War or Peace?: Nationalism, Democracy, and American Foreign Policy in Post- Communist Europe 9780814725030

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WAR O R PEACE ?

STEVEN L . BUR G

'War or ^Peace? Nationalism, Democracy, and American Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Europe

A Twentieth Centur y Fun d Boo k

NEW YOR K U N I V E R S I T Y PRES S

New York and London

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and Londo n Copyright © 1996 by The Twentieth Centur y Fund, Inc. ALL RIGHT S RESERVE D

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Burg, Steven L., 1950War or peace : nationalism, democracy, and American foreign polic y in post-communist Europ e / Steven L. Burg. p. cm . "A Twentieth Century Fund book." Includes bibliographical reference s an d index. ISBN 0-8147-1270-3 (alk. paper) 1. Europe , Eastern—politics an d government—1989 2. Nationalism—Europe , Eastern . 3 . Democracy . 4 . Yugosla v War, 1991- 5 . Unite d States—Foreign relations—Europe, Easter n 6. Europe , Eastern—Foreign relations—Unite d States . 7 . Europe — Politics and government—1989- I . Title . DJK51.B867 196 6 320.94'o9i7i'7—dc20 96-3274 4 CIP New York University Press books are printed o n acid-free paper , and their binding materials are chosen for strengt h and durability .

Manufactured i n the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

for SARAH SAMANTH A and DAVID GRAHAM

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Maps i

x

Foreword, Richard C . Leone x

i

Introduction 1 1 • Nationalism, Democracy , an d Internationa l Peace in Post-Communis t Europ e 1

1

Nationalism an d Internationa l Conflic t 1 Democracy and International Peac e 2 Nationalism an d the Transition t o Democracy 3

2 7 0

2 • Ethnic Conflic t an d th e Euro-Atlanti c Community: Th e Yugoslav Crisis 4

3

CHAPTER

CHAPTER

Principles and Institutions i n Flux 4 Prelude to War 5 Preserving the Status Quo 67 From War to Dissolution 7 The Bosnian Debacle 8 The Vance-Owen Pla n and U.S. Policy 9 Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis 11 CHAPTER

3 • From Nationalis m t o Democratizatio n 12

Institutions and Cultur e 13 Preventing Violence 13 Partition versus Democracy 14 Democracy and Diversity 15 Building Democratic Institutions 15 Toward Political Pluralism? 16 Or One-Party Democracy? 17 Conclusion 17 Vll

5 5 1 2 4 9 9 0 2 4 0 7 5 2 5

viii I Contents 4 • Conclusion: Towar d a n America n Strategy for Peac e 17

9

Social and Political Reconstruction 18 Nationalism, Self-Determination , an d Democracy 19 Conflict Preventio n an d Management 20 Toward a Strategy of Preventive Engagement 21 Multilateralism an d American Leadershi p 22

0 1 0 3 1

Notes 22

7

CHAPTER

Index

249

TABLES AN D MAP S

TABLE 2. 1 • Regional Distribution o f Major Ethni c 5 Groups in Former Yugoslavia, 1991

8

TABLE 2. 2 • Ethnic Composition o f Regions in 5 Former Yugoslavia, 1991

9

MAP 1 • Yugoslavia: Ethnic Majorities 6

2

MAP 2 • Ethnic Majorities i n Bosnia-Herzegovina 6

3

MAP 3 * Te n Provinces of Proposed Vance-Owen Pla n 10

0

FOREWORD

T

HE SWIF T SPRIN G THA W tha t followe d th e unexpecte d collapse o f th e Sovie t empir e opene d hal f o f Europ e t o vas t new possibilities. Fo r man y nation s an d peoples , this mean t a leap, with mixe d succes s so far, towar d democrac y an d capitalism . For others , th e ne w freedo m opene d a Pandora' s bo x o f age-ol d attitudes, aspirations , an d animosities . Bot h response s demonstrat e the exten t t o whic h communis m faile d t o fulfil l it s promis e o f developing "ne w men." Instead, i t di d littl e more tha n loc k in plac e ancient habit s o f mind . An d whil e th e ris k o f globa l destructio n i s surely diminished, we have scarcely entered a n era of peace. In th e diplomati c an d scholarl y scrambl e t o understan d an d explain the altered architecture of international affair s afte r th e Cold War, muc h o f th e speculatio n ha s focuse d o n alternativ e potentia l futures fo r Russia , th e continuin g unificatio n o f Wester n Europe , and the singularity of the role of the United States . Events, however, have tende d t o forc e attentio n towar d othe r issues , especiall y th e dangers o f renewe d ethni c conflic t i n Europe . I n on e sense , th e salience o f thi s subjec t shoul d no t b e surprising . Th e ma p o f th e continent today , afte r all , i s n o mor e congruou s wit h nationalitie s than it was after previou s conflicts . Indeed, sinc e th e fal l o f th e Berli n Wall , score s o f conflict s hav e broken ou t aroun d th e globe . Fo r America n leaders , virtuall y al l these ho t spots , suc h a s th e Persia n Gul f an d Somalia , presente d novel challenge s t o policy . Bu t i t i s i n th e forme r Sovie t states , th e region tha t i n man y ways continue s t o pos e th e greates t risks , tha t stability seems the hardest to imagine. Quite simply, as of early 1996, the futur e o f Russi a an d th e othe r formerl y communis t nation s remains unknowable. As a result , th e Twentiet h Centur y Fun d ha s bee n continuin g a program tha t starte d wit h thi s last decad e o f the twentiet h century : support fo r a serie s o f book s an d monograph s tha t explor e th e

xi

xii I Foreword uncharted terrai n o f the post-Soviet world . Ou r author s hav e com pleted numerous projects , beginning with Elizabet h Pond' s After the Wall, tha t bravel y attempt t o infor m policy . I sa y "bravely" becaus e writing abou t thes e matter s a s kaleidoscopic change s occu r aroun d the globe requires a certain willingness to take risks. But events will not wait for our understanding to jell—or fo r a democratic consen sus to for m abou t foreig n polic y in thes e nations . Today, statesme n continue t o fee l thei r wa y in a gingerl y fashio n regardin g th e mos t fundamental questio n abou t future securit y arrangements: just what will th e variou s public s o f thes e democracie s suppor t i n term s o f expense, risk, and action ? So each of these works has an importanc e that transcend s th e norma l scholarl y tests ; they provid e significan t background, commentary, and advice for those who do not have the luxury of waiting for mor e settled times. During this difficult perio d of change, the Fun d ha s published Jame s Chace' s The Consequences of the Peace, Rosemar y Righter' s Utopia Lost, Gil Loescher's Beyond Charity, Thoma s Baylis' s The West and Eastern Europe, Ton y Smith's Americas Mission, Richard Ullman' s Securing Europe, Patric k Low' s Trading Free, Jane t Heininger's Peacekeeping in Transition, an d Jona than Dean' s Ending Europe's Wars. In addition , a number o f book s on simila r issue s wil l soo n b e published : Michae l Mandelbaum' s analysis o f th e futur e o f NATO , John Ruggie' s stud y o f multilater alism, an d Monteagl e Stearns' s loo k a t th e America n diplomati c effort. This volum e represent s a significant additio n t o tha t list . Steve n Burg, professor o f politics at Brandeis University, is one of a handfu l of scholars qualified t o explai n th e development s i n Easter n Europ e and th e resurgenc e o f ethni c conflict s i n thes e forme r communis t states. Author of Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, Bur g is providing critical materials for the work of the Center for Preventiv e Action, a relativel y ne w organizatio n house d a t th e Counci l o n Foreign Relation s an d supporte d b y both th e Carnegi e Corporatio n and the Twentieth Centur y Fund . In thi s book , Bur g trace s th e developmen t o f th e newl y non communist state s o f Centra l an d Easter n Europe . H e stresse s th e

Foreword I xiii "need for a stable framework fo r internationa l peace, " including th e creation o f a n institutionalize d capacit y t o dea l wit h challenge s i n both domesti c an d internationa l affairs . H e offer s practica l advic e about ho w to suppor t democratizatio n withi n thes e ne w state s an d appropriate outsid e respons e mechanism s fo r multilatera l crises . Even thoug h Bur g complete d hi s writin g befor e th e decisio n t o dispatch American force s t o Bosnia as part o f the NATO peacekeeping force , hi s observation s abou t th e forme r Yugoslavi a remai n powerfully apt . Th e deploymen t o f U.S . troops, o f course , open s a new chapte r i n ou r relation s wit h thi s par t o f worl d an d i n th e history o f th e Atlanti c Alliance . Moreover , thi s initiativ e represent s the mos t ambitiou s America n involvemen t i n an y effor t t o en d ethnic violence. Readers of the pages that follo w will find that Bur g helps unrave l th e comple x polic y issue s tha t surroun d th e upsurg e of nationalis m throughou t th e region . H e place s U.S . polic y i n a valuable historica l context , showin g ho w th e Unite d State s an d it s allies hav e trie d t o dea l wit h risin g ethni c conflic t i n a hos t o f formerly communis t states . Finally, Burg's contention that the use of force doe s no t represen t a long-ter m solutio n t o ethni c conflic t i s sure to be borne out in Bosnia. Ultimately, the test today of a book abou t thes e issues is whether it helps policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. By that standard , Steven Burg' s wor k i s a n unqualifie d success . O n behal f o f th e Trustees o f th e Twentiet h Centur y Fund , I congratulat e an d than k him. Richard C. Leone PRESIDENT THE TWENTIET H CENTUR Y FUN D JANUARY 1 9 9 6

INTRODUCTION

F

OR MOR E THA N FORT Y YEARS , Wester n

policymaker s de fined the revolutionary, expansionist ideology and activities of world communism a s the central threat to international peace and stability. They met that threa t by confronting i t with a counterbalancing threa t o f forc e an d pursuin g a strateg y o f containment . With th e collaps e o f communism, th e natur e o f the threa t t o peac e and stabilit y i n th e Euro-Atlanti c communit y ha s changed . Th e external threa t o f Sovie t expansionis m ha s bee n supplante d b y a powerful, interna l threat arising out of the clash of competing ethnic nationalisms. Thi s challeng e canno t b e me t b y th e threa t o f forc e alone o r neutralize d throug h a strateg y o f containment . I t require s Western state s t o ac t decisivel y t o influenc e th e interna l politica l development o f the post-communist state s themselves. Mounting scholarl y researc h an d th e evidenc e o f day-to-day de velopments i n th e post-communis t state s suppor t th e vie w tha t democratic developmen t offer s th e bes t prospec t fo r th e peacefu l settlement o f disputes an d th e most reliabl e guarantee o f long-ter m international peace . In thi s book, therefore , I argue tha t th e Unite d States an d it s allies share a strategic interes t i n th e consolidatio n o f democracy in post-communist Europe . The emergence of nationalist regimes an d movement s i n thes e state s represent s a powerful chal lenge t o th e developmen t o f interna l democrac y and , therefore , t o the stabilit y o f internationa l peace . Th e strategi c interes t o f th e United State s thu s demand s effort s t o mee t an d defea t tha t chal lenge, no t b y opposin g o r eliminatin g ethni c identities , bu t b y fostering th e development o f multiethnic democracies . Because politica l boundarie s rarel y matc h ethnographi c ones , clashes betwee n nationalis t regime s an d thei r ethni c minoritie s ar e inevitable when political authority is linked to ethnic identity rathe r than t o democrati c processe s o f selectio n an d decisionmaking . Th e repression o f internal ethnic minorities, legitimated by the claims of 1

2 I Introduction a majority t o ethnic self-determination, contradict s the fundamenta l principles o f democrac y an d ofte n engender s a violen t response . Such conflicts ar e easily escalated by individual act s of brutality an d can resul t i n enormou s huma n destruction . Ethni c conflict s ar e difficult t o preven t fro m spillin g ove r int o neighborin g states , an d thus they often assum e international dimensions . Competing nationalism s blocke d democratizatio n o f th e forme r Yugoslavia. With th e onse t o f the crisis , a national arm y was transformed int o a nationalis t one , an d it s conventiona l firepower wa s dispersed an d redirected fro m defens e agains t external aggression t o offensive interna l war against both armed opponents and defenseles s civilian populations . Th e interna l conflic t rapidl y becam e interna tionalized, involving a widening circle of actors. In th e forme r Sovie t Union , wher e contro l ove r a muc h large r and mor e destructiv e inventor y of conventional an d tactical nuclea r weapons ha s als o becom e dispersed , an d wher e concer n ove r thei r security agains t diversio n t o guerrill a organization s i s well justified , the danger of escalation is especially ominous. It imperils more than the security of local actors. The threats by South Ossetian separatist s and Azerbaijani s t o us e nuclea r weapons, 1 th e threat s b y Ser b na tionalists to conduct a terror campaig n agains t the West in respons e to an y militar y interventio n i n Bosnia-Herzegovina , an d th e threa t by the Bosnia n Musli m vic e president t o conduc t suc h a campaig n if the West doe s not intervene, 2 shoul d serv e as forewarnings o f th e potentially catastrophic consequence s o f failin g t o addres s ethni c grievances in the region before they turn violent . Policymakers thu s confron t a difficul t problem : ho w t o oppos e the emergenc e o r consolidatio n o f nationalis t regime s tha t bloc k democratic developmen t an d threate n internationa l peac e withou t becoming unduly involved in the domestic politics of other state s or being draw n int o interminabl e loca l wars . Unfortunately , poli cymakers an d scholar s alik e hav e foun d i t difficul t t o defin e th e policies and practice s that mos t effectivel y suppor t th e developmen t of democrac y o r preven t th e ris e o f nationalis t authoritarianism . Moreover, ethni c an d othe r socia l an d politica l tension s ar e com -

Introduction I 3 pounded b y the difficultie s inheren t i n th e transformatio n o f statedominated an d centrall y planned economie s int o market-base d sys tems. A s recen t election s demonstrate , th e socia l cost s o f progres s toward privat e ownershi p an d marketizatio n undermin e popula r support fo r democrati c leader s who sponso r suc h reforms . Democ ratization itsel f may empower precisely those sectors of society most resistant t o meaningfu l economi c reform . Th e consolidatio n o f democracy ma y therefor e require—a t leas t i n th e shor t run—socia l policies tha t sacrific e th e spee d o f economic transformatio n fo r th e sake of political stability . However, suc h a strategy may result i n th e preservation o f a statist rathe r tha n full y democrati c system . Western policymakers , a s wel l a s thei r Eas t Europea n counter parts, must therefore decid e how to reconcile two seemingly contra dictory goals: progress toward privatization an d marketization o f the economy, an d democratizatio n o f th e politica l order . I argu e here that democratizatio n o f the Eas t European an d post-Sovie t politica l systems shoul d b e see n a s a higher-order priorit y fo r Wester n poli cymakers than the realization of radical plans for economic transfor mation. Suc h "shoc k therapy " ma y i n fac t mak e democratizatio n more difficult . Democratization , o n th e othe r hand , ma y serv e t o ameliorate th e statis t threa t t o refor m inheren t i n a gradua l ap proach t o economic transformation . Although th e collaps e o f communis m ende d th e strategi c threa t to America n an d Wes t Europea n security , policymaker s canno t be come indifferen t t o development s i n th e forme r communis t states . Failure to contain the conflicts that have already broken out, forestal l future ones , secure th e democratizatio n o f the successo r states , an d sustain th e prospec t o f economi c well-bein g fo r thei r population s would hav e negative effect s o n th e economic , political, an d securit y interests o f th e West . Th e mos t immediat e impac t woul d b e fel t i n Western Europe . Bu t th e large r politica l force s unleashe d b y suc h developments woul d certainl y affec t th e globa l economic , political , and security interests of the United State s as well. The destructiv e combinatio n o f ethni c fighting i n th e forme r Yugoslavia, the fear of such fighting elsewhere, and simple economic

4 / Introduction hardship throughou t th e regio n ha s already produced a n increasin g flow of refugee s westward . B y July 1993 , over 800,00 0 peopl e fro m the forme r Yugoslavi a wer e seekin g asylu m elsewher e i n Europe. 3 These refugees ar e relatively few compared to the number that might well be produced by ethnic upheaval in Ukraine, Russia, or Russian populated territorie s o f th e othe r forme r Sovie t republics . Yet the y have alread y produced dispute s betwee n Wes t Europea n state s ove r their respectiv e immigratio n policies , a s well a s a shar p increas e i n domestic socia l an d politica l tensions . Thes e tension s ar e reflecte d not onl y i n incident s o f violen t assaul t o n immigrant s an d "gues t workers" b y Germa n neo-Naz i groups , bu t als o i n th e growt h o f electoral suppor t fo r nationalis t an d othe r partie s o f th e extrem e right in Western Europe. It i s i n th e interest s o f bot h th e Wes t an d th e post-communis t states themselves to mitigate the flow of East Europeans to the West. Emigration threaten s t o sipho n of f significan t intellectua l resource s and entrepreneuria l energie s fro m th e post-communis t state s a t a time when these energies are crucial to social, economic, and political reconstruction . Withi n Easter n Europe , th e flight o f refugee s from ethnicall y mixe d area s o f conflict t o neighborin g state s domi nated by their ow n ethni c groups reinforces reactionary , nationalist , and ofte n extremis t element s i n thes e state s an d contribute s t o th e destabilization o f domestic and regional politics. Economic hardship compounde d b y the threat o f violence weakens th e popula r appea l o f democrac y itself . In th e absenc e o f sub stantial externa l support , an d especiall y i n th e aftermat h o f pro longed violence , i t wil l b e extremel y difficul t fo r mos t democrati c governments i n post-communis t Europ e t o delive r tangibl e short term benefit s t o broa d segment s o f thei r populations . Weak demo cratic government s tha t fai l t o improv e popula r well-bein g ar e vulnerable t o displacemen t b y opponent s les s committe d eve n t o gradual transformatio n o f th e state-dominate d econom y an d th e social and political relations that grow out o f it. The electoral victories of reformed communis t partie s in Lithuania , Poland, an d Hun gary and th e appea l o f nationalist partie s i n Slovaki a an d Romania ,

Introduction I 5 for example , can be attributed i n part to the hardships of transition. Elsewhere, mor e authoritaria n opponent s o f chang e ma y adop t th e strategy o f Sloboda n Milosevi c i n Serbi a an d attemp t t o legitimiz e themselves by pursuing extrem e nationalistic agendas . The substan tial electora l suppor t garnere d b y th e extrem e nationalis t part y o f Vladimir Zhirinovsk y i n th e Decembe r 199 3 Russia n election s re flects the strength o f this threat. Left unattended, the rise of nationalist regimes in Eastern Europe, the flow o f refugee s an d emigre s westward , an d th e consequen t increasing politica l appea l o f nationalism i n Wester n Europ e woul d stimulate furthe r violenc e b y neo-Naz i an d othe r ethnocentri c groups i n th e West. This i n tur n woul d elici t stron g reaction s fro m responsible governments . I f sustaine d fo r lon g periods , however , such reaction s migh t themselve s become rea l threats t o civi l liberty. Thus, the long-term security of liberal democracy in the West (especially i n Germany , a stat e wit h a relativel y shor t histor y o f demo cratic development ) ma y depen d o n th e strengt h o f democrac y i n the East. The military issues raised by continuing conflicts i n the East have already complicated the deeper political integration o f the Europea n Community an d undermine d th e cohesivenes s o f th e Atlanti c Alliance. I n th e fac e o f a reduce d Russia n militar y threa t t o Wester n Europe, NAT O itsel f mus t b e redefine d s o a s t o addres s th e ne w security challenge s arisin g ou t o f th e interna l instabilitie s o f th e post-communist states . Th e vas t change s tha t ar e occurrin g i n th e post-communist state s heighte n th e urgenc y o f establishin g a ne w international securit y framewor k amon g the Nort h American , West European, an d post-communis t state s t o replac e the obsolet e archi tecture o f th e Col d War , bu t the y als o mak e thi s mor e difficul t t o achieve. The securit y arrangement s o f th e Col d Wa r er a succeede d i n preventing East-Wes t conflic t i n Europ e and globa l nuclear war, but they ar e il l suite d t o meetin g th e challenge s o f th e post-Col d Wa r era. Th e Yugosla v crisi s ha s reveale d th e weaknesse s i n NATO , th e European Community , the Conference o n Securit y and Cooperatio n

6 I Introduction in Europ e (CSCE) , and th e U N Securit y Counci l system . There i s a clear nee d t o develo p a new framewor k fo r th e preventio n o f suc h conflicts an d fo r th e peacefu l resolutio n o f thos e tha t canno t b e prevented. Although i t i s ofte n argue d tha t th e instabilitie s withi n an d among the post-communist state s could be resolved if NATO membership were extended to them immediately, I argue here that NATO membership b y itself i s insufficient fo r reestablishin g Euro-Atlanti c security i n th e post-Col d Wa r environment . Wester n experienc e suggests that it was the simultaneous presence of democratic political regimes, economi c integratio n throug h th e Europea n Communit y and other international organization s and agreements, and military security cooperatio n throug h NAT O tha t produce d internationa l stability an d securit y i n th e postwa r Euro-Atlanti c community . In the post-communis t era , America n polic y mus t onc e agai n b e di rected towar d achievin g suc h multidimensiona l integration . Prema ture expansio n o f NATO—that is , expansion i n th e absenc e o f th e democratization an d economi c integratio n o f th e post-communis t states—would introduc e politica l instabilitie s an d perhap s eve n conflicts tha t th e allianc e i s ill prepare d t o handl e an d woul d con tribute to a new division o f Europe. The failur e o f th e Unite d State s an d it s allie s t o dea l wit h th e issues raise d b y th e nationalis t conflict s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a increases th e incentive s fo r othe r competin g group s withi n Europ e and elsewher e t o tur n t o violenc e t o solv e thei r ow n problems . Russian nationalist s poin t t o th e Serbs ' us e o f forc e i n th e forme r Yugoslavia a s a mode l fo r Russia n actio n i n th e Balti c republic s where, they claim, the right s o f the Russia n population s ar e endan gered. Th e conflic t i n Chechny a an d othe r area s o f th e Caucasus , not t o mention th e many active nationalist-separatist movement s i n the Thir d World , Wester n Europe , an d Nort h America , rais e man y of the same issues as those in the former Yugoslavia . The appeal s o f nationalist-separatis t group s t o th e principl e o f national self-determination , whic h a t leas t appear s t o hav e bee n legitimated b y Western action s i n Yugoslavia , challeng e th e princi -

Introduction I 7 pies of state sovereignty, territorial integrity , inviolability of borders, and noninterferenc e i n th e interna l affair s o f othe r state s tha t wer e central t o th e postwar internationa l system . This challeng e mus t b e addressed i f peaceful mechanism s fo r th e resolutio n o f ethni c con flict are to be established and the stability of the international syste m in the post-Cold Wa r era is to be preserved. Extremist politician s i n both Wester n an d Easter n Europ e hav e alread y raise d territoria l claims agains t neighborin g state s base d o n ethnohistorica l identity . And ethni c grou p leader s hav e raise d demand s fo r secessio n i n several otherwise well established states . To prevent the proliferatio n of suc h claim s acros s th e Euro-Atlanti c community , policymaker s must carefull y redefin e th e principles of self-determination an d sovereignty, as well as the obligations that arise out of them. In thi s book I argue that th e righ t o f self-determination mus t b e defined i n term s o f basi c huma n rights . Competin g claim s t o th e rights o f self-determination , sovereignty , an d territoria l integrity , such a s hav e bee n centra l t o violen t ethni c conflict s i n th e post communist states , mus t b e assesse d i n term s o f th e democrati c credentials o f th e claimant s rathe r tha n i n ethni c term s alone . B y demanding that claimants meet internationally recognized standard s of huma n right s an d democrati c governmen t befor e th e interna tional communit y wil l sanctio n th e exercis e o f suc h rights , th e United State s an d othe r democrati c state s ca n reduc e th e appea l o f secessionism or irredentism an d increase the incentives for emergin g leaderships to commit themselve s to democratic formulas fo r gover nance and intergroup accommodation . The successful democratizatio n o f the post-communist state s and the establishmen t o f peacefu l internationa l relation s i n th e regio n will also require greater direct involvement on the part of the United States. Bu t Washingto n wil l hav e t o coordinat e it s policie s wit h it s European allies , whos e ow n interest s i n th e regio n may , i n som e cases, differ fro m o r even conflict wit h those of the United States. As the Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated, i n the absenc e o f coordinate d action, instabilit y an d conflic t i n th e post-communis t state s ca n undermine Wester n cohesion . However , instabilit y an d conflic t ca n

8 I Introduction be me t i n way s tha t furthe r th e integratio n o f th e Euro-Atlanti c community throug h th e institutionalizatio n o f multilatera l mecha nisms for the prevention an d peaceful resolutio n o f conflict . American efforts mus t be multidimensional, addressing the social and politica l aspect s o f democrati c development , a s well a s providing direc t economi c assistance . In Octobe r 1991 , Vaclav Havel, the n still president of a united Czechoslovakia, appealed for direc t American involvement . H e aske d "America n scholar s [to ] com e t o ou r country a s often a s possible an d teac h u s abou t civi c society, abou t the kin d o f legislatio n an d institution s i t require s an d abou t wha t relationships should exist between these institutions and the citizens, and amon g th e citizen s themselves." 4 An y suc h efforts , however , must avoi d patronizin g loca l leaders . And the y mus t b e tailore d t o the specific natur e of the threat to democracy in each state. Where democrac y is threatened b y ethnic conflict, specia l effort s must b e devote d t o establishin g counterweight s t o th e appeal s o f nationalism base d o n a close understandin g o f local circumstances. Clearly, an y externa l power—Europea n o r American—tha t at tempts to impose solutions on such conflicts will find it very difficul t to succeed . Th e challeng e t o th e Unite d State s an d it s allies , therefore, is to find ways to help structure social , economic, and politica l conditions s o that th e contendin g partie s themselve s ar e motivate d to resolv e thei r dispute s an d initiat e an d sustai n effort s t o defus e ethnic tensions. While the crisis in Yugoslavia may seem at first glance to sugges t the impossibility of achieving such a goal, closer examination offer s important lesson s on how it might be pursued mor e effectively. Th e Yugoslav crisi s demonstrate s th e importanc e o f concerte d interna tional actio n t o preven t an d resolv e conflict s befor e the y tur n vio lent. I n thi s boo k I us e lesson s draw n fro m th e Yugosla v crisi s t o suggest a variet y o f peacefu l mean s b y whic h th e communit y o f democratic states , workin g throug h multilatera l institutions , ca n prevent the outbreak of similar crises elsewhere. I call the pursuit o f such activities a strategy of "preventive engagement." While difficult , this strateg y can be coordinate d with , an d reinforce , effort s t o pro mote the democratic development o f new governments.

