What the Victorians Got Wrong [1 ed.] 9781846748714

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WHAT THE VICTORIANS GOT WRONG

STAN & TREVOR YORKE

COUNTRYSIDE BOOKS NEWBURY BERKSHIRE

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First published 2008 © Stan & Trevor Yorke, 2008 Reprinted 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction permitted without the prior permission of the publisher: COUNTRYSIDE BOOKS 3 Catherine Road Newbury, Berkshire To view our complete range of books, please visit us at www.countrysidebooks.co.uk ISBN 978 1 84674 114 2 Illustrations by the authors Designed by Peter Davies, Nautilus Design Produced through MRM Associates Ltd., Reading Typeset by CJWT Solutions, St Helens Printed by Information Press, Oxford All material for the manufacture of this book was sourced from sustainable forests.

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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 Chapter 1 HOLDING BACK NATURE The Dale Dyke disaster

7 Chapter 2 IN IRON WE TRUST The Tay Bridge disaster

16 Chapter 3 HANGING BY A WIRE Suspension bridge disasters

26 Chapter 4 IF ONLY WE HAD THOUGHT OF THAT! Railways: the birthplace of operational errors

35 Chapter 5 THE NEVER-ENDING SORROW Fuel for the nation – but at a terrible price

44 Chapter 6 MEDICAL MISTAKES How the imagination made up for a lack of knowledge

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Chapter 7 PLUMBING A world of trial and error

55 Chapter 8 THE FRIEND THAT GOES BANG! Gas – treat with care

62 Chapter 9 IT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD IDEA AT THE TIME Even Brunel could get it wrong

70 Chapter 10 DANGER AT PLAY Leisure-time disasters

82 CONCLUSION 92 INDEX 93

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Introduction

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n the course of writing other books that have dealt in the large part with the successes of the Victorian era, it occurred to us that that there must surely have been some failures among all the triumphs. Once the question was raised, we recalled the tales of disaster that we had come across in our research. We live in a time of development not invention. Throughout the 1900s and into the 21st century, people have been presented with better versions of cars, aeroplanes, trains, telephones and a multitude of other items that we sometimes naively assume were invented by our own generation. The development of an idea is technically challenging and exciting but doesn’t involve the need to accept something that has never been seen before. A classic example is the mobile phone, embodying techniques and components that are at the forefront of modern technology, yet accepted by all without a moment’s thought, simply because the concept was already familiar. Just think how the Victorians would have reacted to the telephone – they simply had nothing to compare it to. The Victorians were faced with massive changes of scale. There had been horsedrawn trams for over 200 years but only on short local lines, then, after just a few decades, railways were widespread and people travelled faster than ever before. The steam engine developed from a lumbering giant into a powerful and reliable source of energy, made in their thousands and producing levels of power only dreamed of before. The era also brought completely new concepts such as electricity and steel – probably the most useful material since wood. There were enormous improvements in agriculture, the chemical industry was born and iron ships were no longer totally dependent on the winds. It is against this tumultuous background that we must view the mistakes that were undoubtedly made. Many were failures not of materials, the strength of which hadn’t been fully understood, but of organisation and understanding of the concept of safety. Victorian society was run by the wealthy who, for generations, had viewed the poor as expendable. Remember that the slave trade was only abolished in 1833 after years of campaigning. Opium was harvested in the British-run Indian subcontinent and brought profit to Britain despite the obvious suffering it caused. The careless attitude to the loss of life caused by disasters was frankly the norm of the day. To the bosses it was a mere inconvenience, to the wretched poor it was something that was just part of life. This way of thinking goes some way to explain why improvements sometimes took so long to be applied.

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The book includes a wide selection of subjects, some dark and tragic, some almost comical, presented as an antidote to the current thinking that all things Victorian were successful. That so much of their achievement is still with us today and so many of their inventions lie behind our current lives is a sign of just how little they did get wrong. Stan and Trevor Yorke

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CHAPTER 1

Holding Back Nature



The Dale Dyke disaster

Dale Dyke Dam, Bradfield, South Yorkshire On the night of 11 March 1864 the newly-completed dam holding one of the Bradfield reservoirs burst causing one of the worst disasters in British history. How could such an apparently simple structure, designed and built by experienced men, fail the first time it was put to the test?

11 March 1864

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he wind was howling down the valley as William Horsefield made his way tentatively across the new dam keeping just below the top edge to shelter from the elements. This huge earthen structure had taken over five years to complete and was the largest of a series of four around Bradfield. The dams were

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needed to supply the increasing amount of power demanded by the burgeoning city of Sheffield eight miles down the valley. As Horsefield reached the centre of the dam he noticed a crack running horizontally for 50 yards along the surface, large enough to fit one finger in. He thought it was probably caused by frost but still informed a colleague as the dam was now full to the brim for the first time. After some debate they decided to contact the engineer. John Gunson, the resident engineer, had visited the dam earlier in the day to inspect the effects of the gale and waves on the dam but had left at around 4 pm, satisfied that all was well. It was probably with some surprise that he later opened the door of his Sheffield home to a young man saying a crack had been found and he must come with all speed. Gunson and The moment that John Gunson ran for his a colleague made their way by horse life as the dam above him ripped apart. and trap to the dam where they found workmen had already opened the huge sluices at the bottom to start lowering the water and relieve the pressure on the structure. The engineer inspected the crack and decided that there was no imminent danger but to be safe he suggested blowing up the weir at the side to speed up the drainage. Their efforts with dynamite were thwarted by the damp conditions so Gunson returned to look at the crack – now he was more concerned as waves were splashing over the top and running into the opening at his feet. He decided to monitor the rate at which the water was draining so made his way carefully down the embankment to the valve house at the bottom of the dam. No sooner was he inside than shouts from above made him look back up. His heart must have sunk and his body frozen when in the dim light he saw the earth dam simply peeling away creating a huge chasm through which a dark wall of foaming water now began to pour. The engineer turned and ran for his life scrambling up the side of the valley as the first gush of water roared past his feet. The gap ruptured into a massive breach, releasing an immense 650 million gallons of water down the narrow valley directly towards the city of Sheffield.

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A map showing the main area of destruction marked by the dark strip along the middle. This eight-mile section from the dam down into the middle of Sheffield was flooded in less than half an hour.

The first village in the path of the deluge was Low Bradfield but, luckily, word that there was a problem had spread among those who worked on the project and, at the first sign of trouble, those who hadn’t already left scrambled to high ground. A short way further on, though, people were still fast asleep and unaware of the night’s events. Travelling at around a mile a minute, the 9 ft wall of water simply demolished their homes. Whole families were wiped out in seconds, drowned in the relentless flow of ice-cold water. In Sheffield it stormed through factories, demolished bridges, and uprooted trees until finally dissipating miles downstream between Rotherham and Doncaster. As daylight broke the full horror of the scene became apparent. An eight-mile sea of mud and water, with fragmented buildings, severed rows of houses, and shattered machinery was all that remained of this once fertile and industrious valley. Policemen and volunteers were literally pulling bodies out of the quagmire, some with just a naked limb sticking out, others trapped in their houses where they met their fate. Tragedy was everywhere. Three children were found dead in the bed they were sleeping in when the waters overcame them. Their family could only afford to rent a basement so when the flood came it would have engulfed the underground room in seconds, swiftly taking the children’s lives. Some were lucky. A girl was found in her bed in the corner of her room, even though the house around her had been wiped away, and another family survived by floating on their bed while the waters rushed around them. One woman had been working away from home and returned to find her approach blocked by the flood. She became hysterical as her six children had all been inside when the waters swept right through her property. It took her a while to get to the house whereupon she

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One of the worst hit areas was at Malin Bridge on the outskirts of Sheffield. In this scene a whole row of houses including a pub were simply flattened by the force of the water; the piles of rubble and lines of foundations are all that remain as policemen search for bodies in the thick mud.

was relieved to find that four of them were upstairs and had survived the deluge. Shouting down from the bedroom they told her that the other two had not been so lucky and had been trapped downstairs. Eventually the mother made her way into the house to search for the bodies. She had no luck until she opened a cupboard high on the wall and the two pale figures were found. For a moment hearts sank but as their mother lifted them carefully down they opened their eyes. They related to their joyous mother how the elder brother, on seeing their escape route blocked, had lifted his sister into the cupboard and closed the door to keep the water out. They had simply fallen asleep unaware of the concern outside. The immense scale of the tragedy soon became apparent. Over 240 people had perished, and around 60 more died of their injuries. Nearly 700 animals had been lost. More than 400 houses, 100 businesses, 20 bridges and 80 other buildings were either partly or completely destroyed. A further 4,000 properties were flooded, many of which were abandoned due to the damage. It was the worst man-made disaster in Victorian Britain and is still arguably the most devastating on land. Shock quickly turned to anger though, as those who were picking up the pieces began to ask questions. Many dams like this had been built and this one had been designed by a leading engineer, so why had it failed? What happened that night? Who was to blame for the Dale Dyke disaster?

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H O L D I N G B A C K N AT U R E Development of Dams Dams have been built ever since people first needed a reliable source of water. One of the earliest recorded examples was ironically also one of the first recorded failures as it was destroyed by heavy rain shortly after completion nearly 4500 years ago. In Europe dams were widespread, especially in the Low Countries where they were used to keep sea water away from inland areas. The convenient crossing point provided by the dam attracted settlement. The dam across the river Amstel became the site of Amsterdam and that across the river Rotte lead to the growth of Rotterdam. In Britain dams have been built since Roman times. In the medieval period they were used to create fish and mill ponds, and later to supply a head of water for small-scale industries.

The memorial plaque in Holmfirth which records the height to which the water reached when the dam burst. Building large earthen dams was not straightforward. The year before the plans were put forward for the Bradfield Scheme a similar structure had burst in the hills above Holmfirth, the tranquil setting for Last of the Summer Wine. The resulting deluge killed 81 people and left hundreds out of work. The Bilberry Dam had been planned by George Leather, who was, ironically, the uncle of the Dale Dyke designer, but he did not have the necessary tight control over the project. His concerns were ignored by the owners who were desperate to improve the water supply to industries further down the valley. Problems with the dam sagging, leakage and a partly blocked waste outlet went unresolved. Heavy rain in the preceding weeks resulted in a sudden breach on 5 February 1852 and 86 million gallons of water poured down the valley killing 81 people, destroying mills, houses and bridges, and leaving more than 7000 out of work.

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Large-scale earthworks to contain water became necessary when the canal network was developed in the late 18th century. Reservoirs were constructed to supply a reliable source of water into the summit levels. Although the steam engine is credited as being the driving force behind the industrial revolution, running water was in fact a far more widespread source of power in many regions during the Victorian period. For example, rivers drove the water wheels of industry in Sheffield. It was the demands of mill and factory owners which encouraged the Sheffield Waterworks Company to put forward a proposal to build the Bradfield Scheme, a series of four major reservoirs on the edge of the Peak District. The largest at Dale Dyke would hold 700 million gallons.

The Inquiry into the Dale Dyke Disaster Earthen dams are not simply a massive mound of soil and stones. They have to be carefully designed to suit the demands of each individual site and crucially need to have a watertight wall. The dam at Dale Dyke was designed by John Towlerton Leather whose uncle was responsible for the collapsed dam at Holmfirth. It had a central vertical clay puddle wall which prevented water from seeping out. The sloping embankment on each side was principally there to support this 100 ft high wall. To one end was a waste water channel over which excess could pour while beneath the dam itself ran two 18-inch diameter pipes with a valve house on the outer edge from which the out flow of water could be controlled. During the inquiry the designer and resident engineer were both questioned at length about the wisdom of running the outlet pipes below the structure. Many thought that a leak from these may have caused the puddle wall to fail. The inquiry concluded that the workmanship and design were not up to the job, but with no specific reason for the failure there were no prosecutions. Later the Water Company inspectors claimed that the pipes were found to be intact. There was an alternative suggestion that a landslip to one side of the embankment had initiated the collapse. For more than a A cross-section of the dam century the disaster was debated but the next day showing the breach and no conclusion was reached. highlighting the puddle wall which It was not until the late 1970s that was designed to make the structure watertight. G.M. Binnie, Vice President of the

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The sequence of events in three diagrams as they may have happened according to research by G.M. Binnie. In (A) the wall has sunk further over the deeper step in the foundation, creating a crack. In (B) water has seeped through taking with it sediment from inside the dam, leaving a void behind the wall. As this grows the unsupported wall leans back slightly, creating the crack on the facing side which Gunson came to inspect. Finally in (C) the moment of failure as water bursts into the void. As waves pour over the top the central section begins to collapse.

Institute of Civil Engineers and an expert on dam failures, made an extensive study of all the evidence about the Dale Dyke collapse. He came to the conclusion that the puddle wall had ruptured some time during construction and the leak had eroded the central core, resulting in the breach. It was not until 1979, when he came across an original diagram of the dam, that he could confidently explain the leak. The problem was something of which the engineers in the 1860s would have been unaware. Puddle walls will naturally settle over time and sink slightly. This was evident when cracks appeared in dams which had their waste pipes running through a raised concrete channel within the structure. The wall to each side of the channel would be higher and would sink more, creating a crack between it and the shorter section over the channel. It was important therefore that the foundations were level so the puddle wall was of consistent height. At Dale Dyke the pipes were sunk into a channel and therefore would not affect the wall above. The breakthrough for Binnie came because he discovered on the original plans that there had been a problem with the foundations. The builders had had to dig down to find a watertight base on which to set the puddle wall. In the centre an unusual shelf in the bedrock meant that they had to dig down a further 50 ft to find a good foundation. This step was directly below the failed section. It seems that the taller section of wall sank further than the shorter, causing the crack which led to the eventual failure.

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The Aftermath It was in the aftermath of the Holmfirth flood that Dale Dyke was first proposed. Local businessmen, worried by this disaster, had ensured that the water company would be liable for any damage should this new dam fail. This fortunate step meant that they could not wriggle out of paying compensation for the damage caused. There was also a notable public outpouring of support which, unusually for the period, was not confined to the locality, even the Queen contributed. However, it is to the discredit of Victorian society that the surplus money that remained after the initial claims were fulfilled was simply returned to the donors, nothing was put back into the area and no memorial was erected. Even worse though was the action of the water company. They used contacts in Parliament to have an act passed which permitted them to raise the water rates by 25 per cent over a period of 25 years. In effect the people of Sheffield ended up paying for their own compensation.

