Wrong for All the Right Reasons: How White Liberals Have Been Undone by Race 9780814759677

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W R O N G FO R AL L TH E R I G H T REASON S

WRONG » TFORALLTH E

RIGHT REASONS HOW WHITE LIBERALS HAVE BEEN UNDONE BY RACE

GORDON MACINNES A TWENTIET H CENTURY FUND BOOK

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NEW YORK UNIVERSIT Y PRES S

NEW YOR K AND LONDON

The Twentieth Centur y Fun d sponsor s an d supervise s timely analyse s o f economic policy , foreig n affairs , an d domesti c politica l issues . Not-for profit an d nonpartisan , th e Fun d wa s founde d i n 191 9 an d endowe d b y Edward A . Filene. BOARD O F TRUSTEES O F THE TWENTIET H CENTUR Y FUN D Morris B . Abram, Emeritus H. Brand t Ayer s Peter A . A. Berle Alan Brinkle y Jose A. Cabrane s Joseph A . Califano, Jr . Alexander Morga n Capro n Hodding Carte r II I Edward E . David, Jr., Emeritus Brewster C . Denny, Emeritus Charles V. Hamilto n August Heckscher , Emeritus Matina S . Horne r

Lewis B. Kaden James A. Leac h Richard C . Leone, ex officio P. Michael Pitfiel d Richard Ravitc h Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Emeritus Harvey I . Sloane, M.D . Theodore C . Sorensen , Chairman James Tobin, Emeritus David B . Truman, Emeritus Shirley William s William Julius Wilso n

Richard C . Leone, President Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Maclnnes, Gordon, 1941Wrong for all the right reasons : ho w white liberals have been undone by race- / Gordo n Maclnnes. p. cm . "A Twentieth Century Fund book. " Includes index. ISBN 0-8147-5543-7 (acid-fre e paper ) 1. Unite d States—Race relations. 2 . Liberalism—Unite d States 3. Conservatism—United States . 4 . Unite d States—Politics and government— 1993- I . Title. E185.615.M22 199 5 305.8'00973~dc20 95-3252 9 CIP Cover design and illustration: Claude Goodwin Manufactured i n the United States of America. Copyright © 1996 by the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.

DEDICATION

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n memor y o f m y Dad , wh o share d hi s nam e wit h m e an d muc h mor e than h e ever knew .

FOREWORD

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he interaction o f race , poverty, an d publi c policy ha s bee n tangle d i n disgraceful partisa n jockeyin g an d muddle d b y competing versions of reality fo r muc h o f American history . Indeed, i n the broades t sense , tha t history itsel f i s incomprehensibl e withou t a n appreciatio n o f th e dee p and abidin g influenc e o f th e politic s o f rac e o n issues , debates, an d elec tions. For all the talk o f third partie s in recent years, a look bac k provide s us, fo r example , wit h onl y on e rea l cas e o f a permanen t success : th e Republican party , founde d largel y a s a vehicle fo r oppositio n t o slavery . And significantly , ther e can b e little doubt tha t th e more recent history of the two major partie s has been greatly affecte d b y shifts i n their perceive d positions o n race-relate d issues . When Frankli n Roosevel t reache d ou t t o th e nation' s leas t fortu nate, hi s party succeede d th e GO P a s the traditiona l hom e o f blac k vot ers. A generatio n later , whe n Norther n Democrat s brok e thei r unhol y and usuall y unspoken allianc e with segregationis t Southerners , they start ing a process that , i n effect, shrun k thei r ow n party . An d today , th e for merly solidl y Democrati c Sout h i s wel l o n it s wa y t o becomin g almos t equally dependabl e fo r th e Republicans. This shift i s a result, i n no smal l measure, of the willingness o f some to exploit racial tensions for politica l purposes. Fro m a historica l perspective , i n othe r words , neithe r o f th e ascendent partie s ha s a n unblemishe d clai m t o th e hig h groun d o n thi s central issu e o f America n society . To be sure, the nation ha s moved beyon d the racial ratios which stai n our Constitution , the violence of the Civil War, the hypocrisy of Jim Crow , the sit-ins at lunch counters, and the struggle for basi c voting rights; but we haven't reache d th e da y whe n discussion s o f centra l domesti c problem s vii

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WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASON S

such a s teen-age pregnancy, dru g abuse, housing, education, an d s o fort h have no racial or ethnic component. Perhap s there will come a time whe n political debat e an d polic y outcomes i n the United State s are not warpe d by the diversit y o f ou r population . Meanwhile seriou s discussion s o f actio n o n domesti c issue s mus t move beyond argument s abou t th e facts t o include discussions o f politics. That premis e i s the startin g poin t fo r Gordo n Maclnnes' s work . Maclnnes, formerl y a foundatio n executiv e an d consultant , bega n this boo k a s an effor t t o catalogue wha t work s an d wha t doesn' t amon g the approache s t o urban poverty . In the course o f writing, he found tim e to b e elected t o the New Jersey Stat e Senat e and reaso n t o shif t th e focu s of hi s research . H e becam e convince d tha t th e problem s o f rac e an d poverty canno t b e confronte d successfull y unti l ther e i s a considerabl e shift i n th e approac h o f liberal s an d progressives , stil l th e mos t arden t political advocate s o f th e mos t ambitiou s polic y solutions . Maclnnes examine s th e hig h wate r mar k o f nationa l ambition s i n this area : Lyndo n Johnson' s Grea t Societ y programs , man y o f whic h received bipartisa n support . Indeed , considerin g Republica n Senatoria l leader Everet t Dirksen' s pivota l rol e i n th e enactmen t o f th e 196 5 civi l and votin g right s law s an d Richar d Nixon' s substantia l expansio n o f social an d urba n programs , th e nation , fo r a time , wa s unite d a s neve r before—or since—i n it s determinatio n t o conque r th e evil s o f povert y and racism . H e argues , i n th e page s tha t follow , tha t thes e successe s were a false dawn , quickly replaced b y a new sort of divisiveness. Centra l to his argument i s the contention tha t th e stiflin g o f honest debat e abou t the effectivenes s an d succes s rat e o f thes e ne w program s wa s a critica l factor i n reversing th e political viabilit y o f nearl y al l the programs initi ated durin g th e period . Maclnnes's bil l of particular s i s lengthy. His idea s fo r breakin g th e current patter n o f politic s o n thes e matter s i s specific. Hi s cal l fo r mor e open an d critica l debat e amon g supporter s o f socia l program s an d fo r approaches base d o n need , no t race , ar e spelle d ou t i n considerabl e detail. H e note s tha t ther e ar e glimmering s o f thi s sor t o f thin g i n th e reexamination unde r wa y amon g progressive s i n bot h parties , itsel f a reaction t o th e recen t succes s o f conservativ e forces . Ther e ma y be , a s well, he notes, new possibilitie s outsid e th e traditiona l part y structures . Overall, Maclnne s offer s man y provocativ e point s tha t ca n hel p t o ani mate an d focu s thes e fresh look s a t futur e nationa l response s t o racis m and poverty .

FOREWORD

IX

One thin g i s certain : th e en d o f th e roa d towar d socia l justic e an d reasonable economi c equit y i s not ye t i n sight . Th e necessit y t o confron t the peculiar American dilemm a i s as clear as ever. The importance o f candor on these difficult subject s is undeniable. Gordon Maclnne s ha s chose n a topic and a n approach, therefore, tha t compels our attention . O n behal f of the Trustees of the Twentieth Centur y Fund , I thank hi m for hi s efforts . C . LEONE , President The Twentieth Centur y Fun d September 199 5

RICHARD

CONTENTS

F O R E W O R D B Y R I C H A R D C . L E O N E W\\ PREFACE x

m

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV

H

INTRODUCTION 1 1 TH

E POLITIC S O F RACE : CONSERVATIV E INDIFFERENC E MEET S LIBERAL TIMIDIT Y 1

2 RAC

3

E AN D POLITIC S I N TH E JOHNSON YEARS : FRO M MORA L MONOPOLY T O POLITICA L SIDESHO W 2

3

3 TH

E SOURCE S O F LIBERA L DECLINE : FAILURE S O F MIND 4

9

4 TH

E LIBERA L ABANDONMEN T O F POLITIC S 7

3

5 TH

E COST S O F BLAC K UNITY : POLITICA L ISOLATIO N 9

7

6 TH

E HIG H COST S O F CONSERVATIV E RUL E 11

7

7 REBUILDIN 8 SOLVIN 9 PROGRESSIV

G A PROGRESSIVE VISIO N 14 G PROBLEM S I N POO R CIT Y NEIGHBORHOOD S 16 E RESTORATION : WIT H O R WITHOU T CLINTO N 18

5 7 5

N O T E S 20

5

INDEX 22

3

PREFACE

T

he idea s i n thi s boo k firs t bega n t o tak e shap e a s a resul t o f m y work wit h th e Mondale-for-Presiden t campaig n i n 1984 . I went t o Washington t o hel p ru n th e advertising , polling , speech-writing , research, an d debat e preparatio n sectio n o f th e campaign (and , also , t o be able to tell my grandchildren tha t I did everythin g possibl e t o preven t a secon d Reaga n administration) . I came awa y fro m tha t campaig n feel ing tha t Mondale' s lopside d defea t wa s no t jus t th e resul t o f Ronal d Reagan's telegenic smile, but was, in fact, brough t o n in large measure b y the Democrati c party' s timidit y an d hypocris y i n dealin g wit h raciall y charged issues . The approac h t o thes e issue s tha t ha d com e t o characteriz e th e Democratic part y i n th e 1980 s stoo d i n marke d contras t t o wha t I ha d encountered i n Newark' s Nort h War d i n 1971 , when I firs t me t Steve n Adubato, then a Newark schoo l teacher; Adrianne Davis, a teacher's unio n organizer; an d Donal d Eshlemann , a Mennonite-Presbyteria n minister . Operating ou t o f a smal l office , the y wer e startin g a communit y organi zation to help stabilize their polyglot neighborhoo d an d provid e new ser vices t o it s residents . Th e Nort h War d Center , stil l le d b y Adubato , ha s always applie d a singl e standar d t o everyon e an d i s a plac e wher e ope n conversations abou t rac e and ethnicit y ar e frank, frequent , an d valued . When th e organizatio n wa s firs t launched , I was runnin g a founda tion interested in urban problems. I recommended givin g the group a twoyear grant to get it started, and I was pleased to watch it become one of the most thoroughl y integrate d a s wel l a s highl y effectiv e servic e organiza tions I have ever seen. For me, this Newark organizatio n ha s kept alive the vision of Martin Luthe r King, Jr., a vision of an America tha t judges people by the content o f their character , no t th e color o f their skin . XIII

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WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

I have watched wit h growing concern a s that vision has been eclipsed by policie s tha t hav e ofte n bee n well-meanin g bu t thoroughl y wrong-headed. Thi s book represent s a n effort t o explain how progressiv e forces hav e taken a wrong turn o n racial issues and ho w the y can rectif y mistakes tha t threate n t o tur n progressiv e Democrat s int o a permanen t minority i n the nation' s politica l debate . I grew u p i n California , th e so n o f a Presbyteria n minister . I was a "youth leader " wh o pushe d th e "adult " churc h t o joi n Marti n Luthe r King's crusade b y fighting racia l discriminatio n i n the late 1950s . In college I tutored poo r kid s in Lo s Angeles and , later , a s a graduate student , in Trenton. With the Episcopal chaplain o f Princeton University, I traveled to Mississippi in 196 4 to lend suppor t t o embattled an d isolate d worker s in the civi l rights struggles . I hav e spen t mos t o f m y adul t year s engage d i n publi c lif e i n Ne w Jersey, a much-maligne d stat e that , i n fact , mirror s th e nation' s demo graphics o f rac e an d ethnicit y i n man y ways . Afte r earnin g a master' s degree fro m Princeto n Universit y i n 1965 , I move d t o Trento n an d worked fo r th e city's antipoverty program , believin g that th e next ste p in the civi l right s struggl e wa s t o brin g ne w opportunit y t o poo r black s i n northern cities . I moved o n to becom e a special assistant t o the state edu cation commissioner, whose suggestions about schoo l integration betwee n cities an d suburb s dre w rapi d fire . Later , I joined th e staf f o f Governo r Richard J. Hughes i n the aftermath o f the 196 7 Newark riot s an d helpe d write hi s special urba n message . For eigh t year s afte r that , I ra n th e Fun d fo r Ne w Jersey , a grant making foundatio n tha t emphasize d publi c polic y initiative s an d urba n problems. I als o serve d a s chie f executiv e o f Ne w Jersey' s four-statio n public broadcastin g network . In addition t o my temporary dut y in the Mondale campaign , I spent six months in Washington durin g the Johnson administratio n workin g o n the staff o f a White House task force o n cities. Otherwise, I have lived an d worked i n New Jersey . Since 197 0 I hav e bee n deepl y involve d i n th e civi c lif e o f Morri s County. Locate d i n th e norther n par t o f th e state , withi n commutin g distance o f Manhattan , i t i s on e o f America' s wealthies t an d mos t Republican counties . For six years I served as the president o f the Planne d Parenthood affiliat e tha t serve s seve n Nort h Jerse y counties ; I'v e als o served a s treasure r o f th e battere d women' s shelte r fo r Morri s Count y and a s a membe r o f th e board s o f a schoo l fo r student s wit h learnin g disabilities an d a land conservatio n organization .

PREFACE

XV

Not onl y hav e I bee n livin g i n on e o f th e mos t Republica n place s on earth , bu t als o I hav e spen t a goo d dea l o f tim e i n wha t i s stil l a Republican-dominated worl d o f busines s a s the chairman o f a $30 0 mil lion manufacturin g company . Thi s experienc e cam e abou t whe n m y father-in-law becam e incapacitate d b y a brai n tumo r i n 1988 , an d I stepped i n to represen t th e family' s interests . Politically, I have spen t m y lif e a s an underdog . I was th e chairma n of th e Morri s Count y Democrati c part y fo r a n ingloriou s thre e years , and fo r tw o years during the Watergate backlash , I represented th e coun ty a s a Democrat i n the New Jersey Genera l Assembly . In 1993 , just sixt y day s afte r finishin g th e firs t draf t o f thi s book , I was electe d t o th e New Jersey Stat e Senat e b y a margin o f 34 2 vote s ou t of almost 70,00 0 cast . The same day, Christine Todd Whitman wa s elected governor, carryin g my new legislative district b y a 62-38 percen t mar gin. My victor y represented th e largest crossove r vot e in an y New Jerse y legislative electio n i n a t leas t fift y years . My year s a s a legislato r hav e furthe r shape d m y thinkin g o n th e issues that ar e a t th e cor e o f thi s book . I n a typical wee k a s a state sena tor, I attend thre e o r fou r reception s honorin g volunteer s o r recognizin g events at nonprofit organizations . I speak a t school principals' retiremen t dinners, Rotar y luncheons , an d senio r citizen s groups . I present resolu tions honorin g Eagl e Scouts , testify a t public hearings abou t sewe r lines , and hel p dedicate new parks an d bridges . I talk t o police officers, corpo rate executives , owner s o f diners , lawyers , lobbyists , preachers , insur ance agencies , florists, grievin g widows, students, nurses, and teachers . I run i n races, walk i n parades, an d si t o n th e floor s o f da y car e centers. I smile fo r cameras , shak e hands , stan d an d wave , si t an d talk , wal k an d talk, an d driv e an d talk . An d I listen. As a legislator, I want to solve the problems that ar e important t o th e people I represent. So , on the fifty o r sixty days a year that the Senate convenes in Trenton, I propose, argue, cajole, plead, wheedle, and joke abou t laws. I try to fin d th e common groun d tha t wil l permit a majority o f m y colleagues to suppor t somethin g I seek o r to oppos e somethin g I hope t o defeat. I a m i n constan t contac t wit h stat e agencies , pushin g fo r assis tance to the towns and organization s i n my district, sometimes looking fo r money, sometime s jus t seekin g a decision , on e way o r another . This i s the routine , bu t critica l stuf f o f America n politic s an d gov ernment. Throug h a process o f readin g an d talking , debatin g an d listen ing, politicians seek to balance competing interests in a search for enoug h common groun d t o advanc e toward consensus . The process is sometime s

XVI

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

raucous an d alway s untidy, but i t is rooted i n some unwritten bu t strong ly held rule s abou t th e place of civilit y an d respec t fo r th e role of legisla tures a s institutions . I a m a Democrat , albei t a frustrate d one . I have campaigne d fo r Robert Kennedy, Edward Muskie, Morris Udall, Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis, an d Bil l Clinto n fo r president . Bu t I d o no t conside r mysel f a "national" Democra t o r an ideologue. I am a fiscal conservative , by which I mean that I believe that we should no t borro w money from ou r childre n to give ourselves tax cuts and that we should tax ourselves for th e services we demand . I d o believ e i n government , however , a belie f strengthene d every time I drive o n a highway, rea d abou t th e graduate s o f publi c uni versities, fly ou t o f a n airport , o r pas s a cop o r a park . Most important, I believe that a proper role of government is support for the principle of integration, the simple idea that al l of the people in this diverse natio n shoul d b e judge d individually , no t a s member s o f an y group. Thi s mean s tha t governmen t mus t enforc e swiftl y an d certainl y laws against racial an d gende r discrimination . Bu t government mus t als o extend a helpin g han d t o al l American s b y providin g decen t publi c schools, affordable highe r education , fre e librarie s and parks , and acces sible transportation . This boo k i s not a memoir . No r i s it a polic y memorandu m issue d from Washingto n o r from a Cambridge think tank. Rather, it is an assessment o f how progressiv e force s retreate d fro m th e battl e o f ideas , scare d off b y issues tinged b y race. The boo k will suggest the kind of politics an d policies that ar e needed t o restor e goo d sens e to thi s important debate . My perspective is shaped b y years of participation i n America's civic culture in one county within on e state. That cultur e reflects th e endurin g tension betwee n ou r vigorou s individualis m an d ou r equall y stron g tra dition o f communit y obligation , a tradition tha t I believe i s now threat ened b y ideological warfare, Republica n irresponsibility , an d Democrati c timidity.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

W

riting a book compete s with marriage , fatherhood, an d runnin g a s a Democrat i n Morri s County , Ne w Jerse y a s th e mos t difficult an d rewarding experienc e o f m y life . Blair Maclnnes , m y wife, rea d ever y word o f thi s boo k man y time s over, a s well a s thousands mor e tha t disappeare d int o som e cybe r ceme tery. Sh e di d s o wit h goo d humo r an d dispatch , puttin g asid e he r ow n work t o question , argue , an d exclai m abou t mine . Sh e pu t u p wit h th e absences and obliterate d weekends that g o with book-writing . Blair mad e it possible fo r m e to star t an d finis h thi s labor, an d sh e deserves first an d most ferven t thanks . Richard C . Leon e encourage d m e a s a frien d an d a s presiden t o f th e Twentieth Century Fund, taking a chance on a heretofore unpublishe d writ er wit h a n unconventiona l resume . Hi s perspective s an d insight s ar e unmatched in my experience for their acuity and freshness. I also appreciate the hel p o f hi s colleague s a t th e Fund : John Samples , Jason Renker , Jo n Shure, Beverly Goldberg, Kathleen Quinn, Bill Grinker, and Carol Starmack. This boo k grow s out o f thousands o f conversations an d encounters . Those wit h To m Vallely , Charle s Kenney , Bil l Bradley , Charle s Morris , Kathleen Daley, Jim Sleeper, Clement Price, John McLaughlin, Mark Fury , and Wayn e Bryan t were particularly helpful . Carte r Willki e prodded an d supported m e wit h jewel s an d tidbits ; Me l Miste r argue d patientl y an d effectively. Steve Adubato inspire d thi s book b y his practice o f politics and inte gration. M y friend s a t Newark' s Nort h War d Cente r wor k an d liv e as a part o f th e mos t thoroughl y integrate d institutio n I have eve r seen—an d as one o f th e most effectiv e communit y servic e organizations . Miss Juanita Tar r taugh t m e how t o typ e pretty darne d fas t whe n I was i n 9t h grad e a t th e Woodro w Wilso n Hig h Schoo l i n Pasadena . Thanks Mis s Tarr . XVII

INTRODUCTION

B

ill Clinton' s presidenc y bega n a t a confusing , transitiona l perio d i n American history . With the collapse o f the Sovie t Union, he could no t do wha t Ronal d Reaga n did : borro w enoug h mone y i n th e nam e o f national securit y t o purchas e temporar y prosperity . Presiden t Clinto n took offic e wit h th e opportunit y t o buil d a ne w progressiv e coalitio n o f working- an d middle-clas s whites , minorities , an d liberals—traditiona l Democratic constituents—t o restor e credibilit y t o th e ide a tha t govern ment play s a constructiv e rol e i n societ y an d th e economy , an d t o cal l the bluf f o f the Republican Righ t i n its refusal t o inflic t th e pain implici t in its antigovernment jihad . The 199 4 elections demonstrated tha t Clinto n ha d faile d t o make his case. T o b e sure , h e wa s expose d throughou t hi s firs t tw o year s t o a relentless, scurrilous, even libelou s campaig n o f defamatio n an d ridicul e by the Right. And congressional Republican s appeare d mor e interested i n destroying Clinton' s persona l credibilit y tha n i n debatin g polic y differ ences (Senate Republicans use d the filibuster mor e frequently i n 1993-9 4 than a t an y earlie r tim e i n th e twentiet h century) . Question s abou t Clinton's womanizing lingered from th e 199 2 campaign. All of this mixed with a personal imag e of a slick southern politicia n who restyled his policies at th e firs t sig n o f opposition . President Clinto n contribute d t o the creation o f that image , demon strating a lac k o f steadfastnes s t o th e idea s emphasize d b y candidat e Clinton. H e wa s draw n int o a figh t o n gay s i n th e militar y i n th e firs t weeks o f th e presidency , retreatin g fro m hi s campaign pledg e t o th e ga y community an d openin g himsel f t o th e charg e o f waffling . Hi s cabine t looked lik e a n affirmativ e actio n plan . I t include d fou r black s (on e a woman), two Latinos, and tw o white women, bu t no Republican an d n o 1

2

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

one associated with Ross Perot. He nominated (fo r a time) Lani Guinier, a black-Jewish, ivy-league law professor, t o the highest civil rights job in the Department o f Justice, even though sh e advocated a vision o f racia l sepa ratism at variance with his own experience as a son of the civil rights struggles. He was slow to translate his central campaign promise to "en d welfar e as w e kno w it " int o a concret e legislativ e proposal , choosin g instea d t o organize a highly bureaucratic, secretive, and confusing effor t t o achieve a sweeping reform o f the health care system, which faile d spectacularly . During the 199 4 congressional elections , President Clinton' s achieve ments wer e degrade d an d minimized . Th e fact s tha t th e econom y wa s growing steadil y and unemploymen t wa s down sharpl y faile d t o redoun d to th e Democrats' favor . Clinto n ha d kep t hi s promise t o reduce deficits . He ende d th e antichoic e abortio n policie s o f th e Reagan-Bus h years . Millions o f workin g American s wer e aide d throug h expansio n o f th e earned income tax credit he pushed for and b y passage of a family leave act that protecte d workers ' jobs durin g maternit y leave s and famil y medica l crises. Eve n thoug h onl y 2 percen t o f America n household s pai d highe r taxes under Clinton' s budge t plan, Republicans accuse d him (successfully ) of raising middle-class taxes . Clinton's political plight was in no small part a result of wrong turn s taken b y leader s o f th e Democrati c part y durin g th e pas t thre e decades . Before th e mid-1960s certain values and precepts of American life were so widely supporte d tha t they were never the subject o f partisan contention . For leader s o f wha t wa s the n th e majorit y part y t o abando n rathe r sud denly thes e share d principle s represente d a seismi c shif t i n th e cente r o f American politics . Nonetheless, conside r th e following : ± Democrat s move d fro m clearl y opposing crime an d civi l disorder t o the appearanc e o f excusin g blac k crim e an d riotin g a s a n under standable reactio n t o a history o f oppressio n an d discrimination ; A

Democrat s shifte d fro m unquestionin g acceptanc e o f the role of sta ble, two-paren t familie s i n transmittin g society' s value s fro m on e generation t o th e nex t t o th e suggestio n tha t unwe d motherhoo d and single-paren t household s wer e no t closel y associate d wit h ho w well-prepared childre n woul d b e to participate i n American societ y as citizens, parents, and employees ;

± Democrat s were identified i n the postwar er a with seeking good jobs, full employment, and expanding opportunities for willing workers. By

INTRODUCTION

3

the lat e 1960s , they emphasize d instea d th e nee d t o protec t welfar e recipients fro m th e workplace ; ± Democrat s abandone d racia l integratio n i n favo r o f separatism , defining opportunit y i n term s o f membershi p i n a growin g lis t o f "protected" groups , fro m blac k American s an d Pacifi c Islander s t o women an d th e disabled . Thus di d th e Democrati c part y ced e t o th e Republican s th e rol e o f protector o f basi c American principles . Until such fundamenta l value s a s personal an d famil y responsibility , civility , an d wor k ar e reestablishe d as "American " an d no t "conservative " values , Democrat s ar e unlikel y to regain thei r standin g with th e voters. Moreover, withou t a n ope n an d full debat e o n race-frame d issues , th e word s crime, welfare, family dissolution, an d idleness wil l continue t o b e political cod e fo r blacks . Progressives need not b e defensive. Their goals are widely share d b y American voters . I believ e tha t governmen t shoul d sta y ou t o f people' s way—that a woman, for example , should hav e the right to decide whether to have a child or not. I believe that taxes that reflect one' s capacity to pa y them ar e better tha n taxe s that d o not. I admire the entrepreneurial spir it, but I know that sustained economi c growth require s government invest ments i n al l sort s o f activitie s an d facilitie s tha t businesse s canno t mak e a g o of—activitie s suc h a s basi c research , publi c transportation , infras tructure, and educationa l institution s that provide opportunities fo r every one. I believe that th e parents o f profoundly retarde d childre n shoul d b e able t o loo k t o governmen t fo r hel p an d tha t peopl e wh o wor k al l thei r lives should hav e the security of a government-protected pension . I favo r the vigorou s enforcemen t o f law s prohibitin g discriminatio n base d o n skin color, accent, religion, gender, o r ethnicity, although I oppose grant ing preference s t o person s base d o n thes e sam e attributes . I thin k gov ernment help s determin e ou r qualit y o f lif e b y preservin g ope n space s and histori c sites , building parks, cleaning up rivers and bays , and ensur ing our safet y fro m bot h speedin g driver s an d violen t criminals . The Clinto n presidenc y coul d b e the harbinge r o f the restoration o f a progressiv e coalition , on e tha t reunite s th e blac k an d whit e workin g class with traditiona l Democrati c supporter s suc h a s Jews, environmen talists, working women, and public employees. Or the Clinton presidenc y could b e jus t a brie f interruptio n i n th e conservativ e Republicans ' long-term hol d o n th e White House . In additio n t o th e normal test s o f a sitting president—tha t is , whether job s ar e plentifu l an d th e econom y i s

4

WRONG FO R ALL THE RIGHT REASONS

growing, an d whethe r th e United State s is at peac e an d ou r worl d stabl e Clinton mus t conten d wit h a politica l cultur e an d a medi a environmen t that hav e changed i n important way s i n recent years . Politics has seemingly come to b e dominated b y talk radio populism , "tabloid television, " th e reduction o f complex issues to nine-second soun d bites, an d a growin g cynicis m an d sournes s i n th e characte r o f publi c debate. Government , whic h i s suppose d t o b e th e sourc e o f consensu s and agreemen t o n share d publi c goals , i s widel y mistrusted , i f no t despised. A sullen polity looks out o n a shrunken economi c future, whil e neither politica l part y offer s a concret e visio n fo r restorin g prosperity . Triumphant conservative s prattl e o n abou t traditiona l values , ye t sup port policie s tha t diminis h saving s an d investmen t an d tha t permi t gov ernment intrusio n int o th e mos t privat e an d delicat e persona l decisions . Liberals, terrified t o be labeled as such, mask their policies in conservativ e vocabulary. In the course o f the past thirt y years, the bipartisan progres sive coalitio n tha t dominate d America n politic s ha s bee n shattere d an d scattered. Thi s boo k i s about ho w tha t happened , an d wha t need s t o b e done t o restor e a progressive majority . A word abou t nomenclature . I do not attemp t i n this thin volume t o restore liberalism' s goo d name . Liberalis m gre w ou t o f th e Ne w Deal , the economic theories o f Keynes, and a n acceptanc e tha t activis t govern ment wa s essentia l t o refere e fre e enterpris e b y protectin g worker s an d consumers; t o construc t a safet y ne t o f socia l insuranc e fo r th e jobless , elderly, an d disabled ; an d t o enforc e civi l rights. In th e 1960 s liberalis m shifted it s emphasis to expanding the legally enforceable right s of all sort s of groups, downplaying conflicts i n economic policy. I use the term liberal to refer t o those who embrace d th e rights-driven agend a bes t personifie d by Senato r Georg e McGovern' s 197 2 presidentia l campaign . Liberal is , here, a political pejorative . Progressivism ha d ver y differen t root s i n th e earl y twentiet h centu ry an d wa s muc h mor e associate d wit h Republican s lik e Theodor e Roosevelt, Rober t LaFollette , Hiram Johnson, an d Georg e Norris. It fe d on th e sweepin g populis t aversio n t o th e er a o f railroad , steel , oil , an d financial trusts , an d emphasize d governmen t t o improv e worke r safety , child welfare , consume r protection , an d conservation . I us e th e ter m progressive t o refe r t o thos e wh o accep t th e nee d fo r regulatio n o f th e environmental, consumer, and labor practices of the private sector; believe in publi c investmen t i n highe r education , research , transportation , and infrastructur e a s essential t o economi c growth ; advocat e program s to protec t th e helples s an d elderl y an d t o offe r a helpin g han d t o th e

INTRODUCTION

5

economically disadvantaged ; push fo r racia l integration an d stricte r pun ishment fo r thos e wh o discriminate ; an d oppos e racia l preference s an d quotas excep t t o offse t persisten t discrimination . Progressive i s a term o f approbation ; liberal i s not . The 196 4 presidential electio n marke d th e las t hurrah o f th e fable d Roosevelt coalition. Lyndon Johnson was the last Democratic nominee in the twentieth centur y to attract a majority o f votes from whit e American s and t o wi n a convincin g margi n amon g Catholi c Americans . H e was , also, as Thomas and Mary Edsal l observed, the last Democrat to be on the right sid e of th e issu e of race . The two fact s ar e related . For the thirty-five month s betwee n John F . Kennedy's assassinatio n on Novembe r 22 , 1963 , an d th e 196 6 congressiona l elections , a pro gressive polic y majorit y prevaile d i n Washington . A n endurin g recor d was enacted wit h the crucial participation o f Republican "moderates, " a species that i n the mid-1990s seeme d nearly extinct. Most important , thi s progressive polic y majorit y abolishe d America n aparthei d wit h th e pas sage o f the Civi l Rights Ac t o f 196 4 an d th e Voting Right s Act o f 1965 . The automati c pauperizatio n o f th e elderl y wa s ende d b y the enactmen t of Medicare. Federa l investmen t i n public transit wa s inaugurate d alon g with genera l assistanc e t o publi c schools . An d fo r th e firs t time , oppor tunities fo r highe r educatio n wer e guarantee d t o al l qualifie d student s through federa l grant s an d loans . Not eve n the Reaga n tid e of the 1980 s could swee p awa y publi c suppor t fo r thes e landmark s o f th e Grea t Society. Kennedy's succesor , Lyndon Baine s Johnson, and his bipartisan allie s were committed t o integration, the simple American principle that person s should no t b e judged o r categorized b y skin color i n defining thei r acces s to opportunit y an d publi c benefits . American s responde d t o th e mora l force o f th e civi l right s movement , personifie d b y th e Reveren d Marti n Luther King, Jr., with the most effective movemen t o f ordinary citizen s in the nation' s history . Presiden t Johnson's advocac y o f equa l opportunit y for al l Americans an d a n end to legalized segregatio n prevaile d a s a mora l and politica l argument . To b e sure, support fo r equa l opportunity di d no t prevent massive white resistance to the dismantling o f the dual schoo l systems i n th e Sout h no r a contemptuou s hostilit y t o norther n black s wh o moved int o whit e neighborhoods . Mos t white s accepte d integratio n i n theory bu t mad e n o specia l effort t o mak e i t a reality i n their dail y lives. By 196 8 th e progressiv e coalitio n wa s broken . Richar d Nixo n wa s elected presiden t i n a campaig n dominate d b y tw o issues : th e wa r i n Vietnam an d rising crime rates in American cities. Democrats were blame d

6

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASON S

for both , and they had no good answer for eithe r (neither , as it turned out , did Nixon) . Something quit e extraordinar y ha d happene d betwee n 196 4 an d 1968. The liberal Democrats, who would com e to dominat e their nation al party, lost their will to argue about these racially charged issue s (but no t about, say , Vietnam o r weapon systems) . Plenty o f issue s were devilishl y complex an d deservin g o f th e fulles t ventilation , issue s tha t revolve d around th e expectation an d hop e that blac k Americans would participat e fully i n American society after centurie s of oppression. But instead o f turning to a full exploratio n o f what had to be done to improve the educationa l performance o r employment opportunitie s o f poor blac k Americans and t o strengthen blac k families , liberal s retreate d fro m th e challeng e an d remained silen t in the face o f ideas that were morally insupportable, practically ineffective , an d politicall y fatal . The y wer e mut e i n th e fac e o f demands an d proposal s fro m th e Lef t an d "professiona l blacks " tha t demanded rejoinde r an d debate . B y their servilit y an d ineptness , libera l Democrats hande d ove r t o conservativ e Republican s a serie s o f raciall y framed issue s o f suc h potenc y tha t the y woul d hel p determin e th e out come in the 1968 , 1972 , 1980 , 1984 , and 198 8 presidentia l elections . Moreover, i n their ineptness white liberals manifested enormou s disrespect fo r blac k American s collectively , fo r th e America n politica l pro cess, and for th e working- and middle-class Americans who were formerl y at the heart o f the Democratic coalition. By the mid-1990s liberal s still did not respec t the ideas of blac k American s enough t o argu e with them. Yet because they avoided suc h arguments, Democrats found themselve s tagged with idea s that were anathema t o most voters. Democrats di d not endors e muggings, but they sought to defer a crackdown agains t violent criminal s until th e "underlyin g condition s o f poverty " ha d bee n corrected . I n tak ing thi s vie w the y showe d greate r sympath y fo r th e right s o f criminal s than the y di d fo r th e right s o f victims, who ar e disproportionatel y blac k Americans. In the end , liberal s implicitl y accepte d th e argument s o f profession al blacks that th e nation's sa d history o f slavery and legalize d segregatio n required tha t blac k American s b e grante d extraordinar y preferences . Preferences mea n tha t different , inevitabl y lowe r standard s ar e se t fo r some individuals solel y on the basis of their ski n color, a notion tha t col lides wit h broadl y accepte d notion s o f a colorblin d society . Eve n suc h an arden t integrationis t a s Marti n Luthe r King , Jr. , argue d fo r tempo rary preferences fo r blac k Americans modeled o n the incentives, subsidies, and preference s grante d veteran s unde r th e popula r G I Bill . Liberal s

INTRODUCTION

7

appeared t o agree with assertion s that an y differences betwee n blac k an d white American s i n everythin g fro m illegitimac y an d homicid e rate s t o scores on standardized test s could bes t be explained b y the legacy and con tinuation o f racia l oppression . If there were a moral cas e to b e made for temporar y race preference s because of the systematic and persistent oppression o f black Americans, the argument wa s muc h weake r whe n i t cam e t o Asian-Americans , Pacifi c Islanders, an d Latinos . Althoug h the y surel y ha d face d prejudic e an d occasional discriminator y laws , they ha d neve r bee n enslaved no r legall y segregated. Despit e th e clas h wit h bedroc k America n values , liberal s uncritically extende d preference s t o othe r ethni c groups , a s wel l a s t o women. And the y adopte d thes e radical policie s without a n ope n debat e that woul d illuminat e thei r rational e o r allo w fo r dissentin g views . Th e long-term result of this thinking has been devastating for Democrat s at the polls an d o f questionabl e consequenc e fo r th e intende d beneficiaries . Nowhere hav e the cumulative effect s o f liberal thoughtlessness bee n more apparen t tha n i n the ques t fo r a sensible approac h t o the problem s of the urban poor . Becaus e liberals would no t acknowledg e th e role tha t individual behavior , responsibility , an d effor t mus t pla y i n an y polic y that deal s wit h poverty , the y hav e bee n lef t t o advocat e unconvincin g alternatives that require unrealistic levels of spending. Defensive abou t th e consequences o f concentration s o f lower-clas s familie s i n cit y neighbor hoods, Democrats hav e understate d th e difficultie s o f proposals, such a s job trainin g o r schoo l reform , an d underestimate d th e capacitie s o f th e poor themselves . The y hav e bee n reduce d t o slogan s fo r "mor e Hea d Start," "urba n Marshal l Plans, " an d "goo d job s a t goo d wages. " I n th e meantime, the qualit y o f life i n poor neighborhood s ha s declined precip itously, with violen t crime , idleness, and famil y dissolutio n rate s soarin g so high the y defin e a culture alie n to th e res t o f America . In sum, liberals were arrogant—and no t just about urba n povert y o r what wa s best for ethni c neighborhoods. The same attitudes prevailed i n the evolving policies about Vietnam i n the Kennedy an d Johnson admin istrations. I t wa s th e hubri s o f th e "bes t an d brightest " tha t allowe d defense planner s t o assum e tha t superio r logistic s an d bom b tonnag e would subdu e Vietna m an d tha t Washingto n bureaucrat s coul d bes t design solution s fo r th e resident s o f Watts an d th e Sout h Bronx . Democrats ar e reputed t o b e good, scrapp y politicians , which help s explain ho w the y continue d t o d o s o wel l i n stat e an d loca l election s for s o long despite the wanderings o f the national party. This makes it all the mor e ironi c tha t i n tryin g t o solv e raciall y frame d issues , nationa l

8

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

Democrats abandone d th e politica l process . Th e libera l reformer s wh o took ove r the party in the 1970 s intentionally exclude d electe d Democrat s from th e nationa l convention , a s if their succes s in politics ha d contami nated them . Democrats retreate d fro m tryin g t o advanc e th e civi l right s agend a through legislation , a demandin g proces s o f argumen t an d compromis e that narrow s difference s t o build consensus among widely divergent inter ests and philosophies . Instead, liberals turned t o the federal judiciar y an d civil right s bureaucrat s t o advanc e idea s tha t the y coul d no t carr y leg islatively. Suppor t fo r busin g t o integrat e school s los t it s congressiona l majority (eve n among mos t Democrats ) b y the lat e 1960s , so civil right s organizations use d th e court s an d federa l agencie s t o desegregat e north ern schools . The us e o f quota s t o evaluat e complianc e wit h jo b discrim ination law s wa s pu t t o a congressiona l vot e onl y onc e (b y Presiden t Nixon), yet it evolved a s national polic y through successiv e federal cour t decisions an d bureaucrati c rule-making . Democrat s sai d the y oppose d quotas, supportin g instea d "goal s an d timetables " (whic h i n practic e turned ou t to be indistinguishable fro m quotas) . They never put suc h revolutionary idea s to the test of legislative argument, however , an d scurrie d away fro m the m i n campaigns . Finally, Democrats showe d n o respect for working - and middle-clas s Americans. They would no t acknowledg e th e efforts o f millions o f blac k Americans who finishe d school , got jobs, started families , an d joine d th e mainstream. To praise such progress was seen as defusing effort s t o assis t those wh o remaine d mire d i n poverty ; i t blunte d th e argumen t mad e b y professional black s tha t systemati c discriminatio n persisted . Liberal s blamed th e whit e workin g an d middl e classe s fo r opposin g eve n dubi ous scheme s suc h a s locatin g large-scal e publi c housin g project s i n th e midst o f residentia l neighborhoods . Th e whit e liberal s wh o righteousl y condemned suc h oppositio n tende d t o liv e i n neighborhood s no t face d with suc h housing. By 1972 the national Democrati c party—led b y high ly educate d whit e males—wa s suggestin g tha t th e greates t enemie s o f progress and justice were white males, a message that ha s not gone unno ticed b y the whit e male s who hav e com e t o b e the grou p tha t mos t con sistently support s Republica n presidentia l candidates . So maladroit wer e the Democrats tha t the Republicans were able t o draw of f hug e segment s o f traditionall y Democrati c voters , even thoug h these voters' economic interests ar e bette r serve d b y the Democrats' sup port o f organized labor , protectionist trad e policies, and Keynesia n pum p priming. The Republican appea l to "traditiona l values, " such a s law an d

INTRODUCTION

9

order an d patriotism , an d oppositio n t o "socia l engineering " an d wel fare overcam e th e histori c antipath y o f whit e Southerner s an d norther n working-class voter s to Republica n economi c policy . The 1970 s marke d th e en d o f America' s postwa r globa l economi c hegemony an d wit h it , th e lo w unemployment , stabl e prices , an d rapi d growth i n rea l incom e tha t ha d characterize d muc h o f th e postwa r peri od. For almost three decades, white male high school graduates had foun d jobs tha t allowe d the m t o provid e fo r thei r familie s an d enjo y a risin g middle-class standar d o f living . Taxe s ros e throug h thi s period , bu t incomes rose faster. With the onset of a voracious inflation i n 1973 , however, American familie s foun d themselve s o n a n economic treadmil l tha t went faste r an d faster . T o sta y even , marrie d wome n wen t t o wor k (i n 1960 onl y one-third o f married whit e women wer e in the labor force ; b y 1990 two-third s were) . A s rea l income s stalle d an d inflatio n erode d purchasing power , taxe s continue d t o rise , bringin g o n th e condition s for a tax revolt. In combination wit h Democratic sillines s on cultural an d social issues , thi s economi c scenari o lai d th e groundwor k fo r Ronal d Reagan an d th e righ t win g o f th e Republica n part y t o tak e ove r th e national government . Reagan was not conservative in the same sense that Barry Goldwater , Robert Taft , o r William F . Buckley were. Traditional conservative s hol d a long-ter m perspective , an d the y believ e i n balancin g curren t spendin g and revenue s an d i n stimulatin g saving s an d investment . Their s wa s a dour economi c visio n tha t emphasize d cuttin g program s suc h a s Socia l Security. In contras t Reagan' s offe r wa s irresistible— a 3 0 percen t cu t i n income taxes—and no t t o worry: becaus e o f previousl y unforesee n mul tipliers observable only to supply-side economists an d the editorial writer s at the Wall Street Journal, thi s generous giveback would b e accomplishe d without unbalancin g federal budgets . Of course, as George Bush observe d only a fe w month s befor e acceptin g Reagan' s vic e presidential offer , al l this wa s "voodo o economics. " Bu t Reaga n presente d i t wit h suc h ebul lience an d optimism , an d financiall y strappe d American s s o wante d t o believe it , that th e natio n crosse d it s fingers an d spen t th e tax cut . Reaganism wa s buil t o n th e propositio n tha t governmen t wa s th e cause o f economi c stagnatio n an d mora l decline . Where traditiona l con servatives understoo d th e nee d fo r publi c investmen t i n transportation , housing, an d education , Reaga n attempte d t o sharpl y reduc e federa l spending i n these areas . He argue d tha t welfar e explaine d unwe d moth erhood. Whe n eve n th e Republican-controlle d Senat e oppose d hi s pro posed cu t i n Socia l Securit y benefits , Reaga n blame d th e failur e o f hi s

10

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

supply-side promis e o n Congress' s "tax-and-spen d Democrats. " Federa l programs remaine d i n plac e becaus e th e America n peopl e di d no t wan t Reagan t o dismantl e publi c services . Reagan accelerate d spendin g for a new war o n crime and drugs , fed eralized dru g offenses , an d promise d t o clos e the border s t o illici t drugs . During hi s presidency , prison s fille d beyon d capacity , ye t drug-relate d crimes helpe d tur n cit y neighborhood s int o som e o f th e mos t dangerou s places on earth. Since Vietnam, there had not bee n a more spectacular fail ure o f polic y o r program . In fact, Reaga n lost the argument abou t government. When given the choice, voter s opte d fo r continue d indexin g o f Socia l Securit y benefits , expanding Medicar e coverage , maintainin g loan s an d grant s fo r highe r education, subsidizin g mas s transit , an d expandin g ope n space s (th e Republican Righ t rationalized it s defeat o n domesti c programs a s the victory o f "specia l interests") . Bu t American s als o wante d t o believ e tha t they could maintain publi c services, enjoy a massive tax cut, and stil l balance federa l budgets . I n acceptin g Reagan' s deal , the y becam e th e firs t generation o f America n citizen s i n peacetim e t o deman d mor e o f thei r government tha n the y wer e willing to pa y for . Part of Ronald Reagan' s legacy is that h e defined th e terms of debat e for th e next two presidents. For Georg e Bush, it meant a single term. Hi s disavowal o f on e o f th e mos t memorabl e campaig n pledge s eve r made—"Read m y lips , no ne w taxes"—se t of f a n attac k fro m th e Righ t that ruine d th e 199 2 Republica n conventio n an d encourage d Ros s Pero t to run , drawin g of f traditiona l Republica n votes . Whe n Bil l Clinto n assumed offic e o n a promis e t o "en d welfar e a s w e kno w it " an d t o reform healt h care , h e foun d himsel f caugh t lik e a fl y i n th e ambe r o f Reagan's defici t trap . "Wha t publi c servic e wil l yo u reduc e o r eliminat e to cu t th e deficit? " wa s th e questio n tha t ensnare d him . So , Clinton' s modest plan s fo r economi c stimulu s disappeared , whil e hi s welfar e an d health vision s shran k t o modes t proportions . In 198 8 Michae l Dukakis , th e Democrati c presidentia l nominee , tried to sell the American public on the idea that h e was the only true con servative i n th e rac e fo r presiden t an d tha t Georg e Bus h wa s somethin g else. Dukakis studiousl y avoide d admittin g himsel f a liberal until ten day s before th e election . I n 1992 , when Clinto n wa s accuse d o f bein g a liber al, he responded: "That' s a bunch o f bull . . . ." "D o anything, " sa y liberal politicians, "bu t don' t cal l me 'liberal.' " Liberal ha s become a political pejorative, an d I , too, use it as such in this boo k becaus e liberal s shoul d hav e learne d b y no w tha t the y wil l

INTRODUCTION

11

always lose the argument wit h American voters b y walking away fro m it . Their credibilit y wa s destroye d whe n the y wandered of f i n the compan y of a smal l ban d o f leftist s an d professiona l black s an d abandone d th e field t o conservative Republicans . Now, the traditions o f self governmen t and republicanis m ar e endangere d b y a ne w bran d o f right-win g pop ulism tha t declare s al l publi c activit y a misguided , corrupt , ineffectiv e waste of time. It seeks to shortcut th e complexity an d frustration s o f representative governmen t throug h referenda , ter m limits , and recall . Progressives need to respond wit h a n affirmatio n tha t there is much that th e natio n mus t d o wit h a sens e o f commo n purpos e an d publi c investments an d a respectfu l regar d fo r th e right s an d opportunitie s o f everyone. An d the y mus t demonstrat e b y thei r action s an d word s tha t they have absorbed th e lessons of the Liberal Misadventure wit h divisiv e interests an d caucuse s an d ar e read y t o resum e th e har d figh t fo r tru e racial an d economi c progress .

1» T H E POLITIC S O F R A C E : CONSERVATIV E INDIFFERENCE MEET S LIBERA L TIMIDIT Y

CLINTON RECLAIM S TH E CENTE R

I

n June 1992 , Bill Clinton's presidentia l candidac y wa s in deep trouble . True, h e ha d jus t score d bi g primar y victorie s i n Ne w Jerse y an d California o n June 2. The nomination wa s beginnin g to look mor e lik e a sentence than a prize, however. The mid-June Gallu p presidential prefer ence pol l showe d Clinto n a distan t third , wit h onl y 2 4 percen t suppor t against 3 2 percent fo r Republica n Presiden t Georg e Bush, and 3 4 percen t for independen t candidat e Ros s Perot, the Texas billionaire . Surveys suggested tha t voter s neithe r truste d Bil l Clinto n no r showe d muc h interes t in his campaign. Clinto n wa s bette r know n a s a draft-dodge r an d wom anizer tha n fo r an y publi c accomplishmen t o r seriou s proposal s abou t America's future . Som e Democrat s whispere d tha t ther e wa s stil l tim e for th e party t o com e u p wit h a stronger candidate . That wa s the situation o n Saturday , June 13 , when Clinto n appeare d before th e Rainbow Coalitio n meetin g in Washington fo r wha t looke d t o be a routine effor t t o generat e som e enthusias m i n th e party' s lef t wing . The coalitio n ha d alway s belonge d t o th e Reveren d Jess e L . Jackson: h e convened it , chaire d it , an d se t it s agenda . Jackso n describe d th e Jun e meeting a s a n "emergency " gatherin g "betwee n [riot s in ] Lo s Angele s and th e [Democrati c conventio n in ] New York. " Th e agend a include d a 13

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gathering o f blac k minister s t o tal k abou t crime , a breakfas t wit h labo r leaders, a symposiu m o n Jackson' s proposa l t o inves t $50 0 billio n i n infrastructure projects , an d a panel o f ra p an d hip-ho p artists . Jackson's political agend a wa s clear: to move Clinton leftward , clos er t o th e Democrati c party' s bas e amon g unions , urbanites , an d minori ties. Although Pero t was likely to split the anti-Bush vote , Jackson argue d that the Democrats' only chance was to mobilize the liberal-left sid e of th e party: "Thos e wh o canno t touc h th e ri m whe n it' s 5 1 inche s high , ca n slam dunk whe n its lowered t o 34 inches," was Jackson's basketbal l anal ogy for th e 199 2 politica l math. 1 One o f th e ra p artist s feature d a t Jackson' s "yout h summit " o n June 1 2 wa s Siste r Souljah , a self-describe d "rapactivist. " Th e rapper , whose rea l nam e wa s Lis a Williamson , ha d previousl y appeare d a s a warm-up ac t fo r Publi c Enemy , on e o f th e better-know n ra p groups , and ha d issue d he r debu t albu m jus t si x month s earlier . Afte r th e Lo s Angeles riots , sh e ha d gaine d som e prominenc e a s a spokesperso n fo r young blac k Americans , a n interprete r o f thei r "rag e an d frustration. " Bill Clinton' s candidac y wa s abou t t o tur n a corne r o n Siste r Souljah' s words. Some advisers pressed Clinto n t o use the Rainbow speec h to solidif y his base of support, t o rally the Democratic party's lef t flan k an d Jackso n himself t o Clinton' s candidacy , an d t o repai r th e earlie r damag e i n thei r relations. 2 Indeed , tha t i s ho w Clinto n starte d hi s remarks . H e praise d the coalitio n an d Jackso n fo r honorin g black s an d white s wh o ha d reached acros s racia l line s at personal ris k befor e an d durin g th e riots i n Los Angeles. He outlined hi s proposals to invest in infrastructure improve ments, a subjec t dea r t o Jackson . I t was , i n short , a routin e campaig n speech—until h e turne d t o th e remark s o f Siste r Souljah . Jackso n ha d singled he r ou t fo r pridefu l attention , bu t Bil l Clinton said : You ha d a rap singe r her e las t nigh t name d Siste r Souljah . . . . Her comment s befor e an d afte r Lo s Angeles were fille d wit h a kind o f hatred that you do not honor today and tonight. Just listen to this, what sh e said. She told The Washington Post abou t a mont h ago , an d I quote , "I f blac k peopl e kil l blac k peopl e every day , wh y no t hav e a week an d kil l white people ? . . . S o if you'r e a gan g membe r an d yo u woul d normall y b e killin g somebody, why no t kil l a white person?". . . Last year sh e said , "If there are any good white people, I haven't me t them. Wher e

THE POLITIC S O F RACE

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are they? " Righ t her e i n thi s room . That' s wher e the y are . . . . If you too k th e words blac k an d whit e an d reverse d them , yo u might thin k tha t Davi d Duk e wa s givin g that speech. 3 Clinton ha d no t onl y criticized Siste r Souljah, h e had criticize d Jesse Jackson's judgmen t i n front o f Jackson's mos t loya l supporters. Jackson, usually confiden t an d aggressive , wa s take n aback . Afte r th e speech , h e said: " I don' t kno w wha t [Clinton's ] intentio n was , I wa s totall y sur prised." Tw o hour s late r h e called a press conference t o sa y that Clinto n had use d "ver y ba d judgment. " Abou t Siste r Souljah , Jackso n opined : "She represent s th e feeling s an d hope s o f a whol e generatio n o f people . She should receiv e a n apology." 4 Clinton's politica l prospect s were significantly altere d b y these brie f words abou t a n obscur e rapper . Mos t voter s neve r hear d abou t th e con frontation a t the Rainbow Coalition , bu t the fallout wit h Jackson opene d the way fo r Clinto n t o appeal t o white working- and middle-clas s voters . Many o f thes e voter s ha d com e t o equat e Jackso n wit h th e Democrati c party's policie s tha t offende d thei r wor k ethi c an d wit h crim e policie s that seeme d t o favo r th e crimina l ove r th e victim . T o b e sure , economi c stagnation an d Georg e Bush' s miscalculation s wer e influencin g voters , but Clinto n resuscitate d hi s campaig n wit h th e Rainbo w confrontation . By early July Clinto n le d Bush i n the two-way poll s b y a few points , an d in th e wee k afte r th e mid-Jul y nationa l Democrati c convention , hi s lea d grew fro m ninetee n t o twenty-seve n points . Pero t announce d hi s (tem porary) withdrawa l fro m th e race during the Democratic conventio n cit ing the "revitalization " o f th e party. 5 It is a measure o f how fa r libera l Democrats ha d falle n i n their stan dards o f intellectual integrit y an d commo n sens e that a candidate's criti cism of someon e fo r advocatin g racia l violenc e would see m noteworthy . Typically, white liberals had taken to standing in quiet acquiescence in the presence o f statement s b y blac k Americans , howeve r outrageou s the y might be . And whe n thes e liberal s wer e criticize d b y a blac k American , their respons e wa s t o retreat , explain , apologize , o r overreact . Thi s pat tern wa s s o well establishe d b y 1992—particularl y afte r th e presidentia l candidacies o f Huber t Humphrey , Georg e McGovern , Walte r Mondale , and Michae l Dukakis—tha t Clinton' s criticis m stunne d Jackson , th e Rainbow Coalitio n audience , an d th e press. 6 The confrontatio n ove r Siste r Soulja h wa s th e resul t o f increasin g political friction betwee n Clinto n an d Jackson. When Clinto n ha d chaire d

16

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the Democrati c Leadershi p Counci l (th e grou p h e helpe d establis h t o push th e part y bac k t o th e politica l center) , h e ha d exclude d Jackso n from a speakin g rol e a t th e council' s 199 1 conferenc e i n Cleveland , an d he had fough t successfull y fo r a resolution opposin g racial "discriminatio n of an y kind—includin g quotas. " Jackso n ha d accuse d Clinto n o f prac ticing "exclusion, " appealin g t o "whit e suburbanites, " an d usin g "ugly , suggestive, an d race-based " statement s o n equa l opportunity. 7 Whe n Jackson tol d the New York Daily News i n April 199 2 that h e thought h e should b e the vice presidential nomine e and that h e might not suppor t th e Democratic ticket if he were not given serious consideration, Clinto n ha d expressed "surprise " tha t Jackson ha d no t talke d t o hi m abou t hi s inter est. H e sai d i t wa s prematur e t o eve n tal k abou t th e numbe r tw o spo t before th e nominatio n wa s wo n (Jackso n backe d off , claimin g "misun derstanding"). After th e Siste r Soulja h speech , Jackson le d th e counterattac k (pre sumably jus t a s Clinton hope d h e would). 8 Jackson sai d Clinton' s word s were part o f " a consisten t attemp t to provoke me" and tha t Clinto n "wa s invited a s a guest an d h e use d th e platfor m . . . t o embarras s us." 9 In a n interview o n Jun e 1 8 wit h th e chie f politica l corresponden t o f th e New York Times, th e sures t rout e t o nationa l coverage , Jackso n accuse d Clinton o f staging " a ver y well-planned snea k attac k withou t th e courag e to confron t bu t wit h th e calculatio n t o embarrass " him . Clinto n ha d "exposed a character flaw " wit h his criticism of Souljah "purel y to appea l to conservativ e white s b y . . . isolatin g Jackson. " Jackso n wen t o n t o praise Ros s Perot , implyin g tha t hi s defectio n t o th e Pero t cam p woul d take awa y million s o f vote s tha t Clinto n ha d take n fo r granted. 10 For speaking ou t agains t violence, Clinton was attacked b y a choru s of professional blacks , the white Left, an d white liberals. Jackson receive d immediate suppor t fro m blac k journalist s an d scholars . His chie f aca demic advisor , Ronal d Walter s o f Howar d University , weighed in : I woul d b e th e firs t t o condem n anyon e wh o sai d an d mean t that "black s should kill whites," but I believe that was beside the point o f Bil l Clinton' s attack . Th e poin t wa s tha t b y attackin g Sister Souljah , Bil l Clinton' s strategist s intende d t o accomplis h the objectiv e o f havin g hi m appea r stron g an d independen t b y standing u p t o a "specia l interest " o f th e party , puttin g black s "in their place" an d i n the process, appealing to the white mid dle class. . . . Bill Clinton's fora y int o the cultural politics of th e black community wa s as offensive a s it was crassly opportunis tic, making hi s calls for racia l harmon y rin g hollow. 11

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Walters's criticism was classic. First, he said the content o f Souljah' s remarks wa s unimportant, bu t if it were important, h e claimed h e woul d be even stronger tha n Clinto n i n his criticism. Second, what counte d wa s Clinton's intent , which , accordin g t o Walters , was t o appea l t o a grou p that woul d cas t mos t o f th e vote s i n th e Novembe r election . Third , Walters asserte d tha t Clinto n ha d n o righ t (presumabl y becaus e h e wa s white) t o commen t o n somethin g tha t Walter s considere d th e exclusiv e domain o f th e blac k community . Other prominent black s were quick t o jump in. Roger Wilkins, professor an d columnist , sai d o f Clinton' s criticism , "i t wa s a messag e t o white people that Bil l Clinton i s a big, strong man wh o ca n protect the m and i s strong enough . . . t o stand u p for the m to blac k people." 12 Derric k Jackson, a columnist fo r th e Boston Globe, wrote : For white Democrats , Clinto n hand s ou t fre e Bubbagum . Lik e all nominee s befor e him , h e wil l g o t o churc h an d expec t th e African-American vot e to go to him in November, becaus e he is the lesser of two evils.... It may seem like political suicide , bu t there is a feeling, far fro m th e unity of convention halls , that no t voting th e to p o f th e ticke t i s preferable t o bootlickin g a boo t that ha s kicke d you. 13 The Boston Globe, a good plac e t o fin d contemporar y example s o f classic liberalis m a s practice d i n th e 1970s , als o ra n a n editoria l tha t called Clinton' s criticis m o f Siste r Soulja h " a chea p shot. " "Fo r a candidate desperatel y seekin g t o com e fro m behin d i n th e polls, " opine d th e Globe, "th e Rainbo w meeting , an d Souljah' s participation , provide d a perfect opportunity—no t fo r courtin g member s o f th e party' s cor e con stituency, but for kickin g them to the curb." 14 Anna Quindle n o f the New York Times added : Bill Clinton generate d considerabl e heat , bu t n o light , when h e . . . decried [Souljah's ] anti-whit e comment s . . . sounding th e white-guy clario n call , that hatre d i s as bad whe n i t goes blac k to whit e a s when i t goes white t o black . Al l things bein g equa l this i s true. Onl y al l things ar e no t equal . . . . Mr. Clinto n go t to shou t acros s fro m th e whit e sid e o f th e racia l divid e tha t black folk s ca n b e racist. 15 Left-liberal journalist s Alexande r Cockbur n an d Andre w Kopkin d concluded fro m Clinton' s Soulja h criticism , "i f racism i s not i n Clinton' s

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heart, a s he blandly insists , it is evident i n his behavior, which i s after al l what counts. " The y wen t o n t o surmis e tha t th e "Clinto n culture " i s "suffused wit h a gestura l sentimentalit y abou t racia l harmony , bu t it s commitment i s to white power an d privilege." 16 Cockbur n an d Kopkin d hoped to weaken Clinto n sufficientl y t o induce Jesse Jackson t o initiate a fourth-party candidacy .

SILENCE MATTER S In the past, an attack o f this seriousness instigated b y Jackson agains t the Democrati c nomine e woul d hav e produce d immediat e sign s o f sur render: Michae l Dukaki s an d Walte r Mondal e ha d eac h responde d t o Jackson wit h alacrity , an d reassurance s o f "respect. " Eac h piousl y sai d Jackson woul d b e considere d a seriou s candidat e fo r th e ticke t (whe n both me n kne w tha t suc h a choic e woul d b e disastrous) . I n eac h case , after entreatie s from th e designated Jackson intermediary—Bo b Becke l in Mondale's campaign , Pau l Brounta s i n Dukakis's— a well-publicize d peace meeting was organized a t which the Democratic nominee gave way on th e nominatio n rules , a prime-tim e speec h slot , an d a symboli c plat form issu e or two. Jackson invariably wound u p looking stronger than th e candidates wh o ha d beate n hi m i n primary afte r primary . Reversing th e tren d o f libera l timidity , however , Clinto n hel d firm against Jackson's onslaught . Perhap s som e of this confidence cam e fro m the fac t tha t Clinto n ha d alread y show n himsel f t o b e ver y effectiv e a t attracting th e support o f black politicians . Even when Virginia Governo r Douglas Wilde r wa s stil l a presidentia l candidat e an d ha d som e pre sumptive hold o n politicians of color, Clinto n received substantial suppor t from blacks , particularl y fro m blac k southerner s lik e Representative s Mike Esp y (late r name d secretar y o f agriculture ) an d John Lewis . At n o time di d Clinto n ac t o n th e vie w commo n t o libera l candidate s tha t th e only roa d t o th e heart s an d vote s o f blac k Americ a wa s throug h Jess e Jackson. Not al l black politicians and commentators wer e put of f b y Clinton' s statement. Clarenc e Page , a respected Chicag o columnist , wrote : We [blac k Americans] ar e notsaposta han g our dirt y laundry i n public, w e ar e told , becaus e i t migh t weake n th e movement' s ability t o resis t attack s b y political enemies . But what actuall y happens i s almost th e opposite . We en d u p makin g th e enem y

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look better. Bill Clinton has courageously admonishe d whites in the blue-collar North an d the deep South to reach out to blacks . Now he's gambling that we African-Americans, afte r centurie s of abuse, will embrace graciously a similar appeal for harmony with whites. I know I'm notsaposta thin k he's right. But I hope he is.17 Carl Rowan , th e Washington Post columnist , exclaimed : Underdog Democra t Bil l Clinto n move d a badl y neede d ste p toward th e presidency las t Saturday b y angering Jesse Jackson. . . . Jackson acte d a s thoug h h e though t Clinto n wa s o n hi s turf, an d ha d n o righ t t o sa y anythin g abou t Siste r Soulja h o r anyone o r anythin g els e that h e thought Jackson woul d objec t to. Sycophant s ar e telling Jackson, "Clinto n insulte d you; don' t give him your blessing!" Jackson must realize that his "blessing " becomes a curse if it requires Clinto n to endorse even by silence an outrageou s advocac y o f murder. 18 Clinton di d no t bac k dow n i n th e fac e o f th e counterattac k b y Jackson an d hi s chorus . Criticize d fo r hi s "rudeness " an d hi s failur e t o warn Jackso n o f hi s remarks, Clinto n said : " [I didn't] sa y anythin g tha t I hadn't bee n saying since I first starte d running . . . . I called for a n end t o division."19 Presse d t o retrac t hi s criticisms, Clinto n responded , " I gre w up i n a segregated society , an d I have devote d m y public lif e t o tryin g t o overcome feeling s o f prejudice . Tha t i s what I have worked for." 20 Clinton di d somethin g n o Democrati c nomine e ha d don e fo r twenty five years : h e demonstrate d enoug h publi c respec t fo r a blac k leader' s ideas t o argu e wit h hi m i n public . Bil l Clinto n ende d th e silenc e i n th e presence o f alie n ideas , an d thi s simple , otherwis e unremarkabl e actio n was essentia l to hi s election . It i s difficul t no t t o personif y th e whit e libera l dilemm a i n recen t elections an d argu e that Jesse Jackson wa s th e sourc e an d symbo l o f th e politically damagin g ideas . H e no t onl y portraye d himsel f a s th e repre sentative o f the black race , he advocated leftis t domesti c and foreig n pol icy agendas . A s a result , h e require d a s th e pric e o f hi s suppor t tha t Democratic candidate s offen d th e one-half o f the national electorat e tha t is white suburban. The efforts mad e by Democratic candidates to appeas e Jackson were costly because white suburban voter s cast six or seven times the number o f votes that blac k Americans do—vote s cast overwhelming ly for th e Republica n candidates .

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Because Dukakis and Mondale had been afraid t o argue with Jackson, the only route to restore common sens e to a Democratic presidential cam paign ra n throug h Jackson's fron t yard—h e ha d t o b e confronted a s th e proponent o f unpopula r position s an d th e apologis t fo r Fide l Castro , Yassir Arafat , an d Loui s Farrakhan . Jackso n ha d survive d becaus e hi s white opponent s an d th e pres s wer e unwillin g t o trea t hi m o r hi s idea s seriously. Unfortunately, th e sourc e o f th e proble m wa s no t Jackson , bu t th e liberals themselves . As one critic put it : The problem i s not with the black leaders—they ar e merely tak ing advantage o f the timidity an d intellectua l vacuity of the liberals wh o ru n th e nationa l Democrati c Party . Th e proble m i s with the liberals who fail to respect the ideas of black American s enough to argue with them . . . an d who view 30,000,000 blac k Americans a s a racial monolith. 21 Black activists have taken advantag e o f white liberals since the symptoms o f white guilt were first identified . White liberal is a pejorative ter m that connote s a well-educated , well-intentione d perso n wh o doe s no t respect blac k American s enoug h t o treat the m a s individuals, bu t wh o i s willing to suppor t thei r leadershi p i n plans that d o not affec t th e liberal s or thei r familie s i n an y direc t way . Ironically, Clinton , who was so disciplined a s a candidate i n distanc ing himsel f fro m th e unpopula r idea s associate d wit h hi s predecessors , would demonstrat e considerabl y les s agilit y a s president . H e nominate d Lani Guinier to the Justice Department despit e her view of America's white majority a s relentlessly racist. The administration als o argued a New Jersey lawsuit o n the side of using race as the decisive criterion i n layoffs . Clinton's stan d regardin g Siste r Soulja h wa s mor e tha n artifice ; i t would no t hav e worke d ha d i t onl y bee n serve d u p a s cleve r politics . I t worked becaus e Clinton' s criticism was consistent with his public record , philosophy, an d personalit y a s governo r an d presidentia l candidate . H e was a product o f the segregate d South , but h e had alway s pressed fo r a n end t o al l form s o f racia l classificatio n an d discrimination . Moreover , the process o f integratio n applie d t o himsel f an d hi s family a s it applie d to others ; fo r example , hi s daughter , Chelsea , attende d th e Littl e Roc k public schools (althoug h not the Washington, D.C., public schools), which meant that sh e was bused a s a part o f a court-ordered integratio n plan . In

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addition, Clinto n relie d o n a biracial coalition to win the governorship i n Arkansas. His appea l t o blac k voter s went beyon d hi s ability t o cu t deal s wit h black politica l leaders ; h e wa s a Baptist , a s wer e mos t blacks , an d h e spoke easil y an d naturall y wit h them . On e o f th e earl y an d prominen t themes of his presidential campaign was a promise to "brin g us together, " to unif y American s fo r thei r share d interest s an d problems , an d no t t o divide them fo r thei r differences , racia l an d otherwise . Some may bal k a t the idea tha t Clinto n wa s someho w a very differ ent Democrati c candidat e simpl y fo r opposin g racia l violenc e an d sup porting a simple view of race and equa l opportunity . Bu t that i s precisely the point : whit e liberal s ha d faile d politicall y becaus e the y supported — actively or by their silence—ideas about race and racial issues that violate d America's civi c culture . One has to go back to 196 4 find a Democratic presidential candidat e whose view s o n racia l issue s wer e compatibl e wit h thos e o f mos t Americans. Lyndo n Baine s Johnso n devote d muc h o f hi s presidentia l power to dismantling souther n segregatio n an d amelioratin g th e problem s facing norther n blacks . In 196 4 an d 196 5 Johnson enjoye d enoug h pop ular suppor t t o lea d th e natio n t o a ne w understandin g abou t th e prob lems tha t wer e percolatin g i n norther n ghettos . Understandin g th e Democratic experienc e wit h racia l issue s require s takin g a loo k a t LBJ' s most visionar y effor t t o untangl e thos e problem s fo r th e America n public—and examinin g Johnson's retreat when his ideas were attacked b y his "friends " i n the civi l rights communit y an d i n the leftis t salons .

2» RACE AN D POLITIC S I N TH E J O H N S O N Y E A R S : FRO M MORA L MONOPOLY T O POLITICA L SIDESHO W

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resident Lyndo n Baine s Johnson mad e th e natio n whole , at leas t for a short perio d o f time . He stoo d o n th e shoulder s o f te n generation s o f black American s t o liberat e thei r descendant s i n the elevent h generatio n from enslavemen t an d segregation . At the time, Johnson wa s as powerfu l as an American presiden t coul d get. The 196 4 elections installed th e 89t h Congress, the first sinc e 193 6 to have the votes needed t o kee p the coalition o f conservativ e Republican s an d souther n Democrat s fro m block ing progressiv e legislation . Johnso n move d wit h energy , relentlessness , and passio n t o legislate his vision for a Great Society : Medicare fo r olde r Americans, Medicaid fo r poo r Americans , federal ai d for publi c schools , federal assistanc e for mas s transit, a war t o end poverty, and program s t o beautify an d preserv e the environment. Mos t o f these programs ha d bee n long oppose d b y majo r interest s suc h a s th e medica l professio n an d th e highway lobby ; accordin g t o th e conventiona l wisdo m o f th e tim e the y had n o chanc e o f passage. Yet he shepherde d the m throug h Congress . More tha n anythin g else , however , Johnso n wante d t o d o righ t b y America's blacks . H e funnele d th e nation' s emotiona l respons e t o President John F . Kennedy's deat h int o passage o f the Civi l Rights Act of 1964, which outlawe d discriminatio n i n government programs , employ ment, an d publi c accommodations . Johnso n reache d acros s th e aisl e t o 23

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recruit conservativ e Republican s t o joi n wit h libera l Republican s an d Democrats i n fashioning a bipartisan consensu s to undo th e tragedy o f a segregated Sout h an d a n indifferen t North . Th e enactmen t o f th e civi l rights laws in 196 4 and 196 5 did what th e Old Confederac y coul d no t d o for itself . B y eliminatin g stat e law s tha t classifie d person s b y race , i t moved th e Sout h int o th e mainstrea m o f economi c an d socia l lif e i n th e United States . Buildin g o n th e mora l forc e unleashe d b y th e civi l right s movement, Johnson helpe d erase (o r at least, lighten the darkest smea r o n America's history, the failure t o treat blac k Americans a s human beings) . As the 1960 s began, the South stil l practiced apartheid : public facil ities were strictly segregated ; blac k southerner s were routinely intimidat ed an d humiliated , brutalize d an d exploited . Fo r blacks , practicing one' s citizenship b y registering to vote could mea n th e loss of a job, a warnin g shot throug h a window, o r worse . Particularly i n the Dee p South , polit ical candidate s compete d t o b e th e mos t extrem e advocate s o f th e con tinued subordinatio n o f blac k resident s (Georg e Wallace promised, afte r losing th e 195 8 Alabam a gubernatoria l primar y t o a harder-lin e segre gationist, "boy s . . . I ain't eve r going to b e out-niggahed again" 1 ). Afte r the Suprem e Court' s decisio n in Brown v . Board of Education outlawin g segregation, candidates were judged o n the creativity an d efficac y o f thei r schemes to circumven t order s t o abolis h dua l schoo l systems . The Sout h maintained it s ways through massive resistance to federal intervention , fre quent us e of the filibuster i n the U. S. Senate, and a devil's compact wit h the Democrati c part y tha t exchange d electora l vote s fo r a promis e o f nonintervention i n its subordination o f blac k southerners .

THE MORA L HIG H GROUN D Ultimately, blac k southerner s di d wha t liberal s an d federa l judges ' decisions coul d no t do—the y focuse d an d mobilize d th e nation' s mora l outrage agains t th e immoralit y o f segregation . The y di d s o with a disci pline, persistence , courage , an d effectivenes s unmatche d b y an y mas s movement i n American history . The appea l wa s direc t an d simple—giv e black southerner s onl y what al l Americans believ e is theirs a s an inalien able right—the right to equal treatment unde r law . The suffering o f blac k southerners a t th e hand s o f souther n official s wa s th e instrumen t mobi lizing public opinion . The coalition that pushe d the civil rights laws through Congres s wa s bipartisan an d biracia l an d stretche d acros s th e politica l spectru m fro m

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conservative Republica n t o Democrati c Socialist . I t encompasse d Protestant, Catholi c an d Jewish clergy ; corporate leader s an d organize d labor. Its moral forc e cam e from th e philosophy o f nonviolence advance d by Dr. Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., an d practice d b y thousands o f souther n blacks and white allies. "We will soon wear you dow n b y our capacity t o suffer," Dr . Kin g tol d whit e Americans. 2 Th e politica l forc e followed . King's messag e o f wha t blac k American s sough t fi t squarel y withi n th e American politica l theology : what black s wanted wa s a n opportunit y t o be educated, to b e considered fo r goo d jobs, and to secure the blessings of personal libert y an d th e benefit s o f prosperity . Segregationist politician s an d sheriff s responde d wit h a level of offi cial violenc e tha t onl y th e mos t rabi d racis t coul d support . Fir e hoses , water cannon , tea r gas , polic e dogs , an d cattl e prod s wer e use d o n hymn-singing column s o f black s an d whites , young an d old—event s fre quently captured fo r television audiences across the country. Black church es were bombed, civil rights workers and marchers were murdered. Mob s of screaming , cursin g whites menace d earnes t blac k student s wh o dare d to integrat e publi c universities . Dramatized i n this way, th e caus e o f blac k southerner s becam e th e cause of students on northern campuses , preachers and rabbis , the editor s of magazines an d great newspapers, and individual s moved b y the simpl e goal of equality befor e th e law. The result was that the civil rights move ment ha d a monopoly o n morality i n the early 1960s , and it s adversarie s were see n not onl y a s crude, violent, an d ignorant , bu t wrong .