Introduction I 9 The difficult y o f movin g towar d a mor e activis t polic y focuse d on peaceful , preventiv e measure s designe d t o influenc e th e interna l development o f other state s can be attributed, i n part, to the persistence, among theorists and practitioners alike, of the so-called realist theory of international relations . Realist theory focuse s narrowl y o n relative militar y capacities , t o th e exclusio n o f interna l socia l an d political processes . Wit h th e fal l o f communism , however , th e im portance o f interna l structura l an d politica l conditions , includin g the emotional powe r o f nationalism t o elici t extraordinary sacrifice , can no longer be ignored i n the formulation o f American policies to preserve the peace. The strateg y o f preventiv e engagemen t pu t forwar d here differ s radically from th e realis t approac h t o conflic t resolutio n an d inter national security . Realis t theor y hold s tha t th e behavio r o f state s i s constrained b y th e deterren t o r coerciv e forc e o f externa l power . Realists argue, therefore, tha t conflic t i s best prevented an d violenc e is mos t effectivel y ende d whe n eac h part y t o a conflic t i s equall y well armed. Realists argue that between competin g ethnic groups, as in relation s betwee n states , i t i s a balanc e o f militar y powe r tha t ensures peace. In th e post-Col d Wa r world , realis m support s a fundamentall y neo-isolationist view of international relations . In this view, security is achievabl e throug h th e unilatera l acquisitio n o f militar y power . There i s n o nee d fo r collectiv e action . Hence , realist s sugges t th e delivery o f arm s t o secessionis t group s i n Yugoslavia , rathe r tha n efforts t o addres s th e fundamenta l source s o f th e conflic t i n th e region, bot h a s th e means b y whic h conflic t coul d hav e bee n pre vented an d th e means b y which violen t conflic t ca n b e brough t t o an end. 5 Bu t th e behavio r o f Serb , Croat , an d Musli m nationalis t extremists suggest s tha t pruden t policymaker s ough t no t t o plac e much confidenc e i n a strategy that relie s on armin g all sides in suc h conflicts. The realist approach to international security is a prescription fo r an unendin g arm s rac e i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a an d everywher e else competin g nationalism s engende r conflict . A s th e war s i n th e

io I Introduction Balkans and the Caucasus as well as in Northern Ireland , the Middle East, Afghanistan, an d Vietnam have demonstrated, ther e is no suc h thing a s a stable balance o f power o r a simple militar y deterren t t o ethnic mobilizatio n fo r war . Militar y forc e alon e canno t resolv e ethnic conflict shor t of the destruction o f one group by another. The dramati c event s o f recen t year s heighte n th e temptatio n t o resort t o politica l hyperbole . Bu t th e fac t remain s tha t th e Wes t does confron t a histori c opportunit y t o encourag e th e democrati c development o f states that have not been democratic for mos t of the twentieth century . Th e democratizatio n o f th e post-communis t states would provid e th e mos t effectiv e basi s fo r avoidin g th e kin d of crises that in the past have led to international war. The collaps e o f communis m doe s no t i n itsel f guarante e thes e positive outcomes , however . Th e strengt h o f nationalism s through out th e regio n provide s a powerful instrumen t fo r th e constructio n of ne w authoritaria n regimes . A nationalis t authoritaria n govern ment i n Russi a woul d presen t danger s man y order s o f magnitud e greater tha n thos e tha t hav e resulte d fro m th e establishmen t o f a n authoritarian regime in Serbia. Amelioration of the nationalist threat to democracy in the post-communist state s must therefore be recognized an d treate d a s a strategic interes t o f American foreig n policy . American policymaker s mus t resis t th e neo-isolationis t temptatio n to substitut e arm s export s fo r foreig n polic y an d instea d mak e a sustained effor t t o influenc e th e cours e o f politica l developmen t i n the post-communist states .

CHAPTER 1

Nationalism, Democracy , an d Internationa l Peace in Post-Communis t Europ e

T

HE DEMOCRATIZATIO N o f th e post-communis t state s presents policymaker s wit h a vexin g dilemma : Th e collaps e of authoritarianis m ha s unleashe d force s tha t mak e th e es tablishment of liberal democracies difficult. Th e suppression of these forces, however, would entai l actions that migh t mak e the establish ment o f libera l democracie s impossible . Som e accommodatio n o f the nationa l aspiration s o f loca l population s i s essentia l i f violen t conflict i s t o b e avoide d an d th e legitimac y o f ne w democrati c institutions i s t o b e strengthened . I t wil l als o b e necessar y i f thes e populations ar e to endure th e material sacrifice s associate d with th e transition t o democracy . Ther e is , moreover , a mora l virtu e i n creating opportunities fo r th e expressio n o f national cultures . Thus, institutional an d procedura l formula s mus t b e foun d s o that ethni c minorities ar e no t relegate d t o th e status o f permanen t politica l minorities. A t th e sam e time , however , democrac y canno t b e hel d hostage b y a n intransigen t minority . Th e centra l challeng e t o poli cymakers therefore involve s the creation o f incentives to cooperatio n between competin g groups. If th e Unite d State s i s t o assis t th e post-communis t state s o f Eastern Europ e i n meetin g thi s challenge , America n foreig n polic y must underg o a radica l shift—fro m a strateg y o f containmen t t o one o f activ e engagement . B y nurturin g an d stabilizin g th e ne w democracies, the United States will not only contribute to the collective interests of the international communit y of states—establishin g a stabl e an d endurin g internationa l peace—bu t i t will als o provid e for th e nationa l interes t b y securing America n acces s and influenc e in a region o f future economi c and political significance .

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12 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace NATIONALISM AN D INTERNATIONA L CONFLIC T

The Conference o n Securit y and Cooperatio n i n Europe (CSCE) , or Helsinki process, was the product o f the Soviet-American detent e of the 1970s . The United State s an d it s Western allie s used th e proces s to reaffir m th e principle s o f human right s an d individua l freedom , as well as to establish principles of transnational freedo m o f contact and cooperation , i n th e hop e o f weakening th e gri p o f communis t governments ove r their peoples . The Sovie t Unio n an d it s allies , in contrast, sough t affirmatio n o f th e territoria l an d politica l statu s quo i n Easter n Europe. Whil e th e Helsink i Agreemen t adopte d i n 1975 di d ratif y th e internationa l status quo , i t als o establishe d a n important basi s o n whic h bot h th e Wes t and , mor e important , domestic group s i n th e communis t state s themselve s coul d legiti mately pursue politica l change . The Helsinki Accords promoted th e formation b y dissident s i n th e communis t countrie s o f smal l bu t active grassroots political organizations. The increased cultural con tacts between East and West that followed th e signing of the accords reinforced a process already under way among the broader, nondissident socia l elite s i n Easter n Europe : th e developmen t o f bot h in creasingly liberal political values and increasin g nationa l conscious ness. The liberalization of values and the increasing salience of national identity amon g critica l internal elite s were the products o f commu nism's postwar success at social modernization relativ e to the prewar past.1 Mikhai l Gorbachev' s attemp t t o refor m th e Sovie t syste m introduced ne w opportunitie s fo r grassroot s politica l activity , an d intellectuals i n th e economicall y mor e develope d non-Russia n re publics o f th e Sovie t Union—amon g who m thes e values ha d bee n more widespread—rapidl y organize d popula r movement s i n pur suit o f independen t nationa l states . A t th e sam e time , a paralle l increase i n wha t migh t b e considere d liberalizin g nationalis m wa s unfolding amon g the subordinate nations in the multinational state s of Eastern Europe in the 1980s. The apparent marriage of liberalism and nationalism i n the com-

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 13 munist state s i n th e 1970 s an d 1980 s echoe d a simila r marriag e between thes e force s i n Centra l Europ e i n th e mid-nineteent h cen tury. Th e earlie r allianc e resulte d i n th e devolutio n o f powe r t o nationalist leaderships, but it did not produce democracy. 2 Nationalism constitute d a liberalizing forc e onl y i n oppositio n t o ethnicall y alien, authoritaria n rule ; onc e i n power , nationalis m becam e itsel f an ideology of repression. The implosio n o f th e Sovie t domesti c politica l order , th e emer gence o f independen t state s i n th e forme r territorie s o f th e Sovie t Union, an d th e emergenc e o f ne w regime s i n Easter n Europ e hav e resulted in an analogous devolution o f power to national states. As a result, nationalis m ha s agai n becom e a powerful legitimatin g forc e for ne w government s wit h uncertai n base s o f popula r support . I t also threatens to become once again an ideology of repression. Although som e hav e argue d tha t th e collaps e o f communis m leaves no alternativ e t o libera l democrac y a s an ideologica l founda tion on which to legitimate new governments,3 it remains to be seen whether th e post-communis t regime s wil l b e abl e t o transfor m th e bases o f thei r legitimac y fro m nationalis t t o democrati c principles . The wor k o f politica l scientis t Davi d Easton—perhap s th e mos t influential theoris t o n thi s issue—suggest s tha t newl y democrati c and democratizin g regime s mus t demonstrat e thei r effectivenes s i n the shor t ter m i n orde r t o garne r th e instrumental , o r pragmatic , support o f their populations . And benefits mus t b e delivere d t o th e population ove r a lon g perio d i n orde r fo r pragmati c suppor t fo r particular incumben t government s and their policies to develop into deeper, affectiv e suppor t fo r th e politica l syste m i n genera l an d fo r democracy as a way of life. 4 Ethnic diversity by itself represents a major obstacl e to the development o f this affectiv e support , whic h ha s been define d b y Easton as "a sense of we-feeling, commo n consciousness , or group identifi cation."5 Bu t i t i s no t a n insurmountabl e obstacle . I n th e absenc e of pragmati c base s o f suppor t fo r existin g arrangements , however , diversity presents a powerful basi s for th e delegitimation o f a transitional democrac y an d th e mobilizatio n o f suppor t fo r a nationalis t

14 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace alternative. In several of the post-communist state s the instability of incumbent governments , the fragmentation o f ruling coalitions, and the socia l cost s o f economi c transformatio n mak e i t difficul t fo r democratic regime s t o delive r benefit s t o th e populatio n an d thu s raise the prospect o f democratic breakdown. The increase d salienc e o f nationalit y i n post-communis t Europ e has rekindle d man y o f th e ethni c an d territoria l issue s o f th e lat e nineteenth an d early twentieth centuries . The powerful combinatio n of internal discontent an d external ambition ma y again lead some of these state s towar d mor e authoritaria n arrangements , a s national isms are transformed fro m mobilizin g ideologie s o f opposition int o exclusionary, alienatin g ideologie s o f internal oppressio n an d exter nal aggression . Indeed , i n som e o f thes e state s government s stil l face significan t disloya l oppositio n fro m unreforme d communists , extreme nationalists , neofascists , an d othe r authoritaria n force s ready t o exploi t suc h discontent s an d ambitions . Th e specte r o f Weimar haunts the region . Throughout th e Sovie t Unio n an d Easter n Europe , national self assertion ha s bee n characterize d b y the equatio n o f ethni c identit y with a right to political independence. Sovereignty has been define d in th e popula r min d a s freedo m fro m rul e b y a n ethnicall y alie n group. This popular attachmen t t o th e righ t o f ethni c collective s t o sovereignty represent s a powerfu l obstacl e t o th e creation o f eco nomic an d politica l institution s tha t cut acros s ethni c difference s and create the foundations o f a shared political community . Yet Eastern Europe is an ethnically diverse region in which political borders do not correspond with precision to either the territorial distribution o f ethni c group s o r thei r self-define d historica l home lands. Boundaries were established as the result of treaties negotiated after Worl d Wa r I , representin g imperfec t attempt s t o appl y th e principle o f nationa l self-determinatio n t o th e region . Furthe r changes followe d Worl d Wa r I I an d th e Sovie t occupatio n o f th e region. Within the multinational Soviet and Yugoslav states, borders and eve n th e status o f entir e territorie s wer e subjec t t o chang e b y the centra l leadershi p wit h littl e opportunit y fo r expressio n o f th e popular will.

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 15 Some ethnic groups i n postwar Easter n Europ e ende d u p largel y within th e confine s o f a singl e state. Thes e include d thos e tha t formed "homogeneous " nationa l state s o f thei r own , thos e tha t found themselve s part of multinational states, and those that became national minorities . Othe r ethni c group s were divided by state bor ders or by internal borders within multinationa l states. The presence of an overarching political authority, however, moderated the impact of thes e divisions . Th e Serbs , whil e divide d b y interna l borders , remained par t o f a single Yugoslav state, and th e Russians remaine d part of a highly centralized Soviet Union. Similarly, Soviet hegemony suppressed cross-borde r issue s in relation s between state s in Easter n Europe. The collaps e o f communis t powe r wa s followe d b y internationa l recognition o f entities that had attained republi c status in the multinational Soviet and Yugoslav federations. Units of lesser status under the ol d regime s wer e no t recognized . Wherea s th e forme r wer e conceded a right to self-determination, th e latter were not. Nor were national group s divide d b y interna l border s concede d thi s right . Along wit h th e rapi d accessio n o f th e newl y recognize d state s t o membership i n suc h internationa l organization s a s the Unite d Na tions an d th e CSC E cam e th e forma l lega l protection s afforde d b y the internationa l principle s o f stat e sovereignt y an d th e righ t o f states to defend thei r territorial integrity . The Helsink i Accord s ha d ratifie d "th e equa l right s o f people s and thei r righ t t o self-determination, " whic h wa s define d a s "th e right, i n ful l freedom , t o determin e whe n an d a s the y wish , thei r internal an d externa l political status." Despite the referenc e t o "peoples" i n th e Helsink i Accord s an d th e follow-u p document s o f th e CSCE (a s in th e U N Charter) , th e Unite d State s had supporte d th e right o f self-determinatio n i n th e Helsink i contex t becaus e i t ha d understood i t to mea n th e righ t o f the state s unde r Sovie t domina tion t o a free and autonomou s existence . As communism collapsed , however, an d th e internationa l communit y recognize d successo r states on th e basis of formerly interna l borders, some ethnic group s sought to reconfigure thos e borders based on their claims as peoples to a righ t o f self-determination . Th e effort s o f nationalis t regiona l

16 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace leaderships t o achiev e independenc e raise d importan t question s about conflict s betwee n the right o f secession and recognition base d on th e principl e o f self-determination , an d th e righ t o f state s t o defend thei r territorial integrity . Serbs, Croats , Bosnia n Muslims , Romanians , Moldovans , Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians , Ossetians , Abkhazians, Chechen, In gush, an d Russian s hav e al l bee n draw n int o conflict s fuele d b y conflicting claim s legitimated b y these principles . Albanians, Macedonians, Hungarians, and Slovak s may soon be added to this list. In the absence of effective democrati c frameworks fo r th e resolution o f conflict derivin g fro m th e competin g claim s o f group s withi n pre viously recognized states , such conflict s to o easil y escalate int o violence an d threate n t o dra w neighborin g state s int o direc t involve ment. The boundarie s o f th e Hungaria n nationa l stat e tha t ha d bee n part of the Austro-Hungarian Empir e before World War I, for exam ple, were severel y truncated a s the resul t o f the postwa r settlement . Approximately two-thirds of its territory and more than a quarter of its ethnicall y Hungaria n populatio n wer e assigne d t o neighborin g states by the Treaty of Trianon, concluded in 1920. From the perspective o f the Czechoslovak , Romanian , an d Yugosla v state s tha t exer cised sovereignty over them, the formerly Hungaria n territorie s represented potentia l foc i o f Hungaria n irredentism . Durin g Worl d War I I th e Hungaria n government , i n allianc e wit h Naz i Germany , reclaimed part s o f thes e forme r territories . Thes e seizure s wer e re versed afte r th e wa r bu t lef t a renewe d suspicio n o f Hungaria n ambitions o n th e par t o f neighborin g states . I t i s thes e ver y state s that hav e no w al l becom e highl y unstabl e wit h th e collaps e o f communism, an d in which the status of Hungarian minorit y popu lations ha s been threatene d b y the ris e o f Slovak , Serb , and Roma nian nationalisms . The first democratically elected Hungarian prim e minister, Jozsef Antall, escalate d thes e suspicion s when , shortl y afte r assumin g power in May 1990, he declared that he considered himself the prime minister o f fifteen million Hungarians (onl y ten million Hungarian s reside withi n th e border s o f th e Hungaria n state) . Antal l late r

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 17 claimed that h e was "talking about thi s not i n the legal sense but i n the spiritual, emotional context. " But at the same time he noted tha t as th e resul t o f th e Treat y o f Trianon , "one-thir d o f Hungarians , without havin g left thei r homeland o r country , became citizen s of a foreign country." 6 Tha t h e harbore d ambition s t o reclai m thes e territories was clear. Such statements were also consistent wit h pop ular sentiment i n the country. In a public opinion surve y conducted in Ma y 1991 , 68 percent o f al l Hungarian s expresse d th e vie w tha t territories i n neighborin g countrie s actuall y belonged t o Hungary. 7 Concern ove r th e fat e o f Hungarian s i n Romani a wa s particularl y pronounced: som e 4 2 percen t o f Hungarian s surveye d identifie d Romania as their "mai n enemy." 8 The expansionis t ambition s o f Hungary' s leader s apart , thes e expressions o f concer n fo r Hungarian s abroa d reflec t th e threat s posed t o thes e population s b y th e erosio n o f condition s i n th e neighboring state s an d th e ris e o f Slovak , Serb , an d Romania n nationalisms. Hungarian s fro m Vojvodin a hav e bee n fleein g acros s the borde r i n increasin g number s t o escap e persecutio n b y Serbs . They, as well as Hungarians fro m Slovakia , actively seek the physical and political protection o f the Hungarian state. According t o th e 199 2 Romania n census , ther e wer e 1. 6 millio n ethnic Hungarian s i n Romania. 9 Other s estimat e th e numbe r t o be muc h larger . Hungarian s constitute d almos t 2 4 percen t o f th e population i n th e provinc e o f Transylvania , an d ove r 2 1 percent i n Crisana-Maramure§. Withi n thes e regions , Hungarian s constitute d large majorities i n tw o countie s an d larg e minoritie s i n others . The clash between Hungaria n an d Romania n nationalism s i n Transylva nia le d t o th e outbrea k o f violenc e i n th e regio n i n 199 0 an d ha s been a source of continuing conflic t since . Even modest attempt s t o express Hungarian identit y hav e met with repressiv e responses . The nationalist Romania n mayo r o f th e Transylvania n cit y o f Cluj , fo r example, ha s bee n particularl y activ e i n attemptin g t o suppres s Hungarian identit y i n hi s city. 10 Suc h conflict s contribute d t o ex panding electoral support for Romanian nationalist parties in parliamentary elections held in September 1992. u Since 1992 , the governin g part y i n Romania , th e Part y o f Socia l

18 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace Democracy in Romania (the direct descendant of the National Salvation Front , late r Democrati c Nationa l Salvatio n Front , whic h wa s composed predominantl y o f forme r communist s an d whic h as sumed powe r afte r th e overthro w o f Ceau§esc u i n Decembe r 1989 ) has becom e increasingl y dependen t o n th e suppor t o f nationalis t parties t o retai n power . Earl y i n 1994 , i t entere d int o a forma l coalition tha t include d tw o extrem e nationalis t parties : the Part y of Romanian Nationa l Unit y (PRNU ) an d th e Greate r Romani a Part y (GRP). In mid-1994, the PRNU entere d the cabinet, followed b y the GRP in early 1995.12 The growing reliance of the former communist s on th e extrem e nationalist s fo r politica l surviva l ha s contribute d to growin g tension s betwee n th e governmen t an d th e Hungaria n population i n Transylvania. Romanian nationalis t force s i n Transylvania ar e led by Gheorgh e Funar, th e mayo r o f Cluj , an d th e PRNU . The y dra w their suppor t from ethnicall y Romanian communist-era elites of the region, whose power woul d b e threatene d b y th e ful l civi c incorporatio n o f th e large Hungaria n minority , an d fro m th e loca l ethni c Romania n population wh o fea r tha t increase d governmen t attentio n t o th e interests of Hungarians will necessarily result i n decrease d attentio n to thei r ow n interests , an d wh o ultimatel y fea r an y takeover o f th e region b y Hungary. 13 Thes e fears ar e reinforced b y demands o n th e part o f the Hungarian Democrati c Federation o f Romania, the main political organizatio n o f th e Hungaria n minorit y i n Romania , fo r greater loca l cultura l an d eve n territoria l autonomy . Suc h demand s engender hostil e response s no t onl y fro m th e radica l Romania n nationalist parties, but fro m libera l opposition leader s and the independent medi a as well.14 Romanian nationalis t extremist s benefi t fro m popula r fear s wit h respect t o th e demand s o f th e Hungaria n minority . Thes e ar e sus tained, i n part, by intemperate statement s o n th e part o f politicians in Hungary . A t th e Ma y 199 5 meetin g o f th e HDF R i n Cluj , fo r example, th e mos t stridentl y nationalis t statemen t cam e no t fro m the ethnicall y Hungaria n politician s fro m Romania , bu t fro m th e leader o f th e Independen t Smallholder s Part y o f Hungary , Jozse f Torgyan, wh o opposed th e conclusio n o f a treat y betwee n th e tw o

