A Theoretical Analysis of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Bahrain.” Journal of Politics and International Studies, 8 (2012):203–37. Electronic document: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-omaniran-gas-idUSKCN10L21N (Accessed January, 2017). Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Mahjoob Zweiri. “Iran under Ahmadinejad: When Crisis Becomes a Pattern,” In A. Ehteshami and M. Zweiri, editors, Iran’s Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad, 141-156. Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011. Farrokh, Kaveh. Iran at War, 1500-1988. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011. Freeman, Jack. “The al-Houthi Insurgency in the North of Yemen: An Analysis of the Shabab al Moumineen.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2009), pp. 1008-1019. Gause III, F. Gregory. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Gavin, R. J. Aden Under British Rule: 1839-1967. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975. Gavrilis, George. The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Halliday, Fred. Revolution and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Hartshorne, Richard. “Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries.” Annual Association of American Geographers 36, no 1. (1936):56-57. Hassner, Ron E. and Jason Wittenberg. “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why.” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015):157-190. Hellmich, Christina. “Fighting Al-Qaida in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35 (2012):618-633. Hill, Ginny and Gerd Nonneman. “Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2011, published by: http://www. chathamhouse.org.uk/files/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf. (Accessed January, 2017). Hiltermann, Joost. “Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia’s War inside Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, 16 December 2009. Electronic document: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2009-12-16/ disorder-border (Accessed March, 2017). Hodgson, Marshall G. S. “How Did the Early Shî’a become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 75 (1955): 1-13. Hoffman, Valerie. The Essentials of Ibadi Islam. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012.

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Horton, Michael. “Borderline Crisis: Saudi Intervenes in Yemen.” Janes Intelligence Review, January 2010. Jean, Grace V. “Good Fences, Good Neighbours: Saudi Arabia Securing its Borders with Sensors and Software.” National Defense, 94, no. 673 (2009):34-35. Jones, Jeremy and Nicholas Peter Ridout. A History of Modern Oman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Katulis, Brian & Juul, Peter. “U.S. Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition: Lessons for U.S. Policy from the Past Three Years. “ Center for American Progress, 2014. Electronic document: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/06/16/91809/u-s-middleeast-policy-at-a-time-of-regional-fragmentation-and-competition/ (Accessed January, 2017). Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and The World. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995. Kechichian, Joseph A. “Oman: A Unique Foreign Policy Produces a Key Player in Middle Eastern and Global Diplomacy.” Rand.Org. Electronic document: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/ RB2501.html (Accessed December, 2016). Knights, Michael and Alexandre Mello. “The Escalating Northern Front in Yemen.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Policywatch 2490), 24 September 2015. Electronic document: http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/the-escalating-northern-front-in-yemen. (Accessed January, 2017). Kohlberg, Etan. “Some Zaydī Views on the Companions of the Prophet.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 39, no. 1 (1976):91-98. Kolossov, Vladimir. “Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches,” Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (1936):1-27. Lackner, Helen. Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ Transition from Autocracy: Could It Have Succeeded? Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016. Electronic document: http:// www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/yemens-peaceful-transition-autocracy-could-it-have-succeeded (Accessed March, 2017). Lackner, Helen, editor. Why Yemen Matters. London: Saqi, 2014. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. “Oman’s Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century.” Middle East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010):99-114. Electronic document: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14754967.2010.00429.x/full Mabon, Simon. “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.” Middle East Policy, 19, no. 2 (2012):84–97. Manea, Elham. Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen. London: Saqi, 2005. Mcinnis, J Matthew. “What Does Iran Really Want in Yemen ? ” AEIdeas, Spring, 2015. https://www.aei.org/publication/what-does-iran-really-want-in-yemen/ (Accessed January, 2017). Momani, Bessma, and Crystal A. Ennis. “Between Caution and Controversy: Lessons from the Gulf Arab States as (Re-)Emerging Donors.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25, no. 4 (2013):605–27. Nafeez, Ahmed. “Saudi War for Yemen Oil Pipeline is Empowering Al-Qaida, IS, Middle East Eye, 2016. Electronic document: http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/saudi-war-yemen-oil-pipelineempowering-Al-Qaida-1386143996 (Accessed January, 2017). Nuruzzaman, Mohammed. “Conflicts between Iran and the Gulf Arab States: An Economic Evaluation.” Strategic Analysis, 36, no. 4 (2012):542–53. Nyrop, Richard F. Area Handbook for The Persian Gulf States. Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1997. Pollack, Kenneth. “Fight or Flight: America’s Choice in the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2016. Electronic document. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-02-16/fight-orflight (Accessed March, 2017). O’Halloran, James C. editor. IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016. United Kingdom: IHS, 2015. O’Reilly, Marc J. “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future.” Middle East Journal, 52, no. 1 (1998):70-84. Orkaby. A. “Saudi Arabia’s War with the Houthis: Old Borders, New Lines,” Washington Institute, Policywatch 2404, April, 2015. Electronic document: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ saudi-arabias-war-with-the-houthis-old-borders-new-lines (Accessed January, 2017). Overton, Shaun. “The Yemen Arms Trade: Still a Concern for Terrorism and Regional Security.” Terrorism Monitor 3 no. 9 (2005).