At the northern end of the old dam a memorial has been erected by the local historical society and a series of stones has been laid out marking the centre line of the bank (marked with CLOB). A footpath leads down to a new footbridge by the site of the dam and then on to its replacement.

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Some of those who lost their lives that night were buried at High Bradfield church. The Tricketts’ gravestone records the passing of James, Elizabeth and their three children ‘in the Great Flood, at Malin Bridge, caused by the bursting of the Bradfield Reservoir’.

At the abandoned chapel at Loxley is probably the most moving memorial, recording the loss of Eliza Armitage, her two sons, their wives and seven children, all 12 members of the family dying at Malin Bridge. The photo on the left shows the head of the gravestone and the section on the right lists one of Eliza’s son’s family.

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CHAPTER 2

In Iron We Trust



The Tay Bridge disaster

The Tay Bridge Disaster ‘Beautiful railway bridge of the Silv’ry Tay! Alas! I am very sorry to say, That ninety lives have been taken away, On the last Sabbath day of 1879, Which will be remember’d for a very long time.’ The opening lines to McGonagall’s poem are quite prophetic as this remains the most famous of Victorian disasters. As you will find, it was a failing in the ironwork which lead to the collapse. This was not the first time that too much faith had been placed in this material which was the backbone of the industrial revolution.

28 December 1879

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he Tay Bridge was a wonder of its age. Stretching over two miles it was the longest bridge in the world. A slender line of iron columns and girders over 100 ft high was supported by 84 piers across the estuary of the river Tay. Not

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The Tay Bridge viewed from Dundee on the northern bank as completed in early 1878. The trains passed over the approach sections then between the high girders which were raised up to give clearance for shipping.

only was it an ambitious spectacle but also a financial success. Train journeys between Edinburgh and Dundee were reduced by over half an hour which proved very worthwhile to the North British Railway Company. This colossal project had been placed by them in the safe hands of their leading engineer, Thomas Bouch, who was experienced in building similar iron girder bridges. Much of the structure was designed in a conventional manner but the central 13 spans were different as they had to allow clearance for ships’ masts. The gaps between the columns were longer and the girders were raised so the trains passed between rather than above them. The completion of the bridge was such a momentous feat that Queen Victoria made the crossing herself shortly before she knighted Bouch for his accomplishment. On 28 December 1879 the weather had been fine but as darkness fell a storm approached and soon gale-force winds were rattling down the Forth of Tay and over the city of Dundee. At the southern end of the bridge just after 6 pm a local train collected the baton before crossing and proceeded out into the dark. Shortly afterwards the guard on the train noticed sparks flying off the wheels and tried to warn the driver who was unaware of what was going on behind him and carried on over the bridge. When they pulled into Dundee station the train was inspected but finding nothing amiss the guard did not report the incident. An hour later a larger train from Edinburgh slowed down to collect its baton from the cabin at the southern end and passed onto the bridge at 7.13 pm. The signalman then entered the details in his book while a colleague watched the train vanish into the dark. He was able to see its progress by the sparks flying off the wheels just as they had on the previous train; however, he was alarmed when suddenly there was a bright flash and then nothing, just the black of night. At the railway station on the northern end staff were growing concerned

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The view that may have confronted the stationmaster as he found the central section of the bridge missing and a 100 ft drop to the raging river beneath his feet.

that the train from Edinburgh, due in at 7.15, had not arrived, and members of the public were adding to the anxiety by stating that they had seen a flash of fire along the new bridge. It was down to the stationmaster and locomotive superintendent to investigate. After confirming with the signalman that the missing train had entered the southern end of the bridge at 7.13 pm and that communication had since been lost with the other end, there was nothing else to do but walk along the bridge to find out what had happened. As they stepped into the gloom, finding it hard to keep their footing in the battering side winds, they had no idea of the horror which would confront them when on reaching the central section of the bridge they saw it was gone. They were standing above a pier, with the raging sea below and a huge void for at least three of the spans ahead. Convinced that they had seen a red light on the other end of the bridge the men were still hopeful that the train had pulled up short of the fall and returned to the station. However, baggage was soon found washed ashore and it became clear that the falling structure must have taken the train

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The remains of the bridge the following day with only a few tiers of the columns on the first and third pier.

with it. Boats arrived to help with the search for survivors but none were found. In daylight the full scale of the disaster unfolded. The whole central section of the bridge had simply gone – taking the locomotive, carriages and 75 passengers and

Dee Bridge, Chester. 24 May 1847 Even the great engineer Robert Stephenson got it wrong. He put too much trust in iron when designing a new railway bridge across the river Dee at Chester. It comprised cast-iron girders formed out of three sections bolted together and laid in pairs onto masonry piers. These were given extra support from wrought-iron chains fixed above

the ends and running down to hold the centre section. The design looks too flat and flimsy, and so it proved to be as only six months after opening and on the day Stephenson instructed workmen to pour tons of ballast over the girders one of them collapsed as a train passed across. The driver managed to get the engine over but its tender was thrown up and the carriages behind tumbled back into the river taking the lives of four passengers. The bridge was not strong enough, the chains were ineffective, and due to the movement of trains a crack had developed. It probably failed on that day because of the extra weight of the ballast. Modern research has suggested that a decorative piece of casting concentrated the load into a sharp corner and this is likely to have been the point of failure.

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Hartley Colliery Disaster 16 January 1862 The reliance upon iron had its most heartbreaking consequences at this Northumberland coalfield. Many mines at this time had only one shaft down which the lifts ran, while steam engines pumped out the water. There was also a wooden framework running down the shaft separating the pumping and lift machinery. A huge 40 ton cast-iron beam pivoted in the centre transferred the motion of the steam engine to the pumps but on this day, just as a shift was changing, it broke down the middle and one half plummeted down the shaft. The debris it took down with it blocked the entrance to the mine and when after six days rescuers managed to get through they found that toxic fumes had caused everyone to suffocate. As there were two shifts present more than 200 people died, 36 of whom were boys under the age of 16. Although overloading was suggested as the cause, it is more likely the fail was due to poor casting and what is now known as metal fatigue. This view shows the beam of the steam engine broken down the middle. The missing part which should have been on the right of this picture plummeted down the mine shaft.

crew with them. The disaster was compounded by a rule that all carriage doors should be locked after leaving a station, if anyone had survived the fall they would have had no chance of escaping the freezing watery tomb. All that was left were the brick and stone piers and a few tattered pieces of ironwork. How had such an important structure designed by a leading engineer simply toppled over only a year after it was opened? Was it bad design, poor construction, neglected maintenance? Or was it blown down by the exceptional wind? Investigations began almost immediately and would have telling consequences.

Background to the Use of Iron Iron was the backbone of industry. Developments during the 18th century made the mass-production of iron possible and it soon became essential for steam engines, bridges, railways and factories. There were two basic types, cast iron which could be moulded into virtually any shape, and wrought iron which was rolled out into flat or angled bars. Cast iron was strong when compressed but considerably weaker when under tension. Wrought iron had equal qualities and was crucially up to four times stronger than cast iron when under tension. These two types of iron could be used independently when compressive or tensile strength was needed, or together in a structure which required both properties. However, there were problems with iron. Casting was not a simple process and could leave brittle sections or hairline cracks

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IN IRON WE TRUST invisible to the eye. The Victorians were also unaware of metal fatigue, the deterioration of iron through regular wear and loading over time. Long before the Tay Bridge disaster there were warnings of what could happen when too much faith was put in iron. A number of bridges had collapsed due to a failure in their girders. The most notable example, over the river Dee at Chester, nearly resulted in the great railway engineer Robert Stephenson being charged with manslaughter. Fatigue, hairline cracks or poor fixings had resulted in the break up of train wheels with disastrous effects, as had happened only a few years earlier at Shipton-on-Cherwell in Oxfordshire when a rim broke away derailing the train and resulting in 34 deaths. Fracturing of cast iron had also caused accidents with steam engines, as at the Hartley Colliery tragedy in 1862, while its failure in the structure of Radcliffe’s Mill, Oldham in 1844 resulted in five storeys of the building collapsing. When the railway age began there were a number of options for carrying the tracks across water. The problem was that a heavy locomotive not only created a concentrated vertical load but also lateral movement which meant any structure would have to resist its weight and be rigid enough to handle the vibration. Suspension bridges were soon found to be unsuitable (although they were successfully used in America) and most small waterways were crossed on castiron structures or stone and brick arches. These were often unsuitable for large expanses of water due to their weight and the difficulty in creating spans wide enough to permit shipping. The answer was the truss, an arrangement of wrought-iron girders set in triangles – the only geometric shape that cannot be distorted. Although many different types were developed the lattice girder with closely packed diagonal pieces was widely used, set upon stone, brick or cast-iron piers.

Constructing the Tay Bridge When Thomas Bouch made his first plans for the Tay Bridge he designed a long line of such girders resting upon brick, stone and concrete piers across the whole length of the bridge with a series of high girders of greater span in the middle for shipping to pass beneath. Things, however, started to wrong from the outset as the survey of the seabed which had promised sufficiently solid foundations for this heavy structure proved to be inaccurate and Bouch had to redesign the bridge at short notice. In 1875 he changed the location of a number of piers and made the upper parts with cast-iron columns to reduce the pressure on the foundations. The resulting precarious and slender structure was especially top heavy at the central high girder section which, with little horizontal strengthening, meant the sets of columns on each side could move independently of each other. Despite these concerns, construction was fairly rapid and, in February 1878, the Tay Bridge was deemed fit for carrying the load of passing trains by the inspector, Major-General Hutchinson. It is worth noting that afterwards he stated that he

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A close up of the lower section of the Tay Bridge towers. The columns comprised short cast-iron sections bolted vertically to each other and fixed to the base with bolts running down into only the top two courses of the stonework. Resistance to lateral movement from the trains and wind was provided by wrought-iron cross bracing attached to the columns at castiron lugs. The high girders above were attached to each other in groups of four or five with an expansion gap between the sets. Their high position raised the centre of gravity of this middle section. The added weight of ballast (which had not been originally planned for) and that of the train made this slender structure terribly top heavy.

would like to see the effects of high winds striking the side of the bridge before being completely convinced. Unfortunately, he fell ill before this could be carried out and by the time he had recovered the bridge was open. No one seems to have been too concerned about this final test.

Why the Tay Bridge Fell It was only a short while after the opening that the first signs of trouble appeared. People working on the bridge noticed that there was excessive movement when trains passed and many of the cross-bracing straps were found to be loose. Rather than contacting Bouch, who was still responsible for the maintenance of the bridge, the inexperienced man on site just packed out the joints, which stopped them rattling but did not reinstate their structural integrity. As the wind battered against the side of the bridge and the cast-iron columns were pushed sideways, the wrought-iron diagonal bracing designed to resist this pressure should have held firm. It seems, however, that they were not up to the job, especially at the point where they were fixed to the columns with cast-iron lugs. Although the wrought-iron straps were strong under tension the cast-iron fixings were not, and with a large number already disabled the remaining pieces were not strong enough to withstand the wind and the added weight of the express train passing overhead. As the train entered the central section the columns beneath

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IN IRON WE TRUST Close-up of the junction between the cast-iron column sections and the ends of the diagonal crossbracing. The wrought-iron straps were strong in tension but as pressure was applied by the wind it was the cast-iron lugs which gave way. This failure was also due to poor casting and conical bolt holes so all the pressure was applied to one edge.

began to fail and, trapped within the girders, the locomotive and carriages were taken down as the whole mighty structure toppled over into the freezing waters 100 ft below. As the girders were connected in groups they dragged each other down scattering the columns which had not been firmly fixed together at the top.

The Aftermath The inquiry was immediate, thorough and to this day, despite much re-examination of evidence, is generally regarded as having made the correct assessment. After finding little fault with the foundations or the lattice girder spans they concentrated their efforts upon the cast-iron columns and cross-bracing which supported the high girder section. Two crucial finds were the numerous broken ends of the castiron lugs which held the straps to the columns and conical shaped holes for the connecting bolts. These meant that the bolts did not apply even pressure to the lugs which, being cast-iron, were not especially strong in tension. In many cases it was also found that they were poorly cast and had simply snapped off. After more recent analysis it has been added that the structure probably included a weakened girder which had been damaged both during construction and by the lateral action caused by passing trains. In summary, the inquiry pointed the finger of blame at Bouch for the changes made, lack of maintenance and inadequate cross-bracing that could not withstand the strong winds which were well known in the estuary. Bouch, who had already laid the foundation stone for his next project, the Forth rail bridge, found his career in ruins and died later the following year, reportedly a broken man. His great suspension bridge across the Firth of Forth was put on hold and later dropped in

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When the Forth rail bridge was designed in the wake of the Tay Bridge disaster it had to be strong enough to resist a wind pressure up to six times that which Thomas Bouch had allowed for in his ill-fated structure.

preference to a stunning new design by Baker and Fowler which for the first time in this country was to be made of steel (which is strong under both compression and tension) and used the cantilever principle. As there was now national concern about the stability of bridges in high winds the new Forth rail bridge had to reassure the public of its strength so it was made to resist a wind pressure of 56 psi rather than 10 which Bouch had allowed for at the Tay Bridge. Some say it is over engineered but it had to be to put the public’s mind at rest. Meanwhile a new Tay rail bridge was rebuilt alongside the old, this time with a double track creating the wider and substantially stronger structure which still stands to this day. There are remnants of the first bridge, however. The bases of the piers were retained to act as breakwaters for the new bridge behind it, and some of the girders were re-used albeit with additionally strengthening. Most incredible of all was that the locomotive which plunged into the sea on that fateful night was salvaged, repaired and carried on in service for another 25 years, although it was always known to the railway men as ‘the Diver’. Understandably there were few who would drive it across the silvery waters of the Tay!

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The second Tay rail bridge was designed with double tracks making a far more substantial structure which still stands to this day. Many of the lattice girders from the original bridge were reused in the new one. Notice the line of pier bases from the original structure which provide a poignant reminder of that fateful winter’s night.