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 19 states tha t migh t incorporat e a negotiate d compromise , an d calle d for th e unificatio n o f all Hungarians i n a single state. His statemen t was repudiate d b y a representativ e o f Hungary' s rulin g Socialis t Party. Bu t Romania n nationalist s wer e onc e agai n provide d th e opportunity to link HDFR demands for autonomy to the aspiration s of nationalist politician s in Hungary. 15 A similar linkage between domestic ethnic relations and interstat e relations exists in Slovakia . Since 1989, the Hungarian populatio n o f Slovakia ha s becom e increasingl y wel l organized . Ne w Hungaria n cultural and political organizations formed almos t immediately afte r the collaps e o f communism , an d alread y existin g organization s be came more active in the defense of Hungarian interests. The concern of ethni c Hungarian s t o secur e thei r fundamenta l right s ha s bee n heightened b y th e ris e o f distinctl y anti-Hungaria n sentiment s among Slovaks , as manifest i n nationalis t demonstration s i n severa l ethnically mixe d area s o f th e republi c i n earl y 1990, in call s fo r th e expulsion o f Hungarian s an d th e creation o f a "pur e Slova k state, " and i n th e attemp t b y th e Matic a Slovenska , th e Slova k nationa l cultural society , to outlaw the use of the Hungarian language. 16 In a survey conducted i n May 1991, 65 percent o f respondents in Slovakia expressed hostility toward the Hungarian minority. 17 Concern o n the part o f the Hungarian governmen t fo r th e statu s of ethni c Hungarian s i n Slovaki a ha s contribute d t o th e tensio n i n relations between thes e two countrie s sinc e the collaps e o f commu nism. Slova k politic s ha s bee n dominate d sinc e 199 2 b y Vladimi r Meciar an d hi s party, Movement fo r a Democratic Slovaki a (MDS) . The MDS won over 37 percent of the vote in elections to the republic parliament i n 199 2 and establishe d a coalition governmen t wit h th e Slovak National Party (SNP). 18 While the MDS was nationalist i n its orientation towar d relation s wit h th e Czech s an d intoleran t o f th e Hungarian minority , th e SN P represente d th e extrem e right-win g nationalist tendency in Slovak politics. Thus, the Meciar-led govern ment contribute d t o th e escalatio n o f tension s betwee n th e stat e and it s Hungaria n minority , an d thereb y worsene d relation s wit h Hungary. With th e fal l o f th e Mecia r governmen t i n Marc h 1994 , a left -

20 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace right coalitio n too k contro l i n Slovakia , led by Jozef Moravcik. Th e Moravcik coalitio n brough t togethe r thos e partie s seekin g t o dis tance th e stat e fro m bot h it s communis t an d it s fascis t past , an d thus was more liberal than it s predecessor i n its ideological orienta tion towar d th e Hungaria n minority . I t wa s als o dependen t o n th e support o f the two Hungarian partie s to maintain it s parliamentar y majority. Thus it moved to ease relations with the Hungarian minor ity while pursuin g domesti c economi c refor m an d a n internationa l rapprochement wit h Hungary . Despit e gain s registere d unde r th e Moravcik government , however , Meciar' s MD S score d a surprisin g electoral victory in the September 1994 elections, securing 35 percent of the popular vote. The MDS entered into an alliance with the SNP and th e leftis t Associatio n o f Slova k Workers t o tak e contro l o f th e government onc e agai n i n Decembe r 1994 . The Mecia r governmen t moved immediatel y t o strengthe n stat e contro l o f th e media , slo w down the privatization effor t renewe d by the Moravcik government , and increase cultural pressure on the Hungarian minority. 19 Hungary refused , unti l 1995 , to conclud e a treat y affirmin g th e inviolability of the Slovak-Hungarian border , citing the treatment o f Slovakia's Hungaria n minorit y a s on e o f "man y unresolve d prob lems" i n bilatera l relations. 20 Onl y unde r pressur e fro m th e Euro pean Union was a treaty finally concluded. But the March 1995 treaty has bee n th e subjec t o f divergen t interpretation s betwee n th e tw o governments an d has been the cause of renewed conflic t i n Slovaki a between the Hungarian parties and the SNP.21 Parallels ca n b e draw n betwee n th e Hungaria n government' s concern fo r th e statu s o f ethni c Hungarian s i n neighborin g state s and th e concern s i n Albani a ove r th e statu s o f ethni c Albanians i n Kosovo, souther n Montenegro , an d wester n Macedonia . Indeed , these situations ma y be even more volatile because of the conflict i n Bosnia, the extremely high tensions between Serb s and Albanians in Kosovo, th e uncertai n internationa l status o f Macedonia , an d th e potential territoria l ambition s o f other state s i n th e region . Albani a is a weak state unlikely to pursue aggressive action agains t its neighbors o n it s own . Bu t i t coul d easil y b e draw n int o a conflic t wit h

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 21 Serbia ove r Kosovo , as could severa l othe r Balka n states . Such con flict migh t b e sparke d b y a n escalatio n o f Serbia n repressio n i n Kosovo o r th e resor t t o forc e b y Kosovar Albanian s eithe r t o estab lish their independence o r to unite with Albania. Disturbing parallels to conditions in Eastern Europe can be foun d in th e forme r Sovie t republics . Th e mos t intens e an d long-lastin g interethnic violence in the forme r Sovie t Union ha s occurred i n th e Caucasus, a region tha t i s both large r an d mor e populou s tha n th e combined republic s o f Croati a an d Bosnia-Herzegovina . Th e level s of interethni c hostilit y an d violenc e surroundin g th e competitio n for contro l ove r dispute d territor y here paralle l thos e foun d i n th e former Yugoslavia . Th e potentia l fo r powerfu l surroundin g coun tries to be drawn into local conflicts i s at least as great here as in the Balkans. An d th e internationa l consequence s o f suc h involvemen t would be no less important . In the Nagorno-Karabakh regio n o f Azerbaijan, a violent conflic t between the local majority populatio n o f ethnic Armenians, who are seeking autonomy and union wit h th e Armenian nationa l state, and the Azerbaijan i state , whic h exercise s sovereignt y ove r th e region , has continue d fo r mor e tha n eigh t years. 22 Nagorno-Karabakh, lik e the Caucasu s a s a whole, i s located a t th e historica l intersectio n o f three competing , culturall y distinc t imperia l powers : Turkish , Ira nian, and Russian. Despite attempts by the predominantly Armenian population o f Nagorno-Karabakh (abou t 8 9 percent o f the popula tion, accordin g t o th e 192 6 Sovie t census ) t o unit e wit h Armenia , the regio n wa s place d unde r Azerbaijan i sovereignt y i n th e Sovie t period. Fro m 192 1 on, Nargorno-Karabak h remaine d a par t o f th e predominantly Muslim , Turki c republi c o f Azerbaijan . Th e loca l population i n Nagorno-Karabakh , however , remaine d predomi nantly Armenian—84.4 percen t i n 1959, and 76.9 percent i n 1989.23 With th e onse t o f glasnost , th e aspiration s o f Armenian s i n Nagorno-Karabakh fo r unio n wit h Armenia , whic h ha d bee n sup pressed b y Moscow , foun d renewe d publi c expression . The y wer e reinforced b y a sharp declin e i n economi c condition s i n the region . By February 1988, Armenian activists were calling openly for transfe r

22 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace of th e regio n t o th e Armenia n republic , wit h th e suppor t o f mas s demonstrations i n Yerevan and in Nagorno-Karabakh. Th e Azerbaijani population responde d t o rising Armenian nationa l assertivenes s with a bloody attac k o n Armenian s living in th e Azerbaijani cit y of Sumgait. Th e Februar y 198 8 Sumgai t riot s bega n th e progressiv e escalation o f interethnic violence . By January 199 0 the violence ha d become open warfare. Not even the deployment o f large numbers of Soviet troops could suppress it. The continuin g fightin g i n an d aroun d Nagorno-Karabak h con tributed t o the growing instability of the entire Caucasus. Following the collaps e o f th e Sovie t Unio n i n Augus t 1991 , Russian presiden t Boris Yeltsin attempte d t o broke r a peaceful settlemen t o f the con flict i n September . A n apparen t agreemen t betwee n th e Armenian s and Azerbaijani s soo n collapsed , however . Thi s patter n o f outsid e attempts t o broke r a settlement , th e conclusio n o f a n apparen t agreement, an d it s subsequen t collaps e ha s bee n repeate d severa l times since. 24 Regional actors concerne d abou t loca l security issues, including Russia , Iran, an d Turkey, have all attempted t o facilitat e a settlement. Bu t eac h ha s bee n suspecte d b y on e sid e o f excessiv e sympathy fo r th e other , an d th e effor t ha s failed . I n th e cas e o f Russia, ther e i s goo d reaso n t o doub t th e sincerit y o f it s effort s t o broker a peac e settlement: ther e i s stron g evidenc e tha t Russia n troops actin g a s mercenaries , a s wel l a s element s o f th e Russia n army i n Nagorno-Karabak h an d Armenia , hav e bee n fighting o n behalf of the Armenians. 25 International organizations , includin g th e CSC E an d th e Unite d Nations, hav e als o faile d i n thei r effort s t o facilitat e a settlement . The CSC E undertoo k a serie s o f mission s t o th e regio n i n 199 2 to explore the establishment o f a cease-fire. A conference o n Nagorno Karabakh wa s created i n March 199 2 to undertak e negotiations , bu t this failed to produce results. A cease-fire finally was arranged unde r Russian sponsorshi p i n Ma y 1994 . Bu t n o thir d part y mediato r has bee n abl e t o resolv e th e contradictio n betwee n th e competin g principles o f legitimation tha t ar e a t stak e i n thi s conflict : Azerbai jani representative s hav e grounde d thei r claim s t o Nagorno-Kara -

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 23 bakh on the principle that boundaries of the former Sovie t republic s have achieve d internationa l recognitio n an d tha t Azerbaija n there fore ha s the righ t t o protec t it s sovereignly an d territoria l integrity . Azerbaijan thu s ha s refuse d t o accep t representative s o f Nagorno Karabakh as negotiating partners. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh , on th e othe r hand , clai m th e righ t o f national self-determination. 26 Thus, i n man y respects , th e conflic t i n Nagorno-Karabak h repre sented a foretaste o f the conflicts tha t would erupt in Yugoslavia and that stil l threaten othe r Eas t European states. Violent conflic t ha s als o occurre d i n th e Georgia n republic , be tween Georgians and two regional ethnic minorities: the Abkhazians and the Ossetians. The Abkhaz, an ethnically Turkic, Muslim people, had bee n agitatin g fo r increase d autonom y unde r Sovie t rul e an d continued t o d o s o as Georgia achieve d it s own independence. 27 In April 1991 , Abkhaz an d Georgia n leader s i n Abkhazi a formulate d a power-sharing agreemen t tha t essentiall y ratifie d th e statu s qu o b y giving the Abkhaz disproportionat e representatio n i n th e loca l par liament. But this agreement was nullified by the Georgian nationalis t president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who responded to Abkhaz demands with exclusionar y an d repressiv e actions . Th e resul t wa s a rapi d disintegration o f relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. By August 1992, fighting betwee n Georgia n militar y unit s o n on e sid e an d a n alliance o f Abkhazian s an d othe r Caucasia n mountai n people s o n the other had turned int o civil war. 28 The Georgia n leadershi p foun d i t particularl y difficul t t o offe r concessions t o th e Abkhazian s becaus e thi s was no t th e onl y secessionist movemen t o r potentia l movemen t i t confronted . Th e ethni c Azerbaijani populatio n wa s agitatin g fo r th e establishmen t o f a n autonomous regio n o f their ow n within th e republic , and th e Ossetians o f th e Sout h Ossetia n autonomou s oblas t i n nort h centra l Georgia ha d bee n seekin g t o expan d thei r autonom y sinc e 1989 . Ossetian aspiration s t o unit e wit h th e Nort h Ossetia n Autonomou s Republic, fro m whic h the y ar e separate d onl y b y th e Georgian Russian border, clashed with the growing support amon g Georgian s for independenc e fro m th e Sovie t Unio n an d gav e ris e t o violen t

24 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace conflict betwee n Ossetian s an d Georgians . Repressiv e measure s b y the Gamsakhurdi a governmen t le d t o th e escalatio n o f interethni c violence.29 Fighting between the South Ossetian s and Georgians was ended b y a cease-fir e i n Jul y 1992 , enforced b y Russian , Georgian , and Ossetia n peacekeepin g troops . Thi s arrangemen t effectivel y re moved th e regio n fro m Georgia n contro l an d threatene d t o lea d t o its eventual separation fro m th e republic. More recently , th e secessionis t aspiration s o f a smal l natio n an d the determination o f the Russian stat e to defend it s territorial integ rity have led t o violenc e i n Chechnya , a North Caucasia n regio n o f the Russia n republic . Cheche n resistanc e t o Russia n rul e reflect s centuries-long effort s b y th e Cheche n peopl e t o fre e themselve s from foreig n dominatio n an d mor e recen t grievance s arising out o f mistreatment durin g th e Sovie t period. 30 Lik e man y othe r regiona l leaderships in the former Sovie t Union, local Chechen leaders seized the opportunity to declare local sovereignty in 1990. The failed cou p in Moscow in 1991 set off an internal political struggle for contro l of Chechnya, wo n b y radica l nationalist-separatis t force s le d b y Dzhokhar Dudaev , a former Sovie t air force general . After winnin g electio n a s president i n a n apparentl y rigge d election i n Octobe r 1991 , Dudaev blocke d a n attemp t b y Russia n pres ident Bori s Yeltsi n t o restor e centra l control , an d a prolonge d po litical stalemat e se t in . Durin g thi s period , Dudae v exercise d increasingly authoritaria n rule , an d ethni c tension s intensifie d be tween th e Cheche n an d th e larg e Russia n minority—almos t 2 5 percent o f th e tota l populatio n o f Chechny a i n 198 9 an d ove r 5 0 percent o f the populatio n o f Grozny , the capital . The Russia n deci sion finally to use force against Chechnya in December 1994 involved consideration o f a number o f domestic an d internationa l economi c and securit y issues . Perhap s th e dominan t consideration , however , was the Russia n geostrategi c interes t (followin g th e conclusio n o f a major agreemen t providin g fo r Wester n investmen t i n th e exploita tion o f Azerbaijan's substantial oi l reserves) i n ensurin g the securit y of the existin g oil pipeline between Bak u and th e Russian Blac k Sea port o f Novorossiisk, which crosses Chechnya. 31

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 25 From a n ethnopolitica l perspective , Cheche n insistenc e o n inde pendence fro m Mosco w represented onl y one of the several possible challenges that migh t aris e from growin g unres t amon g the people s of the Nort h Caucasus . Th e Russia n leadershi p successfull y negoti ated a compromise solutio n t o simila r conflict s wit h othe r regiona l leaders—most notabl y with Tatarsta n i n Februar y 1994—but chos e not t o pursu e thi s strateg y i n Chechnya. 32 Bu t th e us e o f forc e against Chechny a has proven ineffectiv e a s a means to end Cheche n resistance. The demand s o f the Chechen , Abkhaz , an d Ossetia n minorities , like those o f the Armenians i n Nagorno-Karabak h an d th e warrin g groups i n th e ethnicall y mixe d territorie s o f the forme r Yugoslavia , throw int o shar p relie f th e urgen t necessit y t o resolv e th e apparen t contradiction betwee n th e principle s o f self-determination , sover eignty, and territorial integrity, which are central to the internationa l political order . The y als o reinforc e th e vie w tha t ethni c conflict s cannot easil y be resolve d b y the us e o f force—a t leas t no t withou t enormous human cost . The breaku p o f th e Sovie t Unio n lef t larg e Russia n minorit y populations i n th e non-Russia n successo r states . Altogether , mor e than twenty-fiv e millio n ethni c Russians , o r ove r 1 7 percent o f th e 1989 ethnic Russian population of the Soviet Union, were left outsid e the Russia n republic . Th e policie s an d practice s o f som e o f th e successor stat e government s ar e politicizin g th e Russia n minorit y populations an d creatin g condition s fo r thei r mobilizatio n i n muc h the sam e wa y tha t Serbia n identit y wa s mobilize d i n Croati a an d Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerns abou t th e status an d treatmen t o f Russian s outsid e Russia also reinforce a n emerging tendency toward what on e analyst has calle d "Russia n imperia l nationalism." 33 Fo r example , Russia n defense ministe r Pave l Grache v state d i n Jun e 199 2 tha t h e woul d respond t o an y violation o f "th e hono r an d dignit y o f th e Russia n population" i n an y par t o f th e Commonwealt h o f Independen t States with "mos t resolut e measures." 34 This perspective i s reflecte d in th e revise d Russia n militar y doctrin e mad e publi c i n Novembe r

26 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace 1993, in which suppression o f the rights of Russians abroad is identified as a threat to Russian security. 35 Even i f th e Russia n stat e leadershi p choose s no t t o pursu e irre dentist policies , ethni c Russian s i n th e successo r state s ma y rais e such claim s o n thei r own . An d a s event s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a demonstrate, nationalis t unres t amon g disperse d member s o f th e once-dominant natio n o f a forme r multinationa l stat e ca n lea d to militar y interventio n b y "their " nationa l stat e o n behal f o f it s conationals o n th e peripheries . Th e continuin g presenc e o f larg e contingents o f th e forme r Soviet , an d no w Russian , arm y i n th e successor states raises the prospect o f intervention by predominantly ethnic Russia n militar y unit s t o defen d Russia n minorit y popula tions against perceived threats from th e local ethnic majority . The Serbs ' us e o f forc e i n precisel y thi s wa y agains t th e neigh boring state s o f th e forme r Yugoslavi a provide s a read y mode l fo r the Russian imperial nationalists. Russians in Moldova adopted suc h an approach a s early as August 1990, when they declared a "Dniester Soviet Socialis t Republic. " Th e strengt h o f thei r resistance , thei r ability t o engag e i n violen t conflic t agains t th e Moldova n govern ment, and especiall y their abilit y to secure control over the territor y east o f th e Dnieste r ar e attributabl e entirel y t o th e weapons , othe r logistical support , an d manpowe r provide d b y th e Russia n Four teenth Army, which is based in the region. The conflict i n Moldova is an example of the kind of conflict tha t is most likely to occur between Russia and the other successor states. Although i t has a n ethni c component , i t i s primarily a n ideologica l and politica l conflict . Par t o f th e loca l Russia n populatio n seek s t o oppose the consolidation o f an ethnically alien political order. Loyal to a n imperia l concep t o f Russia n identity , thes e diaspor a Russian s are allie d wit h conservativ e force s i n Mosco w inten t o n restorin g Moscow's powe r ove r th e forme r Sovie t peripheries . Th e outbrea k of conflic t betwee n diaspor a Russian s an d loca l elite s set s the stag e for th e us e o f force b y Moscow—either indirectl y i n suppor t o f a n uprising b y th e Russia n minority , o r throug h direc t interventio n under th e pretex t o f protecting th e right s o f local Russians o r eve n

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 27 of "restoring order." Such a scenario may yet unfold i n Estonia, over the Russia n enclav e surroundin g Narva , o r i n Ukraine , ove r th e Crimea. If political discontent i n the heavily Russian easter n region s of Ukrain e lead s t o ope n rebellio n agains t Kiev , th e conflic t tha t might ensu e betwee n Ukrain e an d Russi a woul d b e o f fa r greate r consequence than thos e in Croatia o r Bosnia-Herzegovina . The war s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a ar e a tragic exampl e o f suc h escalation an d th e unpreparednes s o f th e internationa l communit y to preven t suc h conflict s o r brin g the m t o a peacefu l conclusio n once the y hav e started . Th e cost s an d controvers y ove r Wester n involvement i n suc h conflict s plac e a premium o n thei r preventio n and especially their resolution befor e the y turn violent .

DEMOCRACY A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L PEAC E

In shar p contras t t o th e war s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a an d th e Caucasus an d th e violen t conflic t i n Moldova , negotiation s amon g the democraticall y electe d government s o f East Centra l Europ e an d their active engagement in the CSCE and other international organizations hav e contribute d t o th e maintenanc e o f generall y peacefu l relations. Their behavio r reflects , i n part , th e powerfu l norm s o f negotiation, compromise , an d peacefu l behavio r tha t prevai l amon g democratic governments . I t als o reflect s th e powe r o f economi c interest. Jus t a s peacefu l cooperatio n i n postwa r Wester n Europ e was reinforced b y economic interdependence , s o the anticipatio n o f economic gain acted as an incentive to cooperation betwee n Poland , Hungary, an d Czechoslovaki a (no w th e Czec h Republi c an d Slo vakia) an d between these states and the European Community . In a recen t empirica l stud y o f internationa l conflict , politica l scientist Bruc e Russett ha s found tha t the more democrati c an y pair of state s are , th e les s likel y a militarize d disput e wil l brea k ou t between the m o r tha t an y disput e betwee n the m wil l escalate. 36 Although ther e i s no single , agree d definitio n o f "democracy, " Dia mond, Linz, and Lipset have enumerated three "essential conditions"

28 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace that usefull y summariz e th e characteristic s tha t distinguis h demo cratic regimes. They are [1.] meaningful an d extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; [2.] a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult ) social group is excluded; and [3.] a level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient t o ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.37 The establishment , operation , an d consolidatio n o f thes e essentia l features o f a libera l democrati c regim e requir e a sufficientl y wide spread commitmen t t o peacefu l participatio n an d competitio n s o as t o preclud e th e us e o f forc e agains t citizen s exercisin g thei r constitutionally guaranteed right s or against legitimately constitute d authorities exercisin g thei r constitutiona l powers . Thes e condition s produce th e institutionalizatio n o f politica l accountabilit y o n th e part o f decisionmakers . Unde r condition s o f socia l diversity , th e demands o n decisionmakers , a s well a s the policie s the y adopt , ar e moderated an d constraine d b y the interaction s o f competing inter ests. Thi s principl e o f fre e interactio n amon g diverse , organize d interests lies at the heart of the concept of pluralist democracy. 38 Numerous studie s affir m th e clos e relationshi p betwee n democ racy and international peace. Russett, however, finds that the pacifi c effect o f democrac y operate s independentl y o f othe r factor s ofte n assumed t o accoun t fo r peacefu l relation s betwee n states . Thes e include wealt h and , significantl y fo r th e realis t theorie s o f interna tional relations , th e militar y balanc e betwee n states . Russet t foun d that the strength o f the democratic effect wa s most closely related t o the strength o f democrati c norms , o r democrati c culture , i n thes e states. No t surprisingly , h e foun d tha t democrati c peac e wa s als o explained b y th e institutiona l constraint s o n th e abilit y o f demo cratic governments to go to war.