GHETTO DREAM S AND BITTERSWEE T REALIT Y Black Americans i n 196 5 expecte d tha t thei r recen t victorie s woul d set the stag e fo r thei r ful l integratio n int o American society . That mean t integration int o the booming economy, integration tha t would giv e black men and women goo d jobs that would suppor t a family an d giv e hope t o their children . Integratio n als o mean t acces s t o qualit y educatio n tha t would prepar e blac k childre n t o compete successfull y fo r place s i n goo d colleges an d fo r goo d job s afte r college . Integration mean t bein g treate d justly b y police , merchants , an d realtors . I t mean t th e chanc e t o liv e i n safe, clea n neighborhoods . The civi l rights law s o f 196 4 an d 196 5 clearl y helpe d blac k south erners. But by then, 45 percent o f the blac k American s no longer live d i n the Ol d Confederacy . The y ha d move d Nort h i n pursui t o f jobs , libera l

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governments, programs suc h a s public housing and unemploymen t com pensation, an d th e freedo m t o vot e an d participat e i n the system . The North , however , wa s hardl y th e promise d land . Blac k new comers were concentrated i n the poorest, mos t crowde d neighborhoods . Many o f those who coul d affor d t o move were blocked b y antiblack rea l estate covenant s an d discriminator y practices . (A t th e time , n o on e thought th e enforce d mixin g o f poo r an d middle-clas s black s wa s a n advantage—it wa s on e mor e negativ e consequenc e o f racia l discrimina tion. Onl y afte r th e blac k teachers , police , socia l workers , doctors , lawyers, and busines s people moved ou t to leave concentrations o f poor , struggling familie s wa s i t clear tha t a new, more intractable , class-base d problem ha d t o b e faced. ) The norther n ghetto s coul d no t b e blame d o n Ji m Cro w law s an d segregationist evil . Yet there was plenty o f prejudice, an d th e discrimina tion practiced b y some personnel office s an d craft union s was as hardened and damagin g a s anything foun d i n the South . In 196 0 the averag e earn ings o f blac k colleg e graduate s wer e les s tha n thos e o f white s wh o ha d only on e t o thre e year s o f hig h school . White s mad e i t painfull y clea r that the y wanted n o blac k neighbors , an d rea l estat e agent s wen t along . Black neighborhood s wer e redline d b y mortgag e lenders. 3 Th e federa l government collaborate d wit h the residential segregationists : the Federa l Housing Administration an d Veterans Administration essentiall y classifie d mortgages t o blac k familie s a s "bad " mortgages . White northerners had developed a strong notion o f the right "place " for blacks . Blacks could si t in the front o f the bus—the y coul d eve n driv e it, bu t whit e bu s driver s woul d no t wor k fo r a blac k owner ; norther n whites woul d wor k alongsid e blacks—bu t no t fo r them . Th e occupa tional pigeonhole s wer e strongl y walled : blac k worker s coul d carr y ho d but not run wire; they could stoc k shelves , but not wait o n customers; bus dishes, but not take orders. Even public jobs were stratified. Blac k college graduates might work a s postal clerks, social workers, or school teachers, but fe w blac k hig h schoo l graduates coul d hop e to get a firefighter's job . Hurtful stereotype s abounded . Eve n a s liberal s haile d th e civi l right s movement's successe s in the South and i n Congress, their white neighbor s worried abou t black s movin g to o fas t an d upsettin g custom s an d tradi tions tha t serve d t o kee p "them " i n their place . After th e apartheid o f Alabama o r Mississippi, the North wa s a very confusing plac e for blacks . The prevailing public attitude in the North wa s that racia l discriminatio n wa s immora l an d irrational . Mos t state s an d cities had stron g antidiscrimination laws . Business leaders were frequentl y

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represented i n group s suc h a s th e Urba n Leagu e an d showe d u p o n th e boards o f interfaith , interracia l assemblies . Editorial s i n norther n news papers calle d fo r understandin g an d cooperatio n amon g th e races . Th e clergy i n man y norther n churche s an d synagogue s ha d participate d i n southern civi l rights marches an d no w sough t way s to brin g "th e cause " into their ow n congregation s an d communities . But evidence of the North's racial hypocrisy quickly surfaced. Alabam a Governor Georg e Wallace , a n avowe d whit e supremacist , receive d 3 4 percent o f th e vot e i n th e 196 4 Wisconsi n presidentia l primar y agains t Governor Joh n Reynolds , Lyndo n Johnson' s stand-in . I n a stat e wit h a black population o f only 3 percent, Wallace's message against black crim e and disorde r an d federa l "meddling " foun d a receptiv e audience . I n Maryland, Wallace took 43 percent of the Democratic primary vote, winning b y landslide proportion s i n Catholi c areas . When presse d abou t th e implication s o f suc h votes , Presiden t Johnson maintaine d a n Olympia n detachment , decidin g not t o enter an y presidential primaries, but to "d o the very best job I could a s President fo r all th e peopl e u p unti l conventio n time , an d the n le t th e delegates . . . make thei r choic e freely." 4 Johnson face d a devilish, perhaps irreconcilable , political problem i n 1965. Th e boundarie s o f blac k neighborhood s wer e stretchin g an d breaking unde r th e weigh t o f growin g populations . Th e neighborhood s encroached upo n b y this growth were populated mos t frequently b y white ethnic Catholics , wh o oppose d th e blac k "invasion. " On e o f th e fe w things the new neighbors share d was a loyalty to the Democratic party. In 1964 abou t 9 6 percen t o f blac k vote s an d 79 percen t o f ethni c Catholi c votes went t o Johnson. Th e tw o larges t an d mos t loya l Democratic con stituencies wer e competin g fo r livin g spac e an d publi c benefit s i n th e great an d gra y citie s o f th e Nort h an d Midwest . Th e tension s betwee n these group s create d a seriou s politica l proble m fo r th e newl y electe d president an d fo r th e bi g cit y Democrati c mayor s wh o wer e amon g hi s most effectiv e supporters . For th e firs t tim e la w an d orde r wa s becomin g a nationa l politica l issue. William Brin k an d Loui s Harris foun d i n a 196 6 surve y tha t whil e 44 percent of the nation was "personall y uneas y about the threat o f racia l violence," the numbers for Italian-American s an d Polish-Americans, wh o were mor e likel y t o liv e in centra l cities , were 69 an d 6 7 percen t respec tively.5 Democrats wavered on crime, first denyin g that it was getting worse (blaming th e increase s instea d o n improvement s i n statistica l methods) , then settlin g o n eliminatin g it s "underlyin g causes. " The y advocate d

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"soft" solution s that were vague and untested. Republicans were "tough, " calling for a national "war " the y could not lead. The reason crime was up, conservatives asserte d withou t a whi t o f evidence , wa s becaus e th e Supreme Cour t wa s protecting criminals . Crime wa s no t th e onl y pressure . Blac k me n wante d job s i n craf t unions tha t provide d middle-clas s wage s t o th e sons , nephews , an d cousins of Irish, Italian, and Polish families. They wanted a fair sho t at the best publi c secto r blue-colla r jobs , bu t firefightin g an d polic e slot s wer e viewed a s triba l inheritance s b y Irish, Italian , an d othe r ethni c families . Black familie s wante d bette r housin g i n saf e neighborhoods ; th e closes t and most affordable o f these neighborhoods wer e home to white ethnics. Black parents wanted their kids to go to better public schools; they had been told by judges and experts that black schools could not be good schools . President Johnson kne w that th e federal governmen t woul d hav e t o help defus e th e growin g tensio n i n norther n cities . Becaus e o f th e 196 4 election, the problems of black Americans were now the inheritance o f the Democratic party. "Blac k equals Democrat" wa s the equation i n the public mind. Ghett o residents needed more concrete opportunities to b e educated, t o ge t goo d jobs , an d t o b e protecte d fro m crime . Th e natio n needed t o sho w som e patienc e an d understandin g fo r th e heav y disad vantages born e b y blac k Americans . Johnso n neede d t o mov e quickl y before th e ghettos ble w up. It was so fragile—a bunc h o f sixteen-year-ol d kids i n an y on e o f a hundre d citie s coul d und o th e balance . Th e Democratic coalitio n wa s a t stake .

JOHNSON'S UNCONDITIONA L WA R Forty-seven day s afte r becomin g president , Lyndo n Johnso n stoo d before Congres s t o delive r th e Stat e o f th e Unio n address . I n stentoria n tones he said, "Thi s administration today , here and now , declares uncon ditional war o n poverty in America." Man y Americans, he declared, "liv e on th e outskirt s o f hope—som e becaus e o f thei r poverty , an d som e because of their color, and al l too many because of both." He did not wai t for a strategy, or an analysi s o f the enemy, or a n estimate o f the costs, or evidence of whether th e war coul d eve n be won. He pledged that the wa r would b e fought withou t increasin g taxes o r th e federa l budget . Johnson's Wa r o n Povert y wa s no t buil t o n systemati c thinking , careful analysis , o r eve n a n energeti c pursui t o f truth , bu t o n hunches , guesses, and, i n the end , arrogance . White liberal s approache d norther n

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ghettos lik e American tourist s overrunnin g a small , foreig n village : the y knew littl e abou t it s history o r cultur e bu t wer e certai n tha t it s resident s welcomed thei r presenc e an d woul d benefi t fro m thei r attention . An d then the y were of f t o se e the next cathedral . In the 196 0 presidential campaign, the drive for civi l rights for blac k southerners was an issue. In fact, i n the closest election in the nation's history, it may have been decisive. Candidate Kenned y responded t o Marti n Luther King' s Octobe r imprisonmen t fo r civi l disobedienc e wit h a sym pathetic cal l t o Mrs . King ; Nixon wa s silent . King' s fathe r switche d hi s support t o Kennedy , th e wor d travele d th e grapevin e o f blac k America , and Kennedy received the northern blac k vote by margins wide enough t o carry Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey. The party o f Lincoln was shed ding its ties to blac k voters . But nowher e wer e th e growin g blac k ghetto s themselve s a n issue . Nicholas Leman n traces the embryonic an d superficia l effort s tha t under lay th e Kenned y an d Johnso n administrations ' program s t o transfor m northern ghetto s i n The Promised Land, hi s importan t boo k abou t th e northward migratio n o f blac k sharecroppers . H e conclude d tha t amon g "public polic y experts , the ide a tha t a n importan t nationa l proble m wa s brewing in the black slum s of the Northern an d Western citie s was not a t all a part o f th e conventiona l wisdom." 6 Only a few scholars and visionary foundatio n executive s were study ing or acting on the problems o f blacks in northern cities . In fact, i t is difficult t o fin d a singl e wor k o n th e subjec t befor e Kennet h Clark' s Dark Ghetto, publishe d i n 1965 . Pau l Ylvisake r ha d convince d th e For d Foundation t o star t the "Gra y Areas " project i n 195 9 to encourage may ors, charitable organizations , unions, and public schools to pay attentio n to ghett o problem s i n a fe w cities . The foundation-supporte d project s i n New Haven, Oakland, Washington, an d Pittsburgh were to be particularly valuable in planning the community action program in the War on Poverty. Elsewhere, fe w influentia l purveyor s o f idea s an d issue s pai d an y attention t o the intersection o f discrimination , crime , and povert y foun d in blac k neighborhoods . I n th e earl y 1960s , a loya l reade r o f Atlantic, Harper's, th e Saturday Review, th e Reporter, o r th e New York Times Magazine—never min d Time o r Newsweek—would hav e remained large ly ignorant o f the race-poverty problem . On e exception was Theodore H . White, who offere d a prescient analysi s i n his 196 1 best-sellin g boo k o n the 196 0 presidentia l campaign . Whit e analyze d th e result s o f th e 196 0 census, reporting o n the suburbanizatio n o f th e nation an d th e displace ment o f white cit y residents wit h blac k southerners , an d h e noted :

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For wha t ha s happene d ove r th e pas t twent y years , a s Negr o progress ha s com e s o swiftly , i s that th e ga p betwee n it s ow n advanced leadershi p an d th e troop s o f it s rea r echelo n ha s widened almos t a s fast a s progress. If Negro education , Negr o culture, Negro responsibilities hav e soared, so , sickeningly, ha s the heritag e o f a past no w samplin g lif e with a n abando n onc e choked b y Southern whit e cruelties . Perhaps the most dramatic and alarming of the figures atten dant o n th e releas e o f th e Negr o fro m hi s previou s Souther n punishments ha s bee n th e rise in the proportio n o f illegitimat e Negro birth s a s the Negro ha s moved N o r t h . . . . But attendan t on those figures [o f illegitimacy an d broke n families ] ar e all the figures an d delinquenc y an d stree t violence ; an d th e politica l implications thereof. 7 One segmen t o f th e Kenned y administratio n tha t pai d attentio n t o the black ghettos was the President's Committe e o n Juvenile Delinquency , a tin y grou p locate d i n th e Justic e Departmen t an d ru n b y Attorne y General Rober t Kennedy' s pre p schoo l friend , Davi d Hackett . Th e com mittee, set up a t th e suggestio n o f Kennedy' s sister , Eunice Shriver , gav e grants to experiments suc h as Mobilization fo r Yout h i n New York, mos t of which ha d bee n starte d b y Ylvisaker's For d Foundatio n dollars . The Kennedy presidency i s celebrated fo r th e energy and glamou r i t brought t o the practice o f politics and government . I t was as if the natio n had trade d i n it s gra y Buic k Dynaflo w fo r a brigh t re d Mustang . Th e "best an d th e brightest " too k ove r Washington , introducin g ne w oper ating assumptions , on e of which appeare d t o be : There is no consequential public problem that smart, energetic, white men cannot solve. National war s o f liberation ? No problem, we'll invent the Green Berets and air mobile tactics. Sovie t superiorit y i n aerospace ? We'll focus American industry and government on beating the Russians to the moon. Dangerous combination s o f frustratio n an d povert y i n ghett o neighbor hoods? We'll mount the War on Poverty. On th e secon d da y o f hi s presidency , Lyndo n Johnso n directe d Walter Heller , th e chai r o f th e Counci l o f Economi c Advisors , t o ge t t o work organizin g a Wa r o n Poverty . Helle r sketche d ou t a pla n befor e Christmas, and spen t the holidays working ou t the details at the Johnson ranch. What is amazing, in hindsight, is the great weight put on the results of suc h a hurried effor t fo r a n initiativ e centra l t o a new presidency . Johnson put a Kennedy brother-in-law and the founding directo r of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver, in charge of his war. Shriver inherited an inter-

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agency task force that was split between those who advocated services , such as jo b trainin g an d earl y childhoo d educatio n tha t woul d b e managed b y existing federal agencies and their state or local counterparts, and those who emphasized process , specificall y "communit y action. " Communit y actio n was based on the premise that existing service agencies had failed to serve the special needs of poor black s in cities and tha t th e only way to motivate th e "system" was to empowe r thos e left ou t to bring pressure to bear o n traditional agencies . Community actio n program s woul d no t repor t t o city hall, and would include representatives of the poor themselves. This requiremen t was pushed, in part, to ensure that southern blacks—the poorest group in the poorest region—woul d no t b e cut ou t b y white-run loca l governments . Shriver avoide d a decisio n b y endorsin g bot h approaches . H e pro posed creatio n o f a ne w federa l agenc y t o ru n th e war—th e Offic e o f Economic Opportunity (OEO) . It would also operate some programs directly, such as the Job Corps, and it would fund an d monitor community actio n programs (CAPs ) a t the local level. The Labor Departmen t woul d operat e the Neighborhoo d Yout h Corps ; th e Departmen t o f Health , Education , and Welfare (HEW ) would b e responsible for programs battlin g adult illiteracy. From the outset, the war was hampered b y the untidiness of fundin g and organizational relationship s an d b y the vagueness of the charge to th e CAPs. Charles Morris, an early poverty warrior, capture d th e spirit of th e early days of the War o n Poverty : To th e technocrats , overcomin g povert y wa s jus t anothe r sys tems proble m lik e managing th e econom y o r winnin g th e rac e to the m o o n . . .. Complicate d flowchart s showe d ho w the poo r would b e processe d smoothl y throug h variou s stage s o f life-skills education , literac y training, an d jo b preparation int o permanent employment. . . . Communit y organizatio n wa s discussed a s a subtl e for m o f input-outpu t analysis , a somewha t complicated questio n o f Skinneria n stimulu s an d response — adroit dollop s o f socia l pressur e her e woul d produc e jus t th e desired outcome s ove r there . McNamara-styl e progra m bud geting woul d brin g entir e array s o f socia l service s t o bea r o n each poo r family—healt h care , treatmen t fo r dru g addictio n and alcoholism , marriag e counseling , menta l healt h services , whatever—to suppor t th e communa l marc h forwar d t o socia l respectability an d economi c independence. 8 The War o n Poverty was put together b y smart, confident, elit e white men. Fe w o f the m ha d an y experienc e workin g i n poor neighborhood s

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or wit h poo r blacks . The y worke d fo r a n impatien t presiden t wh o wa s uninterested i n the practical an d conceptual problems the task force faced . He wanted actio n an d bi g numbers. Johnson ha d run th e National Yout h Administration i n Texas durin g the Depression—it ha d helpe d people ; it worked. Wit h thirt y year s o f experienc e an d ne w approaches , wh y shouldn't hi s war d o just a s well? Nicholas Leman n pu t i t this way : The ide a tha t th e federa l governmen t migh t hav e troubl e solv ing a larg e proble m wa s completel y foreig n t o Shrive r an d hi s associates, whos e formativ e experience s wer e watchin g Roosevelt defea t th e Depressio n an d the n th e Nazis . Becaus e all th e ke y participant s . . . were whit e an d fro m th e North , they didn't have that ingraine d awarenes s of the tragic potentia l of th e nationa l enterpris e tha t virtuall y al l African-Americans , and man y whit e Southerners , possessed ; t o them , Americ a almost b y definition couldn' t fai l a t anything. 9 Concurrently with the planning for the War o n Poverty, other group s of self-confiden t whit e me n wer e huddle d i n th e Whit e Hous e an d Pentagon makin g plan s t o contro l event s an d chang e behavio r i n a far away lan d abou t whic h the y wer e a s ignoran t a s were th e povert y war riors. N o matte r t o them . Th e Vietna m an d Povert y war s proceede d i n parallel excep t that , a s a consequenc e o f th e former , th e latte r receive d steadily diminishin g attentio n fro m Presiden t Johnson, politica l suppor t from Capito l Hill , and fisca l resources . Both wars ended i n failure an d i n a los s o f publi c confidenc e i n th e Democrati c part y an d th e polic y entrepreneurs wh o launche d them . The logic of the poverty planners was straightforward: fo r ever y characteristic o f poverty tha t was thought t o b e important, a n off-settin g fed eral progra m woul d b e create d wit h a nam e tha t suggeste d correctiv e action. Poor families di d not give their kids the same preparation for schoo l that middle-class families gav e theirs; ergo, Head Start . Many poor adult s had onl y a few years of inferior educatio n an d were, thus, unequipped t o compete for a good job; the answer: a program i n adult literacy. Poor kid s had highe r jobless rates than suburba n kids ; the result: the Neighborhoo d Youth Corps. And if poor people felt unconnected an d lacking in influenc e to change their neighborhood s an d lives , then the War o n Povert y woul d provide a community actio n program t o give them authorit y an d pride . One o f m y jobs i n the Trento n CA P was t o pu t togethe r a "coordi nated, comprehensiv e attack " o n povert y i n a n are a slate d t o b e cleare d

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for urba n renewal . Th e fundin g proposa l t o OE O reporte d agreement s with thirty-three public an d nonprofi t agencie s for everythin g fro m visit ing homemake r an d nursin g services , lega l representation , an d separat e counseling fo r families , alcoholics , an d disturbe d youth , t o Gir l Scou t troops an d summe r fiel d trips . By the tim e OE O approva l wa s received , a directo r recruited , an d contract s signed , mos t o f th e carefull y identi fied 23 0 familie s ha d move d away . One observe r i n 196 9 offere d a scathin g critiqu e o f th e centerpiec e of th e War o n Poverty , communit y actio n programs : This is the essential fact: The government did not know what it was doing. I t had a theory. Or , rather, a set of theories. Nothing more. Th e U.S . Government a t thi s tim e wa s n o mor e i n pos session o f confiden t knowledg e a s t o ho w t o preven t delin quency, cur e anomie , o r overcom e tha t midmornin g sens e of powerlessness , tha n wa s i t th e possesso r o f a dependabl e formula fo r motivatin g Vietnames e villager s t o figh t Com munism. . . . The divergenc e o f th e variou s theorie s wa s suc h that what would serv e to cure in the one case would exacerbat e in th e other . A big be t wa s bein g made . N o responsibl e per sons had an y busines s actin g a s if it were a sure thing. 10 The word s ar e particularl y damnin g becaus e the y ar e no t thos e o f a n outside observer, bu t rather ar e from someon e who had supplie d Presiden t Johnson wit h man y idea s regardin g rac e an d poverty : Danie l Patric k Moynihan.

MOYNIHAN'S SEARC H FO R ORDE R AN D HIS DESPAIRIN G PROPHEC Y No clea r focu s guide d th e Wa r o n Poverty , n o gran d strateg y o r concept unifie d th e scattere d programs . The crucia l questions—Wha t i s the mai n problem ? Ho w d o w e attac k it ? Wh y d o w e thin k i t wil l work?—went unaske d an d unanswered . Th e leadershi p wa s to o busy — reviewing proposals , fendin g of f unfriendl y congressiona l inquiries , awarding funds , an d tryin g t o secur e IB M Selectric s fo r thei r secre taries—to answe r thes e first , simple , bi g questions . Thi s wa s th e set ting fo r Moynihan' s introduction—i n a bi t part—ont o th e nationa l stage.

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In 196 5 Moynihan ha d become , at the age of thirty-eight , th e assistant secretar y o f labo r fo r polic y plannin g an d research . Moyniha n ha d grown u p fo r a tim e i n Manhattan' s predominantl y Iris h slum , Hell' s Kitchen. After workin g briefl y a s a longshoreman, h e enrolled a t the Cit y College of New York, finishe d hi s bachelor's degre e at Tufts, an d earne d a doctorate a t Tufts's Fletche r School of Law and Diplomacy i n 1961 . He went on to teach at Syracuse University, study in London, and serve on the staff o f New Yor k Governo r Averel l Harriman . Moynihan woul d prov e himsel f t o b e a street-smar t schola r wit h a reporter's instinc t fo r a stor y an d a speechwriter' s flai r fo r th e memo rable phrase . H e wa s neithe r sh y abou t expressin g himsel f directl y an d clearly no r abou t departin g fro m th e prevailin g wisdo m wit h big , bol d ideas. O n to p o f al l this, he would demonstrat e enoug h politica l dexter ity to b e elected U. S. Senator fro m Ne w Yor k an d t o b e twice reelected .

THE MOYNIHAN REPOR T In March 1965 , Moynihan circulate d a 48-page report entitle d "Th e Negro Family : The Cas e for Nationa l Action." 11 Th e report argue d tha t the federa l governmen t ha d goo d reaso n t o organiz e it s scattere d anti poverty effort s aroun d th e objectiv e o f strengthenin g th e blac k family . Known a s th e "Moyniha n Report, " thi s little-read , oft-cite d documen t would generat e bitte r attack s o n it s author . The report , produce d som e nin e month s afte r th e Economi c Opportunity Ac t settin g u p th e OE O wa s signed , wa s Moynihan' s attempt t o brin g th e normall y dra b statistic s o f governmen t table s an d reports aliv e with socia l commentary an d policy implications. Moyniha n avoided specifi c progra m o r polic y recommendations , savin g thos e fo r shorter, follow - u p memorand a directe d a t th e presiden t an d th e smal l audience o f me n i n th e Whit e Hous e an d aroun d officia l Washingto n who coul d influenc e th e presiden t t o shif t dollar s an d program s t o th e Labor Department . Moynihan bega n hi s repor t wit h a n uncontroversia l assertion : th e family i s the basic unit in American societ y for transmittin g value s abou t work, education, and savings ; and familie s tha t hav e both parents presen t are muc h bette r off . H e offere d muc h evidenc e concernin g illegitimacy , divorce, and desertio n tha t indicate d tha t the black famil y wa s not doin g as well a s the white family . Th e report argue d that :

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A

Th

A

Blac k men had bee n robbed o f their manhood, wit h increasingly disastrous consequence s no t onl y fo r the m bu t als o fo r blac k wome n and children . Whe n th e econom y dipped , blac k me n wer e muc h more likel y t o b e lai d off ; wit h n o job , thei r self-respec t wa s de creased an d the y deserte d thei r families . Unemploymen t an d deser tion explaine d mos t o f th e ris e an d fal l i n welfar e caseload s until—ominously—1963, whe n case s continue d upwar d eve n a s black mal e unemploymen t declined .

A

To

e blac k famil y ha d bee n expose d t o uniquel y destructiv e force s from slaver y throug h Ji m Cro w an d wa s particularl y susceptibl e t o instability i n times o f hig h unemployment .

o man y blac k childre n gre w u p i n poo r home s withou t fathers . Social values, especially those concerning education an d family , wer e not effectivel y transmitte d i n suc h a n environment . To o man y girl s repeated th e experienc e o f thei r mother s b y havin g childre n whe n they wer e very young an d befor e the y were married .

The report suggeste d tha t legalize d discriminatio n wa s not the mai n problem facin g mos t blac k familie s i n city ghettos. It declared that , if on e were abl e t o eliminat e i n on e strok e al l th e discriminatio n practice d against blacks , they woul d stil l b e at a competitive disadvantag e agains t the rest o f America n society . The repor t mad e clear , however , tha t deal ing wit h th e crumblin g blac k famil y an d it s disma l prospect s wa s th e responsibility o f th e large r society : In this new period [followin g enactmen t o f the 196 4 civil rights law] the expectations o f Negro American s wil l go beyond civi l rights. Bein g Americans , the y wil l no t expec t tha t i n th e nea r future equa l opportunitie s fo r the m a s a grou p wil l produc e roughly equa l results , a s compare d wit h othe r groups . Thi s i s not going to happen. Nor will it happen fo r generations to come unless a new an d specia l effor t i s made. There are two reasons. First, the racist virus in the America n blood strea m stil l afflict s us ; Negroe s wil l encounte r seriou s personal prejudice fo r a t least another generation . Second , thre e centuries o f sometime s unimaginabl e mistreatmen t hav e take n their toll on the Negro people. The harsh fac t i s that a s a group,

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at th e presen t time , i n term s o f abilit y t o wi n ou t i n th e com petitions o f America n life , the y ar e no t equa l t o mos t o f thos e groups wit h whic h the y will b e competing . Individually, Negr o American s reac h th e highes t peak s o f achievement. Bu t collectively, in the spectrum o f American eth nic an d religiou s an d regiona l groups , wher e som e ge t plent y and som e ge t none , wher e som e sen d eight y percen t o f thei r children t o colleg e an d other s pul l the m ou t o f schoo l a t th e 8th grade , Negroes ar e amon g th e weakest. 12 Moynihan wante d t o soun d th e alar m an d t o offe r a coheren t an d practical rational e fo r governmen t policy . H e argue d tha t th e proble m was critical enoug h tha t th e government shoul d adop t racia l preference s to guarante e tha t black s go t thei r fai r shar e o f jobs , education , an d income. In fact, th e Moyniha n Repor t i s one o f the few "official " exam ples o f a n ope n argumen t i n favo r o f raciall y preferentia l treatment . Moynihan's polic y recommendation wa s offere d i n two sentences : The policy o f the United State s is to brin g the Negro America n to ful l an d equa l sharin g i n the responsibilitie s an d reward s o f citizenship. To this end, the programs of the Federal governmen t bearing o n thi s objectiv e shal l b e designe d t o hav e th e effect , directly or indirectly, of enhancing the stability an d resources of the Negro America n family." 13 One would be hard-pressed to imagine a policy that could be more openly racial tha n th e on e advance d b y Moynihan. Moyniha n wa s alarme d b y numbers an d trend s tha t demonstrate d shar p difference s i n th e fortune s o f black families compared with whites. He sought to convert a national program that ha d bee n conceived t o deal with million s o f poor white s living in rura l America, as well as the poor minorities in cities, to a program for poor blacks. To th e reade r a generation later , Moynihan' s descriptio n an d anal ysis woul d appea r reasonabl e an d supportable , i f debatable . But , i n th e report, Moyniha n provide d th e intellectua l foundatio n fo r thre e radica l departures tha t woul d wrea k havo c with libera l politics : A

H

e "racialized " poverty , concentratin g attentio n o n blac k poverty .

A

H

e justifie d a raciall y consciou s povert y progra m o n th e basi s o f slavery an d segregation , eve n thoug h th e famil y deterioratio n h e

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37

documented ha d no t accelerate d unti l th e 1950s , whe n th e blac k American cultur e becam e increasingl y a n urban , ghett o culture . *H

e playe d o n th e guil t o f contemporar y whit e Americ a fo r th e sin s of th e past .

Moynihan's observations—sympatheticall y pose d an d depressingl y accurate i n the rereading—set of f fierc e attacks . These attacks cam e fro m a choru s o f th e Left , blac k activist s an d scholars , an d a fe w whit e liber als; mainstream conservative s wer e quiet, despit e the radical conclusion s Moynihan reached . None o f this would hav e happened i f Moynihan's repor t ha d disap peared int o a Whit e Hous e fil e cabinet . Bu t b y Ma y 1965 , barel y tw o months afte r h e had complete d th e report, Moyniha n wa s working wit h Johnson's speechwriter , Richar d Goodwin , o n a majo r presidentia l address that would take public the findings an d implications o f the report . Moynihan emphasize d tw o troublin g trend s tha t wer e emergin g i n th e statistics about blac k families. The first wa s the accelerating increase in the proportion o f birth s t o unwe d mothers , growin g fro m 16. 8 percen t i n 1940 t o 23. 6 percen t b y 1963 . Thi s trend , plu s highe r separatio n an d divorce rates, was producing wha t Moyniha n characterize d a s a startlin g increase in the welfare dependency . Secondly , for th e first tim e ever, welfare roll s ha d grow n whil e th e unemploymen t rat e fo r blac k me n wa s falling. Moyniha n wa s eage r t o highligh t th e crisi s cause d b y th e crum bling blac k famil y structur e throug h a speech b y the president .

THE ADDRES S AT HOWARD UNIVERSIT Y In hi s addres s a t Howar d Universit y o n Jun e 4 , 1965 , Lyndo n Johnson wen t furthe r t o identif y wit h blac k American s tha n an y whit e American politicia n befor e o r since . He reache d u p to dra w a high-wate r line that i s still visible today, a line marking th e ape x o f blac k America' s moral purchase on those who govern the nation. Johnson understoo d tha t there were profound difference s betwee n the situation an d expectations of black Americans living in the South an d thos e packed int o northern ghet tos. And he knew that the American public would no t accept the argumen t that th e two situation s were bor n o f the sam e sins of the white majority . The president lai d ou t plans fo r "th e nex t an d mos t profoun d stag e in th e battl e fo r civi l rights." 14 Th e speec h signifie d tha t th e presiden t

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was shifting hi s considerable energie s from th e problem o f segregation i n the Sout h t o th e problem s i n northern ghetto s an d tha t h e was prepare d to shar e ownershi p o f hi s ne w povert y wa r wit h th e civi l right s move ment. Johnson's argumen t followe d th e analysi s an d polic y implication s of th e Moyniha n Report , declarin g tha t th e root s o f blac k povert y wer e different fro m th e povert y face d b y wave s o f Europea n immigrants . Although th e Negro, like the immigrant, "will have to rely mostly on his own efforts . . . h e jus t canno t d o i t alone, " th e presiden t said . Fo r th e Negr o American "equa l opportunit y i s essential, but not enough." In his Howar d University speech , Johnson advance d fou r startling , eve n radical, ideas . First, the American idea l of equal opportunit y wa s insufficient whe n contending wit h th e problem s facin g blac k Americans : You d o no t wip e awa y th e scar s o f centurie s b y saying : No w you ar e fre e t o g o wher e yo u wan t an d d o a s yo u desir e an d choose th e leaders yo u please . You d o not tak e a person wh o . . . ha s been hobbled b y chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting lin e o f a race , an d the n sa y yo u ar e fre e t o compet e with al l th e others , an d stil l jus t believ e tha t yo u hav e bee n completely fair . . . . This is the next an d most profound stag e of the battl e fo r civi l rights. We see k not jus t freedo m bu t oppor tunity. . . not jus t equalit y a s a right. . . but equalit y a s a fac t and equalit y a s a result. 15 Second, Johnso n argue d tha t blac k povert y wa s differen t i n kin d from th e poverty o f other Americans: "Negr o poverty is not white pover ty. . . . There ar e differences—deep , corrosive , obstinat e differences — radiating painful root s into the community, th e family, an d the nature o f the individual." 16 Third, Johnson claime d tha t whit e Americ a wa s responsibl e fo r th e deterioration o f th e blac k family : "Fo r [th e breakdown ] whit e Americ a must accep t responsibility. It flows fro m centurie s o f oppression an d per secution o f the Negro man . It flows fro m lon g years of degradation , an d discrimination, whic h hav e attacke d hi s dignity an d assaulte d hi s abilit y to provide fo r hi s family." 17 Fourth, Johnson sai d that the process of figuring ou t how to accom plish th e goal o f "equa l results " require d a partnership betwee n govern ment an d th e black leadership . Thus, Johnson explicitl y equated th e Wa r on Povert y wit h th e civi l rights movement . Johnson pushe d a t th e edge s of white America's patience and tolerance. In the land o f liberty, equality ,

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and justic e fo r all , he called fo r a special dea l for blac k American s base d on what white Americans ha d don e to their ancestors . The time was rip e if it were ever to b e so: Americans o f bot h color s were benefitin g fro m a sustained growt h i n job s an d th e econom y an d wer e read y t o suppor t a more activ e role for governmen t i n guaranteeing th e rights o f minorities . But practicall y n o American s i n 196 5 supporte d explici t racia l prefer ences. (Brin k an d Harri s foun d whit e respondent s oppose d t o jo b pref erences fo r Negroe s b y a 90-to- 4 margi n i n thei r 196 6 surve y fo r Newsweek—the rati o ha d bee n 93-to- 3 i n 1963.) 18 Johnson, true to Moynihan's report , made it plain that th e unusuall y severe problems o f instability, desertion, an d illegitimac y facing th e blac k family wer e bes t explaine d a s consequences o f whit e discrimination . H e said tha t man y o f th e federa l program s unde r wa y o r propose d i n hous ing, health, education, and job training would help poor Americans, white or black. These efforts woul d not b e enough for poor blacks , however, no t because the y wer e black , bu t becaus e the y wer e th e victim s "solel y an d simply . . . o f ancien t brutality , pas t injustice , an d presen t prejudice. " The focu s o f federa l effort s t o brin g hop e t o th e ghetto , i n Johnson' s view, would b e the blac k family : When the family collapse s it is the children that usually are dam aged. When i t happens o n a massive scal e the community itsel f is crippled. So , unless we work t o strengthe n th e family, t o create conditions unde r which most parents will stay together—al l the rest : school s an d playgrounds , publi c assistanc e an d pri vate concern, will never b e enough t o cu t completel y th e circl e of despai r an d deprivation. 19 What di d thi s tal k o f famil y mea n fo r concret e program s o r fo r th e organization an d conduc t o f th e Wa r o n Poverty , the n te n month s old ? The presiden t wa s confiden t tha t "scholar s an d experts, " th e leader s o f civil right s groups , som e governmen t officials , me n o f bot h race s coul d unlock the mystery. He called for a national gathering to come up with th e answers, a White Hous e Conferenc e "T o Fulfil l Thes e Rights. " The Howard speec h ha d far-reachin g effects ; Johnson, fo r lac k o f a more precis e term , ha d racialized poverty . Th e presiden t ha d sai d blac k poverty was different fro m whit e poverty, suggesting that something as yet unknown woul d hav e t o b e discovere d t o dea l wit h poo r blacks . On e might charitabl y argu e tha t presidentia l rhetori c wa s finall y catchin g u p with presidentia l policy . Afte r all , th e earl y administratio n o f th e

40

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antipoverty program , particularl y th e Communit y Actio n Program , emphasized th e preferenc e t o b e give n t o blac k communit y activist s i n the governanc e an d patronag e o f th e program . Th e popula r connectio n between "black " an d "poverty, " and , particularly , wit h "povert y pro gram," woul d furthe r weake n alread y tenuous congressiona l suppor t fo r the "unconditiona l war. " In hi s speech , Johnson invite d th e civi l rights movemen t t o assum e ownership o f the nationa l effor t t o abolis h poverty . Th e movement wa s a reasonabl y unite d fron t directe d a t dismantlin g souther n segregation , and Johnso n ha d earne d th e respec t o f it s leadershi p b y frequen t con sultations concernin g th e civi l right s bills—bu t th e civi l right s leader ship wa s ill-equippe d t o manag e a role i n th e antipovert y war . Lik e th e planners o f th e War o n Poverty , the y ha d n o operatin g insight s o n ho w to dea l with wha t Moyniha n calle d th e "tangl e o f pathology " i n north ern ghettos . In thes e departure s fro m conventiona l America n politics , Lyndo n Johnson wa s following th e script laid dow n b y Daniel Patrick Moynihan . The Howar d speech , whic h receive d prominen t attentio n i n th e dail y press an d new s magazines , woul d reinforc e th e growin g notio n tha t Democrats wer e cuttin g a special dea l for blacks . As it turned out , Johnson's infatuatio n wit h Moynihan' s idea s wa s short-lived. Th e presiden t mentione d th e specia l problem s o f blac k fam ilies i n publi c onl y onc e afte r Howard—i n th e immediat e wak e o f th e Watts riots . I f Presiden t Johnso n ha d intende d t o rewrit e th e America n creed with the Howard address , as conservatives had suggested , his intention flagge d badl y i n th e month s immediatel y followin g th e speech . Hi s growing preoccupation wit h Vietnam becam e clear. (Betwee n June 196 5 and June 1966 , the ceilin g on American troop s i n Vietnam jumpe d fro m 75,000 t o 400,000.) Bu t there was something more : the Moynihan anal ysis did no t "take " wit h Johnson: he never returned t o the language an d approach h e outline d a t Howar d University . Johnso n neede d program s that woul d delive r number s an d bu y peace , not ambiguous , open-ende d proposals tha t woul d subjec t hi m to vitriol . Writing i n 1967 , Moyniha n calle d th e perio d aroun d th e Howar d speech "th e momen t lost. " I n Moynihan's view : [T]he plain and ascertainabl e fac t was that the nation was going through a moment tha t ha d neve r occurre d before—an d coul d not persis t indefinitely—i n whic h a willingnes s t o accep t a

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considerable degre e o f socia l innovatio n wa s combine d wit h genuine feelin g fo r th e problems o f Negroes. The world wa s a t peace. The President had enormou s majorities i n Congress. The success of the New Economics was by then manifest: th e Burea u of the Budge t was alread y forecastin g a $4 5 billio n increas e i n the level of federa l revenue s b y 1970 . . . . I t was, in addition, a moment o f racia l calm. 20

SUPPRESSION AN D CENSURE : THE NEW ORTHODOX Y IS ESTABLISHED The response to Moynihan's repor t shaped much o f the future debat e of nationa l antipovert y policies . In combination wit h rapi d an d dramat ic change s withi n th e civi l right s movemen t itself , th e treatmen t o f Moynihan an d hi s ideas chilled th e atmospher e fo r scholars , journalists , and politician s t o th e poin t that , a ful l generatio n later , onl y a fe w aca demics an d fewe r politician s wer e prepare d t o dea l wit h th e question s Moynihan raise d an d analyzed . The suppressio n o f th e Moyniha n Report—an d suppressio n i s th e right word—sen t a cold, clea r messag e t o scholars , activists , journalists , and politicians : You ca n tal k abou t th e crue l effect s o f whit e racism , th e underfunding o f government programs , or America's history o f shamefu l treatment o f black Americans . But you run th e danger o f personal attac k if yo u mentio n individua l o r famil y responsibilit y o r poin t t o negativ e statistical correlation s abou t blac k Americans . The approach an d languag e o f the Moynihan Report' s initia l critic s should soun d familia r t o th e contemporar y reader . Conside r a recen t description o f th e repor t b y a respected blac k scholar , Adolp h Reed , Jr. , and th e erstwhil e wunderkind Julia n Bond : the y calle d i t "Moynihan' s racist, scurrilousl y misogynou s 196 5 report." 21 Jewel l Hand y Gresham , writing i n 1989 , summarized th e use s o f th e repor t i n these words : Those who foun d th e Moynihan repor t usefu l wer e presumabl y unaware tha t th e archetypa l sexism o n whic h i t rests i s inextricable from its racism. At any rate, the report signaled, at the very height of the civil rights movement, that Northern white s woul d pick u p where the Sout h wa s forced t o leave off i n blocking th e long black struggl e for parit y with whites in American life. 22

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WRONG FO R ALL THE RIGHT REASON S

Moynihan's earl y critics succeeded i n defining a new orthodoxy, a n orthodoxy tha t prescribed th e boundaries fo r publi c debate for all , except for conservative s wh o foun d th e orthodox y silly , an d a fe w progressiv e black scholar s suc h a s William Juliu s Wilso n wh o ha d th e gumptio n t o speak up . The Moyniha n Repor t wa s neve r i n th e headlines . (Th e 196 5 an d 1966 indice s fo r th e New York Times carr y n o mentio n o f i t b y name. ) The repor t wa s clumsil y release d b y the White Hous e i n August 1965 — some sa y to demonstrat e concer n an d expertis e a s the Watts rio t playe d out. B y tha t time , Moyniha n ha d resigne d t o see k offic e i n Ne w Yor k City; hi s view s wer e withou t stron g sponsorshi p amon g hi s forme r col leagues eithe r i n the Labo r Departmen t o r th e White House . Meanwhile, Moynihan's critic s formed a chorus to shout dow n any one so bold as to question thei r version o f the race and povert y story. The Left welcome d an y all y o r evidenc e tha t aide d it s argumen t tha t th e American economic system had faile d an d was pervasively unfair, corrupt , exploiting, an d racist ; professiona l blacks , preying o n whit e libera l fea r and blamin g whit e racis m fo r th e difficultie s facin g blac k Americans , preached a message of cultural, political, and intellectua l separatism ; liberals, black an d white , tended t o b e the weaker voices , holding the coat s for th e Lef t an d blac k combatant s a s they attacke d Moynihan . Moynihan's mos t effectiv e assailan t wa s William Ryan , the n a psy chologist a t the Harvard Medica l School . In a single articl e provocative ly entitle d "Savag e Discovery, " i n th e Novembe r 22 , 196 5 issu e o f th e Nation, Ryan , a vivid , engagin g writer , wrot e th e textboo k fo r blac k activists an d thei r radica l whit e cam p follower s fo r confinin g th e debat e about th e issue s of rac e an d povert y t o th e narrow groun d the y favored . Following a review of what Rya n characterized a s "methodologica l weak nesses" an d "misstatements " i n the report , h e launched hi s attack . Ryan's first tacti c was to accuse anyone who sough t to discuss problems that disproportionatel y afflic t blac k Americans o f "blamin g the victim." Her e i s a sample o f Ryan' s artistry . The explanation s almos t alway s focu s o n suppose d defect s o f the Negr o victi m a s i f those—an d no t th e racis t structur e o f American society—wer e the cause of al l woes that Negroes suffer. Th e Moynihan Report . . . singles out the "unstabl e Negr o family" a s th e caus e o f Negr o inequality . Bu t th e statistics . . . reflect curren t effects o f contemporaneous discrimination . The y are results, not causes. 23

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Later, i n hi s 197 1 book , Blaming the Victim, Rya n explaine d th e motivation an d practic e o f th e "Victi m Blamer" : Victim-blaming i s cloaked i n kindnes s an d concern , an d bear s all th e trapping s an d statistica l furbelow s o f scientism . . . . I n observing th e proces s o f Blamin g th e Victim , on e tend s t o b e confused an d disoriente d becaus e thos e wh o practic e thi s ar t display a deep concern fo r th e victims that i s quite genuine. . . . Its adherent s includ e sympatheti c socia l scientist s wit h socia l consciences in good working order , an d libera l politicians wit h a genuin e commitmen t t o reform . The y . . . indignantl y con demn an y notions o f innate wickedness o r genetic defect. "Th e Negro is not born inferior, " the y shout apoplectically . "Forc e of circumstance," the y explai n i n reasonabl e tones , "ha s made him inferior. " An d the y dismis s wit h self-righteou s contemp t any claims that the poor ma n i n America i s plainly unworthy o r shiftless o r enamored o f idleness.... No, they say, he is "caugh t in the cycle of poverty." H e is trained t o b e poor b y his cultur e and hi s family life , endowed b y his environment (perhap s b y his ignorant mother' s outdate d styl e o f toile t training ) wit h thos e unfortunately unpleasan t characteristic s tha t mak e him ineligi ble for a passport int o th e affluen t society. 24 Ryan radicall y dismisse d an y assignmen t o f individua l responsibili ty or family obligatio n i n the case of blacks ; in doing so, he suggested th e most unkin d motive s fo r Moynihan' s report . Ryan' s ton e furthe r trivial ized Moynihan's effort : To sustai n thi s ideology , i t i s necessary t o engag e i n the popu lar new sport of Savage Discovery, and to fit the theory, savage s are being discovered i n great profusion i n the Northern ghetto . The all-time favorite "savage " i s the promiscuous mothe r wh o produces a litte r o f illegitimat e brat s i n orde r t o profi t fro m AFDC.25 There was no pattern o f blac k behavior—fro m illegitimac y to crim e to educational performance—tha t Rya n would conced e could b e attribut ed to anything other than systemati c white discrimination an d oppression . More tha n a quarte r o f centur y afte r Ryan' s lesso n i n rhetorica l warfare, on e di d no t hav e t o loo k to o fa r t o fin d devotee s o f hi s tactics.

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The nation' s mos t influentia l newspaper , th e New York Times, regular ly alloted it s valuable op-e d pages to Ryan's ideological descendants . Th e Reverend Mr . Ceci l Williams, a prominent blac k pastor i n San Francisco, for example , wrot e tha t th e epidemi c o f crac k cocain e usag e i n blac k neighborhoods wa s bes t understoo d a s "genocide" : " I a m talking abou t the spiritua l an d physica l deat h o f a race." 26 Thi s astoundin g allegatio n begged fo r th e identificatio n o f wh o o r wha t i s behin d genocide . Williams's answer : "Th e ver y raising o f th e questio n minimize s th e seri ousness of the issue. The answer is not nearly as important a s the steps we take to reverse the genocide." Other s may use crack, bu t Williams argue d that "it s ful l destructiv e fur y wa s unleashe d i n the blac k community." 27 Like Ryan , Williams argue d tha t an y ba d behavio r o f poo r black s i s no t their fault . Ryan's secon d tactic followed closel y on the first: deflec t attentio n t o white shortcomings . Fo r example , accordin g t o Ryan , th e disparit y i n the rati o o f illegitimac y rate s fo r black s an d white s distorte d th e rea l truth, which is that black s and whites engaged i n premarital sexua l inter course in about equa l proportions. (White s make more use of contracep tion, illegal abortions, and "shotgun " marriages. ) I f what Rya n suggeste d was true in 1965 , it still would not change the facts that Moynihan report ed abou t illegitimat e blac k birth s an d th e consequences. (Th e Moyniha n Report, incidentally , di d no t imput e highe r illegitimac y rate s t o greate r promiscuity amon g blacks. ) Ryan use d the same kind o f "analysis " to explain higher blac k crim e rates an d poore r educationa l performance . A frequen t argumen t usin g the deflectio n techniqu e i s that whit e crim e i s just a s pervasiv e a s blac k crime, except that i t is practiced wit h computers an d advertising , not bur glary tools an d stree t weapons. O f course , it is true that much white-col lar crim e goe s undetected o r unreported , bu t peopl e d o no t mov e ou t o f neighborhoods becaus e o f a neighbor' s check-kitin g scheme , an d the y can wal k pas t th e house o f convicted embezzler s withou t fear . Ryan's third tacti c was to cite white racism a s the single explanatio n for an y example of black behavio r tha t seeme d aberrant , pathological , o r undesirable: If we ar e to believ e the ne w ideologues, we must conclud e tha t segregation an d discriminatio n ar e no t th e terribl e villain s w e thought the y were . Rather , w e ar e tol d th e Negro' s conditio n is du e t o thi s "pathology, " hi s values , th e wa y h e lives , th e kind o f famil y lif e h e leads. The major qualification—th e bo w

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to egalitarianism—i s tha t thes e conditions ar e said to grow ou t of th e Negro' s histor y o f bein g enslave d an d oppressed— generations ago. I t is all an ingenious way o f "coppin g a plea." A s the murdere r plead s guilt y t o manslaughte r t o avoi d a convic tion tha t [might ] lea d t o hi s bein g electrocuted , th e libera l America today is pleading guilty to the savagery and oppressio n against th e Negr o tha t happene d 10 0 year s ago , i n orde r t o escape trial fo r th e crime s o f today. 28 Although written a quarter centur y ago , nothing in Ryan's approac h or language is dated: the same arguments ar e still offered reflexivel y b y the Left an d professiona l black s i n respons e t o an y effor t t o untangl e th e mess i n ou r citie s tha t doe s no t explicitl y blam e th e proble m o n whit e racism. Rya n persiste d i n arguin g tha t Moyniha n wa s eithe r ou t o f ste p with a fundamenta l assumptio n o f America n society—equality—o r wa s untruthful i n assertin g tha t th e concep t o f equalit y applie s t o blacks : The theme is "The Negro was not initially born inferior , h e has been made inferior b y generations of harsh treatment." Thu s we continue t o asser t tha t th e Negr o i s inferior , whil e chastel y maintaining tha t al l me n ar e equal . I t i s al l rathe r painful , a s well a s fallacious . Fo r th e fac t i s tha t th e Negr o chil d learn s less not becaus e hi s mothe r doesn' t subscrib e t o The Reader's Digest . . . bu t becaus e h e i s miseducate d i n segregate d slu m schools.29 This type of clinching, shut-your-mouth argumen t wa s made b y oth ers. James Farmer , bes t know n a s the erstwhil e directo r o f th e Congres s of Racia l Equality , criticize d Moyniha n i n a December 196 5 syndicate d column. Lik e Ryan , Farme r attacke d Moyniha n fo r blamin g black s fo r individual an d famil y decision s that Farme r sai d were bette r explaine d b y past an d presen t whit e racism . Moreover , employin g Ryan' s secon d tac tic, Farmer claime d tha t Moyniha n wa s guilt y o f ignorin g th e patholog y in "'a n orderl y an d normal ' whit e famil y structur e tha t i s weane d o n racial hatred." Muc h o f what Farme r attribute d t o Moynihan wa s i n th e report, includin g th e vie w that black s mus t ear n thei r freedo m an d sto p buying Cadillac s an d tha t "menta l healt h shoul d b e th e firs t orde r o f business i n a civil rights revolution." 30 Then, notwithstanding Farmer' s libertie s in representing Moynihan' s report, h e proceed s t o provid e a n excellen t exampl e o f th e fourth ,

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and mos t destructive , rhetorica l tacti c o f professiona l black s an d whit e radicals—the charg e o f racism : [Moynihan's] well-enoug h intentione d analysi s provides the fuel for a new racism . . . i t succeeds i n taking th e real traged y of blac k povert y an d servin g i t u p a s a n essentiall y salaciou s "discovery." . . . I t ha s bee n th e fata l erro r o f America n soci ety for 30 0 year s to ultimatel y blam e the roots o f poverty an d violence i n the Negr o communit y upo n Negroe s themselves . I honestly fel t tha t th e Civi l Right s an d Votin g law s indicate d that w e were ri d o f this kind o f straw-ma n logic , but her e i t is again, in its most vicious form, banding the racists a respectable new weapon an d insultin g th e intelligenc e o f blac k me n an d women everywhere . . . . I am convinced tha t th e author . . . did not consciously intend to write a racist t r a c t . .. bu t the fact tha t it may b e used a s such makes [his ] innocence inexcusable. 31 Unhappily, on e nee d no t limi t a searc h fo r contemporar y instance s of the "racism " charg e to the irresponsible charge s o f stree t leader s suc h as New York' s Al Sharpton. I n the scholarl y journa l American Prospect, Professor Kennet h Tollet t excoriate d th e autho r o f a n articl e abou t th e conservative Suprem e Cour t wit h thes e words : [Cass R . Sunstein's ] deemphasi s o n rac e condone s o r rational izes th e crypto-racis m o f thi s kin d o f so-calle d liberalis m an d progressivism whic h care s mor e abou t protectin g th e righ t t o kill fetuses, to bird-watc h spotte d owls , and t o practice sodom y than savin g black children, employing blac k males, and revivin g the nuclea r family , thu s stemmin g th e tid e o f female-heade d households, a veritabl e plagu e i n th e blac k community , espe cially when i t means childre n havin g children. 32 There may have been other episode s of intellectual intimidation, bu t none wer e a s effectiv e a s th e suppressio n o f th e idea s i n th e Moyniha n report: the subject o f race was now t o b e governed b y new rules o f intel lectual engagement . Fo r th e bette r par t o f tw o decades , liberal scholars , politicians, journalists, and othe r opinio n leader s either style d thei r pub lic discussio n o f th e issue s Moyniha n ha d raise d t o confor m t o th e approved orthodox y o r they simply walked awa y fro m research , debate ,

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and th e searc h fo r solution s altogether . Liberal s lef t th e discussio n o f family an d individua l responsibilit y t o conservatives , who wer e quic k t o seize the opportunity . The chill lasted a very long time. Ironically, the orthodoxy wa s mos t powerful o n universit y campuses , bu t th e ne w constriction s o n th e fre e exchange o f idea s wer e visibl e i n churc h assemblies , legislatures , an d newsrooms. In the vigorous searc h fo r solutions , one was n o longe r abl e to fram e problem s honestly , an d hence , effectiv e solution s becam e tha t much mor e difficul t t o identify , debate , an d test . One thin g shoul d b e mad e clea r abou t th e chill : critic s suc h a s William Rya n an d James Farmer ar e not t o blame . The failure rest s wit h the liberals who obligingl y shu t u p abou t ghett o problems, who patron ized th e idea s o f voca l black s solel y becaus e o f thei r color , an d wh o accepted a s trut h th e vie w tha t les s shoul d b e expecte d o f a blac k chil d because of the legacy of white racism. Liberal politicians stoppe d arguin g about race , about affirmativ e action , and quotas . Instead o f treating blac k colleagues wit h respec t fo r th e argument s the y advanced , liberal s nod ded in agreement, afrai d thei r blac k friends coul d no t withstand criticis m or inquiry . Th e resulting damag e ha s bee n enormou s t o al l involved .

THE LEF T AND THE RIGH T OW N TH E DEBAT E The withdrawa l o f liberal s fro m th e debat e abou t rac e an d povert y in Americ a i n th e mid-1960 s di d no t en d th e debate . Th e discussio n moved t o the fringes o f American politics , to the Left an d th e Right. Th e conservatives, who ha d supposedl y bee n burie d i n the Johnson landslid e of 1964 , wer e ver y muc h aliv e an d increasingl y i n contro l o f th e Republican part y machinery , particularly i n the New South . Intellectual s who wer e no t prepare d t o accep t th e ne w stricture s lai d dow n b y th e response to the Moynihan Repor t were speaking out as neoconservatives . (Irving Kristo l define d a neoconservativ e a s " a libera l who' s bee n mugged.") I n the quarterly journal The Public Interest, neoconservative s analyzed an d criticize d th e liberal orthodox y o n public policy issues suc h as housing, education, and , most effectively, crime . Their argument s wen t largely unoppose d b y white liberals , who wer e to o timi d an d clums y t o fight fo r th e ide a o f integratio n o r fo r a tru e black-whit e partnershi p within th e Democratic party .

3» THE SOURCE S O F LIBERA L DECLINE : FAILURES O F M I N D

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aving bee n to o sanguin e an d to o self-righteou s abou t thei r part i n th e civi l right s movement , [liberals ] ar e to o easil y prey to despair when their contribution i s rejected b y those the y presumed t o help . Tor n betwee n a naggin g guil t an d a secre t desire t o tur n o n thei r blac k tormentors , whit e liberal s hav e become spectator s watchin g wit h froze n horro r a s thei r inte grationist ideal s an d favorit e publi c program s disintegrat e amidst violen t blac k rebellion . . . . Aaron Wildavsky , 1968 1

THE FADIN G O F THE GREA T SOCIET Y Lyndon Johnson anticipate d tha t hi s dream o f a great societ y coul d become a realit y i f hi s administratio n wer e abl e t o transfor m th e blac k ghettos that ha d bee n created i n inner city areas across the United States . In overseein g th e transformation , Johnso n wante d t o se e numbers: ho w many law s were passed , program s started , dollar s delivered , an d peopl e enrolled. H e assume d tha t i f the numbers go t high enough , the problem s could b e tamed. While he was trying to move the numbers u p in the ghet to neighborhoods o f northern cities , however, thes e neighborhoods ble w up o n hi m an d o n hi s Democratic party . 49

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The rise and fal l o f the Grea t Societ y occurred durin g the brief peri od o f Lyndon Johnson's presidency, between the passage of the civil rights laws and Richar d Nixon' s electio n in 1968 . What happene d t o the searc h for solution s i n these fe w years ? President Johnson wa s surrounded b y self-confident me n who wer e dead certai n tha t ther e wa s no t a proble m the y coul d no t resolve , eve n problems tha t the y di d not kno w muc h abou t o r tha t wer e not ver y well defined. Norther n ghetto s were such a problem. S o was Vietnam. Danie l Patrick Moyniha n trie d t o spel l ou t th e precis e natur e o f th e proble m with his report o n the black family, an d for a few months i n the spring of 1965 he enjoyed th e support o f Johnson's senio r advisers . After hi s idea s were put forth b y the president a t Howard University , however, they disappeared fro m officia l view . Despite the lack of a clear definition o f the problem, there seemed t o be no lac k o f "solutions. " Th e proposal s tha t wer e floate d largel y origi nated fro m thre e "schools. " Th e Lef t offere d a theor y o f empowermen t and confrontatio n tha t emphasize d organizin g poor neighborhoods , welfare clients , parents o f schoolchildren , an d worker s t o pres s fo r greate r benefits, jobs , publi c facilities , an d a forma l par t i n makin g decisions . Empowerment wa s mixe d wit h redistributio n program s modele d o n th e health an d welfar e program s o f Western Europea n socialists . The Left i n the United State s was permanently marginalized, however, for it s rejectio n of democrati c capitalism—th e "mixed " economy—an d fo r it s denia l o f the idea that individual , family, an d communit y responsibilit y mus t pla y key roles i n grappling wit h ghett o pathologies . A secon d schoo l wa s le d b y socia l wor k theorist s an d profession als who advocate d "enriching " th e ghett o b y greatly increasin g expen ditures fo r a wid e rang e o f socia l an d medica l service s tha t would , presumably, mak e lower-clas s peopl e mor e lik e middle-clas s people . The welfarist s assume d tha t traditiona l professiona l socia l service s would b e efficaciou s fo r th e poo r i f onl y sufficien t ta x dollar s wer e appropriated an d th e service s themselve s wer e efficientl y coordinated . No on e was very precise a s to the amount s required , an d schoo l bureau crats, United Wa y executives , settlement houses , community actio n pro grams, mayors , an d other s compete d vigorousl y fo r th e designatio n o f "coordinator." A third vie w borrowe d a bi t from th e Lef t an d socia l welfarists bu t placed th e greates t emphasi s o n integration . I t wa s thi s approac h tha t would receiv e the mos t attention .

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LIBERALS AND INTEGRATIO N Integration wa s a terribl y powerfu l ide a i n th e Unite d State s o f th e early 1960s—i t wa s th e goa l o f th e civi l right s movemen t an d o f it s per sonification, Marti n Luthe r King, Jr. White liberals viewed integration no t only as the moral objective of the civil rights struggle, but also as the answer to th e increasingl y visibl e practica l problem s o f th e blac k lowe r clas s i n northern cities . They ha d fait h tha t deservin g black s woul d graduall y b e absorbed int o the majoritarian societ y one by one; they gave little though t to what woul d happe n t o those not include d o r to neighborhoods domi nated b y those who coul d no t b e absorbed . At the time , many whit e American s generall y supporte d th e ide a o f integration. Sinc e th e en d o f Worl d Wa r II , whit e opinio n ha d shifte d from a genera l belie f i n whit e superiorit y t o a t leas t li p servic e i n sup port o f equal opportunity. There was overwhelming suppor t amon g whit e Americans in 196 5 for equalit y in voting rights (9 1 percent) an d acces s t o public accommodations (8 7 percent) a s well as for integrate d school s (7 2 percent).2 White receptivity to integration decline d steeply, however, as the idea moved fro m th e general to the specific; for example , about hal f o f al l whites wer e "upset " b y the prospec t o f blac k familie s movin g int o thei r neighborhoods, 3 an d les s tha n hal f supporte d governmen t interventio n to achiev e schoo l integration. 4 Liberals viewed integratio n a s the nearly inevitable result of enactin g antidiscrimination laws , a view strengthened b y their experience during the civil right s movement . The y ha d bee n gratefull y an d warml y receive d i n black churches, in which inspiring messages about equa l opportunit y an d nonviolence wer e preached. What quickl y becam e most noticeabl e abou t integration plan s fo r th e North , however , wa s tha t the y tende d no t t o affect whit e libera l enclave s i n an y direc t way . Th e plan s fo r norther n school integration almos t alway s mixed children from poo r an d working class blac k familie s wit h childre n fro m working-clas s whit e families . (I n a fe w metropolita n area s suc h a s Boston , liberal s organize d voluntar y one-way busin g schemes to suburban school s for cit y students, and som e smaller citie s an d town s voluntaril y integrate d thei r schools. ) Housin g integration mean t buildin g low-incom e housin g project s i n whit e work ing-class neighborhoods , no t i n the neighborhood s i n which whit e liber als tende d t o live . Job integratio n mean t openin g u p goo d blue-colla r jobs to black s i n the constructio n industr y an d i n police an d fir e depart ments—jobs no t avidl y sough t b y white liberal s o r thei r children .

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Kenneth Clark' s Dark Ghetto, publishe d i n 1965 , was one of a very few seriou s analyse s o f th e problem s t o b e overcom e i n integratin g th e black lower class. His findings abou t famil y instability , welfare, an d blac k male unemploymen t wer e ver y compatibl e wit h Moynihan's , bu t Clar k placed mor e emphasi s o n th e difference s betwee n th e middl e an d lowe r classes. H e offere d neithe r hop e no r despair , bu t h e wa s certai n abou t the minima l condition s require d t o fac e th e challenge : If the civil rights struggle is going to be successful, i t will requir e white participatio n an d commitment , eve n thoug h a numbe r of Negroe s believ e th e whit e i s no longe r relevant . Th e simpl e fact o f arithmeti c decree s otherwise . Negroe s ar e one-tent h o f the America n population . Withou t whit e suppor t an d withou t the white power structur e th e civil rights struggle i s doomed t o failure.5 Clark calle d liberalis m th e "Negro' s affliction, " an d chide d liberal s for a "persisten t verba l liberalis m tha t i s neve r capabl e o f overcomin g an equall y persisten t illiberalis m o f action." 6 Clark' s understandin g o f the nee d fo r genuin e integratio n o f fac t resulte d i n a rar e effor t amon g white liberal s t o discus s integratio n an d th e ghett o wit h an y specificity . Popular suppor t fo r integratio n grew , eve n a s i t was discredite d b y many blac k leaders . I n 196 6 th e Studen t Nonviolen t Coordinatin g Committee (SNCC) , which was founded i n 196 0 to organize black college students to conduct nonviolen t protests agains t Jim Crow, ousted its integrationist leader s (includin g John Lewis , who was later elected to the U.S. House fro m Atlanta ) an d replace d the m wit h leader s wh o favore d a diminished rol e for white s and tolerated a n ideology o f racial separatism. 7 By 1967 the ide a tha t cam e t o b e known a s Black Powe r wa s highl y visible amon g blac k Americans—an d Blac k Powe r deride d integration . Stokely Carmichael , th e militan t hea d o f SNCC , and Charle s Hamilton , a politica l scientist , wrote a t the time : The goal s o f integrationist s ar e middl e clas s goals , articulate d primarily b y a smal l grou p o f Negroe s wit h middl e clas s aspi ration o r status . Their kin d o f integration ha s meant tha t a fe w blacks "mak e it, " leavin g th e blac k community , sappin g i t o f leadership potentia l an d know-ho w . . . thos e toke n Negroes—absorbed i n a whit e mass—ar e o f n o valu e t o th e remaining black masses. They become meaningless show-piece s

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for a conscience-soothe d whit e society . . . . "Integration" . . . speaks t o th e proble m o f blacknes s no t onl y i n a n unrealisti c way bu t als o i n a despicable way." 8 What wa s despicable to the adherents o f Black Power wa s the equation o f quality with "white, " whether in describing schools, neighborhoods, or jobs. Every effort t o force integratio n o n working-class neighborhood s i n the North me t with ferven t opposition . A s early a s 1964 , the term white backlash entere d th e politica l vocabular y t o explai n Georg e Wallace' s spectacularly successfu l foray s i n the presidential primarie s i n Wisconsin , Indiana, an d Marylan d agains t stand-in s fo r Lyndo n Johnson . H e opposed "force d integration, " a messag e tha t appeale d t o th e primaril y Catholic, blue-colla r neighborhood s tha t wer e mos t directl y affecte d b y the continuin g expansio n o f ghett o boundaries. 9 Whil e "nationa l Democrats" suc h a s Rober t Kenned y an d Senato r Eugen e McCarth y opposed al l antibusin g legislation , th e number s o f norther n Democrat s who supporte d restriction s on federal court s and bureaucrat s gre w steadily i n th e lat e 1960s . Amon g th e newl y converte d wer e severa l whit e Democratic Hous e member s fro m ethni c districts. 10 Integratio n wa s a middle-class idea , th e produc t o f blac k an d whit e middle-clas s activist s who mixed easil y when Jim Cro w was the enemy. But once these activist s expanded beyon d th e South , integratio n face d mountin g oppositio n i n the geographically segregate d reache s o f th e North . The 196 4 election accelerated th e transfer o f partisan loyalties amon g two significan t bloc s o f voters : one wa s compose d o f Souther n segrega tionists, who gave Republican Senato r Barr y Goldwate r hi s only victorie s outside Arizona , thu s buildin g a ne w "whit e party " i n th e Ol d Confederacy; th e other wa s blac k Americans , who gav e Johnson 96 per cent o f thei r votes , endin g blac k allegianc e t o th e "Part y o f Lincoln. " After 196 4 blac k problem s becam e Democrati c problems. 11 And th e cloc k wa s ticking . I n 196 4 th e Grea t Societ y liberal s ha d received a powerfu l mandat e fro m voter s t o solv e th e nation' s racia l woes. The y hope d tha t expression s o f goodwil l an d concret e progra m proposals woul d bu y time an d peace . No on e was clear abou t wha t wa s to happe n i n th e meantime , th e tim e betwee n promis e an d delivery , between Hea d Star t an d Job Corps , betwee n rumbl e an d explosion . Th e conference tha t Johnson promise d i n his Howard Universit y speech—t o bring th e bes t mind s togethe r t o figur e ou t ho w t o "fulfil l thes e rights " to equa l opportunit y an d equa l results—wa s hel d i n Novembe r 1965 . Instead o f focusin g th e attentio n o f th e civi l right s coalitio n o n th e

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complexities o f fightin g povert y an d th e nee d fo r blac k "self-help, " th e conference emphasize d increase d federa l spending . Conferenc e directo r Berl Bernhard opene d th e meeting by quipping: " I want you to know tha t I hav e bee n reliabl y informe d tha t n o suc h perso n a s Danie l Patric k Moynihan exists." 12 Moynihan was , in fact, presen t an d eage r to defen d his report. Th e tide, however, was running with hi s critics. The questio n of fragil e familie s an d a nationa l famil y polic y wa s stricke n fro m th e agenda. Lyndon Johnson believe d i n th e efficac y o f government . A n arden t New Dealer and veteran of twenty-two years on Capito l Hill, he measured effective governmen t b y laws enacted—"let's nai l those coonskins [laws ] to the wall, boys," he would urg e his staff—and federa l program s created . Johnson's partner was the 89t h Congress , elected in the 196 4 Democrati c sweep. Together the y altere d the balance s i n the federalist system , giving the federa l governmen t a commanding rol e i n area s i n which i t had pre viously bee n a bi t player . Th e 89t h Congres s enacte d th e firs t program s of genera l federa l assistanc e fo r elementar y an d secondar y education , mass transit , an d land-us e planning . Ove r th e oppositio n o f America' s doctors, it enacted Medicar e fo r th e elderly and Medicai d fo r th e poor. I t broadened highe r educatio n opportunitie s beyon d veteran s an d scienc e majors. The Voting Rights Act constituted a radical intrusio n i n the electoral mechanic s o f souther n states , bu t i t wa s stunningl y effectiv e i n extending th e vote to blac k southerners . President Johnson's penchan t fo r program s meshe d wit h th e libera l faith i n social services as an important wa y to transform th e blac k lowe r class. He wa s convince d tha t th e comprehensiv e an d coordinate d attac k on city slums embodied i n the Model Citie s Act of 196 6 would inevitabl y succeed. Johnson wrot e i n his memoirs : I believ e thi s la w wil l b e regarde d a s on e o f th e majo r break throughs o f th e 1960s . I t pose d tw o basi c challenge s t o ou r ability t o handl e urba n problems . First , i t force d cities . . . t o plan thei r ow n reconstructio n wit h financia l assistanc e fro m the federa l government . . . . Second, thi s legislatio n provide s a graphic test o f the federal government' s abilit y to work i n har mony with othe r level s of government. 13 Joseph Califano , Johnson' s principa l domesti c polic y advisor , con firmed th e president's sweepin g hopes :

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Johnson wa s ready to . . . rebuild ethni c slum neighborhoods i n American citie s an d i n th e proces s provid e job s fo r th e unem ployed i n th e ghetto . Instea d o f urba n renewa l program s tha t moved poo r peopl e ou t o f thei r neighborhood s . . . h e envi sioned a progra m tha t woul d allo w the m t o sta y there , i n remodeled o r new dwellings, with jobs, police protection, recreation, an d communit y healt h centers. 14

THE LIBERAL S SKI P CLAS S Kenneth Clark , Daniel Moynihan, an d other s had warned abou t th e problems brewin g i n th e blac k lowe r class . Among th e fe w progressive s who had thought abou t the ghettos, there was strong agreement abou t th e crucial differences betwee n the prevailing middle-class ethos and the growing lower-clas s subculture . Harringto n observe d i n hi s influentia l 196 2 book, The Other America, "t o b e a Negro i s to participate i n a culture of poverty an d fea r tha t goe s fa r deepe r tha n an y blo w fo r o r agains t dis crimination." 15 Similarl y Clar k note d a critical differenc e betwee n whit e and blac k America : White Americ a i s basicall y a middle-clas s society ; th e middl e class set s the more s an d th e manner s t o whic h th e uppe r clas s must. . . seek to confor m . . . and whic h th e lowe r clas s strug gles t o attai n o r defensivel y rejects . Bu t dar k Americ a . . . has been assigned to be a lower-class society; the lower class sets the mores an d manner s . . . fro m whic h th e Negr o middl e clas s struggles t o escape. 16 The relative scarcity of liberal discussions of class differences durin g this perio d i s surprisin g becaus e liberal s believed—privately—tha t th e unsatisfactory behavio r an d lif e consequence s o f poo r blac k American s was much mor e a function o f class than o f race. The crucial policy ques tion was this: What ca n government d o to replace or supplement th e fam ily role among lower-class individuals to produce middle-class Americans ? If this has bee n th e objectiv e o f libera l programs , why i s it so rarel y mentioned publicly , even now? There are three parts to the answer. First , Americans d o not like to acknowledge th e existence of class, preferring t o believe that everyon e i s middle class , and i f they ar e not, the y ar e takin g

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steps t o ascend . "Upper-class " i s hardl y mentioned . A patricia n lik e George Bus h pretende d tha t hi s favorit e foo d wa s por k rinds , countr y and wester n tune s hi s favorit e music , an d horsesho e pitchin g hi s pre ferred sport . Benjamin DeMot t wrote that the first assumptio n o f America is its classlessness: The mind o f the middle isn't absorbed wit h the subject o f class, doesn't engag e ceaselessly in placing itself an d others , and live s without detaile d map s o f socia l difference . . . . The peopl e i n question kno w . . . that althoug h the y may sometimes spea k o f themselves as men an d women o f the "middl e class," only wit h an effort o f will—only b y contrivance—can the y imagine them selves to be members o f a class. Normally the y fee l themselve s to be solid individual achiever s in an essentially classless society composed o f huma n being s engage d i n betterin g themselves. 17 Second, blac k nationalist s an d th e whit e Lef t hav e routinel y con demned th e middle class for it s mores an d goals . The primary reaso n th e civil right s movemen t succeede d i n th e earl y 1960 s wa s tha t it s goal s were clearl y i n lin e wit h th e America n middle-clas s culture . Bu t a s th e black leadershi p spli t ove r styl e an d substance , th e militant s no t onl y abandoned th e goa l o f middle-clas s aspiration , bu t condemne d mid dle-class culture a s racist . Black nationalist s hav e viewe d th e middle-clas s etho s a s a whit e ethos, oppressiv e an d alie n t o th e value s o f th e blac k community . Moreover, th e Lef t require s th e existenc e o f a permanen t lowe r clas s t o prove it s assertio n tha t an y capitalis t syste m inevitabl y produce s a n exploited class , a situation tha t mus t b e rectified b y social an d economi c restructuring. Laur a Carper , i n he r attac k o n th e Moyniha n Repor t i n Dissent, wrote , "Wha t i s destructiv e t o th e Negr o ma n an d woma n i s social impotence . . . and what rehabilitate s the m i s social power an d th e struggle for it." 18 The Left's insistent , romantic notion s o f revolution can not wor k i n a society that accept s the middle clas s as both th e norm an d the objective . The Lef t an d professiona l black s reserve d thei r mos t poten t veno m for thos e wh o venture d int o a discussio n o f clas s an d race . Edwar d Banfield publishe d a boo k i n 196 8 tha t mad e a simpl e an d well-docu mented cas e that th e problems playe d ou t i n ghetto neighborhood s wer e a consequence of concentrated lower-class populations. 19 Race was not th e critical issue, he said. The black poor, Banfield suggested , were no differen t

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from othe r (white ) lower-class Americans: they had no fondness fo r work , no strong family ties, an easy acceptance of criminal behavior , no brie f fo r schooling, and n o futur e perspective . All these characteristics violat e th e middle-class etho s tha t define s America' s politica l culture , an d Banfiel d argued that eve n well-run government programs could not undo the har m caused b y clas s differences . Hi s wa s a particularl y dangerou s formula tion fo r th e liberal-Lef t orthodox y because , if accepted , i t would under mine the rationale fo r governmen t redistributiv e program s an d blun t th e racism-explains-all-ills theory . Fo r thi s sin , Banfield wa s effectivel y ban ished fro m on e campu s afte r another , hi s book s vandalized , hi s lecture s shouted down , an d hi s sponsors threatened. 20 The thir d reaso n wh y liberal s avoi d mentionin g clas s a s a facto r i s that n o one knows how to orchestrate th e conversion fro m lowe r to mid dle class. Kids who gro w u p i n poor familie s tha t inculcat e th e value s o f education, work , an d othe r middle-clas s value s ca n easil y b e put o n th e right trac k throug h educationa l opportunity . Fo r th e lower-clas s poor , however, no approach o r program ha s bee n proved t o work; nonetheles s liberals have continually accepte d the self-serving assertion s of social service an d educationa l professional s tha t the y hav e th e solution . Socia l workers an d educator s hedg e thei r guarante e wit h al l sort s o f qualifiers , but in truth, many of the conditions required fo r "success " are beyond th e realm o f socia l services .

