The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, influences and instability 9781526162175

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THE GULF STATES AND THE HORN OF AFRICA INTERESTS,INFLUENCES A N D I N S TA B I L I T Y EDITED BY ROBERT MASON AND SIMON MABON

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The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa

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After the Arab Uprisings and the ensuing fragmentation of regime-society relations across the Middle East, identities and geopolitics have become increasingly contested, with serious implications for the ordering of political life at domestic, regional and international levels, best seen in conflicts in Syria and Yemen. The Middle East is the most militarised region in the world where geopolitical factors remain predominant factor in shaping political dynamics. Another common feature of the regional landscape is the continued degeneration of communal relations as societal actors retreat into sub-state identities, whilst difference becomes increasingly violent, spilling out beyond state borders. The power of religion – and trans-state nature of religious views and linkages – thus provides the means for regional actors (such as Saudi Arabia and Iran) to exert influence over a number of groups across the region and beyond. This series provides space for the engagement with these ideas and the broader political, legal and theological factors to create space for an intellectual re-imagining of socio-political life in the Middle East. Originating from the SEPAD project (www.sepad.org.uk), this series facilitates the re-imagining of political ideas, identities and organisation across the Middle East, moving beyond the exclusionary and binary forms of identity to reveal the contingent factors that shape and order life across the region. Previously published titles Houses built on sand: Violence, sectarianism and revolution in the Middle East Simon Mabon Transitional justice in process: Plans and politics in Tunisia Mariam Salehi Surviving repression: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after the 2013 coup Lucia Ardovini

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The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa Interests, influences and instability Edited by Robert Mason and Simon Mabon

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Manchester University Press 2022

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While copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in Manchester University Press, copyright in individual chapters belongs to their respective authors, and no chapter may be reproduced wholly or in part without the express permission in writing of both author and publisher. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN  978 1 5261 6216 8  hardback First published 2022 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Contents

List of illustrations page vii List of contributors viii Acknowledgements x Introduction 1 Robert Mason Part I  The view from the Gulf 1 Patterns of external involvement in the modern political history of the Horn of Africa states Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter 2 Pushing the envelope of national security and state influence at the margins: Saudi and Iranian competition in the Horn of Africa Robert Mason 3 Iran’s foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa: between expansionist ambitions and hegemonic constraints Eric Lob 4 Extended states: the politics and purpose of United Arab Emirates economic statecraft in the Horn of Africa Karen E. Young and Taimur Khan 5 The Turkey–Qatar alliance: through the Gulf and into the Horn of Africa Marwa Maziad 6 Interregional embedded security model: Turkish and Emirati engagement in the Horn of Africa Umer Karim

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vi Contents 7 Strategic geography in jeopardy: Qatar–Gulf crisis and the Horn of Africa Abdinor Dahir 8 Kuwait’s foreign relations with East Africa Mara A. Leichtman

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Part II  The view from the Horn of Africa 9 Djibouti: bridging the Gulf of Aden? Balancing ports, patronage and military bases between Yemen’s war and the Horn David Styan 10 Engaging foreign powers for regime survival: the relative autonomy of coastal Horn of Africa states in their relations with Gulf countries Aleksi Ylönen 11 Sudan’s foreign policy predicament in the context of the GCC diplomatic rift Mohammed Sharfi

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Conclusion 295 Simon Mabon Index 303

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Illustrations

3.1 Construction Jihad’s overseas operations from 1987 until March 1993. Source: Ministry of Construction Jihad’s Office of Statistics and Information in M. J. Iravani, Institutionalism and Jihad-e-Sazandegi (Construction Jihad) (Tehran: Ministry of Construction Jihad, 1998), p. 262. page 73 5.1 Image circulating on social media pinpointing the proximity between Suakin and Mecca. Source: Unknown.138

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Contributors

Brendon J. Cannon is an assistant professor of International Security at the Institute of International and Civil Security, Khalifa University of Science and Technology (Abu Dhabi, UAE). His research interests include contextualising domestic, regional and international relations in eastern Africa, regional security in the Gulf and the western Indian Ocean region. Abdinor Dahir is a graduate student at St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a Researcher at TRT World Research Center and Project Coordinator for the TRT World Citizen Initiative. Umer Karim is a doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham focusing on Saudi foreign policy, decision making and its implications for the politics and security of the Middle East. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, where he focuses on Pakistan’s evolving political and security environment within its neighbourhood. Taimur Khan is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, as well as a journalist who has written extensively on the contemporary politics of the Gulf Arab states and Pakistan. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, World Policy Journal, Al Jazeera America and New York Magazine among others. Mara A. Leichtman is associate professor of Anthropology at Michigan State University and a founding faculty member of the Muslim Studies Program. She is the author of Shi’i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal (Indiana University Press 2015). Eric Lob is an associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University. His research focuses on the intersection of development and politics in the Middle East. Lob is the author of Iran’s Reconstruction Jihad: Rural Development and Regime Consolidation after 1979 (Cambridge University Press, 2020). Simon Mabon is director of the Richardson Institute at Lancaster University and holds a Chair in International Relations. Professor Mabon is

Contributors ix

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also director of the Carnegie Corporation-funded Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianization project. His latest book is Houses Built on Sand: Violence, Sectarianism and Revolution in the Middle East (Manchester University Press, 2020). Robert Mason is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. He focuses on Gulf politics, Euro–Med relations and Asia–Middle East relations. His latest work is a textbook titled New Perspectives on Middle East Politics: Economy, Society and International Relations (American University in Cairo Press, 2021). Marwa Maziad is an international relations and Middle East media and politics expert. She is currently a Turkey civil–military relations researcher and Israel Studies research scholar at the University of Washington. Maziad is also a regular political analyst on Al Jazeera English, BBC Arabic, France 24 and CNN International. Ash Rossiter is an assistant professor of International Security. His academic specialisation is at the nexus of technology and international security, with a particular focus on military innovation. Dr Rossiter’s research interests and teaching areas also encompass the changing character of war and conflict and the shifting geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. Mohammed Sharfi is currently working as a senior consultant at the Diplomatic Institute in the State of Qatar. He previously worked for the United Nations in Sudan and Switzerland as information analyst and human rights officer. His latest book is Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan: Between Radicalism and the Search for Survival (Routledge, 2019). David Styan is lecturer in politics at Birkbeck, University of London, where he focuses on international political economy, foreign policy analysis and development. In addition to his work on French foreign policy, he has written extensively on the Horn of Africa, most notably on the Ethiopian economy. Aleksi Ylönen is an associate professor of International Relations at the United States International University – Africa. He has held a number of positions in various research and higher education institutions in Europe. His recent book is On State, Marginalization, Origins of Rebellion: The Formation of Insurgencies in Southern Sudan (Africa World Press, 2016). Karen E. Young is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where she studies the political economy of the Middle East, with a special focus on the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. She regularly teaches at the Foreign Service Institute at the US Department of State, and has taught at George Washington University and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

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Acknowledgements

This book is the outcome of a workshop held at the Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge, England in 2018. The workshop was, and remains, quite unique in having brought together early-career and mid-career political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists from the Gulf region, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. It was invaluable in drawing on interdisciplinary perspectives as well as empirical insights gleaned from a range of field research undertaken in the Horn as well as other parts of Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Over the course of two and a half days we were able to discuss and debate in a free and open forum and to benefit from critical perspectives provided by discussants as well as thoughtful questions raised by colleagues and visitors to the session. This has all been fed into the work and provided a more focused and critical analysis, which has been captured in this book. For the opportunity to initiate this research project, we thank Dr Abdulaziz O. Sager and his staff at the Gulf Research Center, who made the complex logistics possible, including Elsa Courdier and Sanya Kapasi. We are grateful to Dr Oskar Ziemelis for facilitating the transfer of copyright, which enabled this production to go ahead. For capturing the research in this book format, the credit goes to Rob Byron at Manchester University Press, who expressed an early interest in the project, along with the support and constructive feedback from the anonymous reviewers. At the press, we also thank Dr Lucy Burns, who helped keep us on track, especially during the draft manuscript phase. As always, our heartfelt thanks go to our families, who have had to put up with time spent on getting this manuscript ready for production alongside our other commitments. Robert Mason and Simon Mabon November 2020

Introduction

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Robert Mason

The Gulf states and the Horn of Africa (the Horn) states have enjoyed a relationship as part of a broader engagement between the Middle East and Africa that has spanned millennia. Sailors, conquerors, traders, pilgrims and slaves traversed the Red Sea, and Yemen has exported incense to Egypt since Pharaonic times. The queen of Sheba’s encounter with Solomon, king of Israel, illustrates the extent of their shared histories, reinforced by the Hijrat, whereby Muslims, in accordance with the Prophet, left western Arabia, seeking refuge in Abyssinia with the Axumites, who had a connection to Arabia, as is visible in the inscriptions at Tigrai.1 The powerful Kingdom of Axum led to flourishing trade routes around the Red Sea from 100 CE. The Islamic conquests of the early seventh century into Byzantine-controlled territories of North Africa, including Egypt and the Exarchate of Africa, centred in Tunisia, where a new Islamic province of Ifriqiya would cover western Libya, Tunisia and eastern Algeria, contributed further to these ties.2 From 909 CE, the Shi‘a Fatimids had supplanted the Aghlabid viceroys of the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad, before being replaced in turn by the native Zirid dynasty of Sanhaja Berbers.3 The spread of Islam in West Africa, into what are now the modern states of Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Nigeria, began in the eighth century and may have been linked in turn, to trade and commerce with North Africa.4 In East Africa the trading ports of the ‘Swahili Coast’, such as Kilwa, Shanga, Qanbalu and Mombasa, linked directly to Muscat, Basra, Qalhat and Bandars in Persia.5 The ancient Greeks noted that Arab skippers knew the African coast, ports and language through regular trade and intermarriage.6 Whilst the transatlantic slave trade focused on West Africa, the Arab slave trade was a significant part of commerce in East Africa and lasted from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries, starting later but also ending a few decades later than its counterpart.7 African slaves were used as sailors

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in Persia, pearl divers in the Gulf and soldiers in the Omani army. Many were used as domestic slaves in rich households and as sex slaves. British interception of slave ships off the coast of West Africa and the creation of plantations by the French on the islands of Mauritius and Reunion further boosted demand.8 The nineteenth century represented a peak of engagement in terms of both the European and the Arab presence in Africa. In 1889 Lord Salisbury was focusing on the defence of the Upper Nile to maintain control over Egypt (premised on an age-old logic), while Sultan Seyyid Said had begun to rule over the island of Zanzibar from 1856 by moving his entire court there from Muscat. By 1964, Zanzibar had been caught up in the anti-colonial independence struggles sweeping the African continent, supported by President Nasser in Egypt and others in the Arab world to form Third World solidarity and part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Israel was quick to pre-empt moves toward African independence and mobilised financial and manpower support to Mali, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Madagascar in 1960; to Dahomey (part of Benin) in 1961; to Ivory Coast, Uganda, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Cameroon, Gambia and Burundi in 1962; to Nigeria and Tanzania in 1963; to Togo and Chad in 1964; and to Kenya in 1965.9 With its close relationship with the United States (US) and the remittances from the white-dominated Jewish community in South Africa, Israel was aligned against African freedom fighters. In response, African votes in the United Nations (UN) became hostile to the Israelis, provoking an Israeli policy change to support liberation movements. Israel has continued to engage in Africa, driven by economic interest and the promise of technology transfer to the continent. This culminated in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Africa in July 2016. The ‘Zanzibar Revolution’ was probably the most lethal outbreak of violence against Arabs in Africa, inspired by the socialist/communist regimes of China and the Soviet Union. It sought to redress inequality between Africans and local populations of Arabs and South Asians, which were killed, forced into exile or reduced to relative poverty. Zanzibar is thus one of just a few cases of postcolonial revolutions in sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst it remains a milestone in Arab–African relations, the wider issue of Arab complicity in the African slave trade has still not been fully and transparently addressed. Nevertheless, there remains a wider Indian Ocean civilisation comprising close cultural, religious, linguistic, social, economic and political connections. If history had been different, we might envisage a more manifest expression of Greater Africa all the way to the Persian Gulf rather than the Red Sea. However, European colonisation, hegemony and slavery from this part of the world, starting with the Portuguese in the mid-fifteenth century, has

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Introduction 3 since conspired to artificially separate the African continent from its neighbours, including through Euro-centric cartography. It did much to arrest the economic penetration of Arabs and the Islamisation of East Africa in states such as Kenya, Uganda and Malawi.10 Christian missionaries and British schools in East Africa made much of Arab complicity in the African slave trade, further driving a wedge between societies.11 In today’s globalised world, the Red Sea is once more becoming a linchpin of external intervention focused on renewed security and economic engagement. This includes concerns over water security and violent Islamism; anti-piracy operations that have facilitated military bases along the littoral states of the African coast; and new Chinese economic investments following the roll-out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). There are many tomes which deal with various aspects of African politics and the role of the US and Soviet influence during the Cold War, including in the Horn. Volumes in this category include those by Jackson12 and Yordanov.13 Work by Ehteshami and Murphy has assessed international relations of the Red Sea.14 Writings focusing on the Red Sea and the Horn generally look at the legacy of empires, conflict and disintegration (with reference to Eritrea and Somaliland after the break-up of Ethiopia and Somalia post-1991), failures of governance and state building, and prospects for democracy and stability. Some recent volumes have been published by leading scholars in the field of African studies, including Clapham,15 de Waal,16 Woodward17 and Bereketeab.18 Others such as Daniels,19 Murphy20 and Weldemichael21 look specifically at piracy as a key issue affecting the political economy of the Horn, but with special reference to Somalia. The growth in the literature on the Horn in the 2000s and 2010s reflects the importance and increasing number of connections taking place at both the political and financial levels, including those related to interstate and transnational conflicts. Still, there are very few volumes which deal specifically with the rise of interregional connections between the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, and the Horn. This is to be expected, as some major drivers of Gulf engagement in the Horn, such as food security concerns and the Yemen conflict, are relatively recent. However, there are some specialist and up-to-date book chapters, articles and reports on Gulf geopolitics and investments in the Horn by scholars such as Verhoeven,22 Styan,23 Huliaras and Kalantzakos24 and Ulrichsen.25 This edited volume fits into the first and last categories mentioned. Whilst it addresses a host of issues, ranging from the intensification of geosectarian conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, riyal politik and regional challengers such as Turkey and Qatar, it also assesses the impact these issues have on

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more traditional themes such as state survival and the relative autonomy of the Horn states.

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Thematic and conceptual approach The Gulf states in this volume refers primarily to the assertive politics, foreign policies and growing influence of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the UAE in the Horn. The Horn states are generally considered to be Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, plus the two breakaway states of Somaliland and Eritrea. Given that this is one of the most vulnerable subregions on the African continent, we look specifically at Gulf state rivalry with other actors such as Turkey and other international actors in strategic theatres, with emphasis on states such as Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. These states have often been locked in humanitarian crises ranging from drought to conflict. For the purposes of this volume, we will also pay special reference to Sudan as a key actor involved in Saudi–Iranian rivalry, as well as referencing other parts of East Africa. This fits into existing studies of the Red Sea as a broader subregion, while we maintain a general focus on the Horn of Africa states.26 Whilst a growth and overlapping of two distinct subregions – the Gulf and the Horn of Africa – might be a convenient assessment of the situation, the reality is far more complex. The Egyptian military intervention in North Yemen’s civil war and its peace agreement with Israel have served to facilitate and isolate Egypt vis-à-vis Horn states. Tensions with Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam have contributed a new motivation and dynamic in Egypt’s policies towards East Africa and the Red Sea. The Horn represented one of the most important battlegrounds of the Cold War, and the Red Sea is highly relevant to international actors seeking to secure international oil exports and trade, especially through the Bab-el-Mandeb. The conflict in Yemen has its own dynamic. Thus, we are left, at least initially, without so much emphasis on subregions as on thematic nodes that facilitate conflict or cooperation. Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory, which considers a wider range of security issues beyond traditional military considerations, is particularly relevant to this volume. Buzan writes about a threat or threats which have sparked an emergency response, and, in this case, a rapid increase in interest in the Horn of Africa is clearly evident. This book argues that the conflict in Yemen, violent Islamism and the Saudi–Iranian and Saudi–Qatari Cold Wars, with the inherent necessity for constructing alliances (especially with geostrategic states and those experiencing high economic growth) and deconstructing adversarial alliances are some of the key motivations. Qatar’s

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Introduction 5 removal of 400 observers monitoring the ceasefire on the island of Doumeira, claimed by Eritrea and Djibouti, in June 2017 was one example of how alliance choices could create instabilities in the Horn of Africa. Others security issues to consider include broader vulnerabilities to armed conflict, violent Islamism (created often by the exportation of competing brands of Islam by Saudi Arabia and Iran), organised crime, piracy, human trafficking and money laundering. Finally, there are projection of power/ base considerations, food security,27 Vision 2030 aims for economic diversification and China’s BRI (including its first permanent oversees naval base, set up in Djibouti in 2017, and investments in East Africa) all have a bearing. The treatment of migrant workers from the Horn can also be an irritant. Ethiopia has 500,000 workers in Saudi Arabia alone. Alex de Waal talks about the business of power in the Horn of Africa being a ‘political marketplace’ where the lack of political institutions, a history of patriarchy and merchant culture make political bargaining common. This is highly relevant, as it has offered hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states a way into what is effectively a transactional political model versus a highly developed institutionalised model. Like the Middle East, we can think of the Horn as being penetrated by foreign interests, and, like in some Middle East and North Africa states, the consequences are more pronounced in weak or failed states than they might otherwise be. We have already seen riyal politik in clear effect in the case of Sudan. Saudi Arabia paid $2.2 billion to wrestle political influence back from Iran, whilst Turkey paid $650 million to transfer control of the Red Sea port city of Suakin to Turkey for development. The research in this volume is driven by a methodological awareness of the historical engagements that have taken place and by the study of the Gulf in the new millennium where there are broadening trade and investment patterns, expatriate labour and where peripheral states are considered to be an increasingly important aspect in the study of regions and subregions. Ehteshami and Murphy draw attention to this in their volume International Politics of the Red Sea. Their approach is supported by a range of political, economic and security issues, which in this case are driving the increasingly assertive policies of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the UAE and an internationalisation of their respective political agendas. We therefore analyse the Gulf states’ relations with each other, in the Horn and the Horn states to ascertain the most appropriate theoretical and conceptual conclusions about the current state of Gulf and Horn politics and their impacts. We ask questions such as: What are the main foreign policy priorities of the Gulf states and other external actors in the Horn and Red Sea? What are the main Horn states which fall under external influence or alliance formation/

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deconstruction, and why? What is the contemporary nature of these bilateral relationships, and could they shift over the short to medium term?

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Organisation of the volume This volume draws together Middle Eastern and Horn of Africa scholars who participated in a workshop on this topic at the Gulf Research Meeting 2018. They explored the historical and transnational nature of Gulf–Horn relations and plotted the evolving nature of relations based on shifting political, security and economic calculations. The volume is particularly timely, given recent changes taking place in both arenas, including Turkish engagement in Africa, the Qatar Crisis and the Yemen conflict, as well as the Qatari withdrawal of troops from the Djibouti–Eritrea border, the Ethiopia–Eritrea peace agreement and changes to the UAE security partnership with Somalia. The volume considers strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, international engagement such as joint anti-piracy operations and counterterrorism cooperation, as well as the imperative of open shipping routes through the Bab-el-Mandeb. Drawing on a range of subject expertise and field research across the cases, the volume adds to the sparse literature on the regional and international politics of the Horn and Red Sea, gleaning specific insights through contemporary insights and clear divisions within the book. Part I consists of the view from the Gulf states and identifies the motivations, foreign policies and multifaceted engagements which have raised the profile of these states in the Horn. Chapter 1 sets out the context for external interest and involvement in the Horn during the Cold War and in the contemporary period, and assesses to what extent Gulf state interests enhance or detract from those of other entities such as the US, Russia, the European Union (EU), China, Israel and Egypt. Chapter 2 concentrates on the Saudi–Iranian rivalry in the Horn of Africa in the context of rising US–Iran tensions, the logistical imperatives of the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen conflict and the effects of the drop in the international oil price and COVID-19 and of other regional actors engaging in the Horn. The competition is explored mainly as a geopolitical dynamic superimposed on the instabilities and political transitions that have taken place in the Horn. The chapter discusses how domestic and regional considerations have affected Saudi and Iranian foreign policies, the strategic importance of the Horn, especially during the Yemen conflict, and how Hezbollah has adjusted in Africa, following attempts to interrupt Iranian supply lines. The chapter emphasises the role of riyal politik during critical phases of conflict and political transition. It also discusses the potentially stabilising roles to

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Introduction 7 be played by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Red Sea Forum in resolving further tensions on a multilateral basis. Chapter 3 digs down into Iranian foreign policy with special reference to Africa, where, from the mid-1980s, Iran instrumentalised development assistance to establish and strengthen diplomatic and commercial relations with Africa. Based on extensive fieldwork, the chapter shows that strong relations helped Iran to mitigate its isolation, balance against the US, evade and delegitimize its sanctions and expand Iran’s military presence and temporarily support actual and potential nuclear programme ambitions. Chapter 4 looks at the interaction of Gulf state security and investment strategy within the Gulf states’ near abroad in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on the UAE and its deployment of economic statecraft. The chapter shows how the UAE has become more animated in terms of foreign aid and military intervention, particularly after 2011 and the ensuing unrest in the Middle East, but also with a growing sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and Asia as well. The authors frame a UAE economic policy that is deliberately formulated to promote the foreign policy goals of the state, albeit with a learning curve and some policy overreach involved. Importantly, it distinguishes between economic statecraft, which applies economic means to various ends, and foreign economic policy, which encompasses various means in the service of economic ends. The UAE’s evolving foreign policy in the Horn is shown to have produced mixed results on the commercial and economic fronts and some important wins on the peace and security fronts, and to have exacerbated some of the volatility that has plagued the region for decades. Chapter 5 explores the Turkey–Qatar nexus in the Horn of Africa. It documents the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011, when Turkey and Qatar have been accused of supporting radical Islamist groups, through Turkey’s pan-Islamist ties with Hamas in Gaza and Ennahada in Tunisia. Turkey and Qatar have also attempted to penetrate the Horn of Africa. Their policy has been most clear in Sudan in support of Qatar’s food security objectives, and through economic and aid diplomacy in relation to Turkey’s alleged assistance to members of Somalia’s al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. The chapter argues that Turkey and Qatar pursued an expansionist foreign policy into the Horn in order to challenge the strategic interests of other regional rivals, namely Egypt with its own African roots and strategic depth into the Nile Valley; Israel with its investments and presence in Ethiopia; the UAE with its economic and military training projects in Eritrea; and Saudi Arabia with its competition with Iran. Capitalising on extensive anthropological fieldwork and interviews in Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and the US since 2007, the chapter also shows how the Turkey–Qatar presence in the Horn has triggered further responses from other regional powers.

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Chapter 6 explores interregional embedded security by exploring the regional security complex (RSC) of the Horn and the complication from the impact of external actors from the Middle Eastern RSC. The focus of the chapter is on the involvement of Turkey and the UAE in the Horn of Africa. The strategic and political objectives of their interaction are evaluated whilst also elaborating on how these endeavours have impacted upon the intra-Horn political and security dynamics. Chapter 7 zeroes in on the Qatar crisis and how this specific dynamic, including an embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, has resulted in a fierce competition to win allies in many regions across the world, including in the Horn of Africa. It identifies how Djibouti and Eritrea supported the blockading countries, whereas Sudan and Somalia adopted a neutral position and Ethiopia and Kenya have expressed concern. This chapter examines how the Qatar crisis has put the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, in a delicate position. The study aims to contribute fresh ideas to scholarship on weak states, foreign engagements in the Horn in general and Gulf state engagement in particular. Chapter 8 takes the study in a new but complementary direction by comparing Kuwait’s lesser-known engagement in Africa with that of the other Gulf states mainly in the Horn. Kuwait’s interests in Africa have differed considerably from those of its neighbours. Named ‘an international humanitarian center’ by the United Nations, Kuwait’s relations with Africa have been on the multiple levels of state policy, civil society and individual donors. Kuwait developed the first national development fund in the region, immediately after its independence in 1961. Acutely aware of its vulnerability, in particular following the 1990–91 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait has given generously and strategically to other nations as a significant part of its foreign policy. Poorer countries offer much in return, from soldiers to UN votes; Kuwait was recently elected to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member with African support. This chapter broadens the volume’s focus on Gulf activities in the Horn of Africa by examining bilateral relations between Kuwait and Tanzania. Whereas Gulf organisations focus on relief efforts in the Horn due to war, drought and famine, Kuwaiti-funded sustainable development projects are more prominent in stable African countries. Tanzania was the first non-Arab recipient of a Kuwait Fund loan in 1975 and is the largest East African beneficiary of Kuwaiti development assistance. Part II reverses the lens through which we study the topic, to challenge the conventional wisdom of dependency theory with a series of points which relate to balancing, relative autonomy, elite and state survival. Chapter 9 examines intra-Gulf rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa through the prism of Djibouti’s foreign policy. As a member of the Arab League,

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Introduction 9 how does one of Africa’s smallest states defy diplomatic gravity, balancing intra-Arab regional rivalries alongside competing local logistical and political pressures within the Horn of Africa as well as global rivalry between US and Chinese naval powers? Part of the answer lies in political capital and lucrative rents drawn from intensifying superpower surveillance of shipping lanes, piracy and Islamists in neighbouring Yemen and Somalia. Djibouti now hosts military bases of the US, China, Japan, France and the EU. Recent Chinese rail and port projects consolidated Djibouti as the fulcrum of Asian, Arab and western commercial rivalry and geostrategic cohabitation in the region. In this context, the chapter analyses how the government manages the ongoing reconfiguration of Gulf commercial and military engagements in the Red Sea and the Horn. Gulf ties and Yemen’s war generate strong cross-currents: Djibouti is a corridor for illegal migration from the Horn to Arabia and had allies in both camps in Yemen. It has hosted Yemeni refugees since 2015, and an influential minority of its own population have historic family ties with Yemen. Central to the analysis of Djibouti–Gulf ties are the state’s formerly close relations with Dubai and the UAE. These soured when Dubai Ports World’s investment in Djibouti’s main port became embroiled in political and legal disputes. A rupture of ties in 2015 in turn prompted the UAE to diversify their air and naval facilities in the Horn. These new Arab military outposts in neighbouring Somaliland and Eritrea further contort the mosaic of conflictual regional and global interests in and around Djibouti which the chapter seeks to analyse. Chapter 10 views the Gulf states and Horn of Africa engagement through the prism of state survival. The current intensity of Gulf state interest in the Horn has generated new opportunities among the states in the coastal Horn to support and improve their position through pursing new or shifting external alliances. This chapter examines the relations between three countries of the coastal Horn of Africa with the leading Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and their rivals. Based on the understanding of the historical context of each state, the chapter views Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan as states that orient their foreign relations strategically in an attempt to ensure regime survival and consolidation in the current political landscape. More specifically, the chapter argues that Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan have sought to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the Gulf states’ current interest in the coastal Horn of Africa. It shows that in the cases of Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan the extent of foreign relations adjustments towards the Gulf states appears to reflect their respective regimes’ level of need for domestic consolidation. Chapter 11 examines the Sudanese government’s predicament resulting from the ongoing GCC rift. It discusses the underlying political and economic

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forces that shape relations between Sudan and major countries in the Quartet and Qatar, divergence in the GCC and the significance of Qatari support to the Muslim Brotherhood. It also looks at the bleak outlook of the Sudanese economy following the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The chapter debates the internal and external factors that feed into the Sudanese National Salvation Revolution (NSR) regime’s foreign policy in the lead-up to the Gulf crisis. The chapter contends that NSR foreign policy is profoundly influenced by challenging internal and external factors related to the Gulf dispute. Although neutrality in regional issues is a traditional theme in Sudanese foreign policy historically, the Gulf crisis shows it acting otherwise. The GCC crisis shed light on an internal political crisis, the absence of consensus in policy making and the ability of external actors to influence and exploit political and economic weaknesses. The chapter also discusses the intriguing personal relations between policy makers in the Gulf and Sudan that play a central role in the Sudanese military involvement in the Yemen conflict. The Conclusion seeks to draw together common themes that have run throughout the volume. From the Qatar crisis to evolving Gulf–Turkey relations, from challenges to political economy and the expediencies of the conflict in Yemen, it tracks an evolution of Gulf state economic, political and security influence over the Horn and how this forms a continuation of historic trends or a break from the norm. It digs down into the Gulf–Horn dynamic and argues how this has facilitated recovery or undermined state, subregional and interregional security and economic growth. It closes by shedding fresh light on foreign policy analysis (inter)regional security complexes and the dynamics of riyal politik necessary in the further study of this increasingly important Red Sea region.

Notes 1 A. Al-Thani, ‘The Queen of Sheba in Yemeni and Ethiopian Mythology’, in Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf and Dale F. Eickelman, Africa and the Gulf Region: Blurred Boundaries and Shifting Ties (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2015), p. 37. 2 A. Amara, ‘Ifriqiya, Medieval Empires of (Aghlabid to Hafsid)’, The Encyclopedia of Empire, 11 January 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/ 10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe361. 3 Ibid. 4 M. Hill, ‘The Spread of Islam in West Africa: Containment, Mixing, and Reform from the Eighth to the Twentieth Century’, Spice Digest, Stanford University, Spring 2009, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/the_spread_of_islam_in_west_africa_ containment_mixing_and_reform_from_the_eighth_to_the_twentieth_century.

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Introduction 11 5 A. Fromherz, ‘Oman, the Gulf, and East Africa’, Oxford Bibliographies, 28 October 2014, www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199846733/obo9780199846733–0159.xml. 6 A. Sheriff, ‘The Persian Gulf and the Swahili Coast: A History of Acculturation over the Longue Durée’, The Persian Gulf in History (New York: Palgrave, 2009), p. 174. 7 A. A. Mazrui, ‘Black Africa and the Arabs’, Foreign Affairs, July 1975, www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/1975–07–01/black-africa-and-arabs. 8 BBC World Service, ‘The East African Slave Trade’, www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ africa/features/storyofafrica/9chapter3.shtml. 9 Mazrui, ‘Black Africa and the Arabs’. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 D. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Publishing, 2007). 13 R. A. Yordanov, The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016). 14 A. Ehteshami and Emma C. Murphy, The International Politics of the Red Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 15 C. Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 16 A. de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 17 P. Woodward, Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Politics, Piracy and the Threat of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012). 18 R. Bereketeab (ed.), The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security (London: Pluto Press, 2013). 19 C. L. Daniels, Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (London: Scarecrow Press, 2012). 20 Martin N. Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbery? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 21 A. Weldemichael, Piracy in Somalia: Violence and Development in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 22 H. Verhoevan and E. Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa’, in Neil Patrick (ed.), Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 92–110; Jos Meester, W. van den Berg and H. Verhoevan, ‘Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa’, CRU Report, April 2018, www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/riyal-politik/. 23 D. Styan, ‘The Politics of Ports in the Horn: War, Peace and Red Sea Rivalries’, African Arguments, 18 July 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/18/ politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-rivalries/. 24 A. Huliaras and S. Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?’, Middle East Policy XXIV, no. 4, Winter 2017, www.mepc.org/ journal/gulf-states-and-horn-africa-new-hinterland.

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25 K. Ulrichsen, ‘The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula’, Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 2, Summer 2011, www.mepc.org/ geopolitics-insecurity-horn-africa-and-arabian-peninsula. 26 For a discussion on the broader Red Sea region see Ehteshami and Murphy, ‘Introduction’, The International Politics of the Red Sea, p. 8. 27 Ethiopia has abundant water and fertile land – Mohammed al-Amoudi, SaudiEthiopian billionaire has a massive rice plantation in Gambela; Qatar has negotiated with Kenya in 2009 for 40,000 hectares on the Tana Delta which is on hold, but Hassan Foods signed a $1 billion deal for 20,000 hectares in Sudan. Between 2004 and 2014 Gulf agricultural investments amounted to $30 billion, and there has been a similar ‘land grab’ by India, China and South Korea. G. Feierstein and C. Greathead, The Fight for Africa: The New Focus for the Saudi–Iranian Rivalry, MEI Policy Focus September 2017, p. 4.

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Part I

The view from the Gulf

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1

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Patterns of external involvement in the modern political history of the Horn of Africa states Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter

Introduction This contextual chapter sets out the ebb and flow of external interest and involvement in the Horn of Africa from before the Cold War and then into the contemporary period. In doing so, it allows us to better assess the extent to which the Gulf states’ involvement – which has become heightened in recent years, as other chapters in this volume elucidate – displays similar characteristics to the past actions of other actors. Concurrently, by looking at the wider set of external parties involved in the region, this chapter provides the context necessary to judge whether the actions of various Gulf states are enhancing or detracting from those of other powers operating in the Horn, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, China, Israel and Egypt. By taking a longer view and tracing patterns of external involvement in the security affairs of the Horn states, this chapter provides nuanced analysis of an issue that is having (and has already had) a major influence on the economic, political and security dynamics in the region and beyond it. In doing so, it is an aid to scrutinizing the activities of the various states today. There has been a visible intensification of external involvement in the Horn of Africa region. The reasons behind this increased interest are manifold, as are the ways by which this involvement manifests. Of particular significance, especially in terms of widely held perceptions, is the uptick in the number of countries with some form of military presence at the various ports and port towns and cities that line the region’s north and east-facing coastline. In misplaced reductionism, most commentators writing on this subject – whether this relates to Turkey’s new military training facility in Mogadishu or the Chinese naval presence in Djibouti – chalk it up to attempts by these states to project military power into the region, as if this was an end in itself. It is bad enough that mainstream punditry on the growing foreign military involvement in region rarely progresses beyond this mono-causal

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explanation. Perhaps more worrying is that this perception – that external military involvement is driven primarily by security competition – has seemingly permeated into the minds of officialdom in many capitals and, as a corollary, likely influences decision making at the highest levels.1 We show here that in current discussions about increased external security involvement in the Horn very little attention has been given to the agendas of the states that make up the region. We are left with analysis that takes very little account of the interests and motives of Horn states and their governments. Extra-regional states have certainly not compelled Horn of Africa states to accept a military presence through threat of force. For the most part, current commentary on this topic presents the Horn states as acted upon by external powers, removing all their agency. Yet, even during the height of the Cold War, neither the Soviet Union (USSR) nor the United States (US) acted in the region without the explicit consent of states such as Somalia and Ethiopia. As highlighted later in greater detail, these states were adept – and continue to be – at currying the attention of external states for the purpose of furthering their own regional interests. If this is the case, what are Horn states seeking to gain from acting as hosts to foreign militaries and for inviting greater external involvement in their countries? This chapter is thus partly an attempt to rectify a one-sided perspective that dominates this region’s remarkable story. Our in-depth analysis of the contemporary scene therefore naturally turns to Djibouti, which has for some time hosted a bewildering array of foreign forces. We then turn to the more recent and perhaps less commented-on developments in foreign military and security involvement in the region, namely that by states such as Turkey, China, Israel and France. But before this, the chapter opens by tracing some of the most critical phases of external security-driven intervention in the Horn of Africa.

External security interactions with the Horn before the Cold War Given the impossibility of pinpointing when extraterritorial security interactions with the Horn of Africa region began, a brief mention of key historical occurrences will suffice. The coastlines of the region on the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean encourage and engender at least peripheral interactions with the Horn’s historical and current societies and polities. The Portuguese and the Ottoman Turks vied for maritime supremacy in order to control the lucrative spice trade from the East Indies in the midsixteenth century. In doing so, they found themselves drawn into the ongoing Abyssinian–Adal war (1529–43), with the Portuguese sending weaponry and troops and fighting with soldiers fielded by the Ethiopian Empire against

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those of Adal Sultanate what is now Somaliland, who were assisted by Ottoman arms, armaments and soldiers.2 In perhaps a partial reflection of today’s security interactions, the Ottomans and the Portuguese, possessing wider ambitions that merged their Mediterranean world with that of the Indian Ocean, rapidly saw how helping a regional ally could hurt their prime adversary.3 At the same time, the leveraging of external actors’ capabilities and materiel by these historical Horn kingdoms furthered their own regional aims and interests. The slave trade across eastern Africa saw Africans trafficked to slave markets as far afield as Buraimi, Istanbul and Isfahan from the mid-sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries. The trade shaped the region and its relations with the outside world that continue to be felt today, as ‘associations between blackness and slavery remain powerful shapers of attitudes on both sides of the Red Sea’.4 By the late nineteenth century, competing European colonial policies meant that the region was intersected by rival claims of territory: British claims on both sides of the Gulf of Yemen in Aden and Berbera, French claims next door in Djibouti, Italian claims along the Red Sea coast from Massawa north to Sudan, as well as Italian claims along the entire east-facing Somalia coast and centered at Mogadishu. The Ottoman Turks even returned to the region, re-establishing a fort at Suakin in the mid-1880s on the cost of Sudan, 60 km south of today’s Port Sudan.5 The distance and difficult terrain of the Ethiopian highlands meant that attempts by the British, Italian and French succeeded only as far as they coincided with the aims of rival Ethiopian kingdoms. What is today’s Ethiopia remained under the control of local potentates until the mid-1930s when Mussolini’s Italy, intent on avenging the defeat it suffered at the hands of Ethiopia’s Menelik II in 1896, invaded from its colony of Eritrea and brutally subjected the empire. European colonial penetration in the region, as in much of the world, was relatively light in touch, particularly in places like Somaliland. But the indirect rule by proconsuls and colonial officers across the region nonetheless precluded ‘autonomous foreign policies by [the colonial states’] preferred interlocutors … They also led to the replication of patron–client relations within [their] possessions and concentrated growing amounts of power in narrow ruling elites that owed their primacy to external rents.’ 6 This form of rule was also achieved, in the case of Ethiopia, by Italy’s massively expensive invasion and subjugation (in terms of men and materiel).7 Colonial possessions were also the subject of intense, if short-lived, contestation during the world wars and therefore demonstrated the relative importance of the region, from a security perspective, to the various colonial European powers. As independence movements gathered steam in the 1940s and 1950s, the Horn of Africa witnessed some of the first successes. After British and

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colonial troops removed Italy from the region during the Second World War, Ethiopia’s emperor returned to Addis Ababa and quickly annexed the former Italian colony of Eritrea. Former Italian Somaliland joined with British Somaliland in 1960 to form the independent state of Somalia. However, though the age of colonialism was over, the political bipolarity brought on by the ideological and security competition between the US and the Soviet Union, coupled with the new states’ competing visions and security interests, meant the Horn would continue to be a zone of external involvement and contestation.

An arena of superpower competition The Horn of Africa was the scene of intense superpower competition in the last two decades of the Cold War.8 In particular, relations between the Cold War adversaries, their client states and Ethiopia, the largest and most populous state in the Horn of Africa, were crucial in shaping the region in the last quarter of the twentieth century.9 The Ethiopian monarchy of Haile Selassie was broadly wary of the Soviet Union and its anti-monarchial, atheist brand of communism. It also distrusted the militant pan-Arabism of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, because it was understood to encourage Eritrean secessionists.10 As such, the emperor tacked closer to Washington and its friends such as Israel – with which it established diplomatic relations in 1956, after the Suez War – in order to leverage their support to confront the country’s major post-colonial challenges: Eritrean secession and Somali irredentism. This changed when Haile Selassie was removed from power in 1974 by a socialist-orientated regime, the Derg. Consequentially, Washington, along with the Saudi monarchy in particular, become more active in trying to undermine the Marxist Ethiopian government led by Mengistu Haile Mariam by supporting Eritrea, Somalia and Ogaden Somalis against Ethiopia. Indeed, the Eritrean War of Independence (1961–91) to some extent became part of the wider Arab–Israeli conflict, with the majority of the Arab states siding with Eritrea, whilst Ethiopia sought military support from Israel. These struggles also demonstrated that regime type, while important, did not necessarily decide the positions external states took in regional disputes. The conservative Wahhabi Saudi monarchy generally supported the orthodox Christian Ethiopian monarchy against what became an increasingly Marxist Somalia – at least until 1974. At this point, Siad Barre’s Somalia made a switch from Moscow’s to Washington’s camp, throwing out thousands of Soviet advisers, in the hopes that the US and its partners like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran would assist Mogadishu in its own struggle to carve out a Greater Somalia from Kenyan and Ethiopian territories with majority Somali

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populations. During the subsequent Ogaden War (1978–79) between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Arab Gulf kingdoms and the Iran (still under the shah) attempted to give Mogadishu material support.11 The Somali National Army and Ogadeni rebels were stopped in their rapid approach to Addis Ababa only when the USSR, still smarting over its treatment in Somalia, as well as client states such as Cuba, intervened on the side of the embattled Marxist regime in Addis Ababa. The support offered by the USSR was formidable, amounting to 225 planes (equivalent to approximately 12 percent of the entire Soviet transport fleet), 1,500 Soviet advisers and 10,000 Cuban soldiers.12 Somalia was roundly defeated and the pre-war borders again became status quo. While the external assistance of the USSR was crucial for the Derg’s survival and maintenance of power, Somalia benefited from no such largesse from Washington. By the 1980s, Somalia was heavily dependent on economic support from the Gulf monarchies, as well as military support from Egypt.13 It was also falling apart as clan lines were sharply reified by a much-weakened and discredited Siad Barre regime. The security interactions, even during the height of the Cold War, continued to exhibit similarities with previous interactions with the region. That is, the actions of both the US and the USSR in their on-again, off-again support of Somalia and Ethiopia were predicated by the needs and aims of these states and their elites, whether an emperor, a Marxist dictator or a pretend democrat. Neither state ever danced to the tune emanating from Washington or Moscow. Instead, both Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam curried relationships and lobbied various capitals in a variety of ways in order to prosecute their primary security aims: maintaining or even increasing their territories and strengthening their sovereignty in the process. For example, from the late 1970s to 1990, Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia amounted to as much as $13 billion. Yet, Addis Ababa continued to demonstrate significant autonomy in the area of domestic policy and international economic policy.14 Next door, Somalia lobbied Tehran, Cairo and Riyadh strenuously in the run-up to the Ogaden War, knowing that these capitals had significant clout with Washington. Despite the US’s reticence to fully support Somalia against Ethiopia (and therefore the USSR), Mogadishu’s actions demonstrate yet again the significant, indeed decisive role played by the region’s leaders in relation to external states and their involvement in the Horn of Africa.

A crowded field With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the Derg in Ethiopia, interest in the Horn of Africa on the part of the great powers as well as smaller states in the Middle East waned to a degree. This was, in

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part, because of internal dynamics within the Horn states themselves. Prior to the Derg’s collapse in 1991 and the resulting independence of Eritrea in 1993, Somalia had devolved into a bloody, protracted civil war conducted along localized and highly complex clan lines. Mogadishu bombed and strafed Hargeisa and other Somali cities and scuttled ships at the port of Berbera in a bid to retain control over restive regions. Next door, Ethiopia avoided Balkanization only because the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), composed largely by members of the Tigray ethnic group, found themselves in control not only of the north but of the capital, Addis Ababa, after taking up arms in support of autonomy from the centralized state. Making common cause with other ethnic secessionist movements such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Ethiopia created a new constitution and held elections in 1995. Yet the age-old centrifugal forces of geography and regional autonomy bedeviling Ethiopia continued apace and the EPRDF government of Meles Zenawi began to look to external states for support. Post-9/11, the specter of violent Islam as well as the opportunities that presented themselves to Addis Ababa to quash secessionist movements in the name of counterterrorism pulled Ethiopia even closer to Washington.15 Ethiopia’s interest in countering secession within its borders dovetailed with another of its perennial security interests: keeping Somalia weak. As Cannon has observed: ‘The memory of [the Ogaden War] has informed Ethiopian foreign policy since then and Ethiopia can be said to have taken advantage of the disintegration of Somalia that has occurred as a result of the Somali Civil War.’ 16 When, for example, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its security wing, al-Shabaab, took control of Mogadishu in 2006, fifteen years after the advent of the civil war, Ethiopia acted quickly. It had already sent advisers and troops to assist the then Somali Transitional Government. When active fighting broke out between the Ethiopian Army and the ICU, Addis Ababa sent reinforcements and, by early 2007, had pushed the ICU from Mogadishu, eventually fielding over 10,000 military personnel in the country until their piecemeal withdrawal in 2009. The Ethiopians were actively supported by US airstrikes against the fleeing Islamists, conducted from an airbase in eastern Ethiopia.17 Only one month prior, in early December 2006, General John Abizaid, the commander of US forces from the Middle East through Afghanistan, had met Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who characterized the ICU as a ‘franchise of al-Qaeda in the making’.18 While the US initially urged caution, hoping the ICU would be a stabilizing force in Somali politics, Zenawi’s lobbying in Washington and his insistence that Ethiopia would never countenance an Islamist regime in Mogadishu led the US first to give Addis Ababa the green light to invade Somalia and then to support its endeavor fully. The US airstrikes in support of Ethiopian boots on the ground against a common enemy in Somalia were further bolstered by Addis Ababa’s

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reported sharing of significant intelligence with their US counterparts.19 In addition, Washington, stung by its failed humanitarian/military intervention in Somalia (1992–94), much preferred having Ethiopia further its narrow security interests while keeping American troops and personnel away from the region and focused on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further north, Eritrea pursued an independent foreign policy that saw it, like its neighbors during the Cold War, tack between or maintain ties with various competing external states at the same time. For example, though backed by Arab states during its independence struggle with Ethiopia, once independence was achieved Eritrea quickly sought relations with the US and Israel. Its policy of opposing the National Islamic Front (NIF) military government in Sudan by actively supporting rebel groups made Eritrea that much more important to Tel Aviv and Washington, particularly given the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support of the NIF. Yet, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki slowly turned his back on both Israel and Washington – and further enraged Ethiopia – by supporting the ICU in Mogadishu with shipments of armaments. In this effort, he was supported by the Djiboutian president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, and a number of extra-regional states such as Iran, Libya and Syria.20 Reports of Iranian arms shipments in exchange for possible uranium for Tehran’s nuclear program made the situation that much more alarming for states such as Israel.21 According to UN reports, individuals associated with the ICU fled, in the main, to Eritrea to avoid invading Ethiopian forces and US airstrikes.22 With strong US backing, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1907, imposing international sanctions on Eritrea that included an arms embargo. The rationale for the sanctions cited Asmara’s arms shipments to the ICU and subsequently to al-Shabaab, as well as Eritrea’s tensions with neighboring Djibouti over their shared border. Eritrea’s resulting diplomatic isolation, combined with US backing for Ethiopia’s claim over a parcel of disputed territory, drove Asmara to ally with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Demonstrating an acute pragmatism, Asmara did not regard Tehran’s alliance with Sudan, which was supporting Eritrean rebel armed groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, as an impediment to closer ties with Iran.23 In May 2008 Afwerki made a state visit to Iran, meeting with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and signing a number of agreements. These opened Eritrea’s ports to Iranian shipping, and in early 2009 two Iranian destroyers docked in Asmara, ostensibly as part of the UN-sanctioned anti-piracy coalition in the Gulf of Yemen. This prompted Israel to respond by sending two warships to the Red Sea in mid-2009. As Lefebvre points out, the opaque nature of the Afwerki regime, coupled with hyperbolic and alarmist reporting in the media of the Middle East states, led to ill-informed and, to this day, unsubstantiated reports that Eritrea was hosting both an Iranian naval base at Assab, in the

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south, and an Israeli naval post to supply submarines, a listening post and a small forward operating base in the north.24 In many respects, Afwerki’s head-scratching foreign policy is in line with previous instances of Horn of Africa states playing one external state off against another in order to prosecute its own interests. Asmara continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Washington and Tel Aviv, but never established full diplomatic relations with Tehran. True to Afwerki’s revolutionary credentials and zeal, Eritrea also continued to thwart any Iranian influence within the country and the region.25 Iran, for its part, could offer Asmara only so much and kept its own options open, selling oil to Djibouti and keeping an ambassador in Addis Ababa.26 Its relationship with Asmara also deepened Eritrea’s isolation from the West.

A break with the past? Securitization of the Horn today Ironically, it was renewed US interest in the region in the name of counterterrorism which altered regional security dimensions and set in train events that would lead to greater security interactions between the Horn of Africa states and a host of external powers – some new to the region, some with ties dating back centuries. Following the 9/11 attacks and the dispersion of al-Qaeda fighters after the invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 2001, the Horn of Africa was identified by the Bush administration as a key battleground in the War on Terror.27 Then, in 2003, the US invaded Iraq. The subsequent downfall of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum in the Middle East. His revolutionary, Ba’athist Iraq – attempting to take the mantle of regional hegemon – had effectively kept the power of Iran and Saudi Arabia in check. While Saddam never demonstrated great interest in the Horn of Africa, his demise destroyed Iraq’s power and generated a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East that, indirectly, has generated intensified security interactions with the Horn of Africa states. Partly as a consequence of the US invasion of Iraq, and Iran’s effective exploitation of the resultant power vacuum, heightened strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies as well as Israel against Iran appeared increasingly likely. In turn, Ethiopia, Somalia and even Eritrea pursued strategies designed to spark interest and engaged in hedging behavior towards a variety of external states, but particularly those of the Gulf states with treasuries full from historically high oil prices. Beyond the Gulf states, others in the near and far abroad have shown markedly more interest in the Horn, especially Turkey and China. These states’ multifaceted involvement in Horn countries, however, is typically depicted through a security lens, that is, their increased presence is driven



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by some form of ill-defined strategic competition for power and influence and as a means to check one another’s advances. By unpacking the interaction between external parties and Horn states, the following sections provide a more nuanced picture of the patterns of foreign involvement in the area in recent years.

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New actors Since the mid-2000s, Turkey has made the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and Ethiopia, a major focus of its foreign policy. Its presence in Somalia, in particular, certainly embodies one of the most interesting but widely misunderstood regional geopolitical developments. To be sure, real humanitarian concerns drove Turkey’s early engagement in the region, and particularly in Somalia – at least initially. Ankara ramped up its aid to Somalia in an effort to alleviate a widespread and devastating famine in 2011–12.28 But it should also be remembered that the prospect of economic gains also played a role in Turkey’s developing relationship with the country. In the six years spanning 2011–17, Turkey moved from being an economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports.29 Compared to what others have done in Somalia, Turkey’s engagement has been somewhat unique; it is both tangible and lasting. Ankara’s support has included the construction of hospitals, schools and roads.30 But Turkish support has arrived in less tactile forms too, in the form scholarships and training, as well as diplomatic efforts aimed at fostering political dialogue. These efforts are targeted and coordinated from Ankara and largely unilateral in nature.31 Turkey’s initial investments and efforts to gain influence in Somalia – most notable in the form of infrastructure contracts, to include Mogadishu’s international airport and its seaport – seem to have paid dividends.32 Indeed, control by Turkish companies of Somalia’s most critical and rent-paying infrastructure, alongside Ankara’s substantial humanitarian aid, necessarily makes Turkey an important political actor in Somalia. It short, it gives Turkey a certain amount of leverage over the Somali Federal Government (SFG).33 What is more, Turkey’s relationship with the SFG and the latter’s reliance on the former has only increased since the opening of a military training facility in Mogadishu in October 2017.34 Reportedly built to train up to 22,000 members of the Somali National Army, Turkey’s provision of a national military training center could have significant ramifications for the ability of the SFG to effectively broadcast its power beyond the capital, Mogadishu. Taking all this together, in just a few years Turkey has become one of the most significant actors in Somalia and, by dint of this, in the Horn more generally.35

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These above-mentioned details draw a picture of Turkey unilaterally deciding to act in Somalia, a country that often tops the charts of state fragility and failure indices. It must be noted, however, that the first official contact between Turkey and Somalia occurred when then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2007. As Abdurrahim Sıradağ contends: Erdoğan met the late President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed at the summit and Erdoğan requested from him to submit a proposal to Ankara related to Somalis’ issues and needs. [Subsequently], the former Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed made three visits to Turkey before Erdoğan paid his first official visit to Somalia in August 2011.36

Moreover, Turkey’s relationship with the TFG’s successors, the SFG, can better be characterized as one of push and pull between partners, albeit asymmetric partners. Both parties have something to gain: involvement in Somalia enhances Turkey’s international reputation (at least, that is the perception domestically); Somalia’s government is enriched by Turkish management, refurbishment and expansion of the largest moneymakers in Mogadishu, the port and airport. Much has been written about Turkey’s strategic interests in Somalia and the collision course that Ankara has set itself on with various Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. It is important to note, however, that Turkey, like other external actors, is acting often at the encouragement of Horn political elites and therefore its actions have not necessarily created opportunities for conflict any more than other external actors have. However, they may, advertently or inadvertently, exacerbate them. Turkey’s role in Ethiopia, in contrast, has generated little speculation about its aims. Perhaps this is because Turkey has yet to sell arms to Addis Ababa – at least publicly – or because Ethiopia is landlocked and lacks port facilities, which seem to be the focus of much of the attention by analysts and pundits alike to the region’s security affairs. Yet, Ethiopia remains Turkey’s largest investment destination in Africa, attracting well over $2.5 billion of the total $6 billion of Turkish foreign direct investment in the continent as of 2018.37 While most of the investment is in textiles, Turkish businesses invest in energy, steel and ceramics as well as large infrastructure developments such as the 389 km Awash–Kombolcha–Hara Gebaya railway being built by the Turkish construction company Yapı Merkezi.38 The beginning of China’s strengthening relationship with Ethiopia dates to approximately the same time as Turkey’s –the late 1990s and early 2000s – and dovetailed, once again, with the EPRDF government’s attempts to completely transform all aspects of Ethiopian society through increased investment, trade and infrastructure development.39 Prime Minister Zenawi was, once

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again, front and center in currying Chinese interest, visiting Beijing in 1995, with a reciprocal visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin the following year. By 2003 Ethiopia was honored by Beijing in hosting the second meeting of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Addis Ababa. Since 2000, China has surpassed all other external actors in terms of investment and trade, not just in Ethiopia but right across the continent. However, as Chakrabarty has observed, ‘Ethiopia is an important case study because it is a significant departure from the body of literature on China–Africa relations which has held that Chinese interest in Africa is primarily driven by hunger for resources.’ 40 Ethiopia is primarily an agricultural country, lacking significant mineral resources and only now developing the beginning of an industrial base. That being said, Chinese companies have been active in the country’s nascent oil and gas sector. Oil has also been discovered in undisclosed quantities in the area around Hilala, 1,200 km southeast of Addis Ababa. Gas discoveries amounting to 6–8 trillion cubic feet were made in early 2018. Ethiopia, particularly under Zenawi, has been a shrewd asymmetric bargainer, selling Ethiopia’s diplomatic strength as host of the AU, its titular position as ‘symbol of black freedom’ and its stunning economic growth to both China and the West.41 Indeed, Addis Ababa can be said to gain much from its relationship with China, understanding that if Western partners fail to support its economic and political needs, it can fall back on China. Accordingly, China has built the $4 billion Ethiopia–Djibouti railway, cutting travel time between the port and the capital from over eighty hours to just over ten. The railway was built by the Chinese state-owned China Railway Group and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. Both companies control operations and management of the railroad until 2025, when Ethiopians will reportedly do so.42 In terms of security, Ethiopia has made China a key partner since 2005, when it signed a military cooperation agreement covering technology exchange, training and peacekeeping missions.43 China has reportedly provided training and equipment to assist Ethiopia’s Information Network Security Agency to monitor the internet for anti-regime and government content.44 In 2005, China’s ZTE Corporation gained a monopoly position in the country when it won a bid to develop Ethiopia’s national telecommunications network.45 Its monopoly ended only in 2013, when its competitor, Chinese company Huawei, split another huge contract by massively underbidding the competition. Ethiopia fits into China’s wider strategy of becoming an indispensable partner – in defense and other areas – for many African states.46 Whether in infrastructure or defense, China wishes to ‘promote a Chinese way of doing things as intrinsic to its own progress’, as Pant and Haidar put it.47 From 2013 to 2017, China’s arms exports to Africa reportedly surged 55

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percent from the previous five-year period of 2008 to 2012, making China’s share of total imports of weaponry to Africa rise to 17 percent. Contextually, this occurred at the time when Africa’s overall import of arms dropped by 22 percent. Russia, for example, saw its share fall by 32 percent to 39 percent of total imports to the continent, with the US accounting for only 11 percent.48 Next door in Djibouti, Addis Ababa is finding China to be even more indispensable. Effectively landlocked since its loss of Eritrea and its ports in 1993, Ethiopia is reliant on the port of Djibouti for over 95 percent of its imports and exports. Two developments involving China are of note here. First, in 2017 China built its first overseas military base – in Djibouti, a tiny country already home to American, Japanese and French military bases. While Beijing referred to it as a ‘logistics support base’, the naval and military facilities house over 400 personnel, possess a 400m runway and are operated by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Second, a large stake in the massive Doraleh container port at the port of Djibouti was recently sold by the government of Djibouti to Chinese state entity China Merchants Ports Holdings (CMP).49 This was done after Djibouti forcibly removed Dubai’s Dubai Ports World (DP World), which had developed, expanded and operated Doraleh via a 30-year concession, in February 2018. China Merchants has subsequently also built a separate container terminal in Djibouti. Both port facilities now reportedly offer Chinese vessels priority handling and lower docking fees.50 In contrast, Somalia has received relatively little attention from China, despite Beijing opening its new embassy in 2014 (after staying away for twenty-three years) and Somalia’s being a signatory to the Belt and Road Initiative. If Ethiopia is an outlier as far as Chinese investment in an African country that is resource poor, Somalia – also relatively resource poor – seems to have lost out on that investment until recently. Indeed, despite Somalia’s potential as an offshore oil and gas producer, Chinese companies and investment have stayed away, with the possible exception of fishing.51 Unimportant as this may seem, illegal and/or unfair fishing practices may result in a return to the piracy that emanated from Somalia’s coast – Africa’s longest – circa 2008–11, much of which was blamed on over-fishing by fishermen from extra-regional states such as China. It was, of course, piracy that initially brought the Chinese military to Africa for the first time.

Old actors return As highlighted previously, the USSR was, at times, heavily invested in the Horn, particularly Ethiopia and Somalia, and both countries bought significant

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amounts of weaponry from Moscow.52 During the 1990s the newly independent Russia showed little interest beyond its near abroad and it was only in the early 2000s that Russia began opening shuttered embassies. According to Besenyő, ‘Russia is primarily interested in political issues [in Africa], rather than natural resources’.53 Demonstrating this, Russia has become involved in internal conflicts such as those in the Central African Republic or Mozambique. Moscow has also re-established itself as a major source of arms, reportedly accounting for 49 percent of total arms imports to North Africa in 2014–18 and 28 percent of arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa in the same period.54 Russia operates as an alternative partner to the West with African partners. For example, it never discusses internal governance issues or lectures leaders on democracy or rule of law. Similarly, it will sell arms to states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan that have been boycotted, at various times, by Western defense companies.55 Ethiopia’s current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, was a prominent visitor to the Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi in late 2019 and was seen eyeing Russian-made tanks. Eritrea’s leaders are reportedly interested in ‘full-fledged’ military cooperation with Russia and interested in buying missiles boats, helicopters and small arms. In addition, Russia and Eritrea signed a deal in 2018 for a logistics base at the port of Assab after Russian attempts to build a facility in Djibouti were denied by President Guelleh.56 Russia also reportedly was interested in a base near Zeyla on the coast of Somaliland. Neither the base at Assab nor that at Zeyla has been built, to date.57 A range of European states, including former colonial powers, have increased their involvement in the Horn of Africa in recent years. The UK in particular has become heavily involved in Somalia, especially in terms of development aid and security sector reform initiatives. Likewise, the EU has in place the European Union Training Mission for Somalia troops as well as the EU Capacity Building Mission. In reality, for many years past for Europe, the Horn of Africa has been a locale for engagement on challenges such as poverty reduction and humanitarian activities, attempts at conflict resolution and, layered on top of this, democratization programs. Arguably, these well-meaning policies have had but modest impact. Today, however, Europe’s involvement is increasingly driven by security concerns. Alongside maritime security, two other issues are thrusting the Horn into Europe’s political orbit. First is violent extremism, especially the Somali militant group al-Shabaab, which not only is considered a threat to the people of the region but is feared to have a long reach beyond. The next issue of priority is migration. Indeed, behind Syrians and Afghans, Eritreans fleeing their despotic government are the third-largest group of refugees arriving in Europe today. As de Waal writes: ‘Out of desperation, the EU has started to overcome its scruples and provide development aid to Eritrea – though

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its [sic] clear that spending aid money on that country’s electricity infrastructure isn’t going to change the circuits of political power, and so is most unlikely to stop the exodus.’ 58 At the head of the Red Sea, Egypt is seeking more influence in the Horn of Africa, through extensive cooperation with Eritrea. Cairo believes the region is strategically important for its national security, somewhat on account of the growing Turkish and Qatari presence there, but perhaps more significantly because of the current tensions with Ethiopia and Sudan.59 Egypt and Ethiopia are engaged in a long-running dispute over the Nile waters, which are critical to Egypt’s survival and prosperity. Sudan angered its northern neighbor when it granted Turkey the right to manage the island of Suakin for restoration of the old Ottoman town and garrison. The most powerful external state actor in the Horn is the US. While it never really departed the Horn after the Cold War in the way Russia did, the US has only one significant interest in the region: national security. This generally involves counterterrorism policies and strategies and mainly focuses on Somalia and the degrading or destruction of the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist group. In this, the US works with other Horn states such as Ethiopia, as alluded to earlier, and utilizes its base in Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier, for tactical operations. In addition, the US has recently begun the construction of a military base at Baledogle, 95 km northwest of Mogadishu, and reportedly operates armed drones from Kismayo in southern Somalia as well as from Arba Minch, some 400 km (250 miles) south of Ethiopia’s capital. While security concerns will continue to inform the US’s Horn of Africa policies, Washington reopened its embassy in Mogadishu in October 2019, signaling its interest in playing a larger political/diplomatic role in areas such as strengthening the SFG and assisting it to re-establish sovereignty over various autonomous federal states such as Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland. While this may be welcome to certain key actors in the SFG such as current President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmajo, the possibility of conflict along clan and regional lines within Somalia may also result.

Conclusion Much has been written about the involvement of external states on the Horn of Africa. Many of these articles and analyses share common themes. While many scholars concede that interactions between both sides of the Red Sea date back millennia, they simultaneously posit that what we are witnessing is a ‘new’ kind of engagement, one that is primarily driven by security concerns. These analyses point to current political struggles in the

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Middle East, for example, as engendering competition in the Horn. Other analyses, however, look to brief interludes of external state interaction with the Horn and see continuity where there is none. Examples include scholars drawing connections between the Ottoman Empire’s brief engagements with the region and Turkey’s current interest; or asserting that Zheng He’s fifteenth-century visits to the region somehow inform China’s current Maritime Silk Road investments in Ethiopia or its military presence in Djibouti. The first set of arguments fails on three counts. First, they ignore the historical and present-day evidence that Horn states initiated and often drove the engagement. In doing so, they ignore the timing and rationale of the external states’ involvement in the region. For example, the actions of Middle East states in the Horn are read, first, through the lens of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings that convulsed the region and, second, through the lens of the GCC crisis. Certainly, the breakdown in the regional order following the Arab Spring, and the somewhat unsubstantiated but nonetheless extremely popular perception that the US would henceforth be unwilling to embroil itself in the region’s problems, led some extra-regional states such as those in the GCC to adopt more assertive and self-reliant foreign policies, including a greater propensity for military intervention.60 Yet the same argument cannot be made for other actors from the Middle East such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. Israel’s engagement, as demonstrated, stretches back decades. Iran’s, too, predates the current ideological and sectarian struggles in the Middle East. Only Turkey’s interactions are relatively recent, dating back to the mid-2000s, at most, and in the Horn largely after 2011. Second, a range of analyses – those that see continuity between the actions of, say, Turkey or China – similarly fail to fully appreciate the agency and actions of the most important actors with the deepest and strongest interests in the region: the Horn of Africa states themselves. They are also guilty of drawing flimsy historical connections between the foreign policy priorities of ancient agrarian empires and modern states. There is a third issue that presents itself when reading the analyses of scholars and think-tanks about the actions of Turkey, Iran, China and others in the region that we hope this chapter may correct: they ignore the limits of power of these external state actors. That is, power is finite, and these states – no different from any other – are limited in their resources and capabilities to prosecute their foreign policies whether economically or militarily. In addition, while there are massive disparities between China and Turkey, for example, in terms of economic assets or hard and soft power, both states must also confront the realities of geographically proximate threats and how those inform their own overriding national security concerns. This means that even if these states acquire more in terms of capabilities they will still lack the rationale to place huge resources in the Horn of

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Africa region, given its geographic distance and incongruence with their respective national security interests.

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Notes 1 Authors’ reflections after speaking with officials from various countries both within and outside the Horn of Africa. 2 M. Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and Muslim European Rivalry in the Region (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). See also G. Casale, ‘The Ottoman Administration of the Spice Trade in the Sixteenth-century Red Sea and Persian Gulf’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 2 (2006), pp. 170–198. 3 Some see the enduring mistrust between Ethiopians and Somali as stemming from this conflict. D. D. Laitin and S. S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). 4 H. Verhoeven, ‘The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order’, Civil Wars 20, no. 3 (2018), pp. 333–357, p. 339. See also N. Nunn, ‘The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, no. 1 (2008), pp. 139–176. See also T. Ricks, ‘Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran, AD 1500–1900’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 36, no. 4 (2001), pp. 407–418, 411–412. 5 A. C. S. Peacock, ‘The Ottomans in Northeast Africa’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History (Oxford, 2018). 6 Verhoeven, ‘The Gulf and the Horn’, p. 339. 7 G. B. Strang, ‘“Places in the African sun”: social Darwinism, demographics and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia’, in G. B. Strang (ed.), Collision of Empires (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 11–31. 8 See, for example, J. A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). 9 For an in-depth study of a US ally, Saudi Arabia, and its involvement in the Horn of Africa, see H. Erlich, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity, and Politics Entwined (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007). 10 The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), consisting mostly of Eritrean Muslims, considered Eritrea to be an Arab state and thus looked to Nasser and his philosophy of pan-Arabism for support in their goal of independence from Ethiopia. See Kassim Shehim, ‘Israel-Ethiopian Relations: Change and Continuity’, Northeast African Studies (1988), pp. 25–37. See also M. B. Bishku, ‘Israel and Ethiopia: From a Special to a Pragmatic Relationship’, Journal of Conflict Studies 14, no. 2 (1994), pp. 39–62, 42. 11 They were unable to send US-made and -delivered items from their own militaries such as Phantom jets without explicit American permission to do so. This was never forthcoming during the war. For more information and an excellent

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analysis of the Ogaden War and the role of external security actors in the Horn, see J. Mayall, ‘The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and international Diplomacy’, The World Today 34, no. 9 (1978), pp. 336–345. 12 Mayall, ‘The Battle for the Horn’, p. 341. See also J. A. Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking US Allies’, Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), pp. 117–133. 13 Somalia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/so/somaliacountryst00metz_0/ somaliacountryst00metz_0_djvu.txt. 14 For example, Ethiopia first procrastinated in setting up a vanguard party despite Moscow’s pressure and then, once the party was formed, ensured it was staffed in the majority by former military personnel. This again contradicted Moscow’s wishes. In the economic sphere, Addis Ababa had close aid and trade relations with the West and pursued a pragmatic investment policy. 15 The Ethiopian army began to train with US forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. US military advisors also trained soldiers of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces at Camp Hurso, in eastern Ethiopia in 2006. J. Garamone, ‘U.S. Units Help Ethiopians Build Capacity’, U.S. Department of Defense, 22 April 2006, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15385. 16 B. J. Cannon, ‘Foreign State Influence and Somalia’s 2017 Presidential Election: An Analysis’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 18, no. 1 (2019), pp. 20–49. 17 D. H. Shinn, ‘Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn’, Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no. 1 (2007), pp. 47–75. 18 Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa’. 19 Xan Rice and Susan Goldberg, ‘How US Forged an Alliance with Ethiopia over Invasion’, The Guardian, 30 January 2007, www.theguardian.com/world/2007/ jan/13/alqaida.usa. 20 Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa’. 21 D. Blair, ‘Iran Armed Somali Militia in Attempt to Get Uranium’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 November 2006, www.pressreader.com/uk/the-daily telegraph/ 20061116/282033322698633. 22 Other important ICU figures such as Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Fahad Yasin Haji Dahir fled to Qatar in what was to become Qatar’s platform for influencing events in Somalia. Fahad Yasin became an Al Jazeera journalist in Doha and the power behind the 2012 election of Somalia President Hassan Sheikh and the 2017 election of President Farmajo. He is currently the Director General of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). See Cannon, ‘Foreign State Influence’, pp. 31–33. 23 Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa’, pp. 126–127. 24 According to one report, ‘In February 2009, Israel launched a drone attack, allegedly from Eritrean territory, killing several Iranian Revolutionary Guards traveling with a convoy in Sudan that was attempting to smuggle arms to Gaza’.

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See U. Mahnaimi, ‘Israelis Warn of Eritrea Flashpoint’, The Sunday Times, 19 April 2009, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israelis-warn-of-eritrea-flashpoint-ff750bx2r70. 25 Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa’, p. 129. 26 Ibid., pp. 129–130. 27 D. H. Shinn, ‘Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn’, Foreign Service Journal (September, 2004), pp. 39–40 28 M. Ozkan and S. Orakci, ‘Turkey as a “Political” Actor in Africa – An Assessment of Turkish Involvement in Somalia’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 2 (2015), pp. 343–352. 29 Turkey reportedly made around $71 million in exports to Somalia in 2015, according to official figures. That number has likely increased, but figures are unavailable. As of early 2018, Turkey had invested over $100 million in Somalia, according to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Recep Akdağ, who predicted that the bilateral trade volume would rise to $200 million from about $120 million in 2016 and only $2 million in 2003. T. Joplin, ‘Turkey’s Big Play in Africa Starts with Somalia’, Albawaba News, 4 December 2017, www.albawaba.com/ news/original-turkey%27s-big-play-in-africa-starts-with-somalia–1056610; ‘Türkiye ile Somali arasında ekonomik iş birliği [Economic cooperation between Turkey and Somalia]’, Habertürk, 12 January 2018, www.haberturk.com/ yerel-haberler/14278773-turkiye-ile-somali-arasinda-ekonomik-is-birligi. 30 Turkey built and opened, in 2013, one of the largest hospitals in eastern Africa. S. Uslu, ‘Türk hastanesi Somali’de şifa dağıtıyor [Turkish hospital in Somalia provides healthcare]’, Anadolu Agency, 20 January 2018, https://aa.com.tr/tr/ dunya/turk-hastanesi-somalide-sifa-dagitiyor/1036321. 31 B. J. Cannon, ‘Turkey in Africa: Lessons in Political Economy’, Florya Chronicles of Political Economy 3, no. 1 (2017): 98–100. 32 M. Wasuge, Turkey’s Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little (Mogadishu, Somalia: The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2016), p. 16, www.heritageinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Modelin-Somalia-Achieving-Much-With-Little1–1.pdf. A 2016 report indicates that the airport and harbor fees provided to the SFG are likely many times those officially reported. Abdirazak Fartaag, Breaking Point in Somalia: How State Failure Was Financed and By Whom (Nairobi: Fartaag Consulting, October 2016), http://fartaagconsulting.com/publications.html. For an analysis on Turkey’s path to economic and political influence in Somalia, see B. J. Cannon, ‘Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia’, Bildhaan 16, no. 14 (2016), pp. 110–116. 33 P. Akpınar, ‘Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy’, Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013), p. 740. According to J. Aglionby, M. Srivastava and M. Fick, in the five years spanning 2011–16, Turkey committed a total of US$400m in aid to Somalia: ‘The Reasons behind Turkey Leader Recep Erdoğan’s Africa Tour’, Financial Times, 2 June 2016, www.ft.com/content/ aaf3981a-27e5–11e6–8ba3-cdd781d02d89. 34 O. Decottignies and S. Cagaptay, ‘Turkey’s New Base in Qatar’, Washington Institute, Policy Watch no. 2545, Washington, DC, 11 January 2016,

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www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-new-base-in-qatar. For Turkish media stories with a similar tone and content, see: U. Ergan, ‘Somali’ye Türk Askeri Eğitim Üssü [Turkish military training base in Somalia]’, Hürriyet, 18 January 2016, www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/somaliye-turk-askeri-egitimussu-40042244; and I. Kaya and E. Yeşilduman, ‘Türkiye Osmanlı topraklarına geri dönüyor [Turkey returns to Ottoman lands]’, Yeni Şafak, 3 January 2018, www.yenisafak.com/ekonomi/ciftcinin-maliyeti-15-bin-tl-dusecek-3153203. 35 See A. Rossiter and B. J. Cannon, ‘Re-examining the “Base”: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia’, Insight Turkey 21, no. 1 (2018). See also, for example, J. M. Kantack, ‘The Gulf Contest for the Horn of Africa’, Critical Threats, 26 September 2017, www.criticalthreats.org/ analysis/the-gulf-contest-for-the-horn-of-africa. 36 A. Sıradağ, ‘Turkish–Somali Relations: Changing State Identity and Foreign Policy’, Inquiry-Sarajevo Journal of Social Science 2, no. 2 (2016), pp. 89–106, 92. 37 B. Derso, ‘Africa: Ethiopia Tops Turkish Investment Destinations of Africa – EIC’, Ethiopia Herald, 31 January 2018, https://allafrica.com/stories/201801310663.html. 38 A case study of the textile industry in Ethiopia is instructive in explaining the level of Turkish involvement and once again is demonstrative of the actions taken by a Horn of Africa state to bring an external state and the resources at its disposal into the region. The textile industry in Ethiopia, for example, has grown incredibly since at least 2014. This is, in part, because of concerted Ethiopian government efforts to encourage foreign firms to invest in the country. Prime Minister Zenawi’s drive to break Ethiopia’s investment isolation dovetailed with the AKP’s nascent ‘Opening to Africa Policy’. The strengthening of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Ethiopia also played a key role along with the strong country marketing and business lobbying of then Ethiopian ambassador to Turkey, Mulatu Teshome Wirtu. (The ambassador subsequently became President of Ethiopia, 2013–18). In addition, the Development Bank of Ethiopia extended the 70/30 investment loan offer to foreign investors. Currently, China is the largest investor in Ethiopia’s textile sector, followed by Turkey. C. Staritz and L. Whitfield, Made in Ethiopia: The Emergence and Evolution of the Ethiopian Apparel Export Sector, CAE Working Paper (2017), pp. 1–41, 19. 39 F. Cheru, ‘Emerging Southern Powers and New Forms of South–South Cooperation: Ethiopia’s Strategic Engagement with China and India’, Third World Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2016), pp. 592–610. 40 M. Chakrabarty, ‘Ethiopia–China Economic Relations: A Classic Win–win Situation?’ World Review of Political Economy 7, no. 2 (2016), pp. 226–248. 41 It also ‘forgave’ China for supplying arms to Eritrea during an uptick in conflict in the late 1990s. S. Adem, ‘China in Ethiopia: Diplomacy and Economics of Sino-optimism’, African Studies Review 55, no. 1 (2012), pp. 143–160, 148. 42 ‘Ethiopia – Road and Railways’, Export.gov, 30 October 2019, www.export.gov/ article?id=Ethiopia-Road-and-Railways. 43 J-P. Cabestan, ‘China and Ethiopia: Authoritarian Affinities and Economic Cooperation’, China Perspectives 2012, no. 2012/4 (2012), pp. 53–62, 55.

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44 S. Hess, ‘The role of China and asymmetric bargaining in Ethiopia’s authoritarian backsliding’, in C. Hartmann and N. Noesselt (eds), China’s New Role in African Politics: From Non-Intervention towards Stabilization? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 116–130. 45 A World Bank investigation found that the Ethiopian government appeared to ignore its own procurement rules requiring competitive bidding when it awarded the contract, which gave ZTE a monopoly on supplying telecom equipment for several years. See M. Dalton, ‘Telecom Deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism’, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/ telecom-deal-by-china8217s-zte-huawei-in-ethiopia-faces-criticism-1389064617. 46 It does so through: (1) a combination of establishing arms or military relationships with the target African state; (2) a favorable financing strategy; and (3) aggressive marketing of both high and low-end military equipment and technology. See E. Conteh-Morgan, ‘China’s Arms Sales in Africa’, Oxford Research Group, 19 April 2017, www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/chinas-arms-sales-in-africa. 47 H. V. Pant and A. M. Haidar, ‘China’s Expanding Military Footprint in Africa’, ORF Issue Brief 195 (2017), pp. 1–12, 3. 48 Based on a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See L. Jeong-ho, ‘Everything You Need to Know About the Weapons China Sells to Africa’, South China Morning Post, 8 July 2018, www.scmp.com/ news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2154189/everything-you-need-knowabout-weapons-china-sells. 49 Djibouti sold 23.5% of its 66.66% stake in Doraleh to CMP. DP World, which still owns the remaining 33.34% of the terminal, has taken the Djiboutian government to court and sued CMP. 50 C. Paris, ‘Djibouti Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back Container Terminal’, Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-courtruling-to-hand-back-container-terminal-11579296713. 51 In 2018 the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) granted 31 fishing licenses to China, and the China Overseas Fisheries Association, which represents 150 companies, was allowed to fish for tuna in Somali waters. ‘China–Somalia Fishing Deal May Revive Sea Piracy’, TRT World, 12 March 2019, www.trtworld.com/ africa/china-somalia-fishing-deal-may-revive-sea-piracy-24879. 52 A. Arkhangelskaya and N. Dodd, ‘Guns and poseurs: Russia returns to Africa’, in J. van der Merwe, I. Taylor, and A. Arkhangelskaya (eds), Emerging Powers in Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016): pp. 159–175, 162. 53 J. Besenyő, ‘The Africa Policy of Russia’, Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 1 (2019), pp. 132–153, 135. However, Russia does face shortages of certain raw materials, including aluminium, chrome, manganese, mercury, and titanium. Russia already imports much of its bauxite needs from Guinea. See J. Peter Pham, ‘Russia’s Return to Africa’, The Atlantic Council, 14 March 2014, www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/russia-s-return-to-africa/. 54 P. D. Wezeman, A. Fleurant, A. Kuimova, N. Tian and S. T. Wezeman, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers 2018’, SIPRI (March 2019), pp. 8–12, 9. 55 For example, Sudan purchased MiG-29SE fighter jets and 2 MiG-24UB training planes from Russia in 2001. In 2006, it purchased another 14 MiG-29SE. In

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2008, Sudan purchased 12 MiG-29SE fighter jets as well as 12 Mi-24 attack helicopters and 14 Mi-8 transport helicopters. Besenyő, ‘The Africa Policy of Russia’, 141. 56 B. Ho Wang Bang, ‘The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti’, The Interpreter, 18 March 2016, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/strategic-attractions-djibouti. 57 Author’s interview with former Republic of Somaliland official, Hargeisa, Somaliland, 12 May 2018. 58 A. de Waal, ‘Europe’s Challenge in the Horn of Africa’, Open Democracy, 21 May 2016, www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/europe-s-challengein-horn-of-africa/. 59 ‘Egypt Seeks Greater Influence in the Horn of Africa through Broad Cooperation with Eritrea’, Alsahrq Alwsat, 10 January 2018, https://aawsat.com/english/ home/article/1139021/egypt-seeks-greater-influence-horn%C2%A0-africa-throughbroad-cooperation-eritrea. 60 K. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the UAE in the Wake of the Arab Spring’, HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed Al-Sabah Publication Series, Durham University, UK, 2 (October 2012).

2

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Pushing the envelope of national security and state influence at the margins: Saudi and Iranian competition in the Horn of Africa Robert Mason

Introduction This chapter charts the trajectory of Saudi and Iranian engagement and competition in the Horn of Africa (the Horn) as an extension to their intense rivalry in the Middle East. Enmity between Saudi Arabia and Iran is well documented in various texts1 and is generally attributable to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini articulated an expansionist republican model for Iran and other parts of the Middle East, set against the status quo interests of the Arab monarchies on the other side of the Gulf. The destructive competition is rooted in the struggle for political and Islamic legitimacy and influence in Muslim majority states across the region, and is increasingly being played out on a global basis. Given the uneven sources of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the competition has also featured a regional arms race, embedded United States (US) security assurances and force posture in the Gulf, and Iranian support for various non-state actors such as Hezbollah,2 Hamas and the Houthis. Iran continues to challenge the regional balance of power and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) alliances, especially following the fall of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the Arab uprisings.3 The net effect of this and other contentions, such as the boycott against Qatar and Turkey’s pro-Islamist policies under President Erdoğan, has been questions about the prospects for security in conflict zones and ungoverned spaces. Gulf state–Horn relations have generally been asymmetric, allowing more Gulf state influence in the fragile, weak or failed states of the Horn than vice versa. For years, freedom of maritime navigation and control of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait has been a major Gulf security concern. Even apparently innocuous diplomacy such as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was viewed suspiciously by Iran’s Arab neighbours. Instead of welcoming a victory for regional non-proliferation,

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Saudi Arabia in particular viewed the JCPOA as a gateway to increased Iranian oil exports to the valued Asian market, facilitating additional income that could be used to support military and militia assets in pursuit of Iran’s contentious regional policies. The JCPOA was also an Iranian public relations coup and could have succeeded in breaking Iran out of its position of relative isolation. Only after President Obama promised major new US arms deals to the kingdom did Saudi Arabia reluctantly support the JCPOA. A lack of US policy effectiveness in places such as Syria4 has worsened the regional outlook for the kingdom and caused it to become, along with changes in its traditional pattern of leadership, more assertive in the wider neighbourhood. The chapter covers domestic and regional inputs into Saudi and Iranian policy making concerning the Horn, their major bilateral relations, the role of Hezbollah in the Horn, and the impact of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the nascent Red Sea Forum on stability and security in the Red Sea region. As the introduction to this volume notes, the Gulf states and Horn states have sustained a long history of social, commercial and political relations across the narrow strip of the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia often cites King Faisal, who travelled across Africa during his reign from 1964 to 1975, had a wide number of African contacts and allies, and launched the Saudi Fund for Development in 1974. US pushback against leftist movements and Soviet-backed governments during the Cold War involved Saudi financing, and this happened in the Horn as well as in the more famous case of the mujahideen in Afghanistan.5 The withdrawal of the superpowers from the Horn after the Cold War gave the Gulf states unrivalled access to the region, but larger regional states such as Kenya and Ethiopia were quick to develop a stronger regional presence. Gulf relations, including Saudi engagement in the Horn, have been somewhat uneven and subject to various obstacles and challenges. Yet the Gulf states remain unequalled regionally in their economic resources and the impact that stems from them. Saudi aid, delivered with a Wahhabi message, has been particularly pronounced in Sudan, in Somalia and in support of Eritrean rebels who came to power. Whilst Sudan and Ethiopia have become sources for migrant labour, their political engagement has been somewhat variable. Other Gulf interests in the Horn include investments which have secured agricultural lands that partly address food and water security,6 religious affiliation, geostrategy and alliance building which affects the regional balance of power, as well as growing trade and investment opportunities. Between 2000 and 2017 the Gulf states invested $13 billion in the Horn across 434 investments, mainly in Sudan and Ethiopia.7 Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are at an important juncture, based on recent developments. First, Saudi–Iranian tensions have ratcheted up significantly

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in the Gulf, as have US–Iranian tensions. More US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia after a suspected Iranian-sponsored attack on Saudi oil installations in October 2019. This underscores the kingdom’s reliance on the US for defence in case escalation turns into conflict. The Trump administration also extended its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign to push back against Iran, primarily involving sanctions, to include other unilateral measures such as the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Major General Qasem Soleimani at the international airport in Baghdad on 3 January 2020. This has raised the prospects for Iranian retaliation against Western targets, possibly using terror cells established in Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, the Gambia or Central African Republic.8 Second, there has been an intense scramble to conclude deals with Horn states to service the logistical requirements of the Yemen conflict. Should the conflict be resolved in a manner which contributes to Saudi national security concerns regarding Iran and other non-state actors such as the Houthis, al-Qaeda9 and Islamic State, it could contribute to the beginning of an eventual thaw in Saudi–Iranian relations while enhancing regional and international security. At the time of writing, this eventuality looks to be unlikely. Third, the drop in the international oil price and COVID-19 have put economic pressure on the Saudi national budget to the extent that it could yet affect how Saudi Arabia has operated its foreign policy for many years, namely through financial levers or riyal politik to support alliance building and Iranian alliance deconstruction.10 The oil price and economic impact of COVID-19, as well as the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy, have also adversely affected the Iranian national budget. But, given the relatively small financial costs involved in extending influence in the Horn, most deals in the Horn which do go ahead will probably remain secure. Fourth, other regional actors are complicating the picture of Saudi alliance building and alliance deconstruction. As discussed in this volume, Qatar is pursing some contrary policies in the Horn but in similar patterns of riyal politik, and yet has also provided a stabilising role by facilitating talks between the Sudanese government and rebel movements in Darfur as far back as 2008. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi effort against Qatar has increasingly become internationalised as both states seek to isolate Doha and effect a lasting Qatari foreign policy rethink. Turkey has generally engaged in Africa through its export-orientated trade policies since the 1980s and has also been effective in winning over allies. Turkey has been designated a ‘strategic partner’ for the African Union, and Turkey held an Africa–Turkey Summit in 2014.11 Ankara has set up military bases in Qatar



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and in the Horn, which makes it a relevant actor in Saudi–Horn calculations going forward, especially if it chooses to work more closely with Qatar and/or Iran in future. The following sections concentrate on the domestic and regional policy elements of Saudi and Iranian foreign policies which have repercussions for their engagements in the Horn.