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 29 The importanc e o f th e developmen t o f domesti c democrati c norms an d institution s i n th e post-communist state s to the securit y interests of the Western democracies blurs the traditional distinctio n between interna l an d internationa l issues . Developments withi n th e CSCE reflec t this . Sinc e 1989 , member states , includin g th e Sovie t Union and, later, the post-communist states , have placed an increasing emphasis on the resolution o f ethnic conflict an d th e protectio n of huma n right s an d fundamenta l freedom s a s th e mos t effectiv e means o f securing internationa l peace. 39 Furthermore, i n Vienna i n 1989, i n Copenhage n i n th e sprin g o f 1990 , an d a t th e Genev a meeting o f experts o n nationa l minoritie s i n Jul y 1991, the membe r states purposely did not reaffirm th e principle of nonintervention i n the interna l affair s o f othe r state s adopte d a t Helsink i i n 1975 . Instead, at Copenhagen, they affirmed tha t "pluralisti c democracy an d the rule of law are essential for ensurin g respect for al l human right s and fundamental freedoms. " 40 The Genev a meetin g o f expert s o n nationa l minorities , whic h convened jus t a s wa r brok e ou t i n Slovenia , conclude d tha t issue s concerning th e right s o f nationa l minoritie s "ar e matter s o f legiti mate internationa l concer n an d consequentl y d o no t constitut e ex clusively a n interna l affai r o f th e respectiv e state." 41 Thi s vie w was reiterated a t th e conferenc e o n th e huma n dimensio n hel d i n Mos cow i n th e fal l o f 1991 , i n th e wak e o f th e faile d Augus t cou p attempt.42 The political limits on Western involvement i n the internal development o f th e Eas t Europea n politica l system s hav e thu s radicall y contracted as both the West and the successor states themselves have sought t o construc t a new framework fo r securit y i n th e post-Col d War world . Th e expande d opportunitie s fo r influencin g interna l developments i n th e post-communis t state s mus t therefor e b e ex ploited t o ensur e th e democratizatio n o f thes e states . However , i n order t o d o so , the Wes t mus t formulat e effectiv e response s t o th e most immediate challenge to democracy among the post-communis t states: nationalism.

30 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace N A T I O N A L I S M A N D TH E T R A N S I T I O N T O DEMOCRAC Y

Nationalism ca n be, and has been, a positive force for democratizin g change. Historia n Boy d Shafer , fo r example , ha s chronicle d th e historical connectio n i n Europ e an d Americ a betwee n popula r na tionalism an d republicanism . "Popula r nationalis m was, " he argues, "part o f th e genera l movemen t towar d republicanis m an d democ racy, o f th e revol t agains t monarchical , aristocratic , an d clerica l domination."43 Th e nation-states constructe d afte r 181 5 wer e instruments fo r securin g materia l advantag e an d physica l securit y fo r national elites . The y als o strengthene d an d consolidate d cultura l identity and fostere d th e growth o f expanded politica l communitie s defined o n th e basis of ethnic identity. In the multinational AustroHungarian Empire , nationalis m an d liberalis m wer e allie d agains t autocracy. Th e liberalis m o f nationalis t legitimatio n wa s severel y limited, however . Whil e i t produce d a devolutio n o f powe r t o th e nationalist regim e in Hungary, for example , that regime was characterized by a growing intolerance of its own ethnic minorities. 44 Nationalisms playe d a simila r rol e i n th e moder n multinationa l states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In an effort t o strengthe n the legitimac y o f communis t rule , thes e regime s attempte d t o ac commodate popular identitie s through th e creation o f federal struc tures. These were intended t o serve as an alternativ e to, and weaken support for , th e creatio n o f independen t nation-states . Th e ethni c structures o f thes e state s gre w increasingl y importan t unde r th e impact o f socia l modernization , whic h altere d popula r consciousness, increase d politica l awareness , an d sprea d th e inclinatio n t o participate mor e broadly through th e educated sector s o f the ethni cally indigenou s populations . Bot h th e Sovie t an d th e Yugosla v regimes gradually expande d th e politica l authorit y o f the ethnicall y defined federa l republic s and increased the opportunities for participation in these states by ethnic elites. Concessions t o individua l politica l right s an d opportunitie s fo r political activity were substantially greater in Yugoslavia than i n th e Soviet Union , a t leas t unti l th e onse t o f glasnos t unde r Gorbachev .

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 31 But non e o f th e othe r essentia l condition s characteristi c o f demo cratic regimes were established in either state under communist rule. Ultimately, however , sufficien t civi l an d politica l freedo m wa s cre ated in eac h o f these regimes to allo w the ethni c political structure s they established an d th e nationa l politica l identitie s the y supporte d to b e transforme d b y ethni c elite s int o base s fo r nationalis t move ments. "Nationalism" i s used her e t o refe r t o mas s politica l movement s that aris e amon g group s tha t conceiv e o f themselve s a s potentiall y sovereign political communities. 45 This consciousness of community often derive s fro m a shared cultura l framewor k base d primaril y o n a common language and common historical experiences. Intragroup communication acros s time and territory is central to the growth of this consciousness and to the mobilization an d organization o f mass political action . A commo n languag e an d a linguisti c elit e tha t preserves an d extend s the commo n culture , as well as the sprea d o f literacy an d th e expansio n o f popula r participation , ar e therefor e central to the emergenc e o f group consciousnes s an d th e formatio n of a mass political movement based on it. Hence, it is not surprisin g that on e consequenc e o f modernizatio n processe s amon g socially , economically, o r politicall y aggrieve d group s ma y b e th e ris e o f nationalism.46 The specifi c element s definin g suc h identitie s ma y var y from group t o group o r ove r time within a single group. The existence of aggrieved group s alone , however , doe s no t accoun t fo r th e ris e o f nationalist movements . For such movement s t o take root, individu als and, ultimately , mas s populations mus t perceiv e a n opportunit y to redres s their grievance s throug h organize d action. 47 Thus , political entrepreneurs—whethe r ethni c elite s o f th e ol d regim e seekin g to maximiz e thei r ow n powe r o r ne w counterelites seekin g to over throw th e ol d order—pla y a n importan t rol e i n definin g suc h movements. Dependin g o n th e resource s o f suc h a movement rela tive to the regime, simple repression may prevent it from threatenin g the regime. For a nondemocratic regime , the cost of such repressio n may b e calculate d i n term s o f it s effect s o n socia l an d economi c

32 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace development. Bu t th e consequence s o f suc h repressio n fo r a newl y established democrac y ma y be very grave, indeed: the repressio n o f free expressio n strike s a t th e hear t o f democrati c principles . In either circumstance , repressio n ma y prov e counterproductiv e b y strengthening the appeal of a nationalist movement among its ethnic constituency. Nationalism i s distinguishe d fro m socia l movement s tha t aris e among othe r aggrieve d group s b y the powerfu l affect , o r emotion , associated wit h it . I n extrem e cases , nationalist movement s evok e a willingness to fight and die on behalf of the cause. This derives fro m the notio n tha t wha t i s a t issu e i s grou p survival . Nationalis t de mands for officia l protectio n an d support fo r languages and cultures reflect thi s concern fo r grou p survival . Nationalist movement s cannot , however , be understood a s solely "primordial" i n nature . The y ar e mos t ofte n als o organizationa l vehicles for th e articulatio n o f arguments ove r rights , goods, status, power, an d othe r materia l an d politica l issues . Hence , th e conflict s between Serb s an d othe r group s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a an d be tween Armenian s an d Azerbaijani s i n Nagorno-Karabak h ma y b e exceptional case s b y virtue o f th e disproportionatel y powerfu l rol e of primordial hatred an d th e extreme violence that ha s taken place. But thei r ultimat e solutio n mus t involv e th e redres s o f grievance s pertaining to rights, status, and power that als o motivate and mobi lize th e populations—an d especiall y thei r leaders—i n thes e con flicts.48 I n thi s sense , us e o f th e ter m "ethnic conflict " tend s t o overemphasize a single—albei t extremel y important—dimensio n of intergroup conflict . The strengt h o f nationalist politica l movements , th e popula r ap peal of avenging long-held ethnic grievances, and the resultant esca lation of ethnic conflict imped e the transition from authoritarianis m to democracy. As political scientist Daniel Levine points out, "When regimes change, rules of the game are in flux, new leadership group s emerge, and different kind s of issues, demands, and interests clamor for a plac e i n th e politica l sun." 49 Th e essenc e o f a transitio n t o democracy under suc h conditions consist s in the fact that , while the

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 33 eventual outcomes o f the interpla y amon g thes e ne w political force s may remain i n doub t ove r a n extende d period , a lasting an d legiti mate agreement is reached on the common rules by which outcome s are to be obtained. The political challenge inherent i n the process of democratization, therefore , i s t o creat e stabl e politica l institution s and processe s "tha t mak e conflict, change , and conciliatio n possibl e without institutiona l collapse. " 50 Nationalist conflict, however, suppresses the salience and, in some cases, even the emergence of multiple issues, demands, and interests. Nationalist leaderships attempt t o subordinate al l issues to the effor t to attai n a particular outcome . Unles s institutiona l an d procedura l safeguards ar e established, th e ris e of nationalism amon g a numerically dominan t grou p relegate s al l other s t o th e statu s o f a perma nent minority , unabl e t o defen d thei r interest s eve n unde r condi tions o f competition , participation , an d individua l liberty . Nationalism i n a dominan t group , however , make s i t unlikel y tha t such safeguard s ca n b e establishe d o r tha t minoritie s wil l continu e to enjo y genuin e individua l liberties . Unde r thes e circumstances , nationalist movement s amon g th e minorit y mos t ofte n deman d autonomy and pursue separatist goals. They seek a separate existence for thei r nation, denying the existence or salienc e of commonalities, shared interests , o r eve n mutua l dependence . In extrem e circum stances, nationalis t conflict s tur n violent , destroyin g th e fabri c o f society. Nationalis t movement s thu s strik e a t th e ver y hear t o f th e process o f democratization : they represen t collectivis t base s fo r re gime legitimatio n tha t compet e wit h th e individua l rights-base d legitimation o f a liberal democratic order . The politica l organization s characteristi c o f nationalis t move ments an d stat e institution s an d processe s legitimate d primaril y through th e fulfillmen t o f nationalis t aspiration s ar e therefor e il l suited t o th e conciliatio n o f competin g demand s characteristi c o f democratic regimes. Nationalist organizations and governments may compromise th e aspiration s o f thei r ethni c constituencie s onl y a t the ris k o f losin g thei r popula r suppor t t o mor e radica l elements . They tend , therefore , t o adop t exclusivis t rathe r tha n inclusivis t

34 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace policies; they ten d towar d extremis m rathe r tha n moderation . I n this way , the politic s o f nationalis m i s contrar y t o th e ver y essenc e of the liberal democratic process. The deepl y dislocatin g effect s o f simultaneou s economi c an d political transformatio n contribut e t o th e powerfu l attractio n o f nationalism fo r bot h politica l elite s an d th e mas s population . Th e material hardship s impose d o n th e populatio n b y th e transitio n make it difficult, i f not impossible , for government s t o win popula r support o n th e basis of the benefits the y can delive r t o th e popula tion. Thi s heighten s th e effectivenes s o f appeal s t o nationa l senti ments, which can be satisfied throug h action s more easily under th e control of the state. The declaration of sovereignty, the establishment of cultura l supremacy , o r eve n th e threa t o f militar y actio n ar e al l promises more easil y fulfilled tha n a n improvemen t i n the standar d of living. Moreover, suc h acts strengthen stat e power an d secur e the positions o f political incumbents fa r mor e effectivel y tha n effort s t o institutionalize th e civi l libertie s o f th e population . Th e latter , i n fact, facilitat e criticis m o f th e governmen t an d th e activitie s o f a n opposition, making them less attractive to incumbent politicians . The nationalist legitimatio n o f new states is thus likely to imped e the developmen t o f politica l competition , preven t th e adoptio n o f inclusive principle s o f participation , an d dela y th e institutionaliza tion o f individua l libertie s tha t ar e essentia l t o democrati c systems . Several o f th e post-communis t governments , fo r example , hav e at tempted t o redres s ethni c grievance s o f th e majorit y o r th e epony mous populatio n throug h policie s and practice s that effectivel y dis criminate agains t minorities . Ne w law s with respec t t o citizenship , language rights, and voting rights, and othe r issue s have heightene d tensions between dominant an d minority groups. In bot h Estoni a an d Latvia , radica l nationalist-populis t move ments sough t t o disenfranchis e individual s wh o entere d th e repub lics durin g th e perio d o f Sovie t rule . Th e Congres s o f Estoni a an d the Latvia n Citizens ' Committe e ar e extrem e example s o f attempt s to establish a nationalist, exclusivis t basis of legitimation fo r emerg ing regimes. 51 Suc h effort s ofte n engende r nationalist-separatis t re -

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 35 actions amon g compac t minorit y settlements . The cit y of Narva o n the Estonian-Russian border , for example , is 97 percent Russia n an d a potentia l locu s o f separatis t activit y i f th e Estonia n regim e wer e not t o moderat e it s exclusionar y policies , especiall y i f economi c discontent i n th e are a become s politicized. 52 Suc h disconten t wa s apparent i n th e referendu m o f Jul y 1993, which produce d a n over whelming vot e o f suppor t amon g loca l Russian s fo r territoria l au tonomy.53 The parliamentary strengt h o f nationalis t an d right-win g partie s in Latvi a increase d betwee n th e Jun e 1993 and Septembe r 199 5 elections. I n 1993 , th e nationalis t Fo r Fatherlan d an d Freedo m Part y secured just over 5 percent o f the vote, and six seats in the hundred seat parliament. 54 I n 1995 , thi s part y wo n fourtee n seats , a s th e Latvian electorat e shifte d it s overal l suppor t t o partie s o f the right , abandoning it s suppor t fo r th e moderat e cente r represente d b y Latvia's Way . Th e latte r los t mor e tha n hal f it s parliamentar y strength, declining from thirty-si x to seventeen seats. 55 The popular suppor t exclusionar y measures evoke among major ity population s suggest s th e grea t difficult y o f establishin g a broa d social an d politica l commitmen t t o th e pluralisti c concep t o f civi l society that underlies Western liberal democracy. The cold receptio n President Clinto n receive d i n Latvi a i n Jul y 199 4 when h e urged a crowd o f tens o f thousands t o gran t equa l statu s t o non-Latvian s i s one indication o f the depth o f popular feelin g o n suc h issues. 56 The prospect of successfully establishin g the political culture of tolerance for difference s tha t underlie s America n democrac y woul d see m t o be impossible, therefore, i n the absence of concerted effort s b y local political leadership s t o construc t lega l an d politica l structure s t o defend th e rights of minorities. 57 The policy response of independent Ukrain e to its ethnic minorities stand s i n shar p contras t t o tha t o f th e Balti c states : it ha s bee n inclusionary and has aimed at affirming politica l equality. The much greater size , socioeconomi c complexity , an d ethni c an d politica l diversity of Ukraine in comparison to the Baltic states multiplied th e number o f interest s an d group s tha t emerge d i n Ukrain e unde r

36 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace glasnost. Thi s moderated th e appea l o f narrowly nationalis t politic s in Ukrain e and increase d th e importance o f compromise an d coali tion buildin g fo r mobilizin g suppor t i n Ukrainia n politics . Thus , both national-cultura l an d civil-politica l concern s cam e t o b e re flected i n the opposition movemen t that emerge d in 1989. Ukraine i s a heterogeneous society , characterized b y distinct cul tural an d historical variations eve n among ethnic Ukrainians. There are strong cultural distinction s between th e seven oblasts of western Ukraine, incorporated i n th e republi c afte r Worl d War II an d mak ing u p 18. 9 percen t o f th e tota l population , an d th e res t o f th e republic. The proportion o f Russians in the population o f this region is relatively low. Smaller proportions o f Ukrainians declared Russia n as thei r mothe r tongu e i n th e 198 9 Sovie t censu s i n thi s region . Western Ukrainian s ar e als o mor e "national " i n thei r orientation . Electoral suppor t fo r independenc e an d fo r th e mor e nationall y oriented candidat e fo r presiden t i n the December 199 1 election s was stronger here than i n more Russified region s of the country . At th e sam e time , wester n Ukrain e include s th e larges t non Russian minorit y populations . Hungarian s mak e u p 12. 5 percent o f the populatio n i n th e Transcarpathia n regio n (Zakarpattia ) tha t borders Hungary . Here , th e loca l Hungaria n populatio n ha s vote d its suppor t fo r bot h Ukrainia n independenc e an d loca l autonomy , including administrativ e recognitio n fo r th e Hungaria n minority. 58 Romanians (includin g both those who declared Moldovan and those who declare d Romania n identit y i n 1989 ) accoun t fo r som e 19. 7 percent o f th e populatio n i n th e Chernivts i region , borderin g bot h Moldova an d Romania . Thes e borde r territorie s migh t represen t fertile ground s fo r secessionis t o r irredentis t activit y were it no t fo r the policie s o f th e ne w Ukrainia n government . Th e citizenshi p la w adopted i n Octobe r 199 1 granted citizenshi p t o al l individual s resi dent i n Ukrain e a t th e time , makin g n o distinction s base d o n ethnicity. Th e declaratio n o n nationa l minoritie s adopte d b y Ukraine in November 1991 and the law adopted in June 1992 guarantee the full equalit y of citizens, including their linguistic and cultura l freedom. Th e response of independent Ukrain e to demands for local

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 37 autonomy ha s als o bee n concessionar y an d inclusiv e instea d o f repressive and exclusionary . The proportio n o f ethni c Russians , a s well a s th e proportio n o f culturally Russifie d Ukrainians , i s highest i n th e easter n region s o f the republic, especially in the Donbas. However, the high proportio n of Ukrainians who declare Russian as a mother tongue in these areas is no t du e solel y t o th e Russifyin g impac t o f larg e number s o f Russians i n th e loca l population . I t als o reflect s th e centuries-lon g history of ethnic Russian settlement here and the adoption o f Ukrainian identit y b y populations whos e historica l o r ancestra l languag e always wa s Russian . Thus , th e ver y meanin g o f Ukrainia n identit y differs betwee n th e western an d easter n region s o f the country . I t is not surprising , therefore , tha t Ukrain e ha s opte d fo r a more libera l definition o f right s an d ha s s o fa r avoide d a narrowl y nationalis t definition fo r legitimation o f the state. Concentration o f th e Russia n populatio n i n th e easter n region s of Ukrain e nonetheles s raise s th e questio n whethe r Russian s i n eastern Ukraine might no t la y claim to local autonomy of their ow n or perhap s eve n seced e i n favo r o f unio n wit h Russia . Economi c unrest i n th e heavil y industrialize d province s o f Donets k an d Lu hansk in eastern Ukrain e create s the potential fo r a political allianc e between leftist forces , including the former communists , opposed t o economic refor m an d seekin g continued stat e support fo r th e social welfare o f the population , an d Russia n nationalis t force s seekin g t o exploit fear s o f Ukrainianizatio n amon g th e largel y Russia n an d Russian-speaking local population.59 Suc h an alliance might give rise to a powerfu l separatis t movemen t i n easter n Ukrain e aki n t o tha t which emerge d i n Slovaki a afte r 1990 . Even i n thes e regions , how ever, fro m 7 5 percent t o ove r 9 0 percen t o f th e electorat e vote d fo r independence i n the Decembe r 199 1 referendum. Onl y the Crimea n electorate wa s closel y divide d o n thi s issue ; jus t ove r 5 4 percen t supported independence . Under Sovie t rule , th e Crime a remaine d par t o f th e Russia n republic unti l 1954 , when i t was transferred b y administrative deci sion t o Ukraine . Th e populatio n o f th e peninsul a i s predominantl y

38 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace Russian, an d th e proportio n o f Russian s ha s grow n steadil y a s th e result o f colonization , th e expansio n o f Sovie t militar y facilitie s o n the peninsula, an d th e deportatio n o f the indigenous populatio n o f Crimean Tatars , carried ou t i n 1944. By 1989, the population wa s 67 percent Russian and 25 percent Ukrainian. Moreover, almost half the Ukrainian populatio n wa s linguistically Russified . I t i s not surpris ing, give n thes e conditions , tha t resistanc e t o Ukrainia n indepen dence was strongest among this population. The statu s o f the Crime a represent s a potentially explosiv e issu e in Ukrainia n politics . Th e stron g desir e fo r autonom y amon g th e local majorit y Russia n populatio n ha s bee n me t b y resistanc e o n the par t o f th e Ukrainia n government . Th e latte r ha s encourage d resettlement o f the native Crimean Tatar population, exiled by Stalin after World War II, as a means of increasing the population oppose d to autonomy , o r a t leas t oppose d t o unio n wit h Russia . Interes t among Russia n nationalist s i n securin g Crimea n autonom y an d union wit h Russi a raise s th e possibilit y tha t a loca l secessionis t movement might receiv e support fro m Russia . Russian interes t i n th e Crime a i s reinforced b y the basing o f th e Black Sea fleet o n th e peninsula. Th e status o f the fleet represents a potential flashpoint i n relation s betwee n Ukrain e an d Russi a an d has bee n th e objec t o f intens e politica l disput e betwee n th e tw o states sinc e th e breaku p o f th e Sovie t Union . Despit e period s o f heightened rhetoric , thi s conflic t ha s bee n negotiate d peacefully . Neither leadershi p ca n ris k th e potentia l escalatio n o f conflic t tha t might result . Whil e th e leadershi p o f Ukrain e mus t b e war y o f inciting a Russia n separatis t movemen t i n easter n Ukrain e an d alienating th e million s o f Russians who pla y important role s i n th e economy o f Ukraine , th e leadershi p o f Russi a mus t b e war y o f engendering unres t amon g th e million s o f ethni c Ukrainian s wh o populate ke y areas i n Siberi a an d th e Fa r Eas t an d perfor m critica l economic, political , an d administrativ e function s i n Russia . More over, an y escalatio n o f nationalism s represent s a potentia l threa t to th e politica l surviva l o f bot h th e Ukrainia n an d th e Russia n governments, eac h o f whic h face s politica l challenge s from force s

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 39 that migh t exploi t nationalis t conflic t t o thei r domesti c politica l advantage. Th e economi c an d politica l incentive s fo r maintainin g peaceful relation s an d th e potential cost s of conflict appea r s o great as to compel the Russian an d Ukrainian leadership s to negotiate the peaceful resolutio n o f thei r differences . B y doing so , they ar e likely to avoi d addin g a n interethni c dimensio n t o conflict s betwee n thei r states. Even where common economic and other interests might provide a pragmati c basi s fo r interethni c cooperatio n an d th e preservatio n or establishmen t o f common economi c o r politica l institutions , th e power o f nationalist-separatis t sentiment s amon g mobilize d ethni c groups i n th e post-communis t state s make s i t difficul t fo r loca l leaders t o ac t o n them . Indeed , eve n th e distributio n o f economi c interests and resources itself may be in dispute as illegitimate legacies of th e ol d regim e fo r whic h contemporar y compensatio n i s due . Moreover, i f postwar Germa n experienc e i s any guide, the transfor mation o f political cultur e ma y require tha t democrati c institution s be accompanie d b y significan t improvement s i n th e materia l well being of the population. 60 With th e onse t o f competitiv e elections , politician s ma y gathe r substantially greate r support—an d therefor e greate r politica l power—by exploitin g th e coincidenc e o f regiona l economi c differ ences and inclination s toward ethni c self-assertio n tha n b y advocating economi c compromis e an d politica l unity . Th e perceptio n o f material conflict s i n ethni c term s b y the mas s populace , th e accep tance o r exploitatio n o f suc h ethni c definition s b y elites, and espe cially the frequency with which conflicts define d i n this way produce violence mak e th e resolutio n o f difference s ove r th e distributio n o f governmental function s an d ove r economi c an d othe r issue s muc h more difficult . I f liberal democrac y depend s o n master y by political leaders o f th e ar t o f compromise , the n successfu l transitio n t o de mocracy i s mad e mor e difficul t b y th e fac t tha t Eas t Europea n leaders, facing population s whose nationalist aspiration s ar e uncon strained b y othe r competin g interest s an d aspirations , enjo y littl e leeway in which to develop this art.