LIBERALS AND THE SOCIA L SERVICE S INDUSTR Y In th e mid-1960 s liberal s hope d th e pus h fo r socia l service s woul d cool the ghetto until integration rendere d it s problems manageable. Thus, in 196 7 an d 1968 , liberal s spok e abou t th e simultaneou s strategie s o f "enriching" th e ghetto, while "dispersing " it s residents. President Kenned y ha d relie d o n a socia l service s approac h i n hi s welfare reform s o f 1962 , which authorize d psycho-socia l counselin g an d other service s a s a mean s t o assis t recipient s mov e of f th e rolls . Th e alliance betwee n liberal s an d socia l service s was no t full y cemente d unti l the Grea t Society , however. The War o n Poverty , for example , increase d the numbe r o f direc t service s finance d b y the federa l government : Hea d Start, Job Corps , the Neighborhood Yout h Corps , adult literacy training , legal services, neighborhood healt h clinics, and foster grandparents . It also established communit y actio n program s (CAPs ) i n eac h cit y t o pla n an d coordinate "comprehensive " service s fo r poo r residents . Thes e resident s

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were "empowered " t o help run the CAPs themselves, bringing pressure o n city hall fo r mor e an d bette r publi c services . As the numbe r an d variet y o f program s proliferated , th e socia l ser vice sector ranged fro m disorde r to chaos, and seemingl y all of it received funding. Catalogue s a s thic k a s th e Manhatta n telephon e director y described th e arra y o f federa l programs ; a cottag e industr y o f consul tants evolve d t o hel p loca l an d stat e governments , charitabl e organiza tions, an d universitie s gai n acces s t o pot s o f cas h tha t seeme d t o b e available i n th e corner s o f federa l offices . Th e Mode l Citie s Ac t wa s passed t o rationalize th e impact o f federa l an d stat e programs, to reduc e confusion an d duplication , to concentrate limite d resources to maximu m effect, an d t o coordinat e th e action s o f distan t bureaucracies . Plannin g funds wer e suppose d t o overcom e th e protective an d insula r instinct s o f federal bureaucrats , their loyal constituencies i n cities and states , mayors, newly established CAPs , school districts , public housing authorities , an d voluntary agencies . At the sam e time , Congres s wa s enactin g legislatio n to coordinate othe r federal funds—fo r transi t an d water, for example—o n a metropolita n basis . Meanwhile, menta l healt h fund s wer e "coordinat ed" b y "catchments. " Somehow , all this was to be coordinated an d ratio nalized b y interagency tas k force s an d Burea u o f th e Budge t circulars . It never happened . Instead th e emphasis was on "more. " Liberal s an d thei r profession al allie s argue d tha t th e program s wer e wel l designed , bu t ther e wa s a need for a n "urba n Marshal l Plan " an d "expenditure s a t scale. " In 196 6 Roy Wilkins, head o f the NAACP, and a coalition o f progressive organi zations pushed for th e adoption o f a "freedo m budget " t o spend $18 5 billion ove r te n years . Afte r th e Newar k an d Detroi t riots , th e Kerne r Commission would recommend a $30 billion (abou t $12 0 billio n in 199 4 dollars) increas e in annual federa l spendin g for cit y programs—at a time when Johnson coul d no t convinc e Congres s to approv e a $14 billio n ta x increase fo r fightin g th e Vietnam War . Blac k leaders warned tha t failur e to increas e fundin g woul d lea d to mor e violence . The Grea t Societ y sought to improve the lives of poor black s by providing socia l services . As it turne d out , i t achieve d succes s i n a differen t way: by providing job s to the aspirin g blac k middl e class . Between 196 0 and 1976 , th e blac k middl e clas s triple d i n size , primaril y becaus e o f increased governmen t an d nonprofi t agenc y employment . A stud y b y Michael Brow n an d Steve n Erie in 198 1 estimated tha t th e Grea t Societ y created two million jobs in public schools, nonprofit agencies , and welfar e and healt h agencies . Th e numbe r o f blac k American s i n suc h job s ros e

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from 400,00 0 i n 196 0 to 1.2 5 millio n in 1976 ; the increase in other pub lic jobs was twofold , fro m 412,00 0 t o 835,00 0 (ther e was, for example , a twelvefol d increas e i n th e numbe r o f blac k la w enforcemen t official s between 196 0 an d 1990) . On th e down side , Brown an d Eri e also foun d that the primary impact of the Great Society on poor blac k Americans wa s an increase d relianc e o n welfare , an d a decreased relianc e o n earnings. 21 Nobody expecte d tha t the primary beneficiarie s o f legislation an d appro priations t o assis t th e poo r woul d b e professionals , teachers , an d socia l workers, yet that i s what happened . With th e growt h i n socia l an d educationa l servic e jobs , profession al association s an d union s sa w enormou s gain s i n membership . Again , black professionals wer e the prime beneficiaries . Betwee n 196 0 and 1980 , the numbe r o f employe d American s increase d fro m 6 8 millio n t o 97. 6 million—a 43. 6 percen t rise . I n th e sam e period , however , th e censu s reported tha t th e numbe r o f socia l worker s an d welfar e worker s wen t from 96,00 0 in 196 0 to 476,000 b y 1980— a 394. 1 percent increase—an d the numbe r o f blac k socia l worker s jumpe d fro m 10,61 6 i n 196 0 t o 88,021 in 1980—u p 72 9 percent! Public school teachers mor e than dou bled fro m 1. 3 t o 2.7 5 millio n (110. 8 percent) . Again , blac k American s greatly benefited: ther e were 116,42 3 blac k teachers in 1960 , and 290,38 9 by 1980—a n increas e o f 14 9 percent. Although th e increase i n the num ber of public administrators gre w less dramatically tha n welfare an d edu cation categories (fro m 198,35 1 in 196 0 to 536,549 i n 1980) , the numbe r of black administrator s gre w almost tenfold, fro m 3,07 5 t o 30,109. 22 But expanding publi c an d nonprofi t job s fo r blac k striver s di d no t mee t th e needs o f th e poores t blac k Americans .

THE YLVISAKE R GROU P To 1960 s liberals , i t seeme d tha t ever y proble m coul d b e solve d through specifi c legislatio n accompanie d b y the creation o f a new feder al burea u o r agency . Johnson' s chie f domesti c polic y adviser , Josep h Califano, describe d ho w man y ne w program s wer e born : The Presiden t offere d littl e guidance . H e woul d occasionall y say tha t h e wante d " a progra m fo r th e cities, " o r a n "Asia n Development Bank, " o r "somethin g to help the Negro male an d his family." A t other time s he spoke of a "fair-housin g bill, " o r a "consume r progra m t o help housewives buyin g groceries an d

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veterans buyin g car s an d homes. " Bu t h e expecte d m e t o pu t flesh o n th e bone s "wit h th e fines t mind s i n th e country. " H e wanted the best ideas "withou t regar d to politics. You let these intellectuals get me the ideas. I'll worry abou t th e politics." H e would ofte n add , whe n irritated , tha t "Th e troubl e wit h th e Democratic part y i s that al l the intellectual s wan t t o b e politi cians and al l the politicians want t o b e intellectuals." 23 In 1966 , Califan o pu t togethe r a tas k forc e o n th e citie s tha t wa s chaired b y Pau l Ylvisaker , th e forme r For d Foundatio n executiv e wh o had prodde d th e nation' s larges t foundatio n int o investin g i n ne w approaches t o ghett o problem s an d consulte d wit h Shriver' s plannin g group fo r th e War o n Poverty. Ylvisaker ha d a s much experience a s anyone i n breakin g throug h political , bureaucratic , an d racia l barrier s t o fashion concret e opportunitie s fo r poo r peopl e i n cities . Hi s tas k forc e included som e of the finest mind s on city problems: Theodore Size r fro m Harvard's Schoo l o f Education ; John Dunlop , the respecte d labo r medi ator; Ivan Allen, the "Ne w South " mayo r o f Atlanta; Anthony Downs, a Chicago housin g expert ; an d Edwi n "Bill " Berry , th e directo r o f th e Chicago Urban League . They were joined b y experts o n system s analysi s and th e quantificatio n approac h t o problem-solvin g the n popula r i n th e Pentagon, as well as experts on urban renewal, urban planning, and labor . I was th e group' s deput y staf f director . The Ylvisaker group was an important opportunit y fo r experienced , thoughtful, concerned , libera l white men (Berr y was the only black mem ber, an d n o on e seeme d t o notic e tha t ther e were n o women ) t o identif y the piece s t o th e nation' s bigges t puzzle , t o addres s th e question s Moynihan ha d pose d bu t lef t unanswered . Th e searc h wa s quiet ; ther e were n o pres s leaks o r inquiries , no attack s fro m blac k militant s o r left ists t o worr y about . Califan o an d hi s deputy , Larr y Levenson , showe d interest withou t interference , an d th e tas k forc e delivere d it s repor t t o the president i n July 1967—fiv e dav s befor e th e Newark riots . The grou p wa s charge d wit h layin g th e groundwor k fo r th e Grea t Society's nex t bi g step, presumably i n Johnson's secon d term . Convene d at th e heigh t o f th e Vietnam escalation , th e grou p assume d tha t th e wa r would b e over before long—throwin g of f a large fiscal dividen d in federa l revenues—and tha t the economy would continue its uninterrupted expan sion (i n its fifty-seventh mont h an d countin g i n January 1967) . The task forc e report , neve r mad e public , was a n urgen t an d heart felt appea l fo r integratio n a s th e mai n answe r t o th e problem s o f th e

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ghetto, an d it s principa l conclusion s (whic h woul d b e echoe d i n th e celebrated repor t o f th e Kerne r Commissio n nin e month s later ) wer e unambiguous: The overriding problem of our cities is segregation by race and income. No solutions of the nation's urban problems are valid unless they deal directly with the questions posed by segregation. A dangerou s confrontatio n i s buildin g i n mos t o f ou r metropolitan area s betwee n whit e an d Negro , ric h an d poor , growing subur b an d declinin g centra l city . . . . We see no prospect that these disturbing trends will be arrested by "natural " force s o r b y current program s a t presen t scale . The nation i s at a turning p o i n t . . .. A century ago, President Lincoln riske d th e Unio n i n orde r t o preserv e i t agains t th e threat o f interna l division . Today , a comparabl e ventur e i n national leadershi p i s calle d fo r t o hea l th e rif t betwee n th e ghetto an d growt h sector s o f American society. 24 The Ylvisaker tas k forc e calle d o n Johnson t o strengthe n hi s alread y historic commitmen t t o blac k American s b y makin g th e cas e fo r inte gration wit h white America an d b y fighting entrenche d interest s t o reor ganize federa l urba n programs . Th e firs t recommendatio n t o th e president wa s tha t "integratio n . . . b e explicitly state d a s national poli cy; that i t becom e th e firs t criterio n b y whic h . . . programs ar e tested , that . . . powerfu l incentive s b e devise d t o accelerat e integration ; an d that employmen t an d educationa l opportunitie s fo r th e urba n poo r b e sharply increased." 25 The task forc e mad e som e prescient warnings: cities were losing the competition fo r goo d jobs ; the proliferation o f categorical program s wa s atomizing and confusin g antipovert y efforts ; suburb s were discriminatin g against al l low-incom e familie s regardles s o f race ; mayor s wer e bein g bypassed b y semi-autonomous authoritie s workin g i n league with feder al bureaucrats ; an d schoo l integratio n wa s valueles s i f middle - an d lower-class kid s di d no t atten d th e sam e schools . To counter thes e forces, the group recommende d tha t federa l polic y should no t try to reverse the large economic forces tha t were speeding th e development o f suburba n economies ; tha t federa l gran t program s b e pooled an d allocate d o n th e basi s o f clea r performanc e criteri a (advanc ing integration) t o governors an d mayors ; that antidiscriminatio n order s

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and law s b e vigorousl y enforced ; tha t integratio n b e mad e th e primar y determinant o f housin g fund s an d mortgag e guarante e programs ; an d that "bonuses " o f $1,50 0 (o r abou t $6,40 0 i n 199 4 dollars ) b e offere d to suburba n school s fo r ever y blac k studen t an d poo r whit e studen t residing i n citie s tha t the y enroll . Th e tas k forc e advocate d placin g a high priorit y o n th e enrichmen t o f ghett o familie s throug h higher , fed eralized welfar e payments , jo b trainin g stipends , an d educatio n an d housing bonuses . It als o recommended a dispersal strateg y tha t shu t of f federal fund s t o discriminator y town s an d tie d grant s t o housing , job , and educationa l integration . There wer e man y practica l an d politica l problem s wit h th e group' s proposal. Th e tas k forc e calle d fo r spendin g fo r federa l urba n program s to triple , to $2 7 billion. A t the time, Johnson wa s fightin g th e ne w 90t h Congress, which had bee n elected with a mandate to put a stop to his furi ous expansio n o f federa l spendin g an d experimentation . Moreover , dis trust o f stat e an d loca l government s wa s endemi c t o th e Washingto n culture; every federal dolla r was subject t o the approval an d audi t o f presumably hones t federa l bureaucrats . The tas k force' s emphasi s o n integratio n cam e jus t when th e wor d and ide a wer e beginnin g t o disappea r fro m th e vocabularie s o f blac k and whit e liberals . Th e grou p recognize d tha t onl y vigorou s presi dential leadershi p (i n combinatio n wit h a tripling o f federa l fund s fo r urban programs) , woul d work : "Th e growin g aparthei d o f ou r urba n populations, segregatin g b y race an d income , presents thi s natio n wit h an ugl y fac t an d a n ominou s future—an d a possibl e threa t t o ou r security whic h ma y to o soo n overshado w tha t o f Vietnam." 26 Bu t i t was to o late . Vietna m alread y preoccupie d Johnson , an d th e ne w Congress wa s inten t o n cuttin g urba n programs , no t o n triplin g thei r appropriations. In som e ways , th e Ylvisake r grou p fel l victi m t o th e orthodox y o f permissible inquir y established afte r th e attack o n the Moynihan Report . It paid n o attention , fo r example , to achievin g integratio n betwee n peo ple from differen t classes , even though integratio n b y class was applaud ed. Th e question s Moyniha n ha d raise d abou t th e abilit y o f blac k Americans to compete effectivel y unde r ne w circumstances wer e similar ly ignored. But to today's reader, the most obvious bow to post-Moyniha n orthodoxy wa s th e group' s failur e t o us e the word crime. A t the tim e o f the report, crim e was a growing problem , an d liberal s would pa y dearl y for sidesteppin g it .

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LIBERALS STUMBL E O N CRIM E Liberal self-censorshi p allowe d th e publi c debat e abou t rac e an d poverty t o remai n focuse d o n thos e area s "approved " b y th e Lef t an d professional blacks . Liberals adopte d position s an d languag e tha t woul d prevent persona l attack s fro m th e Left, bu t the eventual price was defea t at the ballo t box . Crim e an d riot s were th e kille r issues . Beginning in 1963, crime rates had begun to rise very rapidly across the nation. Betwee n 196 3 an d 1968 , for example , the rate fo r robberies—th e most random , threatenin g crime—double d acros s the nation. There wa s a ready explanation: the number o f young men an d boys—th e usua l per petrators o f suc h crime—wa s increasin g rapidly . Few person s woul d accep t th e ide a tha t rando m violenc e ca n b e excused. Yet , i n th e post-Moyniha n era , tha t i s precisel y wha t liberal s tried t o argue . A t first , the y suggeste d tha t th e polic e wer e jus t gettin g better a t collectin g statistic s an d tha t th e victim s wer e reportin g crim e more often . Som e liberals, noting the wide disproportion s i n the numbe r of black s convicte d o f crimes , argue d tha t th e crimina l justic e syste m was racist an d tha t i t preyed o n blac k men . Liberals felt tha t stree t crim inals shoul d no t b e criticized—tha t woul d b e "blamin g th e victim" — but tha t crim e shoul d b e "understood " a s a n appropriat e expressio n o f "rage an d frustration. " Thes e idea s wer e nonsens e t o mos t American s who believe d that th e courts were too lenient , that parents were too irre sponsible to discipline their children, an d tha t ther e were too fe w cops o n the street. 27 Among prominen t libera l Democrats , onl y Rober t Kenned y plainl y condemned crim e an d disorde r an d thos e wh o excuse d it . Kennedy ma y have enjoyed specia l license—his martyred brothe r wa s revered, particu larly among black s an d Catholi c American s (th e core o f the white back lash, which he also condemned). In a speech at the University of Californi a at Berkeley , he attacked rioter s an d thei r defenders : Yet, howeve r muc h th e conditio n o f mos t Negroe s mus t cal l forth compassion , th e violence of the few demand s condemna tion an d action . . . . Still far mor e disturbin g i s that th e chaot ic self-destructiv e violenc e o f Watt s o r Oaklan d ar e th e statements o f a ver y fe w Negr o spokesmen—thos e wh o hav e called fo r hatre d t o fight prejudice , racis m to meet racism, violence to destro y oppression. 28

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Kennedy was als o a solitary libera l critic of Blac k Power. 29 Liberal s took thei r lea d muc h mor e fro m Ramse y Clark , Johnson's attorne y gen eral during the era o f civil disorders an d risin g crime rates. Clark typifie d the libera l philosoph y o f crim e control . H e becam e notoriou s enoug h that Richar d Nixo n routinel y promised durin g his 196 8 campaign t o fir e him, a n unremarkable , bu t apparentl y effectiv e pledge . Clar k suggeste d viewing ghetto crim e a s the direc t product o f racism : The most tragic and dangerou s risk of racism in America toda y is tha t i t ma y caus e u s t o misconstru e th e meanin g o f crim e among poor blacks . That crim e flows clearl y and directl y fro m the brutalizatio n an d dehumanizatio n o f racism , povert y an d injustice. Blac k Americ a ha s show n itsel f t o b e far gentle r an d more humane than white America. There is nothing inherent i n black characte r tha t cause s blac k crime . O n th e contrary , th e slow destructio n o f huma n dignit y cause d b y whit e racis m i s responsible. This i s the most pitiabl e resul t o f thi s huge wron g of th e American people. 30 Clark firml y believe d tha t onl y society—whit e society—coul d b e held responsibl e fo r th e surg e in crimes that bega n i n the 1960s . Liberals were painting themselves into a corner with their own timid ity an d thoughtlessness . The y mad e excuse s fo r violen t crime , blamin g government's failur e t o spen d mor e mone y o n mor e programs . Liberal s blindly urge d actio n agains t th e "roo t causes " o f crime , skippin g ove r the inconvenien t questio n o f wha t wa s t o b e don e i n th e meantime . I n 1967 the President's Commissio n o n La w Enforcemen t an d Administra tion o f Justice argue d th e classic libera l line : The Commissio n finds , first , tha t Americ a mus t translat e it s well-founded alar m abou t crime into social action that will prevent crime . It ha s n o doub t whateve r tha t th e mos t significan t action tha t ca n b e take n agains t crim e i s actio n designe d t o eliminate slum s an d ghettos , to improv e education , t o provid e jobs, to make sur e that ever y American i s given the opportuni ties and the freedom tha t will enable him to assume his responsibilities. We will not hav e dealt effectively wit h crime until w e have alleviate d th e condition s tha t stimulat e i t . . . widespread crime implie s a widespread failur e b y society a s a whole. 31

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The commission announce d it s findings i n the midst o f th e nation' s longest economic expansion, when unemploymen t wa s 3. 7 percent over all (4. 9 percen t fo r blac k male s twent y year s o f ag e an d older) , famil y incomes wer e increasing , price s wer e stable , an d th e sens e o f economi c improvement an d well-bein g wa s stron g amon g al l Americans . A corollary t o the issu e of root cause s was the liberal assertio n tha t crime i s a universal , tha t ther e i s larcen y i n ever y heart . Th e differenc e between soli d citizen s an d youn g criminals , liberals argued , wa s no t th e violent nature , bu t rathe r th e flamboyanc e o f th e latter' s crime s an d th e greater willingnes s o f biase d cop s t o arres t them . Willia m Ryan , i n hi s book, Blaming the Victim, pu t i t this way : Crime i s . . . endemic . W e ar e surrounde d an d immerse d i n crime . . . most o f ou r friend s an d neighbor s ar e la w violators . Large number s o f the m ar e repeate d offenders . A ver y larg e group hav e committe d seriou s majo r felonies , suc h a s theft , assault, tax evasion , an d fraud . Fe w of the m ar e ever arrested , still fewe r tried , an d onl y a tin y numbe r ar e eve r imprisoned . This "hidde n crime" . . . is not pett y o r negligible . . . .32 Ryan wen t o n t o mak e th e cas e tha t so-calle d la w enforcemen t ha s little to do with arrestin g criminals—because al l of us as a matter o f rou tine brea k laws—an d everythin g t o d o wit h arrestin g blac k peopl e an d poor peopl e to maintai n no t jus t the publi c order , bu t the socia l order. 33 The argumen t tha t blac k rag e wa s a n explanatio n fo r blac k crim e also found suppor t amon g liberals. In 196 8 two blac k psychiatrists wrot e a boo k entitle d Black Rage tha t receive d wid e attention . Th e authors , William Grie r an d Pric e Cobbs, explained tha t crim e and riots were aki n to a contemporary slav e rebellion : At bottom, America remain s a slave country whic h happen s t o have removed th e slav e laws fro m th e books . The questio n w e must as k is: What hel d the slav e rebellion i n check for s o long? The racis t traditio n i s pervasive an d envelop s ever y American . For black men it constitutes a heavy psychological burden . Fro m the unemployed , illiterat e ghett o dwelle r t o th e urbanize d ma n living in a n integrate d setting , careful examinatio n show s psy chological scars . Blac k me n figh t on e another , d o violenc e t o property, do hurtful thing s to themselves while nursing growin g

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hatred fo r th e syste m whic h oppresse s an d humiliate s them . Their manhoo d i s tested daily. 34 Rage—and it s twin, frustration—would becom e more than a n expla nation fo r blac k violence ; fo r liberals , i t woul d becom e a n excuse . I n time, the argument regarding black rage would spaw n conspiracy theorie s holding that white societ y had initiate d a genocidal campaign—featurin g police assassinatio n an d government-sponsore d dru g an d AID S epi demics—to comba t th e threa t o f blac k violence . The liberal search fo r solution s to the root cause s of crime was half hearted an d confused, an d i t ignored th e problem o f lower-class behavio r in city ghettos. Moreover, the rapidly rising number o f crime victims were disinclined t o view the promised payof f fro m Hea d Star t and othe r socia l programs a s solace fo r thei r trauma . In earl y 196 8 th e Gallu p Pol l reporte d tha t "crim e an d lawlessnes s are viewed by the public as the top domestic problem facing the nation fo r the first tim e since the beginning of scientific pollin g in the mid-thirties." 35 But those , suc h a s Johnson's forme r speechwrite r Be n Wattenberg, wh o warned Democrat s tha t appearin g t o favo r mugger s ove r thei r victim s was a fatal politica l strategy were dismissed as neoconservatives o r racists.

CIVIL DISORDER S AN D THE KERNE R COMMISSIO N Between Marc h an d Septembe r 1967 , civi l disorder s brok e ou t i n 163 town s an d citie s i n ever y par t o f th e nation . Eighty-thre e person s died, almos t ninetee n hundre d wer e injured , an d thousand s o f business es and home s looted an d burned . The worst rioting took place in Newar k and Detroit ; the Detroit riot was put dow n onl y after Arm y paratrooper s were sen t i n and forty-thre e peopl e killed . Republicans condemne d th e violence , anarchy , an d th e rioter s an d called for swif t an d ster n law enforcement measures . Televised footag e o f widespread lootin g le d the schola r Edwar d C . Banfield t o cal l it "riotin g mainly fo r fu n an d profit." 36 Bu t th e Democrat s seeme d ambiguous , a sense captured b y Vice President Hubert Humphrey' s earlie r observation : I'd hat e to be stuck [in ] . .. a tenement with rats nibbling on th e kids' toe s . . . with garbag e uncollecte d . . . with th e street s filthy, wit h n o swimmin g pool s o r n o recreation . . . . I thin k you'd hav e mor e troubl e tha n yo u hav e ha d already , becaus e

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I've got enough spar k l e f t . .. t o lead a pretty good revol t unde r those conditions. 37 On July 27, with Detroit still smoldering, Lyndon Johnson addresse d the nation , promisin g t o appoin t a commissio n t o fin d ou t wha t hap pened. Know n sinc e the n a s th e Kerne r Commissio n afte r it s chairma n Otto Kerner , the n Illinoi s governor, th e National Advisor y Commissio n on Civi l Disorder s woul d tak e it s plac e a s th e archetypa l expressio n o f 1960s liberalism . The commission issue d it s report o n Marc h 1 , 1968, in the midst o f one o f th e mos t turbulen t period s i n America n history . Nort h Vietna m had jus t launche d th e Te t offensiv e throughou t Sout h Vietnam ; a smal l unit had eve n fought it s way ont o the American embass y grounds. Bruta l fighting continue d throughou t February . O n Marc h 12 , Senator Eugen e McCarthy almos t bea t Lyndon Johnson i n New Hampshire' s presidentia l primary (McCarth y ha d bee n give n n o chanc e b y politicians o r journal ists). Four day s later, Robert F . Kennedy announce d hi s candidacy for th e nomination. Johnson then stunned the nation with his March 3 1 announcement tha t h e woul d no t see k reelection . An d jus t fou r day s later , Marti n Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, setting off a week of riots in more than on e hundred citie s that required the call-up of over 50,000 fed eral and National Guar d troop s an d resulte d i n thirty-nine deaths . In suc h turbulen t times , the Kerne r Commissio n repor t migh t hav e suffered th e usual dusty-shel f fat e o f government reports—excep t fo r th e inclusion o f a hastil y adde d two-pag e introduction , i n whic h thes e sen tences appeared : This is our basi c conclusion: Ou r natio n i s moving toward tw o societies, one black , on e white—separate an d unequal . What whit e American s hav e neve r full y understood—bu t what the Negro can never forget—is tha t white society is deeply implicated i n th e ghetto . Whit e institution s create d it , whit e institutions maintai n it , and whit e societ y condone s it. 38 Two othe r equall y memorabl e sentence s followed : Race prejudice ha s shape d ou r histor y decisivel y i n the past ; i t now threatens to do so again. White racism is essentially respon sible for th e explosive mixture which ha s been accumulating i n our citie s sinc e the en d o f World Wa r II. 39

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The Kerner Commissio n repor t remained , twenty-five year s after it s publication, a symbo l o f libera l excess : indiscriminat e invocation s o f white guilt , blanke t amnest y fo r th e crimina l act s o f rioters , an d a n unchallenged fait h i n the efficac y o f federa l programs . The repor t wa s reall y tw o reports . Th e firs t wa s th e introductio n that raise d the warning abou t racial and class segregation an d white com plicity. This was the "Kerne r Commissio n report " mos t frequentl y cited . The second repor t was a n analysi s o f central city problems that assume d the government wa s full y capabl e o f solvin g those problem s i f it had th e will t o tax , spend , an d organiz e stil l mor e programs . Th e repor t repre sented th e culmination o f the Grea t Societ y approach : a n undifferentiat ed batch of categorical programs offere d wit h the unstated hop e that the y would tur n lower-clas s individuals into middle-class citizens. As was customary i n th e post-Moyniha n period , th e Kerne r Commissio n reste d it s recommendations o n fou r assumptions : ± Th

e gap in blac k achievemen t coul d bes t b e explained a s the consequence o f pas t an d continuin g racia l discriminatio n an d th e lac k o f adequate governmen t fund s an d program s t o reduc e thi s gap .

± Th

e rapid growth in the black middle-class offered n o lessons or hope.

± Th

e responsibility fo r respondin g t o black-whit e differential s reste d entirely o n th e government an d majorit y society .

± Th

e failure t o ac t with spee d and urgenc y a t the scale recommende d was likel y t o lea d t o mor e riots , whic h wa s no t onl y predictable , but understandable .

The Kerner Commission , like the Ylvisaker group, predicted a n accelerating concentration o f black residents in central cities and a continuin g out-migration o f whit e residents . Discriminator y rea l estat e practice s would continu e t o bottl e u p middle-clas s blac k familie s i n cente r cities . The commission identifie d thre e broad polic y choices: the continuation o f present policies , invitin g mor e trouble ; th e enrichmen t o f th e ghett o through highe r welfar e payments , a millio n publi c secto r jobs , educa tional vouchers, and expanded housin g subsidies; and integration throug h federal subsidie s fo r school s servin g broa d geographi c areas , tough ne w open housing laws, and a massive increase in low-income housin g outsid e ghettos. 40

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The commissio n acte d quickly . A t th e reques t o f th e president , i t investigated an d succinctl y dismisse d th e theor y tha t th e riot s wer e planned. 41 Lik e the planners o f the War o n Poverty, the commission ha d no soli d evaluation s o f publi c programs , an d i t ignore d th e difficultie s associated wit h raisin g th e lowe r class . The commissio n fel l bac k o n a n approach tha t pleased activists , professional blacks , the Left, an d th e liberal academics : th e natio n shoul d d o everythin g i t though t possible , a t whatever cost , or expec t more violence. The commission mad e hundred s of polic y recommendations , coverin g everythin g fro m polic e trainin g t o property insuranc e to a new national incom e guarantee. It made no effor t to ran k it s suggestion s accordin g t o urgenc y o r cost-effectiveness . No r did th e commissio n acknowledg e th e confusion , rigidity , an d thought lessness endemic in the management o f those public programs mos t relevant t o th e poor. A s Wildavsky observed , th e repor t wa s a continuatio n of a liberal polic y that "angere d white s an d di d no t hel p blacks." 42 Government commission s ar e not appointe d t o find th e whole truth . Few elected officials fee l a need to increase the amount o f public criticis m to whic h the y ar e subjected ; no r d o the y nee d t o b e reminde d tha t "resources ar e limited " o r tha t "problem s ar e complex. " Commission s serve important , albei t limited , purposes—the y bu y tim e an d the y hel p build consensus . A commission i s assembled t o represent divergen t inter ests and t o make recommendations tha t ar e compatible wit h th e policie s and politic s o f it s appointor . Th e Kerne r Commissio n wa s typical : it s chairman wa s a loya l Democrati c so n o f th e Illinoi s Dale y organizatio n (and, later, the first convicte d federa l judg e in history); its vice-chair, John V. Lindsay , wa s th e Republica n mayo r o f Ne w York . Th e commissio n included tw o U.S . senator s an d tw o U.S . representatives— a Democra t and a Republican fro m eac h chamber; on e corporate CEO ; the presiden t of th e steelworker' s union ; on e woma n ( a forme r Kentuck y commerc e secretary); Ro y Wilkins , th e directo r o f th e NAACP ; an d th e Atlant a police chief. John Lindsa y was a white, Protestant Republica n i n his first ter m a s mayor o f a Democratic, ethnic , Catholic , an d Jewish city . Lindsay gav e concrete expressio n t o th e libera l model : h e believe d tha t blac k Ne w Yorkers would d o much bette r i f white New Yorkers—particularl y thos e living i n Brookly n an d Queens—woul d jus t giv e the m a chance . H e believed tha t civi c peac e wa s possibl e onl y i f th e city' s leadershi p tilte d to th e need s o f blac k an d Latin o neighborhoods . H e opene d "littl e cit y halls" t o provid e informatio n an d t o coordinat e cit y services . H e increased garbag e pick-up s i n blac k neighborhood s (u p t o nin e time s a

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week i n som e neighborhood s i n summer) . A t a tim e whe n stree t crim e was risin g dramatically , Lindsa y pushe d t o establis h a civilia n revie w board t o hea r complaint s o f polic e brutalit y (h e los t badly) . H e pro posed low-incom e housin g project s fo r middle-class neighborhood s an d redistricted schoo l attendanc e boundarie s to integrate a dwindling num ber o f whit e student s wit h growin g number s o f minorit y students . H e supported a n experimen t i n communit y contro l o f school s i n Ocea n Hill-Brownsville tha t produce d anti-Semiti c intimation s an d a citywid e teacher's strike . H e supporte d liberalizatio n i n th e administratio n o f welfare—and the n expresse d betraya l whe n th e welfare roll s skyrocket ed t o almost on e million. Lindsay hijacke d th e commission, wit h the help of David Ginsberg , its staff director . Pete r Goldmar k an d Jay Kriegel, members o f Lindsay' s staff, working with Ginsberg' s deputy, Victor Palmieri, drafted th e famous introduction a t th e time th e commission wa s wrapping u p it s business . Lindsay an d Ginsber g insiste d tha t th e introductio n b e included , eve n though i t had not been see n (onl y heard) b y the other members. 43 Lyndon Johnson refuse d t o accept th e Kerner report , refusin g eve n to exchange the usual letters of acknowledgement an d thanks.44 The commission staff , however , had arranged fo r immediate commercial publica tion o f th e report : i n th e firs t eleve n days , i t sol d 750,00 0 copies , exceeding the sales of the Warren Commissio n repor t on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.45 The editorial response was dramatic. The New York Times praise d th e repor t an d counsele d tha t "th e younge r more restless Negroes are increasingly pron e to violence becaus e they fee l trapped. Their sense of entrapment is not imagined."46 The New Republic supported th e commission's most notorious conclusion: "Th e Commission is saying in effect: Don' t blam e conspirators, outside agitators . . . Stokely Carmichaels . . . drugs, neglect i n childhood, hangove r o f slavery, sloth , dirt, rats . Blame Whitey. It's a harsh judgment , an d true." 47 White racism, as an explanation for black behavior, gave governmen t no purchas e wit h whic h t o move agains t th e problems i n black ghettos . When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. This is not to say that white racis m i s not a proble m o r eve n tha t i t is not the most importan t explanation fo r black-whit e divisions . A s a polic y recommendation , i t leads to nothing, except a paralyzing guilt that freezes debat e and halts the search fo r helpfu l answers . Mos t critically , i t produces a n imbalanc e i n which blac k apologist s dismis s all suggestions o f individual responsibili ty for rioting, dru g abuse , and the abandonment o f children .

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THE LIBERA L LEGACY Liberals, rathe r tha n stan d u p t o thei r sometim e allies , sometim e tormenters o n th e Left , wen t sof t instead . The y meekl y withdre w fro m direct conversatio n wit h blac k militant s wh o insiste d tha t whit e Americans had no role in maintaining the progressive coalition that helpe d enact th e civi l rights law s o f 196 4 an d 1965 . Liberals seeme d willin g t o accept the blam e an d guil t for th e entire nation. They excused blac k violence, allowing cities to b e held hostage . Maybe ther e wa s n o consensu s t o b e found i n th e Unite d State s o f 1968 becaus e the divisions were so wide and violent. But liberals stoppe d trying. The y shran k fro m th e har d politica l wor k o f advancin g idea s and arguments , negotiating , shavin g difference s o f opinion , an d fash ioning alternatives . Instead , liberal s fel l bac k o n th e Senat e filibuste r t o block th e adoptio n o f antibusin g directives ; thei r allie s i n civi l right s organizations turne d increasingl y t o sympatheti c federa l judge s an d bureaucrats t o advanc e mor e radica l notion s o f equa l opportunity . Al l the while , th e nationa l consensu s wa s buildin g towar d a conservativ e policy majorit y o n socia l an d racia l issues . S o total wa s th e intellectua l surrender o f white liberals that th e Democratic part y bega n t o lose cred ibility o n basi c issue s tha t ha d previousl y neve r divide d America n poli tics. B y th e 196 8 presidentia l campaign , Republican s coul d mak e a credible charg e tha t th e Democrati c part y oppose d effort s t o maintai n law an d orde r i n America's cities .

4» THE LIBERA L ABANDONMEN T OF POLITIC S

A

s Lyndon Johnson's presidency dre w to a close, the Democrats' mora l leverage o n th e natio n wa s slipping . Th e violen t clashe s a t th e Democratic Nationa l Conventio n i n Chicag o i n 196 8 symbolize d grow ing division s ove r Vietnam , th e emergin g cultura l war s betwee n tradi tional an d ne w values, and th e liberals' efforts t o reform th e Democrati c party. After Richar d Nixon defeate d Huber t Humphre y i n the Novembe r elections, liberal s focuse d o n takin g ove r th e Democrati c party . Thei r short-lived triump h culminate d i n the nominatio n o f Georg e McGover n as their presidential candidate in 197 2 and accelerate d the Democrats' loss of credibilit y wit h America n voters .

THE ROOT S O F REFORM A T THE STAT E LEVEL In sprin g 1968 , I becam e th e deput y manage r o f Senato r Rober t Kennedy's "noncampaign " i n Ne w Jersey' s presidentia l primary . (Thi s grand titl e mean t tha t I did grun t wor k fo r Kennedy' s onl y Ne w Jerse y visit, a boisterou s rall y i n Camden. ) Kenned y ha d bypasse d th e Ne w Jersey primary an d ha d instea d pu t al l his efforts int o California— a win ner-take-all even t involvin g 17 4 convention delegate s hel d th e sam e da y as the New Jersey primary, whic h selecte d 8 2 delegates . 73

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Kennedy decide d tha t Ne w Jersey was no t essential , and th e feelin g was mutual . New Jersey's Democrati c part y wa s ru n b y "regulars " wh o cared muc h mor e abou t winnin g count y election s tha n opposin g a Democratic president on anything as remote as Vietnam. Control of coun ty governmen t mean t jobs , contributions , contracts , an d th e righ t t o decide who ran on the organization lin e for stat e and federal office . (A t his farewell dinne r i n 1968 , Esse x County' s longtim e chairma n delivere d a plain message : "An d don' t worr y abou t m e i n retirement . Y'l l no t b e havin' t o thro w an y bing o game s fo r Denn y Carey." 1) I n retur n fo r th e support o f part y loyalists , the count y chai r woul d awar d member s jobs , services, or small favors. The selection of national convention delegates was yet another opportunit y fo r th e leader t o conduct business , rewarding th e faithful fo r year-in , year-ou t servic e wit h th e chanc e t o tak e a nic e trip , attend a few parties, and do a little political business of their own; there was no place for newcomer s o r ideologues . Kennedy staye d out of New Jersey, knowing that a good showin g in other primaries was his only hope of unlocking the organizational suppor t that ha d nominate d hi s brother i n 1960 . As LBJ's presumptive heir , Vice President Hubert Humphrey focused hi s campaign o n appealing to south ern an d organizatio n Democrat s who remaine d loya l to Johnson; he ha d announced hi s candidacy too late to participate i n primaries. (Johnson di d not announc e hi s retiremen t unti l Marc h 31 , by whic h tim e th e filing deadline for primarie s in most states had passed.) As a result, New Jersey's primary produced sixty-thre e uncommitted delegate s (sixty-tw o o f who m would eventuall y vote for Humphre y i n Chicago) an d nineteen for Eugen e McCarthy. The McCarth y delegate s wer e electe d fro m suburban , Republica n areas wher e th e Democrati c part y structur e wa s weak . Th e exclusio n o f antiwar Democrat s fro m consideratio n a s delegates in strong Democrati c counties le d to the unprovable assertio n b y McCarthy loyalist s that, i n a fair an d ope n fight , the y would hav e won mor e tha n thei r eightee n com mitted delegates . Whe n the y returne d fro m th e tumul t o f th e Chicag o convention, the y wer e read y t o d o battl e wit h th e regula r organizatio n Democrats, eve n i f i t mean t allyin g wit h th e follower s o f th e martyre d RFK to for m th e New Democrati c Coalitio n (NDC) . The Ne w Jersey ND C attracte d whit e liberals , most o f who m wer e well-educated, well-compensate d professional s motivate d b y oppositio n to th e wa r i n Vietnam. A 197 0 surve y o f seve n hundre d ND C member s and mor e tha n eigh t hundre d count y committe e member s ("regulars" ) found a n astonishin g 8 7 percen t o f ND C respondent s employe d a s

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professionals o r managers. 2 Jew s wer e overrepresente d an d Catholic s underrepresented amon g reformers , whil e 4 0 percen t o f th e reformer s claimed n o religio n a t all . B y contrast , 5 8 percen t o f th e regular s wer e Roman Catholi c an d onl y 7 percen t liste d n o religion. 3 Th e ND C als o included representative s o f progressiv e union s suc h a s th e Unite d Aut o Workers, som e renegad e blac k politicians , an d eve n som e organizatio n Democrats—nimble antiwa r incumbent s wh o represente d suburbs . Th e New Jerse y ND C wa s typica l o f th e upper-middl e clas s reformer s wh o would creat e a new nationa l Democrati c part y a t the 197 2 convention . What wa s the tone o f an NDC gathering ? Tw o characteristics stan d out: zealotry an d a numbing emphasi s o n procedural purity . The extrem e McCarthy supporter s distruste d Rober t Kennedy , whom the y saw a s the gutless exploite r o f McCarthy' s Ne w Hampshir e success . T o preven t Kennedy loyalists and suspec t McCarthyites from "stealing " the NDC, the McCarthy extremist s insiste d o n elaborat e safeguard s regardin g notic e and conduc t o f meetings, strict adherenc e t o rules of order , an d cumber some review s o f an y publi c statements . Man y o f thos e attracte d t o th e NDC wer e "professiona l meetin g attenders " wh o ha d hone d thei r par liamentary skill s at League of Women Voters conferences, Episcopa l syn ods, ba r associations , o r socia l worker councils . No poin t wa s too smal l to evade challenge, review, resubmission, reconsideration, amendment , o r amendment t o th e amendment . Meeting s wer e a nightmar e o f resolu tion-drafting, caucu s sessions , and procedura l pedantry . For th e McCarth y zealots , there was n o roo m fo r accommodatio n with anyon e morall y tainte d b y suppor t o f th e Johnson-Humphre y wing, whic h limite d th e potentia l appea l o f th e ND C t o traditiona l Democrats. Th e son s o f whit e working-clas s familie s wer e fightin g th e war (muc h mor e s o tha n th e son s o f ND C members) , bu t th e ND C made littl e effor t t o includ e working-clas s people . Th e son s o f blac k families als o were overrepresente d i n Vietnam, an d Marti n Luthe r Kin g had stoo d strongl y agains t th e war, bu t th e NDC wa s a very pale group . Much o f the languag e an d ideolog y o f the New Jersey reformers stresse d the pligh t o f th e poo r an d minorities , an d advocate d mor e taxe s an d spending t o hel p them . Bu t th e ple a wa s bloodless , abstract , and , fo r most ND C members , devoid o f an y personal connectio n t o the problem s being decried . The ND C di d no t las t long—i t announce d it s establishmen t i n November 196 8 and dissolved i n June 1969—bu t it s effects i n New Jersey were substantia l an d largel y positive . Th e NDC' s leadership , endurin g parliamentary tortur e an d persona l abuse , labore d t o moderat e th e

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extremes an d t o freshen th e Democratic party. Recognizing the energy of the ND C an d th e nee d fo r rejuvenatio n i n th e party , th e leade r o f Ne w Jersey's regular Democrats , Governo r Richar d J. Hughes, gave the ND C his stam p o f approval . A man o f uncommo n graciousness , shrewdness , and resilience , Hughes ha d bee n praised b y all combatants fo r th e digni ty an d fairnes s wit h whic h h e chaire d th e credential s committe e a t th e Democratic National Conventio n i n Chicago. That experienc e convince d him that the Democrats had to accommodate th e newly energized reform ers. On the NDC's establishment , Hughes opined: "Chang e is being force d upon us . We have no choice. Rejecting [th e Coalition] idea s would mea n the earl y destructio n o f the party." 4 In January 196 9 th e Ne w Jerse y ND C hel d it s firs t an d onl y con vention. Mor e tha n 2,00 0 Democrat s registere d fo r a day o f workshop s on part y reform , riots , racism, an d ta x policy ; to elec t officers ( a slate of "moderates" wa s electe d overwhelmingl y agains t a ticke t o f McCarth y purists); and to hear Senato r Georg e McGovern an d the antiwar organize r Allard K . Lowenstein . I t wa s th e larges t suc h gatherin g o f Ne w Jerse y Democrats, making the NDC a n immediate force i n the upcoming guber natorial primary . For a time, it appeared tha t th e NDC migh t entic e sea soned, antiwa r Representativ e Fran k Thompso n t o ru n agains t th e conservative forme r governor , Rober t B . Meyner. "Thompy " eventuall y declined, leavin g th e ND C t o endors e a n ideologicall y satisfactory , bu t electorally unexciting, candidate, Representative Henry Helstoski. Meyne r won the primary. Amidst warnings from Hughe s and other s that h e needed to sho w deference t o the coalition, Meaner name d a n NDC activis t a s vice-chair o f th e Democrati c stat e committe e ( a meaningles s position ) and chos e ND C chairma n Da n Cab y t o b e the hea d o f th e newl y estab lished Democrati c Polic y Council . When Meyne r sough t th e ND C endorsemen t fo r th e genera l elec tion, h e was rejecte d b y it s executive committe e a s too conservativ e an d insufficiently energeti c i n hi s oppositio n t o th e war . I n response , Cab y resigned fro m th e NDC . Hi s vice-chai r declare d th e Ne w Jerse y Ne w Democratic Coalitio n dissolve d an d strod e out . Despite it s shor t lifespan , th e ND C succeede d i n propellin g it s reformist goal s to the top o f the Democratic party agend a i n New Jersey. After Meyne r los t th e election , th e Democrati c Polic y Counci l wen t t o work a s a shado w government , attractin g a broa d cross-sectio n o f Democrats t o wor k o n majo r issues . Whe n refor m Democra t Brenda n Byrne was elected governo r fou r year s later i n the wake o f the Watergat e scandal, muc h o f hi s progra m fo r fiscal , governmental , an d campaig n

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finance refor m reflecte d th e council's recommendations, an d man y o f hi s important appointment s ha d bee n NDC activists. 5 The ND C experienc e i n Ne w Jerse y contain s a n objec t lesso n fo r reformers. Th e Ne w Jersey ND C wa s a vehicl e fo r attractin g an d chan neling th e energie s o f hundred s o f motivate d Democrat s wh o wante d t o end th e Vietnam Wa r an d ope n u p th e party . Fo r al l the sanctimonious ness o f it s rhetori c an d it s sometime s paralyzin g procedura l rigor , th e NDC leadershi p understoo d th e characte r o f it s mission—t o chang e th e Democratic part y an d wi n genera l elections . From it s first da y i n public , the ND C appeale d t o organizatio n Democrats , seekin g t o broade n th e party's bas e an d strengthe n it s coalition . Moral outrag e agains t th e Vietna m Wa r wa s a powerfu l forc e i n 1968, an d it s aftereffect s brough t a ne w generatio n o f activist s int o th e Democratic party . I f man y late r drifte d away , enoug h staye d t o giv e th e party a reservoi r o f talented , progressiv e politicians , wh o becam e th e dominant forc e i n Congress and i n many northern statehouses . But, when it came t o demonstratin g goo d sens e an d inspirin g leadershi p i n nation al campaigns, th e legacy o f libera l refor m i s decidedly different .

1968: TH E LAS T GATHERING O F THE REGULA R DEMOCRAT S The purpos e o f a national part y i s to organiz e th e proces s o f nomi nating and electing presidential candidates. Until 197 2 Democratic nation al conventions were gatherings o f politicians whose main purpos e wa s t o make judgment s abou t wh o coul d wi n th e Whit e House . Stat e delega tions wer e le d b y governors, mayors , legislators , an d labo r leaders . Th e Democratic part y was , b y reaso n o f it s breadt h an d dept h o f support , either a coalition part y o r a losing party. Leader s negotiate d wit h candi dates to guard thei r prerogatives , to ensure that they would b e consulte d about federa l appointment s i n their jurisdictions . Platforms wer e drafte d to ensur e tha t al l majo r interest s an d region s i n th e part y coul d stan d comfortably o n them. It is easy to romanticize the pre-1972 conventions , to understat e th e villain y an d corruptio n o f som e o f th e leaders , an d t o overlook th e exclusion o f blac k Americans (convention s were virtually al l white until 1936) . But what cannot b e too strongl y emphasized i s that th e convention wa s a place fo r politician s t o practic e coalitio n politics . All this was very frustrating t o the Republicans. Much mor e cohesiv e ideologically, racially, and economically , Republican s marvele d a t how a

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mixture of white southerners, city Catholics, Jews, and black s could com e to together wit h wester n rancher s an d midwester n farmer s an d agre e o n a platfor m an d candidate— a proces s tha t ha d regularl y defeate d th e Republicans sinc e 1932 . Democrats kne w how to selec t attractive candi dates an d buil d electora l coalitions . There wa s n o national Democrati c party . Th e nationa l committe e arranged th e quadrennia l conventio n an d di d littl e else . It wa s th e stat e parties tha t decide d wh o woul d g o to conventions. Fo r a century, south ern state s sen t whit e Democrat s whos e primar y objectiv e wa s t o trad e electoral votes for guarantee s tha t th e federal governmen t woul d no t dis turb segregation . Not unti l 196 4 did a national convention eve n questio n the righ t o f a stat e part y t o exclud e blacks . A t Atlanti c Cit y tha t year , Democrats agree d t o sea t tw o at-larg e delegate s fro m th e integrationis t Mississippi Freedo m Democrati c party , an d t o se t u p a Specia l Equa l Opportunity Committe e t o consider change s a t th e 196 8 convention . Even without th e ferment brough t o n b y the Vietnam war, the 196 8 convention i n Chicag o would hav e pursued th e integration o f the south ern delegations . Since the Voting Rights Act, black southerner s were registering i n hug e numbers—a s Democrats . Th e traditio n o f a n iner t national part y ha d ende d i n Januar y 1968 , wit h th e adoptio n o f stan dards against racial discrimination an d secre t party proceedings. The pace of change in the hands of the regular Democrats was slow, however: blac k delegates increased fro m 2 percent i n 196 4 t o just 5 percent i n 1968 . At Chicago , th e Democrat s nominate d Vic e Presiden t Huber t Humphrey, th e badl y bruise d legate e o f Lyndo n Johnson , wh o kep t Humphrey o n a shor t leash ; Johnso n vetoe d an y platfor m languag e remotely critica l o f hi s Vietnam policies . With n o flexibilit y t o compro mise wit h th e antiwa r Democrat s o n Vietnam , Humphre y release d hi s delegates to suppor t part y refor m resolutions , i f they chose to . Two-thirds o f the delegates arrived at Chicago formally unpledge d t o any candidate. The southern delegation s were overwhelmingly supportiv e of LBJ and oppose d t o radical part y refor m (meanin g rapid integration) . Humphrey receive d 440 o f 52 7 votes from th e state s of the Confederac y (the onl y significan t defection s cam e fro m th e tw o delegations — Mississippi an d Georgia—tha t wer e successfully challenge d b y integrate d slates). Humphrey als o captured th e large industrial states , with their tra dition o f organizationa l politic s representin g organize d labo r an d work ing-class Democrats . Libera l o n economi c an d socia l insuranc e issues , but conservative o n social, racial, and cultural issues, party regular s wer e put off b y McCarthy an d his "kids." Humphrey took 11 2 of 11 8 delegate s

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in Illinois , 10 4 o f 13 0 i n Pennsylvania , 9 4 o f 11 5 i n Ohio , 7 2 o f 9 6 i n Michigan, 6 2 o f 8 2 in New Jersey, an d 4 5 o f 4 9 i n Maryland . McCarthy di d bes t in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, California , and Ne w York , pickin g u p a total o f 60 1 delegates . Georg e McGovern , a late entry to attract the assassinated Bobb y Kennedy's delegates, received 146 votes , most o f the m fro m Californi a an d Sout h Dakota . Humphrey wa s terribl y damage d b y the convention : h e looked lik e an LB J puppe t whil e th e street s o f Chicag o wer e turne d int o scene s o f blood an d disorde r as Vietnam protesters clashed with the Chicago police. And al l o f i t wa s o n nationa l television . Th e part y lef t Chicag o badl y divided o n the issue of Vietnam, with many liberal s threatening to sit ou t the general election . Eve n so, Humphrey onl y narrowly los t what turne d out t o b e on e o f th e closes t election s i n America n history , a n electio n confused b y Governo r Georg e Wallace' s stron g showin g (he go t 13. 5 percent o f the vote and electora l votes from Alabama , Arkansas, Georgia , Louisiana, an d Mississippi) .

THE REACTIO N T O THE "SIEG E O F CHICAGO" The uglines s o f th e Chicag o conventio n produce d call s fo r refor m from tw o differen t kind s of Democrats. First and loudes t were supporter s of Senator Eugene McCarthy, who wanted to overthrow regular Democrat s and en d th e Vietna m War . The y proteste d tha t th e tru e strengt h o f th e antiwar movemen t wa s not represente d a t Chicag o becaus e of tricks an d traditions o f regular part y organizations . They pointed ou t tha t si x hun dred delegate s ha d bee n selecte d befor e McCarth y eve n announce d hi s candidacy and that delegate s in most states were picked in private with n o participation b y grass-roots Democrats . In fact, th e picture was a good dea l murkier tha n th e one McCarth y enthusiasts painted . Thei r ma n ha d wo n onl y si x primary elections , an d five of them were against no declared candidates (Johnso n bea t McCarth y by 23 0 vote s i n Ne w Hampshir e a s a n undeclare d write-in candidate) . Oregon wa s th e onl y trul y conteste d primar y tha t h e won . Moreover , grass-roots Democrat s showe d limite d suppor t fo r McCarthy : a mid-Ma y Gallop Pol l showe d Humphre y leadin g with 4 0 percent , followe d b y 3 1 percent fo r Kennedy , an d onl y 1 9 for McCarthy. 6 McCarth y ha d n o visible suppor t amon g organize d labor , regula r Democrats , whit e south erners, or minorities . Nonetheless, McCarthy' s adherent s wer e adaman t that th e nominatio n ha d bee n wo n b y political shenanigans .

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The othe r Democrat s pressin g refor m wer e regular s wh o foresa w the consequences t o the party i f the frustration s o f newl y energize d anti war an d minorit y Democrat s wer e no t addresse d directly . Ne w Jersey' s Governor Hughe s wa s th e mos t consisten t voic e o f refor m amon g part y regulars. H e chaire d th e Democrati c party' s Specia l Equa l Right s Committee, which put fort h a plan containing si x basic elements of stan dards an d procedure s fo r riddin g th e part y o f raciall y discriminator y practices. Thei r adoptio n i n earl y 196 8 constitute d th e firs t ste p i n th e reduction o f stat e part y autonom y an d le d directl y t o th e unseatin g o f the regular Mississipp i delegatio n an d hal f o f the all-whit e Georgi a dele gation a t th e Chicag o convention . Th e Specia l Committe e als o recom mended tha t th e 196 8 conventio n establis h a commissio n o n part y structure t o shap e ne w procedures fo r th e 197 2 convention. 7 Hughes accepte d th e chairmanshi p o f th e Credential s Committe e for th e 196 8 convention , where h e had t o dea l with challenge s t o fiftee n state delegations, including Texas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania . Theodor e White sai d o f Hughes' s performance : The Credential s Committe e hearing s migh t hav e degenerate d into a successio n o f brawls . Fortunately , th e Party' s Nationa l Committee ha d chose n a s it s chairma n Governo r Richar d Hughes o f Ne w Jersey , an d the y coul d hav e mad e n o bette r choice. Hughes, a man o f th e ol d politics , a stern commitmen t man o n the war, was a judge by profession an d instinct , a ma n of absolute fairness whose honor insisted on review of facts... . 8 The Credential s Committee' s wor k woul d b e overlooke d durin g th e tumult o f the Chicago convention, but it would serv e as the point of entr y for th e reformists. The committee's proposal to establish a commission o n party structur e an d refor m wa s approve d a s a n afterthough t b y th e ful l convention. Meanwhile, the Rules Committee' s paralle l recommendatio n for a commissio n t o implemen t rule s forbiddin g winner-take-al l pri maries—the "uni t rule"—and favorin g "timely " primar y election s o f delegates pledge d t o specifi c candidate s wa s th e subjec t o f vigorou s debat e before adoptio n b y a narro w vote . Humphre y delegate s provide d th e margin o f victory . After Chicago , the reformer s ha d a n opportunit y t o ope n th e part y without pushing out the regulars and to integrate the southern delegation s without revertin g to quotas. Many regular s were progressive an d ope n t o debate. Hubert Humphrey , i n defeat, becam e a distant advocat e of refor m

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and se t a preceden t tha t othe r part y nominee s woul d follow . Lik e Mondale an d Dukakis , Humphre y ha d trade d th e nominatio n fo r ne w rules t o appeas e th e lef t win g o f th e part y tha t woul d bin d futur e candi dates and conventions. If Humphrey ha d bee n elected to the White House , the ne w rule s woul d no t hav e bee n a consideratio n becaus e incumben t presidents usually enjoy eas y renomination. Humphrey pushe d the process along with his selection of an Oklahom a populist , Senato r Fred Harris, as party chairma n i n Januar y 1969 . Harri s wante d proponent s o f refor m for th e Commission o n Party Structur e an d Delegat e Selection and foun d a working majority. 9 Georg e McGovern wa s appointe d chai r an d serve d until h e resigne d i n 197 1 t o see k th e presidentia l nomination , a t whic h time Representativ e Donal d Frase r o f Minnesot a replace d him .

REVOLUTION B Y RESOLUTION AND COMMITTE E REPOR T The liberals were playing in a forum wher e their comparative advan tage was greatest, where issues of procedure coul d mask th e power strug gle, and wher e th e argumen t onl y ha d t o carr y a smal l group , with littl e attention fro m th e media t o aler t somnolen t regulars . Hubert Humphre y was concentrating o n a 197 0 Senat e election, not o n Senato r McGovern' s commission. The regulars on the commission wer e inattentive (I . W. Abel of the steelworker s union , fo r example , di d no t atten d a single meeting); furthermore, the y wer e unrepresente d o n th e staff , al l o f who m wer e handpicked b y Senato r McGovern . Th e question s o f wh o woul d vot e a t national convention s and , mor e important , ho w presidentia l candidate s would b e nominated, wer e answered i n a series of close votes among th e twenty-four commissio n members . Revolution i s a word cheapene d b y overuse, but revolution describe s what th e McGovern-Frase r commissio n achieved . Th e reform s woul d result i n a national part y structure , animate d b y presidentia l elections , and quit e distinguishabl e fro m th e stat e an d loca l part y organization s that otherwis e represente d Democrats . Betwee n 196 8 an d 1972 , th e Democrats who ran states and cities and represented th e party in Congres s were purged. Their places were taken b y delegates who represente d pres idential candidates , no t part y organizations . Th e hos t o f th e 196 8 con vention, th e mos t powerfu l Democrati c leade r i n th e nation , Mayo r Richard Daley , was not seated at the 197 2 convention even though he had been elected a delegate in the Illinois primary. Onl y 30 of 255 Democrati c members o f Congres s wer e delegates . (B y th e 197 6 convention , fewe r

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than hal f th e Democrati c governor s an d onl y 1 4 percent o f Democrati c U.S. senator s an d 1 5 percen t o f Democrati c representative s wer e offi cially seated.) 10 Thu s wer e Democrati c officeholder s exclude d fro m th e process o f selectin g their presidentia l nominee . Instead o f lettin g governor s o r part y leader s choos e delegates , th e new Democrats adopted quotas . The McGovern-Fraser guideline s required proportional representatio n fo r blacks , Latinos, women, and younger vot ers. Theodore H . White portrayed th e action a s a betrayal o f liberalism : From th e foundin g o f th e countr y on , th e centra l instinc t an d pride o f th e American libera l ha s bee n to keep opportunit y fo r individuals open . Fo r tw o centurie s th e war s o f America n lib erals—against Kin g George, against the banks, against the slave holders . . . against the bosses—have reflected a doctrine whic h is more tha n politics , a doctrin e whic h i s of th e essenc e o f th e culture o f th e nation : N o ma n mus t b e locke d int o o r ham mered int o a categor y fro m whic h h e ha s n o opportunit y t o escape. He mus t no t b e locked i n b y the colo r o f hi s ski n . . . ; he must not b e locked in by lack of educational opportunity ; h e must not b e locked in by birth, or parentage, or age, or poverty . The quot a ide a wa s a wrench fro m thi s tradition. 11 The vote of the McGovern-Fraser commissio n wa s ten to nine. By a single vote did the party of equal opportunity "wrench " fro m it s tradition. Between th e 196 8 an d 197 2 conventions , wome n delegate s increase d from 1 3 to 3 8 percent ; blac k delegate s fro m 5 to 1 5 percent . In January 197 0 the Democratic Nationa l Committe e approve d th e McGovern-Fraser Commission' s report with little discussion. Nearly ever y state Democratic party would hav e to revise its procedures, state laws, and party regulation s t o comply . Confusio n reigned . Th e simples t wa y fo r states t o avoi d lega l challenge s wa s t o op t fo r primarie s tha t electe d pledged delegate s selecte d b y the presidential candidates . Primaries, previousl y nothin g mor e tha n a sidesho w t o th e nomi nating process—as wit h John Kennedy' s victor y ove r Hubert Humphre y in Wes t Virgini a i n 196 0 o r Georg e Wallace' s guerrill a raid s o n LB J i n 1964—dominated th e proces s b y 1972 . Th e numbe r o f state s holdin g primaries increase d fro m seventee n t o onl y twenty-three ; the percentag e of delegates selected in primaries increased from nearl y half to two-thirds . But th e bigges t differenc e wa s i n th e proportio n o f delegate s formall y bound t o a candidate: in 196 8 onl y 36 percent were committed; b y 1972 ,

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58 percen t were. 12 Th e uni t rul e wa s out , excep t tha t Californi a wa s allowed t o retai n it s winner-take-all primary . Electe d official s an d part y leaders wer e n o longe r grante d ex officio delegat e seats . Suddenly, stat e party organization s face d bewilderin g ne w requirements , an d th e deci sion o n whethe r t o compl y wa s take n ou t o f thei r hands . Th e ne w Democratic part y becam e a regulator y commission , a nose-counting , rule-invoking, lawyer-drive n counci l ru n b y faceles s functionarie s wh o issued edict s to governors, mayors, and stat e chairs. The bloo d wa s run ning ou t o f Democrati c politics . The nominating rules had bee n changed by politicians who could no t win otherwise . "Fairness " wa s thei r publi c rationale , bu t contro l o f th e nominating process was their real objective. Before 197 2 the process favore d leaders with broad appea l to the Democratic base, who could bring regional o r ethni c strengt h an d wh o coul d ge t alon g with th e majo r constituen t groups i n th e party . Th e nominatio n require d carefu l coalition - building . Coalitions mean compromise, and compromise usually pushes one towar d the cente r o f th e politica l spectrum , wher e America n election s ar e won . Finding common ground is the defining political skill—not only for winnin g the nomination, bu t for winnin g general elections and fo r governing . The new incentives favored candidate s wh o coul d generat e enthusi asm amon g policy activists and organize d interest s suc h a s teachers, candidates who coul d appea l to the media, raise funds, moun t highl y visibl e campaigns i n crucial earl y stat e contests—an d understan d th e rule s wel l enough no t t o ge t trippe d u p i n th e extensiv e regulatio n o f th e process . The public nature o f the new process gave additional powe r to the media , which sough t significanc e i n otherwis e insignifican t facts . I n 197 2 McGovern spen t twenty-four day s campaigning for primar y votes in tiny, Republican New Hampshire an d was rewarded wit h a mere 35,000 votes. He los t b y a landslid e margi n o f almos t 1 0 percen t t o Main e Senato r Edmund Muskie . I n th e ne w politics , however, McGover n wa s th e win ner. Early surveys had given Muskie 65 percent of the votes, and the media had buil t u p expectation s fo r th e Ne w Englan d senator . Whe n Muski e fell short , th e medi a sai d h e wa s faltering . B y 197 6 th e proces s wa s s o misguided tha t Jimm y Carte r establishe d hi s candidac y b y drawin g 2 7 percent o f the votes from th e 1 0 percent o f Iowa Democrat s participatin g in neighborhoo d caucuses . Th e obsessio n o f th e medi a transforme d th e 150,000 or so Democrats who attended the Iowa caucuses and voted in the New Hampshir e primar y int o th e ne w kingmakers . The en d resul t i s tha t Democrati c primarie s hav e becom e "polic y auctions" in which candidates bi d up the intensity of their commitment i n

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exchange fo r th e suppor t o f Democrati c interes t groups . The difference s between constituen t group s ar e highlighted , no t thei r commonalities . Thus, Jewish group s hea r promises fo r relocatin g th e American embass y to Jerusalem, blac k groups hear declarations fo r se t asides and affirmativ e action, teachers union s ar e assure d abou t oppositio n t o schoo l "choice " plans, and feminist s ar e promised unqualifie d defens e o f abortio n rights . In return, candidates hop e to receive the enthusiastic suppor t fro m inter est groups without muc h regar d fo r th e effect thes e promises will have in the general election . THE NATIONA L DEMOCRATS : IDEOLOGUES , PARLIAMENTARIANS, AN D NOS E COUNTER S The clas h betwee n traditiona l an d ne w Democrat s reflecte d th e divisions o f America' s cultura l wa r o f th e lat e 1960 s an d earl y 1970s . This wa s i n man y way s a clas s wa r tha t se t thos e wh o oppose d th e Vietnam Wa r agains t thos e wh o fough t i n it ; well-educate d feminist s derided stay-at-hom e mother s an d emphasize d th e career opportunitie s of professiona l wome n ove r secretaries , factor y workers , an d stor e clerks. I t wa s a battl e betwee n th e casuall y religiou s o r agnosti c an d the devout. Liberal s looked a t graffiti o n city walls and sa w folk art ; tra ditionalists sa w defacement . Liberal s heard th e four-lette r word s shout ed a t studen t sit-in s a s the poetr y o f self-expression ; th e traditionalist s heard th e crudity o f th e ill-mannered . Whit e liberal s calle d fo r "under standing fo r th e rag e an d frustration " o f rioters ; traditionalist s sai d "lock the m up. " Whit e liberal s seeme d particularl y enthusiasti c abou t school busin g an d low-incom e housin g proposal s an d lef t i t to th e tra ditionalists t o sa y "no t i n m y bac k yard. " I n ever y cas e th e ne w Democrats supporte d th e culturally libera l agains t th e traditional. And , in just abou t ever y case, a majority o f the electorat e too k th e sid e of th e traditional agains t wha t i t perceive d t o b e th e disruptive , disorderly , and destructive . The accession o f the antiwar reformer s coincide d with the rise of th e women's movement, the increased militancy of racial and ethnic minorities, and th e homosexua l right s movement . Thes e group s gravitate d t o th e Democratic party , wher e the y foun d a war m receptio n fro m th e whit e liberal reformer s wh o wer e lookin g fo r allie s in their wa r wit h th e regu lars. Fo r man y o f th e feminists , gays , an d minorities , th e part y wa s jus t another forum . Thei r loyaltie s wer e t o thei r cause s an d movements , no t

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to the party. They wanted acquiescenc e to their demands, not compromise s and coalitions . By 1972 feminists, blacks , Latinos, gays, and lesbian s ha d organized caucuse s withi n th e part y (th e firs t thre e wer e grante d thei r own seat s on the Democratic National Committee' s executiv e committee , which wa s expande d t o a n unwield y 41 0 member s t o accommodat e th e "protected" classes) . At precisely the time that nationa l Democrat s wer e purging th e tra ditional base s o f thei r party , th e representative s o f ne w cause s infuse d the Democrat s wit h energy , ideas , an d troops . The y als o mad e th e ne w Democrats appea r disorganize d an d fractious , embarrasse d b y patrio tism, and—mor e ofte n tha n not—o n th e sid e o f th e robber s agains t th e cops and the welfare recipien t agains t the worker. These groups als o conveyed anothe r persistent , plai n message : W e d o no t muc h lik e white , straight males . White, straight male s go t th e message . Senator McGovern typified th e new Democrats in several ways. First, he was defined b y his avid opposition t o the Vietnam War. Second, he had limited firsthand experienc e dealin g with blac k Americans. He came fro m Mitchell, Sout h Dakota , whic h i n th e 197 0 censu s reporte d 2 2 black s out o f 13,42 5 residents . Th e crunchin g issue s o f race , crime , disorder , and schoo l busin g wer e remot e fro m th e concern s o f hi s constituents . But he was generous with his sympathy abou t th e plight of blacks. Third, he was a n inep t politician. Although h e mastered procedur e an d reform , he could not exercis e sufficient leadershi p to control his own nominatin g convention. The Republican s coul d no t believ e thei r luck—her e wa s thei r riva l party, claiman t t o th e loyaltie s o f full y hal f th e America n electorate , adopting procedure s an d requirement s tha t substantiall y decrease d it s capacity t o nominat e a winnin g presidentia l candidate . I t woul d tak e twenty years , fou r Republica n victories , an d a right-win g Republica n government fo r th e Democratic part y to recover fro m th e damage inflict ed b y the 197 2 conventio n an d campaign . The platfor m adopte d a t th e 197 2 conventio n reflecte d th e ai r o f unreality that had seize d liberal Democrats. The platform i s an importan t element i n presidential campaign s becaus e i t paints a simpl e picture tha t the party wants voters to see. In 197 2 the Democratic platfor m attracte d attention fo r it s suppor t o f measure s considere d radica l b y most voters . Consider thes e positions : ±O

n Vietnam: "W e will end that wa r b y a simple plan . . . the imme diate tota l withdrawa l o f al l Americans fro m Southeas t Asia. "

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±O

n American society : "W e must restructure th e social, political, an d economic relationship s throughou t th e entir e societ y i n orde r t o ensure th e equitabl e distributio n o f wealt h an d power. "

±O

n poverty : "a n earne d incom e approac h t o ensur e eac h famil y a n income substantially mor e than th e poverty level, ensuring standard s of decenc y an d health. "

±O

n schoo l busing : "Transportatio n o f student s i s anothe r too l t o accomplish desegregation. "

Although th e McGover n platfor m di d no t promis e socialism , i t di d pledge to eliminate—through governmen t guarante e an d dicta—an y man ifestation o f fre e enterpris e tha t coul d potentiall y produc e inequalit y o r failure. I t promised t o us e the tax syste m an d federa l la w enforcement t o redistribute incom e an d wealth . An d i t sai d th e Democrat s woul d stud y whether corporation s shoul d b e chartered a s federal institutions . The McGovern Democrat s were just as radical when they considere d the divisions brough t o n b y the nation's ragin g cultural war. As Thoma s and Mar y Edsal l emphasize d i n their 199 1 boo k o n th e declin e o f liber alism, th e Democrat s "wer e committe d t o continuin g th e right s revolu tion—a revolutio n tha t man y working - an d lower-middl e clas s voter s saw a s threatenin g t o traditional , deepl y valued , i f inequitabl e socia l arrangements." An d mos t strikingly , th e Edsall s noted , "a t a time whe n crime was rising at an unprecedented rate , the Democratic platform devot ed mor e attentio n t o th e restoratio n o f constitutiona l right s t o release d convicts tha n t o effort s t o comba t stree t violence." 13 Th e platfor m endorsed quota s for "historicall y under-represente d groups, " including the poor; the right of welfare recipient s to b e represented b y union-like orga nizations whe n dealin g wit h welfar e agencies ; an d specia l employmen t and educationa l right s for th e mentally retarded an d physicall y disabled . Everybody, i t seemed , wa s hande d speciall y tailore d right s b y reason o f their age , race, gender, handicap, income, or military service—excep t fo r the middle - an d working-clas s voter s wh o cas t mos t o f th e vote s ever y November. The McGovernites though t thei r platform wa s just right. Gar y Hart , the McGover n campaig n manager , reporte d o n th e platform i n on e sen tence in his memoirs: "The platform evolve d essentially as we had hoped , angering onl y th e Wallac e supporter s b y th e pro-busin g plank , militan t women's right s advocate s wit h a moderat e abortio n plank , an d som e

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welfare leader s wit h a moderat e welfar e plank." 14 McGover n blame d Hubert Humphre y an d th e pres s fo r distortin g hi s tru e position s an d painting hi m int o a "radical " corner . Critic s calle d th e Democrat s th e party o f "acid , abortion , an d amnesty." 15 Because th e 197 2 Democrati c conventio n wa s organize d b y politi cians wh o favore d openness , inclusion , an d participator y democrac y i n party affairs , everyon e had a say, and thu s 8 0 million prime-time viewer s of the convention wer e "treated " t o nominatin g an d secondin g speeche s for seve n hopeless candidates fo r vice-president . Havin g satisfied th e procedural imperative s o f reform , th e presidentia l nomine e wa s offere d th e dais a t 2:4 8 A.M . Easter n tim e t o delive r wha t h e considere d th e bes t speech o f his life. Georg e McGovern waste d th e best opportunity h e was to b e given t o spea k directl y t o th e nation . The capper wa s McGovern's selectio n o f Missouri Senato r Thoma s Eagleton a s his running mate . Eagleton ha d t o withdra w fro m th e ticke t when hi s histor y o f menta l healt h problem s wa s mad e public , despit e Senator McGovern's initia l insistence that he supported Senato r Eagleto n "1000 percent. " McGovern wa s inept . H e claimed , fo r example , tha t h e wante d Mayor Dale y and hi s Illinois delegation seate d bu t that he could not con trol th e McGovern delegate s o n th e credentials committee. 16 Bot h he an d Hart describe d their strategy as winning over regular Democrats first, eve n as they pushed issues , such a s school busing , unilateral withdrawa l fro m Vietnam, and racial and gender preferences, that working-class Democrat s overwhelmingly opposed . Over and over, McGovern blame d others for distorting his positions to make hi m appear radical . He portrayed himsel f a s a libera l centrist , wh o too k a stron g an d principle d positio n agains t th e Vietnam Wa r bu t otherwis e appeale d t o the American center . Self-deception i s no t rar e i n politics . Th e mos t importan t rul e t o remember i n politica l campaign s i s th e on e mos t frequentl y violated : never confus e th e campaig n wit h rea l life . Campaign s ar e surrea l hot houses. Th e norma l division s o f th e da y an d wee k ar e withou t impor tance. Campaign s punis h thei r participant s physicall y an d emotionally . There i s too muc h information , to o man y rumors , too man y opportuni ties. I n a presidentia l campaign , th e separatio n betwee n candidat e an d voter i s even more extreme. A candidate's lif e is defined i n an airplan e i n which ar e seated , da y afte r day , the sam e crew o f truste d aide s an d con fidants wit h who m on e visit s a successio n o f airports , assembl y halls , and hotels , traile d b y a pac k o f fatigue d reporters . I n thi s atmosphere , bad judgment s ar e abou t th e onl y one s tha t ca n b e made, whic h i s wh y

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successful candidate s ar e normally thos e who follo w th e more detache d directions fro m a central directorat e "o n th e ground." McGovern' s cam paign wa s particularl y confuse d becaus e th e candidat e himsel f lacke d clear an d stron g conviction s t o ancho r hi s decision s abou t ke y issues , such a s the selectio n o f a running-mate . McGovern's reformis t cou p drov e fro m th e nationa l part y it s bes t politicians. They wer e exclude d b y McGovern an d hi s supporters a s to o white, to o male , to o ambiguou s abou t th e Vietna m War . Thei r place s were taken b y reformers wh o believe d that the United State s had not onl y embarked o n a n immora l an d disastrou s war , bu t tha t th e natio n itsel f was disease d an d coul d b e save d onl y b y radical surgery . Thi s vie w wa s rejected i n November 197 2 b y the largest margin i n history. On e in thre e Democrats vote d fo r th e Republica n incumbent .