Domestic and regional challenges and their impact on foreign policy Saudi Arabia The number of domestic and regional challenges affecting Saudi foreign policy have become manifold since 2015. Whilst the political transition between monarchs often brings with it a degree of uncertainty, this has been multiplied in the post-Arab uprisings environment, especially concerning Yemen. Saudi Arabia has played a leading role there, for example in terms of aid and support for the 2011 political transition through the GCC Initiative and Transition Mechanism, along with the UAE, Oman and Kuwait. Domestic policy has also been upended by major policy changes such as the seemingly incongruent pursuit of economic liberalisation with political consolidation, and the austerity brought about by declining oil prices from 2014, as well as the impacts from COVID-19 in 2020. Fundamentally, and true of all regional power interests and interactions in the Horn, policies are driven by domestic politics, including regime and state survival. These have tended to have a polarising effect, evident in the GCC (i.e. the Qatar Crisis) as much as it has in the Horn. The leadership transition to King Salman in 2015 facilitated the transfer of enormous power to his son Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), who immediately became Minister of Defence, and then took on responsibility for the economy from April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030. It set in motion a more assertive foreign policy, particularly concerning the Saudi intervention in Yemen. This was followed by a series of liberalising domestic reforms that have challenged the conservative religious ulema and constrained the powers of the Islamic religious police, the Mutawa. Whilst this was generally welcomed in the West, especially since 9/11 when the Saudi export of the Wahhabism has been under intense scrutiny, it raises two questions about Saudi religious influence internationally and the extent to which political consolidation will continue unimpeded. First, Gause asks whether MBS can successfully roll back the Saudi religious establishment and ‘return’ Saudi Arabia to a more moderate version of Islam

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(with a lower emphasis on sectarian rhetoric, evident before the 1980s) when tension still exists between official Saudi policy and the grassroots level.12 Decades of conservative and sectarian policies may also make the prospect of national reorientation and reconciliation around a more moderate Islam difficult, especially in local communities where there is a history of division and intolerance. But Saudi clerics under King Salman have stated that domestic liberalising reforms will have a knock-on effect overseas and have pointed to the moderating language of tolerance within the Muslim World League as an example.13 Meanwhile, the UAE incentive to push back against Turkish and Qatari support of the Muslim Brotherhood, with Saudi support, suggests that the moderations are not simply due to a realisation that Wahhabi doctrine was creating a backlash of intolerance, but that there needs to be a decisive attempt to regain control of the narrative from mainstream political Islamist groups which can pose a direct threat to monarchical rule. The key challenges to this appear to be in the diversity of Islamic scholarship; a traditional emphasis on personal as opposed to institutional arrangements to address local political dynamics; and the content of social media posts which often lie beyond Saudi or UAE state control. Second, political consolidation has accompanied the rise of MBS, including the 2017 detention of various royals and business people at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh, with estimates that the state earned $100 billion from associated deals and prosecutions. Political consolidation appears to have extended to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a friend of President Erdoğan’s and ally of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 2018. The UN report into this episode cited MBS’s involvement.14 In March 2020 Mohammed bin Nayef and Prince Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz, both former interior ministers, were arrested in the kingdom. Mohammed bin Nayef was crown prince until he was deposed by MBS in June 2017. Although this is said to send signals to other royals who may be plotting against MBS,15 it does not explain the March 2020 detention of the son and daughter of Saad Aljabri, a senior intelligence official who worked closely with Mohammed bin Nayef.16 Prince Faisal bin Abdullah, the son of the late King Abdullah, has been detained since 27 March 2020. Political consolidation and coup-proofing may be part of the rationale for these moves, but the former interior ministers may also pose a danger in their respective connections to overseas intelligence agencies. Political consolidation has also been apparent in the simultaneous acquiescence to some of those calling for reforms, such as the Women2Drive protest, and the detention of some of those same individuals. The United Kingdom (UK) and France have provided only mild criticism about these episodes, whilst President Trump appears to have given carte blanche to MBS from very early on in his presidency. Indeed, President Trump’s first

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state visit was to Riyadh in May 2017, the month preceding the Qatar crisis. The departure of then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may also have been connected to his efforts to mediate and bring an end to the crisis. Saudi political consolidation therefore continued unabated during the Trump administration. The fall in international oil prices has created a new austerity era in Saudi public and foreign policy. But it’s not just oil prices per se that have been financially costly. Saudi Arabia’s status as swing producer has meant it needed to lead OPEC production cuts. The Yemen conflict is estimated to have cost more than $100 billion17 (although this figure appears to have been off-set by the Ritz Carlton episode). COVID-19 is likely to prove financially costly too, especially in undermining Vision 2030 on jobs and the foreign labour needed to finish large-scale projects. Mega projects include mixed-use cities such as Neom, which sits on the Red Sea border of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. Its expected completion date is 2025 and it could cost $500 billion, although it is likely to be scaled back.18 The official response to the economic pressures has been to suspend the costof-living allowance and increase the Value Added Tax from 5 per cent to 15 per cent from July 2020.19 Given the ongoing policy inputs from the Yemen conflict, including the reluctance of allies such as Egypt and Pakistan to become embroiled in it and the rationale to build long-term allies along the Red Sea coast, most with a relatively low economic base, the Saudi process of alliance building using riyal politik could be quite sustainable. Whether there will be any interceding factors such as further efforts by Horn states to select allies using a different set of metrics than those recently evident, to put more efforts into subregional integration over interregional cooperation or to balance with alternative powers remains to be seen. Indeed, these are not mutually exclusive efforts and most will require further support from the GCC states. The speed of Saudi liberalisation and austerity create uncertainties in the Saudi political economy, and the postponed Saudi–African Summit20 (to be held in Saudi Arabia in 2022) creates uncertainty as to the foundations for enhanced relations with Africa. The possible end of Saudi intervention in Yemen will have a significant impact on security and defensive relations with the Horn states. A legacy of military and commercial port deals are likely to remain, as is the long-term interest in creating a buffer zone against Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula and along the Red Sea border. But the potential to de-escalate with Iran, to implement projects that serve security as well as commercial needs (such as the Bridge of Horns project discussed later) and a move to emphasise trade with emerging African markets may become more apparent over time.

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Iran The coupling of power and political legitimacy with culture and identity is not a new phenomenon in Iran’s external relations. In the Pahlavi period (1925–79) the idea of Iranian national interests triumphed, and with it the growing isolation of the clerical establishment and Iran’s pre-Islamic culture.21 That situation has since been partially reversed by the clerical establishment after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. From this time, Iran sought to enhance its influence in the developing world, including with Africa, through an anti-imperialist approach, in contrast to its declining relations with Europe and the US. Iran’s relations with Europe in particular over the last two centuries have not generally been positive. US efforts to further isolate and contain Iran since the Islamic Revolution have eroded its resources and impinged on its capabilities. Thus Iran has a legacy of a bifocal policy approach which has been more pronounced during the ‘reformist’ presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rouhani. Whilst the IRGC interests are often confined to near-term security and supply issues, the Iranian government has attempted to establish and exert influence through diplomatic channels. Iran’s ideological basis for legitimacy – the generation of a perfect Islamic society, combating Iran’s enemies, defending Islam and supporting the downtrodden (Mustazafin) against arrogant powers (Mustakberin) – has limited Iranian foreign policy options and simply doesn’t achieve the kind of traction among target nations and states that other states’ more pragmatic foreign policies have been able to achieve.22 Enhanced relations with Africa were a feature of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005–13) in pushing for more South–South cooperation to bolster Iranian standing in the world after restarting Iran’s nuclear programme. Also of possible interest have been imports of uranium from African states such as Zimbabwe in 2013, if not in commercially viable quantities, at least serving as a way to enhance bilateral ties against the West.23 Although the Iranian import of uranium is covered by UN Security Council sanctions since 2006, there are no restrictions on the import of uranium ore until the point that it is suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment.24 In 2010 President Ahmadinejad toured Africa and attended the Iran–African Forum in Tehran with a view to garnering African support in the UN Security Council against new sanctions on Iran. In the event, Gabon, Nigeria and Uganda all voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed a fourth round of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme.25 Then, in 2015 the JCPOA signalled a strategic diplomatic opening between Iran and the parties to the agreement, representing the greatest potential in attracting inward investment into Iran’s beleaguered oil and gas network, in addition to consumer goods aimed at the relatively large domestic market

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of over 70 million. The JCPOA also reduced Iran’s incentive to search for nuclear energy supplies abroad, but, after President Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement, questions are again being raised as to Iran’s nuclear intentions and about any new search for supplies. In 2019 uranium particles were detected by the International Atomic Energy Agency at an undeclared and as yet unknown site in Iran.26 Also of relevance is Iranian investment through its intervention in Syria, which may be at least partially reimbursed through access to Syria’s oil, gas and phosphate mines.27 The significance of phosphate fertilisers is their use in the extraction of uranium for weapons and nuclear power, as illustrated by Iraq’s production of 109 tonnes from legally imported phosphates in the 1980s.28 IRGC engagement with the Houthis in Yemen has attracted Saudi-led military resolve to change the balance of power there in favour of the central government. IRGC activities in establishing supply lines to Hamas and Hezbollah, notably through Sudan, have also attracted quite effective countermeasures by Israel and Saudi Arabia, through military strikes and through financial, agricultural and planning assistance incentives. Egypt has also played a major role by destroying tunnels on its the border with Gaza in the Sinai Peninsula. Due to sustained international sanctions and relative isolation, Iranian economic interests are similar to those of the Horn states, requiring foreign investment and technological expertise. Therefore, Iranian economic interests in the Horn are limited. What Iran does possess is a vision for a post-US hegemonic world, in which Horn states can assert their independence, but which lacks the economic resources to heavily engage through riyal politik (the modus operandi of Saudi Arabia) or proof of national development capabilities through targeted projects undertaken by entities such as Dubai Ports World (DP World; UAE) or Turkish private sector companies and aid agencies. Nevertheless, Iran could still put itself in contention with any allied non-state actor, probably a radical militia group in the Horn or elsewhere, ready and willing to receive weapons and other material support. Any residual Houthi presence in Yemen could therefore play a major bridging role to these groups, as the Syrian government currently plays to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Yemen: the facilitating factor for Saudi and UAE intervention in the Horn The Houthi takeover in Yemen in 2014 and the Saudi-led military response in 2015 created a new-found need to secure allies along the Red Sea periphery. This was followed by the accession of MBS as crown prince in 2017, which added a sense of urgency on matters related to Africa. Indeed, Saudi Arabia

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appointed a new state minister for African affairs in 2018. The boycott of Qatar from June 2017 has reinforced the zero-sum approach that Saudi Arabia was taking towards Iranian influence in Africa. All these developments have played a part in shifting the orientation of Saudi foreign policy, but none has been more important to date than the Saudi perception of the Houthis as an Iranian proxy. In response, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have broadened and enhanced their security, diplomatic and economic influence in the Horn. Whilst UAE policy drivers in the Horn are assessed elsewhere in this volume, it is important to note what the impact of the Saudi–UAE coupling and potential decoupling of policies in Yemen will be on Saudi external relations. Yemen faces similar challenges to Somalia, across the Red Sea. Both states suffer from poverty, disease, insurgency and terrorism and can act as a base and conduit for terror groups to use, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The attack on the US compound in Sanaa on 17 September 2008 killed ten people, and the US Foreign Relations Committee estimated that it was just a matter of time before further acts of terrorism occurred.29 This assessment was proven correct, as at least two further attempts at international terrorism have been launched from Yemen. One was to send bomb packets to a synagogue and Jewish community centre in Chicago; on a tip off from Saudi intelligence, they were intercepted in October 2010. The other was a failed bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. These events served to reorientate international counterterrorism attention and policy back to Yemen and highlighted the links to Somali-based terror groups. GCC aid accounted for the majority of aid to Yemen before 2010, but, whilst it prevented the country from collapsing and creating a multifaceted security threat to the GCC, it was not enough to enhance development and improve governance. The emergence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009 served to bolster President Saleh at the time, but a counterterrorism approach to Yemen against AQAP and Islamic State from 2014 masked the more existential and politically diverse threats from the Houthi takeover from September 2014 and from southern secessionists. Iran began to step up its political and operational support for the Houthis in Yemen following the onset of the uprising there in 2011 and 2012. Iran was not a player in the political transition following the resignation of President Saleh but did probably help to connect him to the Houthis following his ouster, which has facilitated the conflict.30 In 2013 the US and Yemeni navies intercepted a dhow which was carrying 40 tonnes of military supplies for the Houthis, including rockets, surface-to-air missiles and ammunition.31 Iran sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy in Somalia in 2008 and formed a Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task force in 2014 which perhaps

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provided it with cover for growing supplies to Yemen.32 Iranian support has grown more overt since the Houthis made major advances, including taking control of Sanaa. The Houthis also launched several ballistic missiles at Riyadh, but they deny targeting Mecca in 2019.33 Some Lebanese Hezbollah members, possibly including commanders, have moved into Yemen, although it is unclear whether there is any causality with the Saudi-led coalition bringing their own forces from allied states such as Sudan. The terms of peace in Yemen that Iran is said to have supported already in 2017, but which the Saudi-backed government has rejected, are the resignation of President Hadi in exchange for Houthi withdrawal from Sanaa (the Kerry proposal).34 Since reconstruction is likely to be undertaken by Yemen’s Gulf Arab neighbours, it is hard to see a long-term role for Iran in Yemen beyond leverage over an adversary. The war economy is one of the clearest outcomes of the Yemen conflict so far, with a major black market for fuel, smuggling, arms and money laundering. The military and militia involved are therefore playing a dual role in the fighting and also in economic profiteering from the fighting.35 The profits for groups such as the Houthis are said to go to the front line rather than to public sector employees in state institutions, leading to state paralysis.36 When the UAE announced a phased withdrawal from Yemen in October 2019, it handed control to Saudi Arabia. Its move coincided with the Sudanese withdrawal of all but 650 troops out of its committed 15,000, which will further isolate Saudi Arabia and undermine its military capacity in Yemen.37 Tensions remain between the Saudi-backed government and the UAE-backed southern separatist movement, the Southern Transitional Council (STC). But, given Saudi and UAE policy convergence on so many vital issues in the Middle East, and growing economic competition as both states strive to rapidly diversify, Yemen is unlikely to derail their overall cooperation.

Saudi and Iranian policy in the Horn states Since the 1980s, Iranian–African relations have included sending delegations, opening new embassies, official propaganda (which has attempted to play up divisions between Christian-dominated governments and Muslim communities), and covert actions, including against governments with which Iran had outwardly good relations, such as in Tanzania, Senegal and Nigeria.38 Iranian attempts at propaganda have had limited success because it tends to appeal only to the radical fringe.39 Iran remains fundamentally constrained by religious affiliation. The larger Shi‘a minority communities in Africa can be found in Chad and Tanzania, where they make up around 20 per cent of the total population.40 Shi‘a are also present in Nigeria (12 per cent),

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Democratic Republic of the Congo (10 per cent), Ghana (8 per cent), Kenya (8 per cent), Uganda (7 per cent) and Guinea Bissau (6 per cent).41 In the Horn, Shi‘a are present in Djibouti (2 per cent) and Ethiopia (2 per cent), in contrast to Sunni communities of 77 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively.42 Therefore the opportunities to leverage local Shi‘a groups in the Horn are quite limited. In the following subsections, Saudi and Iranian foreign policies in the Horn will be examined on a country-by-country basis, focusing on key security, political and economic dimensions to the bilateral relationships.

Sudan On 30 June 1989 Hassan al-Turabi undermined the decades-old status quo and alliance with Saudi Arabia, which had done little to address poverty, and turned Sudan from a status quo power to a revolutionary one. However, Islamists still gained from the former president Ja’afar Nimeiri’s illusory policy of Sudan being the ‘Breadbasket of Africa’, the Middle East and even the world, by benefiting from investments of over 80 per cent in the wider rural sector.43 Turabi’s al-Ingaz (‘salvation’) policy urged all peoples of the Middle East to overturn their pro-US governments. The result was a new alliance with Iran, which Tehran had hoped would provide a springboard for Iranian influence across the Horn. This objective was facilitated by the US decision in November 1992 to send forces to Somalia. Iran would establish the Somali Revolutionary Guard to be trained in Sudanese camps by Iranian and Hezbollah experts.44 Its mission was to incite the Somali public against the US presence and support guerrilla and terror activity by local forces.45 Afghan fighters were sent to Sudan before their deployment in the Horn, and Iran sent Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Sudan for possible use in Somalia.46 This support helped Mohamed Aidid, the Somali militia leader in Mogadishu. By 1994, US forces had withdrawn from Somalia, leaving behind a failed state. This was a victory of sorts for Iran and Sudan, but instability in Somalia has continued to cause regional instability. Sudan went on to refuse to support the US-led defence of Saudi Arabia during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and offered a refuge for Osama bin Laden in 1991 after he was stripped of his Saudi nationality. Saudi Arabia coordinated its response with Egypt and Kuwait, ensuring that Sudan received only 0.5 per cent of all pan-Arab aid in the 1990s.47 Sudan’s Popular Arab-Islamic Conference brought together a range of revolutionary forces as diverse as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Carlos the Jackal. But it was the Sudanese security services and their role in overthrowing the Chadian and Ethiopian governments, an attempted assassination attempt

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against Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995 and Turabi’s rejection of Islamic authorities in Egypt (al-Azhar) and the Saudi ulema that proved most controversial. Egypt and Saudi Arabia quickly subscribed to President Clinton’s policy of regime change in Khartoum. Sudanese economic and foreign policy objectives could not be reconciled, and by 1999 Omar al-Bashir and Turabi’s deputy had successfully implemented a coup, followed by outreach to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. Lasting damage had been done in Sudan’s bilateral relations, but by moving Sudanese political legitimacy back to economic performance based on irrigated agriculture and a dam project, Sudan was no longer in confrontation with the GCC states. Billions of dollars then flowed to Sudan through multilateral Arab funds, serving Sudan and also the agricultural and water security objectives of the Gulf states as commodity prices peaked in the 2000s. From 2017, competition in Sudan stepped up a gear following years of Qatari engagement and central bank support. Qatari direct investment stood in contrast to pledges from Saudi Arabia for multifarious agricultural projects and joint ventures, but with few realised. This is partly due to the state of infrastructure in Sudan, which is also a challenge in other neighbouring states, and due to other bureaucratic obstacles such as restrictions in the repatriation of profits imposed by the Sudanese central bank.48 Sudan also blamed Saudi Arabia for not working with the US and European allies on more debt and sanctions relief after Sudan signed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and after the 2011 secession of South Sudan. Saudi Arabia also views Sudan as having squandered its oil income throughout the 2000s and as not having sufficiently overhauled its failed Breadbasket policies. Sudan continued to engage in relations with Iran, having accepted repeated visits by Iranian warships at Port Sudan, including Iranian officials in Sudan’s military-industrial complex, and allowing its territory to be used for smuggling weapons (including Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets) to Hamas. Saudi Arabia is not the only state to blame Sudan for weapons reaching Hamas. Israel allegedly targeted a military factory in Khartoum in October 2012.49 In response to the covert cooperation between Sudan and Iran, Saudi Arabia closed its airspace to Omar al-Bashir’s plane en route to President Rouhani’s inauguration in 2013. Egypt went on to flood the Hamas tunnels into Gaza with sewage from 2013 and attempted to destroy them with sea water in 2015.50 Sudan closed Iranian cultural centres and expelled an Iranian diplomat in 2014, over fears that Iran was promoting Shi‘a Islam in a majority Sunni country, and possibly hoped for more Saudi aid and investments.51 After the secession of South Sudan, Sudan lost most of its oil reserves and oil income. By 2016, Sudan had committed around 10,000 troops (of which

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7,000 were militia) to the Saudi-led effort in Yemen, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE paying General Daglo (known as Hemedti) directly.52 He has stated that $350 million was then paid into Sudan’s central bank.53 Sudan expelled the Iranian ambassador in January 2016 in protest at the attack on Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran, itself a reaction to the execution of Shi‘a cleric Nimr al-Nimr.54 The Sudanese U-turn in relations with Iran was another unwelcome event for Iran and highlighted the susceptibility of Iranian Horn allies to the economic influence of the GCC states. The incident echoed Gambia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2006 (possibly due to US pressure) over Nigeria’s interception of a shipment of weapons.55 The change in the government of Sudan’s behaviour was probably orchestrated in the lead-up to the visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jabeir to Khartoum in February 2016, when Sudan agreed to participate with troops and aircraft in the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen in return for $2 billion–$4 billion worth of aid and what appears to have been a Saudi promise to push the US to lift sanctions against Sudan.56 Sanctions were temporarily lifted under the Obama administration, but the Trump administration reinstated them until a deal was struck late in his term of office. Al-Bashir then became more prominent during joint Arab military exercises and summits of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.57 After the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged $3 billion to support Sudan’s military-led transition (funds originally intended for Lebanon: $500 million in cash and $2.5 billion in commodities58) in order to bring Sudan decisively into their sphere of influence.59 This is important, as some of Sudan’s sources of income, such as labour remittances which were worth at least $71 million in 2017, have dried up following a dip in Saudi labour demand.60 Saudi Arabia is breaking new ground in Sudan by working closely with the UAE, US and UK to broker a deal between civilian and military leaders. But the kingdom has a competing agenda here: overt support for a political transition and stability and keeping Sudan on side, including against Iran. Saudi Arabia has insisted on preserving the security apparatus, including Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces under General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, with which the kingdom has a close relationship. The UAE appears to be the most active in co-optation efforts of opposition groups such as Sudan Call officials and in sending arms to Sudan.61 Diplomatic support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, may have emboldened the Sudanese authorities during a crackdown in June 2019 that killed 100 civilians,62 although Hemedti’s July 2019 trip to Cairo showed some Egyptian misgivings, which will result in more support for General al-Burhan. The Saudi and UAE support for Hemedti, at least up until late 2019, appears to have achieved the desired outcome of putting Sudan on the

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predetermined path of a military-led political transition. The meeting between General al-Burhan and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about normalising relations, confirmed on 23 October 2020, coupled with a $335 payment to American victims of terrorism and their families, was enough to convince the Trump administration to lift sanctions on Sudan and remove it from its terrorism sponsors list.63 However, the move to normalisation with Israel has created friction between Hemedti, who is in favour of it, and Abdalla Hamdok, elected Sudan’s prime minister in 2019, who is more circumspect. This reflects ongoing tensions and divergent interests of civil–military relations in Sudan. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to support through a new fund to invest in agriculture,64 through petroleum product supply in 2021 and through COVID-19 medicines. Whilst further non-Gulf cash injections and the potential for increasing trade and investment may support the Sudanese economy and consolidate a new political reality, it may require the renegotiation of Sudan’s heavy debt burden, which stood at around $60 billion in 2020. Until Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt engage more fully with Qatar, which has been a peace broker in the Darfur conflict, a joined-up diplomatic approach to Sudan is unlikely.

Ethiopia Ethiopia is attempting to rebalance power in the Nile basin away from Egypt in favour of its own economic and political renaissance. With a population of 100 million, although it is landlocked, it is still a regional power and is expected to open a military base in Djibouti on the Red Sea.65 It is challenging Egyptian water security through the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. Egypt has lobbied its Gulf patrons to oppose this move and has linked it to undermining Saudi agricultural investments in Egypt. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Saudi deputy defence minister in 2013, sided with Egypt and Sudan at the Arab Water Council, including reference to Arab solidarity.66 When Indonesia and the Philippines temporarily stopped migration of domestic workers to Saudi Arabia over concerns about human rights abuses in 2011,67 Ethiopia stepped in to fill the gap. But Ethiopian maids were accused of neglect, the murder of children in their care and the practice of ‘witchcraft’, a crime which carries the death penalty in Saudi Arabia. Tensions rose further in 2013 when Saudi Arabia cracked down on ‘illegal’ migration, and some Ethiopians were killed in the subsequent attacks on Ethiopian nationals.68 More than 160,000 Ethiopians returned home, but many were detained and tortured and faced prosecutions they had been escaping from in the first place.69 In 2017, when Addis Ababa did not sever ties with Qatar, more than 400,000 Ethiopians who worked in Saudi Arabia, many on an

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illegal basis, were given 90 days’ amnesty on repatriation.70 Tensions grew and the Saudi government threatened mass expulsions.71 Some have taken place and efforts were being stepped up in 2020.72 Since Ethiopian remittances from Saudi Arabia were worth at least $191 million in 2017,73 there is an argument to be made to avoid future external economic shocks by engaging more fully with the international community to diversify Ethiopia’s economy and generate more jobs and income domestically. Saudi–Ethiopian relations are broader than migrant labour and include Saudi investments in water, agriculture and livestock. Saudi Arabia has purchased around 124,000 hectares in Ethiopia for food production.74 But this is far less than the 500,000 hectares that Saudi Arabia purchased from Tanzania in 2009.75 Personal connections, such as those of Saudi billionaire Mohammed al-Amoudi, who has an Ethiopian mother and business interests in Ethiopia across agriculture, mining, beverages and hotels, could pave the way for further joint ventures and higher levels of bilateral trade in oil, agriculture and services. In 2019 Amoudi, through his investment group Midroc Ethiopia, was the second-largest employer in the country and was set to invest $126 million in a new, mega edible oil processing factory in Addis Ababa.76 Amoudi was arrested at the Ritz Carlton Riyadh in 2017, along with other Saudi industrialists and royal figures. He was eventually released after 14 months, in January 2019. Although the charges against him remain unclear, his London spokesman stated that his overseas interests remain unaffected.77 There is still a lack of clarity surrounding Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s role in the Eritrea–Ethiopia peace deal. The circumstantial evidence suggests that $1 billion was deposited into the Ethiopian central bank, the Order of Zayed was awarded to the leaders of both states and the final peace accord was signed in Jeddah in 2018, all of which must have at least contributed to the deal.78

Eritrea The relationship between Iran and Eritrea was of concern to Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s. The main factors driving Iranian–Eritrean relations appears to arise from the US isolating Eritrea during counterterrorism operations in Somalia in the 1990s, persistent fears of Somali irredentism79 and Iranian interest in opening up a western flank against the US after the Iraq War began in 2003. Iranian interests vis-à-vis Eritrea were also probably linked to assertions that Israel had a listening post at Mount Amba Sawara and a naval supply base for its submarines at Dahlak Archipelago.80 This was always a marriage of convenience. Iran is an Islamic republic and Eritrea

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has a secular, Christian-dominated political elite. The main enabling factor, therefore, was Eritrea’s radical nationalist foreign policy.81 There were fears that Iran would make another attempt at ‘regional Islamisation’, and Sudan had supported Eritrean opposition groups such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement with Iran’s support.82 But, following revelations of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in 2006, Eritrea agreed to oppose Iran’s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council.83 Eritrea has remained balanced in its relations with Iran and Israel in particular, with closer relations with Iran usually linked to episodes such as the US taking a pro-Ethiopian approach during the Global War on Terror, in which the US needed Ethiopian support in the Somali theatre. The 2002 Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision on Babme and other border areas belonging to Eritrea may also have been a factor. Iranian activity in the Horn rose during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, in 2005 when Iran needed to diversify its international relations to avoid isolation. But Eritrea’s policies in the 2000s were probably a function of the US scaling back military cooperation and then banning US arms exports to Eritrea in 2008, due to the Eritrean government not providing over-flight clearance for US military aircraft and due to alleged support for al-Shabaab. Tehran appointed a non-resident ambassador in 2008, followed by Eritrea reciprocating. From 2008, Iranian warships were conducting ‘anti-piracy operations’ off the coast of Somalia and used Eritrea’s Assab base, where IRGC operatives are likely to have been deployed.84 Israel accused Iran of smuggling weapons through Assab and then overland through Sudan and Egypt’s Sinai to Hamas in Gaza at a time when Israel was conducting an assault on Gaza.85 This assertion caused the multinational Combined Task Force 151 to expand operations into anti-piracy and the Israeli navy to move more assets from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea.86 Similarly, Riyadh accused Iran of shipping weapons from Eritrea across the Red Sea to the Houthis in Yemen, and moved three warships to patrol the northern Yemen coastline in November 2009.87 Iran’s Bank for Export Development also assisted Eritrea with a $35 million credit line in 2010.88 The amount in loans and grants from Qatar has not been disclosed.89 On 29 April 2015, the day Djibouti evicted Gulf troops, Eritrean President Afwerki met King Salman and concluded a security and military partnership agreement including GCC base rights in Eritrea to support the coalition in Yemen. The UAE allegedly concluded a 30-year lease of a deep-water port at Assab (denied by Eritrea) in addition to a nearby airfield, with tanks and artillery stored on the land in between.90 Saudi Arabia has since been pleased by Eritrea’s support for Egypt over Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam dispute and by its close state-security links. These are due to Egypt and

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Eritrea both having had, or continuing to experience, contentious relations with Ethiopia. But, by June 2018 the Eritrean–Ethiopian peace deal meant that UN Security Council sanctions were lifted.91 Eritrea–Ethiopia relations improved to the point that President Afwerki visited the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in October 2020, signalling a possible change of policy in favour of Addis Ababa. There are now prospects for subregional integration as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia have signed a joint agreement on cooperation. Relations between Eritrea and Djibouti are also thawing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have helped to modernise Eritrea’s power grid and have given assistance in the form of oil and aid. Eritrea deployed 400 troops to Yemen, embedded with UAE troops, in 2015.92 The Eritrea–Ethiopia peace deal could serve to boost the trading volume through the port at Assab, should it move from a military base with significant Emirati naval, air and ground assets to a commercial hub operated by DP World. Eritrean President Afwerki was successful in having UN Security Council sanctions lifted in 2018 and has to some extent rehabilitated his image in the international community. Rapidly improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the consequences from that have been greeted with some alarm in Addis Ababa. But the Ethiopian and alleged Eritrean response has been somewhat complicated by fighting in Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost region, that started on 4 November 2020. The US and the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have already been active in this part of the world, all have an important role to play in encouraging Amhara’s territorial claims to be addressed through political processes.

Djibouti In 1998 Iran and Djibouti signed a letter of understanding to consolidate political, economic, trade and industrial ties, but by 2016 Djibouti had cut diplomatic relations with Iran over the Iranian attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Permitting the Saudi embassy attack in Tehran looks to have been a strategic mistake for Iran because, with growing ties with Djibouti, it might have developed into a foothold in the Horn as well as a way to block GCC state security ties. Furthermore, if not a direct challenge to US forces in nearby Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti City, an Iranian presence in Djibouti would have become a point of contention and annoyance, which Tehran has more adeptly explored with other states such as Venezuela. Saudi Arabia planned to build its first overseas base in Djibouti, with talks taking place between 2016 and 2017.93 But, due to the crowded area around Camp Lemonnier and the limited military facilities in Djibouti City,

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Djibouti officials asked Saudi Arabia to consider sites at Obock, to the north.94 It would require considerable investment, but its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb strait may provide a good return. However, since Saudi and UAE plans to base their anti-Houthi campaign in Djibouti were compromised by a diplomatic row after Djibouti seized the Doraleh container port in February 2018 (managed by DP World since 2006), Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly turned to previously isolated Eritrea. Relations and the logistical rationale for the base agreement there will need to be balanced with any return of DP World to Doraleh port after DP World won another arbitration ruling against Djibouti over its operation in 2020.95 Saudi efforts to isolate Doha encouraged Qatari peacekeepers to leave the disputed Djibouti–Eritrea border after both states sided with Saudi Arabia at the onset of the Qatar crisis from 2017. Again, Saudi Arabia may turn to investments to build the alliance with Djibouti, including the Bridge of the Horns, a proposed construction project that will link the coasts of Djibouti and Yemen at a distance of 28 km, across the Bab el-Mandeb. Proposed by Dubai firm Middle East Development LLC and headed by Tarek bin Laden, the project is expected to link two cities, both called Al Noor City, on either side of the bridge at a cost of $25 billion. Although it may generate useful local employment, neither country has good infrastructure and the bridge may end up becoming a white elephant.

Somalia Somalia is the Horn state where the Qatar crisis plays out most obviously. Qatar supports the Somali central government, while the UAE supports autonomous regions in the north.96 The potential for state fracture and escalation of tensions is ever present. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are said to be supporting different candidates in the presidential elections expected to take place in 2021. Furthermore, Turkish businesses have established a credible presence in Somalia and Turkey’s humanitarian presence has been facilitated by the 2011 famine. But Turkey’s understanding of the conflict dynamic remains limited. Gulf investments, mainly UAE port investments in the north, and diplomatic ties to Qatar, have not been sanctioned by the government in Mogadishu. Saudi Arabia, in comparison, has no diplomatic or consular ties to Somalia since the central government broke down in 1991. Somalia was nonetheless able to secure a pledge of $50 million from Saudi Arabia on the day it announced it was cutting diplomatic ties with Iran: $20 million in budget support and $30 million in investment.97 Saudi Arabia has also expressed interest in hosting further discussions aimed at resolving the Somalia–Somaliland dispute.98 For now, instability (including US drone strikes against al-Shabaab) that prevents a more active Saudi role

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in Somalia benefits Iran’s long-held intentions to enhance its own influence both there and over the approach to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

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Hezbollah’s footprint in Africa Hezbollah has worked as Iran’s main proxy in the Levant since the early 1980s. It is focused on prosecuting an asymmetric campaign of warfare against Israel and Western interests by engaging in high-profile kidnappings and attacks, notably the US embassy bombing in Beirut in 1983. Other attacks occurred between 1982 and 1991, and again in 2000.99 In 2006, when Hezbollah ambushed a routine Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) patrol along the Israel–Lebanon border, three Israeli soldiers were killed and two others were taken to Lebanon – leading to the Second Lebanon War.100 Hezbollah’s operations have since expanded globally, with an emphasis on Europe, South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Incidents in Europe include the 18 July 2012 suicide attack that killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian bus driver.101 This coincided with attacks by Iran in India and Thailand in reprisal for Israel’s covert campaign to target Iranian nuclear scientists. As part of these reprisals, two Lebanese men were arrested in Thailand for an alleged plot targeting Jewish tourists in Bangkok in 2014. Two years earlier, Hezbollah was found to be using Thailand as a base to manufacture chemicals which could have been used in weapons similar to those deployed by the IDF, such as ‘sticky bombs’.102 Narcotics and cash smuggling from Latin America into West Africa and Europe are a key component of Hezbollah’s fundraising activities. In 2011, Ayman Joumaa was charged with drug trafficking and money laundering, with an operation worth an estimated $200 million per month.103 Joumaa paid fees to Hezbollah for transport and money laundering, and yet the ties between Hezbollah and the Los Zetas cartel were said to be indirect, making it difficult to know the sustainability of the relationship or whether Hezbollah provides similar services for other cartels.104 But, in 2019, Argentina (where Hezbollah is blamed for terror attacks on the Israeli embassy there in 1992 and a Jewish community centre in 1994) and Paraguay both designated Hezbollah a terrorist organisation. The Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay has long been a site of illicit operations, including terrorist training camps. The knock-on effect on Hezbollah’s global operations is as yet unknown, but as long as there remains a Lebanese diaspora in Latin America its operations are unlikely to be impacted on too much by official policy shifts.105 Hezbollah’s modus operandi in Africa generally looks to be different from elsewhere. Its operatives mingle among the many Lebanese expatriate

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communities and benefit from their financial and logistical support, whether through sympathy or extortion. Hezbollah benefits from weak states, including in Africa, where a lack of governance and porous borders facilitate its myriad of operations, from charity work and recruitment to fundraising and smuggling. Kidnappings do not yet appear to be a key feature of its activities on the continent, even though in October 2003 Israeli intelligence warned of a possible plot to kidnap Israeli business people or diplomats in the Horn of Africa to facilitate a prisoner swap then being negotiated by Germany.106 However, after Imad Mughniyeh, a founding member of the Islamic Jihad Organisation, was assassinated by the Central Intelligence Agency and Israeli operatives in Damascus in 2008, concerns about kidnapping did again become more prominent and also shifted to concerns about retaliation through assassinations in areas where Hezbollah was already active, such as in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania.107 This will also be a concern following Hezbollah’s announcement of retaliation for the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. On 25 December 2003 a plane travelling from Cotonou in Benin to Beirut crashed on take-off, allegedly killing Hezbollah’s local foreign relations official, who was carrying $2 million in donations from regular contributors in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin and other African states.108 Hezbollah clearly has extensive ties in West Africa, where there is a large Lebanese diaspora. Hezbollah has needed West African financial support, as Iranian financial transfers have been compromised somewhat through international sanctions. In June 2013 four Hezbollah operatives were found to be actively fundraising or recruiting in Sierra Leone, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia.109 US sanctions have caught up, being implemented in 2013,110 2015,111 2018112 and 2019,113 but with most sanctions up until 2019 appearing to target few individuals and smaller companies. The sanctions in 2019 appear to more fully target those associated with Hezbollah in the diamond trade (possibly involving ‘conflict diamonds’ from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo). The diamond and narcotics trades have both been cited as sources of funds and weapons for Hezbollah.114 However, equally significant is the assertion that then President Charles Taylor of Liberia was accused in 2003 of having harboured operatives from al-Qaeda and Hezbollah for years, affording them space to operate and grow their networks.115 In 2013 Nigerian authorities arrested three Lebanese nationals plotting an attack on Western and Israeli targets, after a cache of weapons was found.116 This was in line with broader Iranian attempts to ship weapons through Nigerian front companies. Hezbollah has since been found to be providing religious and military training to Nigerian Shi‘as at two camps in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, albeit to relatively small groups.117 In 2016, Northern Nigeria experienced clashes between the Izala Movement backed by Saudi

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Arabia and the Shi‘a Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) supported by Iran. Hezbollah therefore plays an important escalatory role in this sectarian and increasingly violent dynamic. The presence of large Israeli commercial interests in Nigeria might also explain Hezbollah’s presence there, which includes an operational cell, arms caches and locals accused of spying for Iran.118 If IMN becomes as violent as Boko Haram, which between June 2014 and February 2018 killed roughly 1,200 people and injured 3,000,119 the security situation in Nigeria could worsen. If Hezbollah could replicate its Shi‘a training programme, a similar model of sectarian conflict or attacks aimed at Israel and the West could potentially be imported into Central and East Africa. Iran might be able to achieve something similar through its own expansion of terror cells and cooperation with other militant groups such as al-Shabaab. This was illustrated by the arrest of two Quds Force operatives with a hidden cache of explosives on a Kenya golf course in 2012.120 As previously noted, the Sudanese government had given Osama bin Laden refuge from 1991 to 1996. It has also provided safe haven, training bases and staging areas for a number of other groups, including Hezbollah.121 Hezbollah’s overt efforts in Sudan were finally brought to a close in 2019, as the government closed the group’s representative office in an attempt to rebuild relations with the US and get sanctions lifted.122 It is possible that Hezbollah sent a small number of advisers to Somalia in 2006.123 But its activities in the Horn appear to have generally diminished after 2015, as the focus has shifted to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. During this time a combination of Egyptian, Gulf and international pressure have shone a light on Iran and Hezbollah’s efforts at arms smuggling, including north from Sudan. Without a similar political climate for enhanced operation, it is likely that Hezbollah’s cells in Africa will remain small. Nevertheless, Iran and Hezbollah’s role in Yemen, where hundreds of advisers have provided training to Houthi fighters,124 will remain a relevant factor in subregional and interregional security as Hezbollah becomes an increasingly experienced and effective military force. In future, Hezbollah is likely to find itself in more constrained financial circumstances, due to US sanctions against Iran and Hezbollah, the EU having put Hezbollah’s military wing on a terrorism blacklist in 2013, and continued Israeli interceptions of cash destined for Hezbollah. This will no doubt put more emphasis on Hezbollah fundraising than has been the case in the past. Indeed, overt fundraising has taken place in Yemen.125 It is possible that more assertive GCC state economic and diplomatic interventions into the Horn have dislodged not only Iranian bases in places such as Sudan, but Hezbollah’s cells too. Whilst the group remains adaptable, with small cells, it is possible that its fundraising may be limited to hundreds of thousands of dollars from Africa rather than millions or tens of millions of dollars.126



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However, that may be more than enough to achieve its limited goals from Lebanon, a country which is in a political and economic crisis. It is in this context that Hezbollah’s political and economic consolidation should continue to be watched closely amid calls for it, and the rest of the Lebanese political elite, to relinquish power.

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Towards multilateralism: IGAD and the Red Sea Forum IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The intergovernmental organisation participated in conflict resolution in Sudan between 1993 and 2005 in the lead-up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and again in the Somali peace process from the 1990s to 2000s. Its effectiveness in the latter has been compromised by Ethiopia and Djibouti supporting different groups, although the political landscape in Somalia has remained generally chaotic. Somaliland remains contested, and therefore open to Gulf state influence and developmental actions, especially from the UAE. Since IGAD is an organisation with stated objectives to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration among members, it could play an important role in providing stability in the Horn. The ongoing civil war in Darfur, state collapse in Somalia and a fragile peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia, between Sudan and South Sudan and between Eritrea and Djibouti following their 2008 border dispute, make the stakes for regional security high. But IGAD continues to lack the institutional strength to resolve existing conflicts and tensions, and divisive Gulf policies are unlikely to support the IGAD mission through existing modes of engagement.127 The suspension of Eritrea as a member (now lifted) and inability of IGAD to garner US political support and neighbourhood troop contributions for the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia highlight some of its challenges.128 The Red Sea Forum (including the Gulf of Aden) has been in the pipeline for a long time. Egyptian and Yemeni plans date from the 1970s.129 Saudi Arabia attempted to establish a multinational forum among the Red Sea states in December 2018.130 It holds the promise of regular meetings, and there have been four since 2019, to share engagement between the Gulf, Levantine states such as Jordan and the Horn states. In this forum those Horn states that have not benefited from Gulf investments might engage on areas of common interest. As trade grows, so too do the number of ports that serve the region beyond Djibouti, which highlights the opportunities on offer for other littoral states. There is also potential in developing a common migrant charter. But there are concerns that the forum might become exposed to existing regional fissures, whether over Ethiopian dominance at the expense

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of Egypt in the Horn or over Gulf access and influence. The potential for a multilateral dialogue where little existed before is nevertheless welcome as the challenges and complexity mount and the Horn enters a new phase in its relations with the Gulf states.

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Conclusion Buzan and Waever produced a study on regional powers in a Regional Security Complex (RSC), arguing that most security threats travel more easily over short distances and thus generate an RSC.131 This is highly relevant for regional powers in the Gulf which are located close to many of the Horn states and could potentially generate an Inter-Regional Security Complex (IRSC). During the Yemen conflict, proximity matters: to manage the conflict, for logistical reasons and to contain any spill-over effects. However, the Gulf and the Horn still lack some of the key features to be classified as an IRSC. First, there has not been a stable pattern of security interactions between actors. As this chapter has demonstrated, the bilateral relations have been fluid and functional, exhibiting signs of a changing balance of power and polarity. Second, the Red Sea, although narrow, continues to provide a barrier between the Gulf states and the Horn. Interactions have increased, partly due to the geostrategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait and multilateral forums proposed and developed, and grand projects are aiming to literally bridge the gap over the sea, but these are not yet complete or sufficiently long lasting to record their full effect. Third, much of the interaction between the Gulf and the Horn has been economic in nature and hardly exhibits an interdependent relationship, and so dependency theory remains highly relevant. Aid, trade, remittances and investments have flowed from the Gulf and labour migration flows to the Gulf. Nevertheless, there remains a high degree of uncertainty about Gulf investments domestically and in the Horn during a period of lower oil prices, in the context of relations with Egypt, following on from specific events such as the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016 or the Qatar crisis in 2017 and further socio-economic pressure from COVID-19. Should social, security, political and economic ties become more consolidated over time in and between the Gulf and the Horn, where sub-regional irredentism and pan-regional interference have hitherto been common, they could indicate the birth of a new IRSC. We are only at the beginning of a new phase of Gulf influence in the Horn, where diverse interests including defence, energy, migration and tourism coalesce. The foundations of a new interregional order are yet to be set and

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there remain many questions about great-power policies, priorities and engagements in the Indian Ocean. Much depends on US and GCC state policy in the context of evolving conflict and humanitarian concerns. Reconciling the Saudi/UAE/Bahrain/Egypt–Qatar split is probably the single most important aspect of increasing interregionalism between the Gulf and the Horn at this point. Transitions in Sudan and Somalia/Somaliland will prove to be litmus tests for what appears to be a securitised approach to alliance building in the Horn and for the strength and durability of political relations in a new era. Saudi–Horn policy is primarily focused on preventing any challenge to the House of Saud, and the kingdom has successfully used the Yemen conflict, the attack on Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran in 2016 and instances of political transition to roll back Iranian influence in key Horn states. The US ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran opened up the possibility to squeeze Iran further, with implications for Iranian-sponsored reprisals in Africa.132 The IRGC is unlikely to give up trying to open up a new front of insecurity for the Saudis in the Horn, but it is fundamentally hampered by incompatible religious affiliation, lack of shared revolutionary zeal, diminishing security connections and economic resources. Hezbollah appears to have done better through parts of the Lebanese diaspora community. Turkish and Qatari support for political Islamist groups adds a second-tier threat in the Horn after Iran, unless and until a rapprochement becomes evident, and Saudi Arabia is likely to continue to work with the UAE to roll back their influence wherever possible, even if tensions exist in other policy portfolios.

Notes 1 See, for example, R. Mason, Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014); S. Mabon, Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); D. Hiro, Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); K. Ghattas, Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unravelled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2020) and I. Fraihat, Iran and Saudi Arabia: Taming a Chaotic Conflict (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020). 2 Given Hezbollah’s insertion into the Lebanese parliamentary system and avoidance of disarmament under the 1989 Taif Agreement, coupled with an exponential rise in the quantitative and qualitative power of its arms since the 2006 war, Fred Hof is said to classify Hezbollah as a ‘state within a non-state’.

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J. Feltman, ‘Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran’s Most Successful Export’, Brookings, 17 January 2019, www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-iransmost-successful-export/. 3 R. Mason (ed.), Reassessing Order and Disorder in the Middle East: Regional Imbalance or Disintegration? (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). 4 R. Mason, ‘Back to Realism for an Enduring U.S. – Saudi Relationship’, Middle East Policy, 21, no. 4, (2014), pp. 32–44. 5 International Crisis Group, ‘Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact’, Report No. 206, 19 September 2019, www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/206-intra-gulf-competitionafricas-horn-lessening-impact. 6 For more on this topic see H. Verhoeven and E. Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa’, in N. Patrick (ed.), Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 92–111. 7 J. Meester, Willem van den Berg and Harry Verhoeven, ‘Executive Summary’, Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa, Clingendael Institute Conflict Research Unit, April 2018, p. 5, www. clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018–04/riyal-politik.pdf. 8 C. Coughlin, ‘Tehran Sets Up Terror Cells in Africa as Western Sanctions Bite’, The Daily Telegraph, 24 June 2019, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/24/ tehran-sets-terror-cells-africa-western-sanctions-bite/. 9 Al-Qaeda or militants associated with al-Qaeda had previously conducted a campaign of terror in Saudi Arabia, including a suicide attack against the deputy interior minister, Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, in 2009. 10 For more on this see: Mason, Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia and R. Mason, ‘The Nexus’. 11 R. Mason, ‘Patterns and Consequences of Economic Engagement Across Sub-Sahara Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese, British and Turkish Policies’, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, May 2015, p. 12. 12 G. Gause, ‘Saudi Arabia and Sectarianism in Middle East International Relations’, Project on Middle East Political Science, https://pomeps.org/ saudi-arabia-and-sectarianism-in-middle-east-international-relations#_edn2. 13 D. Ignatius, ‘Are Saudi Arabia’s Reforms for Real?’ 14 B. Riedel, ‘U.N. Report Firmly Blames Saudi Arabia for the Murder of Jamal Khashoggi’, Brookings, 19 June 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fro m-chaos/2019/06/19/u-n-report-firmly-blames-saudi-arabia-for-the-murder-of -jamal-khashoggi/. 15 M. Stephens, ‘Saudi Royal Arrests: Why Top Princes Have Been Silenced’, BBC News, 9 March 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51800964. 16 S. Kirchgaessner, ‘“Saran and Omar Have Disappeared”: Children of Ex-Saudi Official Missing since March’, The Guardian, 3 June 2020, www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/jun/03/sarah-and-omar-have-disappeared-children-of-ex-saudiofficial-missing-since-march.

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17 Y. Guzansky and A. Heistein, ‘Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen Has Been a Disaster’, The National Interest, 25 March 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/saudi-arabias-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064. 18 B. Bostock, ‘Everything We Need to Know About Neom, a “Mega-City” Project in Saudi Arabia with Plans for Flying Cars and Robot Dinosaurs’, Business Insider, 23 September 2019, www.businessinsider.com/neom-what-w e-know-saudi-arabia-500bn-mega-city-2019-9. 19 Arab News, ‘Saudi Arabia Suspending Cost of Living Allowance, Raising VAT to Mitigate Economic Impact of Covid-19’, 11 May 2020, www.arabnews.com/ node/1672946/saudi-arabia. 20 A preparatory meeting was held between the Arab League and African Union (AU) in Cairo in February 2021 covering topics such as support for the ceasefire in Libya, support for the political transition in Sudan, the border crisis between Sudan and Ethiopia and AU-sponsored talks concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Arab League, African Union Look Forward to Next Joint Summit in Saudi Arabia’, 2 February 2021, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2780371/arab-league-africanunion-look-forward-next-joint-summit-saudi-arabia. 21 S. Hunter, ‘The Domestic Context of Iran’s Foreign Policy: Impact and External Behavior’, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), p. 19. 22 Ibid., p. 29. 23 M. Hibbs, ‘Iran and Secondary Uranium Sources’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 August 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/08/23/ iran-and-secondary-uranium-sources-pub-52768. 24 Ibid. 25 H. A. Hassan and H. Thabet, ‘Africa and the Middle East: Shifting Alliances and Strategic Partnerships’, in D. Nagar and C. Mutasa (eds), Africa and the World: Bilateral and Multilateral International Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 342. 26 VOA, ‘UN: Uranium Found at Undeclared Site in Iran’, 11 November 2019, www.voanews.com/middle-east/un-uranium-found-undeclared-site-iran. 27 H. Azizi, ‘Iran Seeks Economic Benefits from Syria’, IranSource, Atlantic Council, 22 February 2019, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iranseeks-economic-benefits-from-syria/. 28 R. Kelley and V. Fedchenko, ‘Phosphate Fertilizers as a Proliferation – Relevant Source of Uranium’, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 59, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, May 2017, p. 4, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017–05/phosphatefertilizers-proliferation-relevant-source-uranium.pdf. 29 See US Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb’, 21 January 2010, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT111SPRT54494/html/CPRT-111SPRT54494.htm. 30 G. M. Feierstein, ‘Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace’, Middle East Institute, 6 December 2018, www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemenand-prospects-peace.

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31 Ibid. 32 J. Fargher, ‘“This Presence Will Continue Forever”: An Assessment of Iranian Naval Capabilities in the Red Sea’, Center for International Maritime Security, 5 April 2017, http://cimsec.org/presence-continue-forever-assessment-iraniannaval-capabilities-red-sea/31593; BBC News, ‘Iran Sends Ship against Pirates’, 20 December 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7793603.stm. 33 Reuters, ‘Yemen’s Houthis Deny Targeting Mecca with Ballistic Missiles’, 20 May 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-yemen/yemens-houthisdeny-targeting-mecca-with-ballistic-missiles-idUSKCN1SQ163. 34 Feierstein, ‘Iran’s Role in Yemen’. 35 M. Young, ‘Carnegie’s Ahmed Nagi Discusses His Recent Trip to Yemen and Shares His Impressions of the Houthis’ Expansion’, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 11 June 2019, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/79279. 36 Ibid. 37 I. Jalal, ‘The UAE May Have Withdrawn from Yemen, but Its Influence Remains Strong’, Middle East Institute, 25 February 2020, www.mei.edu/publications/ uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong. 38 CIA, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Growing Iranian Activity’ (sanitised copy), December 1984, p. 11, www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00317R000300 110005–1.pdf. 39 Ibid. 40 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, ‘Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Sahara Africa’, April 2010, p. 21, https://assets.pewresearch.org/ wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 A. al-Shahi, ‘Response to Nimeiri’s Policies: Some Observations on Social and Political Changes in Northern Sudan’, in P. Woodward (ed.), Sudan after Nimeiri (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), p. 153. 44 S. Shay, ‘Iranian Involvement in Somalia’, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 76. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Verhoeven and Woertz, Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy, p. 99. 48 Oxford Business Group, ‘Agriculture’, The Report: Saudi Arabia 2014, p. 262. 49 BBC News, ‘Sudan Blames Israel for Khartoum Arms Factory Blast’, 24 October 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20050781. 50 S. Shay, ‘Egypt’s War against the Gaza Tunnels’, Israel Defense, 4 February 2018, www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32925. 51 K. Abdel Aziz, ‘Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centres’, The Guardian, 2 September 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/ sudan-expels-iranian-diplomats-closes-cultural-centres. 52 A. de Waal, ‘Cash and Contradictions: On the Limits of Middle Eastern Influence in Sudan’, African Arguments, 1 August 2019, https://africanarguments.org/2019/08/01/ cash-and-contradictions-on-the-limits-of-middle-eastern-influence-in-sudan/.

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53 Ibid. 54 Reuters, ‘Saudi State TV – Sudan Expels Iranian Ambassador’, 4 January 2016, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-iran-sudan/saudi-state-tv-sudan-expelsiranian-ambassador-idUKKBN0UI16V20160104. 55 A. Vatanka, ‘Iran’s Awkward Diplomacy in Africa’, The National Interest, 23 March 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-awkward-diplomacy-africa-15571. 56 International Institute of Security Studies, The Military Balance 2017 (IISS, 2017), p. 491. 57 International Crisis Group, ‘Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn’. 58 de Waal, ‘Cash and Contradictions’. 59 K. Abdelaziz, ‘Saudi Arabia, UAE to send $3 Billion in Aid to Sudan’, Reuters, 21 April 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests/saudi-arabia-uaeto-send-3-billion-in-aid-to-sudan-idUSKCN1RX0DG. 60 World Bank Migration and Remittances Group, ‘Bilateral Remittances Matrix 2017’, April 2018, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/ brief/migration-remittances-data. 61 J-B. Gallopin, ‘The Great Game of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan’, POMEPS, https://pomeps.org/the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan. 62 Z. Mohammed Salih and J. Burke, ‘Khartoum Protests Resume after Sudan Military Admits Abuses’, The Guardian, 14 June 2019, www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/jun/14/sudan-military-admits-abuses-committed-in-khartoum-attack. 63 Reuters Staff, ‘U.S. to Remove Sudan from State Terrorism Sponsors List after Payment to Victims: Trump’, Reuters, 19 October 2020, www.reuters.com/ article/us-sudan-usa-trump-idUSKBN2742JC. 64 Reuters, ‘Sudan to Receive $400 Million from Saudi Arabia, UAE for Agriculture, State Media Says’, 11 April 2021, www.voanews.com/africa/ sudan-receive-400-million-saudi-arabia-uae-agriculture-state-media-says. 65 M. Yewondwossen, ‘Djibouti to Host Ethiopia’s Navy’, Capital Ethiopia, 2 December 2019, www.capitalethiopia.com/featured/djibouti-to-host-ethiopias-navy/. 66 M. S. Kimenyi and J. Mukum Mbaku, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’, Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p. 111. 67 The ban was lifted after a year by the Philippines and an MoU was signed between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia in February 2014. 68 R. Jaffrey, ‘Ethiopian Domestic Workers Battle for Survival in Saudi Arabia’, Inter Press Service, 21 September 2018, www.ipsnews.net/2018/09/ ethiopian-domestic-workers-battle-survival-saudi-arabia/. 69 Ibid. 70 A. Huliaras and S. Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?’, Middle East Policy XXIV, no. 4 (2017), p. 69. 71 R. Abdi, ‘A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis Is Fuelling Regional Tensions’, International Crisis Group, 3 August 2017. 72 Financial Times, ‘Saudi Arabia Repatriating Thousands of Migrants Back to Ethiopia’, 12 April 2020, www.ft.com/content/b4f3c258–7ec9–477c-92f7– 5607203f77fc.

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73 World Bank Migration and Remittances Group, ‘Bilateral Remittances Matrix 2017’, April 2018, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/ brief/migration-remittances-data. 74 S. Allison and J. Danap, ‘Bridging the Sea: How to Build an Africa–GCC Partnership’, Emerge 85, https://emerge85.io/Insights/bridging-the-red-seahow-to-build-an-africa-gulf-partnership/. 75 M. Wilerson, ‘Why Is Saudi Arabia Buying Up African Farmland?’, Foreign Policy, 15 July 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/15/why-is-saudi-arabiabuying-up-african-farmland/. 76 New Business Ethiopia, ‘Al Amoudi to Build Mega Oil Processing in Ethiopia’, 28 December 2019, https://newbusinessethiopia.com/investment/ al-amoudi-to-build-mega-oil-processing-in-ethiopia/. 77 S. Soloman, ‘Riyadh Releases Ethiopian-Born Billionaire It Held since 2017’, VOA News, 27 January 2019, www.voanews.com/middle-east/riyadh-releasesethiopian-born-billionaire-it-held-2017. 78 O. S. Mahmood, ‘The Middle East’s Complicated Engagement in the Horn of Africa’, United States Institute of Peace, 28 January 2020, www.usip.org/ publications/2020/01/middle-easts-complicated-engagement-horn-africa. 79 See J. Mayall, ‘The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irridentism and International Diplomacy’, The World Today 34, no. 9 (1978), pp. 336–345. 80 A. Pfeffer, ‘Both Iran and Israel Have Military Bases in Eritrea, Global Intel Reports’, Haaretz, 12 December 2012, www.haaretz.com/.premiumisrael-iran-have-bases-in-eritrea-1.5271574. 81 R. Iyob, International Relations in the Horn: Non-Conformity and Defiance’,  L’Africa nelle relazioni internazionali: sfida al passato 10 (Maggio, 2009), pp. 58–66; and S. Healy, Eritrea’s Regional Role and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives, Chatham House Horn of Africa Group Report, 11 January 2008. 82 J. A. Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies’, Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), pp. 117–133, 120. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., p. 126. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p. 128. 87 Ibid., p. 129. 88 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010, ‘Africa’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 117. 89 Ibid. 90 Global Security, ‘Eritrea – Assab’, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/eritrea/ assab.htm. 91 BBC News, ‘Eritrea Breakthrough as UN Sanctions Lifted’, 14 November 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46193273. 92 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Eritrea’, 30 November 2015, http://country.eiu.com/ article.aspx?articleid=733721457&Country=Eritrea&topic=Politics&subtopic =Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations.

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93 J. Aglionby and S. Kerr, ‘Djibouti Finalizing Deal for Saudi Arabian Military Base, Financial Times, 17 January 2017, www.ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14–11e6–9d7 c-be108f1c1dce. 94 Z. Vertin, ‘Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, The Horn, and the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea’, Brookings Institution, June 2019: www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Red-Sea-Rivalries.-The-Gulf-The-Horn-and-the-NewGeopolitics-of-the-Red-Sea-English-pdf.pdf. 95 Arab News, ‘Dubai’s DP World Wins Ruling against Djibouti over Seized Port’, Arab News, 14 January 2020, www.arabnews.com/node/1612881/ business-economy. 96 E. DeLozier, ‘Seeing Red: Trade and Threats Shaping Gulf – Horn Relations’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3079, 15 February 2019, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/seeing-red-trade-andthreats-shaping-gulf-horn-relations. 97 Reuters, ‘Somalia Received Saudi Aid the Day It Cut Ties with Iran: Document’, 17 January 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-saudi-iran/somaliareceived-saudi-aid-the-day-it-cut-ties-with-iran-document-idUSKCN0UV0BH. 98 Somaliland Standard, ‘Saudi Arabia Eager to Facilitate Any Future Somaliland – Somalia Talks’, 8 May 2019, http://somalilandstandard.com/saudi-arabiaeager-to-facilitate-any-future-somaliland-somalia-talks/. 99 Elhanan Tannenbaum was a reserve colonel in the Israeli Defence Forces, captured in Dubai and flown to Lebanon, where he spent three years in captivity. 100 D. E. Johnson, ‘The Second Lebanon War’, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), p. 9. 101 News Wires, ‘Bulgaria Implicates Hezbollah in Fatal Bus Bombing’, France 24, 5 February 2013, www.france24.com/en/20130205-bulgaria-accuses-hezbollahbus-bombing-terrorism. 102 K. Vick, ‘Bankok Terrorism Arrests Could Mark Latest Setback for Hizballah and Iran’, Time, 18 April 2014, https://time.com/67985/bangkok-arrestspossible-hizballah-setback/. 103 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing in West Africa, October 2013, p. 26, www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/TF-in-West-Africa. pdf. 104 Ibid., p. 27; E. Halliday, ‘Iran and Hezbollah’s Presence around the World’, Lawfare, 8 January 2020, www.lawfareblog.com/iran-and-hezbollahs-presencearound-world. 105 For more Lebanese diaspora in Latin America see: A. Galindo, C. Baeza and E. Brun, ‘Diversity behind Unity: Latin America’s Response to the Arab Spring’, in R. Mason (ed.), International Politics of the Arab Spring: Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 125–153. 106 M. Levitt, ‘Finance and Logistics in Africa’, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), p. 246. 107 Ibid.

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108 M. Levitt, ‘Hizbullah’s African Activities Remain Undisrupted’, RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, 1 March 2004, www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/hizbullahs-african-activities-remain-undisrupted. 109 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing in West Africa, p. 27. 110 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Operatives in West Africa’, 11 June 2013, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ Pages/jl1980.aspx. 111 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Africa-Based Hizballah Support Network’, 26 February 2015, www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl9982.aspx. 112 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Hizballah Financial Network in Africa and the Middle East’, 2 February 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/ news/press-releases/sm0278. 113 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Prominent Lebanon and DRC-based Hizballah Money Launderers’, 13 December 2019, https:// home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm856. 114 G. Feierstein and C. Greathead, ‘The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi–Iranian Rivalry’, Middle East Institute Policy Focus 2017-2, p. 6, www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF2_Feierstein_AfricaSaudiIran_ web_4.pdf. 115 D. Farah, ‘Liberian Is Accused of Harboring Al Qaeda’, 15 May 2003, www. washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/05/15/liberian-is-accused-ofharboring-al-qaeda/96f69a3c-31b2–48fe-ad22–33c792129e11/. 116 BBC News, ‘Nigeria: Three Lebanese Nationals Cleared of Terrorism’, 29 November 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25160682. 117 M. Alami, ‘Hezbollah Allegedly Training Nigerian Shiites to Expand Influence in West Africa’, Middle East Institute, 5 July 2018, www.mei.edu/ publications/hezbollah-allegedly-training-nigerian-shiites-expand-influencewest-africa. 118 D. Lewis, ‘Insight: U.S. and Allies Target Hezbollah Financing, Ties in Africa’, Reuters, 20 September 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-hezbollahafrica-insight/insight-u-s-and-allies-target-hezbollah-financing-ties-in-africaidUSBRE98J04L20130920. 119 J. Campbell, ‘Women, Boko Haram and Suicide Bombings’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 March 2020, www.cfr.org/blog/women-boko-haram-andsuicide-bombings. 120 R. Kreider, ‘Iranians Planned to Attack US, Israeli Targets in Kenya: Officials’, 2 July 2012, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/iranians-planned-attack-us-israelitargets-kenya-officials/story?id=16699615. 121 United States Institute of Peace Special Report, ‘Terrorism in the Horn of Africa’, January 2004, p. 14, www.files.ethz.ch/isn/38971/2004_january_sr113.pdf. 122 L. Kelly, ‘Sudan Closing Hamas and Hezbollah Offices in Bid for U.S. Sanctions Relief’, The Hill, 16 December 2019, https://thehill.com/policy/ international/474806-sudan-closing-hamas-and-hezbollah-offices-in-bid-forus-sanctions-relief.

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123 X. Rice, ‘Doubts Cast on UN Report of Somali Support for Hizbillah’, The Guardian, 16 November 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/16/ syria.mainsection. 124 M. Tranfeld, ‘Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 February 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988. 125 L. Porter, ‘Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Raise Nearly $300,000 for Hezbollah’, The National, 22 July 2019, www.thenational.ae/world/mena/yemen-s-houthirebels-raise-nearly-300–000-for-hezbollah-1.889034. 126 M. Levitt, ‘Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2005, www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-finances-funding-the-party-of-god. 127 S. Healy, ‘Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD’s Contribution to Regional Security’, Working Paper No. 59, Crisis States Research Centre, November 2009, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/ 57a08b60ed915d622c000c5b/WP59.2.pdf. 128 P. D. Williams, ‘Genesis: October 2004 to March 2007’, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) 2007–2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 27–28. 129 Z. Vertin, ‘The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Architecture for a New Regional Order’, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, No. 27, November 2019, p. 9. 130 Z. Vertin, ‘Red Sea Blueprints’, Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 12 March 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/12/ red-sea-blueprints/. 131 B. Buzan and O. Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 132 There was already an Iranian plot to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa in 2020. N. Toosi and N. Bertrand, ‘Officials: Iran Weighing Plot to Kill U.S. Ambassador to South Africa’, Politico, 13 September 2020, www.politico.com/ news/2020/09/13/iran-south-africa-ambassador-assassination-plot-413831.

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Iran’s foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa: between expansionist ambitions and hegemonic constraints1 Eric Lob

Introduction This chapter explores how the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has instrumentalized development to project influence into sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis contributes to the extant scholarship on the IRI’s foreign policy in terms of geography, periodization, and tactics. Geographically, the literature tends to focus on the United States (US) and the Middle East, especially its Shi‘a territories and communities. Numerous books examine the root causes of the adversarial relationship between the US and Iran, as well as the possibilities for détente.2 Other works explore Iranian influence in neighbouring Arab countries along the so-called Shi‘a Crescent (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen). These works overlook the IRI’s relations with Sunni and nonMuslim countries in Africa and beyond. With respect to periodization, the few studies on Iran’s role and presence in Africa tend to focus on the years 2005–13, when the hardliners or principlists pursued an assertive and radicalized foreign policy on the continent. Broadening the scope, this chapter examines how disparate political elites and dominant social forces (leftists, rightists, pragmatists, reformists, principlists, and centrists) came to power at different stages of state formation, possessed varying interpretations of what exporting the revolution meant, and distinctly shaped Iran’s foreign policy in Africa – even as development remained a key component of this policy and an effective soft-power mechanism on the continent. Most scholars of post-1979 Iran assume that the deradicalization of its foreign policy did not occur until after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 and, more particularly, during the administration of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97), who pragmatically practised active neutrality during the Gulf War in 1990–91.3 However, this chapter demonstrates that deradicalization began several years earlier, in 1984, when the

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rightists or conservatives counterbalanced the leftists or radicals inside the government. This transition marked the first time that the IRI instrumentalized development to advance its strategic interests in Africa. This analysis also illustrates that shifts in Iran’s foreign policy in Africa since 1979 have coincided with changes in Iran’s domestic political landscape. For the IRI’s diverse factions, its developmental activities in Africa served as a means to different ends, reflecting a fragmented and disjointed foreign policy, with gains and setbacks. From the standpoint of tactics, the literature on Iran’s foreign policy focuses largely on covert military and financial assistance (hard power) as well as ideological propagation and religious proselytization (soft power). Scholars have argued that the IRI’s clandestine operations and ideological propagation have enabled it to expand its reach by creating and reinforcing connections with civic activists, protest movements, opposition parties, rebel and insurgent groups, and religious leaders and communities in the Shi‘a Middle East.4 Meanwhile, these scholars have downplayed the inherent costs and limitations of these activities – how they have occasionally subjected Iran to public condemnation and embarrassment, reaffirmed its status as a so-called international pariah or rogue state, and led to the cooling of relations with African countries, which subsequently expelled Iran’s officials and closed its embassies and cultural centres. The scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy has placed little emphasis on development as a soft-power mechanism that forges and enhances relations with other countries, particularly in the developing world. Similarly, the few studies that examine Iran’s presence and role in Africa downplay development and exclude it as a primary means for the IRI to improve relations with and advance its interests on the continent.5 Developing nations in Africa and elsewhere remain in urgent need of developmental assistance, and Iran has effectively leveraged its comparative advantage in healthcare, training, and rural and agricultural development to meet these demands. As this chapter reveals, development as a soft-power foreign policy tool has been less fraught with the risks and pitfalls associated with covert military assistance and religious proselytization, while it offers equal, if not greater, material and ideological benefits. This chapter examines the IRI’s developmental activities in Africa as a window into its foreign policy on the continent. The first section explores the deradicalization of the IRI’s foreign policy in Africa and the origins of its developmental activities on the continent beginning in the mid-1980s. This period was significant because it marked the first time that the IRI integrated development into its foreign policy in Africa. Under the direction of the rightists, Iran established and strengthened diplomatic and commercial relations with Africa. During the rise of the pragmatists and the reformists

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between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s, the IRI continued its developmental activities on the continent to repair its image, showcase its technical capabilities, and elevate its status as a developmental patron state in a hierarchical global system. The second and third sections investigate the reradicalization of the IRI’s foreign policy and developmental expansion in Africa – which continued to advance Iran’s economic, geopolitical, and ideological interests. These sections show how relations with Africa helped an increasingly threatened and assertive IRI to mitigate its isolation, balance against the US, evade and delegitimize its sanctions, and expand Iran’s nuclear programme and military presence. The sections also reveal the limitations of the IRI’s activities in Africa in light of its geostrategic interests beyond the continent and its allocation of greater resources and personnel to other regions. Finally, the sections assess the mixed performance record of Iran’s foreign policy and the effectiveness of its developmental activities in Africa during the late 2000s. The fourth section reveals the setbacks that Iran experienced in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere on the continent under the centrists between 2013 and 2019. In response, the IRI relied on development and other means to salvage and strengthen diplomatic and commercial relations with Africa, particularly as the US withdrew from the nuclear deal and reimposed economic sanctions against Iran. To this end, the IRI engaged and signed agreements with African countries at bilateral and multilateral summits. Whether Iran fully delivers on its commitments to Africa during a period of intensified diplomatic and economic pressure remains to be seen. In the end, the IRI’s clandestine operations, religious proselytization, and ideological propagation created friction with Africa, due to the continent’s inauspicious internal demographics. Another constraint was fierce external pressure from Iran’s regional competitors and the global system’s core states in the areas of military hardware, technical expertise, diplomatic recognition and support, political and religious ideas, and foreign aid, investment, and trade. Complementing and supplementing the IRI’s military, diplomatic, ideological, and commercial activities in Africa, development served as an effective and promising means for Iran to make deep inroads into the continent.

Historical context Deradicalization and development (1985–91) In the early 1980s, President Mohammad-Ali Rajai (1981) and other leftists held prominent positions, including cabinet posts in the government and

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seats in the first parliament.6 During this period, the IRI faced formidable and existential, internal and external threats from domestic opponents (royalists and liberals, communists and Marxists, Sunni and ethnic separatists, and traditional elites and other counterrevolutionaries) and invading Iraqi forces backed by the US and the Soviet Union, among other countries. Unable to bandwagon with an external power, and under the influence of leftist elites, the IRI pursued a foreign policy in Africa based on self-help, alliance making, and power balancing through ideological propagation and military build-up. Ideologically, the IRI interpreted and framed its efforts to export the revolution to Africa and elsewhere as fulfilling the revolutionary and anti-imperialist, global mission of ‘recognizing, attracting, educating, and organizing the destitute and oppressed masses’ to ‘develop common interests in the fight against the arrogance of imperial powers’.7 Throughout the 1980s, the IRI aligned itself with leftist authoritarian rulers in Africa, including Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere (1965–85), Ghana’s Jerry John Rawlings (1981–2001), Sierra Leone’s Saidu Momoh (1985–92), and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), who received Iranian military and financial backing during his 1989 coup.8 These alliances were the byproduct of Iran’s radicalized foreign policy in Africa during the early 1980s and this policy’s momentary continuation under Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi (1981–89) and other leftists in the cabinet and the second and third parliaments. The above-mentioned African leaders and many of their citizens – Muslims and non-Muslims alike – were inspired and galvanized by Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. The IRI’s leftists found common cause with these African leaders, who portrayed themselves as anti-Western, anti-imperialist, populist, socialist, and revolutionary – even if most of them came to power through military coups that differed from Iran’s bottom-up, popular revolution. Between 1983 and 1989, the IRI confronted threats to its long-term security and survival. In the wake of the American embassy hostage crisis (1979–81) and during the remainder of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), Iran encountered increased international isolation, economic sanctions, and military expenditures and losses that took a toll on its image, resources, and capabilities. As members and associates of the Bazaari, merchant class, President Ali Khamenei (1981–89) (who succeeded Khomeini as the supreme leader) and other rightists were particularly concerned about this outcome, bore the brunt of it, and felt an urgency to remedy it.9 As such, they became intent on instrumentalizing development by deploying the Ministry of Construction Jihad (CJ) – which specialized in rural development – to Africa in order to establish and strengthen diplomatic and commercial relations on the continent.10 Through them, the rightists sought to mitigate Iran’s growing isolation and to improve its struggling economy.

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CJ’s operations in Africa commenced in 1985 – two years after the revolutionary organization became a full-fledged ministry and fell under the full control and direct supervision of the government. Far from being spontaneous, CJ’s operations in Africa unfolded in a highly formalized, professionalized, and routinized manner. Prior to undertaking operations overseas, CJ – like other ministries – had to secure approval and funding from the parliament.11 Unlike other ministries, however, CJ contained a representative of the supreme leader, who was able to secure extra budgetary and discretionary funds from the supreme leader’s office. Before CJ planned and implemented projects on the ground, high-level officials from Iran and Africa held meetings, negotiated terms of service, and obtained consent and approval through bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOU) and other agreements.12 After visiting several African countries in 1986, President Khamenei met with Tanzanian officials and assigned CJ the ‘mission of surveying and studying rural development plans in Tanzania’.13 During the implementation of CJ’s projects, Iranian and Tanzanian officials ‘toured the organization’s project sites to evaluate progress and ensure that commitments were being met’.14 Following preliminary visits to Tehran by Tanzanian and Ghanaian officials, CJ began implementing agricultural and rural development projects in Tanzania in 1987 and in Ghana in 1989. CJ established branch offices in both countries, and sent employees to work there for two to four years.15 It undertook projects in remote and isolated villages, which were located hundreds of kilometres from the capital. Before being sent to Tanzania and Ghana, employees received technical and cultural training and learned Swahili and other local languages.16 CJ’s activities mainly consisted of opening clinics and helping villagers with farming (ploughing, sowing, harvesting, and irrigation) and raising livestock.17 Former employees reported that they had generally maintained good relations with locals and earned their trust and respect while working under adverse conditions.18 In Tanzania and Ghana, CJ sent a delegation of experts to expand mechanized agriculture, improve farming (dry, wet, and integrated), and increase the production of strategic crops (rice and corn), livestock, and fish (Table 3.1).19 To this end, CJ donated tractors and fishing equipment, offered technical training, and opened service and marketing centres.20 After two years of training and equipping Tanzanian farmers and herders, CJ helped them to increase their production of corn from 1 to 2.7 tons per hectare, their production of livestock from 300 to more than 3,000 head, and their production of rice from 1.2 to 3.2 tons per hectare, with one model farm producing as much as 8 tons of rice per hectare.21 Such production increases enabled these farmers and herders to improve their incomes, living standards, confidence, and motivation, and to pay off their loans by as much as 40 percent.22

Table 3.1  Construction Jihad’s overseas operations from 1987 until March 1993

Hectares Families Hectares Cases Cases Cases

Tanzania 1987

Ghana 1989

Lebanon 1989

Sudan 1991

Sierra Leone 1991

Albania 1993

Total

9,450 450 4,250 12 258 25

5,500 55 1,850 28 198 20

100 – – – – 10

1,000 – 6,000 – – 20

200 – 50 – – 5

850 – 300 – – 4

17,100 505 12,450 40 456 84

Construction Road construction, repair, and maintenance Building construction and renovation Water and irrigation facilities construction Hospital and clinic construction and renovation Hospital and clinic equipment Medical service provision

Kilometers

250

25

–

42

–

–

317

Units Cases

28 1

24 –

25 –

2 –

6 –

4 –

89 1

Units

3

2

3

1

2

2

13

3 8,500

2 3,500

– –

1 125,500

2 75,200

2 250,000

10 462,700

65 830 255

– – –

100 257 525

10 55 15

200 125 25

535 2,517 1,165

8 5 5 10

2 – 2 2

5 2 2 3

3 2 2 3

4 2 4 4

32 16 20 35

120

415

54

77

1,602

Units People

Hygiene Hygiene Agriculture Technical and professional

People Families People

160 1,250 345 Training

Agriculture Social Cultural Economic

Cases Cases Cases Cases

10 5 5 13

73

Project surveys By authorities and officials

People

552

384

Iran’s developmental activities in Africa

Agricultural mechanization Livestock extension Agricultural extension Rural industry Loans Miscellaneous services

Rural development



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Project title

Source: Ministry of Construction Jihad’s Office of Statistics and Information in Iravani, Nihadgirayi, 262.

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In the areas of healthcare and human capital, CJ offered medications, vaccinations, and vocational training, including computer classes for Ghanaian managers in different sectors of rural industry.23 To a lesser extent, CJ offered loans, supplied irrigation and drinking water, built industrial units (quarries, factories, and processing plants), and constructed roads, dams, hospitals, and clinics.24 Each year between 1987 and 1993 an estimated 10,000 Tanzanians and 14,000 Ghanaians were treated at the infirmaries and clinics built by CJ.25 Every six months, the ministry trained and educated seventeen Tanzanian villagers on rural health and hygiene, and, for this purpose, translated books on the subject into Swahili that had been published by the World Health Organization.26 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Rafsanjani and other pragmatists enjoyed domestic support, the Iran–Iraq War came to an end, and the US defeated and contained Saddam Hussein. At the same time, the IRI continued to face an ideological and identity-based deficit as a so-called international pariah and rogue state. As a consequence, an isolated and stigmatized IRI expanded CJ’s presence and operations in Africa to gain international acceptance and increased status as a developmental patron state in the hierarchical global system. Through CJ’s developmental aid projects, the IRI showcased its technical prowess and socio-economic coherence to its citizens, regional competitors, and the core states. Having commenced operations in Tanzania and Ghana, CJ entered Sudan and Sierra Leone in 1991.27 Even before then, in 1986, the speaker of the parliament, Rafsanjani, met with his counterpart from Sierra Leone to obtain official approval for CJ to ‘commence preliminary activities in Sierra Leone’.28 While CJ distributed medication in Sudan and Sierra Leone, the ministry was considerably more active in the former country with respect to agricultural mechanization and extension, road construction, and hygiene (see Table 3.1).29 The reason for this was twofold. First, CJ’s arrival in Sierra Leone coincided with or was triggered by the outbreak of the civil war (1991–2002), which created instability that rendered service delivery outside of medical and humanitarian assistance difficult. Second, Iran’s relations with Sudan developed earlier than those with Sierra Leone. Whereas the IRI supported Sudan’s al-Bashir during his rise to power in 1989, Iran’s political and trade cooperation with Sierra Leone did not intensify until the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2001).30 In contrast to CJ’s activities in Iran, the ministry’s initial operations in Africa focused more on agricultural and rural development than on ideological propagation and religious proselytization. The focus on development related to three factors. First, as a newly established government ministry and contrary to when it had existed as a revolutionary organization, CJ sought

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to concentrate on its core competency and to leave propagating ideology and religion to other Iranian institutions that largely fell under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei (1989–present). They included the Iranian embassy’s cultural section, the International Department of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Organization of Islamic Propagation, the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought or Ecumenical Society, and the World Forum for the Family of the Prophet or Ahl ul-Bayt Institute.31 While recognizing the importance of cultural initiatives in Africa, CJ’s second minister, Gholamreza Forouzesh (1988–97), believed that long-term relations with the continent should focus on economic and commercial cooperation, due to its ability to diversify Iran’s imports and exports.32 Second, CJ adhered to the foreign policy doctrine espoused by Rafsanjani involving the judicious use of ideological propagation and religious proselytization, especially in countries outside of Iran’s immediate surroundings that lacked substantial Shi‘a communities. This policy conflicted with the priorities and preferences of Khamenei, who relied heavily on the Guardianship of the Jurist as a legitimizing ideology because he lacked Khomeini’s religious credentials and charismatic authority.33 In Africa, CJ largely concentrated on agriculture, infrastructure, training, and healthcare. By contrast, CJ’s Lebanese branch – an affiliate of Hezbollah – built and renovated more mosques, congregation halls, seminaries, and schools than hospitals, medical centres, and dispensaries.34 Third and last, CJ faced foreign competition and unfavourable demographics on the continent. One former employee remarked that the robust and comprehensive propaganda and proselytization campaigns in Africa by Iran’s regional Sunni competitors – including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan – limited and discouraged CJ from undertaking similar initiatives.35 Saudi Arabia sponsored Islamic centres, mosques, and charities in Djibouti, Somalia, and other African countries.36 In Somalia, there existed competition between Iran and Turkey in the area of Islamic or faith-based reconstruction.37 Demographically, Tanzania and Ghana were non-Muslim-majority countries while Sudan and Sierra Leone were, respectively, 97 percent and between 60 and 70 percent Sunni.38 At the same time, CJ deliberately serviced predominantly Muslim regions in these countries. The ministry sent delegations of experts to conduct preliminary surveys and assessments in Tanzania’s Ikwiriri region, located 175 km south of Dar es Salaam, and in Ghana’s northern province of Tamale – both of which have Muslim majorities.39 That CJ operated mainly in Muslim regions in African countries meant that it likely laid the groundwork for the religious and ideological institutions of the rightists or conservatives to enter and operate there as well, and vice

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versa. In the event that CJ’s pragmatic and reformist ministers and officials resisted such cooperation, the latter conceivably came to fruition through the supreme leader’s representative inside the ministry.