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Plairfair, Robert L. A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen. Bombay: Education Society’s Press, 1859. Pradhan, Prasanta Kumar. “The GCC–Iran Conflict and Its Strategic Implications for the Gulf Region.” Strategic Analysis 35, no. 2 (2011):265–76. Prescott, J. R. V. Political Frontiers and Boundaries. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Retsö, Jan. “When Did Yemen Become ‘Arabia Felix’”? Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 33 (2003):229-235 Retsö, Jan. “Where and What Was ‘Arabia Felix’”? Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 30 (2000): 189-192. Richter, Thomas. “Saudi Arabia: A Conservative P(l)ayer on the Retreat?” in Henner Fürteg, editor, Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts, 177-190. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Roberts, John. The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Treaty,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, (Summer 2000): 70-73. Ruys, Tom and Luca Ferro. “Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2016):61-98. Rogers, Joshua. “The Making of the Tribal Republic: North Yemen’s Tribes and Central Authority during the Civil War 1962-70,” British-Yemeni Society Journal 24 (2016):12-18. Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, May, 2016. Electronic document: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-stemming-rise-chaos-state (Accessed March, 2017). Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen and the Saudi – Iranian ‘Cold War,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, February, 2015. Electronic file: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_ document/20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf (Accessed March, 2017). Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010. Salter, Mark B. and Elia Zureik, editors, Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity. New York: Routledge, 2005. Saouli, Adham. The Arab State, Dilemmas of Late Formation. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. Schmierer, Richard J. “The Sultanate of Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal. Middle East Policy, 22, no. 4 (2015):113-120. Schmitz, Charles. “Yemen’s National Dialogue,” The Middle East Institute, Policy Paper Series, February 2014. Electronic document: http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue (Accessed March, 2017). Schofield, Richard, editor. Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States. London: UCL Press, 1994. Scomegna, Paolo. “Yemen’s New Government Faces Long-Standing Demographic Challenges”. Prb.Org, 2012. Electronic document: http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2012/yemen-country-spotlight. aspx (Accessed December, 2016). Terrill, W. Andrew. “Iranian Involvement in Yemen.” Orbis 58, no. 3 (2014):429–40. Thiollet, Hélène. “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen.” In Helen Lackner, editor, Why Yemen Matters , 267-286. London: Saqi, 2010. Varisco, Daniel Martin. “Qât and Traditional Healing in Yemen.” In H. Schönig and I. Hehmeyer, editors, Herbal Medicine in Yemen, 69-102. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Varisco, Daniel Martin. “Reflections on Fieldwork in Yemen: The Genealogy of a Diary in Response to Rabinow’s Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco.” Anthropology of the Middle East, no. 2 (2006): 35-62, 2006. Varisco, Daniel Martin. The Adaptive Dynamics of Water Allocation in al-Ahjur, Yemen Arab Republic. Ph.D. dissertation, Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Varisco, Daniel Martin and Najwa Adra. “Affluence and the Concept of the Tribe in the Central Highlands of the Yemen Arab Republic.” In R. Salisbury and E. Tooker, editors, Affluence and Cultural Survival, 134-149. Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society, 1984. Walters, W. “‘Border Control.’” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (2006):187-193.

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Winter, Lucas. “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances.” Middle East Policy 18, no. 1 (2011):102-120. Young, Karen. Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the UAE. Palgrave: London, 2014. Zimmerman, Katherine and Steve Gonzalez. “Tracker: Saudi Arabia’s Military Operations Along Yemeni Border.” American Enterprise Institute (Critical Threats program), 4 January 2010. Electronic document: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/tracker-saudi-arabia’s-military-operations-along-yemeni-border (Accessed January, 2017). Zweiri, Mahjoob. “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen.” Digest of Middle East Studies, 25, no. 1 (2016):4-18. Zweiri, Mahjoob. “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen,” Digest of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (2016):4-18.