40 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace Among the post-Soviet states , in the forme r Yugosla v states, and in Czechoslovakia , th e transition fro m authoritarianis m wa s turne d into a simultaneous "end-of-empire " process . Once it was perceived in these terms, intellectual, economic, and othe r group s who migh t otherwise hav e bee n incline d t o suppor t suc h a transitio n wer e drawn towar d mor e nationalisticall y determine d positions . Th e Slovenian an d Croatia n challenge s to rule from Belgrade , for exam ple, stimulate d a conservativ e an d eve n reactionar y respons e fro m some Serb s whose earlie r suppor t fo r th e democratizatio n o f Yugoslavia ultimatel y prove d les s powerfu l tha n thei r attractio n t o Ser bian nationalis t agendas . Similarly , th e opportunit y t o establis h a n independent nationa l stat e prove d mor e appealin g t o democrati c activists i n Sloveni a tha n th e tas k o f democratizin g a commo n Yugoslav state. In Czechoslovakia, the alliance of Czechs and Slovaks opposed t o communis m soon disintegrated , an d electora l suppor t in bot h Slovaki a an d th e Czec h Republi c shifte d t o leader s an d parties inten t o n pursuin g regiona l interest s a t th e expens e o f th e federation. The rus h t o affir m th e politica l authorit y o f nationa l identitie s and th e legitimac y o f nationa l state s ha s als o le d i n som e case s t o the partia l legitimatio n o r relegitimatio n o f antidemocrati c aspect s of nationa l politica l history . Th e fascis t an d Naz i collaborationis t regimes establishe d i n Hungar y unde r Miklo s Horthy , i n Slovaki a under Jose f Tiso, and i n Croati a unde r Ant e Pavelic have each been the object o f public and in some instances de facto officia l reevalua tion. Ne w government s i n Lithuani a an d Sloveni a hav e pardone d Nazi collaborators , an d th e Croatia n governmen t ha s appointe d former official s o f th e collaborationis t regim e t o ne w position s o f authority. Suc h action s ar e on e dimensio n o f th e reaffirmatio n o f collective identity in the region and a reflection o f the powerful urg e to reject an y negative judgments of them. They also reflect, however , the weaknes s o f concern s fo r individua l an d huma n right s i n th e contemporary politics of the region an d insensitivity o r even hostility towar d ethni c minorities . Th e institutionalizatio n o f individua l and human right s is, however, essential to the success of any transition from nationalis t to democratic bases of regime legitimation.

Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace I 41 Democratically incline d leadership s i n th e regio n ar e thu s con fronted wit h th e tas k o f establishin g a n enforceabl e boundar y be tween legitimate national identification an d cultura l self-affirmatio n on the part o f the majority an d nationalist oppressio n o f the minor ity, betwee n democraticall y acceptabl e an d unacceptabl e politica l behavior. Thi s i s an immensel y difficul t an d ever-changin g politica l challenge. Debate over this issue continues in the United State s even after tw o hundre d year s o f institutionalize d democrati c experience . It shoul d no t b e surprising , therefore , tha t thi s i s s o difficul t t o achieve i n th e post-communis t states , fo r i t i s clea r tha t mos t o f these state s canno t ye t depen d o n eithe r a mas s civi c cultur e o r their ow n accumulate d legitimac y t o insulat e the m fro m popula r discontent. No r d o they hav e th e resource s t o delive r sufficien t material benefit s t o thei r peopl e t o counterbalanc e th e social , eco nomic, and political hardships that confron t them . The electora l victorie s o f post-communis t partie s i n Lithuania , Poland, an d Hungar y demonstrat e tha t suppor t fo r partie s an d governments remain s highly volatile throughout th e region an d tha t popular disconten t ove r materia l condition s i s easily translated int o political power . Wher e intergrou p relation s o r th e frustratio n o f group ambition s creat e ethni c tension s o r conflict , thes e ma y b e joined t o materia l dissatisfaction s t o creat e powerfu l base s fo r na tionalist, antidemocrati c movements . Historica l experienc e a s wel l as th e contemporar y example s o f Yugoslavia , Hungary , Romania , Slovakia, an d Moldov a mak e i t clea r tha t widesprea d reversio n t o nationalist authoritarianis m i n Easter n Europ e ca n easil y lea d t o international conflict . Loca l conflicts inevitabl y threaten t o escalate , spread, an d dra w i n outsid e powers , includin g th e Unite d States . This ha s alread y happene d i n th e forme r Yugoslavia . Th e West , therefore, has a clear security interest in the consolidation o f democracy in th e post-communis t states ; the establishmen t o f democrati c structural constraint s o n th e abilit y o f leaders t o resor t t o violenc e to solv e th e man y outstandin g ethnoterritoria l an d ethnopolitica l issues within an d betwee n th e state s o f th e region ; an d th e longer term establishmen t o f democrati c politica l culture s tha t wil l reduc e their inclination s to do so.

42 I Nationalism, Democracy, and International Peace The constructio n o f a stabl e framewor k fo r internationa l peac e in th e Euro-Atlanti c communit y canno t wai t fo r th e effect s o f a transformation fro m centrall y planne d economie s t o market-base d systems t o produc e th e social , economic , an d cultura l foundation s of democracy . Indeed , ther e i s n o agreemen t amon g analyst s a s t o the specifi c socia l an d economi c "preconditions " o f a democrati c political order . Moreover , a s politica l scientis t Terr y Lyn n Kar l ha s suggested, what appea r t o be the social preconditions for democrac y may, in fact , represen t th e outcomes o f democratic processes . Socioeconomic development , greate r equality , and eve n the emergenc e of a civic culture, she argues, "may be better treated a s the products o f stable democratic processes, rather than a s the prerequisites for thei r existence."61 In view of this uncertainty, American policy must focu s on strengthenin g democrati c politica l institution s an d processe s i n the post-communis t state s agains t th e threa t o f authoritaria n na tionalisms.

CHAPTER 2

Ethnic Conflic t an d th e Euro-Atlanti c Community: Th e Yugoslav Crisi s

T

HE REEMERGENC E O F nationa l conflicts i n Eastern Europ e and th e successo r state s of the forme r Sovie t Union present s the Unite d State s an d it s allie s wit h stron g challenge s t o international peace . Th e immediat e consequence s an d longer-ter m implications o f suc h conflict s requir e European , Euro-Atlantic , an d international organization s t o adap t t o th e mor e difficul t demand s of maintainin g peac e unde r condition s o f economi c an d politica l transformation an d mobilize d ethni c identities. 1 Nationalis t de mands to redefine political relationships within existing states, establish ne w states , o r redefin e boundarie s betwee n existin g state s def y the traditiona l distinctio n betwee n interna l an d externa l conflicts . They involve many dimensions of human interaction an d are subject to conflictin g interpretatio n b y outsid e actor s attemptin g t o dea l with their consequences. The solution of any one such conflict mus t be see n a s a potentia l preceden t fo r others , no t onl y amon g th e successor state s of post-communist Europe , but i n th e Third Worl d and among the Western state s as well. Several Wester n state s fac e o r hav e face d interna l challenge s t o their politica l unit y based o n regiona l ethni c identities. These experiences ar e inevitabl y reflecte d i n differin g view s wit h respec t t o ethnic conflict s withi n states , especially conflicts tha t cut acros s th e borders o f states . The reemergenc e o f politica l diversit y amon g th e post-communist state s als o contributes t o polic y differences amon g Western state s a s the y pursu e opportunitie s t o advanc e divergen t national interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that progress toward 43

44 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community the establishment o f a consistent, agreed set of principles for dealin g with suc h conflict s ha s bee n slo w an d tha t eve n agreemen t o n a d hoc responses to severe crisis has been extremely difficult t o achieve. International response s t o th e crisi s i n Yugoslavi a wer e domi nated b y the grea t powers. Britain, France , and Germany , a s well as the United States and the Soviet Union—later, Russia—played criti cal role s i n shapin g collectiv e response s t o th e crisis . Throughout , each o f thes e actor s pursue d it s own , ofte n conflicting , nationa l interests. Bu t the y als o acte d i n concert . Amon g them , Britain , France, Germany , th e Unite d States , an d th e Sovie t Union/Russi a dominated th e activitie s o f th e CSCE , th e Europea n Community / European Union , th e Unite d Nation s Securit y Council , an d NATO; and throug h thes e organizations , the y influence d th e action s o f others. Som e Islami c states , fo r example , becam e increasingl y in volved i n th e crisis . Bu t thei r option s an d opportunitie s wer e se verely limited b y the constraint s impose d b y decisions o f the Secu rity Council and the actions of the great powers. Thus, the legitimat e authorit y t o addres s th e crisi s i n Yugoslavi a through multilatera l institution s an d organization s wa s dispersed , while the influence an d resource s to do s o were concentrated i n th e hands o f a few key states. This is an inherentl y weak and politicall y ineffective arrangemen t fo r crisis management. But the internationa l community an d particularl y th e Western power s were further ham pered b y several factors : th e rapi d obsolescenc e o f key principles o f international orde r characteristi c o f th e postwa r syste m an d th e organizations develope d t o uphol d them ; th e a s ye t incomplet e process of articulating an d establishin g consensus around ne w principles for resolvin g conflict i n the post-Cold War system; and grow ing difference s amon g th e perceive d nationa l interest s o f the majo r powers. These contributed t o the inabilit y to resolve the conflicts i n Yugoslavia befor e the y threatene d internationa l peace , t o preven t these conflicts fro m turnin g violent, and to end them onc e they did. The Yugoslav crisis represents an extreme example of the destructive powe r o f ethni c conflict . Bu t th e condition s tha t gav e ris e t o that crisi s ar e b y n o means unique . Som e o f th e sam e social , eco -

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I

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nomic, an d politica l conflict s tha t contribute d t o th e mobilizatio n of ethni c identitie s i n Yugoslavi a ar e alread y presen t elsewher e i n Eastern Europ e an d th e forme r Sovie t Union . Onl y a fe w o f thes e have turne d violent , an d man y stil l remai n subjec t t o resolutio n through negotiation . I n attemptin g t o develo p tactic s an d strategie s for th e peacefu l resolutio n o f ethni c conflict s elsewhere , w e mus t therefore as k why conditions i n Yugoslavia gav e rise to violence an d examine whethe r domesti c an d internationa l actor s migh t hav e acted differently t o achieve a peaceful settlement .

PRINCIPLES AN D INSTITUTION S I N FLU X

By th e tim e th e Yugosla v crisi s exploded , i n 1991 , principle s o f international orde r i n th e Euro-Atlanti c communit y wer e undergo ing rapi d change . Th e Helsink i Fina l Act , adopte d b y th e CSC E i n 1975, included te n suc h basi c principles. 2 Thes e include d som e tha t ratified th e postwar configuration o f states in the region by establishing their sovereignt y an d territoria l integrity , affirmin g th e inviola bility of their borders, and establishing the principle of nonintervention i n th e interna l affair s o f othe r states . Othe r principle s committed th e signatorie s t o peacefu l relation s b y disavowin g th e threat o r us e o f forc e an d callin g fo r th e peacefu l settlemen t o f disputes. Others committe d the m t o respec t fo r "huma n right s an d fundamental freedoms " an d "th e equa l right s o f people s an d thei r right t o self-determination. " Th e Fina l Ac t establishe d th e freedo m of individuals, including members of national minorities, to exercise equal civil , political , economic , social , an d cultura l rights . I t als o established th e righ t o f people s t o determin e thei r ow n politica l status. In effect, th e Helsinki principles established Western concept s of individua l libert y an d collectiv e democrac y a s th e Euro-Atlanti c political standar d an d applie d tha t standar d t o al l th e signator y states, fro m Nort h Americ a t o th e USSR . However , mor e tha n a decade o f additiona l negotiation s an d revolutionar y change s i n th e domestic an d foreig n policie s o f th e Sovie t Unio n wa s require d

46 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community before th e CSCE could begin to play an important rol e in the EuroAtlantic securit y framework. 3 Th e thir d CSC E follow-u p meeting , which laste d thre e year s an d conclude d i n Vienn a i n Januar y 1989, reflected th e increasin g interes t o f the Sovie t leadership unde r Gor bachev in East-West cooperation an d the determination o f the West to use that interes t a s leverage to obtain furthe r progres s o n huma n rights, th e peacefu l settlemen t o f disputes , an d othe r issues . Afte r 1989, modest progres s wa s achieve d throug h th e CSC E framewor k toward th e constructio n o f mechanism s fo r th e peacefu l resolutio n of conflict . Th e Yugosla v crisi s mad e clear , however , tha t thes e stil l required substantial improvement . The concludin g documen t adopte d a t Vienn a reiterate d an d deepened th e Helsink i Accords by adding mor e detaile d statement s and definition s b y whic h adherenc e t o eac h o f th e te n principle s established in Helsinki might be judged. With regard to the peacefu l settlement o f disputes , th e Vienn a Documen t include d th e accep tance, in principle, of "mandatory involvement of a third party when a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful means. " It also initiated efforts t o creat e a mechanis m b y whic h participatin g state s migh t enforce implementatio n o f commitment s i n th e are a o f "huma n rights an d fundamenta l freedoms , huma n contact s an d othe r issue s of a related humanitarian character. " This human dimension mecha nism require d participatin g state s to respon d t o request s and repre sentations b y othe r participatin g state s o n question s relate d t o th e human dimensio n o f th e CSCE , an d t o hol d bilatera l meeting s t o examine suc h question s whe n requeste d t o d o so . It als o permitte d participating state s t o brin g suc h issue s t o th e attentio n o f othe r participants an d rais e the m a t meeting s o f th e conferenc e o n th e human dimensio n to be held each year, as well as at the main CSCE follow-up meetings. 4 In thi s way , th e CSC E legitimate d inquir y an d involvemen t b y participating states in the internal affairs o f other participating states and weakene d th e principl e o f noninterference i n interna l affair s a s a defense for activitie s that violated human right s principles embod ied i n th e CSC E agreements . Th e Vienn a Documen t therefor e di d

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I

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not reiterat e th e sixt h principl e adopte d a t Helsink i i n 1975 , which prohibited direc t o r indirec t interventio n i n th e interna l affair s o f other states . Indeed , th e Genev a meetin g o f expert s o n nationa l minorities hel d i n Jul y 1991, which convene d jus t a s war brok e ou t in Slovenia , acknowledged th e political realitie s of ethnic conflic t i n Europe b y specificall y concludin g tha t issue s concernin g th e right s of nationa l minoritie s "ar e matter s o f legitimat e internationa l con cern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affai r of the respectiv e state." 5 This vie w was reiterate d a t th e conferenc e on th e huma n dimensio n hel d i n Mosco w i n th e fal l o f 1991 in th e wake of the failed August coup attempt. 6 The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the continuing change s i n th e USS R permitte d th e Unite d State s an d othe r Western state s t o engag e i n mor e direc t advocac y o f democrati c change throug h th e CSCE . The documen t produce d b y the confer ence on the human dimensio n i n Copenhage n i n the spring of 1990 reflected thes e efforts. I t contained extensiv e statements defining th e general institutiona l an d lega l element s o f pluralisti c democrati c systems and asserted tha t "pluralisti c democracy and th e rule of law are essentia l fo r ensurin g respec t fo r al l huma n right s an d funda mental freedoms. " I t als o establishe d minorit y right s a s an essentia l element o f democracy . Bu t ther e wa s continuin g disagreemen t among membe r state s ove r suc h issue s a s "ho w to cur b intoleranc e while preserving the integrity of the principle o f freedom o f expression," th e definitio n o f wha t constitute d a "minority, " and , mos t contentious o f all, "the exten t t o whic h state s shoul d tak e a n activ e role i n protectin g an d promotin g minorit y identities , rathe r tha n refraining from blockin g o r inhibitin g minorities ' effort s t o protec t and promot e themselves. " Becaus e o f thes e differences , th e Copen hagen Documen t impose d fe w specifi c obligation s o n membe r states.7 The grea t sensitivit y o f issue s surroundin g minorit y right s an d the corresponding difficulty o f achieving consensus among the states of the CSC E were also evident a t the Genev a meetin g o f experts o n national minorities , i n Jul y 1991. 8 The right s o f national minorities ,

48 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community especially th e righ t t o self-determination , wer e i n disput e through out Easter n Europ e an d th e Sovie t Union , an d b y thi s tim e ha d become the focus o f violent conflic t i n Yugoslavia. It is not surpris ing, therefore, tha t th e Yugoslav delegation fough t unsuccessfull y t o include a statement explicitly denying the right of self-determinatio n to nationa l minorities . However , unlike previou s CSC E documents , the Genev a Documen t doe s no t contai n a n explici t affirmatio n o f the right to self-determination. 9 Limited progres s i n th e definitio n o f minorit y right s wa s paral leled b y limite d progres s towar d th e establishmen t o f institution s and organizations empowere d to implement the Helsinki principles. The Charte r o f Pari s fo r a Ne w Europe , adopte d a t th e Novembe r 1990 CSC E summi t meetin g i n Paris , establishe d a Counci l o f th e CSCE Minister s o f Foreig n Affairs , whic h woul d mee t regularly , a t least onc e a year. It also established a Committee o f Senior Official s (CSO) t o prepar e meeting s o f th e council , carr y ou t it s decisions , review current issues , and take appropriate decisions , including recommendations t o th e council . Th e Pari s Charte r mandate d th e development o f provisions for convenin g emergency meetings of the CSO, which i t di d a t it s meeting i n Berli n i n Jun e 1991 . The emer gency meeting mechanism was activated in response to the outbrea k of arme d conflic t i n Yugoslavia . Th e first emergenc y meeting , hel d in earl y July , wa s followe d b y fou r additiona l suc h meeting s o n Yugoslavia in 1991 alone. The Paris Charter als o established a permanent Secretaria t o f the CSCE i n Prague , a n Offic e o f Fre e Election s i n Warsa w (late r re named th e Office o f Democrati c Institution s an d Huma n Right s [ODIHR] an d given an expanded mandate by the council in January 1992), an d a Conflic t Preventio n Cente r i n Vienna . Th e Offic e o f Democratic Institutions became the institutional locus of the human dimension mechanism; th e Conflic t Preventio n Cente r wa s create d to reduc e th e ris k o f conflic t throug h CSC E confidence - an d secu rity-building measures , includin g consultation s an d cooperatio n with respect to "unusual military activities." Both the human dimen sion mechanis m an d "unusua l militar y activities " procedure s wer e

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I 49 called int o operatio n b y CSC E state s a s par t o f thei r effor t t o dea l with the Yugoslav crisis. Three majo r stumblin g block s continued , however , t o preven t successful managemen t within the CSCE framework o f international crises arisin g ou t o f ethni c conflicts . Th e firs t obstacl e wa s th e continuing contradiction inheren t i n the simultaneous commitmen t to th e principle s o f self-determinatio n an d territoria l integrit y o f existing states . Ther e wa s littl e prospec t tha t agreemen t coul d b e reached o n ho w t o determin e wha t group s ar e entitle d t o exercis e the righ t o f self-determination , o r eve n wha t suc h a righ t entailed. Sovereignty o f state s remain s th e cornerston e o f th e internationa l political order an d the basis of membership i n the CSCE. Few states are secur e agains t suc h claims . Moreover , th e principl e o f self determination offer s fe w guideline s fo r th e resolutio n o f conflict s between group s that mak e competing claim s to sovereignt y over the same territory. 10 In actua l practice , th e principl e o f territoria l integrit y enjoye d clear priorit y i n th e internationa l system . Thi s wa s reflected , fo r example, i n th e result s o f th e Januar y 199 1 Valletta meetin g o f th e CSCE o n peacefu l settlemen t o f disputes . Th e modes t procedur e adopted ther e coul d neithe r b e invoke d no r continue d i f a party t o the disput e declare d tha t it s territoria l integrit y o r sovereignt y wa s at issue. 11 Thi s effectivel y rendere d th e procedur e useles s i n case s such a s the Yugoslav crisis or the Soviet use of force agains t Lithua nia, which took place as the Valletta meeting opened . The secon d obstacl e t o successfu l managemen t o f crise s la y i n the CSCE' s continuing relianc e o n consensua l decisionmaking . Thi s rendered i t vulnerabl e t o th e effectiv e vet o o f an y singl e member . The Soviet use of force agains t Lithuania , fo r example , constituted a flagrant violatio n of the CSCE principles, but the solitary opposition of th e Sovie t delegatio n prevente d th e convenin g o f a n emergenc y CSCE meeting to consider the situation in the Baltic states. Similarly, Yugoslav resistanc e t o CSC E involvemen t i n th e resolutio n o f it s own crisi s was the source of continuing frustratio n t o other partici pating states.