Security, economic, and diplomatic considerations

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Reradicalization and development (2007–8) Facing heightened external and internal threats, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13) and the hardliners or principlists significantly expanded Iran’s developmental activities in Africa to maintain and extend alliance making on the continent.40 The IRI leveraged its diplomatic and commercial relations with African countries in an attempt to mitigate its isolation, balance against the US, evade and delegitimize its sanctions, and expand Iran’s nuclear programme and military presence. Although the IRI confronted increased economic sanctions, its developmental expansion in Africa coincided with robust state resources and capabilities resulting from rising international oil prices.41 Within the Office of International Affairs and International and Regional Organizations of the Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (MAJ) – the by-product of the 2001 merger between the Ministries of CJ and Agriculture – resided the Office of Developmental Cooperation with Africa.42 By the late 2000s, near the end of Ahmadinejad’s first term, the MAJ’s operations extended well beyond Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. In 2008, the MAJ sent delegates to Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Sudan.43 Continuing where CJ had left off, the MAJ regularly received high-level African officials, including heads of state, vice presidents, ambassadors, ministers, and parliamentarians. With these officials, the MAJ held joint meetings and signed MOUs on agricultural and rural development, technical training, economic assistance, and investment in infrastructure and industry, including power plants as well as production and processing units. Like its predecessor, the MAJ provided African countries with assistance in agriculture and fisheries. Between 2007 and 2008, the MAJ ‘donated one Lavar fishing ship, five fiberglass motor boats, and thirty electric pumps to Comoros’s fisheries’.44 In 2008, the MAJ’s Jihad Water and Energy Research Company ‘delivered small-scale irrigation to Ethiopia’.45 During that time, Senegal’s ministers of energy, agriculture, and water toured the MAJ’s agricultural centres and facilities in Tehran, and both countries facilitated exchanges between their fishery boards.46 Between 2007 and 2008, the MAJ sent delegations of experts to Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan to assess

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their agricultural needs, explore areas of agricultural cooperation and research, and assist with the cultivation and production of wheat and other strategic crops.47 During the same period, the Senegalese and Ugandan governments transferred land to the MAJ and the Industrial and Agricultural Group of Iran for the cultivation of oil seeds and other crops.48 In addition, the MAJ offered vocational training to Africans, who worked in agriculture and other sectors. Between 2007 and 2008, the MAJ trained Ghanaian farmers in pest and plant disease control, agricultural mechanization and development, soil and water management, plant exchange, and methods for improving general and organic farming.49 The ministry also trained Senegalese agricultural experts in Iran, and the Iranian Organization of Technical and Vocational Training organized workshops in Iran and Senegal for Senegalese aspiring to transition out of farming and to work as electricians and plumbers.50 Given that the MAJ’s Fisheries Organization of Iran operated lucrative fisheries in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the ministry held training sessions for Ugandan fisheries.51 In addition to providing professional training, the MAJ ‘awarded scholarships to university students in African countries, such as Comoros, to study in Iran’.52 The IRI signed investment and trade agreements with the MAJ’s African clients and partners that served their commercial interests and allowed Iranian companies to bypass sanctions. In May 2008, Iran signed four agreements with Eritrea to improve political and economic relations, including expanding bilateral trade and Iranian investment in Eritrea’s mining, agriculture, industry, and energy sectors.53 That year, Iran and several African countries – including Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania – granted each other favourable investment conditions and terms of trade.54 These bilateral agreements included avoiding double taxation, reducing customs duties and other trade barriers, and cooperating on shipping and transportation.55 The IRI also signed a preferential trade agreement with Senegal, and both the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry and Mines invested in various industrial projects and established a commercial centre for Senegal’s private sector.56 Moreover, Iran and Kenya signed an MOU to identify trade opportunities related to the import and export of tea and other commodities through the Iranian free trade and industrial zone at Chabahar.57 Finally, the MAJ explored purchasing phosphate from Togo to use as a chemical fertilizer.58 The most significant of these trade and investment agreements was the opening of Iranian tractor and automobile factories in Africa. In 2008, the Tractor Manufacturing Company of Iran, or Traktur-Sazi, opened manufacturing and assembly plants in Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and had plans to do the same in Senegal.59 The Iranian automobile manufacturer Iran Khodro ‘opened factories to assemble taxis and other commercial

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vehicles in Senegal’, and had plans to do the same in Nigeria.60 The IRI’s tractor and automobile plants ostensibly offered employment opportunities to African labourers and infused Africa’s industry with foreign direct investment. These ventures came with the expectations that parts imported from Iran would be replaced by locally produced components, and that product lines would be expanded into regional markets. From the standpoint of overhead, marketing, and exports, these agreements benefited Iran’s automobile sector, which, as the second-largest sector after oil and natural gas, contributed up to 10 percent of the gross domestic product.61 Traktur-Sazi and Iran Khodro’s manufacturing and assembly plants reduced production costs by leveraging Africa’s inexpensive labour. The presence of both companies in Africa allowed them to increase revenues by marketing and exporting their product lines there. In 2008, Traktur-Sazi ‘featured [its] tractors at a Tanzanian trade exhibition in Dar es Salam’.62 By 2013, Traktur-Sazi was exporting tractors to South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda, while Iran Khodro exported taxis, buses, and other commercial vehicles to Gambia, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal.63 Beyond tractors and automobiles, African countries that received agricultural, technical, vocational, and professional assistance from the MAJ awarded contracts to Iranian companies in other sectors that had been constrained by and suffered from stricter sanctions. In 2008, the Senegalese Ministry of Water and Energy awarded a contract to the Iranian utilities firm Sanir to ‘participate in the country’s water and electricity projects’.64 Meanwhile, Tanzania and Ghana contracted Iran’s Saramjad Company to digitize and automate the country’s radio and television networks.65 Iran’s radio and television agreements with Tanzania and Ghana also extended to broadcasting rights. That year, both countries allowed the IRI to broadcast radio and television programmes and documentaries within their borders.66 These broadcasting rights gave Iran the ability to disseminate political, religious, and cultural content over the airwaves of Tanzania and Ghana. The MAJ also contributed to Iran’s efforts to balance against the US and increase its presence in Africa. The IRI intervened on the side of both governments and rebels in the crises and conflicts inside and between Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.67 In 2008, the MAJ was active in Eritrea and Ethiopia, where it deployed fifteen delegates, the second most after Kenya.68 Although the MAJ’s presence in these two countries expanded under the principlists, it illustrated the legacy of Rafsanjani’s pragmatic active neutrality.69 The MAJ’s bilateral relations with African countries opened the door for Iran to join or play a role in multilateral organizations, including the African Union, the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.70 In 2008, the African Union

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Commission visited Tehran to discuss expanding African–Iranian relations.71 In 2010, the IRI became a member with observer status in the African Union and organized its Iran–Africa forum in Tehran.72 In August 2012, the Non-Aligned Movement held a summit in Tehran.73 Participation in these institutions and their summits afforded the IRI the opportunity to establish new relations and solidify existing ones with Africa. It also delegitimized US-led sanctions and mitigated their isolating effects by raising Iran’s profile and improving its image as a regional and global player. Through the MAJ, the IRI further discredited the sanctions by granting much-needed diplomatic recognition and developmental assistance to African countries that the US and its allies similarly shunned and isolated. These countries consisted of Eritrea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – all of which were subjected to international sanctions and embargoes for allegedly committing human rights violations and sponsoring designated terrorist organizations. As of 2004, the Sudanese government was the only one in sub-Saharan Africa to be on the US’s state sponsors of terrorism list.74 In 2009, Ahmadinejad condemned the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for Sudan’s al-Bashir, who defended Iran’s right to have a nuclear programme.75 That year, international sanctions were imposed on Eritrea for its alleged support of al-Shabaab militants in Somalia.76 In 2011, Iran sent a business delegation to Zimbabwe in order to establish trade ties in the agriculture and mining sectors.77 Even African countries that were not considered international pariahs or rogue states leveraged their relationship with Iran to balance against foreign powers at the core and the periphery (including other Middle Eastern states) and extract maximum concessions from them – as these same countries had successfully done with the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.78 To further evade and delegitimize US-led sanctions, the IRI leveraged the MAJ in an attempt to win pivotal votes in the UN against sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and human rights record. Between 2007 and 2008, the MAJ was active in African countries with non-permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors.79 As non-permanent members of the UNSC, Tanzania (2005–6), Ghana (2006–7), South Africa (2007–8, 2011–12), Burkina Faso (2008–9), Uganda (2009–10), Nigeria (2010–11, 2014–15), and Togo (2012–13) could have voted against resolutions condemning the IRI’s nuclear programme and increasing economic sanctions against the country. Through designated and elected memberships to the IAEA Board of Governors, Niger (2010–12), Tanzania (2011–13), South Africa (2012–13), Nigeria (2012–14), and Kenya (2013–14) had the ability to vote against resolutions imposing heightened restrictions, safeguards, and inspections on the IRI’s nuclear programme. Aside from the fact that Kenya

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imported Iranian oil, carpets, and chemicals,80 its membership in the IAEA Board of Governors helped to explain why, in 2008, the country received more MAJ delegates (seventeen) than anywhere else in Africa.81 In the end, the IRI’s expansion of developmental activities and exertion of soft power as a means of gaining UN votes brought mixed results. On the one hand, Iran’s attempts to influence the UNSC’s African members to vote against nuclear-related sanctions failed. Between 2006 and 2014, all of the MAJ’s African clients and partners with non-permanent membership to the UNSC voted to maintain or increase economic sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme.82 On the other hand, the IRI succeeded in convincing many of the same countries in the UN General Assembly to vote against resolutions condemning Iran’s human rights record. Between 2006 and 2014, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Iran’s human rights record.83 However, between 2010 and 2013, Comoros, Gambia, Malawi, and Senegal changed their previous positions by voting for such resolutions.84 As indicated later, in the cases of Gambia and Senegal, this decision coincided with their cutting of diplomatic ties with the IRI in response to its alleged arming of local rebels.85 These votes were significant, because the US could impose only unilateral rather than multilateral sanctions against Iran’s human rights record. The MAJ also indirectly assisted Iran with enhancing its nuclear capabilities, naval presence, arms trafficking, and proxy warfare. As the IRI confronted elevated external and internal threats, it leveraged the MAJ’s extended presence in Africa to tap into the chief resource for its nuclear programme: uranium. In 2008, the MAJ was active in Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe – countries that contained, produced, and/or exported uranium. Through the MAJ’s Eritrean and Sudanese clients and partners, Iran projected force by deploying and stationing naval vessels at ports on the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.86 Along these strategic routes and shipping lanes, the IRI exported oil to African countries, established a maritime link with its ally Syria, reduced the threat of piracy to its oil tankers and cargo ships, and smuggled weapons to clients and proxies in West Africa and the Middle East that supposedly included the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.87 To mobilize internal support and preserve their legitimacy and authority in the face of mounting domestic opposition, the principlists adopted the rhetoric of radical and religious nationalism. In Africa, they engaged in ideological propagation that combined the leftists’ anti-imperialism and the

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rightists’ religious–political doctrine. In an attempt to garner support from African leaders and citizens, the principlists placed greater emphasis on anti-imperialism in the MAJ’s non-Muslim-majority clients and partners, such as Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.88 The principlists used the same discourse as their leftist predecessors, emphasizing the ‘disinherited, helpless, and oppressed’ Iranians and Africans who experienced Western ‘colonialism’ and ‘pillage’.89 In Africa’s Muslim-majority countries and communities, the principlists and conservatives promoted Shi‘a Islam and the Guardianship of the Jurist through Iranian mosques and cultural centres – some of which had been constructed by CJ. To counter heightened internal and external threats, the principlists intensified the MAJ’s developmental activities to pursue an assertive and reradicalized foreign policy in Africa. Yet, the MAJ’s presence there should not be overstated. In fact, it sheds light on the limitations of Iran’s expansion on the continent. While important, Africa comprised but a component of the IRI’s geostrategic interests and the MAJ’s global operations. The ministry dedicated just as many, if not more, resources and personnel to regions beyond Africa. According to the IRI’s former minister of agriculture Issa Kalantari (1989–2001), this outcome resulted from the limited budget that the MAJ received for its activities in Africa.90 Between 2007 and 2008, the MAJ dedicated more resources and personnel to regions outside of Africa. In 2007, the MAJ hosted more officials from Africa (52) than Europe (47), Latin America (6), and Australia (1).91 However, compared to Asia (75), Africa was a distant second.92 In 2008, the MAJ dispatched more personnel to Asia (199), Latin America (158), and Europe (111) than to Africa (60).93 Compared to any single African country, the MAJ dispatched more delegates to Brazil (132), Syria (43), India (33), Turkey (26), and Italy (19).94 Beyond budgetary constraints, the reasons for the MAJ’s allocation of more personnel to these non-African countries were based on geostrategic considerations. Brazil ranked among the world’s leading emerging economies and agricultural producers. Syria contained a robust agricultural sector and remained Iran’s closest Middle Eastern ally. Located in close geographic proximity, India, Turkey, and Italy represented important export markets and trading partners. In 2011, India, Turkey, and Italy accounted for 9.3, 8.7, and 5.2 percent of Iranian exports, respectively, while Turkey accounted for 4.2 percent of Iranian imports.95 In 2010, Brazil and Turkey unsuccessfully attempted to reduce economic sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme and broker a deal in which the IRI would send enriched uranium to Russia or another country to be processed as nuclear fuel for a medical research reactor in Tehran. That year, Brazil and Turkey voted

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against UNSC resolutions that increased sanctions against the nuclear programme.96

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Successes and setbacks (2005–13) In the final analysis, the principlists’ foreign policy in Africa achieved some successes, but it also encountered setbacks and constraints. The MAJ helped Africa make strides in healthcare, human capital, and rural and agricultural development. To this end and in line with CJ’s original mission on the continent, the MAJ sought to differentiate itself from the West and elsewhere by offering a comprehensive array of services that superseded and transcended distributive assistance programmes, such as loan disbursements, capital injections, and technology transfers.97 These services sought to improve basic infrastructure, resource exploitation, technical knowledge, social participation, economic self-sufficiency, domestic production, income levels, and living standards, as well as to alleviate or mitigate local poverty, food insecurity, import dependency, debt crises, and foreign reserve or exchange shortages.98 The MAJ also helped the IRI to increase bilateral trade with some African states. Between 2000 and 2010, bilateral trade between Iran and Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Niger increased by more than 2,000 percent.99 Nevertheless, the amount of Iranian aid, trade, and investment on the continent was negligible compared to the number of signed agreements.100 As of 2008, a trade imbalance existed between the IRI and its largest African trading partner, South Africa, with Iran’s exports reaching €3,014.3 million and its imports totalling only €197.7 million.101 As of 2004, an investment imbalance also existed between Iran and South Africa, with the South African investment of US$1.5 billion being ten times greater than the Iranian investment of US$150 million.102 This trade and investment imbalance existed despite Iran having a larger gross domestic product than South Africa.103 Such outcomes were presumably related to the limits of South–South cooperation, Iran’s status as a middle-income country, its resource constraints and demand for foreign direct investment, and tighter sanctions against its nuclear programme.104 The principlists’ covert arms trafficking put the MAJ’s African clients and partners in a precarious position, due to the recognition and support they received from the US and its allies. Some of the MAJ’s African clients and partners – such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sudan – have accepted agricultural, commercial, developmental, and military assistance from Iran’s regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia.105 Eritrea has maintained diplomatic and military relations with the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and has resisted the IRI’s religious proselytization and ideological propagation in the Horn of Africa.106 The illicit arms trafficking of the IRI also exposed it to public

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condemnation and embarrassment, reinforced its image as a so-called international pariah or rogue state, and created and aggravated tensions with African countries – as evidenced by Gambia and Senegal’s severing of diplomatic ties with Iran between 2010 and 2011 after it had been caught smuggling weapons to rebels in Casamance.107 With respect to ideology, the principlists’ anti-imperialist rhetoric caused Africa to distance itself from Iran to avoid losing foreign aid, investment, and trade from the US, other core states, and peripheral ones, including those in the Middle East. Iran’s investment and trade in Africa presumably paled in comparison to that of the US, Western Europe, India, and China.108 While Middle Eastern states or mostly Gulf ones accounted for one-fifth of investments in sub-Saharan Africa, China became the largest trading partner to Africa in 2009, while its trade with the European Union declined as of 2011.109 Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has provided substantial aid and investment to the continent, particularly its Muslim states, communities, and minorities.110 At the same time and similar to Iran, Saudi Arabia’s trade with Africa has remained limited, with its exports being negligible and its imports of goods (coffee, tea, spices, and livestock) from countries like Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan amounting to only US$727 million, as of 2011.111 Furthermore, Saudi and Gulf investment in Africa has disproportionately focused on large-scale project designs and exaggerated short-term profit expectations without taking into account local needs.112 While African countries refused to condemn Iran’s human rights record, none of them went so far as to vote against resolutions targeting its nuclear programme. Despite the continent’s inauspicious demographics and the religious proselytization by the IRI’s Sunni regional competitors, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, the principlists and other elites before them encountered modest success and made marginal gains in converting Africans to Shi‘ism and convincing them to embrace Khamenei as their source of emulation. The best-case scenario likely comprised Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, which, as of 2010, contained approximately 3.5 million Shi‘as, whereas virtually none had existed before the 1980s.113 At the same time, as with the principlists’ clandestine operations, their religious activities provoked the hostility of host countries, including long-time ally Sudan, which closed Iran’s cultural centre and expelled its cultural attaché and other officials in 2014.114 This decision coincided with Saudi pressure on Khartoum to cut ties with Tehran for allegedly backing the Houthi rebels in Yemen and to weaken Iran’s geostrategic position in Africa.115 In contrast to covert arms trafficking and more overt ideological propagation, development has enabled the IRI to make significant inroads into Africa, given its sizeable agrarian economies, widespread rural poverty, and formidable developmental challenges. African countries have looked to Iran

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as an alternative development model and a viable investment and trading partner. After harbouring high hopes, these countries became disillusioned by Iran’s empty promises and unfulfilled commitments, uncomfortable with its nuclear ambitions and belligerent posture, and wary of its clandestine operations and religious proselytization. For Iran, the substantial costs of increased sanctions and isolation under the principlists, the escalating tensions with regional rivals, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the ability to diversify from oil to non-oil exports, such as automobiles, in Africa have continued to make the continent a foreign policy priority.116

Bilateral and multilateral relations Salvaging Africa and the Horn (2013–19) During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2013–present), the IRI experienced setbacks with its long-time ally, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa (the Horn) states, and witnessed gains there by Saudi Arabia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In August 2013, Saudi–Sudanese relations reached a nadir when Riyadh prevented al-Bashir from using its airspace to attend Rouhani’s inauguration.117 In 2014, these relations began to change when Khartoum closed Iran’s cultural centre and expelled some of its officials for allegedly proselytizing Shi‘ism. This relational shift gained added momentum when Sudan joined the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen in March 2015.118 That year, Eritrea reportedly sent several hundred troops to Yemen in order to support the coalition and allowed it, after being initially rebuffed by Djibouti, to conduct operations from Eritrean territory, including the port of Assab, in exchange for Saudi and Emirate funding and fuel.119 The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the Horn states became further solidified when Khartoum officially severed diplomatic relations with Iran in January 2016, with Djibouti and Somalia soon following suit.120 In early 2017, Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement with Djibouti to build a military base in an effort to implement and impose a naval blockade against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.121 To this end, Riyadh coordinated with its coalition partner, the UAE, which opened a base in Berbera, Somaliland the same year, much to the consternation of Somalia.122 Later that year, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti signed a military and defence agreement to cooperate against Iran’s alleged military intervention and weapons smuggling to Yemen.123 In Sudan, Iranian setbacks and Saudi gains were largely the consequence of the real and perceived ability of Riyadh, with its petro-dollars and diplomatic ties to Washington, to alleviate Khartoum’s economic pressure

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and political isolation. Economically, Saudi Arabia injected billions of dollars of foreign-exchange reserves, foreign direct investment, military aid, and subsidized petroleum into a country that had been crippled by sanctions and the 2011 secession of South Sudan, which contains a majority of the oil reserves.124 Politically, Riyadh attempted to help Khartoum achieve détente with the US, with the goal of lifting sanctions and acquitting al-Bashir at the ICC. To some extent, Saudi Arabia helped Sudan to succeed in this endeavour. While the US government presumably prevented al-Bashir from attending the Riyadh summit in May 2017,125 Washington ultimately eased sanctions against Khartoum in October of that year.126 In November, American and Sudanese diplomats met in Khartoum to discuss the possibility of removing Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list, which the country had been on since 1993.127 As with Sudan, Saudi Arabia convinced Somalia, and likely Djibouti, to distance themselves from Iran through economic aid and other incentives.128 Particularly in light of their seemingly transactional nature, these setbacks for the IRI in Sudan and the Horn states were serious, but not necessarily permanent or irreversible. Sudan’s persistent economic challenges, lingering US sanctions, ICC arrest warrant, and prolonged engagement in Yemen left open the possibility that Khartoum would refrain from completely cutting its ties with Tehran or would restart them in the future. As will be further described later, this point was corroborated by Sudan’s participation in multilateral meetings with and inside Iran and other African countries that took place in 2017. While supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Eritrea did not officially sever its diplomatic relations with Iran, contrary to Djibouti and Somalia. At the same time, Mogadishu’s tensions with the UAE over its military and commercial activities in Berbera may have created an opening for the IRI to re-engage Somalia, which increasingly became an export market for Iranian foodstuff and produce, cement and tile, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals, and other goods between 2017 and 2018.129 In March 2016, Rouhani sought to mitigate the IRI’s setbacks in Africa and improve its diplomatic and commercial relations with the continent by capitalizing on the overall optimism and sanctions relief generated by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).130 Some African ambassadors to Tehran supposedly welcomed this decision, with the hope and expectation that the president would follow through on the unfulfilled commitments of his predecessor involving joint cooperation on trade, commerce, science, energy, health, and infrastructure.131 In November, the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election created a sense of urgency for Rouhani and his government to further strengthen and expand ties with Africa, particularly in the areas of banking and finance, to soften the blow of a potential American withdrawal from the JCPOA and a reimposition of sanctions

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against Iran.132 To this end, Rouhani relied on the foreign ministry, the MAJ, other parts of the bureaucracy, and the business community to reignite relations with states in the Horn and elsewhere on the continent. Between 2016 and 2017, the Iranian foreign ministry and the MAJ organized bilateral meetings and signed additional agreements with African clients and partners. On 25 February 2016, the South African president, Jacob Zuma, cancelled his trip to Tehran after receiving the Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, in Pretoria.133 Despite this incident, the South African and Iranian presidents, other government officials, and business leaders subsequently met three times between 2016 and 2017 to strengthen bilateral trade and commercial cooperation in the areas of agriculture, agro-processing, automobiles, banking, energy, mining, and pharmaceuticals.134 On 22 May 2017, Pretoria announced that it would consider accepting Iranian investment for a new oil refinery, and purchasing or importing Iranian crude for the first time since May 2012 due to the easing of sanctions under the JCPOA.135 At the thirteenth Iran–South Africa Business Forum on 23 October, Rouhani, his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and other officials sought to re-establish or resume banking and financial ties with Pretoria to counteract future US sanctions, with plans to do the same in Niger and Uganda.136 On 16 November 2017, Iran and Ghana held their sixth joint economic summit in Accra at which the MAJ and the Ghanaian Ministry of Industry and Trade signed cooperative agreements or MOUs in the fields of agriculture, mapping, and sports and education. As part of the agreement, the IRI promised to provide Ghana with technical and engineering services for its mapping, sports, and education. In cooperation with the Iranian private sector, Tehran committed to help transfer water to Accra, build a cement plant, and launch a tractor production line inside Ghana. On its side, Ghana agreed to allocate 6,000 hectares of land to Iran for the cross-border cultivation of crops. With the intent of circumventing possible future US sanctions and promoting bilateral trade and economic ties, the agreement also included provisions on establishing joint banking ventures, reducing and eliminating tariffs or customs duties, and increasing mutual investment, with Accra’s expectation that Tehran would invest in the construction of industrial cities in Ghana.137 In an effort to further reinforce and expand Iran–Africa relations, the MAJ and other agencies organized meetings and events through multilateral institutions with African member states. On 24 May 2017, the MAJ and the Iranian Scientific and Industrial Research Organization held the International Workshop on Drought and Desertification Control in Mashhad for twenty-two member states of the Non-Aligned Movement, including Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.138 That

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year, the MAJ announced its plans to head a joint summit on agriculture with seven African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania.139 On 7 September 2018, the Iranian minister of agriculture, Mahmoud Hojjati, participated in a multilateral summit on eradicating livestock disease that was hosted by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization and World Health Organization with his counterparts from Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia.140 Before and after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanctions against Iran on 8 May 2018, the MAJ pursued bilateral initiatives with Ghana and Tanzania – the first African countries that CJ had entered in the mid-to-late 1980s. On 28 April 2018 and within the framework of a public-private partnership, MAJ officials and Iranian companies signed a trade agreement with the Ghanaian ambassador and business people to export Iranian agricultural machinery, equipment, and products (potatoes, canola oil, and foodstuff) to Ghana and Africa, and to import Ghanaian produce (pineapple, mangos, and bananas) to Iran.141 While signing the agreement, the Ghanaians expressed a desire to attract private investment from Iran in special economic zones (SEZs) and different sectors, including agriculture and mining.142 On 31 July 2018, the MAJ and its Iranian Fisheries Organization signed an MOU with their Tanzanian counterparts that allowed Iranian vessels to fish in Tanzanian waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as permitting Iranian companies to export fishing boats and other inputs and products related to processing, refrigeration, and aquaculture in exchange for offering technical training and knowledge transfer to Tanzanian fishermen and fisheries.143 On 6 July 2019, the MAJ welcomed a Ghanaian delegation led by the Deputy Director or Minister of the Trade and Development Organization to improve bilateral relations by identifying trade opportunities, developing business relationships, attracting agricultural investors, and improving export production and food security.144 During the visit, the Ghanaians agreed to import agricultural machinery and equipment from Iran and to serve as a free trade zone for Iranian exports to Africa and Europe while seeking Iranian foreign direct investment for job creation and rural industry, including almonds, coffee, and coconuts.145 Between April 2018 and July 2019, the MAJ and Iranian farmers and investors signed contracts for extraterritorial cultivation in Ghana, Tanzania, and other countries, including Azerbaijan, Brazil, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine, with the aim of reducing operating costs, promoting food security, meeting rising food consumption and import demand, and compensating for water and land shortages due to population growth and climate change.146 Beyond Ghana and Tanzania, the MAJ cooperated on research and development related to agricultural production, food security, biodiversity, and biotechnology with Kenya and Ethiopia

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between March and October of 2019.147 On 14 January 2021, the Iranian ambassador to Ghana, a deputy minister of the MAJ, and the Ghanaian foreign minister met in Accra to discuss greater bilateral economic and agricultural cooperation, including the transfer of agricultural knowledge and technology from Iran to Ghana.148

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Conclusion The coming months will reveal whether Rouhani and the centrists – who initially enjoyed domestic support and were backed by the pragmatists, the reformists, and, to an extent, the conservatives – are able to improve Iran–Africa relations through development and other means. For Rouhani and the centrists – who initially enjoyed domestic support and were backed by the pragmatists, the reformists, and, to an extent, the conservatives – external and internal pressures made improving Iran–Africa relations through development and other means difficult to achieve. Externally and as with the reformists, the centrists’ reorientation of Iran’s foreign policy role toward the core states as a constructive negotiating partner within the framework of the JCPOA presumably provided Africa with the geopolitical capital and strategic flexibility to re-engage Iran. However, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanctions against Iran likely made some African countries reluctant to re-engage it. Moreover, the US withdrawal and sanctions ostensibly prevented the centrists from receiving the necessary budgetary resources to allocate toward the MAJ’s Office of Developmental Cooperation with Africa and other agencies dedicated to supplying and boosting aid, investment, and trade on the continent. As in the past, the MAJ could have compensated for this deficiency by helping Africa to improve its human capital and domestic productivity through vocational and technical training. Nevertheless, African countries, like South Africa and Ghana, continued to expect and demand Iranian investment in oil refineries, industrial cities, SEZs, rural industry, and other projects and sectors to fully reap the benefits and offset the risks and costs of engaging with the IRI. Internally and like the reformists, the centrists encountered public and economic pressures to channel finite government funds and revenues into domestic rather than foreign development – particularly amid low oil prices, rampant unemployment, a depreciating currency, rising inflation, and renewed sanctions.149 For the centrists, another challenge will be convincing the principlists and the conservatives to curtail their clandestine operations and religious proselytization in Africa. The conservatives and the principlists would likely refuse such a request because it conflicts with their strategic and normative priorities and preferences, and undermined Iran’s pivotal



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role in high-priority proxy conflicts against its regional rivals in nearby Gaza and Yemen. Moving forward, the election of the conservative and hardline parliament and president in 2020–21 may mitigate the IRI’s bifurcated power concentration and decision-making, reduce intra-elite conflict in Iran, and render its foreign policy in Africa less fragmented.

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Notes 1 A modified version of this chapter was previously and originally published as the following article: E. Lob, ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad’s Developmental Activities in sub-Saharan Africa’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 2 (2016), pp. 313–338. 2 See G. Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); J. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); K. M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004); B. Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007); J. W. Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace [USIP], 2009); and F. Leverett and H. M. Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why America Must Accept the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: Picador, 2013). 3 See M. Milani, ‘Iran’s Active Neutrality during the Kuwaiti Crisis: Reasons and Ramifications’, New Political Science 11 (1992), pp. 41–60; M. Milani, ‘Iran’s Gulf policy: From idealism and confrontation to pragmatism and moderation’, in J. S. Suweidi (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), p. 92; C. Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 107; M. Milani, ‘Iran’s Persian Gulf policy in the post-Saddam era’, in A. Gheissari (ed.), Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 354; and S. A. Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 133–143. 4 See J. Cole and N. Keddie (eds), Shi‘ism and Social Protest (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi’ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); L. Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (London: Hurst, 2008); and L. Louër, Shiism and Politics in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 5 S. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010); L. Amelot and O. Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre de la “stratégie Sud” de l’Iran’, in M. Makinsky (ed.), L’Iran et les grands acteurs régionaux et globaux (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012); E. Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique: Nouvel enjeu de la politique extérieure de l’Iran’, in F. Nahavandi (ed.), L’Iran dans le monde (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013).

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6 Led by the Association of Combatant Clergy (Majma‘-i Ruhaniyun-i Mubariz), the leftists or radicals espoused a revolutionary and populist state, a command economy and income redistribution, liberal social values, and a foreign policy that exported the revolution and promoted anti-imperialism. M. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 99–127. 7 Ministry of CJ, The Ten-Year Performance of CJ from 1979 until 1989 (Tehran: Ministry of CJ, 1991), p. 187. 8 Kojo Aidoo, Senior Research Fellow, University of Ghana, discussion with the author, Pretoria, South Africa, 5 November 2013. See also Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 228; and Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 189, 197–198. 9 The rightists or conservatives – who were predominantly members of the Society of Combatant Clergy (Jami‘ih-i Ruhaniyat-i Mubariz) – believed in an Islamic state, a laissez-faire economy and private property protections, puritanical social mores, and a non-revolutionary foreign policy that created open borders and free trade. Moslem, Factional Politics, pp. 99–127. 10 Gholamreza Forouzesh (Minister of CJ), ‘The Activities of CJ in Africa’, in The Office of Political and International Studies (Iran), Africa Studies Group (ed.), The Collection of Papers of the Seminar on Africa: The Practical Paths to Development and Cooperation (Tehran: The Institute of Printing and Publishing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993), pp. 20, 23. 11 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, p. 188. 12 Former CJ official, interview with the author, Tehran, 9 March 2011. 13 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188. 14 Ibid. 15 Former CJ employee, interview with the author, Tehran, 3 May 2011. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188; M. J. Iravani, Institutionalism and Jihad-e-Sazandegi (Construction Jihad) (Tehran: Ministry of CJ, 1998), pp. 261–262; Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 23–25. 20 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188; Iravani, Institutionalism, pp. 261–262; Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 23–25. 21 Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, p. 24. 22 Ibid., p. 25. 23 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188; Iravani, Institutionalism, pp. 261–262; Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, p. 24. 24 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188; Iravani, Institutionalism, pp. 261–262; Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 23–25. 25 Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, p. 25. 26 Ibid. 27 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188, Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, p. 23. 28 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, pp. 187–188.

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29 Ibid.; Iravani, Institutionalism, pp. 261–262. 30 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 229. 31 See W. Buchta, Die Iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit (1979–1996) (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1997), pp. 245–275; W. Buchta, ‘Tehran’s Ecumenical Society (Majma‘ al-Taqrib): A Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran’, in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende (eds), The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 333–354; M. Leichtman, ‘(Still) Exporting the Islamic Revolution: Senegal’s Relationship with Iran’, Shi’a Affairs Journal 1 (2008), p. 88; and Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 195–196. 32 Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 26–28. 33 For more on the rift between the conservatives and the pragmatists, see E. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 184–185. 34 E. Lob, ‘Construction Jihad: State-building and Development in Iran and Lebanon’s Shi‘i Territories’, Third World Quarterly 39, no. 11 (2018), pp. 2115–2116. 35 Former CJ employees, interviews with the author, Tehran, 3, 8, 11 May 2011. 36 T. Docking, ‘Terrorism in the Horn of Africa’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 113, 13 January 2004, pp. 7, 10, www.usip.org/ publications/2004/01/terrorism-horn-africa. On Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism to Africa, see H. Verhoeven and E. Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa’, in N. Patrick (ed.), Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2016), p. 92. 37 R. Mason, ‘Patterns and Consequences of Economic Engagement across SubSaharan Africa: A Comparative analysis of Chinese, British and Turkish Policies’, Working Paper CIS/2015/01, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, May 2015, p. 14, www.lse.ac.uk/international-relations/assets/ documents/cis/working-papers/cis-working-paper-2015–01-mason.pdf. 38 ‘About Sudan’, UN Development Program, accessed 4 April 2013, www. sd.undp.org/content/sudan/en/home/countryinfo/; U.S. Department of State, ‘2010 Report on International Religious Freedom – Sierra Leone’, 17 November 2010, www.refworld.org/docid/4cf2d06b43.html. 39 Ministry of CJ, Ten-Year Performance, p. 188; Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 24–25. 40 For simplicity, Ahmadinejad and his faction are classified as hardliners or principlists. While they were politically and socially conservative, their economic policies combined radical leftism or populism and laissez-faire liberalism. 41 During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, annual average domestic crude oil prices rose from US$50.04 (nominal)/US$60.44 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel in 2005 to US$91.17 (nominal)/US$92.40 (inflation adjusted) per barrel in 2013 – peaking at US$91.48 (nominal)/US$100 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel near the end of his first term in 2008. T. McMahon, ‘Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)’, 1 May 2015, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/ Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.

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42 MAJ, ‘The Brief Report on the Activities of the Office of International Affairs and International and Regional Organizations in the Year 2007’, MAJ, 2007, p. 2. 43 MAJ, ‘The Report on the Performance of the Office of International Affairs and International and Regional Organizations in the Year 2008’, MAJ, 2008, p. 30. 44 MAJ, ‘Report’, p. 8. 45 Ibid. 46 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, pp. 10–12, 21, 24–26; MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 3–4. 47 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, pp. 10–12, 21, 24–26; MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 3–4, 23. 48 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, pp. 10–12, 21, 24–26; MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 7–8. 49 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, p. 12; MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 11–12. 50 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, pp. 10–12, 21, 24–26; MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 3–4. 51 MAJ, ‘Report’, p. 7. 52 Ibid., p. 8. 53 J. A. Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies’, Middle East Policy Council, 19:2 (2017), www.mepc.org/iran-horn-africa-outflanking-us-allies. 54 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 3–4, 6, 8, 11–12. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 2–3, 23–24. See also Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 230; and Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 194. In addition to expanding bilateral investment and trade, Iran and Kenya signed agreements between 2008 and 2010 to establish direct air connections and shipping lines, and for Kenya to receive Iranian assistance with building nuclear power plants. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, pp. 230–231. 58 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 12, 23–24. 59 Ibid., pp. 3–4, 6–8. 60 Ibid., pp. 3–4. See also S. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 230. 61 M. Khalaj, ‘Iran’s Car Industry Output Falls Sharply’, Financial Times, 23 January 2013. 62 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 6–8. 63 ‘Iran to Export Vehicles to Gambia’, PressTV , 26 April 2007, http:// edition.presstv.ir/detail/7552.html; ‘Iran and Israel in Africa: A Search for Allies in a Hostile World’, The Economist, 4 February 2010; ‘Iranian Tractors to Be Exported to South Africa’, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 8 October 2013, www.payvand.com/news/13/oct/1058.html; Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 162; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 193. 64 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 3–4. 65 Ibid., pp. 6–8, 11–12. 66 Ibid. 67 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 160; Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, p. 101; Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. On these conflicts, see S. Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel (London: Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008).

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68 MAJ, ‘Report’, pp. 4, 8, 30. 69 On the IRI’s relations with both Eritrea and Ethiopia, see Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. 70 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, pp. 229–230; Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 157, 159–260; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 191. 71 S. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 230. 72 Ibid., p. 229; Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 157, 159–260; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 191. 73 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 157, 159–260; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 191. 74 Docking, ‘Terrorism’, pp. 13–15. 75 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 168; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 198. 76 Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, p. 103; Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. 77 R. Mason, Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), p. 109. See also ‘Iranian business delegation visits’, The Herald (20 February 2011), www.herald.co.zw/ iranian-business-delegation-visits/. 78 Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 100, 104. On the agency of African leaders and governments in manipulating foreign powers to maximize aid and use it for political ends, see C. Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and J. Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs 99 (2002), 217–267. 79 See Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 229; Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 164; and Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 187, 190–191. 80 Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 194. 81 MAJ, ‘Report’, p. 30. 82 UN Bibliographic Information System, accessed 10 September 2014, http:// unbisnet.un.org. See also Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 231; and Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 172. 83 UN Bibliographic Information System. 84 Ibid. 85 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 170–174; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 204. 86 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 161–162, 168; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 199; Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 100, 103; Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. 87 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 157, 161–162, 165, 168–171, 173; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 198–1299, 208–48; Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 100, 104; Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. On the illicit arms trafficking and piracy between the Middle East and Africa, specifically in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen and Somalia, see G. Hill, Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017), pp. 87–105. 88 Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 195–197.

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89 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 159–160. 90 Issa Kalantari, former Iranian minister of agriculture, interview with the author, Tehran, 28 May 2011. 91 MAJ, ‘Brief Report’, p. 23. 92 Ibid. 93 MAJ, ‘Report’, p. 28. 94 Ibid., p. 30. 95 M. Gasiorowski, ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’, in M. Gasiorowski (ed.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Seventh Edition) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), p. 54. 96 ‘“Security Council resolution 1929 (2010)” on measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development’, UN Bibliographic Information System, 9 June 2010, http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=141 0W9T455609.826&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023_!926973_!8&ri=1&as pect=power&menu=search&source=_!horizon. 97 Forouzesh, ‘Activities’, pp. 21–26, 28–29. 98 Ibid. 99 Mason, Foreign Policy, p. 109. 100 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 231; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 194, 204–205. 101 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 231. 102 Ibid., p. 229. 103 In 2017, Iran and South Africa’s GDP were US$439.51 billion and US$349.42 billion, respectively. ‘Iran GDP (1965–2018)’, TradingEconomics.com, accessed 9 August 2018, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp; ‘South Africa GDP (1965–2018)’, TradingEconomics.com, accessed 9 August 2018, https:// tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp. 104 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 231; Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, p. 172; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 205. 105 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 231; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, pp. 194, 204–205; Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 93, 96–101. 106 Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 97, 104; Lefebvre, ‘Iran’. 107 Amelot and Icho, ‘L’Afrique au centre’, pp. 170–174; Uwizeyimana, ‘L’Afrique’, p. 204. 108 ‘China in Africa: One among Many’, The Economist, 17 January 2015. On China and India’s investment in the Sudanese oil sector, see L. Patey, The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan (London: Hurst, 2014). 109 Mason, ‘Patterns’, pp. 3–4, 17. 110 Mason, Foreign Policy, pp. 15–16, 57–58. 111 Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, pp. 92, 100, 107. 112 Ibid. 113 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 227. 114 K. Abdel Aziz, ‘Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centres’, The Guardian, 2 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/

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sep/02/sudan-expels-iranian-diplomats-closes-cultural-centres; Verhoeven and Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia’, p. 101. 115 Anonymous Sudanese scholar, discussion with the author, Berne, Switzerland, 25 April 2015. 116 By 2013, Iran’s nuclear programme had cost the country well over US$100 billion in lost foreign direct investment and oil export revenues. Ali Vaez and Karim Sadjadpour, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks’, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 April 2013, p. vii, http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/iran_nuclear_odyssey.pdf. 117 See, for example, ‘Sudan’s Bashir Barred from Saudi Airspace’, Al Jazeera, 4 August 2013, www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/20138413204714869.html. 118 S. Sengupta, ‘Sudan Joins Coalition against Yemen Rebels’, New York Times, 26 March 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/africa/sudan-joins-coalitionagainst-yemen-rebels.html. 119 United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014): Eritrea’, United Nations, Publication No. S/2015/802 (2015), pp. 3, 11–15, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/802; United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015): Eritrea’, United Nations, Publication No. S/2016/920 (2016), pp. 4, 8, 10–12, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/920. 120 K. Abdelaziz, ‘As Economy Crumbles, Sudan Ditches Iran for Saudi Patronage’, Reuters, 12 January 2016, www.reuters.com/article/sudan-saudidiplomacy/as-economy-crumbles-sudan-ditches-iran-for-saudi-patronageidUSL8N14V2WV20160112; S. Kerr and J. Aglionby, ‘Regional Allies Back Saudis after Shia Cleric’s Execution’, Irish Times, 5 January 2016, www. irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/regional-allies-back-saudis-aftershia-cleric-sexecution-1.2484866; M. Winsor, ‘Saudi Arabia–Iran Rivalry in Africa: Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia Part Ways with Tehran as Riyadh Influence Grows’, International Business Times, 7 January 2016, www.ibtimes.com/saudiarabia-iran-rivalry-africa-sudan-djibouti-somalia-part-ways-tehran-riyadh2255456; ‘Saudi-Iran Row Spills Over into Africa’, Deutsche Welle, 7 January 2016, www.dw.com/en/saudi-iran-row-spills-over-into-africa/a-18965887; Khalid Abdelaziz, ‘As Economy Crumbles, Sudan Ditches Iran for Saudi Patronage’, Reuters, 12 January 2016, www.reuters.com/article/sudan-saudidiplomacy/as-economy-crumbles-sudan-ditches-iran-for-saudi-patronageidUSL8N14V2WV20160112. 121 ‘Egypt–Saudi Tension Bubbling over Planned Djibouti Base’, The New Arab, 6 December 2016, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/12/6/egypt-sauditension-bubbling-over-planned-djibouti-base; A. Aman, ‘Why Saudi Arabia and Egypt Are Competing for Influence in Africa’, Al-Monitor, 11 January 2017, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/saudi-arabia-egypt-conflictappear-in-africa-over-influence.html. 122 ‘Somaliland Agrees to UAE Military Base in Berbera’, BBC News, 13 February 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38956093; ‘Somalia calls for UN action

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against UAE base in Berbera’, Al Jazeera, 27 March 2018, www.aljazeera.com/ news/2018/03/somalia-calls-action-uae-base-berbera-180327172528871.html. 123 F. Al-Rahman Youssef, ‘Djibouti Defence Minister: Agreement with Riyadh Aims to Secure Region, Monitor Military Meddling’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 April 2017, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/f-yousef/news-middle-east/saudi-arabia/ djibouti-defense-minister-agreement-riyadh-aims-secure-region-monitor-militarymeddling. 124 Winsor, ‘Saudi Arabia–Iran Rivalry’; ‘Saudi–Iran row’, Deutsche Welle; Abdelaziz, ‘As Economy Crumbles’; ‘Saudi Arabia Gives Sudan $5 Billion in Military Aid’, Sudan Tribune, 2 February 2016, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58095; ‘Sudan in Talks with Saudi Arabia on Five-year Oil Aid Agreement’, Reuters, 7 May 2018. 125 ‘Why Has Sudan Ditched Iran in Favour of Saudi Arabia?’ The Guardian, 12 January 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudiarabia-long-term-ally-iran; S. Sengupta and R. Gladstone, ‘Sudan President, Charged with Genocide, Is Invited to Saudi Summit with Trump’, New York Times, 16 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/middleeast/sudanbashir-genocide-saudi-arabia-trump-summit.html; ‘Sudan’s Bashir Declines to Attend Saudi Summit with Trump’, BBC News, 19 May 2017, www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-39978742. 126 ‘US Eases Sudan Economic and Trade Sanctions’, Al Jazeera, 7 October 2017, www. aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/economic-sanctions-sudan-lifted-171006165531902. html. 127 J. Moore, ‘U.S. Is Open to Removing Sudan from Terrorism List, Diplomat Says’, New York Times, 16 November 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/ world/africa/sudan-terrorism-sanctions.html. 128 A. McDowall and B. Maclean, ‘Saudi Arabia Pledged £35 Million in Aid to Somalia on the Same Day Somalia Cut Ties with Iran’, Business Insider (18 January 2016), www.businessinsider.com/r-somalia-received-saudi-aid-the-dayit-cut-ties-with-iran-document-2016–1. 129 MAJ, ‘59 Million Dollars of Agricultural Products Were Exported from Hamadan Province’, MAJ, 1 March 2017, www.maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolse news&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=33641&pageIdF=0&tempname=Main&searc hType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘68 Million Dollars of Agricultural Commodities Were Exported from Hamadan’, MAJ, 12 April 2017, www.maj.ir/index.asp x?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=28540&pageIdF=0&te mpname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch; ‘Iran Exports to Somalia Up 38%’, Financial Tribune, 1 July 2017, https://financialtribune.com/articles/economydomestic-economy/67463/iran-exports-to-somalia-up-38; MAJ, ‘Predicting the Production of over 1.8 Million Tons of Onions, Potatoes, and Tomatoes, the Continuation Plan’, MAJ, 5 December 2017, www.maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=d orsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=81271&pageIdF=0&tempname=M ain&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘An 82 Per Cent Increase in Agricultural Exports from North Khorasan Province’, MAJ, 17 July 2018, www.maj.ir/ index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=94801&page IdF=0&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch.

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130 ‘Iran Keen to Boost Trade Ties with Africa: Deputy FM’, Tasnim News Agency, 17 March 2016, www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/03/17/1030192/ iran-keen-to-boost-trade-ties-with-africa-deputy-fm. 131 Ibid. 132 A. Majidyar, ‘Iran Seeks Closer Economic Ties with Africa to Minimize U.S. Sanctions’, Middle East Institute, 23 October 2017, www.mei.edu/content/io/ iran-seeks-closer-economic-ties-africa-minimize-us-sanctions. 133 T. Fakude, ‘South Africa: Between Iran and Saudi Arabia?’ Al Jazeera, 31 March 2016, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/south-africa-iransaudi-arabia-160331113354567.html. 134 See ‘Iran–South Africa Business Forum to Be Held in Pretoria’, Tehran Times, 22 October 2017, www.tehrantimes.com/news/417797/Iran-South-Africa-businessforum-to-be-held-in-Pretoria; and Majidyar, ‘Iran Seeks Closer Economic Ties’. 135 ‘South Africa Open to Iranian Investment if New Refinery Goes Ahead’, Reuters, 22 May 2017, www.cnbcafrica.com/news/southern-africa/2017/05/22/ sa-iranian-investment-oil-refinery/. 136 Majidyar, ‘Iran Seeks Closer Economic Ties’. 137 MAJ, ‘Iran and Ghana Signed Three Cooperative Agreements’, MAJ, 16 November 2017, www.maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1 &sub=0&PageID=80410&pageIdF=0&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsa search. 138 MAJ, ‘International Drought and Desertification Control Workshop with the Participation of Non-Aligned Movement Representatives Held in Mashhad’, MAJ, 24 May 2017, www.maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang =1&sub=0&PageID=33813&pageIdF=0&tempname=Main&searchType=dor sasearch. 139 MAJ, ‘Iran and Ghana’. 140 MAJ, ‘FAO and the World Health Organization’s Commitment to Eradicate the Disease of Small Ruminant’, MAJ, 7 September 2018, www.maj.ir/index.asp x?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=98134&pageIdF=0&te mpname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch. 141 MAJ, ‘Produce Iranian Agricultural Machinery in Ghana’, MAJ, 28 April 2018, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID= 89073&pageIdF=1632&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch. 142 MAJ, ‘Produce Iranian Agricultural Machinery’. 143 MAJ, ‘Iran’s Readiness to Develop Fisheries Cooperation with Tanzania’, MAJ, 31 July 2018, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&su b=0&PageID=95794&pageIdF=1606&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsas earch. 144 MAJ, ‘Ghana Called for the Development of Bilateral Agricultural Trade Relations between the Two Countries’, MAJ, 6 July 2019, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Pag e_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=115921&pageIdF=1653&tem pname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch. 145 MAJ, ‘Ghana Called for the Development’. 146 MAJ, ‘Produce Iranian Agricultural Machinery’; MAJ, ‘Activities of Agricultural Activists in Tehran Province for Transcontinental Cultivation in Ghana’, MAJ,

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30 June 2018, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&su b=0&PageID=92802&pageIdF=1626&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsas earch; MAJ, ‘Less than 8 Per Cent of Tehran’s Agricultural Production Units are Semi-Active’, MAJ, 7 July 2018, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaeto olsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=94172&pageIdF=1626&tempname=Mai n&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘MAJ Enters Extraterritorial Cultivation in Five Countries’, MAJ, 24 November 2018, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=do rsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=102761&pageIdF=1616&tempname =Main&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘Extraterritorial Cultivation in Ghana Suitable Land for Agricultural Investors’, MAJ, 20 February 2019, https:// maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=108551 &pageIdF=1653&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘Boosting Agricultural Production and Creating Food Security with Overseas Cultivation’, MAJ, 1 July 2019, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1 &sub=0&PageID=115640&pageIdF=1620&tempname=Main&searchType=d orsasearch; MAJ, ‘Ghana Called for the Development’. 147 MAJ, ‘Self-Sufficiency of Dried Seed Production in Iran by Introducing Cultivars by Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension Organization’, MAJ, 19 March 2019, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub= 0&PageID=109538&pageIdF=1648&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsasea rch; MAJ, ‘The Performance of the Headquarters of the Research Organization Was Investigated in the Board of Directors’, MAJ, 19 May 2019, https://maj.ir/ index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=113576&pageId F=1648&tempname=Main&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘The Tenth National Specialized Authority for the Convention on Biological Diversity of the Country Has Started’, MAJ, 19 August 2019, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaeto olsenews&lang=1&sub=0&PageID=118474&pageIdF=1648&tempname=Mai n&searchType=dorsasearch; MAJ, ‘The Twelfth Nanotechnology Festival and Exhibition Started with the Active Participation of the Agricultural Biodiversity Institute in the Permanent Location of Tehran International Exhibitions’, MAJ, 12 October 2019, https://maj.ir/index.aspx?Page_=dorsaetoolsenews&lang=1 &sub=0&PageID=121720&pageIdF=1648&tempname=Main&searchType=d orsasearch. 148 MAJ, ‘Iran and Ghana Stressed the Development of Economic and Agricultural Cooperation’, MAJ, 14 January 2021, www.wheat.maj.ir/index.aspx?page_=d orsaetoolsenews&lang=1&tempname=main&sub=0&PageID=151915&PageI DF=0&BlockName=tool_dorsaetoolsenews_sample_main_block14. 149 During Rouhani’s first term as president, annual average domestic crude oil prices declined from US$91.17 (nominal)/US$95.79 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel in 2013 to US$42.74 (nominal)/US$42.63 (inflation adjusted) per barrel in 2017 – dropping as low as US$36.34 (nominal)/US$37.02 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel in 2016. T. McMahon, ‘Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)’, 27 August 2017, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.

4

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Extended states: the politics and purpose of United Arab Emirates economic statecraft in the Horn of Africa Karen E. Young and Taimur Khan

Introduction and the concept of the emerging powers of the Gulf The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are in an exceptional moment in their modern history. They have never been more confident and influential in their foreign policy and domestic development agendas. Their political and economic stability, along with their global reach in terms of aid, foreign investment and strategic security partnerships attest to their growth and transformation since the early 1970s. The transition from small states (in the cases of the UAE and Qatar) to regional powers has been swift. As these states grapple with their simultaneous transition to post-oil economies, the impact of their fiscal policies rivals in importance their foreign policy choices and interventions. These are some of the new features of the GCC states of the twenty-first century. They are vastly different from the GCC states of the second half of the twentieth century when they mostly acted as closed, traditional, newly independent, rentier, small city-states, politically timid, net importers of influence and highly dependent on foreign, mostly American protection for their survivability. To understand the dynamics of change in the Gulf region, we must also conceptualise changes at the international level. Scholars are now addressing a shift in global power to multipolarity, or declining empire, to rising new powers of the East and Middle East. The rise of the Gulf states, in their interventionist foreign policies and their growing economic reach, is part of larger trends of global political economy. Many scholars have attempted to describe and understand the GCC states of the twenty-first century. In the expectation of a Gulf-led economic boom pre the global financial crisis, Edmund O’Sullivan wrote in breathless terms of the potential of a rising Gulf region. In his book, The New Gulf: How the Modern Arabia Is Changing the World for Good, he proposes the ‘New

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Gulf’ to refer to the vast changes that have taken place in the GCC since the sub-regional organisation was founded in 1981. As he argues: ‘A new Gulf is rising, one that will be radically different to the one we know… the economic, social and political transformation sweeping the Gulf is making [it] the fastest growing part of the world economy.’ 1 This growth is not just economic, however. It is ideational, cultural and aspires to reshape both the regional security architecture and a liberal economic order. The Gulf states are disrupting financial interventions of many kinds, from traditional aid to foreign direct investment and the ability of recipient states to manage their monetary policies, with the use of cash deposits to central banks as a tool of support and alliance building. While this force can be positive for regional access to development finance and improved security, it can also have destabilising effects. Matthew Gray’s concept of late rentierism also seeks to explain the divergence of state behaviour.2 The divergence he addresses is not the recent activist and interventionist turn in Gulf politics that Karen Young later conceptualises3 but, rather, an increase in state capacity and external reach, in the advent of wealth accumulation from oil revenues in the late 1990s and early 2000s among the GCC states, he argues: Specifically, the late rentier model allows for and explains the confluence, since 1990 or so but especially in the 2000s, of a maturing of the state and its view of rents; the impacts of globalization and the need to respond to it; new state economic and development imperatives and policies that are often at times of high, not low, rents; and population growth and employment pressures. These, when faced by allocative regimes that still have large rents at their disposal and which do not wish to cede real power to society or to specific opposition, account for late rentierism.4

Scholars are engaging the question of the evolving social contract of the GCC states, particularly as the role of the state in providing services, subsidised energy and water and employment begins to shift in favour of taxation and a reliance on private sector employment. State–society relations are indeed in flux, particularly the role of ruling families. The rentier model is actively unravelling, or at least is facing some very serious challenges. Analytically, we can see the widening reach of the Gulf states, and the UAE in particular, as part of larger trends in the regional political economy. Scholars have identified this transition, developing a number of useful concepts. Matteo Legrenzi and Bessma Momani early on identified a shifting geoeconomic power of the Gulf states, mostly in their ability to integrate into global financial markets via their sovereign wealth funds.5 The term ‘Global Gulf’ also describes how regional societies internalise economic integration and broader globalisation trends. In their book, The

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Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, David Held and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen examine the GCC states within the global order. They argue that, beginning in the 1990s, the GCC states became increasingly integrated with the world economy, gradually opened up to foreign direct investment and eventually acceded to the World Trade Organization.6 Supported by their infrastructure, including ports and airlines, these states have gone beyond their global economic role of oil producers to become major investors and deal makers across a variety of sectors. Powered by wealth, their politics seek to rebalance and reshape the world around them. The term ‘Gulfization’ is also used to recognise the growing regional power of the GCC states. It reflects the influence the Gulf region has on other parts of the world. It simply means that at this moment the GCC states are taking the lead, influencing events, assuming greater financial responsibilities, projecting socio-economic confidence and becoming increasingly conscious of their newly acquired status as a regional power. Marc Owen Jones, Ross Porter and Marc Valerie in their edited book, Gulfization of the Arab World, argue: ‘Gulfization is a process that is also occurring within Gulf states and societies as they continually adapt, adjust, and reinvent themselves within the context of local and global changes.’ 7 Also recent, the development of a concept of the ‘Gulf moment’ attempts to define the new domestic realities of GCC states, as well as their relation to the wider Arab world. Abdelkhaleq Abdulla describes and analyses three pillars: first, that the GCC states of the twenty-first century are vastly different from their histories in the twentieth century.8 Second, the GCC states of the twenty-first century are emerging as a new centre of gravity and creativity in the Arab world. Third, currently, the six members of the GCC have more power and influence over the sixteen Arab states than the sixteen Arab states combined over the six GCC states (despite the 2014 and 2017 acrimony within the GCC). This Gulf scholarship is descriptive in nature. It seeks to conceptualise a shift or transition within Gulf societies and political economies, and to study the impact of their internal changes towards the wider global political economy. The literature has been important in its effort to track the changes of the reach and ambition of the GCC states. What the literature lacks is a credible explanation or theory of why. Why do the GCC states, and particularly the UAE, see the opportunity to expand both their financial and security reach into the broader Middle East and beyond? What are the motivations of this expansionist, interventionist foreign economic policy and security posture? Is there a policy learning curve in effect, such that we can track formation of policy goals, and a widening or contracting deployment of specific mechanisms of statecraft? Two additional concepts

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help our explanation of why. First, the concept of economic statecraft. Economic statecraft is using economic means to achieve foreign policy ends. It is economic policy deliberately formulated to promote the foreign policy goals of the state.9 Economic statecraft applies economic means to ends that may or may not be economic, whereas foreign economic policy encompasses means that may or may not be economic in the service of economic ends. Thus, trade sanctions imposed on a country in order to persuade it to halt a weapons programme would qualify as economic statecraft, but not foreign economic policy, whereas suspending certain diplomatic contacts with a country – a non-economic intervention – in order to protest its import barriers would qualify as foreign economic policy, but not economic statecraft.10 Second, the concept of complex realism helps to explain the changing nature of foreign policy making in the Middle East, its particular dynamics that are sensitive to regional identity politics and domestic pressures, sometimes of a religious or identity nature and also as side-effects of particular political economies of rentierism. Hinnebusch and Eteshami argue that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) environment is more complex than traditional realist analysis considers.11 Rather than existing in a state of anarchy, MENA states operate in a system that is hierarchical, in that great power politics can have important limitations on foreign policy choices. We might also consider how Gulf states are challenging regional security architecture and disrupting the legacy of clientele relationships common in the region during the Cold War era. The regional political dimension, based on a shared identity of Pan-Arabism and/or Pan-Islamism, also weighs on foreign policy, and can be influential in partnerships and aid choices. Moreover, Hinnebusch and Eteshami have examined how the weakness of foreign policy making in the Middle East, and particularly within monarchies, is exacerbated by centralised, top-down decision making, and subject to quick changes or the whims of rulers.

Security and economic considerations: the UAE and the Horn of Africa This chapter sets out to uncover and explain why the UAE has targeted the Horn of Africa as a site of its economic and security interests. The chapter contextualises this regional target in line with previous recipient sites of Emirati economic statecraft. The story here is of a state’s foreign policy in active formulation and expansionist mode. The drivers of UAE foreign policy continue to be economic interests, often with a ‘value for money’ rationale that differs from traditional aid decision making, along with a

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widening security frame. The sphere of influence of UAE security is gradually widening, but in a very concerted radius, reaching east to the Indian Ocean; south to the Bab el-Mandeb and Arabian Sea; west to the Horn of Africa and Red Sea corridor; north to Egypt and the Levant. The UAE is willing to stretch financial and bureaucratic resources to achieve a development objective (the country’s own demand markets and geostrategic location as a logistics and transport hub) and a security objective to counter where it sees the potential strengthening of political Islam as a competing form of governance. In the Horn, multiple port concessions and security partnerships have occurred in iteration, often after preceding attempts produced disappointing results. Early patterns of economic statecraft demonstrated an emphasis on achieving value for money,12 while more recent attempts have prioritised state security concerns over achieving economic returns, especially as the war in Yemen has elevated the security component to a major policy priority since 2015. At this stage, the UAE’s evolving foreign policy in the Horn has produced mixed results on the commercial and economic fronts and some important wins on the peace and security fronts and has exacerbated some of the volatility that has plagued the region for decades.13 The foreign policy reach of the GCC states continues to expand geographically, empowered by hydrocarbon wealth, ambitious leadership and a purposeful shift to meld economic objectives with security concerns. In the UAE, the decade since 2010 has included expansionist and ambitious foreign policy reach within the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Horn of Africa. Just as the geography of the Gulf sits at the centre of a widening circle or sphere of influence, expanding within eight hours’ flying time to reach two-thirds of the world’s population,14 the UAE has conceptualised its position as central to accessible resources, whether food production in Sudan and Serbia, or port access from Aden to Suez. Strategic geography is central to how the UAE sees itself in a wider global community and how the state envisions its relevance and security in the future global political economy. The logic is ‘What do we need?’ and ‘What is in our reach?’, and from there we see an expansionist interest in investment, aid and security cooperation, and a budding aggression towards those who threaten that access. The UAE has been especially adept at identifying locations of strategic reach, and then exercising a form of economic statecraft to engage a counterpart and try to create leverage. The exercise of economic statecraft is not an invention of the UAE, however, and all states will use the tools at their disposal to create influence, opportunity and to minimise threats to their security. For the UAE, the trajectory of the small state’s willingness to exert influence, and leverage, is growing in both force and breadth. However, there have been disappointments

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and reactions to this policy trajectory that the UAE has found surprising, including with large housing projects in Egypt and its port concession in Djibouti. There is a foreign policy learning curve underway. Early indications suggest that the UAE has a tendency to exit quickly, to extract investment and aid commitments and to redouble efforts in new locations and with new partners. This shift could be seen as creating redundancies, and certainly a low concern for the efficiency of public investment and resources deployed. It may also suggest a transactional view of foreign policy, a lack of long-term diplomatic engagement or interest and perhaps also a weakness of human resource capacity to exercise foreign policy, or a heavily centralised process that does not include complex and multi-tiered decision making. This chapter proceeds in the following order. First, we will provide recent historical context for the acceleration in UAE assertiveness in foreign policy, particularly after the Arab uprisings of 2011. We rely on two concepts to understand this behaviour: economic statecraft and complex realism. We introduce a case study which illustrates these concepts: UAE (and Saudi) aid and investment in Egypt from 2013 to 2016. Second, we address a key hypothesis within the chapter, suggesting that there is a policy learning process in effect, particularly in the light of recent disappointments in Emirati investment and security partnerships in the Horn of Africa. Are policy expectations resting on faulty assumptions about recipients of security partnerships and aid? How might we see a shift in importance of the economic motivation of foreign policy choices and interventions, and how might this reflect on changes in domestic politics and inter-emirate negotiations, particularly in the cases involving Dubai Ports World (DP World)? Third, we examine the extension of the UAE’s activist foreign policy to the Horn of Africa, where early commercial engagements have expanded into a much more focused and deliberate foreign policy based on the dual pillars of economic statecraft and security intervention. The chapter gives case evidence based on two port experiences of UAE investment in the region, based on primary interviews and secondary research. We conclude with further questions rather than firm predictions of state behaviour. However, based on our analysis of Emirati economic statecraft more broadly since 2011, we are able to identify some trends accelerating and some possible areas of conflict emerging.

Foreign policy trends in the Gulf The member states of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE) have historically used foreign aid and humanitarian aid as a quiet tool of their respective foreign policies within the wider Middle East.15 More recently, however, after the onset of Arab uprisings in 2010–11,

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we have seen targeted financial aid and military assistance by these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, toward neighbours in crisis. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have used financial and military aid to jockey for influence among Egypt’s evolving political leadership; to attempt to remove Syria’s Bashar al-Assad from power; to counter the growth of the Islamic State movement in Iraq; and to influence political battles in Libya, as well as in newly democratic Tunisia. In the Horn, Ethiopia fits this pattern of engagement: an erstwhile regional power in the throes of a political crisis, and in dire need of external financial and political engagement. There are opportunities for Gulf states to intervene, given a pattern of wealth accumulation and political motivation since the early 2000s. Windfalls in wealth generated from the rapid ascent of oil and natural gas prices between 2003 and 2014 allowed budgets to expand for both military expenditure and financial aid.16 While the dramatic fall in oil prices in late 2014 has raised questions about the sustainability of this practice and the exercise of economic statecraft in the MENA region, the short-term aid decision making suggests that a different logic is at play.17 The growing trend is that GCC states are willing to export their own models of political economy as a challenge to Western advice and hegemony in their strategic efforts to limit political competition, especially political space open to activist religious political movements like political Islam.18 Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, in his address to potential investors at Sharm el Sheikh, called Egypt ‘the first line of defence’ against regional terrorism, and therefore, in his view, a good place to invest.19 The use of oil and gas products as aid in kind; the targeting of construction and real estate as both investment vehicles (for state and private sector firms) and employment strategies; the deployment of infrastructure development, particularly in ports; and the manipulation of central banks as quick fixes to a depreciating currency, all of these strategies relate to Gulf practices in economic governance.20 The strategic aid priorities originating in the Gulf are generally quite different from those originating in the West. In the case of the UAE, the overwhelming priority has been a coordinated business and security ambition: what strengthens the position of the state, while also providing a quality investment for the state? When state and economic interests dovetail, we see the hallmark of Gulf state economic statecraft. Because of the heavy presence of state-related entities in Gulf economies, any aid decision is also an investment opportunity for state-linked firms to capitalise on bilateral ties.21 This coordinated business and security strategy is perhaps the key feature of Emirati foreign policy and foreign aid policy. In interviews with advisors to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is a recurrent theme heard in meetings from the minister down to advisors: return on investment.22 The

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return is not calculated as a pure financial figure. It includes market access, market dominance, priority over regional rivals in the investment/aid target space and forward-looking opportunities for state-related entities to make profitable partnerships, often with a medium to long-term trajectory. Trade, investment, security and building a state identity within an international system are not mutually exclusive strategic objectives.23 The Egyptian case study clearly illustrates the concept of Emirati economic statecraft after 2011.

Egypt Well before the boycott of Qatar began in June 2017, Egypt was a key battleground for Gulf countries vying for international influence. While Qatar backed the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the military and current regime of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi. In an effort to shore up Egypt’s political stability since its 2013 coup, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have used a number of financial tools, including deposits into the Egyptian central bank, favourable loans, in-kind donations of oil and gas shipments and promises of foreign direct investment in sectors like real estate and agriculture. There has been some volatility in the flow of GCC financial support to Egypt since 2016. That year was especially difficult for Egypt, as it sought assistance from traditional multilateral finance sources like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to address its fiscal crisis and stabilise its currency. The UAE  and Saudi Arabia are again turning on the support flows to Egypt through foreign direct investments from state-related entities, particularly in real estate. However, this foreign aid and investment is not charity, even when its target is a foreign policy priority. Gulf economic statecraft, particularly from the UAE, is often funded by investment vehicles that are the private resources of public figures, which could benefit the state and its related commercial entities. While Egypt holds a geopolitically strategic position in the Arab world, its economic interests remain precariously divided between factions in the GCC dispute. While it is no longer indebted to Qatar for loans extended after 2011 (having made repayments in 2016 and 2014), Egypt’s outstanding arrears to other Gulf states will weigh heavily on its spending commitments in the coming years. For now, investment in Egypt’s political stability and economic growth remains a foreign policy priority of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Both governments and their policy makers might take advantage of the learning opportunities of the experimental nature of the varied economic reform agenda unfolding across the MENA region.



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The dispute between Qatar and the Quartet including Egypt and the GCC states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain) is in many ways a dispute about the exercise of economic statecraft. Qatar uses its economic resources to support regional political movements from below, and the opposing states support what they term secular governance with a strong overarching state. These competing visions of governance have deep pockets, sustained by aid and investment portfolios that have the capacity to reshape, and disrupt, the political economy of the entire region.

Critical historical context: policy learning curves and foreign policy overreach This section outlines key questions on Emirati foreign policy in the current regional environment. Given the war in Yemen and its role as a combatant, along with its recent commitments towards Egypt, the UAE is taking on a regional leadership role in its efforts to model governance and economic growth, as well as to insert itself into a regional conflict. The rationale for this assertive foreign policy is state preservation and state consolidation.

Drivers of UAE assertive foreign policy  The overall process that we are witnessing is not so much about foreign policy but, rather, about the UAE’s own domestic state building. There is a very active state-building project underway, as a second phase following from what first-generation UAE statesman Sheikh Zayed began, through his son Mohamed bin Zayed. We are seeing the consolidation of federal authority, or, really, the weakening of a federal autonomy structure built on separate emirate identities into one national identity. The first tenet of this state-building project is a new nationalism, somewhat similar to Arab nationalist projects of the 1950s, specifically Nasserism; it is separate from political Islam, is confrontational and prioritises its rights as a state on the international stage, seen as an equal to any other state. The ethos of militarism (the parades, the uniforms, the martyrs) is vital to this self-conception. The parallel to Egypt is apt; Egypt is a guidepost and a past case study which the Emirates has tried to replicate and improve. The UAE admires Egypt’s legitimacy in the Arab world, its history of cosmopolitanism, its media icons of the past and its regional powerbroker model. What has motivated UAE foreign policy is not solely a need to react to the Arab Spring; it begins earlier. The decade of tremendous oil wealth that was earned between 2003 and 2014 enabled this state power consolidation

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and centralisation of state authority towards Abu Dhabi; the oil revenues flowed specifically to Abu Dhabi. Federal resource sharing was the force that the British advised to create the UAE, and it remains the glue that holds the country together. However, the allocation of funds to the federal budget is totally discretionary from Abu Dhabi in terms of setting the federal budget. The money was put to use in three specific ways: (1) building a military (worth noting there were separate militias and arms procurement in the UAE between emirates until 1996); (2) extending outward investment via the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, or ADIA, and the creation of the investment firm Mubadala for domestic technology investment; and (3) making Abu Dhabi a real estate venture, in the model of Dubai, for the personal enrichment of members of the ruling al-Nahyan family, buttressing federal institutions in the capital. The effects of that wealth can be seen in institutional capacity building toward the central state, including vehicles of foreign policy making: a ministry of foreign affairs that relies on external expertise, a diplomatic academy, a national defence college, a security apparatus with universities and think-tanks along with sophisticated surveillance technology, an institution for the delivery of aid and foreign assistance, previously handled through private family largesse. The Arab Spring provided justification for increased state security domestically, and set a precedent for intra-GCC ‘meddling’ or forceful integration in the use of UAE and Saudi troops in Bahrain, and in the massive infrastructure aid packages delivered to Bahrain and Oman – $10 billion each.24 This provided leverage in intra-GCC affairs. Egypt is the second major activation of this external foreign policy engineering in UAE investment ideas, injections into the Egyptian central bank and direct support after 2013. The idea that the UAE might be able to shape and mould the behaviour of neighbouring states is very much a post-2011 strategy and use of its ability and resource – but is still largely experimental. The concern of a diminished United States (US) commitment to the region has also motivated Gulf state foreign policy to be more assertive. There have been four instances, each bolder than the preceding effort: 1 Bahrain and Oman 2011 (practice in coup-proofing, domestic riots and, more importantly, in direct subsidies of infrastructure as a model of economic development); 2 Libya 2011; 3 Egypt 2013–15 (this is the key example of emerging use of Emirati economic statecraft, to achieve both financial and political objectives. It has largely been a failure on the economic side, but is still holding together politically, at least as long as President al-Sisi is compliant); 4 Yemen 2015–present.



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What has the UAE learned? There has likely been some reckoning within the Emirati foreign policy establishment, though it may be difficult to communicate the failures to the leadership. Domestically, there needs to be more socialising of ideas of policy shifts. For example, there is broad frustration among the military at the government’s choice to make a deal with Islamists, al-Islah, in Yemen, as a starting point.25 The tactics used to employ economic statecraft to gain political influence and financial access in the Horn of Africa, from Somaliland to Djibouti, have engendered results at far ends of the spectrum, from real disappointment in Somalia, to phenomenal success in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In April 2018 the UAE’s fraying relationship with the Turkey- and Qatarbacked Somali central government in Mogadishu broke down completely after Somali security forces confiscated nearly $10 million in cash from diplomatic bags arriving on an Emirati jet. The UAE claimed that the money was intended for routine salary payments for the Somali troops trained and equipped at the UAE-run base in Mogadishu, while the government insisted that it was aimed at buying support for the UAE-backed speaker of parliament on the eve of a no-confidence vote. Abu Dhabi closed the training base and a major hospital it ran in the city and cut ties with Mogadishu, in response to the incident and demands from Somali officials that the UAE leave the capital. The scandal was an embarrassment to Emirati outreach efforts and served to undermine the UAE’s development of tools of statecraft. This episode is likely to shape future efforts at transactional partnerships, which will be made more privately and on domestic soil. It may reinforce the personalistic nature of deal making already in place. Likewise, protests in May 2018 on the island of Socotra in Yemen are a similar disappointment, in that the Emiratis generally see their interventions and efforts at providing investment and infrastructure development as a force for good, and have been really surprised to see host communities fail to take advantage of the opportunity. For many months, the UAE has been working to think about reconstruction and building an example community of Socotra, in finding UAE citizens to staff its humanitarian efforts there, including the staffing of a new hospital. But, in parallel to these aid efforts, Emirati investors have been buying prime ocean-side property from impoverished Socotrans for private homes and tourism-related real estate developments. The UAE military is also reportedly increasing its footprint on the island.26 Taken together, the UAE’s presence triggered protests by many of the island’s 60,000 residents and forced Saudi officials to step in and mediate. To be rebuffed very publicly for what the UAE sees primarily as humanitarian work, with an economic benefit in return to UAE interests, is a surprise to the Emirati leadership.

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These events in Yemen and the Horn of Africa may be turning points which may shift Emirati strategy, creating more of a divide between the investment arms of the state and members of the ruling families and the political aims of the government. This could be healthy, but it will also require some formalisation in both aid policy and state investment vehicles. Alternatively, these disappointments could reinforce patterns of hierarchical decision making and relationship politics between leaders, slowing aid and investment opportunities. There is a general consensus emerging in 2020 that aid and foreign investment can be linked and that, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the two mandates of diplomacy and economic cooperation go hand in hand. As a senior Emirati diplomat noted, the aim is to have 10 per cent of UAE foreign aid to be ‘in kind’,27 as a means to link the export of energy products or construction projects to foreign policy engagement. The economic resources of the country are fungible as tools of diplomacy, aid and foreign policy. The two most important state offices working now in this area are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala. The ministries and state entities that emerge as facilitators of economic diplomacy and statecraft and provide a return on investment will reap rewards, as their institutional presence and individual leadership portfolios will grow. Those that fail face potential conflicts, embarrassments and entanglements in the politics of recipient states.

Bilateral relations: the case of two ports The groundwork for the UAE’s position in the Horn of Africa was laid in 2006, when Dubai-based port operator DP World won a thirty-year concession to develop and expand the Doraleh Container Terminal at the Djibouti port. Following a global food price crisis in 2007–8, the GCC states also began earnestly targeting agricultural land in the Horn for food-security purposes – largely in Sudan and Ethiopia – an enterprise mainly driven by state-led agribusinesses, sovereign wealth funds and agri-investment vehicles.28 Despite a large amount of investment, these early commercial enterprises did not always prove successful. Large land purchases and food-production exports raised concerns from locals that ‘presented serious operational and reputational risks for Gulf investors’.29 Moreover, an absence of landownership regulation, the lack of infrastructure, technological deficits, a dearth of skilled labour, currency volatility and high political risk undermined ventures and stymied implementation.30 Over time, however, GCC investors began

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addressing structural weaknesses and developing more viable long-term strategies. Gulf states also spent generously on social welfare in the Horn. Saudi Arabia poured money into social welfare projects in Djibouti, built housing, schools and mosques, as well as sending teachers and religious preachers. Other Gulf states, including the UAE and Bahrain, provided millions of dollars in charitable donations and worked to generate economic development.31 By 2011, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar had ‘generated novel aid mechanisms, including non-restricted cash grants, injections into central banks, and in-kind oil and gas deliveries’,32 some of the tools that have continued to define the means of economic statecraft employed by the Gulf states. On the security front, rising concerns over piracy and terrorism emanating from Somalia, which threatened investments in the Horn and commercial maritime activity in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, also began to draw attention from the Gulf states. In 2008, piracy rates in the vital international shipping corridor stretching from the Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea began to skyrocket.33 By 2009, the UAE had joined an international contact group on piracy that included twenty-four nations; and by 2013 the incidence of piracy in the Red Sea had plunged considerably as a result of the coordinated effort to end the phenomenon. Yet, security in the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait was not confined to piracy for very long, and began to take on expanding strategic dimensions for the Gulf states. Rising tensions between some Gulf states and Iran, as well as the expansion of the war in Yemen in 2015, provided more pressing reasons for a focused commitment to the Horn from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in particular.34 Indeed, countering rivals in the region has been one of the more successful avenues for UAE–Saudi engagement, as the allied states were able to influence several governments in the Horn to break relations with Iran, which had developed deep-standing ties to Sudan and Eritrea, in particular. In 2014, for instance, Saudi Arabia pressed Khartoum to end its relationship with Iran, even threatening to deport thousands of Sudanese workers living in the Gulf kingdom – an important source of remittances. Sudan responded by closing Iranian cultural centres, expelling a diplomat and even going as far as accusing Tehran of promoting Shi‘a fundamentalism.35 In 2016, Sudan became the first state in East Africa to break ties with Iran, and was followed shortly afterwards by Djibouti and Somalia. Sudan has subsequently contributed thousands of troops and irregular fighters to the Saudi–UAE war effort in Yemen; and Saudi Arabia was instrumental in convincing the Trump administration in Washington to ease economic sanctions on Khartoum in October 2017.36

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The Gulf alliance also proved successful in Eritrea, where Iran was active and the government in Asmara had supported Houthi rebels from Yemen with training at its port in Assab.37 (Ironically, the UAE would take control of the port and turn it into the staging ground for its offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.) In 2014, Eritrea switched its allegiance and expelled the Houthis, and then signed a bilateral security and military agreement with Saudi Arabia in April 2015.38 The UAE–Saudi alliance faced a setback in Djibouti in 2015, when their troops were expelled from the country (the result of a dispute between Emirati and Djibouti military personnel). However, ties resumed in 2016 and Saudi Arabia signed a separate agreement to develop a base in the country.39 Yet, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not been completely successful in countering all their rivals in the Horn. Both Qatar and Turkey are active in the region, with the latter the most dominant party in Somalia and one of the largest investors in Ethiopia. The intra-Gulf rift with Qatar has also added a layer of complexity and risk to Gulf state foreign policy and intervention in the Horn. Many analysts and observers fear that the rift could exacerbate the tensions and instability already pervasive in the region.40 Indeed, when Eritrea and Djibouti both offered their support for the UAE– Saudi position against Qatar in June 2017, Qatar responded by removing 400 observers who were monitoring a ceasefire between the two Horn countries on the contested island of Doumeira.41 China has also provided varying degrees of competition and cooperation for Gulf countries in the Horn. While China has been the main competitor to UAE port interests in Djibouti, there is also ‘much complementarity to the China–GCC relationship in the Horn’.42 Access to the largest market in the Horn, Ethiopia, has largely transited through Chinese infrastructure. Conversely, Chinese banks are using Dubai as a launching pad for East Africa, as well as Gulf ports and airports for Chinese products.43 This could put the UAE on a collision course with its ally in Washington, which maintains its only military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, only a few kilometres from China’s first permanent overseas naval base.44 The UAE may find itself in a delicate balancing act if tensions between the two superpowers escalate in the region. So far, the UAE has been able to navigate the rough waters of superpower competition by providing value to both Washington and Beijing. An obvious example is the engagement and rehabilitation of Eritrea by the UAE and Saudi, which could provide an alternative to the increasingly China-dependent Djibouti for Washington’s military footprint in the Horn, and as a desperately needed additional commercial port for Ethiopia. The experience of the UAE with two ports in particular – the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti and the Somaliland port of Berbera – demonstrate

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the increasingly complex dynamics animating the geopolitics – and more localised politics – being shaped by the competition among the aspiring regional powers of the Middle East – particularly the Gulf Arab states and Turkey – and China for influence in the Horn of Africa. On 22 February 2018, Djibouti seized control of the Doraleh Container Terminal from its joint owner and operator, the Dubai-based DP World. The seizure was not wholly unexpected and was the culmination of Djibouti’s deteriorating bilateral ties with the UAE and a lost legal battle with DP World to renegotiate the terms of the port concession that gave it a 33 per cent equity stake in 2006.45 The London Court of International Arbitration Tribunal ruled against the claim by Djibouti, lodged in 2014, that DP World had paid bribes in order to secure the thirty-year concession. Djiboutian officials also claim that DP World intentionally diverted transhipment cargo to Jebel Ali, and that the terms of the concession, negotiated with the previous Djiboutian government, were ‘mind boggling’.46 The Dubai government said it had initiated proceedings at the tribunal over the seizure. A statement by the Djiboutian government claims that it seized the port over poor performance (although its volume has grown to around 1 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, a measurement of a ship’s carrying capacity, annually) and additional terms added by DP World that amounted to a violation of its sovereignty.47   Doraleh opened in 2009 and is the only container terminal in the Horn of Africa able to handle 15,000-ton container ships. It quickly became the most important entrepôt for the region’s largest country and economy, Ethiopia, landlocked by Eritrea’s independence in 1990s.48 Ethiopia receives around 97 per cent of its imports through Doraleh, in what has become an unacceptable strategic reliance on a neighbour in a region whose history has been defined by shifting alliances, constant internal meddling and an uneasy balance of power. For Djibouti, Ethiopia’s reliance on its port is existential – around 70 per cent of the port’s activity is from Ethiopian trade, and its exorbitant fees are a result of Addis Ababa’s lack of port options. A second, related development was also unfolding as DP World’s – and thus the UAE’s – relationship with Djibouti soured. A year after DP World finalised an agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland to develop a $442 million commercial port in Berbera, Ethiopia inked a deal in March 2018 with the port operator and Somaliland’s government to acquire a 19 per cent stake in the port.49 There are reportedly plans for Addis Ababa to contribute $80 million in cash or, more likely, in kind, to upgrade the connectivity infrastructure linking Hargeisa to the Ethiopian border at Wachale that would allow Ethiopia and, potentially, greater East Africa, to reduce their dependence on Djibouti, which would have significant strategic implications for regional geopolitics. Many analysts speculate that this agreement to build

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up a direct competitor to Doraleh is what may have been the proximate cause of Djibouti’s seizure of the terminal from DP World.  Djibouti has leveraged its strategic location on a choke point of global maritime trade and proximity to areas of security threats in Yemen and the Horn and increasing competition by outside powers, as well as its relative political stability and developed ports infrastructure, to secure long-term commercial and military rent. But Djiboutian officials are now acutely concerned that recent developments are threatening the country’s position. The dramatic unfolding of this tale of two DP World projects is also an important case study of the UAE’s long-term economic statecraft model that guides its pursuit and expansion of national interests in eastern Africa, Central Asia, the Balkans and elsewhere. In the Horn of Africa, the conflict with Djibouti over Doraleh catalysed a series of moves that has led to one of Abu Dhabi’s most potentially significant strategic breakthroughs in the region to date, and one of its greatest diplomatic achievements and economic statecraft successes: mediating a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and an end to the Horn’s most destabilising conflict.