MEANWHILE, I N THE WHITE HOUS E While refor m Democrat s wer e workin g t o purg e thei r part y o f th e working class , thei r ancien t foe , Richar d Nixon , occupie d th e Whit e House. Nixon continuall y confounde d hi s friends a s well as enemies. H e neither ende d th e Vietna m Wa r a s promise d no r dismantle d th e Grea t Society a s threatened . Havin g spen t mos t o f hi s publi c caree r a s a fer vent anti-Communist , h e opene d relation s wit h th e People' s Republi c o f China. Much ha s been made o f the ironies in Nixon's conduc t o f foreig n affairs; muc h les s of hi s efforts t o formulat e an d launc h th e nation' s las t war o n poverty . To hea r Richar d Nixo n tel l it , h e was obliviou s t o th e cultura l an d racial war s tha t ha d s o muc h t o d o wit h hi s 196 8 electio n an d 197 2 reelection. Nixo n woul d hav e hi s observer s believe , fo r example , tha t Strom Thurmond, th e Sout h Carolin a senato r wh o was the key player i n Nixon's souther n strategy , cared , first , abou t a stron g nationa l defens e and, second , abou t textil e trad e quotas . Civi l rights ? "Thurmon d kne w my position was very different fro m his, " Nixon wrote in his memoirs. " I was fo r th e Civi l Rights Act o f 1964 ; he was agains t it." 17 Nixon ra n hi s 196 8 campaig n lik e a clini c i n th e politic s o f race , a clinic tha t woul d guid e Republica n presidentia l candidate s fo r twent y years an d woul d driv e Democratic candidate s int o fit s o f futility , timidi ty, and stupidity . The Republican part y i n 196 8 was stil l recognizable a s the "part y o f Lincoln. " I n th e Northeas t an d throug h muc h o f th e Midwest, the party was dominated b y racial liberals such as John Lindsay ,

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Nelson Rockefeller , an d Jacob Javits of New York; Senator Cliffor d Cas e and Representative William Cahil l in New Jersey; Senator Edward Brook e in Massachusetts; Senator Charle s Percy in Illinois; Senator Hug h Scot t in Pennsylvania; an d Governo r Georg e Romne y i n Michigan . Thes e me n believed that the civil rights of blac k Americans deserve d th e unwaverin g support o f the Republican party . Nixon understoo d th e danger o f takin g any positions that would offen d libera l Republicans. When Martin Luthe r King was assassinated , Nixo n wen t t o Atlant a t o pa y hi s respect s t o hi s family, returne d fo r hi s funeral , an d suspende d hi s campaig n fo r tw o weeks. Richard Nixon understoo d tha t the Democrats, with their close identification wit h socia l an d civi l right s legislation , ha d hande d th e Republicans a n opportunity . Whit e southerners , onc e th e mos t loya l Democratic voters , felt betraye d b y Lyndon Johnson an d norther n liber als. Working-class Democrat s i n an d aroun d norther n citie s were fright ened an d angere d b y black riots , crime, and schoo l busin g plans, yet th e new Democrat s showe d n o concern . Wha t Nixo n mastere d wa s th e vocabulary tha t allowe d hi m to express understanding an d sympath y fo r white southerner s an d ethni c northerner s withou t offendin g racia l mod erates i n his party . Nixon reflecte d th e ambivalenc e o f white voters o n racia l issues ; he favored racia l justic e an d a n en d t o state-approve d segregatio n bu t opposed a n intrusive federal governmen t i n implementing civil rights law s and cour t decisions . Thus , Nixo n supporte d th e Brown v . Board of Education decisio n endin g segregatio n i n school s an d oppose d schoo l busing; he favored votin g rights for blac k southerners , even as he tried t o limit the Justice Department's power to veto decisions normally reserved fo r southern states . He was an early critic of the Kerner Commission' s indict ment o f white racism: "On e o f the major weaknesse s o f the [report ] . . . i s that i t . . . blame s everyone for th e riots except the perpetrators. . . . Until we have orde r w e can hav e n o progress." 18 Nixon's selectio n of Spiro Agnew as his running mate symbolized hi s approach t o racia l issues . Governo r o f Marylan d fo r onl y eightee n months, Agne w ha d previousl y serve d on e ter m a s th e executiv e o f Baltimore County . Agnew' s thi n publi c recor d me t on e crucia l test—h e was acceptable to Stro m Thurmond. A t the time, he was bes t known fo r his carefully stage d scoldin g of Baltimore's blac k leaders in the aftermat h of th e riotin g tha t followe d Marti n Luthe r King' s assassination . Libera l Republicans wer e throw n of f b y hi s lac k o f publi c record , bu t Agne w appeared liberal because he had supported Nelson Rockefeller's presidentia l

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candidacy a t on e time. In just ten years , Agnew would ris e from hi s firs t elected position—a s th e vic e presiden t o f th e Loc h Raven , Maryland , Kiwanis Club—t o vic e president o f th e United States .

MOYNIHAN'S RETUR N As Nixon turne d t o governing, he would take a surprising path i n his first two years as president. In fact, Nixon would propos e the nation's las t war o n poverty, betrayin g hi s campaign rhetori c an d th e expectations o f conservative supporter s an d libera l critic s alike . N o on e wa s surprise d when h e name d Rober t Finch , hi s closes t politica l associat e an d forme r lieutenant governo r o f California , t o be the secretary o f health, education , and welfare. Fro m Finch, Nixon wa s assured o f a steady stream o f advic e from th e liberal edge of the Republican ideologica l spectrum. The appoint ment o f Georg e Shultz , a highl y regarde d labo r economis t fro m th e University of Chicago , as labor secretar y was equally unsurprising. But his appointment o f Daniel Patrick Moynihan a s the director o f a newly established Counci l o n Urba n Affair s i n th e Whit e Hous e indicate d a radica l departure. Moynihan wa s back , no t quit e fou r year s afte r hi s unceremoniou s departure fro m Washington . H e ha d no t bee n totally invisibl e durin g hi s absence fro m th e nation' s capital , bu t hi s ligh t ha d bee n dimmed . Moynihan ha d returned to academia afte r hi s stint in the Kennedy-Johnso n administrations, chairing a joint Harvard-MIT progra m o n urba n polic y and cochairin g a comprehensiv e revie w o f th e Colema n report , th e nation's largest-scal e investigatio n int o th e performanc e o f school s an d students. Although man y of his liberal critics retreated fro m th e search fo r solutions to the puzzles of poverty and , specifically, th e black lowe r class, Moynihan persisted . The Nixon governmen t di d not bac k awa y from tangle d problems of the ghetto—a t least , no t a t first . I t proceeded o n tw o front s an d i n bot h cases adopte d approache s tha t ha d bee n rejecte d i n th e lat e day s o f th e Great Society . On e fron t wa s opene d wit h th e mos t aggressiv e publi c effort eve r made b y a n America n presiden t t o impos e racia l quotas . Th e Philadelphia Pla n was a part o f Nixon's advocac y o f blac k capitalis m a s the best alternative t o the "socia l engineering" o f the Johnson years . The public rationale fo r th e Philadelphia Pla n was to open high-paying union ized constructio n job s t o blac k workers , wh o ha d bee n exclude d b y al l sorts o f gimmick s an d excuses . Privately , Nixo n delighte d i n drivin g a

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wedge betwee n two powerful Democrati c constituencies, organized labo r and civi l rights organizations. 19 The plan required union s an d contractor s to meet specific goal s for minorit y workers o n any construction involvin g federal funds . Nixo n becam e th e onl y presiden t t o obtai n congressiona l authorization fo r th e use of racial quotas when the Philadelphia Pla n wa s approved i n Congress . I t wa s oppose d b y th e mos t conservativ e Republicans an d souther n Democrat s an d a fe w norther n Democrat s from heavil y unionize d areas. 20 Afte r Nixon' s victor y i n Congress , Secretary Shultz extended th e Philadelphia formul a t o nineteen citie s tha t displayed th e same pattern o f underrepresentation o f minority workers i n the constructio n trades. 21 Nixon receive d n o credi t fro m civi l right s leader s fo r hi s surprisin g and aggressiv e move . Th e NAACP' s spokesman , Herber t Hill , charac terized the Nixon administration' s pla n i n confused an d confusin g terms : The "abandonmen t o f the Philadelphia Plan " was a "payof f t o the build ing trades unions for thei r suppor t o f the war i n Indochina." Hil l went o n to describ e th e extensio n o f th e Philadelphi a Pla n t o othe r citie s a s " a meaningless hodgepodg e o f quacker y an d deceptions , of double tal k an d doublethink." 22 I t wa s ironi c tha t Nixon' s mos t visibl e appea l t o tradi tionally Democrati c blue-colla r worker s fo r suppor t o f his Vietnam poli cies would b e directed a t people in the same construction trade s that wer e singled ou t fo r suc h unfavorabl e treatmen t i n the Philadelphi a Plan . By 1972 Nixon woul d revers e himself, making a n attac k o n quota s a majo r them e i n his convention acceptanc e speech . Criticizin g th e spec tacle o f th e recentl y complete d Democrati c convention , Nixo n sai d "w e can have an open convention withou t dividin g Americans into quotas... . Dividing American s int o quota s i s totall y alie n t o th e America n tradi tion. . . . Americans don' t wan t t o b e par t o f a quota—the y wan t t o b e part o f America. " The secon d par t o f Nixon' s effor t t o addres s th e problem s o f th e ghetto involve d a massiv e an d complicate d proposa l t o refor m th e nation's welfar e system , calle d th e famil y assistanc e pla n (FAP) . FA P was th e produc t o f a partnership o f Moynihan , Finch , an d Shultz , wh o developed i t over the stron g oppositio n o f Nixon's firs t economi c coun selor, conservative Arthur F . Burns. The Nixon pla n was radical i n thre e respects. First , th e federa l governmen t woul d guarante e an d financ e a minimum welfar e paymen t t o eligibl e familie s (i n 1969 , $1,60 0 fo r a family o f four) . Th e ide a wa s t o replac e a syste m tha t permitte d th e southern state s to set welfare payment s a t a sub-subsistence level . Second, families wit h childre n heade d b y worker s earnin g povert y leve l wage s

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would receiv e a supplementary famil y allowance . Third, al l FAP recipients, except for th e disabled, elderly, or the parents o f preschool children , would b e required t o register fo r jo b training an d employment—Nixon' s "workfare." FAP was to o complicate d fo r it s own good . Th e impac t o f th e pro gram wa s differen t fro m stat e t o state , depending o n th e level s of publi c assistance, the earnings of the family (i f any), and the presence or absenc e of th e father . Unde r FAP , some peopl e coul d wor k an d stil l receive wel fare, dependin g o n ho w muc h the y earned ; other s woul d los e benefit s for working . State s were required t o ad d unemploye d father s t o the welfare roll s (i f they ha d no t alread y don e so ) an d t o exten d Medicai d eligi bility to their families . Moreover , a t a time when welfar e appeare d t o b e losing it s stigm a i n ghett o neighborhoods , whe n th e numbe r o f recipi ents had double d i n just five years, and when public opposition t o welfar e was rising, a "conservative " Republica n presiden t offere d a program tha t would increas e th e numbe r o f welfar e recipient s fro m 1 0 t o 2 4 millio n overnight. Conservative s wer e appalled . Nixon presente d th e famil y assistanc e pla n i n a thirty-five-minut e television addres s o n August 8 , 1969 . From al l the charts an d table s tha t accompanied FAP' s introduction, on e very large and certain consequenc e of it s enactment wa s brilliantl y visible : the live s of million s o f southern ers, mos t o f the m black , woul d b e materiall y improved . A contempora neous stud y foun d tha t mor e tha n hal f (tw o million ) o f th e familie s receiving increase d benefit s unde r FA P reside d i n th e South , wher e 5 3 percent o f al l blac k American s lived. 23 Th e stud y foun d tha t th e typica l black famil y receivin g benefit s woul d realiz e a 4 7 percen t increas e i n annual income . A family o f four i n Mississippi, receiving $4 6 a month i n 1969 ($19 0 in 199 4 dollars), would, unde r th e worst case, triple its cash income were FAP to b e enacted. FA P represented a n opportunit y t o eas e the stin g o f povert y fo r th e poores t familie s i n th e poores t state s and , thereby, brin g abou t a government-sponsore d socia l revolutio n i n th e rural South . Within a five-year span , poor blac k southerners , living lives little changed sinc e Reconstruction, woul d hav e won th e vot e an d coul d have bee n lifte d ou t o f abjec t poverty . Although FAP' s potentia l effec t o n th e rura l Sout h wa s vast , i t wa s not without impac t i n the North. Here , the greatest benefi t woul d g o no t to families alread y receiving welfare, bu t to poor familie s where the fathe r was livin g at home. Under FAP , such poor familie s woul d receiv e a fam ily assistance paymen t fro m th e federal government , plu s supplementar y payments fro m th e state, up to the level of the 197 0 Aid to Families wit h

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Dependent Childre n (AFDC ) paymen t o r th e povert y level , whicheve r was lower . Th e bigges t impac t woul d hav e bee n i n state s where familie s with unemploye d father s wer e not previousl y eligibl e for AFDC . In thes e states, a famil y o f fou r wit h n o earning s woul d mov e fro m zer o assis tance t o $2,200 ; a famil y i n whic h th e fathe r earne d $1,00 0 woul d g o from a tota l annua l incom e o f $1,00 0 t o $3,013 . In a stat e wit h AFD CUP—the unemploye d fathe r program—th e famil y incom e woul d hav e increased muc h less , from $3,75 3 t o $3,813 , but the federal governmen t would hav e picke d u p a slightl y large r share. 24 FAP passed th e Hous e o f Representative s b y the impressiv e margi n of 243 to 15 5 in April 1970 . Southern representative s vote d overwhelm ingly agains t it . O f th e seventee n southerner s wh o di d suppor t FA P (ou t of 102) , mos t wer e fro m bi g cities , suc h a s Ne w Orlean s o r Miami , o r were Republican loyalists . But Wilbur Mill s of Arkansas, the chair o f th e Ways an d Mean s committee , was the southerne r wh o counte d most . H e cosponsored th e bil l an d guide d i t largel y untouche d throug h hi s com mittee, throug h th e Rule s Committee , an d ont o th e floo r o f th e House . Seventy-two Republicans voted agains t their president, almos t al l of the m conservatives. Northern Democrat s supporte d th e Nixon pla n b y the lopsided coun t o f 12 6 t o 19 . There wa s n o clea r patter n t o th e opposition : New Yor k City' s mos t libera l representative , Shirle y Chisholm , an d it s most conservative , Mari o Biaggi , unite d t o vot e agains t FAP . Chishol m was th e onl y blac k representativ e t o oppos e FA P in 1970 ; when i t cam e up a year later , onl y on e blac k supporte d it . The Nixon proposa l die d i n the more liberal Senate . It was killed b y southern Democrat s an d wester n conservatives , wit h th e connivanc e o f liberal Democrats . Libera l Democrat s wer e churlish an d defensiv e i n th e face of a dramatic proposal from a long-standing and deteste d foe . Caugh t off guard , they had no ready counteroffer. Senato r Harris, who would ru n for presiden t a year later rather tha n ru n a losing campaign fo r reelectio n to his Senate seat in Oklahoma, propose d th e National Basi c Income an d Incentive Act , whic h mor e tha n double d th e federall y guarantee d mini mum income , fro m $1,60 0 t o $3,740 , an d expande d th e numbe r o f eli gible beneficiarie s fro m 2 4 millio n t o 75 million . Under th e Harri s plan , mothers wit h dependen t childre n o f an y ag e woul d no t b e require d t o work, an d childles s couples would b e eligible for th e guaranteed income . The pric e ta g fo r th e Harri s pla n wa s $2 0 billion , versu s $ 5 billio n fo r FAP.25 Eugene McCarth y introduce d th e pla n propose d b y the Nationa l Welfare Right s Organizatio n (NWRO) , the n a t th e pea k o f it s power . Called th e Adequat e Incom e Ac t o f 1970 , th e NWR O proposa l calle d

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for a floor o f $5,50 0 fo r a family o f fou r ($21,62 9 i n 199 4 dollars) , bu t with n o wor k requirement s an d a margina l "tax " rat e o f 67 percen t o n earnings, the plan wa s a n antiwor k program . Mor e tha n one-hal f o f th e American populatio n woul d hav e bee n covered , a t a n additiona l cos t o f $71 billion. In short, i t was not a proposal tha t coul d b e taken seriously . As Moynihan noted , however , th e NWR O succeede d i n moderating th e support o f som e group s favorin g FA P (suc h a s Commo n Cause) , an d i n eventually swingin g blac k politicians an d som e civil rights organizations , such as the Urban League , into hard oppositio n t o FAP. 26 The Harris an d NWRO proposal s were irrelevant, except for th e fact that bot h McCarth y and Harri s wer e o n th e Senat e Financ e Committee , an d thei r vote s wer e essential i f FAP was to reach th e Senat e floor. A s sponsors o f alternativ e proposals, Harri s an d McCarth y joine d souther n Democrat s an d con servative Republican s i n opposition , an d a revise d FA P proposa l wa s killed i n a ten-to-six vot e i n 1971 . McGovern, wh o wa s alread y plannin g hi s campaig n fo r th e Democratic nomination , als o opposed FAP . In January 197 0 he respond ed t o th e Nixo n pla n wit h a far-reachin g proposa l fo r a n allowanc e o f between $5 0 and $6 5 a month fo r ever y child, regardless of family incom e (a family wit h three children would receiv e up to $9,10 0 i n 199 4 dollars) . He estimate d th e cos t o f hi s allowance a t $1 0 billio n i n the firs t year . I n combination wit h a public service employment guarantee , Social Securit y benefit increases , an d a federalize d welfar e system , McGovern' s cos t increase estimate s gre w t o $3 5 billion. 27 But in contrast t o Nixon, McGovern wa s not serious . He introduce d no legislation, and hi s proposal, advanced a s a major innovatio n i n social policy, died from a lack of persistence b y its architect. In September 197 0 McGovern appeare d befor e th e Senat e Financ e Committe e t o testif y o n FAP and di d no t eve n mentio n hi s January proposal . Instead , h e argue d against FAP' s mandator y wor k requirement , preferrin g incentive s i n th e form o f a n increas e i n the minimum wag e an d guarantee d publi c servic e jobs. He recommended combinin g FAP with free foo d stamps , at an addi tional cos t o f $ 1 billio n t o $ 2 billion . H e als o wante d t o federaliz e th e administration o f welfare , bu t di d no t provid e an y estimat e o f th e addi tional cost. 28 McGovern displaye d bot h imprecisio n an d inconsistenc y i n formu lating successiv e proposal s fo r America' s poor . Thes e habit s o f min d would retur n to sting him badl y in the presidential campaig n i n his advocacy o f a progra m t o pa y $1,00 0 t o ever y American—includin g th e Rockefellers—regardless o f need . I n a primar y debat e wit h Huber t

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Humphrey, McGovern suggested : "Ther e is no way to estimate the cost of this program othe r tha n t o say that ther e is no net cost to the Treasury a t all." 29 Presumably , th e cos t coul d hav e bee n obtaine d simpl y b y multi plying th e estimate d populatio n o f 20 7 millio n i n 197 1 b y $1,00 0 t o yield $20 7 billion—$77 8 billio n i n 199 4 dollars ! I n hi s memoirs , h e claimed tha t hi s progra m was , really , no t s o differen t fro m th e FA P proposal. 30 McGover n wa s hammere d fo r hi s scheme—firs t b y th e Democrats, then by Nixon an d his surrogates in some of the most effectiv e television commercials of the campaign. In late August, reeling from th e mishandling o f Eagleton's brie f tenur e a s his running mate , McGovern aban doned th e $1,00 0 idea . I n it s stead , h e propose d government-guarantee d jobs fo r thre e an d one-hal f millio n un - o r under-employe d peopl e an d a federally finance d $4,00 0 allowanc e fo r familie s o f fou r heade d b y non workers. 31 McGovern's wandering s reflec t th e intellectua l conditio n o f libera l Democratic politician s an d academic s wh o ha d draw n bac k fro m an y serious thinking abou t America' s lowe r clas s following Moynihan' s cen sure b y black an d leftis t critics . There was onl y on e point o f consistenc y in the several schemes he advanced: no on e was required t o see k work i n return fo r incom e payments . In truth, h e demonstrated n o thoughtfu l o r consistent perspective in the problem o f racial inequalities and poverty. H e acted a s i f hi s firs t obligatio n wa s t o avoi d criticis m fro m th e Lef t an d black leaders . McGovern' s politica l timidit y an d intellectua l weaknes s signified th e lowes t poin t o f liberalis m an d Democrati c politics .

5» THE COST S O F BLAC K UNITY : POLITICAL ISOLATIO N

B

lack politica l unit y i s a relativel y ne w concep t i n America n politics . Although th e Fifteent h Amendmen t gav e black s th e righ t t o vot e i n 1870, generations o f blac k citizen s found themselve s disenfranchise d b y poll taxes , phony tests , intimidation, an d violence ; that is , until th e pas sage o f th e Votin g Right s Ac t o f 1965 . See n b y man y a s th e crownin g glory o f th e civi l rights movement , th e Votin g Right s Ac t le d t o th e reg istration of black voters on an unprecedented, massiv e scale. As the blac k voting bloc solidified, blac k politica l leadershi p explore d th e new terrai n in search o f a voice.

MARTIN LUTHE R KING , JR . Dr. Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., le d blac k American s ou t o f the wilder ness. H e smashe d America n apartheid , liberatin g blac k southerners . During his lifetime, no one could match the respect and adoratio n accord ed Kin g b y blac k Americans . A 196 6 Harri s pol l o f blac k American s asked how they rated the job various groups and leaders were doing in the fight fo r Negr o rights . A nearl y unanimou s 8 8 percen t rate d Kin g a s doing a n "excellent " (75 percent ) o r "prett y good " (1 3 percent) job . N o other individua l o r grou p wa s eve n close. 1 I n Gallup' s year-en d surve y 97

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determing th e nation's "mos t admire d men " i n 1964 , Americans ranke d King ahea d o f everyon e sav e Presiden t Johnson , forme r Presiden t Eisenhower, an d Winsto n Churchill. 2 Today, Marti n Luthe r King' s legac y i s appreciated eve n b y conser vatives—even i f the y neve r honore d hi m i n life—a s representin g th e "good" civi l rights movement. They romanticize his devotion to the idea l of a color-blin d America , hi s adherenc e t o th e tenet s o f th e America n creed, and hi s advocacy o f integration rathe r tha n separatism . Fo r exam ple, in justifying th e rise of white-rights organizations, writer Jared Taylo r explained, "Wha t the y call for i s exactly what Marti n Luthe r Kin g called for: equa l treatmen t fo r al l races." 3 But conservatives hav e bee n quicke r than liberal s t o emphasiz e on e o f th e distinguishin g characteristic s o f King's leadership : his appea l t o th e promise o f America n life , the cal l t o animate th e word s o f th e America n drea m fo r al l Americans . Glen n Loury, a self-defined blac k conservative , wrote : King constantly evoke d a n image of Americans a s decent, magnanimous, moral, righteous—as a freedom-loving peopl e whos e great fault la y in failing t o achiev e in reality the nobility implic it i n thei r civi c creed . Hi s tas k wa s showin g the m ho w pro foundly wron g were the exclusionary practices against which h e fought. Thi s Americ a o f King's , o f course , wa s deepl y flawed , but h e chose t o emphasiz e it s potential fo r redemption. 4 Many blac k leader s remind whit e Americans o f thei r shamefu l her itage of racism. King did it in his time, but he was able to combine lamen tations abou t pas t sin s wit h a spiri t o f optimis m tha t whit e American s would redee m th e nation' s pledg e o f racia l justice . H e gav e white s a n escape tha t di d no t requir e humiliation : "Jus t giv e u s th e respec t yo u know w e ar e owed," h e said . A second , critica l elemen t i n King' s leadershi p wa s hi s unswervin g devotion to nonviolence. Although h e characterized blac k riots as demon strating th e ful l exten t o f blac k discontent , h e regarde d the m a s mo b actions. After Watt s exploded , h e called fo r th e extensio n o f nonviolen t demonstration o n a massiv e scal e a s th e bes t antidot e t o th e threa t o f more riots. 5 Kin g neve r advocate d "self-defense, " th e euphemis m employed b y radica l leader s suc h a s Ra p Brow n an d Malcol m X t o explain, excuse , or encourag e blac k violence . King reflected th e black leaders' historic ambivalence betwee n libert y and equality , betwee n encouragin g blac k self-hel p an d demandin g

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recompense fro m whites , betwee n color-blindnes s an d racia l conscious ness. H e understoo d th e appea l o f blac k separatism . King' s leadershi p was distinguishe d b y it s ceaseles s searc h fo r whit e allies , for a coalitio n that coul d pus h civi l rights , o f course , bu t tha t coul d shif t t o economi c issues onc e racia l equalit y wa s encoded . Fo r al l th e visibl e frailtie s o f white liberals, King never suggeste d throwin g them ou t o f the movement : We [Negroes ] ban d togethe r readily ; and agains t white hostili ty, we hav e a n intens e an d wholesom e loyalt y t o on e another . But we cannot win our struggl e for justic e all a l o n e . . .. I believe there i s an importan t plac e i n ou r struggl e fo r whit e liberals. 6 Instead o f politica l separatism , Kin g urge d blac k American s t o "become intensiv e politica l activists, " an d t o "maste r th e ar t o f politica l alliances." H e advocate d workin g with , an d learnin g from , organize d labor an d American Jewry. King told black s to emulate Jewish American s with thei r emphasi s o n family , education , socia l action , an d politica l involvement.7 In pushing for politica l coalitions, King accepted tha t new program s must b e race-neutral , becaus e initiative s intende d t o benefi t onl y blac k Americans coul d no t muste r sufficien t consensus . H e understoo d wha t conservatives woul d no t acknowledge : blac k Americans , a s poo r Americans, required preference s i n jobs, education, an d housing : The closest analogy is the GI Bill of Rights. Negro rehabilitation.. . would requir e approximatel y th e sam e breadt h o f program . . . . Just a s was th e case of th e returning soldier , suc h a bil l for th e disadvantaged an d impoverishe d coul d enabl e the m t o bu y homes without cash... . They could negotiat e loans from bank s to star t businesses . They could receiv e . . . points to place the m ahead i n competition fo r civi l servic e jobs. 8 But eve n here , Kin g though t hi s G I Bil l shoul d b e fo r peopl e wh o were poor—blac k o r white—unlik e hi s successor s wh o woul d pres s fo r preferences define d b y race alone . King, however, had n o convincing strategy for dealin g with the problems o f th e norther n poor . H e searche d an d hypothesized ; h e defende d Moynihan; he talked abou t th e weaknesses i n black family life ; he pushed housing integratio n an d expande d jo b opportunities ; h e le d demonstra tions an d conducte d negotiation s wit h mayors an d corporat e executives .

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But he had n o clear answer to either the subtle obstacles erected by northern whites or the problems o f lower-class blacks concentrated i n norther n ghettos. Martin Luthe r King was the only black leader who possessed enoug h moral authority and visibility to contend with the complexity o f the "next , most profound ste p in civil rights"—full participatio n b y black American s in America n society . An d h e understoo d clearl y tha t blac k American s could no t prospe r o n their own , that black-whit e comity was a necessar y condition fo r realizin g the movement' s objectives . After Dr . King' s deat h i n Apri l 1968 , n o on e emerge d wh o coul d mobilize th e blac k communit y an d sustai n th e visio n o f a racially coop erative society . Even before King' s assassination, th e media wer e empha sizing th e division s betwee n Kin g an d th e mor e militan t blac k leaders . By 196 7 thes e militant s ha d enunciate d a sharpl y differen t visio n fo r American blacks—th e visio n was calle d Blac k Power .

BLACK POWE R AN D THE SEED S O F RACIAL ISOLATIO N A spiri t o f racia l comity , th e hymn s celebratin g "blac k an d whit e together," an d th e hope s fo r ful l integratio n wer e a t th e cor e o f th e civil right s movemen t i n th e earl y 1960s . That vie w wa s challenge d b y a ver y differen t se t o f idea s durin g th e secon d hal f o f th e 1960s . Th e rationale fo r blac k politica l isolatio n wa s se t fort h mos t coherentl y i n the 196 7 boo k writte n b y Stokel y Carmichae l an d Charle s Hamilto n called Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. Ironically , they finishe d th e boo k th e month o f th e Detroit riots , offering "th e pol itics o f Blac k Powe r a s th e onl y visibl e hope " t o avoi d "prolonge d destructive guerrill a warfare." 9 The Blac k Powe r movemen t ma y hav e bee n inevitable , eve n nec essary fo r it s time. Its influence wa s greates t wit h th e blac k intellectua l and politica l elite . Blac k Powe r succeede d i n buildin g racia l prid e i n a people wh o ha d endure d centurie s o f white supremacis t propaganda . I t stimulated scholarshi p t o challeng e th e receive d wisdo m abou t th e African root s o f blac k Americans , thei r reaction s t o enslavement , an d the rol e o f blac k American s i n th e Unio n caus e durin g th e Civi l War . Black Powe r focuse d attentio n o n th e overlooke d an d forgotte n contri butions o f blac k writers , inventors, scholars , and othe r gifte d individu als. Blac k Power , i n short , helpe d chec k th e overweenin g arroganc e o f

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white American s wh o contentedl y assume d tha t th e blac k contributio n to America n prosperit y an d cultur e ha d bee n limite d t o stron g backs , good rhythm , an d achievement s i n musi c an d sports . But Blac k Powe r als o wa s a direc t challeng e t o King' s leadership , personally an d philosophically . Carmichae l an d Hamilto n outline d th e priorities o f Blac k Powe r a s follows : To [challeng e th e majorit y society] , w e mus t firs t redefin e ourselves. Ou r basi c nee d [is ] to reclai m ou r histor y an d ou r identity fro m wha t mus t b e calle d cultura l terrorism , fro m the depredatio n o f self-justifyin g whit e guilt . W e shal l hav e to struggl e fo r th e righ t t o creat e ou r ow n term s throug h which t o defin e ourselve s an d ou r relationshi p t o th e soci ety, and t o hav e these term s recognized. Thi s i s the firs t neces sity o f a fre e people , an d th e firs t righ t tha t an y oppresso r must suspend. 10 The author s o f Blac k Powe r attacke d th e fundamenta l premise s o f Martin Luthe r King' s approac h t o civi l rights : integration , individua l rights, nonviolence, and coalitio n politics . In their place, Carmichael an d Hamilton emphasize d grou p progress , grou p rights , "self-defense, " an d political separatism . O n nonviolence , the y wrote : Those o f us who advocat e Blac k Power ar e quite clear . . . that a "non-violent " approac h t o civi l right s i s a n approac h tha t black peopl e canno t affor d an d a luxur y tha t whit e peopl e d o not deserve." 11 On integration : "Integration" a s a goal today speak s to the problems o f black ness not only in an unrealistic way bu t also in a despicable way . It i s base d o n complet e acceptanc e o f th e fac t tha t i n orde r t o have a decent house or education, blac k people must move int o a white neighborhoo d o r sen d thei r childre n t o a white school . . . . Such situation s wil l no t chang e unti l blac k peopl e becom e equal in a way that mean s something , and integratio n cease s t o be a one-wa y street . The n integratio n doe s no t mea n drainin g skills an d energie s fro m th e blac k ghetto . . . .12

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On grou p right s an d action : Black people have not suffere d a s individuals bu t as members of a group ; therefore, thei r liberatio n lie s in group action . This i s why . . . Black Powe r . . . affirms tha t helpin g individua l blac k people to solve their problem s o n a n individual basi s does little to alleviat e th e mas s o f blac k people." 13 On America' s middle-clas s values : The value s o f thi s societ y suppor t a racis t system ; w e fin d i t incongruous t o as k blac k peopl e to adop t an d suppor t mos t of those values. We also reject th e assumption tha t th e basic institutions o f this society must b e preserved. The goal of black people mus t no t b e t o assimilat e int o middle-clas s America . . . . The value s o f th e middl e clas s permi t th e perpetuatio n o f th e ravages o f th e blac k community. 14 Black Powe r reflecte d th e tempe r o f th e 1960s : Americ a wa s dis eased; middle-clas s value s wer e materialisti c an d hollow ; th e "system " was no t wort h preserving . Blac k Powe r followe d it s condemnation wit h a cal l for racia l separatism . In the late 1960 s two groups emerge d fro m th e separatist movemen t that fed th e fears o f suburban middle-clas s whites who worried tha t blac k America wa s spinnin g of f i n dangerous , radica l directions . Th e Blac k Panthers wer e establishe d i n Oakland , California , wit h th e announce d purpose o f organizin g blac k "self-defense " team s i n majo r cities . The y were master s a t attractin g medi a coverage , throug h suc h tactic s a s a n armed march int o the halls of the Californi a legislature . They practiced a sophisticated menacin g of white society in general and o f the police in particular. Romanticize d fo r thei r blac k berets , militar y titles , an d revolu tionary rhetoric , th e Panther s sprea d t o majo r ghett o cities , extorte d money fro m loca l merchants fo r breakfas t programs , and, with clenche d fists, talke d o f "powe r t o th e people. " Libera l elitist s coul d no t brin g themselves t o criticiz e th e glorificatio n o f violenc e an d th e racia l sepa ratism o f th e Panthers . Instead , som e turne d t o fund-raisin g fo r th e Panther's lega l costs, the ironies o f which wer e captured i n Tom Wolfe' s Radical Chic. 15 The secon d grou p wa s th e Nationa l Welfar e Right s Organizatio n (NWRO), whic h wa s establishe d b y a blac k colleg e professor , Georg e

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Wiley. Wiley relied o n the intellectual construct s o f two Leftist professor s at Columbi a University , France s Fo x Pive n an d Richar d Cloward . NWRO wa s biracia l i n theory , bu t ver y blac k i n practice . Th e Piven Cloward-Wiley goa l wa s t o pus h th e Democrat s t o enac t a guarantee d income. They wanted t o establis h welfar e a s an entitlemen t an d t o orga nize the urba n poo r t o overloa d th e welfare rolls , driving u p the cost s t o states an d citie s unti l mayor s an d governor s woul d forc e Congres s t o provide fisca l relie f i n th e for m o f a guarantee d incom e fo r everyone . NWRO organize d protest s and sit-ins , filed la w suits, and traine d welfar e recipients t o pres s fo r ever y authorize d benefit . Th e ide a wa s t o brin g down th e welfare syste m an d t o rewrite the rules of American capitalism . But when a guaranteed incom e plan was proposed i n the form o f Nixon' s Family Assistanc e Plan , th e NWR O oppose d i t a s to o parsimonious , thereby contributin g t o it s defeat . During the period o f Black Power's maximum impact , between 196 7 and 197 3 or so , most blac k American s wer e livin g lives unrecognized b y the advocate s o f Blac k Power . Civi l right s an d federa l lawyer s wer e liti gating to brin g about a rapid an d comprehensiv e en d t o the South' s dua l school system s an d t o exten d desegregatio n t o norther n cites . Betwee n 1968 an d 197 2 souther n school s were transformed fro m th e most segre gated i n the natio n t o th e mos t integrate d (o r a t least , th e mos t desegre gated).16 B y 1970 , just fiv e year s afte r th e votin g right s la w wa s signed , black southerner s were registered to vote in about the same proportion a s white southerners (i n just two years, black registration i n Mississippi sho t up from 6.7 percen t to almost 6 0 percent o f eligible registrants), but the y were voting in Democratic primaries , not settin g up the separatist partie s consistent with Blac k Power. 17 And blac k American s were taking advan tage o f ne w opportunitie s fo r highe r educatio n an d fo r white-colla r employment. N o one , it seemed, could wai t fo r a radical abstractio n lik e Black Powe r t o catc h u p to rea l life .

UNEASY ALLIES: WHITE LIBERAL S AND THE BLAC K ELITE The term white liberal came into fashion durin g the civil rights struggle as a labe l fo r thos e wh o favore d th e aim s o f th e movemen t bu t wh o were queas y abou t th e pace , manners, o r tactic s o f it s leadership. Jame s Baldwin calle d liberal s th e black' s "affliction"—"someon e wh o think s you're pushin g to o har d whe n yo u roc k th e boat , wh o think s yo u ar e bitter whe n yo u ar e vehement." 18 Kin g wrot e hi s famou s "Lette r fro m

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the Birmingha m Cit y Jail " t o sympatheti c whit e clergyme n wh o urge d an en d t o nonviolen t confrontation s a s "untimely. " " I hav e neve r ye t engaged i n a direct action," Kin g wrote, "tha t was 'well-timed ' accordin g to th e timetable o f thos e wh o hav e not suffere d undul y fro m th e diseas e of segregation." 19 The hear t o f th e whit e liberal-blac k relationshi p wa s no t mutua l interest—but disrespect . White liberal s patronized blacks ; in private the y clucked abou t th e latest horror stor y o f quotas an d doubl e standard s fo r minorities, an d i n public , the y acte d a s i f blac k peopl e woul d withe r i f their idea s wer e debate d seriousl y an d openly . An d so , issue s suc h a s affirmative action , crime, welfare dependency , mal e idleness, and famil y instability were not subjecte d t o the normal give-and-tak e o f political discourse. Drive n b y guilt , timidity , o r hypocrisy , liberal s wante d t o prov e that the y wer e no t oppressors , tha t the y understood , the y sympathized , they wante d t o help . An d becaus e dealin g wit h a blac k perso n was , fo r many sheltere d liberals, an exotic experience, the black person came to b e treated a s a n ambassado r fro m anothe r land : a Blac k Person , no t a n American wh o happene d t o b e black . One consisten t exceptio n t o th e whit e libera l rul e shoul d b e noted : many Jew s wer e willin g t o engag e i n shar p debat e whe n th e issu e wa s anti-Semitism o r quotas . Afte r blac k Americans , America n Jew s ar e th e most reliabl e Democrati c voters . They wer e prominen t supporter s o f th e civil rights movement and , mor e than othe r whites , many Jews have bee n in regula r contac t wit h black s a s landlord s an d sho p owner s i n ghett o neighborhoods. As a group, Jews understand discriminatio n an d persecu tion. An d the y ar e quic k t o jum p o n an y hin t o f anti-Semitism , a s Jesse Jackson learned following his reference to New York City as "Hymie town " and his pledge of support fo r the Nation o f Islam leader, Louis Farrakhan . But sinc e th e lat e 1960s , libera l Democrat s hav e bee n hur t i n presi dential politics b y their silenc e in the face o f radically alie n ideas on racia l issues. Afraid t o argue with either the Left o r blacks, liberals ended up supporting or , a t least , abettin g craz y ideas . Th e collaps e o f th e libera l dis course o n issue s of famil y stability , welfare dependency , an d illegitimacy , and the abandonment of the concept of personal responsibility for crime and riots, left no position for liberals other than as apologists for extrem e blac k views. Liberals went beyon d explanations for blac k misbehavior to excus e actions that almost all Americans—black an d white—considered t o be outside the basic social contract. (Liberal s found othe r ways to offend moder ate voters by deprecating traditional patriotism, showing naivete about th e Soviet threat, an d appearin g t o favor libertinis m an d drugs. )

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None o f this should hav e been altogether surprising . After all , befor e the 1960s , white Americans routinely refused t o consider blac k American s as huma n beings , treatin g the m instea d a s socia l odditie s o r inferiors . The small , brie f opportunit y tha t liberal s ha d i n th e mid-1960 s t o agre e on th e scop e o f th e problem s facin g blac k American s wa s los t whe n Moynihan wa s tol d t o shu t up . Any remainin g hop e wa s smashe d wit h Martin Luthe r King' s assassination . Robert Kenned y wa s on e politicia n wh o coul d spea k effectivel y t o black Americans , working-clas s whites , an d libera l reformers . H e wa s almost alon e i n speakin g ou t earl y an d plainl y abou t th e politica l impli cations o f Blac k Power . I n 1966 , fo r example , h e chastise d Floy d McKissick, the head o f the Congres s o f Racia l Equalit y (CORE) , saying , "you ar e turning your bac k o n Negroes and whites working together an d if people can't mee t your definition , yo u read the m out." 20 The deaths of Martin Luthe r Kin g and Rober t F . Kennedy, just two month s apart , cre ated a vacuum tha t ha s never bee n filled . The new black militancy was not warmly received by most Americans, black o r white. But the Left embrace d th e spirit of insurgency and the revolutionary rhetoric . Whit e liberal s carelessl y incorporate d muc h o f th e black militant program a s their own. Effectively, i t was as if white liberal s said, "We'l l handl e foreig n policy , nationa l security , macroeconomics , and the environment; why don't yo u black s fill in the crime, welfare, civi l rights, and city stuff." Th e only major disagreemen t betwee n Black Powe r and th e McGover n Democrat s wa s ove r integratio n an d schoo l busing , which McGovern insiste d b e supported i n the platform. 21 Thus, th e publi c agenda s o f th e blac k an d whit e elite s were conve niently joined i n the Democratic party . As has bee n noted, the result wa s an electora l slaughte r o f histori c proportion s i n 1972 , th e alienatio n o f working-class Democrats , and the takeover o f the national party machin ery b y ideologues an d zealot s determine d t o shu t ou t th e party' s electe d leaders i n Congres s an d stat e capitals .

RACIALIZED THOUGH T AND THE SUPPRESSION O F DIVERSIT Y After th e suppressio n o f th e Moyniha n report , blac k leader s an d white liberal s stoppe d arguin g i n public . Outspoke n blac k critic s coul d "blame whitey " fo r al l the ill s afflicting blac k Americans . The orthodo x solution invariabl y cam e dow n t o a combinatio n o f racia l preference s

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under the rubric of affirmative actio n and massive public programs. When these "demands " wer e no t full y met , th e allegatio n o f racia l insensitivit y and insufficien t commitmen t wa s leveled. Disagreement wit h th e ideas of any "brother, " howeve r outrageous , was discouraged. Blac k unity, whe n organized aroun d suc h radical ideas , made coalition politic s impossible . This orthodoxy continued to hold sway in the 1990s , despite increasing criticism. In writing abou t th e confused respons e o f blac k leadershi p to th e nominatio n o f Clarenc e Thoma s t o th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t i n 1991, Corne l West , th e provocativ e schola r o f Afro-America n studies , identified th e trap o f "racia l reasoning: " Most blac k leader s go t los t i n thi s thicke t o f reasonin g an d hence go t caugh t i n a vulga r for m o f racia l reasoning : blac k authenticity [lead s to ] blac k closing-rank s mentalit y [lead s to ] black mal e subordinatio n o f blac k wome n i n th e interest s o f black communit y i n a hostile whit e racis t country . Suc h a lin e of racial reasoning lead s to such questions as : "Is Thomas real ly black? " "I s h e blac k enoug h t o b e defended? " "I s h e jus t black o n th e outside?" . . . . Unfortunately, th e very framewor k o f racia l reasonin g wa s not called into question. Yet as long as racial reasoning regulate s black though t an d action , Clarenc e Thomases wil l continue t o haunt blac k America—as Bush and othe r conservative s si t back , watch, an d prosper. 22 The "closing-rank s mentality" mean s that an y truth-telling that coul d possibly fee d th e argument s o f opponent s mus t b e condemned. S o if th e CCNY pseudo-schola r Leonar d Jeffrie s assail s Jew s fo r "financin g th e slave trade," h e is spared criticis m b y black scholar s who privatel y moc k his scholarship . When Mario n Barr y was trie d fo r crac k cocain e use , he was cite d a s a victi m o f "racis t prosecution, " cheere d b y fello w blac k mayors, an d defende d b y th e nationa l presiden t o f th e NAACP . Meanwhile, an y discussio n touchin g o n revivin g th e traditio n o f blac k self-help, which had preserved stron g black families through the unspeak able horror s o f segregatio n an d racia l oppression , i s criticized a s givin g comfort t o conservative victim-blamers . In 197 8 th e blac k sociologis t Willia m Julius Wilson brok e wit h th e orthodoxy whe n h e publishe d The Declining Significance of Race. A liberal, respected scholar , Wilson could no t b e dismissed a s an "oreo " o r "conservative." H e argue d tha t th e deterioratin g condition s i n norther n

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ghettos could b e best explained b y the deindustrialization o f the America n economy, whic h ha d eliminate d high-paying , semiskille d job s i n an d around cities , and b y the progress and subsequen t fligh t t o the suburbs of the blac k middl e class . Childre n i n thes e ghett o neighborhood s gre w u p without th e example o f successfu l black s to emulate ; institutions suc h a s lodges, churches, and clubs , which provide d th e glue for a sense of com munity, had bee n draine d o f their leadership . Ignoring the argument s o n racism an d separatism , Wilso n advocate d blac k participatio n i n coali tions tha t woul d pus h economi c reform s t o benefi t al l poo r people , no t programs targete d t o th e blac k poo r alone . He concluded : The challeng e o f economi c dislocatio n . . . calls for publi c pol icy programs t o attac k inequalit y o n a broad clas s front, polic y programs . . . tha t go beyond th e limits of ethnic and racia l dis crimination b y directl y confrontin g th e pervasiv e an d destruc tive features o f clas s subordination." 23 Wilson's boo k wa s immediately denounce d b y black academic s an d activists. Wilson was charged wit h fou r majo r violation s o f blac k ortho doxy. First , h e ha d sinne d b y drawin g attentio n t o th e expansio n an d progress o f th e blac k middl e class . Second , Wilso n ha d claime d tha t affirmative actio n ha d helpe d primaril y thos e who , b y reason o f famil y background, education , an d luck , would hav e found goo d job s anyway . Third, h e ha d argue d tha t th e grea t disparitie s i n blac k incom e an d employment statu s coul d no t b e blame d o n an y pervasive , contempo rary white racism. Fourth, citin g W. E . B. DuBois an d King , Wilson ha d proposed tha t blac k American s woul d b e better serve d b y joining rank s with white , Latino , an d othe r group s advocatin g race-neutra l policies . The attac k o n Wilso n illuminate s th e proces s b y which blac k insu larity ha s hindere d th e developmen t o f a broade r progressiv e coalition . First, b y insistin g tha t al l black s ar e victimize d b y "th e system " o f per vasive racism, liberals surrender groun d t o the conservative explanation s for a growin g blac k middl e class : tha t systemi c racia l oppressio n ha s ended and that blac k people who study and work har d frequentl y succeed . Not onl y i s th e conservativ e explanatio n mor e credibl e a s a matte r o f fact an d observation , bu t i t is more optimistic , appealin g t o th e nation' s uncritical belie f i n the America n creed . Second, th e rhetori c o f professiona l black s an d thei r whit e allie s offends th e rule s o f America n society . Fo r example , libera l Democrat s aver that white racism is so endemic that blac k Americans must be offere d

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guarantees fo r income , jobs, and colleg e placements—that i f left t o com pete wit h other s the y woul d certainl y fail . Third , ther e i s n o roo m fo r white Americans who believ e in equal opportunit y an d racial justice. The political arithmeti c is simple and inarguable : if Americans are encourage d to grou p togethe r b y color an d t o thin k tha t society' s ill s ar e color-gen erated, the n white s will win ever y time .

MULTICULTURALISM, AFROCENTRISM , AND OTHE R HEIR S T O BLACK POWE R Although the Black Power movement ha s waned, the ideas that gav e birth to the movement hav e been relabeled. Advocates o f "multicultural ism" an d "cultura l diversity " pus h fo r heightene d racia l an d ethni c con sciousness and a new kind o f intellectual balkanization . Adelaide Sanford , a membe r o f th e Ne w Yor k Stat e Boar d o f Regent s wh o strongl y advo cated compulsor y adoptio n o f multicultura l curricula , argue s tha t eac h race an d ethni c grou p mus t hav e th e freedo m t o defin e themselve s an d determine wha t thei r childre n wil l b e taught. 24 Multiculturalist s rejec t the ide a tha t th e America n republi c i s supported b y a strong foundatio n of individual rights and opportunities . Scholar Derrick Bel l goes so far a s to sugges t tha t civi l right s law s ar e bor n o f th e sam e spiri t tha t sanc tioned slaver y and segregation : "A t best , the law—protecting black s fro m blatant racis t practices an d policies , but rationalizing al l manner o f situ ations that relegat e blacks to a subordinate status—regularize s racism." 25 The driv e fo r racia l unit y amon g blac k scholar s an d activist s i s no t an intramura l gam e o f th e blac k elite . Whil e th e urging s o f th e Afrocentrists influenc e curricul a decision s i n city schools an d o n univer sity campuses, they also give rise to a much graver threat b y lending intellectual respectabilit y t o racia l separatism . Wha t i s noteworth y i s tha t such a radical proposal—one tha t challenge s the core values of America n society—is s o tamel y viewe d b y blac k an d whit e American s wh o pur portedly believ e in the idea o f on e nation . The view s frequentl y expresse d b y blac k leader s asser t tha t racis m is the best or sole explanation fo r th e unhappy pligh t of black Americans . A black leade r who advance s the notion tha t a white conspiracy aim s a t the genocida l eliminatio n o f blac k male s throug h polic e murder s an d imprisonment wil l b e cheere d b y man y blac k audience s an d challenge d in practicall y none . Similarl y blac k leader s blam e muc h blac k crim e o n government's effor t t o floo d ghett o neighborhood s wit h drugs . (I n on e

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poll, 6 0 percen t foun d suc h a n explanatio n tru e o r plausible. 26 ) Gap s in educationa l performanc e betwee n blac k an d whit e student s ar e fre quently presente d a s the consequenc e o f uncarin g schoo l systems , sub urban-controlled legislatures , an d "Eurocentric " curricul a an d teachers. Highe r rate s o f blac k infan t mortalit y ar e explaine d a s th e consequence o f th e deliberat e withholdin g o f healt h service s t o blac k mothers an d babies . It is important t o keep in mind the persistent focus th e contemporar y racialist orthodox y ha s o n victimizatio n an d th e vehemenc e wit h whic h these position s ar e defended . Th e polarizin g rhetori c threaten s an y dis senter with excommunication. When Yale professor Stephe n Carte r wrot e of the complex an d nuance d persona l consequence s o f affirmative actio n programs o n his life, he was pilloried, along with San Jose State professo r Shelby Steele, by the Reverend Benjami n Hooks , president of the NAACP, as "jus t a ne w bree d o f Uncl e Toms. " Blac k American s wh o recal l th e powerful tradition s o f blac k self-hel p an d o f stron g mora l tradition s ca n expect comment s suc h a s thi s fro m Adolp h Reed , Jr. : "hi s focu s o n self-help an d moral revitalization [i n ghetto neighborhoods] i s profoundl y reactionary an d meshe s perfectl y wit h th e victim-blamin g orthodox y o f the Reagan/Bus h era." 27

OTHER VOICE S Many blac k Americans have resisted the more extreme ramification s of blac k unity . Th e spectru m o f blac k though t an d idea s i s much riche r and mor e texture d tha n th e usua l publi c discours e allows . In particular , the conservative , distinctl y southern , Baptist , an d famil y orientatio n o f black discours e i s erase d b y th e orthodoxy . A 199 2 pol l reporte d tha t black American s ar e more likel y to describ e themselve s a s conservative s than liberal s by a 34 to 28 margin! 28 Onl y a small ban d o f self-proclaime d "black conservatives," however, have dared a frontal attac k o n the orthodoxy o f blac k unity . Thei r names—emblazone d i n som e Blac k Hal l o f Shame—include Thoma s Sowell , Glenn Loury , Walter Williams, Rober t Woodson, Justic e Clarenc e Thomas , an d Representativ e Gar y Franks . These conservative s say , "Forge t th e legacie s o f enslavement , Jim Crow , and discriminatio n an d ac t lik e th e American s yo u are . Individua l black American s ar e responsibl e fo r thei r lives , an d yo u ar e a s fre e a s any other American t o go as far you r talents and ambitio n ca n take you. " This kin d o f tal k i s heres y t o th e advocate s o f blac k unity . Fo r blac k

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Americans, th e labe l "conservative " ha s th e sam e appea l a s "quisling " would hav e t o a Norwegian patriot . The ground betwee n blac k conservative s an d th e advocates o f blac k unity i s nearly a no man' s land . A few academics , such a s West, Wilson , Carter, Randal l Kenned y o f Harvar d La w School , an d Juliu s Leste r a t the Universit y o f Massachusetts , explor e a middl e ground , on e whic h acknowledges th e powerfu l effect s o f centurie s o f whit e oppressio n bu t stops short o f calling for raciall y determine d preference s an d which seek s to establis h commo n caus e wit h potentia l allie s t o enac t program s tha t would b e broadl y beneficia l bu t wit h particula r relevanc e t o blac k Americans. Much o f this dialogue can be found i n the pages of two quar terly publications : Reconstruction, establishe d b y Kennedy i n 1992 , an d the American Prospect, starte d i n 1990 .

BLACK POLITICA L UNIT Y I N THE JACKSONIAN ER A Jesse Jackson teste d th e theorie s o f blac k politica l unit y i n his 198 4 campaign fo r th e Democrati c presidentia l nomination , an d the n pushe d them t o th e limi t i n 1988 . Jackson' s campaign s wer e base d o n thre e premises. Th e firs t wa s tha t a positiv e racia l appea l t o blac k American s would translat e int o increase d turnout s an d Jackso n votes . Althoug h Jackson spok e o f "rainbows " an d frequentl y appeare d wit h whit e strik ers, white farmers, o r white feminists, h e would not have been taken seri ously without mobilizin g blac k voters . Jackson buil t his base on suppor t from blac k churches . I n 198 4 blac k voter s cas t 1 8 percen t o f al l Democratic primar y votes , an d Jackso n receive d 7 7 percen t o f them . (Walter Mondale got 1 9 percent.) 29 In 198 8 blac k turnout increase d to 2 1 percent o f primar y votes , a n astoundin g 9 2 percen t o f whic h wen t t o Jackson. 30 Thi s mean s tha t two-third s o f Jackson' s 6. 7 million s vote s were blac k votes , an d tha t h e capture d abou t on e o f ever y eigh t whit e votes (althoug h many o f those came in the late primaries, when Governo r Michael Dukaki s wa s "th e las t whit e ma n standing") . A s Brookly n Representative Shirle y Chishol m demonstrate d i n he r brie f 197 6 cam paign fo r th e presidentia l nomination , th e novelt y o f blacknes s alon e i s insufficient t o ear n suc h support . The secon d premis e o f th e Jackso n campaig n strateg y wa s tha t h e would b e treated b y the pres s an d hi s fellow candidates , not a s someon e vying fo r th e America n presidency , bu t a s th e representativ e o f blac k America. In a remarkable post-conventio n interview , Jackson claime d t o

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be the carrie r o f "th e emotion s an d self-respec t an d inne r securit y o f th e whole race." "Historically, " h e said, "w e did not spirituall y unif y Black s of differen t ideologica l persuasions . . . . We ar e molding ou r communit y together."31 Jackson suggeste d that blac k voters supported hi m because he "best articulate d thei r feelings , view s an d interests . . . . I represen t a chance for ou r childre n t o make a breakthrough t o make America better . Through a lifetim e o f servic e an d struggle , I hav e earne d [black ] sup port." I n May, 198 4 Time magazin e acknowledge d Jackson's specia l sta tus in a n effusiv e cove r story : Because of his color, an d becaus e he was never given a realisti c chance o f winnin g th e nomination , Jackso n ha s bee n treate d differently fro m othe r candidates. His rivals dealt with him gingerly, hoping not to alienat e potential blac k suppor t i n the fall . The pres s concentrate d o n hi s vivid campaig n styl e an d rarel y challenged hi s positions o n th e issues. 32 The press ignore d o r sidesteppe d actions , lapses, and statement s b y Jackson tha t woul d hav e bee n subjecte d t o frenzie d investigatio n an d reporting ha d the y bee n associate d wit h a potentia l whit e nominee . Fo r example, onl y spott y attentio n wa s pai d t o Jackson' s exploitatio n o f Martin Luthe r King' s assassination. Jackson ha d claimed , falsely, t o hav e been conversin g wit h Kin g whe n h e wa s sho t an d tha t h e bloodie d hi s shirt cradlin g Kin g unti l th e ambulanc e arrived . Jackson the n hoppe d a plane t o Chicag o an d arrange d a n appearanc e o n th e nex t day' s The Today Show o n whic h h e wor e th e staine d shirt . H e wa s abl e t o avoi d close scrutin y b y th e pres s concernin g th e managemen t an d financia l administration o f PUS H an d Operatio n Breadbasket , tw o organization s Jackson create d an d led , despit e evidenc e o f carelessness , i f no t nonfea sance.33 Jackson als o escape d criticis m fo r hi s foreig n policies , whic h emphasized suppor t for notoriously unpopula r figure s suc h as Fidel Castr o and PL O ChairmanYassi r Arafat . H e wen t fa r beyon d th e commo n Democratic opposition to Reagan-Bush suppor t o f the Nicaraguan Contra s to exten d enthusiasti c suppor t t o the discredited Sandinist a regime . There wa s a consisten t an d importan t exceptio n t o th e patter n o f deference pai d t o Jackson : America n Jews—individuall y an d organiza tionally—were quic k t o criticiz e Jackso n o n tw o counts—tha t h e wa s pro-Palestinian, i f no t anti-Israeli ; an d tha t h e dre w suppor t fro m anti-Semitic blac k nationalists , mos t particularl y th e Natio n o f Islam' s leader, Loui s Farrakhan . (Jew s o n th e Left , i t shoul d b e noted , wer e

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among Jackson's mos t ferven t whit e allies. ) Durin g th e 198 4 campaign , his relations with Farrakhan an d Jackson's reference t o New York Cit y as "Hymie town " wer e th e onl y issue s o n whic h Jackso n wa s hammere d by the pres s i n the sam e way, fo r example , tha t Gar y Har t wa s pursue d on marita l infidelit y o r Senato r Joe Bide n was discredite d fo r la w schoo l plagiarism. The thir d premis e o f th e Jackso n campaig n strateg y wa s tha t th e Democratic nominatin g proces s coul d b e use d t o advanc e hi s persona l ambition to succeed King as the embodiment o f black America. Unlike his primary opponents , Jackson wa s no t boun d b y the imperative s tha t pre vail fo r a candidat e trul y seekin g th e nomination . Thi s freedom , whe n combined wit h th e pervasiv e timidit y o f th e party' s libera l elit e abou t race an d it s allied issues , gave Jackson enormou s roo m t o maneuver . Both Walter Mondal e an d Michae l Dukakis understood th e danger s of Jackson's visibilit y an d demands , bu t neithe r wa s prepare d t o addres s them i n a direc t an d effectiv e way . Bot h me n trie d t o appea r stron g an d "presidential" i n thei r negotiation s abou t th e vic e presidency , platfor m issues, and Jackson's conventio n role . In the end , however , the y acte d i n ways which connoted weakness, a fatal impressio n for someon e seeking the presidency. Jackson wa s give n a prominent rol e i n the 198 4 convention , but the n refuse d t o endors e Mondal e unti l afte r Labo r Day . Althoug h Mondale insisted that he was not negotiating with Jackson, Jackson's support di d not come until after a meeting at which Mondale agree d to cam paign patronage, a "black " foreig n polic y speech, and emphasis on certai n domestic issues. 34 Mondale seeme d unabl e t o ru n hi s own part y an d wa s tarred a s the candidate o f special interests because of his public deals, not only wit h Jackson , bu t wit h feminists , unions , an d Jews . Ye t befor e th e convention, a New York Times/CBS pol l reporte d tha t blac k American s preferred Mondal e ove r Jackson b y a 53 to 3 1 margin. 35 Between the 198 4 an d 198 8 campaigns , Jackson offere d ampl e evidence tha t hi s politica l interest s wer e bette r describe d a s racia l rathe r than Democratic . Durin g th e Reaga n years , th e mos t powerfu l institu tional defende r o f civi l right s law s an d enforcemen t wa s th e Hous e Judiciary Committee , chaired b y Watergate hero and civil rights advocate, Peter Rodin o o f Newark . Ye t i n 1986 , Jess e Jackso n trie d t o unsea t Rodino, supporting instea d a black count y officia l name d Donal d Payn e in the primary. Two year s later, afte r Rodin o retired , Payn e ran bu t wa s opposed i n the primary b y a black cit y councilman. Thi s time, Jackson's racial interest s wer e serve d b y neutrality—Payn e wa s no t deservin g o f his endorsement .

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In 1988 , as the Democratic National Conventio n dre w near, Jackson put Michael Dukakis on the defensive. Jackson learned from a reporter, no t from th e Dukaki s campaign , tha t h e woul d no t b e th e vic e presidentia l nominee. Jackson used this slight to mount a campaign amon g black audi ences, even though the convention was less than a week away and he stood no mathematical chance of blocking the Dukakis nomination. He replaye d his rejectio n befor e th e NAAC P convention , an d the n wen t of f o n a three-day bu s trip to Atlanta, during which he suggested a deal to guaran tee his role in a Dukakis administration. Onl y on the eve of the conventio n did Jackson back off i n a private meeting with the nominee. 36 Bu t the damage wa s done . Jackson ha d playe d t o a powerfu l emotio n amon g blac k Americans b y "dissing " a powerful whit e man an d gettin g away with it . The ferven t an d enthusiasti c crie s that ran g ou t fro m blac k church es o n Jackson' s preannouncemen t crusade s matche d thos e word s fer vently spoke n b y Republica n strategist s fo r Ronal d Reaga n an d the n George Bush: "Run , Jesse, run!" Jackson's high-profil e campaig n an d hi s mobilization o f blac k voters , particularl y i n th e South , wer e a perfec t prelude fo r sweepin g Republica n victorie s i n November . Blac k politica l unity at its height under Jackson was one more "gift " fro m th e Democrat s that helpe d t o ensur e th e Republica n hol d o n th e Whit e Hous e an d th e election o f tw o president s hostil e t o th e politic s an d policie s favore d b y most blac k voters .

BLACK VOTER PREFERENCE S Jesse Jackson's attemp t a t harnessin g th e blac k vot e i s only t o b e expected: A s a whole , black s ten d t o vot e uniforml y mor e tha n an y other group . Man y spea k easil y o f th e "blac k community, " a s i f on e could generaliz e abou t 3 0 millio n American s o f color . However , a n HBO/Joint Cente r fo r Economi c an d Politica l Studie s pol l foun d 7 3 percent o f black s identifyin g themselve s a s Democrats , whil e onl y 4 percent sai d the y wer e Republicans. 37 I n presidentia l election s sinc e 1964, blac k suppor t fo r th e Democrati c candidat e ha s range d fro m 8 2 percent fo r Clinto n t o 96 percen t fo r Johnson , wh o wa s th e onl y Democrat t o carr y a majorit y o f whit e voters . I n comparison , whit e Americans ar e just abou t evenl y spli t betwee n Democrati c (3 6 percent) , Republican (3 3 percent), an d independen t (3 1 percent). 38 The reason blac k American s suppor t Democrat s i s obvious: black s are muc h mor e likel y t o suppor t governmen t activism , becaus e blac k

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Americans ar e twice as likely as white Americans to b e employed b y government, thre e time s mor e likel y t o liv e belo w th e officia l definitio n o f poverty, an d seve n time s mor e likel y t o b e o n welfare . I n the 199 2 elec tion, black voters gave noticeably greate r weight to education an d healt h care issue s i n castin g thei r vote s tha n di d othe r voters , an d muc h les s attention t o th e deficit , abortion , an d th e environment. 39 Whe n address ing problems suc h as inadequate healt h care, joblessness, and dru g addiction, blac k American s ar e mor e likel y tha n white s t o favo r governmen t guarantees promising to take care of everyone seeking treatment o r work . Because o f th e blac k community' s overwhelmin g preferenc e fo r Democratic politicians sinc e 1964 , many Republican s hav e stopped com peting fo r blac k support . Republican s assum e n o ris k b y emphasizin g racially charge d issue s suc h a s crime, welfare, an d quotas , nor b y build ing a n all-whit e souther n party . B y contrast , unti l Bil l Clinton' s 199 2 campaign, Democrats responded a s if there were vigorous competition fo r black votes that required specia l attention to the issues promoted b y black leaders. The resul t o f suc h effort s wa s a net los s of votes .

GIVING AN D TAKING ADVANTAG E Politics rewards those whose interests are well organized an d intensely held. Fo r example , th e Nationa l Rifl e Association' s 2. 5 millio n mem bers have regularly stoppe d th e enactmen t o f laws favored b y four-fifth s of Americans. Lyndon Johnson b y contrast carrie d poll s in his back pock et that showe d 65 percen t suppor t fo r hi s Vietnam policies , but this support wa s passiv e an d unorganized , whil e th e oppositio n wa s motivated , organized, an d fervent—an d i t brough t hi m down . Th e succes s o f orga nized, motivated interest s is also demonstrated b y the activities of ethnic , religious, and racial groups. Considering the American tradition o f ethni c consciousness an d exploitation , i t i s n o wonde r tha t blac k American s have heede d call s fo r racia l unit y agains t a histor y muc h cruele r tha n anything faced b y American Irish or Jews. Black entry into the councils of the nationa l Democrati c part y wa s earne d i n way s simila r t o thos e o f other ethni c groups : appeal s t o unit y base d o n share d resentment s an d aspirations, concentrated vote s in key electoral states , control o f job an d contract-dispensing positions . Lik e politician s everywhere , blac k politi cians bluffe d abou t thei r abilit y t o delive r o r withhol d crucia l vote s an d used th e bluf f t o extrac t persona l an d organizationa l advantage .

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This i s a n ol d an d honorabl e gam e i n Democrati c politics . Wha t makes the liberal-black exchang e differen t i s that i t is not base d o n mutu al politica l advantage . Th e exchang e i s no t base d o n mutua l respect , because ther e i s so little.

THE SIMPL E POLITICA L ARITHMETI C O F RACE On April 1,1990 , the decennial census found 29,986,00 0 American s who classifie d themselve s a s "black " an d 218,724,00 0 wh o di d not. Th e ratio o f black s t o nonblack s wa s 1 to 7 . In 1992 , after presidentia l cam paigns b y Jess e Jackso n i n 198 4 an d 1988 , an d considerabl e publi c emphasis on voter registration, exit surveys of voters estimated tha t blac k Americans cas t abou t 8 percent o f th e vote s fo r president. 40 Fo r twent y years, liberal Democrats hav e campaigned t o increase racial awareness, t o make stron g an d specifi c appeal s t o blac k American s a s blacks , an d t o arouse blac k resentment s abou t problem s visite d mos t heavil y o n blac k families. The political problem wit h this type of approach i s that there simpl y are not enough blac k votes to make it worthwhile. If Americans are force d to thin k i n terms o f blac k an d white , blac k wil l los e every time . Presidential campaign s ar e decide d o n th e issu e o f leadership , an d this contes t take s place i n the cente r o f th e American politica l spectrum . Liberal Democratic candidates demonstrat e tim e and agai n that they can not lea d thei r part y t o a stron g coalition , s o why shoul d anyon e expec t that the y could handl e the much mor e complex challenge s o f leading th e nation? A t precisel y th e tim e the y shoul d hav e bee n healin g th e wound s of the primary seaso n and buildin g support fo r thei r platform o n a national basis, they responded t o demands that the losers be given a share of th e victory. I n bot h 198 4 an d 1988 , Jackson, a fa r superio r orato r t o eithe r Mondale o r Dukakis , wa s give n hi s ow n prime-tim e opportunit y t o remind America n voter s vividl y an d memorabl y wha t America n voter s already knew : th e Democrat s wer e th e part y o f th e poor , th e dispos sessed, the homeless, the disabled, and the pressure was on the party to d o even more . Just whe n Democrat s neede d t o forcefull y remin d working and middle-clas s voter s tha t the y were mor e likel y than th e Republican s to loo k ou t fo r thei r economi c interests , the y wer e instea d reinforcin g their appea l to people who were either highly likely to vote for Democrat s or no t t o vot e a t all .

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CONCLUSION The politica l isolatio n o f blac k Americ a i s accompanie d b y th e rhetorical shrillnes s emanatin g fro m th e visibl e blac k leadership , a lead ership that benefit s fro m suc h isolation . The danger s o f th e political iso lation o f blac k American s ar e beginnin g t o b e appreciate d b y black an d white progressive s alike . Academics suc h a s Wilson, Kennedy, an d Wes t have writte n abou t th e nee d fo r stronge r coalition s acros s racia l lines , for greate r honest y i n public debate, and fo r recognitio n o f the appallin g costs o f famil y dissolution . Yet , the prevailin g orthodox y o f racia l unit y and white demonology i s powerful enoug h that 29 percent o f black Ne w Yorkers ar e willin g t o imagin e tha t thei r nationa l governmen t woul d invent an d disseminat e th e AIDS virus to eliminat e blac k Americans. 41 There i s an answe r t o the problem o f blac k isolation : more politics ; that is , bette r politic s b y whit e American s an d blac k American s alike . The searc h fo r commo n ground—whic h i s th e purpos e o f politics — requires th e hones t statemen t o f interest s an d differences . Whit e liberal s and blac k liberal s need to respect the process enoug h t o us e it to mutua l advantage. They need to determine which problems ar e best explained b y racial discriminatio n an d whic h ar e not ; bu t mos t o f all , the y nee d t o respect eac h othe r enoug h t o spea k directly , courteously , an d seriousl y about th e issues . The result s wil l no t b e surprising , excep t t o thos e wh o deny th e purposes an d efficac y o f politic s i n the American Republic .

6» THE HIG H COST S O F CONSERVATIVE RUL E

C

onservative Republicans were, for mos t of this century, a quaint grou p in America n politics . The y wer e tagge d a s th e father s o f th e Grea t Depression wit h tellin g effect b y Democrats; they whined abou t bi g government an d defici t spending , an d terrorize d th e natio n wit h tal l tale s about a domesti c communis t conspiracy . Conservative s wer e mostl y white, Protestant resident s o f smal l towns, and the y had limite d politica l power. Eve n in the Republican part y i t was liberal Republicans who usu ally decided wh o woul d ru n fo r presiden t o n th e GO P ticket . Then, in 196 4 the conservatives too k ove r the Republican part y an d nominated Arizona' s Barr y Goldwater, "Mr . Conservative, " a s their presidential candidate . Th e debri s wa s everywher e afte r th e 196 4 elections : LBJ took 6 1 percent o f th e vot e an d carrie d al l bu t fiv e states . Fifty-tw o percent o f Americans identified themselve s as Democrats; only 25 percen t labeled themselve s Republican. 1 Poll s showe d tha t th e bipartisa n civi l rights agend a wa s widel y supported ; Goldwater , wh o ha d oppose d th e measures, represented a defeated, isolate d minority . In the weeks follow ing his defeat, th e label "conservativ e Republican " seeme d t o move fro m "quaint" t o "endangered. " Th e New York Times' s Jame s Reston , th e nation's mos t influential politica l commentator, summarize d wha t woul d quickly becom e the popular wisdom : "Barr y Goldwate r no t onl y lost th e Presidential electio n . . . bu t th e conservativ e caus e a s well . H e ha s 117

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wrecked hi s party fo r a long time to come." 2 Not quite . The Republican s went o n to take the White House in five of the seven subsequent elections . Moreover, i n 1980 , conservativ e Republican s demonstrate d thei r mastery o f coalitio n politic s wit h th e electio n o f Ronal d Reagan . Hi s landslide reelectio n i n 198 4 an d Georg e Bush' s victor y i n 198 8 prove d that, in sixteen years, conservatives had progresse d fro m laughingstoc k t o unbeatable. Th e 199 4 midter m elections , whic h gav e th e GO P contro l of Congres s fo r th e firs t tim e i n forty years , suggested tha t Bil l Clinton' s 1992 presidentia l victor y wa s a n aberratio n tha t woul d no t b e repeate d in 1996 .