50 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community The lack of any enforcement mechanis m constitute d a third an d perhaps most serious obstacle. The Soviet leadership could use forc e against the Baltic states, Yugoslavia could use force agains t Slovenia , and other CSCE member state s might elect to use force agains t their own populations with relativ e impunity. There was no possibility of a response in kind from th e CSCE. The Western state s did hav e the capacit y to conduc t multilatera l military operations that could support political efforts t o achieve the negotiated, peaceful resolutio n o f such conflicts, o r to enforce peac e against th e wil l o f conflictin g parties . But tha t capacit y was located in NATO , which wa s organize d agains t wha t thes e state s perceive d as th e mai n threa t t o internationa l peac e i n th e postwa r period : Soviet militar y attack . In additio n t o joint militar y capabilities , th e North Atlanti c state s develope d a n extensiv e networ k o f politica l and economi c consultativ e relationship s unde r th e NATO umbrella. The developmen t o f clos e consultativ e an d cooperativ e behavio r among th e NAT O countrie s wa s facilitate d bot h b y th e perceptio n of a commo n externa l threa t an d b y th e evolutio n o f a share d democratic politica l cultur e amon g almos t al l th e membe r states . The latte r mad e i t largel y unnecessar y t o develo p forma l mecha nisms for carryin g out conflic t resolutio n o r peacekeeping function s between the member states. The military-security integration achieve d through NATO was an important elemen t securin g internationa l peac e in Europe . But it is difficult t o imagin e tha t peac e i n Wester n Europ e o r democrati c political system s i n th e les s stabl e postwa r state s coul d hav e bee n secured as quickly or as effectively i n the absence of rapid economi c recovery an d deliberat e economi c integration . Bot h development s were encourage d an d supporte d b y th e Unite d State s throug h th e Marshall Plan . Economi c integration , however , wa s primaril y th e product o f deliberate effort s o n th e part o f European leader s deter mined to prevent renewed conflict . The economic an d political integration o f Western Europ e in th e European Unio n (EU ) (formerl y th e Europea n Communit y [EC] ) produced a gradua l transfe r o f partia l sovereignt y fro m individua l

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I 51 member state s t o commo n institution s i n man y area s o f economi c and socia l policy. The latter hav e thus become importan t arena s fo r political consultatio n an d th e negotiatio n o f polic y difference s among membe r states. 12 Bu t th e membe r state s o f th e E U ar e unlikely t o ced e sovereignt y ove r th e definitio n o f eithe r thei r na tional territorie s o r thei r domesti c politica l institution s an d pro cesses t o th e EU . Indeed , th e ver y proces s o f ratifyin g th e 199 1 Maastricht Treat y establishin g th e Europea n Unio n affirme d th e sovereign power of domestic authority . The tensio n betwee n nationa l sovereignt y an d transnationa l au thority is reflected i n the European approac h to human right s issues as well. 13 The Counci l o f Europe ha s establishe d a European Com mission on Human Right s to hear complaints against member state s of the counci l for failin g t o secure the rights an d freedom s specifie d in th e Europea n Conventio n o n Huma n Rights , t o whic h state s now mus t acced e a s a conditio n o f membership . However , th e Commission o n Huma n Right s ma y ac t onl y afte r al l domesti c remedies hav e bee n exhausted , an d i t ma y accep t petition s fro m individuals onl y i f th e governmen t concerne d agrees . Thus , th e convergence of European state s around a set of human right s norm s must be attributed mor e to the consolidation o f democratic regime s and culture s in the state s than t o any institutional arrangement s fo r adjudicating dispute s over these rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities. With the important exceptio n of the conflict i n Northern Ireland, th e stron g democrati c institution s i n eac h membe r stat e provide sufficien t capacit y fo r th e peacefu l resolutio n o f domesti c intergroup conflicts . I n the case of Northern Ireland , bilateral negotiations between th e two well-institutionalized democrati c state s directly involved appear likel y to lead to eventual multilateral negotia tions over a peaceful solutio n amon g all involved parties. The conflict betwee n Greece and Turkey over Cyprus suggests the importance fo r internationa l peac e an d conflic t preventio n i n th e Euro-Atlantic communit y o f simultaneous economic an d military political integration o n the one hand, and the evolution o f commo n democratic politica l value s o n th e other . Unlik e i n Wester n Europ e

52 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community since Worl d Wa r II , economi c an d politica l convergenc e betwee n Greece an d Turke y di d no t procee d simultaneousl y wit h military security integratio n int o NATO . Unti l relativel y recently , neithe r country enjoye d stabl e democratic government . Th e absence of stable democracy rule d ou t membershi p i n th e Europea n Communit y and it s networ k o f integrativ e economi c relationships . Greec e wa s therefore no t admitte d unti l democrac y wa s reestablished . Turke y has not yet been admitted. NATO relationships by themselves proved inadequate a s instrument s fo r disput e resolutio n betwee n membe r states. Eve n i n Norther n Ireland , Britis h military-politica l domi nance alone was insufficient t o overcom e the accumulate d legac y of intercommunal violenc e and economi c inequality that underlie s th e conflict there . Thus, it would appea r tha t i n th e absenc e o f a widespread network o f common materia l and othe r socia l interests associated wit h economi c integration , an d i n th e absenc e o f the deepe r values associate d wit h stabl e democrati c systems , military-politica l integration alon e appears to provide insufficient base s for th e peaceful resolutio n o f disputes. In th e cas e o f Cyprus , i t i s th e peacekeepin g capabilit y o f th e United Nation s tha t mad e th e peacefu l managemen t o f th e Cypru s conflict—but no t it s solution—possible . U N peacekeepin g opera tions are primarily political and diplomati c missions , carried ou t b y military contingents. 14 The y ar e intende d t o maintain , o r keep , a peace or cease-fire agree d to by warring parties, and facilitate furthe r negotiation aime d a t a peaceful settlemen t o f th e conflict . The y d o not b y themselve s represen t solutions . No r d o the y represen t at tempts by the United Nations to impose or enforce its own solutions. Consistent wit h th e political nature o f peacekeeping operation s an d the United Nations Charter principle of noninterference i n domesti c affairs, th e succes s o f suc h operation s require s th e consen t an d cooperation o f th e conflictin g parties , usuall y a hos t countr y o r countries. Conditions of internal war make it difficult, i f not impos sible, to secure consent from al l parties involved and are therefore il l suited to such operations. Where peacekeepin g force s ar e interpose d betwee n conflictin g

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I 53 parties wh o canno t agre e o n anythin g othe r tha n a cease-fire , i t i s likely tha t thei r deploymen t wil l a t bes t mar k th e beginnin g o f protracted negotiation s an d effectivel y "freeze " th e statu s quo . I t i s also likel y tha t fighting wil l b e resume d i n th e future , sinc e peacekeeping contingent s d o no t presen t a powerful militar y deter rent. Any party to the conflict ma y therefore choos e to take up arm s at an y time . Th e deploymen t o f U N peacekeeper s t o Cyprus , fo r example, was not followe d b y further agreemen t betwee n th e Gree k and Turkis h communities . I t di d no t preven t furthe r violen t epi sodes or , i n Jul y 1974, a cou p d'eta t followe d b y a Turkish militar y invasion an d full-scal e fighting. Sinc e th e cease-fir e establishe d i n August 1974, the island has been partitione d d e facto. The UN forc e in Cypru s ha s controlle d a buffe r zon e betwee n th e Greek - an d Turkish-controlled region s o f th e island , an d negotiation s betwee n the communitie s hav e mad e littl e progress . I n a wors t case , peacekeeping force s ma y themselves becom e th e targe t o f attac k b y parties who view a cease-fire a s contrary to their interests . The weake r th e politica l suppor t o f th e conflictin g partie s fo r a peaceful settlement , therefore , th e stronge r th e militar y capabilit y required o f an y peacekeepin g operation . However , th e us e o f forc e must remai n a las t resor t fo r Unite d Nation s peacekeeper s i f th e diplomatic an d politica l missio n o f suc h operation s i s t o b e achieved. Th e us e o f forc e fo r purpose s othe r tha n th e self-defens e of peacekeeping troops would alter the character o f such operations, converting them into enforcement operations , whether d e jure or de facto. Th e lin e betwee n peacekeepin g an d enforcemen t operation s may therefor e b e determine d b y th e loca l politica l an d militar y conditions unde r whic h suc h operation s ar e undertaken , a s well as by the intent of the Security Council. United Nation s enforcemen t operation s unde r th e provision s o f Chapter VI I o f th e U N Charte r provid e a basis fo r mor e extensiv e military operation s t o enforc e internationa l peace , eve n i n th e ab sence o f loca l consent . Enforcemen t mission s canno t b e neutra l operations. The y requir e identificatio n o f a threa t t o internationa l peace agains t whic h forc e i s t o b e directed . Th e politica l effec t o f

54 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community using military force is to support, displace, or overthrow the existing authority, o r t o establis h a ne w one , i n th e are a o f operations . Such operation s ca n easil y brin g th e Securit y Counci l int o direc t confrontation wit h th e principl e o f stat e sovereignty . Al l member s of th e Securit y Counci l necessaril y shar e a n interes t i n protectin g their ow n sovereig n authorit y agains t encroachment . Thi s interes t plays a n importan t rol e whe n the y conside r whethe r t o invok e th e authority o f Chapte r VI I an d mandat e coerciv e actio n agains t th e wishes o f anothe r state . Nonpermanen t members , especially , hav e been concerne d no t t o legitimat e interventio n b y th e grea t power s in th e internal affair s o f less powerful states . But grea t powers , too, have bee n concerne d no t t o allo w th e authorit y o f th e Unite d Nations t o constrai n thei r freedo m o f action . U N peacekeepin g operations remai n subjec t t o th e politica l influence s o f th e grea t powers, who exercis e veto powe r ove r th e decision s o f th e Securit y Council. Thus, whe n th e war s i n th e forme r Yugoslavi a brok e out , th e capacity o f th e Euro-Atlanti c politica l communit y t o respon d t o interethnic conflict s tha t threatene d internationa l peac e remaine d dispersed an d uncoordinated . Th e articulatio n an d internationa l ratification o f th e principle s o f democrati c governmen t an d th e rule o f law , a s wel l a s progres s towar d th e institutionalizatio n o f mechanisms fo r th e peaceful resolutio n o f conflicts surroundin g th e exercise an d protectio n o f th e right s embedde d i n thes e principles , had proceede d furthes t withi n th e CSC E framework . Bu t seriou s internal contradiction s betwee n som e o f th e mos t basi c o f thes e principles remaine d unresolved . Legitimat e internationa l authorit y to enforc e agree d solution s o r impos e solution s externall y wa s lodged i n a n entirel y separat e institutiona l arena , wit h overlappin g but no t identical membership: the United Nations Security Council. The Securit y Council , i n turn , require d a consensu s amon g it s permanent member s in orde r to provide suc h authority. Even when authorized, Unite d Nation s peacekeepin g effort s operate d unde r severe political restraints . The primar y militar y organizatio n o f th e Western democracies , NATO, was still organized t o mee t th e reced -

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I 55 ing threa t o f Sovie t militar y attac k an d wa s a s ye t unprepare d t o confront th e threa t t o Wester n securit y pose d b y ethni c conflict s within an d among the post-communist states . The great powers, acting in concert an d led by the United States, still commanded sufficien t militar y an d politica l resource s to galva nize international institution s an d moun t a credible threa t o f peace enforcement whe n thei r vita l nationa l interest s wer e a t stake . Their decisive reactio n t o th e Iraq i invasio n o f Kuwai t stand s i n shar p contrast t o thei r inactio n i n Yugoslavia. Bu t in th e cas e of Yugoslavia, the challenge to Western interests and to international peace was less obvious and thus commanded les s attention from policymakers . Even as the Yugoslav crisis intensified, however , divisions among the great powers and the dispersion o f relevant authorities, responsibilities, an d resource s amon g differin g institutions , organizations , an d individual state s furthe r weakene d th e abilit y o f Wester n state s t o respond.

P R E L U D E T O WA R

The collaps e o f Yugoslavi a mus t b e explaine d i n term s o f severa l factors. Structura l factors , i n th e for m o f mutuall y reinforcin g eth nic, regional , economic , an d politica l cleavages , contribute d t o th e intensification o f th e conflic t an d it s definitio n i n ethni c terms . Political factors , manifes t i n th e inabilit y o r unwillingnes s o f re gional leader s t o compromise , contribute d t o a politica l stalemate . Institutional factors, in the form o f constitutional arrangements tha t granted eac h ethnoregiona l leadershi p a veto ove r decisionmaking , transformed interregiona l stalemat e int o governmenta l paralysi s and, finally, breakdown. By the mid-1970s , Yugoslavia ha d becom e a highly decentralize d federation, i n which the constituent republic s dominated th e federa l center. Politica l leadership s i n th e region s jealousl y protecte d thei r interests an d consistentl y sough t t o expan d thei r prerogative s a t th e expense o f federa l authorities . Th e potentia l fo r interregiona l con -

56 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community flict to become ethnic conflict wa s constrained by the overwhelmin g common interes t of the regional communist leaderships in the preservation o f the political order that shielded them from responsibilit y and accountability. 15 Lik e the othe r regime s o f Easter n Europe , th e multinational regim e in Yugoslavia was legitimated by the benefits i t delivered t o th e population . I t provide d rapi d economi c develop ment, social modernization, an d improved living standards. It delivered physical security from th e internal turmoil of the prewar regime and th e fratricida l conflic t o f th e wartim e state , a s wel l a s th e satisfactions o f belonging to a community that enjoye d a disproportionately high level of international prestige , derived from th e inter national prominence o f President Tito. 16 Legitimation o f th e multinationa l politica l communit y wa s re flected in th e sprea d o f a "Yugoslav" civic identity in th e 1970s. The growth o f this identit y remaine d modest , however . Th e proportio n of th e populatio n tha t declare d "Yugoslav " identit y i n th e nationa l census increased fro m 1. 3 percent i n 1971 to 5.4 percent i n 1981 . This suggested tha t processe s o f ethni c an d politica l integratio n wer e taking hold , bu t th e distinc t ethnic , o r national , identitie s o f th e regional populations continue d t o comman d thei r affectiv e loyaltie s and provide the most powerful base s for political mobilization. 17 The ethnicall y define d territoria l structure s o f th e Yugosla v system reinforce d th e politica l strengt h o f thes e identitie s an d th e political division s i n th e leadership. Federa l political bodies i n bot h the governmen t an d th e party , includin g th e collectiv e stat e presi dency an d th e party' s presidium , wer e compose d o f representative s of th e republic s an d province s selecte d b y the regiona l leaderships . Individual leadershi p position s i n thes e bodies, including the coun try's prim e ministershi p an d presidency , rotate d accordin g t o a n explicit agreemen t betwee n th e regions . Only the militar y remaine d a unified , all-Yugosla v organization , althoug h i t wa s dominate d b y ethnic Serbs. By the mid-1980s , the collectiv e leadership bodie s o f the countr y were divide d betwee n thos e who supporte d a n eve n loose r associa tion betwee n th e region s an d thos e wh o continue d t o suppor t a strengthened federa l government . Thi s divisio n wa s reinforce d b y

Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community I

57

differences ove r the scope and pace of further economi c and political reform an d b y th e coincidenc e o f thes e difference s wit h ethni c cleavages.18 B y th e lat e 1980s , politica l difference s amon g th e re gional leadership s ha d becom e eve n mor e volatil e a s th e resul t o f the increasingl y violen t conflic t betwee n Serb s an d Albanian s i n Kosovo. Devolution and power sharing, two strategies often cite d as possible solutions to ethnic conflict, 19 thu s intensified nationalis t conflic t in Yugoslavia. First, they increased the autonomous power of leaderships whos e regiona l constituencie s wer e define d largel y b y th e identities of their dominant ethnic groups, and second, they contributed t o bot h th e redefinitio n o f interregiona l conflic t i n ethni c terms an d th e politicizatio n o f ethni c identities. 20 However , th e populations o f th e unit s t o whic h powe r wa s devolve d wer e no t homogeneous. With the exception o f Slovenia, the leaderships coul d not seek to fulfill th e nationalist aspirations of their ethnic majoritie s without alienatin g substantial minorit y populations. Only the population o f the Slovenian republic approached homo geneity. Equally important, ove r 9 8 percent o f all Slovenes in Yugoslavia reside d i n Slovenia . Thus , effort s b y ethnicall y Sloven e re gional leader s t o advanc e Sloven e national-cultura l interest s an d strengthen Slovenia n autonom y effectivel y encompasse d al l Slo venes. They neither threatene d th e statu s o f a large minority withi n Slovenia no r challenge d th e powe r o f an y othe r grou p ove r it s own republi c b y encouragin g larg e Sloven e minorit y population s elsewhere to demand autonomy . The cas e of the Croat s an d Croati a differe d sharpl y fro m tha t o f the Slovenes and Slovenia. Eighty percent of the Croats in Yugoslavia in 1991 reside d in the Croatian republic , where they constituted 77.9 percent of the population. Serb s accounted fo r 12. 2 percent o f Croatia's population . Thus , Croa t leader s coul d no t pursu e exclusionar y nationalist policie s withi n th e contex t o f th e Croatia n stat e define d by th e border s inherite d fro m th e communist s withou t th e ris k o f alienating a larg e ethni c minorit y wit h stron g link s t o conational s beyond Croatia' s borders. Croats wer e themselve s divide d b y th e interna l border s o f th e

1,371,892

700,403

Source: Savezn i Zavod Za Statistik u (SZS), "Nacionaln i sastav stanovnistv a po opstinama," Statisticki Bilten broj 193 4 (Beograd: SZS , 1992) .

***Data for certain areas of the republic were extrapolated from alimited census .

23,528,230

1,954,747 3,070 615,267 25,854 | 2,033,96 4 ZI-J

1,962,606 4,760344 2,012317 5,824,211 4,364,574 12,237 104,728 168,859 145,810 239,845

4,412 4,760 16,641 30,936

860 1314,283

Total Population

"Yiugosiavsl

Macedonians

••Data for ethnic Albanian population, which boycotted the census, i s an estimate generated by the Kosovo Provincial Statistical Institute .

•Excludes Vojvodina and Kosovo.

534,262

2,172,693

377,677

2,307,447

4,633354

1,750,867

8326 ,872

GROUP TOTALS

20,045 380,484

1,607,690 40,880 427,313

57,408 89,932

195,301 57 ,176 44 ,159

8,161 6,249

407

4,233 9,521 44,721 75,258

3358 14,281 2,959 76,012

26,725 47,603 6,079 173,871 1,905,829

47 ,097 580,762 1,151 353 5,081 ,766 1369 258

8,499 23302 340,946 4,430

53,688 3,708308 74,226 26,827 755,895

1,718318 23,802 2363 5,777

Slovenia Croatia Vojvodina Serbia* BosniaHerzegovina Kosovo** Montenegiro Macedonif

Montenegrins

Muslims

Serbs

Hungarians

Croats

Slovenes

Regions

Albanians

R]BGIONALDI!STRIBUTION OF MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPs IN FORMER YU GOSLAVTA, 1991

Table2.1

58 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community

ana 1

s—•

1!r

|_

j

i

k k

100 .0

•1

100 .0 100 .0

!22

\ \

!o

lo

REG ION ALDIST RI BIT nONOF MAJ OR GROUPS tTIC AL)

'°!

.0 1

M ontene- • M Region ians Yu«osllavs Tota M[uslims i Mba •damJ s l 0..2! 1. 0. 0. 1.7 j 1 0 .2 .4 ,6 ! loo . .0 0 .2 |0.2 1 * !.. • 2. 0.,7j 15, 0.,3 1. J .0 .3 .2 0.1 | 100 , 12.,2 * 0..3 8. ,4] 0,1] 24,. 1 ! 1. 0 .1 \2 .2 .3 iioo . 0.8 ' 8..4 7..5 3.,5] 14, , 1 ] 20, .8]i 2.,3 1 1.3 0.5 ! 2.,5 1.3 j 100 ,•0 J 3 .0 82, 34, 2\ -1 -! 7 ,5 3. 5. 1 10 0 .0 4: * i 74, •°l 2, i 3, ,8j 0, .4! J 2.2 | 10 0•0 i i 1 .0 - 0,,2 . .9 1. 71. ,2 3, 0.• l | 3,.7! i16 1.18 1 0.1 [ 10 0.0 ...2 1 4.6 • 6 .6 19 .7! 95 .8 1.0 6 1 10 0.0 J 2 64. 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100, .0

Croats Hu ni garians S 385 (henceforth cite d as SGJ); SGJ1983, 464; and SGJ1990, 477; population data i n Savezn i savo d z a statistik u (SZS) , "Popi s stanovnistva , domacinstv a i stanova 1981 . godini: Nacionaln i sasta v stanovnistv a p o opstinama " (Censu s o f the population , households , an d apartments , 1981 : National compositio n o f th e population b y counties) , Statisticki bilten 1295 (Belgrade : SZS , 1982) , 9-17 ; an d the population estimat e fo r 198 8 in SGJ 1990, 437 . 19. Milic a Zarkovic Bookman , "Th e Economi c Basi s of Regional Autarchy i n Yugoslavia," Soviet Studies 42 , no. 1 (January 1990) : 93-109. 20. Prague Post, October 1-7,1991,12 . 21. Mare k Boguszak , "Nationalism , Democracy , an d Economi c Refor m i n Czechoslovakia: 1990-1992, " i n Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, ed . Pete r M . E . Volte n (Ne w York : Institut e fo r East-Wes t Studies, 1992), 233-34.

242 I Notes to Chapter 3 22. FBIS , Daily Report: Eastern Europe, Januar y 30,1992, 8. 23. Se e Marti n O . Heisler , "Ethnicit y an d Ethni c Relation s i n th e Moder n West," an d Milto n J . Esman , "Politica l an d Psychologica l Factor s i n Ethni c Conflict," i n Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed . Josep h V . Montville (Lexington , MA : Lexington Books , 1990), 21-64. 24. Jame s Gow , "On e Yea r o f Wa r i n Bosni a an d Hercegovina, " RFE/RL Research Reports 2, no. 23 (June 4,1993) : 1-13. 25. Joh n J . Mearsheimer an d Rober t A . Pape, "Th e Answer : A Partition Pla n for Bosnia, " New Republic, June 14,1993 , 22-28. 26. Se e Prague Post, June 9-15,1993,1 , 2. 27. Fabia n Schmidt , "Ha s th e Kosov o Crisi s Bee n Internationalized? " RFE/ RL Research Report 2 , no. 44 (Novembe r 5,1993) : 36. 28. Bull. EC 6 (1993) : 12. 29. O n E U decisionmakin g formulas , se e Economist, Octobe r 16-22,1993 , 51 . On th e mor e genera l dilemma s o f Eas t Europea n accession , se e Alexi s Galinos , "Central Europ e an d th e EU: Prospects fo r Close r Integration, " RFE/RL Research Report 3 , no. 29 (Jul y 22,1994): 19-25. 30. Bull EC 6 (1993) : 13 . 31. Thi s definition i s adapted fro m Philipp e C . Schmitter, "Mode s o f Interes t Intermediation an d Model s of Societal Change i n Western Europe, " Comparative Political Studies 1 (April 1977): 9. 32. Seymou r Marti n Lipset , Political Man (Garde n City , NY : Doubleday , 1963), 7 0 ff ; Aren d Lijphart , "Consociationa l Democracy, " i n Consociational Democracy, ed. Kennet h McRa e (Toronto : McClelland an d Stewart , 1974) , 70-74; and idem , The Politics of Accommodation, 2 d rev . ed . (Berkeley : Universit y o f California Press , 1975), 1-15. 33. Gabrie l A. Almond, "Comparativ e Politica l Systems, " Journal of Politics 18 (August 1956): 391-409. See also Alvin Rabushka an d Kennet h A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus , OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972). 34. Danie l J. Elazar, "International an d Comparativ e Federalism, " PS: Political Science and Politics 26, no. 3 (June 1993) : 194. 35. Va l R. Lorwin, "Segmente d Pluralism : Ideologica l Cleavage s an d Politica l Cohesion i n th e Smalle r Europea n Democracies, " i n Consociational Democracy, ed. McRae, 33. 36. Eri c Nordlinger , Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Occasional Pa pers in International Affairs , no . 29 (Cambridge: Center fo r Internationa l Affairs , Harvard University , 1972). 37. Lijphart , "Consociationa l Democracy, " 76. 38. Bria n Barry , "Politica l Accommodatio n an d Consociationa l Democracy, " British Journal of Political Science 5 (October 1975) : 477-505, esp. 502-3.