Give peace a chance: the UAE’s influence on rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea The UAE’s foreign policy engagements are predicated, more often than not, on commercial interests – and Ethiopia is no different. At the time when the UAE won its concession for the port in Djibouti, Ethiopia’s economy was recovering after decades of conflict, and Addis Ababa sought to increase its capacity for trade via its only link to an ocean – through Djibouti. While DP World built and operated the Doraleh terminal, which opened in 2009, Addis Ababa inked loan deals with Chinese state companies for overland infrastructure investments and to link to Djibouti by road and rail. Emirati– Ethiopian trade volume and strategic ties were undeveloped at the time, and the Djibouti port operation fitted primarily within DP World’s commercial expansion plans with regard to Africa. The countries’ economic interests are highly complementary. Ethiopia’s infrastructure boom, which includes a number of power projects that will boost capacity to double current domestic needs, desperately requires private and foreign investment, as ties with China have soured considerably over unpaid loans and unmet expectations The privatisation of telecom conglomerates and Ethiopia’s national airline as well as other growing industries offers significant opportunities for Emirati private investors and state-backed companies that are looking for more international investment opportunities as fiscal budgets shrink in the Gulf. While Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad is privatising some sectors of the economy, the state still plays a controlling

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role. For the UAE, this makes for a familiar economic environment in which to invest. Ethiopia’s economic development plans are premised on the expansion of its industrial base, spurred through the massive development of its agricultural sector, which employs 85 per cent of Ethiopian workers as small subsistence farmers.50 The Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation plan aims to increase industrial sectors built around the core agricultural economy, such as textiles and leather goods, and eventually to transition to a fully industrialised economy. During the Cold War and through the 1990s, Ethiopia had poor relations with Gulf countries, whom its leaders saw as supporting Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against it. But as the balance of power in the Middle East has shifted toward the Gulf, and as Gulf Arab states began to look more closely at the Horn of Africa as key to food security and their strategic interests more broadly, relations have slowly strengthened. The UAE and Ethiopia began tentative diplomatic engagement based on mutual economic interests in 2013, before the decline in oil prices.51 In the case of Eritrea, when the UAE military was ejected from Djibouti at the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh quickly engaged with the government in Asmara over access to its port in Assab.52 Until then, Eritrea had been close to Iran, receiving aid and allowing the Iranian navy the use of Assab. Eritrea also had good relations with Qatar,53 which had kept a contingent of troops along a disputed Djibouti–Eritrea border, until Eritrea sided with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in their dispute with Qatar.54 Eritrea cut ties with Iran and agreed to allow the UAE to build up military facilities just across from Yemen’s south-west coast along the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The bases there have played a crucial role in the UAE’s ability to conduct military operations in southern Yemen, including the amphibious assault to retake Aden from Houthi forces in August 2015.55 In exchange, according to experts, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have helped to modernise Eritrea’s power grid and have given in-kind assistance in oil, among other aid. According to the United Nations panel of experts on Somalia and Eritrea sanctions, Eritrea deployed around 400 troops to Yemen as part of the coalition forces.56 Eritrea’s budding ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia – an apparent lifeline offering relief from its international isolation – triggered an alarmed response in Addis Ababa. Ethiopian officials flew to Abu Dhabi for talks in late 2015. The exchange was rocky, partly because the Ethiopians felt slighted by the transactional and tactical approach of their Emirati counterparts, according to a former Western official. Whatever the learning curve was for both sides, however, it appears that Abu Dhabi and the former government of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn quickly found a modus vivendi that worked and steered the relationship, through confidence building, to an increasingly strategic

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partnership. An understanding was reached over the UAE’s relationship with Ethiopia’s enemy Eritrea, as well as Abu Dhabi’s close ties to Cairo. This initial cooperation soon grew more strategic. Ethiopia had for at least a decade tried to find an international partner to develop Somaliland’s Berbera port into a facility capable of handling large volumes of cargo and thereby reduce landlocked Ethiopia’s almost total dependence on the port of Djibouti for trade. According to scholars at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi, Ethiopia worked to steer Emirati interest in developing Berbera by offering to guarantee trade volumes and eventually use the port for 30 per cent of its trade.57 In addition to the Berbera port talks, Abu Dhabi began discussions with Somaliland to refurbish a former Soviet, subsequently US, airstrip near the port city and build a naval base. Many analysts have speculated that Ethiopia supported the Emirati military base build-up in Berbera in order to dilute the importance of Assab. While that may have been the case, Ethiopia also asked the UAE to remain in Assab so that Eritrea would not be able to offer the empty bases to Egypt, according to a source close to Ethiopian officials. Ethiopia signed a deal with Somaliland in February 2015 to develop Berbera port, a month before a subsidiary of DP World began its own discussions with the government in Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa, which were finalised in May 2016 with the signing of a $442 million agreement to develop the port and some related human capital and infrastructure. A year later, Ethiopia was given a 19 per cent stake in the port and agreed to spend $80 million, in contributions in kind or cash, to develop connectivity infrastructure linking it to its border, according to Somaliland officials. The Ethiopian push to involve the UAE in developing Berbera benefited from the legal dispute between DP World and Djibouti. There is still anger in Abu Dhabi at Djibouti’s moves against it – and vice versa. The mutual animosity has coincided with growing frustration in Washington over Djibouti’s expanding relationship with China,58 which built a military base and naval facility close to the US Camp Lemonnier base. A Chinese company may also take over the Doraleh container terminal seized from DP World, and Beijing is providing loans and strengthening its ties to the strategically located state, including through the construction of four new ports.59 The US military has declared a move away from counterterrorism operations in Africa and toward great-power competition with China and Russia,60 and Eritrea’s coastline may provide an attractive alternative or addition to Djibouti. A US official said that great-power competition in the Horn of Africa must also provide an economic dividend for the US, not just in countering Chinese influence for its own sake, though the US private sector lags far behind Chinese and Middle Eastern state-backed private companies and small- and medium-size enterprise entrepreneurs in eastern Africa.

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The UAE was likely leading the mediation efforts, and its role became increasingly apparent in the final stages of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. On 15 June 2018, ten days after Abiy said that Ethiopia would honour the 2002 boundary agreement to accept Eritrean sovereignty over Badme,61 Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, along with a high-level delegation, visited Addis Ababa to meet Abiy at a key moment in the prime minister’s reform roll-out. The two countries announced that the UAE would inject $1 billion into Ethiopia’s state bank in order to help stabilise the country’s foreign exchange reserves and provide $2 billion in additional aid. The two leaders also discussed Emirati investment in Ethiopia as its economy privatises.62 After Mohammed bin Zayed’s trip to Ethiopia, a high-level Eritrean delegation travelled to Addis Ababa on 25 June 2018 for the first time for talks, landing in the capital in an Emirates Airlines jet.63 Afwerki had not clearly or publicly accepted Abiy’s move over Badme, and Boston University political scientist Michael Woldemariam said that the sequencing of the announcements and meetings appeared to have been planned to give the Eritrean president domestic breathing room to pursue the final rapprochement. On 3 July, Afwerki visited Abu Dhabi and met with Mohammed bin Zayed.64 The two leaders agreed that the UAE would pursue greater investment in Eritrea through agriculture and manufacturing and assist in developing the country’s physical infrastructure. Then, on 9 July, Abiy and Afwerki embraced in Asmara to cement a historic peace deal and pledged to increase economic, security and cultural cooperation.65 On 24 July, the heads of state of Ethiopia and Eritrea convened again in Abu Dhabi under the auspices of Mohammed bin Zayed for a tripartite summit, putting a UAE stamp on the peace effort for the world to see. The UAE–Ethiopia partnership is already having ripple effects, especially in Somalia. After meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed in Addis Ababa on 15 June 2018, Abiy flew to the Somali capital of Mogadishu for talks with President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmajo, which resulted in a vague memorandum of understanding committing to greater political and economic integration between the two uneasy neighbours,66 including joint development of four unnamed ports. Alongside Ethiopia’s interests in better relations with Somalia, Abiy’s trip was also a bid to mediate between the UAE and Farmajo’s government, which has stridently opposed the Berbera port development and the UAE’s relationships with Somali federal member states that bypassed the central government. Farmajo is backed by Qatar and Turkey, and his government’s ties to the UAE have disintegrated as the Gulf rivalry has played out in the country, where the Middle East powers’ interests are less clear, but where the fragmented body politic and predatory political entrepreneurs in charge have made it a particularly conducive

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environment for intrigue. Both client and patron exploit one another for short-term gains, and the particularly zero-sum battle for influence between Qatar and the UAE has contributed in key ways to destabilising dynamics in the country. Remarkably, since Abiy’s visit, Farmajo has spoken about resuming talks with Somaliland, the autonomous Somali state and UAE ally.67 Former Somali officials, members of parliament and Western diplomats in Somalia have said that Farmajo appears to have calculated that, in order to avoid strengthening opponents among the leaders of the Somali federal member states, he will try to balance his government’s relations with Qatar and the UAE. It is unclear if this will indeed occur, and what promises may have been made or Abiy’s exact role, but a dilution of Qatari influence in Mogadishu would be another – albeit smaller – victory for UAE foreign policy objectives. The opportunity to bring Addis Ababa into Abu Dhabi’s orbit was created by the near-revolutionary domestic and regional goals of the new Ethiopian prime minister – who shares some traits with another Emirati ally and Mohammed bin Zayed favourite, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – its alignment with Washington and the externalities of the fallout with Djibouti. But, as China’s experience in Ethiopia has illustrated, economic gains may be more difficult to realise than political goals. For the UAE and other Gulf countries, a short-term return on investments for state and private firms is an economic imperative. For Abiy’s economic liberalisation programme to be successful it will have to navigate a newly empowered citizenry with sky-high expectations. Past Gulf state attempts at agribusiness in the Horn of Africa – dating all the way back to the 1970s – have failed for a number of reasons,68 but the local political realities around land use were central. For Ethiopia, it will receive $1 billion into its central bank and $2 billion in additional unspecified investments and aid. Whether the UAE receives the return on investment – commercial as well as political – or has an experience with Ethiopia similar to that of China, Addis Ababa has quickly accrued a large amount of up-front support at a crucial juncture in exchange for little more than commitments that, at least publicly, remain vague. Abu Dhabi’s economic statecraft approach to an Ethiopia in crisis may indeed create a long-term strategic partnership with the Horn’s chief power. But Ethiopia could also quickly fail to live up to even the UAE’s short-term requirements.

Somalia’s economic statecraft experience A longer-term strategic partnership may also be found in Somaliland, where the UAE has taken a controversial position that could engender loyalty

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from the unrecognised breakaway government in Hargeisa. On the other hand, it could do more harm than good, given Somalia’s fragile political situation. A 2018 trip to Berbera port and conversations with officials and other elites in Hargeisa also illustrated how wide the gap between desired policy outcome and reality can be when it comes to implementing an economic statecraft approach in the Horn. As of early June 2018, no visible work was being done to expand the port or modernise its infrastructure, although a ground-breaking ceremony was held in October 2018, at which the chairman of DP World reiterated the firm’s commitment to the Berbera project: ‘Our aim is to make this an important regional hub for the maritime industry in the Horn of Africa.’ The DP World management of the port, which took over in March 2017, have rationalised some aspects of the port operations, including by eliminating widespread corruption around labour and fees.69 DP World and the Government of Somaliland inaugurated the new container terminal in June 2021, and broke ground on the new Berbera Economic Zone.70 But, so far, the only tangible sign that Berbera is slated to be turned into one of the region’s premier ports and industrial free zones is the rampant land and housing speculation that is driving up property prices and making land an even more contentious issue. Many local residents and officials said the privatisation of property near the port and free zone and along the road that is set to be upgraded into a dual-carriage highway to Ethiopia was one significant way in which the former government enriched its members and allied business and clan elites. Beginning around 25 km outside of Berbera, large tracts of the semi-arid landscape along the road were enclosed by new boundary walls. Officials from the government of Somaliland said they had successfully reclaimed some of this land for the state, but that it was a politically sensitive, difficult process. President Musa Bihi ran in part on a platform of rolling back corruption surrounding the Berbera deal and revisiting the port and base agreements to safeguard Somaliland’s sovereignty. The optics in Somaliland around the way in which the previous government conducted negotiations have had a lasting impact on public perceptions of the government’s ties to the UAE. Negotiations were conducted in a highly personalised manner, with the then president’s wife and Dubai-based son – neither in official positions – leading the talks on the Somaliland side. (This brings to mind parallels with the disastrous results of the UAE’s experience in Djibouti.) Western diplomats and civil society activists in Hargeisa claim that the Somaliland elections were delayed so that the agreements could be finalised, and that members of parliament were paid to endorse the delay. After Bihi took office he reopened talks with DP World and the UAE on both the Berbera port and the free thirty-six-year concession given to the UAE military nearby at the site of old Soviet military facilities.71 Officials

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in the government said that the reopened port talks were only over issues related to Ethiopia’s then recent stake and attendant obligations, while they were less specific about the nature of the talks about the base. Former Somaliland officials and Western diplomats said that the most contentious issue regarding the base is the question of how the agreement will limit access to the base by foreign, especially other Horn of Africa-derived, forces that work with the UAE in Yemen. It is clear that the two facilities are interlinked. Western officials in the Horn said that because the initial deals with Bihi’s predecessor were so personalised and opaque, the current administration likely want their own guarantees and even personal largesse. Sources in Hargeisa said that Bihi is personally in a dire financial situation after bankrolling his own election. The UAE may be holding up development of Berbera until the base agreement is refinalised.72 It is unlikely, however, that the two permanent facilities in Berbera, the DP World port and military airstrip and naval base, will not be finalised. Bihi cabinet members in Hargeisa stressed that the state’s relationship with the UAE is a vital national interest, and one they view as a key element of Somaliland’s strategy for finally gaining international recognition as an independent state. In any case, Somaliland officials said that the base is already under construction and the airstrip has been refurbished, which recent satellite imagery confirms. There do not appear to be any UAE forces using the facilities yet, and it is not clear what the base will offer that the well-developed Assab naval base does not already in terms of facilities or its location. The development of the port may also be stalled by DP World’s desire to have a greater share of the financing provided by partner investors, according to another Western diplomat. (Djiboutian officials complain that DP World did not invest enough in the Doraleh terminal, in their view to hobble it as a transhipment location in relation to Dubai’s Jebel Ali port.)73 The World Bank and European Union helped the Somaliland government to issue tenders for the port’s development and transport infrastructure,74 but the bidding process was halted by the previous Somaliland government as the Berbera deal was being negotiated with DP World.75 This history has made it difficult to attract European and Asian investors, another Western diplomat claimed, many of them seeing the political risks of the UAE’s involvement as too great. The fundamentals around aspects of the port, such as the free zone, may also make it difficult to attract investors. People who have seen the DP World–Somaliland contract say that it includes conditions that Hargeisa has not been able to fulfil. The UAE-mediated rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea may add to inertia around the development of Berbera. Eritrea’s ports are closer to Ethiopian population centres and will reduce transport costs. But Berbera is closer to south-eastern Ethiopia, where inclusive

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economic growth will be crucial for addressing political unrest in the underdeveloped region. In previous iterations of its post-2014 economic statecraft, UAE policy makers may have been likely to re-evaluate their partnership with Somaliland. It is clear that, just as Somali actors will look to maximise rents and flexibility by playing patrons off against one another, the Gulf actors in Somalia are also hedging, as the UAE’s outreach to the Farmajo government, via Abiy, has made clear. But recent developments make a UAE exit from Somaliland unlikely. The setback of losing Doraleh in Djibouti, combined with the sudden momentum caused by having a bold new leader in the most powerful Horn country, has presented an opportunity for a long-term partnership of great potential. The UAE is working to build its influence in the Horn of Africa as part of its ambition to become an important security and economic power as influence ebbs from west to east. According to a European security official, UAE military hegemony on strategic territory on both sides of the Red Sea is preferable to weak states and non-state groups, in terms of the overriding interest of maritime security. When viewed from a wider perspective, the Horn of Africa has served as a laboratory for a sustained economic statecraft approach to a highly integrated region – rather than to a particular state – within which an evolution of this model can be charted. Engagement in the Horn grew out of necessity with Eritrea. Then Somalia offered a conducive arena for challenging rivals Qatar and Turkey, but one that was conducted in an opportunistic and reactive way and lacked a coherent, sustainable strategy. Now, through the partnership with Ethiopia and the UAE’s role in brokering its peace with Eritrea, one can discern a synthesis of previous tactics that proved successful, and the outlines of a strategy emerging. The UAE still lacks bureaucratic, diplomatic capacity, and it is still to be seen if its networks of influence in the two countries run beyond the personal relationships built between Abiy and Afwerki and senior Emirati figures.

Early conclusions of an accelerating trajectory What is evolving in the Horn of Africa is a heightened arena for geopolitical influence, for economic opportunity and for development policy experimentation. In some ways, the intervention of the Gulf states, along with China, Russia, Turkey and traditional American and European players, reflects the new, shifting nature of multipolarity in global politics. In contrast to Cold War strategies that pitted aid, arms and investment recipients between two sides of an ideological conflict, there are now multiple points of entry, and very little ideology. Access to markets, to ports, to agriculture and to easily

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manipulated military partners all motivate these interventions and exchanges. The Gulf interventions in the Horn of Africa are exemplary of the new politics of the developing world. The foreign policy of the UAE is therefore part of this larger transition in a regional security architecture and positioning within the global economy. We should expect to see more melding of economic and security objectives, and experimentation in the exercise of these objectives. It is important to keep in mind the limitations of a small, hierarchical state with little room for dissent in policy formation. There will be zig-zags and reversals of both political and financial commitments. The ramifications could be increased instability within the operational field of recipient states and their subregions – the Horn of Africa being one key arena.

Notes 1 E. O’Sullivan, The New Gulf: How Modern Arabia Is Changing the World for Good (Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2008). 2 M. Gray, ‘A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf’, Center for International and Regional Studies Occasional Papers, 7 (2011). 3 K. E. Young, ‘The Emerging Interventionists of the GCC’, London School of Economics Middle East Centre Paper Series, 02 (2013). 4 Gray, ‘A Theory of “Late Rentierism”’. 5 M. Legrenzi and B. Momani (eds), Shifting Geo-Economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, Finance and Institutions (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2011). 6 D. Held and K. Ulrichsen, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (London: Routledge, 2012). 7 M. O. Jones, Ross Porter and Marc Valeri (ed.), Gulfization of the Arab World (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018). 8 A. Abdulla, ‘Contemporary sociopolitical issues of the Arab Gulf moment’, London School of Economics Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States Occasional Papers, 11 (2010). 9 D. A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn, 2020). 10 B. Steil and R. E. Litan, Financial Statecraft: The Roles of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution). 11 A. Ehteshami and R. Hinnebusch, ‘Foreign policymaking in the Middle East: complex realism’, in L. Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 2016), pp. 239–258. 12 K. E. Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies 7, no. 1 (2017), pp. 113–136. 13 Author’s note: this chapter draws on previously published work from K. Young and T. Khan.

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14 W. Gueraiche, The UAE: A Political and Economic Geography (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2017). 15 For an explanation of how the UAE, as a small state, allocated aid and why, see: K. S. Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid, Identities and Interests (London: Routledge, 1st edn, 2012). 16 Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft’, p. 115. 17 G. Shilling, ‘Get Ready for $10 Oil’, Bloomberg Opinion, 16 February 2015, www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015–02–16/oil-prices-likely-to-fall-assupplies-rise-demand-falls, accessed 23 March 2015. 18 Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft’, p. 116. 19 S. El Wardany, T. El-Tablawy and A. Feteha, ‘Egypt Secures Billions in Aid, Deals as Gulf Arabs Lead Way’, Bloomberg News, 14 March 2015, www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015–03–14/egypt-gets-billions-in-aid-deals-as-gcc-investors-leadcharge, accessed 24 March 2015. 20 Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft’, p. 116–118. 21 Ibid., p. 125. 22 Interviews with international consultants engaged with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on development strategy in Egypt (London, March 2015). 23 Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft’, p. 125–126. 24 U. Laessing and C. Johnston, ‘Gulf States Launch $20 Billion Fund for Oman and Bahrain’, Reuters, 10 March 2011, www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-fund/gulfstates-launch-20-billion-fund-for-oman-and-bahrain-idUSTRE7294B120110310. 25 ‘UAE and Yemen’s Al-Islah: An Alliance of Convenience Only’, The New Arab, 20 November 2018, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/11/20/ uae-and-yemens-al-islah-an-alliance-of-convenience-only. 26 B. McKernan and L. Towers, ‘As Saudi Arabia and the UAE Struggle for Control of Socotra, Yemen’s Island Paradise May Just Swap One Occupation for Another’, Independent, 21 May 2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ middle-east/socotra-yemen-civil-war-uae-saudi-arabia-occupation-militaryemirates-a8360441.html. 27 Author interview, Washington, DC, January 2020. 28 Oxford Business Group, ‘Drivers and Change in GCC–Africa Investment’, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/stable-supply-drivers-and-change-gccafrica-investment. 29 Ibid. 30 A. Huliaras and S. Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?’, Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017), pp. 63–73, 10.1111/mepo.12308; Oxford Business Group, ‘Drivers and Change in GCC–Africa Investment’. 31 J. Braude and T. Jiang, ‘Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti’, HuffPost, 26 September 2016, www.huffpost.com/entry/why-chinaand-saudi-arabi_b_12194702. 32 Huliaras and Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa’. 33 A. Poulin, ‘How the World Overpowered Piracy in the Horn of Africa’, International Policy Digest, 16 January 2016, https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/01/16/ how-the-world-overpowered-piracy-in-the-horn-of-africa/.

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34 D. Styan, ‘The Politics of Ports in the Horn: War, Peace and Red Sea Rivalries’, African Arguments, 18 July 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/18/ politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-rivalries/. 35 Huliaras and Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa’. 36 A. de Waal, ‘Beyond the Red Sea: A New Driving Force in the Politics of the Horn’, African Arguments, 11 July 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/11/ beyond-red-sea-new-driving-force-politics-horn-africa/. 37 Huliaras and Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa’. 38 Ibid. 39 R. Abdi, ‘A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling Regional Tensions’, International Crisis Group, 3 August 2017, www. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/dangerousgulf-horn-how-inter-arab-crisis-fuelling-regional-tensions. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 E. Downs, J. Becker and P. de Gategno, ‘China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base’, Center for Naval Analyses Arlington, United States, 1 July 2017, https:// apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf. 45 T. Khan, ‘UAE and the Horn of Africa: A Tale of Two Ports’, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 8 March 2019, https://agsiw.org/uae-horn-africa-tale-two-ports/. 46 Author interview, June 2018. 47 L. Nightingale, ‘Djibouti Claims “Legal Right” to Take Over Dolareh’, Lloyd’s List, 26 February 2018, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/ LL1121558/Djibouti-claims-legal-right-to-take-over-Dolareh. 48 Styan, ‘The Politics of Ports in the Horn’. 49 Ibid. 50 ‘Ethiopia Country Programming Framework 2012–2015’, Food and Agriculture Organization, December 2011, www.fao.org/3/a-aq402e.pdf. 51 P. Shaw-Smith, ‘The UAE’s Growing Ties with Ethiopia’, Gulf Business, 2 July 2013, https://gulfbusiness.com/uaes-ethiopian-ties/. 52 A. Mello and M. Knights, ‘West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates’, War on the Rocks, 2 September 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-sue z-for-the-united-arab-emirates/. 53 ‘Qatar–Eritrea Ties Reviewed’, TesfaNews, 15 January 2015, www.tesfanews.net/ qatar-eritrea-ties-reviewed/. 54 ‘Qatar–Gulf Crisis: Eritrea’s Position’, TesfaNews, 12 June 2017, www.tesfanews.net/ qatar-gulf-crisis-eritreas-position/. 55 ‘The Emirati Navy Arrives in Eritrea’, Stratfor Worldview, 29 October 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/emirati-navy-arrives-eritrea. 56 D. Fitzgerald, ‘UN Report: UAE, Saudi Using Eritrean Land, Sea, Airspace and, Possibly, Eritrean Troops in Yemen Battle’, UN Tribune, 2 November 2015, http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-landsea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/.

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57 B. J. Cannon and A. Rossiter, ‘Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa’, Rising Powers Quarterly 2, no. 4 (2017), pp. 7–29, http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shiftingbalance-power-horn-africa/. 58 I. Ali and P. Stewart, ‘“Significant” Consequences if China Takes Key Port in Djibouti: U.S. General’, Reuters, 6 March 2018, www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-china-djibouti/significant-consequences-if-china-takes-key-port-in-djiboutiu-s-general-idUSKCN1GI2V0. 59 ‘Djibouti Opens $590m World Class Mega Port Co-funded by China’, Africa News, 25 May 2017, www.africanews.com/2017/05/25/djibouti-opens-590m-worl d-class-mega-port-co-funded-by-china//. 60 I. Ali, ‘U.S. Military Puts “Great Power Competition” at Heart of Strategy: Mattis’, Reuters, 19 January 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-militarychina-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategymattis-idUSKBN1F81TR. 61 E. Abera, ‘Ethiopia Accepts the Algiers Agreement in Bid to Normalize Relations with Eritrea; Opens Up Economy’, Addis Standard, 5 June 2018, http:// addisstandard.com/news-update-ethiopia-accepts-the-algiers-agreement-in-bidto-normalize-relations-with-eritrea-opens-up-its-economy/. 62 H. Bashir, ‘Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Earmarks AED11 Billion to Support Sustainable Development in Ethiopia’, Emirates News Agency, 16 June 2018, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302694780. 63 ‘Eritrean Delegation to Visit Addis Ababa after Ethiopian Olive Branch’, Reuters, 25 June 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea/eritrean-delegationto-visit-addis-ababa-after-ethiopian-olive-branch-idUSKBN1JL0TK. 64 M. Fick, ‘Eritrea’s President Visits Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’, Reuters, 4 July 2018, www.reuters.com/article/eritrea-emirates-idAFL8N1U014R. 65 S. Gebrekidan, ‘Ethiopia and Eritrea Declare an End to Their War’, New York Times, 9 July 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/world/africa/ethiopia-eritreawar.html. 66 H. Maruf, ‘Ethiopia, Somalia Agree to Strengthen “Brotherly” Relations’, Voice of America, 16 June 2018, www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopia-somalia-agreestrengthen-brotherly-relations. 67 ‘President Muse Bihi Welcomed the Statement of President Farmajo to End the Conflict in Tukuraq’, Goobjoog News, 4 July 2018, http://goobjoog.com/ english/president-muse-bihi-welcomed-the-statement-of-president-farmajo-to-endthe-conflict-in-tukuraq/. 68 E. Woertz, Oil for Food: The Global Food Crisis and the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 69 T. Khan, multiple interviews with businessmen in Hargeisa (2018). 70 M. Labrut, ‘DP World and Somaliland Open New Terminal at Berbera Port’, Seatrade Maritime News, 28 June 2021, www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/ dp-world-and-somaliland-open-new-terminal-berbera-port. 71 T. Khan, interviews with two Somaliland Cabinet ministers (2018). 72 T. Khan, interviews with a former Somaliland official and, separately, a Somalilander journalist, in Hargeisa (2018).

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73 T. Khan, off-the-record interview with senior Djiboutian diplomat. 74 ‘Feasibility and Detailed Design for Berbera-Togochale Road (Berbera–Addis Ababa Corridor)’, European Commission (2010), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ documents/aap/2011/af_aap_2011_eastern-africa.pdf; T. Khan, interview with an EU diplomat in Nairobi. 75 T. Khan, interview with EU country diplomat in Somalia (2018).

5 The Turkey–Qatar alliance: through the Gulf and into the Horn of Africa Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Marwa Maziad

Introduction In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings of 2011, Turkey and Qatar were accused of supporting radical Islamist groups. In the words of former US National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, ‘Turkey and Qatar are the New Sponsors of Radical Ideologies’.1 Scholars documented the two allied countries’ foreign policy of recruiting international mercenary jihadists from Tunisia, Europe, and even the United States (US) to fight in Syria and Libya.2 Both countries have also been financing Hamas, whose more uncontrollable offshoots crossed as infiltrators into Sinai, Egypt, to create ‘Wilayet Sinai/ the Province of Sinai’ as a transnational affiliate of the Islamic State (IS).3 Those unruly Hamas elements formed a base for Ansar Bait el Maqdes (Supporters of Jerusalem); launched terrorist attacks against Israel between 2011 and 2013; and later attacked Egyptian military targets between 2013 and 2018.4 Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first expanded his power to create enclaves of influence in small geographies such as Gaza since 2007 and Tunisia since 2011. Then, through the very Turkey–Qatar alliance, Erdoğan subsequently pursued further pan-Islamist expansionist foreign policies, and was able to finance his regional ambitions in Syria and Libya through his partnership with Qatar. Moving forward, beyond Gaza, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya, the Turkey–Qatar alliance attempted to penetrate the Horn of Africa, especially in relation to Sudan for Qatar’s food security, and in the form of military, economic, and aid diplomacy in relation to Somalia’s al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants. It is clear, then, that for Turkey and its Qatari ally, regional expansionism was militantly conducted through the recruitment of mercenary jihadist radical elements to participate in regional proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.5 In the beginning this policy of mercenary jihadists worked for Turkey because it served a means in lieu of putting Turkish boots on the ground

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in Syria. However, by 2018 Erdoğan had committed Turkish troops in northern Syria and Idlib province. With the Turkish president’s increasing, risky military adventurism, a growing number of Turkish soldiers fell, including in the incident on 28 February 2020, where the Russia-supported Syrian military targeted and killed thirty-three of the Turkish armed forces in Idlib. For Qatar, the financing of mercenary jihadists also worked in the beginning, as a means of military diversification beyond absolute dependence on the US as a primary ally.6 Qatar’s policy direction of supporting Islamist militants occurred at the time of an intended and attempted US withdrawal from the military theaters under the Barak Obama administration, including the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal.7 In the Horn, the policy included economic projects as well as support for further militant radicalism. Why did Turkey and its single Gulf partner, Qatar, pursue this kind of regional, hyperactivist foreign policy in support of militancy, including their penetration into the Horn? Looking at the domestic foreign policy drivers for Turkey and Qatar, in terms of their support for regional pan-Islamism, the attempted coup in Turkey, Erdoğan’s risky military adventurism in Syria and Libya, and the Arab Quartet boycott against Qatar since 2017, this chapter will examine how these regional circumstances have affected Turkey and Qatar’s respective and collective interactions in the Horn of Africa.

The argument I argue that Turkey and Qatar pursued an expansionist foreign policy into the Horn in order to challenge the strategic interests of other regional rivals, namely Egypt with its own African roots and strategic depth into the Nile Valley; Israel with its investments and presence in Ethiopia; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with its economic and military training projects in Eritrea; and both Saudi Arabia and Iran with their rival attempts to penetrate into the same East African region. In fact, Turkey and its follower and financial enabler, Qatar, made their presence known in the Horn region, which in turn triggered responses from all the other regional powers. Eventually, the regime change in Sudan – from Islamist to more pro-Egypt, the UAE and even brokering peace with Israel – translated into a failure of the Turkey–Qatar pan-Islamist doctrine in the Horn. This chapter aims to map the Turkey–Qatar alliance’s economic and militarized policies in the Horn of Africa. It locates the Turkey–Qatar presence in the Horn in the context of a two-step process: first, following the rise of the Islamist Erdoğan, Turkey penetrated the Gulf itself, through its alliance with Qatar, in the mid- to late 2000s. Second, Turkey attempted to spread

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into the Middle East region as a whole through its support for pan-Islamism wherever it is found – Gaza, Tunisia, Syria, or Libya. This Turkish foreign policy started out successful, then reflected mixed results, and ultimately failed, as Turkey now suffers increasing economic weaknesses and regional isolation. By isolation I mean that the initial clout of Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who dominated the region between 2005 and 2013, has since dwindled, especially as his regional expansionism provoked the suspicion and subsequent resistance of neighboring countries, whether Arab or Mediterranean. More specifically, I argue that Turkey’s regional failures are a direct consequence of Egypt’s resistance to Turkey’s pan-Islamist expansionism, and Egypt’s alliance with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to foil Turkey’s and Qatar’s regional ambitions. The chapter charts the rise of Turkey’s pan-Islamist expansionism since 2002 and its foreseeable potential fall by 2023 as a contrasting outcome to what the authoritarian President Erdoğan had long planned, in terms of ‘celebrating’ the centenary of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Turkish Republic by reviving his own, contrasting, neo-Ottomanist regional vision. Due to its being currently perceived as a regional, and increasingly international, menace,8 Erdoğan’s expansionism may very well be halted by two dynamics: first, the actual resistance of strong regional players, and second, domestic instability within Turkey, by or even before that very critical juncture of 2023. In fact, building on the mass protests of summer 2013 in Taksim Square’s Gezi Park, it is expected that further domestic agitations will ensue, unless Erdoğan changes his ways.9 Given the currently struggling Turkish economy and the fall of the Turkish lira, domestic instability might indeed be simmering between now and 2023. The Turkish lira lost 20 percent of its value in the year 2018 alone, falling to US$1=4.8TL. By February 2020, following the deaths of the Turkish soldiers in Idlib, it lost even more of its value, reaching US$1=6.24TL. Ultimately, following accusations of government mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and, more importantly, due to Turkey’s isolation in its Middle East and Mediterranean neighborhood, by December 2020 the Turkish lira had fallen even further, reaching $1=7.84TL. By that time in 2020, not only would the Turkey–Qatar expansionist alliance have failed in the Horn of Africa, but in the Middle East at large. As for Qatar, it is expected that it will abandon its Turkish alliance at the very foreseeable critical juncture of 2023, and will ultimately be pushed to create new regional relations with the here-to-stay regional powers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, who, along with Bahrain, had boycotted it, primarily due to Qatar’s threatening alliance with a pro-Islamist Turkey. The core reason for the Quartet’s boycott is Turkey’s reliance on the transnational Muslim Brotherhood organization to expand its regionally hegemonic pan-Islamist vision. Due to its expansionist posture, Turkey under Erdoğan

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became framed and perceived as a regional threat to core Arab countries. But his menace is increasingly threatening to the international community, and Europe in particular, as he threatens and acts on the question of immigration to twist arms in favor of his military adventurism. Erdoğan assumes that he can perpetually maintain a skillful balance with Western interlocutors. But perpetuity is hard to maintain. Thus, with increased perceptions of threat come new perilous realities.10

Research questions The chapter addresses the following questions. • What are some of the Arab Gulf states’ interests in the African continent? And what are the main foreign policy priorities for some of the Gulf states in sub-Saharan and East Africa? • What, specifically, are the main African states that fall under the Egyptian–Saudi–UAE sphere of influence; the Turkey–Qatar expansionist foreign policy direction; the Iranian penetration or the Israeli strategic interests? • Can Horn of Africa states gain greater relative autonomy through balancing, given the intense rivalry between Egypt/Saudi Arabia/the UAE, on the one hand and Qatar/Turkey on the other hand; and with Israel and Iran as additional antagonistic players?

Theoretical framework My theoretical framework emphasizes a Dynamic Regional Order Approach to understanding Gulf–Horn relations in order to showcase how two key non-Gulf, non-Horn, regionally antagonistic weighty players – namely Egypt and Turkey – have shaped and reshaped the entire Middle East by virtue of the their oppositional foreign policies. The alliances these two countries formed in the Gulf, in the Horn region, and internationally with the changing US administrations have divided the region into their two respective camps. Egypt’s secular-statist-militarist comeback since 2013 under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi clashed with Turkey’s pan-Islamist transnational militant project around the same juncture under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. I argue that these two diametrically different visions have shaped the Middle East and beyond. Differences and outright antagonisms between the two regional players manifested in the Gulf and split it into a partnership of the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain in alliance with Egypt, on the one hand, and the single Gulf state of Qatar in alliance with Turkey, on the other hand.

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Accordingly, a major argument and emphasis in this theoretical framework is that both Egypt and Turkey have shaped the Gulf, not the other way around, as some scholars have assumed – namely, that the Gulf countries have shaped Egypt’s domestic and foreign policies (and to a lesser extent Turkey’s). The reason why it is important to distinguish the direction of the arrow of influence is to emphasize the difference of the regional projects for both Turkey and Egypt as substantial and weighty Middle East players with oppositional outlooks. Between the two regional options spearheaded by Turkey and Egypt, of pan-Islamism militancy in the case of the former and secular-militaristic-statism in the case of the latter, the Arab states of the Gulf have aligned themselves. Accordingly, the Gulf countries themselves have been divided by and between Egypt and Turkey. By extension, the oppositional projects of Turkey and Egypt – along with their respective Gulf allies – have simultaneously manifested in the Horn of Africa over the five years from 2015. That is why I emphasize that at the core of Gulf politics lie Turkey and Egypt’s diverging regional visions. Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Gulf countries have followed the ideological direction of either of the two major players Turkey and Egypt. Accordingly, currently Gulf politics and divisions, including the Qatar boycott by the Arab Quartet of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, cannot be treated as an isolated, business-as-usual ‘Gulf rivalry’ phenomenon. Nor is it a phenomenon exclusively initiated from within the Gulf states. Instead, the boycott is, rather, the product of Turkey and Egypt’s regional rivalry and their long-term strategic visions for the entire region. So far, Egypt seems to have won Saudi Arabia and the UAE to its camp, while Turkey has ‘burdened’ Qatar with its increasingly bankrupt, regionally expansionist project, which Qatar itself is projected to abandon as Turkey’s regime falters by or before 2023.11 The Dynamic Regional Order Approach, accordingly, emphasizes the region as a neighborhood, where no single state operates in vacuum – as if immune from interactions with the rest of the regional players. Building on Peter Katzenstein’s concept of ‘World of Regions’ in relation to the American Imperium,12 but somewhat diverging from it, the premise of my Dynamic Regional Order Approach states that the great powers – including the US as a superpower – cannot, or at least can no longer, dictate outcomes onto a given region. The emphasis instead is on the dynamics within the region itself as a product of geographically and physically belonging to it. Being of the region becomes the independent variable in maintaining rivalries within; which impedes any single imposition of a vision from external major world players, including the US, with all its power. That is what I call Regional Equilibrium of Conflict. The Dynamic Regional Order Approach is a mid-level analysis that goes beyond the behavior of circumscribed,

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idiosyncratic, isolated single cases, or the generalizations of the great powers’ conduct in global international relations.

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Methods The chapter employs a historical process-tracing approach since the rise of Turkey’s Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) and its single ruler, Erdoğan, in 2002/3. It examines current news reports and media discourse to show in what ways Qatar and Turkey ‘emerged’ in the Horn of Africa. The research capitalizes on extensive fieldwork research in Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and the US since 2007. The aim is to delineate (1) the drivers behind the Turkish–Qatari alliance’s current penetration into the Horn of Africa, in competition with the other regional players; (2) the means by which their respective influence is exerted; and (3) the extent to which conflicting issues both in the Gulf and Horn co-constitute each other.

Egypt versus Turkey: diametrically different projects splitting the Gulf and the Horn Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, an increasingly pan-Islamist hegemonic Turkey – supportive of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood’s region-wide project of political Islam – has become framed and perceived as a direct threat to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as much as, and arguably even more than, what Iran’s own Shi‘a Islamic Revolutionary Regime has represented to Saudi Arabia since 1979.13 Egypt perceives Erdoğan’s regime in Turkey as radically expansionist – a stark departure from Ataturk’s statist-republican approach that deliberately carved out the modern Turkish Republic as a nation-state, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended over vast lands. Based on Egypt’s own threat perceptions regarding Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates together woke up to Turkey’s, and not just Iran’s, encroachments. Accordingly, the four major regional players started to regard Turkey’s foothold in the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait area as an urgent menace.14 That is why, when Turkey announced a Turkish–Sudanese deal to take over Suakin Island in December 2017, its move was perceived as a direct strategic danger to Egypt to the north, and to Mecca across the Red Sea, right into Saudi Arabia to the east. This project was eventually foiled by Egypt and the change of politics in Sudan and the new government there. The diametrically different regional projects of a secular-statist-nationalistmilitarist turn in the case of Egypt and a pan-Islamist, neo-Ottomanist, expansionist, religiously militant project in the case of Turkey also extended

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the division right into the Horn of Africa. As the UAE sided with Egypt’s regional vision and together they succeeded in pulling Saudi Arabia towards them, Qatar, however, decided to follow Turkey. Qatar eventually became ‘burdened’ by Turkey’s pan-Islamist project, as the project failed to materialize in Egypt, given the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s reign by 2013 – after only one year in power. Accordingly, Qatar was unable to receive the expected ‘returns on investments’ of its Turkish alliance to support moderate and/or militant Islamists. It could not reap the supposed benefits of the alliance, either geopolitically or economically.15 All that Qatar could do in practice, in light of its being boycotted by its neighbors, was to barely hold Turkey accountable for securing it and keeping it afloat, given the harshness of the food security test, following the Arab Quartet boycott and Qatar’s regional isolation. However, that is a stark difference from Qatar’s originally conceived geopolitical project of regional clout and international rise. A main argument here is that Egypt and Turkey are two main regional players whose two existentially oppositional visions of statist nationalism, in the case of Egypt, and pan-Islamism, in the case of Turkey, first clashed within the Arab Gulf states, resulting in the Arab Quartet isolating Qatar –pro-Islamist Turkey’s ally – by 5 June 2017. Second, these two diametrically opposed visions are also agitating the Horn region as well. The Quartet, which is comprised of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in alliance with Egypt, cut diplomatic, commercial, and travel ties with Qatar. Qatar was the target, but I argue that it was a symptom of the Quartet’s clash with Turkey’s regional panIslamist project, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood as a transnational movement in Tunisia, Gaza, and wherever they existed in the region – because the Quartet has targeted Turkey as its main aim, and not just Qatar.16 As for Qatar, it had two main considerations in joining the Turkish alliance: (1) food security and (2) the diversification of military security away from total reliance on the US.17 Regarding food security, Qatar had actually been planning prior to the 2017 Arab Quartet boycott. Qatar is not an agricultural country. But we started to invest in India, in Sudan, in Australia. Over there, there is cheap labour and abundant production … Now we control over 60, 70, or even 90% of Basmati rice production. As well as chicken in Sudan, and meat in Australia. This is for food security. So we do abroad, what we cannot do in Qatar.18

Qataris have been ‘doing abroad’ what they cannot do in Qatar for quite some time. Not only for food security as the case above illustrates but for ‘diversification of security sources’ so as not to be exclusively dependent on the US.19 Going on what looked like an investments shopping spree in Europe at the height of the economic crisis of 2008; displaying military capacity

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by joining NATO strikes on Libya in 2011; and funding and logistically supporting mercenary jihadists in Syria since 2013,20 Qatar has further expanded into the Horn of Africa, especially in Sudan and Somalia. Support for Islamist militants was paramount in those two countries, as opposed to other Horn of Africa countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia, where Islamist politics are not dominant. That is what allowed the latter two countries to become domains for players on the other side of the Gulf divide, namely Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Egypt, and also Israel. The next section will focus on Turkey’s penetrations into the Horn region and how the other players responded to it in the same way that they responded to its penetration of the Gulf through Qatar. Turkey under Erdoğan has engaged with a process of self-orientation into the Middle East as a whole through its pan-Islamist expansionism, as opposed to the Ataturkist disposition of looking to emulate European nation-states in the hope of joining them and belonging to the regional order of Europe, not the Middle East. By drawing itself further into the Middle East, Turkey changed the region, and was changed by it. Hence, the emphasis on a Dynamic Regional Order Approach to understanding the Horn of Africa as an extension of Turkey’s own penetration into the Gulf dynamics, in competition with Egypt over Gulf alliances and regional ideological visions.

Turkey and Qatar in Africa: Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti Since 2002, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP sixteen-year-long single-party rule, Turkey has enormously augmented its diplomatic footprint across the African continent, to include the East African nations of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar, along with Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. For example, Turkey extended its embassies on the continent from 12 in 2003 to 43 as of 2015. The number of African countries’ embassies in Ankara also increased in the same period to 53 – up from a mere 10 in 2008.21 Turkish Airlines (THY) has also started operating in various African countries. In 2002, THY barely operated in 10 African destinations, whereas by now it flies to 52.22 Accordingly, the number of travelers has also risen. For instance, less than 150,000 passengers traveled on THY in 2002. By now, the number exceeds 2 million per year.23 Abolishing visa requirements with eight African countries, and allowing the obtaining of a visa upon arrival in six other countries contributed to the increase in numbers of passengers. Turkish and African businessmen benefited from these policies, and this translated into a trade budget with Africa that has surpassed $25 billion in 2020. In total, Turkey has inked economic cooperation agreements with 38 countries and has established free economic zones with four.

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Moreover, in December 2016 Turkey signed an economic cooperation agreement with Djibouti, the small coastal African country on the Red Sea. The purpose was to create a free trade zone of 13 million square meters and a potential economic capacity of $1 trillion. By September 2017 Turkey had opened its largest military base abroad, in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.24 Additionally, as the US lifted sanctions on Sudan in October 2017, Turkey rushed to take advantage of the possibility to do business there. The Turkish president, who customarily travels with his own delegation of a pro-regime clique of around 200 Turkish business people, signed deals worth $650 million, including $300 million of direct investments. Erdoğan projected that ‘in the coming years, [investments] will be $1 billion, but we are targeting $10 billion’.25 Economically, Turkish investment funds in Sudan were to go towards constructing a new airport in the capital, Khartoum; establishing a free trade zone in Port Sudan on the Red Sea; and directing private sector investments in power plants, cotton cultivation, grain silos, and meat production.26 More importantly, the Turkish president stated that Sudan had agreed to temporarily ‘hand over’ Suakin Island to Turkey for rebuilding as a tourist destination.27 However, there is more significance to Suakin than tourism.

Sudan While Sudan had once been an Iranian enclave of influence, as it smuggled weapons to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon during the mid-2000s, it has shifted gears and allied with Saudi Arabia since 2014 as it expelled Iranian officials. After Sudan accused Israel of an air strike in 2012, the Iranians offered to build air defenses on its Red Sea coast. According to Sudan’s foreign minister, Khartoum declined, however, for fear that it would antagonize Tehran’s rival, Saudi Arabia.28 That juncture of 2014 proved to be crucial, albeit ephemeral, being the moment when Turkey and Qatar managed to temporarily pull Saudi Arabia into their so-called ‘Sunni’ camp in the aftermath of King Abdullah’s death. For a short while Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia seemed to have some mutual understanding and formed the prospect of a ‘Sunni’ alliance against Shi‘a Iran. That alliance did not last, however, because it would have eventually over-empowered Turkey’s pan-Islamist expansionist project, at the expense of Saudi Arabia itself. Instead, due to the active work of the UAE and Egypt, those two countries together succeeded in attracting Saudi Arabia to their side. That was the side of a statist, militarist, secular, nationalist regional outlook as opposed to Turkey and Qatar’s transnationalist, pan-Islamist, pro-non-state-militants doctrine. The Arab Quartet boycott by June 2017

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is the ultimate manifestation of this rivalry between Turkey–Qatar versus Egypt–Emirates for Saudi Arabia’s alliance following the demise of the Turkey–Qatar-backed Islamist regime in Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. Sudan, thus, shifted from Iran’s camp to Saudi Arabia’s camp around that 2014 juncture of former proximity among Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Thus, if the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia had up until 2014 in effect divided the region into two camps, with countries allied either to Saudi Arabia or to Iran,29 by 2014 the latest and perhaps deeper rivalry became that between Turkey and Egypt over militant Islamism in all its variations (be it Sunni or Shi‘a) or secular nationalist-statist militarism. Turkey and Egypt split the Gulf into two camps, and now split the Horn. While in 2014 Sudan was in Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s camp against Iran, by 2017 Sudan was on Turkey’s side and ready to antagonize both Egypt and Saudi Arabia via the Suakin Island question. This arrangement had changed by 2020, as Sudan is now squarely with the Arab Quartet camp, especially since it established normalized relations with Israel. The move to occupy the strategic Suakin Island for commercial and military purposes came five months after the Arab Quartet boycott of Qatar, a boycott that had among its major reasons Qatar’s alliance with Turkey, namely: (a) Qatar’s support for the transnational group of the Muslim Brotherhood – designated a terrorist organization by the Quartet; (b) Al Jazeera’s transformation from a beacon of freedom of the press into a mouthpiece for the transnational Islamist group, due to changing personnel among the journalists and management;30 and (c) the Turkish military base on Qatari soil with a capacity of 5,000 Turkish. In this respect, those three main items on the infamous thirteen-item list of demands issued by the Quartet in order to resolve the Qatar crisis emphasized how Turkey was part and parcel of the Quartet’s boycott of Qatar.31 In fact, Turkey’s panIslamism, its affiliation with and support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s regionally transnational project, and the use of Al Jazeera to promote this particular viewpoint, are the crux of the conflict with Qatar. After the Sudan’s transfer of Suakin Island to Turkey, media reports reflected how Ankara was to use a naval dock to harbor both civilian and military vessels, which, as Sudan’s foreign minister pointed out, ‘could result in any kind of military cooperation, while Ankara strives to expand military and economic ties in Africa, opening a $50 million military base in Somalia’.32 Accordingly, Turkey’s acquisition of the Suakin Island was perceived as a hostile maneuver, judging by the way Egyptian and Saudi media reports highlighted Turkeys’ neo-Ottomanist tones. Erdoğan, for his part, emphasized the ancient imperial connections, and how Suakin was indeed one of the oldest ‘Ottoman’ seaports in Africa. The Anadolu Agency reported that it was used by African Muslims who set out from there for

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pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The agency added: ‘Ottomans used the port city to secure Hejaz province – present-day western Saudi Arabia – from attackers using the Red Sea front.’ 33 Emphasizing that ‘Ottomans’ ‘secure’ the ‘Hejaz Province’ escaped neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia, who affirmed that potential Turkish–Sudanese military cooperation did not go unnoticed. Maps highlighting the proximity of the island to Mecca and Medina – and therefore the present-day Turkish threat to these religious sites, rather than Ottomans’ ‘securing’ them – were abundant on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media (Figure 5.1). Moreover, the fact that high-ranking Qatari military officials featured prominently on Erdoğan’s state visit to Sudan alarmed the Arab Quartet.34 This move was interpreted as the latest manifestation of Turkey’s regional pan-Islamist expansionism and the Turkish–Qatari duo’s most recent hyperactivist foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. It is not expected to go unresisted by the other regional players. Indeed, with the political change that took place change in Sudan following the mass protests of December 2018, Sudan today is closer to Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and also Israel than it is to the Turkey–Qatar pan-Islamist camp. But prior to that moment of Sudan’s proximity to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and talks for normalization with Israel, Turkey’s foreign policy activism in Sudan further antagonized the already severed relations between Cairo and Ankara. Erdoğan’s support for the transnational organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan vexed Egypt, which designates it as a terrorist organization. In November 2017 Egyptian authorities jailed twenty-nine individuals on charges of spying for Turkey.35 Ankara’s penetration into Sudan represented an alarming matter for Egypt, especially if Turkish relations with the Sudanese government were to develop into military cooperation. Turkey was capitalizing on existing border disputes between Egypt and Sudan over the Halayeb Triangle. Sudan renewed its protest at the United Nations, calling for an Egyptian retreat from the disputed region. While Egypt demanded that Sudan should deny refuge to exiled Muslim Brotherhood members, Sudan accused Egypt of supporting rebels in Darfur. Egypt equally perceived Qatar’s accelerated economic investments in Sudan as threatening. What makes Egypt’s relations with Sudan even more complex is that Sudan had sided against Egypt in its water disputes with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). GERD has been under construction on the Blue Nile, the main source of the Nile, since 2011 (the time of the Egyptian uprising). This subject became yet another manifestation of the diametrically oppositional and antagonistic collision course between Turkey and Egypt. Turkey itself had built more than 1,500 installations on the Tigris and Euphrates in the past decade under Erdoğan’s reign, causing

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Figure 5.1  Image circulating on social media pinpointing the proximity between Suakin and Mecca

river diversions and river drying in Iraq and Syria.36 Cairo has seen the influence of both Turkey and Qatar on Khartoum as a manifestation of a growing adversarial alliance between Ethiopia and Sudan. In the beginning, Sudan mediated between Ethiopia and Egypt. Later, however, Sudan seemed to veer towards Ethiopia. With almost no rainfall

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and almost complete dependence on the Nile, some in Egypt are fearful of GERD’s possible ramifications for agriculture and drinking water, and the economic price of these challenges. According to Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources reports, the GERD could result in the reduction of Egypt’s share of Nile waters by 22 billion cubic meters per year, negatively impacting on both agriculture and hydroelectric power.37 Some voices, however, emphasize that a single dam in Ethiopia might not be the problem. In this view, Egypt should support GERD, but only GERD, and not a multiplicity of dams throughout the Nile Basin.38 If Egypt supports GERD for Ethiopian development and for the production of 6,000 megawatts of hydroelectric power for Ethiopia, and agrees to an extension of the time for filling up the reservoir of 63 billion cubic meters from one year to five years or longer,39 then Egypt and Ethiopia might actually have a cooperative relationship of mutual interests: Egypt mitigates the effects of filling the reservoir, and Ethiopia achieves its electricity and development goals. Thus, a central piece of this equation is the emphasis on a single dam and not a multiplicity of dams that would turn the vigorous river into small streams.40 The current Ethiopian government, however, seems much more cooperative with Cairo than the previous one, with regard to the rate of filling the dam, increasing it to over ten years rather than three or five, in order not to impact on the amount of water reaching Egypt. Egypt also succeeded in implicating the US administration under President Donald Trump in its bilateral agreement with Ethiopia. This gives Egypt some leverage over Ethiopia and its plans. Based on all the aforementioned observations, there seems to be a rising risk of further militarization of the Horn of Africa between Turkey and Egypt as two main Middle East players, who have amassed supporters in the Gulf. Some scholars argue that this situation brings Turkey into the Red Sea. Gurbuz argues, ‘for the first time since the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War, Turkey finds itself entangled in the power struggle over the Red Sea’.41 I argue, however, that rather than finding itself entangled, a more accurate description is that Turkey entangles itself, with potentially dire consequences, right into the heart of the Horn, in pursuit of expansionist dreams which will not go unresisted.

Somalia In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as Turkey’s pan-Islamist foreign policy incursions have faltered close to home (in Egypt, and in Syria most specifically, as Russia backed Bashar al Assad against Turkey’s mercenary jihadists), Ankara found a more willing partner in Somalia – or so some

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analysts frame the difference between Turkey’s expansionism in the Levant versus the Horn. Some scholars have argued that Somalia is a country ‘where Turkey could make a difference without necessarily having to compete with regional or global powers’.42 But that interpretation is not entirely precise. Somalia’s policies are indeed proving to be as much a strategic incursion onto Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s turfs, as Turkey’s other region-wide pan-Islamist interventionist policies have been. As the general pan-Islamist project manifested regionally in support of Islamists, whether the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or mercenary jihadists in Syria, where 7,000 Tunisian IS mercenaries out of a total 25,000 were disproportionately recruited from the small, once secular, now Islamist-dominated, Tunisia,43 so did Somalia’s al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, who featured in Turkey’s regional project. Prior to the dealings with al-Shabaab, however, there was the context of humanitarian aid to Somalia.

Aid diplomacy Initially, and back in 2010, Ankara provided aid to Somalia, as opposed to direct security assistance or outright support for political parties. Turkey’s seeming humanitarian aid created trust between Turkey and the Somalis. Turkey’s then Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Mogadishu twice. In 2011 he was the first non-African leader to arrive in the war-torn country. At the peak of the 2011 famine, Turkey’s aid to Somalia – mostly from private firms – ‘won the hearts and minds of Somali people’, as Somali Information Minister Abdirahman Omar Osman told Reuters.44 Indeed, Somalis in the diaspora have been grateful for Turkey’s humanitarian assistance. A cab driver in Seattle, told me in 2011: The Turks are building schools. They are executing huge construction projects. They are the only ones in Somalia today. And they are the only ones who can enter al-Shabaab-dominated areas. No one else can talk to al-Shabaab but the Turks. I wish the Egyptians were present. We share a longer history. Nasser sent Egyptian teachers. We learnt Arabic. Where is Egypt today? Not in Somalia. Now, we learn Turkish and Turkey is the main player on the ground.45

Turkey had indeed expanded into Somalia. It constructed schools, hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure projects as well as offering free scholarships for Somalis to study in Turkey. While schools had primarily been built by Erdoğan’s former-ally-turned-foe, Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, Somalia’s government has been a vocal supporter of the Erdoğan government in its campaign against Gülen’s influence overseas. In the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup, which Erdoğan has continuously attributed to the cleric – an

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accusation Gülen denies – the Somali government closed down schools and a hospital in Mogadishu tied to Gülen. Based on the humanitarian outreach, trade also increased exponentially between the two countries. While the volume of trade between Turkey and Somalia was $5 million in 2010, it amounted to $123 million in 2016.46 In less than six years Turkey went from Somalia’s twentieth-largest source of imports to its fifth largest.47 By the time it was necessary to secure support from the Somali government for the Turkish military base, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency had already played a critical role, having offered over $400 million in aid to the country.48 But Turkey’s own economy is currently showing signs of continuous recession. These economic hits are expected to impact on Turkey’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and economic outreach, including any further investments in the Turkish military base in Somalia. This economic peril can halt Turkey’s regional adventurism. The exchange rate of Turkish lira to the US dollar was US$=1.2TL back in 2005 at the height of the optimism of the so-called Turkish model. Today US$1=6.24TL, as mentioned earlier. This has a direct impact on Turkish citizens’ standard of living, as well as on their imported energy supply. In the fieldwork I have conducted over the years the exchange rate has been on the mind of many Turks I have spoken to, including a taxi driver who had said, perhaps exaggeratedly, in 2015, ‘If the dollar reaches four liras, there will be a civil war in this country!’ By contrast, starting in 2017, it looked like Egypt was indeed starting to regain its place back in the Horn and Red Sea region, in competition with the steps taken by Turkey post the Arab uprisings. The Egyptian strategic goals against Turkey’s economy itself are being achieved as the latter suffers from the withdrawal of hot cash from Egypt’s allies, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, for example, withdrew from a $12 billion energy deal through Taqa, in 2013.49

Security relations As argued earlier, Turkey’s economic projects, or humanitarian aid, are inseparable from its strategic penetrations into the Red Sea region. In fact, Turkey’s largest military base was a result of close economic ties between Ankara and Mogadishu in recent years. The Somali government has hailed Turkish investment in Somalia’s infrastructure. Moreover, the Somali information minister has highlighted Turkey’s advances in enhancing security relations. ‘We are very happy they are giving us modern facilities for our security forces,’ he said.50 ‘This is something that Somalia has never seen

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even though countries like the US and UK are giving us millions. The difference is the camp Turkey built is an institution that will remain for the next 50 or 100 years.’ 51 The Turkish $50 million military base in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, cements its ties with the unstable but strategic Muslim nation and strengthens Turkey’s presence in East Africa. The base can host 1,000 soldiers at a time. Turkey intends to train and equip more than 10,000 Somali soldiers at the base, according to Turkish military chief of staff Hulusi Akar.52 A Turkish official also indicated that the base meets Ankara’s strategic goals of pushing its weapons sales onto ‘new markets.’ 53 Thus, not only do the policies of President Erdoğan bring about the question of what happens when authoritarian civilians, in the name of supposedly positive notions such as ‘civilian control’, dominate over their militaries and render them regimist armies, which the authoritarian leaders could take into harm’s way through flawed adventurist military expeditions. The flawed policies of the so-called civilian Erdoğan also point to the mechanism by which the militarism of the economy continues under civilian autocrats as they seek new markets for their weapons industry, whose players become civilian warlords and weapon traders close to the cliques and entourage of the civilian ruling autocrats.54 Hence, Turkey is a failing model of civil–military relations, not a successful model as has been narrated in the literature since the rise of AKP.55 Ironically, while Turkey is finding new weapons markets in Somalia for its defense industry surplus, Somali officials like Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire welcome the security cooperation with Turkey as being to ‘reconstruct’ its national force – ‘not based on clan … not from a particular place, but well-trained forces that represent the Somali people’.56 Turkey’s work in Somalia since 2011 and its ties to al-Shabaab al Mujahideen militant factions, however, did not go unnoticed by regional rivals – particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. While Somalia’s government has a number of international supporters, including the United Nations, the African Union, and the US, who are helping it to build a national army capable of fighting the militant al-Shabaab group, by contrast, Turkey has had ties with the militant group itself. Erdoğan’s foreign policy that supported the Somali militants is what enabled the Turks to navigate their way through al-Shabaab-held territories to construct the Turkish hospitals and schools. It is through the dual role of talking to ‘dangerous elements’ while remaining connected to Western governments that Turkey under Erdoğan has been pitching itself as a broker. Qatar has equally followed suit by establishing ties with dangerous elements in Somalia and elsewhere, like the Taliban of Afghanistan, for example. Through the connection to militant Islamist groups, with whom Western countries do not necessarily directly talk, both Turkey and Qatar can hold some influential cards in the international security



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game.57 While al-Shabaab militants were pushed out of Mogadishu in 2010, Qatar and Turkey still regionally finance and ideologically enable their militancy.58 Such militias are still some of the major factors leading to chaos and instability in the Horn of Africa region, close to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal – a main global shipping route.

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Djibouti Turkish media have reported that Ankara was invited to establish a military base in Djibouti, which already hosts US, French, Japanese, and Chinese bases.59 Turkey also expanded economically into Djibouti like other regional and global powers, such China forming a free trade zone as part of its Belt and Road project.60 A free-trade zone in Djibouti would serve as a trade hub enabling Turkey to export manufactured goods as well as raw materials to the wider East African region. In fact, Turkey is always interested in international ports and logistics, as this economic sector can yield significant returns on investment. While Turkey aimed to dominate the Suez Canal area during the Muslim Brotherhood’s one-year rule in Egypt, the deals that were signed during Erdoğan’s visit in October 2012 were revoked under the Sisi government, which cited the strategic importance of this region and counted Turkey as a threat, not a friendly country. Hence, Turkey’s policy of expanding into other ports continued into the Horn of Africa, and particularly Djibouti, after particular failures to acquire an economic and logistics footing in Egypt’s Suez Canal region.

Conclusion The chapter has addressed the Turkey–Qatar alliance and Turkey’s regional expansionism through a pan-Islamist ideology that has manifested both economically (soft power) and militaristically via regionally recruited mercenary jihadists (hard power). The analysis has focused on Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti in relation to Qatar/Turkey. This domain of Turkish–Qatari influence is in contrast to (1) Israel’s relation to Ethiopia; (2) the UAE’s presence in Eritrea; and (3) Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s rivalry in the entire Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb region, with the latter’s support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen. All those non-African players, however, lead Egypt to perceive the entire Horn of Africa penetrations and agitations as a threat to what is part and parcel of its own strategic depth in Africa and the Nile Valley. In response to such regional rivalries and agitations, Egypt’s acquisition of a number of navy units from Russia, Germany, and France and the

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deployment of the Mistral-class helicopter carrier Gamal Abdel Nasser, to the Bab el-Mandeb region since the beginning of the Yemen War to guard the straits leading up to the Suez Canal61 have been characterized as a ‘reflection of the strategic importance of this area for Egypt’, and its successful ‘counter-balance’ against the military build-up by other players in the area.62 As for the question of whether Horn of Africa states can gain greater relative autonomy through balancing, given the intense rivalry, the short answer is ‘not quite’. So far, the outside players have the upper hand over Horn of Africa countries’ capacities for balancing. However, given the dynamism of the Middle East as a regional order, this situation could very well change in the future as some regional players weaken and other regains some power. While some might argue that ‘Turkey’s Red Sea activism is primarily driven by economic and strategic interests, not ideology’,63 the response is that, for Erdoğan, economic interests serve his hegemonic and expansionist dreams, whether ideological or not. Thus, the point is to highlight the ‘expansionist’ part as being the threat, and not exclusively the ideological component of pan-Islamism. In other words, Erdoğan is perceived as a threat by the very nature of his expansionism. The threat lies in the ‘Hitler-like expansionist tendencies’ of an empire-building impulse.64 What the Arab Quartet has resisted in Qatar is actually Turkey’s own expansionist and regionally hegemonic project, regardless of its particularly Islamist ideological content.65 However, Qatar’s expansionist trend into the Horn, as this chapter argued, is not a product of independent Qatari policy as used to be the case up until the critical juncture of 2013 and the demise of the pan-Islamist project in the region with the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Rather, it is a product of Qatar’s perilous alliance with Turkey – an alliance that proved taxing and burdensome on a once agile Qatar.66 As Turkey extended its own project into the Horn of Africa, specifically in Somalia and Sudan, Qatar followed suit to cement its presence in these two countries. That was for two main reasons: first, attempting to attain food security, through expansion into Sudan; and second, attempting to hold a competitive position in the regional security game by implicating itself, along with Turkey, so as to maintain close contact with the Somali al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen radicals. However, an actively penetrative path into the Horn of Africa stripped Qatar of its regional influence as it was increasingly paired with a waning Turkey, increasingly perceived as a regional and international menace.67 The Turkish government has made no secret of its pan-Islamist, neoOttoman rhetoric for domestic and regional consumption within the Arab world.68 While some might argue that Ankara seems to be retreating from the neo-Ottomanist, pan-Islamist vision, engineered by former Turkish Foreign

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Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (in political office until May 2016) and heading toward Russia under the direction of Eurasianist bureaucrats in Ankara,69 those of this viewpoint do not seem to recognize that the retreat is tactical and that it is due to the vision’s utter failure in imposing Islamist politics on Egypt via the Muslim Brotherhood. That failure in Egypt does not mean that Erdoğan’s own economically and militarily expansionist dreams did not manifest elsewhere, post-Davutoğlu’s policy input. In fact, Erdoğan’s military adventurism continued through the sending of troops right into Syria in 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2020 – after Davutoğlu that is. Some Turkey experts say that, after the Arab uprisings, ‘as Turkey’s foreign policy forays close to home have floundered, Ankara has found a willing partner in Somalia’.70 Accordingly, the economic and military expansionism manifested in the Horn of Africa as a consequence of failures elsewhere.71 In fact, behaving very similarly to Iran, this Turkish presence in the Horn started to serve the strategic purpose of ‘encircling’ Erdoğan’s foes in Egypt to the north of the Horn of Africa and Saudi Arabia to east of it. From these strategic vistas, whether in Suakin Island in Sudan, or the free trade zone in Djibouti, or from the Turkish military base in Somalia, Turkey is insisting on presenting itself as a regional threat to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, pursuing a strategy of encirclement similar to that of Iran. However, regional resistance to Turkey’s expansionism is likely to fully translate into Turkey’s forced withdrawal and regional isolation by 2023. The Qataris might very well be a conduit for Erdoğan’s demise, by withdrawing their financial support, when they realize that the Turkish autocrat’s power is eventually waning.

Notes 1 J. Karam, ‘US National Security Adviser: Qatar and Turkey Are New Sponsors of Radical Ideology. General HR McMaster attributed the rise of the Justice and Development party in Ankara to Turkey’s growing problems with the West’, The National, 14 December 2017, www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/us-nationalsecurity-adviser-qatar-and-turkey-are-new-sponsors-of-radical-ideology-1.683989. 2 Y. Ayoub, ‘New Ways for International Legal Action against Qatar’s support for Terrorism, Youm7.com, 19 August 2017, www.youm7.com/story/2017/8/ 19/ /3375263; CNN, Interview with Michael Steinbach by Pamela Brown and Wesley Bruer, ‘FBI official: ISIS is recruiting U.S. Teens’, CNN Online, 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/politics/fbi-isiscounterterrorism-michael-steinbach/ (accessed 15 May 2018); K. Delli, ‘Wrong Bets: How is Turkey Dealing with the Regional Crises?’ Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARS), 19 June 2017, https://futureuae.com/en-US/ Mainpage/Item/2939/wrong-bets-how-is-turkey-dealing-with-the-regional-crises;

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M. Mohie, ‘Itha Hadara Al Irhab, Fatesh A’n Qatar (If Terrorism Loomed, Search for Qatar)’, 26 November 2017’ www.youm7.com/story/2017/11/26/ /3526373; M. Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden: The Cost of the Turkey–Qatar Alliance and Hard Power Projection into Qatar’s Foreign Policy’, in D. K. Khatib and M. Maziad (eds), The Arab Gulf States and The West: Perceptions and Realities – Opportunities and Perils (London: Routledge, 2019), 106–133; Weinberg, ‘Qatar’s Muslim Brothers’; D. A. Weinberg, ‘Qatar and Terror Finance. Part One in a Three-part Series on Qatar’s Performance in the Fight against Terror Finance’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2014 (accessed 20 July 2018); D. A. Weinberg, ‘Analysis: Qatar still Negligent on Terror Finance’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Long War Journal, 19 August 2015, www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/ david-weinberg-analysis-qatar-still-negligent-on-terror-finance/ (accessed 20 July 2018); D. A. Weinberg, ‘Terrorist Financing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Trafficking, and Private Donations’, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 17 November 2015, pp. 30–33. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20151117/104202/ HHRG-114-FA18-Wstate-WeinbergD-20151117.pdf (accessed 20 July 2018); D. A. Weinberg, ‘Qatar and Terror Finance: Part II Private Funders of Al Qaeda in Syria’, FDD Press, 18 January 2017, www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/ david-weinberg-qatar-and-terror-finance/ (accessed 20 July 2018). 3 More extreme elements of Hamas moved into northern Sinai during the security vacuum that followed the Egyptian uprising of 2011. Those extreme elements organized and formed Ansar Bait el Maqdes (Supporters of Jerusalem), which explicitly had the Palestinian claim on Jerusalem in its very name. Ansar Bait el Maqdes explicitly targeted Israel and cut the gas pipelines with it in 2011–12. In other words, the terrorist elements in Sinai did not start out as an indigenous insurgency from within Egypt, against the Egyptian state, as some reasoned. Rather, the terrorist groups in Sinai started as offshoots from Gaza under the name Ansar Bait el Maqdes, targeting Israel from a new base in Sinai. Later they paid allegiance and morphed themselves into Wilayet Sinai (Province of Sinai) as part of the Islamic State (IS). At this point, the former Egyptian military officer Hesham Ashmawy, who turned into an IS terrorist operative, collaborated with the transnational terrorist group. Some local Sinai youth were recruited and trained by Ashmawy, who eventually branched into the Western Desert and paid allegiance to al Qaeda of Libya instead of the IS. However, all of this means that the terrorism in Sinai is a regionally funded transnational jihadist phenomenon that emanated from Gaza and was transnationally funded by regional actors, for the most part. This expanded as other international mercenaries were recruited from other countries. All those international elements fielded IS fighters, with some local Sinai recruits. That make-up renders it far from an indigenous Egyptian insurgency but, rather, global transnational, internationally financed mercenary jihadists, targeting both the Egyptian state and the Israeli state, for different reasons, albeit parallel ones, given the Israeli–Egyptian convergence in dealing with respective existential security threats (M. Maziad, ‘The military in Israeli

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politics, state and society’, Stroum Center for Jewish Studies. University of Washington, 1 February 2018, https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/ civil-military-relations-in-israel-politics-state-society/). In a 2013 press release, Congressman Peter Roskam stated ‘According to the New York Times, Qatar’s emir reportedly pledged $400 million in financial aid to Hamas in October 2012. These funds could directly support weapons purchases and terrorism against Israel and other regional allies’ (P. Roskam, ‘Roskam, Barrow Lead Effort Urging Qatar to Abandon Support for Hamas’, 2013, https://roskam.house.gov/media-center/ press-releases/roskam-barrow-lead-effort-urging-qatar-to-abandon-support-forhamas; P. Roskam, ‘Letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew Urging Both to Stop Supporting’s Qatar’s Sponsorship of Hamas and Other Terrorist Groups, such as Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda Syrian Affiliate’, Roskam.house.gov 31 July 2014, https://roskam.house.gov/ sites/roskam.house.gov/files/Roskam%20Qatar.pdf). The hint was that these hundreds of millions of dollars were not to be exclusively targeting Israel, but also regional allies, namely Egypt, if and when the Egyptian military were to stand up to the Turkey–Qatar alliance and its pan-Islamism that was sweeping Gaza, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and with failed attempts in Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, former President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood had pledged, just two weeks before the mass protests that ousted him, to field Egyptian youth as jihadists in Syria. But this failed strategy ended with military-backed popular protests against the Muslim Brotherhood, that ousted that regime on 30 June 2013 (M. Maziad, ‘From Tahrir to Taksim Square’, Al Jazeera English Website, 5 June 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/2013/06/201365145126950165.html). 4 MEMRI, ‘Accusations for Responsibility in Sinai Mosque Attack: Qatar vs. Saudi Arabia and Egypt’, The Middle East Media Research Institute, 28 November 2017, www.memri.org/reports/accusations-responsibility-sinai-mosqueattack-qatar-vs-saudi-arabia-and-egypt; M. Champion, ‘Egypt’s Stake in Case Against Qatar Is Bigger than You May Think’, Bloomberg, 29 June 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–06–28/terrorism-case-against-qatarmuddied-by-muslim-brotherhood-links; J. Demetter, ‘U.S. Ally Qatar Shelters Jihadi Moneymen’, The Daily Beast, 10 December 2014, www.thedailybeast.com/ us-ally-qatar-shelters-jihadi-moneymen; Roskam, ‘Roskam, Barrow Lead Effort’; Roskam, ‘Letter to Secretary of State John Kerry’. 5 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 6 M. Maziad, ‘Qatar: Cultivating the “Citizen” of the Futuristic State’, in P. Erskine-Loftus, M. I. al-Mulla and V. Hightower (eds), Representing the Nation, Representing the Nation, Heritage, Museums, National Narrative and Identity in the Arab Gulf States (London: Routledge, 2016), 123–140. 7 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’; A. Yossef, ‘Gulfization of the Middle East Security Complex: The Arab Spring’s Systemic Change’, in Philipp O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East: Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

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8 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’; R. Gubert, ‘Turquie: Erdogan, Le Dictateur. Au pouvoir depuis quinze ans et candidat à la présidentielle du 24 juin, le président turc bâtit un régime autocratique qui fait trembler l’Europe’, Le Point, 29 May 2018, www.lepoint.fr/monde/turquie-erdogan-le-dictateur-24-05-2018-2220979_24.php. 9 Maziad, ‘From Tahrir to Taksim Square’. 10 M. Maziad, and D. K. Khatib (2019). ‘Introduction: The Arab Gulf States in the West: Imaginings, Perceptions and Constructions’, in D. K. Khatib and M. Maziad and (eds), The Arab Gulf States and The West: Perceptions and Realities – Opportunities and Perils (London: Routledge, 2019), 1–14. 11 For more details on the contextual background and the reasons for the alliance between Turkey and Qatar see Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 12 Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 13 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 14 Personal communication of the author with Egyptian military officer, summer 2015. 15 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Personal communication with Qatari public official during fieldwork research in Doha, 2013. 19 Maziad, ‘Qatar: Cultivating the “Citizen”’. 20 Weinberg, ‘Qatar’s Muslim Brothers’; Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 21 Daily Sabah, ‘Erdoğan’s 3-day Visit to Southeast Africa to Strengthen Ties’, 24 January 2017, http://smc.sd/en/erdogans-3-day-visit-to-southeast-africa-to-strengthen-ties/. 22 Anna Aero, ‘Turkish Airlines Adds Its 52nd African Destination’, Anna Aero: Airline Network News and Analysis, 28 February 2018, www.anna.aero/2018/02/28/ turkish-airlines-2/. 23 Daily Sabah, ‘Erdoğan’s 3-day visit’. 24 A. Hussein and O. Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base in Mogadishu to Train Somali Soldiers’, Reuters, 30 September 2017, www.reuters.com/article/ us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-trainsomali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH. 25 B. Gönültaş, ‘Turkish Businesspeople Invited to Invest in Sudan’, 2017, www.aa.com.tr/ en/economy/turkish-businesspeople-invited-to-invest-in-sudan/1014705. 26 Sputnik News, ‘Turkey Temporarily Granted Ancient Ottoman Red Sea Port in Sudan for Rebuilding’, 26 December 2017, https://sputniknews.com/afric a/201712261060333479-erdogan-red-sea-port-sudan-restoration-ottoman-empire/. 27 A. Küçükgöçmen and Khalid Abdelaziz, ‘Turkey to Restore Sudanese Red Sea Port and Build Naval Dock’, Reuters. 24 December 2017, https://af.reuters.com/ article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1OQ0NC. 28 K. Abdel Aziz, ‘Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centres. Expulsions believed to be linked to government fears that Iranian officials were promoting Shia Islam in majority-Sunni country,’ The Guardian, 2 September

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2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/sudan-expels-iranian-diplomatscloses-cultural-centres. 29 Ibid. 30 Maziad, ‘The Military in Israeli Politics’. 31 M. Maziad, ‘Qatar in Egypt: The Politics of Aljazeera’, Journalism: Theory, Practice, and Criticism, Sage (2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/ yEGxy7ySS9xsAd5yVcSY/full#_i14; Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden. 32 Sputnik News, ‘Turkey Temporarily Granted Ancient Ottoman Red Sea Port’. 33 TIKA, ‘Turkey Renovating Historic Ottoman-era City in Sudan’, 2018, www.tika.gov.tr/ en/news/turkey_renovating_historic_ottomanera_city_in_sudan-41102. 34 M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests in the Horn of Africa’, Arab Center Washington DC, 22 February 2018, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/ turkeys-challenge-to-arab-interests-in-the-horn-of-africa/. 35 T. el-Tablawy, ‘Egypt Arrests 29 People on Suspicion of Spying for Turkey’, Bloomberg, 22 November 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–11–22/ egypt-arrests-29-people-on-suspicion-of-spying-for-turkey. 36 J. al Tamimi, ‘Iran, Turkey Dam Projects Drying up Iraq’s Water’, Gulf News, 7 April 2018, https://gulfnews.com/news/mena/iraq/iran-turkey-dam-projectsdrying-up-iraq-s-water-1.2198616. 37 S. Cook, ‘From the Potomac to the Euphrates: Is War About to Break Out in the Horn of Africa? Will the West Even Notice?’ Council on Foreign Relations, 16 January 2018, www.cfr.org/blog/war-about-break-out-horn-africa-will-west-even-notice. 38 M. Maziad, ‘Interview for Inside Story: Nile River Balancing Interests and Rights?’ Al Jazeera English, 2015, www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/03/ nile-river-balancing-interests-rights-150324190006045.html. 39 P. Engelke and H. Passell, ‘From the Gulf to the Nile: Water Security in an Arid Region’, The Atlantic Council, 2017, www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/ publications/From_the_Gulf_to_the_Nile_web_0426.pdf. 40 Maziad, ‘Interview for Inside Story: Nile River’. 41 Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests’. 42 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’, citing Sinan Ulgen, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 43 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden’. 44 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’. 45 Personal communication with Somali cab driver in Seattle, 2011. 46 Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARS) (2018) ‘Potential Gains: Why Is Turkey Boosting Its Economic Presence in the Red Sea?’ 4 January 2018, https://futureuae.com/m/Mainpage/Item/3595/potential-gains-why-is-turkeysboosting-its-economic-presence-in-the-red-sea. 47 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’. 48 FARS, ‘Potential Gains’. 49 S. al Makahleh, (2013). ‘Taqa Pulls Out $12b Investment from Turkey Power Projects’, Gulf News, 26 August 2013, http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/ general/ taqa-pulls-out-12b-investment-from-turkey- power-projects-1.1224336 (accessed 15 May 2018); Oxford Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum,

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‘Turkey-GCC Relations; Trends and Outlooks’, 2015, www.oxgaps.org/files/ turkey-gcc_relations_trends_and_outlook_2015.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018). 50 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 M. Maziad, ‘Turkey: The Oscillation between “State” and “Regime” 1/3 Al-Ta’rjuh ma bayn Al dawla wal Nizam’, Almasry Alyoum newspaper, 24 July 2016, www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/983554. Translated into English on www.academia.edu/37344186/Turkey_The_Oscillation_Between_ State_and_Regime_1_3. 55 I. Akça, Military–Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems, and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010); U. Cizre, ‘The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming It’, in U. Cizre (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 132–171. 56 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’. 57 Maziad, ‘Qatar: Cultivating the “Citizen”’. 58 Weinberg, ‘Qatar’s Muslim Brothers’; Weinberg, ‘Qatar and Terror Finance. Part One’. 59 O. Sevniç, ‘Djibouti Is Open to Turkey’s Efforts to Safeguard Red Sea, Ambassador Says’, Daily Sabah, 29 December 2017, www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/12/30/ djibouti-is-open-to-turkeys-efforts-to-safeguard-red-sea-ambassador-says. 60 A. Arteh, ‘Djibouti Breaks Ground on Massive Chinese-backed Free Trade Zone’, Reuters, 16 January 2017, www.reuters.com/article/china-djibouti/djibouti-breaksground-on-massive-chinese-backed-free-trade-zone-idUSL4N1F649H. 61 Global Security, ‘Egyptian Navy: Modernization’, Global Security, 26 February 2018, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/navy-modernization.htm. 62 S. Shay, ‘Egypt Strengthens Its Strategic Presence in the Red Sea’, Israel Defense. 10 January 2017, www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28177. 63 Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests’. 64 Gubert, ‘Turquie: Erdogan, Le Dictateur’. 65 Maziad, ‘Qatar in Egypt’. 66 Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden. 67 Gubert, ‘Turquie: Erdogan, Le Dictateur’. 68 B. Özkan, ‘Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism’, Survival 56, no. 4 (2014), pp. 119–140. 69 Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests’. 70 Hussein and Goskun, ‘Turkey Opens Military Base’. 71 R. Abdi, ‘A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling Regional Tensions’, Crisis Group, 3 August 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/dangerous-gulf-horn-howinter-arab-crisis-fuelling-regional-tensions.

6

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Interregional embedded security model: Turkish and Emirati engagement in the Horn of Africa Umer Karim

Introduction The Horn of Africa occupies an important strategic position on the map of the world. It looks over the Bab el-Mandeb straits, which is a major marine transportation hub. Changes in the political and security situation of the broader Middle East have affected the region, and the Horn is increasingly seen as an important strategic asset by regional and international powers. The political disruptions happening in the Arabian Gulf at one end, in the form of conflict in Yemen and the Qatar crisis,1 and the ongoing quest for regional hegemony among various actors within the Middle East have created a competitive multipolarity.2 All of these developments have transcended into the Horn of Africa and have made the region an arena of this balancing game. These new political dynamics are shaping the relations between the states of the Horn and also affecting their domestic political and security outlook. Many Middle Eastern states have initiated political and security engagement with Horn of Africa states, but the most prominent among them have been Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).3 Attempts by both nations to consolidate their foothold in the region have had an impact on the political stature and fortunes of their local allies. This chapter aims to first theorize this interaction between the Horn region and the Middle East and how the interregional security paradigms are becoming intertwined. Following on from that, an attempt will be made to understand the engagement of Turkey and the UAE in the light of this theoretical structure and to explain the manoeuvrings of the UAE and Turkey in the Horn, and also to discuss the impact of this political rivalry on the political dynamics in the Horn. The Turkish role in Somalia will be examined extensively while also elaborating its attempted engagement with Sudan and economic ties with Ethiopia. In the Emirati case, the focus will be upon the strong ties

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with Eritrea and Ethiopia while also investigating Emirati activities within Somalia and the breakaway region of Somaliland. The chapter will also try to establish how this external involvement can be a precursor of political and regional instability but can also be an agent of mediation to defuse regional conflicts.