THE SOURCE S O F THE CONSERVATIV E RENEWA L It is important t o understan d ho w a conservative majorit y wa s buil t in suc h a relatively shor t perio d o f time . Clearly , i t coul d no t hav e bee n done withou t th e complicit y o f th e libera l elit e tha t too k ove r th e Democratic party i n 1972 . But liberal timidity an d hubris , by themselves, were no t enough . Th e conservativ e ascendanc y wa s propelle d b y race-freighted issue s a s well as the shock s t o th e American econom y fel t during th e 1970s . Beyon d that , conservative s wer e activ e intellectually , aggressive i n broadenin g thei r narro w electora l base , and wel l financed .

CONSERVATIVES I N THE WHITE SOUT H In 199 1 Thomas B . and Mar y D . Edsall bega n thei r definitiv e anal ysis of the economic, cultural, and political forces tha t framed th e destruction o f th e Democrati c coalitio n wit h th e 196 4 Goldwate r campaign . Race—specifically a visceral defens e o f segregation—wa s a t th e hear t o f Goldwater's swee p of the Deep South. As the Edsalls argued, however, the Goldwater candidac y offere d th e segregationis t southerne r somethin g more tha n old-styl e white supremacy : Goldwater's succes s demonstrate d tha t conservativ e ideolog y provided a new avenue for th e Republican part y into the South , an avenu e that permitte d th e GO P to carry the most anti-blac k segment o f the nation without facin g publi c condemnation. Fo r a substantial segmen t o f the white South , conservatism becam e a cloa k wit h whic h t o protec t racia l segregation . A t th e sam e

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time, i n a developmen t tha t woul d soo n hav e nationa l rele vance, Goldwate r demonstrate d tha t th e socioeconomi c clas s structure o f the New Deal alignment i n the deep South could b e fractured b y th e issu e o f race . . . . [T]h e issu e o f rac e actuall y produced a n ideologica l conversio n o f poo r souther n white s from a deepl y hel d economi c liberalis m t o economi c conser vatism.3 Goldwater se t th e stag e fo r th e South . Kevi n Phillip s lai d ou t i n microscopic detai l th e blueprin t fo r th e long-ter m takeove r o f th e whit e South b y conservativ e Republican s i n hi s 196 9 book , The Emerging Republican Majority. H e accuratel y observed , "No w tha t th e national Democratic Party is becoming the Negro party throughout. . . the South , the alienatio n o f whit e [Georg e C. ] Wallac e voter s i s likely t o persist." 4 Phillips instructed Republican s o n the acrobatic s require d fo r expandin g their politica l bas e i n the South : "Maintenanc e o f Negr o votin g rights i s essential t o th e GOP . Unles s Negroe s continu e t o displac e whit e Democratic organizations , the latter ma y remain viabl e as spokesmen fo r Deep Souther n conservatism." 5 Republicans were perfectly positione d t o take advantage o f the large, rapid change s i n public opinio n a s the televise d imag e o f blac k Americ a shifted fro m tha t o f prayerfu l victim s o f racis t souther n polic e t o tha t o f rioters an d looters .

CONSERVATIVES VERSUS TH E GREA T SOCIET Y Outside th e South , conservative s bega n thei r clim b ou t o f th e hol e dug b y th e Goldwate r debacl e simpl y b y showin g up . I n th e 196 6 elec tions, twenty o f the forty-seven Democrati c freshmen wh o had bee n elected o n LBJ' s coattails wer e defeate d i n traditionally conservativ e district s by generall y conservativ e Republicans . Th e patter n wa s national , wit h Democratic losse s particularl y heav y i n Iowa , Michigan , an d Ohio. 6 Daniel Moynihan sai d the 196 6 election s indicated tha t "th e recent period o f accelerated , intensiv e innovatio n i s over, " an d tha t th e election s were a "clea r instructio n t o electe d official s everywher e tha t th e countr y has gon e abou t a s fa r a s i t wishe s i n providin g socia l welfar e an d eco nomic assistanc e t o th e Negro masses." 7 In opposing Grea t Societ y experiments suc h a s the War o n Poverty , conservatives appeale d t o white working-class Democrats wh o wanted t o

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keep black northerners "i n their place." 8 Conservatives neve r promised t o maintain segregation , bu t the y vociferousl y oppose d an y Democrati c efforts t o orchestrat e a new political balanc e o f power i n northern cities . Liberals ha d sough t t o brea k dow n th e barrier s t o high-payin g union ized construction job s for black s (althoug h neve r with th e enthusiasm o f Nixon's labo r secretary , George Shultz), to protect young black men fro m arbitrary arres t an d harassmen t b y whit e cops , t o bu s blac k kid s int o schools in other neighborhoods , an d t o buil d house s fo r poo r familie s i n working-class neighborhoods . Thes e policie s ra n headlon g int o th e interests an d strongl y hel d belief s o f man y working-clas s Democrats . Conservatives oppose d LBJ' s "socia l engineering," expande d procedura l rights fo r crimina l defendants , "forced " schoo l busing , an d expande d public housing. Conservative views paralleled thos e of whites who feare d or dislike d blac k Americans .

CONSERVATIVES AN D LA W AND ORDE R Rising crime rates that coincided with the Great Societ y strengthene d the conservativ e appea l t o fearfu l whites . As liberal s trie d t o excus e an d explain rising crime rates and ghetto riots, conservatives talked abou t la w and orde r an d "bleedin g heart " judges . A s i t turne d out , conservative s knew what t o say about crime , but no t what t o do about it . They blame d liberal judge s fo r freein g criminal s o n technicalitie s an d succeede d ove r time i n strippin g judge s o f sentencin g discretion . Republican s declare d one war afte r another—agains t crim e in Washington, crime in the streets, drugs every place—and los t them all. Ironically, they opposed federa l pro grams t o hel p polic e department s ad d patrol s an d ne w technologie s an d steadfastly oppose d contro l o f handguns . Conservative s celebrate d th e return of capital punishment; they spent billions on futile attempt s to close the nation's border s to drugs but showed littl e inclination t o expand dru g treatment opportunities . Republica n presidentia l candidate s emphasize d crime-fighting a s if they were running fo r polic e commissioner o r mayor . The conservatives' failed policies and false promises did not hurt them with the voters, however, because liberals gave them a free ride on the issue of crime . A s see n i n Chapte r 3 , liberal s initiall y denie d tha t crim e wa s increasing and then suggested that crime could not b e fought directl y unti l the "underlyin g causes" had bee n removed. They claimed that anyone wh o even brought th e subject u p was a fear-mongering race-baiter . B y the time liberals realized their error, their credibility on the issue was badly damaged .

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POPULAR PERCEPTIO N O F CULTURAL TURMOI L Along wit h th e breakdow n i n la w an d order , conservative s wer e helped b y the growing debate about socia l and cultura l standards . As the various baby boom revolutions—civil rights , sexual freedom, dru g exper imentation, educationa l freedom—erupted , matter s that heretofor e wer e considered withi n th e preserv e o f privat e conduc t becam e ragin g publi c issues. The situatio n o n colleg e campuses wa s intense . Universities wer e physically occupied, professors an d presidents shouted dow n with obscen ities fro m th e childre n o f th e prosperin g middle-class . Whe n S . I . Hayakawa, th e professor-president o f Sa n Francisco Stat e College, insisted that the free speec h rights be preserved fo r al l persons, not just antiwa r protesters an d Blac k Powe r advocates , h e rod e hi s fam e t o a sea t i n th e United State s Senate . Women rebelled . Feminists fought fo r th e cause of college-educate d women whos e career s wer e blocke d b y mal e stereotypin g an d conven tions abou t a woman' s "place. " Housewive s wen t t o wor k t o preserv e their family' s standar d o f living . Lawsuit s opene d "men' s work " t o women i n construction, policing , sales , and management . The mos t persona l territorie s becam e lega l battlegrounds : th e U.S . Supreme Cour t granted constitutiona l protectio n t o abortion an d restrict ed the powers o f state s and town s to suppres s pornography. State s liber alized divorc e laws, reducing legal separation period s an d expandin g th e grounds fo r divorce . Homosexual s cam e ou t o f th e closet , demandin g protection fro m polic e harassment an d discrimination . Feminists , homosexuals, and abortio n rights ' advocates lined up with the Democrats; tra ditionalists an d antipornography , antiabortion , "pro-family " advocate s went wit h th e Republicans . The cultura l revolutio n drov e million s o f American s wh o ha d pre viously allie d thei r economi c interest s wit h th e Democrati c part y t o se e the Republica n part y a s th e protecto r o f stability , civility , an d goo d sense. Because the Democrat s offere d n o coheren t o r credibl e visio n fo r curbing inflatio n an d endin g stagnation, th e transition t o the Republica n party wa s mad e easier . Autho r Charle s Morri s summarize d th e 1960 s this way : The revolution had becom e tawdry and , even worse, boring... . Blacks were still an underclass, and the war was raging... .[M]os t of th e country wa s tirin g o f th e revolutionaries' antics . On e o f the few political achievement s o f the radicals, in fact, ma y hav e

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been twice to ensure the election o f Richard Nixo n a s President of th e United States. 9 Liberals wer e warned . I n 196 7 Moynihan , the n a directo r o f th e Americans fo r Democrati c Action , spok e t o th e ADA' s annua l confer ence, urgin g liberal s t o mak e leagu e wit h conservative s wh o share d a n interest i n th e "stabilit y o f th e socia l order, " an d wh o recognize d tha t "unyielding rigidity is just as much a threat to the continuity o f things a s an anarchic desire for change." 10 Unfortunately, mos t liberals were afrai d to acknowledg e that a problem eve n existed. Richard Scammo n an d Be n Wattenberg criticize d Democrat s i n 197 0 fo r confusin g th e cultura l rev olution wit h politica l opportunity : In all : [th e electorat e is ] unyoung , unpoor , unblack . Further more, th e youn g an d th e poo r ar e unmonolithi c i n thei r Presidential voting behavior. Si x in seven voters are over thirty . Nine ou t o f ten ar e unpoor. Nin e ou t o f ten ar e white. Becaus e there is some duplication . . . a fair gues s is . . . that seve n of te n American voter s ar e neither young , nor poor , no r black . Lesson: Talk abou t buildin g a powerful "ne w political coalition" whos e major component s ar e all the young, all the poor , all the black s doesn' t mak e muc h electora l sense . Reprieve: Tha t th e electorat e i s unyoung , unpoor , an d unblack doe s no t mea n the y ar e antiyoung , antipoor , o r antiblack.11 Scammon an d Wattenbur g wer e dismisse d a s "neoconservatives. "

THE BATTL E O F IDEA S William F. Buckley started th e National Review i n 195 5 as an orga n of conservativ e commentar y an d letters— a New Republic o f th e Right — and quickl y establishe d himsel f a s the leading voice of American conser vatives. His was a lonely voice, however, becaus e most respected politica l analysis an d commentar y cam e fro m liberals . With th e quickenin g change s o f th e 1960s , Lyndo n Johnso n use d financing approache s tha t ha d no t bee n teste d t o tr y t o solv e problem s that ha d no t bee n wel l defined . I n 196 5 a grou p o f northeaster n intel lectuals—most o f the m Democrats—bega n th e Public Interest, a livel y

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quarterly journa l tha t concentrate d o n th e domesti c issue s tha t swirle d around th e Grea t Society . I n it s infancy , ther e wa s nothin g particularl y conservative abou t th e journal' s editor s o r contributors , excep t thei r willingness t o debat e question s tha t liberal s shunned . The y wrot e con vincingly abou t th e plac e o f famil y an d communit y values , th e demo graphics o f crime , standard s o f civility , an d th e limit s o f governmen t guarantees. Jame s Q . Wilso n opene d th e issu e markin g th e journal' s twentieth anniversar y wit h thes e words: "Th e most importan t chang e i n how on e defines th e public interest that I have witnessed . . . over the las t twenty years has bee n a deepening concer n fo r th e developmen t o f char acter i n th e citizenry." 12 B y 198 5 suc h sentiment s wer e owne d b y con servatives. The neoconservativ e provocation s wen t largel y unchallenge d b y liberal Democrats. On e could argu e that neoconservatism' s purpos e wa s not t o oppos e liberalism , bu t rathe r t o reinvigorat e i t with a moral pur pose tha t woul d strengthe n America' s grea t innovation—self-govern ment. Irvin g Kristol, a founder an d co-edito r o f Public Interest, pu t i t in these terms : Our revolutionar y messag e . . . i s that a self-disciplined peopl e can creat e a politica l communit y i n whic h a n ordere d libert y will promote bot h economi c prosperity an d politica l participa tion. T o th e teemin g masse s o f othe r nations , th e America n political traditio n says : To enjo y th e fruit s o f self-government , you mus t firs t ceas e bein g "masses " an d becom e a "people " attached t o a common wa y of life, sharing common values , and existing in a condition o f mutual trust an d sympath y as betwee n individuals an d eve n socia l classes. 13 The nation's business leadership had alway s been conservative, and its public philosoph y wa s easil y stated—lowe r taxes , les s regulation . Fre e market advocates , however, were badl y underrepresented i n Washingto n policy debate s throug h th e 1960s . Thi s bega n t o chang e wit h th e emer gence of th e American Enterpris e Institut e (AEI) , under th e leadershi p o f William Baroody . On e o f th e origina l "polic y entrepreneurs, " Barood y understood tha t idea s ha d t o b e package d an d marketed , an d h e kne w the Washingto n market . AE I attracte d conservativ e star s suc h a s Irvin g Kristol, Melvi n Lair d ( a forme r Wisconsi n representativ e wh o becam e President Nixon's defense secretary) , and, in 1977 , former Presiden t Geral d Ford. AEI became a center of policy discussion aimed at demonstrating th e

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inefficiencies an d cost s o f governmen t regulatio n t o opinio n leader s an d legislators. B y th e earl y 1980s , Barood y ha d succeede d i n providin g a forum fo r wha t write r Jame s Alle n Smit h calle d " a conservativ e coun terelite." 14 The idea that federal regulatio n was hindering economic growth an d job creatio n an d addin g needles s cost s becam e s o powerfu l b y th e mid-1970s tha t th e Carte r administratio n initiate d th e deregulatio n o f the airline , energy, banking , an d truckin g industries . In the early 1970s , the conservative base was widened afte r th e emer gence o f the self-describe d Ne w Right , led b y Paul Weyrich, the founde r of th e Committe e fo r th e Surviva l o f a Fre e Congress ; Edwi n Feulner , the founde r o f th e Heritag e Foundation ; Richar d Viguerie , Georg e Wallace's direct-mai l wizard; and Kevi n Phillips, the political geographe r from Nixon' s 196 8 presidential campaign. The New Right sought to con vert th e economic , racial , cultural , an d socia l resentment s o f working and lower-middle-clas s white s int o vote s fo r a conservativ e revolution . Weyrich an d Feulne r sa w the Heritage Foundation a s the source of idea s for militan t conservative s dedicate d t o overturnin g th e social revolution s of the 1960 s an d defeatin g th e libera l "elite. " While free marke t an d libertaria n conservative s pushe d t o "ge t government of f people' s backs, " a striden t an d energeti c Ne w Righ t argued fo r governmen t intrusio n o n th e mos t persona l decisions . I n 1973 Ne w Righ t leader s enliste d th e suppor t o f a Virgini a preacher , Jerry Falwell , an d persuade d hi m t o mobiliz e evangelica l Christian s who wer e angere d b y th e 197 3 Roe v. Wade decisio n legalizin g abor tion. 15 The Moral Majorit y wa s born . I t advocated prohibitio n o f abor tion an d contraceptio n an d governmen t scrutin y o f libraries , newsstands, recor d stores , an d cinemas . The New Righ t wanted prosecutoria l power s use d to ferret ou t violators of long-forgotten sodom y an d fornication laws . They opposed fem inism, homosexuality, an d pre- and extramarita l sex , and campaigne d t o require state-sanctione d praye r i n public schools. By 1992 the New Righ t was strong enough to dictate the Republican platfor m o n abortion, schoo l prayer, famil y values , and illegitimacy . By 1975, then, conservative thinkers and activist s were pushing thei r ideas o n a broad front . Wha t the y lacke d wa s a cohesive economi c poli cy that went beyon d suppor t fo r fre e markets , lower taxation, an d dereg ulation an d tha t coul d b e sol d t o middle-clas s voter s a s a n antidot e t o lagging productivity, hig h inflation , an d hig h jobles s rates .

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REAGANOMICS Since the 1920s , conservative Republican s offere d a consistent an d unappetizing economi c philosophy. Its most noticeable feature wa s a tiresome whine about the dangers o f deficit spending . Even as the America n economy dominate d th e world an d create d history' s larges t middle class, conservatives persiste d i n their dou r sermonizing . The conservative vie w was shrunken, negative , and considere d irrelevan t b y most voters—unti l the 198 0 presidentia l campaig n o f Ronal d Reagan . Reagan's campaign had several enormous advantages. The incumben t president, Jimm y Carter , wa s fumbling , unpopular , an d immobilize d b y the Iranian hostag e crisi s and a stagnant econom y wit h record-hig h infla tion. Reagan offered a n economic plan that promised a sharp reduction i n taxes and a balanced budget . Republicans had somehow squared the circle: everyone would receiv e a 30 percent reduction i n their federa l incom e ta x rate and—no t t o worry—federa l deficit s woul d b e eliminate d b y 1984 . That was the promise, one that George Bush labeled "voodo o economics. " The salesma n fo r supply-sid e politic s wa s Jac k Kemp , a retire d professional quarterbac k an d Ne w Yor k congressman . H e convince d Reagan t o adop t i t a s th e economi c centerpiec e o f hi s 198 0 campaign . Supply-side's publicis t wa s Jud e Wanniski , a n editoria l write r fo r th e Wall Street Journal, whic h turne d it s op-ed page s into a continuous bill board fo r radica l tax-rate cuts. The problem facin g th e supply-side enthu siasts wa s obvious . I f ta x collection s decline d b y $15 0 billion , whil e military expenditure s sho t up , a large , recurrin g budge t defici t woul d result. Comin g t o supply-side' s rescue , Wanniski produce d a heretofor e unknown Californi a economist , Arthur Laffer , wh o ha d the solution: th e Laffer Curve . Based on flimsy theor y an d littl e documentation, th e Laffe r Curve postulated tha t margina l ta x rates were s o high and smotherin g o f enterprise tha t thei r shar p reductio n woul d se t of f economi c growth ; i n turn, this growth woul d generat e tax revenues sufficient t o offset th e revenue los s from th e ta x cuts . Few libera l economist s attacke d supply-sid e theory . Walte r Heller , the economic advisor to Kennedy an d Johnson, documente d tha t Kemp' s frequent reference s t o the favorable impac t o f the 196 2 tax cu t on feder al revenue s convenientl y ignore d th e stimulativ e effec t o f th e Vietna m buildup.16 Inexplicably, no one joined his attack. Thomas Edsall describe d the shell-shocked Democratic party: " [The] economic crisis was the essential facto r i n th e ideologica l an d intellectua l collaps e o f th e Democrati c

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party, creating substantiv e problem s that th e party was bot h unequippe d and unprepare d t o address." 17

THE DELETERIOU S EFFECT S O F DEFICIT SPENDIN G The real objective of the radical supply-siders was to cripple the broa d consensus abou t th e rol e o f governmen t i n America n society . Cautiou s supply-siders oppose d larg e deficits , proposin g shar p reduction s i n gov ernment spending . Radical supply-siders saw structural deficit s a s the best means t o brin g governmen t t o heel : First , slas h taxes ; then , exploi t th e dangers o f th e resultan t deficit s t o constrai n an d eve n dismantl e federa l domestic programs. The radicals won. In Reagan's eight years, the nation al debt tripled fro m a little more than $90 0 billio n to almos t $ 3 trillion . Once again , it was Daniel Patric k Moyniha n wh o mos t clearl y stat ed wha t wa s bein g tried . Eve n thoug h h e vote d "yea " a s Ne w York' s senior senator o n the 198 1 tax cuts, Moynihan wa s quick to see the implications o f th e Republica n program . I n Septembe r 198 1 h e sai d o f th e zealots in the new administration: "Thi s new group . . . i s like nothing we have seen. They ar e to conservatives a s anarchists ar e to liberals." 18 And , he asked : "D o w e reall y wan t a decad e i n which the issu e o f publi c dis course, ove r an d ove r an d over , will b e how bi g must th e budge t cut s b e in orde r t o preven t th e defici t fro m bein g even higher?" 19 The intention s o f th e radica l supply-sider s ar e a matte r o f publi c record: Davi d Stockman , Reagan' s first-ter m budge t director , confesse d all—first t o William Greide r of the Washington Post, an d then in his 198 6 memoirs. Stockman kne w tha t th e onl y way Reaga n coul d delive r o n hi s promise o f ta x cuts , huge increase s i n defens e spending , an d a balance d budget wa s t o moderat e Pentago n increases , shav e Socia l Securit y an d Medicare benefits , an d "zer o out " a variety o f other domesti c programs . But Reaga n refuse d t o g o alon g wit h anythin g bu t symboli c cut s i n th e military. And , a s Greide r observed , "on e politicia n wh o scurrie d awa y from th e President's proposed cut s in Social Security was the president." 20 Reagan's retreat was encouraged by the 96 to 0 vote in the Republican-con trolled Senat e against hi s proposal t o cut Socia l Security. Similarly, whe n Stockman propose d reducin g or eliminating subsidies for timber , farming , manufacturing, an d energy—in the interests of eliminating "wea k claims, " not "wea k clients"—h e los t ever y fight t o conservativ e Republicans . Stockman was desperate to cover the huge gap opened u p by the ta x cuts an d militar y spendin g increases . H e resorte d t o wildl y unrealisti c

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economic assumptions , phanto m spendin g cut s (Stockma n calle d thes e "reductions t o be determined later") , and blin d fait h i n the willingness of politicians to act against the interests of their constituents. Stockman con fessed t o Greider: "Non e o f us really understands what's going on with al l these numbers." 21 The budget of the U. S. Government was out of control! In his memoirs, Stockman characterize d Reaganomic s i n these terms: The Reaga n Revolutio n wa s radical, imprudent, an d arrogant . It defie d th e settle d consensu s o f professiona l politician s an d economists o n it s tw o centra l assumptions . I t mistakenl y pre sumed tha t a handful o f ideologues were right and al l the politicians were wrong about what the American people wanted fro m government. An d i t erroneousl y assume d tha t th e . . . infla tion-swollen U.S . economy . . . could b e instantly heale d whe n history an d mos t professiona l economist s sai d i t couldn't be. 22 The radica l supply-sider s were unrepentan t (an d stil l are). Pau l Crai g Roberts, a supply-side purist, blame d Stockma n fo r exaggeratin g the defici t to aggrandiz e hi s rol e a s budge t director. 23 Stockma n wa s als o accuse d o f being a mol e fo r th e "balance d budge t Republicans " wh o ha d flaile d fo r decades against deficits. Ten years later, when the federal debt had balloone d by $2. 6 trillion , Kemp accepte d n o blam e fo r th e deficit s an d worrie d littl e about wha t t o d o abou t them . In a mem o t o Bush' s campaig n managers , excerpts of which found thei r way to the Wall Street Journal, Kem p and his six congressional colleagues had a number o f startling recommendations : ± Reduc e incom e ta x rate s o n al l workin g families . Th e . . . rate should b e cut acros s the board , droppin g th e 15 % rat e to 12% , and cappin g th e to p rat e a t 2 8 % . * Phas e i n a n increas e i n th e persona l exemptio n . . . t o hel p relieve the tax burde n o n families. Ou r ultimat e goal shoul d be to restore the exemptions to the Truman levels , which i n current dollar s would b e over $6,000 . ± Reduc e th e capita l gain s ta x t o a maximu m o f 15 % [fro m 28] an d t o zer o fo r lon g term investments . A

Inde x the capital gain s tax . . . t o end the confiscatory prac tice of taxin g illusor y gain s caused b y inflation. 24

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Kemp's proposal s wer e astoundin g fo r thei r audacity . Th e Kem p package would hav e reduced federa l revenue s by scores of billions, just as the defici t wa s approachin g th e $30 0 billio n mark , bu t Kem p be t tha t a promise o f debt-finance d prosperit y wa s good politics . Recently, th e "miracle " o f suc h Reaganomic s ha s trickle d dow n t o the state level. I was elected to the New Jersey State Senate in 199 3 alon g with a new Republica n governor , Christin e Tod d Whitman , wh o wo n a narrow victor y ove r a n unpopula r Democrati c incumbent , Ji m Florio . She attributed he r 26,000 vote plurality to her proposal for a Reaganesqu e 30 percen t cu t i n th e state' s incom e ta x rates . B y proceeding i n he r firs t year t o implemen t he r promise , sh e attaine d celebrit y statu s amon g Republicans. Lik e Reagan, Whitma n refuse d t o financ e he r ta x cu t wit h offsetting reduction s i n state spending, but instead deferre d contribution s to public employee retirement funds—thus puttin g off th e pain unti l afte r she would b e safely ou t o f office .

ALTERING TH E GOVERNMEN T COMPAC T America electe d revolutionarie s i n 1980 . Th e Reaganite s wer e a s blindly committe d t o laissez-fair e economic s a s an y Grea t Societ y bureaucrat eve r wa s t o th e efficac y o f governmen t initiatives . T o b e sure, in many case s regulation ha d gon e too far : manufacturer s o f waf fle iron s ha d t o war n buyer s agains t closin g th e li d o n thei r hands ; th e Interstate Commerc e Commissio n ordaine d ho w man y trucker s coul d serve th e For t Wayne-Atlant a market , wha t the y coul d haul , an d wha t they coul d charge . True, governmen t wa s a nettlesom e intrude r a t times , bu t i t ha d always represented th e compact amon g Americans regarding the balanc e that shoul d b e struck amon g competin g interests . Politics befor e Reaga n reflected a broa d consensu s tha t prosperit y require d bot h privat e an d public investment . Fo r mos t o f th e twentiet h century , tha t consensu s favored taxe s that wer e base d o n abilit y t o pay . Americans wante d gov ernment t o protect ban k depositors ; to make home ownershi p affordabl e and highe r educatio n accessible ; t o ensur e saf e wate r an d clea n th e air . Part o f th e compac t wa s tha t governmen t woul d hel p th e strivin g poo r and tak e car e o f those who coul d no t wor k becaus e o f disability , age , or other incapacity . These were the tenets that most Americans subscribed t o before Reagan' s election , an d thei r implementatio n helpe d explai n th e breadth o f the postwar prosperity .

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President Reaga n wante d t o alte r th e compact . H e sough t t o tri m Social Security, cut back o n help to poor mothers , reduce ai d for college s and colleg e students , eliminate governmen t employmen t a s a last resort , end genera l assistanc e t o loca l government s fo r transi t an d crim e con trol, cut back food stamp s and nutrition programs for th e near-poor, an d charge "users " for man y government programs . Ultimately, the America n people sai d " n o " t o man y o f hi s propose d cuts . Interestingly , th e Republican-controlled Senat e was les s accommodating t o Reagan' s cut s than th e Democrat-controlle d House . Davi d Stockma n conclude d tha t there was no such thing as a "conservativ e Republican " i n Congress, an d that th e America n peopl e wer e oppose d t o th e antigovernmen t ideolog y of Reagan' s friends : The actual electorate . . . i s not intereste d i n this doctrine; when it i s intereste d a t all , i t i s intereste d i n gettin g hel p fro m th e government t o compensat e fo r a perceive d disadvantage . Consequently, the spending politics of Washington d o reflect th e heterogeneous an d parochia l demand s tha t aris e fro m th e diverse, activated . . . electorate acros s the land . What yo u se e done in the halls of the politicians may not b e wise, but it is the only rea l an d viabl e definitio n o f wha t th e electorat e wants. 25 Reagan's free-market , antistatis t doctrin e wa s no t accepte d b y Republicans advancin g th e interest s o f timbe r companie s an d Boeing . The defense s mounte d t o protec t opportunitie s fo r poo r an d workin g class Americans, however, wer e les s effective .

THE REAGA N REVOLUTIO N AND THE STRUCTURE O F OPPORTUNIT Y The tension betwee n libert y an d equality , betwee n individua l enter prise and communit y nee d is the classic dynamic in American democracy . Alexis d e Tocqueville observe d i n the 1830s : Although privat e interes t direct s th e greate r par t o f huma n actions i n th e Unite d State s . . . i t doe s no t regulat e the m all . I must sa y that I have ofte n see n Americans mak e grea t an d rea l sacrifices t o th e publi c welfare ; an d I hav e notice d a hundre d instances in which they hardly ever failed t o lend faithful suppor t

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to on e another . Th e fre e institution s whic h th e inhabitant s o f the Unite d State s possess , an d th e politica l righ t o f whic h the y make s o muc h use , remin d ever y citizen , i n a thousan d ways , that he lives in society. They every instant impress upon his mind the notio n tha t i t i s th e dut y a s wel l a s th e interes t o f me n t o make themselves useful t o their fello w creatures. 26 Tocqueville note d stron g support fo r publi c education. H e observe d that eve n the backwoodsman "i s acquainted wit h the past, curious abou t the future , an d read y fo r argumen t abou t th e present ; h e is , in short , a highly civilize d huma n being. " Tocquevill e conclude d tha t "th e instruc tion o f th e peopl e powerfull y contribute s t o th e suppor t o f th e demo cratic republic." 27 This i s th e essentia l spiri t tha t Reaga n an d hi s zealot s deprecated . They sa w governmen t no t a s a compac t amon g citizen s an d thei r repre sentatives regarding what neede d to be done together for th e future o f the nation, bu t as an alie n force ru n b y elitist conspirators. Two minutes int o his presidency, Reagan sai d "governmen t i s not the solution to our prob lem; government i s the problem." A s John Kennet h Galbrait h noted , thi s premise i s th e firs t o f thre e supportin g wha t th e economis t terme d th e "culture o f contentment": "ther e must b e a doctrine that offer s a feasibl e presumption agains t governmen t intervention. " Second , h e argued , th e culture require s a "socia l justificatio n fo r th e untrammeled , uninhibite d pursuit and possession o f wealth." Th e third need, Galbraith contended, is to "justif y a reduced sens e of public responsibility fo r th e poor. Those . . . members o f the . . . underclass, m u s t . .. b e seen as the architects o f thei r own fate." 28 And , o f course , conservativ e intellectual s wer e inspire d t o demonstrate th e latte r point , firs t b y castin g doub t o n th e efficac y an d thoughtfulness o f antipoverty programs; then b y arguing that governmen t assistance actually made the problems worse. The chief proponent o f thi s latter vie w wa s Charle s Murray , autho r o f th e 198 4 bes t seller , Losing Ground. Conservatives rationalized thei r agenda , an attack o n the structure of opportunity, wit h a logic as follows : Whereas (Affirmativ e action ) (Jo b Training ) (Hea d Start ) (Any tax-supporte d antipovert y program ) ha s no t helpe d th e very poor escap e poverty; an d Whereas th e strivin g poo r see m t o escap e th e wors t indig nities o f povert y withou t tax-supporte d assistance ; an d

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Whereas ther e i s n o reliabl e wa y t o distinguis h th e persis tently poor fro m th e striving poor i n any lower-class neighbor hood; now , therefore b e it Resolved tha t th e wast e o f taxpaye r fund s goin g t o antipoverty program s shoul d hal t immediately ; an d Further resolved tha t th e poo r b e informe d tha t th e onl y escape rout e lie s i n thei r individua l qualitie s o f self-reliance , perseverance, labor , an d thrift . Neither conservative s no r liberal s hav e convincin g explanation s fo r the significant economi c progress made by black Americans after 1960 . In 1959, 5 2 percen t o f blac k American s wer e poor ; b y th e earl y 1970 s th e proportion wa s less than a third. Citie s with larg e blac k population s suf fered th e greatest population losse s as black families becam e suburbanites . What happened ? Th e economy had continued t o grow and t o create jobs, but th e government als o had a great dea l to d o with blac k progress . Em ployers wer e forbidde n t o discriminat e agains t applicant s o r employee s by race; courts interprete d th e la w i n a n expansiv e way , which le d man y employers to protect themselves b y aggressively seeking minority employ ees; hundreds o f thousand s o f blac k American s finishe d hig h schoo l an d used federal an d stat e government suppor t t o attend college , while other s joined the military. Conservatives tout these achievements as evidence tha t black Americans do not require specia l assistance to move upward, ignor ing th e rol e playe d b y direc t publi c employmen t (blac k American s ar e twice a s likel y a s whites t o wor k fo r government) , highe r educatio n aid , and affirmative action . Liberals act as if no progress has been made, lest the will to help those remaining behin d shoul d disappear . Millions o f blac k American s joine d th e middl e clas s b y takin g advantage o f opportunitie s (affirmativ e actio n excepted ) availabl e t o all poo r Americans . Black s ar e mor e likel y t o liv e i n cities , (b y 1991 , 25.7 percen t o f white s live d i n centra l citie s compare d t o 56. 3 percen t of blacks) . Black s ar e therefor e mor e likel y t o rel y o n publi c services , play i n public parks, and tak e publi c transit t o schoo l o r work . The y ar e also mor e likel y t o atten d publi c schools , rel y o n publi c libraries , an d attend publi c college s an d universitie s wit h publi c scholarship s o r guar anteed loans . They migh t liv e in publi c o r publicl y subsidize d housing ; they rel y disproportionatel y o n Medicai d an d publi c hospital s fo r thei r health care . These service s and program s ar e ope n t o al l poor. Together , they make u p the "structur e o f opportunity" : investment s i n the service s and facilities that give poor Americans a fighting chanc e to escape poverty .

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The Reaga n an d Bus h administration s withdre w fro m th e federal-stat e partnership require d t o maintai n th e structure ; successiv e Republica n budgets reduce d o r eliminate d federa l funding . I n n o cas e di d federa l funding kee p pac e wit h inflation , increase d demand , o r ne w problem s such a s th e impac t o f AID S o n publi c hospitals . Reagan lai d ou t hi s vision i n his first budget , prepare d fo r th e 198 3 fiscal year . Building on the $4 0 billio n o r s o of cuts he achieved i n 1981, he propose d a three-yea r pla n tha t increase d militar y spendin g b y 54. 4 percent, whil e eliminatin g assistanc e fo r publi c transit , schoo l mil k pro grams, CET A (Comprehensiv e Employmen t an d Trainin g Act) , the Jo b Corps, wor k incentiv e programs , lega l service s fo r th e poor , acquisitio n of urba n parkland , an d famil y planning . Majo r reduction s i n othe r ai d programs wer e als o proposed : Pel l Grants—scholarship s fo r poo r stu dents—were t o b e cut b y 54. 2 percent , work-stud y ai d b y 60. 9 percent , and fund s fo r educatio n fo r th e disadvantaged b y 39.5 percent. Reagan' s own inflatio n assumption s fo r th e thre e year s woul d hav e reduce d th e real value of these programs b y another 15. 5 percent. With the exceptio n of federa l housin g programs , however , Congres s refuse d t o approv e Reagan's drasti c reductions . The ghos t o f budget s pas t i s aliv e an d wel l i n th e Republica n Congress tha t wa s electe d i n 1994 .

HIGHER EDUCATIO N The Republican animu s to higher educatio n opportunity—apparen t during th e Reagan-Bus h year s an d i n th e Republican-controlle d Congress electe d i n 1994—deserve s specia l attention . A college degre e is increasingl y wha t separate s American s wh o "mak e it " fro m thos e who d o not. Accessible an d affordabl e highe r educatio n relie s on a part nership betwee n th e federal government , whic h provide s studen t grants , guarantees studen t loans , an d support s th e hig h cost s o f researc h uni versities, an d stat e governments , whic h organiz e an d financ e th e insti tutions o f higher educatio n tha t educat e abou t 8 0 percent o f al l students. Beginning wit h th e Grea t Society , th e federa l governmen t facilitate d college educatio n fo r al l Americans wh o aspire d t o it . Befor e then , th e national governmen t helpe d onl y veteran s an d thos e competen t i n sci ence, engineering , an d foreig n languages—discipline s connecte d t o national security .

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During th e 1960 s an d 1970s , governmen t responde d t o th e bab y boomers' growing deman d fo r highe r educatio n wit h ne w funding, insti tutions, an d flexibl e admissio n standards . Mor e tha n on e o f fou r American college s was establishe d i n the decad e o f th e 1970s , includin g 43 percen t o f al l two-yea r colleges . A t th e time , highe r educatio n wa s still affordable fo r middle-clas s families . I n 1980 , for example , the cost s of attending a public four-year colleg e represented 7. 3 percent o f media n family income ; by 198 8 the cost had rise n to 12. 7 percent. Private colleges and universitie s als o becam e more inaccessible . In 1980 , tuition an d res idence at a private university took 19. 7 percent o f median famil y income ; by 1988 , it was 39. 9 percent. 29 As higher education costs rose more quickly than famil y incomes , the policies of the Reagan-Bush administration s contribute d t o the squeeze in two importan t ways . First, direct federa l suppor t t o college s an d univer sities and t o students di d not kee p pace with inflation . Federa l ai d to pri vate institution s decline d fro m 18. 8 percen t o f curren t revenue s i n 198 0 to 15. 9 percent i n 1989 ; students wer e force d t o mak e u p th e differenc e through highe r tuitio n an d fees . At public institutions, the federal contri bution fel l fro m 12. 8 percen t t o 10. 3 percen t o f revenues ; tuition fund s took u p the slack , increasin g fro m 12. 9 percen t t o 15. 5 percent. 30 Congress resisted the cuts Reagan advocated, particularly fo r studen t aid; nonetheless, the Reaga n an d Bus h administration s successfull y tilte d federal ai d fro m grant s an d direc t federa l loan s t o federall y guarantee d loans. The effect o f this shift wa s greatest for working - and lower-middle class families, whose credit capacity becam e badl y strained b y borrowin g for college . I n 199 1 th e Bus h administratio n wen t s o fa r a s t o propos e limiting Pell Grants to families with incomes under $10,000 . If adopted (i t was not), 400,000 recipient s would hav e been eliminated. Meanwhile, the maximum Pel l Grant covered less and less of a poor student' s tuition cost s (the average fell from 4 1 percent to 26 percent) a s the 1980 s progressed. 31 The second , more important shif t wa s President Reagan' s succes s in transferring th e pai n o f hi s inflate d defici t strateg y t o th e states . Whil e ostensibly movin g decision s t o th e "government s closes t t o th e people, " Reagan walke d awa y fro m man y traditiona l federal-stat e partnerships . Congress attempted t o slow the pace and magnitude o f devolution, but th e combination o f reduce d federa l financin g an d loca l tax revolt s pu t mos t state government s on e recessio n awa y fro m seriou s fisca l trauma . Fo r example, betwee n 198 3 an d 1991 , states responde d t o federa l cut s b y increasing fundin g fo r need-base d scholarship s b y 68. 4 percen t (abov e

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median famil y incom e increase s o f 43. 8 percent) . During th e 1980 s state s increased their spending for higher education by 90.7 percent, well ahead of either inflation o r comparable federal spending. More students, higher costs, reduced federa l assistance , straitene d stat e finances , stagnatin g famil y incomes; in this climate, something would have to give. The 199 1 recession accelerated trend s tha t wer e alread y headin g i n th e wron g direction . Th e American Counci l on Education reporte d with a despondent ai r in 1992 : For muc h o f the public sector , basi c funding ha s bee n cut bac k abruptly, ofte n despit e continuing enrollmen t increases . * Th e majority o f colleges and universitie s in the public secto r have ha d t o dea l with mid-yea r budge t cuts . . . . ± Takin g inflatio n int o account , two-third s o f publi c institu tions los t groun d i n the las t year . * Th e mos t frequentl y cite d effect s o f recen t budge t cuts . . . . increased tuitio n an d fee s . . . increased clas s size and fewe r sections o f course s . . . [an d a] freez e o n hirin g fo r regula r faculty positions. 32 California, lon g th e globa l mode l fo r acces s t o affordable , hig h qualit y post-secondary education , wa s particularly har d hi t b y a deep recession , higher demand , highe r fees , an d fewe r cours e offerings . A 199 1 stud y b y Thoma s Kan e trie d t o untangl e th e discouragin g trends i n college enrollment an d graduatio n rate s for blac k Americans i n the 1980s , particularly th e shar p fall-of f i n the early years o f the decade . Kane foun d (a s Ada m Smit h woul d hav e predicted ) tha t highe r colleg e costs, matched b y lower federa l grant s an d perhap s th e increase d audit ing of family financia l informatio n b y the Reagan administratio n le d to a decline i n th e colleg e enrollment s o f eighteen - an d nineteen-year-old , low-income students , both blac k an d white. By 1986 the portion o f blac k high schoo l graduate s goin g o n t o colleg e ha d decline d t o 26. 1 percent , from a high o f 33. 5 percen t i n 1976 ; for Latino s i t droppe d t o 26. 9 per cent, fro m 35. 5 percen t (befor e turnin g bac k u p i n th e lat e 1980s) . Meanwhile, whit e enrollmen t rate s climbe d steadil y t o 41. 7 percen t i n 1991. 33 Moreover, highe r cost s seem to have discouraged middle-incom e black students , bu t no t whit e ones . Kan e reports , "Th e averag e publi c tuition a t a 4-year universit y rose by 4 5% in real terms between 198 0 an d

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1988, whil e th e maximu m Pel l Gran t decline d b y 1 3 % . " 3 4 Kan e con cludes tha t th e reboun d i n blac k enrollmen t rate s tha t occurre d i n th e late 1980 s wa s a functio n o f th e improve d educationa l background s o f black parents , reflectin g th e shar p increase s i n hig h schoo l graduatio n and colleg e attendanc e beginnin g i n the 1950s. 35 As a parenthetical note , one explanation fo r th e fall-off i n black college enrollment ca n b e found i n the decreasin g inclinatio n o f blac k mal e high school graduates to attend college . A milestone was reached i n 1976 , when th e sam e percentage o f whit e an d blac k mal e graduate s wen t ont o college (35. 4 percent) . B y 199 1 th e attendanc e rat e fo r whit e male s wa s 42 percent , versu s onl y 3 2 percent fo r blac k graduate s (an d tha t wa s u p from a lo w o f 2 5 percen t i n 1988). 36 Pu t anothe r way , wherea s whit e and Latin o women made up about 55 percent o f white and Latin o studen t body i n 1991 , black wome n represente d 6 2 percen t o f al l blac k colleg e students, a proportion tha t ha s grown sinc e the mid-1970s. 37 The sam e dynami c tha t mad e a colleg e degre e mor e difficul t t o obtain als o affecte d hom e ownership . Th e America n drea m i s no t live d out i n a rente d apartment : th e Federa l Nationa l Mortgag e Associatio n confirmed tha t 8 0 percent o f Americans identif y a single-family, detache d home wit h a yard a s the idea l plac e t o liv e an d tha t onl y a secur e retire ment ranks higher than ownin g one's own home as a life goal. 38 Following World Wa r II , the federa l governmen t stimulate d hom e ownership : th e Veterans Administration (VA ) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA ) guaranteed mortgage s that carried lo w down-payments an d interes t rates. The nationa l polic y guarantee d accessibilit y b y stimulatin g suppl y an d subsidizing demand. The effort worked , althoug h becaus e o f discrimina tory practices b y the FHA and real estate agencies, it worked primarily fo r white families . In 197 0 the median pric e of a new house was 2.3 time s median fam ily income, and th e FHA and VA guaranteed 3 7 percent o f all mortgages. By 1990 , however , a ne w hous e cos t 3. 4 time s media n famil y income , and federa l guarantee s fel l t o 1 8 percen t o f mortgages . Harvard' s Join t Center for Housin g Studies found tha t the median price of a first hom e fo r families i n the 25-to-29 ag e range increase d b y 21 percent betwee n 197 0 and 1990 , while median incom e decline d b y 7 percent (fro m $28,50 0 t o $26,700). While abou t on e in four marrie d couple s unde r ag e 25 owne d their own house in 1970 , the proportion wa s less than on e in six by 1990 ; for thos e wher e th e hea d o f househol d wa s betwee n 2 5 an d 2 9 year s o f age, ownershi p decline d fro m abou t 4 4 percen t i n 197 3 t o 35. 9 percen t in 1990—a n 1 8 percent drop. 39

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The Reaga n revolutio n pu t bot h hom e ownershi p an d highe r edu cation ou t o f th e reach o f a n increasin g numbe r o f Americans .

PRIVATIZING TH E PUBLI C SCHOOL S The Reaga n revolutionarie s di d no t confin e thei r effort s t o highe r education. Th e previou s chapte r describe d th e threa t t o th e unit y o f American societ y o f "multiculturalism. " Bu t radica l conservative s hav e been muc h mor e effectiv e a t dilutin g th e nation' s sens e o f commo n pur pose an d share d sacrific e tha n an y multiculturalists . The y worshi p th e workings o f th e marketplace an d cas t ordinar y consumptio n an d invest ment decision s in the light of high religious purpose. In the hands o f rad icals suc h a s Reagan , th e conservativ e philosoph y confuse s th e essentia l nature o f governmen t wit h thos e o f th e privat e corporatio n o r investor . Conservatives d o no t accep t tha t governmen t exist s t o d o wha t privat e enterprise canno t o r wil l no t d o an d t o moderat e th e unacceptabl e con sequences o f fre e marke t forces . N o recen t effor t bette r capture s thi s threat tha n th e conservativ e urg e to privatiz e th e common school . Public education ha s come under increasin g attack fro m conservativ e intellectuals fo r "dumbin g down " educationa l standard s an d expecta tions. A nationa l surve y b y th e Reaga n administration—" A Natio n a t Risk"—found America n student s fallin g behin d th e country' s economi c competitors i n their preparatio n fo r th e globa l marketplace . Th e radica l Republican solutio n t o thi s problem i s to deflec t ta x dollar s fro m publi c schools t o parents . "Th e ke y t o educationa l refor m i s greate r parenta l choice," wrote William Kristol , Vice President Da n Quayle' s chief polic y adviser, "givin g parent s th e abilit y t o choos e th e school s thei r childre n attend b y makin g publi c school s compet e fo r student s an d b y publicl y subsidizing student s wh o choos e t o atten d privat e schools." 40 Kristo l wants t o en d th e monopol y statu s enjoye d b y publi c school s b y helpin g private an d religiou s school s wit h publi c money . Ironically, parental choic e was first propose d b y progressives durin g the Grea t Society . The Ylvisake r Tas k Forc e recommende d tha t "boun ties" shoul d b e put o n the heads of low-income cit y students—black an d white—to mak e the m attractiv e t o privat e an d suburba n publi c schools . Theodore Sizer , the n dea n a t Harvard' s educatio n school , wrote : "Th e children o f the poor would b e sought b y schools, indeed compete d for , i n that the y woul d brin g wit h the m significan t additiona l fund s t o provid e for specia l an d excitin g programs." Size r estimated th e cost of the bount y

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program t o b e abou t $1 6 billio n a yea r (abou t $7 1 billio n i n 199 4 dol lars), limite d a s it was t o poo r children . Th e propose d bount y woul d b e $6,550 i n 199 4 dollars. 41 The theory was that poo r cit y kids would ben efit educationall y b y bein g scattere d t o school s wher e upwardl y mobil e middle-class kid s were i n the majority . Conservatives, o n th e othe r hand , evinc e grea t interes t i n the prob lems an d prospect s o f lower-clas s childre n onl y a s a mean s t o subsidiz e private schools . William J. Bennett, the former dru g czar an d secretar y of education, is a particularly visibl e proponent o f privatization an d quic k t o side with poo r blac k kids : The strongest case for overhaulin g the current educatio n syste m is th e lous y educatio n th e underclas s ar e [sic ] receiving . Th e underclass ar e [sic ] least able to afford a bad education , sinc e a good educatio n i s still the bes t way ou t o f poverty.... I believe that qualit y education i s the central civil rights challenge facin g us today. An d th e bes t way t o improv e America n educatio n i s to suppor t a reform agend a base d o n parental choice , account ability, merit pay, alternative certificatio n an d a solid core cur riculum. Bennett conclude d wit h th e tantalizin g though t tha t "poo r minori ty student s deserv e th e sam e kin d o f educatio n tha t upper-clas s whit e kids get." 42 Whe n Benn o C . Schmidt , Jr. , explaine d hi s resignatio n a s Yale's presiden t t o chai r th e Ediso n Project , a ventur e b y Whittl e Communications, whic h plan s to ope n on e hundred proprietar y school s by 1996 , he insiste d tha t poo r cit y kid s woul d b e included . Th e Ediso n Project, h e said , . . . will operat e a t roughl y th e sam e per-pupi l cost s a s publi c education, an d wil l b e ope n t o all . I t wil l accep t 20 % o f it s students o n ful l scholarship . I t wil l operat e i n ever y typ e o f community—rich an d poor , urban , suburban , an d rural . I n inner cities , most student s ma y b e on scholarships ; in the sub urbs few. 43 The campaign fo r choic e received a major boos t when the Brooking s Institution publishe d a trac t b y Joh n Chub b an d Terr y Mo e i n 1990 . Hailed a s "path-breaking " b y th e Heritag e Foundation , thei r boo k received extraordinar y attentio n becaus e of its publisher. Fo r most o f th e

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1960s an d 1970s , "liberal " wa s Th e Brooking s Institution' s firs t name , even though it s board wa s bipartisa n an d mainstrea m establishmen t an d its publication s decidedl y nonideological . Brookings' s reputatio n wa s shaped b y the back-and-fort h servic e to successiv e Democrati c adminis trations b y the prominent economist s o n it s staff. Th e publication o f th e analysis b y Chubb an d Mo e b y an institution o f the liberal establishmen t seemed lik e a n endorsemen t fo r a ke y tene t o f th e conservativ e ideolo gy—that governmen t service s shoul d b e subjected t o marketplac e tests . Chubb an d Moe's prescription fo r privatizatio n reste d o n their vie w that educationa l refor m wil l neve r wor k i f attempte d throug h publi c school board s becaus e the boards ar e relentlessly democrati c an d democ racy i s untidy. Her e i s their principa l argument : Our guidin g principle i n the design o f a choice system is this: public authority must be put to use in creating a system that is almost entirely beyond the reach of public author ity. Becaus e state s hav e primar y responsibilit y fo r . . . education, w e thin k th e bes t wa y t o achiev e significant , enduring reform i s for state s to take the initiative in withdrawing authority from existin g institutions and buildin g a new system in which most authority is vested directly in the schools, parents, and students . The restructuring can not b e construed a s an exercise in delegation. As long as authority remain s "available " a t higher level s . . . i t will eventually be used to control the schools . . .. [A] U higherlevel authority mus t b e eliminated. 44 The utte r failur e o f educationa l reform , accordin g t o Chub b an d Moe, i s no t th e faul t o f scholar s o r reformer-activists , bot h o f who m know wha t need s t o b e done . "Reformer s ar e righ t abou t wher e the y want t o go , bu t thei r institution s canno t ge t the m there, " Chub b an d Moe wrote. 45 The solution follows quickl y from thei r analysis: employ the people's powe r t o ri d th e publi c school s o f th e people' s power . For , a s Chubb an d Mo e noted , "a s lon g a s . . . [public ] authorit y exist s an d i s available fo r use , public official s wil l com e unde r intens e pressur e fro m social groups of all political stripe s to use it." 46 And the solution is choice. According t o Chub b an d Moe , We think reformer s woul d d o well to entertai n th e notion tha t choice is a panacea. This is our way o f saying choice is not lik e

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the othe r reform s an d shoul d no t b e combined wit h them . . . . Choice is a self-contained reform . . . . I t has the capacity all by itself to brin g about the kind o f transformation t h a t . . . reform ers have bee n seekin g i n myriad othe r ways. 47 For those readers who do not chase after footnotes , i t is important t o note tha t Chub b an d Mo e provide d th e emphasi s i n th e abov e passage . After year s o f frustration , wit h nearl y everyon e complaining tha t today' s employees canno t writ e o r thin k clearly , tha t televisio n i s deadening ou r minds, that lower-class parents do not know what to do to help their kid s along, that politics has been hijacked b y Gucci-shod, fast-talking lobbyists , there is finally a solution—indeed a panacea—offered wit h confidence .

THE POLITIC S O F PRIVATIZATIO N Privatization i s a way t o exploi t poo r cit y kid s an d thei r parent s i n order to subsidize upper-income familie s wit h tax dollars . It is not offere d as a way to brea k dow n racia l an d class barriers in private and suburba n schools, becaus e it s proponent s kno w tha t middle-clas s whit e familie s will not sacrific e th e educational opportunitie s o f their children to accom modate th e educationa l need s o f poor , minorit y kids . According t o con servatives, th e marke t wil l tak e car e o f poo r kid s eithe r b y improvin g city schools o r b y providing privat e alternative s i n the cities. In th e mid-1990 s onl y abou t 5.5 million , o r 1 2 percent, o f elemen tary an d secondar y student s atten d nonpubli c schools . O f tha t numbe r about 8 5 percent g o to religiou s schools—particularl y Catholi c schools , which reporte d abou t 2. 5 millio n student s i n 1991 . This i s importan t information, becaus e choic e proponents oppos e a "choice " tha t i s limited to public schools (a s Bill Clinton proposed durin g the 199 2 campaign). Therefore, i n the early years of any new schoo l choice program propose d by conservatives, the effective choic e for mos t parents would b e betwee n public school s an d religiou s schools . (Th e independen t school s ten d t o charge tuition s tha t ar e highe r tha n typica l publi c schoo l costs , whic h would effectivel y pu t the m ou t o f reac h fo r mos t poo r parent s unabl e t o supplement thei r tax-pai d vouchers. ) Wisconsin' s choic e program , th e most extensive to date , is available onl y to low-income families , and thei r choice was initially restricted to public or nonsectarian privat e schools; the program ha s attracte d onl y a fe w hundre d student s o f th e 92,00 0 i n Milwaukee's publi c system. 48

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Conservatives kno w tha t religiou s school s ar e the primary nonpub lic choice s availabl e t o cit y parents . I n fact , the y hav e argue d fo r som e time tha t parochia l school s d o a bette r jo b educatin g low-incom e stu dents than d o the city schools that spen d muc h mor e money. Yet, practically n o attentio n ha s bee n pai d t o th e fundamenta l questio n o f constitutionality. On e woul d expec t t o rea d constitutiona l argument s under whic h parent s could choos e religious schools , but fe w proponent s even mentio n tha t ther e migh t b e a problem . Chub b an d Mo e dismis s the question in one parenthetical sentenc e in a 318-page work: "Ou r ow n preference woul d b e to includ e religiou s school s a s well, as long a s thei r sectarian function s ca n b e kep t clearl y separat e fro m thei r educationa l functions." 49 If choic e i s t o hav e an y practica l effect , religiou s school s mus t b e available on the school menu. Whether publi c funds shoul d b e channele d into religious programs i s something th e Suprem e Cour t mus t decide . So far, th e Cour t ha s blocke d al l bu t special , student-centere d publi c assis tance to religious schools , such a s bus transportation, schoo l lunches, o r textbooks.

THE COST S O F PRIVATIZATIO N What abou t othe r alternative s to public schools? Benn o Schmidt ha s been vagu e a s t o whethe r th e Ediso n Projec t assume s th e existenc e o f tax-paid voucher s for it s financial viability . Edison "wil l not rely on pub lic funding, an d i t takes no position o n th e wisdom o f vouchers," h e ha s said.50 Assumin g tha t religiou s school s ar e no t eligibl e t o participat e i n publicly finance d choic e programs—an d tha t i s th e mos t reasonabl e assumption—then th e onl y "choices " woul d b e existin g o r ne w privat e schools, which presentl y serv e fewe r tha n 2 percen t o f al l student s (an d only 1 5 percen t o f student s attendin g nonpubli c schools) . Presumably , existing nonpubli c school s woul d b e able t o expan d thei r enrollment s i f vouchers were available, but not enoug h to meet the anticipated deman d for nonpubli c schools . As in any market system , one can anticipat e ne w school s springin g up t o mee t thi s ne w demand ; som e o f thos e ne w school s migh t b e pro prietary. This scenari o strongly , however, suggest s that th e major ratio nale o f privatizatio n advocates—t o giv e poo r minorit y kid s th e sam e kind o f educatio n availabl e t o uppe r clas s whites—wil l no t b e met . Schools organize d t o tak e th e mone y o f low-incom e familie s wil l no t

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have the ability no r th e inclinatio n t o provide hig h qualit y educatio n fo r average revenues . Chubb an d Mo e accep t th e popula r vie w tha t a student' s achieve ment in school is influenced b y the student's cohor t an d th e parents' edu cation.51 Schools directed a t low-income families ar e not likely to draw th e cross-section o f clas s an d incom e idealize d b y choic e proponents . Th e evidence fro m magne t school s offer s littl e encouragemen t i n this regard . Taking int o accoun t tha t incom e an d educatio n ar e highl y correlate d i n American society , it does not see m likely that schoo l choice, as proposed , will advance the standin g o f lower-clas s childre n a t all . Even with universa l voucher s that carr y averag e per pupil costs, the Edison Projec t doe s no t see m likel y t o provid e a n alternativ e fo r sub stantial number s o f parents. Whittle Communication s an d Schmid t hav e scaled bac k their initial claims for th e scope of the project: planned start up investmen t droppe d fro m $2. 5 billio n t o $75 0 million , an d expecte d first-year enrollmen t fel l from 200,00 0 t o 65,000. 52 Journalist Sar a Mosl e points to two majo r burden s tha t i t must fac e a s a nonprofit competitor : it must retur n a profit (sa y 1 5 percent o f "sales " befor e taxe s ar e paid) , and facilitie s mus t b e purchased o r constructe d wit h borrowe d funds . I f Edison receive s $5,60 0 fo r eac h o f it s 65,00 0 students , i t wil l generat e $364 millio n i n revenues; about $8 0 millio n o f this would b e directed t o interest and investor returns, and abou t $7 3 million would no t b e realized because 2 0 percen t o f th e student s woul d b e o n ful l scholarship . Thi s leaves only about $3,20 0 per pupil a year for direc t educational costs , not even hal f o f wha t independen t elementar y school s spen d o n eac h stu dent.53 Becaus e th e heavies t educatio n cost s ar e fo r teache r salaries , th e Edison Project woul d appea r t o have to rely either on a very high studen t to teache r rati o o r o n a majo r expansio n i n th e rol e o f technology . Bu t technology i s expensive. If proprietar y an d religiou s school s ar e no t th e answer , the n th e taxpayer ca n assum e that mos t o f the costs of a voucher progra m would , initially a t least , en d u p bein g reshuffled amon g publi c schoo l districts . Moreover, ther e i s a n additiona l cos t questio n tha t choic e proponent s avoid altogether . I f universal voucher s ar e available , the n the y mus t b e available t o parents whos e childre n presentl y atten d nonpubli c schools . As a practica l matter , i t woul d b e a simpl e ste p fo r th e parent s o f an y private schoo l chil d t o enrol l thei r chil d i n th e loca l publi c schoo l t o establish vouche r eligibility . Affluent American s woul d tak e advantag e of thi s "entitlement " i f offered , jus t a s the y hav e take n advantag e o f their Socia l Securit y benefit s eve n when the y hav e substantia l pensions .

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Assuming tha t onl y the parent s o f childre n i n nonreligious school s wer e included, th e additiona l cost s woul d b e roughl y $ 5 billio n an d woul d represent a pure incom e transfe r fro m th e workin g an d middl e clas s t o the upper-middl e an d high-incom e classes .

CHOICE AN D THE LESSON S O F THE FRE E MARKE T We kno w a lot abou t ho w th e marketplac e operate s i n education , particularly whe n dealin g wit h th e poores t an d leas t sophisticate d "consumers." The federa l governmen t ha s finance d a vouche r progra m fo r post-secondary educatio n fo r three decades. Through a variety of loan an d grant programs , an y qualifie d studen t ca n receiv e assistanc e t o atten d any accredite d institution . Althoug h mos t ai d goe s to student s attendin g conventional four - an d two-yea r college s an d institutions , a curiousl y disproportionate amoun t goe s t o student s wh o atten d proprietar y trad e schools. In 199 0 these students accounte d fo r onl y 6 percent o f 12. 6 million undergraduates , ye t the y accounte d fo r almos t 2 5 percen t o f th e guaranteed studen t loan s an d Pel l grants . Thei r defaul t rate s hav e bee n almost fiv e time s thos e o f student s attendin g four-yea r institutions , s o that, b y 1990 , trad e schoo l graduate s accounte d fo r almos t hal f o f th e $2.4 billio n i n defaults. 54 In marginal commercia l district s in any large city, one can frequent ly find a "colleg e o f beaut y culture " o r "compute r institute " o r "schoo l of the secretarial sciences. " These places exist to harvest money fro m th e unsophisticated poo r wh o ar e eligibl e fo r federa l grant s an d guarantee d loans. I n fact , almos t 8 0 percen t o f al l student s a t proprietary , nonde gree schools rely on federal aid , compared with 3 0 percent of other under graduates. Thes e proprietar y school s ar e "accredited " b y a nationa l accreditation counci l tha t i s controlled b y the owner s o f th e proprietar y schools, wh o ac t t o kee p ou t potentia l nonprofi t competitors . A 199 0 Senate report likene d th e accreditin g agenc y to "puttin g th e prisoners i n charge o f runnin g th e prison." 55 Democrats an d Republican s alik e hav e overlooke d th e scanda l o f trade school s (i n fairness, th e Bush administratio n di d more to disciplin e the worst offender s tha n an y of its predecessors). Trade school s aim thei r advertising an d recruitin g a t low-income people who ar e "guaranteed " a "free" educatio n an d a glamorous jo b afte r training ; som e school s eve n recruit i n homeless shelters . (Thi s tawdry stor y i s but on e sad part o f ou r

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national failur e t o provid e effectiv e trainin g fo r th e majorit y o f adult s who d o no t g o to college. ) Nothin g suggest s tha t thes e "market-driven " proprietary trad e school s produce result s justifying th e enormou s publi c investment i n them . Fo r example , Katherin e Bo o reporte d tha t i n 1990 , "New Yor k . . . officials warne d tha t th e market wa s glutted, [but ] more city residents used federal funds to study nail sculpting and hair cutting than any other vocational subject." 56 Because there ar e no federal requirement s tha t trad e school s actual ly provide their student s with marketable skills , and there is no penalty fo r consistently lo w placemen t rates , th e school s pu t thei r emphasi s o n recruitment an d packaging federal loa n an d grant applications . Boo noted that a "mid-eightie s Genera l Accountin g Offic e stud y o f 1,60 0 school s counted u p a n orchard' s wort h [o f ba d apples] , charging tha t mor e tha n two-thirds o f trad e school s 'misrepresented ' thei r placemen t rates , cur riculum, o r studen t aid." 57 I n 198 9 th e U.S . Departmen t o f Educatio n found tha t hal f o f th e $1. 8 billio n i n studen t loa n default s cam e fro m proprietary schoo l students; 58 just a year later, the amount o f such default s had increase d t o $1.0 6 billion. 59 Th e doubl e sham e i s that, no t onl y d o trade school s rarel y delive r o n thei r promise s o f jobs , the y furthe r pau perize thei r student s when , withou t a decen t job , th e "graduates " ar e forced t o defaul t o n thei r loans , ruining thei r credi t standing . Privatization advocate s ignor e th e result s o f thi s substantial , long-term, expensiv e failur e i n schoo l choic e a s the y wrin g thei r hand s over th e plight o f the cit y poor .

OVERCOMING CONSERVATIV E INDIFFERENC E American politics has come to a curious watershed. In the 199 2 elections, the radica l notion s o f th e Reaga n Revolutio n seeme d t o hav e bee n largely rejecte d ami d tal k o f a "decad e o f greed. " Bu t th e paralysi s o f Clinton an d th e Democrats i n the wake o f thei r faile d healt h car e refor m effort gav e new life to the Reagan coalition. Once again the tensions amon g conservatives have been smoothed ove r b y the ferocity o f their oppositio n to Clinto n personall y an d t o his policies. Republicans wer e united fo r th e 1994 campaig n b y a "Contrac t wit h America, " whic h offere d a neo-Reaganist formul a o f reduce d taxes , increase d militar y spending , a balanced budge t amendment , an d a continuation o f th e cultura l war o n issues suc h a s abortion , illegitimacy , an d idleness . The Republican s suc cessfully appeale d t o antigovernmen t sentiment s withou t havin g t o

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specify ho w the y woul d slas h spendin g t o achiev e a balance d budget . Clinton an d th e Democrat s los t thei r voice s an d faile d t o offe r an y off setting vision t o guid e the nation' s future . The cost s t o America n societ y o f th e triump h o f Reagan' s radica l brand o f conservatis m hav e bee n high . Th e basi c compac t betwee n th e people an d thei r governmen t ha s bee n shredded . Th e rol e o f th e nation al governmen t i n mobilizin g an d directin g publi c investmen t t o trans portation, college s an d universities , libraries , ope n spaces , an d clea n water, air , an d lan d ha s bee n denigrate d an d marginalized . I n truth, th e fundamental ide a tha t underlie s capitalism—that curren t sacrifice s i n the form o f savings and restrained consumptio n ar e necessary for futur e pros perity—has bee n endangered. Instead, government i s held up as the sourc e of economi c stagnatio n an d mora l decay , eve n a s the popula r wil l man dates Social Security, Medicare, scholarships an d loans , parks, and healt h research, non e o f which ca n b e supplied b y the marketplace . The conservativ e ascendanc y feed s on , an d contribute s to , growin g divisions in American societ y along racial and class lines. The civic culture is increasingly stratified , an d th e opportunitie s fo r minglin g an d mixin g across line s o f colo r an d statu s hav e bee n reduced. Conservativ e politic s benefits fro m thi s sense of "u s versus them." Indeed , conservative policie s heighten thi s outloo k b y demonizing issue s such a s crime an d welfare . The Clinton administratio n ha s abetted the Republican resurgenc e by failing t o pursue policies that ar e consistent with the priorities of his election campaign . H e ha s bee n irresolut e i n hi s earlie r oppositio n t o racia l quotas an d undiscipline d i n pushing a consistent visio n tha t respond s t o the growin g economi c fear s o f mos t Americans . Clinto n ha s faile d t o argue for a national effor t tha t strengthen s th e structures o f opportunity . The costs of conservative rule open opportunitie s fo r progressive s t o rebuild thei r standin g an d t o forg e ne w coalition s tha t cros s no t onl y racial an d economi c clas s boundaries , bu t partisa n one s a s well. Given this context, w e need t o return t o the question s that motivat ed this book: How ca n a progressive cente r b e restored, an d wha t ca n b e done abou t th e legac y o f racia l discriminatio n an d inequality ?

7» REBUILDING A PROGRESSIV E VISIO N

L

iberal was a proud labe l i n the middle thir d o f th e twentieth century , when i t describe d thos e wh o fough t t o expan d opportunit y t o poo r and working-clas s American s b y guaranteein g an y qualifie d studen t th e chance t o atten d colleg e an d graduat e int o th e middl e class . Liberal wa s a proud labe l whe n i t was attache d t o thos e blac k an d white Democrats who stood up for disenfranchise d souther n blac k citizens against th e Democrats ' staunches t an d mos t reliabl e supporter s i n presidential elections , white southerners . Liberal wa s a prou d labe l whe n i t describe d a generatio n o f prag matic an d thoughtfu l politician s wh o guide d publi c investmen t t o research, infrastructure , transportatio n systems , an d housin g i n suffi cient amount s t o sustai n prosperit y an d creat e th e firs t trul y middle class society . Liberal wa s a proud labe l for thos e who introduce d Socia l Security , Medicare, and othe r programs to lend dignit y to old age and assistanc e t o the helpless . Then, as we have seen, liberals stopped thinkin g and talking sensibl y about issues freighted b y race, which, in turn, impaired their credibility o n basic questions abou t the role of government i n sustaining prosperity an d in assurin g al l Americans o f acces s to middle-clas s opportunities . By now, th e wor d liberal i s so compromised tha t I retain i t onl y a s a politica l pejorative . I us e progressive t o describ e m y preferre d visio n and politics . 145

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Progressives nee d a vision—no t a n ideolog y an d no t a catalo g o f federal programs , but a vision. Without one , progressives will be left wit h only th e dail y demand s o f politic s t o guid e them , an d whe n ther e i s n o progressive vision , ideologica l conservative s se t th e term s o f th e publi c debate, leavin g progressive s t o reac t defensivel y an d aimlessly . B y th e early 1990s , liberal nomad s ende d u p supportin g proposal s suc h a s bal anced budge t amendment s an d regressiv e taxation , whic h ru n directl y counter t o a progressive posture .

SOME REASON S FO R OPTIMIS M Progressives have a fighting chance . The 199 2 election results demonstrate that th e electorate has great doubts about Reaganonomic s an d tha t Republicans ar e no w o n th e wron g sid e o f th e cultura l war s wit h thei r alliance wit h th e Right . What i s less clear righ t no w i s whether th e pro gressives hav e a pla n t o achiev e sustainabl e economi c growt h an d t o move the public debate of f th e no-win issu e of deficits. The 199 4 electio n results sugges t tha t the y d o not . No t yet . Beyond Bil l Clinton' s 199 2 election , progressive s ca n fin d severa l sources for optimism . First, most Americans no longer support the notio n that th e sures t rout e t o economi c growt h i s t o increas e th e after-ta x income o f th e wealthies t Americans . Althoug h thi s repudiatio n o f Reaganomics represent s progress , it does not mea n tha t American s no w support th e traditional Democrati c enthusias m fo r governmen t activism . But as budget cuts cramp well-liked services, doubts abou t further cut s are growing. The current stat e of public opinion i s jumbled, bu t there appear s to be a policy majority bein g built that looks to the federal governmen t t o restructure healt h care, reform welfar e (again) , make the tax system mor e progressive, and protec t Socia l Securit y an d Medicare . A second reaso n fo r optimis m i s that progressive s see m to b e wak ing up, albeit slowly . The sign s of stirrin g ar e too tentativ e t o constitut e a "school " o r a "movement, " bu t th e number o f progressives willin g t o take a fres h loo k a t previousl y tabo o subject s ha s increased . Danie l Patrick Moyniha n neve r wen t t o sleep : an advocat e o f socia l insurance , welfare reform , an d ta x incentive s fo r familie s an d workers , h e ha s been a provocateur an d tormente r o f ideologue s o n th e Righ t an d Left. Fo r hi s efforts, h e has bee n labele d a Rightist b y the Left, a misog ynist b y feminists, a racist b y blac k nationalists , an d a brothe r b y neo conservatives.

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After th e suppression of the Moynihan Report in 1965, only a few liberal scholar s woul d spea k out : William Julius Wilso n brok e th e silenc e i n 1978 with his book The Declining Significance of Race. Gar y Orfiel d kep t pushing school integration, Christopher Jencks investigated racial and class inequality; David Ellwood an d Mary Jo Bane concentrated o n welfare an d the family . Moreover , a s th e 1990 s began , tw o importan t journal s wer e launched. Randal l Kennedy , a blac k Harvar d la w professo r bega n Reconstruction t o provid e " a foru m fo r uninhibite d commentar y o n African-American politics , society, and culture." Paul Starr, a Princeton sociologist, an d Rober t Kuttner , th e libera l columnist , launche d th e American Prospect, which described itself as "a Journal for the Liberal Imagination. " (Both journals are headquartered i n Cambridge, Massachusetts.) 1 Charles Peter s an d th e grou p o f prominen t writer s h e has attracte d to th e Washington Monthly hav e bee n a n importan t sourc e o f provoca tion and common sens e among progressives since 1978 . The Washington Monthly ha s provide d critique s o f th e mos t damagin g assumption s o f McGovern liberalism . Self-described "neoliberals, " Peter s and hi s friend s have attacked governmen t "waste , fraud, an d abuse, " while also advanc ing idea s fo r fosterin g socia l equality , enhancin g militar y effectiveness , and supportin g selectiv e deregulation . New Jerse y Senato r Bil l Bradle y bega n t o mak e race , politics , an d poverty a matte r o f consisten t persona l attentio n i n July 199 1 b y chal lenging Presiden t Bush' s persona l an d politica l view s o n race . H e ha s persisted b y focusing o n crim e an d th e Los Angeles riots an d b y seekin g longer-term progra m ideas . Barne y Frank , a U.S . House membe r fro m Massachusetts an d a certified liberal , publishe d a harsh criticis m o f th e liberal left win g o f the Democratic party , in which h e wrote: "Fo r a variety of reasons, some strategic, some ideological, some attitudinal, an d al l of the m wrong , man y i n ou r part y objec t t o a n effor t t o demonstrat e that liberal s ar e patrioti c supporter s o f th e fre e enterpris e syste m wh o think tha t har d wor k shoul d b e rewarded an d violen t criminal s severel y punished." 2 Journalists hav e helpe d se t th e stage . Nichola s Leman n offere d a sweeping analysis of the great migration o f blac k sharecropper s t o north ern ghettos; the Edsalls recounted th e changes in the economy, the cultura l conflicts o f the 1960 s an d 1970s , and th e buildin g o f a conservative pol icy majority; Jim Sleeper , a New York Daily News columnist , trace d th e unchallenged ris e of blac k stree t radicals an d showe d ho w their growin g influence i n Ne w Yor k Cit y politic s wa s abette d b y whit e liberal s an d the Left; E . J. Dionne explaine d th e increasing public distast e fo r politic s

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growing ou t o f th e captur e o f th e tw o partie s b y ideologue s wh o concentrate o n issue s of littl e interes t t o most citizens. 3 Third, Democrats spea k more effectively t o the economic interests of working- an d middle-clas s Americans , a constituency tha t make s u p th e electoral majority. The y suppor t socia l insurance for th e jobless and uni versal healt h insuranc e coverage . Democrats protec t wag e earner s whe n tax bill s are written an d union s when collectiv e bargaining is the subject . Progressives also stand to gain now that the politics of cultural issue s are shifting t o favor thos e who stand for values such as choice and privac y concerning persona l rights , particularl y abortion . I t i s th e Republican s who ar e th e extremist s becaus e o f thei r involvemen t wit h th e Religiou s Right, antiabortio n activists , an d homophobes . The y favo r governmen t interference wit h famil y decision s abou t appropriat e car e fo r th e termi nally ill , an d the y ar e intoleran t o n issue s o f religiou s freedom . Republicans, i n short , ar e o n a narrow-gauge trac k no t dissimila r t o th e one that le d th e nationa l Democrat s nowher e afte r 1972 . A fourth reaso n fo r progressiv e optimis m i s that th e realit y o f rac e relations i s better tha n racia l nationalist s hav e le d Americans t o believe . Integration ma y have died a s a widely publicly stated goal in the 1970s — precisely a t th e tim e tha t i t becam e a realisti c possibility—bu t watc h noontime crowd s o n cit y street s o r i n offic e cafeteria s o r dro p b y a n after-work softbal l gam e t o fin d example s o f eas y black-whit e relation ships. At a Democratic convention o r a gathering of Teamsters o r Planne d Parenthood, integratio n appear s vibrant. A 1991 Newsweek surve y foun d that two-third s o f white respondents an d four-fifth s o f black respondent s said they knew "man y member s o f another rac e well," an d 47 percent of the white s an d 6 3 percen t o f black s sai d the y "socializ e regularl y wit h members o f anothe r race." 4 A New Jersey pol l reporte d tha t 7 8 percen t of white and 8 8 percent o f nonwhite respondents reported havin g "mad e friends wit h someone of a different race, " and 6 4 percent of white and 7 1 percent o f blac k respondent s sai d the y ha d invite d someon e o f anothe r race to their homes. 5 Even allowing for exaggerate d responses , Americans are not a people who see m divided int o "tw o nations—separate , hostile , unequal" a s suggeste d b y th e titl e o f a best-sellin g boo k b y Professo r Andrew Hacker. 6 American culture is increasingly mottled. Bill Cosby, Michael Jordan, and Michae l Jackson ar e among the "hottest " definer s o f popular cultur e as wel l a s th e promoter s o f sof t drinks , soups , shoes , juice, an d cereals ; Toni Morrison, Maya Angelou , and Alice Walker ar e important voice s in American literature ; Denze l Washingto n an d Dann y Glove r ar e majo r

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film stars ; Spike Lee and John Singleto n ar e highly regarded youn g movi e directors. America n music—fro m gospel , jazz , rhyth m an d blues , an d rock an d roll to classical interpretation—has bee n heavily shaped b y black Americans. Loui s Armstrong , Mario n Anderson , Leontyn e Price , Ell a Fitzgerald, Duk e Ellington , an d Pau l Robeso n ar e true legends . Even thoug h condition s ar e mor e hospitabl e fo r rebuildin g a pro gressive vision than the y were in the 1980s , formidable obstacle s remain . Progressives mus t demonstrat e tha t the y ar e unafrai d t o stak e ou t clea r and sensibl e positions o n controversial issues . In particular, t o banis h th e term white liberal onc e an d fo r all , progressive s o f bot h race s nee d t o discuss thei r vision s fo r a harmonious , multiracia l societ y frequently , openly, an d candidly .