Notes to Chapter 3 / 243 39. I have examined thes e i n detai l i n Conflict and Cohesion. 40. Se e Burg, "Elit e Conflic t i n Post-Tit o Yugoslavia " fo r a detailed narrativ e and analysis . 41. Vladimi r V . Kusin , "Czech s an d Slovaks : Th e Roa d t o th e Curren t De bate," Report on Eastern Europe 1, no. 40 (Octobe r 5,1990) : 6 ; see also the pollin g data reporte d i n Prague Post, October 1-7,1991,1 . 42. FBIS , Daily Report: Eastern Europe, September 24,1991,13 . 43. Dzintr a Bungs , Sauliu s Girnius , an d Riin a Kionka , "Citizenshi p Legisla tion i n th e Balti c States, " RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 50 (Decembe r 18,1992) : 38-40. Fo r a usefu l summar y o f th e debate s ove r constitutiona l reform s i n th e Baltic states , se e article s b y th e sam e authors , RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 27, July 3,1992, 57-6944. An n Sheehy , "Th e Estonia n La w o n Aliens, " RFE/RL Research Report 2 , no. 38 (September 4,1993) : 7-11. 45. Richar d J . Krickus, "Latvia's 'Russian Question, ' " RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 18 (April 30,1993): 29-34. 46. FBIS , Daily Report: Eastern Europe, October 30,1990,14-15 . 47. Ja n Obrman , "Languag e La w Stir s Controvers y i n Slovakia, " Report on Eastern Europe 1, no. 46 (Novembe r 16,1990) : 13-17. 48. Pave l Mates, "The Ne w Slovak Constitution, " an d Alfre d Reisch , "Mecia r and Slovakia' s Hungaria n Minority, " RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 4 3 (Octobe r 30,1992): 39-42,13-20. 49. Thes e ar e ably surveyed i n Rober t M . Hayden , "Constitutiona l National ism i n th e Formerl y Yugosla v Republics, " Slavic Review 51 , no. 4 (winte r 1992) : 654-73. 50. "[Croatian ] La w o n Citizenship, " i n Constitutions of the Countries of the World, ed. Alber t P . Blaustein an d Gisber t H . Flan z (Dobb s Ferry , NY : Ocean a Publications, 1993) , article 9,127 . 51. FBIS , Daily Report: Soviet Union, November 1,1989, 92-93; and Novembe r 5, i99i> 63-64. 52. Susa n Stewart , "Ukraine' s Policy towar d It s Ethni c Minorities, " RFE/RL Research Report 2 , no. 36 (Septembe r 10,1993) : 55-62. 53. Joh n Allcock, "Yugoslavia, " in New Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. Bogdan Szajkowsk i (Essex : Longman Grou p UK , 1991), 31219. 54. Fo r a compendium o f views o n proportiona l representatio n systems , se e Arend Lijphart , "Constitutiona l Choice s fo r Ne w Democracies, " Gu y Lardeyret , "The Proble m wit h PR, " Quenti n L . Quade , "P R an d Democrati c Statecraft, " and Aren d Lijphart , "Double-Checkin g th e Evidence, " i n The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed . Larr y Diamon d an d Mar c F . Plattner (Baltimore : John s Hop kins Universit y Press , 1993), 146-77.

244 I Notes to Chapter 3 55. Donal d Horowitz , A Democratic South Africa? (Berkeley : Universit y o f California Press , 1991), 175 . 56. Horowitz , A Democratic South Africa? 172-93. 57. Horowitz , A Democratic South Africa? 190. 58. Horowitz , A Democratic South Africa? 197. 59. Jame s Coleman , "Democrac y i n Permanentl y Divide d Systems, " American Behavioral Scientist 35 , nos. 4-5 (March-Jun e 1992) : 363-74. 60. Coleman , "Democrac y i n Permanentl y Divide d Systems, " 373. 61. Mila n Andrejevich , "Election s i n Sloveni a Maintai n th e Statu s Quo, " RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 50 (December 18,1992) : 28-31. 62. RFE/RL News Briefs, January 25-29,1993,11. 63. Sta n Markotich , "Stabl e Suppor t fo r Extremism? " Transition 1 , no . 4 (March 29,1995) : 31-32, 63. 64. Sauliu s Girnius , "Th e Parliamentar y Election s i n Lithuania, " RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 48 (Decembe r 4,1992) : 6-12 . 65. Sauliu s Girnius , "Lithuania n Politic s Seve n Month s afte r th e Elections, " RFE/RL Research Report 2 , no. 27 (July 2,1993): 16-21. 66. Riin a Kionka , "Free-Marke t Coalitio n Assume s Powe r i n Estonia, " RFE/ RL Research Report 1, no. 46 (Novembe r 20,1992) : 6-11. 67. New York Times, Novembe r 12,1993 , A6; and Nezavisimaia gazeta, Octo ber 21,1993 , as trans, i n CDPSP 45, no. 42 (November 17,1993) : 22-23. 68. Sauliu s Girnius, "A Tilt to the Left," Transition 1, no. 9 (June 9,1995) : 3840. 69. Mila n Andrejevich , "Croati a betwee n Stabilit y an d Civi l War, " part s 1 and 2 , Report on Eastern Europe 1 , no . 3 7 (Septembe r 14 , 1990) : 38-44 ; no . 3 9 (September 28,1990) : 38-44. 70. U.S . Commission, Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in an Independent Croatia (Washington , DC : U.S. Commission, 1992) . 71. New York Times, August 5,1993 , A10. 72. T . J . Pempel , "Introduction : Uncommo n Democracies : Th e One-Part y Dominant Regimes, " i n Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, ed . T. J. Pempel (Ithaca , NY: Cornell Universit y Press , 1990), 7. 73. Se e th e collectio n o f article s unde r th e headin g "Regim e Transitions , Elites, and Bureaucracie s i n Easter n Europe, " edited b y Hans-Ulrich Derlie n an d George J. Szablowski, in a special issue of Governance 6, no. 3 (July 1993). 74. Karol y Okolicsanyi , "Hungar y Set s Limit s o n Stat e Ownership, " RFE/RL Research Report 1 , no. 44 (Novembe r 6,1992) : 40-45. 75. Okolicsanyi , "Hungar y Set s Limits," 43. 76. Tama s L . Fellegi , "Regim e Transformatio n an d th e Mid-Leve l Bureau cratic Force s in Hungary, " i n Bound to Change, ed. Volten, 119-50. 77. FBIS , Daily Report: Eastern Europe, April 12 , 1995, 13; and Budapest Sun, September 7-13,1995,1.

Notes to Chapter 4 I 24s 78. New York Times, Februar y 21,1995 , D2. 79. Wolfgan g Wessels , "Th e E C Council : Th e Community' s Decisionmakin g Center," i n The New European Community, ed . Rober t O . Keohan e an d Stanle y Hoffman (Boulder : Westview, 1991), 136. 80. Easton , " A Re-assessment."

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 4 1. Fo r an exampl e of the clash between narrowl y economic an d mor e broadl y social perspective s o n politica l chang e i n th e post-communis t states , se e th e argument o f Jeffre y Sachs , th e leadin g proponen t o f "shoc k therapy, " i n "Post communist Partie s an d th e Politic s o f Entitlements, " Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies 6 , no . 3 (March 1995) : 1-4; an d th e critica l respons e by Polish economists Mieczysla w Kabaj an d Tadeus z Kowalik, "Wh o I s Responsible fo r Postcommunis t Successe s i n Easter n Europe? " (letter) , Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies 6, nos. 7-8 (July-Augus t 1995) : 7-8. 2. Joze f M. van Brabant , Remaking Eastern Europe: On the Political Economy of Transition (Dordrecht : Kluwe r Academic Publishers , 1990), 107-9. 3. Alessandr o Giustiniani , Francesc o Papadia , an d Daniel a Porciani , "Growt h and Catch-U p i n Centra l an d Easter n Europe : Macroeconomic Effect s o n West ern Countries, " Essays in International Finance, no. 186 (Princeton : Internationa l Finance Section , Departmen t o f Economics , Princeto n University , Apri l 1992) , 16-21, esp. table 7, p. 18. 4. Giustinian i e t al. , "Growth an d Catch-Up, " 22. 5. Amarty a Sen , "Wha t Di d Yo u Lear n i n th e Worl d Today? " American Behavioral Scientist 34 , no. 5 (May-June 1991) : 530-48. 6. Sen , "What Di d Yo u Learn i n th e World Today? " 544-45. 7. Larr y Diamond, "Economi c Developmen t an d Democrac y Reconsidered, " American Behavioral Scientist 35 , nos. 4-5 (March-Jun e 1992) : 486. 8. Diamond , "Economi c Developmen t an d Democrac y Reconsidered, " 488. 9. Ada m Przeworski , Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge : Cambridge Universit y Press, 1991), 186-87. 10. Va n Brabant, Remaking Eastern Europe, 117 . 11. Se e A . E . Dic k Howard , Democracy's Dawn: A Directory of American Initiatives on Constitutionalism, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Pres s for th e Unite d State s Institute o f Peace, 1991). 12. Se e Bilahar i Kausikan , "Asia' s Differen t Standard, " Foreign Policy 92 (fal l 1993): 24-41.

246 I Notes to Chapter 4 13. Aryie h Neier , "Asia' s Unacceptable Standard, " Foreign Policy 92 (fall 1993): 42-51. 14. Joh n Zametica , The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Pape r 27 0 (London : Bras sey's for th e Internationa l Institut e fo r Strategi c Studies , 1992), 78. 15. Steve n L . Burg , "Avoidin g Ethni c War : Lesson s o f th e Yugosla v Crisis, " Twentieth Century Fund Newsletter 2 , no. 3 (fall 1992) : 1, 4,11 . 16. Unite d State s Institut e o f Peace , "Armenia , Azerbaija n an d Nagorno Karabakh: Stat e Sovereignt y vs . Self-Determination," In Brief..., no . 4 2 (Septem ber 1992) : 5. 17. Rober t A . Dahl , Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (Ne w Haven : Yal e University Press , 1982), 85 ff . 18. Kuma r Rupesinghe , Conflict Resolution: Current Options and New Mechanisms (Internationa l Alert , London , Marc h 1993 , mimeo), 9 . 19. Rupesinghe , Conflict Resolution, 10-11 . 20. Florenc e Benoit-Rohme r an d Hild e Hardeman, The Minority Question in Europe: Towards the Creation of a Coherent European Regime, CEP S Paper no . 55 (Brussels: Center fo r Europea n Polic y Studies, 1994), 22-37. 21. Fo r discussio n o f the American institutiona l approac h versu s a Europea n cultural approac h t o rights , se e Michael J . Lacey an d Knu d Haakonssen , eds. , A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics and Law, 1791 and 1991 (Cambridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1991). 22. Se e Andre Molitor , "Th e Refor m o f the Belgia n Constitution, " i n Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium, ed . Arend Lijphart , Institut e o f International Studie s Research Series , no . 4 6 (Berkeley : Universit y o f California , Institut e o f Interna tional Studies , 1981) , 139-53 . Fo r a mor e detaile d treatment , se e Kennet h D . McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies, vol. 2, Belgium (Water loo, Ont : Wilfri d Laurie r Universit y Press , 1986). 23. Se e William Zimmerman , Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1987), 107-24. 24. Pa l Dunay , "Stabilit y i n Eas t Centra l Europe, " Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 1 (February 1992) : 3 25. Davi d J . Scheffer, "Challenge s Confrontin g Collectiv e Security : Humani tarian Intervention, " i n Unite d State s Institute o f Peace , Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention (Washington , DC : United State s Institut e o f Peace, 1992), 4. 26. A s quoted i n Scheffer , "Challenge s Confrontin g Collectiv e Security, " 4. 27. Fo r report s o n th e Rom e Summi t an d th e ne w NAT O strategy , a s well a s the tex t o f the Rom e Declaration , se e NATO Review 6 (December 1991) . 28. Alfre d A . Reisch , "Centra l an d Eas t Europe' s Ques t fo r NAT O Member ship," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 28 (July 9,1993): 33-47. 29. Pres s conference , Octobe r 21,1993 , Travemunde, Germany .

Notes to Chapter 4 I 247 30. Se e Joshu a B . Spero , "Centra l Europea n Security, " Problems of Communism 40 , no . 6 (November-Decembe r 1991) ; an d idem , "Th e Warsaw-Prague Budapest Triangle : Central Europea n Securit y after th e Visegrad Summit, " Polis h Institute o f International Affairs , Occasional Papers, no. 31 (1992). 31. Se e his op-ed essa y in New York Times, Octobe r 17,1993 , IV:i7. 32. Harol d Brow n an d Charle s Kupchan , Should Nato Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force (Ne w York: Council o n Foreig n Relations , 1995). 33. Brow n an d Kupchan , Should Nato Expand? 15. 34. New York Times, November 26,1993 , An. 35. Alfre d A . Reisch , "Slovakia' s Minorit y Polic y unde r Internationa l Scru tiny," RFE/RL Research Report 2 , no. 49 (Decembe r 10,1993) : 35-42. 36. Balkan News and East European Report, Marc h 26-Apri l 1,1995 , 42. 37. Joh n Kriendler , "NATO' s Changin g Role : Opportunities an d Constraint s for Peacekeeping, " NATO Review 3 (Jun e 1993) : 17-18 . For th e NAC C texts , se e NATO Review 1 (February 1993) : 28 ff . 38. New York Times, Septembe r 9,1995,1 . 39. NATO Review 4 (August 1993) : 30-35. 40. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, United Nation s documen t A/47/27 7 (Jun e 17,1992) . 41. Th e mandat e o f th e hig h commissione r i s define d i n sectio n 2 o f th e Helsinki Summi t Declaration , reprinte d i n CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change (Washington, DC : U.S. Commission, 1992) . 42. "Key-Not e Speec h o f Mr . Ma x va n de r Stoel , Hig h Commissione r o n National Minorities, " CSCE ODHIR Bulletin 2 , no . 2 (spring-summe r 1994) : 7-13. 43. "Hig h Commissione r o n Nationa l Minorities, " CSCE ODHIR Bulletin 2 , no. 2 (spring-summe r 1994) : 52-53 ; "Hig h Commissione r o n Nationa l Minori ties," CSCE ODHIR Bulletin 3 , no. 2 (spring 1995) : 56-57; and Wilhel m Hoynck , "New Challenge s o n th e OSC E Conflic t Resolutio n Agenda, " CSCE ODHIR Bulletin 3 , no. 2 (spring 1995) : 1-8. 44. Fo r a n overvie w o f CSCE discussions o f peacekeeping, se e U.S. Commission, The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, March 24-July 8, 1992 (Washington, DC : U.S . Commission , 1992), 18-20. 45. Provision s fo r CSC E peacekeeping ar e to b e foun d i n paragraph s 1 7 to 56 of section 3 of CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change. 46. U.S . Commission, Helsinki Follow- Up Meeting, 41-42 . 47. Thi s interpretatio n i s base d o n th e accoun t containe d i n Victor-Yve s Ghebali, "The CSCE Forum fo r Securit y Cooperation: Openin g Gambits, " NATO Review 3 (Jun e 1993) : 26-27 ; an d th e final tex t containe d i n "CSCE : Budapes t Document 1994 : Towards a Genuine Partnershi p i n a New Era" (mimeo) .

248 I Notes to Chapter 4 48. U.S . Commission, Human Rights and Democratization in Croatia (Wash ington, DC : U.S. Commission, 1993) ; idem, Human Rights and Democratization in Slovakia (Washington , DC : U.S. Commission, 1993) ; idem, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia (Washington , DC : U.S . Commission , 1993) ; an d idem, Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia (Washington , DC : U.S . Commission, 1993). 49. Fo r a repor t o n U.S . opposition t o thi s proposal , se e U.S . Commission , Update on Peaceful Settlements of Disputes in the CSCE Process (Washington , DC : U.S. Commission, 1993) . 50. Anthon y Lake , "Fro m Containmen t t o Enlargement " (addres s give n a t Johns Hopkin s University , Septembe r 21 , 1993; text distribute d b y U.S . Depart ment o f State, Bureau o f Public Affairs, Offic e o f Public Communications) . 51. U.S . Commission , CSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities (Washington, DC : U.S . Commission , 1993) ; an d Konra d J . Huber , "Th e CSC E and Ethnic Conflict i n the East," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 31 (July 30,1993): 30-36. 52. Conflic t Managemen t Group , Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Cambridge, MA : Conflict Managemen t Group , 1992), 3. 53. Thi s distinction i s suggested in Conflict Managemen t Grou p an d Harvar d Negotiation Project , Early Warning and Preventive Action in the CSCE: Defining the Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (Cambridge , MA : CMG an d HNP , 1992). 54. Fo r a simila r suggestion , se e Joh n Chipman , "Managin g th e Politic s o f Parochialism," Survival 35 , no. 1 (spring 1993): 163-65. 55. Guillerm o O'Donnel l an d Philipp e C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Universit y Press , 1986) , 32-34 ; an d Samue l P . Huntington , The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman : Universit y of Oklahoma Press , 1991), 231 ff. 56. Fo r a n exploratio n o f thi s issue , se e Jame s Gow , Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter , 1992). 57. Chipma n make s a simila r argumen t fo r th e Caucasu s i n "Managin g th e Politics of Parochialism," 158. 58. Rober t C . Toth , America's Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public about International Affairs (Washington , DC : Time s Mirro r Cente r fo r th e Peopl e an d th e Press, 1993), 65-68, 90-91.

INDEX

Abkhazia, 23-24, 193 Abkhazians, 16 , 23-24, 25 Afghanistan, 1 0 Agenda for Peace, 20 7 Akashi, Yasushi, 111 Albania, 20-21, 65, 143-44; and partition, 14 7 Albanian General Party, 65 Albanians, 16 , 60; in Kosovo, 20-21, 57, 143; in former Yugoslavia , 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1 Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) , 168 Alliance of Reform Forces , 161 Almond, Gabriel, 130 Antall, Jozsef, 16-1 7 Arafat, Yasir, 114 Armenia, 21-2 3 Armenians, 16 , 21-23, 32 Arms embargo, 10 4 Asia, 183 Aspin, Les, 102, 202 Association o f Slovak Workers, 20 Atlantic Cooperation Council , 207 Austria, 71, 72; and EU, 148 ; and NATO, 202; refugees in , 236 n. 65 Austro-Hungarian Empire , 16 , 30 Authoritarianism, 11 , 40; renewed, 181 Autocracy, 30 Azerbaijan, 21-23 , 24, 134 Azerbaijanis, 16 , 32; and nuclear weapons, 2 Badinter, Robert, 80, 212 Badinter Commission , 81 , 82-83 Baker, James, 70, 78-79; and Bosnia Herzegovina, 88, 89-90, 91 Balkans, 9, 186 ; and partition, 148 . See also under specific countries Baltic states, 6, 35-36, 143; and consocia-

249

tionalism, 154 ; and CSCE, 49-50; Russians in, 193 . See also under specific republics Barry, Brian, 154 BBC (British Broadcasting Company) , 239 n. 15 1 Belgium, 153 , 197 Belgrade, 40, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, 83, 86, 91 Bihac, 115 Boban, Mate, 96-97 Bosnia, 20, 65, 118, 122-23, 145-46, 172, 222, 236 n. 61 "Bosniacs," 112 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 65 , 69, 78, 121-22, 125, 145 , 172, 221; and consociation alism, 154 , 155; and EC, 81-82; electoral system in, 160-61 , 162 ; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 6061, 63 map 2, 134-36 , 138 ; and ICFY, 96-119; independent statehoo d of , 82-94; national incom e in, 140 ; and NATO, 205-6; and nuclear weapons, 2; and partition, 146-48 , 171; Serbs in, 143 , 19 3 Bosnian Croats, 96-97, 98 Bosnian Muslims, 16 , 96-97, 122 Bosnian Ser b army, 86, 236 n. 61 Bosnian Ser b Assembly, 82 Bosnian Serbs, 96-97, 122-24 , 206 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 92, 93 Bratislava, 19 3 Brioni Agreement, 74 , 75-76, 84 Bucharest, 19 3 Budapest, 60, 168, 169, 188, 193 Bulgarians, 62 map 1 Bush, George, 91 Bush administration, 214 , 222; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 89 , 93, 102; and Vance-Owen Plan , 101 ; an d Yugoslavia, former, 67 , 73

250 I Index Capitalism, 17 8 Carrington, Lord, 77-78, 83, 85; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 91-92 , 93 Carter, Jimmy, 115 Caucasus, 6, 9, 193 , 212; economic assistance to, 176 ; ethnic violence in, 2 127, 143 ; and partition, 148 . See also under specific countries CDU. See Croatian Democrati c Unio n Central Europe, 202-3 Central European University , 18 8 Charter o f Paris for a New Europe, 48 Chechen, 16 , 25, 132 Chechnya, 6; conflict in , 24-25 Christian Democrati c Party (Hungary) , 168 Christian Democrat s (Slovenia) , 166 Christopher, Warren, 214; and BosniaHerzegovina, 103-4 , 104- 5 Civic culture, 130 Civic Forum-Public agains t Violence, 171 Civil liberties, and ICFY, 95 Clinton, Bill, 101 ; and Bosnia-Herzego vina, 102-3 ; and Latvia, 35 Clinton administration, 214 , 222; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 109 , 111, 114, 116, 117, 205-6; and Vance-Owe n Plan, 104-5 ; and Yugoslavia, former , 123 Coalition Party-Rural Unio n (Estonia) , 170 Cold War, 119,20 1 Coleman, James, 163-6 4 Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) , 48, 71, 208 Communications networks , 189-9 0 Conference o n Yugoslavia (EC) , 79, 80, 81,84, 122,21 3 Conflict. Se e Ethnic conflic t Conflict Preventio n Center , 48, 71 Congress of Estonia, 34 Consociationalism, 129 , 132, 150, 15357 Contact Group, 114 , 115, 124-25, 146 Copenhagen conference, 29 , 149

Copenhagen Documen t o f the CSCE, 196, 198 Council of Europe, 51, 158, 204; admission to, 214; and human rights , 211 Council of Ministers, 149 Council of the CSCE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 4 8 Crimea, 37-38, 148 Crimean Tatars, 38 Crisana-Maramures, 1 7 Croatia, 40, 64-66, 83, 84, 86, 121, 145 ; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 85 , 87, 89, 109, 116, 118; and consociationalism , 154; and EC, 81; election in, 170-72 ; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.12.2; and exclusionary laws, 159; and human rights , 211; independent state hood of , 68-82 ; national income in, 140; and partition, 147-48 ; politics in, 169; refugees in , 167 , 236 n. 65; Serbs in, 57, 126, 133-35, 193; violence in, 133-37, 139 , 140 Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) , 64, 65, 161 , 170-72 Croatian irregula r forces, 86, 236 n. 61 Croatian Krajina , 65 , 143. See also Krajina Croatian-Serbian settlement , 76 Croats, 9, 16 , 64-66, 78, 82-94, 171 ; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 6 3 map 2, 96, 98, 100 , 105-8, 112-14, 116 , 118-19, 135; and exclusionary laws, 159, 161; and self-determination, 81 ; in Yugoslavia, former, 57 , 58-59 tables 2.12.2, 60-61, 62 map 1 Crosscutting cleavages, 151-5 3 CSCE (Conference o n Security and Cooperation i n Europe), 12 , 27, 29, 54, 119, 121, 194; and Bosnia-Herzego vina, 87, 90; and conflict prevention , 213-17; and Eastern Europe, 15 ; and minority populations, 194 ; and Nagorno-Karabakh, 22-23 ; and NATO, 204-5; and U.S., 208; and violence prevention, 208-13; weaknesses in, 5 -