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Theoretical framework In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the evolving security dynamics in the Horn of Africa, this chapter will first try to develop a theoretical approach that is helpful for understanding the Turkish and Emirati engagement in the region and subsequent political, economic and security initiatives. This theoretical section will also try to uncover the traditional debates and attempt to reflect upon the Horn’s security dynamics and how the reinvigorated interest of extra-regional actors and their activities compels us to devise a new security approach to understand regional security within Horn of Africa. Regional security dynamics and their interplay on a global scale have been explained comprehensively by Buzan and Wæver. They have come up with a theoretical framework that illuminates the security linkages on both a global and a regional level and explains with a good degree of success how states behave in response to threats emanating on these different levels. The regional level or subsystemic security dimension is important, as it focuses on the security interdependence of the states in a rather regional sphere and also puts into perspective how medium-sized powers develop strategies to dominate their regional political sphere and address the political and security threats faced by them. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) amicably addresses the balance-of-power struggle taking place at a regional level between competing states and provides a workable theoretical understanding to comprehend the changing security patterns on this structural level.4 However, Buzan and Wæver have marked some regions lacking the necessary conditional requirements of a broader interlinked security complex. The Horn of Africa has been recognized in their study as one such region and it is given the status of being a pre-RSC (Regional Security Complex), one where all the units of the regional political set have not developed a complex web of security-oriented engagement.5 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll follow the same line and characterize the Horn of Africa alongside Central America as an unstructured zone in terms of regional security, due to the lack of a dominant regional hegemon that can further give rise to patterns of succinct polarity.6 Lefebvre goes one step further and argues that political

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dynamics within the Horn of Africa have intricate linkages with those of the Middle East and thus the Horn functions as a subordinate subsystem of the Middle East.7 This viewpoint has been challenged by Mesfin, who argues that the Horn of Africa constitutes a proper RSC on its own and cannot be treated as a pre-RSC as suggested by Buzan or as an unstructured security region subservient to foreign political machinations. For Mesfin, the Horn fits precisely into all the required parameters of Buzan’s RSC hypothesis, with clearly marked patterns of interstate conflicts, border disputes and resource wars, transnational spill-overs of political ideologies and conflicts, as well as a balance-of-power struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia in addition to the one between Sudan and Ethiopia and occasionally involving other actors like Egypt, Kenya and Uganda.8 Healy also emphasizes that there exists significant security interdependence among Horn countries and that the trajectories of their relationship with other regional states have been influenced by traditional patterns of competition and alignment. Furthering this argument, Healy suggests that although conflicts in the Horn have attracted foreign powers, their interventions and involvement have not been able to restructure the dynamics of regional security and the intra-regional political contestation among Horn states has not been altered.9 This chapter concurs with the viewpoint that the Horn of Africa has some marked levels of rivalry between states and an interconnected security environment manifested in the form of wars and internecine cross-border conflicts, whether it is the case of Sudan–Ethiopia rivalry or the tussle between Eritrea and Ethiopia or tensions between the Somali Federal Government and its autonomous regions. The security environment and modalities of insecurity are rooted in the political and economic dynamics of the region and are not an extension of any external power struggle, making its conflicts and alliances politically distinct and having a regional identity of their own.10 During the Cold War, actors within the Horn enlisted in the political patronage networks of one or the other superpower and played against one another. With the end of the Cold War and change in political geography of the Horn, space has opened up for extra-regional actors to condition the Horn’s security infrastructure.11 The traditional drivers of security within the Horn might not have changed fundamentally, but with the weakening of the Somali state and the creation of Eritrea and South Sudan, the prevailing themes in terms of security linkages have become further complex. Mesfin, while arguing that the Horn of Africa functions as an RSC, admits that the economic productivity of the region is quite meagre and hardly sufficient for local needs.12 This results in massive external dependence, which subsequently leads to a greater external intervention in local affairs and the

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construction of localized political narratives, but under the conditions of the extra-regional powers having stakes in the region.

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Turkish and Emirati engagement in the Horn of Africa: formation of an interregional embedded security complex The recent push by foreign powers, specifically Turkey and the UAE, to engage in the Horn builds on the economic woes experienced by majority of states in the region, but additionally is designed to gain a security foothold in its strategically important geography. Yemen, which has always remained a link between the Horn and the Arabian Peninsula, is now itself an area of geopolitical jostling.13 Emirati involvement in Yemen has helped it to create a new role for itself in terms of regional security. The Emirati idea of operationalizing this new security has been manifested in the form of seaports and military installations on the other side of the Red Sea, which have been likened in some commentaries to a string of pearls.14 The Gulf nation called ‘Little Sparta’ acquired ports and air bases in Eritrea and Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia, and thus positioned itself as a stakeholder in the Horn of Africa.15 The other critical engagement within the Horn has been the Turkish foray into Somalia. The Turkish involvement in Somalia has generated dividends for Turkish soft power. Gradually this Turkish presence in the form of humanitarian aid and investments helped in the rejuvenation of the Somali economy. Subsequently, Turkey’s presence in Somalia has also acquired a security facet with the opening of largest overseas Turkish military base, in Mogadishu.16 Turkey’s multilateral involvement in Somalia has resulted in giving it additional leverage in terms of processes of nation building and institutional development in Somalia.17 This takes the engagement of actors from the Middle Eastern RSC in the security and political dynamics of Horn to a critical level, one that is reminiscent of the superpower strategies pursued in the region during the Cold War. Already the region has witnessed Middle Eastern rivalries factoring into its local political dynamics. Iran’s attempts to establish itself within different Horn countries triggered efforts by Saudi Arabia to counter this trend and to remove the Iranian presence across the Horn coast.18 Similarly, Qatari activities within Horn, specifically in Sudan to construct a canal to siphon off water from the Nile river, created controversy in both Cairo and Riyadh and added to the list of grievances that Saudi Arabia and its allies within the Gulf harboured against Qatar.19 The marked change in Turkish foreign policy with the start of the Arab Spring and its support for Muslim Brotherhood-aligned movements across the Middle East and North Africa region has projected Turkey as a major

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revisionist political power while pitching it against the status quo political grouping led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Turkish–Emirati bilateral has seen a continuous decline since the coup in Egypt that brought President Sisi to power. This discord between the two sides has been a product of diverging political models and a significant personal dislike between the leaderships of both sides. Within Turkish governmental circles there remains a near consensus that the intellectual mind countering attempts to revise the political order within the larger Middle East remains that of Emirati de facto leader Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed.20 This has been followed by political contestation between the two nations, whether in the geopolitical realm or the symbolic arena. Within the area of political performativity, the Turkish president and Emirati foreign minister engaged in a diplomatic spat after the Emirati minister criticized the Ottoman commander Fahreddin Pasha for robbing and looting the city in the early twentieth century.21 In the political arena Turkey’s staunch alignment with Qatar and the establishment of a Turkish military base in order to guarantee the Gulf nation’s security has pitted it resolutely against the UAE. Moreover, Turkish authorities have alleged that the UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, has been arming and financially supporting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in Syria.22 More recently, Turkey and the UAE have found each other intervening kinetically on the behalf of their respective allies in the Libyan civil war.23 As both Turkey and the UAE remain the two most active external actors within the Horn, the spillover of this rivalry could have significant implications for the politics and security dynamics of the region. This pushes us to revisit Lefebvre’s argument that the Horn is a subsystem subordinate to the Middle East. On the one hand, where it is difficult to establish the Horn as not a functioning RSC owing to the very indigenous patterns of enmity and affinity, it is nevertheless not easy to ignore the machinations of external stake-holders within the sphere of local politics and their workings to fill in the political and security vacuum existent within the Horn owing to inherent economic and security dependencies. Thus, the argumentation does have some weight that, even if the local political situation dominates the interstate relationship in the Horn, manipulation by foreign powers and recalibration of the local political environment and actors by these external entities can reorient and reconstitute themes of regional security and politics. Since, the end of Cold War, the global-level strategic engagement with the region has been considerably lessened and remains mainly limited to counterterror programmes and anti-piracy initiatives within the red sea.24 On the other hand, interest and interaction by extra-regional actors, mainly from the Middle East and Arabian Gulf, has taken a rather exponential turn. This leads us back to our principal question of whether the Horn qualifies as an RSC on its own and, if so, how can we treat the overarching

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influence of the Middle Eastern RSC over it, especially with reference to the recent political developments. Both regions have security interaction and are developing a level of political, economic and defence partnership gradually giving birth to a model of interregional embedded security complex. This new model of interregional embedded security takes into account both the very root causes of conflicts within the Horn of Africa which impact upon its security atmosphere and also how they have been influenced by the political, economic and security agendas of Middle Eastern political entities. This increased strategic presence of Middle Eastern actors in the Horn compels us to theoretically no longer treat the Horn as an isolated political system, and, as will be explained later, events in one RSC do have an impact on the happenings in another one or substantially speed up the pace of events. For now, this new security model gives an ontological balance to the debate derived from Buzan’s RSC theory and its contestations, but subject to the further weakening of localized factors and greater opportunities for Middle Eastern actors to extend their political capital within the Horn.25 The theoretical understanding thus derived will give us a better toolkit to understand the Turkish–Emirati engagement within the Horn and how it has been impacting on local political divides.

The Turkish engagement in Somalia Somalia, due to its strategic, location has been the focus of attention of different world powers. The surge in external interest in Somalia began with the Turkish engagement in 2011 after Somalia was hit by a famine. President Erdoğan was the first foreign head of state to visit Somalia.26 This marked the beginning of a Turkish campaign to embark upon a foreign policy rooted in humanitarian aid and development that would enhance Turkey’s soft power on the international stage. The foray into Somalia was a unique exhibition of Turkish policy to enhance its international prestige by providing aid and assistance to states facing dire circumstances while simultaneously capitalizing on the economic and trade opportunities emerging as a result of economic growth in these states.27 This approach has made Turkey, as argued by one writer, an indispensable actor in Somalia and thus has made it an important political player within the broader Horn of Africa.28 Turkish business firms have won contracts for operating the Mogadishu port and its airport. Other firms that showed interest in establishing operations in the port include Dubai’s Dubai Ports World (DP World). This showed that Turkey was not the only actor interested in getting a stake in the development and management of Somali infrastructure but was actively competing with other political actors interested in the region.29

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The peak of Turkish influence in Somalia was exemplified when Turkey finally opened its largest military base outside Turkey, which is used as a facility to train Somali security forces.30 This marked the formal start of a security partnership between the two states, and a development that signifies the deepening of a relationship which in the past had been limited to traditional Turkish assistance in the form of humanitarian aid, capacity building in the health and education sectors and infrastructure development.31 This Turkish engagement in Somalia, and the close relations of some factions within the Somali government with Qatari royalty, have in turn affected Somalia’s position vis-à-vis the Gulf, especially after the Gulf Crisis of 2017. Somalia rejected a Saudi donation of $80 million to cut ties with Qatar and acted as an autonomous political actor.32 This Somali approach of continuing cordial relations with both sides has not gone down well, particularly with its Gulf partners in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia showed its frustration by giving a cold welcome to a Somali delegation, but the UAE government chose a more explicit approach by recalling its ambassador from Mogadishu.33 Ties between Somalia and the UAE have historically been cordial, but Turkish success over the UAE in terms of gaining strategic contracts in Somalia and the refusal of the Somali government to take the side of the Arab Quartet countries against Qatar has complicated the bilateral relationship of the UAE with the Somali Republic. These tensions started to emerge with the Somali presidential elections in 2017, which saw Turkey and the UAE backing different candidates.34 The victory of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and the political prominence of his chief-of-staff, suggested to be linked with Qatar, had been instrumental in Somalia treading a path of its own choice vis-à-vis the Qatar crisis and in terms of other regional issues and not simply being dictated to.35 This adoption of an independent stance by a relatively weak and fragile polity within the Horn, in the face of heavy external pressure and lucrative economic incentives, is a most interesting happening. The answer may lie in the way Turkey has conducted itself within the Horn in general, but particularly its interaction with Somalia. It would not be wrong to say that the Turkish entry into Somalia has been catalytic in bringing some sort of stability and economic activity to the Horn nation.36 As compared to international actors who, based on their pressing security concerns, have been reluctant to commit significant political and economic capital within Somalia and also mostly to operate from the safe environs outside Somalia,37 Turkey has taken a leap and constructed a model whereby it has managed to coordinate its efforts at institutional building, investing within the Somali economy and humanitarian aid through the auspices of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency.38 The lack of any former negative political baggage has further helped in cementing this Turkish soft-power project,

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supplemented now by hard-power security-related projects.39 Turkish support for Somalia is crucial in terms of its national identity, since it has been one of the principal supporters of the united Somalia model and seems interested in the revival of the Somali state while also actively taking part in nationbuilding processes. In a conference held in Istanbul with the theme of ‘Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015’, the conference adopted a five-point plan to actively pursue a road map for the reinvigoration of the Somali state including efforts aimed to instil national unity, rebuilding the Somali National Army and also eventually contributing positively towards ending the regional isolation it has faced for long.40 This particularly shows that the goals of Turkey include not only having a foothold within the Horn of Africa but doing so in a manner that both contributes towards enhancing its economic engagement broadly in the region and also can add into its global prestige and soft-power standing. It would not be wrong to say that for Turkey the development of soft power and its functionality has emerged as a key component of its foreign policy, and we do not see it in play anywhere better than in Somalia, where the engagement has been pursued in a manner to lay the groundwork for being an active component in Somali nation building. This model of engagement has not only given Turkey political prestige in the Horn of Africa but has also helped it to make some economic gains, as it has now become the fifth-largest exporter to Somalia, with Turkish exports reaching to a sum of $180 million in 2018.41 This perfectly sums up how Turkey has managed to sustain its political and economic investments within Somalia while using it as an anchor point for furthering its ambitions within the broader East and sub-Saharan Africa.42

Turkish involvement in Sudan and Ethiopia The second major Turkish foray within the Horn of Africa has been its attempts to foster close political ties with Sudan. Erdoğan became the first Turkish president to visit Sudan and penned deals of up to $650 million, with direct investments amounting to $300 million. President Erdoğan also vowed to enhance bilateral trade from $500 million to the gigantic sum of $10 billion in the coming years. The emphasis by Erdoğan on investing in defence industries in Sudan echoed the Turkish strategic calculus of becoming a security partner with the Horn nation.43 Strategically, the most significant outcome of the visit was the deal reached between the two countries granting Turkey rights to restore and rehabilitate the city of Suakin 60 km south of Port Sudan, construct a naval dock and develop it as a major hub for maritime travel across the Red Sea, mainly to transport African pilgrims from Suakin to the Saudi port of Jeddah.44

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The political developments in Sudan that led to the ouster of its President Omar al-Bashir have put the Turkish strategic foray into murky waters. Turkey was caught with the dilemma of whether to support a trusted Islamist ally or to let him fall down and allow its regional rivals to capture the strategic space it has managed to create for itself.45 The new government in Sudan hasn’t annulled the deal, but neither has there been any further development, suggesting that the deal for Suakin port has been put on hold. This has damaging consequences for Turkey’s larger strategic footprint in East Africa.46 This shows that the increasingly contentious nature of geopolitics within the larger Middle Eastern region has impacted upon the external alignment patterns within Horn countries and remains a critical factor in terms of determining the dynamics of regional security. Since al-Bashir had become largely dependent upon Turkish and Qatari political support, his ouster also brought a relative decline in their influence. The new ruling cadres in Khartoum seem to be more predisposed towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE,47 and although the internal politics within Sudan hasn’t really stabilized, for the time being the Turkish foray has been effectively checked. Turkey has also been active within Ethiopia and has given special attention to that Horn country due to multiple reasons. Ethiopia is one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world and the largest in East Africa, with a growth rate of 8.2 per cent. Out of Turkey’s $6 billion investment in Africa around $3 billion has been invested in Ethiopia.48 The biggest Turkish project in the country is the construction of 400 km Awash–Kombolcha–Hara Gebaya railway project, which has a budget of $1.7 billion.49 Turkey has also been assisting Ethiopia in developing its defence industry and has opened up a branch of Ziraat Bank to help with the financing of different projects undertaken by Turkish businessmen. The importance of Ethiopia is also paramount, since its capital, Addis Ababa, hosts the headquarters of the African Union and all Turkish engagement with the African Union has to happen here. Interestingly, Ethiopia was at first reluctant to close down organizations and educational institutions associated with the Gülen movement but acquiesced to Turkish requests in this regard, and the ownership of the Nejashi Ethio–Turkish International Schools has been sold to a German educational foundation.50 Turkey has been increasingly strengthening its foothold within the Horn of Africa. As discussed earlier, the prime anchor point for Turkey remains Somalia, where it has managed to embed itself within the country’s political as well as security structure. This Turkish engagement has resultantly affected Somalia’s foreign relations, and has also triggered new political trends internally. The breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland have simultaneously become prime targets of Emirati political engagement, while complicating

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further their ties with Mogadishu. Although Turkish ambitions within the Horn region remain largely focused on enhancing trade partnerships and economic cooperation, enhancing cooperation in the defence sector within Horn nations also remains a goal of the Turkish government, as is shown by Turkey’s security presence within Somalia.

The UAE’s new security doctrine and changing geopolitics in the Horn region If the Turkish designs in the Horn are more centred on raising their soft-power index and developing partnerships through bilateral trade, the Emirati strategy, on the other hand, is more security oriented. The principle threat for Emirati interests has always been perceived as emanating from Iran, and more specifically the possibility of an Iranian move to block the Strait of Hormuz, which would lead to the blockage of Emirati oil exports. This particular dynamic has been an important factor that has pushed the Gulf state to develop a dynamic security strategy. This involves securing key ports not only on the southern Yemeni shore but also across the coastline of the Horn region.51 The Emiratis recognised the critical value of Horn region in terms of geopolitical security during the Yemen war, when, upon a heated diplomatic row and dispute over Djibouti’s container port, they realized that they didn’t have a logistical hub to carry out aerial operations.52 This was the moment when the UAE realized how critical it is to have multiple strategic footholds on the Horn coast of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Consequently, the UAE successfully negotiated with Eritrea and acquired the Assab airbase for operational purposes. The military and naval installations developed by the UAE in Assab were instrumental in successfully launching the military and aerial offensive to dislodge Houthi rebels from the southern Yemeni city of Aden.53 The Emirati agreement with Somaliland to open a military base in Berbera and develop its port is a continuation of this policy of building strategic assets along the Horn coastline. These developments have all the potential to transform the UAE into a crucial player in terms of maritime security across the Red Sea, in coordination with global superpowers, attaining role of a regional security enforcer and mediator while reducing the influence of its regional (Middle Eastern) competitors within the Horn and also gaining significant leverage to check the growth of Islamist forces as well as countering terrorist organizations within the region.54 The Emirati decision to build a military base in Somaliland and operate in the port of Berbera has several political ramifications. The principal trading port in the Horn region had been Djibouti, and Dubai’s DP World had been operating it. Its contract was cancelled by Djibouti, due to allegations

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of corruption. The Emirati move to develop the port of Berbera will end Djibouti’s hegemony as the central transactional point for regional trade.55 The UAE–Somaliland agreement to develop the port of Berbera could also be interpreted as an Emirati response to the expulsion of Dubai’s DP World and the tense diplomatic relations with Djibouti. The Qatar crisis has added a new dimension to regional geopolitics, which are already shaped by the influence of the Gulf states. Eritrea, which hosts a massive Emirati military and naval installation had a history of conflict with both Ethiopia and Djibouti. The conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea was mediated by Qatar through negotiations with both sides and also deploying its own troops on some sections of the border between the two states.56 As the Gulf crisis unfolded, both Eritrea and Djibouti cut their ties with Qatar. This led to Qatar recalling its forces and Eritrea rapidly deploying its own in the disputed territory.57 This led to a further deterioration of bilateral ties between Djibouti and Eritrea. As the Emiratis strengthened their contacts with Ethiopia and eventually brokered a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the nature of the Ethiopian–Djibouti alliance has now become questionable. On the other hand, Somalia is another place where the political dynamics have been greatly affected by the Qatar crisis. In order to map out the Emirati regional strategy this chapter will now explore both of these cases in order to establish the points already made in the theoretical section, that the regional security dynamics of the Middle East are increasingly impacting on the Horn region.

Emirati relationship with Somalia and the Gulf crisis The bilateral ties between Somalia and the UAE have been largely cordial, but were critically impacted upon by two events, the election of President Farmajo and the onset of the Gulf crisis in 2017. Initially Farmajo’s engagement with the UAE was quite positive, and during his visit to Abu Dhabi there was discussion on the Emirati role and involvement in institutional and capacity building within Somalia.58 This suggested that Farmajo was not as much of a ‘Qatar’ man as later developments suggest. Things took a negative turn after the Gulf crisis, when the Quartet countries decided to put a blockade on Qatar. The Gulf crisis changed the basics of politics within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, as an extension, had an impact on GCC states’ relationships and partnerships in the peripheries of the Arabian Peninsula.59 The states with stronger and more entrenched political and economic structures were able to fend off the impact of this crisis and the expectations of the Quartet countries vis-à-vis Qatar, but more fragile states, and in this case Somalia, came under severe pressure to

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take sides. In a country where there has already been a lot of political fragmentation and factionalization such a crisis had immense repercussions, since the Somali federal government was not the only player to be manipulated, but equally important were the Somali federal states, which often had their own strategic interests in terms both of local politics and of external engagement. This important structural specificity of Somalia went hand in hand with its lucrative and strategic sea ports and made it a battle ground of regional rivalry.60 This crisis actually created a vacuum which, in turn, negatively affected the Somali government’s policy of engaging equally with all Middle Eastern actors. The Somali government and its federal states, by playing on localized political disputes between the Somali government and its federal states, an intra-Somali fissure was created that complicated the political environment after President Farmajo declined to go against Qatar and stressed the need to maintain neutrality. This was a classic example of local Somali politics being instrumentalized within the political rivalries of Middle Eastern and Gulf actors. It led to a break-up in the Emirati relationship with Somali federal government alongside Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the Emiratis enhanced their interaction and partnerships with the Somali federal member states, as well as with local political actors in various cadres of the Somali government.61 The prime focus of the UAE was to initiate more proactive strategic engagement with Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, and acquire the rights to develop its port of Berbera. The Emirati ambitions in Somaliland reached a higher level when they made a formal deal with the Somaliland government to build an Emirati military base in return for millions of dollars in investments and aid packages.62 Interestingly, the agreement’s language hinted to some extent at the acceptance of Somaliland as an independent state and not as an autonomous region of Somalia, as well as affirming the UAE’s commitment towards the security of Somaliland. More recently, in 2018 the UAE officially recognized the Somaliland passport as a valid document and added Somaliland to its database of countries.63 It has also been suggested that this Emirati engagement about came as a result of intense Ethiopian diplomatic and political efforts to compel the UAE to choose Somaliland as its preferred anchor point.64 The decision by Somaliland highlights the criticality of acquiring Emirati support from a security and economic perspective. The deal with the Emiratis has been marketed by him and his party as revolutionary for the republic, and one that will result in huge economic opportunities for Somaliland’s citizens.65 From a regional perspective, the commencement of work on the Berbera port has been equally impactful for Ethiopia. The construction of a functioning deep sea water port in Berbera gives the landlocked African nation another maritime access point. Additionally, the Emiratis will modernize the transportation

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route connecting Berbera with Ethiopia, as well as upgrading its airport.66 The port of Berbera is critically important for Ethiopia, for several reasons. It will help in ending the near-complete Ethiopian dependence on Djibouti for its trade, as well as being crucial for the development of Ethiopia’s remote eastern region. Facilitating the inclusion of the livestock and agricultural resources of this part of Ethiopia into the export net, especially with respect to the Arabian Gulf countries, will also be a positive for Ethiopian economy. In this way the Emirati policy of securing vital ports across the Horn of Africa’s coastal regions for its own geostrategic purposes is in turn impacting upon local political realities within the Horn, and it would not be wrong to imply that this Emirati posturing has the potential to reorient intra-Horn politics.67 An example of this is the Emirati mediation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which will be discussed now.

Emirati mediation between Eritrea and Ethiopia In addition to developing and controlling various ports across the Horn of Africa, the UAE has also moved into the politics of Horn states and is increasingly becoming a mediator in regional conflicts. The stratagem inherent in Emirati manoeuvring was apparent when it brokered a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea, ending the nearly two-decades-old conflict between the Horn nations. Although, traditionally, Ethiopia’s ties with the Gulf nations have remained rather cold, owing to their support for its neighbours mainly, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, since the turn of century things have started to change. Issues ranging from food security to countering radicalism have brought the strategic outlook of Emirates more in line with that of Ethiopia. The Emirati engagement with Somaliland, which retains excellent ties with Ethiopia, and guarantees to Ethiopia regarding any possible Egyptian adventurism have further strengthened this transregional partnership.68 The one problem in furthering this relationship had been the Emirati proximity with Eritrea as a result of the conflict in Yemen; and without normalization of ties between the two countries the Emirati goal of becoming indispensable for regional security could not have been achieved. The arrival of a dynamic new leadership in the form of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia, ready to take revolutionary steps both at home and abroad, has been instrumental alongside robust Emirati diplomacy and extensive engagement between the two sides to sign a peace deal. An injection of $3 billion economic aid from the Emirates further sweetened the deal for Ethiopia. This agreement also signalled the increased political weight that the Emirates has acquired over time within the Horn, and the new contours of regional security linking the Horn with the Middle East.69 It also shows

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that external actors are reordering not only the dynamics of conflict but also the modalities of peace in the region, in close coordination with local actors, and are successful when the internal dynamics create an opportunity for such actions. This affirms the argumentation in the theoretical section of this chapter that, no matter how significant has been the influence of external actors, specifically from the Middle East and Arabian Gulf, in the new security environment emerging within the Horn, the principal actors are still very much local and it is their commitment towards developing intra-regional engagement that will ultimately change the political and security dynamics within the region. The patterns of peace and conflict still remain very much localized. A key question for Ethiopia remains how it will balance its relationship with its political and strategic partner, the Emirates, with the ties it has with Turkey and Qatar, who are also financing projects in the country.70 Keeping out of the rivalries that plague the Middle East will remain a big test for Ethiopia, since most of its neighbours have been forced to take sides.

Conclusion Both Turkey and the UAE are pursuing strategic goals in the Horn of Africa. For Turkey it is mainly about cementing strong economic linkages with the countries in the region and positioning itself as their principal trade partner, but also about investing in a strategic manner so as to reap not only economic rewards but also the strategic prestige that comes with successful engagement within fragile regions and failed states. To this end, Turkey has moved ahead with its soft-power offensive and has poured humanitarian aid into Somalia, as well as initiating projects centred on improving infrastructure and capacity development. Its security engagement with Somalia – constructing a military base and training Somali security forces – essentially means that Turkey will have an impact on the project of Somali nation building. This will effectively entrench Turkish influence and the Turkish political and economic model within the future outlook of the Somali state. The Turkish decision to open up a military base should be seen as continuation of this strategy, but also with additional involvement within the security domain. It is pertinent to mention here that this Turkish engagement has all the potential to create a Somali state that aligns with Turkish foreign policy interests in the region and defending it in regional fora,71 but can also serve as a starting point for a broader Turkish long-term strategic presence in this part of Africa. The Turkish activities in Sudan, although being countered by its rivals, also suggest a similar pattern of investing in economically unstable and fragile

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states so as to gain a foothold in their economies and then utilizing this to impact on their foreign and security outlook. The UAE, on the other hand, has strategic goals that are more security oriented. It wants to strengthen its strategic footprint in the region and to become a principal actor when it comes to the Red Sea security environment. This approach is directly linked with Emirati structural embeddedness in Yemen. Both the Horn of Africa and Yemen overlook the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The UAE understands that in order to become a vital actor for the security of this strait and a bulwark against Iranian influence in the region, and to check terrorist organizations, it has to expand its presence on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb. This elevates the UAE’s political status from a Gulf commercial hub and positions it as a rather middle-sized power that has a capability to impact on the strategic and security environment of the region. This invariably enhances the incentives for international powers to engage with the Gulf states. The nature of the strategic goals pursued by both Turkey and the UAE joins the broader political and security spheres of the Middle East and those of the Horn. This entrenches both states within the broader politics of Horn in such a way that they are able to impact upon local developments within the Horn countries, thus manipulating the security and political environments of the region. The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been possible only with the active mediation of the Emirati leadership, highlighting this new-found political role of the UAE, which may become further involved as a mediator between Ethiopia and Egypt. If this model is pursued further, we can see the geopolitics of the Horn evolving in a manner that posits external political actors from the Middle East such as Turkey and the UAE as key stakeholders who eventually will further embed and intertwine the regional security dynamics across both sides of the Red Sea.

Notes 1 A. Weber, ‘Red Sea: Connecter and Divider’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, November 2017, www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/redsea-as-connecter-and-divider/, accessed 1 September 2018. 2 K. Kausch, ‘Competitive Multipolarity in the Middle East’, The International Spectator 50, no. 3 (2015), pp. 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015. 1055927. 3 J. Burke, ‘Middle East’s Leaders Cross the Red Sea to Woo East Africa’, The Observer, 12 September 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/12/ middle-east-scramble-power-east-africa-sudan-kenya-ethiopia. 4 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4.

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5 Ibid., p. 242. 6 D. Frazier and R. Stewart-Ingersoll, ‘Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes’, European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010), pp. 731–753, https:// doi.org/10.1177/1354066109359847. 7 J. A. Lefebvre, ‘Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa’, Middle East Institute, 50, no. 3 (1996), pp. 387–404, www. jstor.org/stable/4328958. 8 R. Sharamo Berouk Mesfin, ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa’, Institute for Security Studies Africa, 29 April 2011, https://issafrica.org/ research/monographs/regional-security-in-the-post-cold-war-horn-of-africa. 9 S. Healy, ‘Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel’, Chatham House, 2008, www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0608hornafrica.pdf. 10 K. Mustafa Medani, ‘The Horn of Africa in the Shadow of the Cold War: Understanding the partition of Sudan from a Regional Perspective’, The Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 2 (2012), pp. 275–294, https://doi.org/10.108 0/13629387.2011.613188. 11 H. Verhoeven, ‘The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order’, Civil Wars 20, no. 3 (2018), pp. 333–357, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1483125. 12 Mesfin, ‘Regional Security in the Post-Cold War’, p. 12. 13 K. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula’, Middle East Policy 18, no. 2 (2011), pp. 120–135, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475–4967.2011.00490.x. 14 A. Brennan, ‘The UAE Weaves a Regional “String of Pearls”’, Asia Times, 26 May 2018, https://asiatimes.com/2018/05/the-uae-weaves-a-regional-string-of-pearls/. 15 The Economist, ‘The Ambitious United Arab Emirates’, The Economist, 6 April 2018, www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/04/06/the-ambitiousunited-arab-emirates. 16 F. Donelli, ‘Somalia and Beyond: Turkey in the Horn of Africa’, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 1 June 2020, www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/ somalia-and-beyond-turkey-horn-africa-26379. 17 D. Shinn, ‘Turkey’s Engagement in sub-Saharan Africa Shifting Alliances and Strategic Diversification’, Chatham House, September 2015, pp. 1–18, www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150909Turkey SubSaharanAfricaShinn.pdf. 18 N. Melvin, ‘The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, www.sipri.org/publications/ 2019/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/new-external-security-politics-horn-africaregion. 19 F. Lawson, ‘GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas’, Gulf Affairs, Foreign Policy Trends in the GCC States (Autumn 2017), pp. 6–11, www.oxgaps.org/gulf-affairs/bulletins/new-item-276/ publications/foreign-policy-trends-in-the-gcc-states.

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20 Z. Vertin, ‘Turkey and the New Scramble for Africa: Ottoman Designs or Unfounded Fears?’, Brookings, 19 May 2019, www.brookings.edu/research/ turkey-and-the-new-scramble-for-africa-ottoman-designs-or-unfounded-fears/. 21 Y. Sheiko, ‘The United Arab Emirates: Turkey’s New Rival’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 February 2018, www.washingtoninstitute.org/ fikraforum/view/the-united-arab-emirates-turkeys-new-rival. 22 Ö. Tür, ‘Turkey’s Role in Middle East and Gulf Security’, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 13, no. 4 (2019), pp. 592–603, https:// doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1682305. 23 K. Knipp and T. Allinson, ‘Turkey–United Arab Emirates Rivalry Turns Rancorous’, Deutsche Welle, 15 May 2020, www.dw.com/en/turkey-united-arab-emiratesrivalry-turns-rancorous/a-53454973. 24 M. Schwartz, Liat Shetret and Alistair Millar, ‘Rethinking International Counterterrorism Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy’, Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 6 (2013), pp. 100–112, www.jstor.org/stable/26297068. 25 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 61. 26 BBC News, ‘Somalia Famine: Turkish PM Erdogan Visits Mogadishu’, BBC News, 19 August 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14588960. 27 S. B. Çevik, ‘Reassessing Turkey’s Soft Power: The Rules of Attraction’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 44, no. 1 (2019), pp. 50–71, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0304375419853751. 28 B. Cannon, ‘Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 16, no. 14 (2016), pp. 98–123, https:// digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol16/iss1/14. 29 F. Omar and A. Sheikh, ‘Somali Port Poised for Facelift with Turkish Help’, Reuters, 23 October 2014, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-portsidUSKCN0IC1DW20141023. 30 M. Harper, ‘Target Somalia: The New Scramble for Africa?’, BBC News, 22 April 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39654795. 31 A. Y. Abdulle and B. Gurpinar, ‘Turkey’s Engagement in Somalia: A Security Perspective’, Somali Studies 4 (2019), pp. 53–71, www.researchgate.net/ publication/335319976_Turkey’s_Engagement_in_Somalia_A_Security_Perspective. 32 Middle East Monitor, ‘Somalia Turns Down $80m to Cut Ties with Qatar’, Middle East Monitor, 12 June 2017, www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170612somalia-turns-down-80m-to-cut-ties-with-qatar/. 33 A. A. Tawane, ‘The Gulf Crisis is Hitting the Horn of Africa’, International Policy Digest, 23 June 2017, https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/06/23/the-gulfcrisis-is-hitting-the-horn-of-africa/. 34 J. Burke, ‘Ex-Somali PM Heralds “New Beginning” after Presidential Election Win’, The Guardian, 8 February 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/ somali-presidential-election-won-mohamed-abdullahi-mohamed. 35 A. Soliman, ‘Gulf Crisis Is Leading to Difficult Choices in the Horn of Africa’, Chatham House, 29 June 2017, www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/gulfcrisis-leading-difficult-choices-horn-africa.

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36 M. Ozkan, ‘The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid: An Analysis from the Somali Laboratory’, in I. Bergamaschi, P. V. Moore and A. B. Tickner (eds), South–South Cooperation Beyond the Myths: Rising Donors, New Aid Practices? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, International Political Economy Series, 2017), pp. 59–78. 37 A. Arman, ‘Erdogan: The Hero of Somalia’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2015, www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-20151211 24331818818.html. 38 M. Wasuge, ‘Turkey’s Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little’, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 21 February 2016, www.heritageinstitute.org/ turkeys-assistance-model-in-somalia-achieving-much-with-little/. 39 B. J. Cannon, ‘Turkey’s Foray into Somalia Is a Huge Success, but There Are Risks’, The Conversation, 4 February 2018, https://theconversation.com/ turkeys-foray-into-somalia-is-a-huge-success-but-there-are-risks-90868. 40 M. Ozkan and S. Orakci, ‘Viewpoint: Turkey as a “Political” Actor in Africa – An Assessment of Turkish Involvement in Somalia’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 2 (2015), pp. 343–352. 41 M. Kırıkçıoğlu, ‘Business Council Calls for Boosting Turkish–Somali Trade Ties’, Daily Sabah, 31 October 2019, www.dailysabah.com/business/2019/10/31/ business-council-calls-for-boosting-turkish-somali-trade-ties. 42 P. Antonopoulos, Oliver Villar, Drew Cottle and Aweis Ahmed, ‘Somalia: Turkey’s Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-imperialist Rivalries’, Journal of Comparative Politics 10, no. 2 (2017), pp. 4–18. 43 B. Gönültaş, ‘Erdogan Calls for More Turkish Investment in Sudan’, Anadolu Ajansı, 26 December 2017, www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/erdogan-calls-for-moreturkish-investment-in-sudan/1014914. 44 M. Gurbuz, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests in the Horn of Africa’, Arab Center, Washington, DC, 22 February 2018, http://arabcenterdc.org/ policy_analyses/turkeys-challenge-to-arab-interests-in-the-horn-of-africa/. 45 P. Tremblay, ‘There Is No Room Left for Erdogan in Sudan Turmoil’, Al-Monitor, 5 July 2019, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/turkey-sudan-thereis-no-room-left-for-erdogan-in-turmoil.html. 46 D. Jones, ‘Analysts: Ouster of Sudanese Leader Hurts Ankara’s Regional Goals’, Voice of America, 29 April 2019, www.voanews.com/middle-east/ analysts-ouster-sudanese-leader-hurts-ankaras-regional-goals. 47 H. Hendawi, ‘Sudan’s International Charm Offensive Continues with UAE Visit’, The National, 8 October 2019, www.thenational.ae/world/mena/sudans-international-charm-offensive-continues-with-uae-visit-1.921014. 48 P. Dost, ‘Turkey’s Growing Presence in Africa, and Opportunities and Challenges to Watch in 2018’, Atlantic Council, 26 March 2018, www.atlanticcouncil.org/ commentary/event-recap/turkey-s-growing-presence-in-africa-and-opportunitiesand-challenges-to-watch-in-2018/. 49 A. Sano, ‘Turkey Jockeys with China for Influence in Africa’, Nikkei Asian Review, 12 May 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ Turkey-jockeys-with-China-for-influence-in-Africa.

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50 E. Meseret, ‘Ethiopian Schools Linked to Turkish Cleric Are Sold’, AP News, 1 March 2017, https://apnews.com/e77b1fc75a0b43c794c5c1a3e7dc5b99. 51 H. Ibish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6 April 2017, https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf. 52 D. Dudley, ‘East Africa Becomes a Testing Ground for UAE and Qatar as They Battle for Influence and Opportunity’, Forbes, 4 April 2018, www.forbes.com/ sites/dominicdudley/2018/04/04/uae-qatar-horn-of-africa-proxy-dispute/. 53 A. Mello and M. Knights, ‘West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates’, War on the Rocks, 2 September 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-sue z-for-the-united-arab-emirates. 54 I. N. Telci, ‘A Lost Love between the Horn of Africa and UAE’, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 28 May 2018, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/05/ lost-love-horn-africa-uae-180528092015371.html. 55 J. Maina, ‘UAE’s Military Base Plan in Somaliland Fuels Concern over Relations with Neighbour’, All East Africa, 14 January 2017, www.alleastafrica.com/2017/ 01/14/uaes-military-base-plan-in-somaliland-fuels-concern-over-relations-withneighbors/. 56 M. Plaut, ‘Qatar’s Conflict with Its Neighbours Can Easily Set the Horn of Africa Alight’, The Conversation, 19 June 2017, https://theconversation.com/ qatars-conflict-with-its-neighbours-can-easily-set-the-horn-of-africa-alight-79644. 57 Reuters staff, ‘Qatar Withdraws Troops from Djibouti–Eritrea Border Mission’, Reuters, 14 June 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-djibouti-idUSKBN1950W5. 58 Staff reporter, ‘Somalia: President Farmajo meets with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’, Garowe Online, 21 November 2017, www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/ somalia-president-farmajo-meets-with-abu-dhabi-crown-prince. 59 M. Lynch, ‘Three Big Lessons of the Qatar Crisis’, The Washington Post, 14 July 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/14/ three-big-lessons-of-the-qatar-crisis/. 60 Crisis Group, ‘Somalia and the Gulf Crisis’, International Crisis Group, 5 June 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis. 61 M. A. Ruble, ‘“Neutral” Somalia Finds Itself Engulfed in Saudi Arabia–Qatar Dispute’, African Arguments, 16 August 2017, https://africanarguments.org/2017/08/16/ neutral-somalia-finds-itself-engulfed-in-saudi-arabia-qatar-dispute/. 62 A. Cornwell, ‘UAE to Train Somaliland Forces under Military Base Deal – Somaliland President’, Reuters, 15 March 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/ uk-emirates-somaliland-president/uae-to-train-somaliland-forces-under-militarybase-deal-somaliland-president-idUKKCN1GR2ZN. 63 S. Essa, ‘Breaking News: UAE Has Accepted Somaliland Passport’, Africa Times News, 12 March 2018, https://afrika-times.com/2018/03/12/breaking-newsuaehas-accepted-somaliland-passport/. 64 B. Cannon and A. Rossiter, ‘Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa’, Rising Powers Quarterly 2, no. 4 (2017), pp. 7–29, https://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shiftingbalance-power-horn-africa/.

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65 I. N. Telci and T. O. Horoz, ‘Bases in the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates’, Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (2018), pp. 143–166, www.jstor.org/ stable/26390312?seq=14#metadata_info_tab_contents. 66 J. Patinkin, ‘Testing the Waters: Somaliland Dives into the International Arena’, Messenger Africa, 3 April 2017, https://messengerafrica.com/2017/04/03/testingthe-waters-somaliland-dives-into-the-international-arena/. 67 D. Stayn, ‘The Politics of Ports in the Horn: War, Peace and Red Sea Rivalries’, African Arguments, 18 July 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/07/18/ politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-rivalries/. 68 T. Khan, ‘Ethiopia–Eritrea Reconciliation Offers Glimpse into Growing UAE Regional Influence’, Arab Gulf Studies Institute in Washington, 13 July 2018, https://agsiw.org/ ethiopia-eritrea-reconciliation-offers-glimpse-into-growing-uae-regional-influence/. 69 A. Korybyko, ‘The UAE’s Ethiopian–Eritrean Mediation Confirms that It’s a Transregional Power’, Oriental Review, 8 August 2018, https://orientalreview.org/2018/08/08/ the-uaes-ethiopian-eritrean-mediation-confirms-that-its-a-transregional-power. 70 A. Allo, ‘Ethiopia: Exploiting the Gulf’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa’, African Arguments, 13 August 2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/08/13/ ethiopia-exploiting-gulf-scramble-horn-africa/. 71 The National, ‘Arab League Warns Turkey over Syrian “Aggression”’, The National, 12 October 2019, www.thenational.ae/world/mena/arab-league-warnsturkey-over-syrian-aggression-1.922642.

7 Strategic geography in jeopardy: Qatar–Gulf crisis and the Horn of Africa Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Abdinor Dahir

Introduction The Red Sea – the connector and divider of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula – is a pathway for global goods, mostly Gulf oil to Europe and marine cargo from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. The Red Sea is also a channel of migration between the Gulf and the Horn, a known lane for piracy and a bridge for terrorists. Gulf countries are trying to expand their reach militarily, politically and commercially into the Horn. To document the implication of Gulf engagements, it is paramount to unravel Gulf state interest in the Horn. On the one hand, the unipolarity – resulting from the domination of the United States (US) in Middle East politics in the 1980s – is shifting. On the other hand, the political and security realities in the Middle East have seen major shifts, such as the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring in 2011, the fall of oil prices as well as the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) frictions. These events compelled the GCC states to adjust themselves to the changing climate by (a) direct military intervention (e.g. Bahrain, Yemen and Libya), (b) resisting political Islam-led revolutions (e.g. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood) and (c) increasing overseas political and military engagements (e.g. in the Horn). The control of this area along the Red Sea coast is vital for the delivery of goods as well as for GCC state security. Some GCC states, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are angered by alleged Iranian support to the Houthi rebels, who overturned Yemen’s government in 2014. They have also been furious about Iranian activism in the Horn and have been relatively successful in dislodging Tehran from this region. Furthermore, the political realities in the Middle East have divided the GCC, with the 2017 rift between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, on one hand, and Qatar on the other. Following the rift, a fierce competition

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ensued to win allies across the world, including in the Horn of Africa. While Djibouti and Eritrea supported the blockading countries – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain – Sudan and Somalia adopted a neutral position, and Ethiopia and Kenya expressed concern. Consequently, GCC competition resulted in unfamiliar challenges across the Horn. While studies have investigated historical and cultural Gulf–Horn relations, especially through the lenses of Islamic propagation and humanitarian endeavours, the implications of the intra-Gulf dispute, i.e. the Qatar crisis, on the Horn – one of the most unstable parts of Africa – remain largely academically unexplored. Based on historical and qualitative data, including oral interviews with policy makers and academics as well as ordinary people’s views, this chapter examines the GCC states’ engagement in the Horn since June 2017, when the so-called Qatar–Gulf crisis erupted. The historical analysis approach adopted in this chapter is based on the Buzan and Wæver’s Regional Security Complex theory, in which they argue that ‘since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters’.1 Although the Horn is not part of Middle East, I argue that it has become an integral part of GCC state security since 2011. Recent studies, such as that conducted by Huliaras and Kalantzakos, have found that ‘geopolitics, security issues, competing religious affiliations, resource competition, food shortages and crises resulting from a changing climate’ have paved the way for GCC state involvement in the Horn region.2 Additionally, Harry Verhoeven explains the increasing Gulf–Horn regional security interdependence as ‘not merely the product of material forces but an explicitly social construct, shaped by ideology, identity and history’.3 Regarding why Horn nations allow such increased competition from the Gulf, this chapter argues that closely studying the foreign policy decision making of these countries reveals an established governance system based on exchange of loyalties and services to accumulate power and means. In fact, Alex de Waal contemplates that politics in the Horn functions on a ‘political marketplace’ and that the politicians of this region ‘exchange services and rewards, loyalty and money, for prices that are set by the elementary principles of supply and demand, and also influenced by whoever is able to regulate the market’. Ismail N. Telci has singled out that the Horn’s proximity to the Middle East, as well as its sizable populations (i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan etc.), have compelled many actors, including the GCC states, to regard it ‘as a potential power base in securing their interests in global politics’.4 Robert I. Rotberg has detected that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates of the Gulf have propagated Salafism – a form of Islam that some Muslims in the Horn say is ‘foreign imposition of Islamic practices’ – via Islamic charities and schools.5 In accordance with these findings, this

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chapter argues that GCC states consider the Horn region as their natural sphere of influence. It concludes that the 2017 intra-Gulf dispute could exacerbate political conflicts, particularly in Somalia, and jeopardize regional security. On 5 January 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar decided to end their bitter three-and-half-year dispute. The Quartet lifted their blockade on Qatar and re-established diplomatic ties with Doha. Although the end of the blockade is a welcome step forward, the Qatar crisis is far from over and its implications will continue far beyond the Gulf’s shores. The decision to lift the blockade occurred without Qatar meeting a single ones of the Saudi-led bloc’s thirteen demands, especially without any concessions from Qatar on its drift toward Iran or its alleged support for Islamist actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As the intra-Gulf rivalries resulting from the deep-seated mistrust between the GCC states continue, the Horn of Africa will continue to witness a power struggle between these states and remain an unresolved source of friction.

GCC state engagements in the Horn: the case of Qatar The existing international relations literature usually reiterates that small states rarely have independent foreign policy, primarily due to their lack of power and global importance. Rather, they mostly rally behind greater powers in order to balance their foreign relations. Robert Mason contests this theory by contending that ‘small states such as Qatar and the UAE can break the mould of small-state classification’ and extend their influence, regionally and globally.6 This is due to a host of factors: huge natural resource reserves provide some small GCC states with considerable relevance in the global political economy; their potential to benefit from a competitive edge provided by their ‘diplomatic risk-taking, especially in the area of diplomatic mediation’; the possibility that some small states could further universalize their military ties (e.g. the UAE) and can manage versatile alliance motifs; and the capability of small states to tackle sizable internal political, economic and social issues.7 Gerd Nonneman agrees that small states with material resources would wield a competitive advantage to pursue and/or maintain a domestic, regional or international environments.8 In line with these assertions, Qatar’s foreign policy shows three periods. From in 1972 until 1995, the tiny Gulf monarchy closely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia. Qatari politicians and civilians alike have considered Riyadh a ‘big sister’ and remained in its shadows since 1995. One of the primary reasons for this policy was to seek a balance against the regimes of Iraq and Iran, which both had territorial claims on

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other Gulf microstates. Another explanation was the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent outbreak of the Iraq–Iran War in 1980. The Iranian Revolution was primarily determined to export its revolutionary ideology to other parts of the Middle East, and that was perceived as an imminent security threat in all Gulf capitals. During the second period (1995–early 2011), Doha developed a robust and independent foreign policy based on activism and the excessive exercise of soft power to secure its position regionally and internationally. It has further developed its relations with the Western powers including the US, United Kingdom and France. In 2002, the US established the headquarters for US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha, which boosted Qatar’s standing in the region. Moreover, Qatari officials employed diplomatic shuttles for mediating various belligerent states and groups in MENA and beyond. In the third phase (2011–17, the Qatar– Gulf crisis), Qatari foreign policy witnessed (1) a departure from the traditional pan-Arab ideology; (2) a shift from diplomacy to participation in active hostilities and military operations in the region; and (3) a departure from the traditional Arab, especially GCC leadership, succession culture. Qatari officials have openly supported almost all of the Arab Spring movements throughout the MENA region, which toppled some long-time Arab rulers.9 This resulted in a backlash against an active and interventionist Qatari foreign policy which formed part of the basis of the so-called Qatar crisis in 2014 and 2017–21.

Conflict mediation Qatari activism in the Horn has focused mainly on diplomatic mediation. Doha assisted Sudan to resume ties with its neighbour Eritrea, which had cut off relations with Sudan in 1994. The Sudanese and Eritrean presidents, Omar al-Bashir and Isaias Afwerki, met in Doha in 1999 and agreed to resume ties. Qatar has also mediated between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels in an effort to end the Darfur conflict. Doha has also spearheaded several initiatives to bring about a cessation of hostilities and establish a more comprehensive peace deal, such as the adoption of Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011 and the bankrolling of $500 million for the reconstruction of Darfur.10 However, although Qatari mediation has received both African and global appreciation, substantial progress in the Darfur peace process has yet to be recorded, due to the problematic nature of the brawl, and the parties and movements involved. Additionally, Qatar has mediated between Sudan and Chad following inter-border proxy conflicts between the two neighbours.11 Another Qatari mediation role in the Horn of Africa is the Djibouti–Eritrea border dispute, although Qatar pulled out its peacekeeping troops because of the two states’ tacit support for the

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Quartet.12 When the 2008 brief border war erupted between the two countries, Qatar successfully mediated to prevent further confrontations. In 2010, an agreement was signed in Doha and Qatar deployed a peacekeeping mission that observed the implementation of the agreement until a final settlement of the conflict could be established. Subsequently, Eritrea withdrew its troops from the border and released some Djiboutian prisoners of war. Qatar’s activism in Somalia rose to prominence in 2006 following the evolution of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which shortly ruled much of the country before the invasion of the US-backed Ethiopian troops. Sheikh Sharif, leader of the ICU, met with the Qatari leadership, including the emir and foreign minister, in Doha. Qatar soon dispatched a needs-assessment team to Somalia, and Qatar Red Crescent opened an office in Mogadishu. As usual, Doha offered to help mediate, albeit unsuccessfully, between the ICU and Transitional Federal Government (TFG).13 In December 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia and ended the ICU’s rule. Qatar confronted the Ethiopian aggression by chairing the United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting on 27 December 2006 and requesting the immediate removal of the Ethiopian forces from Somalia. The ousted ICU officials organised an opposition conference – attended by the ICU, members from the free parliament group of the TFG, as well as civil society representatives and members of the Somali diaspora – in Doha in July 2007. In September 2007 the opposition groups established the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in Eritrea, with Qatar playing a facilitating role. This relationship with Eritrea and the support of the opposition groups compelled Ethiopia to cut off relations with Qatar in 2008.14 Nonetheless, Qatar maintained a will to unify the various Somali opposition factions; two new rounds of talks between the opposition groups were held in Libya and Yemen. Following UN-brokered peace talks in Djibouti, Sheikh Sharif was elected president of a unity government in 2009, with the opposition breaking up over his election. Qatar pressured Sharif to expand his government by including representatives from the opposition faction in the new cabinet. Additionally, Doha underwrote Yusuf Qaradawi’s 2009 peace mission to Somalia, with the aim of pressuring President Sharif to negotiate with the opposition, especially Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys’s Hizbul Islam group. Since 2013, mediation has become an important element of Qatar’s foreign policy activism. Outside of the Horn, Doha has made attempts to play a mediating and peacebuilding role in the MENA. These include between the Palestinian factions (Fatah–Hamas in 2007), between the Yemen government and Houthi rebels in 2007–8, between Lebanese groups (and contributing peacekeepers) in 2008, negotiating the release of Moroccans captured by Polisario in Western Sahara in 2004, as well as facilitating the exchange of US prisoner of war Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl for members of the Taliban

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held by the US. Mediation can be viewed as a soft-power tool for small states with limited policy alternatives to boost their profile globally as well as achieve long-term strategic goals, such as state survival. According to Sultan Barakat, Qatar pursued mediation to ‘burnish its diplomatic credentials and carve out an image as an important regional player’, while emphasising such endeavour as a ‘moral obligation’. Two factors primarily helped Qatar’s mediation efforts: the possession of the financial muscle to transport and host large delegations for long periods of time, and a ‘highly personalized decision-making structure allow[ing] a small number of key individuals … to initiate mediation efforts and leverage their personal contacts and charisma to secure agreements.’ 15

Economic investment Qatar’s economic relations with the Horn countries have been smaller than those of its Gulf rivals, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In Sudan, the reviving of bilateral ties enabled Khartoum to receive a sizable bulk of Qatari aid packages and investment in the fields of energy and agriculture. South Sudan’s breakaway in 2011, with much of Sudan’s oil fields, has dealt a serious blow to Sudan’s economy. Since 2011, Sudan has entered economic and military deals with Qatar. The following deals have been made: (a) Qatari provision of natural gas to Sudan for electricity production; (b) Doha’s 2014 deposit of $1 billion in Sudan’s central bank, earmarked for energy and agricultural investment;16 and (c) enhancement of Qatar–Sudan military cooperation, such as joint military training.17 Qatar’s economic engagements in Somalia were historically small, compared to those of other Gulf countries. In November 2017 Somalia and Qatar inked a $200 million deal on job creation and infrastructure development.18 Additionally, Qatar has investments in the real estate, agricultural, construction, tourism and mining sectors of several other countries in the Horn. In Kenya, Nebras Power – Qatar’s national energy company – is reportedly planning to invest in a 500 megawatt gas plant in the coastal city of Mombasa. In Djibouti, Nebras officials met with President Ismail Omar Guelleh in 2015 to study potential energy projects for development. In Ethiopia, the two countries have inked agricultural and infrastructure agreements aimed at revitalising the Ethio-Qatari rapprochement in 2017.19

Political manoeuvring In 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as Somalia’s first nontransitional president since the fall of the central government in 1991. Qatar was quick to develop ties with the new president, who was former Muslim Brotherhood activist (sources indicate that Qatar bankrolled his election

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campaign and helped him to beat his predecessor via members of the QatariSomali diaspora).20 During this period Turkey, which is an ally of Qatar, joined the ranks of actors in Somalia. In the 2017 election both Qatar and Turkey were linked to former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Damuljadid Party, an offshoot of the al-Islah branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The current president, Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’, is believed to be on good terms with Qatar. Doha reportedly financed Farmajo’s election campaign in 2016–17 via Fahad Yasin, a former Al Jazeera Arabic journalist.21 Somalia’s official position of neutrality has been regarded as de facto support for Qatar, especially as Mogadishu allowed Qatar airways to use its airspace.

New Cold War in the Gulf and tectonic shifts in the Horn The diplomatic dispute between Qatar and the Saudi-led Quartet resulted in a fierce competition for influence in the Horn of Africa. The conflict led to tectonic shifts in this region as these countries have been forced to adjust to the dynamics of the spat. Initially, Djibouti severed ties, while Eritrea downgraded its ties with Qatar in solidarity with the anti-Qatar camp. Sudan and Somalia have adopted a neutral position. They both remained impartial and offered support to the Kuwaiti-led mediation efforts to resolve the dispute. A press release from Somalia’s Foreign Ministry read, ‘Somalia calls to all the brotherly countries involved to settle the differences through dialogue and within the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’.22 Mogadishu allegedly turned down $80 million to distance itself from Doha.23 Sudan’s former foreign minister, Ibrahim Ghandour, told Sudanese lawmakers – some of whom called on the government to back Qatar – that Sudan ‘Will not stand neutral and we will not take sides but we are at the heart of the issue’.24 Ethiopia – a country that seemed to have little at stake – opted for a neutral stance and voiced a concern. In a televised speech, Ethiopia’s former prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, hinted that Ethiopia could be gravely damaged in the event of regional destabilisation and called for dialogue to resolve the impasse.25 Kenya has expressed its displeasure, and in 2018 President Kenyatta said that ‘foreign agents’ were destabilising Somalia, an apparent reference to the spat’s spillover effect on the country.26 Both Ethiopia and Kenya are troop contributors to the African Union (AU) forces battling the al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia.

Somalia: Gulf petrodollars in the Horn Somalia – a country that has descended into a brutal civil war following the forceful overthrow of the central government in early 1991 – is

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arguably the Horn nation most susceptible to Gulf states’ dollar diplomacy or riyal politik. Somalia has pursued a pro-Arab unity foreign policy since independence in 1960 and rallied behind the Arab League after becoming a member in 1974. Somalia, Sudan and Oman were the only Arab League members who did not break ties with Egypt over the 1978 Camp David accords with Israel.27 Mogadishu was also among the Arab capitals that confronted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.28 In the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia received military and economic assistance from some GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, which provided the Somali army with weapons, training and materials.29 Somalia has diplomatically supported Saudi Arabia. A recent example is Somalia severing ties with Iran in 2016 after Iranian protestors torched the Saudi embassy in Tehran, following Saudi’s execution of prominent Shi‘a cleric.30 Mogadishu has also backed Riyadh against Sweden after the latter accused Saudi authorities of human rights violations in 2015.31 The country also provides support to the Saudi-led war in Yemen by offering its airspace, territorial waters and land to the coalition battling Houthi fighters.32 Since the start of the diplomatic crisis, Somalia has turned into a battleground for the web of competing Middle Eastern interests. The deadlock puts the Somali government in a difficult position and may hinder its recovery process and alter the delicate geopolitical balance in the Horn as well.33

The periphery wins influence Five of Somalia’s six federal member states, namely Somaliland, Puntland, South West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug initially broke ranks with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) over its position and sided with the Quartet. They accused the FGS of taking a critical decision without due consultation with them, and ignoring Somalia’s centuries-old historical, cultural and commercial links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The FGS has the sole monopoly on certain policies, such as monetary policy, national defence and the conduct of foreign relations, according to the Somali Provisional Constitution. Additionally, some members of parliament have confronted the government’s neutral position and urged it to reverse its stance. The lawmakers confess that the country faces difficult circumstances but contend that the FGS should sever ties with Qatar and back the Saudi coalition to protect Somalia’s long-term interests. As a result, the Somali government cracked down on opposition leaders perceived to have links with the antiQatar camp, especially the UAE, and asked parliament to strip certain lawmakers of immunity from prosecution so as to prosecute them on grounds of treason.34 Consequently, UAE-trained Somali soldiers raided a defiant legislator’s home in December 2017. This led legislators to probe the UAE

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ambassador to Mogadishu over unlawful interference in Somalia’s internal politics. Furthermore, the FGS reportedly tried unsuccessfully to arrest one of the federal member state heads for challenging Mogadishu’s neutral position in the Gulf crisis.35 In March 2018 the breakaway region of Somaliland signed a concession agreement with Dubai ports operator Dubai Ports World (DP World) to develop an economic zone and manage Somalia’s Berbera port in the Gulf of Aden for thirty years. Somalia opposed the deal, insisting that it was only the FGS that could engage in international agreements and that DP World was violating the sovereignty of the country. The Somali parliament declared the agreement null and void and banned DP World.36 Soon after, DP World’s concession in Djibouti was also ended, due to accusations of mismanagement. The FGS has also submitted a petition to the Arab League and UN seeking intervention over the DP World deal and the UAE military base in Somaliland.37 The decision to ban DP World has led to political infighting between the Somali government and the parliament and eventually led to the resignation of the parliamentary speaker following weeks of political unrest.38

Locking horns with the UAE Following the FGS’s neutral stance, the UAE moved aggressively to spread influence in the country by seeking support among various Somali politicians and within federal states.39 Somalia–UAE relations deteriorated further when Somali security authorities intercepted a UAE plane carrying nearly $10 million in cash in Mogadishu airport in April 2018. Somalia said the money was unmarked and unverified by the UAE diplomats, thus signalling that it was aimed at destabilising the country. The UAE criticised the seizure of the funds, which it said were intended to pay the salaries of Somali soldiers it had been training. Somalia and the UAE signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation in November 2014. Since then, Abu Dhabi has been training Somali soldiers and police officers as part of a wider international effort to help rebuild the Somali national army. The incident led the UAE to disband the training programme and put an end to the operation of Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Mogadishu. Established in 2015, the hospital had since then been providing medical care to hundreds of Somali patients on a daily basis. Qatar, following Gulf split, doubled its offer of support to Somalia. In November 2017 the Qatar Development Fund struck a $200 million deal with Somalia on implementing development projects, such as the rehabilitation of government premises and the construction of two main roads linking the capital with the southern and northern provinces.40 In April 2018, Doha

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appointed an extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to Somalia and provided 30 buses and two cranes to be used for transportation to Banadir regional officials. In August 2019, Doha pledged to construct the Hobyo port, some 300 miles north-east of Mogadishu. A July 2019 report by the New York Times documented an alleged foreign intelligence recording suggesting that a local armed group had bombed the northern Somalia port city of Bosaso in May that year ‘to advance Qatar’s interests by driving out its rival, the United Arab Emirates’.41 Few months before the bombing, a Maltese national working as the port manager for DP World was killed in Bosaso. In 2017, the Dubai-based port operator won a 30-year concession worth $336 million to develop and manage the port. Turkey – Qatar’s ally – has relatively stronger relations with Somalia and maintains a visible presence across the country. It has been active in Somalia since 2011, when a massive famine hit the nation, and launched numerous humanitarian and development projects throughout the country. Ankara built its largest diplomatic premises as well as its second overseas military facility – where it provides training to Somali security forces – in Mogadishu. Following the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, Somalia clamped down on schools and a hospital run by the Fethullah Gulen organisation, which the Turkish government accuses of orchestrating the coup attempt.42 Following the Qatar–Gulf split, Ankara dispatched cargo ships and planes to Qatar to break the blockade. In July 2017 it established Turkey’s first overseas military base in Doha and deployed troops. Qatar and Turkey share a common vision on many fronts in the MENA region, particularly the Arab Spring events, and the base was set up to help both nations counter ‘common threats’.43

No-win situation It is said in Somalia that when elephants fight, the grass suffers the most. Indeed, Somalia’s historical association with the Gulf and its geostrategic location puts it at the epicentre of the rivalry. Although the Qatar blockade is over, the Gulf rift endures, at least for now, and Somalia stands to lose the most. The intra-Gulf diplomatic rupture has the potential to destabilise the nation, which is recovering from more than two decades of civil war and terrorism. Due to the extent of the Quartet’s investment in the country, it could be hard for the FGS to withstand Saudi and UAE pressure, especially if they were to bear down on it. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are markets for more than 80 per cent of Somalia’s livestock exports, which comprise the backbone of the Somali economy, contributing over 40 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product.44 Banning or decreasing these exports would hurt Somalia’s economy and the livelihoods of millions of Somalia’s

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most vulnerable people. Additionally, thousands of Somalis work in countries of the GCC, especially in Saudi Arabia – Somalia and Saudi Arabia in 2016 were bargaining over thousands of Somalis seeking employment in the kingdom – and the UAE, which serves as a hub for Somali businessmen. Curtailing their operations would negatively affect the country’s economy and deprive thousands of families of the remittances they rely on for their livelihood. The FGS is also seeking debt relief from the Arab League – President Farmajo announced in May 2017 at the London Conference on Somalia that Arab League members would write off their debts – but the Quartet could block Mogadishu’s effort.45 There is an ongoing constitutional dispute between the FGS and the member states (for instance, the Puntland leader announced46 that his administration could enter international deals without the consent of the FGS) over the division of power between them. Most of the regional states have expressed their support for the Saudi allies, which is believed to be the result of the UAE’s bilateral contact with them. Should Mogadishu continue with its neutral decision, Riyadh may follow the well-trodden path of Abu Dhabi, thus further weakening the FGS. Finally, the country may be further destabilised if Mogadishu decides to reverse its decision by disavowing Doha, which might strain its bilateral ties with Ankara. Despite the possibility of losing millions of dollars in aid and assistance, Qatar is a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the group’s influence in Somalia is paramount to its own influence there. There is also the Peace and Development Party (sometimes referred to as Damul Jadid), which is an offshoot of the al-Islah branch of the Muslim Brotherhood to which Hassan Sheikh Mohamud – Somalia’s former president – belonged. Almost 30 per cent of the current members of Somali parliament belong to groups with an Islamist background, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movements. Although it is not clear how long Mogadishu can continue sitting on the fence, these groups will likely challenge Farmajo’s authority, should he put his weight behind the Quartet. As African Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers begin to draw down, this could provide an opportunity for al-Shabaab to revive and to launch fresh insurgency campaigns across the country, thus risking the little peace the country currently enjoys.

Implications of the Gulf split on the Horn of Africa Regional security The Red Sea, which lies between the western coast of the Arabian Peninsula and the eastern coast of Africa, separates Africa and Asia. It is a crucial

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global sea route for trade and transportation through the critical Bab-el Mandeb strait. The Bab-el Mandeb, which is located between Djibouti, Yemen and Eritrea, links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea through Suez Canal. The strait is 18 miles wide, and an estimated 3.7 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined petroleum are shipped through it from the Arabian Gulf, heading to North American, European and North African markets.47 The strait’s strategic importance as a vital maritime trading route will be relevant for as long as oil, inter alia, continues to be a major source of energy. The Bab el-Mandeb is located in a volatile region. It borders the northern Yemeni coast, controlled by the Houthi fighters who sometimes interrupt trade by targeting vessels sailing along the route.48 The strait also passes through Domaira Island – part of territory disputed between Eritrea and Djibouti. There have been several skirmishes between the two nations over the ownership of this island, the last of which was in 2008. In June 2017, Eritrea massed a large number of troops on the island immediately after the withdrawal of the Qatari peacekeeping contingent – a development that resulted in Djibouti’s subsequent lodging of complaints to the AU and UN. Although both international bodies urged dialogue, and the AU dispatched a fact-finding mission, they are yet to find a solution or fill the Qatari vacuum.49 A Djibouti–Eritrea conflict would lead to the further deterioration of security in and around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, thus preventing vessels from the Gulf reaching the Suez Canal and those from Europe and North Africa from reaching Asian markets via the Suez Canal. In addition, a renewed confrontation between Djibouti and Eritrea could easily initiate a full-blown conflict in the entire Horn. Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt are currently at loggerheads over sharing the water of Nile River. Ethiopia has been building the Grand Renaissance Dam since 2011 to create electricity, and Egypt, fearing that this will diminish its share of water, has been very belligerent in defending its access to the Nile. Landlocked Ethiopia will most likely come to the assistance of Djibouti – Ethiopia’s major access to the sea – against Eritrea – Ethiopia’s long-term foe. Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, and the two nations fought a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000. This might also draw Egypt into the conflict, should Egypt choose to assist its ally, Eritrea, against its rival, Ethiopia.50 Sudan and Egypt have a territorial dispute over the ownership of Egyptiancontrolled Halaib Triangle, which Sudan considers a territory under foreign occupation. This adds to existing tensions between the two countries, as Sudan supported Morsi’s government before the counter-revolution which brought al-Sisi to power. This could eventually lead to a major regional conflict, thus jeopardising the already fragile security/stability of the wider Horn. Furthermore, the Horn is currently experiencing ethnic tensions that

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could have far-reaching regional implications. The conflict in Ethiopia’s Gambella region between the Nuer and Anyuaka tribes is pitting Ethiopia against South Sudan. The Afar–Somali strife is causing border tensions between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti, who all share the population. The simmering conflict between the Oromia and Somali states in Ethiopia is another challenge in Ethiopia. The pastoralist rivalry between the Somali Dagodi and Boran Oromos is setting Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia against each other. Finally, the cross-border strife among the Ogaden in Ethiopia and other Somalis is a major source of tension between Somalia and Ethiopia. The GCC states’ competition in the Horn will undoubtedly aggravate these transnational inter-ethnic issues, thus upsetting regional security and stability.51

Clash of ideologies The GCC states, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have been promoting Salafism across the Horn, following Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the growing assertiveness of Shi‘a Islam and, at times, this has resulted in conflicts. This influence also is not always welcome in the region.52 Although the current GCC split has much to do with political, economic and security interests, the rift’s potential to create religious polarisation in the Horn cannot be disregarded. One dimension of this polarisation can take the form of a clash of ideologies, and Somalia and Sudan will most likely become the first battleground.53 The tensions between Salafism and other forms of political Islam, including the Sufism and Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-related groups, may intensify. In Sudan, a chasm is emerging between the older generation and some segments of the youth who sympathise with Salafism. They have moved away from the teachings of the late Hassan al-Turabi, whose ideas have been very influential since 1989 along with the National Islamic Front. The rising number of Salafist preachers, mosques and madrasas in Sudan is gradually gaining momentum, despite the Sudanese government’s closeness to the Egyptian MB. Sudan initially backed Mohammad Morsi – Egypt’s former president – and hosted a large number of fleeing MB members following Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s takeover of Egypt and the subsequent outlawing of the group. Additionally, many Sudanese politicians, businesspeople and intellectuals contradict the Gulf-backed Salafist ideology, but for economic and political reasons they cannot openly confront it. Sudan took a neutral stance in the Gulf crisis; however, Sudanese lawmakers have openly supported Qatar and urged the government to back Doha against the boycotting countries. Like in Sudan, the quest for dominance could strike in Somalia. Although Sufism is reviving gradually in the country, political groups associated

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with different branches of the MB occupy the political scene. The opposite ideology is currently promulgated by the Jihadist teaching of al-Shabaab, which seeks to implement its own form of Islam in the country. Another important factor is the clout of Turkish political Islam and the increasing number of Turkish religious schools in the country. However, it is not clear, at least for now, how Salafist movements can challenge the dominant MB in the Somali political landscape. Finally, Ethiopia, along with Kenya, is furious with the increasing supremacist form of Islam known as Salafism.54 For many years, Saudi Arabia has promoted it across the world, and their work has been so effective that it has routed Sufism as the dominant religious practice in the East and Horn of Africa.55

Exporting repressive regimes Although there is no fully functioning democratic nation in the Horn, none of them, with the exception of Eritrea, is as authoritarian as the GCC states.56 The Gulf emirates and kingdoms are more stable than the states on the Horn shores, mainly due to a combination of family ties, rentier economic systems and their clientelistic nature, alongside a lack of personal and political freedom. These political models have no precedent in the Horn region.57 Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia already restrict freedoms in their country in a manner resembling Saudi Arabia. Sudan is currently undergoing a tumultuous political transition and prolonged conflicts in the South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur regions and has a border dispute with South Sudan – a breakaway neighbour that also has been in a full-blown civil war since 2013.58 In Somalia, the state is fractured and the government is far too weak to exercise a monopoly of violence in order to restore stability. In Ethiopia, a political transition that began in 2018 has proved treacherous: a costly war in Tigray regional state has killed thousands of people and displaced about a third of the six million population. The country is also witnessing deadly ethnic violence in some regions, including the western Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia, and reignition of the frozen border conflict with Sudan. However, any further upsurge of political influence from the GCC states, combined with growing authoritarianism, is a gloomy omen for the people of the Horn of Africa. This could plunge the region even further into a state of political uncertainty.

Shifting regional power balance The region is currently dominated by Ethiopia, economically, politically and population-wise. Since 1991, while most Horn countries were among the most unstable states in the continent, Ethiopia managed to become an

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oasis of stability. Ethiopia is one of the five fastest-growing economies in Africa and one of the five best-performing economies in the world.59 Addis Ababa is the principal seat of the fifty-four-nation AU and extensively campaigned to become the seat of the US Armed Forces’ Africa Command (AFRICOM), although the US finally decided to set up AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Several African countries, including South Africa, Libya and Nigeria, have vehemently opposed the establishment of a command base in Africa because it might pave the way an undesired US military influence in Africa or turn the continent into another battlefield of the US-led global war or terror.60 During late 1990s and early 2000s, by Ethiopia taking the lead of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – a six-member61 regional body for the Horn of Africa –its influence in the region has gained momentum and remained unchallenged over the years. One important yet overlooked aspect of the Gulf split’s impact on the Horn is its potential to change the region’s power status quo. Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia have been high since 2011, when the latter started building the Grand Renaissance Dam – a controversial project to use hydropower for electricity – on the Blue Nile. Egypt, which depends on the Nile as its main source of water for irrigation, agriculture and domestic use, fears that the dam will diminish its share of the water. Several attempts to explore solutions for this stalemate have so far produced no results as Ethiopia’s mega project nears completion.62 Although Egypt lacks trust, influence and strategic ties in the Horn, its involvement in the coalition seeking to isolate Qatar could empower Cairo and weaken Addis Ababa’s dominant role.

Gulf strategic interests at risk Security The security relevance of the Horn of Africa region to the Middle East, especially the Gulf, has always been out of the question. However, its value as strategic security belt has increased following the Arab Spring and, in particular, the Yemeni conflict –where Saudi Arabia has been leading a regional coalition to fight Houthi Yemeni fighters since March 2015. At the start of the anti-Houthi military campaign, which is also seeking to keep Iran at bay, it became unequivocal that Saudi Arabia and the UAE needed additional boots on the ground as well as conveniently located ports and bases. Four Horn of Africa countries – Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti – across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are geographically closer to most of Yemen than are the Gulf capitals, willingly lent a hand.63 While

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Sudan contributed an estimated 350–700 men to the coalition, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea provided the infrastructure to conduct the war by permitting the use of their ports, airspace and territorial waters for coalition bombing missions. The 2017–21 GCC dispute could weaken the coalition by losing the support of the African states. This could serve Iran by creating a space to develop ties with these countries. The Bab el-Mandeb – the meeting point of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, located between Yemen, Eritrea and Djibouti – is another strategic security and trading route for the GCC energy exporters. Most of the oil and petroleum products from the Gulf en route to Europe and North Africa pass through this narrow strait.64 Terrorism and piracy have been affecting both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, although currently minimally thanks to international counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia are believed to have strong links with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and IS in Yemen, respectively. Reports indicate that there is a growing relationship between the pirates and the terrorists based on transferring money, men and material between the two geographies.65 Increased instability in the Horn due to the Gulf split could serve as an opportunity for the piracy and terrorist groups to expand their operations, thus destabilising the whole region again and, of course, risking the Gulf states’ economic and security interest.

Countering Iranian activism The GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have long been fighting Iranian influence building in the Horn.66 Until 2016, Iran has enjoyed relatively good relations with several countries across the region where it used their ports to dock its naval ships, to manufacture weapons or to use as a transit point. In Sudan, Iran has trained Sudanese intelligence forces and helped Khartoum build its own weapons industry. As a result, Iran manufactured arms in Sudanese land and shipped them to Iranian-linked non-state actors across the Middle East, including Hezbollah. Between 2009 and 2012, this has led Israeli warplanes to target Iranian weapons facilities in Sudan. Sudan’s relationship with Iran has also weakened Khartoum’s ties with Riyadh, with the latter banning the Sudanese president’s attempt to use Saudi airspace to visit Tehran, and some Saudi banks suspending transactions with their Sudanese counterparts. In 2014, Sudan accused Iranian diplomats of preaching Shi‘a ideology in the overwhelmingly Sunni country and clamped down on an Iranian cultural centre in Khartoum. Khartoum severed ties with Tehran on the same day that Riyadh announced it was breaking off relations with Tehran due to Iranian mobs torching the Saudi embassy in Tehran. In Djibouti, Iran

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has used the tiny country’s ports to ship supplies to the Houthi rebels who seized the Yemeni capital in 2014 and sent the country’s government into exile. However, the government in Djibouti broke off relations with Iran in 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia, following the burning of its embassy in Iran. Iran has maintained minimal ties with predominantly Sunni Somalia by providing aid and using the Somali coast to dock its navy battling piracy and to protect Iranian commercial and oil cargo shipping.67 Although Iran tried to establish a foothold, relations with Somalia have not been fruitful. Mogadishu has accused Tehran of supporting Islamist groups in Somalia and stealing the country’s uranium deposits. In 2006, a UN Security Council report found that Iran had supplied weapons to the now-defunct Islamic Courts Union that once ruled much of southern Somalia, in for access to country’s uranium deposits. In 2013 a UN monitoring group which oversees compliance with UN sanctions on Somalia and Eritrea reported that al-Shabaab had received most of its weapons deliveries from Iran via Yemen.68 In 2016 Mogadishu severed ties with Iran following the latter’s dispute with Saudi Arabia, and in 2017 Somalia asked the US for military assistance to stop al-Shabaab from selling uranium to Iran.69 Likewise, Eritrea, which has been Iran’s long-term ally in the Horn, has sided with Saudi allies battling the Iran-linked Houthi militia in Yemen. Since its beginning, Eritrea has supported the Iranian nuclear programme, with its president, Isaias Afwerki, expressing the opinion that nuclear energy is Iran’s legal right and that Tehran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Due to Western sanctions and international isolation resulting from its border war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, Eritrea developed links with Iran by amplifying its political, economic and diplomatic contacts. Additionally, in exchange for energy and infrastructure development projects, Asmara gave Tehran a military base and allowed it to access its territorial waters and the Red Sea port of Assab. However, in 2015, at the beginning of the anti-Houthi operation, Eritrea allowed the coalition to use its Assab port and military bases.70 Following this development, the UAE established its first overseas military base, comprising an air base, a facility for military training and a deep-water port, at Eritrea’s Assab port city. Qatar’s relationship with Iran was one of the reasons mentioned by the blockading Arab countries in 2017 which they asserted was threatening the unity and security of the GCC. Although Doha’s ties with Tehran, which it shares the largest gas field in the world, was mainly based on trade, relations between the two countries improved following the spat. Iran has boosted its image in Qatar by presenting itself as a saviour of the small emirate through the provision of critical assistance. For instance, Tehran has sent necessary foodstuffs and allowed Qatar Airways to use Iranian airspace. From the Qatari perspective, Doha had little option but to increase

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its ties with Tehran in a number of areas to lessen the impact of the economic and diplomatic boycott.71 As a result, Qatar reappointed its ambassador to Tehran whom Doha had recalled in the wake of the 2016 attacks on the Saudi embassy in Iran. However, it must be acknowledged that the improved bilateral Qatar–Iran relations do not translate into similarities in their vision regarding the future of the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. It should be noted that Tehran and Doha support opposing groups in regional conflicts. For example, while Qatar considers the Lebanese Hezbollah movement as a terrorist group, Iran supports accusations that Qatar is backing extremist factions in Syria that are at war with the Iranian-supported Assad regime, e.g. the Nusra Front. Another divergence between the two countries is over the Iranian-aligned Houthi militia in Yemen. Doha participated the Saudi-led Arab military alliance in the Yemen war before the start of the June 2017 Qatar–GCC crisis. Most recently, Iran has voiced opposition to Turkey’s military operation in north-eastern Syria against the Syrian Kurdish militia People’s Protection Units/Democratic Union Party (YPG/PYD), while Qatar has backed the Turkish offensive. Only Doha and Ankara view the YPG/PYD as a terrorist entity.72 It is also important to note that Qatar hosts the al-Udeid air base – the largest American military presence in the Middle East. Therefore, Qatar’s rapprochement with Iran following the Qatar–GCC crisis could not be translated into a fundamental shift in Qatar’s foreign policy regarding Iran’s MENA role. Sébastien Boussois has demonstrated that ‘Doha’s policy towards Iran remains therefore a pragmatic one not overshadowing the fundamental differences in values and ideology between the two countries’.73 Sébastien Boussois argues that the Qatar–Gulf crisis ‘has undermined the primary mechanism of countering Iranian influence in the Gulf’. A similar scenario could take shape in the Horn, due to the intensification of GCC state competition. Distancing Iran from the countries across the Horn and the Red Sea is, of course, regarded as a significant diplomatic score in countering Iranian influence in the region. However, the continued intra-Gulf battle of wills could provide a chance for Iran to re-engage with these countries and reinitiate its influence-building efforts. During several informal exchanges of views with foreign policy analysts, diplomats and academics on the Gulf states and Horn of Africa affairs held in London, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Istanbul and Djibouti between 2017 and 2019, it was frequently suggested that Iran might exploit Qatar–GCC tension to pursue influence in the Horn. In fact, the US AFRICOM has recently noted that Iran ‘Seek[s] increased influence in the Horn of Africa’, thus signalling that efforts by Tehran to re-establish a foothold in the Horn of Africa region remain possible.74 To prevent such a scenario and consolidate their strategic relations



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with the Horn and the rest of the continent, the Gulf states would need proper planning and genuine collaboration.

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Food security The GCC states have long been engaged on how to feed their growing populations. Unrest in most of the Arab world, coupled with increases in staple food prices and memories of the 1970s grain embargo, have increased concerns across Gulf capitals. While already some GCC states import almost 90 per cent of their food, it is expected that between 2010 and 2030 the Arab Gulf states will record a 40 per cent population increase – a worrying projection for these countries on how best to feed their people.75 In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the rise in food prices, the Gulf states were concerned about their food security – primarily resulting from their lack of arable land and adequate freshwater resources for agriculture. While tiny Qatar announced that it would produce 70 per cent of its food needs by 2023 by utilising water desalination and hydroponics,76 some others in the Gulf went overseas. Gulf rulers encouraged both public and private investment in agriculture abroad, particularly in Asia and Africa. According to Nolte et al., Africa is the most targeted continent for land investment, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the world’s top ten investors.77 Although it is difficult to obtain accurate data regarding land deals, estimates record that Saudi Arabia has the biggest Arab agriculture investment (approximately 70 per cent) in sub-Saharan Africa, mostly in Sudan and Ethiopia.78 Saudi Arabia have reportedly invested more than any other country in Ethiopia’s agriculture during the last six years – with 10,000 hectares of land leased for sixty years and an additional 290,000 rented, along with a US$2.5 billion investment commitment in 2020.79 Ethiopia has reportedly granted some 1,000,000 hectares (10,000 square kilometres) to the King Abdullah Initiative for Agriculture Abroad alone.80 Likewise, Riyadh is the largest investor in Sudan, amounting to almost half of foreign investment. The UAE has followed the Saudis, with more than 28,000 hectares of land investment in Sudan.81 Similarly, Qatar was bargaining with Kenya to acquire 40,000 hectares of land in the Tana Delta as part of a larger deal to develop Lamu port.82 The Qatari Investment Fund inked a US$1 billion deal in 2009 to support projects by the Doha-based Hassad conglomerate to develop 20,000 hectares in Sudan. Human rights organisations have criticised the GCC state investments as ‘land grabs’ 83 because the deals involve alterations of indigenous communities’ lifestyle and dislocation of communities without compensation, as well as environmental degradation of nature (i.e. water, land and biodiversity).84 While

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there is already an outcry against the GCC states’ massive land deals, continuing divisions in the Gulf could risk their prospects for sustainable agricultural investment in the Horn. For example, Riyadh has arrested Sheikh Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi, a Saudi–Ethiopian dual national and the largest employer in Ethiopia after the government, following the Saudi anti-corruption purge in 2017.85 With his Saudi Star Agricultural Development, a farming venture founded in Ethiopia to supply rice to Saudi Arabia, al-Amoudi has been a leading Saudi agricultural investor in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia normally receives 40 per cent of Somalia’s sheep and goats for sacrifice during the Hajj.86 With COVID-19 placing severe restrictions on travel, Somalia, which is heavily reliant on food exports (making up 75 per cent of total exports) for jobs and income, has been left to search for alternative avenues, such as supporting new local farm projects and markets, to avoid similar shocks in future.87 Qatar has pursued influence-building policies in Africa through investments, often trying to stand up to the pressure of the Saudis and their allies. For example, in December 2017 Emir Tamim launched his first-ever tour of West Africa, visiting Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. A year later, the emir flew to Rwanda and inked several economic deals, including the acquisition by Qatar Airways of 60 per cent of Rwanda’s new airport. In February 2020, Qatar Airways announced plans to acquire 49 per cent stake in Rwanda Air. The move could potentially circumvent the 2017 airspace restrictions imposed by the blockading Arab states, by allowing Rwanda Air to carry passengers from Africa over the blocked airspace to Doha. Other Qatari investments in Africa include a move by Qatar Petroleum to acquire a stake in gas fields in Mozambique and the rehabilitation of the Sudanese port of Suakin. However, it is unclear how the fall of Sudan’s ex-leader would affect Qatari projects. In December 2019 Qatar signed an agreement with the Confederation of African Football over the hosting of the African Super League until 2021.