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About the Contributors

Ahmed Abdullah Baabood is a graduate in BA History from SOAS, University of London and a postgraduate in MA International Studies and Diplomacy from the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS. His MA thesis focused on the role of US counter-terrorism policy in Yemen and its impact on state-building. Since completing his postgraduate studies he has undertaken work as a Research Assistant at Brookings Doha Center. Sterling Jensen is an assistant professor at the United Arab Emirate’s National Defense College where he lectures on economic statecraft and security. Dr Jensen previously served at the USA National Defense University’s Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies where he was research associate supporting the programs in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq. His doctoral dissertation, taken at King’s College, was on the 2006 Sunni tribal uprising against Al-Qaida in Iraq. Dr Jensen worked in Iraq from 2006-2011 as a contract interpreter, civilian foreign area officer and a campaign manager in strategic communications. Helen Lackner worked as a consultant in social aspects of rural development for four decades in over thirty countries, mostly in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. She has been involved in Yemen since the early 1970s where she lived in all three Yemeni states for over 15 years. She now focuses on analysis and writing, trying to promote commitment to equitable development and peace in Yemen. Her most recent publications include Yemen’s Peaceful transition from autocracy: could it have succeeded? (International IDEA 2016) and Understanding the Yemeni Crisis: the transformation of tribal roles in recent decades (Durham, Luce Fellowship Paper 17, 2016). She is currently working on Yemen in Crisis: neoliberalism, autocracy and the disintegration of a state to be published by Saqi in October 2017. Ash Rossiter is Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University of Science and Technology (KUST) in Abu Dhabi. Before joining KUST in 2015, he had a multi-faceted career across the Middle East and North Africa, spanning the private, government and military sectors. His academic specializations are in the international relations and security affairs of the Middle East states and the generation and use of military power. He received his PhD in 2014 from Exeter University where he remains an honorary research fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. Daniel Martin Varisco is President of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies. He first conducted ethnographic research on water resource use and agriculture in a central highland Yemeni valley in 1978-79 for a PhD in anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania. He returned to Yemen during the 1980s through 2005 as a development consultant for USAID, GTZ and the World Bank, including drafting the Yemen Country Social Analysis for the World Bank. As a historian, he has published on Yemeni agriculture, irrigation and environmental issues. His Medieval Agriculture and Islamic Science: The Almanac of a Yemeni Sultan (1994) provides an edition, translation and analysis

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of the earliest Rasulid almanac from the 13th century CE. His commentaries on the crisis in Yemen are archived on the blog MENA Tidningen in Sweden. He has taught at Hofstra University and Qatar University. Mahjoob Zweiri is an Associate Professor in Contemporary History in the Gulf Studies Program at Qatar University. He was the Head of Humanities Department from 2011-2016. Before joining Qatar University, Dr Zweiri was senior researcher in Middle East Politics and Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. He was also a visiting professor to School of Government & International Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003-December 2006 he was a research fellow and then a director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Dr Zweiri has more than 45 p ‬ ublications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary Middle East. In addition to Arabic, Dr Zweiri is fluent in Farsi and English.

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Note on Transliteration and Abbreviations Transliteration in this volume follows commonly accepted forms in the literature and media without technical transliteration. Names of individuals are transliterated as they are usually found in the media. This is also true for terms for groups, such as Daesh in English and Daech in French, the usual Arabic acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq and al-Sham or ISIS). Common Yemeni placenames include Aden, Hodeidah, Marib, al-Mukalla, Sanaa (also recorded as Sana‘a and San‘a), Taiz. Arabic placenames can be found at: http://tinyurl.com/yal2drvn AIYS American Institute for Yemeni Studies AQAP Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BCE Before Common Era CE Common Era DAESH Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) DPW Dubai Ports World DRY Democratic Republic of Yemen ECSC European Coal and Steel Community FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP gross domestic product GPC General People’s Congress IS Islamic State ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria JMP Joint Meeting Parties km kilometers KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDC National Dialogue Conference NLF National Liberation Front OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 121

Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

PFLO Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf ROY Republic of Yemen SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces UAE United Arab Emirates UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UPI United Press International USA United States of America USD U.S. dollar USSR former Soviet Union WHO World Health Organisation YAR Yemen Arab Republic YSP Yemen Socialist Party

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Chronology of Yemen (20th-21st Centuries) Note: The focus of this timeline is for understanding the events leading up to the current crisis. For a detailed timeline of the crisis since 2011, see http://tinyurl.com/yb54slyp. (Accessed March, 2017). Year

Event

1904

Yahya Hamid al-Din becomes Zaydi Imam in North Yemen

1916

Qatar becomes British protectorate

1911

1918 1925 1926 1932 1934 1934 1941 1945 1945 1946 1948 1951 1952 1953 1953 1956 1956 1959 1961

Treaty of Da’an (October) between Imam Yahya and Turkish envoy Izzat Pasha; ratified in 1913. Yahya gave up right to collect zakat and his title of ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ but Ottomans would give him 25,000 Turkish Pounds per year and not let anyone else become Imam Imam Yahya establishes Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen with Ottoman defeat in World War I Reza Shah Pahlavi comes to power in Iran