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CHAPTER 3

Hanging By A Wire



Suspension bridge disasters

Great Yarmouth Suspension Bridge Disaster 1845 As the crowd watched a circus act from the bridge over the river Bure, one of the chains snapped sending hundreds of spectators into the tidal waters.

2 May 1845

I

n these days of 24-hour entertainment it is hard to imagine a time without television, radio, or films. Although wealthy Victorians had access to the theatre and sport, the working majority enjoyed small-scale local or travelling acts which lit up the little leisure time they had. The arrival of the circus in town generated much excitement. This was very much the case when Cooke’s Equestrian Company arrived on 2 May 1845 in Great Yarmouth, a small but developing town

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HANGING BY A WIRE of 25,000 people on the Norfolk coast. To promote the circus, word was spread that Nelson the Clown would travel up the river Bure in a washtub pulled by four geese. Hundreds of people, especially local children, gathered to watch his arrival. Many realised that the best view would be from the bridge and they made their way onto the structure to see the spectacle. What they had crowded onto was a suspension bridge over the tidal river Bure which had been opened in 1829. It comprised a pair of pillars on each bank from which iron chains were suspended across the river with vertical hangers supporting the metal and wooden deck. When the railway arrived in 1844 it provided an important link between the town and the station, so walkways were fixed on either side of the bridge to cope with the increase in traffic. It was along these that the crowds stood in the pouring rain on the fateful day. At around 5 pm a gun was fired and the clown, washtub and geese were carried by the current of the incoming tide towards their destination at the suspension bridge while children ran along the banks to keep up with them. As he approached the bridge more spectators ran onto it jostling for the best view from the south side. It was then that some noticed the usually upward arc of the deck was almost flat under the strain, and although some warned of the danger this was taken as an attempt to take their place on the bridge so few moved. Suddenly there was crack, then another and another – and before anyone had a chance to react one side of the deck collapsed into the river taking with it hundreds of spectators. Many went straight down, some hung on to the remaining chains or railings, others tried to swim to safety. One girl was saved as she hung on to a man’s leg until he pulled her up, her sister was less fortunate. Another child was saved when his resourceful mother held his clothes in her teeth so her hands were free to haul him out. Those who had seen the disaster tried to help, manning boats and pulling survivors from the river before the rising tide and strong current could soon take them down. It was too late for many though. Some were found with their hands still gripping the rail and a number of children who had been sitting with their legs between the railings were also trapped, unable to get back up because of the mass of people on top of them. It is recorded that around 80 died on that day, three quarters of whom were under the age of 18. It is likely though that the total may have been higher as the strong currents could have carried bodies out to sea. How could a structure suddenly collapse and turn a joyous occasion into a heartbreaking tragedy?

The Development of Suspension Bridges Suspension bridges were developed in the far east thousands of years ago, many taking the form of bamboo ropes tied down at either end and holding a wooden slatted deck across rivers and ravines. As early as the 6th century AD the Chinese had developed larger structures with iron chains, yet there is no evidence that the idea was adopted in Europe. The first records here are drawings by an Italian

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A view of the disaster (top) and the same site today (bottom). A tower from the old town walls stands in both views. The bridge was later replaced with a different form of suspended deck bridge which features on the pub sign to the left. This was by-passed in 1972 and later removed.

architect in the late 16th century and the first known suspension bridge in Britain was built around 1741 over the river Tees near Middleton. It is notable that this earliest of British suspension bridges was also the first to fail, as a support snapped

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A large 19th-century suspension bridge. The depth and method of anchoring bridges varied and may have been less elaborate in Great Yarmouth.

in 1802 killing a number of people. It was not until the early 19th century with the mass production of wrought iron that the first large-scale suspension bridges were built. One of the main advantages of suspension bridges is that they don’t need piers or temporary scaffolding for support during construction. This became important as people needed to cross larger rivers along which tall, wide ships travelled. An arched or beam bridge was often not suitable because of the obstruction caused by the piers. Suspension bridges were also cheaper and quicker to build as the expensive ground work was not needed. Captain Samuel Brown was the pioneer of wrought-iron chain links for suspension bridges, and it was he who designed the first bridge suitable for vehicular use in 1820, the Union Bridge over the river Tweed. He was approached by Thomas Telford for advice in constructing his Menai Strait bridge, the first major suspension type in the country, and he also built one in 1830 on the Stockton to Darlington railway where the short-comings of this type of bridge began to be exposed as the concentrated load of a steam locomotive caused the deck to be unstable. It was replaced by a more conventional bridge after only 12 years.

Why the Yarmouth Bridge Fell It was at this time – as doubts about the safety and durability of suspension bridges were first being voiced – that the Yarmouth one collapsed. The man behind its construction was a local landowner, Robert Cory. He had attempted to build a bridge and turnpike road beyond but with little success. One morning in 1826 he discovered surveyor’s markers on neighbouring land for a similar scheme and, realising this would by-pass his land, he quickly secured an Act of Parliament to have a bridge built on the site of his ferry and gain a monopoly on crossing the river Bure. After travelling around the country viewing new bridges he decided upon a suspension type and employed his own man Goddard to design the structure. After

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The gravestone of George Beloe which stands at St Nicholas’s church. It can be found against the railings on the right just through the main south entrance to the church yard. George Beloe was only nine years old when he perished in the disaster. This is the only known memorial to survive and contains a carving of the bridge collapse (see below).

his son had viewed the plans and cast doubt on whether they would work Cory called in an architect to oversee the project. Building started in 1828 and the bridge opened on 25 April 1829. It is not clear whether anyone involved in its planning or construction had any experience in building iron chain suspension bridges. After the collapse on 2 May 1845 the remains of the structure were examined by Mr Walker, the ex-president of the Institute of Civil Engineers. His conclusion was that the immediate cause of the accident was a defect in a joint or welding of the bar which first gave way. He noted that the quality of the iron and the general workmanship was poor in places. He mentioned that the addition of the walkways along the sides changed the original load and stability of the structure and the use A close-up of the carving of the suspension bridge collapse on the gravestone. The central section is worn out but the towers are clearly visible.

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HANGING BY A WIRE of the bridge by a mass of people appears not to have been allowed for in the original plans. The coroner’s jury came to the same verdict but as the builder of the bridge was dead it was decided there was no one to prosecute. Despite the loss of life and widespread grief there has never been a monument erected to the disaster The left elevation shows the original design and the only reminder of the fateful with a mass of spectators standing to day is the gravestone of nine-year-old one side. Their weight would be carried George Beloe in St Nicholas’s by both sets of chains although not evenly. churchyard which features a carving of The right-hand view shows the bridge with the collapsing bridge. It is also unclear the walkways which were added a year what happened to Nelson the Clown. before the disaster. In this case more He may have been the proprietor of weight would be carried by the southern the circus, William Cooke, who was at chains and the deck may have become the inquiry. After this all traces of him unbalanced. disappear and the circus itself seems to have lasted only a short time longer. It is hard without plans and accurate details of the bridge before and during the collapse to elaborate further on the cause. If the walkways had been fixed onto the outside of the hangers and the bulk of the people were on this part, then their weight would have been taken mainly by the southern chains and not by both as would have been originally planned. This would have put a load far greater than the builders ever would have contemplated as they had allowed only for the deck between the hangers. A witness stated that the deck went flat and sagged before there was a crack so it would seem that the main cause was overloading of the southern chains due to the extra walkways upsetting the balance. It was at the weakest point, a poorly made joint, that the chain failed. There were other possible causes of the failure, ones which affected other suspension bridges and which were so serious that they almost brought their use to an end.

Spectator Collapses Failures similar to that at Great Yarmouth occurred on a number of bridges where it is believed that the sheer weight of a crowd or their load being concentrated on just one side caused a break in the structure. One of Samuel Brown’s bridges at Montrose failed during a boat race while another at Langholm in the borders collapsed in 1871 under the weight of around 200 spectators shortly after it was built. The suspension bridge across the river Ure at Middleham in Yorkshire which collapsed in October 1830 apparently broke under the weight of passing cattle and was replaced by a more conventional structure.

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Pedestrian Oscillations A surprising effect of foot passengers crossing suspension bridges is one that can still catch architects unaware today. It seems to occur when a mass of people walk across in time with each other, a situation that recently occurred on the Millennium Bridge in London and forced its closure while dampers were inserted to reduce the motion. In the 19th century it was marching soldiers who were the first to South Esk Bridge, Montrose 1829 find out about this effect. There is scant Designed by Samuel Brown, the pioneer of iron chain bridges, this elegant information about one particular event structure spanned the Esk with a 432 ft on a suspension bridge in Broughton, reach between its large stone towers. It Manchester on 12 April 1831. A had pairs of chains, one set a foot above regiment was marching across the the other, running on either side of the suspension bridge over the river Irwell bridge with independent suspender rods and the structure collapsed. It is claimed hanging down to hold the rather fragile that this was the incident that led to the deck. Trouble occurred during a boat army regulation that soldiers should race when the crowd following the march out of step when crossing competition suddenly moved from one bridges. side to the other causing the upper chain An event of far greater influence was to drop due to a problem with the saddle that which occurred in Angers, France which held it over the top of the towers. in 1850 when some 400 soldiers were Three spectators died in the accident. sent falling into the river after the Luckily the lower chain was strong suspension bridge they were crossing enough to keep the bridge intact. gave way. More than 200 men died and one of the leading nations in suspension bridge design halted their use and brought to an end their development. The French were perfecting the use of cables rather than the chain links that were preferred in Britain, and it was the Americans who borrowed many of their ideas and became the leaders in the field in the late 19th century, most notably with the immense Brooklyn Bridge in New York. The cause of these collapses appears to be the frequency of vibration induced by the mass of marching feet. If it is a similar low frequency to that of the bridge then it can cause movement which can quickly overload the chains or cables.

Wind Related Collapses A more common occurrence seems to be failure due to a strong wind. A number of bridges, including Telford’s famous Menai Strait bridge, collapsed during storms. Samuel Brown’s suspension bridge at Montrose which had already broken under the weight of spectators, collapsed again in October 1838 during a gale. There seems to be an acceptance that this was just one of the characteristics of this type of bridge and that strengthening the deck would reduce the risk of it occurring again. What the Victorians did not realise was that it was not just the force of the

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Menai Strait Suspension Bridge 1836 Thomas Telford faced a major problem with his road to Holyhead. The Menai Strait would have to be crossed in such a way as not to obstruct the passage of large naval ships. This ruled out all the types of bridge which would require temporary scaffolding (centering) during construction and which would be obstacles for the masts or hulls of craft. A suspension bridge of unprecedented scale was the best solution. Telford consulted Samuel Brown before building the 100 ft-high structure. However, like Brown, Telford was unaware of the effects the wind could have upon the relatively fragile deck and in 1836 a gale ripped it to bits. It was rebuilt with stronger and more substantial rails to stiffen the deck and having had replacement chains in 1940 still carries traffic today.

wind which broke them up but the effect it had upon the aerodynamics of the deck. It was recorded at Montrose that the deck had oscillated and twisted in the middle by around three to four feet. This peculiar movement was not just the wind swinging the structure but was caused by eddies which were lifting and dropping the downwind side causing torsion which eventually broke the deck up. It was not until 1940 that this was first appreciated when a cameraman was fortunately in the right place to record the last moments of the Tacoma Straits suspension bridge in America. His famous film shows the shocking effects a moderate wind had upon a modern steel structure, so much so that it disintegrated in front of his eyes. Studies were made into the aerodynamics of the deck and two

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distinctive types of bridge were developed. One has an open truss below which stiffens the deck while allowing the wind to pass through as used at the Forth road and Tamar bridges. The other has a deck with a profile like that of an aircraft wing, a more elegant solution pioneered in Britain at the first Severn bridge and the Humber bridge.

The End of Victorian Suspension Bridges In the wake of these problems in the first half of the 19th century, suspension bridges fell out of favour with engineers. This was not just due to their failings but because the rapidly expanding railway network was where most new bridges were needed. The concentrated load of a train caused so much instability in the structure that they were replaced by new girder or truss bridges. The suspension bridge was best suited to carry roads but due to the railways few major routes were built in the late-Victorian period. One notable project was planned by Thomas Bouch who, while completing his infamous Tay Bridge (see Chapter 2) planned a colossal twinspan suspension bridge to carry trains across the Firth of Forth. The failure of the Tay Bridge in 1879 meant that his design was shelved and the famous cantilevered structure was built in its place. It was not until the development of high-tensile steel cables and the increased demand for large road bridges after the Second World War that suspension bridges once again came into favour.

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CHAPTER 4

If Only We Had Thought Of That! Railways: the birthplace of operational errors



The scene after the Clayton Tunnel crash. The engine had virtually climbed over the last coach of the second train, completely destroying it and accounting for most of the fatalities. The tunnel would have been filled with noise, steam, people crying and the injured calling for help. The public’s fear of tunnels was justified, it was dark and access for rescuers was very limited with the floor covered in debris.

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I

t is very easy to think that the railways had a terrible accident record, particularly in the early days. This is partly due to the attitude to the railways at the time. If we consider tragic events of the 1800s, there are mining accidents, occasional disasters at sea, thankfully rare breakdown of structures, and the railways. The first three were perceived as partly inevitable or as acts of God whereas railways were entirely man-made and everything that happened on them was the result of man’s actions or inactions. The newspapers invariably showed drawings or etchings of a scene, often within a day or two of the accident, and the subsequent investigation and reports were widely read. The sad fact, of course, is that most rail disasters were indeed caused by man’s actions or sometimes inaction. The Victorians’ attitude to safety and to death was very different from ours. During the decades, indeed the centuries, prior to our period accidental death was common and accepted. Accidents in farming, floods, earthworks and building were commonplace and not greeted with the reaction we would have today. Safety was not seen as something which could be influenced, you simply learnt where the dangers lay and tried to recognise when you were at risk. The idea of putting a bell on a bicycle to warn of your approach, for instance, would never have occurred to anyone in the early 19th century. When the railways were in their infancy everything was new, the task was to simply get a train to move and stay on the track until it reached its destination. This

One example of a supposed major advance in support of the ‘keep it moving’ philosophy is the slot signal where the arm is hidden from view within the post to indicate that the line is clear and it is safe to pass. It is raised to indicate danger. It was simply a matter of time before one of these signals froze solid in bitter winter conditions making it impossible to operate. A signal was apparently constantly showing ‘safe to pass’ and a tragic accident duly happened at Abbots Ripton in January 1876.