THE FAILUR E T O DISCUS S RAC E Liberals o n th e Senat e Judiciary Committe e se t a ne w standar d fo r timidity during the hearings on the nomination o f Clarenc e Thomas to the Supreme Court . Thoma s wa s th e hea d o f th e Equa l Employmen t Opportunity Commissio n i n th e Reaga n administration , an d h e ha d presided ove r a radical shif t i n policy from seekin g agreements with larg e employers an d majo r institution s t o correct patterns o f discrimination t o adjudicating individual complaints . The Thomas hearings were the perfec t opportunity t o prob e hi s judicia l philosoph y abou t racia l preferences , but Thoma s receive d no t on e questio n abou t racia l matters . B y contras t he was aske d abou t abortio n sixty-eigh t times . Representative Frank , a sass y Bosto n Democrat , define s th e "not saposta" (a s i n "you'r e notsapost a tal k abou t that" ) a s a "trut h tha t members o f a politica l part y ar e tol d b y ideologue s tha t the y canno t acknowledge, lest they give aid and comfort t o the enemy." Fran k writes : Notsaposta i s the . . . grievously mistake n vie w tha t acknowl edging a troublin g trut h wil l weake n a party' s abilit y t o resis t the conclusion s tha t it s politica l opponent s migh t dra w fro m those truths. What happens , in fact, i s almost alway s exactly th e opposite. The failure t o join your political enemies in affirmin g some belief s tha t ar e strongl y an d widel y hel d b y voters weak ens you r abilit y t o wi n the m ove r t o you r sid e becaus e yo u effectively conced e thes e issue s t o you r opponents . Th e Democrats' silenc e makes u s suspect. 7

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Frank has said that the two most damaging notsapostas ar e crime and for eign policy . Bu t th e notsapost a lis t is , unfortunately, muc h longer , wit h most o f th e issues framed b y race. Progressives cannot hav e a useful conversatio n abou t rac e without a willingness t o agre e wit h "conservatives. " Th e polarizatio n o f dis course—the Lef t blamin g racis m an d "th e system, " th e Righ t blamin g black behavio r an d values—freeze s th e debat e a t a poin t tha t give s th e political an d mora l advantag e t o th e conservatives . Conservative s mak e sense when they discuss the advantages o f two-parent families , the essential rol e o f individua l an d famil y responsibility , th e nee d fo r unifor m standards o f civil behavior, an d the primacy o f the work ethic . These ar e not conservativ e idea s bu t broadl y accepte d America n ideas . It is outra geous for blac k and white progressives to allow their silence on such mat ters t o b e interpreted a s opposition t o them . A 199 2 pol l o f blac k American s receive d considerabl e attentio n because i t foun d tha t blac k publi c opinio n closel y mirrore d America n public opinion. 8 Eighty-fou r percen t favore d mandator y jo b training an d schooling for welfar e recipients ; 90 percent favore d toughe r measure s t o track dow n father s wh o ha d abandone d thei r children . (Bil l Clinto n understood thes e black-white similarities , as evidenced b y his 199 2 cam paign. During the southern primaries, in which blac k voters enjoyed max imum leverage, the Clinton campaign ran campaign ad s on welfare refor m more frequentl y tha n ad s o n an y othe r issue.) 9 Yet , th e rhetori c o f th e black leadership show s no recognition o f the views held by the 30 millio n Americans wh o ar e black . An y attemp t t o tak e u p th e middl e groun d regarding racia l issues—preference s i n particular—i s countere d wit h instant criticism-by-label : "Blac k conservative. " Thus, William Julius Wilson ca n find himsel f lumpe d wit h self-pro claimed conservative s fo r hi s recommendation tha t blac k Americans pur sue policies tha t produc e "universal " benefit s rathe r tha n concentratin g on rac e preferences . Respondin g t o Wilson' s advocac y o f race-neutra l programs an d coalition politics, the black activist-schola r Kennet h Tollet t wrote: I am sa d to observ e that th e views expressed b y . . . Wilson ar e barely, if at all, distinguishable from thos e of so-called liberal.. . whites. . . . But I would lik e to se e better represente d th e view s of black s wh o ar e mor e supportiv e o f a race-consciou s approach. . . . Although Wilso n i s surel y no t a Glen n Loury , Thomas Sowell, or Shelby Steele, his views . .. carr y considerabl e

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force an d persuasivenes s an d giv e ai d an d comfor t t o white s who resist race-conscious policies for reason s . . . inimica l to th e interest o f blacks. 10 The sam e patter n o f guilt-by-associatio n practice d b y Moynihan' s assailants can b e seen in Tollett's criticism . Wilson wa s harshly criticize d for endorsin g coalitio n politics , a n unremarkabl e suggestio n fo r an y minority tha t cast s abou t 9 percent o f th e nationa l vote . College campuses ar e particularly toug h place s to hav e candi d con versations abou t race. Stephen Carter , a Yale law professor, make s a simple observatio n tha t i s almos t alway s avoide d i n debate s abou t rac e preferences: "I f on e supports racia l preferences . . . one must b e prepare d to treat them like any preference i n admission an d believ e that the y mak e a difference , tha t som e students would no t b e admitted i f the preference s did no t exist . n Thi s fac t canno t b e stated o n mos t campuses , however , without callin g down ranco r an d recrimination s fo r drawin g suspicio n t o minority students . A Georgetown Universit y la w studen t wh o publishe d an articl e reportin g significan t difference s betwee n blac k an d whit e stu dents in their score s on the law aptitude tes t and college grade point aver ages was threatened wit h dismissal . The reaction o f the law school's dea n was not unusua l fo r suc h cases: copies of the offending pape r wer e seize d and th e dean declare d tha t rac e "wa s not a part o f the school's admissio n process."12 Unfortunately, selectiv e universities that covertl y employ preferences in admissions mak e no effor t t o contend wit h th e inevitable con sequences o f thos e preferences : blac k students , o n average , wil l b e a t a disadvantage. Just a s liberal s hav e faile d t o openl y discus s racia l preferences , s o too have they ignored on e of the results: white resentment. I t may b e tha t upper-middle-class liberals , wh o ar e typicall y unaffecte d b y a polic y o f racial preferences , d o no t appreciat e ho w commo n th e phenomeno n o f white resentment ha s become. Moreover, professiona l black s and th e Lef t explain white resentment a s just one more manifestation o f racism. Whe n Senator John Kerry suggested that "w e can no longer simpl y will away the growing consensus . . . within America's white majority . . . [that it] is they who hav e born e th e burde n o f complianc e wit h th e [affirmativ e action ] law," h e was attacke d fo r eve n bringin g u p th e subject. 13 Boston Globe columnist Derric k Jackson advised : "Whit e resentmen t ove r 'revers e discrimination' shoul d b e recognized. Bu t onl y a s a fraud." 14 Another ke y issue that liberal s hav e manage d t o avoi d i s the disap pearance o f the two-parent blac k family. Blac k male abandonment o f th e

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newborn i s no w th e norm , a fac t o f enormou s economi c consequence : 51.2 percent o f female-headed blac k families ha d incom e below the poverty level in 1991 , compared wit h 1 1 percent o f blac k two-paren t families . Liberals preten d tha t school s ca n magicall y substitut e fo r th e limite d parental attentio n an d nurturin g give n durin g th e firs t fiv e year s o f th e home life. When CB S aired "Th e Vanishing Blac k Family," th e Nationa l Black Leadership Roundtable , which represents most nationa l civil rights organizations, attacked i t as "unbalanced , unfair,.. . salacious " and chal lenged the implication tha t "th e onl y legitimate . . . family for m i s nuclear and patriarchal. " I t went on : One was left with the impression that black families generally d o not hav e father s i n th e home , bu t ther e wa s n o seriou s exami nation o f th e reasons . . . . The unconscionabl e hig h level s o f unemployment... imprisonment , dru g addiction an d mortalit y among blac k me n . . . al l play a role. Single-parent familie s . . . are not as implied . . . th e result of "immorality " o r promiscuity , but rather are adaptive responses to economic and social forces} 5 This i s the kin d o f rhetori c tha t liberal s hav e chose n t o ignore . Th e intuition tha t childre n d o better when raised b y two parents, that divorc e creates instability and poverty, that abandonmen t b y their fathers i s harmful to children economically an d emotionally, is substantiated b y research, yet liberals continue t o ac t a s if these facts ar e in themselves harmful. 16 Why, whe n low-incom e familie s liv e mostl y i n relativ e peac e an d comfort i n high-rise public housing i n New Yor k City , are similar build ings acros s th e Hudso n Rive r i n Newar k abandone d o r razed ? Wh y d o low-income student s attending parochial school s treat their teachers cour teously, while low-income student s in public schools do not? Liberal s d o not tal k abou t behavior ; the y d o no t mak e judgment s eve n whe n basi c rules of society are breached . Consequently , appeal s for civilit y ar e iden tified a s "conservative " issue s an d considere d distraction s fro m th e rea l business o f restructurin g society . Micaela D i Leonard o pu t i t this way : Of cours e w e hav e t o love , contro l an d enlighte n al l ou r chil dren. Stree t crim e an d dru g addictio n ar e terrible things . Earl y childbearing isn't great. People, including poor people, ought t o be kindl y an d sensitiv e t o on e anothe r i n publi c an d private . But prio r t o al l thes e consideration s ar e publi c policie s tha t have create d an d maintai n povert y an d racia l stratification. 17

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The fou r crucia l issue s tha t liberal s hav e faile d t o addres s carefull y and respectfully—racia l preferences , whit e resentment , th e blac k family , and lower-clas s behavior—are mandator y fo r an y thoughtful approac h t o the nexu s o f rac e an d poverty . Thi s cal l fo r truth-tellin g i s not a call fo r valor. When Senato r Bil l Bradley talked abou t crim e in public in the way that white s tal k abou t i t i n private , n o on e calle d hi m a racist , an d h e did no t spea k i n euphemism : Today, man y white s respondin g t o a mor e violen t reality , heightened b y sensationa l new s stories , se e young blac k me n . . . cruisin g th e city , lookin g fo r trouble , an d the y ar e fright ened. Many whit e Americans , whether fairl y o r unfairly , see m to b e sayin g o f som e blac k males , "Yo u litte r th e stree t an d deface th e subway , an d n o one , black o r white , says stop. Yo u cut school, threaten a teacher, 'dis ' a social worker, and no one , white o r black , says stop. You snatc h a purse, you crash a concert, brea k a telephon e box , an d n o one , whit e o r black , say s stop. You ro b a store, rape a jogger, shoo t a tourist, an d whe n they catch you, if they catch you, you cry racism. And nobody , white o r black , say s stop." 18 Bradley spare d n o one , criticizin g politician s fo r th e paralysi s tha t afflicts libera l an d conservativ e alike : What mos t politician s wan t t o avoi d i s th e nee d t o confron t the realit y tha t cause s the [white ] fear . The y don' t wan t t o pu t themselves a t risk b y speaking candidly abou t violenc e to bot h blacks an d white s an d sayin g th e sam e thing s t o bot h groups . Essentially, they're indifferent t o the black self-destruction . An d violence onl y harden s thei r indifference—no t onl y t o th e per petrator, bu t t o al l African-Americans. 19 Editorialists an d columnist s gushed . Th e Bergen (N.J. ) Record wrote: "I t too k Bil l Bradley t o rais e th e thorn y question s tha t th e pres idential candidate s won' t touch." 20 Th e New York Times editorialize d that Bradle y "raise d th e issu e [o f fear ] wit h . . . bravery an d candor." 21 Bradley, b y reportin g o n America' s kitchen-tabl e conversations , enriched th e effor t t o fin d som e groun d betwee n conservativ e indif ference an d relentles s racialism—an d wa s no t publicl y criticize d fo r his remarks .

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THE PROGRESSIV E VISIO N O F A MULTIRACIAL SOCIET Y Integration an d equa l opportunit y ar e at the heart o f the progressiv e vision fo r a multiracia l society . Advocate s o f separatis m an d "equa l results" ar e vocal , bu t s o sweepin g i s the consensu s o n thes e point s tha t pollsters hav e stoppe d askin g question s abou t equalit y o f opportuni ty—because i t is what define s th e United States. 22 As we have seen, much that ha s been espoused sinc e 196 5 b y racial nationalists an d thei r choru s has directly challenged this defining idea . Contrary formulations—tha t al l persons ar e create d a s member s o f racial , ethnic , o r religiou s groups — might entertain some academics, but these ideas are treated as un-American by the public, both blac k an d white . Arthur Schlesinger , Jr., a proud pro gressive an d distinguishe d historian , recentl y describe d thi s age-ol d American ideal : The genius of America lie s in its capacity to forge a single nation from people s of remarkably divers e racial, religious, and ethni c origins. I t ha s don e s o becaus e democrati c principle s provid e both th e philosophical bon d o f unio n an d practica l experienc e in civi c participation. Th e America n Cree d envisage s a natio n composed o f individuals making their own choices and account able to themselves, not a nation base d o n inviolable ethnic communities. Th e Constitutio n turn s o n individua l rights , no t o n group rights . Law , i n orde r t o rectif y pas t wrongs , ha s fro m time to time . . . acknowledged th e claims of groups; but this is the exception , no t th e rule. 23 The sham e for man y Democrat s i s that Republican s understan d th e primacy o f thi s ide a bette r tha n the y do . Republican s sa y the y suppor t equal opportunit y an d oppos e racia l discrimination . The y migh t no t do anything abou t unequa l opportunitie s o r discrimination , bu t they do no t oppose the visceral views of 98 percent of the nation's citizens. Democrats, by placatin g blac k leadershi p wit h tal k abou t guaranteein g "equa l out comes," fl y i n the fac e o f th e American ethos . No matte r what term s are used, politically it makes sense to empha size equa l opportunit y an d integration . Mak e n o mistake : a s soo n a s someone proposes specific ways and means for th e ideals of equal oppor tunity an d integration t o come alive for blac k Americans, white America n enthusiasm flags , quickly and precipitously. For example, 76 percent support "affirmativ e actio n program s tha t hel p black s ge t ahead, " bu t onl y

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9 percen t favo r "givin g black s preference s i n gettin g job s ove r equall y qualified white s becaus e o f pas t discrimination." 24 There wa s a tim e betwee n Joh n Kennedy' s assassinatio n an d th e 1966 elections—th e Secon d Reconstruction—whe n a majorit y o f Americans were supportive o f specia l efforts t o make good o n America' s promise through integration . In the face o f Black Power an d white resent ment, blac k an d white liberals came to speak les s and les s of integration . The separatists se e integration a s a false promise. Derrick Bell , a law professor a t Ne w Yor k University , call s equa l opportunit y a "new , mor e subtle, but no less effective subordinatin g technique," i n the same spirit as slavery and segregation. 25 Equa l opportunit y ha s been dismissed b y Jesse Jackson a s a "bumpe r sticker " sloga n that i s either "nonsens e o r racist." 26

TAKING O N THE MULTICULTURALIST S Supporting integratio n mean s opposin g multiculturalism , th e cur rent varian t o f th e ol d them e o f racia l an d ethni c nationalism . Multiculturism ha s an innocent ring : "Respec t diversit y s o we can al l get along," a s if multiculturalism i s little more than appreciatin g difference s in cuisine s an d customs . I n fact , multiculturalis m collide s wit h th e American etho s tha t assume s individua l wort h i s no t define d b y race , ethnicity, religion, o r nationa l origin . The appea l t o tribal, racial, and religiou s hyphenatio n i s dangerou s stuff. Multiculturalists answe r th e question, Are we all Americans? i n th e negative. They encourag e American s t o thin k o f themselve s a s member s of a group—especially racial , ethnic, religious, or gender groups—whic h heightens th e sens e of victimizatio n whe n confronte d b y a society domi nated b y white males . Multiculturalists emphasiz e "authenticity, " bu t wha t the y mea n i s adherence t o their definitio n o f what constitute s the group's "culture. " Lan i Guinier, the University of Pennsylvania law professor whose nomination for the top post at the civil rights division of the Justice Department was clumsily withdrawn by President Clinton, defines "authentic " black officeholders a s "authentic becaus e the y ar e electe d b y black s and [he r emphasis ] becaus e the y ar e descriptively similar to their constituents. In other words, they are politically, psychologically, an d culturall y black." 27 Guinier , herself a product o f a welleducated and high-income family (her father was a graduate of Harvard College in 1926), recognizes no diversity within black America: "Authenticity reflects . . . the group perspective o f a disadvantaged an d stigmatize d minority." 28

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However on e delves into the citations an d footnote s o f multicultur alist theory, and howeve r poise d an d "mainstream " it s proponents—lik e Guinier—appear onc e challenged , ther e i s n o wa y t o reconstruc t thei r views s o that the y accep t eithe r integratio n o r equa l individua l opportu nity a s important organizin g principle s fo r America n society . Multiculturalists explai n th e lower achievemen t o f blac k America n students b y th e "theft " o f thei r Africa n heritage . Professo r Leonar d Jeffries, a n unpublishe d pseudo-schola r a t th e Cit y Universit y o f Ne w York, aver s tha t European s fea r tracin g civilization' s "root s t o Afric a because th e trut h will . . . knock the m of f thei r feet, " becaus e the y hav e "stolen" th e African civilizatio n tha t develope d th e foundations o f mod ern mathematics , architecture , philosophy , science , an d politica l theo ry.29 Adelaide Sanford , a membe r o f th e Ne w Yor k Boar d o f Regents , argues tha t multiculturalis m i s th e vehicl e b y whic h blac k American s can "self-defin e thei r culture," just as other hyphenate d American s hav e been fre e t o defin e theirs . Sh e also suggest s tha t oppositio n t o multicul turalism is explained b y the profits earne d fro m prisons , welfare, an d spe cial education program s tha t begi n with the academic failure o f minorit y children.30 Multiculturalism i s a growth industr y o n college and universit y cam puses. Loui s Menand , wh o teache s Englis h a t Queen s College , observe s that mos t colleg e student s ar e i n colleg e t o ge t a bette r jo b o r t o gai n admission to a professional graduat e school and are little influenced b y the canonical war s ragin g a t a fe w elit e campuses. 31 The battl e i s really tw o battles: one that focuse s o n admissions an d scholarshi p decision s in selective universities; a second o n curriculu m an d intellectua l standards . Not surprisingly , many blac k student s fin d themselve s a t a substan tial disadvantag e i n competin g wit h bette r prepare d students , a facto r that contributes to a discouraging college dropout rat e for blacks . A study of 198 0 hig h schoo l graduate s foun d onl y 3 0 percen t o f full-tim e blac k students ha d graduate d fro m colleg e afte r fiv e an d one-hal f years , com pared with almos t 56 percen t o f white students. 32 Increasingly, blac k stu dents hav e bee n respondin g t o academi c pressur e wit h self-segregation . They pres s fo r thei r ow n dinin g an d livin g facilities , cultura l societies , and eve n yearbooks an d graduatio n ceremonies . Often, the y demand sep arate ethni c studie s departments , increase d minorit y faculty , an d a cur riculum freed o f "dead , white males." University administrators ar e mor e likely to give into such demands than to offer intensiv e help in addressin g the underlying academi c deficiencies . Schlesinge r warns agains t this ne w intolerance amon g minorit y students :

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Ethnic ideologue s . . . hav e se t themselve s agains t th e ol d American idea l o f assimilation . The y cal l o n th e republi c t o think i n term s no t o f individua l bu t o f grou p identit y an d t o move th e polit y fro m individua l right s t o grou p rights . The y have made a certain progres s i n transforming th e United State s into a more segregate d society . . . . They hav e impose d ethno centric, Afrocentric, an d bilingua l curricul a o n publi c schools , well designed to hold minority children ou t of American society . . . . They hav e encourage d minoritie s t o se e themselves a s victims and t o live by alibis rather tha n t o claim the opportunitie s opened fo r the m b y th e poten t combinatio n o f blac k protes t and white guilt. They have filled th e air with recriminatio n an d rancor an d hav e remarkabl y advance d th e fragmentatio n o f American life. 33 Stressing similarities ove r differences, Professo r Corne l West urge s a greater emphasi s o n unit y betwee n black s an d whites : To establis h a ne w framework , w e nee d t o begi n wit h a fran k acknowledgement o f th e basi c humannes s an d American ness o f eac h o f us . And w e mus t acknowledg e a s a people — £ Pluribus Unum —we ar e on a slippery slope toward economi c strife, socia l turmoil, and cultura l chaos. If we go down, we go down together. 34 Despite suc h obviou s appeal s t o th e visio n o f a united , integrate d society, liberal s hav e faile d t o acknowledg e th e basi c "humanness " an d "Americanness" o f blac k Americans . Instead , the y hav e "helped " blac k Americans by going along with race-driven preferences, supportin g spend ing o n program s o f dubiou s efficacy , an d tryin g t o protec t blac k peopl e from th e dail y competition s o f America n life . I n addition , liberal s hav e degraded blac k leader s and , indeed , the blac k communit y b y refusing t o accord thei r position s th e sam e vigorous debat e accorde d othe r issues .

INTEGRATION MEAN S FIGHTIN G DISCRIMINATIO N Integration an d oppositio n t o racia l discriminatio n ar e a matche d pair. American s believ e tha t racia l discriminatio n shoul d no t b e tolerat ed, bu t disagre e o n th e exten t o f discriminatio n tha t i s practiced .

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Americans als o disagree on the extent to which difference s betwee n blac k and whit e American s ar e bes t explaine d b y discriminatio n o r b y othe r forces. And Americans certainly disagre e about what t o do regarding discrimination: the majority o f black s favor preferentia l treatment , bu t the y are joine d b y onl y a smal l minorit y o f whites. 35 The consensu s oppose s race preferences . Black American s believ e tha t the y encounte r muc h mor e discrimi nation tha n whit e American s believ e exists . A 198 9 surve y foun d tha t more tha n hal f o f blac k respondent s believe d discriminatio n wa s preva lent i n bot h housin g an d employmen t (compare d wit h 2 0 an d 1 5 per cent, respectively, amon g whites). 36 Only 3 0 percent o f blac k American s believe tha t antidiscriminatio n law s ar e sufficientl y strong , compare d with 58 percent of whites. Black Americans report encounters that sugges t widespread prejudice—stare s fro m sale s clerks , taxi s tha t d o no t stop , unwarranted licens e an d registratio n check s b y police. Most black s als o believe ther e i s a "glas s ceiling " tha t limit s thei r opportunitie s fo r pro motions i n most jobs. 37 Unfortunately, th e evidenc e suggest s tha t a grea t dea l o f racia l dis crimination stil l exists. A 1990 Federal Reserve study of 6. 3 million mort gage applications foun d tha t blac k applicants were twice as likely as white applicants wit h th e sam e incom e t o b e denied loans . Although th e stud y did no t includ e informatio n o n credi t histories , deb t levels , or othe r cri teria pertinen t t o loa n approvals , th e disparat e treatmen t stand s out. 38 The Urban Institute' s 199 1 study reported tha t on e of eight black renter s was denie d informatio n abou t housin g tha t wa s show n t o whit e tester s presenting th e sam e financia l profile . Overall , blac k an d Latin o tester s encountered som e for m o f discriminatio n i n mor e tha n hal f o f thei r encounters wit h realtors. 39 Anyone livin g nea r a significan t blac k popu lation ca n testif y t o th e existenc e o f racia l boundaries . Fo r example , Harrison, New Jersey, a blue-collar tow n abuttin g Newark, reporte d 4 5 black resident s ou t o f 11,74 3 in the 196 0 census; thirty years later, ther e were 7 4 ou t o f 13,425 . Hillside, also contiguou s t o Newark , wen t fro m 35 blac k resident s ou t o f 22,30 4 i n 196 0 t o 8,57 8 o f 21,04 4 i n 1990 . Republicans—who worshi p a n unfettere d marketplace—displa y n o enthusiasm fo r fightin g racia l discrimination , whic h s o clearl y distort s free markets . I n 1991 , the Wednesda y Group , mad e u p o f moderat e Republicans i n th e U.S . House , issue d a fifty-eigh t pag e "opportunit y agenda" withou t mentionin g housin g discrimination. 40 Th e sam e wa s true fo r th e Heritag e Foundation' s "conservativ e agenda " fo r blac k Americans, mos t o f whic h dwel t o n th e nee d fo r restorin g traditiona l

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moral an d famil y values. 41 Willia m J . Bennett , a Reagan-Bus h cabine t officer an d conservativ e author , urge d a new "market-oriented " empha sis on "empowerment " i n his "ne w civi l rights agenda, " bu t ignore d dis crimination. 42 Jac k Kemp , th e conservativ e mos t sympatheti c wit h th e urban poor , ha d th e authorit y a s HUD secretar y i n the Bush administra tion t o mov e agains t housin g discrimination , bu t h e gave highes t priori ty t o initiative s t o kee p blac k American s i n ghetto s b y sellin g the m th e public housin g unit s the y occupied . Moreover , hi s frequen t speeche s o n urban problem s neve r emphasiz e discrimination . Progressives seem no more inclined to fight discriminatio n tha n con servatives, however . Civi l right s group s concentrat e thei r litigatio n o n racially proportionate remedies . Suburban progressive s fin d fai r housin g less fashionable tha n preserving ope n spaces , supporting abortio n rights , or helping battered spouses . Even the victims seem to have lost interest i n actually combatin g discrimination ; complaint s t o civil rights agencie s d o not reflec t th e leve l o f discriminatio n tha t black s sa y they encounter . Progressives should hol d conservatives accountabl e fo r thei r rhetori c about fre e market s b y buildin g a bipartisa n coalitio n t o figh t housin g discrimination. Crimina l penalties should b e imposed o n those who prac tice discrimination; rea l estate agent s shoul d los e their license s for refus ing access or information t o minority home-seekers , and—like embezzlers , forgers, counterfeiters , an d other s wh o ro b b y stealth—persisten t dis criminators shoul d b e imprisoned . Since the 1960s , the American workplace ha s bee n increasingly ope n to blac k Americans , yet many believ e that the y ar e subjecte d t o discrim ination i n job s an d promotions . Som e union s an d employer s persis t i n freezing ou t qualifie d blac k applicants. 43 During New Yor k City' s build ing boom i n the 1980s , the numbe r o f blac k constructio n worker s actu ally decline d b y 1 5 percent , whil e whit e worker s wer e importe d fro m other citie s a s wel l a s Ireland. 44 I n case s lik e these , court-administere d quota plan s appea r t o b e the onl y remedy .

REPAIRING TH E SOCIA L FABRI C American mytholog y insist s tha t w e ar e al l i n th e sam e boat . Television an d movie s celebrat e a classles s America : th e Worl d Wa r I I infantry platoo n becam e th e cinemati c metapho r fo r a civic culture tha t prizes a vibrant , unpretentiou s egalitarianis m (a s long , presumably , a s blacks wer e segregated , a s the y wer e i n Worl d Wa r II) . But i n fact , th e

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social fabric i s fraying. Mos t white children ar e raised i n two-parent sub urban families ; mos t blac k childre n i n single-paren t cit y families . Th e public school is under attac k b y those who want tax funds diverte d to private an d religiou s schools . The bes t job s an d th e safes t an d nices t place s to liv e ar e foun d farthe r an d farthe r fro m centra l cities . The easy , dail y mixing o f American s b y class , race , an d worke r statu s tha t marke d a draftee-filled Army , a publi c schoo l system , publi c libraries , an d mas s transit i s disappearing. Three-quarters o f Americans driv e to work alone ; only 5 percent take public transit. Even the ball park, onc e the symbol of "America's pastime, " ha s becom e segregated , wit h vale t parking , supe r boxes, and suppe r club s separating the affluen t fro m thos e in the bleach ers. From universit y campuses , the reports o f self-selecte d racia l an d eth nic segregation ar e discouragin g fo r thei r frequency . Cities are no longer the epicenters of political o r social life. There ar e now almos t twice as many voters in suburbia a s in cities. Fewer and fewe r suburban resident s wor k i n cities . Onl y a fe w cente r citie s ca n compet e with thei r suburb s fo r culture , nigh t life , an d recreation . On e doe s no t hear a lo t o f suburba n folk s saying , "Let' s g o t o downtow n Paterso n Saturday night. " Th e Lions play football i n Pontiac, not Detroit ; the Jets in East Rutherford , no t Queens , an d th e Cowboy s i n Irving , not Dallas . The long-standing belie f tha t American civilizatio n i s inextricably tie d t o the fortune o f centra l citie s is now questionabl e t o most Americans . Increasingly, educatio n an d class—no t race , language, or religion — are th e rea l divider s i n America n society . Thos e wit h advance d educa tions an d skill s value d i n a globalize d econom y d o well , an d the y ar e quietly, bu t effectivel y distancin g themselve s fro m th e res t o f society . Robert Reich , Presiden t Clinton' s secretar y o f labor , ha s observed : "A s Americans continue to segregat e according to what the y earn, the shift i n financing publi c service s fro m th e federa l governmen t t o th e states , an d from th e state s t o citie s an d towns , ha s functione d a s anothe r mean s o f relieving America' s wealthie r citizen s o f th e burden s o f America' s les s fortunate." 45 Conservatives d o no t worr y abou t socia l equality . Moreover , the y want th e marketplac e t o allocat e publi c service s suc h a s safety , healt h care, university education, recreation, an d transportation. The y want fed eral assistanc e fo r socia l service s an d healt h car e i n citie s halted , prefer ring instea d tha t town s an d citie s "tak e car e o f thei r own" ; the y woul d contentedly se e public school s disappear . Through thei r semiofficia l organ , the Washington Monthly, neolib erals hav e propose d strengthenin g institution s tha t brin g American s

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together acros s racial , class , an d ethni c lines . Wit h militar y personne l needs declining , neoliberal s pus h fo r a mandator y nationa l servic e pro gram tha t woul d impos e a one - o r two-yea r communit y servic e require ment to tutor, teach, build public facilities, and provide social services, and to brin g divers e persons togethe r i n common effort .

RESTORING TH E INSTINC T TO CITIZENSHIP AN D CIVILIT Y Alexis d e Tocquevill e foun d a n Americ a i n whic h th e instinc t t o civility wa s the foundatio n o f citizenshi p an d th e antidot e t o th e excess es of fierce individualism . As this "instinct " weakens , however, th e qual ity and geniu s o f th e American syste m i s imperiled . Citizen i s a proud title . American citizenshi p i s more avidl y sough t than an y in the world. Citizenshi p mean s more tha n votin g o r jury duty , more than th e voluntary paymen t o f taxes o r separatin g clear from gree n glass for recycling . Citizenship is what makes our societ y work; i t is what lends civilit y t o ou r dealing s wit h on e another , an d wha t glue s togethe r practitioners o f tenaciou s America n individualis m i n pursuit o f commu nal interests . The need to codify citizenshi p is evidence that citizenship has broke n down, ye t whe n it' s codified , i t doesn' t work . Citizenshi p i s on e o f th e "unenforceable obligations " tha t Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., ha d i n mind , and th e for m thos e obligation s tak e i s a decen t measur e o f th e healt h o f our republic . The more cities pass ordinances agains t horn blowing , public urination, stree t litter , lou d music , an d drinkin g i n parks , the greate r the evidenc e o f ou r frayin g compact . Civilit y canno t b e enforce d wit h the threa t o f $20 0 fines . During th e lat e 1960s , the cit y o f Ne w Yor k picke d u p garbag e i n ghetto neighborhood s nin e time s a wee k durin g th e summe r an d si x times durin g th e rest o f th e year. I n the borough s o f Queen s an d State n Island, garbag e wa s picke d u p twic e weekl y year-round . Sanitatio n inspectors foun d tha t th e dirtiest neighborhood s wer e those that receive d the most service ; the cleanest, thos e tha t receive d th e least . The popula r explanations fo r thes e result s focuse d o n absente e landlords , inade quate buildin g maintenance , corrup t garbag e collectors , an d racia l dis crimination. Afte r a three-wee k survey , th e New York Times arrive d at a more plausibl e explanation : "wher e shopkeepers , landlords, home owners an d tenant s seriousl y attemp t t o kee p their environ s clean , the y are clean." 46

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It i s painful , again , t o writ e suc h truisms , bu t governmen t canno t work unle s citizens exercise the rights an d repsonsibilitie s o f citizenship . Progressives nee d to b e very clear about th e minimal obligation s tha t cit izenship entails . Citizenshi p an d civilit y ar e locke d together , an d pro gressives shoul d b e unafrai d t o offen d th e boor s an d th e purveyor s o f public obscenit y an d disorde r i n making th e connection .

ECONOMIC GROWT H AN D GOVERNMENT' S ROL E Neither Republican s no r Democrat s hav e deal t squarel y o r clearl y with the primary economi c fact o f American life : 8 0 percent o f America n families ar e working without improvin g their standar d o f living, and th e prospects tha t thi s will change i n their favo r ar e weak . During th e 199 2 presidentia l campaign , Clinto n promise d a "lase r focus" o n th e economy . "It' s th e economy , stupid, " rea d th e sig n i n hi s headquarters. Hi s platfor m calle d fo r revampin g th e healt h car e system , expanding jo b training , modernizin g th e infrastructure , targetin g ta x incentives t o creat e bette r payin g jobs , and reducin g budge t deficits . But Clinto n an d th e Democrati c Congres s wer e soo n stuc k o n th e question radica l conservative s wan t the m stuc k on : What publi c expen ditures wil l b e cut t o reduc e th e deficit ? Senat e Republican s successfull y filibustered th e administration' s omnibu s budge t an d ta x plan , singin g the Reagan-Bus h anthe m o f "N o ne w taxes ; cut governmen t spending. " Senator Ernes t Hollings' s advic e t o Presiden t Clinto n encapsulate d th e challenge: "By defining himsel f a s the Daddy Rabbit o f Deficit Reduction , Clinton ca n clea n u p th e mes s lef t b y th e Republicans , la y clai m t o th e Perot vote and win the credibility he needs as a Democrat to pursue a progressive agenda." 47 Trappe d b y year s o f storie s abou t th e governmen t buying $60 0 coffe e makers , saving s an d loa n scandals , an d a sens e o f pervasive bureaucrati c ineptitude , Democrats foun d thei r argumen t tha t the natio n neede d t o d o more , no t less , abou t transportation , research , higher education , housing , and healt h car e was hardl y heard . One poin t o n whic h a strong post-Reaga n consensu s prevaile d wa s that th e wealth y wer e no t payin g thei r fai r share . Th e Citizen s fo r Ta x Justice reporte d tha t "th e average preta x incom e o f th e richest on e per cent . . . zoome d fro m $314,50 0 i n 197 8 . . . (i n 199 2 dollars ) t o $675,000 . . . a 11 5 percent increase." 48 Even Republicans were reluctan t to attack Presiden t Clinton' s proposed margina l rate increases on familie s with income s highe r tha n $200,000 . Restorin g a mor e progressiv e ta x

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schedule wa s eas y compare d wit h winnin g th e argumen t tha t long-ter m economic vitality shoul d preced e deficit-reductio n a s a national priority . Deficit reductio n i s no-win politics . There i s little credit , bu t muc h pain, t o b e gaine d fro m cuttin g deficits . Populist s argu e tha t becaus e Congress ha s no discipline "th e people " mus t tak e charge , by enacting a balanced budge t amendmen t t o ensur e th e furthe r shrinkin g o f govern ment. Horror storie s about laz y bureaucrats an d stupi d governmen t pro grams fee d defici t politics . "[P]ress fo r a Balanced Budge t Amendment, " write s Marti n Gross , a best-sellin g autho r an d fraud-and-waste-detector . "Mos t states. . . have it and it works," he notes, ignoring the fact that states separate capital an d operating expenses, require voter approva l fo r long-ter m borrowing , an d cannot prin t thei r ow n currencies. 49 Gros s als o recommend s a n "inde pendent" nationa l inspecto r general , withou t specifyin g ho w it s inde pendence woul d b e maintained , an d a rul e tha t forbid s member s o f th e House of Representatives fro m supportin g an y expenditure i n their hom e districts.50 Deficits ma y or may not b e an economic problem. Instinctively, people assum e tha t governmen t borrowin g wil l increas e th e cost s o f bor rowing fo r everyon e else , thus "crowdin g out " privat e investment . Th e truth i s more confusing . Durin g th e 1980s , as deficit s mounted , interes t rates bega n a stead y decline , reachin g a twenty-yea r lo w i n 1993 . Th e enormous increase s i n corporat e an d househol d deb t durin g th e 1980 s suggest littl e crowdin g out . Moreover , a s Professo r Rober t Eisne r o f Northwestern Universit y ha s noted, in contrast t o conventional account ing principles , federa l budgetin g make s n o distinctio n betwee n capita l and operatin g expenses ; i f th e government' s investment s i n buildings , highways, equipment , weapons , an d lan d wer e depreciate d lik e privat e investments, the defici t woul d b e de minimus. 51 But deficit s are , in autho r Charle s Morris' s term , "mora l hazards . They ar e fundamentall y antidemocratic, " h e wrote , "the y allo w gov ernment t o increas e spendin g withou t th e implici t referendu m o f a ta x increase." 52 According t o Morri s an d others , it is immoral fo r thi s gen eration t o pas s alon g t o it s childre n an d grandchildre n th e obligatio n to repa y debt s incurre d becaus e o f it s ow n lac k o f discipline . I n 198 0 the per capit a nationa l deb t wa s abou t $4,000 ; b y 1992 , it had quadru pled! Deficits o f thi s magnitud e violat e strongl y hel d principle s regard ing deferra l o f curren t satisfactio n fo r long-ter m gains . The y ar e als o regressive, a s Kevi n Phillip s explaine d i n hi s 199 0 indictmen t o f Reaganism:

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Funding this huge deficit furthe r realigne d th e nation's wealth . Under Reagan , annua l federa l expenditure s o n interes t woul d climb fro m $9 6 billio n i n 198 1 . . . t o $21 6 billio n i n 1988 . No othe r majo r expens e ros e s o sharply . . . . Not onl y wer e upper-quintile American s collectin g 8 0 percen t o f th e federa l interest payments made to persons, but the top tax rate applica ble to these receipts was falling steadil y (7 0 percent i n 198 0 . . . 28 percent i n 1988). 53 The distinction betwee n economic and moral arguments is important. Morally, i t i s offensiv e t o burde n ou r kid s wit h massiv e deb t t o pa y fo r national parks , farm subsidies , Socia l Securit y payments , o r Coas t Guar d patrols. If we think we need these services and entitlements, then we should pay for them . What w e should no t do , but have don e sinc e Reagan's firs t budget, is to borro w th e money to finance ta x cuts for ourselves . The natio n doe s no t nee d a balance d budge t amendmen t t o th e Constitution; suc h a n amendmen t i s a simplisti c schem e o f antigovern ment ideologues . The obligation t o balance the budget i s easy to evade in practice and questionabl e a s either political o r economic theory. The government need s th e optio n o f runnin g a defici t i n orde r t o pursu e soun d economic policies . Deficit s ma y b e require d no t onl y b y nationa l emer gencies, bu t als o b y the nee d t o stimulat e th e economy . I n fact , th e bes t explanation fo r th e busines s expansio n afte r th e 198 2 recessio n wa s th e enormous kic k give n th e econom y b y unprecedented peacetim e borrow ing along with a runaway increas e i n defense spending . Progressives nee d t o connec t thei r suppor t fo r publi c spendin g t o the well-bein g o f th e econom y an d ou r prospect s fo r th e future . I f Democrats d o no t tak e th e lea d i n restorin g th e opportunit y structure , then i t will no t b e done . Sure , they ca n lear n fro m th e mistake s o f earli er efforts . Washingto n functionarie s shoul d no t contro l loca l programs ; ineffective program s shoul d b e shu t down , an d taxpayer s shoul d no t b e expected to suppor t thos e who can take care of themselves. The "strivin g poor," s o admired b y conservatives, rely on a network o f public facilitie s and services , from school s to buse s to libraries to public colleges to figh t their wa y int o th e middl e class . Thi s networ k need s freshenin g an d strengthening, without apology . But everyone benefits fro m investmen t i n major capita l expenditure s such a s public transit, water an d sewe r projects , highways , airports, an d flood control . An d everyon e benefit s fro m a federa l governmen t tha t works i n concert wit h th e private secto r i n sponsorin g basi c and applie d

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research that ha s no immediate or perceptible commercial applications . In fact, American s hav e a nationa l economi c an d securit y interes t i n main taining the network o f private and publi c research universitie s that ar e the envy o f th e world . I n th e sam e way , everyon e benefit s fro m providin g talented student s wit h th e opportunit y t o receiv e a college education . These ar e the kind s o f public investmen t i n which th e United State s is falling furthe r behin d othe r industrialize d nations . It is no accident tha t the nation's period o f maximum investmen t followin g Worl d War II coincided wit h it s longest perio d o f sustaine d prosperity , whic h wa s enjoye d by the broades t cross-sectio n o f families . If federa l spendin g i s heavily concentrate d i n thes e form s o f invest ment wher e th e payoff s ar e lon g ter m an d benefi t futur e generations , then ther e i s no compellin g mora l o r economi c reaso n wh y thos e invest ments should no t b e financed b y borrowings. Families d o the same thin g when the y borro w t o bu y a house o r t o pu t a child throug h college . Th e pain i s spread ou t ove r tim e an d inflicte d o n thos e who benefi t fro m th e investments. At bottom , th e ver y ide a o f governmen t itsel f mus t b e reargued . Many Americans feel that the public interest i s no longer define d b y congressional enactments ; instead , congressiona l decision s ar e viewe d a s manipulations o f the political syste m designe d t o benefi t specia l interest s that ar e corruptl y represente d b y Washingto n insiders . Ala n Wolfe , a political scientist , characterize s thi s suspicio n a s a "contractua l break down," an d argue s tha t "unti l on e o r bot h politica l partie s begin s th e difficult tas k o f renegotiating th e contract betwee n citize n an d state , ou r political syste m wil l continue t o generat e alienatio n an d withdrawal." 54 However, before negotiation s can begin, progressives must determin e what kin d o f multiracia l societ y the y wan t t o liv e in . Wit h a displa y o f forthrightness an d thoughtfulness, progressive s might even advance a clear, credible, and effectiv e visio n fo r dealin g with th e American dilemm a an d its mos t perniciou s an d discouragin g contemporar y manifestation—th e black lowe r class .

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o seriou s discussio n o f America n societ y ca n avoi d th e tangl e o f pathology foun d i n poor cit y neighborhoods . Place s suc h a s East St . Louis, Nort h Philadelphia , Camden , an d Chicago' s Sout h Sid e suffe r from a dangerous concentration o f violent crime, drug and alcoho l abuse , and dependency . Thi s arra y o f afflictions , combine d wit h a n absenc e o f jobs, continues t o discourag e an d baffl e an y attemp t a t a solution .

RACE, CLASS , AN D POVERT Y For thirty years, bold national initiatives and comprehensive scheme s have bee n offere d t o reliev e poverty—dru g wars , educatio n reforms , welfare reforms , year s o f th e child , an d toug h anticrim e talk . Withal , the qualit y o f lif e i n ghett o neighborhood s ha s worsene d t o th e poin t that they are now among the most dangerous place s in the world. It is true that marginal, ameliorative, and preventativ e program s hav e created job s for som e peopl e an d hav e moderate d th e problem s fo r som e poo r fami lies. But such programs hav e been insufficient t o slow the deterioration i n the quality o f lif e o f poor neighborhoods . The nationa l searc h fo r a conceptually coherent , efficacious , practical , an d broad-range d "Answer " has failed . 167

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I have spen t muc h o f my professional lif e contributin g t o this faile d search. My first "real " job was with Trenton's community actio n progra m in 196 5 wher e I worked wit h communit y leader s an d group s an d non profit an d publi c agencie s developin g fundin g proposals . I worked wit h the staf f o f th e Whit e Hous e Tas k Forc e o n Citie s durin g Lyndo n Johnson's presidency. Returning to New Jersey, I was the special assistan t to a reform-minde d educatio n commissione r befor e movin g ove r t o th e governor's offic e a s Governo r Richar d J . Hughe s wa s respondin g t o th e 1967 riots i n Newar k an d Plainfield . Fo r eigh t year s I ran a foundatio n that searche d for effectiv e answer s to city problems. I visited scores of programs an d peopl e wit h idea s i n th e poores t neighborhood s o f som e o f America's poores t cities . I have consulted wit h community organization s and foundations , serve d o n board s an d tas k force s an d attende d mor e meetings abou t cit y poverty tha n I thought possible . Through thes e efforts , I have met hundred s o f bright , serious , ener getic, motivated, tough-minded, effectiv e huma n being s who were focuse d on wha t t o d o abou t poo r peopl e i n poo r places . Som e endeavor s "worked"—some poo r peopl e moved ou t o f poverty an d their live s were filled wit h mor e an d bette r choices . Many o f thes e effort s di d no t work . But ther e wa s nothin g tha t worke d s o wel l an d s o consistentl y tha t i t could b e packaged a s the answer. Actually, one idea comes close to qualifying a s a solution: jobs for al l who see k one . Th e bes t wa y t o liberat e th e lowe r clas s i s a macroeco nomic policy that sustain s enough growth that labo r shortage s reach poo r cities. Then, employers would hav e to reach dow n int o the labor poo l t o train th e poor . Harvar d economis t Richar d Freema n foun d tha t th e employment an d earning s o f young blac k males benefite d disproportion ately fro m th e tight labo r market s o f the mid-1980s. 1 Economic growt h a s the nationa l urba n polic y benefit s everyone . It avoids th e divisivenes s o f racia l preferences , th e inefficiencie s o f socia l service bureaucracies , an d th e hysteri a o f ta x increases . It s sol e disad vantage i s that n o on e knows ho w t o pul l i t off . Lyndon Johnson wa s the las t president t o presid e ove r a n econom y in which unemploymen t an d inflatio n rate s wer e bot h aroun d 4 percen t or less . America n economi c polic y shifte d fro m strivin g t o reac h an d maintain lo w unemployment ( 3 percent) t o tolerating a much higher job less rate (n o president seem s much threatened b y even a 6 percent rate) i n preference fo r a lowe r inflatio n rate . Mos t economist s an d al l Federa l Reserve chairmen hav e warned tha t th e fiscal an d monetar y action s tha t might creat e a tigh t labo r marke t woul d ac t a s gasolin e o n inflation' s

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fire. Meanwhile , amon g th e patchwor k o f program s aime d a t helpin g the strivin g poo r ar e som e tha t wor k consistentl y wel l a t reasonabl e cost. Prenata l an d well-bab y care , vaccinations , an d famil y plannin g have bee n effective i n improving th e healt h o f th e poor. Publi c libraries , parks, affordabl e publi c transit , an d a rang e o f publi c institution s o f higher educatio n tha t connec t opportunit y t o educationa l potentia l ar e services that benefi t al l levels of society, but provid e life-changin g oppor tunities fo r th e poor . Thes e program s ar e no t dramati c o r inventive , nor ar e they "antipoverty " program s ( a virtue), but the y ar e essential fo r giving concretenes s t o th e America n promis e o f educationa l an d eco nomic opportunity . Such programs hel p some people escape the cycle of poverty eve n in the worst cit y neighborhoods. The Censu s Burea u foun d tha t 2 5 percen t of poo r peopl e i n centra l citie s exite d povert y i n 1988—6 0 percen t o f them had gotte n married an d 5 0 percent had improve d thei r employmen t situation.2 Terry Adams an d hi s colleagues a t the University o f Michiga n found annua l exi t rate s aroun d 3 0 percen t i n th e 1970s. 3 Muc h o f th e poverty polic y debat e ignores these complex dynamic s an d successes , nor does it acnowledge that lasting solutions to the conditions in ghetto neigh borhoods mus t b e contemplate d acros s generationa l spans , no t i n four-year electio n cycles .

DRAWING FRO M PROGRESSIV E AN D CONSERVATIVE STRENGTH S As shown i n Chapte r 2 , liberals retreated fro m sensibl e debate abou t race an d povert y i n th e mid-1960s . Unti l th e lat e 1980 s o r so , liberal s spoke as if all black Americans were poor, subjec t t o systematic racial discrimination, an d victim s o f brutalizin g police . Th e libera l positio n wa s that nothing short o f an "urba n Marshal l Plan " o r hard quota s for black s in selective universities an d job s would work . Anyon e who sa w it differ ently was, in liberal eyes , guilty o f racis m o r victim-blaming . In 1970 , Edward Banfield , the n a Harvard politica l scientist , wrot e an important book , entitled The Unheavenly City, i n which he countere d that th e explanation fo r durabl e povert y wa s to b e found i n class behavior^ not racia l discriminatio n o r stunte d opportunities : The lower-clas s form s o f al l problem s ar e a t botto m a singl e problem: th e existenc e o f a n outloo k an d styl e o f lif e whic h i s

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radically present oriented an d which therefore attache s no value to work , sacrifice , self-improvement , o r servic e t o family , friends, o r community . Socia l workers , teachers , an d law enforcement official s . . . cannot achiev e thei r goal s becaus e they can neithe r chang e no r circumven t thi s cultural obstacle. 4 While Banfield despaire d abou t th e efficacy o f any government interven tion i n "curing " poverty , i n hi s 198 4 book , Losing Ground, Charle s Murray, a fellow a t the conservative Manhatta n Institute , concluded tha t government program s onl y mak e th e situatio n muc h worse : The mos t compellin g explanatio n fo r th e marke d shif t i n th e fortunes o f the poor i s that they continued t o respond . . . t o th e world a s they foun d it , bu t tha t we , meaning th e not-poo r . . . had change d th e rules of their world . . . . The first effec t o f th e new rules was to make it profitable fo r th e poor to behave in the short term in ways that were destructive in the long term. Thei r second effec t wa s t o mas k thes e long-ter m losse s t o subsidiz e irretrievable mistakes . We tried to provide more for the poor and produced more poor instead. 5 Murray's idea s provided th e Reagan extremist s with the intellectual cove r to justify thei r persisten t attack s o n an y kin d o f socia l spending . Antipoverty polic y discours e i s really paralle l monologues : liberal s call fo r mor e publi c program s an d highe r spending , whil e conservative s claim tha t th e poo r wil l eve r b e with u s unti l the y personall y transfor m themselves. Meanwhile, millions of poor American s graduated fro m hig h school, borrowed fro m th e government t o go to college, found jobs , an d entered th e middl e class . As they move d ou t o f thei r ol d neighborhoods , the qualit y o f lif e ther e worsened . Faced with the contradictory trend s o f a growing blac k middle clas s and a n increasingl y pathologica l lowe r class , conservative s argue d tha t public programs were pointless—the middle-clas s aspirant s di d not nee d them, and they only to made things worse for the poor. Liberals countere d that th e government wa s no t doin g enough t o reach th e remaining poor . So, where i s the commo n ground ? E . J. Dionn e ha s suggeste d tha t i t lies in promoting traditiona l famil y value s and providin g socia l services . In th e 1990s , American s ar e seekin g a politic s tha t restore s a sense o f publi c enterpris e an d mutua l obligation . . . . Wit h

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conservatives, Americans accep t th e ide a capture d i n a n apho rism coine d b y James Q . Wilson . "I n th e lon g run, " Wilso n declares, "th e publi c interes t depend s o n privat e virtue. " Liberals are often righ t in seeing "structura l problems, " suc h a s the changin g labo r market , a s primar y cause s o f socia l decay . But designers of social programs need to be clear about values— and "virtues"—the y ar e seekin g t o promote . Value-fre e socia l policy i s a contradiction i n terms. 6 As we've seen, some progressive politicians an d academic s ar e promotin g the unremarkabl e ide a tha t effort s t o ai d th e poo r mus t b e race-neutra l and consisten t wit h basi c American values . But that doe s no t mea n tha t the poo r shoul d b e expecte d t o generate—spontaneousl y an d b y them selves—the mean s o f ascent . Everyone ha s a stake i n a common effort .

WELFARE A S THE TESTIN G GROUN D In the lat e 1980s , dissatisfaction wit h th e welfare syste m dre w con servatives an d progressive s close r togethe r fo r a time. Congressional lib erals acquiesce d t o th e ide a tha t welfar e shoul d impos e a wor k requirement, that there should b e a time limit on benefits , an d that father s should b e financially responsibl e fo r thei r children. Conservative s agree d that ta x dollar s shoul d pa y fo r transitiona l assistance . In response to th e Welfare Refor m Ac t of 1988 , many state s enacted reform s tha t reinforce d society's ethos about work an d famil y responsibility , including more gen erous ta x credit s fo r earne d income , a "marriag e bonus, " an d financia l penalties fo r childre n conceive d whil e o n welfare . Up until the Clinton administration announce d it s welfare reform pro posal i n June 1994 , congressional Republican s agree d tha t refor m woul d have t o includ e fund s fo r da y car e an d transitiona l healt h coverag e fo r recipients moving into the labor force . Onc e in control o f Congress , how ever, the new majority quickl y abandoned suppor t for transitional assistanc e and adopte d a sharply punitive tone. Republicans now go so far a s to suggest tha t a chil d livin g i n a famil y withou t mean s i s no longe r entitle d t o public support. Instead, they propose a freeze o n federal welfar e payment s at th e 199 4 level ; each stat e woul d hav e t o decid e i f childre n causin g th e 1994 roll to be exceeded would b e supported wit h stat e funds o r not . President Clinton' s welfare refor m proposa l was a conceptually solid , but badl y underfinance d measure . H e wa s handcuffe d b y th e 199 3

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budget reconciliation deal , which required th e administration no t onl y t o design a work-oriented reform , bu t to identify program s t o b e cut or revenues to b e increased t o cover an y additional costs . The result was a proposal to impose the work requiremen t an d a two-year benefit s limitatio n only o n recipient s unde r th e ag e o f twenty-fou r an d fo r modes t ne w spending o f $ 9 billio n ove r fiv e years . If th e Republican-le d 104t h Congres s adopt s Presiden t Clinton' s plan, an d i t i s implemented full y an d effectively , i t will no t mak e a den t in the character an d magnitud e o f the problems afflictin g th e underclass . It i s importan t no t t o confus e "underclass " wit h "welfar e recipient. " Most recipient s rel y onl y temporaril y o n welfar e (7 0 percen t ar e of f th e rolls withi n tw o years) . A har d cor e o f remainin g recipients , however , exhibit man y characteristic s o f th e underclass : n o affinit y fo r work , n o expectation o f marriag e o r o f paterna l suppor t fo r thei r children , littl e capacity t o inculcat e educationa l values . For welfare refor m t o cut into the underclass problem, its incentive s need t o b e stronger an d mor e automatic , an d a n unprecedente d numbe r of publi c servic e job s mus t b e created . Thi s i s th e approac h The New Republic's Micke y Kau s urges—"replacin g AFD C [Ai d t o Familie s wit h Dependent Children ] an d al l other cash-lik e welfare program s tha t assis t the able-bodie d poor . . . with a single , simpl e offe r fro m th e govern ment—an offe r o f employmen t fo r ever y American citize n ove r eightee n who wants it, in a useful publi c job at a wage slightly below the minimu m wage for privat e sector work." 7 Onc e someone was working full time , the government coul d supplemen t thei r incom e throug h th e earne d incom e tax credi t t o brin g th e famil y abov e th e povert y line . Kaus is unsentimental abou t thos e who can , bu t wil l not, work. H e proposes n o governmen t backu p fo r them . Bu t h e understand s tha t a work mandat e mean s that th e parents o f young children mus t b e provid ed chil d care , an expensiv e entitlement . Lik e Newt Gingrich , h e propos es public orphanage s fo r th e children o f parents who refus e t o work an d lack th e means o r will to suppor t them . How ca n Kaus justify proposin g such high-cos t idea s a t a time o f publi c stinginess ? The bes t estimat e I'v e bee n abl e t o com e u p wit h . . . puts th e total bil l at between $4 3 and $5 9 billion a year more than we'r e spending now. That's not countin g the value of any of the public service work performe d b y the neo-WP A workers . Still , it' s expensive. So? This isn't a cost-cutting program. It's a solution

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to the underclass problem. In the long run, if the welfare cultur e is absorbed int o the working, tax-paying culture, the budgetar y payoff wil l b e enormous—not t o mention th e payoff fo r socia l equality.8 To put Kaus's estimates in perspective, the 199 3 federal bil l for AFD C was about $2 3 billion, while food stamp s (whic h would b e discontinued unde r Kaus's approach) an d Medicaid (whic h Kaus would replace with a national healt h schem e o f som e kind ) adde d anothe r $4 0 billion . Bu t conside r that th e expansio n approve d i n 199 3 fo r th e earne d incom e ta x credit — a ta x refun d progra m tha t increase s th e incom e o f th e workin g poor — adds $2 6 billio n t o federa l spending . Kaus is right. Mostly. Importantly, h e puts the nature an d magnitud e of th e welfare proble m i n a realistic context. H e spare s neithe r th e liber als for thei r condescending efforts t o protect welfare client s from life' s nor mal tests nor conservative s fo r thei r rot e invocatio n o f traditional value s and failur e t o suppor t transitiona l program s welfar e recipient s nee d t o have a fighting chance . But work incentive s an d sermon s abou t persona l responsibility ma y no t b e enough fo r man y member s o f th e underclass .

FAMILY DIFFERENCE S The most obviou s problem with ghetto life is that poo r familie s ten d to be weak families , an d overwhelmingl y the y ar e headed b y a single par ent. Publi c program s canno t supplan t th e nurture , comfort , discipline , and preparation fo r learnin g supplied b y a strong family. Davi d Ellwood , then o f Harvar d University , conclude d tha t "th e vas t majorit y o f chil dren wh o ar e raise d i n a two-paren t hom e wil l neve r b e poo r durin g childhood. B y contrast, th e vas t majorit y o f childre n wh o spen d tim e i n a single-paren t hom e wil l experience poverty." 9 Raising children i s demanding, difficult , tedious , an d time-consum ing. Goo d parent s teac h thei r childre n no t t o chea t o r steal , t o accep t responsibility, an d t o sa y "please. " Th e differenc e betwee n one - an d two-parent familie s i s no t necessaril y i n parenta l motivation , love , o r belief i n education, bu t i n the shee r capacit y t o atten d t o child-rearing i n the limited tim e available . But all families ar e under increasin g stress . Most America n mother s now work; parent s hav e less time for thei r kid s an d fo r eac h other . Eac h

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year, mor e tha n a millio n childre n se e their parent s divorce . Television watching ha s increased, drawin g children awa y fro m homewor k an d th e educational achievemen t tha t goe s wit h it . Barbar a Dafo e Whitehea d wrote o f the consequences : If we fai l t o com e t o term s wit h th e relationshi p betwee n fam ily structur e an d declinin g chil d well-being , the n i t wil l b e increasingly difficul t t o improv e children' s lif e prospects , n o matter ho w many new programs th e federal governmen t funds . Nor wil l w e b e abl e t o mak e progres s i n betterin g schoo l per formance o r reducin g crim e o r improvin g th e qualit y o f th e nation's futur e wor k force—al l domesti c problems closel y con nected t o famil y breakup. 10 Senator Danie l Patric k Moyniha n i s even more emphatic : The institution o f the family i s decisive in determining not onl y if a person ha s th e capacit y t o lov e anothe r individua l b u t . . . whether h e is capable o f loving his fellow me n collectively. Th e whole o f societ y rest s o n thi s foundatio n fo r stability , under standing an d socia l peace. 11 The wa y childre n ar e raise d i n lower-clas s familie s i s very differen t from th e desired norm—in fact , difference s i n child nurture help define th e lower class . Mos t underclas s kid s ar e conceive d b y unmarrie d parent s and bor n int o broke n families . Al l the risk factor s fo r a child ar e height ened b y lower-class life : during pregnancy, lower-clas s mothers ar e mor e likely t o drink , smoke , an d tak e drugs , resultin g i n muc h highe r proba bilities of low-birth weights , which, in turn, leads to higher rates of retar dation an d chroni c illnesses . The fathe r i s usuall y absent , an d take s n o financial responsibilit y fo r hi s child . A s childre n gro w up , th e streets , with thei r magneti c an d dangerou s allure , too ofte n wi n the competitio n for thei r time and energy . Eventually, the tone and qualit y of life in lowerclass neighborhood s i s determined b y young males—immature , undisci plined, an d dangerous . Public program s canno t easil y correc t fo r thes e disadvantages , ye t there i s n o credibl e evidenc e tha t abandonin g suc h familie s t o market place forces an d t o homilies abou t persona l responsibilit y wil l work. W e cannot abando n th e searc h fo r solution s no r reliev e th e federa l govern ment o f a central role .

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SOURCES O F HOPE AND THREE SIMPL E RULES There ar e a few reasons to b e hopeful—very few . A respectful, ope n dialogue abou t rac e and povert y ha s started amon g blac k an d whit e pro gressives. Bu t th e legac y o f disrespec t an d whit e patronizatio n i s grea t and progressive s mus t reestablis h thei r credibilit y befor e th e Left-libera l ideological warfare i s settled. However, eve n the limited progres s to dat e presages an end to easy Republican exploitatio n o f the cultural "wedge " on the Lef t an d suggest s a n opportunit y t o buil d a broader consensu s o n welfare an d famil y issues . Progressives nee d t o b e reminde d o f thre e simpl e criteri a i n devel oping ne w approache s t o urba n poverty . First , th e approache s mus t b e consistent wit h basi c America n values , suc h a s work, family , individua l responsibility, and community. Second , without a growing economy ther e will b e neithe r enoug h job s no r th e politica l suppor t t o figh t poverty . Third, policie s an d standard s mus t b e universal ; tha t is , they canno t b e seen a s providing specia l deal s fo r minorities . The earned income tax credit and Pell Grants for highe r education ar e examples o f race-neutra l program s tha t attrac t broa d suppor t (no w eve n these popular program s ar e unde r attac k b y the Republica n congression al majority) . Th e argumen t tha t societ y mus t hel p black s i n particula r because o f past injustic e simpl y doe s not carry—no t i n a nation o f immi grants whose ancestor s wer e mor e likel y to hav e bee n serf s i n Galwa y o r Galacia than slav e owners in Georgia. However, most of us believe that th e striving poo r nee d a helpin g hand . Society' s expectation s abou t famil y and personal responsibilities, the role of work, and the place of civil behavior canno t b e compromise d fo r poo r minorities , no r shoul d w e assum e that thei r potentia l fo r learnin g o r thei r capacit y fo r wor k i s less. Ignoring thes e simpl e truth s i s t o invit e failure , politica l folly , o r both. Beyond these criteria, there ar e three rules that must b e followed i n order t o revers e th e trend s i n urba n poverty . RULE ONE : RESTORE TH E STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL AMERICANS The phras e "structur e o f opportunity " ha s a sloganeer' s taint . I mean i t to refe r t o thos e investment s b y societ y tha t hel p creat e a sens e o f com munity an d reduc e th e odd s agains t th e unprivileged . Th e structur e o f opportunity include s th e publi c squar e where , theoretically , w e mingl e regardless o f color , class , o r income , i n place s suc h a s parks , libraries ,

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museums an d concer t halls . But it i s more tha n these . Most importantl y for th e cit y poor , th e structur e o f opportunit y include s publi c schools , public institution s o f highe r education , publi c transit , an d jo b trainin g programs. Conservatives ignor e th e essentia l plac e o f thes e public investment s in helping generations o f the poor realiz e the American Dream . Oh , the y love th e succes s storie s o f heroe s lik e Coli n Powell , wh o gre w u p i n a n immigrant Bron x family , attende d th e New Yor k Cit y schools , and too k the subwa y t o th e Cit y Colleg e o f Ne w Yor k (CCNY) . Bu t i n today' s conservative vision, any future Coli n Powells will just have to do withou t the school, subway, an d CCN Y part . Conservative s wan t t o en d th e fed eral governments assistanc e for publi c transit, an d seriousl y reduc e it fo r schools and highe r education . They als o want t o privatize government b y selling off som e of these public assets and subjectin g the remaining service s to the whim o f the market. "Use r fees" ar e called for, a s if public service s were typifie d b y the Coas t Guar d rescu e o f millionair e yachtsmen . I represent on e of the wealthiest an d most Republican countie s in the nation, wher e taxpayer s pa y fo r loca l parks , publi c gol f course s an d equestrian centers , an d ope n space . Th e qualit y o f ou r publi c school s ranges from goo d to among the best private schools; the county's two-yea r college enjoy s a stron g academi c reputation . Morri s Count y exemplifie s the Republican vision : local taxpayers pa y fo r a high standar d o f ameni ties an d security , bu t whe n i t come s t o nationa l an d stat e politics , the y make plain their interest in keeping their tax dollar s at home. It's what th e Edsalls describ e "loca l liberalism. " Progressives support th e structure o f opportunity, just not very effec tively: the y nee d t o distinguis h betwee n program s tha t wor k an d thos e that d o not . Fo r years , liberal s ignore d th e abuse s o f proprietar y trad e schools, the sloppines s o f compensatory educatio n projects , an d th e fail ures of public housing. The case needs to be made that al l of us rely on th e programs tha t Reaga n an d Bus h an d th e 199 4 "Contrac t wit h America " sought to scuttle: public higher education, public schools and libraries, job training, an d publi c transit . RULE TWO : THINK LONG-TER M The radio ad s promise tha t "yo u ca n b e speaking a foreign languag e lik e a native in just thirty days" by listening to some tapes while driving to an d from work . Conservative s an d liberal s are about a s credible in their idea s about th e lowe r class . Th e 199 4 "Contrac t wit h America, " wit h it s

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shameless gimmic k o f enactin g o f sweepin g constitutiona l change s i n "100 days, " raise d short-term , simplisti c sillines s to a new ar t form . Conservatives d o no t worr y muc h abou t th e lowe r class , regardin g it largely as a useful symbo l o f Democratic failure . The conservative con stituency i s increasingl y spatiall y isolate d an d largel y unaffecte d b y th e underclass. Jack Kemp , one o f the fe w conservativ e wh o demonstrate s a concern fo r cit y problems, recommends subsidizin g businesses that locat e in poo r neighborhood s an d publi c housin g tenant s wh o bu y thei r ow n apartments. His schemes, however, disguise their true costs and, in effect , subsidize ghettoization ; the y als o beguil e u s wit h th e ide a o f a simpl e solution t o th e complex proble m o f urba n poverty . When Moyniha n warne d i n hi s 196 5 repor t tha t man y blac k Americans were not well prepared fo r th e competitions opene d u p b y the passage o f civi l right s laws , liberal s ignore d th e evidence , choosin g t o believe instea d i n th e efficac y o f quick-fi x scenarios . They pursue d pro posals for massiv e income transfers t o the poor, "empowerment " throug h tax-supported communit y organizing , comprehensiv e socia l services , o r the reform o f public institutions lik e schools, welfare, an d polic e depart ments. Each approach reduce d th e goal o f transforming lower-clas s fam ilies int o middle-clas s familie s t o on e o f eithe r improvin g th e physica l environment o f poo r neighborhood s o r o f gettin g bureaucrats , teachers , and socia l worker s t o chang e thei r behavior . Liberals , too , accep t eas y answers t o har d questions . Unfortunately, th e natio n quickl y los t it s patienc e wit h th e poor , and a generatio n ha s com e an d gon e sinc e th e nationa l consensu s las t favored, howeve r briefly , a full-scale effor t t o en d poverty . RULE THREE : RESPEC T SMAL L VICTORIES Discussion abou t urban poverty has been driven by ideology: conservativ e thinkers hav e laid the blam e o n the poor whil e the liberals have taken t o blaming societ y itself . Bot h overloo k th e practica l lesson s o f thos e pro grams tha t hav e prove d effectiv e and , especially , th e rol e o f stron g lead ership an d long-ter m dedication . The firs t tim e I attended a staff meetin g o f the Nort h War d Center , a communit y servic e organizatio n i n Newark, I was embarrasse d b y th e sternness, flamboyance, an d lengt h o f Steve Adubato's lectur e over a gum wrapper h e had picke d u p o n th e fron t steps . True, the cente r wa s quar tered i n a particularl y dramati c setting , a baronia l Victoria n mansio n that ha d bee n painstakingly restore d t o museum quality . But why shoul d

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its staff b e berated fo r fiftee n minute s ove r a gum wrapper? Because , as I learned, i f th e staf f firs t allowe d th e presenc e o f a gu m wrapper , the n soon i t would tolerat e a fe w minutes ' tardiness , th e los s o f a file , o r th e failure t o follo w throug h o n a case. The premise s o f an y effectiv e schoo l o r progra m wil l b e clea n an d welcoming; the program staf f wil l show respect fo r th e people they wor k with; the y wil l offe r a warm, orderly , supportive , an d purposefu l atmo sphere. Smal l mistake s ar e no t ignored . Suc h example s ar e necessar y t o provide participant s wit h th e guidance , assistance , an d incentive s t o ac t differently fro m th e example s provide d b y a lower-class culture . Successful program s ar e usually those that serve limited objective s i n a narrowl y define d community . Fo r example , th e Nort h War d Cente r does not ru n program s fo r delinquent s eve n though i t has the fund s an d facilities t o d o s o an d crim e i s a majo r proble m i n it s neighborhood . Why? Becaus e it doesn't kno w how to transform poor , adolescen t males . The cente r offer s da y car e services , jo b training , nutritio n an d trans portation service s fo r elderl y residents , an d sport s fo r boy s an d girls . I t buys an d rehabilitate s housing . Anothe r successfu l program , th e Sout h Shore Bank i n Chicago , concentrates it s lending and relate d activitie s o n three neighborhoods, even though many other Chicag o areas could us e its expertise an d commitment . Limited scop e means limited victories ; unfortunately, man y consid er limited victor y to b e un-American. We seek resolution withi n a thirty second commercial o r a two-minute new s report. Popular movies portra y a worl d that , withou t th e heroi c effort s o f on e smar t whit e guy , i s moments awa y from tota l destruction . For messy and comple x problems , we trust th e quick, technological answer . Slogan s have replaced thought fulness; w e "figh t wars " agains t drug s o r crime an d expec t to win . Small victories are dismissed a s idiosyncratic, trivial, or "creaming. " For a generation, we have ignored the truth o f how hard i t is to interven e successfully i n th e live s o f person s wh o d o no t gro w u p i n familie s wit h middle-class values and aspirations . Well-run program s provide services , but als o offer a structured introductio n t o the norms o f the classroom o r workplace. Som e program participant s gai n muc h fro m thes e program s because the y us e the m a s a windo w t o understan d "ho w th e worl d works"; for example , they learn how personal relation s an d performanc e can increas e thei r options . Others—man y o f who m ma y b e personabl e and enthusiastic—fail , no t becaus e they are lazy or immoral, but becaus e old habit s ar e to o strong ; th e ga p i s simpl y to o larg e t o b e fille d wit h training o r educationa l programs .