Italy establishes Treaty of Friendship with Yemen’s Imam Yahya

Foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud

Ibn Saud annexes Asir and Najran and attacks Yemen, ended by Treaty of Taif in May Britain and Imam Yahya agree on southern border

Mohammed Reza replaces his father on the throne in Iran

Arab League established with Saudi Arabia and Mutawakkilite Yemen as founding members

Saudi King Abdul Aziz meets President Roosevelt, establishment of US air base in Saudi Arabia Mutawakkilite Yemen recognized by USA President Harry S. Truman Imam Yahya assassinated in February and his son Ahmad takes over Mossadegh becomes Prime Minister in Iran and the Shah flees Nasser and Free Officers overthrow monarchy in Egypt

Death of Saudi King Abdul Aziz, who is replaced by Saud

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi restored to the throne with British and American assistance

Jeddah Pact between Imam Ahmad, King Saud and Egyptian President Nasser, pledging mutual support against British Suez crisis and Saudi Arabian workers’ strike

Federation of Arab Emirates of the South formed from 6 West Aden protectorate statelets and ‘Treaty of Friendship and Protection’ signed with Britain Kuwait gains independence from British protectorate status, with constitution established in 1962

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1962

1962 1963 1964 1965 1967 1967 1967 1968 1970 1970 1971 1971 1973 1975 1975 1977 1978 1978 1979 1979 1980 1981 1982 1982 1986

1988

124

Imam Ahmad dies and start of republican (YAR) revolution and eight-year civil war, with Egypt supporting the new regime and Saudi Arabia supporting the return of Imam Badr Establishment of the Muslim World League by Saudi Arabia to counter Nasserite and other secular ideologies

The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front start armed revolt, the Aden Emergency, against British in Aden Protectorate King Saud replaced by Faisal in Saudi Arabia

Beginning of the Dhofar uprising, led by Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF)

Arab-Israeli 6 day war, which marks major blow to Nasserism and Arab Socialism

‘Siege of Sanaa’ removes President Sallal in north and replaces him with Qadi Abdul Rahman Iryani Independence in the south after 4 year anti-colonial struggle against Britain.

Dhofar Liberation Front becomes People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf Formation of People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in south

Saudi Arabia recognizes Yemen Arab Republic; final end of civil war in north

Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain as independent states Overthrow of Sultan Said bin Taimur by his son Qaboos in Oman

Saudi Arabia initiates oil embargo in support of Arabs in October war against Israel; oil prices rise rapidly leading to vastly improved income for oil exporting states Saudi King Faisal assassinated, replaced by Khaled ibn Abdul Aziz Defeat of the PFLO in Oman

YAR President Ibrahim al-Hamdi assassinated in October

Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh becomes president of YAR after assassination of President Ahmad al-Ghashmi in June

PDRY President Salim Rubai Ali assassinated in June and Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) established in October

Islamic Revolution takes over from Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini becomes Supreme Leader

Fundamentalist attack on the Mecca Great Mosque, and uprisings in Eastern Saudi Arabia Saddam Hussein attacks Iran, beginning of what become the first Gulf War

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established, includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE Saudi King Khaled dies, replaced by Fahd

Earthquake in YAR kills over 3,000 people

Factional dispute in YSP leads to short civil war, exile to YAR of many leaders including Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi; Ali Salem al-Beedh becomes Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party End of Iran-Iraq war

Chronology of Yemen (20th-21st Centuries)

1989 1990 1990 1993 1994 1995 1995 1997 2000 2000 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011

Khomeini dies and is replaced by Khamenei as Supreme Leader; Ali Akbar Rafsanjani becomes president Unification of PDRY and YAR as Republic of Yemen (ROY)

Iraq invades Kuwait, UNSC 678 leads to major crisis between Yemen and the GCC states, with about 800, 000 Yemenis forced to leave GCC states Hussein al-Huthi elected to Yemeni parliament for the Al-Haqq Islamic party between 1993 and 1997 Yemen civil war leads to defeat of southern separatism

Yemen and Eritrea clash over disputed islands in Red Sea

Abdullah takes control due to Saudi King Fahd’s health problems Mohammed Khatami becomes President of Iran

Jeddah treaty on Yemeni border with Saudi Arabia

USS Cole bombed in Aden harbour by Al-Qaida in October

Al-Qaida attacks MV Limburg super tanker in Gulf of Aden, killing one and injuring twelve crew members USA invades Iraq, as second Gulf war starts

10 suspects in bombing of the USS Cole escape from custody; two are re-captured in 2004 Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, first UAE president, dies, replaced by son Khalifa Hussein al-Huthi killed by Saleh’s forces in September Mahmoud Ahmadinejad becomes president of Iran Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz becomes Saudi King