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I F O N LY W E H A D T H O U G H T O F T H AT ! simple statement is more literal than one might think – stopping the train was never considered at first! For many years this essential function depended on a single wooden brake being pushed onto just one wheel of the locomotive and the driver’s skill in putting the engine into reverse. This ‘keep things moving’ attitude underpins many of the basic faults of the railways that caused so much carnage.

Clayton Tunnel Disaster 25 August 1861 Early signalling was done with timing, that is trains were allowed to leave a station after, say, 10 minutes had passed since the previous train left. Railway policemen armed with flags and a watch were positioned along the route and maintained this gap as best they could by slowing down a train which was reaching its destination too soon. They had no idea if the previous train was still going or not, indeed it might well have broken down just out of sight. This time-interval system persisted until it was finally outlawed in the 1890s. Tunnels gave cause for great public concern. Not only were they bad places in which to have a crash but the smoke from the engines reduced visibility and increased the danger. Driven by these fears, engineers in 1841 used the newfangled electricity to provide a means of sending a signal from a man at one end of a long tunnel to a man at the other who could confirm that the train had left the tunnel. These very early electric telegraph systems had a single needle which could describe just two situations but they were a mammoth step forward in safety – no more relying on a time interval, you now knew the line was clear, this was space-interval working, just as we use today. However, this improved system was used for just two tunnels, one being the 1½mile-long Clayton Tunnel on the London to Brighton line; the rest of the route still used the time-interval method. It was a busy Sunday in August 1861 and three trains were scheduled to run north from Brighton early in the morning at 8.05, 8.15 and 8.30, generous time intervals for a line that normally allowed as little a five minutes between trains. All three were running late – in fact they left at 8.28, 8.31 and 8.35. This was the first mistake, and a very serious one too, reflecting the idea that getting trains moving was all that mattered. The man at the entrance to the tunnel had a mechanical signal (one that indicated ‘caution’ but did not mean ‘stop’) positioned 350 yards before the tunnel and a red flag which he could wave if there was real danger and he needed to stop the train. The distant signal was set by a hand wheel in the signalman’s cabin and cancelled by a treadle operated by the wheels of the train. It had the added feature of ringing a bell should the arm fail to return to ‘danger’ in response to the treadle. The line from Brighton to the tunnel is on a continuous climb which meant that most locomotives had quite a struggle and rarely reached 40 mph over the 5 mile journey. On this particular day the signalman at the south end had been on duty for over 18 hours, he was in fact working a 24-hour shift rather than the normal 18 hours!

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Clayton Tunnel Sequence

The first train reached the distant signal but the treadle mechanism failed to work thus leaving the signal indicating a clear line. Our man duly sent the ‘train in tunnel’ telegraph to the man at the north end. He then heard the bell warning of a signal failure and knew that he had to rely on his flag to warn the next train. The next train to arrive was only 3 minutes behind the first, indeed it may even have caught up a little. Used to a gap of at least 5 minutes he was presumably taken aback and

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only just had time to wave his red flag as the engine entered the tunnel. He then sent the ‘train in tunnel’ signal again. The man at the north end hadn’t sent the ‘train out of tunnel’ signal and not unreasonably took the second ‘train in tunnel’ signal to be a simple repeat of the first. Meanwhile the driver of the second train had caught a glimpse of the red flag as he sailed past the signalman and promptly applied the brake to bring his train to a halt some ½ mile into the tunnel. The first signalman, desperate to avoid trouble, used his other signal to ask ‘Is tunnel clear?’ The north signalman was still unaware that there were two trains in the tunnel and as soon as the first train was through he sent the ‘tunnel clear’ signal. The tired man at the south end took this to mean that both trains had left the north end of the tunnel and the scene was set for tragedy. He duly waved the third train into the tunnel. Alas the driver of the second train had not just stopped, which would have been bad enough, but he decided to reverse to find out why the signalman had shown him a red flag. The inevitable terrible collision took the lives of 21 passengers and seriously injured a further 176.

The Aftermath The aftermath reveals just how hard it can be to persuade people of the need to change. The Board of Trade Inspectorate had been urging the railway companies to improve on the time-interval system for years but the railway companies had resisted to a man. Sadly this tragic accident was held up as proof that the spaceinterval approach was no more safe than the time-interval system. They still argued that the cost of a telegraph system couldn’t be justified, that it would slow down the services and cause congestion. Some argued that more signals would make the drivers less vigilant. It was to be a further 30 years before sense prevailed. It is terribly tempting to see this apparent inability to understand the safety issues as some form of tragic stupidity but as mentioned above the attitudes and priorities were fundamentally different from ours.

Armagh Railway Disaster 12 June 1889 This second story also features confusion but alas with even worse results. If it were not for the tragic consequences, it might have been the script for a Harold Lloyd film. During the 1860s and 70s three systems were developed which provided brakes on the coach wheels as well as the tender’s – a vast improvement. Unfortunately two of these systems only worked if the brake pipe between the engine and coaches was intact. As the speed of rail travel increased railway disasters occurred all too often – between 1861 and 1889 there were 11 major crashes. In all of them better brakes would have reduced the extent of the damage and occasionally could have avoided it altogether. This tragedy took place in Ireland in June 1889 when an annual excursion for 800 people was due to be run from Armagh to Warrenpoint. An engine pulling a

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train of 15 vehicles set off and was soon pounding up the 2½ mile 1 in 75 climb which starts just a mile from Armagh. The speed started to drop until eventually the engine stalled 120 yards from the summit. The tender and guard’s van brakes were duly applied and all was well. But what was to be done next?

Armagh Stage 1

After a little thought it was decided to divide the train, take the first part over the summit and store it at the next station then return and collect the remaining coaches, taking them over the summit to rejoin the rest. To do this meant splitting the string of coaches and since there was limited siding space at the next station they chose to take the first five coaches and then return for the remaining nine coaches and the rear brake van. The train was fitted with vacuum brakes of a type that needed to be connected to the engine to work – thus the rear nine coaches now had only the brake van to hold them. The guards placed stones behind the rear wheels of the brake van and one behind a wheel of the leading coach. This done, the coupling was carefully released. At this stage the entire train was under tension having stopped while it was being pulled up the gradient. The uncoupling was successful but in restarting the engine it momentarily ran a short distance backwards (estimated by the guard as between 12 and 18 inches). This was not a problem for the engine and its five coaches but it was a disaster for the leading coach of the remaining nine. The bump pushed the wheels over the solitary stone and it was now free to run down the line as were all the other coaches except the brake van at the end. The problem was that each coach closed up to its neighbour, gathering weight all the time so that they hit the brake van with considerable force, pushing it over its stones and creating a moving force that the single van’s brake couldn’t possibly hold. The group of ten vehicles thus set off towards Armagh with increasing speed. Around 20 minutes after the excursion train had left Armagh the regular train serving the same route set off in pursuit. We now have a set of out-of-control

Armagh Stage 2

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I F O N LY W E H A D T H O U G H T O F T H AT ! coaches running backwards towards a train heading up the same line. The result was inevitable and tragic, 78 dead and around 250 injured. The rear three coaches of the excursion train were completely destroyed.

Armagh Stage 3

Though hard to imagine, the problems were not yet over. The crash had caused the engine of the second train to roll over and in doing so it broke the coupling to the tender. The impact had also broken the coupling between the first vehicle, a horsebox, and the other five coaches. We now have the tender plus the horsebox setting off down the incline preceded by the five other vehicles, all devoid of brakes due to the severing of the brake pipe from the engine. Luckily the driver had been thrown onto the tender and though injured he managed to screw down the brakes. On the other five vehicles the guard had been thrown to the floor and knocked unconscious but quickly recovered and applied his brake. So the two runaway sections were brought to a standstill just 100 ft apart and about a quarter of a mile back towards Armagh.

Armagh Stage 4

But why did it happen? As with most rail disasters there was a long trail of minor mistakes which together gathered momentum. The train was originally set to carry 800 passengers. A rake of 12 small four-wheeled coaches and a brake van were prepared along with a small but sturdy 2-4-0 locomotive. The leading coach was a brake coach with its own simple mechanical brake. En route to Armagh two further coaches had been added and as some 940 passengers (including around 600 children) had assembled on Armagh station the stationmaster had proposed adding two more. The driver who had only been over this route as a fireman protested at the extra coaches, rightly saying that the load was scheduled for just 12 coaches. A row ensued with the stationmaster who suggested that no other driver had ever complained. At this point Mr Elliot, the chief clerk in the general manager’s office, entered the story. He immediately suggested that the engine from the next train

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Armagh Disaster Scene The terrible scene with the wreckage of the last three coaches spread down the embankment and parts of the following train mercifully intact.

should be borrowed to act as a banking engine but after further debate it was thought that this would delay the next train and was dismissed. Eventually Elliot asked the driver what he thought and, still smarting from the taunts of the stationmaster, the driver asserted that he was sure the engine would cope. Just before the train departed all the carriage doors were locked, this being standard practice with Sunday-school excursions. So far there had been four minor errors, a driver who didn’t know the route, the train being bigger than was set down in the instructions, the driver being taunted by the stationmaster and agreeing to take a risk, and the senior officer on the scene not insisting on a banking engine. In his evidence Mr Elliot stated that they began to lose speed for no apparent reason, a remark worthy of thought. All agree that the boiler pressure remained good and there simply was no reason for the engine to slow down. This left the possibility that, as both brake vans were carrying passengers, someone may have played with the brake wheel, causing the brakes to be slightly applied. This is supported by a test made afterwards using the same engine and a load exactly the same as on the eventful day – the train climbed the bank without difficulty. So, possibly, allowing children to be near the brake gear should be added to the list of errors. The most serious mistake was made next, with the train stalled on the incline. Elliot, who had travelled in the engine, asked the driver what they should do and the inexperienced driver suggested dividing the train, which Elliot accepted. Both

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I F O N LY W E H A D T H O U G H T O F T H AT ! should have known that the remaining coaches would have lost their brakes when uncoupled and that relying on a few stones to secure the load was madness. Like most railway disasters the cause of these two events was a series of human errors and just like road accidents today it is very difficult to legislate against people having a lapse of judgement or concentration.

Sir Edward Watkin Out of this tragic tale came the Regulation of Railways Act which at last gave the Board of Trade the power to force railway companies to upgrade their equipment. Three major problems were to be solved, the use of the time interval was banned, one now had to prove that the preceding train had cleared the section, the use of signals that failed to safe rather than failing to danger and lastly the train’s brakes had to automatically operate if the brake pipe was broken. The attitude of the Victorian railway companies was often quite indefensible, they would shun anything designed by a rival company and as to anything from abroad, well that was beyond the pale. One of the three braking systems mentioned, and undoubtedly the best, was made by the American Westinghouse company. Its performance was enhanced with technical advice from Britain when the prototype system was offered but it was still regarded as foreign. Sir Edward Watkin, in his role as chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company, had even gone on record as saying he would rather put up with the occasional accident than bow to the nagging of the Board of Trade to improve safety.

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CHAPTER 5

The Never-Ending Sorrow Fuel for the nation – but at a terrible price



The Oaks Colliery Disaster The first explosion had blown the cages out of the shafts allowing the second explosion to shoot straight up with enormous force. Though a second explosion was quite likely there was no way to predict when it might occur. People would have been moving around the site awaiting news of the rescue attempt.

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n the pre-Victorian era coal was still a relatively little-used commodity. Several industries like glassmaking, baking and brewing had been forced to stop using wood because the forests were becoming depleted and they had modified their

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T H E N E V E R -E N D I N G S O R R O W furnaces to use coal. Coal was only used for heating houses as a last resort as it burnt with a dirty sulphurous smoke. Coke was being produced but again only on a small scale. Two major changes took place at the start of the 19th century. Firstly the canal system had established a network of waterways that could carry heavy goods at low cost. Secondly there was a vast increase in the use of coal for steam engines that were powering the industrial revolution, and to make coke for the rapidly expanding iron industries. With the arrival of the railways in the 1830s coal became the life Blea Moor Tunnel blood of Victorian England. Better- Always dangerous, tunnelling work cost designed chimneys allowed this fuel many lives and the Blea Moor rail tunnel to become the normal method of probably took the highest toll ever. Around 100 men lost their lives cutting this heating the home and the production of the new town gas for 1½-mile-long tunnel high in the north lighting spread to every large town Yorkshire moors. Built with seven shafts and city. We have to look at this there were 16 work faces where men battled for five years. Many of the spoil massively expanding industry heaps can still be seen on the surface. Three against the Victorian values and of the shafts were retained as air vents, the class system. Mining coal as an centre one being some 500 ft deep. Built occupation was in some ways like between 1870 and 1875 using picks, early farming, you needed strength shovels and gunpowder, half a million and the ability to learn by example, bricks were used to line the tunnel. no books could prepare you for either occupation. It was quite normal for miners to be unable to read or write. Miners, like the farm labourers before them, were regarded as little more than slaves. They were allowed their way of life and their legendary bond of friendship but little else. The hours were long and the conditions terrible. Safety was thought of as being necessary to keep the coal flowing and the expensive equipment, including pit ponies, protected. The lives of the miners ranked low. An example of this can be seen in a newspaper report of the financial loss incurred by a mine owner following a disaster, it listed 28 pit ponies valued at nearly £1000, the dead miners didn’t feature at all.

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Oaks Colliery Disaster 13 December 1866 Against this rather bleak background is a coal mine disaster that featured a remarkable bit of good luck for one miner. The scene was the Oaks Colliery near Barnsley on a cold Wednesday in December 1866. The Barnsley coal seam was rich but was also known to be very gassy and many pits that worked this seam had accidents caused by methane gas. At about 1.20 pm a loud ‘report’ was heard throughout the area, even people up to three miles away were alerted. The lift cages were blown out of the mineshafts, smoke and dust was everywhere. A temporary cage was rigged up to allow rescuers to descend No 1 shaft. The scene that greeted them at the bottom was horrific but, incredibly, huddled among the bodies were 20 men who were still alive although 14 were so badly injured that they didn’t live for long. The rescuers continued to search for survivors but they found none and the dreadful job of taking the dead back up to the surface began. Eventually it was thought that 80 bodies were never recovered. On the following morning experienced miners noticed a change in the air currents in the shaft and realised that this was a sign of further trouble. Some 90 brave We can never know what it was like to be caught in an underground gas explosion but perhaps this drawing can convey some of the terror. Unless one has been into one of the pits open to the public it is hard to imagine the darkness and hardship endured by miners.