Skilled labour mobility In the GCC countries millions of migrant men and women, most of them from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, work in the construction, service, trade, manufacturing and agricultural sectors and as private domestic workers. In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is the leading provider of labour migrants to the Gulf countries, particularly to the UAE and Saudi Arabia.88 Skilled labour migration to the Gulf from the Horn and East Africa, with Kenya and Ethiopia providing the largest numbers, has recently surged. As South and South-East Asian governments such as the Philippines, India, Nepal and Indonesia impose restrictions on labour migration to the Gulf,

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due to alleged poor working conditions, the GCC states are increasingly turning towards East Africa and the Horn for cheap labour. As Qatar prepares to host the 2022 Football World Cup there is a huge need for cheap, skilled migrant labour to fill shortages in several sectors, including construction and service-based jobs. The region’s substantial economic growth and its proximity to the Horn have led migrants from this part of Africa to search for employment opportunities in the GCC countries continuously, sometimes causing Gulf–Horn disputes. For instance, Ethiopia temporarily banned migration to the Gulf in 2013. Horn countries accuse the Gulf powers of poor working conditions, while the Arab states accuse their Horn counterparts of not doing enough to curb the flow of migrants. There are around 500,000 Ethiopian and 57,000–100,000 Kenyan89 migrants in the Gulf. In 2016, Somalia and the Saudi Arabia completed negotiations to allow more Somalis to work in the kingdom.90 Ethiopia and Kenya seem to have the most at stake. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia appear to have used mass deportation to pressure Ethiopia and Kenya to break ties with Qatar. COVID-19 has no doubt impacted on the number of expatriate labourers in the kingdom, while more work needs to be undertaken to ensure that minimum standards are met for migrants and undocumented migrant labourers.

Conclusion The Horn of Africa has turned into a hotspot of Gulf competition. Gulf states are trying to expand their reach militarily, politically and commercially into the Horn. The control of this area along the Red Sea coast is crucial for the delivery of goods as well as GCC state security. In June 2017, three GCC members, together with Egypt, cut off ties with Qatar. The move was spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who imposed a full land, sea and air blockade on Qatar, accusing the country of supporting terrorists and developing close relations with Iran. Djibouti and Eritrea threw their weight behind the Quartet by downgrading their diplomatic links with Doha. Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia preferred to stay neutral in the intra-Gulf rift, urging the conflicted sides to resolve the impasse diplomatically. The attempt to isolate Qatar has led to difficult choices in the Horn, and some countries have been more vulnerable than others to the riyal politik of the GCC states.91 Somalia, a country with a weak central government and recovering from decades of civil war and terrorism, has proved particularly vulnerable. Somalia has taken a neutral stance and attempted to maintain ties with Qatar, continuing to allow Qatar Airways to use its airspace. Moreover, Somalia has expressed its support

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for Kuwaiti mediation efforts. This new approach contrasts with Somalia’s previous foreign policy postures, more closely aligning with and following the lead of more influential Gulf states. Although the majority of Somalis supported their government’s position in the Gulf spat, most of Somalia’s federal member states openly sided with the Quartet. Consequently, the FGS fired some key cabinet ministers, deposed a regional state leader, unseated a parliament speaker and cracked down on some opposition members of parliament and parties. The UAE’s port and military deals with Somaliland have also complicated prospects for peace talks between Somaliland and the FGS. This demonstrates the spillover impacts of the Gulf crisis. A prolonged dispute between the wealthy GCC states could hinder Somalia’s recovery and destabilise the region more widely. Gulf states continue to compete for influence and control in the Horn, and have increased their engagement in the region following the Qatar crisis. Gulf powers regard the Horn as their sphere of influence. It is the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on one hand, and Qatar, on the other, whose interests are primarily at loggerheads over this region. Time will tell if one side will come out on top before the dispute is solved. However, the contribution of the crisis to the recent political changes in the Horn (i.e. the growing Saudi and UAE role in the Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement in 2019 and Eritrea– Djibouti mediation in 2017), along with its resolution in 2018, and the impact of COVID-19, warrants further research.

Notes 1 B. Buzan, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 219–220. 2 A. Huliaras and S. Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland’, Middle East Policy, 24, no. 4 (2017), pp. 63–73. 3 H. Verhoeven, ‘The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order’, Civil Wars 20, no. 3 (2018), p. 336. 4 I. Telci, A Lost Love between the Horn of Africa and UAE, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (2018), 1–9. 5 R. Rotberg, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Santa Monica, CA: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 9–33; A. M. Ali, Islamist Extremism in East Africa, Africa Security Brief 32 (Washington, DC: Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2016), pp. 1–8. 6 R. Mason, ‘Small-state Aspirations to Middle Powerhood: The Cases of Qatar and the UAE’, in Adham Saouli (ed.), Unfulfilled Aspirations: Middle Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst and Co., 2020), pp. 157–182; R. Mason, ‘Breaking the Mold of Small State Classification? The Broadening Spheres

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of UAE Foreign Policy through Effective Military and Bandwagoning Strategies’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (2018), pp. 95–112. 7 Ibid. 8 G. Nonneman, ‘Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework’, The Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 118–130. 9 Interview with Qatari foreign policy analyst, Istanbul, 15 September 2017. 10 N. Karamalla-Gaiballa, ‘The Qatari Efforts to Resolve the Armed Conflict in Darfur: The Challenges and Obstacles’, International Journal of Sudan Research 7, no. 1 (2017), pp. 5–6; Gulf Times, ‘African Union Hails Qatar’s Mediation Efforts in Darfur’, 21 July 2014, www.gulf-times.com/story/401361. 11 E. Rosenhart, ‘Chad–Sudan Relations and the Qatar Crisis’, Afriqiya Africa Research Program 3, no. 3 (2017), pp. 1–6. 12 The reference to the Quartet should be understood to refer Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. 13 A. H. Dahir, ‘Horn of Africa Caught in between the Qatar–GCC Crisis: Case Studies of Somalia and Sudan’, TRT World Research Centre, Discussion Paper, 2018, pp. 1–18. 14 Ethiopia accused Qatar of having relations with Eritrea, and its alleged support for rebel groups in the region. At that time, Ethiopian troops were battling local Somali resistance as well as ONLF in Ethiopia’s own restive Somali region. Al Jazeera channel was reporting the abuses of Ethiopian forces both in Somalia and in the Ogaden region. In 2012, Qatar’s former prime minister and foreign minister Jassim and Ethiopia’s former prime minister Meles Zanawi met in London, and later in that year the two countries resumed their diplomatic relations. In 2013 the official visit of the Qatari emir to Ethiopia marked the full restoration of the relations, and respective embassies were reopened in Doha and Addis Ababa in the same year. 15 S. Barakat, Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 12, 2014, pp. 1–5. 16 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, ‘Sudan Says Qatar to Deposit $1 Bn as Part of Aid Package’, 3 April 2014, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaawsat/business/ qatar-2013-gdp-beats-forecasts-growth-slows-in-final-quarter. 17 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan, Qatar Sign Military Cooperation Agreement’, Sudan Tribune, 2 November 2014, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52929. 18 Goobjoog News, ‘Somalia and Qatar Sign a $200m Infrastructure and Job Creation Deal’, 28 November 2017, http://goobjoog.com/english/somalia-andqatar-sign-a-200m-infrastructure-and-job-creation-deal/. 19 Ethiopian Investment Commission, 2013 ‘The Emir of the State of Qatar visits Ethiopia’, 28 November 2017, www.investethiopia.gov.et/why-ethiopia/ economic-indicators?id=434. 20 See letter dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 119, www. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD 3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_413.pdf.

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21 M. Fick, ‘Harboring Ambitions: Gulf States Scramble for Somalia’, 1 May 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-gulf-analysis/harboring-ambitionsgulf-states-scramble-for-somalia-idUSKBN1I23B4. Gubta Online News, ‘Somalia: Villa Somalia Gets Qatar-Backed Chief of Staff’, www.gubta.com/ somalia-villa-somalia-gets-qatar-backed-chief-of-staff/. 22 H. Maruf (@harunMaruf) Twitter feed, ‘How the Gulf dispute destabilised #Somalia: June 5, #Saudi-led bloc cut ties w Qatar June 7, Somalia declared neutral position #Qatar #UAE’, https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/912800170856910852. 23 M. Ahmed Roble, ‘“Neutral” Somalia Finds Itself Engulfed in Saudi Arabia– Qatar Dispute’, African Arguments, 16 August 2017, https://africanarguments. org/2017/08/16/neutral-somalia-finds-itself-engulfed-in-saudi-arabia-qatar-dispute/. 24 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudanese FM Faces Calls by Lawmakers to Support Qatar’, 7 June 2017, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article62666. 25 Africa News, ‘Ethiopia Worried that Gulf Crisis Could Destabilize Horn of Africa region’, 7 June 2017, www.africanews.com/2017/07/07/ethiopia-worriedthat-gulf-crisis-could-destabilize-horn-of-africa-region/. 26 F. Kibet, ‘Foreign Agents Destabilising Somalia – Kenyan President’, 3 May 2018, http://goobjoog.com/english/foreign-agents-destabilising-somalia-kenyan-president/. 27 J. Miller, ‘Jordan Resuming Ties with Egypt It Broke in 1979’, 26 September 1984, www.nytimes.com/1984/09/26/world/jordan-resuming-ties-with-egypt-itbroke-in-1979.html. 28 CNN Library, ‘Arab League Fast Facts’, 25 March 2017, https:// edition.cnn.com/2013/07/30/world/meast/arab-league-fast-facts/index.html. 29 H. Chapin, ‘Somalia: A Country Study’, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, pp. 174–176. 30 Reuters, ‘Somalia Received Saudi Aid the Day It Cut Ties with Iran: Document’, 17 January 2016, http://reut.rs/1SVXeIj. 31 H. Farah, ‘Somalia Interferes with Sweden–Saudi Arabia Row’, 24 March 2015, https://horseedmedia.net/2015/03/24/somalia-interferes-with-sweden-saudiarabia-row/. 32 A. Ahmed, ‘Somalia Lends Support to Saudi-led Fight against Houthis in Yemen’, 7 April 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/somalia-aids-saudiled-fight-against-houthis-yemen. 33 Interview with Somali government official, Istanbul, 8 July 2018. 34 Hiiraan Online, ‘Attorney General Accuses Two MPs for Treason’, 17 December 2017, www.hiiraan.com/news4/2017/dec/145767/attorney_general_accuses_two_ mps_for_treason.aspx. 35 In 2020 Abdullahi Mohamed Ali ‘Sanbalolshe’, who served as the director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency of Somalia between April and October 2017, told local media that he had refused an order by the SFG leadership to arrest and subsequently unseat leader of Galmudug state for siding with the Quartet and breaching Somalia’s neutrality position. Dhacdo TV, ‘Wareysi kulul Taliye Sanbaloolshe oo waxbadan Fashilay’ (Former Spy Chief Sanbaloolshe unveiled a lot in an engrossing interview), 12 February 2020, online video (21:40–22:32), www.youtube.com/watch?v=kH9mPtlbclY.

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36 Reuters Staff, ‘Somalia bans Dubai Ports Operator DP World, Says Contract with Somaliland Null’, 13 March 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-ports/ somalia-bans-dubai-ports-operator-dp-world-says-contract-with-somaliland-nullidUSKCN1GP10E. 37 Al Jazeera, ‘Somalia Calls for UN Action against UAE Base in Berbera’, 27 March 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/somalia-calls-action-uae-baseberbera-180327172528871.html. 38 Interview with two Somali legislators, Mogadishu, 28 June 2018. 39 International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia and the Gulf Crisis’, Africa Report 260 (2018), pp. 1–28. 40 Middle East Monitor, ‘Qatar supports Somalia with Projects Worth $200m’, 29 November 2017, www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171129-qatar-supportssomalia-with-projects-worth-200-million/. 41 R. Bergan and D. Kirkpatrick, ‘With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia’, New York Times, 22 July 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/ world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html. 42 Reuters, ‘In Debt to Turkey, Somalia Shuts Network Tied to Fethullah Gulen’, New York Times, 30 July 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/world/europe/ in-debt-to-turkey-somalia-shuts-network-tied-to-fethullah-gulen.html. 43 The New Arab, ‘Turkey to Deploy Troops to Qatar to “Counter Threats”’, 29 April 2016, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/4/29/turkey-to-deploytroops-to-qatar-to-counter-threats. 44 FAO, ‘Somalia Registers Record Exports of 5 Million Livestock in 2014’, 29 April 2015, www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/283777/icode/. 45 Interview with senior Somali politician, Oxford, 10 August 2018. 46 Garowe Online, ‘Somalia: Puntland Can Reach Deals with Foreign Countries, Says President’, 16 April 2018, www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/ somalia-puntland-can-reach-deals-with-foreign-countries-says-president. 47 EIA, ‘Oil Trade off Yemen Coast Grew by 20% to 4.7 Million Barrels per Day in 2014’, 23 April 2015, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=20932#. 48 J. Pothecary, ‘Dangerous Waters: The Situation in the Bab El-Mandeb Strait’, 21 September 2016, http://cimsec.org/dangerous-waters-situation-bab-el-mandeb-strait/29508. 49 S. Solomon, ‘UN, AU Call for Restraint along Eritrea–Djibouti Border’, 20 June 2017, www.voanews.com/a/united-nations-african-union-call-restraint-alongeritrea-djibouti-border/3908850.html. 50 This chapter uses analysis made before the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 8 July 2018. 51 Interview with two former ministers of SFG (Istanbul, 16 May 2018) and a staffer at the International Crisis Group (Nairobi, 10 May 2018). 52 Field notes, 9–29 March 2016, Mogadishu and Adado, Somalia; interviews with traditional (Sufi) imams, 16 March 2016. The new Ethiopian prime minister has also rebuffed a UAE offer to build an Islamic Centre in Ethiopia by stating: ‘we don’t need to learn the religion from you. You’ve lost the religion. The Islam that does not look like true Islam has begun spreading amongst you, and you have forgotten peace and how to forgive.’ Middle East Eye, ‘“You’ve Lost Islam”: Ethiopian PM

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Recounts Snub to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’, 31 July 2018, www.middleeasteye.net/ news/ethiopian-pm-says-gulf-countries-not-fit-teach-islam-1372998477. 53 Skype Interview with Horn of Africa analyst, Khartoum, 25 June 2018. 54 Interview with analyst at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, 7 May 2018. 55 In 2004, a former U.S. Treasury official estimated that the Saudi government may have spent more than $75 billion propagating Wahhabism. David D. Aufhauser, ‘An Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Terrorism Financing’, Testimony before the Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, 15 June 2004, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg95189/html/CHRG-108shrg95189.htm; see also Andrew L. Peek, ‘The Roots of Lone Wolf Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2016, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016–01–12/rootslone-wolf-terrorism; Lizzie Dearden, ‘Saudi Arabia and Gulf States “Support Islamic Extremism in Germany,” Intelligence Report Finds’, The Independent, 14 December 2016, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabiagulf-states-fund-islamic-extremism-germany-salafism-wahhabism-qatar-kuwaitislamists-a7473551.html. 56 The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, www.economist.com/ graphic-detail/2019/01/08/the-retreat-of-global-democracy-stopped-in-2018. 57 Interview with Horn of Africa academic, London, 14 August 2018. 58 J. Copnall, ‘Will Sudan ever Find Peace in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile?’, 8 December 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30354614. 59 The Economist, ‘The Fastest-growing and Shrinking Economies in 2018’, 5 January 2018, www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2018/01/daily-chart-3. 60 T. Pitman, ‘Africom Headquarters to Stay in Germany’, 19 February 2008, www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Feb19/0,4675,USAfricaCommand, 00.html. 61 Members are Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Uganda, Somalia, and Kenya. Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007 over the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, although the future of its membership in IGAD is still open. 62 Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have tried to find a way out of the deadlock by assembling a tripartite ministerial as well other various technical committees. 63 M. Taylor, ‘Horn of Africa States Follow Gulf into the Yemen War’, The Africa Report, 22 January 2016, www.theafricareport.com/2037/horn-of-africa-statesfollow-gulf-into-the-yemen-war/#.V5yzx3JTQoA.twitter. 64 T. C. Mountain, ‘Choke Point Bab el-Mandeb; Understanding the Strategically Critical Horn of Africa’, 19 November 2011, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/19/ choke-point-bab-el-mandeb-understanding-the-strategically-critical-horn-of-africa/. 65 A. Ward, ‘Pirates and Terrorists Are Working Together now in Somalia’, 13 July 2017, www.vox.com/world/2017/7/13/15948184/pirates-terrorists-somalia-isis-shabaab. 66 A. Manjang, ‘Beyond the Middle East: Saudi–Iranian Rivalry in the Horn of Africa’, International Relations and Diplomacy 5, no. 1 (2017), p. 56. 67 A. Farrar-Wellman, ‘Somalia–Iran Foreign Relations’, 10 May 2010, www. criticalthreats.org/analysis/somalia-iran-foreign-relations. 68 L. Charbonneau, ‘Exclusive: U.N. Monitors See Arms Reaching Somalia from Yemen, Iran’, 11 February 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-arms-un/

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exclusive-u-n-monitors-see-arms-reaching-somalia-from-yemen-iranidUSBRE9190E420130210. 69 H. Maruf, ‘Somalia Seeks US Help, Says Militants Plot to Supply Uranium to Iran’, 1 September 2017, www.voanews.com/a/somalia-seeks-united-states-helpsays-militants-plot-supply-uranium-iran/4011878.html. 70 I. Gridneff, ‘Saudi Arabia, U.A.E Paying Eritrea to Back Yemen Fight, UN says’, 5 November 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–11–05/saudiarabia-u-a-e-paying-eritrea-to-back-yemen-fight-un-says. 71 These include, but are not limited to, aviation, food security, diplomacy, construction and tourism. For more on this see D. Dudley, ‘How Qatar Is Being Pushed into the Arms of Iran by Saudi Arabia and Its Allies’, Forbes, 27 November 2017, www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/11/27/qatar-pushed-into-arm s-of-iran-by-saudi/#3935d9ef7c4f. 72 Reuters, ‘Countries List of Armed Groups Acting in Syria’, 16 January 2018, https:// static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20180116/armed_groups_list.pdf. 73 S. Boussois, ‘Iran and Qatar: A Forced Rapprochement’, in Andreas Krieg (ed.), Divided Gulf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 217–232, at 232. 74 Africom, ‘UPDATE #2: U.S. Statement on Manda Bay Terrorist Attack’, 6 January 2020, www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/32495/update-2-u-sstatement-on-manda-bay-terrorist-attack, accessed 15 January 2020. 75 T. Harding, ‘Security of Food Supply Paramount for Arabian Gulf Region’, The National, 25 April 2017, www.thenational.ae/business/security-of-foodsupply-paramount-for-arabian-gulf-region-1.55353. 76 The Water Network, ‘Hydroponics in Qatar: Qatar Plans to Grow up to 70 percent of Its Own Vegetables by 2023 by Using Technology Like Hydroponics’, https:// thewaternetwork.com/article-FfV/hydroponics-in-qatar-zLHQDHErhXb8_ GnKnbH4CA. 77 K. Nolte, Wytske Chamberlain and Markus Giger, International Land Deals for Agriculture Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II. (Pretoria: Centre for Development and Environment, 2016). 78 African Farming, ‘Saudi Arabia Investing Heavily in African Farmland for Food Production’, 5 July 2012, www.africanfarming.net/crops/agriculture/saudiarabia-invests-in-african-farmland-for-food-production. 79 Ibid. 80 B. Shepherd, GCC States’ Land Investments Abroad. The Case of Ethiopia, Summary Report, Georgetown University in Qatar, 2013, p. 19, www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/157927/TheCaseofEthiopiaSummaryReport.pdf. 81 N. Mhlanga, Private Sector Agribusiness Investment in sub-Saharan Africa, in FAO Agricultural Management, Marketing and Finance Working Documents 27 (2010), p. 20, www.fao.org/3/k7443e/k7443e.pdf. 82 X. Rice, ‘Qatar Looks to Grow Food in Kenya’, The Guardian, 2 December 2008, www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/dec/02/land-for-food-qatar-kenya. 83 Al Jazeera, ‘Ethiopia – Land for Sale’, 30 January 2014, http://fw.to/Mi0FXik. 84 P. Liu, ‘Impacts of Foreign Agricultural Investment in Developing Countries: Evidence from Case Studies’, in FAO Commodities and Trade Policy Research Working Paper 47 (2014), p. 12.

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85 D. Hakim and B. Hubbard, ‘He Owns Much of Ethiopia. The Saudis Won’t Say Where They’re Hiding Him’, The New York Times, 16 March 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/business/saudi-arabia-purge.html. 86 A. Khalif, ‘Why a Quiet Hajj is Hurting Somalia’, Foreign Policy, 29 July 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/29/hajj-restrictions-somalia-livestockgoats-humanitarian-disaster/. 87 Ibid. 88 M. Awumbila, Y. Benneh, J. Kofi Teye and G. Atiim, Across Artificial Borders: An Assessment of Labour Migration in the ECOWAS Region, ACP Observatory on Migration, Research Report 5, pp. 1–91, https://publications.iom.int/system/ files/pdf/ecowas_region.pdf. 89 F. Malit, Jr and A. Al Youha, ‘Kenyan Migration to the Gulf Countries: Balancing Economic Interests and Worker Protection’, 18 May 2016, www. migrationpolicy.org/article/kenyan-migration-gulf-countries-balancing-economicinterests-and-worker-protection. 90 L. Bader and R. Begum, ‘Somali Domestic Workers at Risk as Ramadan Departures Dawn’, 11 June 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/11/somali-domesticworkers-risk-ramadan-departures-dawn. 91 J. Meester, Willem van den Berg, and Harry Verhoeven, Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa, Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), CRU Report, April 2018, pp. 1–87, www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018–04/riyal-politik.pdf.

8 Kuwait’s foreign relations with East Africa

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Mara A. Leichtman

Introduction Scholarship, media and policy reports have begun to examine Africa as a new arena for competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially in relation to the implications of the Yemeni civil war (2015–present) and Qatar–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis (2017–21) on the Horn of Africa.1 To contextualise this recent focus, this chapter will outline the history of relations between the Gulf countries and Africa. Whereas GCC countries are often examined as a bloc, Kuwait – which played an effective role in mediating the Gulf crisis – has had interests in Africa that differ considerably from those of Saudi Arabia or even the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A small state very much aware that larger, powerful neighbours might once again desire its oil wealth following the Iraqi invasion of 1990–91, Kuwait has given generously to other nations as part of a strategic foreign policy. Poorer countries have much to offer in return, ranging from soldiers to votes – as evidenced by Kuwait’s election to a 2018–19 seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, with the support of the African Group voting bloc.2 This chapter will focus on the long history of relations between Kuwait and Tanzania, the largest East African recipient of Kuwaiti development assistance, within the wider context of ties between Africa and the Middle East. Whereas Kuwait’s nineteenth-century seafaring trade with East Africa came to a halt with the discovery of oil, economic interests in the continent have increased as Gulf countries seek to diversify investments following on from the decline of oil prices in 2014 and new national economic plans. Gulf countries also provide the world’s most generous charitable donations, yet these financial flows remain an under-studied example of South-to-South aid. Kuwait is often analysed along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as one of the top three Arab donors that provide more than 90 per cent of Arab

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Official Development Assistance.3 Yet Kuwait, which is still considered a developing country, while also ranked ‘very high’ in the Human Development Index, has a unique history and foreign policy that led the vulnerable young state to develop the first national development fund in the region immediately after its independence.4 ‘Kuwaiti exceptionalism’ has been extensively studied – Kuwait has free elections, a parliament and a relatively free press, whereas other Gulf monarchies do not. Herb argues that the Kuwaiti National Assembly gives the citizen majority a voice in determining economic policy.5 More recently, Kuwait’s charitable contributions, in particular to Syria after 2011, led UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to name the small Gulf country ‘an international humanitarian centre’ and Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah (2006–20) a ‘humanitarian leader’ in 2014.6 Humanitarianism is a source of Kuwaiti pride, and government officials as well as private citizens often comment that Kuwait does not have a strong army, and the country’s unsustainable economic dependency on oil faces many future challenges, but the one thing Kuwait is good at is charity.7 Whereas Kuwait has been accused of financing terrorism, the government has been working closely with the United States (US) and the international community to make internal reforms and establish laws and oversight practices to curb money laundering and terrorist financing.8 Kuwait also joined the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and is a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group. Kuwait’s relations with Africa have been on multiple – and increasingly coordinated – levels of state policy, civil society and pious individual donors. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) initially focused on assisting Arab countries (including Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Comoros, members of the Arab League), but expanded its mandate to non-Arab countries in 1975, with a focus on Africa. This assistance developed in part following the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, which was a defining moment in Kuwait’s joining other Arab countries in enhancing relations with Africa. The first country to apply for a KFAED loan after the fund’s establishment was Sudan, with a capital of KD50 million ($140 million) to expand and improve its railways, begun under British colonialism.9 As KFAED became more established, McKinnon noted a gradual shift away from infrastructure projects and towards programmes that cater for individual human needs, such as the eradication of river blindness in West Africa and other health programmes, as well as helping fishing families and landless people.10 Kuwait’s dedication to assisting African countries was also highlighted by its hosting of the third Africa–Arab Summit in 2013 on the theme ‘Partners in Development and Investment’.11 Prior to this summit, Sabah al-Ahmed was the first Gulf leader to be invited as a guest of honour at the nineteenth African Union Summit held in Addis Ababa in 2012, where he

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promised financial assistance to the African Union (AU).12 The 2013 summit was considered a huge success and saw a record attendance by African leaders. At that conference, $1 billion was allocated from the parastatal KFAED to finance development projects in Africa for a period of five years, in addition to an equivalent amount of $1 billion to be invested in Africa by the Kuwait Investment Authority, the world’s oldest sovereign wealth fund. Kuwait also announced the Abdul-Rahman al-Sumait Award for Development Research in Africa, named after the legendary Kuwaiti doctor who founded Direct Aid (previously called Africa Muslims Agency) in 1981. Direct Aid, Kuwait’s largest non-governmental organisation dedicated almost exclusively to working in Africa, is active in thirty African countries, and now also in Yemen.13 The annual Sumait prize of $1 million is ‘to honor individuals or institutions who help to advance economic and social development, human resources development and infrastructure on the African continent’.14 One official in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me that during the 2013 summit many African heads of state requested a visit to the grave of Dr Sumait. This chapter will broaden out the volume’s focus on Gulf state activities in the Horn of Africa by looking at the history of foreign policies in Kuwait and Tanzania. Whereas the work of Kuwaiti non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Horn has focused on relief efforts due to war, drought and hunger, development organisations and charities carry out a range of other activities in more stable parts of Africa. Tanzania, a historic trading partner with Kuwait, was the first non-Arab recipient of a KFAED loan in 1975 and is the second-largest African recipient of Kuwaiti development assistance (after Senegal). A Muslim-minority country, bilateral relations froze during former Tanzanian President Nyerere’s socialist experiment and the two countries have opened respective embassies only in 2015. Yet Kuwaitis remain nostalgic for the pre-oil seafaring days, where Zanzibar reminds them of old Kuwait, and Gulf tourism to Tanzania is becoming more trendy. It is, thus, important when evaluating current policy interests not to examine Gulf–Africa relations in a vacuum. Analysis should look beyond the security nexus and its corresponding (over)emphasis on more volatile African countries as pawns in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Kuwait is an important ‘non-traditional donor’, which is evident through examining its activities in Tanzania.

Critical historical context: a brief history of Afro-Arab relations Policy analysts have depicted the Horn of Africa as a new arena for Saudi– Iranian engagement on the African continent. For example, Feierstein and

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Greathead highlight how Sudan became a vital Iranian ally, establishing a military- and intelligence-sharing relationship and becoming a transhipment point for Iranian arms on their way to supply Hamas and Hezbollah in Gaza and Lebanon. The authors write that Eritrea offered Iran port access and a foothold in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, while Somalia became a gateway for sending arms and supplies to Houthi rebels in Yemen. They suggest that Saudi Arabia’s investment in the Horn was to counter Iranian influence, with the kingdom’s ‘greatest success’ being Sudan’s 2014 expulsion of Iranian officials, accused of spreading Shi’i Islam.15 Feierstein and Greathead credit Saudi Arabia’s greater economic clout, along with its position as the leader of the Sunni Islamic world, for the country’s advantage over Iran in the competition for influence in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea, which all cut ties with Iran.16 In contrast, Verhoeven and Woertz offer a broader interpretation of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. They note that the Red Sea is important for the transportation of three million barrels of Saudi oil per day. Sudan and the countries that form the Horn of Africa have never posed a threat to the large Gulf country: they have small economies and low-tech armies, yet African countries are seen as opportunities for Saudi Arabia for large-scale agricultural investments and the exportation of Saudi-Arabian understandings of Islam. Verhoeven and Woertz have even suggested that Saudi investment in the Horn of Africa can shift the balance of power in the region.17 Western policy interests have only recently focused on Gulf influence in Africa.18 It is therefore important to highlight that relations between Africa and the Middle East are not new. The renowned Kenyan scholar of African studies and political science, Ali Mazrui, wrote in 1975: Black Africa and the Arab world have been linked by a fluctuating pattern of economic and cultural connections for at least twelve centuries. In the secular field the Arabs have up to this time played two major roles in black Africa: first as accomplices in African enslavement, and then in the twentieth century as allies in African liberation. In the past several years they have built this alliance into a comprehensive political partnership, aimed at maintaining a solid front, particularly with regards to the Middle East and Southern Africa. The critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become partners in African development.

Mazrui further asserted that the relationship between Arabs and Africans has always been largely asymmetrical – with the Middle East usually the giver, and ‘Black Africa’ usually the receiver.19 Before the relatively recent power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia (in addition to other Middle Eastern rivalries) in Africa, Israel and the Arab countries were vying for influence on the continent. Mazrui argues that

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‘black radical identification with the Arabs’ was because Israel was considered too much a part of the Western world and was connected with Whitedominated southern Africa. The pan-Africanism movement had always been inclusive of North Africans, in particular Algerians. Furthermore, Arabs had been major players in movements for Third World liberation and antiimperialism.20 Mazrui makes a strong case for African countries breaking off relations with Israel due to ideological radicalism, not because they were bankrolled by Arab countries (which is the argument of Oded, among others).21 He points to the significance of the 1974 Afro-Arab General Assembly held in Algeria, for two controversial decisions: to invite Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which led to the opening of PLO offices in some African countries, and to suspend South Africa. The slogan ‘Zionism as Racism’ was linked to apartheid in South Africa and White minority rule in Rhodesia. Many African countries did, eventually, renew ties with Israel following a 1983 meeting in Abidjan. Mazrui also critiques the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1974 as ‘becoming a mechanism by which the Arabs can politically influence black Africans. On the other hand, it is also evolving into a mechanism through which black Africans might seek economic concessions from the Arabs.’ 22 Mazrui notes that by 1975 aid from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounted for one sixth of official development aid from rich to poor countries. Oil states gave 1.8 per cent of their gross national product in 1974, compared with 0.33 percent from the Western industrial states, and 0.21 per cent in the US.23 Sudan and Somalia received the largest amounts of Arab bilateral aid.24 There were other areas of Arab–African cooperation. The World Muslim Congress created the NGO Muslim World League, founded in 1962 and headquartered in Mecca, with country offices around the Islamic world, including in Africa. Seven years later in Jedda, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference was launched in 1969 to do much of the work of the Muslim World League, but as a governmental-level body. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth followed in 1972. Three secular institutions focusing on Africa were formed in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab–Israeli war and the subsequent 300 per cent increase in oil prices: the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa, the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Arab and African Countries (meant to replace Israel’s successful programme for technical assistance to Africa), and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA).25 Mazrui noted that ABEDA, established as a result of a resolution by the Sixth Arab Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973, was the only Arab fund that concentrated entirely on Africa (i.e., non-Arab African countries) and did not also lend to Arab countries.26 Jointly owned by eighteen Arab countries – all members of the League of Arab States, the bank began

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operations in 1975 from its headquarters in Khartoum. The first Afro-Arab summit held in Cairo in 1977 called for ABEDA’s capital to increase from $231 million to $500 million. The Gulf countries additionally promised $1.5 billion in aid to Africa during this conference, with $241 million pledged from Kuwait.27 Oded quotes a Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Anba, expressing disappointment that Africa took a ‘no aid no cooperation’ approach, which caused ‘profound disappointment among the Arabs who regard aid as a humanitarian matter arising out of a sincere wish to help’.28 There were, thus, long-established, if at times tenuous, economic, political and cultural relations between various African and Middle Eastern countries.29 Mazrui labelled the 1970s ‘the years of Africa’s political solidarity with the Arabs’.30 By the late 1970s, he was optimistic about the future of AfroArab relations, which, he then noted, ‘remained uncertain’: What may happen in the future is, on one side, greater structural integration between the Arab world and Africa as Arab money finds new avenues of investment in Africa, Arab policy-makers find new justification for aid to Africa, and Arab trade finds both new sources and new markets in sub-Saharan parts of the continent. This interaction would in fact result in genuine integration between the two regions. But structural integration carries always the risk of normative and ideological disagreements. It may well turn out to be that the last fifteen to twenty years of the twentieth century will be characterized by, on one side, new levels of familiarity between Africans and Arabs and, on the other side, new areas of disagreement and differences of opinion on priorities.31

This chapter will evaluate Mazrui’s predictions through the example of bilateral relations between Kuwait and Tanzania.

Economics as security: the foreign policy of Kuwait32 In addition to contextualising the recent policy focus on Gulf influence in Africa within a longer history of relations, it is also important to avoid limiting our understanding of Gulf–African relations to a power struggle between Middle Eastern competitors. Examining Kuwait’s activities in East Africa – and contrasting activities in the Horn with Tanzania – can shed more light on these South–South connections. There are more than thirty-five African embassies in Kuwait today, some under a new embassy subsidy programme that encourages poorer countries to more affordably begin diplomatic relations with Kuwait through assistance with embassy offices and staffing costs. With increased tensions in the Middle East, Kuwaitis are becoming more interested in investing economically in Africa.

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Kuwait’s turn towards Africa is not new, and began well before the 1970s. Since the nineteenth century, Kuwait – strategically positioned between East and West – actively participated in trade between India and Africa. The small country rapidly evolved from its dependency on trade, pearling and fishing to the economic boom resulting from oil discovery and the beginning of its export in 1946. Scholars have argued that the root of Kuwait’s humanitarianism lies in the country’s long history of seafaring and overseas trading relationships. While men were away at sea for up to six months at a time, women and children who remained in Kuwait assisted each other’s families.33 Charitable practices significantly increased after the discovery of oil, and Kuwait built schools, hospitals and wells, supported orphans and inaugurated charitable institutions, helping countries in need while implying ‘gratitude to Allah’. In this way, ‘charitable work converted from individual to institutional activities’.34 However, Kuwaiti humanitarianism is also strategic. Assiri began his book on the country’s foreign policy by noting that state security and the ruling al-Sabah family’s stability have been at the forefront of Kuwait’s concerns since its inception.35 Since independence from British rule in 1961, the Kuwaiti government has developed a foreign policy where security is based on avoiding regional and inter-Arab rivalries. Assiri called Kuwait’s foreign policy ‘reactive’ and ‘triggered by events and stimuli outside its boundaries’.36 As a migrant society, where native citizens trace their population to three neighbouring countries – Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (including the country’s 30–35 per cent Shi’i minority) – Kuwait must play a ‘centrist’ role to avoid a more ‘active or initiatory’ foreign policy, given that its neighbours are often at odds with one another.37 This small Gulf country, thus, established ‘friendly relations with as many countries of the world as possible, regardless of their political inclinations. The obvious assumption is that more friends equal more leverage, and more leverage is a better deterrent.’ 38 From the beginning, then, Kuwait’s foreign policy was based on providing development assistance to other countries. As its gross national product increased due to significant oil wealth, Kuwait dedicated some of these revenues to serving foreign interests and establishing friendly relations with as many countries as possible (this also dissuaded potentially unfriendly countries from acting against Kuwait).39 Kuwait was therefore the first country in the Middle East to establish a regional development fund, the KFAED, only six months after gaining independence on 31 December 1961. Scholars have referred to ‘dinar diplomacy’, which Assiri defined as ‘the power to capitalize on the financial might of the state for political and security purposes, i.e., to win friends and thwart enemies’.40 This policy to considerably redistribute Kuwait’s oil wealth resulted from the Kuwait–Iraq

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crisis in 1961, when Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait one week after gaining independence from British rule on 19 June, declaring Kuwait to be a rightful part of Iraq. When this first Iraqi threat subsided by the end of 1963, Kuwait began to play ‘the roles of donor, investor, mediator and, indeed, honest broker’ in inter-Arab politics.41 Assiri argued that the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war, the first real external threat to Kuwait, which itself became a site of bombings and terrorist attacks, had a significant effect on national politics. Kuwait’s centrist foreign policy began to change as its priorities shifted to domestic and regional security. The country resumed its parliament, cracked down on its Shi’i population, joined the GCC and realigned with Iraq.42 Kuwait learned that if it was to survive, it needed friends, and if its goodwill helped others, then others would be willing to help Kuwait in return.43 This later proved true when Iraq did ultimately invade Kuwait in 1990 and the small country received overwhelming worldwide support for its struggle for freedom and sovereignty.44 Tensions with Iraq continue post-Saddam Hussein, for example with recent disputes over the Khor Abdullah canal, and Kuwait also cautiously watches the dynamics of its other large and powerful neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran.45 Turki states: ‘Kuwait was thus more than eager to use its oil revenues to strengthen not only its political ambitions, but also its national sovereignty, food security, and internal stability.’ 46 Kuwait’s financial assistance to other countries is therefore inextricably tied to its effort to gain political support.47 This began with independence, continued during the first Gulf War, when Kuwait was dependent upon its allies to send soldiers and military aid, and persists today in the form of UN votes. Kuwait’s ‘friend to all’ foreign policy paid off most recently on 2 June 2017: the country received 188 votes – many from its allies and the countries it assists – electing it to a two-year term beginning in January 2018 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.48 The Kuwaiti government also played a mediatory role in the 2017–21 blockade on Qatar by other GCC members Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, in addition to Egypt.49

Kuwaiti assistance to the Horn of Africa Somalia is one of the African countries that receives the largest amount of Gulf assistance. I therefore interviewed Somalia’s (now former) ambassador to Kuwait of thirty years, Abdulkadir Amin Sheikh. Relations between Somalia and Kuwait, the ambassador noted, went ‘way back’ and were initially of an informal ‘family’ nature, where the Kuwaiti people long knew the Somali people.50 After both countries gained independence, relations

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became formalised and Somalia opened an embassy in Kuwait in 1975. The emir of Kuwait even owned a large farm in Somalia and during more stable times visited Somalia annually and ‘had a great passion for the Somali people’. Regardless of Somalia’s many difficulties, relations with Kuwait have always been stable, the ambassador firmly declared. He could not confirm exact dates, but stated that Kuwait was one of the first Gulf countries to engage economically with Africa and claimed that trade relations began with Somalia before Kuwait developed ties with Zanzibar and other cities further south along the East African coast. He told me that Kuwait was always ‘by Somalia’s side’, helping the fragile country to recover from civil war even without a stable Somali government in place. The assistance usually came through Islamic NGOs and humanitarian projects, but the late Kuwaiti emir had also given various orders for Kuwait to contribute to Somalia in any way possible, including through the KFAED. The Kuwaiti government had been planning a large donor pledge for education in Somalia, but this was pushed back because of the 2016 parliamentary elections in Kuwait as well as the 2017 presidential elections in Somalia.51 Kuwait did pledge $30 million in July 2021 as part of the Global Partnership for Education.52 The ambassador also remarked that when the drought was at its worst in Somalia in April 2017, he held a media interview that led to $8 million being donated within only two or three hours by the people of Kuwait, which was paired with assistance from the Kuwaiti government. This example, for the ambassador, demonstrates how the Kuwaiti people relish helping others and are deserving of the UN title.53 In addition to KFAED, the Kuwait Red Crescent Society (KRCS) carries out relief work around the world, including in Africa, and in particular in Somalia and Sudan. The KRCS was established in 1966 as a voluntary society that enjoys an independent status and has a separate legal entity, while working as a complementary organisation to official authorities in Kuwait in the humanitarian field. It works in accordance with the four Geneva conventions and the international treaties that constitute international humanitarian law. Together with the Kuwaiti government, the KRCS is a main source of aid and assistance in times of war and natural disaster, ‘regardless of religion, sect, gender or ethnicity and without consideration of intellectual or political trends’.54 After the first three days to three weeks of assistance in a crisis, considered as relief work, disaster support is recategorised as sustainable development, which also depends on requests from governments of other countries and their assistance priorities. The KRCS has been working in Somalia since 2012 on alternative solutions to the provision of fresh water, providing mobile water tanks to transport water from wells to populations in need. Cotterrell and Harmer note the post-9/11 regulatory environment resulted in shrinking competition, thereby

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making the Red Crescent Societies in the Gulf the most important humanitarian delivery institutions for the region’s international assistance, while also bringing them into an even closer relationship with governments.55 Kuwaiti NGOs, many established in the 1980s, also sponsor charitable and development activities on the African continent. Kuwaiti Islamic NGOs working in Africa include the Islamic International Charitable Organisation, Direct Aid (Kuwait’s largest charity, focused almost exclusively on Africa), Rahma International, the Sheikh Abdullah Al-Nouri Charity Society, the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage, and Al-Thaqalaine Social Philanthropy Association.56 Donors support the work of these organisations in Africa (and elsewhere) in the form of zakat (obligatory almsgiving) and sadaqa (voluntary donations). Kuwaiti youth are also increasingly interested in volunteering, and are bombarded with powerful images on social media of suffering refugees and war victims, and starving and diseased Africans, posted daily by ‘humanitarian photographers’. For example, one Kuwaiti student organisation raised funds by collecting two dinars each from donors, thereby calling itself ‘Dinarain’, and built a school in Sudan, among other educational projects.57 NGOs craft their own agendas while mediating between the specific regulations and demands of individual donors and larger national and international priorities. For example, the Sheikh Abdullah Al-Nouri Charity Society was established in 1981 after the death of Sheikh Al-Nouri to continue his work.58 The charity specialises in education as well as in more immediate relief work, which individual donors like to fund. The organisation builds mosques and wells, sponsors orphans, works in microfinance and builds schools and vocational institutes. It has projects in Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti, as well as elsewhere in Africa. Rahma International, an NGO largely connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, has large trademark complexes in Djibouti and Somalia, with similar projects under construction in Sudan and Tanzania. The NGO’s headquarters boasts large models of the Djibouti and northern Somalia complexes, demonstrating to donors and other visitors the all-inclusive structures with a school, dormitories and a gymnasium, an art academy and a hospital. I was told by the Rahma director in charge of Africa projects that this was the most technologically advanced hospital in Djibouti and is also used to bring in profit, making the ‘Rahma community’ self-sustainable. The Somalia complex also includes a farm, where crops are grown to feed the students and orphans; the surplus is sold in the market for profit that feeds back into other projects.59 The Kuwait Relief Society is the main government umbrella organisation that began in 1986 with the Somalia crisis to coordinate Kuwait’s charities. In 2017 the society launched a new campaign along with many major Kuwaiti charities to raise donor funds to assist Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria

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with famine and drought. This began with a starvation-relief media campaign and became the special focus for some monthly charity magazines (for example those of the Islamic International Charitable Organisation and Direct Aid), as well as the website focus of various organisations. The campaign followed a news article that reported on a study of the number of people affected by the crisis. In addition to coordinating the private charitable organisations mentioned earlier, the Kuwait Relief Society also collaborates with other government organisations that do charitable work, such as Zakat House, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation. The work of Kuwaiti charities in the Horn of Africa focuses mostly on relief, where security, drought and famine are primary concerns. Kuwaitis are informed through public awareness campaigns of the targeted conditions of crisis of these African countries. Yet a different picture of Kuwaiti relations with Africa can be drawn if we shift the focus away from countries in need of immediate relief to more stable African countries with very different histories of connections with the Gulf. Many countries in the Horn of Africa are also members of the Arab League, and are therefore categorised by Gulf countries as ‘Arab’, which gives them a different status than other ‘African’ countries. The remainder of this chapter will focus on outlining the foreign policy of Tanzania, and in particular the coastal East African country’s bilateral relations with Kuwait. I do not have the space to also outline the activities of Kuwaiti charities and NGOs, but many of the organisations mentioned earlier also work in Tanzania.60

Bilateral relations: Tanzania’s foreign policy and relations with Kuwait A former German, then British, colony which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, the United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 from a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Zanzibar, an important trading hub, had been controlled by the Portuguese and the Sultanate of Oman before becoming a British protectorate. Zanzibar’s foreign policy was therefore more closely aligned with that of the Arab world than the African continent’s. Whereas Tanganyika had attained independence in a relatively peaceful manner, a violent revolution in Zanzibar involved the massacre of several hundred Arabs and Asians and the looting of Arab- and Asian-owned shops. The 1964 revolution led to the overthrow of the sultan of Zanzibar by local African revolutionaries, ending 200 years of Arab dominance in Zanzibar, including a history of slavery (abolished in 1897).61

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Colonial policies created an economy dependent on foreign capital and the export of raw materials. At independence, Tanganyika’s export-oriented economy focused on certain cash crops (coffee, tea, cotton, sisal) rather than subsistence agriculture (a large part of Tanzania’s economy today), and Tanganyika was among the poorest countries in the world. Tanganyika gained independence with a weak, underdeveloped economy, poor infrastructure (transportation, communication, electricity, health and education systems), a shortage of skilled personnel, a lack of well-developed class interests and pressure groups and fragile social and political institutions. This provided an opportunity for President Julius Nyerere (1961–85) to consolidate power and shape development and foreign policies.62 Nyerere’s goal was to liberate Tanzanians from economic deprivation and political oppression. The Tanzania African National Union, which became a mass political organisation in 1954 to demand the establishment of an independent nation-state ‘for the Africans’, became the ruling political party at independence.63 Socialism provided post-colonial African leaders with an ideology by which to pursue anti-colonialism, nation building and economic development. The 1967 Arusha Declaration famously declared a policy of self-reliance and outlined a strategy of African Socialism, known as Ujamaa in Swahili. It established state ownership of the national economy and emphasised the need for national economic development that would be less dependent on foreign capital. Tanzania relied on agricultural exports to subsidise state-run industries. This was supposed to provide the foreign exchange needed to import technology and hire Western management consultants for the industrial sector. As 85 per cent of the population were farmers, Nyerere focused on rural and agricultural development and promoted ‘ujamaa villages’, whose members ‘were envisioned to engage in communal production and democratically govern their own affairs’.64 Tanzanian socialism thus depended on mobilising a rural labour force to increase agricultural production. It promised the poor rural majority ‘greater equality, an end to foreign economic domination, a war on corruption, and access to the material benefits of modernity and economic development, including schools, clinics, and clean water’.65 Development was envisioned to be a consequence of the efforts and commitment of the people rather than a result of money or international aid, with agriculture the foundation of national development (and therefore land should be owned by the state).66 The Arusha Declaration also marked Tanzania’s hostility towards foreign investment and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Politicians contended that foreign aid would create a continuing need for foreign experts and technology and would compromise the nation’s ability to create an independent economic policy. Nevertheless, Tanzania became the highest per capita African recipient of foreign aid during the

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socialist era.67 Government officials ultimately justified foreign aid as a short-term necessity that would supplement domestic resources and provide revenues for development projects. While the new government sought to attract foreign aid and capital, Tanganyika was unattractive to foreign private direct investors because of its poor infrastructure. Investors were most interested in agricultural exports and mining, over building industries that would benefit the local population. The government thus had to rely on bilateral foreign aid from Western Europe to finance its development plans. ‘In 1962–1963, the United Kingdom provided 89.5 percent of all foreign aid, and by 1964–1965, the only significant sources of aid were from the West, including the US, West Germany, Scandinavia, and Israel.’ 68 Yet these sources began to decline. The US became troubled by President Nyerere’s support for Marxist-Leninist liberation fighters in southern Africa and the Congo, and Tanzania strongly opposed the US war in Vietnam. Diplomatic ties became strained and US foreign aid to Tanzania dropped between 1965 and 1968. Cold War politics also affected foreign assistance from Western Europe. West German aid was cut off in 1965 over Zanzibar’s retention of dealings with East Germany. Connections with Great Britain also deteriorated that year, due to tensions surrounding Rhodesian independence. The 1964 union with Zanzibar reinforced the position of those who opposed a development strategy oriented towards the West and favoured socialism instead. The arrival of Zanzibari Marxist-Leninist leaders on the Tanzanian mainland also brought a different economic development approach, promoting closer relations with China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and North Korea, whereas Social Democrats turned to the Western European and particularly the Scandinavian countries. The Cold War also helped to radicalise President Nyerere when his policies of non-alignment met with hostility from the West.69 Tanzania diversified its relationships and started accepting assistance from China, Scandinavia and Canada. As chairperson of the OAU, Nyerere attempted good relations with Kenya and Uganda, but this ended with the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 (which was not revived until 30 November 1999 at the 4th EAC Summit, with a Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community entering into force on 7 July 2000). Idi Amin’s 1971 rise to power in Uganda and the 1978–79 Kagera War between Uganda and Tanzania, which led to his overthrow, further exacerbated Tanzania’s economic problems. Cross-border tensions raised the question of security in national and foreign policies, and resulted in increased defence spending and Tanzania’s non-alignment policy, used to mobilise development resources from both Cold War blocs.70 Yet Tanzania ‘received more than three times as much aid from the West (generally

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from the social democratic governments of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland rather than the Western superpowers) than from the socialist bloc’ in the 1970s.71 The country suffered during the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. More and more of the state budget went to pay off interest on loans. Ultimately, Tanzania was forced to abandon its socialist policies as the need for continuing debt servicing and relief gave donors and international financial institutions much leverage over government leaders. Wright states that ‘Tanzania was outspokenly “nonaligned” and “socialists”, but in reality it was little of the sort’. 72 Available resources were inadequate, political pressure was strong and Tanzania was obliged to seek additional economic assistance from the World Bank and IMF. As Nyerere anticipated that the conditionalities of Structural Adjustment Programmes would undermine sovereignty, it was not until President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s administration (1985–95) that Tanzania agreed to these terms, in 1986. Hodgson considers this moment ‘a radical restructuring of the Tanzanian economy from one based on socialist principles of Ujamaa, collective well-being, and communally owned resources to one based on capitalist principles of a free-market economy, privatization of resources, individual success, and profit maximization’.73 Phillips labels this transition ‘neoliberalism in the “African” sense’: ‘the opening of Tanzania’s economy to international markets, foreign debt, and austerity programs and the privatization of state industries and social services’.74 Economic liberalisation was accompanied by democratisation, including the transition from single-party rule to multiparty politics in 1992, decentralisation of decision making from central government to local authorities and the development of an independent media. Yet, this ‘dramatic transition’ was not a success and economic inequalities and political discontent intensified among already marginalised peoples.75 Green questioned how much really changed from the socialist period.76 By the turn of the millennium, primary school enrolment was at a low, infant and maternal mortality had increased and poverty had deepened.77 Tanzanian citizens suffered under structural adjustment and inflation of nearly 40 per cent, and were worse off during the first twenty-five years of independence than they had been during the colonial era.78 Economic and political transitions brought about the expanded presence of international development agencies as Tanzania’s relations with Western donors improved. Tanzania further adjusted its foreign policy in 2001 to attract foreign investments through favouring bilateral and multilateral cooperation.79 This set in motion a proliferation of civil society organisations, mirroring similar developments throughout the global South as ‘multilateral institutions and northern donors shifted their priorities and resources from supporting state-led

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development projects … to those designed and implemented by “grassroots” NGOs and CBOs [community-based organisations]’.80 Yet, in following the good governance agenda, Tanzania became one of the first countries to receive aid from aligned donors directly into government budgets. Green documents how ‘in recent years Tanzania continues to receive around one third of its government expenditure from development assistance’.81 For Miti, the East African country’s inability to ‘move out of the poverty, debt and aid dependence syndrome’ resulted in the ‘globalization of poverty’ and the ‘dictates of survival’ that determined Tanzania’s foreign policy.82

Tanzania’s foreign policy with the Middle East Nzomo’s and Miti’s overviews of Tanzanian foreign policy focus on changing relations with the West and with regional African countries; Green and Hodgson highlight Tanzania’s relationship with Western development agencies; Phillips’ ‘ethnography of hunger’ offers rural Tanzanian perspectives and is positioned against Western stereotypes. Aminzade provides a more comprehensive overview of policies, focusing on the national and international contexts that led to the formation of Tanzanian race relations throughout various historical periods. Yet these authors – and many other Tanzania experts, apart from works focusing on Zanzibar’s history83 – omit almost entirely any discussion of ties with the Middle East. The exception is Mathews, who highlights these connections within the wider context of the development of Afro-Arab relations in East Africa.84 He begins with the long history of Arab trade with Zanzibar and the East African coast, where Swahili culture also developed from interaction between Arabs and coastal African Muslims. However, he traces the origins of AfroArab policy to President Nasser’s philosophies and Egypt’s support of nationalist and liberation movements in Africa, including close ties with Tanzania and President Nyerere. Like Mazrui, Mathews notes that Afro-Arab relations were greatly shaped by Tanzania’s connections with Israel. Nyerere was impressed by Israeli experimentations with socialism. Tanzania, like many African countries, was in need of technological assistance with agriculture, joint commercial ventures, and military assistance, and Nyerere was cautious of approaching the West for aid. Nevertheless, as for other African countries, Israel’s relations with apartheid South Africa became increasingly problematic for Tanzania, whose approach towards the Arab world shifted with the 1967 Six Day War. Tanzania relied on oil for 95 per cent of its energy needs and was one of the African countries hit the hardest by the 1973–74 oil crisis.85 Tanzania thus chaired the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa in 1973 asking the Arab League to ensure that the oil embargo would not harm African states that broke with Israel to support Arab

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political gain. This meeting led to the proposal of an Arab–African summit to broaden Afro-Arab cooperation as well as the establishment of ABEDA. Yet African countries did not view this as a complete solution to high oil prices. Tanzania also led a bitter attack in 1975 against the decision by OPEC to further increase the price of oil. Tanzania, along with other African countries, additionally disagreed with some Arab policies in Africa, including Saudi Arabia’s willingness to do business in South Africa and Arab support for the Eritrean Liberation Front’s demands for secession and independence from Ethiopia.86 Nonetheless, Tanzania also benefited from relations with Arab countries, receiving $20 million in loans from ABEDA in 1975–78 in addition to a $14.2 million loan in 1974 from the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa.87 Tanzania presented a document at the 1977 Cairo Summit that criticised the scale of Arab aid to Africa, to which the Arabs responded generously. Mathews raises several challenges to Afro-Arab relations at the conclusion of his chapter, namely the rise of pan-Islamism, which led to Arab oil states giving a larger amount of assistance to African countries with large Muslim populations, as well as disunity in various Arab positions on African conflict. This culminated in the decline of pan-Arabism with the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979, which eventually led to the resumption of some African relations with Israel. Senegal, for example, was in favour of this, but Tanzania was not, with Nyerere famously stating that Tanzania would not resume relations with Israel until the Arab states did so and until ‘the Palestinian people regain their rights in their homeland’. Nyerere also reaffirmed the link between Arabs and Africans – including mutual security interests – saying ‘what may happen in Africa will definitely have its effect on the Arab states and vise versa’.88 Ambassador Jasem al-Najem, Kuwait’s first ambassador to Tanzania, informed me that Tanzania was the first non-Arab country to receive a loan from KFAED, in 1975, to establish a large factory for paper products. But relations between Kuwait and Tanzania froze from 2004 to 2014 over what he called a ‘silly issue’ with a road.89 There was a misunderstanding, following a KFAED feasibility study in Tanzania, after which Tanzania did not follow up with Kuwait but approached another partner instead. Ambassador alNajem has pushed to bring KFAED back to Tanzania, and in 2017 the country signed a soft loan agreement for $51 million for an 85 km road in Eastern Tanzania. A second loan was signed for an irrigation system in Mwanza using water from Lake Victoria, and a third project was to build a hospital in Zanzibar. Tanzania – and Zanzibar in particular – holds an important place in Kuwaiti hearts and minds. Before Kuwait discovered oil it engaged in trade



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across the Indian Ocean, from India to Zanzibar. Ambassador al-Najem reminisced: Zanzibar at that time was the place where beautiful things come … Until 1960s in Kuwait, sixties and seventies, there was a touch in every house from Zanzibar – either it was a textile or it was a chest (made in India but comes from Zanzibar) … a door, something from Zanzibar … In Stone Town [the old part of Zanzibar city and a UNESCO World Heritage centre] you have the same way or method of building – you feel that you are in Old Kuwait, in Stone Town where the houses, the style – it is the same in most Arabic or Gulf countries … So that was how Zanzibar became famous to every Kuwaiti for the trade … even the wood for building came from Zanzibar, too many spices came from Zanzibar … What is the Kuwaiti influence in Zanzibar? It is the music … When this ship comes with forty … sailors, during the night there is nothing but [to] enjoy the music, so the Kuwaiti folklore it is there on the beach of Zanzibar … So the Zanzibarians, they come during that time to the beach and enjoy listening and sharing and clap their hands to the Kuwaiti music.

Nevertheless, this history of trade and cultural connections did not have much influence on contemporary bilateral politics. Ambassador al-Najem’s summary of Kuwait’s relations with Tanzania was very brief. He stated that President Nyerere had his own way of ruling under socialism, thereby isolating Tanzania until the mid-1980s, which negatively affected the economy. Kuwait re-established diplomatic relations with Tanzania in 1967, but the Kuwaiti embassy in Kenya was in charge of Tanzania until 2015, when Kuwait and Tanzania opened missions in one another’s capitals. I also interviewed Mahadhi Maalim, Tanzania’s first ambassador to Kuwait, who is from Zanzibar.90 He similarly commented that, prior to opening an embassy in Kuwait, Tanzania would approach Kuwait if needed through their respective representatives in New York at the UN, and the Tanzanian embassy in Saudi Arabia was previously responsible for Kuwait. The Africa–Arab Summit hosted by Kuwait in 2013 led to the formal establishment of bilateral relations between Kuwait and Tanzania. The Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs had visited Tanzania in 2013 and met with many ministers. Former Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete (2005–15) was also chairman of the AU and therefore responsible for ensuring the utmost participation by African leaders in the summit. Direct communication between Kikwete and Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmed about the summit led to the opening of respective embassies. The Tanzanian embassy is subsidised by the government of Kuwait; Tanzania in return provided the land for the Kuwaiti embassy in Dar es Salaam. Kuwait and Tanzania signed an agreement for an irrigation project for almost $30 million in late 2014, and the additional KFAED loan

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agreements in 2017, 2018, and 2020 further cemented bilateral ties for infrastructural projects, totaling $54 million.91 In addition to negotiations with KFAED, Ambassador Maalim’s goal was to develop connections with Kuwaiti private businesses. Kuwaitis are also becoming more interested in tourism to Tanzania. Maalim commented that Kuwaitis envision Africa as a less secure region, but those who visited Tanzania were impressed with the country and began to view Africa as a ‘new frontier for investment’. According to the now former ambassador, Tanzania’s selling point was that it had not faced the problems of its East African neighbours. He thought the work of President John Magufuli’s administration (2015–21) to fight corruption would make Tanzania more attractive. In hindsight, however, Magufuli’s populism and nationalist economic policies (in addition to his staunch denial of COVID-19) stifled foreign direct investment in Tanzania during his presidency.92 Kuwaiti NGOs and charitable foundations have been active in Tanzania since 1985, building schools, mosques, clinics and water wells, among other activities. Ambassador al-Jasem himself connected additional Kuwaiti organisations with charitable projects in Tanzania. The Kuwaiti embassy even launched its own initiatives, such as a programme with a goal of building a water well in every school, in response to President Magufuli’s call for free primary education in Tanzania. Additional programmes aimed to build a science lab in every secondary school and a computer centre in every educational institution. Let us now return to discussion of the Iran–Saudi Arabia conflict in Tanzania. Reports have pointed to strong bilateral ties between Tanzania and Iran with increased economic and military cooperation.93 There have also been reports about Saudi Arabia choosing Tanzania as a priority country for the development of trade relations.94 While this could be interpreted as a response to Iranian dealings with Tanzania, the East African country’s history of interactions with the Arab world suggests that Tanzania’s long-time openness to a variety of trading partners, including Saudi Arabia, should be seen as a strategic economic and foreign policy decision. Furthermore, Tanzania is the second-largest African recipient of KFAED loans, totaling $263 million as of 31 March 2020.95 Interestingly, Tanzania supported Kuwait in the Qatar–Gulfs mediation, thereby taking a neutral stance on GCC politics and not siding with Saudi Arabia.96 This could be understood as a continuation of the East African country’s commitment to a non-alignment policy. These events should caution scholars against jumping to conclusions about Saudi Arabia and Iran using Tanzania as a pawn in their rivalry. Furthermore, the Tanzanian constitution provides for freedom of religion, something the government has long enforced, despite recent increased tensions between reformist Sunni and Shi’i Muslim minorities.97



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As a recipient of substantial international development aid, Tanzania is, of course, subject to the terms of a variety of foreign governments and agencies that retain a stake in the country’s activities, including degrees of financial and political influence.98 But this does not mean that Tanzania has lost all agency in official decisions and falls entirely into the agenda of foreign powers. Tanzania has long supported anti-racist movements, welcomed freedom fighters and revolutionaries and served as a hub for political refugees organising liberation struggles. As Aminzade argues: In this way, although it was a small, poor nation, Tanzania came to play a leadership role among Asian and African nonaligned states. It used the United Nations as a forum to express its anticolonial and anti-imperialist views and its membership in the British Commonwealth to challenge policies … Tanzania occupied a strategic position …, and its support for these [liberation] struggles decisively shaped its foreign policy and its relationship with both the East and the West during the Cold War.99

If the Saudi–Iranian competition is being depicted as a new Cold War, analysts cannot assume that Tanzania would abandon its historically strong ideological positions, for which it has achieved respect from other African and global leaders.100 For example, a short Tanzania Daily News report about the Tanzanian foreign minister’s 2014 visit to Iran stated: ‘This visit is consistent with Tanzania’s principled foreign policy of allowing no one to choose friends or enemies for the country.’ 101 The East African country’s geopolitical positioning and international standing are therefore of value to Gulf countries. Nonetheless, Tanzania’s reputation is beginning to change from the time of Nyerere’s position as ‘the elder politician of the Third World’ who inspired countries in the global South with a foreign policy of ‘liberation diplomacy’.102 The East African country’s foreign influence began to wane under populist President John Magufuli and his ‘authoritarian turn’. Tanzania shifted from ‘economic diplomacy’ to economic nationalism, with Magufuli prioritising domestic policy and opting not to attend important international summits.103

Conclusion As Mazrui predicted in 1979, ‘greater structural integration’ has developed ‘between the Arab world and Africa as Arab money finds new avenues of investment in Africa, Arab policy-makers find new justification for aid to Africa, and Arab trade finds both new sources and new markets in subSaharan parts of the continent’.104 Whereas Arabs and Africans do not always see eye to eye, Gulf–African relations can no longer be ignored in

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African studies scholarship. Furthermore, in contrast to how the Gulf rivalry has been depicted in the Horn of Africa, a region suffering from instability, insecurity, drought and famine, Gulf organisations are involved in a variety of other activities in more stable countries on the continent. Through case studies of Kuwait, a small state with a generous and strategic foreign policy, and Tanzania, the largest East African beneficiary of Kuwaiti development funds, this chapter has highlighted each country’s unique interests in relation to the other. A Muslim-minority country that experimented with socialism post independence, Tanzania had a historic trade relationship with Kuwait. Despite Kuwait’s nostalgia for seafaring days and the exchange of goods and culture with predominantly Muslim Zanzibar, the two countries established reciprocal embassies only in 2015. Although Tanzania depends very much on foreign aid, including Arab assistance, the East African country had strong postindependence political ideologies and should not be viewed as a new arena for Gulf power relations. African countries have their own tactical policies and agency in choosing which countries to affiliate with, when and why.105 Tanzania has developed relations simultaneously with a variety of Middle Eastern states, in addition to Western countries and China. Zanzibar’s leaders, in particular, hoped to use neoliberal economic development strategies to attract foreign investments from the Muslim world. Aminzade notes that ‘Zanzibari political leaders envisioned the creation of a pan-Islamic alliance with the oil-rich Gulf nations, which would position Zanzibar as an “African Hong Kong”’.106 We must also consider the future of Gulf relationships with Africa, given the current uncertainty in the region that could significantly impact on the nature of foreign assistance. The decrease in the price of oil (which continues to fluctuate, but exhibited a drop of approximately 60 per cent in 2014 and plunged even further in 2020) has caused domestic tensions in Kuwait as the government develops new plans to decrease the country’s dependence on oil exports. Unpopular policies have aimed at lowering Kuwait’s annual budget and patterns of spending, increasing the price of petrol and raising tariffs on electricity and water, with the possibility of reducing subsidies for fuel and public utilities and slowing the growth of public sector wages.107 The state of Kuwait has developed a five-year plan comprising the government’s ‘Vision 2035’, aimed at transforming Kuwait into a financial and commercial hub.108 Yet the global recession triggered by the coronavirus pandemic, which led to collapsed oil prices, shrunken export and fiscal revenues, and reduced investment activity, has also affected Kuwait. The country’s record-breaking 2020–21 budget deficit of $35.5 billion, exacerbated by political crisis, resulted in a Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings downgrade from A+ to AA- in July 2021, with future challenges ahead.109 KFAED will

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continue to be a dominant global player, as the fund is no longer dependent on financing from the Kuwaiti government, and since 1982 has been selffinancing through its activities and investments.110 Other humanitarian and development organisations, however, have begun to witness a reduction in donations. There are also new electronic systems developed by Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour to register individuals and organisations seeking Kuwait’s assistance in order to create a centralised database, facilitate reporting and auditing and make the transition from cash donations to electronic transfer of funds.111 Organisations must have government authorisation to work with foreign entities and this database aims to protect Kuwaiti organisations from vulnerability to infiltration by terrorists. This system, under development over the past decade, has led to a (likely temporary) decrease in the number of foreign recipients of Kuwaiti assistance, who must undergo a more rigorous approval and documentation process within Kuwait as well as in their home countries. Furthermore, a significant increase in the allocation of funds since 2012 going to help Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, in addition to 2020 fundraising campaigns to support Kuwait’s domestic needs due to the pandemic, has inadvertently reduced available funds for Africa.112 Nevertheless, Kuwait will remain a dominant international actor, has demonstrated willingness to play by the rules set out by the US and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and supports regional and global peacekeeping and development efforts. As oil funds continue to dry up, and economies worldwide struggle to emerge from the budget crises created by COVID-19, competition among Gulf countries and organisations could turn towards more opportunities for collaboration with other GCC members, traditional donors and other emerging donors such as China and India, who are all big players in Africa. Gulf countries are already beginning to reconsider their involvement in the Horn of Africa.113 It remains to be seen how Kuwait and Tanzania’s new leadership – Kuwaiti Emir Nawaf al-Ahmed, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, and each country’s respective second ambassador to the other country – continue to further diplomatic and economic relations.

Notes 1 J. Gambrell, ‘Qatar Crisis Shakes East Africa, a Home to Gulf Militaries’, AP News, 30 August 2017, www.apnews.com/5ad4f46bfc314a978a68c20e4b89b1dc/ Qatar-crisis-shakes-East-Africa,-a-home-to-Gulf-militaries; T. Khan, ‘Gulf Strategic Interests Reshaping the Horn of Africa’, The Arab Gulf Studies

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Institute in Washington Gulf Rising Series, Issue Paper No. 6, 26 November 2018, https://agsiw.org/gulf-strategic-interests-reshaping-the-horn-of-africa/; A. Soliman, ‘Gulf Crisis is Leading to Difficult Choices in the Horn of Africa’, Chatham House, 29 June 2017, www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/ gulf-crisis-leading-difficult-choices-horn-africa; W. Todman, ‘The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC States’ Foreign Policy Laboratory’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Briefs, November 2018, www.csis.org/analysis/ gulf-scramble-africa-gcc-states-foreign-policy-laboratory; A. D. Beyene, ‘The Horn of Africa and the Gulf: Shifting Power Plays in the Red Sea,’ The Africa Report, 16 November 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/50499/ the-horn-of-africa-and-the-gulf-shifting-power-plays-in-the-red-sea/. 2 See M. A. Leichtman, ‘Will Kuwait and Senegal’s Exceptional Friendship Endure?’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 23 February 2021, https://agsiw.org/will-kuwait-and-senegals-exceptional-friendship-endure/. 3 See ‘Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation’, The World Bank, June 2010, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/725931468277750849/ pdf/568430WP0Arab010Box353738B01PUBLIC1.pdf. 4 UNDP, ‘The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene: Kuwait’, Human Development Report 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/ hdr_theme/country-notes/KWT.pdf. 5 M. Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). 6 Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah: A Humanitarian Leader (Kuwait City: Kuwait News Agency [KUNA], 2014), www.kuna.net.kw/KUNA%20 Ameer%20English%20Book.pdf. 7 See M. A. Leichtman, ‘Kuwaiti Humanitarianism: The History and Expansion of Kuwait’s Foreign Assistance Policies’, Changing Landscape of Assistance to Conflict-Affected States: Emerging and Traditional Donors and Opportunities for Collaboration Policy Brief No. 11, August 2017, The Stimson Center, www. stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Kuwaiti%20Humanitarianism%20The%20History%20and%20Expansion%20of%20Kuwaits%20 Foreign%20Assistance%20Policies_0.pdf. 8 M. A. Naheem, ‘The State of Kuwait’s Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting Terrorist Financing Infrastructure and Performance Evaluation’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 23, no. 2 (2020), pp. 441–456. See also F. A. al-Mdaires, Islamic Extremism in Kuwait: From the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda and other Islamist Political Groups (London: Routledge, 2010). 9 M. McKinnon, Friends in Need: The Kuwait Fund in the Development World (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 29–30. 10 Ibid., pp. 84–91. 11 For a list of Resolutions see www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/documents/30953doc-kuwait_resolutions_e.pdf; for a summary of the Kuwait Declaration see www.da.gov.kw/eng/africa-arab-summit-2013/kuwait-declaration.php. 12 African Union, ‘Press Release No. 10 – Nineteenth African Union Summit Opens with Call for Unity and Solidarity for a Strong and Prosperous Africa’, https:// au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/28983-pr-pr_10_au_summit_15_7_12_f.pdf.

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13 See M. A. Leichtman, ‘Da‘wa as Development: Kuwaiti Islamic Charity in East and West Africa’, The Muslim World, forthcoming. 14 www.alsumaitprize.org/. The Board of Trustees for the prize includes prominent Kuwaiti and African ministers and directors as well as Bill Gates. 15 G. Feierstein and C. Greathead, ‘The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry’, Middle East Institute, Policy Focus 2017-2 (September 2017). 16 Ibid., p. 2. 17 H. Verhoeven and E. Woertz, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa’, in N. Patrick (ed.), Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 92–109, 92. See also J. Meester, W. van den Berg and H. Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa’, CRU Report, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, April 2018. 18 See also M. S. Abdullah, ‘Iranian Presence in Africa: Motives and Objectives’, Rasanah, International Institute for Iranian Studies, 5 October 2016, https:// arabiangcis.org/english/studies/iranian-presence-in-africa-motives-and-objectives/; A. McAnenny, ‘Iran in Africa: A Tutorial Overview of Iran’s Strategic Influence in Africa’, Center for Security Policy, 2014, www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Iran-in-Africa.pdf; M. Rubin, ‘Africa: Iran’s Final Frontier?’, American Enterprise Institute, 17 April 2013, www.aei.org/ publication/africa-irans-final-frontier/; ‘UAE Security Forum 2019: Reshaping the Future of the Horn of Africa’, Conference Report, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 12 February 2020, https://agsiw.org/uae-securityforum-2019-reshaping-the-future-of-the-horn-of-africa/. 19 A. Mazrui, ‘Black Africa and the Arabs’, Foreign Affairs 53, no. 4 (1975), pp. 725–742; 725. 20 Ibid., p. 733. See also V. Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: The New Press, 2007) and S. Amin, ‘Afro-Arab Cooperation: The Record and the Prospects’, Africa Development / Afrique et Développement 11, no. 2/3 (1986), pp. 5–17. 21 A. Oded, Africa and the Middle East Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987). Mertz and Mertz note that the 1967 Arab-Israeli war led to eight African nations severing relations with Israel, followed by an additional twenty (including Tanzania) in 1973. R. A. Mertz and P. M. Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1983), p. 32. 22 Mazrui, ‘Black Africa’, p. 739. 23 Ibid., p. 741. 24 For additional charts and figures, see Mertz and Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa; C. Zarour, ‘Mecanismes Financiers de la Coopération Arabo-Africaine’, Africa Development / Afrique et Développement 11, no. 2/3 (1986), pp. 89–136. 25 See Prashad, The Darker Nations. 26 A. A. Mazrui, ‘The Arabs and the Political Economy of Third World Solidarity’, in Historical and Socio-Cultural Relations between Black Africa and the Arab World from 1935 to the Present (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), pp. 33–45; 37–38. See also F. Abdelli-Pasquier, La Banque Arabe pour le Développement Économique

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en Afrique (BADEA) et la Coopération Arabo-Africaine (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991). 27 Oded, Africa and the Middle East, p. 16. 28 Ibid., pp. 14–15. Oded is a retired Israeli diplomat who served in the foreign service in many African countries. 29 For an interesting discussion of these relations from an African perspective, see the published report and papers of a UNESCO symposium in Paris, 25–27. For an Arab perspective, see K. El-Din Haseeb (ed.), The Arabs and Africa (London: Croom Helm and Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1985), proceedings from a seminar organised by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies held in Amman, 24–29 April 1983. 30 Mazrui, ‘The Arabs and the Political Economy’, p. 73. 31 Ibid., p. 80. 32 This section draws heavily from the background information previously published in Leichtman, ‘Kuwaiti Humanitarianism’. 33 See B. Turki, ‘The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and Its Activities in African Countries, 1961–2010’, Middle East Journal 68, no. 3 (2014), pp. 421–435; M. McKinnon, Friends in Need: The Kuwait Fund in the Development World (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997). 34 KUNA, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah: A Humanitarian Leader (Kuwait News Agency, 2014), pp. 21–22. This book was published on the occasion of Kuwait’s UN title. 35 A-R. Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990). 36 Ibid., p. 11. 37 On Kuwait’s Shi’a see L. Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 38 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 8. 39 Turki, ‘The Kuwait Fund’, p. 424. 40 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 10. 41 Ibid., p. 32. 42 Ibid., p. 64. See also Louër, Transnational Shia Politics. 43 McKinnon, Friends in Need, p. 24. 44 See also H. Alojayan, ‘Kuwait’s Economic “Toolkit”: Foreign Aid and the Kuwait Investment Authority’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 13 November 2015, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/11/13/kuwaits-economic-toolkit-foreignaid-the-kuwait-investment-authority/. She attributes the additional impact of the Iran–Iraq war and the Iraq–Kuwait war to Kuwait’s reliance on ‘diplomacy and foreign aid as “hot” tools to achieve foreign policy goals’. Yet, Alojayan notes, Kuwait also realised that providing foreign aid to certain countries does not necessarily guarantee their support (Yemen and Palestine, for example, supported Iraq). 45 H. Toumi, ‘Kuwait, Iraq Embroiled in New Territorial Dispute’, Gulf News, 2 February 2017, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-iraq-embroiledin-new-territorial-dispute-1.1971891. B. al-Saif, ‘Think Big: Why Broadening

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Negotiations Could Help Resolve the Kuwaiti-Iraqi Maritime Dispute’, Carnegie Middle East Center, March 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Al_SaifKuwait_Iraq1.pdf. 46 Turki, ‘The Kuwait Fund’, p. 425. 47 See also M. R. Lowi, ‘Charity as Politics “Writ Small” in Gulf Petro-Monarchies’, Journal of Muslim Philanthropy and Civil Society 3, no. 2 (2019), pp. 26–59. 48 Arab Times Online, ‘Kuwait Wins Security Council Seat – Amir Congratulates FM’, 3 June 2017, www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-wins-security-councilseat-amir-congratulates-fm/. 49 K. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Analysis: Has the Gulf Reconciled After the Qatar Blockade?’ Al Jazeera, 5 June 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/6/5/ has-the-gulf-reconciled-after-the-end-of-the-qatar-blockade. 50 Interview with His Excellency Abdulkadir Amin Sheikh, Ambassador of Somalia, Kuwait City, 3 May 2017. 51 This was most recently announced to take place in 2020. Radio Dalsan, ‘Kuwait Plans Donor Meeting to Fund Education in Somalia’, 4 November 2019, www.radiodalsan.com/en/2019/11/04/kuwait-plans-donor-meeting-tofund-education-in-somalia/. 52 KUNA, ‘Somalia Minister Lauds Kuwait’s USD 30 mln Support for Education in Africa’, 29 July 2021, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=299 0361&Language=en. 53 Kuwait also donated US$13 million to Somalia in 2013, https://reliefweb.int/ report/somalia/kuwait-donates-usd-13-mln-somalia. 54 Kuwait Red Crescent Society, http://krcs.org.kw/?page_id=77. 55 L. Cotterrell and A. Harmer, ‘Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid: Aid Donorship in the Gulf States’, September 2005, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, https:// www.files.ethz.ch/isn/91486/Gulf.pdf. 56 See M. Juul Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London: Hurst & Co., 2015); Z. Pall, ‘Between Ideology and International Politics: The Dynamics and Transformation of a Transnational Islamic Charity’, in P. Fountain, R. Bush, and R. M. Feener (eds), Religion and the Politics of Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 177–200; Leichtman, ‘Da‘wa as Development’. 57 For a video promoting this school project in Sudan see: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=d6r1fSaWizE&app=desktop. 58 For a biography of the sheikh, see the charity’s website: https://alnouri.org/ for-assembly/. 59 For more information about the NGO see www.khaironline.com. 60 Future publications will detail these activities. 61 See J. Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 62 M. Nzomo, ‘The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post-Cold War’, in S. Wright (ed.), African Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 182.

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63 R. Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 69. 64 L. Schneider, Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), p. 2. 65 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, p. 136. 66 M. Green, The Development State: Aid, Culture and Civil Society in Tanzania (Melton, Suffolk: James Currey, 2014), p. 165. 67 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, pp. 181–182. 68 Ibid., pp. 93–94. 69 Ibid., pp. 97–99. 70 Nzomo, ‘The Foreign Policy of Tanzania’, p. 186. 71 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, p. 183. 72 S. Wright, ‘The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies’, in S. Wright (ed.), African Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 1–22; 4. 73 D. L. Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a Neoliberal World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), p. 68. 74 K. D. Phillips, An Ethnography of Hunger: Politics, Subsistence, and the Unpredictable Grace of the Sun (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), p. 13; drawing on J. Ferguson, ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’, Antipode 41 (2010): pp. 166–184. 75 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous. 76 Green, The Development State, p. 100. 77 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous, p. 70. 78 Green, The Development State, pp. 6–7. 79 See T. Mponzi, Challenges to the Implementation of Tanzania’s New Foreign Policy (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014). 80 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous, p. 75. 81 Green, The Development State, p. 3. 82 K. Miti, ‘Tanzania’s Foreign Policy: An Analytical Assessment’, in K. G. Adar and P. J. Schraeder (eds), Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign Policy: A Comparative Perspective of Eastern Africa, Volume II (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 2007), pp. 111–123; 120. See also F. Becker, The Politics of Poverty: Policy-Making and Development in Rural Tanzania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), for a revisionist historical account analysing the failure of development in South-East Tanzania. 83 See, for example, J. C. Wilkinson, The Arabs and the Scramble for Africa (Sheffield: Equinox, 2015) and Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones. 84 K. Mathews, ‘Tanzania and the Middle East’, in K. Mathews and S. S. Mushi (eds), Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961–1981: A Reader (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, n.d.), pp. 152–171. 85 Ibid., p. 159. 86 Ibid., p. 162. 87 Ibid., p. 163.

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88 Ibid., p. 168. 89 Interview with His Excellency Jasem al-Najem, Ambassador of Kuwait, Dar es Salaam, 24 August 2017. 90 Interview with His Excellency Mahadhi Maalim, Ambassador of Tanzania, Kuwait City, 12 December 2016. 91 MENAFN, ‘Kuwait Fund Contributes to Global Development’, 26 December 2017, https://menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.aspx?storyid=1096274153&title =Kuwait-Fund-contributes-to-global-development&src=RSS; KUNA, ‘Tanzania, Kuwait to Sign Loan Agreement Worth KD 5.4 mln’, 9 July 2018, https://www. kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2736279&Language=en; Daily News, ‘33.9bn Kuwait Loan to Facilitate Irrigation’, 29 August 2020, https://www. dailynews.co.tz/news/2020-08-295f49fd2742e71.aspx; Highlight of the Activities of the Fund, 1 January 1962–31 March 2021, Kuwait Fund, https://www. kuwait-fund.org/documents/11433/13290/Mojaz2021.pdf/d5f6bd20-ee194300-bb47-a88f2748d72f. 92 See N. Minde, ‘The Waning Foreign Policy Influence of Tanzania Under President Magufuli’, Kujenga Amani, Social Science Research Council, 26 March 2019, https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2019/03/26/the-waning-foreign-policy-influence-oftanzania-under-president-magufuli/; M. Harris, ‘Unfinished Business: Magufuli’s Autocratic Rule in Tanzania’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 February 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unfinished-business-magufulisautocratic-rule-tanzania; R. Warah, ‘The Reluctant Scientist’, Africa Is A Country, 25 March 2021, https://africasacountry.com/2021/03/the-reluctant-scientist. 93 See McAnenny, ‘Iran in Africa’, The Iran Project, http://theiranproject.com/ blog/2016/03/05/iran-tanzania-navy-officials-agree-on-regular-visits/. 94 Tanzania Invest, ‘Saudi Arabia Choose Tanzania as Priority Country to Develop Trade and Investment in Africa’, 2 April 2016, www.tanzaniainvest.com/economy/ trade/saudi-arabia-chooses-tanzania-as-priority-country-to-develop-and-promotetrade-with-africa. 95 ‘Kuwait Fund Annual Report 2019/2020’, www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund/ anuual-reports. 96 W. Todman, ‘The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC States’ Foreign Policy Laboratory’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Research Report, 1 November 2018. 97 See M. A. Leichtman, ‘Transnational Networks and Global Shi’i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania’, in H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 201–245. 98 See Green, The Development State. 99 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, p. 196. 100 For a discussion of the invocation of President Nyerere’s legacy in contemporary Tanzanian politics, see F. Becker, ‘Remembering Nyerere: Political Rhetoric and Dissent in Contemporary Tanzania’, African Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013), pp. 238–261. She suggests that government policy decisions often appear to build consensus among the local population with an eye to convincing international observers of good intentions.