Ali Abdullah Saleh wins re-election in ROY in September

Suicide bomber kills 8 Spanish tourists and two Yemenis in Marib in July Attack on the American Embassy in ROY in September AQAP established in Yemen in January

Saleh launches ‘Operation Scorched Earth’ against Huthis in north in August Huthi forces invade southern Saudi Arabia in November

Arab Spring uprising begins in Tunisia after self immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December, leading to fall of President Ben Ali in January, 2011

Major protests in Sanaa against Saleh in late January; Saleh soon announces he will not seek re-election in 2013 In February Abdul Malik al-Huthi announced support for the pro-democracy protests Huthis take control of Sa‘da in north in March

GCC intervene militarily in March to support the Bahrain monarchy and repress the popular movement President Saleh severely wounded in bomb attack on his palace in June

USA-born Al-Qaida spokesman Anwar al-Awlaki assassinated by USA drone in September Libyan leader Gaddafi captured and killed in October

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2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015

2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015

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GCC agreement in November brings about transition from Saleh’s rule and Government of national unity

Suicide attack in May on military personnel preparing for Unity Day parade kills over 120 and wounds 200 Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi elected interim president unopposed in February

Huthi movement takes over most of Sa‘da governorate and parts of Hajja, Jawf and Amran Saudi diplomat and bodyguard killed by assailants in Sanaa in November Yemen: National Dialogue Council starts in March, ends Jan 2014

Tens of thousands of Yemenis attend reburial of remains of Hussein al-Huthi in Sa‘da Hassan Rouhani becomes president of Iran

President Hadi approves federation of 6 regions, but this is rejected by Huthis

Yemen’s largest oil pipeline blown up in July, disrupting supplies from the interior to Red Sea export terminal President Hadi sacks cabinet in August and overturns controversial fuel price rise following two weeks of anti-government protests Huthi-Saleh alliance takes over Sanaa in September virtually unopposed ISIL (aka ISIS, IS, Daesh) formed in Yemen in November

Huthi-Saleh alliance formalises takeover of Yemen in January, president Hadi placed under House Arrest until he escapes in February to Aden and takes refuge in Saudi Arabia Saudi King Abdullah dies in January, replaced by Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Mohammed bin Nayef named Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman named deputy crown prince and Minister of Defence

Saudi-led coalition begins ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ in March and begins aerial bombing campaign of Huthi-Saleh alliance Troops loyal to Saleh troops seize control in March of Aden International Airport, which was retaken by pro-Hadi forces in July, 2015 In April AQAP fighters take control of port of al-Mukalla, which is retaken by Emiratibacked troops in April, 2016 Saudi-led coalition announces ‘Operation Restoring Hope’ in April after announcing destruction of Huthi-Saleh heavy military equipment and missiles

Saudi-led coalition bombs Sanaa International Airport in April to prevent Iranian plane belonging to Iranian Red Crescent Society from landing

Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed replaces Jamal Benomar,as UN Envoy to Yemen in April Oman offers seven-point peace plan in April to end conflict

Saudi jets dropped leaflets in May declaring the Sa‘da as military zone subject to bombing Centuries-old historic al-Qahira castle in Taiz, part of the ancient Marib dam remains and the Dhamar regional archaeology museum all bombed by Saudi-led coalition in May

Chronology of Yemen (20th-21st Centuries)

2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015

2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017

Saudi Arabia establishes the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism alliance with close to 40 members Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognised government retake control of Aden in August after intervention of coalition ground forces Saudi jets bomb UNESCO World Heritage Site of Old City of Sanaa in June, killing at least 6 people and destroying some of the historic buildings Nasir al-Wuhayshi, founder of AQAP, killed in drone strike

Provincial capital of Abyan Governorate, Zinjibar, and the town of Ja‘ar captured by AQAP Médecins Sans Frontières(MSF) reports coalition airstrike bombed their hospital in Sa‘da governorate, Haydan district Huthi OTR-21 Tochka missile hits ammunition dump in September at Saudi-led coalition military base in Safer in Marib Governorate killing 52 UAE, 10 Saudi and 5 Bahraini soldiers Saudi-backed governor of Aden assassinated in December

Saudi Shi’a Sheikh Nimr Baqer Nimr executed in Saudi Arabia in January Chinese President Xi Jin Ping visits Saudi Arabia and Iran in January

Mohammad Ali al-Huthi declared President of Supreme Revolutionary Committee in Sanaa in February

Saudi-led coalition bombs historic town of Kawkaban in October, damaging city gate and killing 7 civilians

Saudi-led coalition bombs hall in Sanaa where a funeral was taking place in October, with over 140 people killed and 600 wounded Cholera outbreak begins in Yemen