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Oaks Disaster Memorial The only memorial to those who lost their lives in the disaster was erected nearly 50 years after the event. It records the bravery of those who went back into the mine to rescue survivors, notably Mammatt and Embleton who saved Samuel Brown. It stands outside the entrance to Kenray Hospital east of Barnsley town centre.

rescuers were hurriedly removed from the mine before, at around 9 am, there was a second explosion described at the time as of ‘great violence’. There were, alas, 27 rescuers still in the mine and it was soon agreed that none could have survived. At 7.30 pm yet another explosion occurred and it became clear that the pit was on fire. The lucky event occurred on the next day at around 4.30 am when the signal bell on No 1 shaft rang. No amount of calling down the shaft could raise any response so in desperation the men lowered a bottle of water and brandy down the shaft and to their surprise when the rope was pulled back up the bottle was gone. Temporary winding gear was again rigged up and two miners, T. W. Embleton and J. E. Mammatt, insisted on going down the shaft despite the obvious dangers. After a perilous descent they reached the bottom and discovered Samuel Brown who must have had the luckiest escape ever. During the following day no fewer than 14 more

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A new memorial erected in 2007 at Hillies Golf Club, Wombwell, which stands on the site of the mine. Lundhill Mining Disaster 19 February 1857 A few miles from the Oaks Colliery there had been another disastrous explosion only nine years before. An explosion and fire ripped through the mine at around noon while over 200 men and boys were working. Only 25 survived, the other 189 lost their lives. The fire was so intense that the rescuers had to turn back. The only solution was to divert a local stream into the mine, flooding it and extinguishing the flames. It took two months for the water to drain away before the bodies could be recovered and then only 146 were found. It is impossible for us to imagine the devastation to the community caused by this and the two Oaks blasts.

The memorial at Darfield church and a close-up of the plaque.

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T H E N E V E R -E N D I N G S O R R O W explosions occurred and the decision was taken to fill the shafts. No complete record of who was in the mine existed and subsequent investigations by the miners’ union established that of the 340 men and boys in the mine on that fateful Wednesday only six survived. The second explosion had taken the lives of 27 of whom 23 were volunteers from other collieries. The mine was reopened some years later using new shafts, leaving the original workings in peace. It remained the worst British coal mining disaster until 1913 when the record was taken by the Senghenydd colliery in south Wales with a terrible loss of 436. Coal is formed from vegetation which has rotted and been compressed for millions of years. A natural part of this process is the creation of small pockets of gas, usually methane, which are held within the coal seams. When the coal is mined these pockets of gas are released, known as firedamp (‘damp’ is derived from the German word dampe meaning vapour). These have long been known, indeed up to the early 1800s the first man into a mine at the start of a shift wore wet clothing and carried a lighted candle on a long stick to deliberately ignite any gas resting near the roof – methane is lighter than air and thus rises. As methane burns, the atmosphere is deprived of oxygen and carbon monoxide is produced – the invisible and lethal gas known in mining as afterdamp or whitedamp. One of the main reasons for using forced ventilation in coal mines is to disperse any such gases. If, The mine was reopened some time later and new shafts were dug. The later pit-head winding machinery and buildings have been retained while part of the site is now Oaks Industrial Estate.

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Davy Lamps Originally candles were used for lighting mines but these provided a perfect ignition source. It was this understanding that led to the invention in 1815 of the Davy lamp or ‘miner’s friend’ as it was known. Unfortunately it had two major drawbacks, the light was dim and it gave miners the confidence to work in what had earlier been considered hazardous conditions. In fact the Davy lamp had almost no effect on the rate of explosions. Years after its invention it was realised that given a good stiff draught methane gas could be driven through the gauze and be ignited by the flame.

due to blasting the next section of a coal seam, a gas pocket of some size is opened then, as here, the blast itself can ignite the gas. An added problem, which was not understood until the end of the 19th century, was that the initial gas explosion often raised a vast cloud of coal dust from the floors and walls. This dust mixture is explosive and often caused more carnage than the initial gas explosion. Many of the tragedies in this book are marked by a change in the rules to prevent a recurrence but this was invariably where the public were involved. In the whole period from 1800 to 1900 there were only five years in British coal mining that were free of disaster, and from 1860 onwards only two years where the fatalities were fewer than 100 men and boys.

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CHAPTER 6

Medical Mistakes How the imagination made up for a lack of knowledge



The Victorian chemist sold toiletries, just as chemists do today. A selection as shown here might include hair tonic, eau de Cologne and lavender water. Many of these, like the medicines, would be made by the chemist himself.

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t the start of the Victorian era the medical profession could be divided into two groups, those who knew what they were doing and those who pretended they did. The first group included the practical side of medicine, surgeons who knew how to save a gangrenous limb, how to set a broken bone and pull a rotten tooth. Through trial and error they had evolved a crude but honest role. Nursing had also developed beyond the simple observation that rest and

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warmth seemed to help the recovery of some patients, and at least some of the apothecary’s repertoire of medicines were known to help. The other group however were the quacks, pompous and arrogant and almost totally devoid of any real medical knowledge. These self-appointed doctors had enjoyed fame and fortune whilst in general they dispensed only death. Through this rather bleak landscape, real knowledge was slowly making progress. Before the 1830s there had been breakthroughs in pathology, obstetrics and vaccination although progress was difficult due to the false foundations upon which the doctors’ reputations had been built. It is not easy to confess that you have been making money out of ignorance when faced with some fundamental breakthrough. Fortunately Victoria’s reign was eventually to revolutionise medical knowledge and lay down the foundations of modern health care. So what was it like in 1837 if you were ill? Favourite treatments involved medicines based on such homely substances as mercury, arsenic, iron and phosphorous. Vomiting and powerful laxatives were popular as were bleeding and leeches. As we know, just sometimes some of these actually worked. A ‘change of

A selection from a Victorian chemist, including quinine wine, laudanum, chilblain ointment, wingarnis, eye ointment, stomach tablets, tooth powder, cough syrup, anti-obesity tablets, lung tonic pastilles, haemorrhoidal suppositories, and ‘adult’ tonic!

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M E D I C A L M I S TA K E S air’ was often proposed, though those who could afford this luxury rarely needed it in medical terms.

Cholera Cholera spread, it is believed from India, reaching our shores in 1831. It moved quickly; within the first 9 months 22,000 people had died and it was soon found in most parts of the land. A cruel disease that killed in less than a day sometimes, it provoked all the usual theories about any disease that simply was not understood. Like the plagues before it the outbreaks died down for a few years but then reappeared. It was popularly believed that all diseases spread through the air – it was the stench of foul waste (miasma) that gave you the illness. This belief was widely held and was

Bazalgette’s Memorial on the Thames Embankment In 1838 the office of Registrar General was established and during the period of the cholera outbreaks chief statistician William Farr produced some vital figures which were later to help overcome the ‘miasma’ theory. The sewers were also being steadily improved and by 1854 only 1000 London homes still used cesspits, unfortunately the sewers still emptied into the Thames. The latest microscopes had allowed the closer study of water and indeed had identified both living organisms and material that could be identified as being from human waste. Despite numerous committees and much talking nothing was done until in 1858 London had a very hot summer and the stink from the sewage-laden Thames became unbearable. In Parliament the windows were draped in lime-washed curtains in the hope of keeping the stench at bay. The Government even considered leaving the House altogether. Parliament resolved that something must be done and following years of committees and powerless health boards, the Metropolis Local Management Amendment Act became law. At last the Metropolitan Board of Works had the money and the authority to rid the Thames of sewage. The scheme, famously designed by Joseph Bazalgette, was to construct large sewers running parallel to the Thames that would intercept the present sewers and carry the waste down river.

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supported by many eminent people. Florence Nightingale was adamant that this was how disease spread right up to her death in 1910. Unfortunately, as we will see, it took a further three cholera outbreaks and a terrified Parliament before anything serious was done. In 1842 the Poor Law Commission issued a report into the sanitary conditions of the poor based largely on the findings of its secretary Edwin Chadwick. The report was just as horrifying as earlier revelations but this time it came with the authority and drive of Chadwick, a very industrious and rather aggressive man who had trained as a barrister. The result was the first permanent General Board of Health set up under the Public Health Act of 1848. Dr John Snow, an early anaesthetist, had become interested in cholera during the previous outbreak in 1831 and studied the spread of the disease. In 1848 another massive outbreak of cholera took over 50,000 lives, 14,000 of them in London alone. He soon became convinced that water was the carrier and he then made a study of the general water supplies in London. At the time London was served by nine water companies who drew their supply from the Thames. The Thames of course also received most of London’s waste, not a pretty sight and a subject of great public displeasure. He found an alarming correlation between illness and the source of water – the further downstream the water source, the greater the problem. His dissenters simply pointed to the fact that the stench from the river grew worse the further east one went and this was the cause of the infection. Though he had written up his findings (published in late 1849) little was done; indeed many eminent people ridiculed his work but we must also remember that his was just one in an avalanche of theories. From 1845–56, over 700 works were published on cholera, not bad considering nobody actually understood the condition. In 1853 the disease struck again. Snow had realised that most of the affected houses in the Soho area, where he worked, took their water from one particular pump in Broad Street. Further investigation revealed that a sewer passed close to the pump. After considerable pleading with the authorities he was able to get the pump handle removed to prevent any further use and the outbreak in the area promptly died down. To return to our original story over the stubborn way in which the medical profession refused to accept new evidence that might challenge their long-held but erroneous ideas, in 1866 a fourth outbreak of cholera occurred in east London and by August about 4000 people had died. It was interesting that they were all within the East London Water Company’s area. Despite protests from the water company, investigations showed that errors had been made and regulations had been breached. Most significant was that this area was the only part of London not to be drained by Bazalgette’s new sewers. Special temporary pumps were installed until the main pumps started in Abbey Mills, since when no outbreaks of cholera or typhoid have occurred in London. Faced now with an enormous amount of data supporting Snow’s original theory, people began to abandon the miasmic idea and a completely new era in medicine started.

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CHAPTER 7

Plumbing



A world of trial and error

The moment when an unsuspecting maid is sent flying by an exploding range cooker after a huge build up of pressure within its boiler. This was just one of the dangers which were possible in the Victorian home.

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ven in this world of DIY most of us still look on plumbing with a touch of caution. For our story we have to travel back to the early 1800s when plumbing was integrated into the building industry and when it was more likely to involve sewers and water mains than a leaking tap in the bathroom. Strange though it seems plumbing was then at the leading edge of engineering. The old wooden water mains were being replaced with cast-iron pipes. These needed

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Classic Victorian lavatory with the S-bend to prevent smells. Many early designs had the contents flushed out at the front of the bowl.

joining and above all they needed to be laid where they wouldn’t be subjected to stress or blows from an ill-directed sledgehammer. Sewers needed to be built with good bricks and mortar and with a steady gradient. Inexperience, alas, meant that often none of these targets were met. When Bazalgette, the engineer who first revolutionised sewers in London, was advertising for builders he stipulated that applicants must be able to demonstrate the use of a spirit level because he knew all too well that most builders had never used one. As the new large sewers were being built the older sewers were found to be in a terrible state, often trying to flow uphill and leaking. As the mid 1800s approached, more housing was being built for the new middle classes and these were expected to offer running water to sinks, basins, baths and water closets. The WC would be connected to the sewers as would the drains and over-flow pipes from the baths and sinks. Added to all these were the hot water system with its boiler and the hot and cold water storage tanks. Very conscious of the lack of experience, makers of plumbing components supplied fitting instructions although many of the plumbers may not have been able to read. Two features of Victorian domestic plumbing in particular caused loss of life due to lack of knowledge rather than any wilful neglect. After 1860 most middle-class homes had all the features mentioned above. The WC always had some form of seal to prevent the smell of the sewers reaching the bathroom (the water seal

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PLUMBING we still rely on today was first patented in the 1770s). Yet over the next 20 or so years a surprising trend began. Typhoid and other fevers were becoming prevalent among the middle classes whilst the working-class homes were less affected. It took some time for the cause to be understood, though with hindsight the problem seems

A simplified diagram of a Victorian middle-class house showing the waste pipes feeding into the soil pipe.

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obvious. If we look at the diagram of a typical house we notice two suspect features, firstly the drains and over-flow pipes all join directly into the sewer stack pipe. Why nobody thought to fit the same simple water trap on these junctions as was used on the WC seems strange but at the time it was believed that disease spread by either having direct contact with drinking water or by very strong smells. The second feature is the way the sewer stack was vented near the cold water tank in the loft. The way many of these large terrace houses were built allowed for the sewer stack to rise up the centre of the building rather than outside on a wall. The pipe thus ended in the loft near the water tank. The pipe however contained contaminated water vapour which in all probability would have eventually condensed in the cold of the loft and dripped into the tank. The problem was that this tank fed all the cold taps in the house – a situation that led inevitably to disease.

The Dreaded Geyser There was parallel work being carried out to develop gas-powered domestic water heaters. One of the difficulties was to find a way of lighting the gas without causing an explosion. The first geysers had no protection at all so the poor housewife or maid was probably terrified, having no doubt heard exaggerated stories of terrible explosions. The situation was made worse if, having failed to light the gas before the first match went out, the maid forgot to turn the gas off while she prepared the second match. The gas would then be lit with no problem – except for the almighty bang as all the gas that has been hissing out exploded. After a while a small pilot flame was installed which was all the user had to light. This then heated a thermal device that allowed the main gas jet to be turned on. However, should the pilot flame go out, a second attempt to light it would be met by the full gas flow as the thermal device hadn’t cooled down enough to shut off the gas. Eventually the pilot light was designed to be permanently alight and apart from a whoosh as the main gas jet lit there would be no more bangs, at least in theory.

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Over the years many variations of the Victorian range were made. This drawing shows the features of a large model from late in the 1800s.