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ILLUSTRATING TH E RULE S Examples o f programs tha t hono r thes e rules can b e found i n man y cities. Some of these model programs provide job training, others housing , some prepar e poo r kid s fo r college , an d other s ar e broad-range d community developmen t corporations . Mos t ar e run b y nonprofit orga nizations, not government agencies . Voluntary organization s avoi d cum bersome procedures, inefficient wor k rules , and clos e political oversight . Moreover, effectiv e program s usuall y benefi t fro m th e efforts o f a stron g leader wh o i s dedicate d t o workin g i n a toug h neighborhood . The y ac t with flexibility, compassion , an d carefu l attentio n t o the particular need s of eac h client . The publi c educatio n syste m i n Newark , Ne w Jersey , serve s a s a good exampl e o f th e empt y searc h fo r gran d strategie s an d th e facil e acceptance o f quick-fix solutions . In 1967, 1 worked fo r Car l Marburger , New Jersey' s newl y appointe d "reform " educatio n commissioner . Th e year before , Governo r Richar d J . Hughe s ha d beste d th e educationa l establishment, splittin g of f highe r educatio n fro m th e contro l o f th e "lower" educationists . I started work th e week after th e Newark riots . My boss was determine d t o mak e a difference i n the live s of poo r cit y kids . In the lat e 1960s , there wer e tw o principl e approache s t o brin g th e minority poo r u p t o standard : integratio n an d supplementation . Policy enthusiasts , includin g som e educators , wer e analyzin g th e conclusions an d implication s o f th e Colema n report , th e mos t compre hensive surve y o f studen t achievemen t eve r conducted. 12 Advocate s o f federal financin g fo r publi c educatio n ha d pushe d fo r th e report , antici pating a conclusio n tha t poorl y performin g student s cam e mostl y fro m schools to o poo r t o provid e th e amenitie s an d suppor t typica l o f subur ban schools . Instead, the Colema n repor t conclude d tha t low-performin g students tende d t o com e fro m poor , undereducate d familie s an d usuall y attended schoo l wit h kid s fro m simila r backgrounds ; schoo l spendin g and facilitie s ha d n o measurabl e impac t o n achievement . Th e repor t fe d the conclusio n tha t i t mad e mos t sens e t o sen d kid s fro m lower-clas s families t o schools with a clear majority o f middle-class peers. Since most black kid s wer e the n bot h poo r an d concentrate d i n school s wit h othe r poor blac k kids , the clea r implicatio n o f th e repor t wa s tha t racia l inte gration shoul d b e pursue d fo r educationa l a s wel l a s constitutiona l an d social reasons . The competing answe r i n 196 7 was to provide poor kid s with com pensatory education . I n 1965 , Congres s enacte d th e Elementar y an d

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Secondary Educatio n Act ; Titl e I funnele d significan t ne w fundin g t o school district s base d o n th e numbe r o f poo r kid s enrolled . Th e ratio nale was intuitivel y appealing : schools would mak e u p for wha t wa s no t provided b y th e family . Th e proble m wa s tha t compensator y educatio n meant radicall y differen t thing s to differen t people . Conventiona l think ing focuse d o n improvin g th e readin g an d mat h performanc e o f poo r kids b y providing after-hour s schooling , smalle r classes , enriching activ ities suc h a s field trips , and tutoria l help . Others proposed , i n the word s of Dian e Ravitch , tha t "poo r childre n woul d d o bette r i n schoo l i f th e school would respect their culture and values, rather than trying to impos e middle-class culture an d value s on them." 13 Many Title I programs hire d "paraprofessionals" fro m poo r neighborhood s an d establishe d advisor y committees to give the poor a voice in their children's educations. The tw o approaches t o improvin g educatio n fo r th e poor—integratio n an d com pensation—were pursue d simultaneously . By 1967 , th e driv e fo r integrate d school s ha d heade d north . Car l Marburger ha d gaine d hi s reputation b y integrating th e Detroit school s as assistant superintenden t i n the early 1960 s and then runnin g the reser vation school s fo r th e Burea u o f India n Affairs . I n Ne w Jersey , i n th e wake o f the 196 7 Newark an d Plainfiel d riots , the questio n wa s focuse d on ho w th e stat e wa s goin g t o educat e larg e number s o f poo r minorit y kids i n th e olde r cities . Tas k force s wer e established , building s wer e inspected, plea s fo r mor e mone y wer e heard—ther e wa s eve n a recom mendation tha t th e stat e takeove r th e Newar k schools . Marburge r explored th e takeove r idea , bu t receive d littl e encouragemen t fro m th e governor o r Democrati c legislators . School integration was already proceeding in many smaller New Jersey communities. Princeto n ha d com e u p wit h a pla n tha t paire d predomi nantly black and white elementary schools so that children from eac h neighborhood woul d spen d first through third grades at one and fourth throug h sixth at the other. The New Jersey Supreme Court authorize d the commissioner o f educatio n t o preven t on e distric t fro m withdrawin g it s student s from anothe r if the result was an increase in segregation. But this would no t work i n the cities—Marburge r ha d observe d wha t simpl e arithmeti c con firmed: there were simply not enough white students left in the city to brin g about meaningfu l integratio n a s lon g a s municipa l boundarie s wer e observed. Hi s remark s se t of f a politica l firestor m tha t helpe d th e Republicans win control of both legislative chambers in the 196 7 elections. Fast-forward t o Januar y 1994 : I a m no w a membe r o f th e Stat e Senate education committee , interviewing the newly designated educatio n

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commissioner. Th e mai n questio n is : Shoul d th e stat e tak e ove r th e Newark schools ? An d i f so , wha t d o th e educationa l bureaucrat s i n Trenton kno w that could b e reasonably expecte d to improve the prospect s for larg e numbers o f poor minority students ? The answer di d not mentio n or suggest that the prospects o f any student in Newark coul d b e improved by a public policy that aime d fo r integratio n b y race o r class . Moreover , it was clear that nothin g much ha d bee n learned i n the intervening twen ty-eight year s t o offe r confidenc e tha t stat e operatio n woul d produc e higher studen t achievement . I n July 1995 , the stat e took contro l o f Ne w Jersey's largest distric t without offerin g an y plan for improve d educatio n (it alread y ha d ru n th e Jersey Cit y school s fo r si x year s an d tes t result s showed n o improvement) . More than a quarter-century ha d passe d betwee n these two glimpse s at educatio n i n Ne w Jersey' s larges t city , an d i n tha t time , "educatio n reform" ha d becom e an industry that employe d scholars , policy entrepre neurs, corporate leaders , politicians, teacher unionists , foundations, an d citizen groups. Since the mid-1960s, the industry ha s spawned on e mode l and fa d afte r another . Technologist s hav e pushe d talkin g typewriters , computer-assisted instruction , an d interactiv e television ; communit y activists have gone from integration , parental empowerment , an d decen tralized schoo l board s t o Afrocentri c mal e academie s an d "multicultur alism." Ther e hav e bee n pushe s fo r communit y schools , school-base d management, Mor e Effectiv e Schools , magne t schools , charte r schools , and partnership schools . Conservatives who oppose d voucher s when the y were proposed t o ease metropolitan segregation , now embrace them as the only answe r fo r th e poo r an d ric h alike . I n th e meantime , schoolin g fo r most poo r kid s ha s bee n reduce d t o stigmatizing , remedia l instructio n and lim p "self-esteem " projects . Plainly , somethin g i s wrong. This discussion abou t ho w to educate lower-class children will not b e a lon g one . My prescriptio n i s simple an d unachievabl e o n a large scale : find tough , energetic, demanding principals who believ e that every kid ca n achieve. Good school s must b e clean, inviting, respectful o f students an d parents, and demandin g o f teachers an d students ; they must put forwar d high expectations fo r academi c achievement , an d mus t b e led by one wh o never lose s sight of the vision while attending to the details. The shame is that this has been known fo r years, but politicians, policy proponents, an d educators hav e continue d thei r ques t fo r gran d solutions . The publi c polic y implication s ar e equall y simple : d o whateve r i s possible to increase the probability tha t suc h principals can b e convince d to work i n tough school s for th e long run. The first bil l I introduced i n the

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New Jerse y Senat e woul d replac e lif e tenur e fo r principal s an d othe r administrators wit h three- to five-year contracts . It has set off nast y fight s with powerfu l interes t groups , which vie w these contract s a s a first ste p to strippin g teacher s o f tenur e o r a s a way t o politiciz e th e appointmen t of principals . Th e beneficiarie s o f suc h a victor y ar e currentl y unorga nized, unrepresented , an d frequentl y unappreciative , bu t thei r need s should outweig h thos e o f th e protectors o f th e statu s quo . Two storie s from Ne w Yor k illustrat e the problem an d th e promis e found i n the public education system . In November 1988 , the principal of a Bron x elementar y schoo l wa s arreste d fo r buyin g crack . I t turn s ou t that h e had, for man y o f his sixteen years as principal, appeared a t schoo l intoxicated an d shabbil y dressed . He ha d bee n suspende d thre e times; in the yea r befor e hi s arrest , h e ha d bee n lat e o r absen t 14 2 ou t o f 18 4 school days. No charge s had eve r been filed agains t him for thre e reasons: his goo d frien d wa s th e chairma n o f th e loca l board ; hi s white subordi nates (h e is black) feared tha t any charges they brought agains t him woul d bring accusation s o f racism ; and th e local school boar d though t th e pro cess for oustin g a tenured principa l was too cumbersom e (onl y one prin cipal in a system with a thousand school s was dismissed i n the 1980s ; the average disciplinar y proceedin g too k 63 1 days!). 14 A few month s earlier , th e New York Times profile d P.S . 87, an elementary schoo l (on e of the 616 in New York ) whose students performe d well abov e expectations . Wh y di d P.S . 8 7 hav e a waiting lis t fo r admis sion? Becaus e i t wa s ru n b y a tough-minded , visionar y principa l wh o involved parent s extensively , respecte d he r students , recruite d teacher s who wante d t o teac h i n a racially mixe d schoo l withou t separat e track s for lo w an d hig h achievin g students , an d emphasize d readin g an d mor e reading.15 One must ask: Has the profile o f an effective schoo l ever included a bureaucratic , jargon-spewing, time-servin g principal ?

MOVING AHEA D We ca n no w glimps e th e changin g politica l condition s tha t offe r whatever smal l optimism can b e mustered abou t the prospects for dealin g with cit y poverty . When Democrat s distanc e themselve s fro m idea s tha t offend th e politica l an d cultura l sensibilitie s o f mos t Americans , oppor tunities t o fin d bipartisa n accor d o n ne w initiative s arise . Consider , fo r example, the relative ease with which President Clinto n secured agreemen t on a significan t increas e i n th e coverag e an d fundin g fo r th e earne d

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income tax credit a s part o f his 199 3 budget proposal. He proposed tha t it b e expande d s o tha t full-tim e worker s withou t childre n b e include d for th e first tim e and tha t th e ceiling on tax credit s for worker s wit h tw o or mor e kid s woul d g o t o $27,000 . Th e cos t o f Clinton' s proposa l wa s about $2 7 billio n a year , a hug e increas e t o th e federa l spendin g whe n budget deficit s ar e the principal preoccupatio n o f Washington . The earne d incom e ta x credi t i s favore d b y bot h partie s becaus e i t rewards peopl e wh o wor k full-time . However , a s th e Republica n con gressional majorit y seek s to mak e goo d o n it s balanced-budget promise , the credi t ha s bee n targete d fo r reduction s an d fo r a n increas e i n th e enforcement o f it s eligibility criteria . The stron g bipartisa n accor d neede d t o restructur e th e welfar e sys tem lasted onl y a short time. The losers in its demise are the poor an d th e states who administe r th e system. Republicans hav e backed of f fro m thei r early suppor t fo r transitiona l child - an d health-car e fo r recipient s takin g training o r low-wag e jobs . Instead , Republican s no w se e welfar e a s a way t o reduc e federa l spendin g b y cappin g i t a t th e 199 4 leve l i n th e form o f a block grant to states. This would remove the federal partnershi p and dollar s from an y increases in the welfare rolls , leaving to the states t o pick u p th e slac k (o r not) . What canno t b e envisione d i s a federall y finance d an d coordinate d second wa r o n poverty . Leadershi p o n povert y issue s wil l hav e t o com e from th e state s a s the y grappl e wit h welfare , education , housing , an d health issues. This is as it should b e in an area where the policy choices are so clouded an d th e resources s o pinched. Progressiv e Democrat s i n Ne w Jersey, b y way o f a brie f example , too k th e lead i n revising welfare law s to eliminate payments for additiona l childre n bor n while the mother i s on welfare, an d t o reduc e th e incentiv e fo r mother s unde r eightee n fro m moving int o subsidize d housing . The deterioration o f conditions i n poor cit y neighborhoods ove r th e last generation shoul d warn u s off gran d designs . The problem i s not tha t nothing works ; the problem i s that wha t work s require s a degree o f dili gence an d patienc e tha t i s uncommon i n th e contemporar y merchandis ing o f publi c issues . Liberal s hav e bee n slo w t o acknowledg e failure ; conservatives exploi t the failures fo r politica l advantage . Neither postur e moves th e debat e t o a point wher e solution s ca n b e the focu s o f biparti san effort . W e don' t nee d anothe r roun d o f progra m proposal s wit h catchy acronyms , lofty objectives , an d doubtfu l leadership . What work s ar e program s wit h fidelit y t o basi c America n princi ples, programs tha t favo r wor k ove r idlenes s and persona l responsibilit y

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over escape, programs tha t demonstrat e respec t fo r th e dignity an d com petencies o f th e poor . Misfortune , disadvantage , an d povert y shoul d determine the universe for suc h programs, not race or ethnicity. Standard s for everyone—staff , parents , and kids—must b e high. Programs that wor k emphasize cleanliness , order , civility , an d goo d citizenship . The y tak e a long-term vie w o f th e investment s require d befor e payoff s ar e delivered . They accep t smal l victorie s a s sufficien t recompense . An d mos t often , they are programs that, while largely financed wit h tax dollars, are run b y nonprofit organizations , no t civi l servants .

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o countr y withou t a revolutio n o r a militar y defea t an d subsequent occupatio n ha s ever experienced suc h a shar p shift i n th e distributio n o f earning s a s America ha s i n th e las t generation. A t n o othe r tim e hav e media n wage s o f America n men falle n fo r mor e tha n tw o decades . Neve r befor e hav e a majority o f America n worker s suffere d rea l wag e reduction s while per capit a domesti c produc t wa s advancing . —Lester C . Thurow, 1 MI T economis t

THE ENDANGERE D MIDDL E CLAS S AND THE OPPORTUNIT Y FO R PROGRESSIVE S The American Drea m i s threatened fo r mos t Americans. Since 1973, nearly one-hal f o f America n familie s hav e see n thei r standar d o f livin g decline! The fortunes o f abou t 6 0 percent o f the remainder hav e stagnat ed. Only the top 20 percent o f households hav e seen any improvement i n income an d wealth . Thes e soberin g fact s animat e th e ide a o f buildin g a new progressive coalition . 185

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The extremist s wh o hav e take n ove r th e Republica n part y ignor e the stagnatio n o r deterioratio n i n livin g standard s fo r 8 0 percen t o f American families . Any economic problems ar e blamed o n government o r on th e failur e t o abid e b y th e famil y value s prescribe d b y th e divorce d white me n wh o lea d th e Republicans . T o th e exten t tha t a visio n fo r broadened prosperit y i s detectabl e fro m extremists , i t i s this : trus t th e investor class to invest the funds Republican s make available to it throug h new ta x deal s i n way s tha t wil l eventuall y benefi t thos e wh o wor k fo r salaries an d wages . Progressives d o not have much o f an answer , either. They have bee n too bus y fightin g a rear-guard actio n i n the cultura l wars , trying to con vince voters that the y really d o favo r punishin g rioter s an d violen t crim inals, that they are true patriots who believ e in a strong national defense , that they endorse the American passio n fo r wor k (eve n for welfar e recip ients under certai n circumstances) , and tha t the y are not al l that enthusi astic abou t bigge r governmen t an d highe r taxes . Much o f thi s boo k ha s argue d tha t progressive s go t sidetracke d from th e mai n busines s o f politic s an d governmen t becaus e the y wer e afraid t o argu e sensibl y o n a tangl e o f issue s freighte d b y race . Befor e they ca n rebuil d a politica l majority , progressive s mus t bot h shor e u p their coalitio n an d com e u p wit h a n answe r t o restorin g th e America n dream.

STRESSES I N THE PROGRESSIV E COALITIO N Progressives can take no one for granted, least of all black Americans. Going along with racial preferences an d appearin g weak-willed o n welfare reform an d crime has produced littl e enthusiasm amon g black progressive s and ha s opened the door t o the permanent fligh t o f Reagan Democrat s t o the GOP. When th e shared interest s of white and blac k Americans an d of working—and middle-clas s American s ar e emphasized, progressive s ca n win. Black an d white Americans hol d unremarkabl y simila r view s abou t work, persona l responsibility , patriotism , crim e control , an d th e impor tance o f education. Bot h worry abou t goo d jobs , health care , safe neigh borhoods, an d th e futur e o f thei r children . Blac k American s ten d t o b e more conservative o n socia l issues than blac k leaders. 2 For example, they are slightly more likely than white s to favor praye r i n public schools an d restrictions o n abortions. 3 Moreover , mos t black s perceiv e muc h les s

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animosity and much more amiability from white s than i s suggested b y the dire and divisiv e language o f professional blacks. 4 If whit e progressive s d o no t lea d th e publi c discussio n abou t racia l bias, th e share d interest s o f blac k an d whit e Americans , an d th e exag gerated claim s o f professiona l blacks , the n interracia l difference s wil l grow an d wit h the m th e hope s o f a new coalition . Bu t public discussio n is terribl y difficult , a s I discovere d whe n I helpe d arrang e a serie s o f forums o n racia l an d ethni c issue s fo r th e Ne w Jerse y Democrati c Stat e Committee. Ther e i s no simpl e o r quic k wa y t o brea k dow n pattern s o f speech an d expectatio n tha t hav e bee n buil t u p ove r thirt y years . Nor i s it realistic to expect black political leaders to agree to coalition approach es on issue s suc h a s racial districtin g o r set-aside s withou t a demonstra tion o f goo d fait h b y whit e politicians , an d o f alternative , race-neutra l programs tha t giv e promise t o blac k Americans . There ar e important voice s for biracia l politics who shoul d b e heeded. Joh n Lewis , a U.S . House membe r fro m Atlant a an d a her o o f th e civil rights struggle , has never given up o n th e idea o f a n integrated soci ety. Hugh B . Price, the presiden t o f th e nationa l Urba n League , noted i n his 199 4 inaugura l address : For all our suffering , w e cannot becom e so fixated o n ou r prob lems that we ignore our commonality o f interest with others. All of the problems I've addressed . . . inadequat e schooling, idle and alienated youngsters , an d chroni c unemployment—cu t acros s racial lines . If we're eve r t o dea l with the m o n a scal e remotel y equal t o thei r size , we mus t coalesc e with peopl e o f othe r com plexions who fee l the same pain, even if it isn't yet as acute. 5 Obviously, bot h blac k an d whit e American s woul d benefi t fro m policies tha t lea d t o sustaine d economi c growt h (th e migratio n o f poo r black families int o the middle class stagnated i n the late 1970s) . Black an d white progressives shar e the belief tha t government plays a crucial role in stimulating an d sustainin g economi c growth, b y prescribing the rules fo r fair an d ope n markets , financin g infrastructur e investments , an d guar anteeing educationa l opportunity . If , however , progressive s emphasiz e bailing out society' s most troubled members , they squander th e chance t o incorporate increasingl y anxiou s working - an d middle-clas s whit e Americans int o the coalition. Democrats d o not nee d to prove agai n tha t they care about poo r people , nor mus t the y apologiz e fo r goin g after th e votes o f whit e suburbanites .

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solely to racial reapportionment—Republicans hav e bee n gaining steadi ly in the South , and 199 4 was a particularly ba d yea r to b e a Democrati c incumbent. Republicans feas t o n isolatin g black s an d Democrat s o n issue s o f race. It i s not surprisin g that , i n th e roun d o f redistrictin g tha t followe d the 199 0 Census , th e Republica n Nationa l Committe e provide d blac k and Latin o activist s wit h expensiv e softwar e t o hel p the m dra w u p thei r own maps maximizing the number o f safe minority seats . While it is clear that racia l apportionmen t benefit s th e blac k politician s wh o ar e guaran teed saf e seats , othe r beneficiarie s (othe r tha n whit e Republica n politi cians) ar e tougher t o identify. I n New Jersey's 8t h district, for example , a one-term Democrati c incumben t ra n furiously , ye t lost b y 2,000 vote s in 1994, while in the adjoinin g super-majorit y minorit y district , the incum bent hardly campaigned, ye t won b y a 72-28 percen t margin . Blac k pro gressives d o hav e a stak e i n helpin g t o elec t large r numbe r o f whit e progressives. Moreover, blac k American s ma y no t b e well served b y district lines that overwhelmingl y protect incumbent blac k legislators—every one benefits fro m competitio n o r its threat. Bu t worse, the effort t o buil d a biracial coalition may be thwarted b y black legislators who, to represen t their constituent s an d t o avoi d powerfu l primar y challenges , mus t figh t tooth-and-nail fo r racia l policie s suc h a s quota s an d set-aside s tha t can not b e sold i n majority whit e districts . This discussio n suggest s wher e th e black-whit e progressiv e debat e might begin . It will not b e an easy one for a very simple reason—most o f the compromising will necessarily involve black interests. Moreover, in the absence o f a clea r progressiv e visio n o f wha t th e countr y mus t d o t o restore rea l equa l opportunity , ther e i s no goo d reaso n fo r blac k electe d officials t o deal .

PROGRESSIVES MUS T VISUALIZE AMERICA N SOCIETY WITHOUT RAC E PREFERENCE S Progressives must b e clear about the implications of race preferences : they so strongly counter th e fundamental belief s o f American societ y tha t they should b e opposed, except in cases of persistent discrimination wher e temporary preference s ar e the onl y solution . Progressives should fashion alternative s to racial preferences base d o n the experience o f the U.S. Army. The Army builds on old-style affirmativ e action. It accepts no one who fails its recruitment test standards (whic h ar e

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only a bit lower than thos e of the Navy an d Air Force). After basi c train ing, screening tests identify enliste d personnel wh o d o not possess the literacy an d mathematica l competencie s t o compet e successfull y fo r promotions. Thes e soldier s ar e pu t throug h a comprehensiv e an d quit e expensive instructional sequenc e to brin g them u p to standard. The resul t is a n institutio n tha t i s le d b y a remarkabl y divers e noncommissione d officer corp s an d wher e blac k Americans , i n particular , fin d tru e equa l opportunity t o perfor m an d lead . Th e Arm y require s office r promotio n boards to include minority candidates o r justify thei r exclusion in writing. No quota s are employed. The consistent attentio n t o inclusion, a vigorous ethic agains t racia l discriminatio n (th e caree r o f an y office r cite d fo r racially offensiv e languag e o r behavio r i s finished), an d hig h priorit y i n performance review s t o effectiv e leadershi p o n diversit y an d inclusio n issues has produced th e nation's mos t thoroughly integrate d institution — and on e o f it s most effective . The militar y service s ar e on e o f a fe w place s i n America n societ y where white Americans ar e almost certain t o encounter blac k American s as superiors . Th e Arm y experienc e confirm s th e crucia l rol e o f leader ship in suffusing organization s wit h a commitment t o equa l opportunit y and a n intolerance o f racial discrimination. It also illuminates the value of remedial assistanc e fo r underperformers . Th e Arm y balance s rac e con sciousness wit h a n absenc e o f quotas . Americans—blac k an d white — support thi s old-styl e affirmativ e actio n b y a wide margin. 6 Consider ho w the Army approac h migh t work t o replace set-asides , now endangere d b y Suprem e Cour t decisions . Under existin g law , fixe d percentages o f government contract s ar e reserved fo r wome n an d minor ity vendors o n th e grounds tha t the y were subjecte d t o prior discrimina tion. I have developed legislatio n that assume s a public interest in helping small businesse s tha t ar e starte d withou t sufficien t famil y o r persona l contacts an d assets . Preferences woul d b e based o n economics, not race or gender. I f you ar e undercapitalize d an d hav e a relatively lo w ne t worth , and you r busines s i s small, you woul d b e eligible for preferre d contract s for a period o f five years, whatever you r colo r or gender. After fiv e years, you ar e eithe r read y t o compete o r not . The sam e standard s ca n b e applie d t o employmen t an d promotio n decisions. Employer s shoul d b e require d t o demonstrat e tha t the y ha d included wome n an d minorit y candidate s i n their search , an d tha t ther e are acceptabl e explanation s fo r disproportionatel y lo w representation . As the chairman o f the board o f a $300-plus million manufacturing com pany, I ca n certif y tha t whit e me n nee d t o b e reminde d systematicall y

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and persistentl y abou t th e existenc e o f qualit y candidate s wh o ar e non white an d nonmale . Employer s shoul d hav e t o documen t thei r specia l efforts t o increase the hiring and promotio n opportunitie s fo r thos e wh o traditionally hav e been excluded. On e test is whether th e corporate com pensation progra m reward s senio r executive s fo r increasin g the diversit y of th e workforce . Progressives mus t ac t o n th e belie f o f mos t blac k American s tha t racial discrimination i s widespread. The y should pus h clear, prompt, an d vigorous enforcement o f antidiscrimination laws , particularly i n the are a of housing . A s discusse d i n Chapte r 7 , th e result s o f matched-pai r test s corroborate statistica l evidence that i n a significant percentag e o f encoun ters wit h th e rea l estat e industry , blac k an d Latin o hom e buyer s ar e no t given the sam e information o r encouragemen t tha t whit e buyer s receive. Racial discriminatio n distort s th e market a t great persona l an d financia l cost t o it s victims . Those responsibl e fo r i t shoul d b e treated a s thieves . Just as an Army office r end s his or her career b y abusing anyon e becaus e of their race , so should thos e responsible fo r housin g discriminatio n los e their realto r license s an d b e subjected t o fines , eve n jail time.

CLINTON'S FADIN G OPPORTUNIT Y AN D THE POLITICS O F REBUILDING A PROGRESSIVE COALITIO N Bill Clinton' s 199 2 victor y a s a "Ne w Democrat " provide d a roa d map fo r a potentia l progressiv e coalition . H e wo n b y emphasizin g th e growing economi c insecurit y o f middle - an d working-clas s Americans , the increasing costs of health care, and the generally fading hope s of thos e who "pla y b y the rules. " Hi s electio n coalitio n cobble d togethe r "new " and "old " Democrats , environmentalist s an d loggers , factory hand s an d professional women , an d blac k American s an d som e whit e southerners . Bolstered b y a solid stripe of farming an d industria l state s across the mid dle o f th e country , Clinto n receive d a convincin g majorit y o f Electora l College votes, but only 43 percent of the popular vote . The Clinto n coali tion die d a n infan t i n 1994 . I n th e wreckage , Democrat s coul d se e n o bright lining : Congres s ende d u p i n Republica n hand s fo r th e firs t tim e since 1952 , wit h stil l a doze n o f s o conservativ e Democrat s read y t o switch parties, and Republican s hel d thirty governorships, including eigh t of the ten largest states. When th e Republican nationa l chairma n asserte d that hi s goal was control o f al l fifty legislature s b y 2001, it did no t soun d terribly unrealistic . Worse, much worse , Democrats ha d nothin g t o say .

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The 199 4 electio n reflecte d Clinton' s utte r failur e t o us e hi s presi dency t o respon d t o middle-clas s despai r h e s o brilliantl y identifie d an d spoke to in his 199 2 campaign. Oh , he tried, bu t not with a focus o r per sistence proportionat e t o th e tas k o f reversin g a three-decad e drif t o f working- and middle-cas s voters to the GOP. Clinton honore d hi s pledge to "jum p start " th e economy b y proposing a $30 billion "stimulus " pack age. In the third month o f his presidency, a GOP filibuster kille d the plan . In truth, Clinton' s package was a grab bag—proposal s fo r capita l invest ments, basi c research, an d modernizatio n mixe d wit h short-ter m spend ing for foo d ai d an d summe r jobs . And a s writer an d investmen t banke r Charles Morri s pointe d out , th e magnitud e o f th e pla n wa s timid , with in the statistical margin o f error o f the accounts for a $6 trillion economy. 7 Clinton tried , too , with hi s Septembe r 199 3 proposal t o remak e th e American healt h care system. His plan did not recognize that there was n o strong consensus about what constituted th e "healt h care crisis." Was it the 40 million Americans without an y coverage, the lack of portability o f ben efits, th e fast-risin g price s fo r medica l care , or th e billion s squandere d i n insurance paperwork ? Th e Clinto n pla n woul d hav e treate d al l o f thes e problems at once by setting up a new public agency that would finance uni versal coverage in mysterious way s and b y providing healt h care throug h a confusin g tangl e o f "alliances " an d regiona l functionaries . H e lost , an d badly. The "Ne w Democrat" looke d like an enthusiast of big government and higher taxes—proposing i n Phil Gramm's words, a health system with "the efficienc y o f the post offic e an d th e compassion o f the IRS." Clinton deferred an y noticeable or painful spendin g cuts and droppe d his campaign messag e of shared sacrific e fo r a better future . "Sacrifice " i s the dirt y word o f politics , for eithe r party . Ordinarily, a growin g econom y wit h lot s o f job s an d n o threa t o f war i s a boo n t o a n incumben t presiden t an d hi s party . No t fo r Bil l Clinton. Even though th e economy ha d generate d seve n million ne w job s since his inauguration, wit h lo w inflation an d globa l stability , the natio n reflected n o sens e o f well-being . Building a ne w coalitio n o n thi s wobblin g foundatio n mus t begi n with th e traditiona l progressiv e base . Th e highes t concentratio n o f Democratic suppor t i s foun d amon g blac k Americans , whos e vot e fo r Democratic nominees has not droppe d belo w 8 0 percent sinc e 1964 . Jews and Latino s ar e the next most loyal supporters, followed b y single work ing women, gays, and unio n households . Throw i n middle-class activist s such a s environmentalists , an d th e Democrat s ca n coun t o n abou t 4 0 percent o f th e electorat e (McGover n polle d 3 8 percent) .

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The liberal-Left win g of the party ha s asserted fo r a quarter centur y that sharpenin g th e party' s messag e o f deliveranc e t o th e "desperate , the damned , th e disinherited , th e disrespected " woul d resul t i n a n out pouring o f additiona l poor , minority , an d youthfu l voter s sufficien t t o win presidentia l elections . Wrong . Th e bi g Democrati c losers—Georg e McGovern, Jimm y Carte r i n 1980 , Walte r Mondale , an d Michae l Dukakis—all di d ver y wel l amon g bas e Democrati c voters , bu t th e increased vote r turnou t promise d b y th e Lef t neve r materialized . Ru y Teixeira reconstructed th e 198 8 election using Jesse Jackson's most braze n promise o f vote r mobilization : "Assumin g th e highes t turnou t scenario s (for black s an d Hispanics , 1 0 point s highe r tha n whites ; fo r th e whit e poor, 1 0 points highe r tha n th e whit e rich) , the computation s stil l sho w only 4,677,000 ne t additiona l vote s for Dukakis." 8 In other words , wit h improbable an d unprecedente d level s o f votin g amon g poo r white s an d minorities, Dukaki s woul d stil l hav e los t b y mor e tha n tw o millio n votes—assuming n o off-settin g Republica n mobilization .

PROGRESSIVES SHOUL D NO T COUNT O N THE PEROTISTA S As soo n a s th e 199 2 return s wer e in , pundit s wer e suggestin g tha t Clinton's reelection i n 199 6 would b e assured i f he went afte r th e 1 9 million mostl y white , mostl y middle-clas s voter s wh o supporte d indepen dent candidat e Ros s Perot—th e "Perotistas. " Th e pundit s dre w o n th e parallels wit h th e 196 8 election—anothe r three-wa y race—i n whic h Nixon wo n with 43 percent o f the vote while George Wallace received 1 3 percent, launching the generation-long journe y o f the white working clas s and whit e southerner s int o th e Republica n party. 9 Whil e th e paralle l i s appealing o n it s face , th e contrastin g interest s o f Pero t supporter s wit h other potentia l coalitio n member s presag e substantia l difficulties . Stanley Greenberg , Clinton' s pollster , i n a postelectio n surve y o f Perot voters , discovere d wha t h e called "refugees " fro m th e Republica n party, voter s wh o wer e resentfu l o f Reaganomic s an d uneas y abou t th e hold o f th e religiou s righ t o n th e GO P (Pero t an d Clinto n voter s wer e about eve n in their suppor t o f abortion rights). 10 But more than anythin g else, Pero t voter s wer e foun d t o b e deepl y antigovernmen t an d anti establishment, whic h se t them apar t fro m bot h Clinto n an d Bus h voters. Greenberg notes: "These attitudes are less about ideology and more abou t the failur e o f publi c trus t tha t characterize s thei r vie w o f almos t al l bi g

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institutions fro m bi g business to Congres s to bi g labor." 11 H e found tha t Perot supporter s ar e strongl y convince d tha t th e "poo r ar e tryin g t o ge t something fo r nothing, " tha t "it' s th e middl e class , no t th e poor , wh o really ge t a raw deal, " an d tha t "w e hav e gon e to o fa r i n pushin g equa l rights fo r differen t groups . . ." 12 Perot' s stronges t suppor t cam e fro m white voter s unde r ag e thirt y an d whit e me n withou t a colleg e educa tion, precisel y th e group s affecte d mos t negativel y b y rac e preference s and b y decline s i n rea l income. 13 Pero t voter s wante d governmen t t o reform healt h car e to guarantee universa l acces s and reduc e cost s an d t o clean u p th e welfare system. 14 In short, th e typical Perot voter wa s just boycottin g the Republica n church unti l i t go t a ne w preacher ; mos t neve r bothere d wit h th e Democrats. Th e commo n groun d betwee n th e neopopulist , antigovern ment sentiment s o f Perot's voters an d Clinton' s governmental activis m is too narro w fo r buildin g an y coalition .

RESTORING BIPARTISANSHI P T O THE PROGRESSIV E CAUS E To govern , a progressive coalitio n mus t includ e progressiv e Repub licans. GOP moderates suc h as New Jersey's former governor , Tom Kean , can se e that their party is headed i n a direction that is as irrelevant an d a s offensive t o mos t American s a s that take n b y the McGover n Democrat s in the 1970s . Republicans provide d muc h o f the leadership an d many o f the vote s to pass the historic civil rights laws of the 1960s . Until 196 4 the party wa s dominated b y it s eastern , libera l establishment . I n shor t order , Repub licans became the antiblack, white separatis t party , driving out a numbe r of progressive s includin g Ne w Yor k mayo r Joh n V . Lindsay , Nixon' s civil rights chie f Leo n Panetta , an d Michiga n senato r Donal d Riegle . By the 1980s , the Republican patter n o f exploiting racial fears o n issues such as crime and welfar e wa s well established, furthe r offendin g increasingl y silent an d impoten t GO P moderates. The party o f Lincol n wa s dead . GOP moderate s migh t excus e thei r party' s abandonmen t o f blac k Americans a s goo d politics , bu t no t s o th e full-scal e cultura l warfar e that se t u p Bush' s 199 2 defeat . Unde r th e rubri c o f "famil y values, " Republican conventio n speaker s expresse d disdai n no t onl y fo r homo sexuals, bu t fo r workin g mothers , singl e parents , an d non-Christians . Republicans cam e acros s a s harsh , intolerant , an d self-righteous . The y

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should hav e learne d fro m th e McGover n Democrats : linge r i n th e com pany o f extremist s an d on e i s tarre d wit h thei r label , a s Georg e Bus h was, thanks t o Pa t Buchana n an d Pa t Robertson . The wheel ha s turned. A s Kevin Phillip s has noted : In domestic affairs, w e have seen how much o f the critical GO P momentum i n th e Nixo n an d Reaga n year s ha d com e fro m social issues : risin g crime , judicia l permissiveness , th e deat h penalty, riots and racial tension, welfare . . . campu s radicalism , busing, quotas , patriotism . . . . Not onl y di d thes e point s . . . lose importance nex t to 199 2 dislocation s i n the economy, bu t a new set of domestic an d cultura l issue s were emerging for th e 1990s: healt h care , education , urba n problems , th e environ ment, economi c fairness , abortio n an d wha t coul d b e calle d a "women's" arra y o f concerns , includin g da y care , parenta l leave, equal pay, the feminization o f poverty, the glass ceiling in employment . . . an d sexua l harassment . Issue s lik e thes e favored th e Democrats. 15 They shoul d als o favor progressiv e Republicans . The fading o f Republican progressive s is reflected i n the meager sup port give n t o moderat e measure s Presiden t Clinto n pu t forwar d i n th e 103d Congress . Only 40 o f 17 4 Republican representative s vote d fo r th e family leav e act; only 35 voted fo r federa l protectio n fo r abortio n clinics . On th e Senat e side , th e influenc e o f progressiv e Republican s i s har d t o detect. Progressive Republican s finall y stoo d u p i n 1995 , along wit h mos t House Democrats , to try to sto p (unsuccessfully ) congressiona l eviscera tion o f environmenta l regulation . Speake r Gingrich' s agend a include s dismantling th e Environmenta l Protectio n Agency' s capacit y t o overse e implementation o f the clean air and water statutes , adoption o f pro-industry standards, and a surrender o f federal managemen t o f millions of acre s of nationa l forest s an d ranges . A right-wing putsch i n the Republican part y would b e entirely favor able fo r Democrats . Th e politic s o f abortio n an d gu n contro l alread y favor progressives . I won a state senate seat in one of the most Republica n counties i n th e natio n b y emphasizin g m y pro-choice , pro-gu n contro l positions agains t a longtime antiabortion , pro-NR A incumbent . A strat egy that relies on the hope of Republican extremis m alone , however, pro vides progressives neithe r purpos e no r durability .

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EXTREMISTS HAV E HIJACKE D TH E REPUBLICA N PART Y Conservative, a t on e time , referre d t o a philosoph y o f fisca l pru dence, a long-term perspective, and a recognition tha t saving s and invest ment ar e th e engin e o f capitalism . Conservative s fro m Ada m Smit h t o Robert Taft understoo d a s well that government was an essential partne r with th e marke t econom y t o financ e thos e publi c investment s tha t th e private secto r ca n neve r undertake . Unde r thes e no w quain t terms , I a m a conservative . As fo r th e curren t leadershi p o f th e Republica n party , "conserva tive" i s a marketin g ter m wit h onl y a fragil e connectio n t o traditiona l conservative standards . Th e ter m no w camouflage s a n extremis t an d dangerous politic s tha t ca n b e state d thusly : thin k short-ter m (no t pas t the nex t election) ; promise ta x cut s and no-pai n spendin g cuts ; pay fo r this improbabl e combinatio n b y borrowin g fro m th e nex t generation ; serve the investor class , trusting tha t it s decisions to optimiz e its incom e and wealt h wil l eventuall y translat e int o improve d livin g standard s fo r the 9 5 percent o f societ y that works fo r a living; relieve industry b y minimizing oversigh t o f market s an d winkin g a t complianc e wit h environ mental regulations ; an d tal k frequentl y abou t campaig n refor m an d th e "broken system, " bu t d o nothing . Unhappily, on e stanc e the GO P lead ership share s wit h Democrats : ignor e th e erosio n i n middle-clas s livin g standards an d opportunities . The pattern ha s bee n the sam e sinc e 1980 : Republicans blam e gov ernment a t al l level s fo r slo w economi c growth . Republican s campaig n against governmen t spendin g an d hig h taxes . Onc e elected , the y fai l t o cut spending , bu t borro w heavil y t o financ e thei r ta x cut s an d spendin g increases. I t i s wort h tellin g th e stor y abou t Ne w Jerse y Governo r Christine Tod d Whitman' s ta x cu t becaus e i t show s ho w shortsighte d politics play s a t th e stat e leve l and translate s int o nationa l acclai m (an d it i s on e i n whic h I played a bi t par t a s a minorit y membe r o f th e stat e senate). Initially, Whitman campaigne d agains t ta x cuts : "Ther e i s no poin t giving an election year tax brea k when you have to come back . .. an d hi t them fo r tw o time s the cut " sh e declare d earl y i n the 199 3 gubernatori al campaign. 16 B y late September , sh e changed he r mind an d propose d a 30 percen t cu t i n incom e tax , despit e bein g roundl y criticize d fo r ignor ing a looming $ 1 billion-2 billio n budget gap and no t identifying ho w th e tax cut would b e financed. Whitma n wo n a close election over a n unpop ular incumben t governor .

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Before reliable budget information wa s available, Governor Whitma n announced i n he r inaugura l addres s a retroactive 5 percent cu t t o mak e good o n he r promis e an d t o "energize " Ne w Jersey' s laconi c economy . The proposal wa s nothing les s than anothe r supply-sid e miracl e wherei n a $30 0 millio n ta x cu t i n Ne w Jersey' s $23 0 billio n "economy " woul d propel a spree o f spendin g an d investmen t sufficien t t o se t of f a job-cre ating splurge. To pay for th e cut and to maintain stat e aid for propert y ta x relief, Whitman balance d th e budget b y borrowing almos t $ 4 billion ove r three years from publi c employee pension an d retire e health benefi t fund s with th e argumen t tha t the y wer e "overfunded. " (On e chang e sh e mad e left Ne w Jerse y wit h a n unfunded liabilit y o f mor e tha n $3 0 billio n fo r retiree health benefits. ) Wh o benefited ? Th e across-the-board 5 percent cu t returned abou t $5 0 t o th e averag e Ne w Jerse y family , $85 0 t o familie s with income s o f $300,000 , an d abou t $12,00 0 t o the governor's family . The revenues that were lost came from th e Property Tax Relie f Fun d (New Jerse y ha s th e secon d highes t propert y taxe s i n th e country—b y constitutional dedicatio n th e Fun d receive s ever y penn y o f incom e ta x revenues). Whe n th e pensio n borrowing s end , th e los t revenue s wil l b e shifted t o the propert y tax , th e larges t ta x fo r mos t Ne w Jersey families . For example, the average family o f four i n the middle quintile had a 199 2 income o f $54,000 , pai d $3,18 6 i n propert y taxe s an d $1,08 0 i n Ne w Jersey income taxes—it s "savings " o f $5 4 i n income taxe s would b e off set b y property ta x increase s o f abou t $162 . When 199 4 jo b figure s showe d a n increas e o f 65,00 0 job s i n Ne w Jersey, the governo r calle d a press conferenc e t o connec t th e jo b growt h to her income tax cut. In 199 5 as New Jersey unemployment rat e hovere d above those o f he r neighbor s an d th e nationa l averag e the governor wa s silent. The supply-siders' formulation, questionabl e enoug h for th e nation al economy, i s nonsensical a t the stat e level . The short-term politics of the Whitman ta x cut are irresistible: spending goes up (th e second Whitman budge t i s $16 billion—$ 1 billio n mor e than he r predecessor' s las t budget) ; property taxe s ar e stabilized , an d a campaign promise is kept. And in the bumper-sticker politic s of the 1990s , "Tax Cut " sur e beats "Yeah , but just wait," o r "Ou r kid s will pay for th e tax cuts." Long-term, the picture i s not pretty: borrowin g ha s ballooned , and the pensions will have to be funded unles s the bloody fight o f cuttin g benefits i s won. B y the time state politicians ar e forced t o deal with thes e nasty problems , Governo r Whitma n wil l b e safely ou t o f office . If words yet have meaning, there is no way that the term "fisca l con servative" can be applied to the policies of Governor Whitman (o r Ronal d

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Reagan, Georg e Bush, or Newt Gingrich) . The policies are not onl y short sighted; they ar e reckless . The extremist s plac e unqualifie d fait h i n the marketplace . Tak e th e Republican answer s t o th e problem s o f public education . "Liberat e par ents, make public schools compete" i s the chant o f extremist Republican s who support vouchers. They want to get the federal governmen t ou t of the business o f settin g nationa l standard s an d helpin g state s t o develo p an d enforce the m (a n idea o f Georg e Bush and hi s education secretary , Lama r Alexander). But nowhere d o the extremists give the intuitive explanatio n for declinin g educationa l achievement : childre n spen d mos t o f their tim e watching television , les s o f thei r tim e o n homework , an d thei r parent s are not aroun d t o enforce th e standards prevailing in Europe an d mos t of Asia. The absence of mothers from th e home and the growing appetite fo r entertainment ove r educatio n ar e bot h market-drive n development s tha t better explai n America' s mediocr e performanc e tha n th e existenc e o f a federal departmen t o f education . The extremist Republican vision calls for government to reward thos e at the top of the income scale with further relie f from taxatio n s o that the y can pa y directl y fo r thei r ow n security , ope n space , convenient transport , and multipl e houses . Simultaneously , GO P extremist s wan t t o en d gov ernment investments in public transport, public open spaces, public security, and housin g assistance . Extremis t Republican s hav e se t ou t t o destro y America's Publi c Squar e an d wit h i t th e sens e o f share d obligatio n an d investment i n our future . The y eve n propose t o en d th e thirty-year pledg e of th e federa l governmen t t o assis t an y deservin g studen t wit h th e oppor tunity fo r highe r education—the essentia l link to the American dream . The extremist leader s o f the Republica n part y hav e a narrow, intol erant vie w of ho w American s shoul d liv e their lives . They oppos e equal ity fo r wome n i n persona l matter s suc h a s th e marriag e contrac t an d i n sexual politics. Simultaneously, the y seek to end federal suppor t fo r con traceptive healt h service s for poo r wome n an d th e righ t o f al l women t o decide whe n o r i f t o bea r a child . The y applau d technologica l break throughs lik e th e "compute r superhighway, " bu t d o no t trus t citizen s enough t o allo w it s uncensore d use . They attac k a popula r cultur e tha t features excessiv e violenc e an d eas y sex , the n hai l th e marketplac e tha t feeds th e popula r appetit e fo r both . The y hai l th e America n spirit , bu t exploit economi c insecurit y wit h attack s o n aliens , lega l an d not . The y impugn th e patriotis m o f thos e wh o fea r tal k o f " a Christia n nation, " and wh o rejec t officia l praye r i n public schools . These Republican s ar e hypocritical . The y scol d th e poo r fo r no t working and acceptin g responsibility fo r thei r children, while they saw the

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rungs o n th e opportunit y ladde r tha t th e strivin g poo r nee d t o gra b t o escape poverty. They sa y they ar e against racia l discrimination , bu t the n encourage Republicans lik e David Duke , whose appea l i s based o n racia l hatred. The y pla y toug h o n crim e an d the n endors e a convicte d Olive r North t o represent Virgini a i n the U.S . Senate. The GO P "Contrac t wit h America " i s ver y muc h i n lin e wit h th e big talk-n o pai n approach . Whe n aske d t o specif y th e cut s require d t o reach the contract's goal of balancing the budget in seven years, the Hous e Majority Leade r Dick Armey o f Texas refused, o n the grounds tha t t o d o so would caus e his supporters' "knee s to buckle. " The new extremists, in short, ar e phonies; they dishono r th e conservativ e tradition .

A PROGRESSIV E RESPONS E Progressives understan d tha t th e postwa r America n prosperit y wa s spurred o n b y much highe r rates of personal saving s and b y high levels of government investmen t i n a nationa l highwa y system , ne w airport s an d infrastructure, an d a huge expansio n i n public highe r education . (Forty four percen t o f today' s college s an d universitie s wer e establishe d afte r 1960—almost al l of them public). The federal governmen t finance d basi c and applie d researc h o n an unprecedented scale , in aerospace an d militar y applications, and biomedica l research an d basi c science. It subsidized an d expanded th e home-mortgage marke t an d finance d housin g for poo r fam ilies. An d durin g th e much-maligne d Grea t Society , th e natio n finall y guaranteed a dignifie d retiremen t fo r workin g American s b y establish ing Medicare t o en d th e near-automati c impoverishmen t o f the elderly . Today, progressives are confused abou t what to do to restore a broad based prosperity . Bil l Clinto n ha s trie d t o ge t b y wit h a conflictin g eco nomic policy that o n the one hand relie s on the Reaganist prescriptio n t o reduce federal deficit s b y gutting federal spending , and, on the other, recognizes the need for increase d federa l spendin g for research , development , infrastructure investment , highe r education , an d housing . Thirty-six per cent of the Democratic representatives voted for a balanced budge t amend ment i n 1995 , a n inventio n o f th e Righ t t o accomplis h b y wa y o f constitutional amendmen t what they are unwilling to support throug h th e legislative process . I n short , Democrat s ar e actin g mor e lik e crypto Republicans tha n lik e representatives o f a political philosoph y tha t offer s concrete opportunit y t o middle-class aspirations . A progressive majority coalitio n cannot b e rebuilt o n campaign clev erness o r b y exploitin g th e fear s o f wha t th e right-win g takeove r o f th e

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GOP portends. Not alone , anyway. Nor i s the test whether Clinto n win s a secon d term : assumin g n o economi c cras h o r Whitewate r disaster , a right-wing opponen t o r a rightis t thir d part y i n th e field , Clinto n coul d win without disturbin g th e underlying preference o f American voter s fo r Republican presidents . No , fo r progressive s t o com e back , the y nee d t o be firm an d consisten t abou t som e general principles , some o f which ar e tactical an d political , some philosophical fundamental . Al l should hav e a familiar fee l afte r readin g th e precedin g eigh t chapters . Principle One: Progressives support both higher levels of public investment and strengthening marketplace forces. Th e United State s ha s reached a poin t wher e it s ai r traffi c contro l syste m shut s dow n periodi cally, wher e bridge s o n interstat e highway s collapse , wher e it s greates t public researc h universit y (th e University o f California ) i s slowly deteri orating, and where no viable solution to the disposal of radioactive waste s has ye t bee n implemented . Restorin g a broad-base d prosperit y require s not onl y a marke t syste m tha t stimulate s entrepreneuria l activity , bu t a level of public investment that ensure s a n efficient transportatio n system , maintenance o f ou r competitiv e edg e i n researc h an d development , an d management an d preservatio n o f ou r environment . Principle Two: Progressives believe in the place of private behavior and personal values in shaping the public interest and achieving economic prosperity. Progressive s shoul d b e consisten t i n advancin g policie s tha t strengthen two-paren t families , th e wor k ethic , an d takin g financia l responsibility fo r one' s children . Th e evidenc e i s overwhelmin g tha t parental nurturin g i s essentia l t o educationa l achievement , whic h i s i n turn a bi g determinant o f lifetim e earning s potential . Th e natio n canno t afford t o witness th e furthe r weakenin g o f families . Principle Three: Progressives represent the interests of the working and middle classes and reject the idea that incentives for investors and entrepreneurs are sufficient to bring about broad-based prosperity. Republicans hav e wage d successfu l clas s warfar e agains t wage-earner s and the poor for fiftee n years , by decreasing taxes on the very rich, increasing them on the middle-class, and exploitin g the poor. The result has bee n intentional deficits , a persisten t budge t crisis , an d a massiv e transfe r o f wealth and income from thos e who work to those who invest—just 1 percent of Americans own almost half of all financial assets! 17 Progressives not only must advance principles of fair taxatio n that reflect abilit y to pay, bu t

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also mus t rene w th e belie f tha t th e Unite d State s ca n affor d t o provid e universal healt h care , educationa l opportunities , an d lifelon g training . "Trickle-down" ha s not trickled—i t i s time to try something else. Principal Four: Progressives believe American self-government is endangered by a failure of citizenship. Governmen t an d th e political sys tem do not fail b y themselves. Citizens, individually an d collectively, contribute t o th e failure . Progressive s shoul d hel p se t th e standard s o f citizenship require d t o preserv e America n democracy . On e standar d should b e that citizen s wil l no t accep t publi c service s the y ar e unwillin g to pay for. Progressive s should b e consistent in calling for a restoration o f standards o f civility in public discourse, as well as in society at large. We know that litter laws do not clean our highways, that "moto r voter " law s do no t registe r ever y potentia l voter , o r tha t jo b trainin g program s d o not inculcat e th e wor k ethi c i n ever y trainee . Onl y citizens , actin g indi vidually, wit h a sense of civic virtue ca n mak e ou r syste m work . Principle Five: Progressives support ending ineffective and unnecessary programs and are enthusiastic about making government more efficient, decisive, and effective. Bil l Clinto n wil l no t receiv e th e credi t h e and Vic e Presiden t A l Gor e hav e earne d fo r actin g o n thei r "reinven t government" pledge . Reducing the federal wor k forc e b y 102,000 employ ees by 199 4 an d savin g a n estimate d $2 6 billio n i s a noticeable achieve ment, eve n i n a $1. 5 trillio n budget . Bu t mos t American s com e int o contact with their government i n a post offic e line , or through a n indeci pherable IRS instruction, o r through a rude clerk at a motor vehicl e agency. Progressives nee d eithe r t o mak e civi l service work fo r it s customers , or take o n th e nasty figh t t o refor m it . Principle Six: Progressives operate with a long-term perspective and a prudent fiscal philosophy that emphasizes "cash payment" for current needs and incurring debt only for investments with long-term benefits. Progressives ar e associated wit h Keynesia n economics , which anticipate s cyclical budge t deficit s t o "jum p start " laggin g economie s b y providin g unemployment payment s an d acceleratin g publi c works projects. That i s very differen t fro m th e polic y o f Republica n extremist s t o us e deb t t o finance ta x cuts . Debt i s an appropriat e wa y t o financ e investment s tha t produce long-term benefit s wher e future beneficiarie s ca n pay their share . With living standards fo r mos t Americans steadil y deteriorating, it woul d be sensibl e t o inves t i n badl y neede d infrastructur e improvement s an d

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higher educatio n t o increas e economi c growth , enhanc e th e skil l bas e of the American labo r force , an d increas e return s o n privat e investment . Principle Seven: Progressives believe that the American dream relies on higher education being available for all who seek and qualify for it. Only 2 2 percen t o f colleg e student s atten d privat e institutions , a figur e unchanged fo r tw o decades. For this principle to be honored means , then, that public highe r educatio n mus t b e accessible, efficient, an d affordable . The great American promis e o f higher educatio n i s endangered a s publi c institutions struggl e to minimize tuition increases , maintain cours e offer ings s o student s ca n graduat e i n a reasonabl e time , an d stil l suppor t research an d graduate programs. Family incomes have increased hardl y a t all sinc e 1975 , but colleg e cost s hav e rise n a t twic e th e rat e o f inflation . Progressives mus t revers e thes e discouragin g trend s eve n a s extremist s seek to shrink th e public commitment t o higher educationa l opportunity . Principle Eight: Progressives support the historic struggle for racial justice and an inclusive American society. Thi s is where we end, bac k o n the subjec t o f rac e in America . "[W]hite America has been historically weakwilled i n ensuring racia l justice," Corne l West writes, "an d ha s continued t o resist fully acceptin g the humanity of blacks." 18 The goal of a racially harmonious society is not a blac k concer n o r a whit e concern , bu t a n America n concern . Becaus e white Americans dominat e it s institutions, they se t the tone in determin ing if equal opportunit y an d racia l goodwil l wil l prevail . A progressive coalitio n need s stron g political an d mora l leadership . Lyndon Johnson, Rober t Kennedy , an d Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., i n thei r very different ways , helped blac k an d white Americans consider ne w possibilities fo r racia l harmony . Kenned y wa s almos t alon e amon g progres sive Democrats i n appealing directl y to working-class white s an d blacks , criticizing blac k nationalism , an d initiatin g program s t o figh t ghett o poverty. Americans need a president t o remind them, as Bill Clinton has , that "Them i s the dread word i n American politics. The Republicans blam e all the problem s o n them. Sometimes , th e Democrat s say , 'We'r e goin g t o help them.' Peopl e don' t nee d hel p a s them\ the y nee d hel p to b e part o f ws, o f definin g thei r ow n future. " Americ a nee d leader s t o emphasiz e common interest s an d t o demonstrat e personall y tha t blac k an d whit e Americans ar e boun d together . But , ultimately , th e problem s ar e muc h

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larger tha n anythin g tha t ca n b e resolved b y hearin g th e righ t word s o r seeing the right examples . Senator Bil l Bradley set s an example , personally an d politically : I ask every American t o becom e a part o f the dialogue that lift s this discussion t o the higher ground . Beginnin g with ourselves , each o f u s mus t addres s ou r ow n persona l understandin g o r misunderstanding o f race. Ask yourself, when was the last time you had a conversation abou t rac e with someon e o f a differen t race? As k yoursel f wha t value s ar e share d b y al l races ? An d begin t o as k ou r leader s ho w the y hav e confronte d thei r ow n understanding o r misunderstandin g abou t rac e i n thei r ow n real lives—no t jus t their politica l careers. 19 There i s no othe r way , is there? Individua l American s mus t demon strate th e respec t fo r thos e o f othe r race s an d background s b y speakin g directly an d openl y abou t thei r share d problem s an d thei r differen t experiences. Race can b e discussed in a way that encourage s people to think opti mistically of America's promise of equal opportunity . The answer reside s between th e ic y indifference o f mos t conservative s t o th e pligh t o f blac k Americans an d th e group-thin k o f racia l nationalists . Race ca n b e discusse d i n a wa y tha t acknowledge s tha t mos t Americans, most of the time, treat other s with civility, if not respect. Thi s discussion nee d no t ignor e o r revis e ou r horrifi c racia l histor y o r dimin ish th e influenc e o f ou r ver y differen t racial , ethnic , an d religiou s back grounds. Bu t racia l harmon y wil l no t b e achieve d i f w e insis t tha t th e nature an d qualit y of our participation i n American societ y is determine d by skin color . At bottom , n o la w ca n tel l an y paren t t o lov e thei r child , an d n o court can tell Americans o f different races , tongues, and religion s to trea t one another with civility, respect, and curiosity. Only we—you an d I—ca n do that .

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 1. Davi d Broder , "Flynn , Jackso n See k Clinton' s Urba n Commitment, " Washington Post, June , 13 , 1992, p. A12. 2. Thoma s B . Edsall an d Davi d Broder , "Weeken d o f Meeting s o n Strateg y Bringing Clint o n to Washington," Washington Post, Jun e 12 , 1992 , p. A16. 3. "Remark s o f Governo r Bil l Clinto n t o th e Rainbo w Coalitio n Nationa l Convention," Washington , D.C . (Jun e 13 , 1992) , fro m tex t provide d b y Clinton-Gore fo r President . 4. Thoma s B . Edsall, "Clinto n Stun s Rainbo w Coalition, " Washington Post, June 14 , 1992 , p. A8. 5. Pol l dat a summarize d an d reporte d i n American Enterprise, September / October, 1992 , p. 82 . 6. "Stunned " i s the right word; see Edsall, "Clinto n Stun s Rainbow Coalition. " 7. Th e "exclusion " cit e is found i n Gwe n I f ill, "Democrati c Grou p Argue s ove r Goals," New York Times, May 7,1991, p. A21; others in Dan Balz and David S. Broder, "Democrats Argue over Quota Clause, " Washington Post, May 7,1991, p. A9. 8. Clinto n denie d th e premise o f the June 1 2 Edsall-Broder stor y that hi s campaign wa s spli t ove r th e Soulja h speech , wit h som e adviser s pushin g a n accom modating approac h t o Jackson an d other s a confrontational one . See Thomas B. Edsall, "Clinto n Hit s Bus h Rol e at Rio Meet," Washington Post, Jun e 13 , 1992, p. A12 . 9. Davi d S . Broder an d Thomas B . Edsall, "Clinto n Find s Biracial Suppor t fo r Criticism o f Ra p Singer, " Washington Post, Jun e 16 , 1992 , p. A 7 10. R . W. Apple, Jr. "Jackso n See s a 'Character Flaw ' i n Clinton's Remark s o n Racism," New York Times, Jun e 19 , 1992 , pp. A l, A24 . 11. Ronal d Walters, " . .. Clinton' s Gall," Washington Post, June 16,1992, p. A21. 12. Michae l K . Frisby , "Clinto n Debat e wit h Rappe r Rages, " Boston Globe, June 18 , 1992, p. 22. 205

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13. Derric k Z . Jackson, "Wher e Dissatisfactio n wit h Clinto n I s Running Hig h . . . ," Boston Sunday Globe, Jul y 26 , 1992 , p. 63. 14. "Clinton' s Chea p Shot . . . ," Boston Globe, Jun e 19 , 1992 , p. 14 . 15. Ann a Quindlen , "Al l of These You Are," New York Times, June , 28, 1992 , section IV , p. 17 . 16. Andre w Kopkind an d Alexander Cockburn , "Th e Democrats, Perot, and th e Left," Nation, Jul y 20/27 , 1992 , p. 82 . 17. Clarenc e Page , "Bil l Clinton' s Notsapost a Sa y That , I s He? " reprinte d i n Liberal Opinion Week, Jun e 28 , 1992 , p. 28. 18. Car l Rowan , "Bil l Clinton , Jesse Jackson an d Siste r Souljah, " reprinte d i n Liberal Opinion Week, Jun e 28 , 1992 , p. 6 . 19. Gwe n If ill, "Clinto n Stand s b y Remark o n Rapper," New York Times, Jun e 15, 1992 , p. A16. 20. Gwe n If ill, "Clinton , i n Need o f Lift , Deftl y Play s Racial Card, " New York Times, Jun e 17 , 1992 , p. A22. 21. Ibid .

CHAPTER 2 1. Polit e versions use the word "out-segged. " I rely on the more likely version , quoted b y Theodore H . White , The Making of the President, 1968 (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1969) , p. 344 . 2. C . Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Ne w York: Oxfor d University Press , 1974) , p. 170 . 3. A goo d summar y o f discriminator y federa l policie s an d practice s ca n b e found i n Douglas Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press, 1993), pp. 51-57 . 4. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964 (Washington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printin g Office , 1966) , p. 474. 5. Willia m Brin k an d Loui s Harris , Black and White: A Study of U.S. Racial Attitudes Today (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1966) , p. 109 . 6. Nichola s Lemann , The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (Ne w York : Alfred A . Knopf, 1991) , p. 11 7 7. Theodor e H . White , The Making of the President, 1960 (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1961) , p. 234. 8. Charle s R . Morris , A Time of Passion: America 1960-1980 (Ne w York : Harper an d Row , 1984) , pp. 91-92 . 9. Lemann , The Promised Land, pp . 148-4 9 10. Danie l P . Moynihan , Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (Ne w York : Th e Fre e Press , 1969) , p . 17 0 (Moynihan's emphasis) .

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207

11. Th e ful l tex t i s publishe d i n Le e Rainwate r an d Willia m L . Yancey , The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy (Cambridge , Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 39-124 . 12. Ibid. , p. 43. 13. Ibid. , p . 93. 14. Johnson' s speec h i s reprinte d i n ful l i n Rainwate r an d Yancey , The Moynihan Report, pp . 125-32 . 15. Ibid. , p. 126 . 16. Ibid. , p . 128 . 17. Ibid. , p. 130 . 18. Brin k an d Harris , Black and White, pp . 278, 220. 19. Ibid. , p. 130 . 20. Danie l P . Moynihan , "Th e Presiden t an d th e Negro : Th e Momen t Lost, " Commentary, Februar y 1967 , p. 33. 21. Adolp h Reed , Jr. , an d Julia n Bond , "Equality : Wh y W e Can' t Wait, " Nation, Decembe r 9 , 1991 , p. 733. 22. Jewel l Hand y Gresham , "Th e Politic s o f Famil y i n America," Nation, Jul y 24/31, 1989 , p. 11 8 (emphasi s added) . 23. Willia m Ryan , "Savag e Discovery, " Nation, Novembe r 22 , 1965 , pp . 380-84; reprinted i n Rainwater an d Yancey, The Moynihan Report, pp . 457-66. 24. Willia m Ryan , Blaming the Victim (Ne w York : Vintage Books , 1976) , pp. 6-7 (Ryan' s emphasis) . 25. Ryan , "Savag e Discovery, " p . 464. 26. Ceci l Williams , "Crac k i s Genocide , 1990' s Style, " New York Times, February 15 , 1990, p. A29. 27. Ibid . 28. Ryan , "Savag e Discovery, " p . 464 (Ryan' s emphasis) . 29. Ibid . 30. Jame s Farmer , "Th e Controversia l Moyniha n Report, " syndicate d colum n of Decembe r 18 , 1965 . Reprinte d i n Rainwate r an d Yancey , The Moynihan Report, p . 410. 31. Ibid. , pp. 410-11 (author' s emphasis) . 32. Kennet h S . Tollett , "Racis m an d Race-Consciou s Remedies, " American Prospect, Sprin g 1991 , p. 93.

CHAPTER 3 1. Aaro n Wildavsky , "Th e Empty-Hea d Blues : Blac k Rebellio n an d Whit e Reaction," Public Interest, Sprin g 1968 , p. 3. 2. Willia m Brin k an d Loui s Harris , Black and White: A Study of U.S. Racial Attitudes Today (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1966) , p. 127 . 3. Ibid. , p . 109 .

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4. Howar d Schuman , Charlotte Steeh , and Lawrenc e Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvar d Universit y Press, 1985) , pp. 88-91 . 5. Kennet h B . Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (Middletown , Conn.: Wesleyan Universit y Press , 1965) , pp. 237-38 . 6. Jame s Baldwin , Natha n Glazer , Sidne y Hook , an d Gunna r Myrdal , "Liberalism an d th e Negro : A Round-Tabl e Discussion, " Commentary, Marc h 1964, p. 39 . 7. Clayborn e Carson , In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press , 1981), pp. 191-21 1 i n particular . 8. Stokel y Carmichae l an d Charle s V . Hamilton , Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (Ne w York : Vintage Books , 1967) , p. 53. 9. Theodor e H . White , The Making of the President, 1968 (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1969) , pp. 233-35. 10. Thoma s Byrn e Edsal l an d Mar y D . Edsall , Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics (Ne w York : W . W . Norto n an d Company, 1991) , pp. 88-89 . 11. Th e thesis that 196 4 marked suc h a watershed fo r bot h partie s is best developed b y Edsall an d Edsall , Chain Reaction, pp . 32-4 6 i n particular . 12. Le e Rainwate r an d Willia m L . Yancey , The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy (Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press , 1967) , p. 248. 13. Lyndo n Baine s Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (Ne w York : Holt, Reinhart , an d Winston , 1971) , p. 330 . 14. Josep h A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1991) , p. 131. 15. Michae l Harrington , The Other America: Poverty in the United States (Ne w York: Macmillan , 1962) , p. 62. 16. Clark , Dark Ghetto, p . 21. 17. Benjami n DeMott , The Imperial Middle: Why Americans Can't Think Straight about Class (Ne w York : William Morro w an d Company , 1990) , p. 43. 18. Laur a Carper , "Th e Negr o Famil y an d th e Moyniha n Report, " Dissent March/April 1966 , reprinted i n Rainwater an d Yancey , The Moynihan Report, p . 474. 19. Edwar d C . Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Centers (Boston : Little, Brown an d Co. , 1970) . 20. Nichola s Lemann , The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (Ne w York : Alfre d A . Knopf, 1991) , pp. 178-79 . 21. Michae l K . Brow n an d Seve n P . Erie, "Black s an d th e Legac y o f th e Grea t Society: Th e Economi c an d Politica l Impac t o f Federa l Socia l Policy, " Public Policy 29 , no. 3 (Summe r 1981) : 299-330 . 22. U.S . Bureau o f th e Census , U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Final Report PC(2)-7A, Occupational Characteristics (Washington , D.C. : U.S . Governmen t Printing Office , 1962) , pp . 21-22 ; 1980 Census of Population, Occupation by

NOTES

209

Industry, PC80-2-7C (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Printin g Office, 1984) , pp. 1 , 2, and 157 . 23. Califano , The Triumph and Tragedy ', p . 113 . 24. Unpublishe d repor t o f th e Whit e Hous e Tas k Forc e o n Cities , Pau l N . Ylvisaker, chairman, Washington, D.C., July 7,1967 , p . i, author's file s (empha sis in original) . 25. Ibid. , p. ii. 26. Cove r lette r fro m Pau l N. Ylvisake r t o Presiden t Lyndo n Johnson, accom panying unpublishe d repor t b y the Task Forc e on Cities , unnumbered . 27. I n fact , a Gallu p Pol l conducte d Februar y 1-6 , 1968 , foun d tha t 6 3 per cent o f its sample agreed tha t judge s were not treating criminals harshl y enough , while only 2 percent thought they were too tough. On question s about what to d o about risin g crime , onl y 1 8 percen t favore d correctin g underlyin g conditions , while 1 8 percen t favore d mor e parenta l discipline , 1 4 percen t mor e police , 1 7 percent harshe r sentencing , an d 1 3 percent increase d penalties . 28. Rober t F . Kennedy, "Excerpt s fro m Kenned y Speec h on Coast, " New York Times, Octobe r 24 , 1966 , p. 16 . 29. "Kenned y Clashe s with COR E Chief," New York Times, Decembe r 9,1966 , pp. 1 , 27. 30. Ramse y Clark , Crime in America: Observations on Its Nature, Causes, Prevention and Control (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1970) , p. 51. 31. President' s Commissio n o n Law Enforcement an d Administration o f Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Governmen t Printing Office , 1967) , p. 15 . 32. Willia m Ryan , Blaming the Victim (Ne w York : Vintag e Books , 1971) , p . 204. 33. Ibid. , particularly pp . 215-18 . 34. Willia m H. Grie r and Price M. Cobbs , Black Rage (Ne w York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 71. 35. "Pol l Find s Crim e To p Fea r a t Home, " New York Times, Februar y 28 , 1968, p. 29. 36. Se e Associate d Press , "Humphre y Warn s o f Slu m Revolts, " New York Times, July 19 , 1966 , p. 19 . 37. Banfield , The Unheavenly City, cit e is title of chapter titl e beginning p. 185. 38. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Ne w York: E . P. Dutton S t Co. , 1968) , pp. 1 , 2. 39. Ibid. , p. 203 (emphasi s added) . 40. Ibid. ; th e broa d polic y choice s ar e outline d o n pp . 395-407 , th e specifi c national policie s on pp . 410-82 . 41. Ibid. , pp . 201-2; the commissio n devote s 2 o f 66 8 page s t o th e conspirac y theory. 42. Wildavsky , "Th e Empty-Hea d Blues, " p. 5. 43. Intervie w wit h Victo r Palmieri , Newark, Ne w Jersey, 1991.

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44. Califano , The Triumph and Tragedy, pp . 260-62 . 45. Henr y Raymont , "Rio t Repor t Boo k Bi g Bes t Seller, " New York Times, March 14 , 1968 , p. 49. 46. "Th e Choic e for Americans, " New York Times, Marc h 3 , 1968, section IV, p. 12 . 47. "Challenge/Response, " New Republic, Marc h 16 , 1968 , p. 5.

CHAPTER 4 1. Angel o Baglivo , Newark News (pape r ha s ceased publication) . 2. Vick i Grane t Semel , At the Grass Roots in the Garden State: Reform and Regular Democrats in New Jersey (Rutherford , N.J. : Fairleig h Dickinso n University Press , 1978) , Table 2 , p. 102 . 3. Ibid. , Table 1 , p. 99. 4. Ronal d Sullivan , "Hughe s Back s Jersey Party Refor m a s Liberal Democrat s Unite," New York Times, Novembe r 15 , 1968, p. 30 . 5. Byrne' s recor d wa s a s importan t a s hi s tw o mos t importan t predecessors , Woodrow Wilso n an d Richar d Hughes . Unde r Byrne , Ne w Jerse y becam e th e first stat e t o financ e gubernatoria l election s wit h publi c fund s an d t o represen t consumers i n utility rat e cases. He enacte d a n incom e tax to reduc e an d stabiliz e property taxe s an d preserve d a wide swat h o f th e New Jersey Pinelands . 6. Survey # 761-K , Gallu p Pol l (Ma y 15 , 1968), reported i n The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (Ne w York : Random House , 1972) , p. 2127. 7. Fo r a discussio n o f th e influenc e o f th e Specia l Equa l Right s Committee , see William J. Crotty , Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure (Baltimore: Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1978) , pp . 10 , 12 , 16 , 72-73 , an d 276-77. 8. Theodor e H . White , The Making of the President, 1968 (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1969) , pp. 273-74 . 9. Crotty , Decision for the Democrats, p . 31. 10. Compile d b y Nelso n W . Polsby , Consequences of Party Reform (Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press , 1983) , Table 3.5 , p. 114 . 11. White , The Making of the President, 1968, pp . 175-77 . 12. Polsby , Consequences of Party Reform, Tabl e 2.5 , p. 64 . 13. Thoma s Byrn e Edsal l an d Mar y D . Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics (Ne w York : W . W . Norto n an d Company, 1991) , pp. 94-95 . 14. Gar y Warre n Hart , Right from the Start: A Chronicle of the McGovern Campaign (Ne w York : Quadrangle , 1973) , p. 208. 15. Georg e McGovern, Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern (Ne w York: Random House, 1977) ; see his discussion of the nomination o n pp. 182-87 . 16. Ibid. , p . 186 .

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211

17. Richar d M . Nixon , RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Ne w York : Touchstone, 1990) , pp. 30-45 . 18. Rober t B . Semple , Jr. , "Nixo n Score s Pane l fo r 'Undue ' Stres s o n Whit e Racism," New York Times, Marc h 7 , 1968 , p. 1 . 19. Joh n Ehrlichman , Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (Ne w York : Simo n and Schuster , 1982) , pp. 228-29 . 20. Se e House of Representatives vot e on HR 1520 9 in Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1969 (Washington , D.C. : Congressiona l Quarterl y Press , 1970) , pp . 80-81H. 21. Fo r a mor e complet e discussio n o f th e Philadelphi a Plan , se e Hug h Davi s Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy (Oxford: Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1990) , pp. 322-45 . 22. Ibid. , p. 344 . 23. Th e study , b y John F . Kain an d Rober t Schafer , "Regiona l Impact s o f th e Family Assistanc e Plan " (mimeograph , Harvar d University , Cambridge , Mass. , June 1971 ) i s cited i n Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan (Ne w York: Rando m House, 1973) , pp. 385-86 . 24. U . S. Senate Committee on Finance, "Family Assistance Act of 1970 , Hearings on H.R . 16311 " (Washington , D.C. : U.S . Governmen t Printin g Office , 1970) , Part I , pp. 112-19 ; examples wer e prepared b y the committee staff . 25. Ibid. , p . 451. 26. Ibid. ; see pp. 327-4 4 fo r Moynihan' s analysi s o f NWR O an d it s proposal . 27. Deirdr e Carmody , "McGover n Offer s Pla n o n Poverty," New York Times, January 2 1 , 1970, pp. 1,38 . 28. "Statemen t of Senator Georg e McGovern" i n U.S. Senate Finance Committee , "Family Assistance Act of 1970 , Hearings o n H.R . 16311, " Par t 3 , pp. 143-55 . 29. Theodor e H . White , The Making of the President, 1972 (Ne w York : Atheneum, 1973) , p. 128 . 30. McGovern , Grassroots, p . 226. 31. Jame s M . Naughton , "M'Gover n Offer s Ne w Ta x Progra m i n Wal l St . Talk," New York Times, Augus t 30 , 1972 , pp. 1 , 22.

CHAPTER 5 1. Willia m Brin k an d Loui s Harris , Black and White: A Study of U.S. Racial Attitudes Today (Ne w York: Simo n an d Schuster , 1967) , p. 246. 2. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion Volume III, 1959-71 (Ne w York: Rando m House, 1972) ; Gallu p Pol l fo r Decembe r 11-16 , 1964 , p. 1912 ; Gallu p Pol l fo r December 11-16 , 1965 , p. 1981. 3. Jare d Taylor , Paved with Good Intentions: The Failure of Race Relations in Contemporary America (Ne w York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, Inc., 1992), p. 243.