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101 All Africa, https://allafrica.com/stories/201711030681.html. 102 Prashad, The Darker Nations, p. 113; N. Kamata, ‘The Economic Diplomacy of Tanzania: Accumulation by Dispossession in a Peripheral State’, Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy 1, no. 3 (2012), pp. 291–313. 103 Minde, ‘Waning Foreign Policy Influence’; M. Gavin, ‘Lessons from Tanzania’s Authoritarian Turn’, Council on Foreign Relations Blog, 7 February 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-tanzanias-authoritarian-turn. 104 Mazrui, ‘Africa and the Arab–Israeli Conflict’, Historical and Socio-Cultural Relations between Black Africa and the Arab World from 1935 to the Present (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), pp. 73–81; 80. 105 See, for example, W. Brown and S. Harman, ‘African Agency in International Politics’, in W. Brown and S. Harman (eds), African Agency in International Politics (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1–15. 106 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, p. 311. 107 Kuwait Times, ‘Low Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences and Challenges’, 5 October 2016, http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/low-oil-prices-causes-consequenceschallenges/; A. Helal, ‘Kuwait’s Fiscal Crisis Requires Bold Reforms’, Atlantic Council, 18 November 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ kuwaits-fiscal-crisis-requires-bold-reforms/. 108 See M. Leichtman, ‘Kuwaiti Humanitarianism’. 109 Reuters, ‘Kuwait’s 2020–21 Budget Deficit Increases 175% to Record 10.8 bln Dinars’, 7 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kuwaits2020-21-budget-deficit-increases-175-108-bln-dinars-2021-08-07/; A. Werman, ‘Kuwait’s Fractious Politics Undermine Much-Needed Fiscal Measures’, Middle East Institute, 11 March 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/ kuwaits-fractious-politics-undermine-much-needed-fiscal-measures; Reuters, ‘S&P Cuts Kuwait Rating on Lack of Deficit-Financing Strategy’, 17 July 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sp-cuts-kuwait-rating-lack-deficitfinancing-strategy-2021-07-17/. 110 Fund directors are also very proud of having been able to continue business from London during the 1990–91 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, from where they signed six loan agreements. 111 This is in accordance with US Treasury requirements post-11 September 2001. 112 https://fts.unocha.org/donors/4849/summary/2012; https://coronafund.cmgs. gov.kw/en. 113 C. Lons, ‘Gulf Countries Reconsider Their Involvement in the Horn of Africa’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 June 2021, https://www.iiss.org/ blogs/analysis/2021/06/gulf–horn-of-africa.

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Part II

The view from the Horn of Africa

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9

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Djibouti: bridging the Gulf of Aden? Balancing ports, patronage and military bases between Yemen’s war and the Horn1 David Styan

Introduction Djibouti is an enigma; it is one of the poorest and smallest member states in both the Arab League and the African Union. Yet its president, Ismael Omar Guelleh, appears to be courted by superpowers and regional decision makers alike. The latter include governments from the Gulf, whose policies towards the Horn of Africa are the focus of this volume. Contrary to theories of dependency or small-state vulnerability, he apparently wields considerable autonomy and influence, eschewing the notion that small states require ‘strategic partnership’ and protection from a larger power (Styan 2016).2 This appears true both on a global stage, where Guelleh plays off the United States (US) and China, and regionally in terms of relations with rival Gulf Arab powers, which are the subject of this chapter. The chapter’s central argument is that Djibouti’s policies towards Gulf Arab powers replicate the state’s broader diplomatic strategy. This aims to maximize financial and political benefits from rivalries between powerful states seeking ties with Djibouti. The growing number of states establishing maritime and military facilities in Djibouti primarily reflects its geostrategic position at the southern gateway of the Red Sea. However, the chapter analyses how failure to manage tensions with its main Gulf commercial partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has dented this strategy, significantly altering Gulf–Djibouti dynamics in the Horn. Geographically, linguistically and ethnically, Djibouti is clearly African. Yet its physical proximity to Yemen, membership of the Arab League and long-standing economic and human ties to Arabia give it a unique role in recent Arab divisions, both over the Yemen war and since 2017 between Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This singular status is accentuated by both the recent, fraught wrangling between Djibouti and the government of the UAE examined in this chapter and the broader context

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of the manner in which Dubai has become an ‘African’ economic hub, particularly for Somali speakers, from which Djibouti’s elite are largely drawn. While not the focus of this chapter, this human dimension, of personal ties and two-way migration between the Horn and Arabia, is all too often neglected, and epitomizes Djiboutians’ linkages with Arabia every bit as much as the diplomatic, trade and military issues examined by the chapter. 3 This chapter attempts to focus on the regional dimensions of Djibouti’s foreign policy, with an emphasis on its ties with the Gulf states. However, it does so within a view to highlighting how these ‘regional’ dynamics interact with local and global actors – thus, part of the chapter’s aim is to explore the linkages between local, regional and global forces, viewed through the specific prism of Djibouti. In doing so, we hope to shed some light on the complex interlinkages underpinning the Gulf states’ involvement in East Africa, including the oft-neglected maritime dimension of interactions between states surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea coasts. By ‘local’ dimension we mean Djibouti’s bilateral ties with neighbouring states in the Horn of Africa itself, Eritrea, Somali(a/land) and, above all, Ethiopia, for whom Djibouti provides its principal trading outlet to the sea. Taxes and fees on Ethiopian trade account for much of the Djiboutian state’s revenues. Global powers’ own military ties with the Gulf states are also refracted militarily via their ties with Djibouti, primarily due to Djibouti’s hosting military bases belonging to leading Western and Asian powers. Djibouti’s location overlooking the western approaches to the Bab elMandeb means that it is the principal port of call for both civilian vessels transiting the Red Sea via the Suez Canal and the world’s navies who monitor the sea lanes. As such, it is the operational base for the myriad of anti-piracy forces surveying and policing the Red Sea and Somali coasts. Indeed the ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’, which guides much anti-piracy activity, underscores quite how central Djibouti’s port is to the anti-piracy industry.4 Until recently Djibouti’s government maintained close relations with Dubai and the UAE. Yet a five-year falling-out, between 2013 and 2018, culminated in the seizure of Dubai Ports World’s (DP World) key asset in the country, the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT), in early 2018. This rupture with the UAE prompted several knock-on effects, accelerating the ‘remilitarization’ of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with the UAE hastening the expansion and construction of military facilities in Assab to the north and Berbera just to the south-east of Djibouti. In turn, Turkey, which under Erdoğan has explicitly sought an expansion of its influence in the Horn of Africa, has intensified its military and economic ties with the Federal Republic of Somalia government in Mogadishu, and has strengthened ties with the government of (North) Sudan. Both trends have been reinforced since Turkey sided with Qatar in the GCC split.

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This chapter examines intra-Gulf rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa through the prism of Djibouti’s foreign policy, focusing in particular on the implications of the protracted rupture between Dubai and Djibouti. As a member of the Arab League and home to the Horn’s regional body (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD), the chapter asks how one of Africa’s smallest states appears to defy diplomatic gravity, balancing intra-Arab rivalries alongside competing logistical and political pressures, both from within the Horn of Africa itself and increasingly between its long-time ally the US and China. A secondary question is, since the opening in 2017 of China’s first-ever overseas naval ‘logistics facility’ – a military base in all but name – how and why Beijing has promoted Djibouti as a key global hub on its resurgent ‘Maritime Silk Road Initiative’. As noted in the opening paragraph, part of the reason behind Djibouti’s successful diplomatic juggling is its ability to extract political capital and lucrative rents drawn from intensifying superpower surveillance of strategic shipping lanes, piracy and Islamists in neighbouring Yemen and Somalia. Djibouti now hosts military bases from the US, China, Japan, France and the European Union (EU). In 2017 the completion of major Chinese rail and port projects linking Ethiopia and the Gulf of Tadjourah further consolidated Djibouti as the fulcrum of Asian, Arab and Western commercial rivalry and geostrategic cohabitation in the region. Following this introduction, the chapter is structured in five sections. The first provides some basic factual background on Djibouti and its foreign policy. The second section focuses on Djibouti’s privileged ties with the UAE and the ruling family of Dubai in particular, while noting Qatar’s arbitration role vis-à-vis Eritrea. The third section examines the most substantive element of the bilateral relationship with Dubai, the investment of DP World in Djibouti’s container terminal, providing details as to how the investment soured and prompted a rupture between Djibouti and Dubai between 2015 and 2018. The fourth section then looks at the manner in which the split with Dubai has influenced the activities of other regional powers, particularly Turkey and Qatar. An initial rupture of ties in 2015 had already prompted the UAE to diversify their air and naval facilities in the Horn. These new Arab military outposts in neighbouring Somaliland and Eritrea further contort the mosaic of conflictual regional and global interests in and around Djibouti analysed here. Both Turkey and Qatar have intensified their patronage of Somali politicians, with Turkey and the UAE in turn both consolidating military cooperation and the construction of military facilities in the region; effectively a regional arms race and ‘base race’. The latter is linked to the UAE’s intensified engagement in Yemen’s civil war during 2017–18. The final, fifth section looks at the global dimension of Djibouti’s status. Having long been an outpost of French military influence in the region,

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over the past two decades Djibouti has accommodated, first, since 2002, the US and, most recently, China as military partners, hosting key facilities for both. Overall, the chapter seeks to analyse how the government manages the current renewal and reconfiguration of Gulf engagement in the Red Sea and Horn.

Historical context: a small, patronage-based polity benefiting from its geostrategic location Djibouti gained political independence from France only in 1977; like the key Gulf states, it is thus both a very young as well as a small state in terms of population, by any African or international standards. It has a population of under a million and a minuscule gross domestic product (under US$2 billion), in both absolute and per capita terms. While geographically it is incorrect to call it either a ‘micro-state’ or a ‘city-state’, at least 80 per cent of Djibouti’s population (officially put at 900,000, but probably far smaller) live in and around the eponymous capital city. On most indices it is comprehensively dwarfed not just by its neighbours, but by all other members of the two regional bodies – the Arab League and African Union – of which it is an active member and from which it draws considerable diplomatic influence and legitimacy.5 Similarly, in terms of its Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime neighbours, Djibouti is the regional minnow; to the east, Somaliland has a population of around 4 million, including the Gadaboursi and Issa Somali sub-clans, which constitute over half of Djibouti’s own citizens (the rump, Federal Republic of Somalia to the south, claims a population of 15 million). The population of Djibouti’s northern neighbour Eritrea is around 5 million. However, Eritrea’s port of Assab and the Danakil littoral, which lie just across Djibouti’s northern border, are sparsely populated, primarily with Afars who share linguistic and clan ties with Djibouti’s own northern populace. All these coastal states are dwarfed by highland Ethiopia’s 100 million population and, across the Gulf of Aden, Yemen’s 28 million beleaguered inhabitants. Gulf ties and Yemen’s war generate strong cross-currents: Djibouti is a corridor for illegal migration from the Horn to the Gulf and had allies in both camps in Yemen. It has hosted Yemeni refugees since 2015, while an influential minority of its own population have historic family ties with Yemen and Arabia. Several thousand Djiboutians, many drawn from influential trading families, are descended from Yemenis.6 Since 2015 Djibouti has also hosted around 3,000 Yemeni refugees in a camp in the northern port of Obock, with many also lodging in Djibouti-ville.



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Geostrategic location as a diplomatic resource The Djiboutian state owes both its existence and its current diplomatic significance to its strategic location. Its territories both overlook the southern entrance to the Red Sea – and, as such, are close to Yemen’s western coast – and provide a natural port and railhead for its giant neighbour, Ethiopia. All three factors are central to understanding the pivotal position that the small territory plays in the current rivalries between Gulf Arab states in the region. Evidently the state’s strategic location, at a pinch point on sea lanes between the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean, is also the reason for US, EU – and now Chinese – military involvement in the state. These global players are briefly considered in the final section of the chapter. Prior to the construction of the Suez Canal and France’s incursion into the region, the Gulf of Tadjourah, around which modern-day Djibouti nestles, provided anchorages for dhows trading between the Gulf, East Africa and Red Sea ports. While the ports of Tadjourah and Obock provided outlets for slaves, coffee and other goods from Ethiopia’s highlands, their significance in Africa’s trade with Yemen and other Arab ports beyond was less than Zeila’s, which at different historical epochs fell under Egyptian, Ottoman and Omani spheres of influence. France ruled Djibouti from the late nineteenth century to 1977. For the first fifteen years of independence the French army provided the Djibouti government’s core finance, in exchange for military bases and extensive training facilities. While French forces were scaled back in the 1990s, Djibouti nevertheless remains France’s largest military base in Africa.7 Although it was a legacy of imperial rivalries, the French military presence at the southern gateway to the Red Sea was significant during the Cold War. Heightened Cold War tensions in the Horn from the late 1970s saw the Soviet Union back first Somalia, then, from 1977, Marxist Ethiopia. The Berbera naval base, constructed by the Soviets, subsequently became a key US installation in the Gulf of Aden. In terms of domestic politics, power is largely a personal affair; President Ismael Omar Guelleh’s control rests on patronage. ‘Rent’ accrues from foreign military bases and access to economic assets – foreign direct investment, trade licences, foreign exchange – and revenues are redistributed to ensure legitimacy. This personalized, patronage-based political system may in part account for Djibouti’s unusual flexibility and innovation in terms of foreign policy. Nimble foreign policy has generated significant political and economic capital from inauspicious foundations – most recently in relation to China. Thus Djibouti’s power and influence is disproportionately greater than the state’s small size and ostensibly ‘dependent’ roles would suggest.8

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Schematically, Djibouti’s regional and foreign policy roles can be conceptualized in four distinct ways: firstly, bilaterally purely as a bridge (perhaps more accurately, a conduit) providing access to the sea for the Horn’s regional hegemon, neighbouring Ethiopia, whose foreign trade overwhelmingly transits via Djibouti; secondly, corresponding more closely to the vision currently promoted actively by Djibouti itself, as a corridor to the region as a whole.9 Here Djibouti’s port facilities are envisaged as providing port services and pipelines not simply in terms of bilateral ties with neighbouring Somaliland and Ethiopia, but as a catalyst for broader regional economic growth and integration, encompassing all the Horn’s states, including South Sudan and all of Somalia (for which Djibouti has always been a key conduit for livestock exports to Arabia). This vision promotes Djibouti as the Horn’s natural regional and logistical hub, buttressed by the regional body IGAD, which it hosts. Thirdly, most explicitly since 2009 and the opening of the DP World container port at Doraleh, just to the west of the capital, Djibouti’s Ports and Free Zone Authority has aggressively pursued the revival of its status as a logistical hub for transhipments. This positioning and explicit marketing of Djibouti as a global port and hub emphasizes Djibouti’s centrality to trade flows between Asia, Africa and Europe. This role is not new, and was central to DP World’s investment in the country in 2006. Yet its profile has been considerably heightened by the significant investment of China in infrastructure within Djibouti and Ethiopia, with a clear shift perceptible between Djibouti’s Arab and Asian partners in terms of who is promoting this vision. The fourth aspect of foreign policy is Djibouti’s unique role as a military hub. In 2013 this author argued that Djibouti was fast becoming an ‘international maritime and military laboratory’ spawning new networks of naval, military and surveillance cooperation, both among NATO forces (above all US, French and the EU’s EUNAVFOR contingent) and between them and diverse Asian powers.10 Two factors have served to intensify this trend since: firstly, the expansion of Chinese naval power in tandem with Beijing’s ‘Maritime Silk Road Initiative’;11 secondly, the latest phase of Yemen’s, civil war which has intensified the military engagement of Arab and other midrange actors in the Horn of Africa.

Economic considerations: DP World and Dubai’s privileged ties with Djibouti12 This section provides an overview of Djibouti’s privileged ties with the UAE and the ruling family of Dubai and the DP World maritime group. While



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these ruptured in 2018 (the reasons for which are analysed in the next section), what appeared to be a solid Djibouti–UAE axis established by 2010 is crucial for understanding the background of Gulf ties with Djibouti and East Africa more broadly. The section then briefly notes Qatar’s engagement with Djibouti in providing arbitration with a belligerent Eritrea following the latter’s incursion into Djiboutian territory in 2008.

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Djibouti as the ‘Dubai of Africa’: DP World’s port investments This chapter does not seek to provide a detailed evaluation of the roots of Dubai–Djiboutian ties, rather, it briefly sketches the contours of bilateral ties. The souring of initially close ties has been the subject of lengthy legal wrangling and arbitration; in due course London court records and interviews may provide ample sources for a full evaluation. Dubai investors began putting money into Djibouti after President Ismael Omar Guelleh came to power in 1999, providing an alternative source of capital from French investors, hitherto the dominant foreign actors in Djibouti’s diminutive economy. The Emirati National Oil Company, ENOC, runs the main petro-chemical importation facility, the Horizon oil terminal, in Doraleh. This is used primarily to import petroleum products into Ethiopia, although it also serves Djibouti as well as foreign naval vessels and bases using the port. Dubai financed the state’s first top-flight, luxury Kempinski Hotel and also undertook some more modest real estate ventures in the mid-2000s. An ambitious, some would say hubristic, set of urban development plans also circulated in this period, most notably prior to the 2011 elections. These included a project to build a bridge across the Red Sea, and digital blueprints to transform Djibouti’s sleepy down-town area (today still characterized by two-storey Ottoman and French colonial buildings) with a series of Burj Khalifa-style skyscrapers. Two factors ended this fleeting vision of transforming Djibouti into a ‘second Dubai’: firstly, the financial crisis and reversals in Dubai’s own economy in 2008; and secondly, a more local issue, the falling-out between President Guelleh and the man who played a pivotal role in brokering Djibouti–Dubai ties, Abdourahman Boreh, discussed further later. Unquestionably, measured by value and economic impact, Dubai’s key development in Djibouti is the Doraleh Container Terminal. Lying twelve kilometres to the west of the capital city and its congested old port facilities, until February 2018 the container terminal was managed, and partly financed, by DP World, who also owned a third of the port’s equity. With its 1,050-metre quayside and natural, 18-metre-depth anchorages, the port was the most advanced in East Africa. Both it and the Horizon oil terminal, which sits alongside it, were needed and made financially viable largely as

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a result of the 1997–98 Ethio-Eritrean border war. This closed the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa to Ethiopian trade, meaning that, de facto, Djibouti became land-locked Ethiopia’s sole outlet to the sea. The port also became the home anchorage for the vessels of Ethiopia’s state-owned shipping line. Negotiations and plans for the DCT date back to the mid-2000s, with construction undertaken from 2006 and the port facility opening in 2009. For DP World it was hailed as a key element in their expansion into African ports, following their take-over of the P&O shipping line. Djibouti provided the group not only with a key hub but also with a transhipment ‘spoke’ from DP World’s home port of Jebel Ali. In 2009 DP World also appeared poised to take a leading role in the expansion of Djibouti’s Free Zone development plans, and briefly also managed Djibouti’s airport. Meanwhile Dubai itself (which hosts a very significant Somali population and acts as a hub for Somali financiers) became an increasingly attractive travel and retail destination for Djibouti’s small, but wealthy and influential, middle class. By 2009 Dubai had overseen the construction, financing and management of Djibouti’s key economic infrastructure – the oil and container ports at Doraleh. An apparently strong bond was established between Guelleh and the al-Makhtoum entourage, in part via DP World. As such, it appeared that Djibouti had secured a key Arab ally, with Dubai prepared to back the economic transformation of the economy while Djibouti would benefit from DP World’s global reach to bolster its trade ties and aim to emulate in the Horn of Africa the emirate’s rapid transformation of the Gulf.

Djibouti–Qatari ties: mediating the 2008 Eritrean border conflict Unlike the UAE, Qatar has not played a particularly prominent or significant role in Djibouti, beyond limited project funding and maintaining a prominent embassy and regular diplomatic ties with a fellow Arab League member. Qatar’s relatively low profile partly reflected Djibouti’s limited economic potential and the ‘first mover’ advantage of UAE investors. However, once relations with Eritrea ruptured in 2008, Qatar added Djibouti to the roster of conflicts in which it negotiated (Darfur, Yemen, Libya etc.), Doha playing a pivotal role in mediating between the two states. As part of the agreement signed in 2010, Qatar provided troops to oversee the contested border post, which overlooks the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Djibouti’s relations with neighbouring Eritrea, which had gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, reached a new low when Eritrea deployed troops into Djibouti territory at Ras Doumeira, in the far north-east of the country, in April 2008. The Eritrean incursion comprised as many as 4,000 Eritrean

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soldiers and Djibouti committed some 8,000 military personnel to the area, representing about two-thirds of its total armed forces at the time. The Eritrean advances into Djibouti in June were strongly condemned by the United Nations Security Council, the Arab League, the African Union (AU) and IGAD. Following months of negotiations, mediation under the auspices of the government of Qatar succeeded in securing the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Djiboutian territory in June 2010. In June 2017 Qatari troops, who had been monitoring the border, were abruptly withdrawn in the wake of the rupture between Qatar and other Arabian Gulf states. Djibouti protested to IGAD, the AU and the UN that Eritrean troops had immediately seized the disputed territory, on the headland and the nearby island of Doumeira. Although considerable attention was given to the possibility of renewed Eritrean aggression at the time of Qatar’s withdrawal, in reality almost nothing has leaked as to who actually now controls Ras Doumeira. France, the ultimate guarantor of Djibouti’s borders under a bilateral defence accord, is believed to have maintained an observation post. If so, given its proximity to the Yemeni front line, it seems probable that either French or US forces would discretely occupy the observation post.

Djibouti breaks with Dubai: personal and commercial recriminations with strategic implications The escalation of tensions, culminating with the rupture of relations with the UAE is a clear break with Djibouti’s otherwise pragmatic diplomatic policy. As we have seen, this seeks to systematically balance rival powers to bolster both the material and symbolic aspects of the state’s broader diplomatic strategy. Djibouti’s privileged ties with Dubai began to sour even before the flagship DCT had opened. In 2008–9 there were considerable domestic political tensions as Guelleh pushed through constitutional amendments in order to be eligible for a third term as president in 2011. In a move that was to have far-reaching implications for Djibouti’s relations with Dubai and the UAE, Guelleh also broke with Abdourahman Boreh, the friend and business associate who had played the central role in brokering the DP World contract for the container terminal at Doraleh. Following allegations of corruption, Boreh fled into exile in Dubai and London. He was pursued in a series of court cases, at considerable expense, by the Djiboutian authorities on corruption charges linked to the DP World agreement. While DP World continued to manage the port until February 2018, relations with Djibouti became increasingly strained from 2013 onwards.

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Boreh was subsequently convicted – on evidence which later proved controversial – of both tax and terrorist charges in Djibouti. Between 2012 and 2016 the government pursued a protracted series of legal actions against Boreh in commercial courts in London. However, in March 2016 Boreh was acquitted of all charges, in a judgment that was highly critical of the Djiboutian government’s case. Meanwhile, in a separate but parallel legal case in London, in July 2014 Djibouti’s Port Authority sought to nullify its existing management contract with DP World, alleging malpractice by Boreh. After protracted hearings this too was rejected in a February 2017 ruling. In both cases, the Djiboutian authorities were ordered to pay full costs. Meanwhile bad blood over the DP World–Doraleh deal – which started at root as effectively an intra-Djiboutian (President Guelleh vs his ex-adviser and confidant Boreh), personal dispute – spilled over into the military sphere in April 2015 in a somewhat quixotic manner. With the start of Saudi-led bombing of Yemen in 2015, Djibouti’s close diplomatic ties with NATO allies of Saudi Arabia meant that from the outset Saudi and GCC aircraft used Djibouti for surveillance and bombing of Houthi positions in Yemen – in large part due to the proximity of Djibouti’s extensive military facilities and airstrips to Yemen, and its close ties with the UAE. In April 2015 a senior Djiboutian military figure remonstrated with the pilot of a GCC–UAE fighter that he was parking his jet in the wrong place (according to some accounts, to avoid landing fees); an altercation erupted which ended in fisticuffs. To understand this incident, which prompted the 2015 rupture with the UAE, one has to first appreciate quite how congested are the runways at Djibouti’s main airport, Ambouli. The same strips serve civilian airlines, US forces of the Lemonnier base opposite Ambouli, as well as those of Japan, plus the flight-support arm of the EU’s EUNAVFOR anti-piracy force. Add to this, from early 2015, GCC aircraft refuelling and rearming en route to Yemen. A few days after the incident Dubai broke diplomatic ties with Djibouti and cancelled all flights and visas for Djiboutians. At the time, certainly as viewed by senior members of the Djiboutian government, this incident appeared to rapidly become entangled in the broader DP World–Boreh dispute.13 While visas and flights were eventually restored several months later, trust and relations never recovered. Almost three years later, on 22 February 2018, Djibouti’s government unilaterally terminated the DP World management contract and shares in the DCT. The port’s seizure thus brought the increasingly bitter, six-year legal and commercial dispute between the Emirati-owned DP World and Djibouti’s president to a climactic end. In turn this reconfigured alliances

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in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. DP World vowed to push hard for compensation through the courts in London. Bilateral ties with Djibouti and the government of the UAE, DP World’s owner, will remain fractious. However, the UAE’s ability to censure Djibouti diplomatically, bilaterally or via the Arab League, are limited given broader Arab disarray. The seizure was the culmination of four months of acrimonious, eleventhhour divorce negotiations between Emirati and Djiboutian delegations. The talks followed legislation passed in Djibouti on 8 November 2017, allowing the government to nationalize ‘strategic assets’ in the event of management disputes. Disagreement focused on three core issues: unequal voting rights; low transhipment volumes; and a hitherto obscure clause which allegedly gave DP World exclusive control of Djibouti’s overall port development. Managerially, the fact that although DP World holds only 33 per cent of DCT’s equity the contract gave it a two-thirds share of boardroom votes was a continual bone of contention. Djibouti’s authorities also regularly complained of the failure of DP World to adequately utilize Doraleh for regional transhipments of containers, arguing that DP World systematically privileged their home hub of Dubai’s Jebel Ali, allegedly depriving Doraleh of lucrative trade. DP World was replaced as port manager by Singapore-based Pacific International Limited, who will manage the port with the Djibouti Ports and Free Zone Authority, with the aim of boosting transhipments of container traffic. However, in one of the most commented-upon repercussions of this Africa–Gulf spat as Dubai–Djibouti ties soured, in May 2016 DP World had announced a $440 million, thirty- year deal to develop Berbera, neighbouring Somaliland’s dilapidated port, just 250 kilometres east of Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopia has for long been keen to diversify its access to ports. On 1 March 2018, just days after Djibouti’s seizure of DP World’s stake in DCT, the Ethiopian government announced that it would take a 19 per cent stake in the Berbera port development, alongside DP World (51 per cent) and the Hargeisa government (30 per cent). However, the move had been planned for many months; it was not a response to Djibouti’s nationalization of DCT.

Broader regional ‘security’ considerations: the Yemeni war and the UAE’s Somaliland and Eritrea bases Given this narrow, Africa–Gulf dispute, pitting Djibouti’s president and entourage against his ex-adviser and DP World, the matter might be dismissed as being more about pride and personalities than hard-nosed

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commercial rivalry or geopolitics. However, Djibouti’s domestic ports’ dispute with the Emirates evolved in an exceedingly fraught regional context. This meant that the UAE/DP World’s problems over their Doraleh port and DP World’s linked move to also invest in neighbouring Somaliland’s dilapidated port of Berbera have wider implications and require broader interpretation. By 2020 the regional and global context in the lower Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was that regional rivalries and alliances on both sides of the Red Sea coast, as well as global rivalries – above all between China and the US – appeared to be being played out in a race for military and commercial port infrastructure spanning almost 1,200 kilometres of the Horn of Africa coastline. The scramble for military and commercial influence and facilities contributes to political volatility and associated foreign policy choices facing the states in the Horn of Africa. This is most pronounced in terms of the implications of foreign government involvement in Somali politics, and how other actors, particularly the other Somali states (quasi-autonomous Puntland and the de facto independent Somaliland), view Gulf Arab involvement. It is also of concern to Ethiopia and Djibouti, both of whom contribute troops to the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM. The AU also expressed unease about the impact that growing Middle Eastern rivalry had upon Somalia, with Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat, chairperson of the AU Commission, voicing concern in May 2018 at what he termed ‘increasing instances’ of interference by ‘non-African actors’ – a veiled reference to the UAE, Turkey and Qatar.14 This in turn appears to be inextricably linked both to the GCC military campaign in Yemen and to the splits within the GCC that are dealt with in other chapters in this volume.

Wider schisms: Egypt–Saudi–UAE vs Turkey–Qatar in the Horn? The military and commercial rivalry between disparate Gulf and other powers in the Horn also complicates Western strategic responses to the rapid increase of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. In the short term, developments at the end of the second decade of the twentieth century pointed to a gradual hardening of positions into increasingly concrete and fractious regional blocs. In the longer term, US and EU concerns about strategic shifts in the region will remain focused primarily on Chinese plans and the containment of Islamist threats emanating from Yemen and Somalia, rather than on regional tussles between local powers or, indeed, the fate of the Yemeni nation and peoples. As such, what Saudi, its allies

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and Qatar do in the Horn of Africa is of only peripheral importance to US, European and Chinese stances on the splits in the GCC as a whole. Nevertheless, the escalation of war in Yemen in 2015 and the blockade of Qatar in 2017 had a profound impact on regional geopolitics in the Horn of Africa as competition and patronage increasingly fell along an Egypt–Saudi–UAE vs Turkey–Qatar fault line, disrupting old patterns of patronage and positioning. As noted in the following section, amid Dubai’s DP World problems in Djibouti, in 2016 it decided to invest in Berbera’s civilian port infrastructure. Subsequently, in March 2017, Somaliland’s parliament approved plans for the UAE to construct a separate naval facility in Berbera, which, in the Cold War had harboured first a Soviet and then a US naval facility. The facility will be separate from Berbera’s merchant port, which, as noted, is the focus of a $400-million refurbishment by the Emirati state-owned DP World in a joint venture between Somaliland, Ethiopia and DP World. Commenting on the naval construction in April 2018, Somaliland’s ambassador to the UAE claimed that UAE troops would protect Somaliland’s coastline train security forces and also use the base to launch attacks on Yemen. Berbera lies approximately 300 kilometres due south of Yemen’s strategic southern port city of Aden. In November 2017 the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that the UAE had already constructed a 400-metre jetty to the west of Berbera’s main port, the facility apparently aiming to support the GCC’s naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Yemen. It was in part the spat over GCC landing rights in April 2015, narrated earlier, which spurred the UAE to invest in the mothballed Eritrean port of Assab, which lies just sixty kilometres west of the Yemeni port of Mocha. Once the principal port for Ethiopian trade, Assab had fallen into disuse after trade routes closed as a consequence of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war. Assab also had the dual advantage of being even closer to Yemen’s Houthicontrolled coastline than Djibouti and, being utterly isolated and located in a country with tight information controls, obscuring the GCC’s devastating Yemen campaign from public scrutiny. UAE and Saudi aircraft and ships enforced an ongoing naval blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemen making extensive use of Assab’s proximity to Yemen, the Saudi navy’s home base of Jizan being 400 km further to the north. Assab’s utility meant that the UAE shelved plans for a three-kilometre airstrip on Perim Island. While Perim lies just two kilometres off Yemen’s coast, this proximity also made it particularly vulnerable to Houthi attack. In February 2018 satellite imagery indicated that earlier construction works had ceased and equipment had been removed from Perim.

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Turkey’s investment in Somalia; renovating Sudan’s Suakin; Qatar’s countermoves? The most visible aspect of the expansion of Turkey’s ambitious strategy in the Horn of Africa has hitherto rested on substantial investment in Somalia. Following several years of humanitarian and commercial activity by Ankara, in September 2017 the Turkish government opened a military base in Mogadishu, providing extensive funds and training for the nascent Somali National Army. Subsequently, during a high-profile visit to Sudan in December 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey would rehabilitate part of the abandoned Ottoman port of Suakin and construct new naval facilities nearby. Egyptian and Saudi alarm at Turkish expansion into the Horn was aggravated by the announcement in March by Qatar that it would provide $4 billion for a broader Suakin and Port Sudan venture, to be twinned with the Qatari Gulf port of Hamad. However, the plans to date appear vague; Port Sudan itself, lying fifty kilometres south of Suakin, is congested and lacks investment. As noted earlier relative to their arbitration and monitoring role in the Eritrean–Djiboutian border dispute, to date, Qatar’s role in the Horn of Africa has been primarily diplomatic rather than military, such as, for example, the role Qatari diplomats played in negotiating Sudan’s Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. However, more recently Qatar has also provided patronage for key Somali politicians in Mogadishu’s federal government, including, allegedly, the president. This was likely a major factor behind the rupture in April 2018 between the UAE and Somalia, prompting the UAE to precipitously close their hospital in Mogadishu and withdraw from military training programmes for the federal government. In terms of ramifications in the upper Red Sea, while, in theory, a Qatarifunded, Turkish-built expansion of either Port Sudan (or – less probably – Suakin) could provide berths for Turkish or Iranian vessels seeking to break the Saudi–UAE naval blockade of Yemen, at present the Suakin project appears to be one of symbolic intent, aimed more at giving practical substance to Erdoğan’s (‘neo-Ottoman’) strategic ambitions in East Africa while strengthening the Turkey–Qatar alliance across the region.

Superpowers and GCC–Horn dynamics: nascent US–China rivalry and regional divisions over Yemen and Arabia This overspill of Middle Eastern rivalries also complicates the long-term strategic repercussions of China’s new naval presence in the Red Sea. The

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fulcrum of China’s long-term policy in the region is the consolidation of its ‘naval logistics facility’ in Djibouti, a key link in Beijing’s ‘Maritime Silk Road Initiative’ (MSRI). Since 2013 China has invested heavily in Djibouti’s infrastructure, moulding the Red Sea state into a key logistical hub for China’s trade, investment and naval activities in the region. Djibouti’s privileged status was reflected in Xi Jinping’s high-profile reception of Djibouti’s President Guelleh in Beijing in November 2017, and the signing of bilateral accords enhancing the two states’ ‘Strategic Partnership’. Since 2012 China has become Djibouti’s largest inward investor, thanks largely to the two major MSRI infrastructure projects: the rail link to Addis Ababa, with its associated infrastructure and the Multi-Purpose Port (MPP) at Doraleh, with its adjacent Free Trade Zone. The slashing of container transportation times between the Red Sea and Ethiopia’s burgeoning highland manufacturing zones (from two to three days of unreliable truck journey, to eight to twelve hours by rail) is set to radically transform the manufacturing potential of Ethiopia. China constructed its ‘naval logistics facility’ at Doraleh between 2015 and 2017, its first overseas military base. This came in the wake of an upsurge in Chinese civil investment in port, rail and industrial infrastructure in the Horn of Africa. The base shares berths with the far larger civilian MPP at Doraleh, run by the state-backed China Merchants Holdings (CMH) conglomerate. Since 2013, CMH have owned 23.5 per cent of Djibouti’s Ports and Free Zone Authority, which manages all of Djibouti’s ports. China is just the latest global power to establish a presence in Djibouti, which has, over the since 2002, embraced a spectrum of new military partnerships and alliances. Prior to Chinese troops debarking in July 2017, Djibouti’s most striking ‘new’ relationship was with the US, diversifying dependency away from France. The US’s Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa has been based in Djibouti since 2002. Originally conceived as part of the US response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, with the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 it became the US military’s only permanent facility on the African continent, based at a former French military facility, Camp Lemonnier in Ambouli, a southern suburb of the capital. US military investments in Djibouti have since grown steadily. President Guelleh visited Washington in May 2014, signing a further ten-year rental agreement on the military facilities, worth around $60 million per annum to Djibouti.15 Thus it is primarily the swift expansion of Chinese presence and power, embodied in the opening of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) facility in Djibouti in August 2017, which challenges the established patterns of US and European presence. The AFRICOM has its only military base

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on African soil in Djibouti, which also hosts the EU’s anti-piracy force EUNAVFOR Somalia, as well as a Japanese naval base and France’s largest garrison in Africa. While this much is clear, what is far less certain is what, if any, impact the presence of so much global firepower in the Gulf of Aden has had upon the regional dynamics surrounding both Arab involvement in Yemen and the broader rivalries of regional powers, aligned since mid-2017 along the Qatar–GCC divide, which seek influence in the Horn of Africa. China’s own policies towards the Middle East as a whole are now the subject of extensive study and are dealt with elsewhere in new literature.16

China’s involvement in Djibouti, the Red Sea and Horn of Africa In terms of the new ties with China, Djibouti is an influential hub on the ‘Maritime Silk Road’. The specificity of Djibouti’s role is the fact that it harbours China’s first, and so far only, naval and military logistics facility outside of China. President Guelleh first hinted to journalists about a possible Chinese military presence in Djibouti in April 2015. Just a week after US Secretary of State John Kerry had made his inaugural visit to Djibouti that May, Guelleh confirmed the Chinese plan, and on 8 November a formal agreement was signed by General Fang Fenghui of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff. Military ties did not come out of the blue; eighteen months before, in early May 2014, Djibouti had signed a limited military cooperation agreement, providing China with mooring and bunkering facilities in exchange for military supplies. Chinese armoured vehicles and weaponry were displayed in Djibouti shortly afterwards.17 The naval base, which in practice is a heavily militarized annex of the Doraleh civilian MPP, was officially inaugurated on 1 August 2017. During construction, the Chinese navy and media routinely referred to a ‘36-hectare logistics base’ for the PLAN. The facility can accommodate up to 400 marines and comprises ammunition depots, an office complex, a heliport with a short airstrip and other facilities.18 Both the opening ceremony and the first live-fire exercises by Chinese troops operating from the base the following month were publicised widely in both Western and Chinese media, with the coverage in China emphasizing Djibouti’s links to the MSRI and the broader Belt And Road framework.19 China’s new military presence is largely driven by Beijing’s global commercial maritime ambitions and economic investments in the Horn of Africa, secured through a network of global shipping lanes, with expanding

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Chinese investment in East African ports. Evidently this nascent, ongoing strategic reconfiguration of the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean has been fuelled by new regional enmities forged on the anvil of Yemen’s disintegration. Yet these rivalries provide only a partial picture of the shifting strategic balance of power in the region. US, European and Asian naval forces all retain a very significant presence in the Horn, predating both Yemen’s war and the GCC split, and largely reflecting the ongoing vital strategic importance of the sea lanes through Egypt’s Suez Canal.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to highlight the impact of selected regional factors impact on Djibouti’s foreign policy. It has focused in particular on the evolution of its convoluted ties with Dubai and the UAE. Failure to manage tensions with the UAE, its main Gulf commercial partner, marks a reversal for Djibouti’s established diplomatic practice. This has invariably sought to maximize the financial and political benefits from rivalries between states by seeking bilateral ties and a military or maritime presence in the city-state. In the case of the UAE, the highly personalized roots of the rupture, originating within the presidential entourage, overrode diplomatic principles and priorities, prompting significant damage to Djibouti’s regional standing and Gulf ties. The chapter has also sought to sketch how these broader ‘regional’ dynamics interact with local actors in the Horn of Africa, notably in neighbouring Somaliland and the Federal Republic of Somalia, where the UAE, Qatar and Turkey all play influential roles. Given the chapter’s focus on Djibouti, we have not evaluated Eritrea’s ties with Arabia, and Yemen’s civil war, beyond noting the expansion of the UAE’s military facility in the Eritrean port of Assab, whose role in policing the blockade of Yemen’s western ports was central. Eritrea itself, like several other African states, was believed to have contributed troops to the Saudi coalition in Yemen, while Ethiopia was cautious to avoid direct entanglements. The UAE’s Assab base is an important source of foreign exchange for the beleaguered Asmara authorities. Given its utility for the blockade of Houthi supply lines, notably around the key port of Hodeida in the fighting of 2018, it was important, even as the UAE accelerated construction of its military facility at Berbera, in Somaliland to the south, and initially consolidated its hold on Socotra. In the long term, rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea from mid-2018 should alter regional power

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dynamics, notably as trade routes reopen. A preliminary peace deal between Eritrea and Djibouti, signed in September 2018, coupled with renewed Ethio-Eritrean ties, also shifted the outlook for Arab, Turkish and Asian third parties, whose presence in the Horn has increased so sharply in recent years. The chapter has attempted to provide a specific Djiboutian perspective on the complex interlinkages underpinning Gulf states’ involvement in East Africa, outlining how the Djiboutian government manages the current renewal and reconfiguration of Gulf engagement in the Red Sea and Horn. It has not sought to delve into the maritime dimension of interactions between states surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea coasts. Clearly the Saudi-led naval blockade of Yemeni ports, coming amid ongoing and intense anti-piracy surveillance in the region, has prompted increased awareness of the dangers of the waters to the north and south of the Bab el-Mandeb itself. However, it is the expansion of Chinese power – underscored by the opening of Beijing’s military facility in Djibouti in August 2017 – which challenges the contours of US and European presence in and around the Horn, despite wariness of China. Given the nature and rationale of the activities of AFRICOM and the EU’s anti-piracy force EUNAVFOR Somalia, they are unlikely to be altered by the activism of the Gulf states and Turkey in the Horn. Evidently, the US base in Djibouti also hosts non-AFRICOM US military units. These oversee attacks on Islamist and other targets in both Somalia and Yemen. In the latter case, attacks in Eastern Yemen against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, like the escalating war along western Yemen’s coast, may well have involved the US in liaising with Emirati troops. Whether one views this as distinct from Emirati actions in Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, largely depends on one’s reading of the UAE military and foreign policy rationale and processes. More broadly, it is less certain what impact the presence of so much global firepower in the Gulf of Aden has upon the regional dynamics surrounding both Arab involvement in Yemen and the broader rivalries of regional powers. After mid-2017 the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain were at loggerheads with Qatar, with the GCC split in turn reconfiguring regional powers’ influence in the Horn of Africa. Western (and Indian) media will continue to focus on the expansion of China’s naval and military facilities, while the regional arms and base races narrated here will in practice continue to revolve around the evolution of the Yemeni quagmire. However, it is likely that it will be the acceleration of Chinese trade and investment in the Horn, and the increase of China’s maritime power in the region, that will largely determine the shape of long-term port expansion in the Gulf of Aden.



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Notes 1 This text was originally presented to the Gulf Research Center Conference, Cambridge, 31 July–3 August 2018, as part of a workshop on ‘The Gulf States in East Africa: Security, Economic and Strategic Partnerships?’ 2 D. Styan, ‘Djibouti; Small State Strategy at a Crossroads’. Third World Thematics 1, no. 1, 2016. 3 On migratory trends, see: Research and Evidence Facility (REF) Consortium (2017) Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen, A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen, www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-chapters/ file122638.pdf. 4 For details of the ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’, regulating anti-piracy operation, see http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/djibouti-code-conduct. See also C. Bueger and T. Walke, From Djibouti to Jeddah, the Western Indian Ocean Needs Security (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018). 5 Formally speaking, in terms of population, Djibouti is the fifth-smallest state in Africa; only four island micro-states of Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and the Comoros are smaller. Of the 22 members of the Arab League, only Comoros is smaller. 6 Samson A. Bezabeh, Subjects of Empires/Citizens of States: Yemenis in Djibouti and Ethiopia (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2016). 7 French forces in Djibouti were reconfigured in the 1990s; then, in June 2011, troop numbers fell significantly with the transfer of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign Legion from Djibouti to the UAE. 8 See S. Le Gouriellec, ‘Djibouti’s Foreign Policy in International Institutions: The Big Diplomacy of a Small State’, in Jason Warner and Timothy Shaw (eds), African Foreign Policies in International Institutions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Styan, ‘Djibouti’. 9 This aspect is central to the ‘Vision 2035’ developmental blueprint adopted by the Djiboutian government. 10 D. Styan, Djibouti; Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub, Chatham House Briefing (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2013). 11 D. Styan, ‘China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti’, Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 122 (2020), pp. 191–206. 12 This section draws on the author’s work for Africa South of the Sahara and Oxford Analytica. 13 Personal communications, Djibouti, April 2015. 14 Al Jazeera, ‘External Actors Urged to Stop Meddling in Somalia’s Affairs’, 29 May 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/external-actors-urged-stopmeddling-somalia-affairs-180529180345722.html. 15 C. Presutti, ‘US Signs Long-term Lease for Military Base in Djibouti’, Voice Of America, 5 May 2014, www.voanews.com/africa/us-signs-long-term-leasemilitary-base-djibouti. 16 J. Reardon-Anderson, The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

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17 M. Singh, Port de Djibouti: China’s First Permanent Naval Base in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses [IDSA], 23 February 2016), p. 5. 18 V. Bhat, ‘China’s Mega Fortress in Djibouti Could Be Model for Its Bases in Pakistan’, 27 September 2017, https://theprint.in/2017/09/27/china-mega-fortressdjibouti-pakistan/. This provides a detailed analysis of aerial surveillance photos of the base taken in September 2017. 19 For example, see the items at Chinese News Agency (2017): http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ news/2017–07/12/content_4785301.htm and, Russia Today (2017), www.rt.com/ news/404593-china-military-drills-djibouti.

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10 Engaging foreign powers for regime survival: the relative autonomy of coastal Horn of Africa states in their relations with Gulf countries Aleksi Ylönen Introduction The Saudi–Iran rivalry and the war in Yemen have had important implications for interstate relations in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. As explained in Chapter 2, the two ongoing conundrums intensified the relations, especially between the most powerful states of the Arabian Peninsula and the strategically important states in the Horn. While Saudi efforts since 2013 to diminish Iran’s role in the Horn of Africa have been largely successful, the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in the war in Yemen since 2015 has intensified Saudi Arabia’s and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) involvement in the Horn. Instead of Iran, it has been above all Turkey and Qatar which have been able to advance their influence in the Horn of Africa and counter increasing Saudi and UAE involvement through receptive governments that have accommodated their efforts. In mid-2017 a rupture occurred involving the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Saudi Arabia and the UAE viewed the foreign policy pursued by Qatar, often geared towards the empowerment of non-state actors, including grassroots and civil society movements, as an increasing threat to their own interests and sought to isolate it. Issuing an extensive list of demands which would have significantly undermined Qatar’s sovereignty,1 the two GCC powers imposed a blockade on the country. States in the Horn of Africa, which had already sought to take advantage of the war in Yemen, reacted to Qatar’s curtailment by calibrating their foreign policy orientation towards the GCC. These events, causing the new unfolding political constellation, have provided new opportunities for the governments of the coastal Horn states. These regimes have sought to strengthen their internal position and maintain the status quo by using their foreign relations to obtain resources and undermine their domestic rivals. Adjusting their external alliances in the

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prevailing regional political landscape has formed a crucial part of this effort. Although this strategy has featured strongly in the efforts for regime survival in the Horn for a long time,2 the increasing intensity of the Gulf powers’ interest in the subregion widened the opportunities for such ‘extraversion’.3 The resources and other material and non-material support obtained through such strategic foreign relations orientation empower the existing regimes. This chapter discusses the relations of three countries of the coastal Horn of Africa with the leading GCC states and their rivals. Founded on the understanding of the historical context of each state, it views Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, all having faced significant internal challenges and external pressure, as states that have oriented their foreign relations strategically in an attempt to ensure regime survival and consolidation in the prevailing regional political landscape. More specifically, the chapter argues that Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan have sought to take advantage of the wider range of opportunities provided by the Gulf states’ interest in the coastal Horn of Africa, brought about by the larger political context of the Saudi–Iran rivalry, the Saudi/UAE–Turkey/Qatar competition, and the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in the war in Yemen. The chapter shows that in the context of changing regional political landscape, the extent of Eritrea’s, Somalia’s, and Sudan’s foreign relations adjustments towards the leading Gulf states and Turkey reflects their relative autonomy towards these states and the respective regimes’ level of need for domestic political and economic consolidation.

Brief historical contextualisation of the Horn of Africa’s connections with the Arabian Peninsula The Horn of Africa has a long history of connections across the Red Sea. These interactions have formed a fundamental dimension in the strategies of the rulers and elites of political entities in the subregion. For example, the Axumite Empire (100–940 CE), forming one of Africa’s great civilisations, centred on the highlands of today’s northern Ethiopia and extended its influence and territorial control across the Red Sea to the Arabian Peninsula, and its merchants engaged in commercial relations with faraway regions and empires, such as India and Rome.4 Following the rise and expansion of Islam, its influence reached the Horn of Africa early on, through merchants and sailors engaging in trade across the Red Sea. They were followed by Arab-Muslim migrants who settled in the subregion and whose presence and intermarriage with locals led to a gradual peaceful cultural transformation in which Arab culture and Islam featured in various degrees.5 The gradual

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expansion of Islam, also involving proselytising by Muslim scholars and clerics, began in the coastal areas and their city-states, which served as the foundation for its extension to the interior. Islam gradually became the majority religion, especially in the lowlands and plains of the subregion, while Ethiopian highlands remained largely Christian. While the kingdoms and sultanates of the Horn of Africa adopted cultural influences from the Arabian Peninsula, they engaged in commercial activities that accumulated wealth and permitted the maintenance of internal political order. Whereas Mogadishu’s extensive trade networks extending to Asia made it wealthy already between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Berbera, along with Bulhar,6 became a key trading port connecting the Horn of Africa with the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries.7 Trade created wealth for these coastal cities and brought about the necessary resources for them to maintain their position as important logistical hubs. In the nineteenth century the European Scramble for Africa resulted in the formation of colonial territories and new political orders in the Horn of Africa. In a number of colonial dominions some of the local subjects willing to collaborate with the coloniser were at times appointed to administrative positions, and a few eventually ascended to positions of power during the process of decolonisation. Often out of necessity, these individuals developed patron–client networks that supported their power and used their relations with others to maintain a socially powerful position, especially when converting into anti-colonial elites and inheriting power from the coloniser. In the process, and as part of the colonial administration, these individuals learned ruling strategies and methods associated with maintaining the colonial state in their particular contexts and were inclined to develop similar methods after they themselves came to power. As a result, following independence, and after brief democratic preludes, mostly authoritarian regimes emerged in the Horn of Africa. While the monarchic, dictatorial, and highly centralised Ethiopia annexed the democratically governed Eritrea in 1952, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti succumbed to authoritarian rule, respectively in 1958, 1969, and 1977. Since independence, and during the Cold War, the governments in the Horn of Africa, most of which faced significant domestic challengers, sought to use their foreign relations for state8 and regime survival. They pursued strategies that enabled them to accumulate resources for consolidation while domestic economies remained endemically weak.9 External resources maintained neopatrimonial networks of the ‘big men’ who concentrated public resources in their person and fed extensive bureaucracies and security apparatuses loyal to them.10 A number of domestic challenges to the narrow concentration of political and economic power took a violent form, and armed opposition groups often benefited from external assistance along

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Cold War alliances, especially when the neighbouring governments supported them as proxies. It was domestic political actors that posed as the main threats to the continuity of the regimes in the Horn of Africa. When, during the Cold War, regimes in the Horn shifted their political orientation along the East–West rivalry, they employed strategies of extraversion in order to benefit from external support and resources provided by their allies. Obtaining resources from abroad was aimed at ensuring regime stability and the domestic political status quo. In the early 1950s, Ethiopia, the dominant state in the subregion, used its alliance with Western powers as leverage when it absorbed Eritrea. Following the formal annexation of Eritrea in 1962, armed resistance for Eritrean liberation emerged, while Sudan (1956) and Somalia (1960) had recently gained independence. This led to a proxy confrontation in which the states exploited the Cold War rivalry for external support. Whereas Ethiopia was confronted by Eritrean armed opposition, Sudan faced an insurgency in the south of the country. Sudan, aligned with the Soviet Union, supported Eritrean resistance and, itself being assisted by Arab states, transited Arab material support to the Eritreans. In contrast, Ethiopia and its allies provided assistance to the southern rebels in Sudan. In 1969 left-wing officers staged successful military coups in Sudan and Somalia. While in Sudan this action by the Revolutionary Command Council marked the return of military rule, in Somalia the Supreme Revolutionary Council that took power cut short the early and vibrant democratic political order. Both coups were inspired by socialist ideas, as well as the influence that the Soviet Union commanded in the Middle East and its aspirations in the Horn of Africa. The 1970s brought a number of changes in the Horn of Africa. The importance of external resources for regime survival against internal rivals was highlighted by the difficulties governments faced when the financial and other support from external patrons diminished. Looking to ensure the flow of such external resources that would help to consolidate their regimes, the governments changed their allegiances between the superpower patrons. Starting off in Sudan, soon after the 1969 takeover by the socialist officers, it became clear that the new regime needed external support to strengthen itself against internal challenges. Already in March 1970, it faced an abortive coup attempt, which was followed by another, almost successful, one in July 1971 organised by the marginalised Sudan Communist Party with external assistance. This led the regime to move towards the West. The following year, Sudan reinstated diplomatic relations with the United States (US) and began receiving generous economic and military assistance as well as investments and financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, which sought to turn Sudan into a breadbasket for the Middle East.11

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Meanwhile, increasing economic hardship and dissatisfaction with the imperial system in Ethiopia culminated in a military coup in 1974 by lowranking leftist officers. The coup, taking place shortly after Sudan had turned towards the West, also aligned with the Soviet interests. The revolution in Ethiopia, a key state in the Horn of Africa previously aligned with the West, sent shockwaves to the neighbouring states in the region. In Sudan this gave the regime an incentive to consolidate its realignment with the West, while in Somalia the increasingly totalitarian regime’s vision of ‘great Somalia’ seemed to be closer than ever to the upheaval in Ethiopia, which also involved intensification of the conflict in Eritrea, in part due to increased external support, especially from a number of Arab states. The Somali regime, seeking to consolidate itself, had received Soviet and Egyptian armaments which it used to supply the Western Somali Liberation Front in Ethiopia as part of its ‘great Somalia’ aspirations. In June 1977 Djibouti gained independence, and the following month Somalia launched a fully fledged invasion of Ethiopia. Again, the respective regimes in the Horn sought and drew support through their external alliances and Ethiopia eventually gained the upper hand, due to Cuban, Soviet, and South Yemeni assistance, while Somalia broke ties with the Soviet Union and sought to regain the momentum by seeking an alliance with the US. However, eventually the external support helped Ethiopia to emerge as victorious, while the vision of ‘great Somalia’ lost appeal as the Somali regime turned inwards to fend off internal rivals who sought to exploit its weakness after the military defeat. The following decade brought further instability in the Horn of Africa. In Sudan in 1985, severe economic difficulties led to mass protests which prompted a military takeover deposing Jaafar Nimeiri’s military regimeturned-Islamist. In Somalia, during the second half of the decade, the increasing unpopularity of the repressive military regime of Siad Barre led to the establishment of armed opposition. This, together with the downward economic spiral in connection with the end of the Cold War, led to the regime’s downfall in January 1991. Similarly in Ethiopia, the coalition of armed opposition movements, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), brought down the increasingly bankrupt Derg regime a few months later, after it had lost Soviet support in the previous year and, ironically, aided the armed opposition to depose the Barre regime in Somalia. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War was devastating for the military regimes in the Horn. It greatly diminished the strategic importance of the subregion and, consequently, the possibility of manoeuvring between the East and the West to extract vital resources and maintain the political regimes dependent on external assistance. In the following unipolar world, in the context of increasing exigencies and decreasing funding from

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the West, the survival of the regimes in the Horn became more dependent on their ability to extract resources from other internationally and regionally powerful states. The post-Cold War international order saw the deepening of Western influence in the former Soviet sphere. Neoliberal economic reforms and a wave of democratisation swept through Africa.12 The old authoritarian regimes had lost their Cold War support and the powerful Western donors and international organisations increasingly subjected leaderships in Africa to conditionalities such as ‘good governance’, respect for human rights, and the cutting down of the public sector. The aid largely dictated by the ‘Washington consensus’ promoted overwhelming dependency on the West, which a number of governments sought to prevent. This new reality made life difficult, particularly for those regimes that were not strategically important, had not allied with the West, or had failed to adhere to the Western-imposed conditionalities. In Sudan, in June 1989, officers staged a military coup which led to the establishment of an Islamist National Congress Party regime that initially drew support from the Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-1990s, its increasing isolation by the West had led the new Sudanese regime to seek alternative external alliances. Meanwhile, following the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991, the Somali National Movement, the main armed opposition force in north-western Somalia, oversaw Somaliland, which it largely controlled, declare itself as independent. There was also a relative strengthening of other regional states, including Puntland, towards the central administration, which eventually collapsed, leading to a destructive power struggle among warlords, especially in south-central Somalia. In the course of the early 1990s international interventions, focused mainly in the south, were unable to support the re-establishment of a stable political regime and eventually withdrew after suffering heavy casualties, and despite having been able to momentarily secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to part of the population. In Ethiopia, the downfall of the Marxist Derg regime also resulted in the takeover by rebel groups. However, in Ethiopia the EPRDF, led by its strongest faction, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, established a central government but was compelled to allow its coalition partner, the Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front, to effect the long fought-for independence of Eritrea in 1993. While from the mid-1990s onwards a number of African countries joined the Western liberal project, a number of the narrowly based and authoritarian regimes in the Horn had to find remedies to survive in the conditions of relative marginalisation and international isolation. For example, Sudan’s Islamist regime, principally threatened by a Western-backed rebellion in the

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south, forged strong ties with China and Iran,13 while also seeking to remedy its relations with the West. Djibouti’s leadership used the country’s strategic location to become a military base for external powers and a transport hub connecting Ethiopia to the sea. In return, it has obtained generous funding and development assistance, while further strengthening its already strong relations with China.14 From independence, Eritrea sought to maintain a highly hierarchical political system based on the structure and philosophy of the liberation movement, while entering into a number of territorial disputes with its neighbours. In December 1994 it broke ties with Sudan, while accusing Khartoum of supporting Islamist anti-government forces in Eritrea. One year after, Eritrea’s forces took the Greater Hanish Island belonging to Yemen, but in 1998 the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the latter regarding the ownership of the island. Earlier in the same year, the tension on the Eritrean border with Ethiopia had caused a clash in Badme, which ignited a two-year war between the two states. Ending in a treaty in December 2000, the conflict resulted in a military stalemate at the common border and forced Ethiopia to rely increasingly on Djibouti to secure a commercial lifeline to the Red Sea. While Ethiopia was able to gain allies in the West after the war, Eritrea faced international isolation, especially after it was seen to support Islamist factions in Somalia, which went especially against US and Ethiopian efforts to consolidate a secular government in the country. In June 2008 a border dispute emerged between Eritrea and Djibouti, and in December 2009 the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on Eritrea, due to its refusal to withdraw from the Djibouti border as Djibouti troops had done and its brief involvement in Somalia. In response, the Eritrean government sought to mitigate the effects of the sanctions by focusing on austere self-reliance and pursuing a variety of especially non-Western ties, including with Iran, through which additional financial and material resources could be obtained. Meanwhile, using its central strategic position in the Horn and promoting the commercial potential of its domestic market, Ethiopia’s new leadership began to increasingly rely on China as an external partner, while at the same time benefiting from its good relations with the West. Finally, Somalia, which has still to fully recover from the collapse of the central government in 1991, has continued to face political divisions and a deeply entrenched Islamist insurgency. This situation has been exploited by internal and external actors, perpetuating Somalia’s predicament despite simultaneous efforts of rebuilding the state and establishing central authority. Only recently, in the 2000s, has Somalia’s government become vocal about its interests in the Horn, but, confronted with internal challenges, it has been obliged to seek domestic consolidation and has to carefully consider its policy towards its constituent parts that

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have detached themselves from its authority. For this, the Somali government has continued to draw resources and other support from its external partners.

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Politics of regime survival in the Horn of Africa Historically, the states in the Horn, as in most of Africa, are relatively recent constructions. With the notable exception of Ethiopia, they are generally products of colonialism and largely collations of a number of ethnic and clan groups and nations which have been governed through various forms of strategy based on the logic of ‘divide and rule’. The colonial heritage and the prevailing multi-ethnic, clan, religious, and sectional divisions compounded by artificial borders originating in or being severed by oftendivisive colonial governance practices have, in most such cases, resulted in endemically weak multinational states. This endemic fragility and the governing elite’s perpetual search for stability to maintain the prevailing status quo, which at times gives it almost coloniallike privileges, is at the heart of the politics of governance in the states of the Horn. The fragility owes largely to the structural conditions of the states, and state–society relations which to an extent are still tainted by colonial or, in Ethiopia, imperial legacies, including a tendency towards minority rule, weak institutions, and difficulties in managing ethnic diversity. The governance practices of the elites often continue to divide and marginalise the majority of the population along the constructed and sustained politics of ‘tribalism’, largely along ethnic and clan lines. In the greater Horn, the structures of the modern state put in place by the coloniser come face to face with heterogeneous societies, creating a political environment in which authoritarian politics and tendencies have prospered throughout most of their recent history. The main threats to the survival of regimes in the Horn and the rest of Africa are internal. Large-scale interstate conflicts or external interventions for regime change have been rare. Although many governments engaged in proxy wars during the Cold War and have supported each other’s opposition organisations since then, as in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sudan and South Sudan, external interventions by neighbouring states have very often been made in support of the incumbent regimes. Major examples of this include Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2006, Kenya entering Somalia in 2011, and Uganda intervening in South Sudan in 2013. Similarly, international interventions and mediation have in most cases backed the recognised governments.

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Exclusive governance as a structural condition of many African states, to an extent rooted in the colonial or imperial past, features prominently among the internal political factors that cause domestic threats to governments. Although this exclusivity tends to greatly benefit the political and economic elites and their constituencies, it results in a drastically unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities, marginalisation or outright exclusion, and deeply entrenched inequality and socio-economic divisions, often contributing to relative deprivation,15 grievances, and endemic political instability. However, it is important to understand that internal and external politics do not work in isolation from each other but are integrally intertwined. This is particularly apparent in the Horn of Africa,16 where the relationship between internal and external politics, in practice, makes foreign relations an important tool for regime and state survival.17 Especially since independence, the already present practices of using strategies of ‘extraversion’,18 namely diplomacy and foreign policy to attain resources from the exterior, have become important, particularly in conditions of state decay and waning internal legitimacy. The efforts of governing elite factions to maintain power domestically, especially in such circumstances, require strategies for survival, among which using the legal recognition and status of the state for external legitimacy and obtaining resources from the exterior have been important.19 In these circumstances, the governing factions often seek to control external relations because they may be crucial for maintaining power, while state institutions provide a façade for informal wealth generation and redistributive channels favouring the domestic consolidation of the regime.20 The states in the Horn of Africa share a common history of emphasising foreign relations for regime survival. Rather than focusing on maintaining a capacity to win violent interstate conflicts for survival as the Realist International Relations theory would suggest,21 the ruling elites in the Horn have generally sought to strengthen themselves primarily against internal challengers and threats through cooperation with strategic partners, including donor countries and states providing other forms of assistance. As some Institutionalists would argue,22 the states in the Horn appear to be capable of establishing sustainable cooperation that follows their governments’ self-interest and forming agreements and institutions mitigating inter- and intra-state tensions and conflicts. In the Horn, as in most of Africa, maximising coercive and economic state power relative to neighbouring states seems to be a lot less important than maintaining sufficient power domestically to be able to maintain political and economic control, status quo, and stability. Again, this power is largely gained through the instrumentalisation of foreign

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relations to gain external legitimacy and, more importantly, material and political resources for the governing elite and constituent groups associated with it. Therefore, constructive foreign policy and the acquisition of resources based on cooperation with strategic partners is considered crucial for regime survival.

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Current Horn of Africa–Gulf relations In 1979 the Iranian revolution disrupted the US-led coalition against the Soviet Union among the Middle Eastern powers. It marked the end of friendly relations and the beginning of the deep sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the leadership of the Muslim world. Both powers have since competed for influence in their neighbourhood and supported proxy leaders and forces in the neighbouring states. While their focus has largely been the troubled states in the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, they have also competed for ground on the African side of the Red Sea. Although the 2011 Arab Spring brought changes in Egypt, the Horn of Africa remained relatively unaffected. The Iranian presence was strong in a number of states in the subregion, but soon after the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, together with its GCC allies, engaged in an effort to persuade states such as Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan to abandon their relations with Iran. The tactics to achieve this have involved a mix of ‘stick and carrot’ policies ranging from financial pressure to offers of lucrative economic and military cooperation. The most recent episode of this competition in the Horn of Africa has come in the context of the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in the war in Yemen. Bringing the GCC rivalries and security concerns to the Horn, it has incorporated the subregion into the ‘regional security complex’ 23 centred on Yemen, while at the same time overlapping with Libyan, Somalian, and Syrian security complexes. As a result, the Red Sea coastal territories of the Horn have to a degree become an extension of the political and security dynamics of the Arabian Peninsula while at the same time being strongly influenced by the political and economic realities of the interior Horn of Africa. For example, Ethiopia, the dominant state in the region, also plays an important role in the political dynamics of the coastal Horn. While the Gulf powers have sought to use their economic power and resources to seek influence and promote their security interests, especially in the strategically important Red Sea coastal areas, the governments of the powers in coastal Horn countries have engaged with them according to their need to ensure external resources for their domestic survival. When

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opportunities have emerged in the context of political events and processes drawing the Arab states’ attention to the Horn of Africa, the governments in the Horn have sought to exploit their relative autonomy towards these states to improve their own domestic standing. This is why the heating Saudi–Iran rivalry and the Yemen conflict have enabled especially the coastal Horn states to capitalise on the security concerns and their strategic position next to the crucial Red Sea shipping lanes by using them as leverage for advancing their strategic interests. With the GCC rift in 2017 new opportunities emerged, especially for the coastal Horn states to exploit the Saudi/UAE–Qatar/Turkey rivalry. While a number of them were pushed to choose sides, they again sought to use their relative autonomy to remain open to benefiting from ties with both parties in order to deal with their domestic challenges.

Eritrea The logic and practice of current Eritrean politics arise from the system of rebel governance by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) during the long liberation struggle.24 Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, the political system has remained highly hierarchical and national-level elections have not taken place. Power is concentrated in the presidency, which emphasises self-sufficiency and uses foreign relations as an integral part of its strategy for regime survival, continuing the EPLF’s earlier practice. In relation to its strategic location on the coast along a narrow stretch of the Red Sea, Eritrea has long historical ties to the Arabian Peninsula. In the past, it served as the point of access to lucrative commercial sea routes for the Ethiopic empires and later became an obsession for the leadership of landlocked Ethiopia. During the liberation struggle the links of Eritrean rebels with particular neighbouring countries and states in the Arabian Peninsula were important, and, after independence, the Eritrean leadership has continued to embrace relations with Arab countries. However, external criticism of Eritrea’s very hierarchical domestic political order has somewhat restricted its foreign policy options for regime survival. Eritrea’s relations with the West began to deteriorate after the Eritrean– Ethiopian war. In Eritrea the conflict was followed by increasing criticism of the political system and a domestic campaign of silencing opposition individuals and groups in 2001. Facing increasing international isolation in the later 2000s, Eritrea’s leadership sought new external alliances and its relationship with Iran grew closer. In June 2007 the countries exchanged ambassadors and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki publicly endorsed the Iranian nuclear programme.25 In the following May he visited Iran, which

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strengthened the countries’ bilateral relations. Soon after, unconfirmed rumours emerged about Iranian military presence in Eritrea, and allegations by the Eritrean opposition surfaced regarding Asmara’s support for the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen by channelling Iranian arms.26 However, the 2011 Arab Spring invited increasing GCC attention to the coastal Horn of Africa. In this situation, and while facing UN sanctions since 2009, due to its conflict with Djibouti and activities in Somalia, Eritrea seized the opportunity to diversify its foreign sources of support and establish closer ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Reportedly, Eritrea had military officers trained in Abu Dhabi during 2012–15.27 The Eritrean leadership’s next step to strengthen relations with the GCC powers and their allies came in the context of the increasing prospects of lifting UN sanctions on Iran. In September 2014 President Afwerki visited Egypt. Subsequently, in April 2015, approximately a month after the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign in Yemen, he visited Saudi Arabia. Afwerki reportedly decided to support ‘military and security cooperation to fight terrorism and piracy in the Red Sea’ and join the effort to isolate Yemen, possibly sending troops for the coalition ground forces,28 but at the same time not renouncing Eritrea’s relations with Iran.29 Since joining the Saudi-led coalition, Eritrea has provided logistical assistance that allows its military partners to use the port of Assab in return for financial assistance and fuel, while also, according to some reports, sending troops to Yemen. The Eritrean government has also reached an agreement with the UAE for the latter to use Asmara airport and build a military base in Assab to support its operational capability in western Yemen and efforts to control the Bab el-Mandeb strait and secure oil transportation through it. In the 2017 GCC rift, Eritrea backed the Saudi–UAE posture towards Qatar. Together with Djibouti, it was one of the first countries in the Horn to voice its support for Saudi Arabia, which led Qatar to withdraw its peacekeeping force from the Djibouti–Eritrea border. Eritrea later accused Qatar and its ally Turkey of subversive activities and promotion of Islamism, which could undermine peace in the region.30 These accusations came after increasing tension on the border between Sudan and Eritrea and in the context of warming Sudan–Qatar–Turkey relations that led Sudan to adopt an ambivalent position and seek to mediate in the GCC crisis. Yet, at the same time, Eritrea maintains good relations with Israel and may not have entirely abandoned its sympathies with Iran. Finally, the most ground-breaking event recently affecting Eritrean foreign relations occurred in July 2018, when it suddenly reconciled with Ethiopia. This was made possible by the emerging reformist leadership of Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa and mediation by the UAE, which brought the leaders of

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the two countries together. Initially, it seemed that the rapprochement rapidly undid years of animosity and confrontation and brought Eritrea even closer to the UAE, while Eritrea’s cooperation with the GCC states also entails a hope of improving relations with the US. However, further improvement of Eritrea’s relations with Ethiopia was hindered by the growing Tigrayan resistance to Abiy Ahmed’s rule across the Eritrean border. In November 2020 the Eritrean government joined the new Ethiopian administration in its military effort to subdue the Tigray People’s Liberation Front-dominated regional leadership in Tigray. This demonstrates the continuation of a close alliance between the Eritrean and the new Ethiopian leadership while they both also pursue relations with a variety of external partners to ensure regime survival.

Somalia The coastal Somali peoples have a long history of engaging in maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. A number of sultanates engaging in sea commerce existed in the Somali territories from the medieval to modern times. Somalia’s strategic location has attracted the interest of other powers, and this has been apparent from the Cold War era until today. After the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 and the territorial disintegration of the state, Greater Somalia has attracted diverse external actors and interests. The struggle for the control of central administration and territory, heavily involving external actors, has forced the Somalian leadership to largely turn inwards. The territorial disintegration of the state has obliged the central government to largely focus on domestic and inter-Somali issues, including security and state and nation building. However, Greater Somalia experiences significant influence from the Gulf states. This is largely due to its proximity to Yemen, the strategic location it occupies in the shores of the Indian Ocean, and access to the Red Sea. Yet the Gulf states’ engagement is not only about the rivalry between the Saudi–UAE coalition and the Qatar–Turkey alliance, Iran, Israel, and Russia, or the great power competition involving the US and China, but, importantly, it involves Somali politics and, especially, relations between Somalia’s constituent parts. While brief Iranian and Eritrean involvement in the mid-2000s undermined US and Ethiopian attempts to establish a secular central administration, the current engagement by the Gulf states has weakened the federal government’s position relative to Somaliland and Puntland. Mogadishu’s attempt to impose itself as the legitimate government and its insistence on the territorial unity of Somalia without significant

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concessions to regional states continues to face potent opposition that is fuelled by external support. While the Somali federal government maintains strong relations with Qatar and Turkey, Somaliland and Puntland have looked towards the GCC states for external assistance. The Somali leadership’s warm relations with Qatar were reaffirmed by the 2017 election of Doha-backed Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ as Somalia’s president. This, and the close partnership with Turkey which has been particularly influential in Somalia since 2011, has enabled Qatar to maintain influence in Somalia, despite losing out when Eritrea and Djibouti decided to side with the Saudi-led coalition against Qatar and Turkey in 2017. Somalia’s relations with Qatar and Turkey have been important, especially since the federal government lost international leverage against Somaliland, which has gained from its alliance with the UAE and the Saudi-led coalition. Although Hargeisa’s position is strengthened by further consolidation of its already strong relations with Ethiopia, the attempts of Somalia to improve ties with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti may improve Mogadishu’s situation, which has been undermined by Qatar’s isolation and Turkey’s recent economic challenges. Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s once warm relations with the UAE have deteriorated. This is owing largely to the UAE’s pressure to have Somali president Farmajo’s administration cut ties with its major backer, Qatar, while the UAE has chosen to work with Somaliland and Puntland. This, in turn, has exacerbated tensions between Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe. The main initial manifestation of increasing tensions was the UAE’s agreement with Somaliland to build a military base in the strategically located Berbera, where the UAE is also expected to train the Somaliland military. Meanwhile, in 2016 Dubai Ports World (DP World) signed a deal with Hargeisa to operate the Berbera port for thirty years, at the same time upgrading it and building an associated economic free zone which is expected to significantly boost trade and result in economic development in Somaliland. Mogadishu initially rejected the agreement into which Ethiopia was later incorporated as a major stakeholder by claiming that it constitutes ‘a clear violation of international law’.31 In April 2018 relations between Somalia and the UAE deteriorated further after Somalia seized US$9.6 million at Mogadishu Airport that it suspected the UAE was seeking to use for subversive activities. This prompted a diplomatic confrontation in which the UAE ended its training mission in Mogadishu and sent a twelve-member delegation to Hargeisa as a demonstration of strong ties with Somaliland. The UAE has also continued to put pressure on Mogadishu through deals with its northern autonomous region, Puntland. Already in April 2017, DP World’s subsidiary, P&O Ports, had signed a thirty-year concession agreement

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to manage and develop a multipurpose port in Bosaso. The port is located in close to a naval base that has been used by the UAE-supported Puntland Maritime Police Force for fighting piracy and other illegal maritime activities. However, the Bosaso port lacks infrastructure connecting it into the interior, which hinders its strategic importance, while it has also been intermittently closed, due to protests. As their relations with the UAE indicate, the governments of Somaliland and Puntland have highlighted the strategic significance of their coastlines and successfully attracted financial resources and development ventures. Yet, the growing tension between Somalia’s constituent parts and breakaway states is also reflected in the Somaliland–Puntland relations. The two autonomous de facto states have remained at odds about the ownership of their shared border regions in Sanaag and Sool. In January 2018 Somaliland forces invaded the strategic town of Tukaraq and the parties have engaged in several episodes of heavy fighting. Further severe fighting between the two parties in Sool took place in the strategically important Las Anod. In February 2018, voices in Somaliland accused militias linked to federal president Farmajo of stirring trouble in the region in an attempt to destabilise Somaliland,32 but, following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Somalia in June, Farmajo expressed his willingness to resume negotiations with Somaliland.33 Viewed from the understanding of Ethiopia’s leverage on Somalia, this appeared also to be an indirect reconciliatory gesture towards the UAE, with which Ethiopia and Somaliland enjoy good relations. Somalia has also recently re-established diplomatic ties with another UAE ally, Eritrea, in 2018. This conciliatory approach to broaden regional relations appears to have come in the situation in which Mogadishu’s strongest supporters, Turkey and Qatar, have faced difficulties. As a result, Farmajo’s attempt to re-establish contacts with Abu Dhabi while continuously insisting on neutrality in the GCC crisis could be seen as the manifestation of a strategy of extraversion that seeks to broaden the sources of external support for domestic consolidation. Finally, in Somalia the actions of external actors have resulted in the penetration of outside influence that contributes to divisions between its constituent parts. Although the Farmajo administration has been the beneficiary of Turkey’s and Qatar’s partnership with Somalia, the UAE’s actions to expand its influence through Somaliland and Puntland have undermined Somalia’s efforts to establish unity. Somalia’s divisions have opened space for various external actors to extend their influence, and the UAE has been the principal actor taking advantage of them. Although this has deepened the divisions among Somali territories, affecting Djibouti–Somaliland relations as well, the UAE’s efforts can be seen to have been useful for securing the crucial shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

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Sudan34 The Sudanese political elite has for a long time considered external relations as an important way of strengthening its domestic position. Particularly from the 1970s onwards, with the rise of the Islamist tide, relations with the Gulf states featured prominently in Sudan’s foreign policy and the political elite’s strategies. In this, Saudi Arabia’s role was particularly important due to its support for influential exiled Sudanese opposition groups and hosting of a considerable number of migrant workers. At the end of the Cold War, Sudan stood in the midst of a protracted civil conflict. In 1989 it experienced a coup and regime change by the National Islamic Front (NIF). The new leadership was an outgrowth of political Islamist sections in the Sudanese urban political elite that had gained power during the gradual decline of the initially socialist army officer Jaafar Nimeiri since the early 1970s. Initially headed by a religious leader, Hassan Turabi, the NIF sought to consolidate its power in the midst of an ongoing civil war and managed to do so particularly after the Derg regime in neighbouring Ethiopia collapsed in 1991, resulting in a drastic decrease in external support to the rebel factions in southern Sudan. The NIF pursued a policy to Islamise Sudan’s non-Muslim areas and spread political Islam in its neighbourhood, with the help of its allies in the Gulf. In Khartoum, this was largely seen as an appropriate strategy for the new regime’s domestic consolidation. Internationally, it actively sought a central role in promoting and radically extending political Islam, including through a repressive domestic Islamisation policy, hosting Osama bin Laden, and supporting Islamic organisations in neighbouring states. In response to various attacks which Sudanese elements had allegedly organised or participated in, such as the 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at the AU meeting in Addis Ababa, and ‘because of its continued sponsorship of international terrorism, its effort to destabilise neighboring countries and its abysmal record on human rights’, the US put Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism and imposed economic sanctions in 1997.35 However, the Islamist regime in Sudan survived. It continued to maintain good relations with a number of Gulf states hosting considerable Sudanese diaspora, but also looked towards Asia for new partnerships. China and largely Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia answered, and from 1999 Sudan began exporting petroleum, principally to China, following the construction of a 1,600-kilometre pipeline from its south-central oilfields to the Red Sea coast. Despite a leadership struggle in which President Omar al-Bashir sidelined Turabi, and the ongoing civil war, this greatly improved the state’s economic position. Seemingly the new government had substituted the previous

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regime’s uneasy leaning towards the West with a new partnership with Asian states. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, Sudan again gained importance in US foreign policy. The US took a leading role in pushing the peace negotiations on its long civil war, resulting in a controversial, narrow power-sharing agreement finalised in 2005 which endorsed the South Sudanese calls for self-determination. On 9 July2011, following a six-year interim period of limited self-rule and a referendum on self-determination, South Sudan became independent and Sudan lost approximately three-fourths of its petroleum reserves. This shocked its economy, highly dependent on oil exports, despite the government’s efforts to diversify with exports of other raw materials and primary products; however, this did not compensate for the lost income. The deteriorating economic conditions that followed contributed to demonstrations and riots over a number of years, due to the lowering and abolishing of subsidies on various consumer goods, which sparked record inflation.36 Dissatisfaction with the government’s economic and political management became commonplace, while the cash-strapped regime sought to maintain power by obtaining resources from the Gulf states and other major allies to maintain its security and institutional apparatus. The initial events leading to Sudan’s current foreign relations orientation towards the GCC took place in 2013. Following the Arab Spring, and alarmed by the increasing prospects of easing Iranian sanctions, Saudi Arabia sought to curtail Iran’s influence on the African side of the Red Sea coast. Among other littoral states, namely Egypt and Eritrea, it targeted Sudan, which had maintained warm relations with Iran since the 1990s. Aware of the vulnerability of the Sudanese economy, due to the independence of South Sudan and the US sanctions, Saudi Arabia applied economic pressure. In March 2014 it targeted the Sudanese banking sector by banning bilateral dealings, thereby undermining the banks’ long and considerable links to Saudi Arabia, which are important in channelling the diaspora remittances that have been essential for funding both the Sudanese regime and economy. To counter its increasing economic difficulties, the Sudanese government tried to impose austerity measures, but it soon abandoned them, due to wide protests. In September 2014 Sudan succumbed to the Saudi pressure. It closed Iranian cultural centres on the pretext of curbing the extension of unwanted Shi‘a philosophy among the youth, and expelled Iranian diplomats.37 In March 2015, seeking to benefit from these gestures and affirming ties with the GCC states, Sudan seized the opportunity to formally join the Saudi-led military coalition.38 Subsequently, the banking restrictions were lifted and Sudan was rewarded with generous financial injections and other economic support, including US$5 billion in military aid from Saudi Arabia.39 In

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2015–19 Sudan contributed air support, logistical assistance, and up to 15,000 ground troops for the military coalition, with expectations of significant economic and financial support. During the January 2016 escalation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, sparked by Riyadh’s execution of a famous Shi‘a opposition cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Sudan stood firmly with the coalition of GCC states and was among the first to condemn Iran. However, the deeper partnership with the GCC states was not sufficient to alleviate Sudan’s overall economic crisis. From 2016 Sudan has also taken the opportunity to become the European Union’s partner in curbing the European refugee crisis.40 It has sought to benefit from its position as a transit country for refugees seeking to reach Europe. This partnership against illegal migration and human trafficking has been financially beneficial for Sudan, but it has generated controversy, largely due to the treatment of migrants.41 In June 2017 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar. This led to the GCC partners’ blockade and isolation of Qatar and another opportunity for Sudan. Although firmly allied with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Sudanese government sought a reconciliatory approach to the crisis. Despite Saudi pressure, it sought to salvage its politically beneficial and economically lucrative relationship with Qatar.42 In late December, the heads of state of Sudan and Turkey agreed in Ankara to rehabilitate and manage the port of Suakin. This initiative further extended Turkey’s presence in the Horn, which has been largely focused on Somalia. In another development, in March 2018, Sudan and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding, Doha pledging US$4 billion and later delivering cranes and tugboats to convert Suakin into a major commercial port.43 The partnership with Turkey and Qatar, and overtures towards Russia for economic and military support during President al-Bashir’s visit to Moscow in December 2017, may have been controversial from the Saudi and UAE perspective, but the latter two were criticised for not helping Khartoum to resolve the economic crisis in the country despite the close partnership. The Sudanese government appears to have kept the Turkey–Qatar–Russia card to pressure its GCC allies for economic support, but it has received little such help.44 By the second half of 2018 Sudan’s economic crisis had deepened and inflation had skyrocketed. In September 2018, in the aftermath of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation meeting in Beijing, President al-Bashir dismissed the entire cabinet, announced the reduction of ministries from thirty-one to twenty-one, and had the prime minister appoint a new cabinet four days later. Forming part of the austerity measures, this drastic move sought to rejuvenate efforts to revitalise the economy,45 while China agreed to provide support to alleviate the dire economic situation.46 China’s assistance to the ailing government

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should be seen in the context of its interest in stability so as to ensure access to raw materials and secure investments. Faced with deepening economic difficulties, the Sudanese leadership maintained a pragmatic foreign policy. It sought desperately to maximise sources of income and resources. One aspect of this foreign policy was to remedy relations with the West, and especially the US, but progress was slow, although in October 2017 the US formally lifted most of its economic sanctions, largely due to lobbying by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, which sought to keep Sudan away from Iran, with which it has a history of close ties.47 However, this had a detrimental effect on the Sudanese economy because of the rising level of imports. By the end of 2018 the prices of basic goods had shot up and fuel was hardly available, which severely undermined the economy and people’s lives. Civilian protests initiated in December spread, and escalated into a popular uprising. Eventually, sections in the Sudanese security apparatus began siding with the civilians and the army finally deposed President al-Bashir in April 2019. The new government, the Transitional Military Council, continued to face sustained protests and committed a massacre of civilians in Khartoum in June 2019. However, faced with sustained pressure, it was finally forced to share executive power with civilians in the newly established Sovereignty Council of Sudan for a period of thirty-nine months, after which a general election would take place.