The second case is of more well-intentioned improvements which caused death and destruction. The hot water system in many of the Victorian houses consisted of a coal-fired boiler on the ground floor. Often this was built into a beautiful castiron range that took pride of place in the dining room where it served to keep everyone warm and was used for cooking. The boiler was quite large and was connected via two good-sized pipes to a hot water tank on the top floor. A cold water feed from the loft tank usually fed into the boiler. There were two potential weaknesses in the system, both of which were apparent during very severe winters which froze the cold water tank and thus not only prevented the supply of water but also occupied the hot water’s expansion space. If the fire were allowed to die down overnight the next day would begin with frozen loft pipes and a system full of cold water. When the fire was rekindled the water naturally began to warm up and expand. Having no room to expand the result was a terrific build up of pressure leading to the failure of either the hot tank or the

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boiler which would hopefully only produce a short but violent stream of water that would be quickly noticed. The second hazard was far more serious and indeed took many lives. The problem was caused by taking hot water from the system when the loft tank and pipes were frozen. Opening a tap on a system that is sealed by ice will produce a trickle of hot water because if water is leaving the pipe then air must get into the same pipe to replace it. This is where the large boiler and large pipes act against us by giving enough room for the water to come out whilst at the same time allowing air to enter. The flow would have been sputtering but presumably nobody thought this significant. There is also the possibility that more than one tap on the hot water system would be open at the same time providing the perfect exit for the hot water from the lower tap and an entry for the air via the higher tap. The net result was that the hot water was eventually all drained off, one can just hear the remark that ‘the feed must be frozen’. The man of the house, or the servants, would be dispatched to the loft to thaw out the tank and pipes, probably armed with candles. The moment soon came when, with a gurgle, the ice-cold water would surge down the feed pipe heading for the empty but very hot boiler below. When the water arrived it immediately boiled and turned to steam which very quickly filled the otherwise empty boiler and the pipes. The pressure rose alarmingly and as often as not the boiler exploded producing not only hot steam The basic concept of heating water in a but enough violence to bring down coal-fired range. Natural circulation ceilings and to kill or injure anybody caused hot water to rise to a storage tank near it. There is a very subtle difference which in turn fed the hot taps in the between pressure produced by house.

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PLUMBING A modest mid-Victorian range produced heat and hot water.

expanding water and that produced by steam. Once a break or crack appears in the pipes under hydraulic pressure the liquid escapes and immediately the pressure drops. Because water does not compress it stores very little energy. Steam however expands continuously and in the situation described above water constantly enters the boiler to be turned into more and more steam. We thus have a very powerful explosion. In fairness to the profession they very quickly worked out what was happening. By making the boiler very much smaller, removing the hot water tap from the boiler and using smaller pipes the problem was resolved.

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CHAPTER 8

The Friend That Goes Bang!



Gas – treat with care

The Nine Elms incident was one of the more spectacular explosions at a gasworks. The site, many times rebuilt, remains a gas storage site to this day.

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he supply of town gas to streets and houses started in the early 1800s. Inevitably, piping such a potentially dangerous commodity led to some problems. Even today we hear of the occasional gas explosion. Our story is based on the Gas and Light Company who served large parts of London, a city that was more crowded and growing faster than anywhere else in the country in the 19th century. Several small explosions occurred but these were

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T H E F R I E N D T H AT G O E S B A N G ! A modern gasholder still in use in Birmingham, though all the holders are destined to be taken out of use and demolished in the next few years.

punctuated by the occasional much more dramatic event, one of which, in 1865, was in a different league altogether.

The Nine Elms Explosion 31 October 1865 Men had been working in the brand new gasworks at Nine Elms in the meter house which was inadequately ventilated. They were concentrating on the governor, a device to control the gas pressure in the mains, with its moving parts immersed in water. It is suspected that the governor had been damaged and the workmen’s efforts to hold it in place failed. The subsequent gas leak caused an explosion which completely destroyed the meter house and killed all the men in it. The force of the explosion damaged the nearest gasholder some 20 yards away causing a serious leak which in turn ignited. This holder, which had a capacity of a million cubic feet, erupted in a massive fire which wrecked parts of the works and the surrounding neighbourhood. Windows were blown out and doors shaken off their hinges and people nearly a mile away claimed to have been thrown to the ground by the blast. This explosion in turn ruptured a further gasholder on the site whose escaping gas soon caught fire and added to the burning cloud above the works. The flames,

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Part of a Victorian Gasworks Town gas was produced by heating coal in an oxygen-free atmosphere, a process which also produced tar and a wide selection of chemicals. The gas was filtered and treated before being pumped into the gasholders from where it was piped under the streets to reach the factories and houses. The gasholder actually sits in a deep pool of water which allows the holder to rise and fall with demand whilst still keeping a gas-tight seal at the bottom.

though relatively short lived, rose so high that the attending firemen were able to use the sight to guide them to the tragedy. Altogether nine people died but many more were badly injured. When it all died down all that was left was the twisted wreckage of the two gasholders and the smouldering remains of the gasworks buildings.

Tottenham Court Road Explosion In 1880 work was being carried out to extend a new 36-inch gas main near Tottenham Court Road with two sections being joined together. The new pipe at this point was naturally full of air but somehow gas had leaked in and mixed with

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Other Gas Incidents A few weeks after the Peter Street works had started supplying the Westminster area in 1813 one of the purifiers developed a leak. So anxious were the operators not to stop the supply they allowed production to continue; alas the leaking gas ignited which in turn caused the gasholder to explode. Fortunately at this early stage holders were still small (14,000 cubic feet) but nevertheless it caused a very loud report and great alarm in the neighbourhood. This incident gave rise to a committee who laid down some simple recommendations and pacified the public by commenting that ‘the explosion had, after all, been no more than five to ten barrels of gunpowder’! There continued to be minor accidents. One such occurred when an enthusiastic wine merchant decided to excavate a cellar under Pall Mall in 1822. His works unfortunately undermined the local gas main and when he came to stock his new cellar, using candle light of course, the resultant explosion was described as spectacular. A similar incident occurred 2 years later when a Mr Rand of Westminster Bridge Road reported the smell of gas. The contractor unfortunately dispatched an inexperienced fitter who investigated the problem using a candle and yet again disaster resulted. The 1860s were to provide still more problems. In 1863, outside the shop of Mr Medex in Oxford Street, a gas main was fractured by workmen repairing an adjacent sewer. The claim included medical attention to his wife, injury to a servant and the loss of a dog. Two years later an explosion and fire was caused in Leicester Square following the careless removal of a gas meter.

the air producing an explosive mixture. This was ignited close to the workmen and the subsequent explosion killed two and inflicted dreadful injuries on the others. As the pipe was uncovered at the junction the explosion ripped it open but then was able to vent its energy in the open air resulting in relatively little damage to buildings. What could not have been foreseen was that the explosion had sent a flame hurtling along the new pipe causing a series of underground explosions in the pipe for nearly half a mile along the road. The alarming effect was mysterious upheaval along the road as the pipe below exploded like a moving earthquake. Paving stones were sent flying, causing damage to the buildings, injuring passers-by and causing panic. At the time nobody knew of the original explosion in Tottenham Court Road and the effect on those who saw their road disintegrating for no apparent reason must have been traumatic. Joining lengths of piping had been done safely many times before and because the men working at this particular junction were killed by the blast, the actual sequence of events that led to the disaster was never known. Unfortunate events such as these in London were repeated in many other cities though, because of the need to keep the gas flowing and the rate at which extensions to the system were being built, London suffered most.

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Tottenham Court Road Explosion An impression of the side road where the new gas main started to explode.

St Helens Explosion, Lancashire 12 May 1899 Another danger came from chemical works. The production and storage of dangerous substances could be explosive in certain circumstances. One such situation occurred at the Kurtz’s chemical works in St Helens when a fire broke out in a chlorate house. The flames were of such force that they caused a number of huge boilers nearby to explode, flattening the entire works and nearby factories, and damaging houses across the whole town. The gasworks were lucky to escape as debris had ripped a hole in one of the gasholders but only caused a shot of flames rather than another blast. Five people died in the explosion and many others were injured. The devastation in the town was so great that sightseers poured in for days after the event.

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T H E F R I E N D T H AT G O E S B A N G ! The Great Fire of Gateshead and Newcastle 6 October 1854 The production and storage of chemicals presented more dangers in many Victorian towns and cities. In isolation the substances may have presented little threat but mixed together they could be much more hazardous. Add to this the risk of fire and you have the potential for disaster, such as that which struck Gateshead and Newcastle early one Friday morning in 1854. It was just after midnight when a fire was discovered in a worsted factory on the Gateshead side of the river Tyne. Packed with wool and other materials it quickly became an inferno and within an hour the building had been gutted. Ships were moved from their moorings and a mass of spectators gathered to watch as the flames engulfed the buildings and spread to neighbouring properties. Some of the more observant spectators here might have noticed that the adjoining warehouse was under threat, a few may have been aware that it contained some highly

St Mary’s church, Gateshead The church just above the exploding warehouse had windows blown out and gravestones knocked over.

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The Tyne Bridge The warehouse and factories where the fire started stood on the Gateshead side (left) of this view of the Tyne Bridge. A plaque on one of the towers marks the spot.

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T H E F R I E N D T H AT G O E S B A N G ! combustible materials like naphtha (an inflammable oil), nitrate of soda and potash. The warehouse caught fire and despite a number of warning blasts most people stayed on to watch the spectacle. Suddenly at around 3.15 am there was the most enormous ground shaking explosion anyone had ever heard. The warehouse was blasted to smithereens and everyone was thrown to the floor. For miles around windows and doors were blown out, gravestones were thrown across the churchyard, and a scalding cascade of brick, metal and timber fell on the spectators. The explosion was felt by ships out at sea and debris from the blast landed nearly six miles away. The blast had not only injured and killed many rescuers and spectators but had also spread the fire over both sides of the river. Now whole streets in Gateshead and the previously immune Newcastle were set alight. Unfortunately fire engines had been trapped by the falling rubble so it was not until well into the next day that help from neighbouring towns reached the disaster. It took several days to quell the flames; 53 people died and over 500 were injured. People were quick to suggest that gunpowder must have been illegally stored in the warehouse if only because they were unaware that any other substance could have caused such a devastating blast. However, chemists who explored the remains could find no trace and suggested alternative theories. These included the addition of a mass of water to the mixture of sulphur and nitrate of soda in the burning building, or trapped gases resulting in the huge blast. The inquiry dismissed the idea that it was caused by gunpowder and left an open verdict. To this day it is not known exactly what caused the catastrophe. The exact spot where the great fire took hold is now buried under Newcastle and Gateshead’s most famous structure, the Tyne Bridge.

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CHAPTER 9

It Seemed Like A Good Idea At The Time



Even Brunel could get it wrong

Watkin’s Folly – An Eiffel Tower for London! An incredible thought, but building work for it actually began. This was just one of a series of ventures which the Victorians got wrong because they pushed the limits of design, commerce or society too far.

Brunel’s Atmospheric Railway

T

o suggest that Isambard Kingdom Brunel might have got something wrong is, to some, bordering on sacrilege but that is to miss the point of his genius. He possessed a wonderful free-thinking mind backed by great mechanical skills. Whatever he did he did big! The Great

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Broad-gauge Replica Locomotive Brunel had convinced the directors of the Great Western Railway of the benefits of a broad gauge (7 ft 0¼ in) as opposed to the standard gauge used everywhere else (4 ft 8½ in). This choice was one of several warning signs that Brunel was focused on achieving the best technical solution for a project and needed to be kept in line by strong and knowledgeable directors. Following the railway’s successful arrival at Bristol another company, the Bristol and Exeter Railway, employed him as engineer, thus continuing the broad-gauge track ever westward. Despite the continued growth of the standard-gauge railway system virtually everywhere else in Britain, still more companies in the west of England were persuaded to use the broad gauge and thus the wider lines reached Plymouth and went on into Cornwall to Penzance so by the 1860s there were over 280 miles of broad gauge. By now another main line system had reached Devon and Cornwall (the London and South Western Railway) using the standard gauge and Parliament had decreed that all future lines must be built in standard gauge. By 1892 every mile of these broad lines had been re-laid in standard gauge and the potentially technically superior system became a memory. With hindsight it is obvious that for a region that needed to be connected to the rest of the country rather than the other way round, choosing a different gauge was bound to be a mistake.

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Western Railway from London to Bristol was his first and perhaps best-known railway venture; laid with great skill it swept westwards with the absolute minimum of gradient. This was a very important feature in 1835 as the locomotives were still very primitive and lacked any real pulling power. Brunel’s railway work includes one rather odd venture. In 1844 he recommended that the South Devon Railway should adopt the atmospheric system over the entire Exeter to Plymouth route. Even for Brunel this was an extraordinary leap in the dark. In 1838 Samuel Clegg along with Jacob and Joseph Samuda had taken out a patent on a new method of propelling railway carriages. In 1840 a demonstration line was erected at Wormwood Scrubs, London and the system was adopted for a short line in Ireland in 1844. A large iron pipe was laid down the centre of the railway track firmly bolted to the sleepers. Along the top of this pipe was a continuous slot covered by a hinged leather flap weighed down by a thin cast-iron plate. At suitable distances along the line, fixed pumping stations were built to draw air out of the tube. The partial vacuum would then pull a piston along the pipe. A blade passing through the slot connected the piston to the train and thus pulled it along. Brunel was understandably very concerned about how the locomotives in use at the time would climb the unavoidable hills on the route to Plymouth. An alternative solution was to dig tunnels but they would have to be very long and expensive. A diagram with a cutout of the atmospheric pipe to show how the system worked.