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4. Glen n C . Loury , " A Cal l t o Arm s fo r Blac k Conservatives, " i n Josep h Perkins, ed. , A Conservative Agenda for Black Americans, 2 d ed . (Washington , D.C.: The Heritag e Foundation , 1990) , p. 19 . 5. Marti n Luthe r King , Jr. , "Nex t Stop : Th e North, " Saturday Review, November 13 , 1965, pp. 33-35 . 6. Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., " A Testamen t o f Hope, " Playboy, Januar y 1965 , reprinted i n Jame s M . Washington , ed. , A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., (Sa n Francisco : Harpe r an d Row, 1986) , p. 316 . 7. Marti n Luther King, Jr., "Black Power Defined," New York Times Magazine, June 11 , 1967. 8. Cite d i n Washington, Testament of Hope, pp . 367-68 . 9. Stokel y Carmichae l an d Charle s V . Hamilton , Black Bower: The Politics of Liberation in America (Ne w York: Vintage Books , 1967) , p. vi. 10. Ibid. , pp . 34-35 . 11. Ibid. , p. 53. 12. Ibid. , pp . 54-55 . 13. Ibid. , p. 54 . 14. Ibid. , p . 40. 15. To m Wolfe , Radical Chic and Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers (Ne w York : Farrar, Strauss , and Giroux , 1970) . 16. Se e Gar y Orfield , Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy (Washington, D.C. : The Brooking s Institution , 1978) , pp. 56-6 9 i n particular . 17. Se e Abigai l M . Thernstrom , Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 18. 18. Jame s Baldwin , Natha n Glazer , Sidne y Hook , an d Gunna r Myrdal , "Liberalism an d th e Negro : A Round-Tabl e Discussion, " Commentary, Marc h 1964, p. 38. 19. Marti n Luthe r King , Jr., "Lette r fro m Birmingha m Cit y Jail," reprinte d i n Washington, Testament of Hope, p . 292. 20. Unite d Pres s International , "Kenned y Clashe s wit h COR E Chief, " New York Times, Decembe r 9 , 1966 , p. 1 . 21. Joh n Herbers , "Democrat s Vote Pro-Busing Plank," New York Times, Jun e 27, 1968 , p. 1 . 22. Corne l West, Race Matters (Boston : Beacon Press , 1993) , pp. 24-25. 23. Willia m Juliu s Wilson , The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, 2 d ed . (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1980), p. 157 . 24. Author' s note s o f remark s b y Adelaid e Sanfor d a t a pane l o n "Mode l Programs an d Innovative Strategies, " Sixt h National Polic y Institute, Joint Cente r for Politica l an d Economi c Studies , Washington, D.C. , January 24 , 1992 . 25. Derric k Bell , Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (New York : Basi c Books, 1992) , p. 104 .

NOTES

213

26. Survey o f 15,49 0 voter s b y Vote r Researc h an d Surveys , "Portrai t o f th e Electorate," New York Times, Novembe r 5 , 1992 , table o n p . B9. 27. Adolp h Reed , Jr. , "Al l fo r On e an d Non e fo r All, " Nation, Januar y 28 , 1991, p . 87 . 28. Join t Cente r fo r Politica l an d Economi c Studies , "Voice s o f th e Electorat e among th e Africa n America n Population, " Washington , D.C. , July, 1992 , p. 2. 29. Ada m Clymer , "Th e 198 4 Nationa l Primary, " Public Opinion, August / September 1984 , pp. 52-53 . 30. E . J. Dionne , Jr., "Jackso n Shar e o f Vote s b y Whites Triple s i n '88, " New York Times, Jun e 13 , 1988, p. B7. 31. Leron e Bennett, Jr., intervie w wit h Jesse L. Jackson, " I Coul d Hav e Won, " Ebony, Augus t 1984 , p. 168 . 32. Eva n Thomas, "Prid e an d Prejudice, " Time, Ma y 7 , 1984 , p. 30 . 33. Mar k Rosenthal , "Jesse' s Business, " New Republic, Ma y 9 , 1988 , p. 10 . 34. Willia m R . Doermer , " A Long-Awaite d Embrace, " Time, Septembe r 10 , 1984, pp. 12-13 . 35. Davi d E. Rosenbaum, "Blac k Democrats in a Poll Prefer Mondal e to Jackson as Nominee," New York Times, Jul y 10 , 1984 , p. A l . 36. Christin e M. Blac k an d Thoma s Oliphant , All by Myself: The Unmaking of a Presidential Campaign (Chester , Conn. : Glob e Pequo t Press , 1989) , particu larly pp. 165-70 . 37. Join t Cente r fo r Politica l an d Economi c Studies , "Voice s o f the Electorat e among th e African-American Population, " p . 2. 38. Th e Gallu p Organization , "Th e Gallu p Pol l Part y I D Tren d t o 1937, " unpublished, reprinte d i n Harold W. Stanley and Richar d G . Niemi, Vital Statistics of American Politics (Washington , D.C.: Congressional Quarterl y Press, 1992), p. 161. 39. Vote r Researc h an d Surveys , (Novembe r 3 , 1992) , reporte d i n American Enterprise, January/Februar y 1993 , p. 93. 40. Survey o f 15,49 0 voter s b y Vote r Researc h an d Surveys , reporte d i n New York Times, Novembe r 5 , 1992 , p. B9. 41. Jaso n DeParle , "Tal k Grow s o f Governmen t Bein g Ou t t o Ge t Blacks, " New York Times, Octobe r 29 , 1990 , p. B6.

CHAPTER 6 1. Harol d W . Stanle y and Richar d G . Niemi, eds., Vital Statistics on American Politics (Washington , D.C. : Congressiona l Quarterl y Press , 1992) ; calculatio n by editors fro m dat a fro m National Election Studies (An n Arbor , Mich. : Cente r for Politica l Studies , University o f Michigan) , p. 158 . 2. Jame s Reston , "Wha t Goldwate r Lost, " New York Times, Novembe r 4 , 1964, p. 23.

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3. Thoma s B. Edsall and Mar y D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics (Ne w York: W. W. Norton an d Company , 1991), p. 4 1. 4. Kevi n P . Phillips , Emerging Republican Majority (Ne w Rochelle , N.Y. : Arlington House , 1969) , p. 286 (emphasi s i n original) . 5. Ibid. , p. 287. 6. "Republican s Scor e Net Gai n of 47 Seats," 1966 CQ Almanac (Washington , D.C: Congressiona l Quarterl y Press , 1967) , p. 1398 . 7. Danie l P . Moynihan , "Th e Presiden t an d th e Negro : Th e Momen t Lost, " Commentary, Februar y 1967 , p. 31. 8. I t is somewhat surprisin g that the Grea t Society , as it was set up b y LBJ, has proved to be very durable, even in the face of the Reagan Revolution. Medicare ha s helped prevent the automatic pauperization o f retired Americans, and Grea t Society programs guarante e acces s t o a colleg e educatio n fo r million s o f Americans . General ai d fo r publi c education , mas s transit , famil y planning , libraries , eve n the arts , survive d th e determine d oppositio n o f Reaga n an d Bush . Bu t th e pro longed intellectua l an d politica l attack s b y conservative s hav e bee n effective : "Great Society " remain s the code for faile d federa l program s tha t were suppose d to liberat e th e poor, especiall y th e blac k poor . 9. Charle s R . Morris , A Time of Passion: America 1960-1980 (Ne w York : Harper an d Row , 1984) , p. 128 . 10. Josep h A . Loftus , "Moyniha n Call s o n A.D.A . t o See k Tie s wit h Con servatives," New York Times, Septembe r 24 , 1967 , pp. 1 and 44 . 11. Richar d M . Scammo n an d Be n J . Wattenberg , The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate (Ne w York : Coward-McCann, Inc. , 1970) , pp. 57-58 . 12. Jame s Q . Wilson, "Th e Rediscovery o f Character : Private Virtue an d Publi c Policy," Public Interest, Fal l 1985 , p. 3. 13. Irvin g Kristol, in Reflections of a Neo-Conservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Ne w York: Basi c Books, 1983) , p. 89 . 14. Fo r a quick histor y o f AEI, see James Allen Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (Ne w York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 174-84. 15. Her e I rely o n E . J. Dionne , Jr.'s usefu l perspectiv e o n th e Ne w Righ t i n hi s book Why Americans Hate Politics (Ne w York : Simo n an d Schuster , 1991) , pp . 227-36. 16. Se e for example , Walter W . Heller , "Th e Kemp-Roth-Laffe r Fre e Lunch, " Wall Street Journal, Jul y 12 , 1978 , p. A20. 17. Edsal l an d Edsall , Chain Reaction, p . 208. 18. Tex t o f speech b y Daniel Patrick Moyniha n t o the Business Council o f Ne w York State , September 13 , 1981, printed i n Daniel Patric k Moynihan , Came the Revolution: Argument in the Reagan Era (San Diego: Harcourt Brac e Jovanovich, 1988), p. 31. 19. Ibid. , p. 34 (Moynihan' s emphasis) .

NOTES

215

20. Willia m Greider , The Education of David Stockman and Other Americans (New York : E . P. Dutton an d Co. , 1981) , p. 46. 21. Ibid. , p. 33. 22. Davi d A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: The Inside Story of the Reagan Revolution (Ne w York : Avon , 1987) , p. 429. 23. Pau l Crai g Roberts , The Supply-side Revolution: An Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press, 1984), p. 96 . 24. Jac k Kemp et al., "A Message for Houston, " Wall Street Journal, Augus t 11, 1992, p. A14. 25. Stockman , The Triumph of Politics, p . 409. 26. Alexi s De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol . 2 (Ne w York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1987) , p. 105 . 27. Ibid. , p . 317 . 28. Joh n Kennet h Galbraith , The Culture of Contentment (Boston : Houghto n Mifflin Company , 1992) , pp. 96 , 97 . 29. Media n famil y incom e is from th e U.S. Department o f Commerce , Bureau of the Census , Current Population Reports (Washington , D.C. : U.S . Governmen t Printing Office , 1981J ; th e highe r educatio n cost s ar e foun d i n th e U . S . Department o f Education, Digest of Education Statistics 1992 (Washington , D.C. : U. S. Government Printin g Office , 1992 ; p. 307 . 30. U.S . Department o f Education , Digest 1992, pp . 318, 319. 31. Kare n DeWitt , "Battl e I s Looming o n U.S . College Aid to Poo r Students, " New York Times, Ma y 27 , 1991 , pp. A l, 9 . 32. Elain e El-Khawas , "Campu s Trends , 1992, " America n Counci l o n Education: Washington, D.C. , July 1992 , p. v. 33. Debora h J . Carte r an d Reginal d Wilson , "Minoritie s i n Highe r Education , 1992," American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1993, Table 1, pp. 41-42. 34. Thoma s Josep h Kane , College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of Tuition, Financial Aid, Local Economic Conditions and Family Background (Cambridge, Mass. : Malcolm Wiene r Cente r fo r Social Policy , John F . Kenned y School o f Government , Harvar d University , 1991) , p. 176 . 35. Ibid. , p. 177 . 36. Carte r an d Wilson , "Minoritie s i n Higher Education, " Tabl e 2, pp. 44-55. 37. Ibid. , Table 5 , p. 59. 38. Federa l Nationa l Mortgag e Association , "Fanni e Ma e Nationa l Housin g Survey," Washington , D.C. , June 1992 , p. 6 . 39. Ive r Peterson, "Hom e Ownership— a Recedin g Dream, " New York Times, October 20 , 1991 , section X , pp . 1 , 12 . 40. Willia m Kristo l an d Ja y P . Lefkowitz , "Ou r Students , Stil l a t Risk, " New York Times, Ma y 3 , 1993 , p. A15. 41. Theodor e R . Sizer, "Recommendation s fo r Improvin g Educatio n i n Metro politan Areas : A Supplement t o th e Repor t o f the Task Forc e o n Cities, " unpub lished mimeograph , Washington , D.C. , July 5, 1967 , p. 8 .

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42. Willia m J . Bennett , " A Ne w Civi l Right s Agenda, " Wall Street Journal, April 1 , 1991 , p. A12. 43. Benn o C . Schmidt , Jr. , "Educationa l Innovatio n fo r Profit, " Wall Street Journal, Jun e 5 , 1992 , p. A10. 44. Joh n E . Chubb an d Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools (Washington, D.C. , The Brooking s Institution , 1990) , pp. 218-19 . 45. Ibid. , p . 191. 46. Ibid. , p . 188 . 47. Ibid. , p . 217. 48. Am y Stuar t Wells, "Schoo l Choic e Program i s Upheld i n Wisconsin," New York Times, Augus t 8 , 1990 , p. B6. 49. Chub b an d Moe , Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, p . 219. 50. Schmidt , "Educationa l Innovatio n fo r Profit. " 51. Se e th e discussio n o f studen t achievemen t i n Chub b an d Moe , Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, pp . 101-40 . 52. Patric k M . Reilly , "Whittl e Seek s Ediso n Fundin g o f $75 0 Million, " Wall Street Journal, Ma y 5 , 1993 , p. Bl . 53. Sar a Mosle , "Di m Bulb, " New Republic, Januar y 18 , 1993, pp. 16 , 19-20 . I have reworked he r number s t o confor m wit h Whittle' s late r estimate s o f scale . 54. Nationa l Cente r fo r Educatio n Statistics , Digest 1992, Tabl e 306 , p . 312 ; Jason DeParle , "Repor t Cite s Flaws in Regulation o f Trade Schools, " New York Times, Septembe r 12 , 1990 , p . B7 ; an d Rober t G . Bottoms , "Sur e W e Nee d Beauticians. . . ," New York Times, Septembe r 17 , 1990 , p. A23. 55. DeParle , "Repor t Cite s Flaws. " 56. Katherin e Boo , "Beyon d Beaut y Schools, " Washington Monthly, Marc h 1991, p . 29. 57. Boo , "Beyon d Beaut y Schools, " p . 30 . 58. Juli e Johnson, "Loa n Enforcer s Focu s on Trade Schools, " New York Times, June 11 , 1989, section IV , p. 7 . 59. DeParle , "Repor t Cite s Flaws. "

CHAPTER 7 1. See , for example , William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press, 1978); Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy (Washington, D.C. : Th e Brooking s Institution , 1978) ; Davi d T . Ellwood , Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1980) . Th e descriptive statement for Reconstruction appear s on its masthead^ Reconstruction 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990) : inside fron t cover . 2. Barne y Frank , Speaking Frankly: What's Wrong with the Democrats and How to Fix It (Ne w York : Times Books , 1992) , p. 55.

NOTES

217

3. Nichola s Lemann , The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (Ne w York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1991) ; Thomas B . Edsall and Mar y D . Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics (Ne w York: W. W. Norton an d Company , 1991) ; Jim Sleeper , The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York (Ne w York: W. W. Norton an d Company , 1990) ; and E. J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (Ne w York: Simo n an d Schuster , 1991) . 4. "Th e New Politic s o f Race," Newsweek, Ma y 6 , 1991 , p. 30. 5. Star-Ledger/Eagleto n Poll , "Discrimination—Th e Viewpoin t o f Ne w Jerseyans," press release from th e Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick , N.J. , March 14 , 1993 , p. 6 . 6. Andre w Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (New York : Charle s Scribner' s Sons , 1992) . 7. Frank , Speaking Frankly ', pp. 36-37 . 8. "HBO/Join t Cente r Poll, " Joint Cente r fo r Politica l an d Economi c Studies , Washington, D.C., July 8 , 1992. See Table 2 for questio n o n political philosophy ; Table 3 for questio n o n part y preference . 9. Stanle y Greenberg , telephone intervie w wit h author , Marc h 24 , 1993 . 10. Kennet h S . Tollett , "Racis m an d Race-Consciou s Remedies, " American Prospect, Sprin g 1991 , p. 91. 11. Stephe n L . Carter , Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (Ne w York : Basic Books, 1991) , p. 14 . 12. Miche l Marriott , "Stor m a t Georgetow n La w o n Admissions, " New York Times, Apri l 17 , 1991 , p. A14 ; Timoth y Maguire , "M y Bou t wit h Affirmativ e Action," Commentary, Apri l 1992 , p. 51. 13. Senato r John Kerry , "Race , Politics, and the Urban Agenda, " speec h at Yale University, New Haven , Marc h 30 , 1992 , p. 6 . 14. Derric k Z . Jackson , "Kerry' s Profile s i n Crumble, " Boston Globe, Apri l 5 , 1992, p . 7. 15. Jewel l Hand y Gresham , "Th e Politic s o f Famil y i n America," Nation, Jul y 24/31, 1989 , p. 11 9 (emphasi s added) . 16. Fo r evidence on the effects o f single-parent families, see, for example , Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, "Da n Quayl e Was Right," Atlantic Monthly, Apri l 1993 , p. 47. 17. Micael a Di Leonardo, "Boyz on the Hood," Nation, Augus t 17/24,1992, p. 186. 18. Senato r Bil l Bradley , "Rac e an d th e America n City, " Washington , D.C. , March 26 , 1992 , p. 5 (provide d b y office o f Senato r Bradley) . 19. Ibid. , p. 6 . 20. " A Cal l t o En d Racism, " Sunday Record (Hackensack , N.J.) , Marc h 29 , 1992, p . A30. 21. "N o Place Seems Safe," New York Times, Marc h 29,1992, section IV, p. 16. 22. Herber t McClosk y an d John Zaller , The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press, 1984); o n p . 65 th e author s report : "Thi s assumptio n o f th e equalit y o f huma n

218

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worth i s s o deepl y ingraine d i n America n politica l cultur e a s t o b e axiomati c fo r most people. " 23. Arthu r M . Schlesinger , Jr. , The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (Ne w York : W. W. Norton an d Company , 1992) , p. 134 . 24. Le e Sigelman and Susa n Welch, Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality: The Dream Deferred (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991J, p. 129. 25. Author' s transcriptio n o f intervie w wit h Derric k Bell , "Dail y Edition, " Monitor Radio , January 15 , 1991. 26. Jess e Jackson , "Don' t Fa n th e Flames, " syndicate d colum n reprinte d i n Liberal Opinion Week, Ma y 13 , 1991, p. 7 . 27. Lan i Guinier , "Th e Triump h o f Tokenism : Th e Voting Right s Ac t an d th e Theory o f Black Electoral Success, " Michigan Law Review (Marc h 1991) : 1103. 28. Ibid. , p . 1108 . 29. Author' s notes of speec h b y Leonard Jeffries a t the New Jersey Black Issue s Convention, Newark , Ne w Jersey, September 2 1 , 1991. 30. Author' s transcription o f speech b y Adelaide Sanfor d a t the Sixth Nationa l Policy Institute , Join t Cente r fo r Politica l an d Economi c Studies , Washington , D.C.January 23 , 1992 . 31. Loui s Menand , "Wha t Ar e Universitie s For? " Harper's, Decembe r 1991 , pp. 47-56 . 32. Joh n H . Bunzel , "Alienatio n an d th e Blac k Colleg e Dropout, " Wall Street Journal, Apri l 3 , 1991, p. A20. 33. Schlesinger , The Disuniting of America, p . 134 . 34. Corne l West, Race Matters (Boston : Beacon Press , 1993) , p. 4. 35. Th e firs t statisti c i s fro m a Jun e 13-15 , 1991 , surve y b y th e Gallu p Organization; th e result s o n preference s ar e fro m a surve y b y Princeto n Surve y Research Associations , Inc . fo r th e Times-Mirro r Cente r fo r th e Peopl e an d the Press , Ma y 1990 . Bot h result s ar e reporte d i n American Enterprise, September/October 1991 , p. 82 . 36. AB C News/Washington Pos t survey conducted i n September-October 1989 , reported in Sigelman and Welch, Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality, p . 57. 37. Ibid . 38. Se e "Hom e Mortgag e Disclosur e Act : Expande d Dat a o n Residentia l Lending," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Washington , D.C. , Novembe r 1991 , pp . 859-81; an d Paulett e Thomas , "Federa l Dat a Detai l Pervasiv e Racia l Ga p i n Mortgage Lending, " Wall Street Journal, Marc h 31 , 1992, pp. Al an d A10-11 , which refine s dat a i n the Federal Reserv e study . 39. I n Marger y Austi n Turner , Raymon d J . Struyk , an d Joh n Yinger , "Housin g Discrimination Study : Synthesis," The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., August 1991. 40. Th e Hous e Wednesda y Group , U.S . House o f Representatives , "Movin g Ahead: Initiative s fo r Expandin g Opportunit y i n America, " Washington , D.C. , October 22 , 1991.

NOTES

219

41. Josep h Perkins , ed. , A Conservative Agenda for Black Americans, 2 d ed . (Washington, D.C. : The Heritage Foundation , 1990) . 42. Willia m J . Bennett , " A Ne w Civi l Right s Agenda, " Wall Street Journal, April 11 , 1991, p. A14. 43. Ronal d Sullivan , "Right s Agenc y Accuse s Time s an d Pressmen' s Unio n o f Job Discrimination, " New York Times, Septembe r 3 , 1991 , p. A20. 44. Elizabet h Kadetsky , "Musclin g I n on Constructio n Jobs," Nation, Jul y 13 , 1992, p. 47. 45. Rober t B . Reich , The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (Ne w York : Vintage Books , 1991) , p. 273. 46. Jame s M. Markham, "Residents , Not City , Called Ke y to Cleane r Streets, " New York Times, Octobe r 19 , 1971 , p. 39 . 47. Ernes t F. Hollings, "Som e Advice to the New Kid in Town: Just Remembe r You're a 'Ne w Democrat,' " Los Angeles Times, Jun e 27 , 1993 , p. M6 . 48. Citizen s fo r Ta x Justice , "Inequalit y an d th e Federa l Budge t Deficit, " Washington, D.C. , September, 1991 , pp. 6 , 8 (emphasis i n original) . 49. Marti n L . Gross, The Government Racket: Washington Waste from AtoZ (New York : Banta m Books , 1992) , p. 260. 50. Ibid , pp. 262, 257. 51. Rober t Eisner, How Real Is the Federal Deficit? (Ne w York: The Free Press. 1986), pp. 26-32 . 52. Charle s R. Morris, "It' s Not th e Economy, Stupid, " Atlantic Monthly, Jul y 1992, p. 62 . 53. Kevi n P . Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath (Ne w York: Random House, 1990), pp. 89-90. 54. Ala n Wolfe , "Proposa l fo r a Stud y o f a Ne w America n Social Contract, " unpublished manuscript , Octobe r 1992 , p. 2.

CHAPTER 8 1. Richar d B . Freeman, "Employmen t an d Earning s o f Disadvantage d Youn g Men i n a Labo r Shortag e Economy, " i n Christophe r Jenck s an d Pau l Peterson , The Urban Underclass (Washington , D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1991) , pp. 103-21. 2. U.S . Bureau o f th e Census , "Povert y i n th e Unite d States : 1991, " Current Population Reports, Serie s P-60 , no . 18 1 (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Governmen t Printing Office , 1992) , Table H , p . xxi. 3. Terr y K. Adams, Greg J. Duncan, and Willard L. Rodgers, "The Persistence of Urban Poverty," in Fred R. Harris and Roger W. Wilkins, eds., Quiet Riots: Race and Poverty in the United States (Ne w York: Pantheon Books , 1988), pp. 94-95. 4. Edwar d C . Banfield , The Unheavenly City: The Nature and the Future of Our Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown an d Company , 1970) , p. 211.

220

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

5. Charle s Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (Ne w York: Basi c Books, 1984) , p. 9 (emphasi s supplied) . 6. E . J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics (Ne w York: Simon and Schuster , 1991), p. 334 . 7. Micke y Kaus, The End of Equality (Ne w York: Basic Books, 1992, ) p. 125. 8. Ibid. , p . 13 5 (emphasi s supplied) . 9. Davi d T . Ellwood , Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family (Ne w York: Basic Books, 1988) , p. 46. 10. Barbar a Dafo e Whitehead , "Da n Quayl e Wa s Right, " Atlantic Monthly, April 1993 , p. 48. 11. Danie l Patric k Moynihan , Family and Nation (Sa n Diego : Harcourt Brac e Jovanovich, 1987) , p. 38. 12. Jame s S. Coleman e t al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Printin g Office , 1966) . 13. Dian e Ravitch , The Troubled Crusade: American Education 1945-1980 (New York : Basi c Books, 1983) , p. 158 . 14. Se e David E . Pitt, "Bron x Principa l I s Arrested a s a Street Buyer of Crack, " New York Times, Novembe r 10,1988 , p. B18; Neil A. Lewis, "Arrest of Principa l Rekindles a Debate ove r School Tenure," New York Times, Novembe r 12,1988 , pp. A l , A31 ; Joseph Berger , "Iner t Syste m Le t Shak y Principa l Go, " New York Times, Decembe r 27, 1988 , pp. A l, B4 ; and "Ne w Principa l Rules Sought," New York Times, Januar y 29 , 1991 , p. B3. 15. Suzann e Daley , "Wh y They'r e Pleadin g t o Ge t int o P.S . 87," New York Times, Marc h 16 , 1988 , pp. Bl, B5.

CHAPTER 9 1. Leste r C . Thurow , "Companie s Merge ; Familie s Brea k Up, " New York Times, Septembe r 3 , 1995 , section IV , p. 11. 2. Th e HBO/Join t Cente r Pol l reported tha t blac k American s wer e mor e like ly to identify themselve s a s conservative o r somewhat conservativ e (33. 9 percent ) than libera l o r somewhat libera l (28. 3 percent). "Voice s o f the Electorate amon g the African-America n Population, " July , 1992 , Join t Cente r fo r Politica l an d Economic Studies , Washington, D.C. , Lil y 1992 , Table 2 . 3. Th e abortio n question s wer e aske d b y th e Nationa l Opinio n Researc h Center, 1987-199 0 an d combined ; the religious an d mora l question s were aske d by the Princeton Surve y Research Associates, Inc., for th e Times Mirror Cente r fo r the Peopl e an d th e Press , Ma y 1-31 , 1990 , an d wer e reporte d i n American Enterprise, September/Octobe r 1991 , pp. 84-85 . 4. Althoug h onl y 20 percent o f blac k respondent s (compare d wit h 2 5 percen t of white) characterized rac e relations in the United State s as "generall y good, " 5 8 percent (an d 7 9 percen t o f whites ) sai d rac e relation s i n thei r ow n communitie s

NOTES

221

were generally good; these findings cam e from a CBS/New York Times pol l con ducted Ma y 6-8 , 1992—immediatel y afte r th e Lo s Angele s riots—an d wer e reported i n American Enterprise, July/Augus t 1992 , p. 95. 5. Hug h B . Price, "Keynot e Address : Nationa l Urba n Leagu e Convention, " Indianapolis, July 24 , 1994 , p. 15 . 6. See , fo r example , Marttil a an d Kiley , Inc. , "Highlight s fro m a n Anti Defamation Leagu e Surve y o n Racia l Attitude s i n America, " Boston , Jun e 11 , 1993, pp. 64-67 . 7. Charle s R . Morris, "It' s Not th e Economy, Stupid, " Atlantic Monthly, Jul y 1993, p. 50 . 8. Ru y Teixeira , " . . . Wha t i f W e Hel d a n Electio n an d Everyon e Came? " American Enterprise, July/Augus t 1992 , p. 57. 9. Kevi n Phillips , Boiling Point: Democrats, Republicans, and the Decline of Middle-Class Prosperity (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1993) , p. 248. 10. Stanle y B . Greenberg, A l From , an d Wil l Marshall , The Road to Realignment: The Democrats and the Perot Voters (Washington , D.C. : Democrati c Leadership Council , July 1993) , pp. iii-14 . 11. Ibid. , pp . ii-2. 12. Ibid. , pp . ii—2,6, and figure s 4 an d 5 . 13. Ibid. , p . ii-17. 14. Ibid. , pp. iii-26, iii-28, iii-18. 15. Phillips , Boiling Point, p . 248. 16. Da n Weissman, "Whitma n Oppose s Tax Deduction Propose d b y Republican Legislators," Star-Ledger (Newark) , February 25 , 1993 , p. 17 . 17. Se e Edward N . Wolff, Top Heavy: A Study of the Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America (Ne w York: The Twentiet h Centur y Fun d Press , 1995) , p. 7 . 18. Corne l West , Race Matters (Boston : Beaco n Press , 1993) , p. 3 19. Bil l Bradley , "Speec h o n Rac e an d Civi l Right s i n America, " Washington , D.C.,July 16 , 1991 , p. 9 .

INDEX

Abel,LW., 8 1 Abortion, 2 , 121 , 124, 186 , 19 5 Adams, Terry, 16 9 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 18 8 Adubato, Steve , 17 7 Adult literacy , 31 , 32 AFDC. See Aid fo r familie s wit h dependent childre n Affirmative action , 106 , 107 , 109 , 131, 151 , 154-55; in the mili tary, 189-9 0 Affluent society , 43, 141-4 2 Afro-Americans. See Black American s Agnew, Spiro , 89-9 0 Aid fo r familie s wit h dependen t children (AFDC) , 43, 92-9 3 Alexander, Lamar , 19 8 Allen, Ivan, 6 0 American Counci l o n Education , 134 American Dream , 176 , 18 5 American Enterpris e Institut e (AEI), 123-2 4 American Prospect (journal) , 46 , 110,147 American society , 91 , 152, 156 , 160-61, 203 ; division in , 67 , 144, 157 , 160; multiracial, 108 , 148-49, 165 ; myth of , 159-60 ; principles, 2 - 3, 104 , 123 , 154 , 157, 183-8 4

American values , 150 , 175 , 189 ; assimilation of , 57, 102 ; and lower class , 7, 57 , 169-70 ; protection of , 3 , 148 ; and Republican party , 3 , 8-9, 121 , 158-59; restoration of , 170-7 1 Antidiscrimination laws , 26, 51, 61,158,191 Antipoverty programs , 170 , 171, 187; administration, 184 ; criticism of , 130-34 , 179-82 , 183; federal aid , 91-95 ; success, 178 , 182 , 183-84 . &>e also War o n Poverty ; Welfar e Anti-Semitism, 104 , 11 1 Antiwar movement , 75, 77 ', 79, 84,85 Armey, Dick, 19 9 Baby boomers , 121 , 132 Baldwin, James, 10 3 Bane, Mary Jo, 14 7 Banfield, Edward , 56-57, 66, 169-70 Baptists, 2 1, 109 Baroody, William, 123-2 4 Barry, Marion, 10 6 Bell, Derrick, 108 , 15 5 Bennett, William J., 137 , 15 0 Bernhard, Berl , 5 4 Berry, Edwin "Bill, " 6 0 223

224 Biaggi, Mario, 9 3 Bipartisan coalition , 5 , 23-25, 117; restoration, 2 1 , 159, 182-83, 194-95 ; shattering, 4 Biracial coalition , 24 , 186 , 187 , 188-89,202 Black activists , 20, 39 , 42, 71 , 147, 150-51. See also Blac k nationalist s Black Americans , 35-37 , 121; attitudes of , 109 , 116 , 150 , 186-87, 191 ; beliefs about , 44-45 , 169; constituents, 3 , 18 , 2 1, 27, 113-14; economic conditions , 35 , 107, 131-32 , 165 ; expectations of , 25, 28, 35, 37; respea for, 8,19,47 , 98,104,115, 175 , 203; voting, 27 , 53, 193 . See also Civi l right s movement; Discrimination ; See also subject s beginnin g wit h race o r racia l Black children , 35 , 107, 16 0 Black churches , 110 , 11 3 Black civilization , 15 6 Black conservatives , 109-10 , 221 nl Black crime , 27, 30 ; excusing, 2 , 63,64-65, 108- 9 Black elite , 100,105 , 10 8 Black family , 106 , 153 ; economic conditions, 91-95 , 152 ; problem s in, 30 , 34-37, 39 , 42, 43, 46, 99 , 151-52, 16 0 Black leadership , 30 , 52, 152 ; attitudes, 186 ; criticism of , 46 , 116, 150 ; and Democrati c party , 14, 19 , 20, 154 , 187 ; and govern ment, 38 , 89; and liberals , 58, 103, 105-8 ; and M . L . King, 9 8 Black nationalists , 56, 111 , 148, 154, 155 , 203 Black Northerners, 21, 25-26,100,119 Black Panthers , 10 2 Black politicians, 155 , 189 ; an d Democratic party , 18 , 75, 77, 78 , 114-15, 18 8

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

Black power, 52-53 , 64 , 100-103 , 105,155 Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (Carmichae l and Hamilton), 100-10 2 Black servicemen , 19 0 Black Southerners , 24-25, 29-30, 37 ; economic conditions , 92 ; suffrage , 54, 78 , 89, 103 ; voting, 113 , 15 0 Blaming the Victim (Ryan) , 43, 65 Blue collar. See Working clas s Bond, Julian, 4 1 Boo, Katherine, 14 3 Boston (Mass.) , 5 1 Boston Globe, 17 , 15 1 Bradley, Bill , 147 , 153 , 203 Brink, William, 3 9 Brooke, Edward, 8 9 Brookings Institution , 137-3 8 Brown, H. Rap , 9 8 Brown, Michael , 58-59 Brown v. Board of Education, 2 4 Buckley, William F. , 12 2 Budget, 162-64 , 199 , 200; as campaign issue, 9,125; under Democratic administrations, 2, 40-41 , 60, 162,183 , 201; under Republican administrations, 10 , 127 , 132; and welfar e reform , 172 , 173. See also Governmen t spending Burns, Arthur F. , 9 1 Bush, George , 9 , 10 , 56, 147 ; as presidential candidate , 13 , 15, 194-95 Bush administration , 132 , 133, 159, 19 8 Business leadership, 25, 26-27, 12 3 Busing, 8 , 20, 5 1, 53, 86, 10 5 Byrne, Brendan, 76-7 7 Cahill, William, 8 9 Califano, Joseph, 54-55 , 59-6 0 California, 14 , 42, 102 , 13 4

INDEX

CAPs. See Community actio n programs Carey, Denny, 7 4 Carmichael, Stokely, 52-53,100-102 Carper, Laura , 56 Carter, Jimmy, 83 , 125, 19 3 Carter, Stephen , 109 , 110 , 15 1 Carter administration , 12 4 Catholic Americans , 75; and blacks , 27, 53 ; constitutents, 63 ; voting, 5,27 Census, 169 ; (1960), 29-30; (1990) , 115 Chicago (111.) , 178 Children, 2, 107 , 160 , 171 , 172, 173-74 Chisholm, Shirley , 93 , 11 0 Christianity an d politics, 124 , 193, 198; and blacks , 25, 103-4 , 110 , 113 Chubb, John, 137-39 , 14 1 Citizenship (concept) , 161-62 , 20 1 Civil disorders, 121 ; excusing, 2 , 63-68, 70 , 71; solutions for , 58, 68-70. See also Riots ; Violence Civility, 161-62 , 20 3 Civil rights, 6 , 38 , 130 , 137 ; as campaign issue , 117 ; and Democratic party , 8 , 37 ; and New Right , 124 ; and Republica n party, 89 , 91, 159. See also Votin g rights Civil Rights Ac t (1964) , 5, 23, 25, 8 8 Civil rights laws , 24-25, 46, 10 8 Civil rights leadership , 40, 9 1 Civil rights movement, 26 , 49, 52 , 159; and Black Power, 100-102 ; and L . B. Johnson, 2 1 , 24, 38; moral force of , 5 , 24-25, 26-27, 37, 51 ; and Wa r o n Poverty , 38,40 Clark, Kenneth , 29 , 52, 55 Clark, Ramsey , 6 4 Class. See Social classe s

225 Clinton, Bill , 201, 202; credibility , 1; criticism of , 16-18 , 143-44 , 191-92; policies, 10 , 144 , 162 , 182-83, 199 ; as presidentia l candidate, 13-15,16-21,114,139 , 191; suppor t for , 18-19 , 11 3 Clinton administration , 1-2 , 3 , 144, 160 , 171-7 3 Cloward, Richard , 10 3 Cobbs, Price, 65-66 Cockburn, Alexander , 17-1 8 Coleman report , 90 , 17 9 Commission o n Part y Structur e an d Delegate Selection (Democrats), 81-82 Community actio n program s (CAPs) , 29, 32-33 , 168 , 177-78 ; adminis tration, 40 , 57-58; criticism of , 33; premise , 31 ; success, 17 8 Community responsibility : denia l of, 50 , 66 Congress, 8 , 10 , 53, 165; and B . Clinton, 1 , 162, 171, 172, 175, 182-83, 192 , 195 ; and L.B . Johnson, 23 , 39, 40, 54, 58, 62, 71; and R. Nixon, 91, 93-94; and R . Reagan , 129 , 132 , 13 3 Congressional elections , 188-89 ; (1964), 23; (1966), 5, 119 ; (1994), 2,143-44,146,191-9 2 Conservatives, 123-24 , 144 ; edu cational policies , 138 , 139-40 ; labeling, 47, 110 , 122 , 196 ; policies, 4, 130-31 , 137 , 160 , 171,176,177; principles, 9,118, 136, 138 ; and racia l issues , 16 , 23, 40 , 99, 107 , 109-10 , 159 , 203; auppor t for , 71 . See also Black conservatives; Republica n party, effec t o f conservatives o n Conservative values , 3, 121 , 123, 124, 150 , 152 , 18 6 Constituents. See Voters "Contract wit h America," 143-44 , 176-77, 19 9

226 Council o n Urba n Affairs , 9 0 Courts, 53, 71 , 131, 180. See also Supreme Cour t Credentials Committee (Democrati c National Convention) , 80 , 8 7 Crime, 29, 44, 147 , 150 , 209 n27; as campaign issue , 5-6, 14 , 15, 27-28, 62 , 63, 71, 120; causes, 64-66; war on , 10 , 28, 120 . See also Blac k crime ; Drugs, and black s Criminal justice system, 70; accused of racism, 63 , 64, 65, 66, 108 , 16 9 Criminals, 6 , 15 , 63, 66 Cultural revolution , 121-22 , 146 , 186, 19 4 Daley, Richard, 8 1 Dark Ghetto (Clark) , 29, 5 1 Declining Significance of Race, The (Wilson) , 106-7 , 14 7 Deficit, 126 , 164 , 183 , 220, 201; reduction, 2 , 163 ; spending, 125, 126-28 , 196-9 7 Democratic leadership , 62 , 74 , 77, 8 5 Democratic Leadership Council , 1 6 Democratic Nationa l Convention , 77; (1968), 73,78-79, 80; (1972), 85, 87 , 112 ; (1988), 11 3 Democratic party , 77-78 , 125 ; campaign issues , 5-6, 15 , 71, 79, 83-84, 85-88 , 94-95, 104 , 139 , 191; constituents , 1 , 3, 15 , 27-28, 91, 112 , 113-14 , 115 , 192, 193; effect o f liberal s on, 6-8, 75-77 , 79, 80-84,118,147 , 149-50 ; liberals in , 14 , 74-75; in New Jersey , 74-77; principles, 2-3, 7-8,21, 66, 148, 193 ; and racia l issues , 6-8 , 16,17,21,40,78,112,154; reforms, 76-77, 80-8 5 Democratic politicians , 7-8 , 60 , 7 4-77, 95, 188 . See also Blac k politicians, and Democrati c

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

party; als o specifi c politicians , e.g. Jackson, J . DeMott, Benjamin , 56 Desegregation. See Integratio n Detroit (Mich.) , 66, 18 0 Di Leonardo , Micaela, 15 2 Dionne, E. J., 147-48 , 170-7 1 Discrimination, 29 , 35, 104 , 154 ; beliefs about , 8 , 26-27, 43, 157-59, 169 , 171 ; and Demo cratic party, 16 ; and Republica n party, 149 , 199 . See also Anti discrimination laws; Housing discrimination; Job discrimination ; Segregation Diversity i n the workplace, 19 1 Downs, Anthony, 6 0 Drugs: and blacks , 43-44, 108-9 ; war on , 10 , 12 0 DuBois,W. E . B., 10 7 Dukakis, Michael, 10, 81,110,193; and J. Jackson, 18 , 20,112,11 3 Duke, David, 15 , 19 9 Dunlop, John, 6 0 Eagleton, Thomas , 87 , 9 5 Earned incom e credit , 2 , 171 , 173, 175, 182-8 3 Economic growth, 60, 65, 127,131, 168; and government , 9 , 187 , 192, 196 , 199 , 200-201, 202 Economic interests , 8 , 115 , 121 , 148 Economic policy, 164-65,192,199 , 201-2; unde r Democrati c ad ministrations, 40, 162-63 , 192; under Republica n administrations , 9-10, 124 , 125 , 128-29, 132 , 163-64, 196-9 8 Economy, 3-4 , 168-69 , 195 ; as campaign issue, 2,118,124,125,134, 162; effect o n blacks , 35, 107, 17 5 Edison Project , 137 , 14 1 Edsall, Mary D. , 5, 86, 118-19 , 147 , 176

INDEX

Edsall, Thomas B. , 5, 86 , 118-19 , 125, 147,17 6 Education, 130 ; and blacks , 108 , 134 , 135, 180 ; compensatory, 176 , 179-80; as campaign issue , 114 ; federal aid , 23, 54, 68 , 160 , 180 ; opportunities, 131,187,201 ; reforms, 181-82,198 . See also Higher education ; Race differences , in educational performance ; Schools; School integratio n Educational achievement , 109,136 , 141,179, 181 , 182, 19 8 Educational vouchers , 68 , 136-37 , 139-42, 19 8 Eisner, Robert , 16 3 Elderly, 5 , 19 9 Elementary and Secondary Educatio n Act, 179-8 0 Elite, 102,105,118,123-24 , 136 , 139. See also Blac k elit e Ellwood, David , 147 , 17 3 Employment, 2-3,197; and blacks , 58-59, 62 , 68, 114 , 131 ; opportunities, 99,103,131,188,190-91. See also Job discrimination ; Jo b integration; Unemploymen t Empowerment: o f blacks , 50, 56, 58, 159 ; of poor , 17 7 Equality, 24 , 45, 147 , 160 , 173, 194; and liberty, 98-99,129-3 0 Equal opportunity, 25, 51, 71,129-30, 131, 154-55,156 , 203; and Demo cratic party, 5 , 16 , 38, 108 ; and Republican party , 130-32 , 160 , 194, 199 ; structure, 175-76 . See also Education , opportunities ; Employment, opportunities ; Higher education , opportunitie s Erie, Steven, 58-5 9 Espy, Mike, 1 8 Ethnic minorities : attitudes, 27; economic conditions , 28, 190 ; and politics , 84 , 85 , 89;

227 preferences for , 7 . See also Blac k Americans; Hispanic American s Falwell, Jerry, 12 4 Family, 147 , 150 , 160 , 173-74 ; dissolution, 30,116,174; economic conditions, 9,121,133-34,135, 185-86,197, 202; role of, 2 , 34 . See also Blac k family ; Lower-clas s family Family assistance pla n (FAP) , 91-94, 10 3 Family-leave act , 2, 19 5 Family responsibility , 35 , 150 ; denial of , 4 1 , 42, 43, 45, 46, 50; b y fathers, 171 , 174 Family values, 170 , 171 , 173, 186, 19 4 FAP. See Family assistanc e pla n Farmer, James, 45, 4 7 Farrakhan, Louis , 104 , 111-1 2 Feminists, 84 , 85 , 112, 12 1 Feulner, Edwin , 12 4 Finch, Robert, 90 , 9 1 Florio, Jim, 12 8 Food stamps , 17 3 Ford, Gerald , 12 3 Ford Foundation , 29 , 30, 6 0 Frank, Barney , 147 , 149-5 0 Fraser, Donald, 8 1 Galbraith, John Kenneth , 13 0 Gay, Dan, 76 Gays, 121 ; and politics , 1 , 84, 85, 19 2 Ghetto. See Urban poo r Gingrich, Newt, 19 5 Ginsberg, David, 7 0 Goldmark, Peter , 7 0 Goldwater, Barry , 53, 117-1 9 Goodwin, Richard , 3 7 Gore, Al, 20 2 Government, 54,147, 165 ; attitudes toward, 4, 146 ; intervention by , 9, 27,51, 89,124,128,130,170 ; an d

228 Reaganites, 123-24,128-29 , 130-32,136; role, 1, 38-39, 78, 126, 128-29 , 136 , 144 , 162 . See also Intergovernmenta l relations ; State government s Government programs , 59-60, 68-69 ; and conservatives , 129 , 130-32 , 138, 160,177 ; cutting, 62, 126 , 129; effectiveness, 57, 167,176 ; universality, 175,184 . See also specific programs , e.g. Antipovert y programs Government spending , 9 , 54, 127 , 160, 171 , 173; by Republica n administrations, 10 , 126-27 , 129 , 132, 163-64,170 , 172 . See also federal aid under subjects, e.g . Higher education, federal ai d Gramm, Phill , 19 2 "Gray Areas " project, 2 9 Great Society , 49-50, 60 , 123; criticism of , 68 , 120 ; goals, 58; impact, 59 , 132 ; opposition to , 119-20; programs, 23, 57,136, 199; support for , 5 , 53. See also War o n Povert y Greenberg, Stanley , 193-9 4 Gresham, Jewell Handy , 4 1 Grieder, William, 12 6 Grier, William H. , 65-66 Gross, Martin, 16 3 Group rights, 101-2,154,157, 20 3 Guaranteed income . See Incom e guarantees Guinier, Lani , 2, 15 5 Hacker, Andrew , 14 8 Hackett, David , 3 0 Hamilton, Charles, 52-53,100-10 2 Harrington, Michael , 55 Harris, Fred, 81 , 92 Harris, Louis, 27, 3 9 Hart, Gary , 86 , 11 2 Hayakawa, S . I., 12 1

WRONG FO R ALL THE RIGHT REASONS

Head Star t (program) , 3 2 Healthcare, 109 , 114 , 131 , 132, 148 , 198, 201; reform, 2 , 1 7 3 , 192 , 19 4 Heller, Walter, 30 , 12 5 Helstoski, Henry, 76 Heritage Foundation, 124,137,158-5 9 Higher education , 46 , 121 , 151, 156; federal aid , 5, 10,131 , 32 , 133-35, 142-43 , 175 ; oppor tunities, 5,54,103,132-36,165 , 169,198,202; state aid, 133-3 4 Hill, Herbert, 9 1 Hispanic Americans: discriminatio n against, 158 , 191 ; education, 134 , 135; and politics, 85,107,192,19 3 Hollings, Ernest, 16 2 Home ownership , 135-3 6 Homosexuals. See Gay s Hooks, Benjamin , 10 9 House of Representatives, 93,129,195 ; and racia l issues , 53, 112, 15 8 Housing discrimination , 8 , 26, 27, 158-59, 19 1 Housing integration , 8 , 51, 61, 68, 99 Housing subsidies , 68, 13 1 Hughes, Richard J., 76, 80 , 168 , 17 9 Humphrey, Hubert , 66-67, 81 ; as presidential candidate , 74 , 78-79 , 80-81, 94-9 5 Illegitimacy. See Unwed mother hood Income, 28, 134 , 146 , 185 ; and inflation, 9 , 133 , 135, 202 Income guarantees , 92-94 , 103 ; as campaign issue , 86, 94-9 5 Income tax: cutting, 10 , 127 , 128 , 196-97; an d Democrati c party , 148, 162-63 . See also Earne d income tax credi t Income transfers , 142 , 177 , 20 0 Individual responsibility , 131 , 173, 183; denial of , 4 1 , 43 45-47 , 50, 70 , 10 4

229

INDEX

Individual rights , 101 , 154, 15 7 Isolation, Political , 100 , 11 6 Integration, 8 , 51, 52, 53-55; accomplishing, 103 , 148, 156 ; black expection s from , 25 , 28, 35; and B . Clinton, 20 ; Democra t position on , 2, 47, 50, 60-62, 105 ; government fund s supporting , 60-61, 68 , 119 ; and L.B . Johnson, 5 ; opposition to , 52-53 , 101, 102 , 155 ; and progressives , 154-55, 187 , 202. See also School integration; Segregation ; Separatism Intellectuals, 130 , 170 ; conservative, 123-24; in Democratic party , 60 , 95, 118 , 122-23 ; and racia l issues , 47, 71 , 100 Interest groups . See Special interest s Intergovernmental relations , 54 , 61-62, 121 , 132, 133-34 , 18 3 Jackson, Derrick , 17 , 15 1 Jackson, Jesse L., 155 ; and B . Clinton, 15-16 , 19 ; and Democratic party , 13-14 , 18 , 19-20, 115 , 193 ; and Jewis h Americans, 104 , 111-12 ; a s presidential candidate , 110-1 3 Javits, Jacob, 8 9 Jeffries, Leonard , 106 , 15 6 Jencks, Christopher, 14 7 Jewish Americans : and blacks , 25, 104, 106 , 111-12 ; and politics , 3, 99 , 19 2 Job Corps , 31 , 13 2 Job creation , 167 , 17 2 Job discrimination , 8 , 26, 158 , 15 9 Job integration , 28 , 51, 62, 90-91 , 189-90 Job opportunities . See Employment , opportunities Johnson, Lyndo n Baines , 62, 67, 122, 168 ; criticism of , 50 , 120 ;

Howard University speech, 37-40, 50, 53; as presidential candidate, 27, 117 ; and racial issues, 5, 21, 23-24, 49 , 70, 89 , 202; State of the Union messag e (1965) , 28; support for , 113 , 11 4 Johnson administration , 7 , 29, 30-3 3 Judiciary, 8 , 53, 71, 131. See also Supreme Cour t Kane, Thomas, 134-3 5 Kaus, Mickey, 172-7 3 Kean, Tom, 19 4 Kemp, Jack, 125,127-28 , 159 , 17 7 Kennedy, John F. , 23, 29, 63 , 70 Kennedy, Randall , 110 , 116 , 14 7 Kennedy, Robert F., 53, 63-64,105, 202; a s presidential candidate , 67, 73-74 , 75 , 79 Kennedy administration , 7 , 29, 3 0 Kerner, Otto , 67 Kerner Commission , 58 , 61, 66-70, 89 Kerry, John, 15 1 King, Martin Luther , Jr., 6 , 51 , 75, 103-4, 161 ; assassination, 67 , 89, 105, 111 ; influence of , 5 , 25, 98-100, 101 , 107, 202; and J. F. Kennedy, 29 ; opinio n of , 97-9 8 Kopkind, Andrew , 17-1 8 Kriegel, Jay, 7 0 Kristol, Irving, 47, 123 , 13 6 Labor market , 168-69 , 171 , 202. See also Employmen t Labor unions, 25; and blacks, 90-91, 120, 159 ; and Democrati c party, 1 4 , 7 5 , 1 1 2 , 1 4 8 , 1 9 2 Laffer, Arthur , 12 5 Laffer Curve , 12 5 Laird, Melvin , 12 3 Latinos. See Hispanic American s Law enforcement , 66, 70 , 71, 120 Leadership, 33 , 62, 115 , 183;

230 need for , 61 , 177, 202; See also Black leadership ; Busines s leadership; Civil rights leader ship; Democratic leadership ; Republican leadershi p Left (politics) , 14 , 42, 193 ; and B. Clinton, 16-18; and Black Power, 105; an d clas s issues, 56-57; and J. Jackson, 111-12 ; and L . B. Johnson, 21; marginalization of, 50 ; and rac e issues , 6, 13 , 45,56 Legislation, 46 , 53, 59, 121 , 124; See also Antidiscrimination laws; Civil rights laws ; specific acts , e.g. Civi l Rights Ac t (1964 ) Legislative districts , 187 , 188-18 9 Lemann, Nicholas , 29, 31 , 14 7 "Letter fro m th e Birmingham Cit y Jail" (King) , 103- 4 Levenson, Larry , 6 0 Lewis, John, 52 , 18 7 Liberal elite , 124 , 13 9 Liberalism, 8 , 176 ; history, 4 Liberals, 60 , 171 ; and B . Clinton, 16 , 17; and blac k separatists , 102 ; and class issues, 55-57; and crim e issues, 63-6, 70; credibility, 11 , 20, 21, 120 ; criticism of , 20 , 46, 47, 52, 55-57,121-22,147-48,149-53 ; and integration , 50 , 51-55, 62, 120; labeling, 4, 5 , 10-11 ; an d M. L . King, 99, 103-4 ; an d R . Nixon, 93-95; an d racia l issues, 6-8, 15 , 20, 42, 44-45, 104-5 , 107-8; and social services, 30-31, 57-59; See also Democrati c party, effec t o f liberal s on ; Democratic party , liberal s in ; Republican party , liberal s i n Liberty, 98 , 12 9 Lindsay, John V. , 69-70 , 8 8 Living standards . See Quality o f life; Standard o f livin g

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

Local liberalism , 17 6 Long-term strategy , 9 , 176-77 , 201-2 Los Angeles (Calif.) , 13-14 , 42, 14 7 Losing Ground (Murray) , 17 0 Loury, Glenn , 98 , 10 9 Lowenstein, Allar d K . 76 Lower class , 55, 95, 165; behav ior, 66, 68 , 70, 153 ; concentration of, 7 , 56; education, 134 , 140-41, 179 . See also Poor ; Working clas s Lower-class family , 7 , 91-95 , 140-41, 152 , 173 , 17 4 Low-income housing , 8 , 70, 132 , 152, 176 ; ownership, 15 9 Maclnnes, Gordon , 73 ; beliefs of , 3, 196 ; in community actio n programs, 32-33,168,177-78 ; as state senator, 128,176,180-82 , 187, 190 , 195 , 19 6 Malcolm X , 9 8 Marburger, Carl , 18 0 McCarthy, Eugene , 53, 67, 74, 75, 78 , 79, 93-9 4 McGovern, George , 76, 81 , 147; as presidential candidate , 4 , 79, 83 , 85-87, 88, 94-95,192 , 193 McGovern-Fraser Commission . See Commission o n Part y Structure an d Delegat e Selection (Democrats ) McKissick, Floyd , 10 5 Meaner, Rober t B. , 76 Media, 4 , 29, 40, 42, 70 , 147 ; in election campaigns , 17 , 79, 25; and J. Jackson, 111 ; and M . L . King, 100 ; on racia l issues , 25, 27, 2 9 , 4 0 , 4 2 , 1 0 2 , 151,15 3 Medicare, 5 , 10 , 23, 54, 19 9 Medicaid, 23 , 54, 92, 131 , 178 Menand, Louis , 15 6

INDEX

Middle class, 55-56, 75, 125,134,194; becoming, 8 , 58, 68, 170 , 187 ; and blacks , 52-53, 58 , 68, 151; constituents, 6,15, 86,124,187 , 192, 193 ; criticism o f their values, 102; economic conditions, 133 , 196, 200; as a goal, 52-53, 56, 57, 68, 177 Middle clas s blacks , 8 , 55, 58 , 107 , 131,187 Military, 147 , 189-90; government spending on , 126 , 13 2 Miller v. Johnson, 18 8 Mills, Wilber, 9 3 Mississippi, 10 3 Model Citie s Act (1966) , 54-55, 58 Moe, Terry , 137-39 , 14 1 Mondale, Walter, 81 , 110, 193 ; and J.Jackson, 18,20 , 11 2 Moral Majority , 12 4 Morris, Charles, 31,121-22, 163 , 192 Morris Count y (N.J.) , 176 , 19 5 Mosle, Sara, 14 1 Moynihan, Danie l Patrick , 33-34 , 55, 119 , 146 , 174 ; criticism of , 54, 95 , 105 , 122 ; and Johnso n administration, 34 , 40-41, 42 , 50 ; and Nixo n administration , 90 , 91; an d Reaga n administration , 126 Moynihan Report , 34-38 , 41-42, 50 , 60,177; criticism of, 37 , 41, 2-47, 56; and L . B. Johnson, 37-38 , 39 ; and th e media , 4 1 Multiculturalism, 108 , 109 , 136 , 155-57, 18 0 Murray, Charles , 130 , 17 0 Muskee, Edmund, 8 3 NAACP. See National Associatio n for the Advancement o f Colore d People National Advisor y Commissio n o n Civil Disorders. See Kerne r Commission

231 National Associatio n fo r th e Ad vancement o f Colore d Peopl e (NAACP), 11 3 National Blac k Leadershi p Council , 152 National Review (journal) , 12 2 National Welfar e Right s Organizatio n (NWRO), 93-94 , 103- 4 Nation at Risk, A, 13 6 Nation o f Islam , 104 , 111-1 2 NDC. See National Democrati c Coalition Negroes. See Black American s "Negro Family : The Cas e for Nationa l Action." See Moynihan Repor t Neighborhoods, 51 , 56, 69 , 183; growing, 27, 29, 53; and integra tion, 8 , 51; rebuilding, 55 Neighborhood Yout h Corps , 31 , 32 Neoconservatives, 47, 66, 111, 12 3 Neoliberals, 147 , 16 1 New Democrati c Coalitio n (NDC) , 74-77 Newark (N.J.), 60,69,179,180,18 1 New Jersey, 176 , 177-78 ; blacks in , 158; Democratic party, 74-77,183, 187, 189 ; economic policy, 76-77 , 128, 196-98 ; schools, 180-8 2 New Right , 12 4 New Yor k (N.Y.) , 152 , 161 ; education, 182 ; politics, 147 ; racerelations, 69-70 , 104 , 15 9 New Yor k (State) , 10 8 New York Times, 17 , 42, 44, 70 , 117,153,182 Nixon, Richard , 90 , 91; as presidential candidate , 5-6,19, 88-90 , 95, 122 , 19 3 Nixon administration , 90-95,120 , 19 5 Nonviolence, 52 , 103 ; Black Powe r criticisms, 101 ; and M . L . King, 98, 99, 103- 4 North, Oliver , 19 9 North, 26-27 , 37 , 106- 7

232 Northerners, 9 , 2 1, 25-28, 100 ; attitudes, 26, 27, 11 9 NWRO. See National Welfar e Rights Organizatio n Office o f Economi c Opportunit y (OEO), 31 , 33 Orfield, Gary , 14 7 Orphanages, 17 2 Other America, The (Harrington) , 55 Page, Clarence, 18-1 9 Payne, Donald, 11 2 Percy, Charles , 8 9 Perot, Ross, 10,13,15,16,193-9 4 Personal responsiblity . See Individua l responsibility Peters, Charles , 14 7 Philadelphia Plan , 90-9 1 Phillips, Kevin, 124 , 163-64 , 19 5 Piven, Frances Fox , 102- 3 Political advantage , 114-1 5 Political affiliation , 19 , 109 , 113 , 117, 148, 187 , 193 , 221 n2; switching , 8-9, 85 , 88, 89,121,186,188,19 3 Political coalitions , 99 , 100 , 107 , 122 , 150-51; obstacles to, 101,106,151. See also Bipartisa n coalitions ; Progressive coalition s Political culture , 4, 25, 57, 73, 84-85, 86, 14 4 Political platforms, 87-88,147-48 . See also Democratic party, campaig n issues; Republican party , cam paign issues ; also campaig n issues under subjects, e.g. Vietnam War , as a campaign issu e Politicians. See Black politicians ; Democratic politican s Poor, 99-100 , 173 , 199; attitude s toward, 56-57 ; constituents, 193 ; education, 136-37 ; preference s for, 99 ; programs for , 39 , 54, 164 , 169; and Republica n party , 129 , 130-32, 200 ; statistics, 131 . See

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

also Antipovert y programs ; Urba n poor; Welfare recipient s Popular culture , 148-49 , 19 8 Poverty: a s a campaign issue , 86 , 194 ; causes of , 7 , 35-38, 177 ; racializing, 36-37, 39-40 , 45-47. See also Wa r o n Povert y Powell, Colin , 17 6 Preferences fo r blacks , 106 , 153 ; consequences of , 151 , 189; M. L . King position on , 6 , 99; oppositio n to, 16 , 38-39, 40 , 158,194 ; support for , 6-7, 155 . See also Affirmative action ; Quota s Presidency, 62 ; tests of , 3-4 . See also Bush administration ; Clinto n ad ministration; Johnson administra tion; Kennedy administration ; Nixon administration ; Reaga n administration Presidential elections , 6, 8 , 115 , 120 , 193; (1960) , 29; (1964) , 5 , 2 1 , 27-28, 53 , 117, 118-19 ; (1968) , 5-6, 73-74 , 75, 77-79, 88-90,122 ; (1972), 85-87 , 88, 94-95, 105 ; (1980), 9 , 125 ; (1984), 110 , 112 ; (1988), 10 , 110 , 193 ; (1992), 10 , 13-15,16-21,114,146,191,194-95 President's Commissio n o n La w Enforcement an d Administratio n of Justice, 64-6 5 President's Committe e o n Juvenil e Delinquency, 3 0 Price, Hugh B. , 18 7 Private schools : subsidizing, 136 , 137 , 139-40, 141-4 2 Privatization: o f government services , 176; of public schools, 136-42 , 16 0 Professional blacks , 187 ; and B . Clinton, 16-17 ; on racisim , 8 , 42, 45, 56-57, 151 ; reaction to , 107- 8 Progressive coalition , 1 , 6, 71 ; restoration, 3 , 4, 144 , 185-86 , 187 , 188-91, 192-93 , 199-203 ; shattering, 4, 5-7, 107- 8

INDEX

Progressives, 58, 194 , 199-200 ; credibility, 175 ; goals, 3, 11 , 146, 149 , 154-55, 162 ; labeling, 4 - 5, 145 ; principles, 200-203; and racia l issues, 150 , 15 9 Progressivism: history , 4 Promised Land, The (Lemann) , 2 9 Public housing. See Low-incom e housing Public interest, 123 , 129-30, 165 , 171,190,200 Public Interest, The (journal) , 47 , 122-23 Public investment, 131-32 , 184 ; ben efits from , 164-65 , 175-76 ; in education, 143 ; opposition to , 9-10, 144 , 198 ; support for , 5 , 14, 187 , 200, 201-2. See also Government spendin g Public opinion, 146 ; on crime , 66, 209 n27; o n leadership , 97-98 ; o n political affiliation , 109 , 113 , 221 nl; o n presidential candidates , 79, 112 ; on rac e relations, 26-27 , 39, 117 , 148 , 154-55 , 221 n4; o n racism, 26,109,158; on welfare, 15 0 Public schools, 136-42 , 160 , 181 , 186, 198. See also Schoo l integratio n Public servic e jobs, 68, 172-73 , 198 , 201 Public services , 57-58, 138 , 201; government spendin g on , 9-10 , 57. See also Community action programs Quality o f life , 167 , 17 0 Quindlen, Anna , 1 7 Quotas, 8 , 80 , 159 , 189 , 190 ; suppor t for, 16 , 90-9 1 Race differences , 35-36 , 44, 161 ; in educational performance , 109 , 151, 156 ; explaining, 6-7 , 55, 68 , 70; in poverty, 37-4 0 Race-neutral policies , 107 , 150-51 , 171, 175 , 18 7

233 Race relations , 18-19 , 40, 148-49 , 186-87, 203 ; and liberals , 157 , 160-61; i n politics , 77, 78, 80, 188-89. See also Discrimination ; Integration; Segregatio n Racial integration . See Integratio n Racial issues , 104 , 118-19 , 150 , 189 . See also Discrimination; Integration ; Segregation; Separatism ; See also racial issue s under subjects , e.g . Conservatives, an d racia l issue s Racial justice , 89 , 98, 108, 202- 3 Racism, 7 , 4 1, 89, 108 ; and B. Clinton, 14-15 , 16-18 ; as caus e of blac k problems , 35 , 42, 45-47 , 57, 68, 105-9 , 156 ; and civi l disorders, 67-68; and crime, 63, 64-66, 108, 169 ; and R . F . Kennedy, 6 3 Radical Chic (Wolfe) , 10 2 Rainbow Coalition , 13-1 4 Ravitch, Diane , 18 0 Reagan, Ronald , 9-10 ; a s presidentia l candidate, 12 5 Reagan administration , 128-29 , 136 , 149, 195 ; economic policy , 125 , 126-27, 132 , 133-3 4 Reaganomics, 9-10 , 125 , 126-28 , 146, 163-6 4 Reconstruction (journal) , 110 , 14 7 Redistricting, 187 , 188-8 9 Reed, Adolph, Jr., 4 1, 109 Reich, Robert, 16 0 Religious schools , 136 , 14 0 Republican leadership , 88-89, 196 , 198 Republican Nationa l Committee , 18 9 Republican party, 77-78 , 85, 175, 191, 193-95; an d blacks , 89 , 113 , 114; campaign issues, 9, 71,114,143-44 , 180, 196 ; constituents, 113 , 186, 193-94; and crim e issues , 28, 66, 71; effect of conservatives on, 117-20, 124, 126 , 143-44 , 196-99; liberal s in, 88-89 , 90 , 117 , 194 ; policies, 47, 183 , 186; principles, 88 , 148 , 202; an d racia l issues , 88-89 ,

234 117-20, 154 , 158-59 ; role, 3; support for , 8-9 , 19 , 188-8 9 Republican Right , 9 ; effect of , 186 , 194-95, 199-200 ; policies, 10 , 198-99, 20 1 Reston, James, 117-1 8 Richardson, Elliott , 8 9 Right an d lef t (politics) , 47, 146 , 193. See also Lef t (politics) ; New Right ; Republican Righ t Riots, 60 , 147 ; causes, 67; criticism of, 63 , 89, 98; results from , 42 , 58,68 Roberts, Paul Craig , 12 7 Rockerfeller, Nelson , 89-9 0 Rodino, Peter, 11 2 Romney, George , 89 Rowan, Carl , 1 9 Rules Committe e (Democrats) , 8 0 Ryan, William, 42-43 , 45 , 47, 65 Sanford, Adelaide , 108 , 15 6 "Savage Discovery " (Ryan) , 4 2 Scalia, Antonin, 18 8 Schlesinger, Arthur , Jr., 154 , 156-5 7 School integration , 62 , 89 , 103 , 179 , 181; oppositio n to , 8 , 24; suppor t for, 51,70 , 147 , 18 0 School principals , 181-8 2 Schools: choice of , 136-42 , 143 . See also Private schools; Public schools; Trade school s School vouchers. See Educationa l vouchers Scott, Hugh, 8 9 Segregation, 6 , 25, 61, 104, 160 ; an d Democratic party , 19 , 2 1, 24, 37 ; in Democratic party , 77 , 78, 80 ; legal end of , 5 , 89 , 180 ; an d Republican party , 24,118-20,194 . See also Discrimination ; Integratio n Self-government, 12 3 Self-help, 98-99 , 106 , 10 9

WRONG FO R ALL TH E RIGHT REASONS

Senate, 129 , 149 ; and B . Clinton, 1 , 162, 195 ; and R . Nixon, 93-94 ; and racia l issues, 24, 71; and R . Reagan, 9 , 12 9 Separatism, 3 , 42, 108 , 154 , 155 ; in Black Powe r movement , 52-53 , 101; an d M . L . King, 99; an d National Welfar e Right s Organ ization, 102-3 . See also Integration ; Segregation Set-asides, 187 , 188 , 18 9 Short-term strategy , 176-77 Shriver, Sargent , 30-31 , 3 2 Shultz, George , 90 , 91, 120 Single-parent family , 2 , 30 , 152 , 173; criticism of , 46 , 160 , 17 4 Sizer, Theodore, 60 , 136-3 7 Sleeper, Jim, 14 7 Social classes , 123 , 159-60 , 200 ; behavior, 169-70 ; difference s between, 52 , 55-57, 160 ; an d inequality, 107 , 147 . See also Upper class ; Lower class ; Middle class; Working clas s Social issues, 186 , 187 , 195 . See also Abortiion; Poverty ; Racial issues ; Urban issue s Social policy, 120 , 128-29 , 171 . See also Antipovert y programs ; Urba n policy Social Security , 9 , 10 , 126 , 141-4 2 Social services , 30-31, 54 ; oppositio n to, 170 ; results from , 58-59 ; government spendin g on , 50 , 57-58 Social statistics , 37, 44, 65, 131 , 169 Social workers, 50 , 5 9 Societal values, 1 , 57; transmittal of , 2, 35 . See also America n value s Souljah, Sister , 14-15 , 16-1 9 South, 91-92 ; politics, 47, 53, 189; schools, 5, 103 ; segregation, 2 1, 24,118-19

INDEX

235

Southerners, 80 , 89 ; and politics , 9 , 78, 114 , 118-19 , 193 . See also Black Southerner s Special Equa l Opportunit y Committe e (Democrats), 78, 8 0 Special interests, 23, 84,112,114, 12 9 Standard o f living , 9, 121 , 185, 186 , 196,201 Starr, Paul , 14 7 State governments, 133 , 138, 196-98. See also Intergovernmenta l relation s Steele, Shelby, 10 9 Stockman, David , 126-27 , 12 9 Striving poor, 173 ; programs for , 164, 169 , 19 9 Student Nonviolen t Coordinatin g Committee (SNCC) , 5 2 Student protests , 52, 12 1 Suburbanization, 29-30 , 107 , 13 1 Suburbs: discrimination in , 61-62 , 6 8 Suburban voters , 19 , 159 , 16 0 Sunstein, Cas s R., 4 6 Supreme Court , 24 , 46, 106 , 140 , 149, 188 , 19 0 Surveys. See Public opinio n

Underclass, 121 , 130, 172 , 173 , 17 4 Unemployment, 2 , 65, 168 , 197 ; and blacks, 35,37,65,92,93; insurance, 148 Unheavenly City, The (Banfield) , 169-70 Unions. See Labor union s Unwed motherhood , 2 , 37 , 44; an d blacks, 30, 35, 43, 46; as campaig n issue, 124 ; causes, 9 Upper class , 56, 75, 146 , 193 ; economic conditions , 162 , 185 , 200; voting, 19 8 Urban issues , 27, 29, 61, 68, 131, 187 Urban policy , 49, 54-55, 61-62, 168 , 177 Urban poor , 28, 49; escape from, 169 ; and M . L . King, 100 ; policies for , 36, 54-55, 61-62,175-76,177-78 ; policy problems , 7 , 28-29, 30-31 , 62, 183 ; problems of , 35 , 40, 50 , 51, 67 , 106-7 , 160 , 167 ; and welfare, 91-92 , 10 3 Urban renewal , 33 , 55

Taxation, 9 , 198 , 200-201; unde r Democratic administrations, 2,125, 162-63; unde r Republica n admin istrations, 10 , 125, 126, 127 ; state, 128,133,196-97. See also Income tax Taylor, Jared, 9 8 Teixeira, Ruy , 19 3 Thomas, Clarence , 106 , 109 , 14 9 Thompson, Frank , 7 6 Thurmond, Strom , 88 , 8 9 Thurow, Leste r C , 18 5 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 129-30 , 16 1 Tollett, Kenneth , 46 , 150-5 1 Trade schools: criticism of, 142-43,17 6 Traditional values . See America n values; Family value s Trenton (N.J.) , 16 8

Values. See American values ; Conservative values; Family values; Societal value s "Vanishing Blac k Family , The, " (CB S program), 15 2 Victim blaming , 42-43, 44-46 , 63, 65, 106 , 10 9 Vietnam War , 5 , 7 , 33, 40, 58, 60 , 114, 125 ; as campaign issue , 5, 75, 76 , 77, 78, 79, 85 ; effect o n domestic issues , 32, 6 2 Viguerie, Richard, 12 4 Violence, 30 , 58, 105 ; causes, 63, 66, 153; fear of , 27 , 102 , 153 ; by local government , 25 . See also Civil disturbances; Crime ; Riot s Voodoo economics , 9 , 12 5

236 Voters, 5, 8,13,19, 86,122,126,160 , 193; attitudes , 10 , 15 , 125 , 129, 149, 177 , 193-94 ; goals, 3. See also Blac k Americans, constituents ; Democratic party , constituents ; Middle class , constituents; Political affiliation ; Republica n party, constituents; Suburban voters; White Americans, voting; Working class, constituent s Voting rights , 24, 51, 89, 9 7 Voting Rights Act (1965), 5, 54, 78, 97 Voting Right s Act (1982) , 18 8 Vouchers fo r schools . See Educationa l vouchers Wallace, George , 24, 27, 53, 79, 86 , 193 Wall Street Journal, 9 , 125 , 12 7 Walters, Ronald, 16-1 7 Wanniski, Jude, 12 5 War o n Poverty, 32-33, 38 , 39-40, 57; creating, 23, 28-29, 30-32 ; oppo sition to, 119-20; and R. Nixon, 90-95 Washington Monthly, 147 , 160-6 1 Wattenberg, Ben , 66, 12 2 Welfare, 37 , 119 , 147 , 171 ; as cam paign issue , 86 , 87, 119 ; as a n entitlement, 103 ; opposition to , 92, 194 ; and Republica n adminis trations, 9 , 91-95; as race neutral , 150-51; reform , 10 , 150 , 170-73 . See also Antipovert y program s Welfare recipients , 70 , 114 , 172 ; attitudes toward , 43 ; services for , 57-59, 171 ; work requirement s for, 3 , 92, 95, 132 , 171 , 172-7 3 Welfare Refor m Ac t (1988) , 17 1 West, Cornel , 106 , 110 , 116 , 157, 202 Weyrich, Paul, 12 4 White, Theodore H. , 29-30, 80 , 8 2 White Americans , 29, 186 ; attitude s toward blacks , 69, 105 , 120 , 151, 153, 154-55 ; attitudes towar d

WRONG FO R ALL THE RIGHT REASONS

integration, 5, 8, 51; black attitude s toward, 187 ; blaming, 38 , 39, 42, 43,44-45, 68 ; effect o f Black Power on, 100-101 , 102 ; resistance t o integration, 5 , 24, 4 1, 51. See also Northerners; Southerner s White backlash , 53 , 63 Whitehead, Barbar a Dafoe , 17 4 White Hous e Tas k Forc e o n Citie s (Ylvisaker Task Force) , 60-62, 13 6 White liberals : labeling, 103 , 149. See also Liberal s White power , 1 8 White racism . See Racisi m White-rights organizations , 9 8 Whitman, Christin e Todd, 128,196-9 8 Whittle Communications , 137 , 14 1 Wildavsky, Aaron , 49 , 6 8 Wilder, Douglas , 1 8 Wiley, George , 103- 4 Wilkins, Roger, 1 7 Wilkins, Roy, 5 8 Williams, Cecil , 4 4 Wilson, James Q. , 123 , 17 1 Wilson, William Julius, 42, 106-7 , 110, 116 , 147 , 150-5 1 Wisconsin, 13 9 Wolfe, Alan , 16 5 Wolfe, Tom , 10 2 Women, 9 , 121 , 173, 198; and politics, 3, 60, 84, 85, 86, 112, 19 2 Work. See Employmen t Working class : constituents, 18 , 86, 88, 124 , 187 ; and Democrati c party, 6 , 8 , 15 ; economic condi tions, 2, 127 , 133 ; and racia l issues, 5 1, 119-20; and Repub lican party, 9 , 91, 193; reuniting, 3 Working poor . See Striving poo r Ylvisaker, Paul , 29, 30, 6 0 Ylvisaker Tas k Force . See White House Tas k Forc e o n Citie s