Conclusion The major international developments of the acceleration of Saudi–Iran rivalry, the war in Yemen, and the GCC rift have drawn increasing interest on the part of the Gulf states towards the Horn of Africa. In the changing regional political environment, subregional rivalries in the context of waning international liberalism have played an important role in opening new space for foreign policy orientation toward authoritarian regime survival. In response to these developments, the governments of coastal states in the Horn have actively sought to take advantage of the prevailing situation. By forging new and reaffirming old external alliances, they have engaged in balancing foreign relations to obtain resources from the exterior for strengthening their domestic position. Using their relative autonomy, the Horn governments have been wary of firmly taking sides and have sought to balance their relations in order to ensure their survival, although often seemingly siding with one external actor or the other. Maintaining a degree of autonomy has enabled them to shift or broaden alliances when necessary to address domestic threats and challenges.

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The strategy of engaging in extraversion so as to obtain resources for regime survival has deep roots in the subregion and in Africa in general. However, it has become apparent from this analysis that the current external relations orientation of the coastal Horn of Africa states reflects the extent of the urgency of ensuring regime survival. While the Eritrean government’s external relations towards the powerful GCC states and its initial reconciliation with Ethiopia appear to indicate a somewhat lesser need for regime consolidation, the Somali federal government’s and Sudanese regime’s (until April 2019) respective approaches to pursuing wider foreign relations across and beyond GCC rivalries point to the necessity of maximising economic, financial, and military resources and other support from a wide variety of foreign sources to ensure regime survival. Whereas the Eritrean political system has enabled the government to survive with meagre resources from multiple foreign sources, the Sudanese regime’s inability to use its autonomy to secure sufficient resources from the exterior was largely responsible for its demise. Indeed, in the case of the littoral states in the Horn, it appears to be the extent of the necessity of obtaining resources for regime survival against primarily domestic threats that largely dictates the need to adjust foreign policy orientation and external alliances.

Notes 1 P. Wintour, ‘Qatar Given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi Arabia’, The Guardian, 23 July 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/ close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade. 2 C. Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3 J-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs, 99, no. 395 (2000), pp. 217–267. 4 D. W. Phillipson, Foundations of an African Civilisation: Aksum and the Northern Horn 1000 BC–AD 1300 (London: James Currey, 2012). 5 A. Mazrui, ‘The Black Arabs in comparative perspective: The political sociology of race mixture’, in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 47–81. 6 F. L. James, The Unknown Horn of Africa: An Exploration from Berbera to the Leopard River (London: George Philip & Son, 1890), p. 327. 7 J. C. Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind: Ethnography of the African Races (Sherwood: Gilbert & Piper, 1837), p. 160. 8 Clapham, Africa and the International System. 9 N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 10 M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, ‘Neo-patrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa’, World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994), pp. 453–489; in Mats Utas

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(ed.), African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2012). 11 A. Ylönen, On State, Marginalization, and Origins of Rebellion: The Formation of Insurgencies in Southern Sudan (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2016), p. 258. 12 M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); C. Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012). 13 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002); Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003). 14 J. N. Brass, ‘Djibouti’s Unusual Resource Curse’, Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 4 (2008), pp. 523–45; J. Braude, ‘Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti’, Huffington Post, 26 September 2016, www.huffpost.com/entry/why-china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702. 15 T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 16 A. Ylönen and J. Záhořík (eds), The Horn of Africa since the 1960s: Local and International Politics Intertwined (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 17 Clapham, Africa and the International System; van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. 18 Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’. 19 R. H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 20 J-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993); P. Chabal and J-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). 21 J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural realism’, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith (eds), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71–88. 22 R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 23 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 24 A. Ylönen, Eritrea: A Rogue or a Strategically Constructed Threat? Observatoire pluriannuel des enjeux politiques et sécuritaires dans la Corne de l’Afrique, Note 14, February 2016. 25 Tehran Times, ‘Eritrean President Says Iran Has Undeniable Right to Nuclear Energy’, 7 June 2007, www.tehrantimes.com/news/142583/Eritrean-presidentsays-Iran-has-undeniable-right-to-nuclear. 26 Yemen Post, ‘Houthis Receive Arms from Iran via Eritrea’, 10 April 2010, www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1548. 27 N. Manek, ‘Eritrea’s Military Got Help From U.A.E., Foreign Firms, UN Says’, Bloomberg, 12 November 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–11–12/ eritrea-s-military-got-help-from-u-a-e-foreign-firms-un-says.

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28 D. Fitzgerald, ‘UN Report: UAE, Saudi Using Eritrean Land, Sea, Airspace and, Possibly, Eritrean Troops in Yemen Battle’, UN Tribune, 2 November 2015, http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-landsea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/. 29 Y. Seddiq, ‘Iranian Support to Houthis via Eritrea: Reality or Myth?’, Ahram Online, 15 June 2015, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/132655/ World/Region/Iranian-support-to-Houthis-via-Eritrea-Reality-or-.aspx. 30 J. Jawhar, ‘Eritrea Accuses Qatar, Turkey of “Subversive Acts”’, Asharq AlAwsat, 5 April 2019, https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1665896/eritreaaccuses-qatar-turkey-%e2%80%98subversive-acts%e2%80%99. 31 Al Jazeera, ‘Somalia Calls for UN Action against UAE Base in Berbera’, 27 March 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/27/somalia-calls-for-un-actionagainst-uae-base-in-berbera#:~:text=Speaking%20at%20the%20Security%20 Council,clear%20violation%20of%20international%20law%E2%80%9D. 32 A. Al-Mutairi, ‘Somalia is Invading Somaliland’, SomalilandPress, 7 February 2018, available at www.somalilandpress.com/somalia-is-invading-somaliland/. 33 Goobjoog News, ‘President Muse Bihi Welcomed the Statement of President Farmajo to End the Conflict in Tukuraq’, 4 July 2018, http://goobjoog.com/ english/president-muse-bihi-welcomed-the-statement-of-president-farmajo-to-endthe-conflict-in-tukuraq/. 34 The case of Sudan and particularly its recent relations with influential Gulf states is explored in more detail in Chapter 11 of this book. 35 C. Giacomo, ‘U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Sudan’, Reuters, 4 November 1997, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/us-imposes-new-sanctions-sudan. 36 Reuters, ‘Sudan’s Bread Prices Double after Government Cuts Wheat Subsidies’, 5 January 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-economy/sudans-bread-pricesdouble-after-government-cuts-wheat-subsidies-idUSKBN1EU1RM. 37 K. Abdel Aziz, ‘Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centres’, The Guardian, 2 September 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/02/ sudan-expels-iranian-diplomats-closes-cultural-centres. 38 S. Sengupta, ‘Sudan Joins Coalition against Yemen Rebels’, New York Times, 26 March 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/africa/sudan-joins-coalitionagainst-yemen-rebels.html. 39 Sudan Tribune, ‘Saudi Arabia Gives Sudan $5 Billion in Military Aid’, 2 February 2016, https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58095. 40 International Organization for Migration, ‘EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route (Khartoum Process)’, 2014, www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-routeinitiative-khartoum-process. 41 P. Kingsley, ‘By Stifling Migration, Sudan’s Feared Secret Police Aid Europe’, New York Times, 22 April 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/ migration-european-union-sudan.html. 42 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Calls to Ease Tensions between Qatar and Gulf Countries’, 5 June 2017, https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article62648. 43 Daily Sabah, ‘Sudan, Qatar Ink $4 Billion Deal to Develop Suakin Seaport’, 26 March 2018, www.dailysabah.com/africa/2018/03/26/sudan-qatar-ink-4-billiondeal-to-develop-suakin-seaport; Sudan News Agency, ‘Port Sudan Port Celebrates



44

45

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Delivery of Qatari and Tow Boats Sent by QPMC’, 26 April 2018, https:// suna-sd.net/en/single?id=1341. K. Abdelaziz, ‘Sudan Assessing Military Participation in Yemen: Defense Minister’, Reuters, 2 May 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-sudan/ sudan-assessing-military-participation-in-yemen-defense-minister-idUSKBN1I3245. M. Amin, ‘Sudan’s Bashir Dissolves Government amid Economic Crisis’, The East African, 10 September 2018, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Sudangovernment-dissolved/4552902–4752082-rhi1m9/index.html. Xinhua, ‘Sudan Appreciates Support from China – Official’, 4 September 2018, https://allafrica.com/stories/201809040285.html. Ryan Grimms and Alex Emmons, ‘How Sudan Got off Donald Trump’s Latest Travel Ban List’, The Intercept, 25 September 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/09/25/ sudan-trump-travel-ban-uae-yemen/; Carol Morello, ‘U.S. Lifts Sanctions on Sudan, Ending Two Decades of Embargo’, The Washington Post, 6 October 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-lifts-sanctions-onsudan-ending-two-decades-of-embargo/2017/10/06/aac1bd22–86d5–434 e-9a21–1e0d57a72cb0_story.html?noredirect=on.

11 Sudan’s foreign policy predicament in the context of the GCC diplomatic rift Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Mohammed Sharfi

Introduction The current dispute between Qatar and the Quartet countries (a coalition of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, and Egypt) initiated a new, complex pan-regional dynamic involving a web of contradicting foreign policy directions and interests. The massive financial resources and international connections of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have provided considerable political leverage at the regional and international levels. The contest for political influence between the Gulf states became apparent in different regional theatres such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Quartet grievances with Qatar focused on claims of its support for terrorism, unacceptable close relations with Iran and interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries. However, upon examination, the dispute could be viewed through a prism of regional competition. This regional rivalry involves supporting opposite political sides, with Qatar betting on the rise of Islamist groups in the region. The intra-GCC dispute has a huge political, economic and security impact in the Horn of Africa. Sudan is an important country in the Horn, and plays a central part in the GCC rivalry, due to its economic potential and strategic location. The dispute triggered hard choices for the Sudanese regime in the domestic and international spheres. The Gulf states were central in the shape and form of Sudanese foreign policy with its close geographical proximity, huge financial resources and their emerging international influence. Following the arrival of the National Salvation Revolution (NSR) to power in 1989, there was continuous tension with major Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, over its radical political Islam agenda in its initial years. The authority of President Omar al-Bashir over foreign policy direction has critical implications in the engagement with the ongoing GCC dispute. Following the collapse of the Islamist regime and the formation

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of a transitional government, new dynamics started in Sudan’s relations with the GCC. The GCC rapprochement with the signing of the al-Ula communique in January 2021 that led to the end of Qatar blockade does not end the history of complexities and the deep-rooted conflict between Gulf states. There is a growing area of research on the increasing engagement of the Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa states, including Sudan. The Gulf states competition affects considerably the political undercurrents and security in the Horn of Africa. One of the main areas that led to this Gulf engagement is the economic potential in the region. Since the 1990s, the GCC has made extensive investments in the fields of commerce, agriculture, telecoms, finance, infrastructure development etc.1 However, Coates Ulrichsen asserts that the intensity of GCC involvement in the Horn of Africa is being pushed by the dynamics of insecurity.2 Huliaras and Kalantzakos explain the rising power of the through its widened sphere of influence in a region characterized by international competition: ‘geopolitics, security issues, competing religious affiliations, resource competition, food shortages and crises resulting from a changing climate – but also the opportunity for business investments in a number of sectors – all draw Gulf states and other nations into this difficult region’.3 This perspective could explain the various agreements between some GCC countries and states in the Horn for establishing military bases, such as with Saudi Arabia in Djibouti or the UAE in Eritrea.4 Meanwhile, other studies delve into the presence of a small state such as Qatar in conflict management in the Horn of Africa, using it as a tool to enhance its foreign policy credentials, with mediation initiatives straddling the Darfur conflict in Sudan and the Eritrea–Djibouti dispute.5 A number of interviews were held with former senior personnel and ex-ambassadors in the NSR. These interviews were conducted in the background of a study on Sudan’s external relations following the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The study conducted a qualitative analysis of the political and economic literature and perceptions related to GCC–Sudan relations in the context of the ongoing impact of the crisis on the Horn of Africa. There are dispersed analyses in literature by academics or in newspapers on the effect of the crisis on the internal context of Sudan’s external outlook.6

NSR relations with Qatar and Quartet countries: background Since the NSR regime’s instigation in 1989, its relations with the Gulf states have fluctuated between tense and improved. The Sudanese government

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was able to overcome the tension with major states in the region over its position after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1991. Political developments in Sudan after 1991 convinced many within the NSR of the blunders committed because of radical Islamist policies. The Islamist fabric of the Sudanese regime forced it to commit to backing other Islamist political groups that believe in the same ideological political project, but with some differences. One of the foreign policy intentions of the regime in the initial stage was to encourage international Islamist groups to pursue a political programme that endeavoured to undermine and control the state. The NSR’s ideological agenda threatened the political context on an international level, imperilling the NSR’s continuation in power. Although the regime fabric continued to be Islamist in nature, real politik was ultimately applied in order for the NSR to continue in power. This is an important dimension in the regime’s dynamic relations with the GCC. At the time, Egypt was perceived by elements in the NSR security apparatus as leading moves to destabilize the Islamic project in Sudan. Egypt’s antagonistic posture was reflected in the attempt to mobilize against the NSR on both regional and international levels. In retaliation, some personnel within the security service encouraged Egyptian Islamists to execute a ‘sacred’ plan of assassinate President Hosni Mubarak. The assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in June 1995 led to substantial changes in the regime’s international interactions.7 The event alerted the Sudanese regime to its radical failings of ideology in its engagement in the international sphere. The botched plot led to isolation and the initiation of a regional and international coalition to topple the NSR, prompting the NSR to adopt an appeasing attitude towards the Gulf states and Egypt. Foreign policy was a crucial facet in accelerating the political conflict between the NSR power centres, Dr al-Turabi and President al-Bashir. Both men viewed the management of the regime’s external relations through different lenses, ultimately leading to an internal split in the NSR in 1999. Meanwhile, the government recognized the damage caused to its relations with Saudi Arabia by its strong political links with Iran, its main regional adversary in its early years. One of the implications of the NSR foreign policy reverse in the mid-1990s was the turn toward a minimalist engagement with Iran, since the paramount objective was to revive ties with regional and international powers. The NSR’s relations with Iran grew problematic with the expansion of Iranian-sponsored Shi‘a activities in Sudan. The Sunni social composition of Sudan and the sensitivity of the Shi‘a–Sunni schism on the domestic level added to the complexity of Iranian–Sudanese ties. This dimension, in addition the pursuit of political capital, led in September 2014 to the closure of Iranian cultural centres and the expulsion of the people in charge of them from the country.

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Regional alliances are critical in the dynamics of Sudanese relations with Egypt, which is part of the Arab Quartet. Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider their ally President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt as critical to regional security. With Sudan’s growing relations with Turkey, Egypt became alarmed at the prospect of Turkish–Qatari encroachment into its sphere of influence. Sudan signed various agreements during the visit Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in December 2017, including a deal to rebuild the Red Sea island of Suakin.8 The agreement over Suakin has generated regional fears that this is another Turkish attempt to create a military base in the region – in addition to those in Qatar and Somalia. The Muslim Brotherhood orientation of the Sudanese regime in the context of the GCC rift adds an important dimension to the dynamics of NSR foreign policy.

Relations with Qatar The tendency of Qatar to follow an independent position in the Gulf, which is largely dominated by Saudi Arabia, led to the consolidation of mutual relations with the NSR in the mid-1990s. For a long time the Islamist NSR regime viewed Saudi Arabia through an ideological lens and contested Saudi leadership in the Muslim world. A new Qatari foreign policy orientation emerged following the ascent of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa to power in 1996. Qatar has always supported the NSR during difficult times. During the internal rift between al-Turabi and President al-Bashir, Qatar expressed its interest in mediating the conflict through Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, the Qatari foreign minister.9 Although the mediation was unsuccessful, the effort to intervene in the dispute illustrates Qatar’s leverage with the regime in Khartoum. Qatar became an active player in the Darfur conflict, which led in March 2009 to the indictment of President al-Bashir for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Various rounds of Darfur peace negotiations were held in Qatar until the completion of the Doha peace document, and Qatar donated $2 billion for the development of the Darfur region.10 Autonomous Qatari foreign policy that emerged in the wake of Arab Spring was oriented towards the support of Muslim Brotherhood movements and governments, including the NSR. ‘In many places, this strategy has meant fostering a government made up of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) related groups that are beholden to their benefactors in Doha.’ 11 The heavy involvement of Qatar with the NSR was part of its increasing pursuit of influence in the Arab world through support for Islamists such as in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. Many policy makers in the NSR still feel indebted to the sustained Qatari support during a long period of international sanctions and exclusion in the region.12 Relations with Qatar are vital to the NSR’s political and

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economic interests, since it is an important lender of hard currency to the Central Bank of Sudan. This dimension remains vital during economic crises, which pose a real threat to the government’s survival. The NSR seeks Qatari investment and trade, and political support on the international level. Qatari investment in Sudan amounts to more than $3 billion and is expected to rise with the introduction of new ventures such as the Qatar Mining Company, which will invest more than $1 billion in this field. Hassad Food’s agriculture project will contribute to the cultivation of 260,000 acres in the River Nile state. Hassad Food was also implementing an electricity project in the area with a value of more than $200 million, of which many phases have already been completed.13

Relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE Three main issues informed Saudi Arabia’s relations with the NSR in the past: the position on the Gulf War; the regime’s relations with Iran; and the presence of Osama bin Laden in Khartoum in the past. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, bilateral relations passed through difficult times in all spheres, due to the NSR’s support for Iraq. Bilateral relations were restored in 1995 after the Sudanese government made huge efforts with the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia’s strategic ties with the West and Egypt had a positive influence on ameliorating NSR foreign relations with the outside world. The expulsion of bin Laden from Sudan in May 1996 was intended to rebuff accusations of terrorism against the regime, and to overcome the strains between the two countries. ‘In June 1996, there were constructive initiatives in bilateral relations, Saudi Arabia closed the Sudanese opposition office in Riyadh, and on 7 July 1996, Sudan allowed the distribution of Saudi newspapers.’ 14 Saudi Arabia was vital in the lifting of United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions in the context of the assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt in 1996, as well as the freeze on Sudan’s membership in the International Monetary Fund. The NSR realized the damage caused to its relations with Saudi Arabia as a result of its political links with Iran. The NSR’s close links with Iran are considered to be part of an Iranian strategy to encircle Saudi Arabia. The geostrategic location of Sudan is paramount to assuring the security and stability of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi unease at the Islamization project of al-Turabi as a rival concept to its own authority in the Islamic world was finally defused on 12 December 1999, with al-Bashir’s measures that led to the removal of al-Turabi. Bilateral relations were restored with al-Turabi’s departure of from the regime. ‘The last developments related to the end of power duality led to a real awakening

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in the relations between the two countries not only in the official circles but also in the media and at the national level.’ 15 A joint ministerial committee was formed in 2004, chaired by trade ministers of both countries, memorandum of understanding on political consultation and coordination was signed between the two foreign ministers and the first meeting was held in February 2005. On the economic front, an agreement was signed for the Saudi funding of $150 million for the Meroe dam. Saudi Arabia was crucial in urging the mobilization of Arab funds in the Gulf to contribute in the dam’s construction. Saudi Arabia’s investments in Sudan encompass various sectors including agriculture, transportation, construction and cement. Saudi Arabia is the largest market for Sudanese exports, due to its exceptional economic situation. ‘Saudi Arabia’s investments in the country reportedly amounted to $15bn in 2016, with more than 590 projects in infrastructure and agriculture. The United Arab Emirates follows closely as the second-biggest investor, with projects worth $11bn.’ 16 The Gulf War at the beginning of the 1990s instigated a rupture in UAE–Sudanese relations, which led to the expulsions of both ambassadors. The UAE’s investments and its large Sudanese expatriate population, along with its political weight, compelled the NSR to strive for rapprochement to improve relations. The UAE affirmed its full support for President alBashir’s ‘legitimate measures’ against al-Turabi, which ‘preserve unity and attain stability and security for the Sudanese people and the necessity and his right to govern in accordance to its national interests’.17 The UAE’s statement was in line with their stringent regional position regarding the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE view Hassan al-Turabi, the éminence grise of Islamists in Sudan, as a threat to regional stability. Sudan supports the UAE’s position on its disputed islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE is one of the largest investors of the Sudanese economy. ‘The UAE has provided more than AED28 billion in investments and development financing in Sudan, while 17 UAE companies are operating in various economic sectors in Sudan.’ 18

Economic decline: a threat to survival The Sudanese economy faces enormous challenges since the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, with the loss of three-quarters of its oil production to South Sudan. This economic context, combined with prolonged civil and political unrest and conflict, led to dependence on external sources to shore up the budget. The impact of the loss of petro-dollar revenues was reflected

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in the significant decline in the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound. The secession of Southern Sudan in 2011 put huge pressure on the economic stability of North Sudan with the loss of 75 per cent of the state’s foreign exchange earnings and 45 per cent of the general government finances. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy reported that the performance for Q2 2019 revealed a budget deficit of 16 billion Sudanese pounds ($355 million), with revenues of 61.8 billion pounds ($1.37 billion) and expenditures of 77.8 billion pounds ($1.37 billion). Inflation rose to 52.59 per cent in July 2019, compared with 47.78 per cent in June and 44.95 per cent in May 2019.19 There are various indicators of the current economic predicament, including: rapid deterioration in the internal and external financial balances, hyperinflation, exchange rate volatility, rising external debt and erosion of the national reserves. The budgetary emphasis on the security and defence sectors since the secession of South Sudan indicates their high priority for the regime’s survival. The ongoing conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur are part of the political and security threats that the NSR continues to confront. The consolidation of the military and security apparatus has put government finances under severe pressure. The numbers in the 2018 budget demonstrate the huge difference in the level of funds allocated to basic social services and the welfare of society and the amounts allotted for defence and security. In 2018 ‘The budget allocates SDG23.8 billion to the national security and defence sector out of a total budget of about SDG173.1 billion, compared to just SDG5.3 billion to the education sector, and SDG2.9 billion to the health sector.’ 20 The current dire market situation is a manifestation of the government’s incapacity to inject sufficient hard currency into the economy. Businesses to resort to the parallel market for hard currency, since the official channels, that is, banks and exchange bureaus, have difficulty in catering for their needs. In the meantime, the domestic prices of imports, especially essentials such as medicine and sugar, have continued to rise dramatically following the devaluation measure. The dearth of hard currency reserves and the large difference between the official and unofficial exchange rates have continued to impede external trade. The regime’s problematic relations with the international community, particularly with the West, on several internal and external issues including human rights, the Darfur conflict and terrorism continue to affect the overall outlook of the economy. Sanctions were imposed when Sudan was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in the 1990s, and were extended in 2006 as a result of the conflict in Darfur. These measures have impeded the development of the Sudanese economy. ‘The sanctions included a fairly comprehensive trade embargo, a freeze on government assets, and tight restrictions on financial institutions dealing with Sudan.’ 21

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It was assumed that the recent revocation of some of the sanctions against Sudan would have a positive impact in the economy. However, the structural deficiency of the economy, along with the continued domestic political fragmentation and international isolation, poses huge challenges for reviving the economy. It would be exceedingly difficult for the NSR to fix its budget deficit without some kind of external support. The NSR is experiencing similar symptoms to those that triggered the Arab Spring revolutions, with diminishing financial resources, spiralling inflation, widespread corruption, a high rate of unemployment and the prospect of further deterioration in the economy. The GCC states play an important role as mediators for ending the US sanctions and in sustaining Sudan’s weakening economy. The economy and its critical impact on the regime’s stability became the main factor in NSR foreign policy. In such depressed economic conditions, the GCC states were one of the few options available to the isolated regime, especially when its president was indicted by the ICC in 2009.

The intra-Gulf rift In June 2017 the dispute between Saudi Arabia–UAE led Quartet and Qatar erupted when the Quartet drew up a list of thirteen conditions that Qatar was required to meet. The conflict was the most serious event in the Gulf since the formation of the GCC in 1981. The demands included: limiting Qatar’s diplomatic links with Iran and the closure of its diplomatic missions; cutting all ties to ‘terrorist organizations’, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood; dismissing the Turkish military presence in Qatar; and Qatar bringing itself into line with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically. These were far-reaching conditions for Qatar to assent to without a complete overhaul of its foreign policy. The root causes of the conflict can be traced to the ascent of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa to power in Qatar after ousting his father in 1995. Sheikh Hamad embraced a foreign policy that was independent from that of the dominant regional power, Saudi Arabia, and this led to a turbulent relationship. Qatar used its immense hydrocarbon wealth to grow its regional and international influence. ‘From a Qatari perspective, Doha seeks to retain an independent policy that does not necessarily impinge on the interests of its neighbours but is also not linked at the hip with the GCC.’ 22 One of the most important highlights of Qatar’s foreign policy since 2013 has been support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. Qatar became the financial hub and the main supporter of various Islamist groups including Hamas, the NSR since the 1990s, Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. ‘The reasoning behind Qatar’s support is rooted in a mutual

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agreement that influences Doha’s domestic and foreign policies, with the small Gulf emirate utilizing the Islamist movement as a tool for shaping a new order in the Middle East.’ 23 This orientation of Qatar’s foreign policy prompted conflict with other states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. The Qatari alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood is assumed to threaten the security of the region’s other states. Al Jazeera was viewed by many in the Arab world as promoting the Qatari agenda of supporting reform through backing regional Islamist groups. This patronage of the Islamist groups became clear on the eve of the Arab Spring revolts and Qatar’s support for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of President Mohamed Morsi: ‘Qatar established itself as Egypt’s key energy partner and provided the country with $8 billion in foreign aid.’ 24 However, the overthrow of the elected Egyptian President Morsi instigated a crisis between the GCC and Qatar, since Qatar was opposed to the military transition in Egypt. The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s endeavour to crush the Muslim Brotherhood in the region was a foreign policy priority. They supported and funded the toppling of President Morsi in Egypt, and exerted huge efforts to limit the tide of Muslim Brotherhood resurgence after late 2010, when popular revolts toppled despotic regimes in the Middle East. This trend of fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, who were perceived as a transnational group, continued in Libya, Yemen and Palestine. Qatar, on the other hand, continued with its policy to empower Islamists in the region. ‘Saudi Arabia and the UAE particularly view Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood affiliates as lethally threatening to their own regimes, and therefore see Qatar’s behaviour as not merely objectionable, but utterly intolerable.’ 25 Qatar’s ideological orientation, with its use of Al Jazeera as a mouthpiece for Islamists such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, prompted Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to take joint action in 2014 to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha. The main contention at the time was Qatar’s failure to ‘ensure non-interference, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of any member state’. Qatar’s persistence in supporting the Islamist group stems partly from its assertion of foreign policy independence; Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, does not entertain the idea of Qatar as a regional heavyweight. Another important flashpoint in the GCC spat is differences over Iran, since Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider Iran as a critical threat, while Qatar views accommodation with Iran as a possibility. Qatar’s mediation initiatives in several Middle Eastern countries such as Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon reflect its growing influence in the region. This regional engagement has generated increasing tension and is viewed as an encroachment on Saudi Arabia’s influence and status in Middle East, regional and international diplomacy and in the broader Islamic world. The Egyptian

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government was also unsettled over Qatari mediation efforts in Sudan. In a Wikileaks document dated 26 January 2010 a very senior Egyptian diplomat in Doha told the Political-Economic Chief at the US embassy that Egypt was determined to hinder ‘every single initiative’ that Qatar put forward during its presidency of the Arab League at the time.26 He referred to Qatar’s particular involvement in the Darfur conflict: ‘Frankly, Egypt is angered by Qatar’s mediation purely because it involves a country in Egypt’s back yard. There is nothing Qatar has done in Darfur that hurts Egypt or its interests.’ Qatar’s relative regional successes and its mediation efforts with Lebanon, Yemen, or Sudan have perplexed regional players and upset their view of Qatar as being an insignificant player in the regional political setting. Qatar’s expanding relations with Turkey’s Islamist-oriented government under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is also another dimension in the ongoing crisis. Turkey has the same Qatari strong links with groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, and share similar stances on many issues in the region including the Arab spring. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt view this as a new regional axis. In this framework, Turkey opened its first military base in Qatar following a military protocol signed between the two countries in 2015. ‘Turkey’s decision to open a military base on the Arabian Peninsula signals Turkey’s gradually growing involvement in the Middle East and therefore foreshadows another critical challenge for Turkey in the near future.’ 27 This development in bilateral relations reflects Turkey’s increasing regional power, which is unnerving to Qatar Gulf neighbours. Qatar’s relations with the NSR have been another contentious issue between Qatar and Egypt both during the President Mubarak era and under the current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Since the 1990s, the Egyptian government has accused the NSR of supporting Egyptian Islamist groups. In this framework, Egypt also perceives Qatar’s support to the NSR as undertaken to undermine the Egyptian government and as an encroachment into its sphere of influence to the south. The Egyptian media and political commentators constantly denounce the nature and objectives of Qatari–Sudanese relations. The visit of the wife of former Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa and mother of the current emir, Sheikha Moza al-Missnad, to Sudan in 2017 inflamed Egyptian sentiment towards Qatar’s relations with Sudan. Her visit to the ancient Kushite pyramids in Merowe incensed social media and TV channels in Egypt: ‘Qatar’s move to invest $135m (£100m) in projects to develop Sudan’s archaeological sites is seen by many in Cairo as an attempt to undermine the struggling tourism sector in Egypt and part of ongoing efforts by the Gulf emirate to discredit Egypt and its leadership.’ 28 In this context, the crisis in the Gulf led to severe polarization in the Horn of Africa, and Sudan is at the centre of it. The importance of this

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region stems from various security, military and economic determinants that include issues related to the conflict in Yemen, maritime piracy and the war on terrorism. The region is located on a strategic strait that is vital to global trade routes. The Bab el-Mandeb strait is a central corridor for international shipping, and hence for the global economy and trade. ‘In 2018, an estimated 6.2 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil, condensate, and refined petroleum products flowed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, an increase from 5.1 million b/d in 2014. Total petroleum flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait accounted for about 9 percent of total seaborne-traded petroleum (crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2017. About 3.6 million b/d moved north toward Europe; another 2.6 million b/d flowed in the opposite direction mainly to Asian markets such as Singapore, China, and India.’ 29 The crisis within the GCC added another destabilizing factor in the region, with governments, political parties, and elites in East Africa being forced to choose between one or another of the rival alliances. GCC rivalry in the Horn of Africa is an extension of the cold war that has erupted in the region since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Qatar and Turkey supported popular protests and Islamic political parties that emerged during that period, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia opposed the uprisings and Islamist parties. The war in Yemen led to extensive engagement by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to establish military bases in different parts of this region such as Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, the objective being to prevent Iran from smuggling weapons and providing military assistance to the Shi‘a Houthi insurgency in Yemen. The Gulf states signed the al-Ula Declaration at the Forty-first GCC Summit, held on 5 January 2021 in the Saudi Arabian city of al-Ula, ending the blockade against Qatar. The communique stated that the GCC will ‘stand together as one to confront any threat to any member state’ and prevent any ‘violation of sovereignty or disturbance to the security of any GCC state’.30 This reconciliation came as a result of the regional political context and the US elections; however, various issues at the centre of the rift are far from resolved. The recent detente will not ease the fierce collision of geostrategic perspectives within the GCC, particularly in the Horn of Africa. ‘As ideological conflicts, strategic rivalries, and deep-seated mistrust among the Gulf monarchies endure, the Biden administration should accept the fragility of the GCC’s reconciliation.’ 31

Sudan’s foreign policy predicament On the eve of the crisis, the Sudanese government described the inter-GCC dispute as an ‘unfortunate development’ and offered to exert all efforts to

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reconcile the parties, to de-escalate the dispute and to restore ‘calm’.32 The complexity of regional geopolitics in midst of this dispute left the regime disconcerted over its badly needed relationship with the Gulf states. The international isolation of the regime, combined with its dismal economic context, prompted it to invest heavily in restoring its past damaged links with the Gulf states. The NSR’s political and military links with Iran had led to the deterioration of relations with the GCC; however, its priorities with the change in the political context required constructive relations with regional and international powers. The regime realized that Iran’s isolated position within the international community meant that it would not be able to offer any financial support or achieve its foreign policy objectives to open up to the outside world. Sudan’s association with Iran would generate further political difficulties and accusations.

The geopolitical dimension In October 2017, following lobbying efforts undertaken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the US decided to revoke number of the economic sanctions against Sudan; however, Sudan remained on the list of countries supporting terrorism.33 The US measure is the beginning of a process to rehabilitate the NSR relations with the West and end its international isolation.34 When the sanctions were first lifted, during President Obama’s tenure, the Sudanese government referred to the central part played by Saudi Arabia in annulling part of sanctions. General Taha Osman al-Husain, state minister at the Sudanese presidency at the time, said: ‘Saudi Arabia has exerted enormous and continued pressure on the US administration to achieve that goal.’ 35 The Saudi and Emirati drive to engage the US administration with Sudan induced the NSR to sever its strong links with Iran. Sudan had been accused for a long time of smuggling weapons to Hamas, in Gaza, in coordination with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which had led to Israeli air strikes against Sudan in 2009, 2012, and 2014.36 The stick and carrot approach led the NSR to cut its relations with Iran in 2013 and participate in Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthi Shi‘a rebels. The Gulf states’ endeavours to lift sanctions against the NSR have come at a very high price for Sudan’s foreign policy. Sudan’s participation in the Yemeni war has no real strategic interest for the state, since it exploited a perilous course for an opportunity to survive. The NSR finds itself in an awkward position, wedged in the middle of the GCC parties following Qatar’s removal from the war in Yemen. The NSR has continued its participation in Yemen’s bloody civil war while maintaining strong links with Qatar and Turkey. However, in the long term there is a risk that the NSR could lose credibility among the two opposing camps,

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and hence there has at times been mounting pressure within some policymaking quarters to take sides. The Saudi government in particular has urged Sudan to take a ‘clear stance’ on the ongoing Gulf dispute.37 The regime’s policy options are all risky, and have both domestic and international implications. To take sides with one or other of the camps would be costly for the NSR. A decision to be part of the Saudi-led camp in the GCC squabble would infuriate the Islamist elements in the regime, who support Qatar in the dispute. The Islamists are a crucial part of the Sudanese regime’s internal fabric and their support for regime policies is paramount.38 They view Qatar and its support for Islamist movements as a force for good, and value its past assistance to the NSR in difficult times. When the crisis started, the June 2017 National Assembly called on the government to support Qatar, but the foreign minister stated: ‘We will not stand neutral and we will not take sides but we are at the heart of the issue.’ 39 However, siding with the Qatar–Turkey camp might become a challenge for the president in the long run. It would derail the president’s efforts to revive the NSR’s relations with the West, would mean the continuation of the regime’s rogue status on the international level, and could strengthen the Islamists within the regime structure. ‘Alignment with Qatar would make President al-Bashir vulnerable to removal, and face the ICC. In general, the president became a heavy burden on global political Islam, and an ugly face for their project.’ 40 For the NSR to side with the Saudi-led camp would entail getting rid of the regime’s Islamist supporters. This action could open the door for the removal of Sudan from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and the lifting of US sanctions, and could provide a possible exit strategy from the ICC indictment. However, joining the Saudi-led coalition comes at the cost of participating in the Yemeni war, a decision that contradicts the traditional Sudanese foreign policy position of neutrality in regional conflicts. ‘Sudan has at least 3,000 ground troops and several fighter jets fighting in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led alliance. Dozens of Sudanese soldiers have been killed on coastal battlefronts.’ 41 The Sudanese military participation in the Yemeni ground campaign is a financial lifeline for the NSR. According to some reports, the Sudanese generals and regular infantry are paid the equivalent of about $480 a month for a 14-year-old novice to about $530 a month for an experienced officer. They receive an additional $185 to $285 for any month in which they see combat, and at the end of a six-month rotation each fighter also receives a one-time payment of at least 700,000 Sudanese pounds – roughly $10,000.42 ‘People are desperate. They are fighting in Yemen because they know that in Sudan they don’t have a future,’ said Hafiz Ismail Mohamed, a former banker, economic consultant, and critic

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of the government. ‘We are exporting soldiers to fight like they are a commodity we are exchanging for foreign currency.’ 43 While the Saudi–UAE promises for further investment and to relieve the deteriorating economy have not materialized some members of the Sudanese parliament have called on the president to withdraw the forces from Yemen. Although the government has declared that it will reassess its involvement in the Yemeni campaign, this is a clear expression of displeasure with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on account of the lack of substantive support despite significant human losses. The reassessment statement was later retracted by President al-Bashir’s affirming that economic hardship will not deter Khartoum from ‘playing its Arab role in restoring legitimacy in Yemen, given that Sudan’s declared principle is to defend the land of the two holy mosques [Saudi Arabia]’.44 President al-Bashir recognizes the political risk and economic damage that would arise if the NSR chose to withdraw its forces from the ongoing military campaign in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE could withhold their investments in Sudan; lobby the US not to lift economic sanctions; and expel large numbers of Sudanese expatriates, with implication for remittances; and lastly, Sudan could become the next target of blockade.45 Another dimension is Sudan’s complex relationship with the Egyptian government, which complicates further Sudan’s position arising from the Gulf dispute. The growing tension in the Gulf inflames the various outstanding issues between the two countries. There are many sensitive areas, including Sudan’s historic support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the dispute over the border Halaib Triangle, while the spat over Ethiopia’s mega dam, the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), is critical. Egypt believes that the dam erodes its share of the Nile River waters and views Sudan as backing Ethiopia’s project. The Sudanese government perceive its ties with Ethiopia as vital for the Sudanese economy increasingly views its growing links with Addis Ababa as critical to resolving Sudan’s economic difficulties and furthering its long-term development. ‘Sudan hopes that electricity from the dam will address some of its chronic power shortages, and that GERD will reduce flood risks to its vital agricultural sector by controlling the flow of water during the flood season.’ 46 The entry of Turkey into the ongoing regional dispute, with its agreement along with Qatar to reconstruct the Sudanese port of Suakin following the visit of the Turkish president, has disconcerted the Egyptian government.

The personalization of Sudan’s foreign policy In June 2017 the president dismissed one of the firmest supporters of the Saudi-led axis from the cabinet. The state minister to the presidency, the

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director of the president’s office and Gulf envoy General Taha Osman alHussein has had President al-Bashir’s ear for many years, and played a key part in overhauling Sudan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both countries used his leverage over the president to advance their regional agenda through the exploitation of the NSR’s political and economic vulnerabilities in the Yemeni civil war.47 General Taha seized the opportunity of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman political rise in Saudi Arabia, to become an agent the Saudi Arabia and the UAE, furthering their interests in Sudan. General Taha was able to steer foreign policy according to their preferences, translated into Sudan participation in the Yemeni civil war and the expulsion of the Iranians from Sudan. Many reports in the Sudanese media drew attention to General Taha’s humble beginnings and his association with an unparalleled level of corruption, siphoning millions of dollars from the state.48 General Taha was granted Saudi citizenship while engaged in his highprofile position at the Sudanese presidency.49 This was part of the Saudi–UAE effort to protect their protégé and achieve their objectives. According to the Arabi21 news site, his sacking came on the eve of the revelation that he had offered to assist Saudi Arabia and the UAE to implement a military coup in Qatar to overthrow its government. The plan was in process without the knowledge of the Sudanese security services or even the president.50 This episode reflects the sidelining of state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, since most of the crucial foreign policy files were in the hands of individuals from outside the ministry. The foreign minister, Ibrahim Gandour was in constant competition with others in the government, including General Taha, regarding the control of foreign policy. One of the main reasons behind Gandour’s resignation in April 2018 was his displeasure over his inability to control foreign policy issues, with the transfer of files from his department to other government officials and departments.51 The ICC is another critical dimension that impacts on the form and shape of the NSR’s relations with the GCC. The president seeks a future exit from the helm of power while avoiding the risk of being handed over to the ICC, and perceives the Gulf states as an option for his personal safety. The ICC has contributed to the moulding of the Sudanese domestic and international context, particularly following al-Bashir’s emergence as the dominant power in state foreign policy and the fragmentation of the NSR in 1999 following al-Bashir’s dispute with Dr Hassan al-Turabi. The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with their economic and political leverage in the West, could provide him with a political exit or a future sanctuary. International policy is dominated by President al-Bashir’s preferences and views, and he has the ultimate say in foreign policy matters, therefore

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his personal concerns play a vital role in defining the state interest. This personalized foreign policy decision making echoes relevant features of successive Sudanese regimes. One of the challenges facing Sudan’s international engagement is the absence of coordinated efforts and proper consultation on the pros and cons of each course of action. This personalized approach has shackled the mechanisms within various Sudanese institutions that could allow for the formulation and delivery of an effective foreign policy. President al-Bashir’s position in relation to the war in Yemen reflects the substantial erosion of formal state institutions such as the foreign ministry.52 Any attempt to implement rational policies corresponding to Sudan’s interests would be derailed on account of the personal concerns and safety of the president. An example of the confusion in foreign policy was President al-Bashir’s visit to Russia in December 2017. During that visit, the president asked President Putin of Russia for ‘protection’ against the ‘aggressive’ acts of the US. His comments came in the midst of the US administration’s process of lifting sanctions against Sudan.53 Both this and his closer links with Russia and Turkey demonstrate his deep distrust of the US administration. The indifference of the US administration in the matter of advocating the dropping of the ICC charges against al-Bashir, and its attempt to stop him from running in the 2020 presidential elections, produced his reaction in Russia. External forces were able to influence and manoeuvre Sudan’s international relations by manipulating central figures in the regime.

The Sudanese position post the NSR’s downfall Following the ousting of President al-Bashir and the NSR in April 2019 in the wake of a non-violent uprising, a military–civilian administration is leading a transitional government towards a democratic system. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt supported the president’s removal and reached out to the military through secret channels to encourage his removal from power.54 These three countries perceived al-Bashir’s close links with their rivals as problematic, with the prospect of changing his alliance with the Qatari and Turkish camp. Since the removal of al-Bashir, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have supported the new military with $3 billion in aid, and the UAE has facilitated talks between the transitional government and opposition and rebel groups.55 Undoubtedly, they are attempting to capitalize on the ejection of al-Bashir, with his Qatari–Turkish alliance, and to reshape Sudan’s relations with the outside world in the new political context. A transitional government has been formed between the Transitional Military Council and the opposition coalition of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC).56

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The military component is represented by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who command the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). They were considered to be UAE and Saudi Arabian protégés, advancing their regional agenda through the use of Sudanese forces in the Yemeni and Libyan conflicts. Saudi Arabia led the axis empowering the Sudanese generals in the transitional government, using vast financial resources to undermine the democratic transformation. The International Crisis Group described their support to the military in Sudan as an attempt ‘to shepherd the country through a managed transition from one military-led regime to another, avoiding the interlude that occurred in Egypt – elections with uncertain outcomes followed by brief Muslim Brotherhood rule – by sidelining those favouring more wholesale reform among civilian protesters’.57 Many in Sudan viewed the massacre that occurred in June 2019, perpetrated by the RSF, as a repeat of the 2013 killings of hundreds of Egyptian protesters in an effort to destabilize the call for democratic transition. The massacre did not hinder the transition towards democracy, despite many challenges and diverging interests of the military–civilian power equation. Undeniably, Qatar and Turkey have lost out from this political fall-out in Sudan, with the Islamist-aligned al-Bashir forced out of office. Many in Sudanese political circles following the demise of the NSR still perceive past Qatari support for the NSR and attempts to strengthen Islamist groups and figures in the new political context with mistrust. However, the new Sudanese government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok continues to take a neutral official position. He has affirmed that his country would create a balanced foreign policy that preserves its interests during the transitional period, saying, ‘we aspire to achieve a regional cooperation that gets Sudan out of isolation and sanctions … The foreign policy will play a role in conveying an image of Sudan that is different from the past thirty years.’ He has indicated that relieving Sudan of its debts and removing it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism are two of the major policy challenges facing the transitional government. ‘The foreign policy will be subject to mutual interests … In that way, we would be able to manage the complications of the foreign policy. We will deal with friends and partners without being dictated to.’ 58 In the meantime, Qatar is also trying to re-energize its relations with the transitional government in order to rebuff accusations that it lends support to Islamists elements only. The visit of General Muhammad Dagalo to Doha on 31 January 2021 reflects the Sudanese government’s endeavour to mend relations with Qatar following the GCC’s al-Ula communique. The economy in Sudan is passing through a severe and difficult period after the collapse of the NSR. The new prime minister has indicated that the rebuilding of the economy will entail up to $10 billion in foreign aid over the next two years.59 The International Monetary Fund predicted that

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the Sudanese economy would contract by 2.3 per cent in 2019, and inflation increased to 60 per cent in November 2019; the parallel exchange rate continues to depreciate rapidly, while the fiscal deficit rose from 7.9 per cent in 2018 to 9.3 per cent of gross domestic product in 2019.60 Sudan’s current external debt amounts to between $50 billion and $60 billion.61 This economic environment reflects the centrality of the economy to the success of the newly formed transitional government, and the backing of the Gulf states is vital both for financial support and in lobbying efforts in the US for Sudan’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.62 This is a central issue for the economic progress and the flow of investments to Sudan. The combination of economic decline, internal fragmentation, and external pressure has led the Sudanese government to acquiesce with the US demand to recognize Israel in order to lift sanctions. This move was encouraged by the UAE following its peace declaration with Israel (the Abraham Accords) along with Bahrain. The Sudanese shift to normalizing relations with Israel ignored the public debate on a central foreign policy issue during a fragile transition. Many observers indicated the risks posed by following the Saudi–UAE policy direction towards Israel.63 However, the transitional government continues its cautious approach towards any major changes to a neutral foreign policy related to the GCC rift. In this context, there is a growing call for Sudanese military forces to disengage from the Yemen and Libya conflicts. The armed forces led by Burhan and Hemedti affirmed the continuation of military engagement in Yemen, while the prime minister expressed his commitment to withdrawing the Sudanese troops from Yemen. He indicated the number of soldiers in Yemen has decreased from 15,000 to 5,000. ‘We have inherited the problem from the former regime, and this conflict can only be resolved through political means, but not a military one.’ 64 The participation of Sudanese forces in the Libyan civil war was raised in December 2019 in a UN report accusing Sudan of violating UN arms sanctions. ‘The Panel estimates that 1,000 Sudanese troops from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were deployed to Libya on 25 July 2019 by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).’ 65 The Guardian newspaper also reported in December 2019 the presence of 3,000 Sudanese fighters in Libya.66 The controversy that erupted as a result of the Emirati security services company Black Shield Security Services hiring Sudanese youth to fight in Libya reflects the exploitation of the dismal economic situation in Sudan.67 Undoubtedly, there are clear divisions between the FFC and the military component on various foreign policy issues, including the GCC rift. The Declaration of Freedom and Change, which form the basis of FFC foreign policy engagement, stresses the centrality of policy independence, common

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interests, and distancing Sudan from alliances. This was reflected in the participation of all GCC countries, as well as Turkey, in the celebration of the signing of the transitional power-sharing accord for a civilian-led government in August 2019. Egypt and the UAE used a covert social media campaign to boost the military, a similar pro-military tactic as was used in Libya, Somalia, and Egypt. ‘Facebook said the Egyptian and Emirati companies worked together to manage 361 compromised accounts and pages with a reach of 13.7 million people. They spent $167,000 on advertising and used false identities to disguise their role in the operation.’ 68 This manipulation of social media is part of the attempt to push the new Sudanese government to follow policies sponsored by the anti-Qatar-led alliance. The strategy is to strengthen the military and overpower the popular uprising, paving the way for future authoritarian rule. The military part of the transitional government represents a clear risk, with its constant intervention in the formulation of a cohesive foreign policy.

Conclusion It is clear that the interests of the Sudanese government, with its intricate links to the opposing sides of the GCC dispute, would propel the NSR to commit itself to a neutral position, despite pressure from the Saudi-led Quartet. Both parties are deeply needed for the survival of the regime, due to both domestic and external factors. In the meantime, the GCC crisis demonstrates the limited options and freedom of movement in the external policy sphere. The cumulative government policies of the 1990s in the external sphere will continue to be a thorny for the regime’s image on the international level. The regime has weak relations with the West and the US over internal political reform, and remains on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, where it has been since October 1993, and the human rights situation has intensified, with the ICC accusing al-Bashir of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. This context marginalized the NSR, and led to the use of foreign relations as a tool for regime survival rather than to serve long-term interests. The regime undermined policy-making institutions, which President al-Bashir dominated so as to continue his grip on power and provide him with an exit strategy for his future own safety, and state institutions dropped out of the equation in terms of foreign policy formulation. The Sudanese state’s diminishing financial resources, the fall in foreign direct investment and private remittances, and the growing current account and balance of payments deficits deepened the crisis of foreign policy. This economic context continues to drive post-NSR foreign policy, despite the FFC’s assertion of



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Sudan’s neutrality with regard to regional conflicts. The dynamics of the military–civilian power-sharing government and their fragmented interests in relation to regional issues have blurred the formulation of foreign policy. Sudan’s relations with the GCC states will continue to be shaped by the dynamics of how the latter address their core differences following the recent rapprochement.

Notes 1 J. Gavin. ‘Gulf Investors Target Africa’. Farmlandgrab.org, 3 April 2009, https:// bit.ly/2xqUTQd. 2 K. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Introduction’, The Gulf States in International Political Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 6–9. 3 A. Huliaras and S. Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?’, Middle East Policy Council, XXIV, no. 4 (2017), pp. 63–73. 4 D. Alghoul, ‘The Gulf’s Military Expansion in the Horn of Africa’, Middle East Monitor, 31 December 2016, https://bit.ly/2xwQRWG. 5 B. Mesfin, ‘Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa’, ISS Africa, East Africa Report, no. 8, November 2016, https://bit.ly/2JHFjZk. 6 Examples including: C. Felter and Z. Laub, ‘Will Gulf Nations Tip the Balance in Sudan Crisis?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 June 2019, https:// on.cfr.org/2SJd1AS; M. Woldemariam and A. Young, ‘What Happens in Sudan Doesn’t Stay in Sudan’, Foreign Affairs, 19 July 2019, https://fam.ag/2F2UDLr; Jalal Salmi, ‘A New Foreign Policy in Sudan: Status Quo or a Shift Towards the Gulf?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 May, 2019, https:// bit.ly/39qsZpy; G. Cafiero, ‘Qatar-GCC Crisis Unsettles Sudan’, Al-Monitor, 20 June 2017, https://bit.ly/2SzB45r. 7 On 26 June 1995, on the eve of the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, President Mubarak encountered a plot to end his life. The president escaped unharmed, and on his return to Cairo accused the Sudanese government of masterminding the attack. He asserted that the assailants had travelled to Ethiopia on Sudanese passports. It was obvious that there was financial and logistical assistance from certain elements within the Sudanese intelligence service. 8 A. H. Adam, ‘What Is Going on between Egypt and Sudan?’, Al Jazeera, 12 January 2018, https://bit.ly/2y1SnA5. 9 Centre for Sudanese Studies, Halat Al-Watan: The First Sudanese Strategic Report: 1999–2000, Cairo (1999), pp. 214–215. 10 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan to Hold a Donor Conference for Darfur Development in October’, 2 August 2011, https://bit.ly/2D82IjS. 11 J. Shapiro, ‘The Qatar Problem, Foreign Policy’, 28 August 2013, https:// bit.ly/2l7ZR12. 12 Interview with Sudanese academic, 3 September 2012. 13 Alarab Newspaper, ‘Qatari-Sudanese Relations Years of Cooperation and Excellence’, 23 October 2017, https://bit.ly/2PMkc6N.

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14 Al-Syassah Al-Dwaliyah, ‘Al-Sudan Min Al-Inglaab Al-Aaskari (1989) Ila AlMuaarda Al-Musalha’, melaf Al-Syassah Al-Dwaliyah, 128, April 1997, p. 88. 15 The Sudanese Embassy in Saudi Arabia, ‘Report on the Diplomatic and Political Relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia’, Arab Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 August 2001, Khartoum. 16 Y. Elbagir, ‘Sudan’s Antiquities are Under Threat as Gulf Crisis Rages’, Financial Times, 17 August 2017, https://on.ft.com/34ZalSo. 17 Centre for Strategic Studies, Halat Al-Watan, The First Sudanese Strategic Report: 1999–2000, p. 215. 18 Emirates News Agency, ‘UAE plays Key Role in Sudan Economy with Investments Exceeding AED28 Billion’, 13 March 2018, https://bit.ly/2D5yFcH. 19 Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Sudan’s Economy Shrinks 2.1% in Q2 2019’, 3 September 2019, https://bit.ly/364N3Mk. 20 Radio Dabanga, ‘Large Spending on Army: Economists Criticize 2018 Budget’, 26 December 2017, https://bit.ly/2BHE6co. 21 The Economist, ‘Why America Has Lifted Sanctions on Sudan’, 10 October 2017. 22 H. Hassan, ‘There’s No Space for Qatar to Save Face’, Foreign Policy, 29 June 2017, https://bit.ly/2sl8sRF. 23 M. Hedges and G. Cafiero, ‘The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What Does the Future Hold?’, Middle East Policy XXIV no. 1 (2017), 129–153. 24 Ibid. 25 E. Trager, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis’, The Atlantic, 2 July 2017, https://bit.ly/2sg3AsA. 26 Wikileaks, ‘Egyptian DCM: Cairo to Thwart Any Qatari Initiative’, 28 January 2010, https://bit.ly/2pgvSDJ. 27 N. Çetinoglu Harunoglu, ‘Turkey’s Intensifying Partnership with Qatar and Its Implications for Turkish–American Relations’, Middle East Review of International Affairs 20, no. 3 (2016), pp. 1–11. 28 BBC News, ‘The Qatari Princess, Angelina Jolie and the Battle of the Pyramids’, 20 May 2017, https://bbc.in/2NY1mwt. 29 U.S. Energy Information and Administration, ‘The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments’, 27 August 2019, https:// bit.ly/2twhMDC. 30 ‘The Closing Communique of the 41st GCC Supreme Council’, 7 January 2021, Al Jazeera, https://bit.ly/3bNatcX. 31 R. Samuel, ‘The Qatar Blockade Is Over, but the Gulf Crisis Lives On’, Foreign Policy, 27 January 2021, https://bit.ly/2ZWYUut. 32 CNN/Arabic, ‘The Gulf Crisis: Sudan Offer to Calm the Dispute’, 6 June 2017, https://cnn.it/2NUjYNF. 33 J. Burke, ‘US Eases Economic Sanctions on Sudan’, The Guardian, 6 October 2017, https://bit.ly/2OzyZlg. 34 This shift in the US policy was based on assessing Sudan’s Progress on the Five Tracks: cooperation on counter-terrorism; addressing the LRA threat; ending hostilities in the Two Areas and Darfur; improving humanitarian access; and

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ending negative interference in South Sudan. International Crisis Group, ‘Time to Repeal U.S. Sanctions on Sudan?’, Briefing, 22 June 2017, https://bit.ly/2sXLRKy. 35 Arab News, ‘Sudan Thanks Saudi Arabia for Helping Lift Sanctions’, 15 January 2017, https://bit.ly/2xlyXqu. 36 In 2009, Israeli air forces attacked a truck convoy, and later a ship in Port Sudan, and in 2012 stroked a suspected munitions factory in Khartoum; and in 2014 attacked a military installation near Omdurman. 37 Sudan Tribune, ‘Riyadh Urges Khartoum to Take “Clear Stance” on Gulf Crisis’, 3 July 2017, https://bit.ly/2tHnwJy. 38 Interview with prominent Sudanese journalist, 15 June 2018. 39 Middle East Monitor, ‘Sudan under Pressure to Back Qatar in Gulf Dispute’, 8 June 2017, https://bit.ly/2pguX6f. 40 A. Hamad, ‘On Alsir Sid Ahmed Posit: Turning the Country into a Prey’, 6 May 2018, https://bit.ly/2MHnSVr. 41 Reuters, ‘Sudan Says Committed to Yemen Military Campaign, Weeks after Signaling Doubts’, 24 May 2018, https://reut.rs/2pe9CdE. 42 D. Kirkpatrick, ‘On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers from Darfur’, New York Times, 28 December 2018, https://nyti.ms/2Qtmon3. 43 Ibid. 44 Reuters, ‘Sudan Says Committed to Yemen’, 24 May 2018, https://reut.rs/2FkcX2S. 45 A. Hassan Dahir, ‘Horn of Africa Caught in between the Qatar–GCC Crisis: Case Studies of Somalia and Sudan’, TRT World Research Centre, March 2018. 46 Oxford Analytica, ‘Sudan/Egypt: Regional Issues Will Entrench Division’, Daily Brief Service, 24 January 2018. 47 Interview with a Sudanese academic, Khartoum, 4 January 2018. 48 A. Al-Amin, ‘How Did Taha and the Mafia Steal $ 110 Million from a Qatari Deposit and Bought Stolen Oil without Documents? Alrakoba, https:// bit.ly/2MIPYzG. 49 Following his sacking, he was appointed as an advisor to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. 50 M. Abdalsalam, ‘Details of the Overthrow of the Director of the Office of the Sudanese President and Its Relationship with Riyadh’, Arabi21, 28 June 2017, https://bit.ly/2PHKg2X. General Taha discussed the costs and expenses with the Saudis and Emiratis, inviting a delegation to give them an idea of the ability of the required forces and its readiness to implement the invasion plan. All these moves were behind the scenes, without the knowledge of President Bashir; however, all these details were monitored for some time by the security apparatus. However, after ascertaining the dangers of the plan, the security apparatus presented General Taha’s telephone conversations to the shocked policy makers in the presidency. 51 Interview with Khalid Al-Tijani, editor-in-chief, Ilaf Newspaper, Khartoum, 18 July 2018. 52 Interview with ex diplomat at the Sudanese Foreign Ministry. 53 France 24, ‘Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for “Protection” from “Aggressive” US’, 23 November 2017, https://bit.ly/2xw9idO.

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54 S. Magdy, ‘As Sudan Uprising Grew, Arab States Worked to Shape Its Fate’, Associated Press, 8 May 2019, https://bit.ly/2F8tPJB. 55 C. Felter and Z. Laub, ‘Will Gulf Nations Tip the Balance?’ 56 The power-sharing deal creates a joint military and civilian sovereign council to govern for three years until elections can be held. Under the agreement, a military leader would head the 11-member council for the first 21 months, followed by a civilian leader for the next 18. It would also establish a cabinet appointed by the activists and a legislative body. 57 International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan: Stopping a Spiral into Civil War’, 7 June 2019, https://bit.ly/37x0Njf. 58 Hamdok first interview with Sudania 24, 24 August 2019, https://bit.ly/36j9VYs. 59 K. Abdelaziz, ‘Sudan Needs up to $10 billion in Aid to Rebuild Economy, New PM Says’, Reuters, 24 August 2019, https://reut.rs/2tlu29E. 60 IMF, ‘IMF Staff Completes 2019 Article IV Mission to Sudan’, 23 December 2019, https://bit.ly/2sMI5Fv. 61 A. Soliman, ‘Sudan Stakeholder Dialogues Options for Economic Stabilization, Recovery and Inclusive Growth’, Chatham House, Africa Programme, October 2019, https://bit.ly/2FnkUEs. 62 Reuters, ‘Saudi Arabia Working to Remove Sudan from U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism List: Tweet’, 6 October 2019, https://reut.rs/2QMHUC3. 63 P. Knopf and J. Feltman, ‘Normalizing Sudan–Israel Relations Now Is a Dangerous Game’, Brookings Institute, 24 September 2020, https://brook.gs/3f2XQfd. 64 Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan’s Prime Minister Hamdok “Optimistic” after US Meetings’, 8 December 2019, https://bit.ly/2ZTvVGM. 65 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), 9 December 2019, p. 10, https://undocs.org/ S/2019/914. 66 J. Burke and Z. Mohammed Salih, ‘Mercenaries Flock to Libya Raising Fears of Prolonged War’, The Guardian, 24 December 2019, https://bit.ly/3krAh0I. 67 H. Zayadin, ‘Recruited as Security Guards in the UAE, Deceived into Working in Conflict-Ridden Libya Instead’, Human Rights Watch, 1 November 2020, https://bit.ly/3f4R4FN. 68 D. Walsh and N. Rashwan, ‘“We’re at War”: A Covert Social Media Campaign Boosts Military Rulers’, New York Times, 6 September 2019, https://nyti.ms/ 3acKJ7F.

Conclusion

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Simon Mabon

Relations between states in the Persian Gulf have become increasingly complex – and often volatile – amid competing visions of regional security, the role of religion in public affairs, support for Islamist groups, and influence on the world stage. At the heart of much of this is the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which has become increasingly fractious, spilling out into new arenas of competition that include new geographic and institutional spaces beyond divided societies that have traditionally provided fertile ground for competition. While many analysts refer to the Horn of Africa as a new arena in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran – along with new entrants from states including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, all of whom seek to increase influence – this view belies a great deal of history between states in the Gulf and their counterparts in the Horn, reducing a complex set of interactions between a range of actors in two different regions to a bilateral rivalry. Indeed, relations between Arabs and Africans in the Horn have oscillated over a period of a thousand years, shaped by fluctuating economic and cultural connections. Yet, as Ali Mazrui noted in 1975, in a pattern that continued over the following decades, ‘the relationship between Arabs and black Africans has always been largely asymmetrical with the Middle East usually the giver, and black Africa usually the receiver’.1

Evolving links As the contributors in this volume attest, the Horn has become a site of increasing interest and engagement from Gulf states since 2013. While these tensions have been prominent within the construction of regional politics – both in the Persian Gulf and in the wider Middle East – the increasing influence of Gulf states playing out in a range of different ways has meant

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that rivalries find new arenas for competition to play out, both spatially and institutionally. For states across the Gulf, the Horn of Africa has taken on increased importance in recent years, yet to frame this as a ‘new’ discovery is problematic and ignores a rich history of trade, conquest, collaboration, and friction. Indeed, there has been a gradual evolution in the nature of relations between the Gulf states and their counterparts in the Horn from an approach underpinned by economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic concerns to an approach driven by security and political calculations in the policies of Gulf states. This increasing engagement has resulted in an estimated $13 billion of investments across the Horn of Africa from Gulf states in a range of different sectors beyond traditional economic linkages, including ports, military outposts, and grand projects. More recently, this has also involved the provision of support from Sudan, Eritrea, Somaliland, and Djibouti to Operation Decisive Storm, the Saudi-led mission in Yemen against the Houthis. Interregional relations occur on both material and ideational factors. In recent years, increased attention on sect-based identities has helped to shape local politics, but in earlier decades the Muslim World League – and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – created fora for dialogue within and across regions. Ideological dimensions were important across the 1960s–2000s, with shared support for liberation movements, anti-imperialism most apparently being seen in a collective anti-Israeli stance. Yet, material factors have taken on a more prominent role in shaping relations between the two regions. While there has been an undeniable increase in engagement between states from the two regions, external states have not solely imposed their strategic goals through military force but, rather, Horn states have sought to cultivate relations with external backers in an effort to cultivate autonomy – however relative – and to engage in effective balancing measures. Material support has long been a feature of relations between states in the two regions, driven largely by security and economic interests; ideational factors have little influence on the construction of relations. The justifications for more contemporary Gulf expansionism into the Horn are multifarious. For example, while access to ports was a strategic justification in terms of access to supply chains and security, notably at the onset of the Yemen war, other factors are prominent in determining foreign policy. For example, following the Saudi-led blockade in 2017 Qatar sought to address food shortages by cultivating links with Sudan, while after the 2008 financial crisis states in the Horn were seen to offer a means of ensuring longer-term financial security as elites from the Gulf bought up vast swathes

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Conclusion 297 of farmland in an effort to ensure future food security, while also capitalising on fast-growing economies on the African continent and as part of the gradual divestment of economies away from reliance on oil revenues. Security is a key theme for contributors to this volume, understood in multiple ways from traditional rivalries between states to the Copenhagen School’s far broader understanding of security which allows for a focus on food and water security, along with demographic deficits in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Within this broad spectrum are also concerns about control of the Bab el-Mandeb, piracy and counterterrorism operations, alongside more general issues of food and economic security. Indeed, access to land in the Horn – of which many Gulf states are short – provides a means of ensuring self-sufficiency in the production of food. Of course, these efforts butt up against a broader pan-African search for food security, albeit the continent faces myriad challenges, not least of which stem from infrastructural and political issues. Similar political, economic, and security challenges are found among the Gulf states, notably in the UAE and Iran, as broader regional activity has come at a price, prompting the Emirates to withdraw from military engagement in Yemen in spite of concerns about Iranian expansionism onto the Arabian Peninsula. Here, the Horn of Africa takes on key strategic importance through providing logistical and strategic access to the conflict and to key sites in Saudi Arabia along or close to the Red Sea corridor, including Mecca, Jeddah, and new cities such as Neom. While Neom is heralded as a city designed to rival Dubai, a site designed to demonstrate modernity and attract both business and tourism, questions remain over the implications of such developmental disparity –in terms both of ultimate results and of the speed of achieving these goals – which can have serious repercussions for regional relations. Perhaps the best example of this is the ill-fated Bridge of Horns, a construction project designed to cross the Bab el-Mandeb, connecting the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. At each end of the bridge two cities were to be built, housing a combined estimate of around seven million people. While equally ambitious as Neom, the Bridge of Horns struggled to get beyond its initial conception, due to conflict, economic, and logistical challenges, demonstrating the vast disparities within and across regions. Much like Gulf states have engaged in competition with each other in their behaviour in the Horn of Africa, states in the Horn have also sought to build relationships with Gulf states as a means of addressing their own local and regional challenges. Here, tensions between the states of the Horn of Africa – and interests across neighbouring parts of the continent – have prompted the cultivation of relations with local actors such as al-Shabaab.

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Here, the actions of key individuals from Gulf states has been central in developing relations.

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Sites of competition and rivalry As Gulf states became increasingly interested in the Horn of Africa, their rivalries, tensions and conflicts migrated and became embedded across the region, playing a prominent role in shaping engagement with the region. Most prominently, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been so central to contemporary developments across the Middle East, have migrated into the Horn of Africa, shaping the strategic thinking of states in both regions. Yet, other tensions among GCC states have also manifested on the Horn, adding to existing complexities. Perhaps this is most notably seen in tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also in less vitriolic forms of competition between others, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia, manifesting in a range of different ways. What this volume has demonstrated is that tensions between states in the Persian Gulf are not solely intra-regional tensions, but have taken on additional meaning as intra-regional rivalries have interregional dimensions, creating a complex web of interactions redrawing regional security in both areas in the process. With regard to relations between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, analysis has typically viewed the Gulf as a collective organisation, yet aspirations, intentions, and outcomes differ dramatically, reflecting both the needs and objectives of Gulf states, but also the possibilities to be found in the Horn. In some ways this is driven by broader grand strategies of increasing influence across the Middle East and beyond, yet elsewhere it is a consequence of opportunism, seen as a means of countering gains made by regional rivals. For both, this is often viewed in ‘zero-sum’ ways, particularly after the blockade against Qatar from 2017 to 2021, yet for others, engaging with states in the Horn provides opportunities to improve economic standings, to develop humanitarian agendas, or to reposition themselves on the world stage. This notion of broadening spheres of influence is particularly apparent in the cases of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, albeit occurring in a range of different guises and at different times. As Karen Young and Taimur Khan argue in Chapter 4, the UAE’s actions in the Horn are driven by investment and military intervention, but these should be taken together in a form of ‘complex realism’ that is apparent beyond the Horn itself, but emblematic of efforts by Gulf states to position themselves centrally amid a global order seemingly in flux.

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Conclusion 299 Similarly, Kuwait has sought to use its influence across the Horn as a means of cultivating its international humanitarianism, a process that began after independence in the 1960s, but increased dramatically in the 2000s. This also matches the positioning of the state as a neutral arbiter to resolve Gulf tensions, albeit alongside charges of supporting the financing of terrorist groups. In a number of states, domestic divisions cut across broader regional and cross-regional strategies. In Iran, for example, the factionalism that shapes domestic politics helped to shape the nature of relations with states in the Horn. When pragmatists and reformers were in the ascendancy, Iran engaged in developmental activities aimed at improving its soft-power capacity and shaping its status as a ‘developmental patron’. In contrast, under the hardliners and conservatives, the Horn provided a means of pushing back against the US and Saudi Arabia, particularly against Washington’s sanctions regime. Similarly, for others, the Horn has provided opportunities to challenge the accepted order. In particular, Qatar sought to engage in an expansionist approach into states across the Horn that could counter the strategic interests of other regional rivals, notably the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Qatar’s actions in the Horn also helped to improve relations with Turkey, opening up a new arena for collaboration. Here, the picture is made more complex by the involvement of actors external to both regional security complexes, either directly, as in the case of Turkey and Egypt, or indirectly, as in the case of the US and its international influence. The actions of Gulf states in the Horn of Africa demonstrate the extent to which Saudi leadership over the GCC has waned in recent years, with Qatar and, more recently, the UAE – particularly in diverging strategies in the Yemen conflict – appearing to contest Saudi hegemony among the Gulf Arab states. Here, the evolution of a regional security complex (RSC) has led to spillover from the Gulf into the Horn, in an effort to meet key strategic priorities which demonstrates the imposition of external – and for some, hegemonic – aspirations. An important criticism of the existing literature on relations between the states of the Horn and external actors has been an ongoing failure to adequately reflect on the interests and motives of local states – and nations, as seen in the case of Sudan – themselves. With this, of course, comes a need to focus explicitly on the ensuing rush to establish political transitions, cultivate new relationships, or reinforce existing alliances and strategies. In the case of states across the Horn, much of this involves engaging with Gulf states. A great deal of the existing literature focuses on the role of external actors in the Horn of Africa – predating the involvement of states from the Gulf – but with little focus on the reasons why states in the Horn have sought to cultivate relations with states from the Gulf.

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Further complicating matters are the presence of additional external actors from outside the Gulf vying for influence across the Horn. In some cases, such as the apparent waning US interests in the Middle East, this has created opportunities, while increased Chinese engagement through the Belt and Road Initiative has altered strategic thinking. All of this has shaped the nature of relations between the two regions, and also the actions of states in their engagement.

Theoretical issues Central to the book has been an attempt to reflect on linkages between the two regions. In part this reflects on the nature and composition of networks, partnerships, and alliances driven by material or ideational interests, but it has also been driven by the idea of an RSC. This concept allows for greater awareness of the ways in which security (defined broadly) shapes relations between actors within and beyond the parameters of a particular region. Yet the task of exploring relations between two different RSCs is replete with intellectual, conceptual, and empirical challenges. This is especially so as both RSCs remain underdeveloped and open to broader regional and international penetration. Here, it is imperative to understand a range of factors that impact on relations, including but not limited to: foreign policymaking processes; geostrategic aims; military objectives; economic contexts; geopolitical calculations and contestations; the role of agency in domestic and foreign policy; local, national, regional, and international structures; and the (changing) role of external actors. Such challenges are not unique to our study, but the complexity of (inter) relations necessitates such a multifaceted approach in an attempt to explore the ways in which two regional security complexes are constructed and interact with each other. Of course, the impact of COVID-19 has placed additional strain on states in both the Gulf and the Horn. Financial pressures stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic have called into question budget lines across GCC and Horn states, while also provoking serious questions across the Gulf about the nature of relations between the rulers and the ruled and their social contracts. This was exacerbated by an oil crisis between Saudi Arabia and Russia which had a damaging impact on oil prices, further exacerbating financial pressures. With citizens long enjoying state largesse, efforts to rewrite the nature of social contracts – and continued moves to impose forms of taxation – will, most probably, not be well received by citizens of the wealthy GCC states, prompting serious reflections on broader regional engagement. Indeed, the financial cost, along with formalising the role of the Southern Transitional Council through the conclusion of the

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Conclusion 301 Riyadh Agreement in a seemingly intractable war in Yemen, is seen by many as the main driver for the UAE withdrawing from the conflict. In understanding the actions of states in – and across – RSCs, it is paramount to bring together domestic and regional challenges and possibilities, perhaps best understood in the evolution of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia after the death of King Abdullah in early 2015. Following the accession of King Salman and his son, Mohammad bin Salman, a dramatic reordering of society took place, with existential transformation of the role of religion in society, along with severe economic challenges stemming from the precipitous drop in oil prices from 2014, economic largesse and interventionism, and high defence spending, including the cost of the war in Yemen. Much like its actions across the Middle East, the kingdom’s and other GCC states’ actions in the Horn of Africa are underpinned by efforts to manage their own stability and prevent threats from Iran, or the rising influence of violent Islamist movements that are increasingly transnational. For most Gulf states and external actors, their policy in the Horn is a learning and adaptive process. For the UAE, the Horn is not unconnected from battles which have been fought in Afghanistan and elsewhere, in the Middle East and internationally. Its experience in Somalia draws attention to the relative autonomy of local actors and the stakes of maintaining a sustainable and credible presence in the Horn. The installation and operation of commercial and naval ports in close proximity highlights an element of hybridity in military and economic planning within overall foreign policy decision making which is relatively novel in this part of the world. Questions of course then remain as to the most appropriate ways in which to frame these discussions, with a range of other factors feeding into the ways in which national and regional security doctrine is constructed and pursued. Perhaps, given the plurality and range of complex variables involved, using an omnibalancing approach would frame a more robust account of the interaction between different actors, taking into account local, national, regional, and international grievances, along with the inevitable tensions between actors and levels of analysis.

Moving forward This book seeks to act as a foundation for further research into relations between states of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. With that foundational nature, there are a range of issues to explore in more detail. Perhaps the most important is to place greater emphasis on states in the Horn in shaping relations with their Gulf counterparts and between regions more broadly. At present, relations between the regions – and states within – have been

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dominated by Gulf states, which reflects both the power asymmetries and also the focus of this book. Yet, moving forward, greater analysis is needed of the ways in which states across the Horn engage not only with an RSC in the region but also with their counterparts, and how they pursue irredentist or interventionist policies through non-state actors at the expense of multilateralism. Greater empirical and conceptual exploration is required in an effort to understand the nature of these interactions and the strategic goals of those involved. More rigorous exploration will also facilitate better awareness of the impact of neighbouring states – in both regions – on relations between the two. For example, more work is needed on the ways in which Egypt’s actions have shaped the Horn, both directly and indirectly, through its relations with Gulf states and international actors, notably China and the US. This additional layer of complexity is seen broadly, in political, diplomatic, economic, and security terms, opening up new avenues of exploration, and also new arenas in which states can compete. Take the case of Hezbollah, which has played an important role in the Horn, supporting Iranian objectives but also seeking to counter Israel on its own terms. There remains a great deal of work to be done on relations between states in the Horn of Africa and their counterparts in the Persian Gulf, yet, in engaging in this work, much like in other forms of scholarship, a myriad of related questions are raised. With that in mind, this volume has explored some of the key questions within the context of regionalism, interregionalism, and the politics in both the Horn and the GCC, underpinned by a changing global environment.

Note 1 Ali A. Mazrui, ‘Black Africa and the Arabs’, Foreign Affairs, 54, no. 4 (1975), pp. 725–742, at p. 725.

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Index

Abizaid, John 20 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 240 Afwerki, Isaias 21–22, 51, 52, 117, 121, 174, 187, 259, 260 Ahmad, Abiy 27, 114, 117, 118, 121, 163, 260–261, 263 Al-Amoudi, Mohammed 50 Arab–African relations 203–204, 295 Assab 27, 51, 52, 84, 112, 115, 116, 160, 187, 230, 236, 241, 245, 260 Axumites 1, 250 Bab-el-Mendeb 4, 36, 53, 58, 103, 111, 115, 132, 143, 144, 165, 182, 186, 230, 246, 282, 297 Barre, Siad 18, 19 Al-Bashir, Omar 47, 48, 71, 84, 85, 266, 272, 286 Berbera Port 20, 84, 85, 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 160–161, 162–163, 179, 233, 239, 240, 241, 245, 251, 262 Al-Burhan, Abdel Fattah 49 China 15, 29 arms exports to Africa 25, 26 Belt and Road Initiative 5, 112, 114, 234, 300 military base in Djibouti 26, 243–245, 246 relations with Ethiopia 24, 25, 26 relations with Somalia 26

Cold War 16, 18, 19, 21, 28, 37, 79, 102, 121, 153, 155, 211, 217, 233, 251–254, 256 Daglo, Mohamed Hamdan (“Hemetti”) 48, 49, 288 Derg 18, 19, 20, 254 Djibouti 5, 8, 16, 229–246 relations with ICU 21 relations with the UAE 9, 26 strategic location and relations 230, 232–233, 234 Doraleh 26, 53, 110, 112–114, 116, 120, 121, 230, 234–240, 243–244 Doumeira island 5, 112, 237 Dubai Ports (DP) World 26, 53, 110, 113, 114, 119, 234, 235 Egypt 7, 19, 28, 105, 128, 129, 130, 132, 144 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 129, 130 Eritrea 5, 9, 20, 255, 259 relations with ICU 21 relations with Iran 21, 260 Ethiopia 16, 18, 19, 20, 49, 50 relations with Somalia 20, 21 Ethiopia–Eritrea peace agreement 6, 52, 114, 192 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 20 European colonialism 2, 3, 17, 18, 210, 251

304 Index

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European Union (EU) missions in Somalia 27 Naval Force Somalia (NAVFOR) 234, 238, 244, 246 policy towards Eritrea 27, 28 food security 5, 37, 50, 85, 87, 103, 110, 115, 127, 133, 144, 172, 189–190, 276 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 25, 266 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 4, 49, 137, 139 great power competition 19, 102, 131, 261 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 9, 39, 44, 297 Guelleh, Ismaïl Omar 21, 229, 233, 243

Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 20, 21, 175, 187 see also al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 38, 42, 43, 51, 59, 75, 283 Israel 2, 21, 22, 49, 135, 203 Al-Jabeir, Adel 48 Jebel Ali 113, 120, 236, 239 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 36, 42, 43, 85, 88 Kuwait aid 199–201, 205, 206–209 election to temporary UN Security Council seat 199 engagement in Africa 8, 199–219 relations with Tanzania 8, 215, 218–219

Hamas 43, 47, 127 Hezbollah 43, 45, 54–57, 188 Horn of Africa defined 4 international actors 6, 15–30 Al-Hussein, Taha Osman 286

Mariam, Mengistu Haile 18, 19 migrant labour 37, 41, 48, 58, 78, 133, 190–191 Mohamed, Mohamed Abdullahi (‘Farmajo’) 28, 117, 118, 161, 162, 177, 181, 262, 263

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 37, 57, 231 Iran 19, 42, 43, 45, 59 see also Hezbollah; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) development assistance to Africa 7, 68–89 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (MAJ) 76, 77, 78–82, 86, 87, 88 Ministry of Construction Jihad (CJ) 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82 relations with Djibouti 22, 52, 186–187 relations with Eritrea 22, 50, 51, 85, 187 relations with the Houthis 43, 44, 45 relations with ICU 21 relations with Sudan 21, 46, 47, 74, 84, 186, 283 Iran–Iraq War 71, 206

Nasser, Gamal Abdel 18 Al-Nayhan, Mohammed bin Zayed 107, 117, 155 Al-Nimr, Nimr 48 Ogaden War 19, 20 oil prices 22, 38, 39, 41, 58, 76, 99 Oromo Liberation Front 20 Ottoman influence 16, 17 piracy 3, 5, 6, 9, 21, 26, 111, 155, 186, 230 Portuguese influence 2, 16, 209 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 44, 186 Qatar crisis (2017–21) 8, 10, 41, 44, 133, 135–136, 161, 172–173, 177, 178, 296 policies in the Horn of Africa 7, 127, 128, 133, 134, 144, 174, 176

Index 305

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policies towards Somalia 175, 176–177, 179 relations with Sudan 47, 242, 275–276, 279–282 Turkish military base in 180 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi 68, 74 Rajai, Mohammad-Ali 70 Red Sea Forum 37, 57 Regional Security Complex 4, 8, 10, 58, 152, 155–156, 299, 300 rentier model 100, 102, 184 riyal politik 5, 6, 10, 38, 178, 191 Rouhani, Hassan 85–86 Russia 26, 27 arms sales to Horn of Africa states 27 cooperation with Eritrea 27 Said, Seyyid 2 Al Saud, Faisal Abdulaziz 37 Al Saud, Khalid bin Sultan 49 Al Saud, Mohammad bin Salman 39 Saudi Arabia 19, 39, 59, 83, 183 2015 intervention in Yemen 41, 44, 45 relations with Djibouti 52, 53, 84, 111, 112 relations with Eritrea 37, 52, 53, 112 relations with Ethiopia 37, 49, 50 relations with Somalia 37, 53, 180–181, 186 relations with Sudan 5, 37, 47, 48, 84–85, 111, 276–277, 283, 286 Vision 2030 5, 39 Wahhabism 39 see also Al Saud, Faisal Abdulaziz Saleh, Ali Abdullah 44 Saudi–Iranian competition 6, 36–59, 75, 199, 202, 217, 219, 298 Second World War 18 Selassie, Haile 18 Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen 7, 20, 56, 297 Eritrea relations with 21 slave trade 1, 2, 17, 202, 209, 233 small states 99, 173, 176, 199, 229 Socotra 109, 245

Somalia 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 53, 253, 255, 261–263 civil war in 20 Somaliland 9 Southern Transitional Council (STC) 45 Soviet Union 16, 26 relations with Ethiopia 19 Suakin Island 5, 17, 28, 132, 135, 136, 138, 145, 158, 159, 190, 242, 266, 275, 285 Sudan 9, 10, 46, 253, 264–267, 272–291 economy 277–279, 288–289 military participation in Yemen 284 National Islamic Front (NIF) 21 National Salvation Revolution (NSR) 10, 272, 273–275, 284, 287, 290 relations with Egypt 285 relations with Iran 47, 48 Suez Canal 245, 103, 111, 143, 144, 230, 233 Swahili Coast 1 Tanzania 211–214, 216–217, 218 Tigray 20, 261 Al-Turabi, Hassan 46 Turkey 29, 38 economic engagement in Ethiopia 24, 159 policies in the Horn of Africa 7, 23, 127–129, 134, 144, 154–156 policy and presence in Somalia 15, 23, 24, 53, 135, 139–143, 156–158, 159–160, 164 relations with Djibouti 135, 143 relations with Sudan 135, 137, 158–159 United Arab Emirates economic statecraft 7, 102–122 foreign policy 103–104, 105–106, 107–110, 122, 160, 301 regional security issues 111 relations with Djibouti 53, 112, 113, 120, 160 relations with Egypt 105, 106–107 relations with Eritrea 52, 53, 112, 115, 117, 121, 160, 163–164, 165

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306 Index relations with Ethiopia 105, 115, 117–118, 120, 121, 163–164, 165 relations with Somalia 161, 162, 179, 180 relations with Somaliland 113, 118–120, 121, 160, 162, 179, 192 relations with Sudan 277, 283, 286 United States 19 Camp Lemonnier 28, 52, 112, 116, 243

post-9/11 counterterrorism interest in the Horn 22, 28, 51, 53, 59 policy towards the Islamic Courts Union 20, 21 policy towards Sudan 47, 49 Yemen war (2014–) 4, 9, 38, 39, 43–45, 51, 52, 53, 56, 59, 103, 109, 111, 154, 232, 237–238, 241, 258, 301 Zanzibar 2, 209, 214–215 Zenawi, Meles 20, 24