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I T S E E M E D L I K E A G O O D I D E A AT T H E T I M E However, Brunel brushed aside what he called ‘mere mechanical details’ when challenged over how the new system would work and so great was his confidence and charisma that all doubters were silenced. He had estimated that because it was impossible to have a crash using the system (technically quite untrue) then only a single line need be built, saving over £200,000 plus further savings due to the more efficient nature of stationary pump engines over conventional locomotives. Work by Daniel Gooch, on the GWR, had shown that nearly half of the power produced in a steam locomotive was spent moving the locomotive itself. It therefore followed that, with no engine to move, much less power was needed. George Stephenson, a standard-gauge man, declared it a ‘great humbug’, and the idea certainly wasn’t proven over any distance. Incidentally Brunel held Stephenson in great esteem. By the end of 1846 the broad-gauge line had reached Newton Abbot and traffic started with conventional broad-gauge locomotives hired from the GWR. By now the atmospheric system had been used on the relatively short Croydon railway and Brunel, though still convinced of its use, Map showing the route of the South wanted to gain from the Croydon line’s Devon Railway. experience before proceeding too far. Even at this juncture one of the engineers on the South Devon line, a Mr Margary, wrote in his journal that ‘almost everything had still to be learned’. By the start of 1848 the construction of the pump houses was well under way and in March the first test runs were being conducted. Many unexpected difficulties arose, the sealing of the pipe to prevent air entering the low pressure sections caused problems as did the actual performance of the pumps. Nevertheless, in September 1848 atmospheric-hauled

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Brunel’s GWR bridge over the Thames in Maidenhead, Berkshire Brunel had amazed the world with a beautiful arched railway bridge over the Thames at Maidenhead and now designed a similar but smaller bridge to cross the river Parrett near Bridgwater. Alas this one failed, the foundations slipped and the wooden centering had to be left in place to support the brickwork until, within the year, an all-timber bridge quietly replaced it.

trains were reaching Teignmouth and early in 1848 the full service to Newton Abbot was atmospheric. Though there were plenty of problems, most trains usually made good progress, reaching around 35 mph, some sources suggest even as high as 60 mph, giving the passengers the slightly eerie experience of an almost silent ride. Construction of the line was now progressing over Dainton bank west of Newton Abbot, the first serious hill climbing challenge, and a pump house had been erected at Dainton. At this point steam engines were providing the service between Newton Abbot and Totnes, presumably with very short trains, nevertheless the latest conventional traction was making it over the steep climbs. It was now 18 years since the Rocket made its first faltering steps and much had been learnt. Brunel, confident of the atmospheric system’s power, had in fact designed the Newton Abbot to Totnes section with tighter curves and steeper gradients than he would have used if

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I T S E E M E D L I K E A G O O D I D E A AT T H E T I M E One of the remaining sections of the vacuum pipe lying between broadgauge rails. The slot can still be seen along the top but the flap has long since gone.

steam-hauled trains alone were envisaged. The Samudas had proposed improvements. A rubber flap replaced the leather over a short distance in August 1848 which may have overcome the problem of maintaining a good seal. The iron plate covering the leather flap had corroded quickly and at times had even broken off adding to the seal problems; it also froze in winter. There were also problems due to the slot not being cast accurately in some sections, and rain water was getting into the pipe, blocking the passage of the piston. All was indeed not well. Heated board meetings were raging with strong antiatmospheric voices to the fore. On 31 August at a shareholders’ meeting only the chairman was left supporting Brunel. A few days later the decision was made that the ‘atmospheric caper’ should come to an end. Possibly Brunel had not realised how quickly conventional locomotives would improve in power, and he certainly had not appreciated just how many problems would arise. In effect he had talked the company into using its main line as an experimental test bed for an untried system. At the very start he had increased the diameter of the pipe from 13 to 15 inches to obtain greater power and had expected to use an even larger-diameter pipe on the steep climbs. (The early experiments had been conducted with a pipe of 9 inches diameter.) It was soon discovered that the pumps just couldn’t lower the pressure in the larger pipe sufficiently. The almost-level line to Newton Abbot had needed 8

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pumping stations, the full journey to Plymouth would probably have needed in excess of 30. The real killer though was money. The South Devon company had made a loss of some £3000 in the first half of 1848 – a fact the board of directors had learned just before the fatal board meeting at which they also learned that the entire 20 miles of leather flap that was central to the atmospheric system was worn and needed to be replaced at a cost of over £20,000. The decision to end was inevitable and the chairman, Thomas Gill, resigned over the affair. Of an estimated cost of over £430,000 only £81,000 was recovered, mostly from the sale of the pumps and pump houses. Today three fragments of the pipe can be seen, at York Railway Museum, at the Science Museum and at Didcot in Oxfordshire. The pump house at Starcross in Devon, now without its beam engine, is still standing. It is now privately-owned and has been used as a church and later by a coal merchant.

The Victorian Channel Tunnel Brunel was principally an engineer whose imagination needed a board of wise commercial directors to filter his ideas. They possibly should have also curbed their chairman’s imagination. This is the story of Sir Edward Watkin and two of his ideas that were simply out of step with their time. The idea of a tunnel beneath the English Channel goes back to 1802 when a

A map of the coast between Folkestone and Dover showing the original route proposed in 1880 for Watkin’s tunnel and that taken by today’s Channel Tunnel. The two shafts marked are parts of the system which were actually built.

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I T S E E M E D L I K E A G O O D I D E A AT T H E T I M E French mining engineer, one Albert Mathieu, suggested to Napoleon that a road tunnel should be built in three stages. More than 40 years later another Frenchman, Joseph Thome (later changed to de Gamond) took up the idea for a rail tunnel. He received encouragement from Brunel, Joseph Locke and even the Prince Consort. In 1865 he submitted plans to Napoleon III and a commission was set up which quickly reported that before any serious research was undertaken the British and French governments needed to agree some basics. The plans were shown at the Universal Exhibition in Paris in 1867 and a year later the Anglo-French Tunnel Committee was set up. Despite the end of the Napoleonic era in France and rumblings from Germany, the committee founded the Channel Tunnel Company in London in 1872. A tunnel was proposed linking the London, Chatham and Dover Railway and the South Eastern Railway on the English side to the Chemin de Fer du Nord on the French side, the route being broadly from Dover to Sangatte with an estimated cost of £10 million. At this time that the English railway companies were committed to making money for their shareholders and if they could disadvantage their rivals then that was fine. Not surprisingly the two UK railway companies both engaged their own engineers (Hawkshaw and Low) to study the options and soon there were two different proposals. The LCDR plumped for a single bore carrying two tracks whilst the SER went for two adjacent interconnected bores each with a single track. The LCDR, led by Low, formed a rival company, the Anglo-French Submarine Railway Company. At this time the committee had approached both the Board of Trade and the War Office neither of whom raised any objections. Sir Edward Watkin was chairman of the South Eastern Railway, among other lines, and was following every turn of the story. Born into a Manchester cotton family he had long mulled over the idea of improving the export route to the Continent and beyond, even as far as India. By this time the French had responded with commendable speed. A bill was passed by the French Chamber and planning started. De Gamond, who had kept the scheme alive in France, died in 1876 but many others took up the banner. The story now takes a rather sad turn that was to cost Sir Edward much money and which, some say, affected his mental health. The speed of the French response sent panic through the British government; one can almost hear politicians saying ‘we thought it was an interesting idea but surely we’re not going to actually do anything?’ There followed years of political wrangling, problems appeared from every quarter and the once happy War Office began to have second thoughts. The potential investors vanished to await a solid government-backed scheme. Sir Edward wasn’t a political animal, he had little time for the endless ill-based worries and decided to press on by himself. In 1874 he put forward his own proposals and the following year the Channel Tunnel Company received its Royal Assent with a concession of 99 years. Despite Watkin’s early work the Channel Tunnel Company was soon proposing

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The remains of the second tunnel. Work started at St Margaret’s Bay near Dover but was quickly abandoned after flooding. Following the St Margaret’s failure Watkin, backed by the South Eastern Railway, put forward a new plan in 1880 after buying land to the west of Dover from the Church of England. A shaft was sunk well inland and a pilot tunnel set off for the Channel. Never one to miss a good publicity stunt, Watkin organised champagne parties in the tunnel attended by up to 80 guests including dignitaries such as the Lord Mayor of London, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Prince of Wales. This venture progressed some 1¼ miles and was virtually a private venture by Sir Edward and the SER.

an alternative scheme. Watkin had failed to get the Government to finance the venture and so he floated yet another company, the Submarine Continental Railway Company, who took over the existing shafts and tunnel. The opposition now became more vocal, possibly under the orchestration of the London, Dover and Chatham Railway Company. The Board of Trade repeatedly pointed out that the

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I T S E E M E D L I K E A G O O D I D E A AT T H E T I M E tunnel must not progress beneath the first 3-mile strip of sea which was technically owned by the Crown. Xenophobia was whipped up, not least by The Times who published articles on how we could be easily invaded via the tunnel. Eventually in 1882 work stopped on the tunnel whilst the various government departments and endless committees did what they should have done 10 years earlier. On a more practical note some serious work was done; evidence was given on many technical matters including Watkin’s hope that the journey would take around 30 minutes. The invasion risk was to be answered by three safety barriers, the first a massive guillotine gate which could be closed near the tunnel entrance. Next was an explosive charge that would collapse the tunnel, positioned between the entrance and the sea such that it would not flood the tunnel, and lastly a set of explosive charges that would flood the tunnel. It has been suggested that the undertaking was too difficult but we must remember that longer rail tunnels were being constructed through mountain ranges and that by now France, Italy, Switzerland and Germany were all linked this way. The French tunnel had reached their shoreline and the endless British antics were being watched with disbelief. Watkin’s company introduced another bill in 1887 to enable work to continue but it was defeated, such was the strength of public feeling against the scheme. Possessed of seemingly limitless enthusiasm he continued to introduce bills and motions until 1895. There were further attempts during the 20th century to revive the idea but it was not until 1986 that the government finally gave the go-ahead. The Channel Tunnel opened in 1993 providing a 35-minute journey and with true British style the highspeed rail link into London was finished 14 years later, in 2007.

Watkin’s Folly Some have suggested that the endless opposition made Sir Edward a touch eccentric and that this explains his second unfortunate adventure, ‘Watkin’s Folly’. Sir Edward had several strings to his bow and one was the Metropolitan Railway which was setting out west from Baker Street in London into the relatively untouched countryside of Buckinghamshire. The company had wisely bought much more land than was needed for the railway and by the 1880s the sale and development of this surplus land was producing more than a third of the company’s profits. Watkin felt that this gave a dangerously inflated idea of just how well the railway company was doing and in 1887 the land development side was separated from the railway operation. The Surplus Lands Committee of the Metropolitan had negotiated to purchase the entire 280-acre Wembley Park Estate in 1890 for just under £33,000. Watkin’s plan was to use some of the land to construct London’s finest leisure and exhibition centre and the rest for housing. The railway company’s development of these tracts of land, though profitable, was always done with the aim of providing passengers for the new line in the foreseeable future, a very sound investment indeed.

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In 1889 Paris had held an exhibition, with the Eiffel Tower (at 984 ft the tallest construction in the world) as the central feature. This had impressed Sir Edward. Interestingly it had repaid its cost of £¾ million in just seven months – a fact that may have marred Sir Edward’s judgement. Following a competition, the chosen design for a central position on the Flights of Fancy Wembley site was similar to the Paris Some of the designs submitted to tower, having four stages rather than Watkin. Taking advice from W. E. three and being made of steel rather than Gladstone he decided to better Paris iron. The overall height was to be and make a similar, but taller tower as the centrepiece of the Wembley 1150 ft. The first stage consisted of six development. The Metropolitan Tower great legs which were to rise to 300 ft. Company was duly formed with This was altered to four legs supporting a £300,000 capital from the railway massive deck at 155 ft. A temporary company. Watkin approached Eiffel railway was laid from the Metropolitan himself for the design but he declined. into the site to convey materials including In November the design was put out to the steel girders from Manchester. The competition offering prizes of 500 and surrounding area was developed with a 250 guineas. Some 68 designs were boating lake, sports grounds and even a received from around the world, variety hall which drew in the visitors. ranging from the absurd to the The tower however did not progress so outrageous. One well. The park opened in 1894 and had a railway within the first three months some which climbed 100,000 people had visited it but the around the tower was already doomed – it was sufoutside in a fering from subsidence, indeed by 1896, steady spiral when lifts had been installed, the tilting taking visitors to was described as ominous! Projects of the 1000 ft level this type can be seen by the public as with a further exciting and potentially dangerous but 1000 ft still to their construction must be seen as speedy be climbed! and flawless – with no sign of trouble. (Right): The winning design. The idea of a tower in Britain was not in itself flawed but the location was simply wrong. During this same period the more modest 520 ft tower had been built in Blackpool and in 1897 a similar but slightly higher (621 ft) version was built in New Brighton. This second tower was taken down in the 1930s.

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Wembley Stadium It seems appropriate that the exact spot where Watkin started to build his great tower, should be the site of the new stadium with its illuminated arch, a structure which is taller than his tower ever reached!

The Wembley tower stayed open to the public until 1902 and then in 1906 when more housing development was to be started the rusting tower was demolished. A band of 40 men armed with sledgehammers knocked out the bolts and rivets until only the foundations remained. These were duly blown up in 1907, whilst 2700 tons of scrap steel were exported to Italy. We must remember that the sports and leisure ideas had worked well, the area becoming famous during the 1910s and early 1920s when the conference centre, arena and assembly hall were built forming the venue for the British Empire Exhibition in 1924. In 1948 the whole area was used to stage the Olympic Games. Today we know the site a little better as that of the new Wembley Stadium.

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C H A P T E R 10

Danger At Play



Leisure-time disasters

The First Ibrox Disaster The moment at a football match between England and Scotland when a section of the stand collapsed, dropping hundreds 40 ft down through a network of metal girders and timber onto the concrete ground.

I

n the majority of the calamities covered by this book, failure has come about as a result of the limits of technology being pushed too far, through over-reliance on a particular material, or because of a series of mistakes which led to disaster. Even where these were not the cause there was always an element of danger if you rode upon a train, lived beneath a dam, worked in a mine or used gas in these experimental times. In this final chapter, however, these excuses do not seem valid. Spectators standing and watching some form of entertainment do not push the boundaries of science or produce complicated calculations of load which could

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D A N G E R AT P L AY catch out the unwary engineer. Managing large numbers of people can be problematical but in most of these cases their actions were predictable and disaster was easily avoidable. These are therefore the saddest and most tragic of events, none more so than the final case in which a single grossly inept decision by one person resulted in the most tragic loss of life.