Kuwait sponsors peace talks April to August

Saleh Ali al-Sammad becomes President of Supreme Political Council in Sanaa in August USA Secretary of State Kerry holds peace talk in Oman about Yemen crisis in November UN announces in January figure of 10,000 dead and 40,000 wounded in Yemen war

Saudi-led coalition bombs funeral reception near Sanaa in February, with 9 women and 1 child killed and ten more women reported wounded Huthi missile kills Yemen Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff in February

Ballistic missile fired from Yemen in February by Huthi-Saleh alliance hits power facility in Jizan Saudi King Salman visits China in March and Prince Mohammed bin Salman visits President Trump in Washington, DC UN announces that 17 million people in Yemen on brink of famine

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Map

SYR IA

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IR A Q

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BAHRAIN

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QATAR Abu Dhabi

U.A.E.

Muscat

Jeddah Re d S e a

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Asir

S UDAN

Najran Jiz

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Taiz

Gulf of Aden

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Bossasso

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Addis Ababa S OU T H SUDAN

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ET H IO PIA

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Mogadishu © S J Ballard (2017)

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Index Abbasid: 67, 105 Abdul Aziz, King: 12, 123 Abdullah, King: 10, 126 Abu Dhabi: 18-19, 49, 51, 65-66, 119, 129 Abu Musa: 13 Aden: 18-20, 23-25, 34, 38-39, 47, 51, 55, 68, 73-74, 90, 91, 96, 105, 108-111, 114, 121, 123-127, 129 Ahmad, Imam: 123- 124 Ahmed, Ismail Ould Cheickh: 96, 126 Alawi, Yusuf bin: 68, 69, 74 Al-Ahjur: 103, 110, 116 Al-Ahmar, Abdullah bin Hussain: 9, 20, 25 Al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen: 25 Al-Assad, Bashar: 38, 89, 92-93 Al-Attas, Haidar Abu Bakr: 73 Al-Azhar: 50 Al-Beedh, Ali Salem: 16, 20, 71, 74, 124 Al-Ghashmi, Ahmad: 103, 124 Al-Hamdi, Ibrahim: 32, 103, 124 Al-Hashimi, Alaa: 51 Al-Huthi, Hussein: 125-126 Al-Ma’mun: 105 Al-Mazunah: 74 Al-Nimr, Baq Nimr: 76, 92-93, 127 Al-Qaida: 2-3, 10, 14, 34, 42, 51, 75, 89, 91, 97, 99, 102, 106-108, 114-115, 119, 121, 125 Al-Talh: 36 Al-Turki, Abdullah bin Faisal: 38 Al-Zindani, Abdul Majid: 9, 20, 25 AQAP al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula: 3, 10, 14, 22, 26-27, 34, 48, 51, 75, 79, 82, 121, 125-127 Arab League: 69, 92, 96, 123 Arab Spring: 37-38, 43, 48, 55, 68, 70, 77, 83, 85, 88-89, 90, 93, 95, 98-99, 102, 111, 113-114, 125 Arabia Felix: 2, 67, 101, 104, 110-111, 116 Asir: 8, 29-32, 44, 73, 105, 123, 127, 129 Augustus, Caesar: 104 Ayyubid: 105 Bab al-Mandab: 15, 23, 51, 89, 90, 105 Baghdad: 14, 48, 69, 72, 89, 94, 105, 129 Bahah, Khaled: 68 Bahrain: 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 24, 38, 43, 46, 48, 68-69, 76, 85, 88-98, 94-95, 97-98, 114-115, 124-125, 127, 129 Beirut: 14, 48, 111, 113 Berlin Wall: 34

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Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