Index I 251 6; and Yugoslavia, former, 44-50 , 71, 73-74, 77, 78, 125-26, 201, 222. See also Helsinki Accords Csurka, Istvan, 16 8 Cuellar, Javier Perez de, 83, 200 Cultural communities, 152-53 , 154 Culture, civic, 130 Culture, political, 130-3 2 Cutiliero, Jos, 84 Cyprus conflict, 51-53 , 114 , 148-49, 202 Czechoslovakia, 8 , 16, 27, 40, 129, 212; and consociationalism, 154 , 156; elections in, 165 ; electoral system in, 163; media in, 217; and partition, 145 , 150; politics in, 171 ; vs. Yugoslavia, 133-44, 198-9 9 Czech Republic, 27, 40, 146 ; elections in, 165 ; and NATO, 202; politics in, 169; vs. Slovakia, 133-4 4 Czechs, 40; vs. Slovaks, 133-4 4 Dahl, Robert, 19 5 Dalmatia, 65, 68, 71 Declaration o n Yugoslavia, 77 Delic, Rasim, 117 Democracy, 11 , 27-29; and development, 184-85 ; and diversity, 150-57 ; and institutions and culture, 130-32 ; and nationalism, 1-10 , 30-42 , 129 30; one-party, 172-75 ; vs. partition, 144-50 Democratic Alliance, 65 Democratic National Salvation Front , 18 Demos coalition, 17 1 Denmark, 72 Development, and democracy, 184-8 5 Diamond, Larry, 27-28 Differentiation, 175-7 6 Diversity, and democracy , 150-5 7 Dniester republic , 143 "Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic," 26 Domestic violence, 191 Drnovsek, Janez, 74-75, 166 Dubrovnik, 18 8 Dudaev, Dzhokhar, 24 Dumas, Roland, 72

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 67 East Central Europe, 27 Eastern Europe, 4-5, 13-15 , 21, 43-44, 176, 218; and consociationalism, 154 ; and CSCE, 12-13 ; and EC, 148-49; and exclusionary laws, 160 ; extremist politicians in, 7; and nationalism, 11, 41; and NATO, 201; and partition , 149-50; U.S. reconstruction strateg y in, 179-200 . See also under specific countries Easton, David, 13 , 132, 178 EC (European Community) , 27, 50, 119; and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 83-84 , 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94-96, 104 , 161; and Cyprus conflict, 52-53 ; and Czechoslovakia, 143 ; and economi c weakness, 148-49 ; success of, 176-78 ; weaknesses in, 5-6; and Yugoslavia, former, 44 , 67, 69, 70-82 Economic hardship, 4- 5 Economic integration, 150-5 1 Economic sanctions, 87 Elazar, Daniel J., 152 Elections, 165-7 2 Electoral systems, 160-6 4 Emigration, 4 Estonia, 27; election in , 167-68 , 169-70; and exclusionary laws, 157-58; and HCNM, 209; nationalism in , 34-35; Russians in, 211 Estonian Cente r Party , 17 0 Ethnic cleansing, 87 Ethnic conflict: an d domestic violence, 191; prevention an d management of , 200-13; and preventive engagement , 8-9, 179-80 , 213-21, 223. See also Ethnic violence Ethnic diversity: in Eastern Europe, 1315; management of , 12 9 Ethnic identity, 120-21 , 194 , 197 Ethnic integration, 150 , 175-76 Ethnic self-assertion, 3 9 Ethnic violence: and CSCE , 208-13; prevention of , 132-44 ; in Soviet Union , former, 21-27 . See also Ethnic conflic t

252 I Index EU (European Union) , 50-51, 185 , 204; and Hungary, 20; and Yugoslavia, for mer, 44. See also EC (European Com munity) European Commissio n o n Huma n Rights, 51 European Conventio n o n Huma n Rights, 51 European Cour t o n Human Rights , 214 Extremist parties, 161-6 2 Far East, 38 Federalism, 152-53 , 156 Federal Republic of Germany, 131 , 198, 223 Finland, 14 8 For Fatherland an d Freedom party, 35 Forum fo r Securit y Cooperation, 210 France, 72; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 90, 104, 105, 109, 114, 115, 117; and CSCE, 210; and NATO, 205; and for mer Yugoslavia, 44, 67, 76 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 3 Free press, 189 Funar, Gheorghe, 18 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 23, 24 Geneva Convention, 29, 95, 96 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 8 3 Georgia, 143 ; conflict in , 23-24; violence in, 132 Georgians, 16 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 13 3 Germany, 16 , 39, 71, 72-73, 74, 101, 198, 223; and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 84, 114; and CSCE, 210; democracy in, 5, 131-32; and NATO, 201, 205; neo-Nazi groups in, 4; refugees in , 236 n. 65; and Yugoslavia, former, 44, 67, 76, 80, 8 1 Glenny, Misha, 138-3 9 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 12 , 30, 67, 191; and CSCE, 46 Grachev, Pavel, 25 Great Britain, 72, 114; and Bosnia-Her zegovina, 90, 93, 104, 105, 115, 116,

117; and NATO, 205; and Yugoslavia, former, 44 , 67, 76, 80 Greater Romania Part y (GRP), 18 Greece, and Cyprus conflict, 51-5 3 Green Party (Slovenia), 166 Havel, Vaclav, 8, 137 , 202, 203 HCNM (Hig h commissioner o n na tional minorities), 208-9 Helsinki Accords, 12 , 29, 69, 193, 209; and self-determination, 15 . See also CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 45, 80 Herzegovina, 85, 87 High commissioner o n national minori ties (HCNM), 208-9 Horowitz, Donald, 161-6 2 Horthy, Miklos, 40 House Armed Services Committee, 10 2 House of Nations, 156 Human capital , 187 Human rights , 7, 29, 40, 45, 119, 190, 194, 195 , 200, 214; and CSCE, 46-48, 210-11; European approac h to , 51; and ICFY , 95; in Yugoslavia, 127-2 8 Hungarian Democrati c Federation of Romania (HDFR) , 18 Hungarian Democrati c Forum (HDF) , 168, 173 Hungarians, 16 , 60, 193, 221; in Romania, 17-19 ; in Slovakia, 19-20 , 133, 158-59, 204-5; in Ukraine, 36; in Yugoslavia, former, 58-5 9 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1 Hungary, 16-19 , 27, 40, 60, 204-5, 221; and CSCE, 210; economic hardship in, 4-5; elections in, 167-68 , 168-69; and HCNM, 209; and nationalism , 41; and NATO, 202, 203; and oneparty democracy, 173-75 ; politics in, 165, 169 ; refugees in , 236 n. 65 Hurd, Douglas, 92 ICFY (International Conference o n the Former Yugoslavia), 92-93, 94-99, 102-3, 106-8 , 112-14, 122-24 , 213.

Index I 253 See also Vance-Owen Pla n Imperialism, 19 0 Independent Smallholders Party of Hungary, 18 India, 194 Ingush, 16 Institutions, democratic, 130-32 , 157-6 4 Integration. See Ethnic integration; Pluralistic integration Interethnic compromise, 16 1 International Conference o n the Forme r Yugoslavia. See ICFY International order, 19 2 International peace, 11 , 27-29 Inter-University Center, 18 8 In vincible negotiations, 107 , 112 Iran, 21, 22 Iraq, 55, 67 Ireland, Northern, 9, 51, 52, 72 Islam, 104 Isolationism, 1 0 Italy, 71, 72; and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 90; democracy in, 131 Izetbegovic, Alija, 83, 96-97, 108 , 115, 117, 147; and Arafat, Yasir, 114 ; and Karadzic, Radovan, 239 n. 151 ; and Lisbon Agreement, 106- 7 Japan, 18 3 Jeszenszky, Geza, 173-7 4 JNA (Yugoslav People's Army), 74-76, 77, 78, 79, 236 n. 61; and Bosnia-Her zegovina, 86, 89 Jugoslovenska narodna armija . See JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) Kampelman, Max, 194 Karadzic, Radovan, 96-97, 123 , 239 n. 151 Karl, Terry Lynn, 42, 131 Khalilizad, Zalmay, 10 1 Klaus, Vaclav, 140 Kosovo, 57, 65, 85, 109, 143-44; Albanians in, 20-21; and EC, 81; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 60-

61; and ICFY, 96; national income in, 140; and partition, 14 7 Kozyrev, Andrei, 90, 95 Krajina, 65 , 85, 116-17, 143 ; and EC, 81; and partition, 148 ; Serbs in, 139 , 171 Kucan, Milan, 61, 75 Kuwait, 55, 67, 74 Lake, Anthony, 11 3 Language, and exclusionary practices, 157-60 Latin America, 218 Latvia: and exclusionary laws, 158; and HCNM, 209; nationalism in , 34-35; politics in, 169 ; Russians in, 211 Latvian Citizens' Committee, 34 Latvia's Way, 35 Laws, exclusionary, 157-6 1 League of Communists o f Yugoslavia, 64 Levine, Daniel, 32 Lewis, Anthony, 10 1 Liberal Democrats (Slovenia) , 166 Liberalism, 12-13 , 30 "Lift an d strike," 104 Linz, Juan, 27-2 8 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 27-2 8 Lisbon Agreement, 105 , 106-7 Lithuania, 40, 41; and CSCE, 49-50; economic hardship in , 4-5; elections in, 167-68; and exclusionary laws, 158; politics in, 165 , 169, 171 Lithuanian Democrati c Labor Part y (LDLP), 168 Ljubljana, 16 7 London Conference , 95-9 6 Luxembourg, 76 Maastricht Treaty, 51, 80 Macedonia, 65, 78, 87; Albanians in, 20; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 109 ; and EC, 81; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2; and HCNM, 209; national income in, 140 ; and partition, 14 7 Macedonians, 16 ; in Yugoslavia, former , 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1

254 I Index Malta, 149 Market-based economy, 3, 178, 180-81, 183-87 Markovic, Ante, 80 Marshall Plan, 50, 176, 180-81, 18 6 Material hardship, 181 Matika Slovenska, 19 McCaffrey, Barr y R., 236 n. 61 Meciar, Vladimir, 19-20 , 204 Media: in Hungary, 174-75 ; privatization of, 217-18 ; in former Yugoslavia , 136 Middle East, 10 Military, and ethnic violence, 218-19 Milosevic, Slobodan, 61, 75, 102, 103, 105, 117-18, 137, 172; and media suppression, 136 ; strategy of, 5 ; and U.S., 206 Minority rights, 95, 129 Mitterrand, Francois , 91 Mladic, Ratko, 103 Moldova, 26-27, 36, 143 Moldovans, 16 Montenegrins, in former Yugoslavia , 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1 Montenegro, 78, 81, 86, 118, 144; Albanians in, 20; and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 87-88, 89; and CSCE, 208; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2 Moravcik, Jozef, 20 Moscow, 19 3 Moscow conference, 29 Movement fo r a Democratic Slovakia (MDS), 19 Muller, Edward, 13 1 Multilateralism, 221-2 5 Munich agreemen t (1938) , 101 Muslim-Croat federation , 118 , 119 Muslim-led Bosnian government forces , 236 n. 61 Muslims, 9, 65, 66, 78, 82-94, 96-119; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 6 3 map 2, 135; and exclusionary laws, 161 ; in Yugoslavia, former, 58-5 9 tables 2.12.2, 60, 62 map 1

NACC (North Atlantic Cooperatio n Council), 210 Nagorno-Karabakh, 134 , 143, 193; conflict in , 21-23; and consociationalism , 154; nationalism in , 32; violence in, 132 National identity, 40, 41, 119 Nationalism, 30-34 , 39-42, 152 ; and democracy, 129-30 ; in Eastern Europe, 11-16; in Estonia, 34-35; in Latvia, 35; in Ukraine, 35-39; in Western Eu rope, 5 Nationalist oppression , 41 Nationalist regimes , and democratiza tion, 1-1 0 National minorities, 29, 47-48 National Salvation Front, 1 8 NATO, 50, 210; and Bosnia-Herzego vina, 85, 93, 109-13, 115, 118-19; and conflict management , 219-21 ; and Cyprus conflict, 52-53 ; and Germany , 223; limits of military action of , 2018; and Soviet Union, 54-55; and Vance-Owen Plan , 103-4 , 106-7; weaknesses in, 5-6; and former Yugoslavia, 44, 54-55, 71-73, 123-24 , 222 Neo-Nazis, 4, 5 Netherlands, 15 3 New York Times, 101 "No-fly zone, " 102 Noninterference, principl e of, 5 2 Nonintervention, principl e of, 29 , 45 North America, 6 North Atlantic Cooperation Counci l (NACC), 201, 205, 210 North Caucasus , violence in, 132 Northern Ireland . See Ireland, Norther n North Ossetia n Autonomous Republic, 23 Nuclear weapons, 2 Office o f Democratic Institutions an d Human Right s (ODIHR) , 48 Office o f Free Elections (i n Warsaw), 48

Index I 235 One-party democracy, 172-7 5 Ossetians, 16 , 25; in Georgia, 23-24; and nuclear weapons, 2 Owen, Lord David, 96 Paris Summit (1990) , 209 Partition, 144-5 0 Partnership fo r Peace , 202 Party of Democratic Action (Muslim) , 160-61 Party of Romanian Nationa l Unit y (PRNU), 18 Party of Social Democracy (i n Roma nia), 17-1 8 Pavelic, Ante, 40 Peterle, Lojze, 166 Pluralism, 188-8 9 Pluralism, political, 165-7 2 Pluralism, societal, 129 Pluralistic democracy, 29 Pluralistic integration, 129 , 132, 150-5 3 Poland, 27, 41; economic hardship in , 4-5; and NATO, 202; politics in, 16 5 Political cultures, 187 Politicians, extremist, 7 Powell, Colin, 101- 2 "Power-sharing" arrangements, 99 Prague, 188 Presevo, 65 Preventive engagement, 8-9 , 179-80 , 213-21, 223 Privatization, 3, 178, 184-85; of media, 217-18 Professional groups , 190 Przeworski, Adam, 18 5 Putman, Robert, 13 1 Quebec, 142 Rawls, John, 13 1 Redman, Charles, 108 Refugees, 3-4 , 88, 167, 236 n. 65 "Republika Srpska, " 11 8 Romania, 16 , 36; economic hardship in , 4-5; Hungarians in , 17-19 , 193 , 221;

and nationalism, 41 ; and NATO, 203; and partition, 14 8 Romanians, 16 ; in Ukraine, 36 Rose, Sir Michael, 110 Rugova, Ibrahim, 14 7 Russett, Bruce, 27, 28 Russia, 4, 10 , 25-27; and Baltic republics, 6; and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 87, 90,91, 105 , 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116; and Chechen minority, 132 ; and Chechnya, 24-25; economy of, 182 ; and Georgia , 23-24; and Moldova , 143; and Nagorno-Karabakh, 21-23 ; and NATO, 203; and Ukraine, 36; and Yugoslavia, former, 4 4 Russian Federation , 182-8 3 Russian Intelligenc e Service, 203 Russians, 15-17 ; in Baltic states, 193 ; in Estonia, 35, 157-58, 169-70, 211; in Latvia, 211; in Ukraine, 37-39, 160 "Safe areas," 111 "Safe havens," 104 Sajudis coalition , 167 , 168, 171 Sarajevo, 88 , 89, 92, 93, 94, 106, 118, 205; and ICFY , 98-99 Scotland, 72 Scowcroft, Brent , 67 Secretariat o f the CSCE, 48 Self-affirmation, cultural , 41 Self-determination, 45 , 81, 119, 120, 126, 128 , 194, 195; in Caucasus, 25; and CSCE, 48, 49; definition of , 150 ; in Eastern Europe, 15 ; and ICFY, 95; in Nagorno-Karabakh, 23 ; and Yugoslavia, former, 6-7 , 192-9 3 Seligson, Mitchell, 13 1 Sen, Amartya, 183-8 4 Serbia, 10 , 64-66, 69, 81, 82, 96, 118, 144; and Albania, 20-21; and Bosnia Herzegovina, 85 , 87-88, 109, 117; and Croatia, 76-78; and CSCE, 208; ethnic groups in, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 60-61; and partition, 147 , 148; politics in, 169 , 172; and Slovenia, 74-76,

256 I Index Serbia {Continued) 134; violence in, 133-37 , 140, 143, 144 Serbian Communis t Party , 61 Serbian Democrati c Party, 82, 161 Serb irregular forces , 86, 236 n. 61 Serb Republic, 118 Serbs, 6, 9, 15 , 16, 32, 40, 60, 64-66, 7682, 82-94, 96-119, 122-24 , 138 , 142, 239 n. 151 ; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 6 3 map 2, 135; in Croatia, 57, 126, 13335, 170-72 , 193 ; and exclusionar y laws, 161 ; and independent statehoo d of Croatia and Slovenia, 68-71; in Kosovo, 20, 57, 143; in Krajina, 139 , 143; and nuclear weapons, 2; in former Yugoslavia, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1 Shafer, Boyd , 30 Siberia, 38 Slavonia, 116 Slovakia, 17 , 27, 37, 40; economic hardship in, 4-5; elections in, 165 ; and exclusionary laws, 158-59; and HCNM , 209; and human rights , 211; Hungarians in, 19-20 , 193 , 204-5, 221; and NATO, 202, 203; and partition, 148; politics in, 169 ; vs. Czech Republic, 133-44 Slovak National Party (SNP), 19 , 20 Slovaks, 16, 40; and exclusionary laws, 158-59; vs. Czechs, 133-4 4 Slovenes, 64; and self-determination, 81; in former Yugoslavia, 57, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 62 map 1 Slovenia, 29, 40, 61, 64, 66, 82, 83, 121 , 142; and consociationalism, 154 , 155; and CSCE, 47, 50, 71; and EC, 81; elections in, 166-67 ; ethnic groups in, 57, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2; ethnic violence in, 133 ; independent statehoo d of, 69-71 , 72-82; national income in, 140; and NATO, 202; and partition , 145; politics in, 168 , 169, 171; refu gees in, 167 , 236 n. 65; vs. Serbia, 134 Slovenian National party, 166-6 7

Social Democrats (Slovenia) , 166 Socialist-Free Democratic coalitio n (Hungary), 174-7 5 Socialist Party (Hungary), 168-6 9 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SRBH) , 81 Sovereignty, 7, 45, 119, 128, 194, 200; in Caucasus, 25; definition of , 14 ; in Nagorno-Karabakh, 23 ; and Yugoslavia, 192-93 Soviet Foreign Ministry, 76 Soviet Union, 54-55, 67-68; and Baltic states, 143 ; collapse of, 192-93 , 199; and CSCE, 12, 45-46, 49-50, 73; and exclusionary laws, 160; and Georgia , 23-24; and international peace , 29; and nationalism, 14-15 , 30-31; and NATO, 201; and partition, 150 ; and self-determination, 48 ; U.S. reconstruction strateg y in, 179-200 ; and former Yugoslavia , 44, 76, 77 Soviet Union, former, 3 , 40; ethnic violence in, 21-27; flight o f refugee s from, 4 ; and nuclear weapons, 2 Spain, 72, 142 Stoel, Max van der, 208- 9 Sudeten Germans , 146 Sweden: and EU, 148 ; refugees in , 236 n. 65 Switzerland, 15 3 Tallinn, 17 0 Tatarstan, 25 Territorial integrity, 7, 45, 119, 128, 194, 195; in Caucasus, 25; and CSCE, 49; in Nagorno-Karabakh, 23 ; in forme r Yugoslavia, 127 , 192-93 Third World, 6 Tiso, Josef, 40 Tito, Marshal, 56, 64, 155 Torgyan, Jezsef, 18-1 9 Trade relationships, 18 5 Trade unions, 190 Transdniester, 19 3 Transylvania, 17 , 18 Treaty of Trianon, 16 , 17

Index I 257 Tudjman, Franjo , 64 , 65-66, 105 , 113; and CDU, 170 , 171; and media suppression, 136 ; and partition, 14 8 Turkey, 21, 22; and Cyprus conflict, 5 153 Ukraine, 27; economy of, 182 ; flight of refugees from , 4 ; and inclusiveness , 160; nationalism in , 35-39; and NATO, 203; and partition, 14 8 UN. See United Nation s UN Charter, 15 , 52, 80, 119; Chapter VII, 53-54, 79, 89 UN Declaration o n the Rights of Persons Belonging to National o r Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 194, 198 UN high commissioner fo r refugees , 236 n. 65 Union o f Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 7 United Nations , 119 , 194, 213; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 85 , 88, 91, 92, 93, 94-96, 103-5 , 110-11, 115-17 ; and CSCE, 212; and Cyprus conflict, 52 53; and Eastern Europe, 15 ; enforcement operations , 53-54; and Nagorno-Karabakh, 22-23 ; and NATO, 205, 206; and Yugoslavia, former, 73, 76-80, 87, 123-24, 201, 207-8, 222 United Nation s Covenant o n Civil and Political Rights, 196 United States , 41; and Bosnia-Herzego vina, 83-84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 109-13, 114 ; and CSCE, 12, 208, 21012; and democratization o f post-communist states , 1-10 ; an d ethni c violence, 214; and Iraq , 55; and Kuwait , 74; leadership role of, 221-25 ; and Marshall Plan, 50, 176; and NATO, 201-2, 205; policy in Eastern Europe , 11; and self-determination , 15 ; strategy in post-communist states , 179 200; and Vance-Owen Plan , 101 , 1034; and Yugoslavia, former, 44 , 67-71, 78-79, 80, 122-2 3

Unity List (Slovenia) , 166 UNPROFOR/Croatia, 9 4 UN Security Council, 54; and Bosnia Herzegovina, 94, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 115 ; and ICFY, 95; Resolution 757, 88-89; Resolution 770 , 93; Resolution 836 , 105; weaknesses in, 5-6 ; and Yugoslavia, former, 44 , 77, 7879, 87, 207-8 U.S. Congress, and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 107, 116 U.S. Helsinki Commission, 21 1 Vance, Cyrus, 79-80, 83, 96 Vance-Owen Plan , 98-101, 103-5 , 122, 123, 213; ten provinces of, 10 0 map 3. See also ICFY (International Confer ence on the Former Yugoslavia ) Verba, Sidney, 13 0 Vienna conference, 2 9 Vietnam, 1 0 Violence. See Ethnic violence Vojvodina, 17 ; ethnic groups in, 58-5 9 tables 2.1-2.2, 60-61 Vukovar, 89 Wales, 72 War crimes, 102 Washington Agreement , 112-1 3 Western Europe , 6, 27, 201; after Worl d War II , 176-78 , 180 , 182; extremist politicians in, 7; and Marshall Plan, 180-81; nationalism in , 5; refugees in , 4; and Yugoslavia, former, 192-9 3 West Germany, democratization of , 177-78 WEU, 85 World War I, 14 , 16 World War II, 14 , 16; Western Europ e after, 176-78 , 180 , 182 Yeltsin, Boris, 90; and Nagorno-Kara bakh, 22 "Yugoslav" army, 86 Yugoslav Communist Party , 64

258 I Index Yugoslavia, 16 , 30-31, 41, 55-67, 62 map 1 , 118,208 Yugoslavia, former, 5-6 , 26, 27, 40, 132, 212, 213, 215, 218, 221, 224; and Bosnia, 82-94; and consociationalism , 155, 156 ; crisis in, 2, 71-82, 180 , 19294, 198-200 ; crisis in, western response to, 67-71; and CSCE, 44-50; economic assistance to, 176 ; electoral system in, 163 ; ethnic groups in, 5657, 58-59 tables 2.1-2.2, 60-61, 62 map 1 , 64-67; and exclusionary laws, 159; flight of refugees from , 3-4 ; and

ICFY, 94-119; lessons of, 8 , 9, 11928, 210-11; media in, 217; nationalism in, 32, 41; and NATO, 54-55, 201; and partition, 147-48 , 150; and self-determination, 6-7 ; and UN Security Council, 207-8; vs. Czechoslovakia, 133-44 , 198-9 9 "Yugoslav" identity, 56, 60, 156 Yugoslav People's Army. See JNA "Yugoslavs," 58-59 tables 2.1-2. 2 Zagreb, 65 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 5