The First Ibrox Disaster 5 April 1902 The concept of leisure was, until the second half of the 19th century, generally limited to the well off. The majority of people working long hours, six days a week, had little spare time or money for entertainment. A travelling circus, annual fairs or entertainment in a pub or hall was all they could expect. In the later Victorian period increases in disposable income and reduced working hours gave the poorer classes greater freedom for pleasure although the change was regional and sporadic. One example is the growth of football in the north of the country, which suddenly became a mass spectator sport in the late 19th century, especially as mill and factory workers tended to have Saturday afternoons off, a benefit not always enjoyed further south. The money these large crowds pumped into the new clubs Football Stand Collapses permitted many to become professional As the popularity of football had grown and teams like Aston Villa, Preston so quickly, the skills to manage huge North End and Sunderland dominated numbers of passionate supporters and the league in the last decade of the the development of suitable stands were century (in fact it was not until 1930 still in their infancy. It was Christmas that Arsenal became the first team Day 1888 and Bradford City were from the south to win the league more playing a local derby at Valley Parade than 40 years after it had been which was, by the standards of the day, formed). a good-quality venue. As over 15,000 The first international football fixture people crowded in to watch the match a for England was back in 1872, a number of boys were lifted towards the goalless draw against Scotland. It was front so they could get a good view. The game had only just started when the these two teams who were to meet again supporters surged forward, causing one in 1902 for the first international match of the barriers to collapse with the boys to feature only professional players. The beneath it. One of them, aged 12, had Scottish FA had selected Ibrox Park, the his neck broken and died at the scene, home of Glasgow Rangers for the the others suffered only minor injuries. match. The ground had been rebuilt in The game was abandoned when news of 1899 leaving the club in debt, so staging the fatality had spread and it was an international match was a good decided that the day’s gate receipts source of income to repay this. A huge should be given to the poor lad’s crowd of nearly 70,000 packed the relatives. stadium to watch the game.

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The stand from beneath. Large terraces on this scale were new and the rapid increase in numbers of spectators meant a variety of designs were quickly erected. The stand at Ibrox, designed by the experienced architect Archibald Leigh, was built on a concrete base with vertical and horizontal steel girders braced by diagonal pieces supporting the wooden terraces. This view shows the gaping hole where the stand collapsed and the iron sheeting which was ripped out by people trying to reach the injured.

During the match a cracking noise was heard high in the back of the Western Tribune Stand but before anyone could react a mass of bodies vanished through a hole. As the crowd pushed forward to get away from the danger they crushed the crowd lower down, until they broke through onto the pitch at which point the match was halted. Without a public address system and only a few stewards there was no way of organising an evacuation as many were unaware of what had taken place. The match was completed while the emergency services attended the situation under the stand. This seems incredibly distasteful but it probably saved further lives and avoided any panic. In all 25 spectators died and more than 500 were injured. Most had hit the wooden joists and steel framework under the stand or the concrete base beneath after a fall of about 40 ft, while others had been crushed in the surge to get away from the gaping hole. In the aftermath the contractor, Alexander McDougall, was charged with culpable homicide principally because of his use of cheaper quality wood for the

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D A N G E R AT P L AY terraces than that stipulated in the original contract. He was found not guilty as the jury did not think this was responsible for the collapse; however, no inquiry was ever held to establish the facts and prevent it happening again. It is likely that heavy rain the night before, the excessive number of fans, and the poorer quality of wood used all contributed towards the failure. The design, using vertical and horizontal steel girders supporting wooden planks, fell from favour after this and most subsequent large terraces were built with earthen banks or concrete structures for support.

Exeter Theatre Fire 1887 Music halls and theatres were another popular and growing form of entertainment. However, in these days of electricity we forget the problems which must have existed in the past for lighting up the stage. Gas was the wonder of the age and burners with naked flames were the most widely used form of lighting despite the obvious fire risk. A number of theatres had already burnt to the ground, some with huge loss of life like in Canton, China in 1845 when nearly 1700 died in one blaze or in Vienna when the Ring Theatre disaster claimed more than 600 lives in 1881. Yet little seems to have been done to reduce the flammability of these buildings or to improve evacuating procedures to reduce the loss of life when they did catch fire. Firemen fight in vain to control the fire which rapidly took hold of the new theatre on the night of 5 September 1887. Those in the gallery were trapped and faced the horror of either succumbing to the smoke and flames or jumping for their life from the roof. Virtually none survived.

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The memorial at Higher Cemetery, Heavitree, to those who lost their lives in the Exeter Theatre Fire. It records that ‘more than 160’ died although the total is accepted as 188. Only 68 bodies were ever recovered.

The Theatre Royal in Exeter was built in 1886 shortly after the tragedy in Vienna and only a year after the previous building had burnt down, yet the events of the night of 5 September 1887 indicate that little had been done to increase safety. The play had just reached the end of the fourth act when, to the crowd’s amusement, one of the curtains which came down between scenes fell to the stage, narrowly missing one of the actors. What the audience of around 800 did not realise was that the curtain had caught fire from an open gas light high above the stage and in the vital seconds while they wondered what was going on it had set the building alight. Unfortunately the actors had already run for their lives without alerting the audience to the danger, though this quickly became apparent as the curtain billowed out revealing the inferno behind. To shouts of ‘fire, fire’ those in the ground floor stalls ran for the exits and escaped. However, the few hundred in the gallery above found that there was only one way out and this was partially obstructed so the fleeing crowd quickly blocked it completely. Some tried to escape over the roof or by jumping from balconies but within a few minutes the building was engulfed and those who were not killed by the smoke either died in the flames or from injuries when hitting the ground 40 ft below. The horrific event claimed the lives of 188 people, still the worst accident in a single building in this country. The well-respected designer of the theatre, Charles Phipps, made a statement during the subsequent inquiry that he had followed the latest safety regulations. Despite the fact that it is clear that the loss of life was mainly due to the single obstructed exit from the gallery the verdict was accidental death and no one took

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D A N G E R AT P L AY the responsibility for the loss of life, although Phipps’ career suffered as a result. Fire curtains became compulsory sometime after this event and regulations were tightened although major changes to the way these buildings were built were not introduced until the 1930s.

Victoria Hall Disaster 16 June 1883 The Victoria Hall in Sunderland was a large purpose-made concert venue that could hold thousands in its ground floor stalls, gallery or upper circle. On the day in question ‘The Fays’, a variety show advertised as ‘the greatest treat for children ever given’, were performing. With the promise of prizes and a ticket price of only 1d the hall was packed with a couple of thousand excited children. The show was drawing to a close at around 5.10 pm when Mr Fay announced from the stage that children with a certain numbered ticket would be presented with a prize when they reached the exit. At the same time though gifts were being given out by his assistants to those in the stalls. The children in the gallery above, already energized by the show, suddenly felt they were missing out and began to rush to the staircase to get down to where the gifts were being distributed. Some 1100 of them were trying to get down a narrow spiral staircase and out through the door at the bottom – a tricky move even if all the doors had been left open but someone had locked the exit and left just a narrow gap through which only one child could pass at a time. The situation was intensified by the fact that the door opened inwards towards the stairs. As the crowd of children reached the exit it quickly jammed and one after another they piled up, more and more crushing those below, yet still they came down unaware of why they were not moving until hundreds of them were buried and suffocating. When the adults at the bottom realised what was going on they tried to free the door and release the bolt but as it only opened towards the children who were pressed against it they could not move it. The caretaker, Frederick Graham had the sense to run up the other side and lead 600 of the children who were still in the gallery down the other side. At the blocked door below adults were trying to drag out the bodies one by one until someone eventually smashed the door down. The horrendous scene and immense sense of grief that must have struck those who pulled back the door is unimaginable. They had to extract the motionless little bodies of 183 children. In those few frantic minutes 114 boys and 69 girls aged between 3 and 13 had died of asphyxiation, while another 100 were injured. An entire bible class which the week before had been filled with 30 faithful voices would be silent the following week. More than one family had sent all their children to the show and would rush to the scene to find them gone. The Mills of Ann Street lost four children aged between 6 and 12 and the Watsons of Wayman Street lost three aged 10,12, and 13.

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The Aftermath There was a huge outpouring of emotion following the disaster and money quickly poured in, sufficient to pay for the funerals which were held from the following Tuesday to Friday while all businesses in the town remained closed as a mark of respect. An inquest was held but failed to find anyone to blame. This caused such an immediate national outcry that a second was held but still the person or group responsible were not identified. No one was ever prosecuted for this most horrific loss of life. One outcome of the second inquiry was the recommendation that all public venues must be built with a minimum number of exits and their doors must be outward opening. This subsequently resulted in the invention of the push bar emergency exit. The legislation which was put in place is still in force today. The money also paid for a touching memorial, a statue of a mother holding a dead child, which was erected in Mowbray Park in the shadow of Victoria Hall. It

Today the site of Victoria Hall is a car park opposite Mowbray Park where the memorial stands (opposite page). The statue represents a weeping mother clutching her dead child while the plaque (opposite page) rather understates the level of culpability by referring to it as ‘the calamity’.

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D A N G E R AT P L AY is surprising that such an event slipped from people’s minds, as after the last war the statue was removed to Bishopwearmouth Cemetery where it soon became forgotten and vandalised. Thankfully the local community have recently rescued the monument, restored it and returned it to a site near its original location in Mowbray Park where it stands today. As for Victoria Hall – it got its just desserts, albeit 58 years too late, when at 3 am on 16 April 1941 it was burnt out by a German bomb.

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Bishopwearmouth Cemetery, Sunderland (this page and next): Sections from four graves of children lost in the Victoria Hall disaster. The Mills (top) tragically lost four children. The choice of words may reflect the parents’ anger at the authorities. The use of ‘killed’ and ‘disaster’ are perhaps more appropriate to this horror than those on the memorial.

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CONCLUSION

T

hat the Victorians learnt by a painful series of trials and errors is abundantly clear but again and again one has the impression that they were so occupied by the novelty of their inventions that they were unable to think through the ‘what if’ scenarios. Some of these tragic tales are simply the result of material weaknesses which, at the time, could not be tested. Many engineers would have protested at the suggestion that they hadn’t considered human error or confusion, or hadn’t made careful structural decisions. All design work and operational systems were made after lengthy calculations and discussions, it was simply the best that could be achieved at the time. We still sometimes have the illogical idea that anyone who appears to be a professional is all-knowing and, unlike us, is incapable of error. We feel let down when doctors or airline pilots are shown to have made a mistake. ‘How could they be so silly?’ we cry. ‘Only ordinary people are allowed that privilege!’ The instruction to the consultants who were to design the Forth railway bridge so soon after the failure of the Tay Bridge, was to employ a safety factor of six! Perhaps the mistakes are simply the price that had to paid for a period of such enterprise and invention as had never been seen before. Our present mania for health and safety is often criticised but we must remember the thousands of lives it has saved.

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 INDEX

A Abbots Ripton 36 Angers, France 32 Armagh, Northern Ireland 39–43 Atmospheric Railway 70, 72–76

B Baker and Fowler (Forth rail bridge) 24 Barnsley 46 seq Bazalgette, Joseph 53, 54, 56 Beloe, George 30, 31 Bilberry Dam, Holmfirth 11 Binnie, G.M. 12–13 Birmingham 63 Blea Moor Tunnel, Yorks 45 Bouch, Thomas 17 seq, 34 Bradfield Scheme 11, 12 Bradford 83 Bridgwater (river Parrett bridge) 74 Broughton, Manchester 32 Brown, Captain Samuel 29, 31, 32, 33 Brown, Samuel (Oaks Colliery) 47 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom 70–81

C

Chadwick, Edwin 54 Channel Tunnel 76–79 Chemical works 66–69 Cholera 53–54 Clayton Tunnel 35–39 Clegg, Samuel 72 Cory, Robert 29

D Dale Dyke Dam 7–15 Darfield 48 Davy lamps 50 Dee Bridge, Chester 19 Dundee 17

E Embleton T.W. 47 Exeter 85–87

F Forth rail bridge 23–24, 34, 92

G Gamond, de, Joseph (previously Thome) 77 Gas 58, 62–69 Gateshead 67–69 Geysers, domestic 58 Gill, Thomas (South Devon Railway) 76

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Gooch, Daniel (GWR) 73 Great Yarmouth 26–31 Gunson, John 8

H Hartley Colliery, Northumberland 20 Heating, water 58–61 Holmfirth 11 seq Humber bridge 34 Hutchinson, MajorGeneral 21

I Ibrox Stadium 82, 83–85

L Langholm 31 Leather, George 11 Leather, John Towlerton 12 Leicester Square, London 65 Leigh, Archibald 84 Low Bradfield 8 Loxley 15 Lundhill Mine, Wombwell 48

M McDougall, Alexander 84

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INDEX

Maidenhead (GWR bridge) 74 Malin Bridge, Sheffield 10 Mammatt, J.E. 47 Medicine 51–54 Menai Strait bridge 29, 32, 33 Middleton, Yorks 31 Montrose 31, 32

N Newcastle 67–69 Nightingale, Florence 54 Nine Elms 62–64

O Oaks Colliery, Barnsley 44, 46–49 Oldham 21 Oxford Street, London 65

P Pall Mall, London 65 Peter Street, Westminster 65 Phipps, Charles (Exeter) 86 Plumbing 55–61

R Radcliffe’s Mill, Oldham 21 Railways 35–43, 70–79

S St Helens 66 Samuda, Jacob and Joseph 72, 75 Severn bridge 34 Sewers 53–54, 55 seq Sheffield 8 seq Shipton-on-Cherwell, Oxon 21 Snow, Dr John 54 South Esk Bridge, Montrose 31, 32 Starcross, Devon 76 Stephenson, George 73 Stephenson, Robert 19 Stockton to Darlington railway (suspension bridge) 29 Sunderland 87–91

T Tacoma Straits suspension bridge (USA) 33 Tamar Bridge 34 Tay Bridge 16–25, 34, 92

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Tees suspension bridge, Middleton 28 Telford, Thomas 29, 32, 33 Theatre Royal, Exeter 85–87 Thome, Joseph (later de Gamond) 77 Tottenham Court Road, London 64–66

U Union Bridge, river Tweed 29

V Victoria Hall, Sunderland 87–91 Victoria, Queen 14, 17

W Walker, Mr (Institute of Civil Engineers) 30 Watkin, Sir Edward 43, 70, 76–81 Watkin’s Folly 70, 79–81 WC 56–58 Wembley 79–81 Westminster Bridge Road, London 65

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IN THIS

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SERIES