Cairo: 69, 129 Camp David: 69 China: 52, 72, 95, 127 Cold War: 57, 59-60, 65, 81, 98, 114, 116 Daesh, see also ISIL/ISIS: 12, 89, 106-109, 121, 126 Damascus: 14, 48 Dammaj: 2, 26 Dar al Hadith: 26 Decisive Storm: 38, 46, 68, 78, 90, 98, 126 Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY): 74, 121 Dhofar/Dhofari: 16, 67, 70, 72-74, 76, 78-79, 124 Dilmun: 104 Djibouti: 51, 129 Doha: 18, 22, 119 Dubai: 13, 18-19, 49, 51, 64-65, 108, 121 Dubai Ports World (DPW): 51, 121 Egypt: ii, 8, 10, 24-25, 30, 48, 50-51, 53, 55-56, 59-61, 69, 88, 93, 95, 105, 107, 111, 113, 123-124, 129 Emirati Red Crescent: 62 Empty Quarter: 29, 31-32 Eritrea: 15, 33, 98, 125, 129 Ethiopia: 73, 129 European Union (EU): 58, 86 Fahd, King: 13, 124-125 Gallus, Aelius: 104 Gargash, Anwar: 54, 65 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council): ii, v, 1-8, 11, 13-17, 19-26, 37-38, 41, 45-47, 50, 55, 57-64, 66-71, 7377, 79-81, 83, 85, 89, 91-92, 94-99, 101, 105-110, 113-114, 116, 121, 124-126 Germany: 57-58, 60-61, 63, 77, 95 Hadhramaut: 23, 67 Hadi, Abdu Rabbo Mansour: 3-4, 11, 24, 37-39, 45, 48, 52-54, 61-63, 65-66, 68, 81, 83, 90-91, 106-107, 124, 126 Hajja: 38, 126 Hamad, King: (Sheikh Hamad: 18), 46 Haradh: 53, 129 Hezbollah: 14-15, 54, 87, 91-93 Himyar: 67 Hiraak: 65, 68, 71 Hormuz: 23, 49, 70-71, 94, 96 Horn of Africa: 33-34, 83, 89, 92-93, 105 Hussein, Saddam: 46, 52, 85, 87, 124-126 Huthi: 2-4, 9-13, 15-16, 18, 24, 26-27, 29, 35-39, 42, 44-48, 51-56, 61-63, 68, 75, 78-79, 83, 86-94, 96-98, 102, 105-109, 111, 113, 116, 125-127 Ibadi: 14, 72, 76, 81, 94, 114 Ibn Saud, King Abdul Aziz: 29, 123 Imamate: 8, 12, 29-30, 36, 102 India: 67, 72, 105 Indian Ocean: 96, 104 Iran: 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11-17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27-28, 30, 38, 43, 46-52, 54-61, 64-65, 68-73, 75-76, 79-99, 101, 105, 108-110, 113-117, 120, 123-127, 129 Iranian Revolution: 12-13, 56, 60, 71, 84, 94 Iraq: 5, 13-14, 17, 21, 29, 31, 35, 46, 52, 56-60, 63, 70, 72, 75, 85-86, 88-91, 93-95, 97, 108, 110, 119, 121, 124-125, 129

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Index

ISIS/ISIL: 75, 79, 92-93, 97, 106, 121, 126 Islah: 4, 12, 18, 25-26, 48, 54-55, 87 Israel: 69, 79, 81, 94-95, 98, 113, 124, 129 Jabal al-Dukhan: 36 Jeddah Treaty: 10, 35, 125 Jizan: 8, 29-30, 32, 37, 42, 127, 129 Jordan: 24-25, 59, 68-69, 73, 81, 120, 129 Kerry, John: 75, 81, 127 Khaled bin Sultan: 37 Khalifa, King: 13, 17-18, 46, 88-89, 125 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla: 70, 124-125 King Salman Centre for Relief and Humanitarian Aid: 62 Korea, North: 39 Kuwait: 17, 19-21, 24, 31, 43, 46, 52, 64, 68-69, 72, 74, 76, 80, 95-98, 113-114, 123-125, 127 Lahj: 39, 91 Lebanon: 14-15, 44, 54, 57, 59-60, 63, 83, 90-93, 111, 113, 119 Libya: 10, 73, 79, 88, 95, 125 Mahra: 74-75, 101, 109 Manama: 89 Mansour al-Turki: 11, 35, 37, 68, 83, 90, 124, 126 Marib: 25, 67, 91, 121, 125-127 Marshall Plan: 57-58, 60-61, 63, 66, 113 Mecca: 31, 47, 93, 124 Midi: 53, 129 Mohammed bin Nasser: 37 Mohammed bin Nayef: 10, 35, 126 Mohammed bin Zayed: 65 Morocco: 24-25, 68, 110, 116 Morsi, Mohammed: 48, 88 Mottaki, Manoucher: 86 Mu‘awiya: 105 Mukalla: 26, 121, 126 Muscat: 16, 69-71, 73, 75-76, 79, 81, 94-95, 129 Muslim Brotherhood: 8, 18, 20, 25, 48, 87-88, 93 Najran: 8, 29-32, 40, 42, 44, 105, 123, 129 Nasir, Mohammed Ali: 73 Nasser, Gamal Abdel: 8, 61, 105, 107, 123 National Front for the Liberation of Najran and Asir: 31 NATO: 57, 60-61, 121 National Dialogue Conference: 38, 47, 53-55, 65, 68, 110, 116, 121, 126 Obama, President: 56, 66, 110 Operation Decisive Storm: 38, 78, 90, 98, 126 Operation Scorched Earth: 14, 36, 40, 125 Oman: v, 5, 7, 12, 14-16, 19-20, 23, 32, 42, 50, 67-82, 94-96, 98-99, 106, 109, 113-116, 122, 124, 126-127, 129 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): 96 Ottomans: 12, 102, 105, 108, 123 Patriot (missile): 29, 39 PDRY, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen: 9, 16-17, 20-21, 26, 67, 72-74, 79, 102, 121, 124-125 Pearl Roundabout: 89 PFLO: 73, 122, 124 PFLOAG: 20, 72, 122

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Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis

Qaboos, Sultan: 14, 16, 67, 69-70, 72-74, 76-78, 80-81, 94-95, 106, 113, 124 Qatar: 3, 15, 18-19, 24-25, 43, 50, 68-69, 83, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 120, 123-124, 129 Rabin, Yitzhak: 69 Rasulid: 103, 105, 120 Red Sea: 23, 26, 29, 32, 36-37, 47, 51, 53, 89-90, 96, 103-105, 113, 125, 129 Reem Island Ghost: 50, 65 Riyadh: 25, 29-34, 36, 38, 40-41, 68, 85, 87, 92, 96-97, 109, 129 ROY, Republic of Yemen: 9, 16, 20-22, 67-68, 101, 122, 125 Russia, see also Soviet Union, USSR: 52, 57, 59-60, 91, 95 Sa‘da: 2, 14, 18, 26-27, 34, 36, 46, 53, 56, 63, 68, 86-87, 125-127 Sadat, Anwar: 69 Salalah: 71-72, 78, 129 Saleh, Ali Abdullah: 2-4, 10-13, 16-20, 24-27, 31-32, 37-39, 43-45, 47-48, 51-56, 61, 63, 65, 68, 74, 79, 83, 86-87, 89-91, 102-103, 105-109, 124-127 Salman, Mohammed bin: 11-12, 24, 78, 93, 126-127 Salman, King: 11, 24, 62, 78, 93, 106, 127 Sanaa: 2, 8-11, 14, 16, 18, 24-25, 27, 31-33, 35-36, 38, 53-54, 65, 68, 74-76, 83, 86-87, 90, 96, 107, 121, 124-127 Saudi-Yemeni border: 4, 9, 30, 44 Scorched Earth, operation: 14, 27, 36, 40, 125 Scud (missile): 39, 44 Senegal: 24-25 Shah of Iran: 12, 73 Sheba: 67 Solana, Javier: 86 Somali: 10, 33, 89, 102 Somalia: 42, 104, 114, 129 Somaliland: 51, 129 Soviet Union, USSR, Russia: 52, 57, 59-60, 72, 91, 95, 122 Sudan: 8, 15, 24-25, 68, 91, 129 Sultan bin Abdul Aziz: 9-10 Syria: 5, 13-14, 38, 56-57, 59-60, 71, 75, 83, 88-93, 95, 97-98, 108, 113, 121, 129 Taif Treaty: 8, 31-32 Taiz: 26, 108, 121, 126, 129 Tehran: 14-16, 50, 54, 68, 84-86, 91-94, 97 Tihama: 105 Trump, Donald: 56, 97, 106, 110, 127 Tunb: 13 Tunisia: 10, 88, 95, 125 UAE, United Arab Emirates: 4, 12-13, 15, 18-19, 24-26, 43, 45, 49-52, 54, 59, 62-65, 68-69, 76, 83, 89, 91, 93-96, 99, 117, 122, 124-125, 127 Ukraine: 52 Umayyad: 67, 104-105 UK, United Kingdom: 28, 41, 44, 57, 60, 64, 81, 95, 114-115, 122 UN, United Nations: 17, 21, 31, 33, 39, 43, 62, 66, 68-69, 75-76, 81, 95-96, 99, 102, 107-108, 111, 121122, 126-127 USA, United States of America: 3, 10-13, 16-17, 19, 38, 46, 50, 54, 56-61, 63-64, 70-71, 76, 87-88, 94-95, 97, 106, 109-110, 119, 122-123, 125, 127 Velayati, Ali Akbar: 15 Wahhabi: 8, 11, 48, 105 Wahhabism: 27, 48, 57, 84

134

Index

World Bank: 82, 119 World War: 5, 57, 61, 64, 105, 123 Yahya, Imam: 8, 105, 123 YAR, Yemen Arab Republic: 8-9, 17, 20-21, 30-31, 42, 58, 67-68, 73, 102, 110, 116, 122, 124-125 YSP, Yemen Socialist Party: 20, 73, 122, 124 Yemen: 1-69, 71-84, 86-93, 95-99, 101-111, 113-117, 119-127, 129 Zarif, Mohammad Javad: 75 Zaydi: 8-9, 12-13, 48, 53, 68, 86, 97, 102, 105, 108, 115, 123 Zaydism: 2, 36 Zayed, Mohammed ibn: 49, 65 Zayed, Shaykh bin Sultan al Nahyan: 19, 125

135